Santos vs.
Secretary of Labor detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts
G.R. NO. L-21624 | February 27, 1968
Sanchez, J.
Doctrine:Public office is a public trust. It is personal to the incumbent thereof or
appointee thereto.
Facts:Segundo Santos was, for a number of years, employed as Labor Conciliator I of the
Department of Labor. His monthly pay was P259 per month, or P3,108 per annum. On August
24, 1960, he was promoted as Labor Conciliator II with compensation per annum of P3,493,
vice Juan Mendoza, Jr., resigned. This appointment, was approved by the Commissioner of
Civil Service, and released to the Department of Labor. respondent Secretary of Labor
appointed Ricardo Tiongco,one of the respondents, to the same position of Labor Conciliator
II. Petitioner's demand for the revocation of respondent Tionco's appointment and payment to
him (Santos) of salary differentials was rejected by respondent Secretary of Labor. Before the
case could be tried on the merits that is, on February 14, 1963, Santos died. A motion to
substitute the "Estate of Segundo Santos, deceased." represented by Rodolfo Santos, one of
the heirs, was filed. This triggereda move on respondents' part to seek dismissal of the case.
Issue/s:Whether Estate of Segundo Santos, deceased, be substituted in place of
petitioner.
Ruling :Public office is a public trust. It is personal to the incumbent thereof or
appointee thereto. In this sense, it is not property which passes to his heirs. None ofthe heirs
may replace him in that position. It is in this context that we say that the Estate of the
deceased Segundo Santos may not press Santos' claim that he be allowed to continue holding
office as Labor Conciliator II. Actio personalis moritur cum persona.But jurisdiction of the
court had attached before the death of Santos. That jurisdiction continues until the termination
of the suit. It is true that what is left is a
money claim for salary differentials. But death will not dislodge jurisdiction on that
money claim — it subsists. Resolution of this question depends upon the right of
Segundo Santos to the position of Labor Conciliator II
JESUS P. MORFE v. AMELITO R. MUTUC, GR No. L-20387, 1968-01-31
Facts:Congress in 1960 enacted the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act[1] to deter public
officials and employees from committing acts of dishonesty and improve the tone of morality
in public service. It was... declared to be the state policy "in line with the principle that a
public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons
alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto."One of the
specific provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 is that every public
officer, either within thirty (30) days after its approval or after his assumption of office "and
within the month of January of every other year thereafter", as well as... upon the termination
of his position, shall prepare end file with the head of the office to which he belongs, "a true
and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family... expenses and the amount
of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar yearThen on February 14, 1962, came an
Answer of the then Executive Secretary and the then Secretary of Justice as defendants, where
after practically admitting the facts alleged, they denied the erroneous conclusion of law and
as one of the special affirmative defenses set... forth: "1. That when a government official,
like plaintiff, accepts a public position, he is deemed to have voluntarily assumed the
obligation to give information about his personal affair, not only at the time of his assumption
of office but during the time... he continues to discharge public trust. The private life of an
employee cannot be segregated from his public life * * *."[9] The answer likewise denied that
there was a violation of his constitutional rights... against self-incrimination as well as
unreasonable search and seizure and maintained that "the provision of law in question cannot
be attacked on the ground that it impairs plaintiff's normal and legitimate enjoyment of his life
and liberty because said provision merely seeks to... adopt a reasonable measure of insuring
the interest of general welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate
exercise of the police power."
Issue s:In this declaratory relief proceeding, the periodical submission "within the month of
January of every other year thereafter" of such sworn statement of assets and liabilities after
an officer or employee had once bared his financial condition upon assumption of office
was... challenged for being violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power
and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicit in the ban against
unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against... self-
incrimination.
Ruling:It would appear then that a reliance on that case for an allegation that this statutory
provision offends against the unreasonable search and seizure clause would be futile and
unavailing. This is the more so in the light of the latest decision of thisCourt in Stonehill v.
Diokno.[73] where this Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, after stressing that the
constitutional requirements must be strictly complied with, and that it would be"a legal heresy
of the highest order to convict anybody of a violation of certain statutes without reference to
any of it its determinate provisions delimited its scope as "one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution," safeguarding "the... sanctity of the domicile and the privacy
of communication and correspondence * * *." Such is precisely the evil sough to be remedied
by the constitutional provision above quoted - to outlaw the so-called general warrants.
It thus appears clear that no violation of the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure
has been shown to exist by such requirement of further periodical submission of one's
financial condition as set forth in the Anti-Graft Act of 1960.
Nor does the contention of plaintiff gain greater plausibility, much less licit acceptance, by his
invocation of the non-incrimination clause. According to the Constitution: "No person shall
be compelled to be a witness against him... self."[74] This constitutional provision gives the
accused immunity from any attempt by the prosecution to make easier its task by coercing or
intimidating him to furnish the evidence necessary to convict. He may... confess, but only if
he voluntarily wills it. He may admit certain facts but only if he freely chooses to.[75] Or he
could remain silent, and the prosecution is powerless to compel him to... talk.[76] Proof is not
solely testimonial in character. It may be documentary. Neither then could the accused be
ordered to write, when what comes from his pen may constitute evidence of guilt... or
innocence.[77] Moreover, there can be no search seizure of his house, papers or effects for
the purpose of locating incriminatory matter.WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of
July 19, 1962 "declaring unconstitutional, null and void Section 7, Republic Act. No. 3019,
insofar as it requires periodical submittal of sworn statements of financial conditions, assets
and liabilities of an official or... employee of the government after he had once submitted such
a sworn statement * * * is reversed." Without costs.
Principles:Even with due recognition of such a view, it cannot be said that the challenged
statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person
to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a... requirement possesses
with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an objection of such
character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of a position he holds, is bereft of
constitutional protection; it is only to... emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further
compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of the amounts and
sources of income, the amounts of personal an
BRUNO O. APARRI v. CA, GR No. L-30057, 1984-01-31
Facts:private respondents (as members of the Board of Directors of the
defunct National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration... approved
the following resolution:
"RESOLUTION NO. 13 (Series of 1960)
"RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to appoint Mr. Bruno O. Aparri, as
General Manager of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA) with all the rights, prerogatives and compensation
appurtenant thereto to take effect on January 16,1960);
Pursuant thereto, private respondent Remedios O. Fortich, in her capacity as
Chairman of the NARRA Board, appointed petitioner Bruno O. Aparri... the
same Board of Directors approved the following resolution:
"RESOLUTION NO. 24 (Series of 1962)
"WHEREAS, the Chairman of the Board has transmitted to the Board of
Directors the desire of the Office of the President, Malacañang, Manila, to fix
the term of office of the incumbent General Manager up to the close of office
hours on March 31, 1962
Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction
The petition prayed to annul the resolution of the NARRA Board dated March
15, 1962, to command the Board to allow petitioner to... continue in office as
General Manager until he vacates said office in accordance with law and to
sentence the private respondents jointly and severally to pay the petitioner
actual damages... when the case was still pending decision in the lower court,
Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform
Code, took effect. The said law abolished the NARRA
Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, finding "that this case
has become academic by reason of the approval of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844) and thereby dismissing the instant
petition without... pronouncement as to costs"Court of Appeals... affirmed the
decision of the lower court in dismissing the petition for mandamus.
The motion for reconsideration by petitioner in the then Court of Appeals was
denied.
Issues:whether or not Board Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal
or dismissal of petitioner without cause.
Ruling:WE affirm. WE hold that the term of office of the petitioner expired
on March 31, 1962.A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring
at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be... exercised by him
for the benefit of the publicThe right to hold a public office under our political
system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all, only
because and by virtue of some law... expressly or impliedly creating and
conferring itThere is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office,
or even an absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which
provide for special immunity as... regards salary and tenure, no one can be
said to have any vested right in an office or its salary
Paragraph 2, Section 8 of Republic Act 1160 expressly gives to the Board of
Directors of the NARRA the power "to appoint and fix the term of office of
the general manager x x x subject to the recommendation of Economic
Coordination and the approval of the
President of the Philippines"By "appointment" is meant the act of designation
by the executive officer, board or body, to whom that power has been
delegated, of the individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office
appointment.Lacking such approval by the President as required by the law
(par. 2, Sec. 8 of R.A. 1160), the appointment of petitioner was not complete.
The petitioner... can, at best, be classified as a de facto officer
However, such appointment was made complete upon approval of Resolution
No. 24 (series of 1962 - approved March 15, 1962) wherein the President
submitted to the Board his "desire" to fix the term of office of the petitioner up
to the close of office hours on March 31, 1962. The word "term" in a legal
sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that
an officer may hold an officeIn the case at bar, the term of office... is not fixed
by law. However, the power to fix the term is vested in the Board of Directors
subject to the recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and
the approval of the President of the Philippines. Resolution No. 24 (series of
1962) speaks of no removal... but an expiration of the term of office of the
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY
AFFIRMED.
Principles

When the power of appointment is... absolute, and the appointee has been
determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and the formal
evidence of the appointment, the commission, may issue at once.

Where, however, the assent or confirmation of some other officer or body is

required, the commission... can issue or the appointment is complete only
when such assent or confirmation is obtainedThe petitioner was appointed as
general manager pursuant to Resolution No. 13 (series of 1960 - approved on
January 15, 1960) of the Board of Directors. A careful perusal of the
resolution points out the fact that the appointment is by itself incomplete
because of the lack of... approval of the President of the Philippines to such
LUCITA Q. GARCES v. CA, GR No. 114795, 1996-07-17
Facts:Petitioner Lucita Garces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac,
Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent
Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte.[4] Correspondingly... approved by the Civil Service
Commission,[5] both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of
office. Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for
it.[6] Garces, on the other hand, was directed by theOffice of Assistant
Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac postBut she was not able to do
so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial Election
Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office in
Gutalac as... the same is not vacant.[On February 24, 1987, Garces was
directed by the same Office of Assistant Director to defer her assumption of
the Gutalac post. On April 15, 1987, she received a letter from the Acting
Manager, Finance Service Department, with an enclosed check to cover for
the expenses on... construction of polling booths. It was addressed "Mrs.
Lucita Garces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte" which Garces interpreted
to mean as superseding the deferment order.[9] Meanwhile, since respondent
Concepcion continued occupying the Gutalac office,... the COMELEC en
banc cancelled his appointment to Liloy.[10]Garces filed before the RTC a
petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
and damages against Empeynado[11] and Concepcion, among others.
Meantime, the COMELEC en banc through a Resolution dated June 3,... 1988,
resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election Registrar of
Gutalac,[12] and ordered that the appointments of Garces to Gutalac and of
Concepcion to Liloy be cancelled.[13] In view thereof, respondent
Empeynado moved... to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the
same was rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution
The RTC, thereafter, dismissed the petition for... mandamus on two grounds,
viz., (1) that quo warranto is the proper remedy,[14] and (2) that the "cases" or
"matters" referred under the constitution pertain only to those involving the
conduct of elections. On appeal, respondent CA affirmed the RTC's...
dismissal of the case. Hence, this petition.
Issues:First, is petitioner's action for mandamus proper? And, second, is this
case cognizable by the RTC or by the Supreme Court?
Ruling:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is hereby
DENIED without prejudice to the filing of the proper action with the
appropriate body.On the first issue, Garces claims that she has a clear legal
right to the Gutalac post which was deemed vacated at the time of her
appointment and qualification. Garces insists that the vacancy was created by
Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution.[15] On the... contrary,
Concepcion posits that he did not vacate his Gutalac post as he did not accept
the transfer to Liloy.Article III Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution
provides:"All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973
Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation
or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of
their successors, if such is made within a... period of one year from February
25, 1986.The above organic provision did not require any cause for removal
of an appointive officiaMere appointment and qualification of the successor
removes an incumbent from his post. Nevertheless, the government in an act
of auto-limitation and to... prevent indiscriminate dismissal of government
personnel issued on May 28, 1986, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 17. This
executive order, which applies in this case as it was passed prior to the
issuance of Concepcion's transfer order, enumerates five grounds for
separation or... replacement of elective and appointive officials authorized
under Article III, Section 2 of the Provisional Constitution, to wit:
"1. Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to Section 40 of the
Civil Service Law;
2. Existence of the probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head concerned;
 3. Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of functions;
4. Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes;
5. Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is unfit to
remain in the service or his separation/replacement is in the interest of
the service."
Not one of these grounds was alleged to exist, much less proven by petitioner
when respondent Concepcion was transferred from Gutalac to Liloy. More,
Concepcion was transferred without his consent. A transfer requires a prior
appointment.[19] If the... transfer was made without the consent of the official
concerned, it is tantamount to removal without valid cause[... contrary to the
fundamental guarantee on non-removal except for cause.[21] Concepcion's
transfer thus becomes legally... infirm and without effect for he was not
validly terminated. His appointment to the Liloy post, in fact, was incomplete
because he did not accept it. Acceptance, it must be emphasized, is
indispensable to complete an appointment.[22
Corollarily,... Concepcion's post in Gutalac never became vacant. It is a basic
precept in the law of public officers that "no person, no matter how qualified
and eligible he is for a certain position may be appointed to an office which is
not vacant.[23] There can be no... appointment to a non-vacant position. The
incumbent must first be legally removed, or his appointment validly
terminated before one could be validly installed to succeed him.
These factors negate Garces' claim for a well-defined, clear, certain legal right
to the Gutalac post. On the contrary, her right to the said office is manifestly
doubtful and highly questionable. As correctly ruled by respondent court,
mandamus, which petitioner filed below,... will not lie as this remedy applies
only where petitioner's right is founded clearly in law and not when it is
doubtful.[24] It will not issue to give him something to which he is not clearly
and conclusively entitled
Considering... that Concepcion continuously occupies the disputed position
and exercises the corresponding functions therefore, the proper remedy should
have been quo warranto and not mandamus.[26] Quo warranto tests the title to
one's office claimed by another and has as... its object the ouster of the holder
from its enjoyment, while mandamus avails to enforce clear legal duties and
not to try disputed titles.[27]
Garces' heavy reliance with the 1964 Tulawie[28] case is misplaced for
material and different factual considerations. Unlike in this case, the disputed
office of "Assistant Provincial Agriculturist" in the case of Tulawie is clearly
vacant and... petitioner Tulawie's appointment was confirmed by the higher
authorities making his claim to the disputed position clear and certain.
Principles
FELIMON LUEGO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, GR No. 69137,
1986-08-05
Facts:petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City
Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on February 18, 1983.
appointment was described as "permanent" but the Civil Service Commission
approved it as "temporary,"... subject to the final action taken in the protest
filed by the private respondent and another employee, and provided "there
(was) no pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest
against the appointment nor any decision by competent authority that will...
adversely affect the approval of the appointment."Civil Service Commission
found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the...
contested position and, accordingly, directed "that Felicula Tuozo be
appointed to the positionThe private respondent was so appointed on June 28,
1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte.[4] The petitioner, invoking
his earlier permanent appointment, is now before us to question that
orderSolicitor General, rather than face the question squarely, says the
petitioner could be validly replaced in the instant case because his
appointment was temporary and therefore could be withdrawn at will, with or
without cause. Having accepted such an appointment, it... is argued, the
petitioner waived his security of tenure and consequently ran the risk of an
abrupt separation from his office without violation of the Constitution.
Issues:Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent
appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the
appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter?
Ruling:While the principle is correct, and we have applied it many times,[6] it
is not correctly applied in this case.appointment of the petitioner was not
temporary but permanent and was therefore protected byConstitution. The
appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do
so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him
and call it temporary.stamping of the words "APPROVED as TEMPORARY"
did not change the character of the appointment, which was clearly described
as "Permanent"What was temporary was the... approval of the appointment,
not the appointment itself. And what made the approval temporary was the
fact that it was made to depend on the condition specified therein and on the
verification of the qualifications of the appointee to the position.Civil Service
Commission is not empowered to determine the kind of nature of the
appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to
approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the
Civil Service Law. When the... appointee is qualified and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the
appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws.
determination of the kind of appointment to be extended lies in the official
vested by law with the appointing power and not the Civil Service
Commission.the approval is more appropriately called an attestation, that is, of
the fact that the appointee is qualified for the position to which he has been
named. As we have repeatedly held, such attestation is required of the
Commissioner of Civil Service merely as a... check to assure compliance with
Civil Service laws.Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and
must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot... be
faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have
been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of
wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.It is different where
the Constitution or the law subjects the appointment to the approval of another
officer or body, like the Commission on Appointments... the Commission on
Appointments could review the wisdom of the appointment and had the power
to refuse to concur with it even if the President's choice possessed all the
qualifications prescribed by law. No similar arrangement is provided for in
the Civil ServiceDecree. On the contrary, the Civil Service Commission is
limited only to the non-discretionary authority of determining whether or not
the person appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the law.all
the Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the
appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If... he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is
disapproved.Commission on Civil Service acknowledged that both the
petitioner and the private respondent were qualified for the positionThat
recognition alone rendered it functus officio in the case and prevented it
from... acting further thereon except to affirm the validity of the petitioner's
appointment.In preferring the private respondent to the petitioner, the
Commission was probably applying its own Rule V, Section 9, of Civil
Service Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies, which provides that
"whenever there are two or more employees who are next-in-rank, preference
shall... be given to the employee who is most competent and qualified and
who has the appropriate civil service eligibility." This rule is inapplicable,
however, because neither of the claimants is next in rank. Moreover, the next-
in-rank rule is not absolute as the Civil ServiceDecree allows vacancies to be
filled by transfer of present employees, reinstatement, reemployment, or
appointment of outsiders who have the appropriate eligibility