Issue 5

February 2017

ASIA

Politics of Food
 This edition of Perspectives Asia is
published jointly by the offices of the
Heinrich Böll Foundation in Asia

BEIJING
KABUL
ISLAMABAD
NEW DELHI

YANGON
BANGKOK
PHNOM PENH

Heinrich Böll Foundation

The Heinrich Böll Foundation is a publicly funded institute that is closely affiliated
with the German party Bündnis 90/Die Grünen. From our headquarters in Berlin and
33 overseas offices, we promote green ideas and projects in Germany, as well as
in more than 60 countries worldwide. Our work in Asia concentrates on promoting civil
society, democratic structures, social participation for all women and men, and global
justice. Together with our partners, we work toward conflict prevention, peaceful
dispute resolution, and search for solutions in the fight against environmental degrada-
tion and the depletion of global resources. To achieve these goals, we rely on disseminat-
ing knowledge, creating a deeper understanding between actors in Europe and Asia, and
on a global dialogue as a prerequisite for constructive negotiations.

Cover photo Not having a table, only chairs prepared for dine-in customers. This is how a woman vendor managed
her space in one of high competitive areas for street food vendors nearby Chinatown in Bangkok.
Photographer: Ampol Chansirisri
All rights reserved to Heinrich Böll Foundation
Contents

2 Introduction

5 Are we junking the forest for poor nutrition?

Janice Ser Huay Lee

9 Contract farming in Myanmar: From expectations to exploitation

Nwet Kay Khine

12 China’s overseas agricultural investments: Not what it appears

Feifei Cai

16 The limits of industrial food strategies and alternatives

Shefali Sharma and Ginger Fletcher Santillan

20 Street food in Asia: An industry that is much better than its reputation
Florentinus Gregorius Winarno

27 «In India nationalism is defined by what you eat»

An Interview with Veena Shatrugna by Sadia Sohail

31 Gendered food insecurity: The legal and social foundations for women’s
food discrimination in Afghanistan
Weeda Mehran

34 Zero political power for zero hunger in Pakistan: How food security is
undermined by political power plays
Abid Suleri
2 Introduction
Introduction
A lot of politics lies in eating
What we eat is determined by more than just
our preferences. Food choices are shaped
by availability, culture and global economic
structures. Tradition and wealth can influ-
ence what we eat, just as trade and foreign
investments can influence our access to
food. Due to the high degree of economic
interdependence, the purchase of a food
product in one country can affect the price
development in another, ultimately restrict-
ing food choices. In short: Food is a highly
political issue. Nowhere is this more true
than in Asia.
Asia’s rapid economic development in
the last two decades fundamentally altered
the patterns of food consumption and
availability for large parts of Asian socie-
ties. Despite the growth in wealth and the
correlating increase in calorie intake, many
governments still have difficulties providing
food security to large portions of the popu-
lation. Impressive growth rates and the rise
of metropolises cannot hide the fact that
Asia remains home to three-fifths of the
world’s undernourished people, amount-
ing to 512 million adults and children that
consume too few calories. When it comes
to the subject of food policies, Asia has two
faces. While the rural and agrarian parts of
Asia continue to struggle with old, familiar
problems, such as the lack of access to food
and nutrient deficiency, the richer, urban
and more industrialized Asia is confronted
with a different form of malnutrition stem-
ming from unhealthy food products. Policy-
makers are thus forced to think about how
to meet the different nutritional needs of
people and what it means for a society when
traditional food production and consump-
tion habits are suddenly replaced.
This wide range of topics shows that
food politics in Asia has become more than
simply a matter of production and distribu-
tion. In effect, politics in Asia often deals
with ethical, cultural and environmental
disputes between different stakeholders
when it comes to questions of food and
nutrition. Establishing modern value chains
and introducing new food products bears
the risk of driving out small-scale famers,
while new eating patterns might conflict
with religious beliefs. At the same time,
Asia’s growing appetite presses increasingly
hard against the finite bounds of the plan-
et’s natural resources, and in some regions,
the consequences of climate change have
forced governments to consider alternative
approaches to food production. As a result,
international actors need to work together
to improve food availability and safety, put
pressure on decision makers, empower
local communities and find solutions for a
healthier and self-selected diet for all.
This publication seeks to illustrate some
conflicting issues in the field of food and
nutrition in Asia. The contributions from
across the continent highlight a selection
of fields, where political action is needed to
ensure that there is enough food on people's
plate, which is also healthy and nutritious.
Power over nutrition and people mani-
fests itself on different levels: on a macro-
international level, on state policy levels
and even on a micro-level within house-
holds. A prominent example of how global
food consumption influences local liveli-
hoods is palm oil. The appetite for junk food
in both developed and emerging countries
is fueling the demand for palm oil from Asia.
In her article, Janice Ser Huay Lee discusses
how the growing appetite for crisps, frozen
pizzas and other processed foods affects
the nutrition of oil palm plantation workers,
who have adapted their diets to the chang-

Pakistan
-44%
India
7%
Cambodia
26%
Indonesia
45%
Percentage reduction in the number of
undernourished in Asia-Pacific countries
1990–92 to 2014–16
Source: FAO Regional Overview of Food Insecurity –
Asia and the Pacific 2015, Bangkok 2015
ing environment, as tropical rainforests
have been cleared to make way for palm oil
plantations.
In India, the question of food has always
been a question of ideology and belief, and
this is all the more true since the Hindu-
nationalist party BJP has been in power.
There are national conflicts over who has
the right to decide what others eat. The gen-
eral illegitimacy of eating meat, not just beef,
but also pork and chicken, brings a different
angle to what vegetarianism means when it
is politicized. Veena Shatrugna argues in an
interview that vegetarianism, forced upon
India by the ruling class, and the morals
associated with this diet are causes of mal-
nutrition among the poor.
This openly political conflict around
food is in contrast to what Abid Suleri
describes in his article on food security in
neighboring Pakistan, where explicit food
policies are not popular, as illustrated by
the failure of the Zero Hunger Program. He
analy­ses how political power plays have
undermined honorable goals to effectively
Introduction 3
China
53%
Vietnam
Myanmar
68%
71% Thailand
76%
Afghanistan
126%
fight food insecurity. Although the issues of
food safety and availability are important
concerns for the Pakistani people, they are
not issues that draw crowds to the voting
booths; as a result, they are only addressed
as part of the broader issue of poverty
­eradication.
Being able to provide safe and sufficient
food for your own population is a central
question across Asia that is answered dif-
ferently from state to state. Shefali Sharma
and Ginger Fletcher Santillan from the Insti-
tute of Agriculture and International Trade
Policy (IATP) compare different approaches,
with a focus on the big powers, India and
China. The two countries emphasize dif-
ferent strategies, but both show a tendency
toward more industrial food production,
which calls into question the future of
small-scale farmers.
Small-scale farmers in Myanmar, where
the economy and politics have just recently
been liberalized, are witnessing rapid
changes driven by international investors.
Laws are being drafted to attract foreign
4 Introduction
investment, but the benefits are one-sided.
Nwet Kay Khine analyses the development
of contract farming in Myanmar and how
it affects the livelihoods of small-scale
­farmers.
While Myanmar tries to improve food
security by letting investors in, its big neigh-
boring country, China, is encouraging com-
panies to invest abroad. Chinese outward
agricultural investments have been grow-
ing exponentially in the last years, drawing
a lot of critical media attention about the
consequences for host countries. However,
according to Feifei Cai, these concerns are
overrated and a more objective assessment
of Chinese agricultural investments shows
that there can be more opportunities than
risks to them. She therefore argues that Chi-
nese investment flows should be more wel-
comed on an international level.
On the household-level, Weeda Meh-
ran from Afghanistan argues that nutrition
is a matter of gender. As one form of vio-
lence against women, access to food can be
denied, through norms and laws. A revision
of the Afghan legal code appears crucial in
order to end food discrimination against
women.
Prevalence of hunger in Asia and the Pacific by subregion
Source: FAO Regional Overview of Food Insecurity – Asia and the Pacific 2015, Bangkok 2015
Asia-Pacific
Eastern Asia
Southern Asia
Southeast Asia
30,5%
24%
23,5%
23%
Year 90–92 00–02
Gender also plays a role in Asia's
street food culture. Florentinus Gregorius
Winarno explains that women who gener-
ate income by finding a niche in the infor-
mal sector are often the suppliers of street
food. By contrast, poor hygiene and an
insufficiently diverse diet may pose a health
risk for women who work all day long in fac-
tories. In Cambodia, for example, the unbal-
anced nutrition of garment factory workers
has led to sudden mass faintings, resulting
in protests for healthier food that were led
by women. Street food may result in a bet-
ter diet as it is cheap, offers diverse meals,
and many female factory workers rely on
street food for their daily calorie intake. The
photo series that accompanies this article
illustrates some implications of food safety
and availability. It shows who's eating and
who's selling and, thus visualising some
food-related power structures that inform
everyday life in Asia.
Katrin Altmeyer
Director of the Asia Department
Heinrich Böll Foundation, January 2017
15,5%
12%
9,5% 9,5%
05–07 10–12 14–16

Are we junking the forest for poor nutrition?
Janice Ser Huay Lee
The growing palm oil industry in South-
east Asia has many social and ecological
consequences. While the industry boosted
the economies in Southeast Asia, local
communities are suffering from deforesta-
tion and poor nutrition. Only new forms of
collaboration can guarantee strategies for
meeting all people’s needs.
The oil palm is one of the most efficient oil
crops in the world, yielding several times
the amount produced by other major
oil-bearing crops. Its high productivity,
competitive price, accessibility for poor
households, and versatile uses have driven
exponential growth over the past 30 years1
and secured its place as one of the most
important resources in the food industry
today. Approximately 80 per cent of globally
produced palm oil is used for cooking or the
production of processed food such as cook-
ies, potato chips and instant noodles.2 This
widespread consumption of palm oil has
fueled its development in tropical Southeast
Asia, with Malaysia and Indonesia leading
the way in global production.
The amount of land dedicated to oil
palm cultivation has grown radically in
the last decades: In Malaysia the area
increased from 43,000 ha in 1961 to 4.7
million ha in 2014, while in Indonesia the
cultivated area has gone from 70,000 ha to
7.4 million ha over the same time period.3
This rapid expansion has been in part the
result of state policies promoting the palm
oil industry as a way of economic develop-
ment. At the local level, smallholder tree
crop plantings were used to fight poverty in
rural areas and at the national level, govern-
ments attracted foreign private investments
through market-liberalization to diversify
Are we junking the forest for poor nutrition? Southeast Asia 5
exports. Undoubtedly, the development
of the oil palm industry boosted national
and regional economies, and has played an
important role in providing employment;
however, the manner in which oil palm
plantations have been developed and man-
aged has generated a great deal of contro-
versy due to their immense environmental,
social and nutritional impacts.
When the industry began taking off,
large tracts of tropical rainforests were
leased to companies for monoculture oil
palm cultivation.4 The price for this devel-
opment was the loss of habitats for a wide
range of plants and animal species, many
of which are endemic to the region, and the
loss of critical ecosystem services such as
climate and water regulation. In addition,
Indonesia and Malaysia are home to large
tracts of peatland, which likewise store
a high amount of carbon. The process of
clearing peatland to make way for cultiva-
tion also releases large amounts of green-
house gases and is one of the main culprits
behind the transboundary haze pollution
Dr. Janice Ser Huay Lee works
impacting the environment and public in the areas of conservation
health in Southeast Asia.5 biology, land use change and
agriculture. Much of her work
The social impact of the palm oil
focuses on the social and
industry has been mixed. In Malaysia, the ecological consequences of human
smallholder oil palm sector has been very activity on the environment. Dr.
Lee earned a Master of Science
successful in improving the lives of small at the National University of
farmers and lifting rural people out of pov- Singapore, a PhD from the ETH
erty. This is the result of carefully crafted Zurich in Switzerland, and was a
postdoctoral research associate
state policies, along with institutional and at the Woodrow Wilson School
private sector support for the development at Princeton University. Dr. Lee
of the smallholder oil palm sector.6 In Indo- loves to eat traditional Peranakan
food, which includes her mother’s
nesia, the smallholder sector has been less home-made popiah, mee siam and
consistent in its performance and success. buah keluak. These dishes have
Some of the earlier government initiatives complex flavors and take many
hours to prepare. They remind her
that integrated smallholders into joint of home and her family’s cultural
ventures performed very well and enabled roots and traditions.
6 Southeast Asia Are we junking the forest for poor nutrition?
Area of palm oil expansion
Source: FAOSTAT
Indonesia
Malaysia
70.000 hectare
43.302 hectare
1961 1971 1981
them to move out of poverty and afford a
better life.7 Other partnerships with palm oil
companies performed terribly and resulted
in the exploitation of local communities,
leading some households into debt. In
some regions where oil palm development
was rejected, communities faced punish-
ment, with villages being burnt down and
local community members being harassed.8
The lack of law enforcement, as well as cor-
ruption in some of these rural regions, have
also increased the vulnerability of local
communities, often leading to unjust legal
outcomes in favor of the wealthier and more
powerful elites.
Good fat for bad nutrition
Many proponents of the palm oil industry
prominently cite the importance of palm oil
for food security among poor and vulner-
able households due to its nutritional value.
Palm oil is an important source of dietary fat.
Fat can be categorized into «good» fats (i.e.,
unsaturated fats) and «bad» fats (i.e., satu-
rated and trans fats). A high intake of bad
fats can increase the risk of heart disease,
while the intake of good fats can reduce this
risk.9 Of the bad fats, trans fats are the worst.
Palm oil is free of trans fats and has a high
level of unsaturated fats, making it a good
choice even though it also has high levels of
saturated fats. Therefore, palm oil may be
preferable to replace vegetable oil that con-
tains trans-fats, especially in processed food
items where it helps maintain the sensory
characteristics of specific food items (e.g.,
the texture of doughnuts and crispiness of
cookies).
7.407.090 hectare
4.689.321 hectare
1991 2001 2011 2014
So can palm oil adequately substitute
trans-fats in the production of industrial,
processed food items that are considered
«junk food»? And what would this mean for
human and natural life in Southeast Asia?
Junk food consumption is already on the
rise in Asia. Driving factors for the increased
consumption include the integration of
the Asian market into the global economy,
which has brought with it large inflows of
foreign direct investment by transnational
food and beverage companies; the «super-
marketization» of the region, where food
is now distributed through supermarkets
rather than fresh markets; and the rapid
expansion of fast food companies such as
McDonalds throughout the region.10 As a
consequence, the global demand for vege-
table oil used in junk food production from
2001 to 2014 resulted in the expansion of
approximately 163,500 to 413,400 ha of oil
palm plantations.11 When projected to 2050,
the global demand for vegetable oil just to
produce junk food would entail an expan-
sion of approximately 0.5 to 1.3 million ha
of oil palm to be planted. Much of this oil
palm expansion will occur at the expense
of tropical rainforests, unless strict land-
use regulations and market initiatives are
implemented to avoid tropical deforesta-
tion.
Losing local agriculture
It is particularly egregious if deforestation
takes place for the sake of junk food. The
expansion of palm oil for the production of
industrial, processed food has impacts not
only for the final consumers but can also

pose a threat to the food security of produc-
ers and communities. While some house-
holds profited from the palm oil boom and
could increase their levels of food security,
other households were not able to do so. In
fact, the acquisition of land resources by
companies has led in some cases to a reduc-
tion of land for local agriculture and the dis-
placement of local communities from their
traditional way of life. In the Philippines, for
instance, traditional livelihoods in Palawan
were destroyed, most communities experi-
enced land grabbing without the replace-
ment of their livelihoods and wild palms,
an important source of starch during times
of emergency (e.g., drought-induced crop
failures), were cleared to make way for oil
palm cultivation. Pests, such as insects and
rats, associated with oil palm development
also affected local agriculture, resulting in
the loss of productive coconut groves that
sustained local livelihoods. Moreover, com-
munities located near forests tend to have
a more diverse diet due to a wide range of
food items harvested from the forests.12 As
forests are increasingly converted to mono-
culture oil palm plantations, local agricul-
ture and a diverse set of cultivated plants are
lost, forcing local communities and small-
holders to depend on unhealthy, purchased
industrial food. This leads to a less diverse
diet and a reduction in micronutrients, ulti-
mately making local communities more
likely to suffer from malnutrition.
Food insecurity is also an issue among
laborers on the plantations. There have
been cases where laborers were forced to
work an extended number of hours without
sufficient rest, and wages were denied or
overdue.13 Such exploitation of human labor
has definite impacts on their food security
as well as health and nutrition.
To balance food security needs, detailed
consultations with local communities
should be conducted to ensure that free
and prior-informed consent is given, and
that oil palm developments are beneficial to
all stakeholders. An example of an in-depth
community consultation was carried out in
Liberia, where a large-scale oil palm conces-
sion was proposed in the rural landscape.14
Local communities appreciated the social
and physical infrastructure benefits that
oil palm development would bring to the
region but expressed interest in retaining
closed forests, which are a source of bush
meat important to local diets. These forests
were also habitats for medicinal plants used
by local communities and act as an impor-
Are we junking the forest for poor nutrition? Southeast Asia 7
tant wind break to protect their crops. The
land set aside for local agriculture was insuf-
ficient and too distant for local communi-
ties, so instead, buffer zones surrounding
the oil palm concession were suggested to
enable local communities to practice food
and cash crop cultivation on communally
held land. Such an interactive planning pro-
cess at the beginning of a development pro-
ject can be highly beneficial to mitigate both
the environmental and social impacts of oil
palm cultivation and should be conducted
to ensure local food security.
Improving the end use of
palm oil
Despite the negative environmental and
social impacts of the palm oil industry, there
is an undeniably high demand for palm oil
at a global scale. Recent bans on the use of
trans fat in processed foods are likely to fuel
further demand since palm oil is a suitable
and affordable alternative. It is predicted
that by 2050 the demand for palm oil will
increase from 74 to 156 million tons a year15,
based on a scenario where soybean oil con-
sumption remains constant. The increased
consumption of food items high in sugars,
salts and fats will potentially lead to a rise in
World consumption of palm oil in million tons
Source: fapri - food and agriculture policy research institute,
2014: US and World Agriculture Outlook. Ames, ia: fapri
10 million t =
1995 / 1996
15,8 million t
2012 / 2013
55,2 million t
2013 / 2014
57,8 million t
2014 / 2015
58,8 milion t
2015 / 2016
74 million t
8 Southeast Asia Are we junking the forest for poor nutrition?
World market share of non-communicable diseases in developing
vegetable oils 2012 / 2014 Asian countries. Therefore, there is a need
Source: USDA (United States Department
of Agriculture), 2015 to improve the end use of palm oil for more
nutritious food items that do not contribute
to poor health, and to ensure that the pro-
duction of palm oil by local farmers does
not come at the cost of their own food secu-
rity. Finding an alternative to palm oil would
be challenging in Asia, considering its low
Palm oil
36% cost and how accessible it is for poor rural
and urban households, so the focus should
be placed on improving production and
management. The Roundtable of Sustain-
able Palm Oil (RSPO), a multi-stakeholder
organization that certifies sustainable palm
oil production, takes into consideration
environmental and social criteria for the
development of oil palm plantations but
has yet to include explicit criteria to ensure
food security for local producers and plan-
Soy oil tation laborers. The regulation of processed
27%
food consumption, as well as sound land
use policies, require new forms of collabo-
ration among ecologists, nutritionists and
agronomists to develop strategies for meet-
ing people’s nutritional needs with healthier
foods that do not entail further conversion
of tropical forests. A higher consumption
of RSPO-certified products increases the
demand for sustainably produced palm
Rape seed oil
oil and will encourage more producers to
15% follow RSPO guidelines. Nevertheless, the
RSPO has come under criticism for poor
monitoring over the palm oil industry’s
activities. A useful addition would therefore
be to involve civil society actors to work with
communities to preemptively identify culti-
vatable tracts of land that would have mini-
Other oil
14% mal environmental and societal impacts.
This could strengthen the communities’
negotiating position before an oil palm
company begins plantation development.
Sun flower oil The high-yielding nature of the oil palm
8% will continue to make it a choice crop for
vegetable oil production in many tropical
countries, making the need even greater to
ensure that the method of production does
not come at the expense of the environment
and local livelihoods. Good governance and
adherence to rigorous environmental and
social impact assessments are necessary
to improve future oil palm development
in the tropics. Palming the planet for poor
nutrition needs to be changed for better
use of resources as well as better nutrition
of ­people.
1
USDA-FAS, «Indonesia: Palm oil production growth
to continue»: Commodity Intelligence Report, March
19, 2009. Available at: http://www.pecad.fas.usda.
gov/highlights/2009/03/indonesia/
2
USDA-FAS, «Indonesia: Rising Global Demand Fuels
Palm Oil Expansion»: Commodity Intelligence Report,
October 8, 2010. Available at: http://www.pecad.fas.
usda.gov/highlights/2010/10/Indonesia/
3
FAOSTAT Online Statistical Service, Food and Agri-
culture Organization of the United Nations, 2015.
4
Sheil, Douglas, et al., «The impacts and opportuni-
ties of oil palm in Southeast Asia: What do we know
and what do we need to know?»: CIFO 2009, Bogor,
Indonesia.
5
Glover, David, and Timothy Jessup, «Indonesia's Fires
and Haze. The Cost of Catastrophe.»: International
Development Research Center and the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, 1999.
6
Vermeulen, Sonja, and Nathalie Goad, «Towards
better practice in smallholder palm oil production»:
International Institute for Environment and Develop-
ment, 2006.
7
McCarthy, John F., «Processes of inclusion and ad-
verse incorporation: oil palm and agrarian change in
Sumatra, Indonesia»: The Journal of Peasant Studies
37(4): p. 821-850, 2010.
8
Colchester, Marcus, et al., «Oil Palm Expansion in
South East Asia: Trends and implications for local
communities and indigenous peoples»: Forest Peoples
Programme and Perkumpulan Sawit Watch, 2011.
9
Sun, Ye, et al., «Palm Oil Consumption Increases LDL
Cholesterol Compared With Vegetable Oils Low in
Saturated Fat in a Meta-Analysis of Clinical Trials»:
The Journal of Nutrition, 2015.
10
Baker, P., and S. Friel, «Processed foods and the
nutrition transition: evidence from Asia»: Obesity
Reviews 15(7), p. 564-77, 2014.
11
Lee, Janice Ser Huay, Lian Pin Koh, and David S.
Wilcove, «Junking tropical forests for junk foods?»:
Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment in press,
2016.
12
Ickowitz, Amy, et al., «Dietary quality and tree cover
in Africa»: Global Environmental Change 24, p. 287-
294, 2014.
13
Al-Mahmood, S. Z., «Palm-Oil Migrant Workers Tell
of Abuses on Malaysian Plantations»: The Wall Street
Journal, 2015.
14
Evans, Ruth, and Geoffrey Griffiths, «Palm oil, land
rights and ecosystem services in Gbarpolu County, Li-
beria»: Walker Institute for Climate System Research,
University of Reading, 2013.
15
Corley, R. H. V., «How much palm oil do we need?»:
Environmental Science & Policy 12(2), p. 134-139,
2009.

Contract farming in Myanmar: From
expectations to exploitation
Nwet Kay Khine
With Myanmar’s new investment bill,
foreign direct investments in the agricul-
tural sector are booming and business
conglomerates are interested in expand-
ing their agricultural production through
contract farming. Yet, in the absence of
effective mechanisms for poverty reduc-
tion and adequate land tenure security,
the fruits of contract farming have often
been harvested solely by companies.
Since Myanmar’s independence, the state
has always been the ultimate land owner,
with the power to expropriate land from
farmers and grant non-transferrable tillage
rights to them. According to Myanmar law,
the acquisition of land is legitimate if the
government decides that it is needed for the
public interest. In return, the former land
owners must be fully compensated for the
losses. The sheer power that the state has
over land rights has led to numerous cases
of land grabbing.
In the late 1990s, the government
started promoting an elite-driven agricul-
tural growth model by reallocating land to
mostly private investors. Without updat-
ing agricultural land maps, or conducting a
census, policymakers were reckless enough
to ignore the fact that little vacant land actu-
ally existed. More than 5.2 million acres1 of
what the military government called «waste
land» was awarded to private agribusiness
companies.2 As it turned out, this «waste
land» was in fact communal land shared by
small farmers and families of ethnic minori-
ties. Due to their practice of communal
land ownership, these groups have never
been accustomed to using land certificates
and many of their cultivated areas were not
Contract farming in Myanmar: From expectations to exploitation Myanmar 9
officially registered. As a result, the state
assigned land to companies that had been
in use by local farmers for decades. The
implementation of large-scale agricultural
projects as big as 50,000 acres led to the
eviction of thousands of farmers from their
hereditary lands.3
Misusing contract farming
for land grabbing
Often this kind of land grabbing came in
the guise of contract farming. Since 2005,
the g
­ overnment of Myanmar has put a lot
of effort into encouraging investors from
China, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Kuwait
to invest in contract farms. The Thais for
example have a formal agreement to farm
120,000 acres along the Thai-Myanmar bor-
der.4 Yet, these business deals can hardly
be classified as contract farming, which is
defined as an agreement between buyers
and farmers to establish conditions about
the production and marketing of an agricul-
tural product. Typically, the farmer agrees to
provide, at a certain time, specified quanti-
ties of an agricultural product that meet
the quality standards of the purchase. In
turn, the buyer commits to purchase the
Nwet Kay Khine holds Master
product and, in some cases, to contribut- Degrees in Media, Journalism and
ing to the production process through the Globalization from the Universi-
supply of farm inputs, land preparation, or ties of Aarhus and Hamburg. In
2015 she co-authored the book
the provision of technical assistance. Ideally, «The Commons of Myanmar». She
both parties to the contract would benefit: is a former scholarship fellow
Farmers are guaranteed a market outlet of the Heinrich Böll Foundation
and worked on many different
and enjoy reduced price uncertainty, while development projects in Myanmar.
purchasing firms benefit from having a As a native of Mon State in
guaranteed supply of agricultural products Myanmar she prefers traditional
Mon food. Her favourite dish is
that meet their specifications. In Myanmar, streamed curried fish wrapped in
however, such a win-win situation for farm- banana leaves.
10 Myanmar Contract farming in Myanmar: From expectations to exploitation
ers and companies has been the excep-
tion rather than the rule. Instead, the term
contract farming has often been used to
legitimize the expropriation of land from
farmers. Only in a few cases have compa-
nies offered any sort of compensation, as set
out by Myanmar's law, but this was either
to improve their public image or to appease
the anger of the original land owners. When
the Max Myanmar Group of Companies was
accused of exploiting farmers, the company
explained that it had offered a compensa-
tion fee of 20,000 Kyats per acre to 50 farm-
ers who owned 391.63 acres of land.5 It is
hard to spell justice when an acre of land
in Yangon’s proximity was compensated
at less than 20 US Dollars in 2009. Other
companies just completely ignored calls to
adequately provide compensation. Farmers
had no choice other than to accept their fate
and take whatever little they were offered in
return for their losses. Thus, contract farm-
ing only paid off for companies and not for
farmers.
Until U Thein Sein came into power in
2011, it was simply not possible for farmers
to reclaim their property rights, as voices of
discontent were severely suppressed under
the military government. As soon as Myan-
mar became more politically open, people
were finally free to express their deep dis-
satisfaction. Complaints of land grabbing
became louder as new social and economic
reforms allowed farmers to present cases of
forceful land confiscation. Tensions from
long-standing grievances peaked, and
farmer-groups and land rights advocates
tried to seek justice through official chan-
nels. The parliament even formed an inves-
tigative committee in 2012 to look at the
cases of land confiscation.
Land conflicts may continue
despite new laws
Despite these negative experiences, the
concept of contract farming is still at the
top of the Myanmar's political agenda.
The government has been closely work-
ing with international institutions like the
Organization for Economic Co-Operation
and Development (OECD) to formulate a
policy framework to increase foreign direct
investments through contract farming. In
September 2016, the government approved
a bill on the Myanmar Investment Law6 to
provide investors with the possibility of
extending the initial maximum land lease
period of 50 years by two ten-year periods.
Furthermore, foreign investors can directly
approach farmers for joint agricultural and
manufacturing activities in order to gain
access to their lands. The foreign business
community welcomed this, as rules over
land acquisition now have become clearer.
The new law also allows farmers to use their
land certificates to take up mortgages, and
to sell or transfer land as inheritance. This is
a major step toward helping farmers secure
land ownership. Farmers can now use their
land as collateral, as long as the land use
abides by the government’s prescription.
Although this new legal framework
paved the way for real contract farming
in Myanmar, it seems likely that the land
conflicts will continue. The Myanmar
Investment Law might promote foreign
investments, but it lacks a mechanism to
oversee the justice and fairness of the con-
tracts agreed to between farmers and com-
panies. The current legal structure still has
too many loopholes that ultimately under-
mine the interest of the farmers and raise
doubts as to whether balanced negotiation
powers between both contract parties can
be established. The existing land laws do
not adequately recognize the customary
land rights of farmers who lack proper titles
or communal land ownership, which dis-
proportionately impacts ethnic minorities
practicing shifting cultivation.
As Si Thu from the local land rights
advocacy organization, Land in Our Hand,
puts it: «Land grabbing is no longer hap-
pening by clearing land with bulldozers and
gun-carrying soldiers, as it happened in the
past. Instead, farmers have fallen into the
land-price-trap.» Many farmers now use
their land titles as collateral for loans from
ethnic Chinese brokers. Poor farmers are
especially susceptible to becoming chroni-
cally indebted due to high-interest loans,
and often end up selling their land titles
for cash, condemning them to become yet
another landless farmer. This is a problem
prevalent in countries with a derelict agrar-
ian economy, where peasants are just barely
«hanging on,» such as in Myanmar. Some
businessmen know this and exploit the situ-
ation. Kevin Woods, a researcher from Berk-
ley University, explains that «poor farmers
are so vulnerable to selling their land title,
especially when there are no rules or regu-
lations on whether or not farmers can sell
their title ‹under duress.› There are no regu-
lations in place to prevent this in Myanmar.
This is a very scary situation.»

With prevailing inequalities, the farm-
ers who benefit from contract farming are
those who have already accumulated a
higher level of financial capacity, while the
rest are prone to more structural vulnerabil-
ity with higher indebtedness. A semi-feudal
system has gradually developed out of this
debt trap in areas including Myanmar’s Dry
Zone and Shan State. According to a recent
study by Michigan University, Myanmar
has a landless population ranging between
30 per cent and 50 per cent. This number is
likely to increase if the current agricultural
business model continues to develop.
Making contract farming a
success story in Myanmar
The success of contract farming has so far
been limited. Due to repeated disasters,
price volatility and climate change, farm-
ers were not able to meet the quality, quan-
tity, or the timing of the crops, as set out
in the contract. Also, the obligations from
the company side, including the provision
of technical inputs, fertilizers and quality
seeds were often not fulfilled either. Never-
theless, properly-operating contract farm-
ing schemes have a lot to offer without
necessarily putting farmers at risk of land
dispossession.
One of the few encouraging examples
showing the potential of contract farming
was the founding of the Myanmar Agribusi-
ness Public Corporation (MAPCO) in 2012.
The company aims to sustain a long-term
business relationship with farmers by pro-
viding both technical and financial input.
MAPCO also guarantees the purchase of a
certain amount of rice from the farmers at
a fair price. As a result, transaction costs for
both sides were effectively reduced. Moreo-
ver, the contractual security fostered the
development of small-scale contract farm-
ing in the form of a co-partnership among
rural non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), farmers and business companies.
This shows that with the right marketing
and financial strategy, as well as guaranteed
fair purchasing prices, companies can con-
tribute to a more sustainable livelihood of
small-scale farmers.
Yet, contract farming can only fully
become a success story in all of Myanmar if
the government reverses policies that have
resulted in low productivity and chronic
rural indebtedness. This requires macro-
economic stability, adequate infrastructure
Contract farming in Myanmar: From expectations to exploitation Myanmar 11
to reach potential small-scale farmers and
a law that finally recognizes communal
land ownership, as it is practiced by farm-
ers of ethnic minorities. In addition, limited
access to quality research and extension
support is also one of top factors contribut-
ing to the underperformance of Myanmar’s
agriculture. Previous governments gave no
more than just lip-service to promoting
agricultural education. While Thailand has
been developing agricultural universities
and schools in nearly every province in the
last four decades, Myanmar has only estab-
lished one agricultural university since its
independence in 1948.
When the National League for Democ-
racy (NLD) government opens a wider door
to agribusiness companies in contract farm-
ing, as it is currently doing, it must similarly
implement such fundamental reforms, in
order to create an enabling environment for
farmers. In short, as long as structural vul-
nerability is not tackled by politics, Myan-
mar farmers will not benefit and contract
farming will remain an empty promise.
1
One acre equals 0.4047 hectare, i.e. 2.5 acre roughly
one hectare.
2
McCarthy, S., «Land tenure security and policy
tension in Myanmar»: Analysis from the East-
West Center, No. 127, 2016. Available at: http://
www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/api127.
pdf?file=1&type=node&id=35865
3
Baker, T.A., «Lessons for the Potential Use of
Contract Farming with Small Land Holding Farmers
in Myanmar»: Vahu Development Institute, p.4. (2),
2011; Wikileaks, «Contract Farming in Burma»
Created 12 January 2009, Origin: Embassy Rangoon,
Classification: Confidential. Available at: https://
wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09RANGOON25_a.html
4
Ibid.
5
Max Myanmar Holdings Ltd, «Land Compensation in
Agriculture Sector», 2013. Available at: http://www.
maxmyanmargroup.com/index.php/news-room/news-
release/111-land-compensation-in-agriculture-sector
6
Myanmar Investment Law (Draft), 2016. Available
at: http://www.dica.gov.mm/sites/dica.gov.mm/files/
document-files/myanmar_investment_law_draft_as_
of_060716_translated_by_kcy_14_july_2016.pdf
12 China China’s overseas agricultural investments: Not what it appears
China’s overseas agricultural investments:
Not what it appears
Feifei Cai
Feifei Cai is a researcher who
works for the Chinese NGO Social
Resources Institution (SRI). She is
in charge of the field Responsible
Investment at SRI and is focusing
on the impacts of Chinese land-
based investments in Southeast
Asia and Africa. She also organ-
izes a network on sustainable
food and the agriculture system in
China and advocates these topics
on platforms like the G20 and
BRICS. Her favourite food is fresh
seafood. Feifei Cai was born and
grown up in a small town along the
Chinese coast where seafood is the
main source of nutrition. Every
time she eats seafood it reminds
her of home.
China’s «Going Out» strategy has led to
the rise of accusations concerning land
grabs and destabilizing other countries
for the sake of China’s own food security.
However, a careful consideration of the ef-
fects of Chinese agricultural investments
shows that mostly host countries benefit
from these investments. By contrast,
Chinese companies often struggle with bu-
reaucratic hurdles, minimizing potential
profits. Instead of expressing constant
critique, the international community
should therefore help China reduce its
investment risks.
China’s foreign policy has been given many
different names, depending on the perspec-
tive and the media coverage. China has been
described as a development partner, a colo-
nizer and an economic competitor in its
approach towards foreign countries.1 Lately,
their growing overseas agricultural invest-
ments have moved to the center of public
attention, particularly in regard to China’s
role in Africa. The intensive media coverage
about Chinese investments in Africa on the
one side, and the growing domestic demand
for food products in China on the other, has
made many observers question the real pur-
pose of such a seemingly «national» scheme.
China has been accused of grabbing African
land and resources to feed its own people.
However, in reality, the influence derived
from outward agricultural investments has
been exaggerated. The aims and interests of
China’s outgoing strategy in the agricultural
sector are much more complex and diverse
than suspected. When talking about Chi-
nese agricultural investments, it is, there-
fore, important to put certain assumptions
about China into perspective in order to
lend objectivity to the public debate.
Although the debate about Chinese
«land grabbing» focuses on Africa, it is not
the biggest recipient of Chinese agricul-
tural investments overseas. In fact, in 2014
the largest share flowed into Asia, account-
ing for 60.3 per cent of total Chinese over-
seas agricultural investment, followed by
Europe with 14.5 per cent of the total. Africa
accounts for only 8.8 per cent of their agri-
cultural investments abroad, placing them
in third place.2 Furthermore, Chinese com-
panies do not simply acquire land from the
state; instead, their primary investment
strategy is to establish subsidiary branches
or merge with local successful companies in
host countries. Data shows that an increas-
ing number of Chinese companies are in
search of partnerships abroad. From 2013
to 2014, the number of mergers and acqui-
sitions (M&A) deals increased by 86.9 per
cent. In 2014 alone, 415 Chinese investment
agencies founded 505 agricultural compa-
nies overseas and carried out 43 agricul-
tural M&A deals with a total value of USD
3.56 ­billion.3
Even though this shows that Chinese
agricultural companies are very active
abroad, the business conditions to operate
in foreign countries remain difficult. Espe-
cially in developing countries, where cor-
ruption can be high and local markets are
often small and thus limit buying power,
the costs for Chinese companies can be
considerable. Furthermore, business goals
are very heterogenic, and there are in fact
many different strategic motivations for
Chinese agricultural companies to invest
abroad. While some overseas agricultural
investments are still driven by state inter-

ventions, other companies invest abroad
to wholly integrate their supply chain by
realizing M&A deals in the agricultural sec-
tor. Recently, huge deals went to developed
countries, where advanced technologies
and markets helped improve the Chinese
companies’ control over the food supply
chain and strengthen their pricing power.
However, the trend shows that China’s
agricultural M&A deals are increasing in
developing countries, where rich natural
resources and growing markets could be
utilized by Chinese companies to inte-
grate the supply chain from downstream to
upstream.4
Internal promotion and
external crisis drove
investments
One of the driving forces for China’s rapid
expansion in outward agricultural invest-
ments can be found in the government’s
new «Going Out» policy. In 2008, the Chi-
nese government specified that it wants to
«encourage domestic companies to ‹go out›
and build a stable and reliable imported food
security system, which helps strengthen the
country’s capacity to ensure domestic food
security.» This policy needs to be under-
stood as a continuation of China’s «Opening
Up» policy from 2000; however, with a dif-
ferent focus. While the «Opening Up» policy
was a rather inward directed strategy to
promote economic, technological and cul-
tural exchanges between China and other
countries and to facilitate market access for
foreign companies, the current «Going Out»
policy in turn is an outward directed strat-
egy that tries to help Chinese companies
settle down abroad and operate multina-
tionally. It was in 2008 that the central gov-
ernment started to form an official working
mechanism and roll out specific policies
to support companies’ agricultural invest-
ment overseas. At the same time, the Chi-
nese Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) signed
cooperation agreements with the China
Development Bank and the Export-Import
Bank of China to give financial support to
Chinese companies. The government and
financial institutions worked hand in hand
to encourage local companies to invest
abroad by providing low-interest loans,
simplifying administrative and approval
processes and reforming foreign exchange
policies.
China’s overseas agricultural investments: Not what it appears China 13
Another reason that triggered China’s
increasing outward agricultural invest-
ments was the worldwide food price crisis in
2007 and 2008. In the preceding 10 years, the
storage of grain in the world had decreased
by one third, putting pressure on grain
prices. Also, tensions between food supply
and demand had caused the food price to
increase substantially, resulting in the larg-
est hunger crisis ever recorded in history.5
These dramatic events led to a rethinking of
the Chinese food policy. The central govern-
ment put «food security», which it consid-
ers as the base for a nation’s stability, at the
heart of its strategies. Prompted by impend-
ing food crises and limited domestic natural
resources, the government shifted its food
policy from importing food to meet produc-
tion shortages to directly investing in agri-
cultural companies abroad. China’s No.1
Central Document6 from 2014 outlines this
approach by pointing out that China wants
to «explore the establishment of funds for
international agricultural trade and invest-
ment.» This idea is further elaborated upon
in a policy paper from 2015 about the «One
Belt One Road» Initiative, which suggests
expanding mutual investment and deep-
ening cooperation between agriculture,
forestry, husbandry, fishery, agricultural
machinery and agricultural processing. This
shows that the Chinese government is will-
ing to protect domestic food security by pro-
moting outward agricultural investments.
China’s new strategy has already taken
effect. The annual amount of outward agri-
cultural investments fluctuated around
USD 200 million between 2003 and 2008; by
2009, it had grown by 99.5 per cent to USD
342.79 million. Since then, it has main-
tained an average annual growth rate of 53.3
per cent. In 2012, the growth rate peaked at
83.9 per cent and then fell back to 24.1 per
cent in 2013.
Mixed impacts on food
security
This rapid development indicates that the
Chinese government sees outward agricul-
tural investments as key to achieving food
security. In this regard, an official from the
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs once
remarked that providing food security in
Africa and reducing the continent’s depend-
ence on the global food supply would stabi-
lize the demand and price of global markets,
which indirectly contributes to China’s food
14 China China’s overseas agricultural investments: Not what it appears
security.7 But in reality, the impacts of these
overseas investments are mixed and it is
still too early to tell whether this goal will be
achieved.
Firstly, Chinese companies face regu-
latory constraints when transferring agri-
cultural products from host countries to
China. For example, companies only enjoy
a reduced import tariff if they receive the
so called quotas of tax reduction. Depend-
ing on the food product a company is
producing, it needs to satisfy different
organizational criteria. A sugar company,
for instance, needs to be state-owned and
is required to have a certain daily process-
ing capacity and a certain minimum rev-
enue of over RMB 450 million in order to
qualify for a tariff reduction. On the other
hand, agricultural companies that do not
obtain the tariff quota have to pay higher
tax rates for imports. This increases the
costs and risks for a company, leaving little
profit when products are being imported.
Besides heavy taxes and fees, Chinese com-
panies also face other challenges, including
long and complicated approval procedures,
inspection and quarantine procedures and
seed management regulations. Long-dis-
tance transport and storage requirements
also extensively increase the cost of certain
agricultural products. Hence, there are une-
qually distributed trade barriers for Chinese
agricultural companies, generating compet-
itive disadvantages due to bureaucratic and
fiscal obligations. Because of these obsta-
cles, companies’ willingness to invest in
the agricultural sector abroad and transfer
products back to China is l­ imited.
Secondly, despite a series of policies
encouraging overseas agricultural invest-
ment, there is no real evidence this really
has an impact on the food security situation
in China.8 According to a report released by
the International Institute of Sustainable
Development (IISD), out of 54 «confirmed»
Chinese agricultural investment projects,
only four projects are actually in opera-
tion and produce grains sold to China.9 The
link between agricultural investments and
food security thus seems to be rather insig-
nificant. The soaring demand from Chinese
consumers still continues to be met by buy-
ing food products from foreign countries.
However, on the contrary side, Chi-
nese agricultural investments have helped
improve the food situation in host countries.
Investments in staple grain production, for
example, have led to a general increase in
the food supply in the host countries. The
reason for this is that many Chinese com-
panies prefer to sell their products on the
local market, as they face many challenges
when they want to transfer their products
to China. Also, sometimes agreements with
governments in the host countries oblige
the companies to sell their agricultural
goods on local markets.10
The situation is different when invest-
ments go to non-grain crops. Such invest-
ments result in the shrinking of the
plantation area for staples and conse-
quently, the food supply in the host coun-
try decreases. Taking China’s agricultural
investments in Laos as an example, the
arrival of Chinese companies transformed
the plantation structure in south Laos sig-
nificantly. While the plantation area of vege-
tables/bean, starchy vegetables, sugarcanes,
tobacco and tea grew, the plantation area
of the staple upland rice decreased from
122,116 hectares to 106,682 hectares.11
Opportunities from
investments should be seized
Based on these first findings, it is still too
early to draw a final conclusion about the
effects of Chinese outward agricultural
investments. It still remains to be seen
how they will influence the food situation
in China, host countries and in the world.
What already is certain today, is that Chi-
na’s outward agricultural investments are
expected to expand even further, especially
in light of the implementation of the One
Belt One Road Initiative. Despite these pros-
pects, Chinese companies are still at the ini-
tial stage of «going out,» without adequate
awareness, methods and experiences to
handle the challenges of different political
contexts, market risks as well as social and
environmental requirements from stake-
holders. Negative social and environmen-
tal consequences can arise from Chinese
investments when effective laws, policies
and safeguards system are not in place in
the host countries.
Although many western media and
scholars are quick to condemn Chinese
agricultural investments as a nationally
driven policy to secure China enough food
products, a close examination of the num-
bers and scale of actually implemented pro-
jects reveals that there is a big gap between
announced and realized agricultural invest-
ments abroad. Furthermore, intensive
media coverage about land grabbing in

Africa will not only lead to misunderstand-
ings, but also prevent the public from push-
ing forward on other important issues such
as higher environmental and social com-
pliance standards that companies need to
meet when investing in foreign agricultural
sectors. Opportunities arising from Chinese
investments need to be seized, in order to
make them beneficial for local society and
communities.12
The Chinese government and NGOs are
already paying more attention to making
China’s outward agricultural investments
more responsible and sensitive to local
peculiarities through extensive research.
Wider international support for China’s
«going out» process could therefore pave
the way for improvements with regard to
regulations and more sustainable busi-
ness activities. Due to their important role
in understanding the reality on the ground,
Chinese NGOs are expected to play a bigger
part in monitoring companies and advocat-
ing for responsible investment.
It is clear that China’s key challenge will
be to make outward agricultural invest-
ments more responsible. Building trust
through improved cooperation mecha-
nisms among government, companies,
communities and NGOs should be the solu-
tion. For this to happen, common efforts
from all stakeholders are needed to commu-
nicate with each other based on evidence,
respect and mutual understanding.
China’s overseas agricultural investments: Not what it appears China 15
1
Alden, C., «China in Africa»: London and New York:
Zed Books, 2007.
2
Report on China’s Outward Agricultural Invest-
ment and Cooperation in 2014, jointly prepared by
the International Cooperation Department and the
Foreign Economic Cooperation Center of the Ministry
of Agriculture of China.
3
Ibid.
4
Zhao Li, «China's Agriculture ‹Going out› Strat-
egy Target on Foreign Countries»: Tengxun
News. Chinese version available on：http://edu.
qq.com/a/20160421/057047.htm
5
Lester R. Brown, «Full Planet, Empty Plates: The
New Geopolitics of Food Scarcity»: Shanghai Technol-
ogy Education Pressing, 2012.
6
The Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China published the No.1 Document of Central
Government every year. The topics of these documents
always focus on China’s most important issues, which
need to be solved urgently. Since this document play
programmatic and guiding role to lead Chinese gov-
ernment’s job every year, it attracts a lot of different
stakeholders’ attentions.
7
Gao Wei, Mengchun, Zhao Caiyun, «To Ensure
China’s Food Security from the perspective of China-
Africa Cooperation»: Economics Relevance Research,
2014.
8
Deborah Bräutigam, Zhang Haisen, «Green Dreams:
Myth and Reality in China’s Agricultural Investment
in Africa»: Third World Quarterly. Vol. 34, No. 9,
2013.
9
Carin Smaller, Wei Qiu, Yalan Liu, «Farmland and
Water: China Invests abroad». Published by IISD.
10
Feifei Cai, «The Debate and impacts of Chinese Out-
ward Agricultural Investments». Available at http://
sri.blog.caixin.com/archives/77592.
11
Phanhpakit Onphanhdala, Terukazu Suruga, «Chinese
Outward FDI in Agriculture and Rural Development:
Evidence from Northern Laos»: GSICS Working Pa-
per Series. Available at: http://www.research.kobe-u.
ac.jp/gsics-publication/gwps/2013-25.pdf.
12
Lila Buckley, «Globalization of Chinese Agriculture:
Ensure Global Food Supply?»: IIED Global Land
Rush.
16 Asia The limits of industrial food strategies and alternatives
The limits of industrial food strategies
and alternatives
Shefali Sharma and Ginger Fletcher Santillan
Shefali Sharma is director of the
Institute for Agriculture and
Trade Policy’s (IATP) Agricultural
Commodities and Globalization
Initiatives, which work on sustain-
able food, farm and trade systems.
She has a Master of Philosophy
in Development Studies from the
Institute of Development Studies
in Sussex. One special dish that
Ms. Sharma loves is called allu
ka parantha (potato stuffed fried
bread). Every time she visits
her parents in India, her mother
makes it on the first morning.
Ginger Flechter Santillan is from
California where she graduated
from Humboldt State University
with a degree in International
Studies. After graduating, she
lived and worked in various Latin
American countries including
Ecuador, Colombia, and Mexico.
Recently in 2016 she has been a
meat industry research intern
for the Institute for Agriculture
and Trade Policy. Ms. Flechter’s
favorite Asian dish is pad see ew
from Thailand. She loves the flat
rice noodles and broccoli in this
dish. When she was a child, her
mom used to take her to the Thai
restaurant down the street from
their house in Santa Barbara,
California.
Industrial food strategies are challeng-
ing environmental limits and are pushing
small-scale farmers out of the market.
New food policies are needed in order
to address the growing demand for food.
While countries like India and China are
basing their politics on large-scale in-
dustries, local alternatives exist and may
lead the way for new strategies.
By 2025, the total population of Asia and
the Pacific region will reach about 4.4 bil-
lion—this is more than a third of the world’s
current population1, and it will mean a
greater demand on agriculture and strain
on natural resources. The Green Revolution,
an agricultural strategy that has been hailed
as having solved Asia’s impending food cri-
sis in the 1960s and 1970s, is now criticized
for creating a vast number of ecological
and equity problems. Industrial agriculture
has led to the depletion of water tables, soil
salinization and numerous other problems
for long term food production.
There is also much talk about the grow-
ing Asian middle class and their dramatic
change in dietary preferences. On the one
hand, urban Asians are increasing their
intake of meat, dairy and eggs, as well as
sugars and fats. This nutrition trend has
public health, environmental and economic
consequences. On the other hand, accord-
ing to the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion, twelve Asian countries belonged to
the «low-income, food deficit countries»
as recently as 2015.2 This list includes for
example India, which for the first time also
became a net exporter of food. A food secu-
rity strategy that fulfills the dire needs of the
poor and ensures access to the dietary pref-
erences of the relatively rich continues to be
an unmet challenge, with significant trade-
offs for Asians as well as the rest of the world.
Of course food policies are different
across Asia, but sometimes they share com-
mon components. For instance, some coun-
tries' s­ trategies prioritize increasing food
production through industrialized methods,
where transnational corporations and their
investments play an increasingly important
role. China and India are paradigmatic of
this food strategy. It is worth taking a closer
look at them, since both are trying to meet
a growing demand through an expansion
in industrialized food production and face
many common challenges linked to this
approach.
China’s challenge of feeding
the new urban middle class
China has made remarkable progress in
boosting national economic development
and agricultural production. This has led to
a transition in nutrition, which takes place
at different speeds in China. While the
urban population is changing its nutritional
trends and is undergoing a westernization
of food patterns due to higher consumer
incomes, rural China is still lagging behind,
and parts of its population continue to suf-
fer from inadequate nutrition.
A big challenge to China’s national food
strategy is posed by a growing urban popu-
lation and its big appetite for meat and dairy
products. By 2050, China will add an addi-
tional 292 million people to urban areas3.
In 1980, Chinese meat consumption was
approximately 11 kg per person; today it is
approximately 59 kg per person and by 2020,

it is projected to be approximately 65 kg per
person4. This nutritional transition is lead-
ing to adverse health consequences, as the
rates of diabetes and cardiovascular disease
increase. From 1982 to 2002, the per centage
of people suffering from obesity had already
increased by 414 per cent5.
When the nutrition institute of China’s
Health Ministry recently published a recom-
mendation to reduce Chinese citizens’ meat
consumption by 50 per cent, it received
considerable international attention. It is
questionable if the country’s rising middle
class will base their diets on governmental
guidelines and cut down on meat consump-
tion. Eating meat has historically always
been associated with the notion of wealth
and progress. Moreover, China’s agricultural
and economic policies are actively support-
ing meat production, both through increas-
ing domestic capacity and by acquiring
infrastructure, technology and firms from
abroad that can ensure imports of meat,
feed and food processing. Examples of this
can be seen in Chinese-based companies
investing in farms and ports in different
parts of the world. Over the last two dec-
ades, and with the help of public and pri-
vate funds, a powerful group of companies
has emerged with vested interests along the
supply chain, encouraging expansion of the
meat sector, marking a major change in Chi-
na’s food security strategy6. China is moving
away from a policy of food self-sufficiency
towards a policy that relies increasingly on
imports. Since 2005, it has been importing
over half of the world’s traded soybeans,
and in recent years, increased its imports
of corn. The government also approved the
buyout of the U.S.’s largest pork producer—
Smithfield Foods— by Chinese-based trans-
national Shuanghui Company. This makes
China the biggest global pork producer—
pork being the Chinese meat of choice.
While Chinese state enterprises and for-
eign and domestic companies benefit from
this approach, the strategy has come with
numerous costs—including massive agri-
cultural pollution, antibiotic resistance, and
the deadly avian flu.
Indian small farmers’
struggle with big business
Although still very low by global standards,
including China, India’s meat consump-
tion is also on the rise, with poultry con-
sumption leading the way. Rising incomes,
The limits of industrial food strategies and alternatives Asia 17
urbanization, fast food restaurants’ market-
ing campaigns, and the emergence of super-
market chains contribute to these shifts in
diets. India's fast food industry is projected
to double in size between 2013 and 2016 to
1.12 billion US Dollars, thanks in part to the
largest youth population on earth7. These
changes will have a dramatic impact on the
country’s small scale farmers, processors,
fresh markets and street vendors, which
currently still dominate the food system.
Supermarket chains tend to favor industri-
ally produced meat, vegetables and dairy
products from transnational companies
that can consistently supply large volumes
and meet their exacting standards. Smaller
players will simply be unable to integrate
themselves into this value chain.
There is a similar development in the
dairy sector. Indian milk consumption has
doubled since the 1970s and the country
has become the world’s largest milk pro-
ducer8. Small-scale, independent farmers in
the informal sector still produce about 70 to
85 per cent of the milk, but government pol-
icies have been encouraging a shift towards
large-scale cooperatives and private dairies.
As elsewhere in the world, small producers
suffer from milk price volatility. This is likely
to result in a highly concentrated dairy sec-
tor in India (mimicking the global dairy
market), with a few large companies domi-
nating the market and price.
Transformative food
strategies do exist
While much emphasis has been placed both
globally and regionally on the «need» to pro-
duce more industrialized food and increase
exports (hence increase Gross Domestic
Product) to ensure food security, little effort
has been made to comprehensively address
culturally appropriate nutrition, distribu-
tion of existing food supplies, equity, and
human rights and environmental degra-
dation. However, alternative, people-led
strategies that focus more on small-scale
farmers and de-centralized food systems
do exist. They stand a far better chance to
empower the most food insecure.
The System of Rice Intensification (SRI),
which is widely used in Cambodia and
India, is an important component of such
an alternative food strategy. It is an agro-
ecological innovation in rice cultivation
and allows farmers to increase their rice
production and incomes through a shift to
18 Asia The limits of industrial food strategies and alternatives
Meat production (growth %, 2000–2011)
Source: FAO statistical yearbook 2014: Asia nd the Pacific food
and agricultre, Bangkok 2014
China
Cambodia
198 thousand t, -0,1%
Malaysia
1691 thousand t, + 6%
Myanmar
2112 thousand t, + 14,5%
Thailand
2403 thousand t, + 1,5%
Afghanistan
333 thousand t, + 0,4%
India
6228 thousand t, + 3,1%
Pakistan
2774 thousand t, + 4,5%
a sustainable management of plants, water,
soil and nutrients. The introduction of SRI
gives small-scale farmers an alternative to
expensive external inputs like agrochemi-
cals. SRI promotes farmer to farmer knowl-
edge sharing, the use of local seeds, and the
efficient and productive management of
available water resources. Furthermore, the
soil is improved through the use of green
manure, and results are formidable: In
Cambodia farmers experienced a 30 to 150
per cent increase in rice yields in 20119. In
India, the average grain productivity with
SRI was 38.87 per cent more than that of the
conventional method. For a six-member
farm family, this translates to 69 additional
days of food security10. By implementing
SRI strategies, rice farmers across Cambo-
dia and India have benefited from improved
access to food, better health and increased
income.
Another successful food security strat-
egy is the Homestead Food Production
method. In Bangladesh, garden-based
homestead food production is seen as an
important strategy to improving nutrition
among women and children. In 1990, the
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)
Helen Keller International (HKI) started
a pilot program with a 1000 Bangladeshi
households to explore existing gardening
practices and the feasibility of promoting
low-cost vegetable gardens and nutritional
education. The pilot program demonstrated
that with technical assistance and support,
households in Bangladesh can produce
fruits and vegetables throughout the year.
Moreover, the combination of home gar-
dening, nutritional education and gender
aspects can have a very positive impact
on vegetable consumption. In conjunc-
2000
2011
tion with the government and other NGOs,
HKI’s program (which now also includes
small-scale poultry-raising and egg produc-
tion) has expanded to 900,000 households
across Bangladesh, Nepal and Cambodia.
Importantly, the participation in the home
gardening program and the income it gen-
erates has also helped to empower women11.
More food sovereignty as
a solution to growing food
demand
Food activists rightfully challenge the «pro-
duction centric» narrative of global food
policymakers. SRI and homestead food pro-
duction are just two successful examples,
refuting that more industrial production
is the key solution to addressing growing
food demand in Asia. Also, an abundance
of food can still result in malnutrition and
starvation, as long as policies continue to
ignore inequality and injustice and fail to
strengthen distribution systems.
A critical element of a food security
strategy must address the critical and grow-
ing inequality between the urban middle
class and the rural poor in Asia. While no
«one size fits all» food security strategy can
apply to a region as diverse as Asia, it is clear
that some of the most transformative exam-
ples of addressing food security entail cre-
ating greater food sovereignty—resulting in
ecological integrity, better health and nutri-
tion and empowerment of small producers.
The Indian Right to Food Movement for
instance, has pushed to integrate the pro-
curement of coarse grains (millets, maize),
most often produced by small and poor
 The limits of industrial food strategies and alternatives Asia 19

79,216 thousand t, + 3,2%

farmers, as part of the new Indian Food growing-imports-of-feed.aspx#.V5rAaqJRJmh

Security Act. More income for small pro-
ducers means greater food security in rural
communities and less pressure to migrate to
urban areas.
In terms of meat, nutrition and growing
demand—much more needs to be done to
educate the wealthier population about the
ecological, social and public health costs of
industrial meat production. Moreover, the
clear public health risks of over-consuming
meat and processed foods must be bet-
ter understood. Supporting small-scale,
humane production of livestock and poul-
try, rather than replacing it with the failed
Western model of industrial meat produc-
tion, would be one clear way to support
also food security among rural producers
and meet the higher demand for meat. It
is important to acknowledge that this meat
demand is not inevitable and that in part, it
has been created by clever corporate mar-
keting and bad policy.
5
Gunasekera, Don and David Newth, «Asia’s nutri-
tion time bomb». East Asia Forum. December 24,
2014. Available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.
org/2014/12/24/asias-nutrition-time-bomb/
6
Sharma, Shefali, «The Need for Feed China’s Demand
for Industrialized Meat and Its Impacts». Institute for
Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP). February 2014.
7
Gauba, Vaishali, «India's fast-food industry is becom-
ing a major market». CNBC. Apr 2, 2015. Available
at: http://www.cnbc.com/2015/04/02/indias-fast-food-
industry.html
8
Lewis, Martin W., «Mapping the Consumption of
Milk and Meat in India». The Wire. August 3, 2016.
Available at: http://thewire.in/24181/mapping-the-
consumption-of-milk-and-meat-in-india/
9
Institute of Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) and
the Asian Farmers’ Association for Sustainable Rural
Development, «Agroecology and Advocacy: Innova-
tions in Asia». October 2011.
10
Sinha, Biswanath and Tushar Dash, «Learning from
the up-scaling efforts». LEISA India. March 2013.
volume 15 no. 1. Available at: http://www.agricul-
turesnetwork.org/magazines/india/sri/learning-from-
the-up-scaling-efforts
11
Talukder, Aminuzzaman, «Homestead food
production: A strategy for reducing micronutrient
malnutrition and poverty in South Asia». LEISA
India. Volume 16 no. 4. December 2014, updates Jan.
2015. Available at: http://www.agriculturesnetwork.
org/magazines/india/nutrition/homestead-food-
production#sthash.j6XAJgiX.dpuf2015

1
Dwyer,Graham J., «Asia’s Rising Prosperity, Climate
Change Taking Toll on Food Security»: Inter Press
Service News Agency, June 21, 2016. Available at:
http://www.ipsnews.net/2016/06/asias-rising-prosper-
ity-climate-change-taking-toll-on-food-security/
2
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), «Low In-
come Food-Deficit Countries (LIFDC) – List of 2015».
Available at: http://www.fao.org/countryprofiles/
lifdc/en/
3
United Nations, «World’s population increasingly
urban with more than half living in urban areas».
July 10, 2014. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/de-
velopment/desa/news/population/world-urbanization-
prospects-2014.html
4
Hansen, James and Fred Gale, «China in the Next
Decade: Rising Meat Demand and Growing Imports
of Feed». United States Department of Agriculture
Economic Research Service. April 7, 2014. Available
at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2014-april/
china-in-the-next-decade-rising-meat-demand-and-
20 Asia Street food in Asia: An industry that is much better than its reputation
Street food in Asia: An industry that is much
better than its reputation
Florentinus Gregorius Winarno
Prof. Florentinus Gregorius
Winarno is an expert on nutrition
and food technology. He finished
his PhD in Food Technology at
the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in 1970, and chaired
the FAO's Codex Alimentarius
Commission from 1991 to 1995.
He is also acknowledged as In-
donesia’s Father of Food Science
and Technology. Prof. Winarno
champions Indonesian dishes that
are served with the traditional
soy product tempeh. Tempeh is
made by a natural culturing and
controlled fermentation process
that binds soybeans into a cake
form. In a country like Indonesia,
where animal products are
considered expensive, tempeh is a
perfect substitute, since it is high
in protein and vitamin B12.
From ancient Greece to Pompeii, from
China to Turkey and beyond, street food
has a long and colorful history. Today,
around 2.5 billion people eat street food
every day. Especially in Asia, street food
has become an urban mainstay and is part
of the local food scene in large cities and
small towns alike.
Many Asians buy the ready-to-eat foods
and beverages on their way to work or dur-
ing their lunch breaks. Consumers come
from every social class and businessmen
are often seen eating their lunches next to
construction workers from the countryside.
The benefits of street food seem to be appar-
ent to everybody: It is cheap, easily acces-
sible, often nutritious, and offers an endless
culinary variety of traditional dishes for
every taste.
Yet, street food enterprises are often not
welcomed by local authorities. Their activi-
ties are seen as a hindrance to «moderniza-
tion.» Hawkers selling food and beverages
are considered to be part of the informal
sector and thus benefit from competitive
advantages. Unlike licensed eating estab-
lishments, they have considerably lower
operating costs. Finally, officials scrutinize
street food vendors for having poor hygiene
practices and for contributing to the spread
of diseases. In spite of these concerns,
street food in Asia is much better than its
reputation. The significance of the street
food industry for Asian societies has been
ignored for too long by politics. In effect,
street food bears positive social, economic
and nutritional aspects, which need to be
recognized by local authorities and govern-
ments.
A driver of social inclusion
and economic development
In times of urbanization, street food micro-
industries play a crucial role in the social
inclusion and participation of vulner-
able groups in big cities. Urban population
growth has stimulated a rise in the number
of hawkers in metropolises throughout the
world. Since street food enterprises are
generally small in size and require only
basic facilities and skills for the preparation
of food, just about anybody with a small
amount of capital can set up a food-stall.
The potential gains in income are
appealing for newcomers to the cities.
Many migrant workers who are in search
of employment obtain their first income
from selling foods and beverages on the
street. Women, who play a great role in pre-
paring, marketing and selling street foods,
have also benefited from the sector. These
micro-industries offer important employ-
ment opportunities to many women, ena-
bling them to make a living of their own.
The expansion of the street food sector is
also being favored by a change in eating
patterns. Due to the migration from rural
areas and foreign countries and the result-
ing living conditions, many working people
need to eat outside their homes. As a result,
the demand for relatively inexpensive, tasty
ready-to-eat food has increased as people
have less time to prepare meals. The street
food industry is therefore an important first
job-provider for many people and prevents
vulnerable social groups from slipping into
poverty.
By offering business opportunities,
the sale of street food can make a sizeable
contribution to the economy of a develop-

ing country. The impact of the street food
industry on the economic development of a
country has long been neglected and under-
estimated. The reason for this is that the
street food industry is seen as a part of the
informal sector, which typically describes
loosely organized and often non-enu-
merated economic activities. This makes
it hard to collect solid statistical data. Yet,
from an economic perspective, the division
between the informal and formal sectors is
not always clear. Suppliers and consumers
may «cross sectors» to exchange goods and
individuals may be active in both formal
and informal economic endeavors.
Eradicating malnutrition
through street food
Street food is not only appreciated for the
role it plays in the cultural and social her-
itage of societies, it also has become an
essential pillar in the provision of food to
the population. In fact, street food is crucial
when it comes to maintaining the neces-
sary nutrition status for large parts of the
population. Those with little or no income
depend almost exclusively on food sup-
plied by street food vendors. For many, the
food-stalls are the least expensive and most
accessible means of obtaining a nutrition-
ally balanced meal outside their homes.
Thus street food can be a key element in the
improvement of food security worldwide
and in Asia in particular.
Governments and public health author-
ities nevertheless remain skeptical of street
food and fear that an unregulated street
food industry might lead to a backlash in
tourism. Officials are especially concerned
Street food in Asia: An industry that is much better than its reputation Asia 21
about the risk of food poisoning outbreaks,
which is often linked to the microbiologi-
cal quality of the water used to prepare
food and drinks. Other sources generally
seen as contributing to microbial contami-
nation are the preparation areas, cooking
and serving utensils, raw materials, under-
cooked and improperly stored food and the
personal hygiene of vendors. While health
concerns about food contamination linked
to street food might be legitimate in some
cases, the number of documented food
poisoning cases stemming from street food
has been limited. In fact, the incidence of
such is surprisingly low, with a study from
2012 showing rates comparable to nor-
mal restaurants.1 Epidemiological studies
suggesting that street food contributes to
a significant number of food poisoning
cases are inadequate due to deficiencies in
knowledge about important parameters in
the food chain and host pathogen interac-
tions. It is rather more likely that the health
risk of food is not only determined by the
concentration of various additives and
other contaminants in a food product, but
also by cumulative daily intake of certain
contaminants or additives throughout a
­consumer’s diet.
Against this background, politics should
move away from putting the street food
industry under general suspicion, and start
informing consumers and hawkers about
the benefits of a well-balanced street food
diet in order to fight malnutrition in Asia.
Providing access to safe water supplies for
street food stalls would be a first impor-
tant measure to promote food safety. For
instance, authorities could oblige the street
food industry to harvest rain water, which if
treated properly can serve as a fresh potable
22 Asia Street food in Asia: An industry that is much better than its reputation
water supply and has a better microbiologi-
cal quality than water collected from local
family wells. Such interventions would
ensure safe food practices and improve
people’s nutrition. Besides improving the
environmental conditions, authorities
could also focus on educating the food han-
dlers in hygienic standards, since the lack
of knowledge among hawkers is often the
core problem of malnutrition. Moreover,
the adoption of good agriculture practices
through hazard analysis would significantly
reduce risk in the street food consumption.
Political recognition is
needed
It is clear that street food can be paramount
when it comes to food security. Given that
millions of people depend on this source of
nutrition, street food will certainly continue
to evolve and tempt passers-bys to stop for
a snack or a drink. Unfortunately, the politi-
cal mills are grinding rather slowly. Only in
the late 1990s did the United Nations (UN)
and other organizations begin to recognize
that street vendors had been an under-
Lunch is another peak hour for
street food vendors in Thailand.
It is not easy to secure good loca -
tions nearby the offices, which
are crowded with working people
and competitions among vendors
are high. A group of blue collar
engineering workers are trying to
save time by quickly eating their
meals.
used method of delivering fortified foods
to populations. In 2007, the Food and Agri-
culture Organization (FAO) recommended
considering methods to add nutrients and
supplements to street foods that are com-
monly consumed by a particular culture2.
Although these are first signs of a rethinking
about street food, these recommendations
are not sufficient and have not been ech-
oed by all developing countries. To enable
official recognition and control of the street
food industry as integral part of the food
supply, appropriate regulations should be
prepared and incorporated into existing
food regulations. Above all, active collabora-
tion of all stakeholders, including consumer
associations, toward the strengthening and
proper enforcement of public health poli-
cies to ensure safe practices and a safer and
healthier society is needed.
1
Rahman et al., «Food Safety Knowledge Attitude and
hygiene practices among the street food vendors in
Northern Kuching city, Sarawak»: Borneo Science 31;
September 2012.
2
FAO, «Promises and Challenges of the informal food
sector»: FAO 2007.
A mobile food vendor with a
variety of choices makes it con -
venient for instant buying. Thai
street food vendors are required
to register for a one-year license
with the Bangkok Metropolitan
Administration but there are a
huge number of unregistered
peddlers.

With intensive experience as Head

Chef in a number of five-star hotels
in Thailand and worldwide, «Uncle
Chom» is accustomed to wearing
the white uniform while cooking.
In fact, he has turned himself to
serve street people for many years.

Photographer: Ampol Chansirisri

All rights reserved to Heinrich Böll Foundation
Mohammad Ali Road in Mum -
bai, on an Eid Day: Vermicelli
(top) and Kebabs (bottom) are
specialties for the festive day.
During Ramzan (Ramadan),
the area is Mumbai’s street
food hotspot, teeming with
restaurants and stands. But
it is not just the Muslims who
come here: People from all of
Mumbai’s communities savour
these delicacies.
Fort Area in Mumbai, during
lunch hour: People descend from
their offices to grab a bite. Fort
is one of the oldest areas of Mum -
bai, today a business district.
Besides enjoying street food, hun -
dreds of thousands of office-going
Mumbaikars receive their daily
home-cooked lunch through the
Dabbawallahs, known for their
reliability of service, as shown
in the critically acclaimed Bol-
lywood movie «The Lunchbox».

Khau Galli, Zaveri Bazaar,

Mumbai. Khau Gallis, literally
«Food Street», have sprung up
in many commercial areas of
Mumbai and other cities. Zaveri
Bazaar is a silver trade market,
one of the oldest in town. Papads,
a crispy wafer made from lentil,
rice or sorghum flour, made for a
quick snack. Their production and
sale requires little equipment and
capital; thus it is often women or
children who sell them.

Photographer: Nikhil Roshan

All rights reserved to
Heinrich Böll Foundation
Wala Noor wali, works in his
ancestral tea shop in Qissa Khwani
bazar in Peshawar, Pakistan.
Historically, Qisa Khwani was
known for its tea shops, where
traders from different places used
to sit and tell stories, that is how it
got the name Qisa Khwani meaning
place where people tell stories. It
is also reputed for its green tea and
specific kettles.

Photographer: Hassan Turi

All rights reserved to Heinrich Böll
Foundation

Textile workers in Cambodia buy

street foods during their lunch
break. The mass fainting of fac-
tory workers across the country,
sparked a debate in Cambodia if
the nutrition is too unbalanced for
hourly long work.

Photographer: Heng Monorom

All rights reserved to Heinrich Böll
Foundation
 «In India nationalism is defined by what you eat» India 27

«In India nationalism is defined by

what you eat»
An Interview with Veena Shatrugna by Sadia Sohail

India has experienced enormous economic growth in the last years. Yet, many people
still suffer from hunger and malnutrition due to misguided food policies and imposed
ideologies. Veena Shatrugna talks about the politics of nutrition in India and how elitist
and upper caste ideas about the «right» nutrition contributed to malnutrition among
the poor.

In 2015, the Global Hunger Index Report ranked India 20th amongst leading countries
with a serious hunger situation. Although the government implemented numerous food
policies in the last decades, India still has one of the highest malnutrition rates in Asia.
What is going wrong?

India is a society divided by caste and class, with clear-cut stratifica-

tions. This social division can also be seen in the nutrition of Indians.
India’s high malnutrition rate has been produced through the genius
of the elite, who handout guidelines and popular knowledge about
food and nutrition that do not correspond to the living conditions of
the poor. The poor, however, depend on the state for their basic needs.
The crucial question, therefore, is «Who plans for whom?» The Indian Veena Shatrugna is a medical
doctor by profession and the
bureaucrats and top nutritionists are all from a certain caste and class; former deputy director of India’s
they have never looked at the lives of the poor and Dalits. Instead, the National Institute of Nutrition
government subtly communicates to the poor «If your stomach is full, in Hyderabad. For three and a
half decades, she has worked
you should be grateful.» This is very ingenious, because your stomach on nutrition and health issues,
could be full with plain rice or chapattis, but you could still feel weak especially those impacting women
and children. Dr. Shatrugna’s
and listless.
research on hunger and food
politics in India has put things in
How does malnutrition manifest itself in India? perspective for her; after seeing
how little people have to eat, she
does not occupy herself with what
The core problem is that our diet is largely based on cereals. In the she gets to eat or what her favorite
absence of good quality proteins, vitamins and minerals from eggs, dish could be.
fruits, vegetables, nuts, and meats, cereals get converted into fats.
After all, the human body requires a wide range of nutrients to develop Sadia Sohail works as the Coordi-
proper organs and tissues such as nerves, blood and muscles. The lack nator of the resource governance
programme at Heinrich Böll
of these protective foods in diets results in a paucity of important nut- Foundation's India office in New
rients. This is the reason why the poor often suffer from a calorie and Delhi. She has a masters degree
protein deficiency, and why we in India are prone to chronic diseases in environmental science and
has worked extensively on environ-
like diabetes. We have become fat-thin people. We are thin but our mental governance and regulatory
body tissue is all fat. The consequences of this cereal-diet are devas- aspects of waste management
tating. It affects the ability of children to put on height during their especially e-waste and municipal
solid waste in India. Sadia is a
growing years. Up to 30 per cent of the adult population and 40 per typical foodie and loves to gorge
cent of children are too short and underweight. on Indian street food.
28 India «In India nationalism is defined by what you eat»

Amartya Sen once said «No famine has ever taken place in the history of the world in
a functioning democracy.» Why did the Indian democracy not succeed at eradicating
hunger?

It depends on what a democracy prioritizes. In a democracy where

you cannot see under-nutrition, you do not prioritize it. Economists
can calculate the mortality rate of a country, but they see nothing sig-
nificant, when there is rampant hunger, disease and under-nutrition.
There are economists like Arvind Panagariya, the vice-chairman of
NITI Aayog [government’s economic think-tank] saying that Indi-
ans are genetically short and that this has nothing to do with mal-
nutrition1. This is absurd and these kinds of debates keep India from
addressing the core issues. Today, half the country is under drought,
and bureaucrats play this down with figures to show that it is not so
bad. You may not see children starving to death, but you have people
walking with anemia, with multiple nutrient deficiencies, people who
are underweight and stunted. Democracy does not privilege them;
instead, democracy privileges the rich, when power plants and malls
are financed. We have to ask, whose democracy are we talking about,
who can really exercise democratic rights in this country? Amartya Sen
does not talk about that.

What role does the government play in this?

Instead of altering the official diet recommendations and diversify-

ing the availability of food, the government invests solely in the pro-
duction and distribution of cereals. The Public Distribution System
(PDS) deals exclusively with the provision of wheat and rice. However,
even these cereals do not reach the poorest in adequate amounts, and
thus do not give much room for improving quality of life. Then there
is the issue of the government banning beef in many states. In some
states, even eggs have been taken out of the mid-day meals provided
to schoolchildren. In this way, the foods that would provide people
with quality proteins, such as poultry, eggs and meat, have become
illegitimate. Beef, for example, is seen as undesirable, although it is the
cheapest form of protein that common people in India can afford. The
government promotes a certain food policy for ideological reasons. It
is privileging a vegetarian lifestyle because those in power have access
and control over most democratic institutions. Cow protection has
been enshrined in the constitution to assuage the upper caste Brah-
mins. Due to the hegemonic vegetarian cultures of the upper castes,
it is believed that any meat is impure and killing a cow is akin to kil-
ling your mother! As a result, people are pushed to being vegetarians.
This leads to a situation where calories are derived only from cereals
because the poor cannot afford other quality vegetarian food, such as
fruits, nuts, vegetables, milk and milk products.

Are most Indians really vegetarians?

The belief that all Indians are vegetarians is a popular stereotype. In

reality, only the Brahmins, Jains and Vaishyas [upper castes] are true
vegetarians. In the North East, in Kerala, many castes in the South, in
West Bengal, and among most Dalits, beef is eaten. So, we have a lot
of regional differences, depending on the availability or the extent of
urbanization. As you come to the cities, there are only two to three
kinds of meat available, mostly chicken and mutton because Muslims
will not eat pork and certain upper caste Hindus will not eat beef. I
would estimate that between 80 and 85 per cent of India’s population
are non-vegetarian. Yet, India wants the world to believe that it is a
 «In India nationalism is defined by what you eat» India 29

vegetarian country, because today India is defining nationalism by

what you eat. This is a very dangerous development!

Prime Minister Modi has spoken out against cow-defending fundamentalists by calling
them «miscreants». Are religious beliefs getting out of hand in India?

We are going through a very difficult phase, where being patriotic

means not eating beef. Beef has become such a frightening issue that
today you cannot even have mutton in your fridge because people
may suspect it to be beef. A Muslim was recently lynched in Dadri
[near Delhi] by a Hindu mob because he was accused of killing a cow.
States like Maharashtra and Haryana have banned all buffalo meat,
bull meat, and of course cow meat. The dominant Hindutva mindset is
creating havoc and affecting not just eating habits, but also livelihoods.
The lives and eating cultures of the meat eating population are under
the scanner in India. Their very existence has become illegitimate. It
is nothing but a brute hegemonic culture of the upper caste at play.

If politics does not succeed at giving the people the food they need; do you think that
economic growth will do the job?

I doubt it. Economic growth is measured in terms of Gross Domestic

Product (GDP), but GDP does not translate into food. Using a sim-
ple economic criterion and expecting it to relate directly to food and
hunger does not work. Also, minimum wages in India are still among
the worst in the world and do not allow people to purchase the food
they need. In fact, the minimum wage in India is tied to the number
of calories that a family of three needs per day. Hence, a family will
receive just enough money to buy the food that will provide them with
sufficient calories. Most of the time, this food is rice. This is pathetic,
because in the end, families receiving the minimum wage are bound
to only having rice. Logically, the consequences of such a diet are
devastating. Even if your income rises, the ability to buy quality food
is limited if you live in a remote area, where people cannot grow food.
We have a huge migrating and landless population that cannot grow
their own food, and consequently, they are forced to depend on the
Public Distribution System.

Infants are particularly vulnerable to malnutrition. Feeding and care, which are ty-
pically seen as women’s duties, has significant implications for the health of child-
ren. Is India’s high child malnutrition also linked to nutritional discrimination in the
households?

There is no evidence that women in India face nutritional discrimi-

nation. In poor households, both men and women are badly off when
it comes to nutrition. Yet it is true that the effects of malnutrition are
more profound for women because their iron requirements for the
formation of blood are higher. Women menstruate every month and
they have babies. Over 50 per cent of women suffer from anemia.
When they are pregnant, this figure even climbs up by 60 to 90 per
cent. Blood formation needs a whole range of nutrients, so menst-
ruation, pregnancy and lactation take a toll on them. Often Indian
practitioners are too busy to diagnose anemia that comes from the
lack of quality foods, and send the women back with a prescription
of iron tablets. Moreover, a woman’s nutrition during pregnancy lays
the basis for the health of her children in later years. This is called fetal
programming. A fetus that is used to poor nutrition in the womb is
unable to handle excess cereals in later life, because the liver is unable
to metabolize carbs, and the pancreas is unable to secrete adequate
30 India «In India nationalism is defined by what you eat»

insulin. So, not having enough good food is the biggest problem that
Indian families face.

What measures can you think of to resolve this problem and give the population the
nutrition they need?

The foremost important step would be to start de-ideologizing food,

and lay down wages that allow families to eat well. Since the rule of the
Hindu nationalist party BJP, nutrition has become a much-politicized
issue. The interpretations of being «Indian» are going haywire and that
serves the cause of political goons to establish a hegemonic eating
culture in the name of nationalism. This has nothing to do with nutri-
tion and nothing to do with hunger. The state needs to stop imposing
a straightjacketed dietary pattern based on certain religious beliefs.
Everybody should be able to afford food, and feel free to eat whatever
they want without being stigmatized. This is the basis that could lay
the ground for an honest discussion regarding food and nutrition for
Indians.

1
Arvind Panagariya, «Does India Really Suffer from Worse Child Malnutrition Than Sub-Saharan Africa?»:
Economic and Political Weekly (EPW) 48, 18, May 4, 2013.

Nutrition status in India

Source: Rapid Survey on Children, Ministry of Women and Child development India 2014

18,6%
38,7%
Children under 3 years
Children under
who have low birth weight
5 years who are
{less than 2500 grams}
stunted

44,7%
Girls aged 15–18 with BMI
less than 18.5 (low weight)
BMI formula: Weight / Height ²
BMI under 18,5 is considered
underweight.

Prevalance of anemia in India, in per cent

Source: National Family Health Survey-3., Ministry of Health and Family Welfare India 2006

55,3%
69,5%
Women 15–49
Children 6–59 years old
months old
 Gendered food insecurity: The legal and social foundations for women’s food discrimination in Afghanistan Afghanistan
Gendered food insecurity: The legal and
social foundations for women’s food
discrimination in Afghanistan
Weeda Mehran
Afghanistan has been described as the
world’s most dangerous country for
women. Many civil society organizations
working on women’s rights claim that
violence against women (VAW) is on
the rise in the country. VAW takes many
forms, and has complex and deep roots
in the patriarchal culture of the Afghan
society. One form of VAW is denying them
access to food. This discrimination can be
derived from patriarchal norms and the
legal system.
Poverty is one of the major issues Afghani-
stan is struggling with. More than one
third of the Afghan population lives below
the national poverty line.1 This has direct
effects on the diets of most Afghan house-
holds, and often some family members
suffer from nutrition deficiency. In par-
ticular, the most vulnerable groups, such
as women and children, are more likely
to be exposed to malnutrition. Poverty is
gendered and women are more likely than
men to be poor. Malnutrition is prevalent
among Afghan women. Approximately 21
per cent of Afghan women have a low body
mass index (BMI), 48 per cent suffer from an
iron deficiency, and a staggering 75 per cent
suffer from an iodine deficiency.2 In effect,
women’s malnutrition has serious impli-
cations for the health of their children. In
Afghanistan, 55 per cent of children under
the age of 5 do not get sufficient nutrition to
develop physically and mentally, leading to
an extraordinary high child mortality rate of
45 per cent.3 The primary reason for all this
is gender inequality, which is institutional-
ized in Afghanistan.
31
Access to food is a mean of
social power
Gender inequality can be both a cause and
a result of food insecurity. Just as women’s
access to education and health care has
been limited by patriarchal norms and
structures, so has women’s access to nutri-
tion and food been limited. Inequalities in
access to food and women’s limited deci-
sion-making power at the household level
can influence women’s role in society. Food
and nutrition can be used as a basic form of
controlling women’s autonomy. For exam-
ple, it limits women’s appearance outside of
the household. If a husband does not agree
to his wife working outside the house, a
woman’s decision to go against this can sim-
ply mean starvation for her or her children
as a form of punishment, since the husband
is usually in charge of family expenditures
and food purchasing.
Gender segregation and division of
labor at the household level can infringe
upon women’s access to food. In a patri-
archal society such as Afghanistan, men’s
primary role is as a breadwinner, while
women’s role is traditionally limited to
household labor. As such, men are more
likely to be in charge of major and even
every-day household finances. It is common Dr. Weeda Mehran is a human
practice in some parts of the country, espe- rights activist and has worked
cially in the periphery and in rural areas, at a number of national and
international organizations
for women to ask for money from the head in Afghanistan, including
of the household for the daily purchase of Afghanistan Independent Human
food, or request men to buy various food Rights Commission and Integrity
Watch Afghanistan. Dr. Mehran
items (particularly among families where obtained her PhD degree from
women are not allowed to go shopping). the Department of Politics and
While male members of the household are International Studies at the
University of Cambridge, and
responsible for purchasing food, women her work focuses on the Islamic
are in charge of cooking. Traditionally many radicalization of young people.
32 Afghanistan Gendered food insecurity: The legal and social foundations for women’s food discrimination in Afghanistan
families, even in urban areas, serve meals in
separate rooms for women and men. This is
particularly common in larger households
where three generations live under the
same roof. The rational for this is to make
women feel more comfortable while eat-
ing and allow children to freely play around
without upsetting the male members of the
household, who can eat in peace and quiet.
Furthermore, male members of the
household are more likely to get better food,
or a bigger portion of it. This discrimina-
tion is especially a problem among house-
holds with limited nutritional resources. It
is not only perpetrated by men, but also
by women, to the extent that mothers feed
their sons better than their daughters when
resources are limited. Men often engage in
labor intensive jobs such as farming, con-
struction, and armed forces. Hence, food
discrimination at the household level is
justified based on needs, wherein men get
the priority.
Gender inequalities are
legally manifested
Women’s predicament in the family is to a
great extent institutionalized through the
laws of the country. The Civil Code of 1977,
which is still in effect, contains many dis-
criminatory articles that clearly put women
at a disadvantage. By subjugating women
to men’s authority and requiring them to
submit to their will, women are, in effect,
treated as legal minors.4
These legal inequalities are manifested
even more in Sharia law. Following the
sharia rule of nafaqa, a man is obliged to
support his wife with food, clothing and
shelter as soon as the marriage is consum-
mated. This is derived from the Quran (4:34),
which states that «Men are protectors and
maintainers of women because God give
one more than the other, and because they
support them from their means.» A hus-
band can be jailed for not providing nafaqa
and the Civil Code5 of Afghanistan as well
as the Shiite Personal Status Law6 include
the provision that nafaqa is a husband’s
­responsibility.
These strict gender responsibilities
enshrined in Sharia law and the legal code
of the country have led to systematic dis-
crimination against women. A woman is
subjugated to a man’s authority for the
provision of her food, and a man can easily
justify limiting a woman’s educational and
workforce participation. These laws have
largely been an interpretation of women’s
«inferiority» to men, as women are con-
sidered «weak» and unable to provide for
themselves. Consequently, a husband or a
male figure in the family is responsible for
providing them with basic material needs in
life. In turn, women and men are socialized
to internalize such gender practices. In fact,
men can suffer from such gendered roles as
well. For example, research conducted by
the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation
Unit (AREU) found that many Afghan men
feel that they are unable to live up to the
expectations that society sets upon them.
More legal and social
reforms are necessary
Since 2001, significant efforts have been
made to address legal discrimination
against women. Afghanistan’s Constitution
makes provisions that allow for adopting
laws that ensure equality. In fact, Article
7 of the Afghan Constitution states «The
state shall observe the United Nations (UN)
Charter, inter-state agreements, as well as
international treaties to which Afghanistan
has joined, and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.» Ratification of the UN
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
in 2003 was a major step in this direction.
However, bringing family laws on par with
the Constitution is a challenging matter,
particularly when family laws are based on
Sharia law. In this regard, Article 3 of the
Constitution clearly makes the provision
that «No law shall contravene the tenets
and provisions of the holy religion of Islam
in Afghanistan.» As a consequence, many
religious groups in the country can easily
reject a Civil Code that is based on gender
equality principles and perceived to violate
Sharia law.
To address systematic discrimina-
tion against women, the legal code of the
country needs to be revised. Evidently, the
implementation of progressive reform poli-
cies to ensure women’s rights will be a very
challenging task that needs to be addressed
through a comprehensive strategic plan. For
example, in 2013, hundreds of women affili-
ated with radical Islamic groups in Kabul
carried out a demonstration against the Law
on Elimination of violence against women.
They viewed the law as a «plot by the West
to strip Muslim women of their Islamic dig-
 Gendered food insecurity: The legal and social foundations for women’s food discrimination in Afghanistan Afghanistan
nity.»7 Hence, progressive reforms in family
law will not be possible without the lobby-
ing of members of parliament and religious
leaders and direct engagement of civil soci-
ety organizations at the local level.
Yet, challenging discriminatory legal
codes alone will not be sufficient, due to the
lack of law enforcement. To address women’s
access to food and the broader underlying
factors associated with food discrimina-
tion, namely gender inequality, longer-term
policies need to be put in place. These poli-
cies need to allow for women’s education
and labor force participation. Educational
programs should address discriminatory
practices at the family level. Gender stud-
ies should be incorporated into the school
curriculum so that young boys and girls get
formal training and exposure to the issue
from an early age. These are first important
steps so that violence against women in any
form including food discrimination can be
eradicated in Afghanistan.
1
UNDP, «About Afghanistan». Available at: http://
www.af.undp.org/content/afghanistan/en/home/coun-
tryinfo.html
2
Levitt, Emily, Kees Kostermans, Luc Laviolette, and
Nkosinathi Mbuya, «Malnutrition in Afghanistan:
Scale, Scope, Causes, and Potential Response»: The
World Bank. 2011.
3
Ibid.
4
Musawah, «Home Truths: A global Report on Equality
in the Muslim Family», 2009. Available at: http://
www.musawah.org/sites/default/files/Home%20
Truths-EN_0.pdf
5
Civil Law of the Republic of Afghanistan (Civil Code) –
Official Gazette No. 353, published 1977/01/05
(1355/10/15 A.P.)
6
Shiite Personal Status Law, Official Gazette No. 988,
2009.
7
Osman, Borhan,«Beyond Jihad and Traditionalism:
Afghanistan’s New Generation of Islamic activists»:
Afghanistan Analyst Network, 2015.
33
Dining with the Taliban
Sharing one of my culinary experiences: One of the
main dishes that almost every Afghan likes is Qabuli.
It is rice cooked with meat and served with raisins,
fried carrots and almonds on top. It used to be one
of my favorite dishes, of which I have a memory. In
1998, I was working as an interpreter with Medicine
sans Frontiers (Doctors without Borders) in Afghani-
stan. I got the job after the Taliban took over the city
and closed down all the schools for girls. I was one
of the few lucky women in the whole city who could
work outside and had a job in the health sector, the
only sector in which the Taliban allowed women to
work. In the summer of 1998, with the MSF team,
we travelled to the province of Ghor to carryout a
health and nutrition survey among Afghan families.
The Taliban administrator for the district, Tulak,
invited the MSF team for lunch at one of the very
few restaurants in the small local bazaar, which con-
sisted of two rows of mud stores. Turning down the
invitation would not have been taken well, especially
since the team needed protection in order to be able
to carry out its work. So we decided to go. I was one
of the only two women on the team; the other woman
was an anthropologist. The pious Taliban, who did
not talk to women, let alone dine with them, guided
the two of us to the smaller room behind the main
salon where all men were seated on the floor for
lunch. Our food was sent to the room, where the two
of us were sitting in one corner, like two prisoners,
whispering in soft voices lest the men in the main
room heard us. It was Qabuli. I thought, at least, the
Taliban got one thing right! Alas, it had an overdose
of oil. Oil was literally dripping from each grain of
rice. We each reluctantly ate a spoonful. Not eating
the food can be considered an insult and we did not
want to insult the Taliban, who had already shown
a leap of faith by inviting two women for lunch. So,
we started to encourage each other to keep eating,
but to no avail. Hence, I came up with the idea of
emptying half of the big plate of rice into a plastic
bag and taking it with us. We found a plastic bag in
the room, but as luck would have it, it had a hole in it.
Nonetheless, I emptied most of the rice into the bag.
I had to carry the bag under my burqa, as my foreign
colleague was not required to wear a burqa and
couldn’t be seen with a plastic bag filled with Qabuli.
As we left the restaurant, I was carrying the Qabuli
bag, knowing that the rice was falling from the hole.
By the time I got to the MSF cars, I had left behind
a meandering trail of Qabuli from the restaurant
to the white Pajero cars parked at the beginning of
the bazaar. I also had a big, visible oil stain on my
burqa. We burst into laughter once we got into the
car. Anytime I see Qabuli now, I am reminded of my
dining experience with the Taliban.
Weeda Mehran
34 Pakistan Zero political power for zero hunger in Pakistan: How food security is undermined by political power plays
Zero political power for zero hunger in
Pakistan: How food security is undermined by
political power plays
Abid Suleri
Dr. Abid Suleri is a social policy
analyst and executive director
of the Sustainable Development
Institute in Pakistan. He is also
a member of various official
bodies, such as the Economic
Advisory Council of the Pakistani
government and the National
Advisory Committee. Dr. Suleri
holds a PhD in Food Security from
the Natural Resources Institute
at the University of Greenwich.
His favorite dish is daal (lentil)
with chawel (boiled rice) because
it is a specialty cooked by his
mother. Traditionally, two types of
lentils, split black gram and split
chick peas, are cooked together
and served with plain rice. He
associates this dish with the rich
aroma of freshly cropped basmati
rice and black gram.
An essential prerequisite to achieving
food security is making sure that food
is available. Although many developing
countries produce enough food to feed
their people, macro-policies and political
interests determine people’s access to
food. Food insecurity, therefore, is often
linked to matters of political power.
Pakistan is paradigmatic for the dreadful
relationship between food insecurity and
politics. Almost half of the population in
Pakistan is considered to be food insecure
and lives in multidimensional poverty.1 This
year’s Global Hunger Index2 reported that
22 per cent of the population is undernour-
ished and that 45 per cent of children under
five exhibit stunted growth, placing the
hunger situation at a «serious» level. Food
production, however, is not the problem.
The agricultural sector plays a major role
in the Pakistani economy, sustaining the
livelihoods of 42 per cent of the population.
It produces Pakistan’s major export com-
modities such as cotton, rice and fruits. In
2015, Pakistan was the world’s eighth larg-
est producer of wheat and fourth largest
producer of milk; yet, the per centage of the
population experiencing food insecurity is
increasing. The main reason for this is that
the socio-economic access to food and the
hygiene of foodstuffs are on a sharp decline
in Pakistan.
Although numerous programs by
various political governments have been
adopted to fight food insecurity, they have
had very little effect on the living conditions
of the Pakistani people. Either the programs
have been too ambitious, trying to simul-
taneously overcome food- and poverty-
related problems on different levels, or they
were never concretely implemented. Often
the political will of the government was
lacking because other issues were of greater
importance to stay in power. The fate of
the then promising Zero Hunger Program
(ZHP) shows how noble objectives are sac-
rificed at the altar of political power-plays,
disappointing people’s hope to end hunger.
A program with eager
goals under bad political
circumstances
In 2012, Prime Minister Gillani announced
that he wanted to implement a major ZHP,
which was explicitly dedicated to fight food
insecurity. The program comprised numer-
ous measures such as mid-day school ini-
tiatives, conditional cash and food transfers
to the most vulnerable households, stimu-
lus programs to expand farm outputs and
market access, and the rationalization
of market prices of food commodities. It
also designed special nutritious diets for
breast-feeding mothers, pregnant women,
and children under five. Furthermore, it
intended to establish a National Food Secu-
rity Council equipped with high executive
powers to assist in preparing a national food
­security strategy.
These eager goals had the potential to
make the ZHP a flagship food security pro-
gram in Pakistan; however, the successful
implementation of such programs gener-
ally depends on the political circumstances.
In this case, shortly after presenting the
program to the public, Prime Minister Gil-
lani was removed by the Supreme Court
of Pakistan. Even though the subsequent
 Zero political power for zero hunger in Pakistan: How food security is undermined by political power plays Pakistan 35

Depth of the food deficit* 2011–2013 (kcal/cap/day)

Source: FAO statistical yearbook 2014: Asia nd the Pacific food and agricultre, Bangkok 2014

* The depth of the food deficit indicates how many calories would be needed to lift the undernourished
from their status, everything else being constant. The average intensity of food deprivation of the
undernourished is multiplied by the number of undernourished to provide an estimate of the total
food deficit in the country, which is then normalized by the total population.
Source: www.indexmundi.com

Pakistan: India: Cambodia: China:

131 g (131 kcal) 107 g (121 kcal) 90 g (102 kcal) 68 g (76 kcal)

Indonesia: Vietnam: Thailand:

57 g (64 kcal) 56 g (63 kcal) 35 g (40 kcal)

Prime Minister was also from the Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP) and shared sympathy
for the ZHP, other issues were more press-
ing at the time. In the end, the high fiscal
deficit of Pakistan made the allocation of
funds to the ZHP in the 2012 to 2013 fiscal
year impossible.
When the Pakistan Muslim League
(PML-N) emerged as the majority party in
the elections that followed in May 2013, the
public debt level had become so crucial that
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was
called in for help. In order to convince the
IMF of the need for further financial aid, the
government sold old wine in new skins to
the IMF. It presented the Benazir Income
Support Program (BISP), a former program
of the PPP from 2008, as a flagship social
safety net that needed funding. Compared
to the ZHP, the BISP envisages not only
hunger and food problems, but also other
socio-economic issues. For example, it tries
to increase the living conditions of the poor
through cash grants to women-headed
households below a certain poverty thresh-
old. Due to the broader approach to food
insecurity, the BISP was viewed as a higher
political asset than the ZHP and the PML-N
therefore decided to apply with this pro-
gram at the IMF. In a nutshell, establishing
a social safety net to make a stronger case
for external financial facility became the
national political priority.
A further pitfall for the ZHP was the dif-
ficulty of coordinating and integrating it
into other already existing programs. For
example, the ZHP and the BISP had com-
mon features and could have been con-
verged to some degree, but such integration
would have created a bureaucratic tussle
for funds between two departments, the
BISP and Ministry of National Food Secu-
rity. Against this background, there was no
appetite among the civilian bureaucracy to
present ZHP to the new political bosses.
Is food insecurity no political
issue in Pakistan?
Despite the fact that half of the popula-
tion in Pakistan is food insecure, decision
makers in the Federal Ministry of National
Food Security and Research (a rebranding
of the former Ministry of Food, Agriculture
and Livestock (MINFAL)) always insisted
that food insecurity was not an issue. Most
of these decision makers quote the recent
bumper crop of wheat and rice as evidence
that Pakistan is not a food insecure country.
To their understanding, hunger is merely
a production issue that is to be addressed
through increased output. This is true to a
certain extent, but an increase in produc-
tion is a means, not an end in itself to solv-
ing food insecurity. They ignore the fact that
physically available food does not automat-
ically guarantee food security.
Even though the public knows that too
little is being done politically to change the
36 Pakistan Zero political power for zero hunger in Pakistan: How food security is undermined by political power plays
food situation in Pakistan, unlike with other
issues, no real resistance has emerged from
the people. It is not that Pakistanis do not
exercise their democratic right to demon-
strate. In fact, protests as a mean of political
expression are quite common. In the past,
there have been protests against power out-
ages in different parts of Pakistan, protests
against the law and order situation, and
protests against the lack of water supply
in different parts of Karachi. Interestingly,
however, public protests against hunger and
food insecurity are very rare. The general
elections also showed that the PPP could
not make any political capital out of this
issue. Voters were simply not attracted by
the party’s anti-hunger programs. Instead,
Pakistan’s public attributes a greater impor-
tance to issues like poverty, corruption, the
power crisis, illiteracy and extremism. Thus,
PML-N’s promise to end power outages was
one of the main reasons for its victory in the
election.3
This is an indication that people in Paki-
stan do not trust politics anymore to effec-
tively fight hunger and instead focus on
other issues. The failure of the ZHP was just
more proof that relying on the government
to fight hunger was fruitless. As a conse-
quence, instead of demanding food com-
modities, people demand uninterrupted
electricity, employment and educational
opportunities in order to sustain their live-
lihoods and to earn enough to meet their
food requirements on their own.
In fact, the Pakistani people are still
sensitive about food insecurity and hun-
ger; they are quite aware of the factors
that would enhance their access to food.
However, the many disappointments that
resulted from fruitless hunger programs
have led to a shift in responsibility. Today,
the population trusts civil society more
than public institutions to alleviate hun-
ger. The needs of chronically food insecure
people are largely met by domestic philan-
thropy, charity, and food distributions at
local shrines. These forms of support create
a bridge between the food haves and have-
nots. As long as hunger programs like the
ZHP do not come into fruition, this bridge
is essential for social peace in Pakistan.
1
World Food Program, Sustainable Development
Policy Institute et al., «Food Insecurity in Pakistan»,
2009 available at: http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/
groups/public/documents/ena/wfp225636.pdf?_ga=1
.150790334.922576915.1475180281
2
Welthungerhilfe, International Food Policy Research
et al., «Global Hunger Index 2016», October
2016. Available at: file:///C:/Users/FabianH/Down-
loads/130918.pdf
3
See for example: DAWN, «Protest against power out-
age turn violent», June 20, 2015. Available at: http://
www.dawn.com/news/1189268; DAWN, «Rallies
against power outage», June 9, 2015 Available at:
http://www.dawn.com/news/1263721
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 Afghan Appetizer
Crispy pakoras with a fresh dip
serves 4 | vegetarian

For the pakoras:

350 g seasonal vegetables
250 g chickpea flour
1/2 tsp. turmeric powder
1/2 tsp. chili powder
1 tsp. garam masala
1 l vegetable oil for deep-frying
280 ml water
salt

For the mint-coriander dip:

1 bunch mint
1/2 bunch coriander
2 garlic cloves
1/2 tsp. chili powder
50 g yogurt, 10 % fat
Salt

Pakoras:
Cut vegetables into bite-sized chunks.
In a bowl, mix the chickpea flour together with the
spices and add 280 ml water, stirring throughout. Heat
up 1 l of vegetable oil in a pan. The oil has the perfect
­temperature when a little piece of batter immediately
starts to deep-fry on contact.
Cover the vegetable chunks in the chickpea batter and
deep-fry them for about 4 - 5 minutes or until golden
brown.

Mint-coriander dip:
Coarsely chop the mint and coriander and place in a
­kitchen blender. Add peeled garlic and the chili powder
and finely blend together into a fine mixture. Now add
the yogurt and blend again until the mass is creamy.
Season with salt.
Serve the mint-coriander dip together with the p­ akoras.

Photo and recipe courtesy by ueberdentellerrandkochen.de

Über den Tellerrand kochen is a non-profit organization, which
was founded in October 2013 in Berlin. The organization
promotes intercultural exchange by bringing together people
to build sustainable intercultural communities. Today, their
community comprises approximately 1,500 committed people
in more than 25 cities. For further information please visit:
www.ueberdentellerrand.org

www.boell.de