The International History Review

This article was downloaded by: [University of Auckland Library]
On: 09 October 2014, At: 14:14

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,
37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
The International History Review

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rinh20
Dynasty, constitution, and confession: The role of

religion in the thirty years war
a
PeterWilson H.
a
University of Hull , Hull
Published online: 22 Nov 2011.
To cite this article: PeterWilson H. (2008) Dynasty, constitution, and confession: The role of religion in the thirty years war,
The International History Review, 30:3, 473-514, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2008.10415483
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2008.10415483
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained
in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the
Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and
are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and
should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for
any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of
the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic
reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
P E T E R H. W I L S O N
Dynasty, Constitution, and Confession:

The Role of Religion in the Thirty Years War
Downloaded by [University of Auckland Library] at 14:14 09 October 2014
NE ROOT OF the resurgence of interest in the place of religion in
O human affairs lies in the postmodernist critique of materialist ex-

planations, combined with the heightened sense of living in a new,
possibly 'post-secular', age distinct from classical modernity. Secular
ideologies such as Marxism have lost ground since the end of the cold war
saw the resurgence of ethnic and religious violence in some of the succes-
sor states to Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The theocratic character of
the Iranian revolution and the rise of the religious right in the United States
also help to explain why religion is the defining characteristic of the new
order which Samuel Huntington portrays as the 'clash of civilizations'.
The events following H September 2ool have done little to distract from
the preoccupation with religious fundamentalism?
The current debate about the role of religion turns to history to supply
depth and context. The period that preceded the nineteenth- and twen-
tieth-century liberal ideal of the constitutional separation of church from
state, the so-c',dled 'age of religious wars', is customarily regarded as having
begun with the Protestant Reformation in 1517 and grown more violent and
destructive until its culmination in the Thirty Years War 06x8-48). 2 His-
tories of international relations traditionally portray the treaties of West-
phalia that concluded the war as the birth of the modern secular states
system made up of sovereign states; 3 the significance of the birth of the
I thank H. M. Scott tbr helpful criticism and tile Arts and Humanities Research Council of file United
Kingdom tbr financial support.
t First presented, hesitantly, in S. P. Htmtington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', ForeignAffab's, lx.xii
(1993), '2"49, then, more stridently without the question mark, as The Clash of Civilizationa and the
Remaking of World Order(London, 1996). See also, Religion in Global Civil Society, ed. M. Juergens-
meyer (Oxford, ~'oo5).
2 Examples of this perspective include E. Luard, War in International Sociely (London, 1986); M.
Komlert, Early Mo&rn Europe: The Age of Religious War, 1559-1715(Peterborough, ON.. 2oo6).
3 The peace of Westphalia consisted of three treaties negotiated at Miinster and Osnabri.ick. The first
treaty of Miinster in January 1648 made peace between Spain and the Dutch Republic, endhlg the war
that began around t568 and resmned after a twelve-year truce in 1621. The second treaty of Miinster in
October t648 ended die war between die Holy Roman Empire and its ruling Habsburg dynast'), against
France diat had begun in t635, while the treat'), of Osnabriick: signed the same day, settled the
differences between die emperor and the imperial estates (Reichsstiinde)and between both of them and
The International History Review, xxx. 3: September 2oo8, pp. 473-708-

CN XSSN0707-.5332 9 The International History Review. All International Rights Reseta,ed.
474 Peter H. Wilson
states system is acknowledged even by scholars who stress continuity

across 1648.t The view that religion caused the Thirty Years War, while
secularization helped to end it, is deeply embedded in the orthodox chron-
ology of Western political development. This article questions both
whether the Thirty Years War was a religious war, and whether the peace
was secular in the modern sense.
Anglophone scholarship since 1945 tends to place the central European
struggle between 1618 and 1648 within a wider, more prolonged, inter-
national struggle against Spanish Habsburg pretensions to universal mon-

archy. 2 In the most extreme case, the Thirty Years War disappears into an
almost seamless three-hundred-year contest between the Habsburgs and
France. 3 Tiffs international perspective does injustice to what contempor-
aries saw as a distinct struggle beginning in 1618 and lasting thirty years:
Only a militant minority believed that all of Europe's wars had been fused
together. Each belligerent was eager to enlist foreign support, but not at
the expense of being dragged into the quarrels of potential allies. This
article interprets the Thirty Years War as a conflict over the political and
religious order in the Holy Roman Empire and the Austrian Habsburg
monarchy. The war, which began as a relatively localized contest within
the Habsburg lands, shifted into the German-speaking lands of the empire
where it was pursued with varying intensity until 1648. The constitutional
issues that caused it remained central throughout: their intractability
helped to prolong the war, and every foreign intervention was justified as
upholding one of the opposing interpretations of the points in dispute.
The inability of any belligerent to achieve a decisive military preponder-
ance both prolonged the fighting and obliged all parties to accept a com-
promise based on options that had been available at the outset)
Sweden. The Spauish-Dutch treaty is available in a good critical e~fidon as Der Frieden yon Milnsler.
De Vrede van 3fnnster 1648, ed. G. Detlef.s (Miinster, 1998). Texts of the other treacles, including
various translations, can be fou,,d at http://www.pax.westphMica.de.
1 D. Croxton, 'The Peace of Westphalia of t648 and the Origins of Sovereignty', lulelnational HistoTy
Revie~v; xxi (1999), 569-91; S. Krasner, ;Westphafia and .MI That', in hleas in Foreign Policy: Beliefs,
tnslitutior~, and Political Chang'e, ed. J. Goldstein aud R. O. Keohane (lflaaca, 1993): pp. 235-64; D.
Philpott, 'The Religious Roots of Modern International Relations', World Politics, lii (2ooo), '~o6-45.
2 "17teThir O' Yea~" War, ed. G. Parker (Lamdon, 1984); S. H. Steinberg: 'The 'Thh't). Years War'and
the Conflicl for Europeau Hegentony, 16oo-6o (London, 1966); D. Maland, Europe at War, J6oo-5o
(London, 198o); P. Kennedy, 77~eRi.~eand Fall of the Great Powers (London, 1988); M. P. Gutmann,
'The Origins of file Tlfirty Years War', Journal oflnlerdist~plina~ History, xviii (1t988), 749-70.
3 N. Suthedand~ 'The Origins of the Thirty Years War alld the Structure of European Politics:,Elzglish
Hiatorical Review, cvii (199a), 587-625.
4 G. Mortimer, 'Did Contemporaries Recogadse a "Thirty Years War"?', English Hiztorical Review,
cxvi (oool), to.4-36; K. Repgen, 'Seit warm gibt es den Begriff"Drcigigi~ihriger Krieg"', it~ Weltpolilik,
E~tropageganke, Regioualismta', ed. H. Dollinger et al. (Miinster, 1989), pp. 59"70: and idem, 'Noch
eittmal zum Begriff"DreiBigj~flariger Krieg" ', Zeits&rijqfiir Histotqsche Fors&nng, ix (1.98~'),347-52.
5 These arguments are elaborated fi.lrther iu P. H. Wilson, 'The Causes of the Tlfirty Years War',
The Thirty Years War 47.5
The conventional definition of a religious war is one fought about

religious truth and/or possession of church property? Scholars who apply
this definition to the Thirty Years War generally treat religious issues as
paramount only until 1635, when secular concerns took precedence after
Catholic France intervened on the side of Protestant Sweden against the
Catholic Habsburg emperor and his Lutheran Saxon allies. 2 The conven-
tional definition is too vague, however, to be of use as a historical category.
War was made in the name of religion both before the Reformation and,
one could argue, long after the Thirty Years War. Even the Second World
War was, in part, an attempt by the Third Reich, in which the Nazi party
opposed organized Christianity, to exterminate European Jewry.
Some scholars distinguish religious wars from confessional wars? They
reserve the former term for conflicts between Christians and non-Chris-
tians along the lines of Huntington's clash of civilizations. In early modern
Europe, the term applies primarily to wars against the Ottoman empire.
The general verdict is that, in this case, the laws of war, as understood by
Christian Europe, did not apply, thus both increasing the brutality and
ruling out a permanent peace that would normalize relations with un-
believers. The absence of this form of religious war is an important, yet
neglected, aspect of the Thirty Years War. The Ottoman conquest of
much of Hungary during the 152os had influenced the course of the Ger-
man Reformation and the political development of the Holy Roman
Empire by dampening inter-confessional strife. Whereas few Protestants
accepted the militants' call to bargain military assistance against the Otto-
mans for religious concessions from the emperor, the need to repel the
Ottomans compelled the emperor and the constituent imperial estates
(Reichsstiinde) to modify the imperial constitution, strengthening it by in-
creasing its flexibility." Protestants and Catholics alike paid financial and
military contributions at a high rate during the later sixteenth century)
English Historical Reviav, cxxiii (2o08), 554-86, and The Thirty Years War ([brthconling).
! E.g., A. Gotthard, 'Der deutsche Konfessionslu-leg seit 16z9. Ein Resuhat gesttirter politischer
Konmmlfikation', HislorischesJahrbuch, cxxii (2002): 168 n. 78.
2 R. Bh'eley.. 'Tile Third, Ye,'u-sWar as Germany's Religious War:, in Krieg und Politik, 1618-48, ed. K.
Repgen (Munich, 1988), pp. 85-1o6, S. R. Gardiner, The Thirly Years War, 16z8-48(London, 1889),
esp. pp. 178-87.
3 A. Schindliug, 'Das Stratgeficht Gottes', in Das Strafgericht Gettes. Kriegsetfahrungen und Religion
im Heligen Rilmiwhen Reich Deulsdler Nation im Zeitalter des Dreiflig~iihrigen Krieges, ed. M. Asche
and A. Sehindling (Mrinster, 'zool), pp. 15-21; F. Brendle and A. Schindling, 'Religionskriege in der
Frrihen Neuzeit. BegTiff, Wahmehnmng.. Wirlunfichtigkeit', in Religionskriege im Alten Reich und in
Alteuropa, ed. F. Brendle and A. Schindling (Miinster, 'zoo6), pp. 19-"2.
4 Good ovendcw in H. Netdlaus, 'Reichskreise und Reichslu'iege in der Fli.iheu Neuzeit', in ReiclL~kreis
und Tel~'itorium: D# Herrschafl iiber der Herrschafl?.. ed. W. Wrist (Stuttgart: '~ooo)..pp. 71-88.
5 W. Stegfieh, 'Die Reichsttirkelflfilie in der Zeit Kar|s V.'~ Militiirgeschichtliche Mitteilungen.. xi 0972),
7"55; W. Schulze, Reich und Tiirkengefahr im spiiten 16. ~ahrhmldert (Munich, 1978).
476 Peter H. Wilson
Despite the unprecedented support, Emperor Rudolf II (r. 1576-1612)

failed to defeat the Ottoman empire in the 'Long Turkish War' of a592-
16o6, the most prolonged and extensive conflict with the Ottomans to that
date. The material and political consequences contributed to the empire's
constitutional crisis when the Habsburg dynasty, its prestige among the
German princes badly tarnished, turned on itself in t6o8 in a violent
dispute over the succession to its hereditary lands.
The absence of open war with the Ottoman empire for more than fifty
years after 16o6 may well have encouraged the Calvinist Elector Palatine,
Frederick V (r. 161o-32), to pursue more confrontational policies within
the empire. Similarly, the relative peace in Hungary helped the Habsburgs
to survive after 1618, although fear of the sultan obliged them to maintain at
least 15 per cent of their forces in Hungary despite the demands on them in
Germany. Even if the Ottomans were distracted by internal problems and
war with Persia, their decision to renew the truce of 16o6 throughout the
Thirty Years War was attributable to skilful Habsburg and Hungarian
diplomacy:'- Istanbul was one of the few capital cities outside the empire in
which the emperor maintained a resident ambassador? Not only elements
of'normal' diplomatic relations but also elements of secular war character-
ized this form of'religious' war. The Christian populations under Ottoman
suzerainty remained loyal, notably the Transylvanians who attacked the
emperor in 1619-23, 1626-7, and 1644-5. The image of the Ottomans as 'the
hereditary enemy of Christendom' was as much a product of intra-Chris-
tian conflict as of implacable hostility to Muslims. The ultimate insult to
one's confessional opponents was to brand them as behaving like Turks?
The term 'confessional war' was coined by scholars of the sixteenth-
lj. p. Niederkorn, Die europiiischen Miichte und der 'Lange Tiirkenkrieg' Kaiser Rudolfs II. 0593-16ot0
(Vienna, 1993); H. Sturmberger, Land ob der Enus und Osterreich (Linz: 1979), pp. 32-75.
2 H. Valentinitseh, 'Die Steiermark, Ungarn und die Osmanen, 16o6-62', Zeitschrift des Historisehen
Vereiusfiir Steiermark, xlv 0974), 93q28; G. Wagner, '0sterreich und die Osmanen im Dreissig-
jfihrigen Kxieg. Hennann Graf Czentins Grossbotschaft nach KolLstantinopel t644/5', Mitteilungen des
Oberb'~te~s'eichischenLandesarchivs, xiv (]984), 325"92; I. Hiller, 'Feind im Frieden. Die Rollr des Os-
manischen Reiche in der europ~iischen Politik zur Zeit des Westf~ilisehen Friedens', in Der Westfiilische
Frieden, ed. H. Duehhardt (Munich, 1998), pp. 395"4o4: and idem, 'Ungarn als Grenzland des christ-
lichen Europa hn 16. und 17.Jahrhtmdert', in Frieden und Krieg in der Friihen Neuzei~ ed. R. G. Ascl,
et ",d.(Mmfich, 2ool), pp. 561-76.
3 S. Ehrenpreis, 'Die Rolle des Kaiserhofes in der Reichsverfassungslu'ise und im europiiisehen
Mfichtesystem vor dem Dre~igj~ilu'igen Krieg', in Friedliche Iutentionen - Kriegge~qscheEffekte, ed. W.
Sehulze (St Kadaarinen, "~oo2),pp. 7Ho6.
4 A. Ht|'ert, Den Feind beschreiben: 'Tiirkengefahr'und europiiisches Wissen iiber das Osraanische Reich
145o-16oo (Frankfurt, "0o3); A. Cirakman, From 'Terror of the World' to the 'Sick Man oJ Europe':
European Imag'es of Ottoman Empire and Socie~ from the S~r Centu O, lo lhe Nineteenth (New
York, '~oo~'); M. Grothaus, 'Zum Tfirkenbild in der Kultur der Habsburgermonarchie zwische, dem
16. und 18. J,'dlrhundert', in Habsburgizch-osmanische Beziehungen: ed. A. Tietze (Vienna, 1985), pp.
67-89.
The Thirty Years War 477
century Protestant and Catholic reform movements who sought to set

religious change in early modern Europe in its political, social, and cultural
context? Despite doctrinal differences, adherents of all confessions used
similar methods to foster conformity with official belief and to stamp out
dissent. The process of'confessionalization' began in the x52os as the
evangelical reformers were compelled to define and to defend their faith,
and intensified around 155o with the second wave of reform associated
with Calvinism and the Catholic renewal launched at the council of Trent.
Some scholars list these developments under the conventional heading of

religious war to argue that the Thirty Years War was the inevitable result of
escalating tension between two mutually hostile confessional cultures. By
1618, according to Axel Gotthard, the world views of the two groups were
so entrenched that they could no longer communicate with one another.
By paralysing the imperial constitution, their miscommunication led
directly to violence?
According to Heinz Schilling, the confessional world x,iew was the de-
fining characteristic of early modern European international relations. 3 He
seeks expressly to harmonize the religious developments stressed by Gott-
hard with Johannes Burkhardt's thesis that early modern wars were about
'state-building'? For Schilling, religious schism coincided with political
fragmentation following the failure by 1558 of the Habsburgs' bid for uni-
versal monarchy. The growing identification of particular states with par-
ticular confessions helped to distinguish early modern wars from earlier
wars that had involved religion, including the medieval campaigns against
heretics, for example the Cathars. Confessionalization structured inter-
national relations: it filled the gap between the collapse of medieval Chris-
tendom and the rise of national sentiment by providing a guide to dis-
tinguishing friend from foe. Religion fused with politics because 'the
Reformations became part of the process of state-building, with sovereigns
t The term 'conti:ssionalizafion' was introduced to label the process of fi~rming a distinct identity by
E. W. Zeeden, 'Grundlagen und Wege der Konfessionsbildung ill Deutschland im Zeitalter der
Glaubensk~impfe', Histotis&e Zeitschrifl, eLxxxv0958), 249"99. lmport,'mt developments of tile con-
cept are now available in English: W. Reirdtard, 'Retbrmation, Counter-Reformation, and the Early
Modern State: A Reassessmeut'. Catholic Historical Review, Ixxv 0989), 383-404, and idem, 'Pres-
sures towards Conti~ssionahsation? Prolegomena to a Theory of dae Cont~ssional Age', m 77zeGet'man
Reformation, ed. S. Dixon (Oxford, 1999), pp. 169-92.
2 A. Gotdaard, 'Strukmrkonservativ oder aggressiv? Die geistlichen Kurfiirsten und der Ausbruch des
teutsehen Konfessionskriegs', in F~iedliche lntentionen, ed. Schulze, pp. 14o-68, and idem, 'Der
deutsche Konfessionskrieg:.
3 H. Sclfilling, 'Confessionalisation in Europe', in 1648: War and Peace in Europe, ed. K. Bussmaun
and H. Sclfillhtg (Miinster. 1998), i. ':'19-28, and idem, KonJbssionalisier~ng und Staalsfiz&re~s~n 1.5.59"
t66o (Paderbom, 2oo7).
4 J. Burkhardt first advanced these ideas in his book Der Dreifligjiihrige Krieg (Fraukfurt am Main.
1992). His interpretation is smmnarized as 'The Tlfirty Years War', hi A Companion to the ReJbrmation
World, ed. R. P. C. Hsia (Oxford, ~oo4): pp. u7'~-9o.
478 Peler H. Wilson
and city magistrates arising as patrons and defenders of the new teach-
ings. '~ The ability of common faith to forge bonds across great distances
was also helped by the sixteenth-century 'media revolution' that saw an
explosion of print culture and other new forms of communication.2 Finally,
the transitional stage of state formation enabled non-state actors to exercise
influence, such as international religious orders like the Jesuits, or confes-
sional networks based on shared experience of education at Protestant uni-
versities. Influence was not yet determined solely by the material criteria
favoured later by Realpolitik. Conventionally 'weak' states - the papacy or

Calvinist Geneva - were considered to be important actors alongside
richer, larger monarclfies.3
Schilling, who incorporates much of the standard interpretation within
his framework, presents events as tensions escalating inexorably towards
general war after 1618. He places particular weight on the confessionalized
generation that, having grown up in the post-Reformation world, obtained
positions of influence between 158o and 16oo, and displaced the older
moderates who still hoped to reconcile the confessions. 4 What nineteenth-
century historians labelled the 'disintegration of the imperial constitution',
here becomes the consequence of the empire's 'partial modernization'.
The constitutional changes of the first half of the sixteenth century left the
empire passive in an international system increasingly geared to aggression
and expansion. Confessional tension, by paralysing the mechanisms both
for resolving internal problems and repelling external threats, led to im-
plosion after 16o8 and triggered general war a decade later?
The war thus becomes the inevitable consequence of the 'failure' of the
peace of Augsburg to defuse in 1555 the initial impact of the Reformation.
The peace is widely interpreted, especially in anglophone scholarship, as
an 'armed truce'. 6 Polarization, allegedly accompanied by militarization,
culminated in 16o8 in the formation of the Protestant Union of German
princes and cities, countered a year later by the Catholic League: both
I H. Schilling, :War and Peace at tile Emergence of Moderni~,: Europe between State Belligerence,
Religious War, and tile Desire tbr Peace', in 1648: ed. Bussmaml and Schilling, i. 18. See also: P. K.
Monod, The Power qf Kings: Monard 9, and Religion in Europe, t589-1715 (New Haven, t993).
2 W. Behriuger, Im Zeichen des Merkur: Reichsposl und Kommunikationsrevoluliou in der Friihen
Arenzeit (G6ttingen, ooo3);J. Weber, 'Der g'rolle Kxieg und die friihe Zeitung', ~ahrbuchfiir Kommu-
nuikationsgeschichte, i 0999), 23-61, and idem: 'Strassburg, 16o5: The Origins of the Newspaper in
Europe'~ German Histo~7, xxiv (2oo6), 387-412.
3 Schilling, Kon/essionalisiet~ng und Staatsinteresse.n: pp. lo, lo8q9.
4 Ibid., pp. 349"5o, 414q5.
5 Ibid., pp. 352-8. The term 'dishltegrafion of the imperial constitution' is the tide of the section cover-
lug 1586-16o8 in M. Ritter's three-volume history: Den/scke Geschichte im Zeitaller tier Gegen-
reJbrmation und des Dre~'/Jig~iihrigenKrieges (Stuttgart, 1889-t9o8).
6 E.g., Thirty Years War~ed. Parker, p. 18.
parties 'stood armed and ready for the decisive battle'? Though Schilling,
too, regards the subsequent conflict as international, he differs from British
and US historians such as Geoffrey Parker and David Maland who present
it as a political struggle against potential Spanish hegemony? Confession,
not politics, divided Europe into rival blocks locked in a titanic struggle
across the continent. In an argument that pre-eclioes Huntington's,
Schilling endorses Josef Polisensky's concept of a Catholic-Habsburg civil-
ization based on proto-absolute monarchy and feudal agriculture pitted
against a Protestant civilization associated with representative govermnent

and mercantile economics exemplified by the Dutch and Bohemians. 3
Thus, the Thirty, Years War becomes the 'developmental and moderniza-
tion crisis of European civilization': the 'inferno' that forged the modern
system of sovereign states."
The concept of'confessional war' focuses attention on structures to the
detriment of actual belief. It is helpful to review how historians who are
themselves committed Christians have defined religious war. 5 They dis-
tinguish between religious war and holy war in which belligerents believe
that God summons them directly to fight and promises them victory
despite seemingly impossible odds. A conflict in which one defends or
propagates the faith becomes one in which God guides events. ~ The
elements of this belief present before the sixteenth century came into focus
more clearly thanks to the intensification of religious debate after the
Reformation.7 The Catholic equation of Protestantism with heresy, com-
bined with the menace from the Ottomans, both gave added impetus to the
medieval crusading legacy and turned it inwards against European foes.
The sense of being summoned as God's elect was reinforced by the
humanist articulation of distinct national histories. Protestants were espe-
cially prominent in instrumentalizing the past to present particular peoples
1 Schilling, KonfessionalisietTtng und Staatsinteressen, p. 399.

2 Thirty Years War; ed. Parker; Maland, Europe at l'Val:
3 Maland, Europe at War, pp. 398"9;J. V. Polisensky, The Thirty Years War (London, t971t). Polisen-
sky later distanced himself fi'om tile view flaat the rival alliances represented liandament,'dly distinct
socio-economic systems: J. V. Pofisensky andJ. Kolhuann, Wallenstein. Feldhe~wdes Drei.fli~iiihrig~t
Ktdeges (Cologne: 1997), pp. 9-tL
4 Schilling: Konfessionalisierung und Staatshzleressen, pp. 415, 417, 419.
5 The maha contributions come from Catholics: Bireley, ~Tlfirty Years War'; H. Waldent~ls, 'Refigions-
kriege im Blickwinkel der Wel~eligionen', in E~ahlTtng und Dentung van Krieg und Frieden, ed. K.
Garber et al. (Munich, 2oat), pp. 83-95. Both authors are menfl~ersof the Society ofJesus. Nineteenth-
century historiography was dominated by Protestants who were also practising Christians, but did not
articulate any theories of religious war.
6 The biblical scholar Roland de Vaux provides further discussion in Anci~mt [~rae[: [ls Life and Insti-
tutions (New York, t96x): pp. 958-61. For d~e implications of this belief on how war was justified, see
J. T. Johnson, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of Wa~;.Reli~ious and Seodar Concepts, ]2oo-174o
(Princeton, 197.5):pp. 8H46.
7 N. Housley: Religio~* Warfare in Europe, t4oo-t536 (Oxiord, 2ooe), esp. pp. 195-2o4.
480 Peter H. Wilson
as 'chosen': Catholics generally favoured recharged versions of univer-

salism, t The concept of the 'imperial translation' presented the Holy
Roman Empire as the direct continuation of the ancient Roman one and so
as the last world monarchy prophesied in the Book of Daniel. Such ideas
lent support to secular projects such as the glorification of the Habsburg
dynasty as the defenders of Christendom?
Believers assumed that they had a mandate to do God's work; a sense of
mission often accompanied by an apocalyptical belief that holy war would
thcilitate Christ's return. Protestants embraced this view whenever they felt
embattled, like the Bohemian Hussites in 1419-2o and the Miinster Ana-
baptists in 15357 The view was reinforced by eschatological beliefs in the
continuous unfolding of sacred history, to be understood through Scrip-
ture, that offered a guide to God's will. Biblical references were correlated
with current events through typology, which promoted the search for signs
as indicators of what individuals should do next. Wolfgang Behringer
argues that the increased incidence of natural phenomena like storms,
floods, and the other climadc events associated with the 'Little Ice Age',
may have encouraged the practice? During the late sixteenth century, Cal-
vinism, largely subsuming the millennial elements from Lutheranism,
developed a Providentialist strain that attached symbolic significance to
contemporary figures as the embodiment of hopes for divine guidance and
even die dawn of a new age) Frederick V was hailed as a new King David
who would re-establish Jerusalem in Prague. Similar expectations were
held of Christian IV of Denmark around 1625, and of Gustavus Adolphus
of Sweden around 163o.6
Such beliefs did not automatically increase the likelihood of war: the
constant presence of doubt acted as a powerful constraint. Every con-
t V. Urb~inek, 'The Idea of State and Natiou in the Wridngs of Bohemian Exiles after 162o', in State-
hood Before and Beyond Ethnicity, ed. L. Eriksonas and L. Miiller (Brussels. 2oo5), pp. 79-8o; L.
Scales, 'Late Medieval Germany: 'An Under-State Nation?', in Power and the Nation in European His-
troy, ed. L. Scales and O. Zitmner (Cambridge, 2oo5), pp. 166-91; P. Schnfidt, Spanische Universal-
mouarchie oder 'te~dscheLibertiit' (Stuttgart, 2ool).
2 p. S. Fichtner, 'The Politics of Honor: Renaissance Chivalry and Habsburg Dynasticism'. Biblio-
lh~que d'humanisme et Renaissance: xxix (1967), 567-80; M. Trainer, The Last Descendent of Aeneas:
7he Hapsburgz and the Mythic Image of the Emperor (New Haven, 1993); M. Goloubeva, The Glorifica-
tion of Emperor Leopold l in lmag:, Spectacle, and Text (Mainz, ~'ooo), esp. pp. 99-4o.
3 Housley, Religious Warfare, pp. 33-6L
4 W. Behfiager, 'Die Kxise yon t57o', in Um Himmels Will.~n.Rdigion in Katastrophenzeiten, ed. M.
Jaknbowski-Tiessen and H. Lelnnaml (Giittingen, 2oo3)..pp. 51q56.
5 W. Sclnnidt-Biggermamh ~The Apocalypse and Millenarianism in die Tlfirty Years War', in t648: ed.
Bussmalm and Schilling, i. 259-63. Some Catholics also expressed millennialist beliefs: see G. Meier,
'Konunentar zu den beiden vorstehenden Abbildungen', in Das StraJgeTqcht Gotten, ed. Asche and
Schiudling, pp. 212q7.
6J. R. Paas, ~The Changing hnage of Gustavus Adolphus on German Broadsheets, 163o-3', Journal of
the WarbuTgand Courtauhl b*stitutes, ]ix ( t996), 205-44.
fession stressed the subordination of human affairs to divine omnipotence,

and even the most devout questioned whether they comprehended the
divine will. As signs were open to multiple interpretations, many were
quick to criticize their over-enthusiastic brethren for using rehgion to dis-
guise self-interest. At best, apocalypticism and Providentialism fostered
both a brittle confidence in believers who might underestimate the risks
they took and paralysis from fear of being punished for taking the wrong
step. t
The difficulty in defining religious war points to the methodological

problem of distinguishing motive from justification. Marxist historiog-
raphy, which treats expressions of sectarian hatred as justifications, sub-
sumes religion within the ideology of the ruling elite that used it to disguise
the competition for material resources. 2 While some, equally crude, at-
tempts are made to dismiss religion as a device used to inflame hatred and
mask naked ambition,3 others, less crude, nonetheless despair of identify-
ing motives, and argue that scholars can only assess how war is justified. 4
Justification, however, implies belief. Even if the decision-makers are dis-
missed as cynics, their use of certain arguments in preference to others
implies confidence in the likelihood that they could convince others of the
legitimacy of their actions.
The difficulty arises from the attempt to attach a single, defining, label to
a phenomenon like the Thirty Years War that had multiple causes.
Scholars often differ less than they claim. Schilling incorporates political
causes (state-building) within a religious explanation (confessional war).
Although accused by Gotthard of misleading a generation of students by
focusing on state-building, Burldlardt includes religion as one of the 'struc-
tural deficits' of the early modern state, owing to the inability of rulers to
neutralize confessional strife, s Given the contradictory evidence, we need a
framework that not only allows us to relate religious motivation to other
causes, but also allows scope for contingency and agency in an event too
easily seen as inevitable and structurally determined. The role of religion
becomes intelligible when we recognize that confessionalization failed
either to homogenize belief or to marshal adherents into disciplined,
I Doubt and sdf-crifcism emerge strongly from coutempora~, reflections oil kingship: Das lterrscher-
bild im 17.Jahrhundert. ed. K. Repgen (Miinster, xggz).
2 H. Langer: 'Refigion: Konlession und Kirche in der Epoche des 0bergangs yon Feudalismus zum
Kapitalismus', Zeitschrift35"irGeschichtswis.wrLwhafl,xxxii 0984), no-93.
3 A. Rapp, DasfanatischeJahrhunde74. Diegrofle Legende yon den Glaubenskriege (Stuttgart~ 197o).
4 K. Repgen, 'What ls a "Religious War" ': in Politics and Society in Reformation Europe, ed. E. I.
Kouri and T. Scott (Basingstoke, 1987), pp. 311-28.
5 Gotthard, 'Strukturkonservativ oder aggressiv?', p. 153 n. 37;J. Burkhardt, 'Die Friedlosigkeit der
frifllen Neuzeit. Grundleguug einer Theorie der Bellizit~itEuropas', Zeitschriftfiir Historische For-
schung, xxiv (z997), 548"54.
482 Peter H. Wilson
motivated parties. Members of the same church disagreed violently over

the proper relationship between belief and action. Even if, for some, the
war was a holy war in which eternal salvation was at stake, most were less
willing to believe that God had called them to arms. They remained more
pragmatic. The distinction was not one between the religious and the
secular outlook: for both, faith, inseparable from daily life, helped to deter-
mine attitudes to law and politics.
Militant and moderate perspectives should be understood as opposite
ends of a continuum, rather than as mutually exclusive. An individual

might take a militant stance on some issues, while remaining moderate on
others, and his degree of militancy might wax or wane according to cir-
cumstances. The two perspectives shared the goal of advancing the faith.
While confessionalization sharpened distinctions, theologians of all hues
still hoped to restore unity. Militants were distinguishable from moderates
by their methods: the former were more willing to use forcc, while the
latter hoped to persuade dissenters to recognize their errors. For the
majority, advancement of tile faith remained the primary, if distant, object-
ive. More immediate objectives, justified as preparatory steps, often
became of greater practical significance, at the expense, apparendy, of the
primary one. For example, after a622, Phihp IV of Spain's minister, the
count-duke of Olivares, urged Ferdinand II to offer concessions to Prot-
estants to secure peace in the empire and enable him to offer help in Italy
and the Netherlands. Such choices, justified by the doctrine of the 'lesser
evil', were seen as tactical concessions designed to anticipate more serious
obstacles in the way of reaching the primary objective. The doctrine,
which derived from the writings of Thomas Aquinas, was buttressed by
the horrors of the civil wars in France and the Netherlands. It underpinned
the papacy's tacit acceptance of the peace of Augsburg, and was restated
on the four-hundredth anniversary of the peace by Plus XII. 1
Militants, uncompromising and impatient, beheved victory to be within
their grasp. More receptive of Providential and apocalyptical beliefs, they
were more likely to feel summoned to holy war, and their relative isolation
as the minority, even within their own confession, reinforced the sense of
being embattled. Their impatience with the moderate majority led them to
use invective to inflame local disputes and colffessionahze pohtics. Rather
than representing the use of rehgion for pohtical ends, their actions arose
from their behef: they sought to reveal what they saw as the true character
of seemingly secular disputes and to convince doubters that tile faith was at
! M. Heckel, 'Die Ka'ise der Religionsver|assung des Reiches und die Auf~,ingedes DreiBig'j~hrigen
Kriegcs', in Krieg nnd Politik, ed. Repgen, p. t23.
The Thirty Years War 48~
stake? Militancy was not invariably, however, a call to arms. The Saxon
court preacher and Lutheran fundamentalist Matthias Hoi~ von Ho~negg
058o-1645) rejected claims that the Bohemians had revolted in defence of
religion and seconded the elector, Johann Georg's (r. 16H-56), support for
the emperor. Notwithstanding the increasing Habsburg influence through-
out the empire during the 162os, Ho~ stated that the correct response for
Lutherans was to suffer in silence. 2
Divine judgment remained ever-present for moderates, but they were
less prepared to see God as directly involved in human affairs. The best
example is Cardinal Melchior Klesl (t552-t63o), a Catholic convert from
Lutheranism who became the Emperor Matthias's chief adviser? While
promoting the re-Catholicization of Habsburg Austria, he stressed the role
of reason and law in politics. Agreements, including those made with
Protestants, were legally binding and to be revised only by mutual consent.
Gustavus Adolphus's chancellor, Axel Oxenstierna (t583q654), despite
belonging to the allegedly fully confessionalized generation, represents a
Protestant equivalent. In a reflection on Gustavus Adolphus's policies in a
speech to the Swedish council of state in 1637, he stated that defence of
religion must contribute to the general public good. Sweden had inter-
vened in the Thirty Years War in 163o for this reason, not solely to defend
the Protestant faith: the crown would not pursue religious goals to the
detriment of the country:
The next three sections of the article analyse the role of religion at three
levels. The first shows that the process of confessionalization neither div-
ided the empire along sectarian lines, nor necessarily intensified religious
persecution. The second shows that religion played only a subordinate
role in mobilizing the people and stirring them to violence. The third
shows that confession did not underpin alliances, either within the empire,
or between its constituent elements and outside powers. The final section
of the article presents an alternative to the concept of the Thirty Years War
as a religious war by showing that confessional issues were subsumed
within a wider dispute over the imperial constitution.
1 Example in M. Riide, England und Kurpfalz im weT"dendenMiichteenropa 0608-32) (Stuttgart, 2oo7),

pp. 167-8.
2 H. D. Hertrampf, 'H6e yon H6enegg - s~ichsicher Oberhofprediger 1613-45', Beitriige zur Kirchen-
geschichte Deutschlands, vii (197o), P29"48.
3 H. Angenneier: 'Polifik, Religion und Reich bei Kardinal Melchior KhlesP, Zeitschrifl der Savigny-
St~tnngfiir Recht~g~schichte,GelvnanislischeAbteiluug, cx (1993), 249"330.
4 N. Ahnlund, Gustav~ Adolphus the Great (New York, 1999), pp. 274, 282. See also,J. P. Findeisen,
Axd Oxenstierna. Architekt der schwedischen Groflmacht-Ara und Sieger des Dre([3ig~iihrigen Krieges
(Gemsbach, '~oo7). esp. pp. o14q9, 339-41.
484 Peter H. Wilson
THE EXTENSIVELITERATUREon confessionahzation modifies the assumption

that it was primarily a sixteenth-century phenomenon. The different devo-
tional cultures emerging around 155o were distinguished by their varied
use of symbol, ritual, and communal practices like singing) Confession
also influenced the choice of first names, and literary and artistic styles,
and it showed in the Protestants' refusal, between 1582 and 17oo, to adopt
the Gregorian c',dendar. 2 These distinctions were neither uniform, nor fully
accepted prior to 17oo. Confessionalization may have been more marked in
the century after 165o than in the previous one)

The alhance between throne and altar was far from firm during the six-
teenth century, despite the provisions of the peace of Augsburg that
allowed powerful princes to change the faith of their subjects. The Elector
Palatine practised Lutheranism between 1544 and 1559, Calvinism until
1576 , Lutheranism again until x583, then Calvinism again. The last trig-
gered a revolt in the Upper Palatinate in 1592. The majority of the elector
of Brandenburg's subjects refused to follow his conversion from Luther-
anism to Calvinism in 1613, while the landgrave of Hesse-Kassel and the
count of Lippe also faced serious unrest when they embraced the Re-
formed faith. Some opposition came from those who had firmly embraced
the previous official religion, but many subjects rejected every effort to
dictate what they should believe. The faith of Hessian villagers was ethical
rather than doctrinal, with a local focus; it guided daily life and resolved
difficulties according to communal norms. Although it incorporated offi-
cially sanctioned practices and behefs when they met local needs, the sub-
stance of communal religious life altered little. 4
Official efforts were also hampered by the lack of qualified, dedicated
clergy and local officials. The outbreak of war in 1618 and lack of funds
compounded the problem) Bishops of Bamberg spent more in the later
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries on representational culture than on
1 Liindliche Friimmigkeit. Konfessionskultnren und Lebenswelten 15oo-285o, ed. N. Haag, S. Holtz, and
W. Zinunennann (Stuttgart, 2OO'Z).
2 U. Lotz-Hemnann and M. Poldig, 'Confessionalization and Literature in the Empire, 1555-17oo',
Central European History, .,d (2oo7), 35"61; D. Breuner, :Raumbildung in der deutschen Literatur-
geschichte der friiheu Neuzeit als Folge der Konfessionalisierung', Zeitschriflfiir deutsche Philologie,
cxvii (1998), t80-91.
3 M. R. Forster~ Catholic Revival in the Age of the Baroque: Rdigious hlentiby iu Southwest Germany,
155o-175o (Cambridge, 2oo0; R. P. C. Hsia, The World of Catholic Renewal, 154o-177o (Cambridge~
1998). Usefid further discussion of this point in E. Labouvie, 'Konfessionalisierung in der Praxis -
oder: War der Dreifli~ihrigr Krieg ein Kon|~ssionskrieg', m Konfession, Krieg und Katastrophe (issued
by die Verem fiir Kirchengesclfichte der Kh'chenprovinz Sachsen, Magdeburg, '~oo6), pp. 69-92.
4 D. Mayes, Communal Christianity: The Life and Loss of a Peasant Vision in Earl), Model~t Germany
(Boston, ooo4). For shnilar findings |or East Frisia, see N. Grochowina~ Indifferenz and Dissens in der
Graf~chr Oslfriesland im 16. und17. Jahrhundert (Frankfilrt am Main, 2oo3).
5 F. Kleinehagenbrock, Die Grafschaft Hohenlohe im Dreifligjiihrigen Krieg (Stuttgart, 2oo3), pp. t3~
2"8.
confessionalizing, and even the militant Julius Echter, bishop of Wtirzburg

1573-1617, spent as much on beer each year as he gave to the Jesuit college)
The result was not indifference to religion: faith remained a vital element
of daily fife. Identification with one of the officially sanctioned creeds was,
however, only one of the elements that gave people their sense of place and
belonging. They were also bound within a web of corporate rights, feudal
jurisdictions, and local customs, which sometimes straddled confessions
and conflicted with official teachings. For example, the citizens of Luth-
eran Magdeburg, despite their church's official repudiation of relics, pro-

tested loudly when the Catholics, in 1627, removed the bones of the local
saint, Norbert (c. lo8o-H34), to Prague.2
One test of a religious war is what happens when the forces associated
with one confession overrun populations associated with another. The
Catholic Habsburg victory over the Bohemian confederates in a62o pro-
vides the clearest example, because it was not reversed despite the Habs-
burgs' subsequent defeats elsewhere in the empire. The spread of Prot-
estantism throughout the Habsburg hereditary lands in the later sixteenth
century had contributed to the dynasty's instability. Protestantism became
entrenched in the Austrian provinces from the early :57os when the dy-
nasty conceded limited freedom of worship to nobles and towns in return
for the amortization of its debt and the payment of taxes for the military
frontier. Dynastic infighting after 16o6 led to further concessions, includ-
ing the Letter of Majesty granted to the Bohemian Protestants in 16o8.
These concessions were not universally popular among Protestants, who
divided along sectarian lines and some of whom had fewer rights than
others. The concessions also divided the provincial estates, because they
satisfied sectarian religious interests rather than the concerns of the cor-
porate groups that constituted society.
Further divisions followed a concerted effort to re-establish the dy-
nasty's authority by insisting after 1579 on Catholicism as a criterion for
social advancement and crown employment. In this ease, the modves were
undoubtedly religious, and are traceable to individuals who can be labelled
militants, at least for certain periods, notably the archduke of Styria,
Ferdinand II, who became emperor in a619. However, the decision also
had a political goal: to define loyalty and facilitate identification with the
ruling dynasty. But not all Catholics welcomed it, nor did Catholic families
necessarily find favour. By 162o, many of the most important figures in the
1 E. Schubert, 'Staat, Fiskus und Konfession in den M,'finbistiirmern zwischen Augsburger Religions-
fi'ieden und Drei~ig~ihrigen Krieg', in Fiskus, Kirche und Staat im konfessionellen Zeitalter, ed. H. Kel-
lenbenz and P. Prodi (Berlin, 1994), pp. 12t-3, 128, 133,135.
2 See tile contemporar), account in Die Zersto'1~ng Magdeburgs yon Otto Guericke nnd andere Denk-
wiirdigkeiten aus dem Dreissigjiihrigen Kriege, ed. K. Lohmann (Berlin, t913), pp. lt5-2~'.
486 Peter H. Wilson
Habsburg government were converts, or resembled the future generalis-

simo, Albrecht Wenzel Eusebius Wallenstein, who had been baptized a
Protestant but educated by Catholics. Habsburg Catholicism was geared
to centralization, as the dynasty sought to reassert itself by limiting the op-
portunities for the estates to obstruct policy. However, Protestantism was
not automatically the faith of resistance, as many Protestants, too, dis-
trusted the institutions established by the Letter of Majesty that had no
place in the established estates constitution. Re-Catholicization was pur-
sued within the limits of the moderate position represented by Klesl:

existing agreements were not revoked, but interpreted through a minimal-
ist view of the concessions:
The policy was continued after the revolt broke out in 1618. Lutheran
nobles who remained loyal were allowed to retain their faith and their pos-
sessions, z and, despite the execution of twenty-seven prominent rebels in
Prague in 1621, many others were pardoned and some had their property
returned. The widespread confiscation of rebel estates in 1622 was driven
by the need for money and predated by three years the measures of re-
Catholicization) A second wave of confiscations, after x633, targeted col-
laborators with the Saxon invasion of 1631-2. More lands were seized in
1634-5, mainly from those implicated in Wallenstein's alleged plots, some
of them the chief beneficiaries of the earlier confiscations. In total, about
half of noble-owned land changed hands, thus transforming not only
Bohemia and Moravia, but also Austria, by creating a new land-holding
elite throughout the monarchy. Uniformly Catholic, it was also character-
ized by the habit of administrative, court, and military service. The for-
merly closed world of intra-Bohemian kinship came to an end as noble
families confirmed the pattern made by the transfers of land by inter-
marrying across the monarchy?
The same test for loyalty was applied in Bohemia to the remainder of the
population, who were ordered to embrace Catholicism or leave. Around
15o,ooo people fled in the t62os, followed by a smaller group at the end of
t K.J. MacHardy, War; Religion, and Court Patronage. in Habsburg Aastria: The Social and Cultural
Dimensions of Political Interaction, 15"21-162~(Basingstoke, 20o3); P. Mata, 'Der Adel aus den brh-
mischen L~indern am Kaiserhof 162oq74o'. in ,~lechta v habsburskg monarchii a cfsarsksy dv21r 0526-
t74o), ed. V. Bfif~ek and P. grill (Ceskd Buddjoviee, 2oo3): pp. 19t-233; R. Prrmer, The Counter-
Refm~natiou in Ceutral Europe: Styria, 158o-163o (Oxford, 2ool);J. F. Patrouch, .4 Negotiated Settle-
ment: The Counter-Reformation in Upper Austria under the Habsbur~ (Boston, 2ooo).
2 The Reformation in Eastern and Central Europe, ed. K. Maag (Aklershot, 1997).
3 T. Winkelbaner: Stiindefreiheit und Fiirstenmacht. Liinder und Uutertanen des Haases Habsburgs im
konJessionellt~n Zietalter (Vienna, "oo3), i. 98qo8. For Austria, see also A. StSgmann, 'Staat, Kirche
und BfirgersehaR: Die katholische Knnfessionalisierung trod erie Wiener Protestanten zwischen Wider-
stand und Anpassung (1580-1660)', in Wieu im Dreifli~iihHgen Krieg, ed. A. Weigl (Vienna, ~'ool),
pp. 48'2-564.
4 R.J.W. Evans~ The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy, ~55o-17oo (Oxford, 1979), esp. pp. 2ol-9.
the war. Most of them went to Saxony, where the elector, Johann Georg,
refused to treat them as religious refugees and helped Ferdinand II to con-
fiseate their property: Like Ferdinand, Johann Georg, although a Luth-
eran, regarded the exiles as defeated rebels; few objected to the emperor's
use of imperial law to brand his opponents 'notorious rebels' who could be
punished without trial on the grounds they had condemned themselves by
taking up arms. 2 Even those affected did not dispute the legality of the
seizures on confessional grounds, but claimed that they had not supported
the revolt? Many placed under the imperial ban were subsequently
pardoned, like Prince Christian of Anhalt (1568-163o) and Count Georg
Friedrich of Hohenlohe (1569-1fi45), who had commanded armies de-
feated in 162o. The punishment proved less controversial than Ferdinand's
distribution of seized lands and titles among his supporters, notably those
of Frederick V of the Palatinate to Maximilian I, duke of Bavaria, in x623.
As the rebels, in Ferdinand II's view, had forfeited their rights, in 1627
he revoked the Letter of Majesty extorted under threat of violence from
Rudolf II. The estates of Bohemia and Moravia received revised constitu-
tions that restored the clerical representation discontinued in the fifteenth
century and asserted the Habsburgs' interpretation of the monarchy as
hereditary rather than elective. Otherwise, re-Catholicization proceeded
slowly, with mixed results.
The same pattern can be detected in the Palatinate when occupied by
Bavarian troops after 162o. As in the Habsburg lands, Protestant clergy
and teachers were expelled, but the newly minted Elector Maximilian hesi-
tated to ban worship until his possession of the territory had been legalized
through enfeoffment by the emperor. Both Maximilian and Ferdinand
based their actions on imperial law, citing the 'right of Reformation' (ius
reformandi) granted to most of the imperial estates by the peace of Augs-
burg? The right of Reformation, defined as secular advocacy of the
church, was invoked by Catholics as well as Protestants in the confession-
alization process. As in the Habsburg lands, conformity with the new reli-
gious order lagged behind the formal measures: legal and constitutional
1 W. Wiintig, 'Kurs~ichsiche Exulantenauti,ahme hn 17. Jahrhundert', )r ArchivJ~r siichsische Ge-

schichte, Lx.xiv-lxxv(2oo4), 133-74.
2 C. Kampmann, Reichsrebdlion undkaiserliche Acht. Politische Strc~ustiz im Dreifligjiihrigen Krieg
und das Velfahren gcgen Wallenstein 1634 (Miinster, 1992).
3 T. Knoz, 'Die Konfiskationen nach 162o in (erb)l~inderfibergreil~nde," Perspektive', in Die Hab.*~
burgelw~.onarchie16~o bis 274o, ed. P. Mata and T. Winkelbauer (Stuttgart, '2oo6), pp. lo3-M.
4 B. C. Sclmeider, hat r~rrnandL Die Eni'wicklung eines Slaatskirchenre~hts yon seinen AnJiingen bis
zum Emle des Alten Reiches (Tiibingen, 2ool).
5 F. Maier, Die baytrische Unterpfalz im Dreifligjiihrigen Krieg (New York, t99o); T. Johnson,
Mag4strates, Madonnas, and Miracles: The Counter Reformation in the Upper Palatinate (Aldershot,
forthcoming).
488 Peter H. Wilson
arguments took precedence over religion except with clergy who saw an
opportunity to recover, or to enlarge, church lands and influence.
Protestant policies are more difficult to assess, because the only system-
atic effort to dispossess Catholics ended after three years with the defeat of
Sweden at the battle of N/Srdlingen in 1634. The Swedish government's
intentions, however unclear, involved the usurpation of hnperial overlord-
ship in conquered areas and either their incorporation within the Swedish
empire, or membership in a Swedish-led alliance: The practice corres-
ponded with Habsburg and Bavarian policy. Catholic clergy and teachers
were expelled or fined, but their congregations were allowed to retain the
use of some of their churches. Rather than suppress Catholicism in the
conquered ecclesiastical territories, the Swedes granted equal rights to the
Lutheran minorities in the hope, in time, of converting the rest of the
population. As in the Habsburg lands, confession became the test for
political loyalty, while church property and the estates of Catholic nobles
who had fled were redistributed to Swedish and German officers in lieu of
pay. Even though confessionalization was inhibited by Sweden's alliance
with France, which obliged Sweden to respect the rights of Catholics in
Germany, there seems to have been little enthusiasm for religious reform.
The goal remained the entrenchment of Sweden's authority and the suc-
cessful prosecution of the war? Even Sweden's Protestant allies distrusted
its claim to be the champion of Protestants' rights: they suspected a ruse to
gain control of their internal affairs?
P~.OPL~.nat) Acc~.ss to an unprecedented range of media during the Thirty

Years War. Improvements to the physical infrastructure of communication
facilitated traditional sources of news, such as the spread of rumours by
travellers, soldiers, and refugees. More significant, print media, already
expanding, grew exponentially upon the outbreak of the Bohemian revolt.
Religion made little impact on these sources of information, as it was
relatively easy to publish confessional polemics in the decentralized, terri-
torially fragmented empire in which censorship was difficult. Yet news
1 S. Goetze, Die Politik de.~sehwedischen Reichz'kanzlers Axel Oxenstierna gegeniiber Kaiser und Reich
(Kiel, 1971).
2 C. Deinert, Die schwedisehe Epoche in Frank~n yon 16~31-5(Wiirzburg, 1966); B.J. Hock, Kilzingen irn
Dre~igjiihrigen Krieg (T(ibingen, 1981), pp. 54-87; R. Weber, Wiirzburg uud Bamberg im Dreiflig-
jiihHgen Krieg (W(irzburg, 1979), pp. 57"155; M. Meumann, 'Die schwedische Herrschaft in den
Sti|Lern Magdeburg und Halbcrstadt w~ihrend des DreiBiKjfihrigen Krieges (1631-5)', in Die besetzte res
pnblica, ed. M. Meumann and J. Rogge (Berlin, '~oo6), pp. z41-69; H. D. Miiller, Der schwedisehe
Staat in Main,-, 1631-6 (Mainz, 1979).
3 A. Rieck, Frankfitrt am Main nnter schweds Besatzung, ~631-5 (Frankfiart am Main, 2oo5).
tended to recount military events and speculate on developments rather

than give partisan explanations. Bias was further reduced by the wide-
spread practice of reprinting text verbatim from other publications; even
partisan publications such as the Viennese Ordentliche Postzeitung oc-
casionally printed stories complimentary to the enemy, as well as subtle
criticism of imperial troops)
Such publications do not convey the sense of two confessional parties
locked in combat across the continent. The various armies are referred to
by their nationalities or conunanders, not as 'Catholics' but as 'imperialists'

or 'Bavarians'. In more partisan writing, the opposing side is simply 'the
enemy'. The same is true for correspondence between rulers and their
commanders, for personal diaries, and for local chronicles. Many personal
accounts fail to distinguish between different forces, simply recording the
names of regiments, or their officers, who passed through or demanded
provisions: the labels 'Catholic' and 'Protestant' are largely convenient
inventions by later historians. Religious images are more common in visual
sources like broadsheet prints, but they focused on personalities, as more
accessible, and rarely commented direcdy on political issues. 2
Religion was more pronounced in explicit propaganda, as this sought to
justify official policy, comment on events, or rally support for more vigor-
ous action. The massacre of around six hundred Protestants by the Cath-
olic inhabitants of the Valtellina in 162o, which attracted considerable
public attention, provides a good example. Protestant publications focused
on the gory details to demonstrate the victims' martyrdom and highlighted
the role of Catholic clergy as the alleged instigators of the violence. Cath-
olics passed over the events to discuss the political background - the valley
was controlled by the Protestant Rhetian free state (Grisons), which had
suppressed local rights - and portrayed the victims as heretics, beneath
notice as fellow hmnans.
Nonetheless, there were limits. Protestant publications noted that some
Catholics had refused to participate, while Catholic ones agonized over the
legitimacy of such violence and wondered whether the perpetrators, in
using religion as an excuse to seize property, had sinned) Moreover, some
voices urged compromise. By 162o, prints appeared advocating peace and
almost invariably invoking the imperial constitution as the ideal frame-
work. Germany appeared in female form as 'Germania', either as innocent
S. Reisner, 'Die K/impfe vor Wien im Oktober t6z9 im Spiegel zeitgenSssischer Quellen'. in Wien,
ed. Weigl, pp. 457-81;C. Oggolder, 'Druck des ~'ieges', in ibid., pp. 434"44.
2J. Burkhardt, 'Reichskriege in der fi'i.ilmeuzeidichen Bildpublizistik', in Bilder des Reiches, ed. R. A.
Mi.iller (Sigmaringen, 1997), pp. 58-66.
3 A. Wendland, 'Gewalt in Glanbensdingen. Die Veltiner Mord 0620)', in Ein Schaupla& herber
Aright, ed. M. Metunann and D. Niefanger (GSttingen, 1997).' pp. 223-39.
490 Peter H. Wilson
victim or embodying peace, as in the celebration of the peace of Prague in

1635 in which she is flanked by Ferdinand II and Elector Johann Georg)
War was also experienced directly through contact with soldiers, pri-
marily in transit or billets, but also as marauders, plunderers, and, less
commonly but often more violently, through proximity to the fighting.
Military occupation occasionally lasted years, but usually brief periods of
acute pressure and devastation were interspersed with longer periods of
relative tranquility. Direct contact was often avoided; when soldiers ap-
proached, civilians fled to the woods, marshes, or fortified towns. Un-

doubtedly, the war was brutal, but our perceptions of it have been dis-
torted by undue emphasis on exceptional events. The most notable was
the destruction of Magdeburg, which caught fire when stormed by imper-
ial and Bavarian forces in May 163l, killing four-fifths of the 25,ooo inhabit-
ants. 2 There were other massacres. Around one thousand inhabitants and
most of the eight-hundred-strong garrison of Mi.inden were killed when the
town was stormed by Catholic League troops in t626, and Wallenstein
executed the defenders of Breitenburg (in Holstein) in September 1628 to
frighten other towns into surrendering.3 Other examples could be cited.
Nonetheless, such unusual events arose from specific circumstances rather
than confessional antagonism. In all cases, the slaughter followed the re-
fusal of the defenders to surrender once the walls had been breached;just
what happened later during sieges in the Peninsular war: During the
Thirty Years War, most deaths were the result of plague and other diseases
exacerbated by malnutrition and population displacement.5
Brutality, present from the start, may even have diminished rather than
increased in the later stages of the war, as soldiers and ci~41ianslearned the
rules governing protection and extortion: The brutality has undoubtedly
I Burkhardt, 'Reichskriege', pp. 72-8o.

9 ~..ganz verheeret!'Magdeburg und der DreiJ3igjiihrige Krieg, ed. Ktdturlfistorisches Museum Magde-
burg (Magdeburg, 1998); H. Medik.. 'Historical Event and Contemporary Experience: The Capture
and Destruction of Magdeburg~,Histo12y WorkshopJouTvtal, lii (2ool), 23-48.
3 There is a highly inaccurate account of this in the famous Protestant history by Robert Monro,
Monro: His Expedition with the Worthy Scots Regiment Called Mac-Keys, ed. by W. S. Brockington, Jr
(Westport, CT, 1999), pp. 50-3. For dae event, see Wallenstein, ed. Pofisensky and Kollmann, p. 138.
For the sack of Miinden, see B. Rill, TiUy. FeldherrfiirKaiser und Rei& (Mutfich, t984), pp. t76-7.
4 Numerous examples, with graphic contemporary quotations, in C. Esdaile, The Peninsular War
(London, ~oo'~).
5 R.J.G. Cmlcanuou, 'The Third Enemy: The Role of Epidemics in the Tlfirty Years War', aTou~tal
oJ World Histoly, x 0967), 5ooqlt. For the debate on the war's demog'rapbic consequences, see J.
Theibault, 'Tile Demography of the Thirty Years War Revisited', German l-listoty, xv (t997), 1-'~l; M.
Vasold, 'Die deutschen Bevlilkerungsverluste w~ihrend des Dreil]i,~ihrigeu Krieges', Zeits&tqfifiir
Bayerische Landesgeschichle, lvi (1993) , 147-6o.
6 0 . Ulbficht, 'Tile Experience of Violence during d~e Thirty Years War', in Powe~ Violenc~ andMass
Death in Pre-Modern and Modern Times; ed. J. Canning, H. Lehmann, and J. Winter (Aldershot,
2oo4), pp. lo9qL Further discussion in R. Priive. 'Gewalt und Herrschaft in der Fri.ihen Neuzeit ~,
been magnified by subsequent literary depictions; ~ the cruelty noted in

eyewitness accounts, which was rarely directly witnessed, is evidence of
fear, rather than of incidence of violence. 2 For instance, the Saxon city of
Naumburg, with a pre-war population of 8,900, recorded only eighteen
citizens murdered by soldiers during the entire war. 3
Religion certainly featured. There are numerous examples of icono-
clasm, ranging from the inhabitants of Donauw6rth who shredded the
banners of a Catholic procession in 16o5, to Protestant troops stabling
their horses in Catholic churches during the war. Such incidents received
prominent attention in contemporary propaganda and were assiduously
noted by clerical observers in their diaries. However, it remains question-
able how far violence was directly motivated by religion. Confessional
animosity could be fanned by militants, as in pre-war Augsburg, desig-
nated a bi-confessional city in 1555, where Georg Miiller prophesied divine
wrath unless his fellow Lutherans resisted the Gregorian calendar. Ser-
mons like his, however, were effective only when they set general claims in
the local context: Miiller cited as evidence for his claim of an international
Jesuit conspiracy, the recent conversion of prominent local families, and he
blamed the city's economic problems on an alleged Catholic boycott of
Lutheran shops? Such evidence can explain rioting but not warfare, which
requires a political infrastructure to organize and direct it. Political leaders,
averse to mob violence, sought by the disciplined application of force to
achieve political objectives. They saw war as the extension of a legal battle,
not as a means of settling a religious dispute. 5
None of the armies was fully confessionalized. Although most soldiers
shared the ruler's faith, each army contained large numbers of dissenters,
and these often held senior positions. Sir James Hepburn 0598q636), a
Scots Catholic, commanded a brigade under Gustavus Adolphus. Nmner-
ous Lutherans also held commands in the imperial army, and its senior
Zeitschrififiir Geschichtswi~senschaft,xlvii (1999), 79"-806.

1 A. Merzh.iuser, '0ber die Schwelle gefiihrt. Anmerkungen zur Gewahdarstel[ung in Grimmcls-
hausens Simplicissimus', in Ein Schauplatz, ed. Meumann and Niefanger, pp. 65-82; J. Theibauh,
'The Rhetoric of Death and Destruction in the Thirty Years War',Jou1~al of Social Histo~, xxvii
0993), "7a "9o-
2 G. Morthner, E),~dtness Accounts of the Thirty Years Wal; 1618-48(Basingstoke, 2oo2), pp. 164-78.
3 A. Ritter, 'Der Einflufl des Dreissigj~ihfigen Krieges aufdie Stadt Naumbnrg a.d. Saale', Thiiringisch-
SiichsischeZeitschriftfiir Geschichteund Kunst, xv (19~,6),45.
4 S. Dixon, 'Urban Order and Refigious Co-Existence in dae German Imperial City: Augsburg and
Donauwiirth, 1548q6o8', Central European History, xl (2oo7), 1-3% esp. 26-7.
5 M. Kaiser, 'Maximifian I. yon Bayem und der Krieg', Zeitschriftfiir Bayel~che Landesgeschichte,lxv
(2oo~'), 69"99; R. Bireley, 'Ferdinand II: Founder ofd~e Habsburg Monarchy', in Crown, Church, and
Estates, ed. R.J.W. Evans and T. V. Thomas (New York, 1991), pp. a~'6-44; G. Franz, 'Glaube und
Reeht im pofitischeu Denken Kaiser Fer~finands ll.', Archivfiir Reformationsgeschichte, xlix (1958)~
258-69.
492 Peter H. Wilson
general in 1647-8 was Peter Melander von Holzapfel (1589-1648), a Calvin-

ist. t Prisoners of war were already being pressed into the victors' forces by
162o, further diluting the confessional homogeneity. The violence towards
civilians had many causes other than religious differences; in addition to
searching for food and loot, soldiers tried to assert a claim to superiority
over a society that generally despised them, especially when they came
from different ethnic and linguistic groups. Scots, Finns, and Croats, all of
them strangers, acquired particularly fearsome reputations. 2
Far from invariably targeting clergy, sometimes soldiers deliberately

spared them and their churches? As female communities of women often
living in isolated locations, nuns felt especially vulnerable. Yet Sister Mafia
Anna Junius of the Dominican convent outside Bamberg records with
some embarrassment the gentlemanly behaviour of the Protestant Swedish
officers who occupied the area in the early 163os. The nuns even enter-
rained Bernhard of Weimar (16o4-39) by singing during a banquet at the
convent, gave a present to a grateful Swedish sentry when his regiment
moved away, and were so well treated that the local population became
resentful. Having described the imperialists as 'our' side when recounting
their operations at a distance, Junius becomes more ambivalent after they
arrive: her diary records examples of ill-treatment at the hands of Catholic
soldiers? Most eyewitness accounts are reticent about religion, leaving
their loyalties implicit; litde distinguishes Christian from Jewish accounts
of the conflict, s Almost every diarist records overwhelming fear, help-
lessness, and sense of personal misfortune: none portrays himself as an
enthusiastic participant in a religious struggle.
Kasper von Greyerz and Bernd Roeck assert that religion offered con-
temporaries a way to make sense of their feelings and cope with the
violence.6 However, the variety of responses suggests that faith proved an
I F. Geisdlardt, 'Peter Melander Grafzu Holzapfel t589-t648', Arassans LebeTcr iv 095o), 36"
53. Other examples and fiwther discussion in M. Kaiser, 'Cuius exercitus, eros religio? Konfession mid
Heerwesen im Zeitaher des Dreifligj~ihfigen Krieges', Archivfi'ir Reformationageschichte, xci (2ooo),
316-53.
2 p. Burschel, $iildner im Nordwestdeutschland ~ s z6. and 17. Jahrhundevts (G6ttingen~ 1994), pp. 27-
53; R. G. Asch, ' "Wo der soldat hink/Smbt, da ist alles sein': Military Violence and Atrocities in the
Tl'firty Years W,'u", German History, x~fili (2ooo), 'z91-3o9.
3 M. Kaiser: 'Die "Magdeburgische Hochzeit': (t631). Gewaltph~inomene im DreiBigj~ihfigenKa'ieg':in
Leben in derStadt, ed. E. Labom,ie (Cologne, aoo4), pp. 'zo8-n.
4 M. A. Junius, 'Bamberg im Schweden-KriegC, Bericht des Histo~schen Vereins zu Bamberg, lii
089o), 37"45, 123-3o, and continued in ibid., liii (1891), 169-o3o. Further discussion in C. Woodford,
Nuns as Historians in Early Modern Germany (Oxford, ~oo'~).
5 A. Levy, Die Memoiren des Ascher Levy aas Reichshofen im EIsafl 0598"]635) (Berlin, 19t3); P. Bloch,
:Ein vielbegehrter Rabbhter des Rheingaues, Juda Melfler Rcutfingcn', in Festsehrift zum siebzigsh:n
Gebnrtstage Martin Philippso,~s(Leipzig,1916),pp. n4"34.
6 K. v. Greyerz and K. Siebenhiiner, introduction in Religion and Gewalt. Kor~ikte, Rituale, Deu-
tnngen 05oo-18oo), ed. K. v. Greyerz and K. Siebenhfiuer (G6ttingen, 2oo6), p. 13. Similar argumeuts
unrehable guide. The official interpretation attributed the war to divine

wrath: established practice decreed periodic days of prayer and fasting,
and exhortations to the populace to lead morally upright, thrifty lives, to
keep the war at bay or ensure it would not return2 As the foreign forces
withdrew around 165o, these arguments characterized the official celebra-
tions of peace throughout Lutheran Germany. Their portrayal of peace as
a gift of divine grace 2 suited the agenda of the territorial state as it tried to
ensure disciphne to promote social order and economic recovery. War was
tailored to the official explanation for fires in cities and natural disasters
like the flood that destroyed Nordstrand island off the coast of Holstein in
1634. Fire and flood were stock metaphors for war in sermons. 3
It is easier to analyse official accounts of the war as religious texts than to
find evidence that they brought comfort. On the contrary, one can find
cases of permanent psychological damage along the lines of what would
now be diagnosed as post-traumatic stress syndrome, including the repres-
sion of memories and their resurfacing in later life. 4 Other than fear, few
emotions are expressed in contemporary diaries, and religious references
are confined to stock thanks to God for deliverance from personal danger, s
Studies of Lutheran funeral orations show that all of them mentioned the
war. Some echoed the official interpretation, presenting the deceased as a
good Christian who had patiently endured hardship; others, more matter
of fact, refer to the war to explain widowhood, remarriage, or other stages
hi life. 6
in B. Roeck, 'Der Dreilh~fihrige Krieg und die Mensehen ina Reich', in Krieg und Frieden. Militiir und
Gesellschaft in der Friihen Neuzeit, ed. B. R. Kroener and IL Pr6ve (Paderbom, t996), pp. 265-8o.
1 Prayer and fast days had been a regular Ludleran response to war since the I532 imperial campaign
against the Ottomans: D. Schr/Sder, '"Deml es ist b6se Zeit": Reflexionen zeitgen6ssischer Hamburger
Prediger fiber den Dreilligj~ihrigen ga'ieg', in Der Krieg vor den Toren, ed. M. Kananer and S. Tode
(Hamburg, 2ooo), pp. 289-31L See also, M. Salhnamh "Innerlichkeit" und "(~ffendicbkeit" yon
Refigion. Der Fast- und Bettag yon 16oo in Basel', in Um Himmels Willen. Religion in Kata~trophen-
zeilen, ed. M. Jakubowsld-Tiessen and H. Leluuann (G6ttingen, 2oo3), pp. 157-78.
2 E. Fran~:ois and C. Gantet, 'Vergangenheitsbew~ildgung im Dienst des Friedens und der korv
fessionellen ldenti~t. Die Friedenst~ste in Sfiddeutschland nach 1648', in Krieg und Fl~eden in der
historischen Gediichtniskultur, ed. J. Burkhardt (Mmdch, 2ooo), pp. 1o3-~,3; D. R. Moser, 'Friedens-
feiem - Friedensfeste', in ErfahrTtng und Deutung, ed. Garber et al., pp. 1133"53; C. Koldmann,
'Kriegs- und Krisenerfahrungen yon lutherischen Pfarrern und Gltiubigern im Amt Hornberg des
Herzogtums Wfirttemberg w~ihrend des Dreifligj~ihrigen Krieges und nach dem Westt~,ihschen File-
den ~, in Das Strafgetqcht Gottes, ed. Asche and Scifindling, pp. 188-96.
3 M. L. Allemeyer, 'Zur Wahrnehmung, Deutung und Verarbeitung wm Stadtbranden in nord-
deutschen Sclu'ifien des 17. Jahrhunderts', in Urn Himmels Willen, ed. Jakubowski-Tiessen and Leh-
mann, pp. 2ol-34, and M. Jakubowski-Tiessen, 'WahmehmmLg und Deutung der Flutkatastrophe yon
1634', in ibid., pp. 179-~,oo.
4 Ulbricht, 'The Experience of Violence', pp. 121-4; G. P. Sreenivasan, The Peasants of Ottobm~ren,
1487-17~6: A Rural Society in Earl), Mode1~ Gelwzany (Cambridge, 2oo4), p. 286.
5 S. Externbrink, 'Die Rezepfion des "Saeco di Mantova" im t7. Jahrbundert', in Ein Schanplatz, ed.
Meumann and Niefanger, pp. 205-22.
6 B. Hoflinann, 'Krieges noth und gTosse theuerung. Strategien yon Frauen in Leipzig 1631-50', in
494 PeterH. Wilson
Evidence from Catholic communities presents an equally diverse

picture. Participants at an all-night prayer vigil in Rottweil, besieged by
French troops in November 1643, reported that a statue of the Virgin had
changed colour and rolled its eyes towards heaven. However, an official
investigation found widely diverging views of the alleged miracle. Some
with poor eyesight, or who had been standing at the back of the church,
insisted that the miracle had occurred, as did some Lutherans ti'om the
city. To some Catholics, the alleged miracle brought consolation - though
soldiers who believed in it still surrendered the city nine days later - others
had been terrified, seeing it as an ill omen. These inidal reactions were
swiftly suppressed in official accounts, especially one propagated by the
Jesuits who related the miracle to the battle of Tuttlingen that enabled the
imperialists to recapture the city two weeks later?
* * * * *
THE ASSERTION THAT confession structured alliances underpins the

concept of a religious war that routinely cites as evidence the formation of
the Protestant Union and the Catholic League and their integration with
international coalitions. In fact, neither group managed to recruit the
majority of its co-religionists among the imperial estates, who regarded
sectarian alliances as inimical to the imperial constitution and feared that
membership would suck them into conflicts not of their concern. Neither
alliance created effective institutions, though the league was the more
coherent, thanks to its reliance on Bavaria, which had a relatively well-
developed and efficient territorial administration. Perhaps most significant,
the two organizations never came to blows. They negotiated a truce in ]61o
over the first Jiilich crisis and another in 162o during the Bohemian revolt.2
The union collapsed two years later and the subsequent league of Heil-
bronn, formed in 1633 to fall apart two years later, was primarily a vehicle
for Swedish interests)
The Catholic League, too, was an instrument of particular interests.
Established by Maximilian of Bavaria to protect his lands and give him
greater influence in imperial politics, he never dictated to the league,
though he held the initiative throughout. The other members joined to
enhance their security and weight in negotiations with the Protestants.
Erfahrung und Deutung, ed. Garber et al., pp. 372"4; C. N. Moore, Patterned Lives: The Lutheran
Funeral Biog~'aphy in Early Model~ German), (Wiesbaden, 2006).
! A. Holzem, ~...ztuu seut:zen und waien also bewegt worden. Mafia im Krieg - Das Beispiel Rottweil
t618-48': in Religionskriege, ed. Brendle and Sehindling. pp. 191-'-,16.
2 Excellent comparative overview in A. Gotthard, 'Protestantiscbe "Union" und Katholische "Liga" -
subsidiiire Strukturelemente oder Ahernadventwiirfe?', in dlternativen zur Reichsve~fassung in der
Friihen Nenzeit 9, ed. V. Press (Munich, 1995): pp. 81-11'2.
3J. Ka'etzschnmr, Der Heilbronner Bund1630_-5 (3 vols., L(ibeek.. 192'2).
Many Catholic territories, however, pursued confessionalization within

their borders, but remained outside the league: the city of Cologne, for in-
stance, made Catholicism a requirement for citizenship in 16t7, but con-
sistendy refused invitations to join, as did the archbishop of Salzburg, who
regarded Bavaria as a threat.1
Both organizations presented themselves as supporting the constitu-
tional order at a time when the existing institutions were failing to defuse
tension. The 'Catholic League' was never the organization's title, but a
pejorative label attached to it by Protestants hoping to tar it by association

with the infamous Ligue in the French wars of religion. Many of its mem-
bers wished to offer an alliance to Saxony and other Lutherans, to which
Maximilian consistently objected because he understood that their inclus-
ion would enable the Habsburgs to seize control. Thus, the strictly Cath-
olic composition of the league had political, not religious, roots. After Klesl
managed to disband it in 1617, it was re-established two years later only as
a concession in return for Bavaria's help against the Bohemian rebels. 2
Klesl's success indicates that we should not underestimate the potential of
Iris parallel efforts to broker a compromise over the confessional elements
of the imperial constitution.3
Catholic militancy helped to prolong the war after 162o rather than to
cause it, though confessional arguments did not necessarily determine the
key decisions. Adam Contzen (1571q635), Jesuit adviser to Maximilian,
was convinced that God showed his support 'in an ordinary fashion', not
just through miracles? Other leading clerics shared his opinion, including
William Lamormaini (157oq648), Jesuit confessor to Ferdinand II from
1624.s Events appeared to confirm such faith in Providentialism. The
i H. W. Bergerhausen, 'Die Stadt K61n im DreiBigj~hrigen Krieg~ i,, Der Dre~igjiihrigen Krieg im
Herzogtum Berg und seinen Nachba~'e~onen, ed. S. Ehrenpreis (Neustadt, "2o02), pp. lo'2-31; C. Bartz,
Koln im Dreifligjiihrigen Krieg" (Frankfurt am Main, 2oo5); E. Stahl, Wolf Dietrich yon Salzbulg
(Vienna, 198o); R. R. Heinisch, Paris Graf LodroTt Reichsfilrst and E~7bischof von Salzbnrg (Vienna:
1991).
2 M. Kaiser, Politik nnd Kriegfiihrung. Maximilian yon Bayern, Till), nnd die Katholische Liga im
Dreifligjiihrigen Krieg (Miinster: 1999), and idem~ ;St~indebund und Ver|Mirensordnung. Das Beispiel
der Kathofischen Liga (1619-31):, in Vormoderne politische Velfahren, ed. B. Sto[[berg-Rillinger (Berlin,
2oot), pp. 331-415; T. HiSIz, Krnmmstab nnd Schwert. D# Liga und die geistlichea Reichsstiinde
Schwabens 16o9-35 (Leinfelden-Echtelx[ingen: 2ool).
3 J. Rainer, 'Kardinal Melchior Klesl (1552-163o) yore "Generalreformator" zum "Ausgleichspolit-
iker:: :, Riimische Quartalsch~fl, lix (1964), 14"35;J. Miiller: 'Die Vernfittlungspolitik Klesls wm 1613
his 1616 im Lichte des gleichzeitig zwischen Klesl und Zacharias Geizkofler gefl.ihrten Briefwechsels~,
Mitteilnngen des lnstituts.fiir Osterreichische Geschichtsforschung, Sul)plement 5 (1896q9o3), pP. 6o9-
9o. It is worth nodng that much of the Catholic opposition to Klesl stemmed from Maximilian's
concern at the impfications ofa cnmpronfise for |fis league; see D. Albrecht, Maximilian I yon Bayern
1573-1651 (Munich, 1998), pp. 435-44.
4 Quoted ht R. Bireley, The.7~tnit.s and the Thirly Years War (Cambridge, "~oo3),pp. 1'~4-.5.
s A. Posch, 'Zur T~figkeit und Beurteilung l.amormains', Mitteilungen des Inslitutsftir Ostel~'eichische
GeschichtsJbrschnng, LvSfii(1955), 375"90.
496 Peter H. Wilson
Madonna had allegedly unfurled her cloak to save the three Catholic
officials defenestrated in Prague in May 16x8. God answered Ferdinand's
prayers to save Vienna during the siege in June 1619. Father Dominicus
(1559-x63o), a Carmelite monk, claimed to have had a vision prophesying
victory and had helped to persuade the doubting imperial commander to
attack at White Mountain where Frederick V's forces were routed in 162o.
The explosion of a powder wagon that disconcerted the Protestant troops
at Wimpfen in 1622 gave rise to the myth of a white woman urging the
Spanish and Catholic League forces to victory. The battle of Stadtlohn was
fought on the feast of Transfiguration in 1623, while a shooting star before
the battle of Lutter in 1626 was interpreted as a fiery sword pointing
towards the Danish forces who were routed the following day. Such inci-
dents could be fitted into a pattern established by the naval victory over the
Ottomans at Lepanto in 1571, and seemed to suggest that God had sum-
moned the faithful to holy war against infidels and heretics)
These opinions were voiced primarily by clerics, not by soldiers or
rulers. Even so, many clergy distanced themselves from them, including
Pope Urban VIII, and they found little favour in France. Lamormaini's
views were far from popular in Vienna, even at the height of the emperor's
success. Anton Wolfradt 0581-t639), abbot of Kremsmiinster and later
0631) bishop of Vienna, opposed harsh terms for defeated Protestants.
Most of the emperor's key political and military advisers were at best
lukewarm towards the edict of Restitution, which required Protestants to
return all church property, taken since 1555. Issued in 1629, the edict was a
political miscalculation of the first order: it alienated Saxony in the critical
months prior to Sweden's intervention. Though Lamormaini influenced
the decision to issue the edict, it also reflected Ferdinand II's legalist
interpretation of the imperial constitution and was intended to lower, not
heighten, the tension. 2
Bavaria pursued goals independent of the emperor's throughout the
t62os, as Maximilian collaborated with Brandenburg and Saxony in resist-
ing what appeared to be the unwarranted increase in imperial power. The
most obvious consequence was the dismissal of Wallenstein in 163o. Later,
in 1635, Maximilian agreed to dissolve the Catholic League, in return for
concessions from Ferdinand II who allowed Bavaria to retain its own army
as an autonomous cows within the imperial army. Maximilian was bidding
for a voice in the direction of the war and the terms of peace. 3 His appeal to
1 0 . Chaline, La bataille de la Montagne Blanche (Paris, 1999); T. Johnson, '"Victoria a deo missa?"
Living Saints oll die Batdefields of the Central European Counter Refonnadon', ill Coz~fessionalSanc-
tity (c.15oo-c.~8oo), ed.J. Beyer et ,-d.(Mahlz,'zoo6), pp. 319-35.
2 M. Frisch, Da.s Restitutionsedikt Kaiser Ferdinands 11. yore 6. Miirz 16~9 (TObingen, t993).
3 C. Kapser, Die baye~ische Kriegsorgani.sation in derzweiten Hiilfte des Dreifli~iihrigen Krieges 1635-
the pope and Spain for subsidies to buttress Bavaria's autonomy owed
nothing to Catholic solidarity. However momentarily important, the sub-
sidies paid only a fraction of Bavaria's and the league's costs, which were
met largely by members and occupied territories) Moreover, Maximilian
opposed any action likely to extend the war into Italy or the Netherlands,
because he considered Spain's interests in these regions to be separate
from the war in the empire.
Dynastic rather than confessional solidarity underpinned the Austro-
Spanish co-operation. This, too, had limits. Ferdinand II and his succes-
sor from 1637, Ferdinand III, were reluctant to support Spain, rightly
fearing French retaliation. France's declaration of war against Spain in 1635
left the Austrian Habsburgs no choice, but they scaled back their commit-
ment once it became obvious that France could not be defeated quickly.
The two wars remained distinct: Austria's decision not to negotiate separ-
ately from Spain at Westphalia was motivated by fear of losing its most
important ally, not because Ferdinand III regarded his cousin, Philip IV's,
war as his own. Each of them had long wished the other to compromise to
be free to assist him against Iris owaa enemies? Spain's chief minister from
1622 to 1643, Olivares, who ignored all arguments for a holy war and even,
briefly in 1625, supported the French Huguenots, was willing to ally with
Saxony, criticized the edict of Restitution, and tried to persuade Ferdi-
nand II to dismiss Lamormaini? Spain allied in 1637 with the Rhetian free
state and, two years later, returned to it the Catholic Valtellina. 4 Nor did
concern for Spain's Catholic credentials prevent the Spanish Habsburgs
from allying in 1652 with the Protestant regicide Oliver Cromwell.
French policy conformed even less to the model of confessional war.
France had backed German Protestant princes since 153o and negotiated
with the Protestant Union in 161o. Its actions arose from its ambition to act
as the international arbiter, a standard response to the underlying move
throughout Europe away from the medieval ideal of Christendom) While
historians disagree about France's motives in edging towards war by 1635,
48/9 (Miinster, 1997).

1 D. Albrecht, 'Zur Finanzierung des Dreil3igj,ihfigen Ka'ieges. Die Subsidien der Kurie flit Kaiser und
Liga 16t8-35', Zeitschriftfiir Bayerische Landesgeschichte, xix (1956), 534"67; W. Goetz, 'Die Kfiegs-
kosten Bayerns und die Ligastiinde im Dreilligjiihrigen Krieg', Fors&uugen zur Geschichte Bayerns, xii
09o4), to9-25.
2 E. Straub, Pax und Imperium. Spaniens Kampfum seime Fried~9l~ordnung in Europa zwischen 1617
und1635 (Paderborn, 198o): H. Ernst, Madrid und Wien 1632-7 (Miinster, 1991).
3 Bireley: Jesuits, pp. 174-8. See generally, J. H. Elliott, The Count-Duke of Oiivares (New Haven,
1986).
4 A. Wendland, Der Nutzung der P~sse und die Gefiihrdung der Seele. Spanieu, Miland und der Kam~f
urns Veltin ~62o-41 (Zurich, 1995), pp. ~
5 C. Karapmann, Arbiter und Friedensstiftung: Die A~winandersetzung um den politisehen Schieds-
richter" im Europa der Frilhen Neuzeit (Paderborn, 2ool), pp. 144-8"a.
498 Pe~rH. Wi~on
none argue that religion predominated: ~ the intervention in the war was
justified on legal and constitutional grounds, primarily the illegality of
Spain's seizure in March 1635 of the elector of Trier. 2
Similarly, Catholic Savoy fails to fit Schilling's model: it supported the
Protestant Union because the duke hoped to become king of Bohemia.
The difficulties Savoy, and also Stuart England, encountered in trying to
pursue a consistent foreign policy cannot be reduced to the alleged incom-
patibility of cross-confessional allies? Savoy was a weak state precariously
perched along the Alpine valleys between France and Spanish Milan; in-
ternal opposition to the duke was largely the product of external inter-
ferenee in support of rival factions within the ruling dynasty. The Stuarts,
however, faced more serious domestic discontent, but geography and lack
of money also prevented them from intervening on the Continent. Above
all, the Franco-Swedish alliance from 163z, the cross-confessional partner-
ship par excellence, was strikingly suceessfiil. Both parties made sub-
stantial gains from their involvement in Germany.
Protestant alliances rested on even shakier foundations than combina-
tions of Catholic powers. The standard argument that the lack of a com-
mon church compelled Protestants to seek alliances as a political frame-
work to substitute for an ecclesiastical one, is advanced to explain irenicist
efforts to establish common ground between what had become by the later
sixteenth century a bewildering array of competing confessions? Such
efforts failed miserably. Calvinists dubbed the Saxon statement of Luth-
eran orthodoxy issued in z58o as the 'Book of Discord'. Subsequent
attempts to find common ground ended in acrimony,s Cultural organiza-
tions like the famous 'Fruitful Society' of 1617 that propagated the German
I Important contributions include: W. H. Stein, Pro&c/ion royale. Eine Un&rsuchung zu den Protek-
tionsverhiiltnissen im EIsafl zur Zeit Richdieus, 16~2-43 (Mi.inster, 1978); D. Parrott, 'The Causes of the
Franco-Spanish War of 1635-59', in The Origins of War in Earl)' Model~i Enrope; ed.J. Black (Edin-
burgh, 1987), pp. 72-111; R. A. Stradling, 'Olivares and tile Origins of the Franco-Spanish War ~,
English Historical Review, ci (1986), 68-94; H. Weber, 'Vom verdecketen zum offenen Krieg:
Richelieus Kxiegsgriinde und Kriegsziele t634-5:, in Krieg and Poli/ik; ed. Repgen, pp. 2o3-z8.
2 H. Weber, 'Zur Legitimation der fi'anz6sischen Kriegserkl~rung 1635'., Historisches ~ahrbuc.h, cviii
0988), 9o-n3; K..M)meier, Der Trierer Kn~fiirst Philipp Christoph yon Siitern and der Wes~iilis&e
Friede (Miinster, 1986 ).
3 As argued by Schilling, Konfessionalisierung und Staatsinleressen, pp. 399-4oo. For die following,
sce R. Kleinman, 'Charles Emanuel I of Savoy and the Bohenfian Election of 1619': European Studies
Rev#w, v (1975), 3"29; R. Oresko, 'The House of Savoy in Search fi)r a Royal Crown in the Seven-
tcendl Cenmly', in Royal and Republican Sovereignty in Early Modern Europe, ed. R. Oresko et al.
(Cambridge, 1997), pp. 27',~-35o; S. Adanls, 'Spain or dae Nethed,'mds: Tile Dilemmas of Early Smart
Foreign Policy', in B~fore the English Civil War, ed. H. Tondinsolt (London, 1983), pp. 79-zoL
4 Sclfilling, KonJ~sionalisierang nnd Staatsfizteressen, pp. 395"7.
5 R. Kolb, 'The Dynamics of Part2.," Conflict in the Saxon Late Reformation: Gnesio-Ludterans vs
Philippists',7ournal of Modern Hislory, xlix 0977): 1~ B. Nischan, 'Retbrmed Irelficism and
tile Leipzig Colloquy of t63z', Central European Histoo, , ix (1976), 3-26.
language made only a limited impact. Palatine court culture, which was
orientated at least in part towards France and England, thanks to Frederick
V's education at Sedan and marriage to James I's daughter, contrasted with
the beer-drinking, German-speaking Saxon Lutherans who made their
educational trips to Italy.~ The Saxon-organized jubilee to mark the cen-
tenary of the Reformation in 1617 was signalled by a decree issued in
Wiirttemberg (a member of the Protestant Union) that lumped Calvinists
and Zwinglians along with Jesuits, the pope, tya'ants, and Turks as com-
mon threats to the faith2 Similarly, Lutheran fundamentalists sparked riots

in Berlin, in the belief that the troops James had sent to assist the Bo-
hemians in 162o had been sent to impose Calvinism on Brandenburgers.
The existence of sectarian hatred offers one explanation for the failure to
establish a Viable Protestant alliance. Lutherans generally followed the
Saxon line that the emergence of Calvinists as an illegal sect endangered
the gains made in a555 and that confessionally based alliances had no place
in the imperial constitution. Saxony's refusal to lead such a group left the
Palatinate as the only alternative. The Protestant Union emerged as a
regional alliance between the Elector Palatine and the neighbouring Cal-
vinist counts. Others joined through dissatisfaction with Saxony's repre-
sentation of their interests in the Reichstag, or because pursuit of their own
territorial ambitions had left them vulnerable to pressure from their
neighbours. In each ease, local and regional issues were paramount. For
example, the imperial cities of Nuremberg and Ulmjoined because their
neighbours, both of them important principalities, had done so: they were
alarmed at Bavaria's annexation of Donauwtrth in 16o7, more for the
suppression of civic autonomy than for the gradual erosion of Lutheran
rights that followed. Membership did not undercut civic solidarity with
Catholic cities; for instance, Nuremberg protested to the Protestant Union
in 1614 when two of its leading princes built a fort on land belonging to the
Catholic city of Cologne.3
Even though some western and southern Lutherans joined the Prot-
estant Union, the majority, including the larger north German territories,
refused. Failure to rally the German Protestants left the union an unattrac-
tive partner to potential foreign allies. Frederick V's marriage boosted his
prestige in 1613, but James I, who at first refused to back his son-in-law's
I Die Fruchtblingrr - ci,*c teutschherzige Geseltwhafl, ed. K. Manger (Heidelberg, 20o0; H. Watanabe-
O'Kelly, Conrt Culhtre in Dresden from Renaissance to Baroque (Basingstoke, 2ool).
2 Kohhnann, 'ga-iegs- und Krisenerfahrungen', p. 15L
3 H. Gfirsching, Die Unionspolitik der Reichsstadt Niirnberg vor dem Drei/Jigjlihrige,t Kriege (16o8-18)
(Munich, 19y2), esp. pp. 43, 62, 77; G. Horstkamper, 'Die Protestanfische Union und der Ausbruch
des DreigigifluJgen Krieges', in Friedliche b~tentionen, ed. Schulze, pp. m-51; A. Gotdlard, Kor@kssion
und Staatsriison. Die Auflenpolitik Wiirttembergs unter Herzog aTohann Friedrieh (16o8-'2.8) (Stuttgart,
1992).
5oo Peter H. Wilson
political ambitions, only reluctantly supported them after 1619 because the
Stuart dynasty's own reputation was at stake, a Treaties with the Dutch,
Venice, Savoy, and France all proved insubstantial; even Schilling is
forced to admit that by 1617 the union had become 'essentially an instru-
ment of Palatine policy'.2
The Protestant Union's institutional weakness increased the relative
weight of non-state actors, the supposed 'Calvinist international' for one.
The shared experience of exile or of fighting in the Dutch and Huguenot
forces, as well as education in Protestant universities and fund-raising trips

for churches, forged personal bonds that reinforced faith. However, one
doubts whether this network acted like a 'general staff', co-ordinating
policy across the continent.3 Militancy became more influential in specific,
local circumstances, especially where the leadership became detached
from the subject population. The frequent changes of official faith, along
with the centralizing pretensions of the elector's government, alienated
many of the men who had traditionally served the Palatinate. The elector
now relied increasingly on exiled veterans from the French and Dutch
wars and educated commoners like Dr Ludwig Camerarius (1571-1651)
from Nuremberg, who was convinced of the existence of a Catholic con-
spiracy to extirpate Protestantism?
A similar situation prevailed in Brandenburg where the majority of
councillors were nobles and burghers who converted with the elector in
16a3, or their sons. For the chancellor, Friedrich Pruckmann (1562-163o),
'this is a religious war. '5 Yet, in Brandenburg, the militants faced significant
local opposition from the Lutheran old guard grouped around the elector,
Georg Wilhelm's, mother and uncle, as well as the chief minister, Count
Adam yon Schwarzenberg (1583-1641), a Catholic who placed Hohen-
zollern dynastic interests ahead of Protestant solidarity. Dr Wolfgang
Gunther 0578-1628), a Protestant exile from Catholic Paderborn, faced
1 E. Weil~, Die UnteT"stiitznngF~4edl~chs V. yon der Pfalz durch Jakob L und Karl I. yon England im
Dreiflig~iihrigen K~eg (Stuttgart, 1966); Ri.ide,England and Kurpfalx.
2 Sclfilfing, Kottfessionalisie~7mg und Stoatsinteressen, p. 36'2.
3 A. A. van Schelven, ~Der Generalstab des politischen C',dvinismus in Zentraleuropa zu Beginn des
DreilJigi~ihfigen Krieges~,Archivfiir Reformationsgeschichte, xxxvi 0939), It7-41. For a succinct stun-
mary. of the recent research, see G. Murdoeh, Beyond Calvin: The Intellectual, Political, and Cultural
World of Europe'~ Refolvned Churches (Basingstoke, '~oo4), pp. 31-75.
4 F. H. Schubert, 'Die PRilzische Exilregierung im Dreil~igj~ihfigenKrieg', Zeit.schriflfiir Geschichte des
Oberrheins, cii (1954), 575-68o; J. G. WeiB, 'Die Vorgeschichte des B6hmischen Abenteurs Friedrichs
V. yon der Pf~lz', Zeitscht4ftfiir GeschicMe des Oberrheins, xcfi (194o), 383-8; V. Press, Cavlinismus
und Te~'ritorialstaat. Regier~4ng und Zentralbehiirden der Kurpfiilz t559-16z9 (Stuttgart, t97o), esp. pp.
299-3'!L
5 A statement fi'om 1626, quoted in U. Kober, 'Der Favorit als "Factotum". GrafAdam yon Sehwarzen-
beig', in DerzweiteMann irn Staat, ed. M. Kaiser and A. Pecar (Berlin, aoo3), p. 236.
The Thirty Years War 5Ol
similar opposition during his tenure as chief minister in Hesse-Kassel. ~As

a result, neither territory played an active role in the war until foreign
occupation forced its hand.
No such constraints existed in the hothouse atmosphere of the Palatine
court, where the fateful decision was taken to accept the offer of the Bo-
hemian crown from the rebels in 1619. Even there, however, dynastic and
political factors were significant, with Providentialist beliefs fostering false
confidence and screening out evidence that contradicted preconceived
opinions. The leaders of the Protestant Union had rebuffed the Bohemian
and Austrian Protestants when they appealed for help in 16o8, and only
turned to them in 1619 when their own prospects looked less promising.
Confession certainly suggested potential allies, but in practice they never
lived up to expectations. The Palatine leadership, in taking the prince of
Transylvania, the Calvinist Bethlen Gabor, to be a natural ally, failed to ap-
preciate that his power rested on a compromise with three other confes-
sions, as well as the blessing of the sultan, Osman II. 2 All three - including
the radical Austrian leader Georg Erasmus Tschernembl (1567q626) -
refused to endorse calls to rally ordinary people to arnls. Even an Ottoman
alliance appeared preferable to inciting popular insurrection. During the
negotiations for an Ottoman alliance against the emperor held throughout
162o, Tschernembl assuaged his conscience by claiming that Osman might
be persuaded to give official recognition to Christianity. Even though the
Ottoman envoy, Mehmet Aga, was greatly impressed with Prague, Osman
postponed a decision until it became obvious that Frederick had been
defeated, when the negotiations were broken off? The Bohemian confed-
erates, who had to wage their war with mercenaries, were bitterly disap-
pointed with the insubstantial English and Dutch support?
Denmark's and Sweden's interventions also owed little to religion. Den-
mark only intervened when its victory over Sweden in 1613 and Sweden's
distraction in Poland made it safe for Christian IV to try to secure his dy-
nastic interests and political influence in northern Germany. From a625,
Danish propaganda and private publications made the standard Lutheran
1 H. T. Grat~ 'Der Generalaudienzierer Wolfgang Gfmfller und Landgraf Moritz yon Hessen-Kassel'.
in Der zweile Mann im Staat, ed. K~fiserand Pecar, pp. 59-76.
2 M. Glettler, 'Uberlegungen zur historiographisehen Neubewertung Betlflen Gabors', Ungarn-
aTahrbuclz, ix 0978), "37"55; G. Murdoch, Calvinism on the FrontleT, 16oo-6o: Intet~zational Calvinism
and the Re]brined Ch*trch in Hungary and Transylvania (Oxford. 2000).
3 R. R. Heinisch, ~Habsburg, die Pforte und der Btilmfisehe Aut~tand (1618-20)', Sfidost Fol:whungen,
x.xxiii (1974), 1'~5-65; xxxiv (1975), 79-m4.
aj. v. Pofisensky, Tragic Triangle: The Netherlands, Spain, and Bohemia, 1617-22 (Prague, 1991). The
Dutch also rebuffed appeals from d~e landgrave of Hesse-Kassel when his land was invaded by
Bavarian troops: L. van Tongerloo, 'Beziehungen zwischen Hessen-Kassel und den Vereinigten Nie-
derl~inden w~ihrend des Dreissigi~hrigen Krieges', l-lessisches Jahrbuch fiir Landesgeschichte, xiv
(1964), 199-27o.
5o'2 Peter H. Wilson
argument that, as war was divine punishment, the populace should pray
and live a better life to avoid defeat. Even publications directed at an inter-
national audience, which did emphasize Protestant solidarity, treated it as
subordinate to political considerations; ones for a local audience were even
more cautious, owing to the substantial opposition within the government
to royal policy. Official documents separated practical questions, like
raising money and soldiers, from religious activities such as prayer and
penitence. Private opinion might blur the distinction, but nevertheless re-
garded the war as a purely Danish affair. The peace of 1629 was interpreted
as the result of divine intervention because it surpassed all reasonable ex-
pectations: the emperor returned all of Denmark's lost provinces without
charge, in return for Denmark's abandonment of its Protestant German
allies.1
Having noted the significance of religion in the civil war in Sweden in
the 159os, Schilling concedes that Sweden subsequently lacked a crusad-
ing impulse and focused on building a Baltic empire. It failed to answer
militants' prayers during the 162os, and even negotiated secretly with Wal-
lenstein in 1627-8 for an alliance that would allow it to seize Norway from
Denmark. z While religion did feature in the discussions prior to inter-
vention and in official justifications for it, it was always subordinate to
other considerations. There is evidence that Gustavus Adolphus may have
shared some militant Providentialist beliefs, but as many of his statements
are cryptic, Erik Ringmar is right to argue that the Swedish monarchy
suited the presentation of itself to the audience it was addressing? The
manifesto issued to justify the landing in Pomerania in 163o stressed
Sweden's defence of German constitutional rights and its determination to
avenge perceived slights at the hands of imperial diplomats? Thereafter,
religion remained subordinate to political considerations.
1 p. D. Lockhart, Denmark in the Thirty Years Wa~, 16z8-48(Selinsgrove, 1.996); G. Lind, qnter-
preting a Lost War: Danish Experience 1625 to 1629', ill Religionskriege,ed. Brendle and Sehiudlnig,
pp. 487-51o.
2 Polisensky and Kolhuann, Wullenstein, pp. 143"5. For the debate on Swedish intervention, see S.
Troebst, 'Debating the Mercantile Background to Earl), Modern Swedish Empire-Btfilding: Michael
Roberts versus Artur Attman', EnropeanHistory Quarterly, xxiv (1994), 485-5o9.
3 E. Ringmar, Identity, Interest, and Action: A Cnltural Explanation of Sweden's Intervention in the
Thirty Years War (Cambridge, 1996). See also, P. Piirm~ie, 'Just War in TheotT and Practice: The
Legitimation of Swedish Intervention in the Thirty Years War', Historical~ouTvtal, xlv (aoo2), 499"
523; J. Hohn, :King Gustav Adolf's Death: The Birda of Early Modern Nati~malism in Sweden', in
Statehood, ed. Eriksonas and Miiller, pp. lo9-3o.
'* Available in English in Wa~,Diplomac9; and Imperialism, 2628-1763,ed. G. S),meox (New York,
1974), pp. lo'-'-13.
The Thirty Years War 5o3
TrIE ROLEOF religion becomes comprehensible when we examine its place

in the dispute over the imperial constitution. The peace of Augsburg of
1555 was a hybrid, simultaneously a pohtical and a rehgious document in
which the two elements were not fused. The secular elements sat alongside
new forms of confessionalized law within a common framework that
looked back to pre-Reformation Christian unity. ~ The peace proved
remarkably successful. In stark contrast to France and the Netherlands, it
gave the empire sixty-three years of freedom from major conflict, the
longest period of peace in modern German history. It was not matched

until 2oo8, by the absence of hostilities since 1945. The peace remained
formally in force after 1618, and was not revised by the edict of Restitution,
which restated the Cathohc interpretation of the issues in dispute. In 1635,
the peace of Prague suspended the edict for forty years and endorsed the
peace of Augsburg. It was not modified until the peace of Westphalia.
The controversy surrounding the peace of Augsburg needs to be set into
the proper, constitutional, context. The religious terms took up only eight
out of 141 paragraphs in a document that was itself part of a raft of consti-
tutional reforms of justice, defence, pohce, and monetary policy. The re-
forms consohdated a process underway since the a48os that gave the early
modern empire its character as a mixed monarchy governed by the em-
peror, and composed of the imperial estates, the territories whose rulers
were represented in the Reichstag. Its structure was hierarchical: it left
considerable, unspecified powers to the emperor as sovereign overlord,
while grouping the imperial estates in a complex pattern of unequal status
and rights. The arrangement remained fluid, open to modification in indi-
vidual cases, as well as, potentially, either greater central authority or
greater princely autonomy.2
While strengthening the empire as a whole, the peace of Augsburg
represented a severe blow to the Habsburgs' bid to enhance imperial
authority. Charles V's attempts to settle the religious controversy and to
reorganize the empire along more dynastic lines were both unsuccessful.
His abdication was followed by tighter restrictions imposed by the electors
I M. Heckel, 'Autonomia und Pacis Compositio', Zeitachrifl der Sauvigny-St~/htngfiir Rechts-

geschichte, Kanonistische Abteilung, xlv 0959), 141-'~48. The best overview is A. Gotthard, Der
Augsburger ReligionsfHeden (Miinster, 2oo4), that should he read in conjunction with the extended
revie'a, by M. Heckel, Historische Zeitschrifl, cclxxxii ('-'oo6), 39]'42.5. Further ,'malysis of how
contemporaries disputed the contentious clauses can be found in H. Urban, Das Restittuionsedikt
(Munich, t968 ). See also~ M. Heckel, 'Staat und Kirche nach den Lehren der evangefischen Juristen
Deutschlands in der ersten H~ilfte des 17. Jahrhunderts', Zeitschrift der Sauvigny-St(ftnng fiir
Recht.~geschichte,Ka~tonistische Abteilung, x.lii(1956), 117"247, xliii (1957), `202-3O8;Als Frieden mb'glich
war. 45o~ahreAugsburgerReligiorufrieden, ed. A. C. Hoffmann et al. (Augsbmg, "2oo5).
2 For the debate on these developments, see P. H. Wilson, 'Still a Monstrosity? Some Reflections on
Early Modern German Statehood', Historical~ou~al, xlix (`2oo6),565-76.
5o4 Peter H. Wilson
on his successor, Ferdinand I, in a558. Meanwhile, the partition of the

Habsburg possessions deprived the formally senior Austrian branch of the
dynasty of Spain's resources at a time when the emperor faced renewed
Ottoman attacks. The structural problems were compounded by the
partition in 1564 of the Austrian lands, which lasted until 1619, with the
Tyrol remaining separate until 1665. Personal incapacity aggravated the
structural weaknesses after the accession of the mentally unstable Rudolf II
in 1576, whose increasingly erratic behaviour contributed substantially to
the loss of imperial authority around 16oo. The loss was serious, because
all parties looked to the emperor as supreme judge in disputes over the
interpretation of the imperial constitution. Ferdinand and his successor in
x564, Maximilian II, had maintained good personal relations with key
princes. Rudolf, however, aloof and haughty, and after 16oo a virtual
recluse, created a vacuum that gave the Elector Palatine and the duke of
Bavaria greater opportunity to advance their personal agendas:
The flaws in the peace of Augsburg, obvious at the time, only became of
political consequence with the emperor's incapacity. The root problem
was the de facto acceptance of religious schism at a time when people pre-
ferred a universal faith: plurality was theologically unacceptable because
there could be only one true religion. What began as a religious issue, then,
had legal and political consequences that assumed a life of their own. Any
form of religious peace threatened, by privatizing religion, to divide the
private persona fiom the public one embedded within a political collective.
The militants accused anyone who favoured such arrangements of being
politiques, who treated politics as more important than religion. 2 The
peace of Augsburg ignored the issue by omitting theological statements
and giving equal rights to Catholic and Lutheran imperial estates to exer-
cise the right of Reformation, or supervision of the church, in their own
territories. The terms were acceptable to moderates because they implied
the possibility of reconciling the confessions through theological compro-
mise, which is what contemporaries understood by religious toleration. 3
Militants insisted on sharper distinctions, but few questioned the legality
1 p. S. Fichtner, Emperor Maximilian H (New Haven, 2000; A. P. Luttenberger, Kurfiirsten, Kaiser

nnd Reich, Politi~&e Fiihrung und Friedenssicherung unter Ferdinand L und Maximilian 11. (Mainz,
1994); M. Lanzinner, Frieder~sicherung und politische Einheit des Reiches unter Maximilian II. (1564-
76) (Gtttingen, ]993). Rudolf's reign remains understudied, though his person',dity is well captured by
R.J.W. Evans, Rudolf Hand His World (2nd ed., Oxford, 1997).
2 E. Wolgast, 'Religionsfrieden als politisches Problem der Friihen Neuzeit', Historische Zeits&rifl,
ccLx.xxii(2oo6), 59"96.
3 H. Louthan, The Questfor Compromise: Peacemaking in Counter-Reformation Vienna (Cambridge,
1997); H. Gabel, 'Glaube - Individuum - Reichsrecht. Toleranzdenken im Reich ,.'on Augsburg his
Miiuster', in Krieg und Kultut: Die Rezeption yon Krieg und Frieden in der Niederliindischen Republik
nnd im Deuts&en Reich, 1568-1648, ed. H. Lademacher and S. Groenveld (Miinster, 1998), pp. 157-77.
of the settlement. Instead, disputes focused on the interpretation and

implementation of three terms: the exercise of the fight of Reformation by
the elected rulers of the Catholic ecclesiastical principalities; the status of
church property within Lutheran territories that had escaped secular-
ization; and religious freedom for imperial cities, imperial knights, and
dissenting minorities. While involving matters of faith, the disputes were
primarily about constitutional fights. Catholics turued to the imperial judi-
cial system to repel what they regarded as infringements of the peace, but
these so-called 'refigious cases' did not judge doctrine: they decided claims
to exercise constitutional and property fights)
The Protestant princes who ruled most of the larger, more populous
lands were outnumbered in imperial institutions by the rulers of the
smaller, but more numerous, Catholic lands. The imbalance did not cause
controversy immediately because the Reichskammergericht, the supreme
court with primary responsibility for upholding the peace of Augsburg,
was composed when deciding religious cases of equal numbers of judges
from both confessions. However, the supervision of the court was the
responsibility of the Reichstag that, like all imperial institutions, used
majority voting. The system was not necessarily defective, but remained
open to charges of bias from those who felt they had been denied justice,
or wished to mobilize support for a particular agenda.
Constitutional issues also dominated the debate among Protestants
about their fight to challenge the Catholic majority. Unlike Polish or Hun-
garian nobles, German princes lacked fully articulated rights of resistance;
they merely asserted their right to freedom of association? The balance of
power between emperor and imperial estates was still evolving when the
Reformation raised the question of religious liberty. For Catholics, true
freedom, which came only from grace, was achievable only within their
own universal church. As both the political and, at this point, demographic
minority, Protestants initially invoked God and Scripture as higher author-
ities than emperor and pope, a claim that threatened to place them outside
the established political order. The likely consequence swiftly became
obvious when imperial knights and then, far more serious, peasants and
burghers made the same claim in the early 152os to justify plans for the
radical reorganization of society and the redistribution of wealth. 3 The
1 M. Heckel, 'Die Religionsprozesse des Reichskannnergefichts im konfessionell gespaltenen Reichs-

kirchenrecht', Zeitschrift der Sauvig~y-$tiflung fiir Rechtsgescl,ichte, Kanonistische Abteihtng, Ixxvii
0991), 283"35o; G. Dolezalek, 'Die juristische Argumentation der Assessoren am Reichskanuner-
gerieht zu den Reformationsprozessen, 153o-8 ', in Das Reickskammergericht in der deutschen
Geschichte, ed. B. Diestelkamp (Cologne, 199o), pp. 25-58.
2 Furdler discussion of these alliance rights in H. Carl, Der 8chwiibischeBund, 1488-1.534(Lehlfelden-
Echterdingen, oooo).
3 p. Blickle, The Revolution of15~5 (B',dtimore. 1985).
506 Peter H. Wilson
ensuing controversy helped to fragment the evangelical movement, with

the mainstream emerging by 153o as Lutheranism, which reconciled resist-
ante with Christian obedience by placing it within the established defini-
tion of a just war. To be just, a war had to meet three criteria: to be waged
according to accepted norms (right intent) and on sufficient legal grounds
(just cause), and to be directed by a proper authority?
The second and third criteria proved the most contentious. Just cause
was defined as opposition to tyranny, which included attempts by estab-
lished authorities to interfere with 'true religion', while proper authority

was restricted to the imperial estates, which made the first 'Protest' in 1529
against the Catholic majority in the Reichstag that gave the wider move-
ment its name. Several important Lutheran princes then formed in 153t a
defensive association, known as the Schmalkaldic League, which encoun-
tered the problems that were to bedevil the Protestant Union: its failure
contributed to the weakness of subsequent Protestant alliances. Martin
Luther and other theologians endorsed the league with great reluctance,
while the Protestant imperial cities regretted their decision to join when
they found themselves footing the bill for the leadership's private interests,
such as restoring in 1534 the outlawed duke of Wiirttemberg, or invading
the duchy of Brunswick in t545. Such actions allowed Charles V to chal-
lenge the league on the grounds that it had disturbed the peace of the
empire. His victory in 1546-7 discredited the league, even among its own
members. 2
Defeat broke the fragile consensus on the right of resistance. A minority
adhered to a more theocratic, apocalyptic vision represented by the
Magdeburg confession of 155o, issued while that city was still defying the
emperor. This extended the definition of proper authority to include
'lesser magistrates', such as city councils, among those entitled to lead
resistance, joined by clergy who assumed the right to admonish secular
leaders if they failed in their duty towards true religion. The confession
voiced the views of those backed into a corner: tyrants were beyond
redemption and resistance meant a fight to the finish? Although elements
1 K. Repgen, 'Kriegslegitimationen in Alteuropa', I'listorische Zeitschrifl, ccxli 0985), 27"49; R. R.

Benert, 'Lutheran Resistance Theory and d~e Imperial Constitution', II pen.ffero politico, vi (1973), 17-
36.
2 E. Fabian, Die Entstehung des Schmalkaldischen Bnndes und seine Verfmsung, 1524/~9-1531/35
(Tiibingeu, 196'2); R. Hauswirth, Landgraf Philipp yon Hessen nnd Zwingli. VormL~setznngen nnd Ge-
schichle der politisd~en Beziehungen zwiJchen Hessen, Straflbur~ Konstanz, Ulm, Ub~ch yon Wiirttera-
belt nnd die r~formierten Eidgenossen, 1526-~53t (Tii >ingen, 1968); T A Brady, 'Phases and Su'ategies
of the Schmalkaldic League', Archivfiir Reformationsgeachichte, Ixx.iv0983), 16o-8L
3 T. Kaufinann, Das Ende der Reformation: MagdebnTgs 'herrgotts kandei' 0548-t551/2) (Tiibingen,
'~on3); J. Finucane, ' " T o Remain Unaltered in the Courage You Have Inherited from Your An-
cestors": Magdeburg under Siege, 1547-t631' (Ph.D. dissertation, Tfiuity College Duhlhl, ooo8); D. M.
Whitlord, Tyranny and Resistance: The Magdeburg Cortfession and the Lutheran Tradition (St Louis,
from the confession were incorporated into Calvinist theories of resistance,

they were rejected by mainstream Protestant thought, which restricted
leadership to princes and left open the possibility of compromise by de-
fining resistance as a form of persuasion designed to make wayward rulers
see the error of their ways and repent. There was no linear path towards
militancy during the remainder of the sixteenth century. Moderate, more
secular views generally prevailed, even though militant ideas took hold
whenever Protestant interests seemed to be threatened directly, t
None of the disputes that occurred in the last two decades of the six-
teenth century was serious, with the exception of the attempted seculariza-
tion of the electorate of Cologne in 1583, when the involvement of Spain
briefly threatened to entangle the empire with the Dutch war. Other cases
involved the disputed election of the bishop of Strasbourg and attempts by
Protestants to exclude Catholics from imperial cities like Aachen and
Donauw6rth. The most important case was the 'four monasteries dispute'
of 1597-9, in which the Reichskammergericht upheld Catholic protests
against secularization. The verdicts applied constitutional and property
law, and Protestant judges joined their Catholic colleagues to provide the
necessary majority. Most Protestant estates accepted the verdicts, albeit
reluctantly, but the Palatinate led a minority in protest in an attempt to
rally support for a new Protestant alliance. Such a group, which had no
foundation in imperial law, also challenged the hierarchical character of the
empire by combining estates of varying status within the same body.
Though presented as upholding the constitution, the Palatinate's pro-
gramme after 16o4 for a corpus evangelicorum posed a serious threat to the
existing order and was consistently rejected by Saxony as well as by the
Catholics? The rejection not only explains the delay in forming the Prot-
estant Union and its structural weaknesses, but also why confessional
issues had to be pushed to the fore to rally support for it. Only through
fostering a climate of fear and suspicion were the Palatinate's leaders able
to convince some of dieir co-religionists to join the alliance.
The weakness of confessional bonds was revealed in the Protestants'
response to the Bohemian revolt and Frederick V's acceptance of the
crown of Bohemia in 1619 . As the first Protestants openly to defy the
MO,2o00.
x R. v. Friedeburg, Sdf-Defenceand Religious Strife in Early Modern Europe:England and Germany,
153o-168o (Mdershot, '2oo'2), pp. 35"153. See ,alSO, W. Schulze, 'Estates and tile Problem of Resistance
ill Theory and Practice ill the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries'. ill Crown, Church, and Estates,
ed. Evans and Thomas, pp. 158-75; A. Strohmcyer, Konfession.~kor~fliktund Herrschaflsordnung. DcLs
Widerstandsrecht bei den 6sterreichischenStiinden 055o-~65o) (Mainz, 2o06).
2 K. Schlaich, 'Coqms Evangeficorum und Coqms Cathoficormn', DerStaat, xi (197'2),218-3o; D. M.
Phelps, 'Reich, Religion, and Dynasty: The Formation of Saxon Policy, 1555-16t9' (Ph.D. dissertation,
Kings College London, 2005).
508 Peter H. Wilson
emperor since 1552, the Bohemians published their Apologia on 25 May

1618, two days after the Defenestration of Prague. If there was ever a
moment for a confessional appeal, this was it. Yet, in the Apologia, reli-
gious arguments justifying rebellion take second place behind the claim
that the Habsburg government had infringed the imperial constitution and
contravened the Letter of Majesty. Even here, defiance is expressed in the
stock form of criticism of'evil advisers', to enable the rebels to claim to be
loyal to the emperor: Significandy, the elector of Saxony, Johann Georg,
not only rejected the constitutional claims, but also a subsequent appeal on
religious grounds?
Foreign involvement did not change the underlying character of the war.
The widespread, and mistaken, assumption that the war became inter-
nationalized upon Sweden and France's intervention derives from nine-
teenth-century German historians' depiction of their country as the victim
of plundering foreign hordes) Spain's intervention was limited to two
attempts in 1633 and 1634 to send an army across the Alps and down the
Rhine to the Netherlands. The presence of Swedish troops in southern
Germany obliged the Spanish to fight their way through, contributing in
the process to the imperial victory at N6rdlingen: Sweden and France
justified their intervention as the defence of 'German liberties' against
'Habsburg tyranny': the claim was more than mere rhetoric, as both
powers saw increased security from a change to the imperial constitution
that lowered the emperor's status to p~'imus inter pares. Officially, the em-
peror insisted that the original dispute had been settled by 163o by the
(unratified) treaty of Regensburg with France (which ended the dispute
over the Mantuan succession), the peace of Liibeck with Denmark in 1629,
and the edict of Restitution. His aim was to preserve the gains the Habs-
burgs had made during the first half of the war and to exclude them from
negotiations with Sweden or France. Ferdinand III, who regarded Fred-
erick V's bid for the Bohemian crown as 'the cause of the war', saw the
wars with Sweden and France as the continuation of the struggle that
began in x618.s
1 The Apologia is printed in Quellen znr Vorgeschichte und zu den Anfiingen des DreiJ3ig~iihrige,~
Krieges, ed. G. Lorenz (Darmstadt, 1991), pp. '237-5O.My reading differs fi'om A. Gotthard, 'Einefeste
Burg ist vnser vnnd der B6hmen Gott. Der biihmisc|le Aufstand 1618/19 in der Wahrnehmung des
evangelischen Deutschland': in Religionskriegr, ed. Brendle and Schiudfing, pp. 135-6~', who sees it as
a refigious appeal.
2 Phelps, 'Reich, Religion~ and Dynasty', pp. 214-64; F. Miiller, Knrsachsen nnd der Bo'hmische Anf-
stand, 2628-~ (Miinster, 1997), pp. t49-2OL
3 K. Cramer, The Thirty Years War and German Memo~7 in the .~:ineteenth Century (Lincoln, NE,
2007).
4 p. Hrncir~, Spanier aufdem AIbnch. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Schlacht bei N6rdlingen im Jahre
1634 (Aachen, 2oo7).
s Ferdinand's instructions to his chiefplenipotentiary, Count Trauttmannsdorfl', 16 Oct. 1645, printed
Religion remained subordinate to constitutional questions during the

peace negotiations at Westphalia) Religion supplied the moral high
ground, as it had in wartime propaganda. The instructions given to the
Spanish and French envoys contained almost identical phrases about the
necessity of peace for the reposo de la christiandad[repos de la Chrestientg. 2
There was some reason for this, given the outbreak of the Ottoman-
Venetian war in 1645, but in practice the desire to fight the hereditary
enemy of Christendom did little to hasten a settlement. Confessional antag-
onism was not, however, the major cause of delay. The origirr,d 'Protestant
Cause' championed by the Palatinate and the Bohemian confederates had
been lost by 1623 when Ferdinand II transferred Frederick V's lands and
titles to Maximilian of Bavaria. The conditions of the grant remained to be
settled, but were mostly settled by the time Frederick's death in 1632 re-
moved the main obstacle. England, by the 164os, was in no position to
object, while the other powers used the fate of the Palatinate and the
Bohemian exiles merely as a bargaining chip?
If the fate of Catholics living in the northern Netherlands affected
Spain's reputacitn, colonial issues affected it more. Whereas Spain could
not make colonial concessions without alienating the Portuguese, in rebel-
lion from 164o, the Dutch representatives who resisted peace were heavy
investors in their West India Company, which faced ruin if Brazil was
restored to Portugal. These issues postponed agreement to a peace that
had been on the table since 1632, but was not signed until January 1648. 4
Though Spain and France accused the other of harming Christian interests
by continuing the war, religion did not prevent peace between them in
1648: the negotiations failed because Louis XIV's chief minister, Cardinal
Mazarin, tended to raise his demands whenever Spain gave ground: The
Franco-Austrian negotiations were prolonged by his demand for Alsace
and his refusal to negotiate with envoys who represented both branches of
in Acta Pacis Westphalicae, series 1:h~t,~ktionen, vol. I, ed. H. Wagner (Miinster, 1962), pp. 44o-52.
1 For an overview, see K. Repgen, 'Die Hauptprobleme der Wesdlilischen Ffiedensverhandlungen yon
1648 und ihre Ltsungen', Zeitschr~ftjqir Bayerische Landesgeschichtc, l.,di (1999), 399"438. The classic
study is F. Dickauann. Der WesOCiilischeFrieden (7th ed., Mimster, 1998).
2 M. Rohrschneider, Der gescheiterte Frieden yon Milnster. Spaniens Ringen mit Frankreich aT~'dem
Westfiilischen Fl~edenskongress 0643-9) (Miinster, '-'007), pp. 79-8a.
3J. Steiner, Die 'pfiilzische Kurwiirde wiihrend des Dreiflig~iihrigen Krieges 0618-48) (Speyer, 1985),
esp. pp. 152-88.
4 D. E. A. Faber and R. E. De Bruin, 'Utrecht's Oppositon to the Miiuster Peace Process', in ~648, ed.
Bussmann and Schilling, i. 4t3-2~,;J. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-
18o6 (Ox|ord, J995), PP. 5~5-43, and idem, Dutch PT"ima~"in World Trade, 15g~5-174o(Oxford, t989) ,
pp. 168-96.
5 p. Sourmlo, 'Preludc to the Froude: The French Delegation at the Peace of Westphalia'. in Der West-
fiilische Friede, ed. Ducl'dlardt, pp. '~o4-5. See generally, Rolu'schneider, Der gescheiterte Frieden yon
Miinster.
51o Peter H. Wilson
the Habsburgs. Ferdinand II had offered Alsace to Spain in t6x7 as part of

the bargain over the Habsburg succession, while both branches of the
dynasty considered joint representation essential to safeguard their dy-
nastic interests. Refigion played only a minor role. Bavaria and the German
Catholic estates urged Ferdinand III to cede Alsace in order, by making
peace with France, to break up the Franco-Swedish alliance. While the
effect might have been to lessen what might have to be conceded to the
Protestants, Bavaria's goal was to win French backing for its retention of
the Palatine lands and electoral title transferred to Maximilian by Ferdi-

nand II in 1623)
Whereas these talks in Mfinster were between Catholics, confession
seemed superficially more prominent in the negotiations at Osnabriick be-
tween Protestant Sweden and the Catholic emperor. When France backed
Sweden's demands to ensure a common front against the emperor, the
confessional issues formed part of a package of constitutional reforms
designed to emasculate the emperor and prevent him either from helping
Spain against France, or threatening the territorial acquisitions Sweden
hoped to make. In addition to 5 million talers to pay off the army, Sweden
received half of Pomerania and the former ecclesiastical lands of Bremen
and Verden. Other ecclesiastical principalities were secularized to com-
pensate Brandenburg, which also laid claim to Pomerania. Ferdinand III
supported Brandenburg's territorial demands to create a more effective
buffer against Sweden in the Baltic, 2 and agreed, in September 1645, to the
Franco-Swedish demand that the imperial estates should join the talks.
Although the concession represented the abandonment of the Habs-
burgs' goal since 163o of trying to rally all Germans to resistance to foreign
invaders, it proved an astute move: once the imperial estates' right to par-
ticipate had been recognized, they lost interest in the Franeo-Swedish bid
to undermine the emperor's status within the empire. Most issues had
been settled by May 1646. Peace was postponed only by France and
Sweden's objections to the constitutional compromise hammered out by
the imperial diplomats, and by Ferdinand III's reliasal to abandon Spain.
The compromise, which entailed the revision of the right of Reformation,
fixed the confessional composition of the empire as it had been on 1
January 1624.
I These twists ,'rod turns are detailed in D. Croxton, Peacemaking in Earl3' Mode~ Enrope: Cardinal
Mazarin and the Congress of Westphalia, 1643-8 (Selinsgrove, 1999); A. Tischer, Franztsische Diplo-
mat# und Diplomaten auf dem Wes~ilischen FTqedenskon~ress (Miinster, 1999); G. hmnler, Karfiirst
Maximilian L und der Westfiilische Friedenskongrefl. Die bayerische aTL~wiirtigePolitik yon 1644 bis zum
Ulmer Wttf'fenstiUstand (Miinster, 1992).
2 H. Langer, 'Die pommersehen Landstiinde und der Westf~ilische Ffiedenskongrefl', in Der West-
fiiliache Friede, ed. Duehhardt, pp. 485"99, and S. Lundkvist, 'Die schwedischen Friedenskonzptionen
und ihre Umsetztmg in Osnabriick', in ibid., pp. 349"59.
The Thirty Years War 5n
The compromise represented a reduction in princely autonomy, as

rulers who had converted after that date were not allowed to oblige their
subjects to follow their example. Minorities who could prove legal rights of
worship dating from 1624 had to be tolerated; even other minorities could
be expelled only after three years' notice, and nobody could be refused
medical treatment, education, or burial on religious grounds. The emperor
was granted an exemption, enabling him to continue the Habsburgs' pre-
war policy of stabilizing their authority by promoting confessional con-
formity throughout their lands, with the partial exception of Silesia. After
Viennese theologians had approved these terms, and France and Sweden
accepted them in June 1647, peace was signed in October 1648 after
Ferdinand III gave up hope of including Spain:
The emperor's tactics enabled moderate voices to gain the ascendancy
among the imperial estates. The leading Catholic representative was
Johann Phifipp yon Schtnborn, who became bishop of Wiirzburg in 1642,
then elector of Mainz in 1647. Maximilian of Bavaria also criticized zealots
for delaying the peace, while his brother, Ferdinand, elector of Cologne,
removed the militant Franz yon Wartenberg from his delegation.2 Protest-
ants, too, made concessions - allowing the archbishop of Salzburg to chair
the princes' meeting, for instance - and criticized Hesse-Kassel for using
religion as a device to try to postpone giving back lands it had seized
during the war. 3 Some militants even recognized the incompatibility be-
tween confessional demands and constitutional claims: Jacob Lampadius,
who represented Brunswick-Grubenhagen7 conceded that restricting free-
dom of conscience to Protestants conflicted with the notion of liberty that
underpinned political and corporate privilege within the empire?
The peace of Westphalia was not a solely secular settlement: it modified
the hybrid arrangements made at Augsburg in 1555. The empire remained
hierarchical, as the right of Reformation remained restricted to princes,
I R. v. lGetzell, 'Der Frankfurter Deputationstag yon 1642-5', Nassauiscke Annalen, Ixxxiii (1972), 99"
n9; K. Ruppert, Die kaiserliche Politilr auf dem Westfdlischen Friedenskongress (1643-8) (Miinster,
1979), esp. pp. 258-66. These changes were far more important than die practice of itio in partes, or
voting as two confessional groups on refigious issues, which was used only five times alter 1648.
2 F. J~.irgensmeier, 'Johann Phifipp yon Schtnborn', Friinkische Lebensbilde~; vi (1975), 161-84; G.
Schmid, 'Konfessionspolitik und Staatsr~ison bei den Verhand|ungen des Westffilischen Friedens-
kongresses fiber die Gravamina Ecc|esiastica'. Archivfi'ir RefoTvnatio~sgeschichte, xfiv (1953), ~'o3-23;
J. F. Foerster, Kurfiirst Ferdinand yon Ktln. Die Politik seiner Stifle in den Jahren 1634-5o (M/luster,
1976), pp. 30"-63.
3 Heinisch, Paria GrafLodron, pp. ~'81-95; K. Beck, Der hessische Bruder,.wist zwischen Hessen-Kassd
und Hessen-Darmstadt in den Verhandlungen zum Westflilischen Frieden yon 1644 bis 1648 (Fralffffurt
am Main, 1978), pp. 54"73; F. Wolff, 'Frankreich, Hessen-Kassel und die kolffessionellen Corpora auf
dem Westt'alischen Friedeuskongre[~', in Frankreich und Hessen-Kaasel, ed. K. Malettke (Marburg,
1999), pp. 18'z-'2o2.
4 R. G. Asch, '"Dean es sind ja die Deutschen [...] ein frey Volk." Die Glaubensfreiheit als Problem
der Westf;ilischen Ffiedensverhandlungen', Westfiiliache Zeitsehrift; cxlviii (1998), 1~'3"9.
5m Peter H. Wilson
with limited privileges granted to the cities and knights) Calvinists, despite
opposition from Saxony, received rights comparable to the rights of Lu-
therans and Catholics, but freedom of conscience was not formally recog-
nized. In addition, the empire remained holy, in the sense of being exclu-
sively Christian. Jewish minorities remained dependent on special imperial
or princely dispensations for toleration. 2
At the heart of the original dispute, the imperial constitution also
provided the solution to it. Precisely because the imperial constitution
incorporated rehgion without defining doctrine, all parties could appeal to

it to legitimate their actions. The constitution was able to sustain the six-
teenth-century humanist ideal of a 'common fatherland' standing above
sectarianism? A decisive shift had occurred, nonetheless: the peace of
Augsburg had incorporated Lutherans within a pohtical framework closely
identified with pre-Reformation universal Cathohcism. Thirty years of
violence had placed them on a more equal footing and encouraged them to
identify with a political framework that guaranteed their freedoms.
Sectarian hatred could be defused by shifting disputes away from abstract
concepts like ultimate truth to the precise interpretation of local and
particular rights able to be settled by judicial arbitration or bureaucratic
review. Thus, in the eighteenth century, though the majority of imperial
estates were still ruled by Catholics, Protestant writers became the imperial
constitution's most prolific and ardent defenders.
As NONEOF the existing definitions of religious war apply in their entirety

to the Thirty Years War, their use has distorted our understanding of it.
The conventional definition is too vague. The war was a religious war in
the sense that all parties included faith and church in the common good
they sought to defend. However, this general objective had little bearing
on decisions for war or peace. The war was not a confessional war. The
population did not divide neatly along sectarian lines, nor did faith dictate
the choice of allies. The so-called age of religious wars was, in fact,
1 R. Endres, 'Die Ffiedensziele der Reichsritterschaft", in Der Westfiilische Friede, ed. Duchhardt, pp.
565-78; H. B. Spies, 'L/ibeck, die Hanse und der Westt",ilischeFrieden', Hanische Geschichtsbliitter, cx
098~,), 11o-24; H. Langer, 'Ffiedensvorstellungen der Sflidtegesandten auf dem Westffilischen Frie-
denskongrefl (1644-8)'.,Zeitsch~flfiirGeschichtswissenschaft, xx.xv(t987), 1o6o-72.
2 Judeu im Recht. Neue Zugiinge zur Rechtsgeschichte der Jnden im Allen Reich, ed. A. Gotzmann and
S. Wendehorst (Berlin, ~'oo7).
3 G. Schmidt: 'Die "deutsche Freiheit" und der Westt~ilisehe Friede', in Frieden und Krieg in der
Friihen Xeuzeit, ed. R. G. Aseh et al. (Munie|h 2OOl), pp. 323"47; A. Sehmidt, Vaterlandsliebe und
Relgionskol~flikt. Politische Diskurse im alten Reich 0555-1648) (Leiden, 2oo7); Sehindling, 'Das
Stra|~gerichtGottes', in Das Strafgoicht Gottes, ed. Asche and Sehindling, pp. ~7"44.
The Thirty Years War 5~
characterized by more cross-confessional alliances than cross-ideological

ones during the cold war. The stress on confessionalization blurs the dis-
tinction between militants and moderates, and treats everyone as militant.
Confessional antagonism was not necessary for mutual suspicion, as the
relations between Spain and France clearly demonstrate. Nor did the war
arise from a clash of civilizations: it was fought about the meaning of the
imperial constitution, of which religious rights were an integral part. These
rights were subsequently built into a peace that did not impose a fully
secular order.
The Thirty Years War was a holy war only for a minority of militants
who did not necessarily hold this view throughout it. Militancy sharpened
the polemical edge of debate, and fostered the conviction that, with funda-
mentals at stake, compromise was impossible. But such a conviction was
difficult to sustain, given the scale and duration of a war fought with mer-
cenaries and conscripted peasant militias. Rulers consulted theologians on
particular issues, as Frederick V did before accepting the crown of Bo-
hemia, and Ferdinand II did wlfile drafting the edict of Restitution. Rulers
were also cognizant of the theological debate; their faith influenced certain
of their decisions. However, no party claimed to be waging a holy war, and
religion played a small role in justifications for hostilities that focused on
legal and political rights. Militancy featured most prominently among cler-
ical observers and groups like the Bohemian exiles who suffered personally
from defeat.
Religion and politics remained distinct throughout the war. Theological
controversies had been disguised since the peace of Augsburg, which
deliberately avoided the use of sectarian language in favour of neutral or
ambiguous terms acceptable to both sides. Clergy might dispute the impli-
cations for belief and ritual, but by 1555 religious freedom had become one
of the political and legal riglits guaranteed under the imperial constitution.
Disputes over doctrine took second place to the dispute over the exercise
of constitutional rights. As most contemporaries understood, a more sect-
arian approach to the war would have narrowed their political options,
restricted their choice of allies, and lessened the chances of victory or
peace.
In explaining the Thirty Years War, we should pay more attention to
contingency and agency. Neither the outbreak nor the duration of the war
was inevitable. Throughout it, numerous voices urged reason, or at least
caution, including those who genuinely believed that war was contrary to
the true interests of their faith. None of the problems that led to the war
was unsolvable, but militants presented them as such and deliberately
inflamed them, especially at the beginning. When a dispute about power
and influence within the empire was viewed through a confessional lens,
5t4 Peter H. Wilson
complex legal and constitutional issues were transformed into a cosmic

showdown between good and evil. Even if such beliefs affected decision-
makers only momentarily, the outcome could be disastrous for hundreds
of thousands, as in tile case of the Defenestration of Prague and the Elector
Palatine's acceptance of the crown of Bohemia. The contemporary political
and constitutional structures could not constrain rulers fi'om going to war,
even if the underdeveloped fiscal-military infrastructure of seventeenth-
century states made success uncertain.
University of Hull

The International History Review

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The International History Review

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

This article was downloaded by: [University of Auckland Library]

On: 09 October 2014, At: 14:14

The International History Review

Dynasty, constitution, and confession: The role of

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2008.10415483

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Dynasty, Constitution, and Confession:

NE ROOT OF the resurgence of interest in the place of religion in

O human affairs lies in the postmodernist critique of materialist ex-

The International History Review, xxx. 3: September 2oo8, pp. 473-708-

states system is acknowledged even by scholars who stress continuity

national struggle against Spanish Habsburg pretensions to universal mon-

The conventional definition of a religious war is one fought about

Despite the unprecedented support, Emperor Rudolf II (r. 1576-1612)

century Protestant and Catholic reform movements who sought to set

Some scholars list these developments under the conventional heading of

favoured later by Realpolitik. Conventionally 'weak' states - the papacy or

against a Protestant civilization associated with representative govermnent

1 Schilling, KonfessionalisietTtng und Staatsinteressen, p. 399.

as 'chosen': Catholics generally favoured recharged versions of univer-

fession stressed the subordination of human affairs to divine omnipotence,

The difficulty in defining religious war points to the methodological

motivated parties. Members of the same church disagreed violently over

ends of a continuum, rather than as mutually exclusive. An individual

1 Example in M. Riide, England und Kurpfalz im weT"dendenMiichteenropa 0608-32) (Stuttgart, 2oo7),

THE EXTENSIVELITERATUREon confessionahzation modifies the assumption

the century after 165o than in the previous one)

confessionalizing, and even the militant Julius Echter, bishop of Wtirzburg

eran Magdeburg, despite their church's official repudiation of relics, pro-

Habsburg government were converts, or resembled the future generalis-

sued within the limits of the moderate position represented by Klesl:

1 W. Wiintig, 'Kurs~ichsiche Exulantenauti,ahme hn 17. Jahrhundert', )r ArchivJ~r siichsische Ge-

P~.OPL~.nat) Acc~.ss to an unprecedented range of media during the Thirty

tended to recount military events and speculate on developments rather

by their nationalities or conunanders, not as 'Catholics' but as 'imperialists'

victim or embodying peace, as in the celebration of the peace of Prague in

proached, civilians fled to the woods, marshes, or fortified towns. Un-

I Burkhardt, 'Reichskriege', pp. 72-8o.

been magnified by subsequent literary depictions; ~ the cruelty noted in

Zeitschrififiir Geschichtswi~senschaft,xlvii (1999), 79"-806.

general in 1647-8 was Peter Melander von Holzapfel (1589-1648), a Calvin-

Far from invariably targeting clergy, sometimes soldiers deliberately

unrehable guide. The official interpretation attributed the war to divine

Evidence from Catholic communities presents an equally diverse

THE ASSERTION THAT confession structured alliances underpins the

Many Catholic territories, however, pursued confessionalization within

pejorative label attached to it by Protestants hoping to tar it by association

48/9 (Miinster, 1997).

mon threats to the faith2 Similarly, Lutheran fundamentalists sparked riots

forces, as well as education in Protestant universities and fund-raising trips

similar opposition during his tenure as chief minister in Hesse-Kassel. ~As

TrIE ROLEOF religion becomes comprehensible when we examine its place

longest period of peace in modern German history. It was not matched

I M. Heckel, 'Autonomia und Pacis Compositio', Zeitachrifl der Sauvigny-St~/htngfiir Rechts-

on his successor, Ferdinand I, in a558. Meanwhile, the partition of the

1 p. S. Fichtner, Emperor Maximilian H (New Haven, 2000; A. P. Luttenberger, Kurfiirsten, Kaiser

of the settlement. Instead, disputes focused on the interpretation and

1 M. Heckel, 'Die Religionsprozesse des Reichskannnergefichts im konfessionell gespaltenen Reichs-

ensuing controversy helped to fragment the evangelical movement, with

lished authorities to interfere with 'true religion', while proper authority

1 K. Repgen, 'Kriegslegitimationen in Alteuropa', I'listorische Zeitschrifl, ccxli 0985), 27"49; R. R.

from the confession were incorporated into Calvinist theories of resistance,

emperor since 1552, the Bohemians published their Apologia on 25 May