The Teacher Educator

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CONSTRUCTIVISM AND EDUCATION:

MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND PEDAGOGICAL
IMPLICATIONS

Emery J. Hyslop-Margison & Johannes Strobel

To cite this article: Emery J. Hyslop-Margison & Johannes Strobel (2007) CONSTRUCTIVISM
AND EDUCATION: MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS, The Teacher
Educator, 43:1, 72-86, DOI: 10.1080/08878730701728945

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The Teacher Educator, 43:72--86, 2008
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0887-8730 print/1938-8101 online
DOI: 10.1080/08878730701728945

OPEN FORUM

CONSTRUCTIVISM AND EDUCATION:

MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND
PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

EMERY J. HYSLOP-MARGISON
Faculty of Education, University of New Brunswick

JOHANNES STROBEL
Engineering Education & Educational Technology, Purdue University

Constructivism is a popular concept in contemporary teacher education pro-

grams. However, a genuine concern arises with the concept’s application because
many teachers and teacher educators claim that knowledge is constructed, with-
out appreciating the epistemological and pedagogical implications such a claim
entails. This article employs Phillips’ (1995) analytic framework that divides
the pedagogical applications of constructivism into three distinct categories: the
good, the bad, and the ugly. Reviewing the constructivist epistemologies of Dewey
and Vygotsky also enables the exploration of how constructivism might inform
both our understanding of the impediments students confront when learning
new knowledge and our understanding of general constructivist pedagogical
practices. The primary objective in this article is to provide teacher educators
and teachers with a richer understanding of constructivism—its limitations
and its strengths—while offering concrete pedagogical strategies for its classroom
application.

We begin this article by expressing our concern with the rhetor-

ical employment—or slogan-based application—of the term con-
structivism in contemporary teacher education. In the absence

Address correspondence to Dr. Emery J. Hyslop-Margison, Associate Professor,

Faculty of Education, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, New Brunswick, Canada,
E3B 5A3. E-mail: ehyslopm@unb.ca

72
 Constructivism and Pedagogy 73

of understanding more about constructivism, many teachers and

teacher educators may claim that knowledge is constructed, with-
out fully understanding what this claim entails from either an
epistemological or a pedagogical perspective (Hyslop-Margison
& Sears, 2006; Phillips, 1995; Siegel, 2004). Constructivism repre-
sents a multifaceted and contested epistemological mindset with
important implications for classroom teaching, but it amounts
to little more than an educational slogan in the absence of con-
ceptual understanding and clarification. Hence, in this article
we hope to provide teacher educators with some conceptual
and epistemological elaboration on what constructivism actually
entails. In the process, we also propose some learning approaches
emerging from constructivism that are designed to create a more
successful classroom experience for students.

The Conceptual Framework: Avoiding the Bad and the Ugly

In his seminal article on the subject, ‘‘The good, the bad, and the
ugly: The many faces of constructivism,’’ Phillips (1995) provided
a taxonomy for classifying constructivist classroom approaches
along three different dimensions. He considered the emphasis on
active participation by learners to be the positive (or good) impli-
cation of constructivism because it predisposes students toward
classroom participation and subject matter engagement. The en-
gagement of learners promotes improved attention to the subject
matter and correspondingly improves learning. The bad element
of constructivism Phillips identified is the tendency toward epis-
temological relativism with the unfortunate jettisoning of any
substantial expectation for the rational justification of student
beliefs. The bad outcome occurs in classrooms where students
make claims of fact or offer opinions that teachers routinely fail
to question or when students are not pressed to supply warrant
or evidence to support their positions. This type of classroom
discussion may regress to the relativist view that one perspective
is necessarily as good as another and leaves student concern
for evidence sadly lacking. Finally, the ugly side of construc-
tivism involves the tendency toward what Phillips referred to as
sectarianism, or the distrust—even dismissal—of rival epistemic
theories and possible ways of learning. For example, even within
74 E. J. Hyslop-Margison and J. Strobel

a constructivist framework, in some circumstances it is pedagog-

ically acceptable to simply teach by lecturing, and lecture as
a form of instruction should not be entirely dismissed from a
constructivist teacher’s repertoire. Lecture, or direct instruction,
is especially effective in classrooms where students already pos-
sess considerable subject knowledge-an application counter to its
standard use in introductory university classes.
Although we generally agree with Phillips’ identification of
some problematic uses and unreflective assumptions regarding
constructivism, we are also compelled to point out a rather unre-
flective pedagogical rigidity in Phillips’ own position. To classify
classroom approaches generally as good, bad, and ugly without
referring to the particular learning outcomes achieved; the de-
sign of the instruction; the activities of the students; and the
related assessment strategies—in short, the embodied context of
the classroom practice—is pedagogically problematic. Teaching
context inevitably plays a role in classroom outcomes, and the
value judgements Phillips offers are an abstraction and therefore
somewhat suspect as normative evaluations of teaching. Neverthe-
less, Phillips’ taxonomy provides a useful approach to introduce
various understandings of constructivism and to consider their
related classroom implications.
Most teachers and students familiar with constructivism tend
to focus on the idea of individual cognition and active participa-
tion within a social context (Hyslop-Margison & Sears, 2006).
However, they also adopt unreflective assumptions on the role
of both processes during the actual learning experience. Radical
constructivism, or what Phillips referred to as the bad, creates
the disturbing possibility of students using constructivism as the
foundation for adopting one of two equally extreme presup-
positions: that is, students might claim that everything is true
or nothing is true by misguidedly equating constructed indi-
vidual belief with knowledge. For example, in a recent gradu-
ate seminar class one of us taught, the epistemic basis of re-
ligious belief arose with many students clearly confusing belief
with knowledge and lacking the epistemological criteria to dis-
tinguish speculative metaphysics from propositional knowledge.
Knowledge is most reasonably defined as justified true belief
confirmed through some publicly accessible warrant or empirical
evidence.
 Constructivism and Pedagogy 75

Constructivists need not embrace the epistemic relativist po-

sition that one belief is equally as sound as another or accept
the sceptic’s view that we can know nothing for certain. The
argument that knowledge is constructed on a cognitive level and
supported by an agent’s particular prior knowledge does not sup-
port the conclusion that beliefs cannot be evaluated and scruti-
nized to avoid epistemological relativism. Constructivism strongly
supports the idea, however, that individual representations of
knowledge are somewhat idiosyncratic and socially mediated.
As we previously noted, the cognitive understanding of
knowledge construction as an individual and social act does not
necessarily entail the conclusion that certain classroom practices
are inherently preferable to other classroom practices, based
on some narrow interpretation of constructivism. Constructivism
with a capital C (Duffy & Jonassen, 1992) avoids what Phillips
defined as the ugly by arguing that the appropriate instructional
strategy or practical approach is dependent on the desired
learning outcome, the individual students, and the situational
context. Although lectures, for example, are often dismissed
as non-constructivist teaching approaches, they are valuable in-
structional tools when used in proper context. Indeed, research
indicates that lectures are very beneficial when students possess
a considerable amount of prior knowledge and practiced skills,
whereas lectures are less efficacious when students have lower
levels of prior knowledge (Schwartz & Bransford, 1998).
Lorsbach and Tobin (2005) raise the spectre of epistemolog-
ical relativism by emphasizing the supposed challenge construc-
tivism presents to the idea of objective knowledge:

Objectivity is not possible for thinking beings. Accordingly, knowledge is a

construction of how the world works, one that is viable in the sense that it
allows an individual to pursue particular goals. Thus, from a constructivist
perspective, science is not the search for truth. It is a process that assists
us to make sense of our world. (¶ 10–11)

Even more definitively supporting the notion of epistemic sub-

jectivism, Gergen (2005) argued, ‘‘On an epistemological con-
tinuum, objectivism and constructivism would represent opposite
extremes’’ (¶ 6).
In grappling with the potentially problematic implications
and theoretical misunderstandings of such constructivist claims
76 E. J. Hyslop-Margison and J. Strobel

identified by Phillips as bad, it is necessary to consider in greater

detail what factors separate individual belief from knowledge.
Clearly, knowledge entails belief, but it must be true belief, a
belief minimally supported by adequate and publicly confirmable
evidence or warrant. For example, we cannot construct knowl-
edge that the Holocaust did not take place nor can we construct
knowledge that 2 C 2 D 3. We can certainly construct beliefs
in both of these instances, but those beliefs do not meet any
reasonable or viable epistemic criteria to qualify as knowledge.
Some teachers who claim that all knowledge is constructed by
individual cognition and adopt the subjectivist position lose sight
of the distinction between knowledge and belief and of the epis-
temological requirements of knowledge construction.
What does it mean to claim, as many constructivists often do,
that all knowledge is constructed? For example, Lorsbach and
Tobin (2005) made the following problematic claim: ‘‘Construc-
tivism asserts that knowledge resides in individuals; that knowl-
edge cannot be transferred intact from the head of a teacher
to the heads of students’’ (¶ 6). We know that Caesar crossed
the Rubicon in 44 B.C., but in what way have we personally
constructed that knowledge? From a cognitive and historical per-
spective, this sentence holds necessarily true even though under-
standing it requires some prior knowledge such as who Caesar
was, what the Rubicon represented, and what the word crossing
means. However, we frequently accept the warrant and evidence
accumulated by various experts—in this case within the field of
history—and confirm knowledge claims by researching the avail-
able evidence. Similarly, we know that smoking causes cancer,
but this knowledge is dependent on the conclusions reached
by experts within the field of oncology research and not on
our personal cognitive construction. Of course, this does not
mean that students cannot or should not evaluate the evidence
in support of these claims to establish greater ownership of the
provided knowledge, but knowledge in these cases is socially
rather than individually constructed. Siegel (2004), referring to
the work of Robert Nola, explained:

We can and should agree with constructivism that the ‘‘construction’’ of

beliefs is a necessary condition of knowledge. But it cannot be sufficient
since beliefs can be false or ill founded as well as true or justified.
 Constructivism and Pedagogy 77

The radical constructivist account of knowledge, stands ready to count

any ‘‘viable’’ student construction as a sufficient condition for knowledge
[or] worse, it either downplays or misrepresents the epistemic role of
reasons, evidence and warrant justification. (p. 189)

Siegel’s major point here is that radical constructivism, as we

pointed out earlier in the article, lacks any substantive crite-
ria that distinguishes belief from knowledge. In the absence of
such epistemological distinctions, the empirical verification of
outcomes and the falsification practices that stand at the heart
of quality scientific investigation are woefully absent.
In a more expansive educational sense, however, construc-
tivism directly influences the way students make meaning related
to propositional knowledge such as 2 C 2 D 4 or the fact that
Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 44 B.C. A myriad of ways ex-
ists to understand an abstract mathematical equation when that
equation is translated into tangible ontological entities. Similarly,
the historical claim of Caesar crossing the Rubicon might be
understood as a historical description of a man crossing a river—
or alternatively—as an exemplary act of human courage and
determination or as one of history’s most grievous examples of
treason. People construct the normative meaning of Caesar’s act
and other propositional facts differently because they often in-
volve some measure of interpretation and ethical debate (Hyslop-
Margison & Sears, 2006).
Our acknowledgement that people’s understandings of the
same historical events or contemporary concepts may be con-
structed differently is not to fall into the trap of epistemological
relativism that Phillips warned against. The ability to ground
one’s understandings and knowledge claims in evidence or to
supply a supporting warrant remains essential, as does an ap-
preciation of the distinction between fact and value. Although
historical evidence may allow students a range of ways to interpret
in a valuative sense Caesar’s march on Rome—or the significance
of the Holocaust to European and world history—it does not
always allow for any interpretation of these events. Due to the
lack of sufficient or justifiable evidence, for example, one cannot
justify the position that Caesar acted in ignorance of Roman law
and tradition when he brought his army into the city or that
the Holocaust is a figment of the fertile imagination of post-war
Jewish conspirators (Hyslop-Margison & Sears, 2006).
78 E. J. Hyslop-Margison and J. Strobel

The Role of Prior Belief in Acquiring New Knowledge

Constructivists such as Piaget (1954), Dewey (1929), and Vy-

gotsky (1978) all maintain that students arrive in any learning
situation with a range of prior knowledge and experience that
influences how they respond to new information. Piaget referred
to these organized bodies of knowledge as schemata (see Ander-
son, 1977). These structures are epistemologically persistent, or
resistant to change, and therefore play a key role in determining
how students assimilate or accommodate new learning (Hughes
& Sears, 1996). In other words, teachers and students do not like
to change their minds—particularly if that change includes con-
sidering ideas radically different from those they presently hold.
In his book, Wonderful Life, Harvard biologist Stephen J.
Gould (1989) recounted how some of the world’s best scientists
engaged in this type of epistemological distortion during the 20th
century when they found a rich deposit of fossils that provided
evidence countering much of what was previously believed about
evolution. Instead of dealing with the implications of that ev-
idence, the scientists reshaped their findings to fit commonly
accepted views about the evolution of life. Most scientific fields
undergo processes that result in so-called file drawer effects (Hyslop-
Margison & Sears, 2006). In these cases, the evidence that cannot
be explained by a presupposed theory is simply disregarded or
filed away, without anyone attending to its implications for an
existing theory (see Kuhn, 1970 and Thagard, 1992, on paradigm
shifts).
In similar fashion, students often resist changing their minds
until evidence of anomalous data is overwhelming (Chinn &
Brewer, 1993); their current models are not able to assist in
solving current problems; the new model becomes intelligible,
plausible, and fruitful (Strike & Posner, 1985); or they become
uncomfortable with their current way of thinking (for a more
complete discussion of various conceptual change theories and
different strategies supporting conceptual change, see Jonassen,
Strobel, & Gottdenker, 2005). Part of what qualifies as good
teaching, then, is discovering what students already believe and
creating the required cognitive dissonance or conflict that leads
to the hard work of adjusting their conceptual understanding.
Windschitl (2002) described this dissonance as ‘‘a puzzling even
 Constructivism and Pedagogy 79

shocking experience that prompts an extensive reconsideration

of their ideas’’ (p. 162). We view this extensive reconsideration
of taken for granted ideas as a key component of constructivist
learning and one of the theory’s most significant contributions
to teacher education.
Students learn that their constructed beliefs do not neces-
sarily qualify as knowledge and that knowledge emerges from
sources other than their own individual cognition. Any teaching
strategy and approach to knowledge acquisition should introduce
a variety of the following challenges toward individual precon-
ceptions and pre-perceptions to assist students in the evolution
of their thinking:

1. The factual challenge: Factual knowledge like the temperature

of a certain chemical under certain conditions, 2 C 2 D 4, and
so on, can be established by objective measurements.
2. The evidence challenge: Complex knowledge that involves in-
sights into the psychological states of mind, motives, and agen-
das of people cannot be objectively determined or definitively
answered. The question of what 9/11 meant for the American
public cannot be exhaustively answered, especially because
different theoretical and symbolic lenses can be employed
that lead to different conclusions. Nevertheless, supporting
evidence for claims has to be provided, counter-evidence has
to be explained, and boundaries of the claims have to be
staked. In addition, the analysis and the evaluation of evidence
need to be stressed.
3. The pragmatic challenge: In disciplines that focus on design
and development, pragmatic challenges can provide a valid
source of cognitive dissonance. The knowledge that an engi-
neer employs to construct a bridge might be difficult to defend
as accurate when the bridge is breaking or when simulations
and constructions reveal severe design flaws.
4. The social challenge: In this form of challenge, the emphasis
lies on the experienced practice and discourse by peers, the
community, and society in general.

Our primary pedagogical concern within the area of prior

belief involves helping students over their epistemological dog-
mas that, because they are resistant to change, potentially prevent
80 E. J. Hyslop-Margison and J. Strobel

students’ acquisition of new knowledge. Constructivism informs

us that pre-existing belief systems are very resistant to concep-
tual change and underscores the problem of addressing this
resistance in pedagogical contexts when new information is in-
troduced. Numerous strategies for fostering both the inter- and
intrapersonal dialogue in classrooms help achieve this objective,
but one referred to as subversive stories is particularly effective
(Hyslop-Margison & Sears, 2006).
Wright (2002) used this term to describe the New Testament
parables of Jesus. Wright argued that these parables were firmly
rooted in the language and experience (or the world views) of
Jesus’ followers but contained surprising twists designed to sub-
vert assumed understandings about the world and the nature of
faith. The stories were not, as is sometimes assumed, vehicles for
communicating immutable truths; ‘‘They were ways of breaking
open the worldview of Jesus’ hearers’’ (p. 77), so worldviews
could be re-examined and rethought. We similarly advocate using
critical incidents, or subversive stories, in classrooms as a chal-
lenge to the beliefs students bring with them into the classroom.
We have provided the following design strategies for teachers to
follow (Hyslop-Margison & Sears, 2006):

 The subversive stories should be authentic, with the best stories

drawn from historical or current events. In our experience,
contrived narratives often are not nearly as compelling and
interesting to students as are stories based on actual circum-
stances.
 The compelling situations or narratives should be succinct.
Recall that the situations themselves are not the focus of the
learning—the focus is rather the ideas and concepts inherent
within the situations. The purpose of the situation is to pro-
mote student inter- and intrapersonal dialogue about these
ideas, as well as provide a concrete context for this dialogue.
Extended, rambling stories that provide excessive and unneces-
sary detail distract students and may undermine their attention
to the story.
 The stories and narratives should be deliberately ambiguous to
allow independent decision making by students. The purpose
of the situations is not to provide answers but to stimulate
questions and new perspectives. To achieve this objective, the
 Constructivism and Pedagogy 81

stories must be open ended and remain open to student inter-

pretation.
 Finally, the stories should be representative, or include within
them features of the ideas or concepts that are common across
a number of situations or contexts, and not unique to the
specific incident in question. A study of various elements re-
lated to globalization might be launched, for example, using
the so-called Battle in Seattle as a critical incident or subver-
sive story. The violent nature of the confrontation provides a
context for exploring enduring questions about the legitimacy
of state governments making international agreements without
subjecting them to public scrutiny. These stories also raise im-
portant questions about the appropriateness of various means
of civic action and protest.

Pedagogical Implications of Constructivism

To understand the epistemological foundations of constructivism

and the theory’s implications for classroom practice, we turn to
Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky (1978) and American prag-
matist John Dewey (1929). Vygotsky’s theory of knowledge ac-
quisition is often described as social constructivism. Approaches
to teaching based on social constructivism maintain that knowl-
edge is a socially negotiated product: ‘‘Words and ideas do not
have inherent meanings apart from those created and negotiated
by people in particular contexts’’ (Hughes & Sears, 2004, p.
260). Social constructivism avoids the idea that individual cog-
nition is the sole generating force in knowledge construction
and espouses the view that knowledge is a cultural or negoti-
ated artifact generated in cooperation and understanding with
others.
From the social constructivist perspective, the instructor—
contrary to some misguided constructivist views—remains a piv-
otal classroom figure by creating activities that direct students
toward subject mastery and that promote a certain level of cul-
tural assimilation. In the following quotation, Vygotsky (1978)
implied that acquiring social conventions and cultural tools is
a key objective of constructivist pedagogy and a distinguishing
feature of human experience:
82 E. J. Hyslop-Margison and J. Strobel

The internalization of cultural forms of behaviour involves the reconstruc-

tion of psychological activity on the basis of sign operations. Psychological
processes as they appear in animals actually cease to exist; they are in-
corporated into this system of behaviour and are culturally reconstituted
and developed to form a new psychological entity. The internalization of
socially rooted and historically developed activities is the distinguishing
feature of human psychology. (p. 57)

Through language acquisition and guided instruction, then, Vy-

gotsky’s model of social constructivism leads students toward edu-
cational objectives designed to provide them with certain crucial
forms of social and cultural knowledge.
Whereas Vygotsky (1978) emphasized the importance of
cultural transmission as the primary aim of social constructivist
learning, Dewey, consistent with his more democratic and self-
actualization aims—advanced the idea of constructing personal
knowledge through individual cognition:

The assumption that gives rise to the procedures just criticized is the
belief that social conditions determine educational objectives. This is a
fallacy. Education is autonomous and should be free to determine its
own ends, its own objectives. To go outside the educational function
and to borrow objectives from an external source is to surrender to the
educational cause. (Dewey, 1929, p. 73)

Dewey’s constructivist approach is less focused on providing stu-

dents with social knowledge and cultural tools than it is on creat-
ing learning conditions that permit students to pursue essentially
independent objectives based on their own experiences, inter-
ests, and concerns. Dewey’s model of constructivism situates the
teacher as a classroom facilitator whose role is to help students, as
autonomous agents, design their own learning experiences in re-
sponse to personal priorities and objectives. Although seemingly
incommensurable, when jointly considered, both of these posi-
tions enrich our application of constructivist classroom practice.
If the central objective of education is the creation of au-
tonomous democratic agents rather than compliant social, cul-
tural, and occupational conformists, student understanding of
cultural norms and processes, as Vygotsky (1978) advocated, af-
fords a necessary condition of learner agency. Hence, the dis-
tinction between the positions advanced by Vygotsky and Dewey
is perhaps less profound than it might initially appear. We must
 Constructivism and Pedagogy 83

also remember that Vygotsky’s focus is early childhood devel-

opment, where rudimentary knowledge in the form of cultural
and social understanding is essential. Although social values are
certainly embedded in language, Vygotsky did not manifestly
support social reproduction as the goal of education beyond
language acquisition. Following Engle and Ochoa (1988), we
believe that education for individual empowerment requires both
socialization and counter socialization. In order for students to
critique and transform current social conditions, they must un-
derstand in a fairly substantial way what those conditions are, how
they developed, what possible alternatives exist to them, and the
social and political institutions that might be used to reshape
them. Some of this knowledge and understanding will inevitably
emerge from the fairly traditional study of history, economics,
philosophy, political science, and sociology.
As Hyslop-Margison and Sears (2006) pointed out, Martin
Luther King Jr. provides an excellent example of the relationship
between socialization and counter socialization and of how each
element potentially contributes to emancipating and transforma-
tive political action. King had a solid grounding in the central
cultural artifacts of the United States, including the Declaration
of Independence, the Constitution, and in particular, the U.S.
Bill of Rights. He applied this cultural knowledge, however, not
to celebrate the great accomplishments of his country, but to call
it to account for falling short of its promised ideals and principles.
Without socialization in American history and government, King
might have been far less effective as a social reformer. Simi-
larly, Mahatma Gandhi used his rich understanding of British
government and law to inform his challenge to British colonial
rule in India during the early 20th century. The role of cultural
knowledge and understanding illustrates that Vygotsky’s version
of constructivism, with its emphasis on cultural tool acquisition,
has an important complementary role to play in meeting Dewey’s
constructivist objective of empowering individual learners.
Vygotsky argued that people acquire knowledge through two
kinds of activity: interpsychological, or among people, and in-
trapsychological, or within ourselves (Wink & Putney, 2002). In
considering the implications of these ideas for learning, teach-
ers must design activities that promote interpersonal and in-
trapersonal dialogue about concepts and ideas introduced into
84 E. J. Hyslop-Margison and J. Strobel

classroom discussion. Interpersonal dialogue typically begins in

the classroom between students and the teacher but then is ex-
panded to consider ideas relevant to the issue from thinkers well
beyond the classroom. In a career education classroom, for ex-
ample, if students are discussing the ethical relationship between
employers and employees—or more abstractly, between capital
and labor—they might also read texts or watch documentary films
based on a range of thinkers from Karl Marx to Sam Walton.
Through engaging in this type of expanded dialogue, learners
construct a base of information and knowledge about the range
of ways these issues are evaluated to help them developed an
informed but personal understanding of the subject (Hyslop-
Margison & Sears, 2006).
Dewey’s (1938) pragmatism submits that in addition to the
communicative approach, the skills and knowledge that students
learn must be fully integrated into their lives as workers, citizens,
and human beings. Instructors employing constructivist practice
should design activities that are transformative in nature, engag-
ing students in complex and ill-structured problem solving within
authentic contexts and in learning by applying concepts and
principles to new and challenging situations. These environments
afford the application of different knowledge and dispositions
in order to accomplish a particular goal or solve a particular
problem. Additionally, the production of external inscriptions
and concrete designs of models can highlight the underlying
beliefs and assumptions (Strobel, 2003).

Conclusion

We believe that constructivism can make a significant contribu-

tion to student learning, and those of us involved in teacher ed-
ucation ought to ensure future educators add some of construc-
tivism’s insights and pedagogical implications to their emerging
repertoire of teaching tools. The importance of collaborative
problem based learning, for example, is reinforced by the view
that knowledge is essentially a socially constructed and negoti-
ated product. Further, the insights of constructivism regarding
student resistance to new conceptual understandings alert us to
the pedagogical challenges in shifting the preconceived notions
 Constructivism and Pedagogy 85

that student teachers bring with them into teacher education

classrooms. It correspondingly presents us with the considerable
challenge of how to help these learners open their minds to the
acquisition of new ideas and knowledge related to teaching and
learning.
In spite of the potential contributions of constructivism, we
must also ensure that our preservice teachers fully understand the
epistemological limitations of this theory. Constructivism should
not be used as an excuse for students providing inadequate war-
rant for their various claims, beliefs, and perspectives. Further,
the claim that all knowledge is constructed is not very helpful if
the assertion limits the application of more traditional teaching
approaches, such as lecturing, that are equally effective within
certain teaching and learning contexts. As constructivist teachers
and teacher educators, we need to be continually cautious about
slipping into the relativism and sectarianism—or the bad and the
ugly—Phillips wisely and correctly warned us against.

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