ithout well- spplies athe 1 (bu he has nly re- aay be, 3) from od with atrolled —4, _ Patafijala Yoga in Practi History and Texts of Pataiijala Yoga are all sorts of traditions of yoga in India and elsewhere, both sectarian forms of South Asian permuta- oga (yoga 1 and non-sectar yous that are especially salient for understanding Yoga in its m: known as Patatijala 1, but there are primarily two systematic tions. These are a philosophical system of yo inthe Lineage of Pataijalis hereafter PY, ing relating to the functioning of ordinary awareness (citta-v yoga (*E focusing lagely on meditation training relating to the functioning of the body, its postures, breathing, and general health. Both sys~ ising largely on meditation train- and ion Yoga’ with one another, since the functioning of ordinary ly, and similarly, the exer tems, of cours awareness is always contingent on the states of the cises that a yogin performs regaeding posture, breath, muscle control, bodily fuids, and so forth, always impinge on the functioning, ‘As systematic forms of yoga, PY appears to be considerably older than bagha dis likely the source from which much of later hatha yoga is derived, a .d that the precise historical development of yoga though it must be adm twaditions in India is still bei ed in contemporary scholarship. In any case, PY isthe focus of this chapter. he later Aatha yoga, usually associated with willbe treated elsewhere. the names Goraksanatha and Matsyendranath PY itself is usually referred to as Patarijala-yoga-sastra, that is, the learned tradition (astra) of Yoga in the lineage belonging to Patatijali, or Paani yoga-darsana, the philosophical school of Yoga in the lineage of Patafjali phy is set forth systematically in a er ¥5 stéra, compiled of attributed to a certain Patafjali in the early cen the Common Era (roughly 350-450 CE). The siitra collection itself is a com- “This learned tradition or school of philo: or sometimes Pat Sanskrit text entitled Yaga Satr74 GERALD JAMES LARSON pilation of 195 brief sitras or aphorisms in four sections or chapters (called ‘Padas”) containing 51, 55, 55, and 34 satras respectively. Some of the apho~ be considerably older than the fourth century CE when they The collection itself is accon 4 to a certain Vyasa (hereafter VB), compiled into the present extant collector nied by a commentary (Bhisya), attributed and to be dated approximately to the same time as the sutra collection itself it has been maintained with some plausibility that the commentary nosed by the compiler of the sitra collection, thereby making the pa commentary what is known in Sanskrit as a “self-composed” commentary PY is said to be a “common tradition” (samana-tanzra) with one of the old rem of thought that pes. The est systems of Indian philosophy known as Samkh proceeds by “enumerating” (samlfya) a set of twenty ld Samkehya philosophy takes shape in the last centuries BCE and attains its Classical of systematic formulation in the frst centuries of the Common Era fe basic prin: a Varsaganya and a younger contemporary, Vindhyaw two teachers remain, in the work ofa ces Unfortunately only fragments of the teachings of thes The system, however, is given an elementary summary explication in an extant led 5 savika (*Verses on Samkhys") composed by Isvarakesna |-450 CE. As such, this text is roughly contemporary with the the VB. The Sérmbbyakirika is said Sagti-tanra, the “System of text ent in about 3 composition of the YS and its commentary, by Tévarakryna to be a summary of a so-cal Sixty,” referring either to an old name of the Sarnkt texts by that name, Moreover, the YS together with its commentary is said to be an “explanation of Sampkhya” (sionkbya-prvacana). It would appear t0 be the case, then, that PY is a system of thought and practice combining an an- Gent philosophical system (Samkhya) with a systematic compilation of older meditation (Yoga) practices it has been suggested that the commentary (the VB) traditions of disciplin As mentioned abo that accompanies the YS is a“self-composed” (sepa) commentary. If such the case, the obvious question to be answered is why two distinct nar connected with the stra collection and the commentary, Patafijali and Vyasa. Sufficient evidence to resolve the issue of the names is not yet available, but it is possible to offer a few comments. The name endary name as cribed to all sorts of texts in Sanskeit literary histo There is, however, the old Samkhya-yogn teache named Vindhyavisa, who was working at about the same time as the compila- tion of the YS and who may well be the author of the commentary. The spe- tain us other than to say that ay a leg , is obviously incorrect. mentioned previously, cific reasons for such a suggestion need not it Vindhyavasa is a plausible hy there are some enticing clues to sugy PATAN pothesi cal inte with th Buddy reflect the aut! Sam the t who liv they arc been th work ar that ap portion practice have be the Yog compile most fa tem (6a Indian s This i should 1 may ha wise, thi nave be: Vyasa be scholars and prac Ma YS with for our | the tent misea hi Samkhy the Trutled ho ®), self. tary PATANJALA YOGA IN PRACTICE . 5 pothesis. Perhaps the most important cluc is that Vindhyavasa was in polemi- cal interaction with Buddhist thinkers in the first centuries CE, especially at Buddhist author, Vasubandhu, and was influenced by many Buddhist ideas. Many aspects of the YS and its basic commentary appear to actions. Thus, even if Vindhyavisa was not himself the author of the commentary on the YS, ‘Samlhya-yoga teacher very much like Vindhyav reflect such polemical in 1¢ author must surely have been a “The name Patafjaliis the same as that of the famous grammarian Pataijal, who lived in the first or secon they are the same person. While itis unlikely that the grammarian could have been the compiler of th sntury BCE, and some have suggested that he ¥' that a portion of the sttra collection may be traceable to the famous gram- ection, YS 2:28 through about 3:5, that is, the ant YS, since the dates of the grammarian’s work and the compilation of clearly divergent, a case can be mai marian, namely, the yogang portion of the sitra collection that deals with the eight “limbs” (arigas) of Yoga practice, There is some evidence to su sgest that the famous grammarian may have been interested in some of the older forms of yoga practice. Thus, when rst centuries CE, the 1s in the same pi the Yoga system of philosophy was compiled in th npiler—for example, Vindhyavasa or one of his colle riod—may have attributed the system as a whole to one of Yoga’ first and ‘most famous adherents, thereby tem (astra) of Yoga and linking it to another of the great learned systems of zitimating the value of the new learned sys Indian scientific work, the grammar of Pataiijal ‘This is admitted! only speculation based on some suggestive clues, and it should be frankly admitted that the name of the compiler of the Yag may have been some other Pataajali and not the famous grammarian. Like~ wise, this other Parafjali could have been 1 (ovepajia) commentary. It could, of course, algo be the have bes thor of the “self-composed” case that there may some other author of the commentary, di ferent not only from Vyisa but from Vindhyavasa as well. These matters are not settled in current scholarship but are important issues to be pursued in any attempt to write 2 cogent history of the de and practice in India Many commentaries have been written on both the Sdmthyadarika and the YS with the VB. Only two authors of Jopment of Yoga as a systematic system of thought mmentaries are especially important 1. These are Vicaspatimisea, who lived and wrote in for our purposes, how the tenth century CE, and the sixteenth-century Vijaanabhiksu. Vicaspati- miéra has written important commentaries on both Samkhya and PY. His Simkhya commentary is entitled Sam the Truth of the sa-kaumudi (“Moonlight on ampkhya"), and his massive commentary on the YS and the76 GERALD JAMES LARSON PATARJALA Yoo VBis entitled Tur Vijianabhiksu’s commentary on Sim 2-vaisaradi (“Expertise on the Truth (of Samkhys-yoga yas), five ya is entitled Samebya-p fas). Intellect, va (“Commentary on the Explanation of Samkhya”), and his commentary are largely governe itika (“Critical Annotations on Yoga”). Both Vacaspatimisra ments and gross ¢ and Vijsdnabhiksu were adherents of Vedanta philosophy, a system of phi- amas. The constitue losophy that differs from both Samkhya and Yogs. Ic is generally recognized, sions of materiality however, that Vacaspatimisra’s commentaries on the various systems of Indian At this poing, iti philosophy are exhaustive, reliable, and balanced. The same is not the ease important twists or with Vijianabhikyu, He was a vigorous po diverged from his own Vedanta, and, hence, his against all traditions that positions, nat only ommentaries are not nearly nature of the practic as reliable as Vacaspatimisras. Also, of course, his work comes nearly a thou- First, given the n sand years after the YS and the VB, long after Samkhya and Yoga were vigor think that the consi us living traditions of thought and practice in their original forms. In what twenty-four. In fac follows, therefore, we will obviously be relying more on Vacaspatimisra’s inte: pretations of the YS and the VB. tions, Materiality, o - though a unique sit ist be addressed, and that is a brief characterization of the essentials the distinction betw ential for understanding the meaning of thinks. Matcriality, matter m of Samkhya philosophy, since it is e the basic ideas underlyin, rationally in PY. Sarnlkhya philosophy consists in the “enumera si tion” (sambbya) of twenty-five basic principles ( two (camas). Conscioust 9, more precise! ritologically distinct realities, that is, “consciousness” (puruja) and “material though in its essence (pratrti), che latter of which has owenty-theee internal components in ad tentional, and totally nd, although dition to itself, thereby making a total of twenty-four principles. In other s words, consciousness is ontologically distinet from materiality and represents | usual understanding a unique principle separate from the twenty-four-fold structure of materiality | its operations, in fac Samlkhya is in this sense a rigorous dualism, although it is an unusual form of usual notions of selft dualism, Consciousness is said to be content-less (or, in modern terms, non: are construed in a y intentional). It is simply a witnessing translucent presence, Materiality itself is, with sense capacities made up of three constituent processes or dynamic strands (gums) that are rial makeup. Any an mutually in vario ways present together and always operatin permuta meditation and, in f mbolized by the color there is a somewhat ¢ tions; saffea, the intelligibility or hinking proce white); rajas, the energizing process (symbolized by the color red); and tama, objects. For Samkhy the objectifyin x objectification process (symbolized by the color black or motor capacities are blue). These constituent processes are not qualities of materiality, but forms (the brain, car actually constitute materiality. Consciousness and materiality are in proximity ‘combined into one « to one another and without beginning (os, put somewhat differently, each di- which is a subtle obj mension of reality is all-pervasive). This beginning-less proximity brings about capacities are subtl continuous process of unfolding structures or components within material (grabaya), and the m: ity that include intellect (buddhi or mabat), ego (abamaara or asmita), mind subtle and gross objec (mana), and the five sense capaci indriyas), five motor capacities or awareness (ciftawe ad pATANJALA YOGA IN PRA 7 and five gross elements (ma pabhittas), Intellect, ego, mind, the sense capacities, and the motor eapacities ly governed by the constituent process sattua, while the subtle cle ad governed by the constituent proces tama. Th tions of ma ‘At this point, it is crucial to grasp several remarkably counterintuitive but important owists or reversals that are fundamental to the Samlehya and PY ositions, not only philosophically but also for understanding the underlying. d gross elements are largely as energizes the ongoing overall transforma~ astituent proc ality (prakyzi) pe nature of the practice involved. First, given the number of twenty-fv think that the consciousness principle is one and the materiality principle principles, one might be inclined to twenty-four. In fact, however, the situation is reversed. Consciousness al: though a unique singularity in its essence, i, rather, plural in its manifesta- tions, Materiality, on the other band, although apparently plural in its man fest components, is singular in number, In other words, in Samkhya and PY the distinction between one and the many is the opposite of what one usually thinks. Materiality, ahough having many internal components, is really a single, rationally intelligible (ca‘eea), dynamic (rajas), and objective world anifests itself pluralisticaly, (tamas), Consciousness, to the contrary, though in its essence it isa unique singularity, that is, content tentional, and totaly distinct from the gua-realm of materiality. might think that cons. he self in terms of mental jousness (puriga) includes our >and mind in all of Second, altho usual understand its operations, in fact, for Sarpkhya and PY, intellect, iality (or,in modern te and mind and our re included within mat ns, usual notions of selfhood are construed in a physicalist manner). The intellect, ego, and mind, ities, are all part of our physical or mat with sense capacities and motor cap: p. Any and all of these may b meditation and, in fact, are material objects for meditation. there isa somewhat diffrent vocabulary in Simmkhya and PY for these various objects. For Saenihya, inte motor capacities are all separate subtle “objects” abiding in gross physical forms (the brain, ear, eye, and so forth). For PY, intellect, ego, and mind are rial m: ome, in other words, “objects” fo this regard, ‘ego, and mind along with sease capacities and combined into one single composite notion of “ordinary awareness” (cia), rabity). Sensing and motor which is a subtle obj capacities are subtle objects known as “sensing” or apprehending, capacities (grabara), and the manifest world of ideas and empirical objects are known as sub (gratya). All three dimensions of ordinary experienc that is, subject, object, and the sensing that inks subject known as the “subject ind gross obj or awareness (cit78 GERALD JAMES LARSON and object together—are functions of materiality and are ontologically dis- tinct or “isolated” (kevala, daivalyam) from consciousness (purusa). Put di- rectly, for Simkhya and for PY, a crucial intuition that grows out of ongoing meditation or yogic practice is that “awareness” is fundamentally distinet or od from “conscioust separate of isola Third, this then leads to the most important insight of Samkhya and PY. Because consciousness is a content-less (non-intentional) translucen or presence, it can only appear as what it is NOT: that is, it appears as if it were the same as the manifest material world. Similarly, materiality in turn, hich is lacking in consciousness by virtue of having been witnessed or itis NOT: that conscious. In 0 double negatio n all its forms, a profoundly mistaken confu ion” of “awareness” and “consciousness ected in non-intentional consciousness, appears as wha words, the appears as if it w the heart of sentient existenc sion, a fundamental mixing up or that triggers the profound suffering characteristic of the manner in which one experiences the gods, the experience of one's involvement in social life and the meditational goal of Samkhya and experience of one’s own personal life. T PY, then, is to bring about the “disunion” (vi~ sciousness,” of what PY refers to as the of the guna-realm of materiality from the guna-less realm of consciousness. ) of “awareness” and “con: calization of the absolute “otherness What the yogin seeks to accomplish in meditation is the “cessation of the functioning of ordinary awareness” (citta-vrtti-niradBa) (YS 1.2) so that the sence of consciousness (drayit) may show itself in its sheer translucent excellence (YS 1.3). There is nothing otherworldly or mysterious about this realization. The un-doing ofthe confusion between “awareness” and “witnessing” pr “consciousness” simply allows for the yogin to attain an experiential realiza jom at the heart of sentient existence, an ion of the presence of a radical fre experiential clarity that cadically transforms self-understanding, thereby pro viding relief from the suffering that has been brought about by the affictions attendant upon mistaken or muddled awareness Pataajala Yogain Practice to the commentaries (or the firy/Pada) of i forrect understandiglg of “concenfration’ madbi) {Chapter 2 (second Pafa) has to do witl/ the meditayfve practices dhgha) needed to prepare yhe yogin for the c Chafter3 (third Pada) has (vibbati) that atise from pursuing the higher levels of yogic concentration Accordis the text fas to do with gainin fy the YS, chapter vation of “opncentration.’ 6 do with the “extrdordinary cognitive capacities PATARJALA Yoo Chapter 4 (the fina fore, focusing on th karma, the reality o bout liberation, en valyam) is the sta: nature.” ‘The overall focus in order to overcom suich “ordinary clude the basic understanding, cour ing to the illusions fold insight” (prajta the Four Noble Trut the path to be folk achievement of the functioning of the c realization that pu Chapter 2 then pi fold path) of Yoga five stages of Yoga p restraints (yama), pu postures (sana), af withdrawal exercise 3:1-8 and include sp temporal flow regare ‘one-pointed “con: The first five “lin little to do with the nal limbs” (4ahi~a1 oft and philosophy, ine! conventional lis belongs to others, se