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    Hodis ural ef Sencre Velame 2022 aie npes sLong 10. Research Article A Mathematical Queuing Model Analysis Using Secure Data Authentication Framework for Modern Healthcare Applications A. Samson Arun Raj,' R. Venkatesan,' S. Malathi,” V. D. Ambeth Kamar," E. Theamozhi,* Anbarasu Dhandapani ©,’ M. Ashok Kumar,” and B. Chitra” ‘computer Science and Engineering, Karunya Univer. Coimbstore 641114, Ida “Anica Iteigence al Date Scence, Panimalar Engitecing College, Ania Univesity, Chennat 600123, Pudi “Computer Science & Engineering. Penimalar Hagineering College. Am University, Chena 0123, dia “Department of formation Technolgy. Panimalar Institute of Technolgy, Arne University, Comma 00128, dia “Department of Flcrcal aul Computer Engineering. Instat of Tedmoley. lige University. 1020 Sema Etiepia ‘Faculty of Computer Sconce nd Software Engincering. Skyline Univesity Nigeris (SUN). Kano, Nigeria ‘Conresponudence should be addreiied to Anburosu Dhudapain: anbarasudhandapani@jjwaluct Received 28 July 20221 Accepted 24 Augie 2022; Published 16 September 2029 Academic Hditor: Seta Shattacharya Copyright © 2022-4. Sammon Arun Raj et al. This ian open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Atteibution License, which permits unnesricted use. distribution, and reproduction ia any medium. provided the original wank is properly cited. Healthcare application is one of the most promising developosenta to provide on-time demand services tothe end wer, vehicles, and athe Rod Side Units (RS) inthe whan environment. tn recent years several application interfaces have beet developed Wo ‘connect, communicate, and share the required servis from one source to another, However, the urban envirunment bolds & complex entity of both homogenous: and heterogeneous devices to which the communicativa/ensing cange between the devices leads to connestivity breakage lack of needed service in time and other exvitonmental wsnstraints. Also, yecuity pays ‘vial ene in allowing sveryete inthe ueban area to wccea/request nervices according to their tceds. Again thin leads to a riassive breakthrough in providing relable sevice to authentic users or a catastrophic failure of service denial involving unauthorized wer access. "thin poper proposcs x nove topological architesturs. Seeute Authentication Relay-busad Urban Network (S:ARUN}, designed for healthcare and other smart city applications for register! transportation stakeholders. The registered stakeholders hold bulls data security framework with Gee suboystems cannested to the SARUN topology: (8) tutientkation subsystem: the stakeholder mint identify themselves to the surce reypondet as part of the authentication subsystem before trinamiting the actual data service request: (2) connectivity subsystem o pera check the connection state of stakeholders as they travel slong with the read patter: and (3) service subsystem: each source responder wil keep a separate queve for collecting dats service requesty processing them quickly. and sending. the reslts to the approprate italchokler. ‘The Kerbero suthentcation method is used in working with SARUN's mode to connect the stakeholders securely and litimately, The performance of the proposed S-ARUN iv assesed, al the performance metric toward key senertion and other date security-related metrics is texted with existing schemes, 1. Intreduction Invnetworkdng, “data” refers toa collecion of multimedia data streams Data can be text, image, audio, video, or other document type material ready for transmission with the appro. Dia stakeholders in the field. Flowsver, data transmission from one source to another is not easy but plays a vital role Jn various design applieations [1 ]."The possible namber of data ‘can be lapped, abered, or worse rerouted by the third-party member. Reearchers have introduced several algorithms and ‘mathematical formulation ways of securing the wired andl wire Jess communication channel from which the third party cannot alter the dats shared amongits stakeholders. Recently, smart city application under variows opera tional purposes has gotten the 2ttention of constructing an cifcetive topology by introducing a hybrid infrastructure in the transportation environment. Ax a result, the stakeholders can easily interact with the nearest substation of RSUs any, ‘where and anytime. Jeong et al 2] have addressed the stan aedization initiatives for smart transportation systems, protocols, applications, and security which have been thor: ‘oughly examined by researchers. However, this hybrid infra structure faces certain topological flaws of its own such as lack of communication, mobility speed, network coverage, limited resources, data contention, and data congestion. Since the transportation environment mode of comm nication and equipment changes, the stakeholder’s eralution changes, However, the infrastructure from which the data is. relayed is still conventional. The working mechanism of the existing transportation envitonment i like a Hoodting mech anism, [fone RSU receives the tervice requet to access the data, the source data of that particular is broadcasted to all its neighboring RSUs and finally reaches the appropriate stakeholder. ‘Thus, it creates a huge security risk of revealing the service access throughout neighboring RSUs that find themselves unrelated to the store and unnecessary accep tance of information to relay the communication. The thind party finde theue weak RSUs node gains access and listens to all the surpassed information. Morcover, most RSUs have limited and few operational resources to classify and process the néeded information to bedetivered in time. Hence, these RSUs undergo certain eco friendly and communication difficulties as the on-road vehi cles move quickly along the road. Furthermore, the potential increase/decreae in on-road vehicles entering and exiting the transportation environment makes maintaining the net- ‘work topology and data Mow critical As a result, there are several technical challenges with RSUs providing dependable data service to on-road vehicles in the transportation envi ronment. Surely, we can consider the encl-user terminal for requesting the needed service. Since the topological design deals with vehicles and aerial nodes, the end oser can also be considered a ground node depending on the configura tion devices used in the application scenario. LL, Usage of UAVs. As intelligent transportation systems become more sophisticated with digital streams, each tran port mode needs to cooperate under various application platforms to form a global network of hybrid- vehicular sya tems. Flying Ad-Hoc Networks (FANETS) bave recently focused on cvilion and miltary-based systems (hitps(/blog. -tgbsi.com/what--v2i-technology) [3]. FANET is a subclass. of Vebicalar Ad-Hoc Networks (VANEI8) that use flying anchor nodes or small scale Unmanned Aerial Vehides (UAVs), a8 an intermediary agent in harsh locations where establishing, infrastructure is nearly impossible. However, there are certain difficulties that the VANET system faces daily. For example, the transportation environment condi tions and node behavior between ground vehicles and aerial vehicles: change dynamically, leading to the isolation of stakcholders in the transportation environment. Therefore, aan extensible wireless communication gateway must inte: grate existing technologies and make modern transportation systems more sustainable, écoftiendly, and safe for on-road vehicles to obtain the sought service promptly [1 Jourmal of Sensors On the other hand, the height oC RRSU nodes plays a vital role in providing network connectivity to vehicular nodes, which is one of the ses encountered in the somiicmporary ‘application environment. Surely, eploring serial nodes is quite challenging inthe urban environment as the altitude against : should be mainiained with constant observation. Several mobility models with artificial intelligence are under development to address this issue. Few automobile nodes, for ‘example, have poor network connectivity throughout their journey as they follow road patterns. Because the distance fron the RRSU network in the transportation environment exceeds 300 meters, is not considered to offer or receive the requested data service Furthernore, the present TTS vervice system's inconting arrival rate indicates thatthe requested service licks lata priority due to significant data conlict from several vehie ‘ular nodes, resulting ina buifer overflow nnd packet loss. 12. Data Authentication in VANE, tn a vehicle ad boc network, authentication is crucial, A VANET"s basic struc ture comprises three primary element: the Trusted Author: ity (1A), roadside units, and automobiles. ‘The VANET"s real-time, dynamic communication properties allow for ell cient and continuous information sharing and attractive application servixes, which could ‘significantly improve the driving experience of drivers The'TA isin charge of register ing all RSUs and cars and assigning secret keys. To validate the participating automobiles, TA uses a twofold authenti tion process. Meanwhile, RSU serves as a commurication hub ‘There are four counds to the authentication process “Theconnection between multiple vehicles is at the heart of VANETs, and the security of stich communication is ensured via message authentication, Several approaches have been developed lo improve message authentication. efliciency. However, both techniques have the drawback of redundant authentication. The same’ message is: authenticated several and they fail identify errancous messages in a batch cof messages, Because VANE'Ts are vulnerable to. malicions sssaulty the security of vehicular ad hoc networks has gotien much attention in wireless mobile networking, Several safe authentication systems based oa asymmetric. cryptography have been proposed to counter such attcks On the other hand, these techniques are not ideal for ‘extremely dynamic environments such as VANET% since they ‘cannot handle the authentication operation efficiently. As a result, en ficient authentication aystem for VANE'Ts ip til required. Furthermore, message: authentication, a common ‘mechanism for verifying information rebiability, such as data integrity and authenticity, hie a problem in VANE, ‘When it vehicle receives many messages, typical echaustive (or per messoye) anthentication might cause unacceptably high processing, overhead a the car catising unacceptable delays in time-critical like accident warnings. For vehicular ad hoc networks, the tmde-off between reliance on the lamper proof device (1D) end storage space in authentication schemes has recently become a hot topic [4], Because the inieh ligent transportation systems of smart city technologies, vehicu: larad hoe networks, and Internet of Vehicle (loV) technologies are drawing, interest from industry communities (5), ‘VANETs vehicle to vehicle (V2V) connectivity can hep traffic Journal of Sensors ‘management andl road safety. However, becuse V2V commit nication cannot handle many cars simultancounly, it must be split and communicated by region Asa result, exental agro ‘ments are created for V2V communication between the same Cor different regions, considering the locale Furthermore, stan dacd public key infrastracture and Kerberos systems incur com ‘Puiational costs fo be-used in a rel sting, Existing vehicalarad hoc network (VANE) authentication systems are not scalable to high-density and safety-critical VANE In their design, these methods overlook critical and unique VANET properties such as frequent. path disconne- tions die to high mobility, bandwidth limited channels, ltrs Jow latency appliations, high channel error rae. and nuch ‘more. Furthermore, due to the usage of an open wireless com: ‘munication medium where meseages are transferred in plain text, which allows attckers:to intercept, manipalate, replay, find dete them, VANEN"s security and. privacy arc of the utmost importance (6). As a result there isa good chance that the security of a VANET-tased! smart transportation ystem may bye jeopurlizad. 1.4. Objectives of the Research Work The primary objectives ofthe proposed topological design are listed as follows: (0) Yo introduce a secare authentication mechanism to, all the registered stakeholders connected to the S: ARUN topology in the transportation environment (fi) To perform the data packet request by analyzing its parameters based upon the data security framework. introduced in every RSU node ‘The proposed work i compared with the existing schemes to verify the performance metsic, and ‘merits and demerits are notified in detail 2, Related Works "The teployment of vehicle networks in practice isatill a work in progress. This stuy (7) presents new self organized authen- tication approach for VANET that enables ubiquitous, quick, and safe deployment. Because the nodes themselves certify the authenticity of the public keys ofthe other nodes, there is no need for 4 central certification authority. On the ve hand, researchers have devised a mechanism that each node must cemplay when selecting public key certificates for its focal storage, Because ofthe variety and severity of prospective assaults, communication suriy in VANETs is one of the essential concemis to enable their effective deployment. On the one hand, erroneous traffic warning messages can inflaence drivers jundgmients, waste time and fuel, and even restlt in trafic ac dents. Ava eeult, VANET must guard againat attackers send: ing fase information about road conditions, such as traffic jams, to deceive other vebicis On the other hard, ast result, ‘VANETs should not provide complete vehicle anonymity since the risk of sending misleading signals would jeopardize their ‘practical implementation With promising technologies that provide rich multimie- dis data strcams of information to all searching vehicular 3 nodes in the transportation envionment, the ned for inte: ligent transportation sputem services has grown dramatically ‘workdwide [8,9]. The existing intelligent transportation sys tem has two application scenarios: pole infrastructure based {8} and aerial mobility based [7] ‘The data packets that con ‘vey the message low from the source, ic, the base control station (BCS), are sent through a sequence of communica tion RSU agents to reach and communicate with relevant ‘vehicula traffic nodes in both application scenarios, n adi tion, the RSU agents have the authority to proces: dats packets snd alert the nearest subutnits tp, monitor, track, and direct the vehicular nodes in the event of hazards, warn ings, oF event nolifications. In various intligent transportation system applications, the roadside units are stationary constructed atthe intersection points slong with the read pattern. Over time; these stationary RSU agents ek the priority in establishing the desirable oct work connextivity and cannot the necessary reliable lata service among the vehicular nodes. The RSU ts a station. ary unit normally permanenily installed alongs the sie of the road. Ad hoe domain is used for single/muliihop communis tion between automobiles. A Dedicated Short- Range Comms ‘nication (DSRC) technology is used to communicate between V2V and V21. The BSRC is a short- to medium-range wireless communication system utilized in the VANET for data trans fer. The DSRC system ses a spectrum of 75 MEL: with a com: munication range of DSRC that is 100 to 1000 meters nel the data rate is 6to 27 megabits per second |10}, Since the techno: logical equipment and mode of communication changes, the ASU agents are packed with numerous amounts of information lading, to 8 processing overload of limited resources and incapable of tricking high-speed vehicular nodes pursuing the transportation environment. Thus, replacing or reconstructing the entire TTS service system operating in the tion environment over the years is impractical. Fotohi et al. [11] talked shout am agent-based. self protective technique for UAVNS called ASP-UAVN, based ‘on the Human, Iminune System (HIS), to ASI UAS, a self protective system chooses the salest route from the source UAV to the destination UAV. Using an Artificial Immune Spite (AIS), a multiagent sysiem lentes the attacking UAV and picks the safest approach. Furthermore, [3] covered the various sorts of attackers’ ond socurty assaults in: the VANET. The attackersare categorized based on their network activities. A node is considered adversarial if it injects or mod, ifies any messoges, causing the entire network to be disrupted. “The attackers primary goal is to cause network disruptions for ‘personal gain. According to their actions and scope, the three types of attackers are insiders vx outalders, aggressive vs, pas sive, and malicious vs, reasonable attackers ‘Authentication is critical security issue for VANETS [12]. (Over the last few years, marty authentication systems based on public key infrasiructure (PKT) oF identification (ID) have bbom presented. The digital signature provides message authentication, integrity, and nonrepusdiation, Knowing the signer’spublic key allows anyonetto verify the signatures legit ienacy. This property makesit possible to we the digital signa ture in one-to-one (unicast) and one-to-many (tulticast) applications. In some mulicast applications, the root node may be required to gather messages from leaf modes, evuling in many to one communication. Lall et al. {6} concentrated on the imany authentication techniques used in. VANET because they are critical for safe comniunication. The thece main authentication schemes are cryptography techniques, digital signatures, and message ver ification techniques. A taxonomy of authentication systems is ala thoroughly examined. Also authentication is necessary for accepting safety messages from legitimate VANET users. Authentication is divided into two parts part | is the sender Vehicle's signature, and parts the receiver vehicle's signature verficaion of the menage received, Authentication can be done at two levels i @ VANET communication system: fist al the node level, referred to as node authentication, and se: fond at dhe message level, message authentication. Authentica tion of nodes and messages ensures a node's legitimacy and a message's integrity, respectively. Verifying the message's integrity and the node legitimacy check i critical t increasing, VANET secirity. As a resull, the mos critical security aspect in VANET is message authentication. Azees [13] and Tan et al (14| have introduced 4 two-factor authentication and ky management strategy for xfs data transferin vehicular adhoc networks. According o theauthors, the propose approach is immune to replay and masquerade attacks. Chuang and Lee [15] have introduced a deceatralced lightwoght. authentication technique for vehicle:to-vehicie communication networks dubbed trust-cxiends authentica tion mechanism (TEAM). To increase the efficiency of the authentication operation, TEAM ines the concept of transitive trast connections and only requires a few storage spaces. TEAM alo meets the allowing security requirements anonymity, Jocation privey, mutual authentication, forgery, modification, ‘and replay altack resistance, no dock synchronization problesn, no verification table, fast ertor detection, perfect forward secrecy, man-in-the- middle attack resistance, and session key it Lin and Li [16] have proposed an effective cooperative ‘authentication stimtexy for VANETs that minimizes redun dant authentication efforts on the sime message by various vehicles while reducing the authentication overhead on int ‘vidual cars and shortening the authentication delay. Because it simultaneously provides mutual authentication and pri ‘acy protection, the conditional privacy-preserving authen lication (CPPA) technique [17] is appropriate for handling scaurity and privacy: preserving chalkngcs in VANZETs. On the other hand, the bilinear pairing process ix renowned as ‘one of the most dificult operations in modern cryptography. ‘Therefore, constructing a CPPA scheme for the VANET environment that does not require bilinear paring becomes a challenge to improve performance and redice the eonypu tational complexity of information processing in. VANE" Zhv et ab [18] discussed an effiient privacy: preserving authentication technique for automotive ad hoc networks based on group signature (VANETs). Although group signa tures are commonly tied in VANET to achieve anonymous authentication, existing systems based on group signatures. sulfer from substantial calculation delays in the CR checking and signature verfication processes, resulting in high message Joss, Liv etal. [4] talked abot using identity based encryption Journal of Sensors basi certilicateto create a realistic distributed conditional privicy-preserving, authentication ‘mechanism for VANETS, Lee et al [5] presented a lightweight technigue for man- aging regional segmentation and overhead resolution using dynamic features of vehicles. Furthermore, because vehicle «tata is sent through public networks, our protocol employs ‘mutual authentication and honey list technology to protect against various threats. ‘The concept of exge computing has been discussed in the mesoage-authes ‘VANETs [19]. Even ifthe VANET is attacked, the suggested system can not only perform well in an ideal scenario where the attacker is not present but it can also swifily distingoish valid and invalid messages. Shao et al [20] developed new authentication protocol for VANETs in decentralized group architecture that ‘employs a novel group signature mexhanian to addres these difficult issues. VANET must have an authentication mecha- ‘nisin fo protect against attacks and maintain privacy to enable safe communication. Azam et al. [21] extmined security, privacy, and scalability requirements with a complete c taxon: ‘omy fo authentication sysiems in VANET: Shen et al. [22] ‘has addressed the issues of high computing overhead caused by safety message authentication in the cooperative message authentication protocal (CMAF), which was developed to reduce the computational burden on automeabies, ‘Ying and Nayak [23] have developed a smartcard (ASC) protocol-based anonymous and fightweight authentication system. ASC uses. low-cost phic operstions. to authenticate the legitimacy of users (vehicles) and validate data communications. ASC also has a way of changing pass words that do not reliant on a tnasted authority. As a result, it can withstand an offine password guessing attack. Finally, a formal security model is developed to demonstrate that out protocol is secure when the computational Difie-Hellman problem is assumed. Asaar et al [24] have proposed a new identity-based message authentication system based on ‘Prasy vehicles (ID MAD) that satisfies the message authenti cation condition against adaptively chosen messages. AlSharesla et al [6] thoroughly examined the many authentications and privacy systems implemented over time. Vijayakumar et ol [25] have created a: trusted authority to supply. clients with various online ‘premium’ services vin VANETs. The and uthentication of messages ‘exchanged betwremn the'T' and the VANET nodes are critical ‘Asa resi, we focus on the situation in which the TA divides sers into primary, secondary, and. unauthorized. users to aires the security fste. Lee eta. [5] stated that two public, hey cryplosystems have devloped at privicy- preserving local: inl hybvid authentication (PLHAS) mechaninm for PRT and (CLARE. 1 etal, [26] have propeacal a composite fault diagno sismeth Tee on detecting and identifying the fault of the vehicle ad hoe network's onboard unit. Ceniticatcless public key cryptography is used to tackle the complex certificate management problem in classical public hey cryptography and the key escrow problem in identity Ihased encryption (27). The aggregate Fignature notion comes in handy when the signatures on various messiges generated by various wets must be compressed. Because it allows foe Journal of Sensors considerable bandwith and calauation time reductions, this feature is highly appealing for authentication in a resource constrained setting, A novel cerficateess signature system is [proposed in this paper. The new certificateless signature tech. ‘nkqUe gives a novel ceificate lest aguregate signature scheme for vebicle-to-infrastructure communication in vehicular ad ‘boc networks. Dae to the high dynamics in topology, mobility, and link connectivity, data dissemination in VANET is a difficult issue, Dac to the hostvaddress-centric, connection oriented commis ‘nication mechanism primarily built for reliable wired networks, the Internet paradigm (Le, TCPAP) is inefficient for VAI data dissemination |28|. Arshad et al, [29] has developed a full block chain-based 5G vehicular network architecture that is cont effective, scalable and secureand sddresses vations vehic cular network concems in smart cities All necessary compo: nents, such as a reputation system, an incentive mechanism, and priority based strategies, are included in the propesed design. Soleymani et al, [30}, as well asa trust model, have addressed a privacy preserving node and message authentica- tion approach, In addition, fog nodes were placed along the highway by the fog computing concept to reduce latency snd ‘enhance throughput. "The Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) pe tocol is widely used to offer secrecy, data integrity, and authen- tication services in various settings. On the other hand, preshared passwords are insecure in a practical self-organized, network becuuse mass produced devices frequently haye sim far default passwords, such 36 0000 or 1234, which are seldom changed [31], Eftekhar et al (32), Ogundeyin and karnil [33], and Peixoto. tal, [34] have developed a fog computing: based data clustering. framework for trie information reduction at the elge of ‘vehicular networks. Rao and Ram [35] have improved the time ‘synchronization and freshness plen for Kerberos $ authentica: tion sing symmetric encryption Keyt in» client-server sce nario, Also, [36] have proposed a secure. protocol based on. tickets for igocous mutual autbentication and scsion key cexublishment tokens that incorporate Kerberos’ strong qual tes. Based on their architecture and implementation specifics, 137] has comprehensively evaluated VANET, SDN, and SDN- based VANETs. Section 3 describes the intemal design and operation of the RSU agent’s data security framework, 3. Data Security Framework and Their Working Process "The model for the data security framework we will use in our research effort is represented in Figure 1 in the 3y scenario |1), Base control station, satelite relay station, aerial networks, atid vehicular nodes (Le, on-road vehicles) are the four primary components of the application scenario. How ver, these components ar interrelated, each having. a spectic role in preserving data security ond obtaining requested data ‘packats in diverse mobility patterns. (Base control station: the transportation field station, alo known as the base control station, organizes and retains information concerning aerial nodes, vehicular nodes, situation awareness, and other ray subunits In addition, the base contro! station mont torsandl guides the aerial network in a dedicated way. ‘point lane inthe transportation envirorment (li) Satelite relay station: satellites: provide a backbone relay communicaifon across civilian platforms, actoss the transportation environment in moder ‘transportation applications, Depending on the necessity, the satelite can be utilized asa backbone Iransceiver, processing all microwave data into the proper data format between the source and destina tion platform communicators (ii) Acriad ides: the aerial nodes, aso refered (0 as Relay-Road Side Unit (RRSU) network, act as a buffer between the vehicle nodes. It improves net ‘work connectivity to all vehicnlar nodes and takes the initistive to process data packet requests and deliver mad-assisted service messages on time. A single RSU nctwork comprises many RSU nodes separated by a defined distance and travels at an ideal pace 10 avoid colliding with the RSU substn tion and each other Gv) Vehiular nodes: « vehicular nade can be 2 em: ‘éreial, semiautonomous, or fleet management vchicle that leads group of subunits i the trans portation environment. Autonomous vehicles have been created for various TIS sorvice appbecations, including field support, exploration, search, and rescue In this paper, we will be considering this application see nario for healtheare wage in which thexe aerial moves have the following advantages as follows, (®) Aerial access points: unlike traditional networks, these actial nodes are equipped with all communi cation functionalities to communicate t0 the nearest hospital if a vehicle or use requires an emergency service to the nearest hospital or doctors. Thus, it provides seamless and anytime. connectivity. who eck pervice (i) Built-in data storage: since the urban environiment i pore with vee eeesting service scot the acrial nodes are embeded with predefined information an how. when, where. and whom to process the request in time. Table | illustrates some Of the information predefined in every aerial node to process: (iii) Computation: once the connection establishment of the stakeholder is authentic, the request for the ser vice is granted with priosty. If the service bs requested from_an unauthorized user, the aerial ‘nodes seek out othe® nodes for supporting service Journal of Sensors . ay station if Freya 2: Application scenario 1), (i) Service transmission: since the urban envionment deals with moving vehicles, the requested service ‘must be delivered in time. Ifthe serial node cannot transmit the service in time, the neighboring nodes will notify, providing service reliably ‘The working process of the data security framework in S-ARUN topology is of a three-stage level of subsystem pro: cess. AL firs, all the:sinkeholders: must be connected tn the nearest RSU agents for registration confirmation. the RSU agents first broadcast 9 series of control beacon messages (CBM) to all stakeholders by establishing unified. network communication. The registered transportation stakeholders veil quickly establish the connection apar from the nonre gisteral stakeholders who seek data service must go through a secure authentication verification before offering the actual network connection, which will be explained in detail. Alter connecting (0 their nearest RSU agent, vehicular nodes can request data service application informiatiot/ mes. sages, such 9 infotainment, location guidance, and safety awareness. The HSU agents process the data packet roquest according: to ther prority index of vehicle type and. then respond! to, message/service fo the appropriate yehicular node vwithin the specified time frame. Figures 2 and 3 depict the Information flow of dita service packets and the intemal sab- systems of a data security framework inside a single RSU agent. Sl. Authentication Subsystem. The authentication service provided in this subsystem follows the working principle concept of Kerberos. The Kerberos authentication scheme ‘authenticates all the stakeholders. who present an open dis tributed environment. In the case of nonregistered stake holders seeking service, it is mandatory to prove that it has been identified for each service request to acqire the data service.or ele their acces request will be denied. Any stake holder can request any RSU agent for data service if the topology is unprotected. ‘Thus, the RSU agent cannot easily deny the data service requests without proper constraints Every RSU agent is provided with an inbuilt Stakeholders Service Authentication (SSA) to ensure safety measures. This authentication server knows the true identity of the stake holder and logs all the possible information maintained in a centralized database. In addition, every RSU agent pro: ‘vides a unique key in a ficket for granting access to the requested data service ‘The following steps describe haw the stakeholder’s ser vice auihentication ticket is generated for stakeholders who seek service. This mechanism cin be applied to registered and nonregistered stakebolders in the trinsportation. envi ronment. ‘Table 2 illustrates the notations used for service access ticket generation under the authentication scheme, and Pseadocode 1 outlines the functional approach of the lata security framework ina single RSU agent, Journal of Sensors 7 “Tamia 1: Types of MPLS labels used iy data secatity ratneworl. MAIS ender fal bie Tater Goveenment Private ‘Specie ‘lini Shater er its ‘001 ‘1010 ‘oot io ‘oot Cater Accident ome Inteructions/oundabauts ond bumps Spe alerts Callison ales Ey tennis Bite uo ott ‘1000 vot oa Cater Location of substations Allernatiye rates Navigation Pedestrian erasing Lane resirictions Service application tits e101 ‘ono oni01 ono onn Cater tnfwinment Service wcess’ Tete status Crave control Smart sensors OHMS (OTH ae 10000 008 fd fm 0100 DATA SECURITY FRAMEWORK a Fe Network mney sea compyation wi | pee Deby mcs Grantaccem to TS a aaa Alithesticatsin subypatem $ & . “Teanwent 7 frspeme / cnx 3 Internal architecture of the dats security ftamework "Vanie 2: Lit of notations used in authentication server Siakcholier Secret encryption kay shared by SSA Network addres ofthe aaleholder ‘The Wietime of the TGS Req SU registered datitrase Request connection, Service request type SU agents Service access request. L= 1, 2. Service mesiae Service authentication Identifier of takeholder Stakeholder service authentication “Ticket granting sever ‘Ticket granting server request 1D of ticket granting sever Time stamp Server Mentifier of server Type af sakeholderivchiculsr node Step 1. SSASIDISTYPENVID, Step 2 SAA=>8Ticket. Step 3. §=>V SIDINTicket ‘Ticket =# (Ky, [SID||NDS}]VID]) w ‘The above steps provide data service access to registered and nonregistered stakeholders in the transportation environ ‘ment—the data sccwily framework provides this simple authentication scheme. However, the problem encountered ‘in this simple scheme is that the ptakeholder would need a new ticket for every different data service. ‘Therefore, the [RSU agents hold a Ticket Granting Server (TGS) in the service imibaystem to extend its authentication service neds to access different data services. However, is process of granting quite similar to the previous simple authentication scheme. ‘Once per requesting data service access is as follows Step. SSASUDITGSID, Sup 288A SI (Ks, Tice) (Once per requesting the type of data service i as follows: Step 3: 9=>TGSSIDIVIDI Ticket. Step 4. 1GS = >SiTicket,J/ Ticket to access any RSU agent for service. ‘Once per requesting the type of data service bs as follows: Journal of Sensors Step 5, $ => VSIDItTicket, ‘Tickee, =E (Ky |SUD|INDS)|TGSTD|Noxice]) ‘Ticket, = E (Kg [SID|NDSI]VID||Nonce} ” The stakcholders can accest the data service through a secure authentication scheme upon the application dexiga and ussge. The stakeholders can ether go for one-time access to the ever oF access mip serves for diferent types of dain services by suentiating thenecves and acquiring the Tike, ‘ACs, the authentication subsymem of every RSU agent obtains the scrvice acess request asa collective input from the slakcholders On obtaiing the service access request, the RSU agent crossverfes with the connsctivky ubsyatem and notifies its connection status by updating is internal connectivity database. The service acest requeds are passed tough the SSA for authentication verification. For exans ple, suppose the requesting stakeholder ia registered mem ber of the a ion environment oF 2 aahenticated user. In tht cae, the TGS Req forthe TGS ewer of every ASU agent is automaticaly yrante fll acarss On the olher hand, if the tequesting stakeholder is hot a member or unregistered, ite network connectivity towards the RSU agents gets disconnected without any sign 32. Connectivity Subiystem. Le. the application scenarka, there are cases where vehicular nodes will be connected to their nearest RSU agents without requesting service. Thus, the network connectivity to such vehicubr nodes feads to resource depletion, The proposed data security framework categorizes the incoming control beacon messages. based ‘on the vehicular node type and its vervice allocated upon the priority level to avoid such resource consumption. In this research work, we have not considered the authentication time limit for each packet to be served for accessing the data service. However, we have computed the connectivity time limit for each vehicular node connected with the aerial atccess points. Upon the connectivity time fimit, the aerial nnodes know where to. process the request packet or not ‘The network connectivity siatusand whicle types will prior ltixe daa service for the vehicular nodes as they move along the road patie. Table 3 illustrates various vehicular nodes that enier/exit the transportation environment. 34. Service Subsystem, The service subsystem isa functional module for processing and granting the serve request to the 1'GS server. Every RSU agent holds a set of multimedia Jnstractions and s Krtted numberof services to be comma ‘ated with the appropriate stakeholders in the tiansportation ‘environment Once the authentication subsystem grants the ‘TGS request for access, the TGS server clsifis the service request based on ther MPLS header labels, as shown in “Table 1:The incorving service requests are discriminated with a S-bit MPLS header label holding 20 possible data service imessiges tht the stakeholders wold need to access in time- For real-world applications, the MPLS header labels sre defined as Gita and some labels are reserved for rescarch Journal of Senvors BEGIN Loop. aneveeee InputsTransmission of Service Access Request Output: Transmission of Service Crant TGS. Rag or Conestion Termination tiie SID, VEYPE, TS, Reg. Type, SA. Reg, SM, TGS Reg, Nomes, RASUH [RRSUT =-Process: $A. Roy, (SER, SER), SER, Ser Auth -— Extract: SER (SID, VTYPF, TS, Rey. Type) REQ_Conn + Ser_Auth: Compare (St, REG, DB) Hf (REQ Conn = Registered) then RRSUF -Retunn REQ Conn (SER, TGS Req, Nonce) 9. else 10, RUSUi Return REQ. Conn (SHR, "Yerminate) 1 end if 12 End Loop 1 END SER) Psuuvoconi 1: Authentication check fue service request from stakeholders. “Vaan 3: Classification types of vehicular noes, “Tami 4 Simulation parameters SI No, Vehide pen (VIVPE) Vehicle names Priority level Parameters Vale v a 1 ‘Sinulabon environment 2000+ 2000500 2 B 2 Nummer of RSU nodes 3 © 3 Number of yehicwiar noses 50, 100, 150, ‘ Dp 4 Total mumber of puckets 500, 1000, 1590, 5 # 5 The velocty of vehicula ones 2awis 6 F 6 The velocity of RSU nodes Sais * é + “Time instant for every T second 160,120, 180% ‘Total simulation time 1000s ‘and development In our proposed idea, we have considered 5 bits of MPLS header libel for our research idea. Table I ils tates the different MPLS labels used in the transportation environment. Once the appropriate requested nervice is fetched from the ‘TGS server, a response message is generated and arranged in the queue for transmission. ‘The scheduling mechanism for the propased scheme follows a non-preemptive methodology in which the pricrty packets trigger the quewe for accessing, the daa service. The whicle classfication proces: crascveriies the connectivity subsystem of which type of rtakeholder is requested and the current network satus fo Communicate oF relay the response message/service to the neighboring KSU agents in the transportation field. Asshownin Table 3,itotiers: access to and objains the most recent service updates for var fons types of requests represented by yehicalar nodes. 4. Experimental Setup A network simlator (NS-3) is used to test the viability of the data security framework. A 3D rectangalar waypoint mobiity model for RSU and. vehicle nodes is used to assess: the data security framework’ performance. Auriliary Network Ani ‘ator (NetAnim) software with a third-party programming, language is used to examine, clasify, and compute the received data packet packets bised on the queuing factors toward the incoing arrival rales and simulation. Table 4 shows the simulation parameters employed ina three dimensional transportation simulation. ‘The data security framework’s performance ix evaluated in bo ways: (1) gomputation analysis and (2) performance comparison with competing methods. Afier experimenting, With these two features, the data security architecture fines its best-case and worst-case scenarios for wie over its vehic tular nodes in the transportation environment, In our exper: iment, we have considered storage file to which the requested data packets are received. We have used a readline 0 fianction to process and provide data service based an the network connectivity level. For example, if there are three vehiculir nodes with a network connectivity level of high, then their corresponding, node IDs and connectivity levels bbe used as pointers to pinpoint the received data from the storage file for dats service. ‘The information ‘exchanged among aetial and ground nodes are simple bit sequences; hence, the file size isa few kilobytes. 414, Computation Anabsis. The MPLS label classification and ‘queuing factors are computed to identify the demanding ser vice from the vehicular nodes, Based on the data packet ‘requests, the feasillity of the packet-lahel classifier subsystem {is demonstrated under two test scenarios based on incoming arvival ates, namely, adaptive and static The incoming request Journal of Sensors Unage of adaptive ve atthe areal tos Avival Meret scriptions z4 (The arrival aie (1) vats depending on the Wakebolders request and the network connesions (i) The service rate (ff ef toa masimam threshold value X (trban or highway) depending on the service demand 1 Adaptive and environmental condition (Gi) Best case scenario: RSU nodes can reesve a ratige of 0 wo N data packet requests foi their stakchalders (iv) Wors-case scenario: a nigatficant resource allocation is required to process the data packet request occasionally 40) The arrival rate (2) cont et rumber of daa packet requets fen selene (i) the RSU node ues longer to process the data packet ree, the service rte (4) becomes diane 2 State (jest cave protide ade dale with Hts suketolders tm processing the request (Gv)Worst case lac af data priority and contention de to multiple saksholdery’cequest seat over a fred omaation channel tle “Tans & Queuing analysis of adaplive aval rate ur jt ~ 10sec. ‘Guaring actor 5 Vebicar MOIS acy Gy) (HY EBA) ead Kg) _(W3) (ed (Ya) (ae), Canty time at) Yahi prinity vi m2 0820 0.18) 455637362000 «16.40 cy z ve 1200470 oI O06 aaa 0 5 v3 2 00m 0580 00%) ou a7 5243 3 va too 0.100 asm) att oa 000 5 va 14001400460 ies omy 4s m0 4 v6 990 0900 0.100 9000 KIN) 36903240 un 2 va 2 0m20 880 oa) ut 37 5203 1 va Ho 08081207392 ASD OND us ‘ vs 7% 07 020 Aye 29H uw 1 vito 140 0M0 axa) 6 Os ks 710 3 Arete 3030303007264 Buse a9 9.005 ar "Tan 7 Queuing analysis of saptive aval rate under y2— 106 Taclos : ee yey Gv cm MBO ted tg) CW) _ Co ny’ Cm ie) Vice poaty va 00 O00 0.200 40003290 18D 4A irs = va 400.450 Os) ORI OK Sa an 5 va 200 0200 0800 0250 Om ASD. 500 3 va 1100110080 atm Oot taka sis ‘ vs 400A 0s) O7KG OG 2 2 v6 890 OK) 56674817 2440 ts 1 v7 110 0.10 ob 12k one tt ois * va 9000900 0.100 9000 8.100 $6032.00 uu i va 7070302383183 us 5 va 440 04005600785 OMG GAS 8 wz ‘ Average Ee ee ee 351 pockets follow the hybrid approach of dynamic and static arrival rates, To differentiate the arrival rates anu! their perfor ‘mance towards the queuing factors, we have separately mea sured them in two parts. ‘The descriptive information abet ‘using these two test scenarios within the dats security architec ture is shawn i Table 5 “The numerical dataset acquired in measuring the queuing factors rom RSU agents under adaptive arival rates with two diferent service rates, 4y, and ty is shown in Tables 6 and 7. The service rate i st to a maximum threshold of 1, and Hz in the best-case scenario, allowing the RSU agents to receive a range of 0 to N— 1 data packet requeste from its Journal of Sensors u “Tan Quin anole of ic arial entender AN = 16 Veluculr makes Sere hee Conmetivity Hons (ses) Vebiek preity (Wis) W) ()_%) CH) (Ls) Cg) (We) ee) _ (Wa) 6d. va To 0100-0900 0.111 oor 400 oa 7 z v2 10001000900 eI oi Ao oo 10 5 va loo 0100 goa ml) a0 oo w 3 va joo 0400090 GAH OM -aoD oo » 3 va oo o,100 0900 eal poit 4.00 oo 0 4 ve Joo 0.400990 GTI LL 4.00 oa 0 1 va oe ee ee) ao 0 ‘ va too 0100990 att OIL 4.00 a0 0 ‘ va Joo 0.100 8900 att It 00 oo 10 ‘ vo 100041000901 OO 400 ao » , Average oo 0.100 090 att o9it 400 0 0 ‘Tam 9+ Queuing snalyis of static arrival rate under A2= 2000 racing factors Vac nO aye) (ph) CE) ON tad Ul) fd (Wa ode ime os) Vie pronty va 300 0100 0900 O1IT aol 200 020 7 2 va 00 0.100 0.900 ott omit 2.00 020 0 3 va 290 @.100 om ot 9911.00 020 0 3 va 200 0.100 0.900 aE goit 200 020 0 $ vs 200 0.100 0900 11h Mik 2.00 020 0 ‘ ve 200 0.100 0900 atl om) 2.00 20 » 2 var 200 a1 09 att ool 2.00 020 10 1 vs 200 0.100 0.900 ONT Omi 2.00 020 i é vo 300 @.100 00 ott awit 3.00 30 0 ‘ vin 200 0.100.900 OTE QuLE 200 020 0 3 Avorage 200 0.400 0.900 04t)_aoil 20 020 wo “Tamu 10; Comparative analysis techniques Tite Descriptions Na (34) “A new frainewurk Tor the Geniicas revocation provesa within VANET is infreduced, This process can be activated by the ‘Minbebavior detection and elicient revocation within VANTET miabehayior deection ayaterne (MDS) running within weiss and the misbehavior authority (MA) within the infrastructure, which ‘deities and excludes misbehaving vebickes to guarantee the Kon: term functionality ofthe network, A Catt les Paring ree Authentication Scheme for ‘nian Aerial Vehicle Networks [27] ‘A pairingfiee authentication scheme (CLAS) is propowa for ‘Unmanned Act! Vehicle Networks (UAVS based on the ‘estficatses signature tedology. It supports batch verification at ‘uth the data aggregator (AGT) aod commands centet (CMC) sides that the verification efficiency can be imprced realy stelcholders every time interval ‘TL. When the RSW agents: receive the data packet request, we also notice that they com: pte their vehicle priority checker’s average server usage (p). Once checked, the associated RSU node can determine Whether or not it can offer the desired service to the requested stakeholders on time: “Tables 8 and 9 show the mumerieal dataset gathered from a single RSU agent to meavnre the queuing factors of data packet requests under two different arrival rates, Ay, and Ay, respectively, in contrast to the adaptive arrival rate- ‘The best case scenario for this strategy is that the dita packet request athe arrival rate ise to» minintum threshold. Journal of Sensors en ict en ele allison © J E 1 7 (Miaesany. 4.2009) rip wit le ‘we nr 4; Time vm detected malls wei Service mbepiten respinsequewe No oF RSL agen = (.Lietal. 2021) 2 Propemat wu Time ‘ivi "Time vx response queie Asa result, whether the RSU agent's network connections are Alerent in processing the desired service, the RSU agent can offer acceptable data to their stakeholders. 4.2 Comparative Anulysis, The dita security framework has been compared to existing methodologies for two perfor- ‘mance indicators, key generation and malicious node detec tion, at various time instants and the rising number of data packel requests across vehicle nodes. Soroe of the compari- son assessments performed against the proposed model are shown in ‘Table 10, Figure 4 shows the performance metrics for monitoring thie misbehaving noses in the environment. Ax time increases, the proposed work identifies the staketolder behavior accord ing to their idle state and requests unnecessary data queries to the RSU agents. ‘The authentication right is. revoked. upon ‘hese constraints. and the service access link is disconnected. Figure 5 depicts the service subsystem’s response queue of accepting data service requests from all the stakeholders in the environment. Several RSU agents must process and accumu fate the data service requests at time increases. The proposed ‘work requires more SU agents since the klen of the work is designed for smart city applications. However, in reality, the deployment oF RSU agents in the field wil be quite sna. ‘The performance metric “network load’ of each vehicular ‘node iscalculated against three eaisting schemes, (1) AIR-RSU framework (1), (2) load balanced routing (LBR), and (3) near- ‘81 neighbor rauting (NNR) [39]. Fach node periodically for wards ‘controls: beacon messages fo its nearest node to ‘communicate/reach aerial nodes. Figure 6 depicts the network lood of individual vehicular nodes at time instante among the ‘existing schemes. Also, it is observed that the network load in [LDR and NNR gradually increases as the ramber of nodes in the transportation environment inereases. However, for the AIR-RSU framework and proposed work, the network load Invevery individual node is equally shared between the vehicu lar nodes giving an equal chance (o comnmunikate and process the information with aerial nodes. Finally, the level of network density is measured in terms ofthe percentage of actual connections ofa single aerial node ‘orthe average of multiple aerial nodes. The network density is defined and given in (source hitps//wnwithe- vial xge-com Wwhat-tsnetwork-density) for the entire network. A single aerial node can establish one or more Jogical connections eperiding upon the number of vehicular nodes joining the Journal of Sensors ‘Netw 08) (3) NNR (Agata Sel at_ 26) a LN gars cea, 206) 5 ehiara AIR (ay pln, 2001) 4 Papel work iawn fe Network lead of vehiclar node, “Thue Hs Network density for single aétial node with range of actuil connections. Noxkes_Achual Connections (10) Actual ctnecions (0)_Actual connection (10) Aca connections (40) Act) connections (50) w Dak 036 8 08 017 » 05 010 26 ans 006 w oz oot 3% oz ps “o 01 0, 055 os oor 925 033 a2 ont ong 02a ny an ors 6.06 any on 405 0.06 08 08 005, 0.06 “Talia 12: Average etvork density for multiple aerial nodes wit range of actual coitections, Nowkes_Actual connections (10) Actual connections (20) Actual connections (30) Aca connections (40) Actual convections (50) 1e as 03 15 009 ous » 06 09 a aoa 006 +” aos bot 3 oor 03 40 ame 02 048 ra o7 022 030 037 bas wr 022 om an om 6.06 0.08 10, 105, 0.06, 0.08 20 005 0.06 network within the range. The benefit of providing additonal connections for a specific node has-a backup connection, mul tiple hardware communications (Le. sensors, GPS, tracking camera, and other secondary comemnications), and infotain= ‘ment communication, Hence, the more the cannection, the higher the network density ts other words, the higher the net ‘work density, the better the connectivity, “Tables 11 and 12 represent the network density measure under range of actual connections with a single aerial node and an average of multiple aerial nodes, respectively. ‘The best caseof the proposed application scenario fs that as the number of actual connections increases for aerial nodes the network density amoog vehicular nodes is almost cenirely connected, and it approaches lin a normalized ‘range. However, he worst case of this application scenario is that as the number of vehicular nodes joining the network increases, the network density tends ta decreaw’ to a mini ‘mum value of 0.01. The overhead of the entire network will increase concerning its bandwidth, latency, and nctwork Joud as the number of mobile sink nodes and: vehicular nneaes joining the network increnses. 5. Conclusion and Future Works ‘This paper proposes a new topological design fr smart city applications, je. a Secure Authentication Relay-Based Urban “4 [Network (S-ARUN) specially constricted for registered trans- portation stakeholders. ‘These registered. stakeholders. were ‘connecied to the S-ARUN topology hold an in-built lata secu tity framework consisting of theee subsystems (1) self ‘authentication subsystem: the requesting stakeholder must ‘authentic itself by sharing its identity 1 the source responder before transmitting its actual data service naquest (2) vehicle -cssification subsyetere: a priority forthe data service roquest will be given based on the type of stakeholder andl request needs, and (9) request accumulator mubyystem: every source responder will be maintaining a separate quewe to accumulate the data service requests to process and transmit the requested dita service to the appropriate stakeholder ina short time. The ‘working principle of S ARUN follows the Kerberos authenti cation technique where the stakzholders are connected in well-socured authentic manner: Remilts indicate that the best and worst cascs of the pro posed work are tested under various queuing analysis arrival tates. Ob the ther hand, the priority of the vehicle towards the vehicular nodes is allocated based on their query request type and. physical parameters stich as distance, signal strength, and. velocity. Moreover, the comparison of the malicious node detection and request accumulator proce dure with other schemes is analyzed in detail, For future works; the data security framework will be tested. ina real-time environment, where the benefits and drawbacks of the working process will be clearly defined. Also, we can compare the proposed idea with and without a wcurity mechanism for fulure enhancement. Alo, the idea formance value than working, with 9 security mechanism. But the counterpart to using a security mechanisms, the wal ‘ious nodes can be identified over time. In addition, the data security framework architecture will be evaluated in a het is vehicular network 10 experience’ the incoming arrival rate of data packets towards the RSU networks at the network layer, data link layer, and physical layers. Data Availability ‘The original data presented in the study are included in the article and queries cam be directed to the all authors. Conflicts of Interest "The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest. References [i] AS. Ata) and ¥. Patanichamy, "Packet clasification bane acta Intelligent relay-romd side unit (air-rau) framework for vehicular udhoe network” Peer-to-Peer Networking. and Applications, vol, 44, no.3, pp. 1132-1083, 2001 121 HLH, Jeong. ¥. C. hen LP Jeong, and TT. 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