Parliamentary versus Presidential Government

Author(s): Gonzalo Villalta Puig

Source: AQ: Australian Quarterly , Sep. - Oct., 2002, Vol. 74, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2002), pp.
9-11, 40
Published by: Australian Institute of Policy and Science

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 feature article - government., parliament
parliamentary versus
presidential government
By Gonzalo Villaita P?ig
In consideration of Australia's current
republican debate and the hypothetically
plausible change from a parliamentary to
a presidential system of federal
government sometime in the foreseeable
future, the time is ripe for a greater
understanding of the differences between
the two.
While sharing the aim of efficiently
managing the state within the
framework of a liberal democracy, these
two forms of government are under
pinned by distinct political philosophies and are
organised upon different administrative structures.
Parliamentary governments derive their power and
continuance from the support of the assembly, to
which they are responsible. Yet, legislative power is
counterbalanced by the executive's ability to indirectly
dissolve parliament. The fusion of powers characteris
tic of such a system greatly varies from the doctrine
which best defines presidential government, namely,
the separation of powers. Here, the chief executive is
independent from the assembly and the assembly,
which commands a separate sphere of power, cannot
alter the fixed term of presidential office. This article
compares and contrasts the series of features that dis
tinguish parliamentary and presidential government
with respect to matters such as the formation of the
executive, its structural nature, or its relationship with
the legislature in the context of the models provided by
Great Britain, the cradle of parliamentary government,
and the United States of America, the paradigm of pres
idential government. Two countries which, according
to Beloff: "... best represent these alternative ways of
Gonzalo Villalta Puig is a Barrister and Solicitor of the
High Courts of Australia and New Zealand and a Legal
Practitioner of the Supreme Courts of New South Wales
and the Australian Capital Territory.
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14.139.213.70 on Tue, 10 Jan 2023 06:38:08 UTC
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running the central government."1
Parliamentary theory stipulates that government
and assembly must merge together in the common
forum that is parliament. From this theoretical
premise, an important historical feature emerges: the
assembly's transformation into parliament. The
assembly-cum-parliament differs from the separate,
unchanged entity of the assembly in presidential
systems.2 As a concept, parliament is a development of
the political and constitutional evolution undergone by
Western European countries over the last few centuries
by which the assembly's ever increasing power eventu
ally materialised in a new forum that came to be known
as parliament, much to the detriment of the monarch.
Thus, the expression parliamentary governmentis said
to define the fusion of powers through which the legis
lature and executive govern together. This is not the
case in the United States. Here, the assembly, or
congress as it is known, remains true to its original
design. Presidential theory is opposed to the assembly's
parliamentary transformation. Instead, it reinforces
the separation of powers, the idea of keeping the
executive and legislature separate, yet balanced by a
system of checks.
Another difference between parliamentary and
presidential systems of government relates to the
nature of the executive. While in parliamentary govern
ments, as the British model exemplifies, the executive is
fragmented (that is, it is divided into a head of govern
ment, cabinet, and a head of state), presidential
government requires the executive to be undivided. A
split executive is the result of the assembly's conversion
into parliament. The prime minister or chancellor leads
the national government assisted by cabinet, whose
members each govern over a specialised area of public
importance. The parliamentary executive is comple
mented by the figure of a head of state. According to
Riggs: "[t]his means that the unity of the state and
patriotic sentiments can focus on a [politically invul
nerable] head of state."3 Often, the parliamentary head
of state adopts the persona of a hereditary constitu
tional monarch (for example, Queen Elizabeth II of
Great Britain) or, where a republic is involved, a parlia
mentary elected president (as is the case in Germany).
In presidential systems of government, however, the
executive is a unified and separate entity. The president
AQSep-Oct2002 9
government., parliament

The collective, egalitarian status of the

parliamentary executive contrasts with
the salient individualism of the
acts as the head of both government and state, thus
presidential office
combining executive duties with ceremonial and rep
resentative obligations.
Following on from the parliamentary concept of a
divided executive, yet another distinguishing feature
can be traced. In parliamentary systems, the head of
state appoints the head of government, who is the
person selected by the assembly to manage the nation.
Conversely, presidential theory joins the differing roles
of head of government and state in the office of the
president. Hence, there is no need for the head of state
to appoint the government leader: the president plays
both roles. Rather, he or she is popularly elected at the
time of the elections to the assembly. These constitu
tional requirements again contrast with the finer
details of parliamentary government. Here, the prime
minister is not popularly elected but selected by the
assembly from the majority party or coalition of parties.
Similarly, as Almond states, while the president's term
in office is fixed, parliamentary government will hold
office "only as long as it can command the support of a
majority in the assembly."4
Parliamentary systems stipulate that, once the head
of state has appointed the head of government, the latter
designates the cabinet, whose members must, invari
ably, come from the legislature. A somewhat similar
arrangement can be observed in presidential systems
where the president is free to name his or her subordi
nate advisers who, in most cases, must not be members
of the legislature or, else, must resign from it before
taking charge of their respective executive departments.
One other important facet of parliamentary govern
ment is the fundamental shift from the monarchical
one-person-rulers of the anciens regimes to the collec
tive nature of the ministry.5 The collective, egalitarian
status of the parliamentary executive contrasts with the
salient individualism of the presidential office.
According to Blondel: "... the [presidential] executive is
hierarchical and not collective. Ministers are subordi
nates of the President and only responsible to him."6
In parliamentary systems, cabinet ministers are
often, though not always, members of the assembly,
again stressing the fusion of powers. A double responsi
bility is, thereby, established: as ministers, they are
responsible to the assembly but, when these are
members of the legislature, they are responsible to their
constituents also. This intergovernmental overlap
clashes with the norm in presidential systems where
the president and his or her administration are consti
tutionally barred from joining the ranks of the assembly
(except in Cuba and Peru).7 Yet, participation of the
American presidential cabinet in congressional
debates is still possible.
Both parliamentary and presidential executives are
accountable but to distinct bodies and concepts. Par
liamentary governments are responsible to the
assembly, needing its support to keep on governing the
state. As Olson puts it: "... [the cabinet is] ultimately
answerable to and dismissed by [the assembly] ."8 It is
up to the assembly to assess when a ministry is acting
irrationally or unconstitutionally. A censure vote or the
assembly's refusal to pass an important government
proposal would end the life of the executive and a new
head of government would have to be appointed by the
head of state (note, for instance, Australia's 1975 consti
tutional crisis). This is not so in presidential systems
where the executive is not answerable to the assembly
but to the constitution. Nonetheless, congress can
enforce the president's answerability to the constitu
tion by way of an impeachment. Otherwise, the
assembly can in no way interfere with the president.
Parliamentary systems are further distinguished
from their presidential counterparts by the power
conferred on the head of state to dissolve parliament
and call elections on the advice of the prime minister
(excluding Norway, which has a self-dissolving
assembly).9 The government leader can, indirectly,
bring about the dissolution of parliament. This
mechanism differs from presidential proceedings: the
president cannot dissolve the assembly and, corre
spondingly, the assembly cannot dismiss the
executive.10 Accordingly, coercion, in either direction,

10 AQ Sep-Oct2002

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is ruled out. Legislature and executive maintain an
extraordinary degree of mutual independence but
check and balance each other, hence maintaining the
separation of powers.
For parliamentary government to work, parliament,
as a whole, must be supreme over its constituent parts:
the executive and legislature.11 The executive relies on
legislative backing to stay in office, while the assembly is
subject to the government's potential to dissolve parlia
ment. The supremacy of parliament is at the core of
parliamentary ideology. This contrasts with the
American presidential system where the assembly is, to
all extents and purposes, supreme. To be effective in his
or her tasks, the president must have congressional
support. Further, the assembly has the power to
impeach the executive and, ultimately, is able to amend,
though not alone, the constitution. The separation of
powers doctrine dictates that all government arms must
exercise equal power, a requirement that the system of
checks and balances is meant to safeguard. In practice,
however, the assembly is supreme in most matters.
Finally, on the issue of accountability, a further dis
tinction can be identified. The parliamentary executive
is only indirectly responsible to the electorate while the
president is directly accountable to the national con
stituency. Parliamentary ministers are liable to the
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government., parliament
assembly only, that is, the organ that elects their leader.
Therefore, the government's responsibility to the elec
torate is premised upon the fact that it is largely formed
by assembly members directly elected by the people.
The president, however, is directly elected by the
populace, a characteristic central to presidential
doctrine. Such an electoral method ensures that the
president is accountable to the citizenry.
Parliamentary and presidential systems of govern
ment are different. The former practises the fusion of
powers between the legislature and the executive, the
latter reinforces their separation and mutual indepen
dence. Members of the parliamentary executive are
chosen from the popularly elected assembly, to which
they are answerable.12 Legislative power to dismiss the
executive is counterbalanced by executive power to
dissolve parliament. In contrast, presidential systems
keep the elected president's field of action out of the
reach of the powers of the legislature. Yet, both are
balanced by a series of checks. Although they are
similar, in the sense that both systems strive to effi
ciently manage the state within a liberal democratic
milieu, their particular political philosophies and
administrative structures place parliamentary and
presidential systems of government poles apart, acl
AQSep-Oct2002 11
^^^^References ^^^J
Parliamentary versus Presidential
Government
1 Max Beloff, Parliamen tary versus Presiden tial System of
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2 DouglasV.Verney, "Parliamentary Government and
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3 Fred W. Riggs, "A Neoinstitutional Typology of Third
World Politics," in Contemporary Political Systems:
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4 Gabriel A. Almond, Comparative Politics Today: A World
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5 Verney, Douglas V., op. cit., p. 35.
6 Jean Blondel, Comparative Government:An
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7 Austin Ranney, Governing: An Introduction to Political
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8 David M. Olson, The Legislative Process: A Comparative
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9 Alan R. Ball, Modern Politics & Government
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10 Jean Blondel, Comparing Political Systems (NewYork:
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11 Douglas V.Verney, "Parliamentary vs. Presidential
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12 Arend Lij phart, Democracies: Patterns of Major itarian
and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 68.
Politics in the suburbs and the
emergence of Patio Man
1 See D. Bagnali, "Streets of dreams", The Bulletin, 24
September, 2002, pp. 28-31.
2 David Brooks, "Patio Man and the Sprawl People:
America's Newest Suburbs", The Weekly Standard, Issue
46, Volume 007,12 August, 2002.
3 J. Brett, Robert Menzies' Forgotten People, Pan
Macmillan, Sydney, 1993 edition, p. 272.
4 T. Morton, "ALP must pin its future on a redistribution
of hope", The Sydney Morning Herald, 26 November,
2001.
5 See G. Henderson, "Just a fancy word for the up and
coming", The Sydney Morning Herald, 11 December,
2001.
6 See Henderson, "Just a fancy word for the up and
coming".
7 See C. Bean, D. Gow and I. McAllister, Australian
Election Study, 2001. Accessed from the Social Science
Data Archives at the Australian National University,
Canberra. Also, K. Betts, "Boatpeople and the 2001
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2002, pp. 36-55.
8 M. Latham, "The Culture War", The 2002 Menzies
Lecture, King's College London, 17 September, 2002.
Privacy and health care:
Reconciling the irreconcilable?
1 For example, see http://www.euro.who.int/observa
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2 OECD Health Data (2002). Retrieved from the World
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http:/ / www.oecd.org/pdf/M00031000/
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3 Commonwealth of Australia (2002). Budget Paper No.
5, Part III Projections for Spending and Revenue.
Retrieved from the World Wide Web on 26 September
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03/bp5/html/05_BP5Part3.html#P17_1350.
4 National Office for the Information Economy ( 1998).
Strategic Framework for the Information Economy.
Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia. Retrieved from
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http://www.noie.gov.au/projects/information%5Feco
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5 Note that NHIMAC has been the subject of a recent
review, see
http://www.health.gov.au/healthonline/hopubs/nhi
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6 National Health Information Management Advisory
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http://www.health.gov.au/healthonline/publishd.htm.
40 AQ Sep-Oct2002
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7 Government of Ireland (2001). Reach, connecting
people and public services. Retrieved from the World
Wide Web on 26 September 2002,
http://www.reach.ie/about/psb.htm.
8 The groundwork has been done, see
http://www.health.gov.au/healthonline/sp/standards.
pdf
9 Information = data + meaning. See Boisot MH ( 1998).
Knowledge Assets: Securing Competitive Advantage in
the Information Economy. Oxford: Oxford University
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10 This would assist in the prevention and management of
identity fraud, which is a significant problem. See Main
M and Robson (2001 ). Scoping Identity Fraud.
Attorney-General's Department, Canberra:
Commonwealth of Australia.
11 A similar system operates in vocational education and
training in Australia, see
http://www.anta.gov.au/vetWhat.asp.
12 For a useful analysis of these issues, see Clarke R (2002).
"Why Do We Need PKI? Authentication Re-visited".
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An Australia-Us Free Trade Agreement
In Alliance Context
1 For modelling results of an Australian-US FTA's effects,
see Centre for International Economics, Economic
Impacts of an Australia-United States Free Trade Area
(Canberra and Sydney : CIE, 2001).
2 Keating, remarks cited by Pilita Clark in Sydney
Morning Herald, 28-29 April 2001.
3 Downer, cited by Brendan Pearson in Australian
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4 Downer, cited by Matt Price in Australian, 23
September 2002.
5 For Howard's remarks, and an overall account of
Australia's efforts, see Geoffrey Barker, Australian
Financial Review, 11-12 September, 1999.
6 Eric Schwartz, writing in Sydney Morning Herald, 27
July 2001.
7 Schwartz, quoted by Peter Hartcher in Australian
Financial Review, 31 August 2001.
8 Powell, interview with Peter Hartcher, in Australian
Financial Review, 25 March 2002.
9 Comments by Vaile and Stephen Martin (then shadow
trade minister) cited by Mark Davis in Australian
Financial Review, 25 March 2002.
10 Remarks by Pascal Lamy, cited by Mark Davis in
Australian Financial Review, 17 July 2002.
11 Sheridan in Weekend Australian, 20-21 July 2002.
12 Kelly, interview remarks cited by Roy Eccleston in
Australian, 26 July 2002.
13 Ross Boyle, quoted by Andrew Fraser in Australian, 26
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14 For instance address of 29 August 2002 by Craig
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15 UMR research data, published in Sydney Morning
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16 See Office of Research, US Department of State,
Australian Public Views on Foreign Relations, Security,
4 August 2000; Clive Bean, David Gow, Ian McAllister,
Australian Election Survey, 2001 (Canberra: Social
Science Data Archives, April 2002), p.85.
17 Downer, address of 29 August 2002, transcript. A
ranking American spokesperson earlier made much
the same argument as part of a review of incentives for
concluding an FTA: "by deepening the ties between our
economies and societies, Australia and America would
strengthen the foundations of our security alliance. A
broader cross-section of our citizens would have a
greater appreciation of why we should be partners in
areas of intelligence, military inter-operability,
command-and-control, and security planning."
Zoellick, address of 10 July 2002, transcript. Emphasis
added.
18 Alan Oxley, "Free Trade Agreements in the Era of
Globalization- New Instruments to advance New
Interests - the Case of Australia", forthcoming in
Australian Journal of International Affairs, manuscript
version. Likewise Australian APEC Centre, An
Australian-USA Free Trade Agreement. Issues and
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19 Ross Garnaut, "ANZUS and Australia's Security in Asia,"
in Henry Albinski and Rawdon Dalrymple, compilers
and introducers, The United States-Australia Alliance
in an East Asian Context (Canberra: Defence
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by Ann Capling, cited by Mark Davis in Australian
Financial Review, 11 September 2002, and by Jane
Drake-Brockman, cited by Philip Hopkins in Age
(Melbourne), 12 September 2002.
20 Peter Hartcher, Australian Financial Review, 21 June
2002.
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Been there, done that: Thoughts on the
proposition that yet more circumcision
can save the world from AIDS
1 A.J. Fink, "A possible explanation for heterosexual male
infection with AIDS", New England Journal of
Medicine, Vol. 315,1986, p. 1167; "Newborn
circumcision: A long-term strategy for AIDS
prevention", Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine,
Vol. 83,1990, p. 673
2 The UNAIDS organization has a sensible discussion of
this issue, "What makes people vulnerable?", available at
www.unaids.org/epidemic_update/report/Epi_report
_ chap_vulnerable.htm. See also Daniel B. Hrdy,
"Cultural practices contributing to the transmission of
human immunodeficiency virus in Africa", Review of
Infectious Diseases, Vol. 9,1987, pp. 1109-19
3 See his personal details at
www.zoology.unimelb.edu.au/staff/short.htm.
4 Robert Szabo and RogerV. Short, "How does male
circumcision protect against HIV infection?", British
Medical Journal, Vol. 320,2000, pp. 1592-4
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infection", in George C Denniston, Frederick Hodges
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in pediatrie practice (NewYork and London, Kluwer
Academic and Plenum Publishers, 1999) pp. 99-130
6 Jonathan Hutchinson, "On the influence of
circumcision in preventing syphilis", Medical Times
and Gazette, NSVol. II, December 1855, pp. 542-3
7 E. Harding Freeland, "Circumcision as a preventive of
syphilis and other disorders", Lancet, 29 December
1900, pp. 1869-71
8 Abraham Wolbarst, "Universal circumcision as a
sanitary measure", Journal of the American Medical
Association, Vol. 62,1914, pp. 93-4
9 "Circumcision andVD", Newsweek, 21 July 1947, p. 31
10 Sander Gilman, Freud, race and gender, (Princeton
University Press, 1993) pp. 60-70; John M. Efron,
Medicine and the German Jews: A history, (New Haven,
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11 Milton Lewis, Thorns on the rose: The history of
sexually transmitted diseases in Australia in
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12 Hrdy, "Cultural practices"
13 James Men, "Bilharziahaematobia and circumcision",
Lancet, 8 May 1909, pp. 1317-20. It is now known that
the parasite can penetrate normal skin and that the
main factor in its prevalence is lack of sanitation.
14 Ornella Moscucci, "Clitoridectomy, circumcision and
the politics of sexual pleasure in mid-Victorian Britain",
in Andrew H. Miller and James Eli Adams (eds),
Sexualities in Victorian Britain, (Bloomington, Indiana
University Press, 1996)
15 David Gollaher, Circumcision: A history of the world's
most controversial surgery, (NewYork, Basic Books,
2000) ch. 8, esp. p. 199; SamiA. Aldeeb Abu-Sahlieh, Male
and female circumcision among Jews, Christians and
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(Warren PA, Shangri-La Publications, 2001) pp. 185-7
16 Los Angeles Times, 25 June 1997
17 NewYork Times, 6 August 2001, p. A6
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in Britain's mortality decline, c. 1850-1914: A
reinterpretation of the role of public health", Social
History of Medicine, Vol. 1,1988, pp. 18-19, citingA.
Wrigley and A.S. Schofield, The population history of
England 1541 -1871 (London 1981 ) ch. 6
20 P.C. Remondino, History of circumcision from the
earliest times to the present: Moral and physical
reasons for its performance, (Philadelphia and
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21 John Stover et al, "Can we reverse the HIV/AIDS
pandemic with an expanded response?", Lancet, Vol.
360, July 2002, pp. 73-7
22 The statement is available at
www.racp.edu.au/hpu/paed/circumcision/index.htm
23 For the gory details see www.infocirc.org/ methods.htm
24 EM. Hodges, J.S. Svoboda, R.S. Van Howe,
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25 Xavier Castellsague et al, "Male circumcision and
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26 Age, 1 August 2001
27 Jonathan Hutchinson, "On circumcision as a
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28 Jonathan Hutchinson, "The advantages of
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29 R.S. Van Howe, "Does circumcision influence sexually
transmitted diseases? A literature review", BJU
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30 Ronald Hyam, Empire and sexuality: The British
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