In this scenario question, we will explore the rights of Sasha, Gloria, and Barbie and

how they are affected by the sale of Pink Cottage under the Land Protection Act

2002(LPA2002) and Land Registration Act 2002(LRA2002). We will also delve into whether

Ruth and Alan are meant to have specific rights and whether they should have been involved

in the sale as per the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996(TLATA1996).

Parking in garage

Sasha has an express agreement that she uses particularly to park her car sometimes.

If this is an easement, it must have been registered and given by deed as illustrated in s1(2)

and s52 LPA1925 to be valid. An expressly created easement is only binding and legitimate if

it is registered against the title of Pink Cottage, as per s27(2)(d), LRA2002. Barbie will be

bound by it if that has been completed, but not otherwise. If the easement is equitable, it will

only be a tiny interest and might be safeguarded by registering a notice. Schedule 3,

paragraph 3 only applies to legal easements that are not subject to registration requirements

of s27, therefore if it is insufficiently protected, it will not be covered.

It is debatable whether the equitable easement of Sasha qualifies for protection under

Schedule 3, paragraph 2 given his ownership interest and the possibility that she is occupying

the space. Parking a car in an area of the property has been acknowledged as an actual

occupation as per Saeed v Plustrade,1 whilst the use of a right of way was not an actual

occupation where it corresponded merely the use of the land in Chaudhary v Yavuz.2 These

cases were decided regarding Epps v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd,3 under the old law in s70(1)(g)

LRA1925. Parking in a garage by agreement, nevertheless, represented adequate occupancy

to fulfill the provision concerning a right of pre-emption of the garage in Kling v Keston
1
[2012] EWCA Civ 2011.
2
[2011] EWCA Civ 1314.
3
[1973] 1 WLR 1071.
Properties Ltd.4 It was stated the sporadic presence of the car in the garage would have

sufficed if it had not been parked at the time. Furthermore, Schedule 3, paragraph 2(c)(i),

stipulates that at the moment of the transfer, the interest had to be evident upon a sufficiently

meticulous inspection of the land. It might be impossible for the sporadic presence of the car

of Sasha to meet that. Regardless, the overriding interest would only be enforceable on the

same terms and conditions against Barbie.

Lease to Gloria

Though with certain limitations, Gloria can exercise the rights of a landowner

according to Street v Mountford.5 The case Hunter v Canary Wharf,6 underlined the

significance of a right to ownership of property and exclusive possession which is the

'bedrock of English land law'.7 Gloria has a monthly tenancy which is probably a legal

periodic tenancy under s54(2) LPA1925. According to Schedule 3 para 1 LRA2002, it is

safeguarded as an overriding interest since it is a legal lease with a maximum duration of

seven years. Under LRA2002, leases spanning more than seven years are substantively

registrable. As a proprietary interest, the lease of Gloria is additionally protected under

Schedule 3, paragraph 2, as long as she is occupying the space. Before the date of disposition

as well as the day the interest of the purchaser is registered, there must be overriding

interests. The interest of Gloria is therefore safeguarded by Schedule 3, paragraph 1, making

it enforceable against Barbie.

Promise to Midge

4
(1983) 49 P & CR 212.
5
(1985) UKHL 4.
6
(1997) UKHL 14.
7
Ben Mcfarlane, Nicolas Hopkins & Sarah Nield, Land Law (2nd edition, Oxford University Press 2020) 80.
 The enforceable agreement that Ken made to Midge, even if it is not included in the

deed is a restrictive covenant. According to s32 LRA2002, a covenant on registered land

must be recorded as a notice on the charges register of Pink Cottage. Barbie would have a

notice under s29(2) LRA2002 if it was recorded. However, under s 29(1) LRA2002, Barbie

would be considered not to have a notice if it was omitted. Moreover, if Barbie did not pay

thoughtful attention, then she certainly did have notice. Considering a restrictive covenant

does not grant Barbie actual occupation, an unentered restrictive covenant will be an interest

that can supersede the position on the register under Sch 3 para 2 LRA2002.

Selling to Barbie

Barbie will become the legitimate owner of the property if she complies with the

registration requirements of s27(1) LRA2002. Barbie is limited to an equitable freehold estate

in the land if she fails to, then Ken will maintain the legal fee simple on bare trust. Law

Commission 2016 suggested giving the individual eligible for proprietor registration the same

ability to make decisions as a registered proprietor.8 This is backed by s23 LRA2002, the

powers of the owner should not be practically restricted until they are reflected in an entry in

the register. Once the transferee is identified as the proprietor in the register, the registration

criteria for the transfer of a legal freehold are satisfied under Sch 2 para 2 LRA2002.

Ken is the owner of Pink Cottage held in trust for him, and Ruth, and Alan are the

beneficiaries. In equity, they are all tenants in common. Under s6(1) TLATA1996, Ken as the

sole trustee, retains the authority of an absolute owner. S11 TLATA1996 emphasises the full

age and beneficial entitlement of Ruth and Alan to an interest in possession. Ken just needs to

comply with their instructions when they align with the overall goals of the trust. The clause

in s11(2) TLATA1996 excludes the right of Ruth and Alan to be consulted. S12 and S13
8
Barbara Bougsz, Roger Sexton, Complete Land Law, (6th edition, Oxford University Press 2019) 120.
TLATA1996 grant Ruth and Alan the right to inhabit the land. A beneficiary may occupy

trust property anytime provided that the objective of the trust includes providing beneficiaries

with land to inhabit and that the land is both available and appropriate for use, in compliance

with s12(1) and (2) TLATA1996. The authority of Ken may be used, but only with the

consent of Ruth and Alan. Since the role of the trustee includes the authority to sell the

property, Ruth, and Alan, parties with an interest in the property, might file an application

under s14 TLATA1996. They would then have to consider the pertinent issues under s15

TLATA1996 which correspond to matters that are essential when evaluating applications.

The issue of whether Ken will take free of any interests after the sale depends on

whether there has been overreaching which enables Barbie to separate the land from the

beneficial interests under the trust. Mortgage Express v Lambert,9 shows how overreaching

can go above beneficial interests under a trust. In line with s2 and s27 LPA1925,

overreaching provides purchase money to a trust company or at least two trustees. This

successfully separates the interest from the land, permitting Barbie to take free from it.

Instead of being over the property, the interest now lies in the purchase monies that were

spent. The interest is still attached to the land. The land is registered; nevertheless, it is not

evident from the registration if any attempts have been undertaken to safeguard the beneficial

interests, for instance by way of a restriction under s40 LRA2002. The trustees will then

either reinvest the funds or allocate them among the beneficiaries according to the rules of the

trust. The landmark overreaching case of City of London Building Society v Flegg10 is one

example. As demonstrated in Williams & Glyn's Bank Ltd v Boland,11 overreaching is

ineffective since Ken was the only one who received the money. Ruth and Alan would

9
[2016] EWCA Civ 555.
10
[1988] AC 54.
11
[1981] A.C. 487.
essentially have to depend on the overriding interests of Sch 3 para 2 LRA2002, and the

standard procedures would apply.

In conclusion, the overriding interest in parking the car of Sasha and the interest of

Gloria is enforceable against Barbie. Concerning the use of Pink Cottage for business

purposes, Barbie does not have the right to do so unless the notice was not entered. Lastly,

Ruth and Alan should have been aware of the sale and are eligible to stay at the property.

Word Count: 1318

Bibliography
Primary Sources:
Table of Cases
 Chaudhary v Yavuz [2011] EWCA Civ 1314

 City of London Building Society v Flegg [1988] AC 54

  Epps v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1973] 1 WLR 1071

 Hunter v Canary Wharf (1997) UKHL 14

 Kling v Keston Properties Ltd (1983) 49 P & CR 212

 Mortgage Express v Lambert [2016] EWCA Civ 555

 Saeed v Plustrade [2012] EWCA Civ 2011

 Street v Mountford (1985) UKHL 4

 Williams & Glyn's Bank Ltd v Boland [1981] A.C. 487

Table of Legislation:

 Land Protection Act 2002

 Land Registration Act 2002

 Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996

Secondary Sources:

Books

 Bougsz Barbara, Sexton Roger, Complete Land Law, (6th edition, Oxford University
Press 2019)
 Mcfarlane Ben, Hopkins Nicolas, Nield Sarah, Land Law (2nd edition, Oxford

University Press 2020)