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PLA’s Evolving
Capabilities
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CONTENTS
05 CHINA: PLAA Forces and Capabilities
07 CHINA: People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
Strength, Capabilities and Power Projection
11 CHINA: People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and
PLAN Aviation Forces and Capabilities
13 CHINA: PLA Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force -
Forces and Capabilities
17 CHINA: PLA Reserves, Paramilitary - Forces and
Capabilities
20 CHINA: PLA Developing Joint Capabilities
22 CHINA: PLA Advancing Toward an Informatized Military
24 DEFENCE INDUSTRY: Industry News
28 DEFENCE RESEARCH: DRDO News
www.imrmedia.in
Volume 14, No 3, March 2023
EDITORIAL
Chief Editor: Maj Gen RK Arora, rk.arora@imrmedia.in
Editor: Maj Gen Dr GD Bakshi, SM, VSM, Retd
geedee@imrmedia.in
Associate Editors
Air Marshal Bharat Kumar, PVSM, AVSM, Retd
Maj Gen Deepak K. Mehta, Retd.
Kunal Kaushik
Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023
30 Meloni Visits India, UAE To PatchUp Old Defense Kerfuffles
31 India Approves Purchase of 70 HTT-40 Basic Trainer Aircraft
32 India To Buy Three Homemade Cadet Training Ships
32 The Time Is Now To Prepare For China Conflict: U.S. Army
Leaders
33 Weaponized Balloons Challenge US Air Superiority - Littorally
35 'Smaller, Better And Cheaper': Portable Drone Interceptors
36 Hydrogen-Fueled Drones Offer Increased Payloads,
Endurance
37 What Will ChatGPT Mean For The US Defense-Industrial
Base?
38 How the US Navy is creating the 'nirvana of one combat
system’?
40 INDIA-U.S.: India-US Initiative on Critical and Emerging
Technologies Dr D Bhalla, IAS
42 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY: Port Calls, Visits and Defence
Dialogues
44 MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES: Glimpses from Joint
International Exercises
47 JOINT TRAINING: Theatre Level Operational Biennial
Maritime Exercise TROPEX 23
48 CEREMONIAL: Battle Honours and Raising Day Anniversaries
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3

EDITORIAL
Maj Gen Ravi Arora
PLA's Pace of Modernisa on
T he People's Libera on Army (PLA) has
sought to modernize its capabili es and
improve its proficiencies across all
warfare domains so that, as a joint force, it can
conduct the full range of land, air, and
m a r i m e , a s we l l a s n u c l e a r, s p a c e ,
counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and
cyberspace opera ons.
The PLA's evolving capabili es and
concepts con nue to
strengthen the PRC's ability to
fight and win wars against a
"strong enemy" (a
euphemism likely for the
United States), counter an
interven on by a third party
in a conflict along the PRC's
periphery, and project power
globally.
In 2021, the PLA
con nued to make progress
implemen ng major
structural reforms, fielding
modern indigenous systems,
b u i l d i n g re a d i n e s s , a n d
strengthening its competency
to conduct joint opera ons.
With approximately 2.2 million ac ve duty
military service members and 660,000
paramilitary personnel, China maintains one of
the largest military forces in the world. In 2021,
China's defense budget increased by 6.8% to
$261 billion. According to a PRC work report,
the new defense budget aligned with PRC
military goals associated with its 2027 and
2035 military moderniza on program. PRC
state media reported that the defense budget
increase over the prior year focused on
modernizing the PLA's training with realis c
simula on and the use of virtual reality,
accelera ng improvements in logis cs
capabili es, inves ng in defense science and
technology, and enhancing the military's
strategic capaci es.
In effort to create a leaner, more mobile
force, the PLA Army (PLAA) has steadily
reduced ac ve duty personnel in the last three
decades but s ll outnumbers other services
4
Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023
with roughly one million soldiers in 2021. The
PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF)
have grown in size since 2015, indica ng their
increasing importance. By 2021, the PLAN
Marine Corps expanded from two to six
brigades and supplemented with avia on and
Special Forces, becoming increasingly capable
of protec ng China's overseas interests. The
PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), formerly the Second
Ar llery, manages the PRC's land-based
nuclear and conven onal missile units. The
Strategic Support Force (SSF) centralizes the
PLA's strategic space, cyberspace, electronic
warfare, informa on, communica ons, and
psychological warfare missions and
capabili es. Lastly, the Joint Logis cs Support
Fo rc e ( J L S F ) h a n d l e s q u a r t e r m a s t e r,
transporta on, medical services, and other
logis c func ons to enhance PLA's joint
capabili es during peace and war.
In this issue we look at military
developments in China in 2021 and 2022 and
the pace of moderniza on and growth in
capabili es.
The PLAA emphasized realis c training
scenarios and standardiza on of training
methods during the exercise STRIDE-2021 and
throughout extensive joint amphibious
training that u lized both PLAN and civilian
roll-on roll-off (RORO) vessels.
The PLAN is numerically the largest navy in
the world with an overall ba le force of
approximately 340 ships and submarines,
including approximately 125 major surface
combatants. As of 2021, the PLAN is largely
composed of modern mul -mission ships and
submarines.
The PLAAF and PLAN Avia on together
cons tute the largest avia on force in the
Indo-Pacific region. The PLAAF is rapidly
catching up to Western air
forces. The PLAAF con nues
to modernize with the
delivery of domes cally built
aircra and a wide range of
UASs.
In 2021, the PLARF
launched approximately 135
ballis c missiles for tes ng
and training. This was more
than the rest of the world
combined excluding ballis c
missile employment in
conflict zones. The PLARF
con nues to grow its
inventory of DF-26
intermediate-range ballis c
missiles (IRBMs).
Interoperability and integra on between
the PLA, its reserve components, and the PRC's
paramilitary forces con nues to grow in scale
and sophis ca on, including the coordina on
between the PLAN, the China Coast Guard
(CCG), and the People's Armed Forces
Mari me Mili a (PAFMM).
The PLA is aggressively developing
capabili es to provide op ons for the PRC to
dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-
party interven on in the Asia-Pacific region.
The PLA is also developing the capabili es to
conduct military opera ons deeper into the
Indo-Pacific region, and in some cases, globally.
The PLA is pursuing next-genera on
combat capabili es based on its vision of
future conflict, which it calls "intelligen zed
warfare," defined by the expanded use of AI
and other advanced technologies at every level
of warfare.
India must sit up and take note.
 Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023

CHINA
People's Liberation Army - Recent Developments

PLAA Forces and

Capabilities
IMR Special Report

Key Takeaways: Major Ground Units

• The PLAA emphasized realistic training
scenarios and standardization of training
methods during the exercise STRIDE-2021 and
throughout extensive joint amphibious
training that utilized both PLAN and civilian
roll-on roll-off (RORO) vessels.
• The PLAA and Russian Army units
participated in ZAPAD/INTERACTION-2021, a
large-scale joint exercise to expand
cooperation between the two militaries, which
was conducted on PRC soil for the first time.
• The PLAA applied twice a year conscription
after delays from COVID-19 in 2020,
emphasizing the recruitment of college
graduates and students with science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics
(STEM) backgrounds.
The PLA Army (PLAA) has approximately
975,000 active-duty personnel in combat units
and is the primary ground fighting force in the
PLA. The 2020 PRC National Defense
University's Science of Military Strategy
described the PLAA's development as a
transition from a regional defense force to a
global combat force. In 2021, the PLAA
continued to emphasize the modernization
and standardization of their equipment
through the fielding of new and upgraded
combat systems. 2021 also highlighted
standardization of training, improvements to
power projection capabilities, and extensive command, and the Tibet military command. personnel each. Each group army controls six
combined-arms and joint trainings. The PLAA has 13 group armies, which are additional brigades responsible for operational
Force Structure and Organization. In 2021, comprised of multiple combined-arms element functions: an artillery brigade, an air
the PLAA continued to field a large number of brigades that serve as the PLAA's primary defense brigade, an army aviation (or air
new platforms and updated equipment. The maneuver force. The brigades vary in size and assault) brigade, a special operations forces
major force restructuring required by the 2016 composition. The PLAA delineates its (SOF) brigade, an engineer and chemical
and 2017 PLA reforms is complete, but combined-arms brigades into three types: light defense brigade, and a sustainment brigade.
significant additional equipment fielding is (high-mobility, mountain, air assault, and Some variations exist with at least one group
necessary to complete the transformation of motorized), medium (wheeled armored army per theater separating their engineering
the PLAA into a fully modern force. vehicles), and heavy (tracked armored and chemical defense brigades into separate
The PLAA is organized into five Theater v e h i c l e s ) , w i t h s i ze s ra n g i n g f r o m units. Although the PLAA has standardized its
Army Commands, the Xinjiang military approximately 4,000 (light) to 5,000 (heavy) group armies, it does retain a number of

IMR 5
 nonstandard divisions and brigades that exist
outside of the group armies. These units are
typically located in areas the CCP considers
sensitive including Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and
Beijing.
Capabilities and Modernization. Despite
the PLAA's ambitions to become a highly
modernized ground force they still widely
employ a mix of modern and obsolete tanks
and armored fighting vehicles. Throughout
2021, the PLAA continued to test and field new
systems with a large emphasis on the
development of situational awareness and
manned unmanned teaming (MUM-T) with
the proliferation of vertical takeoff and landing
(VTOL) and fixed-wing uncrewed aerial
systems (UAS). Soldier enhancement
capabilities have also taken the next step as
units are beginning to use exoskeletons and
hyperbaric oxygen therapy to mitigate stresses
on the individual soldier. A ground force with
these capabilities, supported by sufficient lift
and sustainment capabilities, would likely be
able to project at least limited ground power
regionally. The PLAA also continued the
fielding of light, highly mobile systems with
emphasis on areas with difficult terrain.
The PLAA is rapidly developing a limited
capability to project ground power as an
expeditionary force. In addition to protecting
national sovereignty and security, the 2020
National Defense University's Science of
Military Strategy describes the PLAA as
focused on improving precision, multi-
functional, and sustained operations
capabilities, command and control, and
integrated systems to promote ambitions of
building a global combat capable army. The
PLAA's primary power projection initiatives are
mobile, modular combined arms formations,
special operations forces, and PLAA Aviation
and Air Assault units.
After years of substantial reform, the
combined-arms battalion of the combined
arms brigade is the basic combat unit of the
PLAA. PLAA officers tell PRC media that the
formations comprise more than 10 different
combat arms, are plug-and-play and
adjustable based on the terrain and mission
requirements. The PLAA enhanced power
projection capabilities through increased
mobility, ease of transport and logistics, and
precision strike capabilities. This was
accomplished through an effort to lighten
PLAA with a focus on medium and light, high
mobility platforms, and the fielding of new
long-range multiple rocket launcher systems.
The PLAA's 15 Special Operations Forces
(SOF) brigades provide group army
commanders with an organic unit capable of
6 IMR
“ Despite the PLAA's
ambitions to become a
highly modernized
ground force they still
widely employ a mix of
modern and obsolete
tanks and armored
“ anti-terrorism.
fighting vehicles.
executing special operations. Typical PLAA SOF
brigade missions include raids, harassment
operations, target seizure and control, special
reconnaissance, precision strike guidance, and
rescue operations. Observed SOF training in
2021 included aerial infiltration, small-unit
tactics, and maritime operations.
PLAA Aviation and Air Assault units
remained a focus of development in 2021.
PLAA training events and reports in PRC media
show that air-ground integration, multi-
dimensional assaults, and MUM-T are now a
standard part of training. Training in 2021 also
included numerous examples of helicopters
executing nighttime flight operations and
ultra-low altitude flying. PLAA Aviation works
directly with ground units to enhance its ability
to support air assault operations and conduct
air strikes. Highlights from PLAA Aviation joint
training in 2021 included the army aviation
helicopters conducting confrontational
training against PLAAF surface-to-air missile
brigades, and army aviation helicopters
coordinating with PLA Navy landing ships. The
two PLAA Air Assault brigades continued
extensive training on helicopter insertion, air
reconnaissance, and coordinating air strikes
with other PLAA units and joint service
partners. In 2021, PLAA Aviation Brigades
began using the new Z-20 medium-lift
transport helicopters for various missions in
western China. Ongoing development of PLAA
Aviation and Air Assault units will lead to a
highly-mobile, modular ground force unit
capable of supporting expeditionary
operations. Expeditionary operations where
PLA seeks to improve proficiency include: the
protecting of overseas PRC citizens and
overseas PRC economic interests, UN
Peacekeeping Operations (UN PKO),
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
( H A / D R ) , N o n c o m b ata nt Eva c u at i o n
Operations (NEO), Counterterrorism
Operations (CT), and the ability to secure
strategic lines of communication (SLOCs) far
from the PRC mainland. The PLAA envisions its
Aviation and Air Assault units employing their
three-dimensional maneuver, firepower, and
assault capabilities to act as a main combat
force, support a greater joint operation, or
conduct non-war military operations outside
China. Overseas military operations is
comprised of surveillance implementation,
seizure, electronic combat, and battlefield
rescue, while overseas non-combat operations
include disaster relief, emergency rescue, and
Readiness. PLAA training in 2021 followed
the trend from 2020, focusing on combined-
arms and joint training. PLAA units conducted
multiple iterations of STRIDE-2021 in various
theaters with an emphasis on setting the
standardization of training methods and
conditions. PLAA units stressed realistic
training, professionalization of opposing force
(OPFOR) formations, and conducted numerous
force-on-force "confrontation drills."
In addition to conventional ground force
training, PLAA units conducted extensive
specialty exercises in 2021. Units conducted
coastal defense, multiple sea crossings and
landings, and high-elevation plateau
operations. Joint training included for the first
time, ZAPAD/INTERACTION-2021, where PLAA
units conducted a large-scale exercise with the
Russian military in China. PLAA and Russian
forces participating in ZAPAD/INTERACTION-
2021 underwent theoretical and systems
training, weapon swaps, and a culminating
exercise to further understanding and
cooperation between the two militaries. The
PLAA also continued extensive joint training
using PLAN landing ships and civilian RORO
vessels to expand amphibious capabilities.
While continuing to focus on equipment
modernization, the PLAA also turned to the
development of their personnel. The PLAA
changes in their recruitment strategy as the
PLA implemented a twice a year conscription
and increased its emphasis on the recruitment
of college students majoring in science and
engineering. The PLAA also emphasized the
use of simulations in exercises to carry out
immersive training in lieu of actual combat
training. Use of simulations gives users an
emulation of a battlefield that provides a
variety of training situations to allow for
completion of instruction and mitigation of
shortcomings in a low risk environment.
Based on the Annual Report by the
Secretary of Defense to U.S. Congress: Military
and Security Developments Involving the
People's Republic of China, 2022
 Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023

CHINA
People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)

Strength, Capabilities
and Power Projection
IMR Special Report

Key Takeaways Major Ground Units

• The PLAN is numerically the largest navy in
the world with an overall battle force of
approximately 340 ships and submarines,
including approximately 125 major surface
combatants. As of 2021, the PLAN is largely
composed of modern multi-mission ships and
submarines.
• In 2021, the PLAN's overall battle force
shrank due to the transfer of 22 early flight
JIANGDAO class corvettes to the China Coast
Guard.
• The PLAN commissioned its fourth RENHAI
class cruiser (CG) in late 2021 and resumed
series construction of the JIANGKAI II class
frigate.
• The PLAN commissioned two YUSHEN class
amphibious assault ships, one each in April
2021 and April 2022. The PLAN launched a
third hull in the class in January 2021, which is Shang (Type 093) Attack Submarine (SSN)
currently undergoing sea trials prior to
commissioning. The PLAN is also emphasizing maritime joint combat operations beyond the reach of the
operations and joint integration within the PRC's land-based defenses. In particular,
Recent Developments PLA. This modernization aligns with the PRC's China's growing force of aircraft carriers
In the near-term, the PLAN will have the growing emphasis on the maritime domain extend air defense coverage of deployed task
ability to conduct long-range precision strikes and increasing demands for the PLAN to groups beyond the range of land based
against land targets from its submarine and operate at greater distances from mainland defenses and will enable operations at
surface combatants using land- attack cruise China. increasingly longer ranges. The PLAN's
missiles, notably enhancing the PRC's power The PLAN organizes, mans, trains, and emerging requirement for sea- based land-
projection capability. equips the PLA's naval and naval aviation attack systems will also enhance the PRC's
The PRC's 2019 defense white paper forces, as well as the PLAN Marine Corps ability to project power. Furthermore, the
described the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLANMC), which is subordinate to the PLAN. PLAN now has a sizable force of highly capable
(PLAN) as adjusting to changes in the strategic The PLAN continues to implement structural logistical replenishment ships to support long-
requirements of near seas protection and far reforms that began in late 2015 and early 2016. distance, long-duration deployments,
seas protection, noting that it was "speeding Similar to the other services, the PLA-wide including two new FUYU class fast combat
up the transition of its tasks from defense on reforms removed the PLAN headquarters from support ships (AOEs) built specifically to
the near seas to protection missions on the far conducting operations, which became the support aircraft carrier operations. The PLAN's
seas." The PLAN is an increasingly modern and purview of the PLA's joint Theater Commands, expanding fleet of large modern amphibious
flexible force that has focused on replacing its and focused the PLAN on organizing, manning, warships will enable it to conduct a wide range
previous generations of platforms that had training, and equipping naval forces. of expeditionary operations wherever PRC
limited capabilities in favor of larger, modern Missions. The PLAN continues to develop interests are threatened or in support of PRC
multi-role combatants. As of 2021, the PLAN is into a force increasingly capable of global participation in internationally sanctioned
largely composed of modern multi-role operations, gradually extending its operational operations. The expansion of naval operations
platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, anti- reach beyond East Asia. The PLAN's latest beyond China's immediate region will also
air, and anti- submarine weapons and sensors. surface and subsurface platforms enable facilitate its non-war military activities and

IMR 7
 Major Ground Units
Jingdao (Type 056) Corvette
further legitimize the PRC's growing global
military posture, including at its base in
Djibouti.
China continues to learn lessons from
operating its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning. Its
first domestically built aircraft carrier,
Shandong, was launched in 2017 and
commissioned in December 2019-the
beginning of what the PLA states will be a
multi-carrier force. China's next generation of
carriers, including one that began construction
in 2018, will have greater endurance and an
electromagnetic catapult launch system
making it capable of launching various types of
specialized fixed-wing aircraft for missions
such as early warning, electronic warfare (EW),
and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). This will
increase the striking power of a potential PLAN
carrier battle group when deployed to areas
beyond China's immediate periphery. China's
newest aircraft carrier, the Fujian, is expected
commission in 2024.
The PLAN's newest amphibious ships, the
YUSHEN class Landing Helicopter Assault (LHA)
and YUZHAO class Amphibious Transport
Docks (LPD) are modern platforms capable of
regional and global expeditionary missions in
support of both wartime and non-war
contingency operations either singly or as part
of capable and flexible task groups composed
of multiple amphibious ships and surface
combatants.
The PLAN's ability to perform missions
beyond the First Island Chain is modest but
growing as it gains more experience operating
in distant waters and acquires larger and more
advanced platforms. China's experience in
extended range operations primarily comes
from extended task group deployments and its
ongoing counterpiracy mission in the Gulf of
8 IMR
Aden. Notable deployments in 2021 included
the following:
• In April 2021 and December 2021, the PRC
a i rc ra f t ca r r i e r L i a o n i n g co n d u c te d
deployments to the Philippine Sea and South
China Sea accompanied by escort ships
including the RENHAI class cruiser Nanchang
during both deployments. According to the
Japanese Self-Defense Force, the December
deployment included night flight operations
almost 200 miles southeast of Okinawa with
the task group accompanied by a FUYU class
AOE.
• In May of 2021, a PLAN task group
operated in the South China Sea, Java Sea, and
Celebes Sea, and conducted an exercise with
the Indonesian Navy.
• In August and September 2021, a PLAN
task group that included a RENHAI class cruiser
and an AGI deployed to the North Pacific and
operated inside the U.S. EEZ in Alaskan waters.
• In October 2021, PLAN and Russian
warships exercised in the Sea of Japan and then
sailed into the Pacific Ocean through the
Tsugaru Strait that separates the Japanese
Islands of Honshu and Hokkaido.
• The PLAN sustained its counter-piracy task
groups in the Gulf of Aden through 2021, a 13-
year effort that is the PRC's first enduring naval
operation beyond the Indo- Pacific region.
Force Structure. The PLAN is the largest
navy in the world with a battle force of
approximately 340 platforms, including major
surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going
amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft
carriers, and fleet auxiliaries. In 2021, the
PLAN's overall battle force shrank due to the
transfer of 22 early flight JIANGDAO class
corvettes to the China Coast Guard. This figure
does not include approximately 85 patrol
combatants and craft that carry anti-ship
cruise missiles (ASCM). The PLAN's overall
battle force is expected to grow to 400 ships by
2025 and 440 ships by 2030. Much of this
growth will be in major surface combatants.
The PLAN's force structure consists of three
fleets with subordinate submarine flotillas,
surface ship flotillas, aviation brigades, and
naval bases. The PLAN's Northern Theater
Navy is subordinate to the Northern Theater
Command, the Eastern Theater Navy is
subordinate to the Eastern Theater Command,
and the Southern Theater Navy is subordinate
to the Southern Theater Command.
Submarines. The PLAN has placed a high
priority on modernizing its submarine force,
but its force structure continues to grow
modestly as it works to mature its force,
integrate new technologies, and expand its
shipyards. The PLAN currently operates six
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
( S S B N ) , s i x n u c l e a r - p o we re d atta c k
submarines (SSN), and 44 diesel-powered/air-
independent powered attack submarines
(SS/SSP). The PLAN will likely maintain
between 65 and 70 submarines through the
2020s, replacing older units with more capable
units on a near one-to-one basis.
The PRC continues to increase its inventory
of conventional submarines capable of firing
advanced anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM).
Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, the
PLAN purchased 12 Russian-built KILO class SS
units, eight of which are capable of launching
ASCMs. China's shipyards have delivered 13
SONG class SS units (Type 039) and 17 YUAN
class diesel-electric air-independent
propulsion attack submarine (SSP) (Type
039A/B). The PRC is expected to produce a
total of 25 or more YUAN class submarines by
2025. In late 2021, the PLAN retired the first
two KILO class submarines purchased from
Russia in the 1990s.
Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has
constructed twelve nuclear submarines - two
SHANG I class SSNs (Type 093), four SHANG II
class SSNs (Type 093A), and six JIN class SSBNs
(Type 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2)
submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)
(7,200KM), the PLAN's six operational JIN class
SSBNs represent the PRC's first credible sea-
based nuclear deterrent.
By the mid-2020s, China will likely build the
SHANG class (Type 093B) guided-missile
nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSGN).
This new SHANG class variant will enhance the
PLAN's anti-surface warfare capability and
could provide a clandestine land-attack option
if equipped with land-attack cruise missiles
(LACM). The PLAN is also improving its anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities through
the development of its surface combatants and

special mission aircraft, but it continues to lack
a robust deep-water ASW capability. By
prioritizing the acquisition of ASW capable
surface combatants, acoustic surveillance
ships, and fixed and rotary wing ASW capable
aircraft, the PLAN is significantly improving its
ASW capabilities. However, it will still require
several years of training and systems
integration for the PLAN to develop a robust
offensive deep water ASW capability.
Surface Combatants. The PLAN remains
engaged in a robust shipbuilding program for
surface combatants. At the close of 2021, the
PLAN was building an aircraft carrier, a new
batch of guided-missile destroyers (DDG), and
a new batch of guided missile frigates (FFG).
These assets will significantly upgrade the
PLAN's air defense, anti-ship, and anti-
submarine capabilities, and will be critical as
the PLAN expands its operations beyond the
range of the PLA's shore-based air defense
systems. By the end of 2019, the PLAN had
commissioned its 30th JIANGKAI II class FFG,
reportedly completing the production run.
However, in 2021 PRC media reported
production had restarted with at least two
hulls launched by the end of year and
additional units are likely under construction.
The PLAN augmented its littoral warfare
capabilities, especially for operations in the
East and South China Seas, with the high- rate
production of the JIANGDAO class FFLs (Type
056 and Type 056A). The PLAN commissioned
the 72nd JIANGDAO in February 2021,
completing the production run. The PLAN also
transferred the early flight JIANGDAO variants,
likely 22 ships total, to the China Coast Guard in
2021, probably due to the models' lack of
towed-array sonar. The 056A FFLs are
equipped with a towed-array sonar and are
thus capable ASW ships.
The PLAN has expanded its force of large
surface combatants with two programs, the
LUYANG III class DDG and the RENHAI class
guided-missile cruise (CG). By late 2020, the
PRC had launched 25 LUYANG III class DDGs-
including 12 lengthened LUYANG III MOD DDGs
with 19 of the new hulls commissioning by the
end of 2021. Both the standard LUYANG III and
the LUYANG III MOD have a 64-cell
multipurpose vertical launch system (VLS)
capable of launching cruise missiles, surface to
air missiles, and anti-submarine missiles. In
December 2021, China commissioned its
fourth RENHAI class guided-missile cruiser
with the remaining four hulls likely
commissioning during 2022. The RENHAI has
112 VLS cells and can carry a large load out of
weapons including ASCMs, surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs), torpedoes, and anti-
submarine weapons along with likely LACMs
and anti- ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) when
Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023
those become operational.
The PLAN continues to emphasize anti-
surface warfare capabilities in its force
development. The PLAN's frigates and
corvettes, as well as modernized older
combatants, carry variants of the YJ-83/ YJ-83J
ASCM (97N M , 180K M ), while newer surface
combatants such as the LUYANG II class DDGs
are fitted with the YJ-62 (215NM, 400KM). The
LUYANG III class DDGs and the RENHAI class
CGs will be fitted with a variant of China's
newest ASCM, the YJ-18A (290N M, 537K M). A
few modernized destroyers have been
retrofitted with the supersonic YJ-12A ASCM
(250NM, 460KM). Eight of the PLAN's 10 KILO
class SSs are equipped with the Russian built
SS-N-27b ASCM (120NM, 220KM). The PRC's
SONG class SS, YUAN class SSP, and SHANG
class SSN field the PLAN's newest domestic
submarine- launched YJ-18 and its variants,
which constitute an improvement over the SS-
N-27b ASCM.
The PLAN recognizes that long-range
ASCMs require a robust, over-the-horizon
(OTH) targeting capability to realize their full
potential. To fill this capability gap, the PLA is
investing in joint reconnaissance, surveillance,
command, control, and communications
systems at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels to provide high-fidelity targeting
information to surface and subsurface launch
platforms.
As the PLAN continues to transition into a
global multi-mission force, the addition of
land- attack capabilities to its modern array of
anti-surface and anti-air capabilities is a logical
next step. In the coming years, the PLAN will
probably field LACMs on its newer cruisers and
destroyers and developmental SHANG class
Type 093B SSGN. The PLAN could also retrofit
its older surface combatants and submarines
with land-attack capabilities as well. The
addition of land-attack capabilities to the
PLAN's surface combatants and submarines
would provide the PLA with flexible long-range
strike options. This would allow the PRC to hold
land targets at risk beyond the Indo-Pacific
region.
Amphibious Warfare Ships. China's
investment in Landing Helicopter Assault ships
(LHAs) signals its intent to continue to develop
its expeditionary warfare capabilities. In April
2021, China commissioned the first of YUSHEN
class LHA (Type 075) followed by the
commissioning of the second hull in December
2021. A third YUSHEN-class LHA was launched
in January 2021, marking an approximately 16-
month timeframe to launch the three vessels,
and will likely join the fleet in the first half of
2022. The YUSHEN class are highly capable
large-deck amphibious ships that will provide
the PLAN with an all-aspect expeditionary
capability. The YUSHEN class can carry a large
number of landing craft, forces, armored
vehicles, and helicopters. In addition, the PLAN
has eight large YUZHAO class amphibious
transport docks (LPD) (Type 071) in service.
The YUZHAO class LPDs and YUSHEN class LHAs
provide the PLA with greater capacity,
endurance, and more flexibility for long-range
operations than the PLAN's older landing ships,
which it has reduced in number over the last
decade with obsolete units being
decommissioned. The YUSHEN and YUZHAO
can each carry several YUYI class air-cushion
medium landing craft and a variety of
helicopters, as well as tanks, armored vehicles
and PLAN marines for long-distance
expeditionary deployments.
Aircraft Carriers. In December 2019, the
PRC commissioned its first domestically built
aircraft carrier, Shandong, which launched in
2017 and completed multiple sea trials during
2018-2019. Shandong was photographed at a
base on Hainan Island in the Southern Theater
Navy in late 2020 and should now be
considered to be operational. Shandong is a
modified version of the Liaoning (Soviet
KUZNETSOV class) design and likewise uses a
ski-jump takeoff method for its aircraft. The
PRC continued work on its second domestically
built aircraft carrier in 2021, which will be
larger and fitted with an electromagnetic
catapult launch system. This design will enable
it to support additional fighter aircraft, fixed-
wing early- warning aircraft, and more rapid
flight operations and thus extend the reach
and effectiveness of its carrier based strike
aircraft. The PRC's second domestically built
carrier, the Fujian, is projected to be
operational by 2024, with additional carriers to
follow.
Ship Based Aircraft. The PLAN operates
and is developing several aircraft to operate
from its carriers and combatants. In addition to
the standard J-15 fighter that currently
operates from PLAN carriers, there is a
catapult-capable J-15 variant in development.
The aircraft is currently testing from land-
based steam and electromagnetic catapults. A
third J-15 variant, the J-15D, is a two-seat
aircraft equipped with wingtip electronic
support measures/electronic intelligence
gathering pods as well as several conformal
antennas. The aircraft is intended to fill a
dedicated electronic attack role. China is also
developing a carrier capable variant of the
fifth-generation J-31 fighter. Beyond fighter
aircraft, China is refining the design of a carrier-
borne airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft
known as the KJ-600. A mockup of the aircraft,
which appears externally similar to the E-2C/D
Hawkeye, has existed for many years, and a
prototype of the KJ-600 is currently in flight
IMR 9
 testing. The PRC is also developing the Z-20F
helicopter for the PLAN, intended for the
RENHAI cruisers and LUYANG III MOD
destroyers and possibly the YUSHEN LHAs. The
Z-20F is similar to the U.S. Navy's SH-60 and will
provide significant improvements in ASW
capabilities over the smaller Z-9 and Ka- 28
helicopters the PLAN currently operates. The Z-
20F will also complement the larger Z- 18Fs
that operate from the PLAN's aircraft carriers.
Land Based Aircraft. The PLAN is in the
process of replacing its older variant H-6
bombers in 2019 with the H-6J, a naval variant
of the H-6K operated by the PLAAF. This new
and larger advanced maritime strike bomber
has six weapons pylons instead of four,
advanced avionics, and upgraded engines, and
the H-6J can employ the supersonic YJ-12
ASCM (250NM, 460KM). In 2020 PLAAF H-6Ks
were also photographed carrying YJ-12s,
significantly increasing the number of bombers
available to the PLA for long-range maritime
strike missions.
The PLAN operates a diverse inventory of
fixed-wing special mission aircraft for maritime
patrol and airborne early warning aircraft
including many of the same variants operated
by the PLAAF. However, the PLAN has also
fielded a variant of the Y-9 for anti-submarine
warfare and maritime patrol. The new aircraft
is equipped with a magnetic anomaly detector
boom, similar to that of the U.S. Navy's P-3.
This Y-9 ASW variant is equipped with surface-
search radar mounted under the nose as well
as multiple-blade antennas on the fuselage,
probably for electronic surveillance. A small
electro-optical (EO)/ infrared turret is located
just behind the nose wheel, and this variant is
equipped with an internal weapons bay in front
of the main landing gear.
Auxiliary Ships. The PLAN continues to
build a large number of seagoing auxiliary and
support ships, including intelligence collection
ships (AGI), ocean surveillance ships (AGOS),
fleet replenishment oilers (AOR), hospital
ships, submarine salvage and rescue ships, and
various other specialized units. Additionally,
China's first domestically built polar
icebreaker, XUELONG 2, became operational in
2019. The ship is operated by the Polar
Research Institute of the State Oceanic
Administration. In May 2021, XUELONG 2
completed the PRC's 37th research mission to
Antarctica and in the second half of 2021, the
PRC's 12th research mission to the Arctic.
PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC). The
PLANMC is still in the process of completing
expansion requirements set forth by the CMC
under PLA reform in 2016. Serving as the PLAN
land combat arm, the PLANMC continued to
evolve throughout 2021 and is receiving
equipment and training necessary to become
10 IMR
the PLA's preeminent expeditionary force, as
directed by Xi Jinping. All six PLANMC
maneuver brigades have achieved initial
operating capability (IOC); three of the
brigades are assessed to be fully mission
capable. Two other PLANMC brigades - the
aviation brigade and the special operations
brigade, are IOC and Full Operational
Capability (FOC), respectively. The aviation
brigade will likely not achieve FOC status until
at least 2025 and likely beyond, based on the
current pace the brigade is receiving new
helicopters, fully trained flight crews, and
support equipment. The FOC aviation brigade
will most likely contain a mix of heavy-lift,
medium-lift, attack, and multi- purpose
helicopters capable of operating on land and at
sea to support all aspects of PLANMC
operations. Such operations include, but are
not limited to humanitarian aid/disaster relief,
fo rc e p ro te c t i o n , c o u n te r te r ro r i s m ,
amphibious assault, and combat operations
ashore, either in support of large-scale PLA
operations or as an expeditionary force
overseas.
On December 30th, 2021, Lieutenant
General Kong Jun, previously the PLANMC
commander, was identified as the Eastern
Theater Command Army commander. The new
PLANMC commander is Major General Zhu
Chuansheng. Major General Zhu also came
from the PLAA and has a background in
amphibious operations as the deputy
commander of the 41st Group Army. It is likely
that Major General Zhu will see the PLANMC
through its reform and expansion, likely by
2027. The new commander will lead a PLANMC
of over 30,000 marines. This number could
increase to closer to 40,000 by 2027,
depending on whether current estimates of
the number of marines in each combat brigade
and the overall size of the aviation brigade
remain accurate. The top end of PLANMC
personnel strength is not likely to go higher
than 40,000 marines, of which less than one-
third will be conscripts. The majority of
PLANMC marines will likely be non-
commissioned officers with at least the
equivalent of a high school diploma; many
marines will likely be college-educated.
The PLANMC's roles and missions
principally include defending PLA bases in
mainland China, the South China Sea and
abroad, conducting amphibious operations to
seize and defend small reef and island
outposts, and conducting non-war military
activities (NWMA). Although the PLANMC has
traditionally focused on its task to assault and
defend small islands in the South China Sea,
more recently its focus has grown to include
expeditionary operations beyond the First
Island Chain. The PLANMC's roles under
NWMA support the PRC's efforts to protect its
overseas interests including resources,
infrastructure, and citizens abroad.
The PLANMC has increased the size of its
force in Djibouti from approximately 250
marines in 2017 to 400 marines in 2022,
including a new special forces contingent. The
PLANMC also embarks a contingent of marines
with the PLAN's Gulf of Aden counterpiracy-
focused naval escort task force that supports
China's trade interests. Additionally, the
PLANMC supports the PRC's military
diplomacy. For example, they have trained
with Thai, Pakistani, Saudi, South African, and
Djiboutian forces.
The PLANMC has begun to train on the
PLAN's first amphibious helicopter assault ship
(LHA), likely as part of the vessel's initial
qualifications for operational status. PLAN
LHAs will be capable of delivering PLANMC
ground and air forces, to include amphibious
and non- amphibious combat units -
throughout East Asia, the Indian Ocean, and
the western Pacific Ocean. Additionally, the
PLANMC is almost certainly serving a force
protection role on PLAN ships operating
beyond the First Island Chain, capable of both
repelling an assault from the sea and
conducting visit, board, search and seizure
(VBSS) operations to protect both PRC and
international shipping in the Indian Ocean, the
Philippine Sea, and the Pacific Ocean.
D es p ite th e fo cu s o n exp an d in g
expeditionary missions, the PLANMC has not
abandoned its amphibious mission. To the
contrary, the PLANMC continues to conduct
amphibious and expeditionary training in the
Northern, Eastern, and Southern Theater
Commands, to include training events in the
Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands in the
South China Sea. The most significant aspect of
PLANMC amphibious training is the continued-
and almost certainly expanding-use of civilian
roll-on/roll off (RORO) vessels to transport
PLANMC combat forces during training events.
This activity is significant because it
demonstrates that the PLANMC now has a role
as a second-echelon force in the PLA, providing
theater commanders the flexibility to use the
PLANMC in multiple roles as part of an
amphibious campaign, specifically in a Taiwan
scenario. This flexibility decreases the
requirement to build additional PLAN
amphibious ships to successfully assault
Taiwan. This operational flexibility also
provides operational and logistics units within
the PLANMC the training and proficiency to
move between military and civilian vessels not
just in a Taiwan scenario, but in any maritime
environment where civilian transport vessels
are available to the PLANMC and PLAN
amphibious ships are not.
 Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023

CHINA
People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)
and PLAN Aviation

Forces and Capabilities

IMR Special Report

Key Takeaways Major Aviation Units

• The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation together
constitute the largest aviation force in the
Indo-Pacific region.
• The PLAAF is rapidly catching up to
Western air forces. The PLAAF continues to
modernize with the delivery of domestically
built aircraft and a wide range of UASs.
• In October 2019, the PRC signaled the
return of the airborne leg of its nuclear triad
after the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N as
its first nuclear-capable air-to-air refuelable
bomber.
The People's Liberation Army Air Force
(PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation together constitute
the largest aviation forces in the region and the
third largest in the world, with over 2,800 total
aircraft (not including trainer variants or UASs)
of which approximately 2,250 are combat
aircraft (including fighters, strategic bombers,
tactical bombers, multi-mission tactical, and
attack aircraft). The PLAAF's role is to serve as a
comprehensive strategic air force capable of
long-range airpower projection. The PRC's
2019 defense white paper described the
PLAAF's missions and tasks as transitioning
from territorial air defense to "offensive and
defensive operations." In 2021, General Chang
Dingqiu assumed the post of PLAAF
commander and continued to enact PLAAF
reforms to improve the force's ability to
accomplish joint warfighting tasks. The PLAAF
is rapidly catching up to Western air forces. This
trend is gradually eroding longstanding and by disbanding its fighter and fighter-bomber increasing the number of air-to-air missiles
significant U.S. military technical advantages divisions. (AAMs) the fighter can carry in its low-
vis-à-vis the PRC in the air domain. Fighters. The PLAAF and PLAN Aviation observable configuration, installing thrust-
The CMC's intent is to transform the PLAAF continue to field greater numbers of fourth- vectoring engine nozzles, and adding super
into a more effective and capable force that is generation aircraft (now more than 800 of cruise capability by installing higher-thrust
proficient at conducting joint operations. The 1,800 total fighters, not including trainers) and indigenous WS-15 engines. Development
PLAAF is comprised of aviation, airborne, air probably will become a majority fourth- continues on the smaller FC-31/J-31 for export
defense, radar, electronic countermeasure, generation force within the next several years. or as a future naval fighter for the PLAN's next
and communications forces. Amid the wide- For fifth-generation fighters, the PLAAF has class of aircraft carriers.
ranging reorganization of the PLA, the PLAAF operationally fielded its new J-20 fifth- Bombers. The PRC's bomber force is
has reorganized into five Theater Command Air generation stealth fighter, and PRC social currently composed of H-6 Badger variants,
Forces, established at least six new air bases, media revealed a new 2-seat variant of the J-20 which are domestically produced versions of
and restructured previously subordinate in October 2021. The PLAAF is preparing the Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 (Badger) bomber.
regiments into brigades under the new bases upgrades for the J-20, which may include Despite the relative age of its bomber force,

IMR 11
 the PLAAF has worked to maintain and
enhance the operational effectiveness of these
aircraft. In recent years, the PRC has fielded
greater numbers of the H-6K, a modernized H-
6 variant that integrates standoff weapons and
features more-efficient turbofan engines for
extended-range. The H-6K can carry six LACMs,
giving the PLA a long-range standoff precision
strike capability that can range targets in the
Second Island Chain from home airfields in
mainland China. PLAN Aviation has
traditionally fielded the H-6G to support
maritime missions. More recently, PLAN
Aviation has begun operating the H-6J, a
maritime strike version of the H-6K with six
weapons pylons for ASCMs. This aircraft carries
six supersonic long-range YJ-12 ASCMs and can
attack warships out to the Second Island Chain.
During the PRC's 70th anniversary parade
in 2019, the PLAAF publicly revealed the H-6N,
a derivative of the H-6K optimized for long-
range strikes. The H-6N features a modified
fuselage that allows it to carry externally an air-
launched ballistic missile (ALBM) that may be
nuclear capable. In October 2020, an H-6N was
observed carrying an air-launched ballistic
missile. The H-6N's air-to-air refueling
capability also provides it greater reach over
other H- 6 variants that are not refuelable in air.
Special Mission Aircraft. In 2019, the
PLAAF publicly debuted its new Y-9
co m m u n i cat i o n s j a m m i n g /e l e c t ro n i c
countermeasures aircraft (known as the GX-
11). This aircraft is designed to disrupt an
adversary's battlespace awareness at long
ranges. The PLA can conduct air-to- air
refueling operations to extend the ranges of its
fighter and bomber aircraft equipped with
refueling probes using the H-6U, a modified
tanker variant of the H-6 bomber, as well as a
small number of larger IL-78 Midas. In addition,
the PRC is developing a tanker variant of its Y-
20 heavy-lift transport, which will enable the
Chinese Ground
Major Helicopter Units
Gunships practise taking-off for the coming China Helicopter Exposition, Sep 2015
12 IMR
PLAAF to expand its tanker fleet and improve
the PLAAF's ability to operate beyond the First
Island Chain from bases in mainland China.
Production and deliveries of the KJ-500-
the PRC's most advanced airborne early
warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft-
continued at a rapid pace, joining earlier KJ-
2000 Mainring and KJ-200 Moth variants.
These aircraft amplify PLAAF's ability to detect,
track, and target threats in varying conditions,
in larger volumes, and at greater distances. It
also extends the range of the PLA's integrated
air defense system (IADS) network.
Furthermore, China has produced at least one
KJ-500 with an aerial refueling probe, which
will improve the aircraft's ability to provide
persistent AEW&C coverage.
The PRC's aviation industry continues to
advance with deliveries of its domestic Y-20
large transport aircraft and completion of the
world's largest seaplane, the AG600. These
transports will supplement and eventually
replace the PRC's small fleet of strategic airlift
assets, which to date, consists of a limited
number of Russian-made IL-76 aircraft. These
large transports are intended to support
airborne C2, logistics, paradrop, aerial
refueling, and strategic reconnaissance
operations as well as HA/DR missions.
Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UASs). China
continues their comprehensive UAS
modernization efforts, highlighted by the
routine appearance of ever more sophisticated
UASs across theater and echelon levels. The
last three years have seen several key
milestones. These include the airshow display
and operational appearance of the Xianglong
jet powered UAS, as well as the unveiling of
both the supersonic WZ-8 UAS and a
redesigned version of the GJ-11 stealth
uncrewed combat aerial vehicle (UCAV). The
PLA also continues the maritime use of ISR
UASs, featuring both the venerable BZK-005
and the newer TW-328/TB001. China is also
expanding the applications of large UASs,
demonstrating uses including disaster
communications, anti-submarine roles,
firefighting, and weather modification.
Advanced small UASs are increasingly
appearing in both military and civilian
applications, with the PRC industry remaining a
key exporter of UAS and components of all
sizes.
In addition to maturing their current
capabilities, China is also signaling its efforts in
next generation capabilities. Air and trade
shows are displaying growing numbers of
autonomous and teaming systems, including
for combat applications. In these concepts,
PRC developers are demonstrating an interest
in additional growth beyond ISR and EW into
both air-to-air and air-to-ground combat, with
a substantial amount of development
displaying efforts to produce swarming
capability for operational applications.
Air and Missile Defense. The PLAAF
possesses one of the largest forces of advanced
long- range SAM systems in the world,
composed of Russian-sourced SA-20 (S-300)
battalions and domestically produced CSA-9
(HQ-9) and follow-on HQ-9b battalions. To
improve its strategic long-range air defenses,
the PRC has acquired the SA-21 (S-400) SAM
system from Russia. The PRC is also developing
its indigenous CH-AB-X-02 (HQ-19), which will
likely have a ballistic missile defense (BMD)
capability. China is also developing kinetic-kill
vehicle technology to field a mid-course
interceptor, which will form the upper layer of
a multi-tiered missile defense. The PLA
conducted a test of a land-based mid-course
interceptor on February 4, 2021.
PLAAF Airborne Corps. The PLAAF Airborne
Corps commands six airborne combined- arms
brigades, a SOF brigade, an operational support
brigade, an aviation transport brigade, a training
base, and a new training brigade. The six
combined arms brigades consist of three airborne
infantry, one air assault, one wheeled airborne
mechanized (wheeled air droppable armored
vehicles), and one tracked airborne mechanized
(tracked air droppable armored vehicles).
Each airborne combined-arms brigade
typically commands four combined-arms
battalions, an artiller y battalion, a
reconnaissance and pathfinder battalion, an
operations support battalion, and a service
support battalion, and possibly a
transportation battalion.
Based on the Annual Report by Secretary of
Defense to U.S. Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People's Republic
of China
 Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023

CHINA
PLA Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force -
Recent Developments

PLARF and SSF Forces

and Capabilities
IMR Special Report

PLA Rocket Force - Key Takeaways

• The PLARF is advancing its long-term Nuclear Ballistic Missile
modernization plans to enhance its strategic
deterrence capabilities.
• In 2021, the PLARF launched
approximately 135 ballistic missiles for testing
and training. This was more than the rest of the
world combined excluding ballistic missile
employment in conflict zones.
• The PLARF continues to grow its inventory
of DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs), which are capable of conducting both
conventional and nuclear precision strikes
against ground targets as well as conventional
strikes against naval targets.
The PRC is developing new
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that
will significantly improve its nuclear-capable
missile forces and will require increased
nuclear warhead production, partially due to
the introduction of multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capabilities.
In 2021, the PRC continued building three
solid-fueled ICBM silo fields, which will
cumulatively contain at least 300 new ICBM
silos.
The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) organizes,
mans, trains, and equips the PRC's strategic
land- based nuclear and conventional missile
forces and associated support forces and
missile bases. The PLARF is a critical
component of the PRC's nuclear deterrence
strategy and its strategy to deter and counter
third-party intervention in regional conflicts.
According to the PRC's 2019 defense white
paper, the PLARF is working towards
"enhancing its credible and reliable capabilities
of nuclear deterrence and counterattack,
strengthening intermediate and long- range mobile ground-launched short-, medium-, and of the PLAAF and PLAN. The PLARF's
precision strike forces, and enhancing strategic intermediate-range ballistic missiles and conventional missile forces includes the CSS-6
counter-balance capability, so as to build a ground-launched cruise missiles. The PLARF's (DF- 15) short-range ballistic missile (SRBM)
strong and modernized rocket force. ground-based missile forces complement the (range 725-850 km); the CSS-7 (DF-11) SRBM
The PLARF fields a variety of conventional air and sea-based precision strike capabilities (600 km); the CSS-11 (DF-16) SRBM (more than

13
 CHINA
700 km); the land-attack and anti-ship variants
of the CSS-5 (DF-21) medium-range ballistic
missile (MRBM) (approximately 1,500 km); the
hypersonic glide vehicle capable DF-17 MRBM;
the DF-26 IRBM (approximately 3,000 km); the
CJ-10 (DH-10) ground-launched cruise missile
(GLCM) (approximately 1,500 km); and the CJ-
100 (DF-100) GLCM (approximately 2,000 km).
The PLARF's conventionally armed CSS-5 Mod
5 (DF-21D) ASBM variant gives the PLA the
capability to conduct long- range precision
strikes against ships, including aircraft carriers,
out to the Western Pacific from mainland
China. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500
km, is fitted with a maneuverable reentry
vehicle (MaRV), and is reportedly capable of
rapidly reloading in the field. The PLARF
continues to grow its inventory of DF-26
IRBMs, which it first revealed in 2015 and
fielded in 2016. The multi-role DF-26 is
designed to rapidly swap conventional and
nuclear warheads and is capable of conducting
precision land-attack and anti-ship strikes in
the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the
South China Sea from mainland China. In 2020,
China fired anti-ship ballistic missiles against a
moving target in the South China Sea. The
PLARF is developing and testing several new
variants of theater-range missiles and
developing capabilities and methods to
counter adversary ballistic missile defense
14
employment in conflict zones. The DF-17
SSF Units passed several tests successfully and is
deployed operationally. While the DF-17 is
primarily a conventional platform, it may be
equipped with nuclear warheads. In 2020, a
PRC-based military expert described the
primary purpose of the DF-17 as striking
foreign military bases and fleets in the Western
Pacific.
The PLARF is developing intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that will significantly
improve its nuclear-capable missile forces with
more survivable delivery systems, and will
require increased nuclear warhead
production, partially due to the introduction of
multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicle (MIRV) capabilities. The PRC appears to
be doubling the numbers of launchers in some
ICBM units. The PRC's ICBM arsenal consists of
approximately 300 ICBMs, including fixed and
mobile launchers capable of launching unitary
and multiple reentry vehicles. China's fixed
ICBMs consist of the shorter range CSS- 3 (DF-
4), as well as the silo-based CSS-4 Mod 2 (DF-
5A) and MIRV-equipped Mod 3 (DF- 5B), which
is capable of carrying up to five MIRVs. PRC
media indicates a follow-on DF-5C may be in
development. The solid-fueled, road-mobile
CSS-10 class and CSS-20 (DF-41) ICBMs
complement this force. The CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-
31A), with a range in excess of 11,000 km, can
reach most locations within the continental
“intercontinental
The PLARF is developing
ballistic
United States. PRC media reports suggest a DF-
31B might also be in development. The DF-41
ICBM has been operationally deployed with
missiles (ICBMs) that will commentary during the 2019 parade noting
that two brigades existed for the system. The
significantly improve its PRC appears to be considering additional DF-
41 launch options, including rail- mobile and
nuclear-capable missile silo basing. The PRC is building multiple ICBM
silo's intended to support the land-based
forces with more component of the PRC's nuclear triad.
survivable delivery Additionally, sources indicate a "long- range"
DF-27 ballistic missile is in development.
systems, and will require Official PRC military writings indicates this
range-class spans 5,000-8,000km, which
increased nuclear means the DF-27 could be a new IRBM or
ICBM. Additionally, on 27 July 2021, China
warhead production, conducted the first fractional orbital launch of
partially due to the an ICBM with an HGV. The HGV flew around the
world and impacted inside China. This
introduction of multiple demonstrated the greatest distance flown
(~40,000 km) and longest flight time (~100+
independently targetable minutes) of any PRC land-attack weapons
reentry vehicle (MIRV)
“ system to date. According to senior U.S.
military officials, the HGV did not strike its
capabilities. target, but came close.
(BMD) systems. In 2021, the PLARF launched Strategic Support Force - Key Takeaways
approximately 135 ballistic missiles for testing • The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) is a
and training, more than the rest of the world t h e a te r c o m m a n d - l e ve l o rga n i za t i o n
c o m b i n e d exc l u d i n g b a l l i st i c m i s s i l e established to centralize the PLA's strategic

space, cyberspace, electronic, information,
communications, and psychological warfare
missions and capabilities.
• The SSF's Network Systems Department is
responsible for information warfare with an
i nte g rate d m i s s i o n s et t h at i n c l u d e s
cyberspace warfare, technical reconnaissance,
electronic warfare, and psychological warfare.
• The PRC continues to develop
counterspace capabilities-including direct-
ascent anti-satellite missiles, co-orbital
satellites, electronic warfare, and directed-
energy systems-that can contest or deny an
adversary's access to and operations in the
space domain during a crisis or conflict.
• The PRC's space enterprise continues to
mature rapidly and Beijing has devoted
significant resources to growing all aspects of
its space program, from military space
applications to civil applications such as profit-
generating launches, scientific endeavors, and
space exploration. SSF works with civilian
organizations, such as universities and
research organization, to integrate civilian
support to military efforts.
The PLA Strategic Support Force (SSF) was
established in 2015 to centralize the PLA's
strategic space, cyberspace, electronic, and
psychological warfare missions and
capabilities. The SSF reports directly to the
CMC and supports the entire PLA with its
capabilities. The PRC's 2019 Defense White
Paper described the SSF's modernization goals
as "seeking to achieve big development strides
in key areas and accelerate the integrated
development of new-type combat forces, so as
to build a strong and modernized strategic
support force."
The SSF oversees two deputy theater
command-level departments: the Space
Systems Department responsible for military
space operations, and the Network Systems
Department responsible for information
operations (IO), which includes technical
reconnaissance, EW, cyberspace warfare, and
psychological operations. At the headquarters
level, the SSF has a four-department
administrative structure that includes the Staff,
Equipment, Political Work, and Logistics
Departments. As a strategic organization, the
SSF is directly subordinate to the CMC, but
some of its subordinate units may report to the
theater commands in wartime. The SSF
provides information support derived from
space-, cyber-, and terrestrial-based means to
all PLA services and the five joint theater
commands. Civilian reserve and militia units -
typically comprised of personnel from the
Ministry of Information and Industry
Technology, Ministry of Public Security,
Ministry of State Security, and academic
institutions - augment SSF cyberspace
Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023
“ The PLA has an
operational ground-
based anti-satellite
(ASAT) missile intended
to target low-Earth orbit
satellites, and the PRC
probably intends to
pursue additional ASAT
weapons capable of
destroying satellites up
to geosynchronous
“ department is the only publicly known
Earth orbit.
operations during peacetime and are
organized into specialized units during
wartime to support network defense
operations.
In 2021, General Ju Qiansheng was
promoted to SSF commander. He previously
served as commander of the Network Systems
Department. Lt. Gen. Shang Hong was the
commander of the Space Systems in 2021. He
previously served as the chief of staff for the
former General Armaments Department,
Chairman of the China Satellite Launch and
Tracking General, and commander of the
Jiuquan Satellite Launch center. The leader of
the Network Systems Department is unknown.
The SSF participates in joint exercises and
training throughout China, including possible
national strategic joint exercises. For example,
since its creation, the SSF has participated in
joint far seas training exercises with the PLA
Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force concentrated
on advancing joint operations and
informatized warfare capabilities. These
exercises allow the SSF to assess and improve
its capabilities to support joint operations and
better enable the PLA to project power into the
East and South China seas.
Network Systems Department. The SSF
Network Systems Department is responsible
for information warfare with a mission set that
includes cyberspace warfare, technical
reconnaissance, electronic warfare (EW), and
psychological warfare. By placing these
missions under the same organizational
umbrella, the PRC seeks to remedy the
operational coordination challenges that
hindered information sharing under the PLA's
pre-reform organizational structure. The
integration of cyberspace and EW elements
under one organization was a crucial step
towards realizing the operational concept of
integrated network and electronic warfare that
the PLA has envisioned since the early 2000s.
The Network Systems Department operates
five theater-aligned technical reconnaissance
bases, a number of signals intelligence
bureaus, and several research institutes. The
Network Systems Department provides
intelligence support to the theater commands
by leveraging a diverse suite of ground-based
technical collection assets to provide a
common operating picture to geographically
dispersed operational units.
The SSF and the "Three Warfares" Concept:
The SSF Network Systems Department,
performs missions and tasks associated with
the PLA's concept of "Three Warfares," which
comprises psychological warfare, public
opinion warfare, and legal warfare. This
organization in the PLA that performs
psychological warfare operations. See 'Special
Topic: PRC Views of Information and
Information Dominance' for more on PLA
views on information warfare, including
psychological warfare.
The SSF's strategic space, cyberspace, and
psychological warfare capabilities and
missions are not bound by geographic
constraints and can be used independently or
to enable and support PLA global power
projection operations. The SSF's information
support role involves centralizing technical
intelligence collection and management,
which provides strategic intelligence support
to the theater commands, enables power
projection, supports strategic defense in the
space and nuclear domains, and enables joint
operations. The PRC continues to develop a
variety of counterspace capabilities designed
to limit or prevent an adversary's use of space-
based assets during crisis or conflict. In
addition to the development of directed-
energy weapons and satellite jammers, the
PLA has an operational ground-based anti-
satellite (ASAT) missile intended to target low-
Earth orbit satellites, and the PRC probably
intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons
capable of destroying satellites up to
geosynchronous Earth orbit.
SSF Space Systems Department
Space and Counterspace Trends. The PRC's
space enterprise continues to mature rapidly
and Beijing has devoted significant economic
and technological resources to growing all
aspects of its space program, from military
space applications to civil applications such as
profit-generating launches, human spaceflight,
scientific endeavors, as well as lunar and
Martian exploration missions. Space has been
considered a distinct domain of warfare since
at least 2015, and the PLA expects space to play
15
 CHINA
an important role in future conflicts by
enabling long-range precision strikes and in
denying other militaries the use of overhead
c o m m a n d , c o nt ro l , c o m m u n i c at i o n s ,
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. The PRC
probably will continue to develop the
capabilities for use against satellites in orbit to
degrade and deny adversary space capabilities.
Space and Counterspace Organizations.
The SSF Space Systems Department is
responsible for nearly all PLA space operations,
including space launch and support; space
surveillance; space information support; space
telemetry, tracking, and control; and space
warfare. The Space System Department
operates at least eight bases, including those
whose core missions are the launch, tracking,
R&D, and operation of the satellites vital to
China's overhead C4ISR architecture. The SSF
operates tracking, telemetry, and command
stations in several locations worldwide. The
SSD also operates Yuan Wang space support
ships that track satellite and intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) launches.
C h i n a ' s s p a c e p ro g ra m co m p r i s e s
organizations in the military, political, defense-
industrial, and commercial sectors. The PLA
historically has managed China's space
program and continues to support both civilian
a n d m i l i ta r y i nte re st s . T h i s i n c l u d e s
strengthening and investing in its science and
technology sector, growing international
p a r t n e rs h i p s , a n d i m p ro v i n g C h i n a ' s
capabilities in space-based ISR, SATCOM,
satellite navigation, human spaceflight, and
robotic space exploration. Although state-
owned enterprises are China's primary civilian
and military space contractors, China is placing
greater emphasis on decentralizing and
diversifying its space industry to increase
competition.
The SSD's China Launch and Tracking
Control (CLTC) operates all four launch sites, in
addition to Yuan Wang space support ships,
two major satellite control centers-Xian
Satellite Control Center (XSCC) and the BACC-
and the PLA telemetry, tracking, and control
(TT&C) system for all Chinese satellites.
China leads the Asia-Pacific Space
Cooperation Organization (APSCO), a
multilateral organization with rotating
leadership whose members include China,
Bangladesh, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru,
Thailand, and Turkey, with Egypt, Indonesia,
and Mexico as associate members. APSCO
oversees a space surveillance project known as
the Asia-Pacific Ground-Based Optical Space
Object Observation System (APOSOS). As part
of the project, China provided to Iran, Pakistan,
and Peru 15-cm telescopes that are able to
16
track objects in LEO and GEO. All tasking
information and subsequent observation data
collected is funneled through the Chinese
Academy of Science's National Astronomical
Observatory of China. APOSOS has near full
coverage of LEO and GEO. The organization is
planning to improve optical system
capabilities, coverage, and redundancy as well
as data sharing networks.
China utilizes locations worldwide to aid in
TT&C of space missions both around the Earth
as well as in cislunar and deep space. There are
ground stations in Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Ethiopia, France, Greenland, Kenya, Kiribati,
Namibia, Norway (Svalbard), Pakistan, South
Africa, and Spain. There are also four sites in
Antarctica that can provide similar support as
well as a BeiDou reference station: Great Wall,
Kunlun, Taishan, and Zhongshan Stations.
The State Council's State Administration
for Science, Technology, and Industry for
National Defense (SASTIND) is the primary
civilian organization that coordinates and
manages China's space activities, including
allocating space research and development
funds. It also maintains a working relationship
with the PLA organization that oversees
China's military acquisitions. SASTIND guides
and establishes policies for state-owned
entities conducting China's space activities.
The China National Space Administration
(CNSA), subordinate to SASTIND, serves as the
public face of China's civilian space efforts.
China is increasingly using CNSA efforts to
bolster relationships with countries around the
world, providing opportunities to cooperate on
space issues. China had more than a hundred
cooperative space-related agreements with
more than three dozen countries and four
international organizations.
Many space technologies can serve a
civilian and military purpose, and China
emphasizes "military-civil fusion"-a phrase
used, in part, to refer to the use of dual-use
technologies, policies, and organizations for
military benefit. The SSF works with civilian
organizations like universities and research
organizations to incorporate civilian support to
military efforts since there is an already high
demand for aerospace talent and competition
for finite human resources. China's commercial
space sector features partially state-owned
enterprises such as Zhuhai Orbita, Expace,
Galactic Energy, and OK-Space for remote
sensing, launch, and communication services.
International Cooperation. In 2021, China
launched the China-France Oceanography
Satellite, China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite
04A, Ethiopian Remote-Sensing Satellite, and
Student Small Satellites (SSS) for the Asia-
Pacific Space Cooperation Organization
(APSCO). Beijing also completed the in-orbit
delivery of the Pakistan Remote-Sensing
Satellite (PRSS-1), Venezuelan Remote-Sensing
Satellite (VRSS-2), Sudan Remote-Sensing
Satellite (SRSS-1), and the Algerian
Communications Satellite (Alcomsat-1). China
has provided satellite carrying or launching
services for countries including Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Laos, and
Luxembourg. China has built satellite data
receiving stations with countries including
Bolivia, Indonesia, Namibia, Thailand and
South Africa.
Space and Counterspace Operations. The
PLA views space superiority, as well as the
a b i l i t y to co nt ro l t h e s p a c e - e n a b l e d
information sphere and to deny adversaries
their own space-based information gathering
and communication capabilities, as critical
components of modern "informatized
warfare." China's perceptions of the
importance of space-enabled operations to
the United States and its allies has shaped
integral components of PLA military planning
and campaigns. In addition, space is a critical
enabler of beyond-line-of-sight operations for
deployed PLA forces. The PLA probably views
counterspace operations as a means to deter
and counter a U.S. intervention during a
regional military conflict. Moreover, PRC
defense academics suggest that
reconnaissance, communication, navigation,
and early warning satellites could be among
the targets of attacks designed to "blind and
deafen the enemy."
The PRC seeks to enhance the PLA's C2 for
joint operations and establish a real-time
surveillance, reconnaissance, and warning
system, and it is increasing the number and
capabilities of its space systems, including
communications and intelligence satellites, as
well as the BeiDou navigation satellite system.
These capabilities allow the PLA to maintain
situational awareness of potential flashpoints
as well as monitor, track, and target adversary
forces. Additionally, the PRC continues to
develop direct ascent, co-orbital, electronic
warfare, and directed energy capabilities that
can contest or deny an adversary's access to
and operations in the space domain during a
crisis or conflict. PLA writings indicate the
purpose of these capabilities is to deter and
counter the intervention of a third party during
a military conflict.
Based on the Annual Report by Secretary of
Defense to U.S. Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People's Republic
of China, 2022
 Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023

CHINA
PLA Reserves, Paramilitary - Recent Developments

Forces and Capabilities

IMR Special Report

Key Takeaway Major Ground Units

• Interoperability and integration between
the PLA, its reserve components, and the PRC's
paramilitary forces continues to grow in scale
and sophistication, including the coordination
between the PLAN, the China Coast Guard
(CCG), and the People's Armed Forces
Maritime Militia (PAFMM).
People's Liberation Army Reserve Force. The
PLA Reserve Force was founded in 1983 and
professionalized throughout the 1990s and
2000s. On July 1, 2020, the PRC amended laws,
regulations, and policies to bring the Reserve
Force under the command of the Central
Committee of the CCP and the CMC. The previous
arrangement split control of the Reserve Force
between the PLA and local Party committees.
Motivations for the change include improving
combat capability, facilitating cooperation with
active-duty units, and upholding the CCP's People's Armed Police deployed in Lhasa in 2016 to quell protests_New
absolute leadership over the military. Chinese

sources often stated specifically that the reform
would enhance reserve performance in Tibet and
Xinjiang. Additionally, the PLA appears to have
begun making a partial restructure towards using
a PLAA reserve base system to continue to
improve facilitation and support for active-duty
units.
The PLA Reserve Force is comprised of
approximately 510,000 personnel subordinate
to the Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Air Force
Reserve, and Rocket Force Reserve. According
to official Chinese media and journal articles, a
small number of active duty cadre serve as a
permanent backbone for the Reserve Force to
enable the influx of reserve officers and
soldiers when required. The 2020 Science of
Military Strategy published by the PLA's
National Defense University states the building
of the reserve force is an important part of
national defense construction and is the basic
and strategic project to consolidate national
defense. The primary mission of the reserves is
to reinforce active-duty forces for national
defense, with a secondary mission to aid in
national disasters or maintaining social order.
The Reserve Force should be prepared to
effectively respond to a variety of emergencies
and military threats, safeguard national
“
sovereignty, security and development
The primary mission of interests, and the core security of the country.
Reserve officers are selected from veteran
the reserves is to PLA officers, local officials, PAP or militia
reinforce active-duty officers, and other technical personnel.
Reserve soldiers are selected from eligible PLA
forces for national veterans, trained grass-roots militias, and
other local or military specialty personnel.
defense, with a Some reserve soldiers also failed to meet
secondary mission to aid active duty entry requirements and conduct
remedial training in the reserves until they are
in national disasters or able to join the active duty force.
Anecdotal evidence sug gests that
maintaining social order. significant issues remain in the mobilization of
The Reserve Force reserve forces, including which equipment
should be used, what level of government pays
should be prepared to for the mobilization, and resistance from
enterprises at the sudden requisition of their
effectively respond to a employees. Chinese documents state that
variety of emergencies Reserve Force equipment is predominately
antiquated; one report stated that more than
and military threats, 70% of air defense artillery and artillery
equipment is at or beyond its maximum service
safeguard development life. Some of the equipment is no longer
interests, and the core
“ manufactured and repair requires
cannibalization.
security of the country. The PLA Reserve Force also provides

17
 CHINA
Major Ground Units
A Japanese Coast Guard patrol boat shadows a CCG vessel in Senkaku waters during a stand-off.
significant support to local areas after natural
disasters. The PLA Reserve Force does not
include militias, the Civil Air Defense, or myriad
other groups (e.g. the People's Armed Police or
the Xinjiang Production and Construction
Corps (XPCC)).
People's Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a
component of the PRC's armed forces and an
armed wing of the CCP with an estimated
660,000 personnel. In the 2020 National
Defense University publication Science of
Military Strategy, the primary responsibilities
of the PAP include maintaining political,
institutional and regime security, handling
emergency rescue, counter-terrorism, air
s u p p o r t , m a r i t i m e r i g ht s p ro te c t i o n ,
administrative law enforcement, and defense
operations. The PAP is organized into three
main parts: the Internal Security Corps, the
Mobile Corps, and the China Coast Guard
(CCG). The Internal Security Corps covers each
of the PRC's provinces, provincial-level cities,
and autonomous regions. There is not yet a
reported permanent presence of the PAP in the
Special Administrative Regions (SARs) of Hong
Kong or Macao, but since 2019, the PAP
maintains a rotational deployment in Hong
Kong. The Mobile Corps is comprised of myriad
PAP units placed to reinforce the
Internal Security Corps and provide
flexibility in responding to internal security
issues. Mobile Corps units are concentrated in
the west and south (Xinjiang, Tibet, Sichuan,
Yunnan, and Qinghai) as well as the major cities
of Beijing and Shanghai. Xinjiang is a particular
focus of the PAP due to PRC perceived
separatist activity, as well as its proximity to
areas of unrest in Central Asia. The China Coast
Guard is covered in depth in the next section of
this report.
18
“expansion
The CCG's rapid
and
modernization has made
it the largest maritime
law enforcement fleet in
the world. Its newer
vessels are larger and
more capable than older
vessels, allowing them to
operate further off shore
“ used for limited offshore operations, and an
and remain on station
longer.
Xi Jinping and the CCP leadership tasked
the PAP with integrating themselves into the
PLA's joint operation system. The PAP's main
mission is internal security, but is increasingly
focused on joint operations with the PLA and is
developing capabilities for rapid response,
mobility, and counterterrorism operations.
The PAP also conducts training with foreign
partners, including at least Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. Since at least 2016, PAP
forces have likely operated in Tajikistan,
patrolling the tri-border region connecting
Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and the PRC.
In 2021, the PAP reportedly executed
numerous emergency rescue and disaster
response operations in response to heavy
flooding and typhoons, as well as conducting
counter- terrorism and opposing force training
and exercises.
China Coast Guard (CCG). The CCG is
subordinate to the PAP and is responsible for a
wide range of maritime security missions,
including defending the PRC's sovereignty
claims; fisheries enforcement; combating
smuggling, terrorism, and environmental
crimes; as well as supporting international
cooperation. In 2021, the Standing Committee
of China's National People's Congress passed
the Coast Guard Law which took effect on 1
February 2021. The legislation regulates the
duties of the CCG, to include the use of force,
and applies those duties to seas under the
jurisdiction of the PRC. The law was met with
concern by other regional countries that may
perceive the law as an implicit threat to use
force, especially as territorial disputes in the
region continue.
The CCG's rapid expansion and
modernization has made it the largest maritime
law enforcement fleet in the world. Its newer
vessels are larger and more capable than older
vessels, allowing them to operate further off
shore and remain on station longer. A 2019
academic study published by the U.S. Naval War
College estimates the CCG has over 140 regional
and oceangoing patrol vessels (of more than
1,000 tons displacement). Some of the vessels
are former PLAN vessels, such as corvettes,
transferred to the CCG and modified for CCG
operations. The newer, larger vessels are
equipped with helicopter facilities, high-
capacity water cannons, interceptor boats, and
guns ranging from 20 to 76 millimeters. In
addition, the same academic study indicates the
CCG operates more than 120 regional patrol
combatants (500 to 999 tons), which can be
additional 450 coastal patrol craft (100 to 499
tons).
China's Maritime Militia
Background & Missions. The People's
Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) is a
subset of China's national militia, an armed
reserve force of civilians available for
mobilization that is ultimately subordinate to
the Central Military Commission through the
National Defense Mobilization Department.
Throughout China, militia units organize
around towns, villages, urban sub-districts,
a n d e n t e r p r i s e s , a n d va r y w i d e l y i n
composition and mission.
PAFMM vessels train with and assist the
People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the
China Coast Guard (CCG) in tasks such as
safeguarding maritime claims, surveillance and
reconnaissance, fisheries protection, logistics
support, and search and rescue. China employs
the PAFMM in gray zone operations, or "low-

Major Ground Units
A Japanese Coast Guard patrol boat shadows a CCG vessel in Senkaku waters during a stand-off.
intensity maritime rights protection struggles,"
at a level designed to frustrate effective
response by the other parties involved. China
“maritime
employs PAFMM vessels to advance its disputed
sovereignty claims, often amassing them in
disputed areas throughout the South and East
China Seas. In this manner, the PAFMM plays a
major role in coercive activities to achieve
China's political goals without fighting, and
these operations are part of broader Chinese
military theory that sees confrontational
operations short of war as an effective means of
accomplishing strategic objectives.
Operations. PAFMM units have been
active for decades in maritime incidents and
combat operations throughout China's near
seas and in these incidents PAFMM vessels are
often used to supplement CCG cutters at the
forefront of the incident, giving the Chinese the
capacity to outweigh and outlast rival
claimants. In March of 2021, hundreds of
Chinese militia vessels moored in Whitsun
Reef, raising concerns the Chinese planned to
seize another disputed feature in the Spratly
Islands. Other notable incidents include
standoffs with the Malaysian drill ship West
Capella (2020), defense of China's HYSY-981 oil
rig in waters disputed with Vietnam (2014),
occupation of Scarborough Shoal (2012), and
harassment of USNS Impeccable and Howard
O. Lorenzen (2009 and 2014). Historically the
maritime militia also participated in China's
offshore island campaigns in the 1950s, the
1974 seizure of the Paracel Islands from South
Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023
These mainland based
militia units
routinely operate in the
Spratly Islands and in the
southern South China
Sea, and their operations
in these areas are
enabled by increased
“ more than 500 tons. These vessels were built
funding from the PRC
government.
Vietnam, and the occupation of Mischief Reef
in the Spratly Islands in 1994.
The PAFMM also protects and facilitates
PRC fishing vessels operating in disputed
waters. For example, from late December 2019
to mid-January 2020, a large fleet of over 50
PRC fishing vessels operated under the escort
of multiple China Coast Guard patrol ships in
Indonesian claimed waters northeast of the
Natuna Islands. At least a portion of the PRC
ships in this fishing fleet were affiliated with
known traditional maritime militia units,
including a maritime militia unit based out of
Beihai City in Guangxi province. While most
traditional maritime militia units operating in
the South China Sea continue to originate from
townships and ports on Hainan Island, Beihai is
one of a number of increasingly prominent
maritime militia units based out of provinces in
the PRC. These mainland based maritime
militia units routinely operate in the Spratly
Islands and in the southern South China Sea,
and their operations in these areas are enabled
by increased funding from the PRC
government to improve their maritime
capabilities and grow their ranks of personnel.
Capabilities. Through the National
Defense Mobilization Department, Beijing
subsidizes various local and provincial
commercial organizations to operate PAFMM
vessels to perform "official" missions on an ad
hoc basis outside of their regular civilian
commercial activities. PAFMM units employ
marine industry workers, usually fishermen, as
a supplement to the PLAN and the CCG. While
retaining their day jobs, these mariners are
organized and trained, often by the PLAN and
the CCG, and can be activated on demand.
Additionally, starting in 2015, the Sansha City
Maritime Militia in the Paracel Islands has
developed into a salaried full-time maritime
militia force equipped with at least 84 purpose-
built vessels armed with mast-mounted water
cannons for spraying and reinforced steel hulls
for ramming along with their own command
center in the Paracel Islands. Lacking their
normal fishing responsibilities, Sansha City
Maritime Militia personnel, many of whom are
former PLAN and CCG sailors, train for
peacetime and wartime contingencies, often
with light arms, and patrol regularly around
disputed South China Sea features even during
fishing moratoriums. Additionally, since 2014,
China has built a new Spratly backbone fleet
comprising at least 235 large fishing vessels,
many longer than 50 meters and displacing
under central direction from the Chinese
government to operate in disputed areas south
of twelve degrees latitude that China typically
refers to as the "Spratly Waters," including the
Spratly Islands and southern SCS. Spratly
backbone vessels were built for prominent
PAFMM units in Guangdong, Guangxi, and
Hainan Provinces. For vessel owners not
already affiliated with PAFMM units, joining
the militia was a precondition for receiving
government funding to build new Spratly
backbone boats. As with the CCG and PLAN,
new facilities in the Paracel and Spratly Islands
enhance the PAFMM's ability to sustain
operations in the South China Sea.
Based on Annual Report by the Secretary of
Defense to U.S. Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People's Republic
of China, 2022
19
 CHINA
PLA Developing
Joint Capabilities
IMR Special Report

Key Takeaways Major Ground Units

• The PLA is aggressively developing
capabilities to provide options for the PRC to
dissuade, deter, or, if ordered, defeat third-
party intervention in the Asia-Pacific region.
• The PLA is also developing the capabilities
to conduct military operations deeper into the
Indo-Pacific region, and in some cases,
globally.
• Although the PLA has undertaken
important structural reforms to promote joint
operations, the capability of the PLA to carry
out joint operations in support of counter-
intervention or joint campaigns outside the
First Island Chain remains in its infancy.

Joint Capabilities for Counter-intervention

The PRC's counter-intervention strategy
aims to restrict the United States from having a
presence in China's immediate periphery and
limit US access in the broader Asia-Pacific
region. The PLA's anti-access/area-denial
(A2/AD) capabilities are, to date, the most
robust within the First Island Chain, although
the PLA is increasingly able to project power
into the Philippine Sea, and the PRC seeks to
strengthen its capabilities to reach farther into
the Pacific Ocean.
PLA ground, naval, air and rocket forces are
increasingly capable of projecting power at
greater distances from China. However, joint
service training is still in its infancy and the PLA interests expand in areas like Africa, Latin grown as the advanced globalized economy
has demonstrated limited joint operational America, Central Asia, and the Middle East, we develops, implying that growing PLA strike
capabilities beyond the FIC. Instead, overseas expect to see increased focus on expanding capabilities will attack an increasing array of
activities are mostly conducted by single power projection operations globally. targets, and thereby attaining international
services and do not involve combat. L o n g - R a n g e P r e c i s i o n S t r i ke a n d strategic effects by striking critical nodes of the
Beijing recognizes the importance of Supporting ISR. PLA doctrinal writings state global economy during a future conflict. The
increasing military capabilities to achieve that precision attack in all warfare domains is PRC's military modernization efforts have
global security objectives and has encouraged critical in modern war. The PLA further notes rapidly transformed the PLA's missile force.
the PLA to increase its operations beyond the that small elite forces using advanced weapons PLA writings frame logistics and power
Indo- Pacific. As detailed in China's 2015 and or capabilities can attain military effects that projection assets as potential vulnerabilities in
2019 Defense White Papers, Beijing is primarily previously required large armies and much modern warfare, which aligns with the PLA's
interested in developing these capabilities to higher levels of damage and cost. Therefore, expanding ability to conduct strikes against
p ro te c t C h i n e s e m a r i t i m e r i g ht s a n d PLA writings state that precision weapons are regional air bases, logistics and port facilities,
commercial interests. However, the majority of not only force multipliers, but also a means of communications, and other ground-based
PLA modernization and recent exercises "war control" to prevent escalation. PLA infrastructure.
remains focused on fighting and winning a documents further state that the range of vital U.S. bases in Guam are in range of a
regional conflict. As Beijing's economic political, economic, and military targets has growing number of the PLA's ballistic and

20

CHINA
cruise missiles. In the future, LACMs will also
likely be deployable on surface platforms like
the RENHAI class guided-missile cruisers. H-6K
bomber flights into the Philippine Sea
demonstrate the PRC's ability to range Guam
w i t h a i r- l a u n c h e d L AC M s . T h e D F - 2 6
intermediate range ballistic missile is capable
of reaching Guam, and is capable of conducting
nuclear, precision conventional, and maritime
attacks.
China views its ability to acquire timely,
high-fidelity information as critical to its ability
to execute precision strikes. The PLA's
information support system for precision
strikes depends heavily on Strategic Support
Force (SSF) assets to detect, identify, target,
and conduct battlefield damage assessments.
China emphasizes the importance of space-
based surveillance capabilities in supporting
precision strikes. In 2021, the PRC continued to
d e ve l o p i t s co n ste l l at i o n o f m i l i ta r y
reconnaissance satellites that could support
monitoring, tracking, and targeting of U.S. and
allied forces, while also investing in
reconnaissance, surveillance, command,
control, and communications systems at the
strategic, operational, and tactical levels to
p r o v i d e h i g h - f i d e l i t y OT H t a r g e t i n g
information for its strike platforms.
Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). The
PRC has a robust and redundant IADS
architecture over land areas and within 300 nm
(556 km) of its coast that relies on an extensive
early warning radar network, fighter aircraft,
and a variety of SAM systems. The PRC has also
placed radars and air defense weapons on
outposts in the South China Sea, further
extending the range of its IADS. It also employs
point defenses, primarily to defend strategic
targets against adversary long-range cruise
missiles and airborne strike platforms.
The PLA has increasing numbers of
advanced long-range SAMs, including its
indigenous CSA-9 (HQ-9) and its follow-on HQ-
Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023
9B, Russian SA-10 (S-
300PMU), and SA-20 (S-
300PMU1 / PMU2), all of
which have the advertised
capability to protect against
both aircraft and low-flying
cruise missiles. To improve its
strategic air defenses, the
PLA possesses Russian-built
SA-21 (S-400) Triumf SAM
systems as a follow-on to the
SA-20. Compared to these
other systems, the SA-21
systems possess a longer
maximum range, improved
missile seekers, and more
sophisticated radars.
The PRC manufactures a
variety of long-range air
surveillance radars, including models claiming
to support ballistic missile defense (BMD) and
other models asserting the ability to detect
stealth aircraft. Marketing materials also
emphasize these systems' ability to counter
long-range airborne strike and combat support
aircraft. PLAAF AEW&C aircraft such as the KJ-
2000 and KJ-500 can further extend the PRC's s
radar coverage well past the range of its
ground-based radars.
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Defense. The
PLA's long-range SAM inventory also offers a
limited capability against ballistic missiles. The
PRC's domestic CSA-9 (HQ-9) long-range SAM
system likely has a limited capability to provide
point defense against tactical ballistic missiles.
The PLA has SA-20 (S-300 PMU2) SAMs and SA-
21 (S-400) SAMs that may have some capability
to engage ballistic missiles, depending on the
interceptors and supporting infrastructure.
The PRC is working to develop BMD systems
consisting of exo-atmospheric and endo-
atmospheric kinetic-energy interceptors.
China is pursuing a mid-course interceptor that
may have capabilities against IRBMs and
possibly ICBMs. The RENHAI cruiser has been
identified as a platform for mid-course
intercept capabilities suggesting the PRC will
have forward deployed missile defense in the
near future. Additionally, the HQ-19
interceptor has undergone tests to verify its
capability against 3,000 km-class ballistic
missiles. The PLA's cruise missile defense
capability is more robust than that of its
ballistic missile defenses, with short-to-
medium range SAMs, such as the HQ-22,
augmenting the PLA's long-range SAMs in this
role.
Hypersonic Weapons. China's deployment
of the DF-17 HGV-armed MRBM will continue
to transform the PLA's missile force. The
system, fielded in 2020, is possibly intended to
replace some older SRBM units, according to
PRC media, and is intended to strike foreign
military bases and fleets in the Western Pacific,
according to a PRC-based military expert.
Aviation Forces (PLAAF, PLAA Aviation,
PLAN Aviation). PLA aviation forces are fielding
advanced platforms capable of supporting
future long-distance operations, as their
mission sets evolve from defending Chinese
territorial space to launching offensive
operations at distances beyond the First Island
Chain. While interoperability is a stated
priority, joint exercises between the aviation's
forces are limited. Individually, the PLAAF,
PLAN Aviation, and PLAA Aviation continue to
improve their capabilities to conduct offensive
and defensive operations offshore, including
strike, air and missile defense, strategic
mobility, early warning and reconnaissance
missions, and insertion. The PLAAF, in
particular, has received repeated calls from its
leadership to become a truly "strategic" air
force, able to project power at long distances
to advance and defend the PRC's global
interests.
• In 2021, the Y-20U tanker entered service,
supporting the continued PLAAF expansion of
air refuelable fighters, bombers, and SMA
aircraft like the KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft. These
new air refuelable aircraft will significantly
expand China's ability to conduct long-range
offensive air operations.
• China was developing a new generation of
long-range bombers, likely named the H- 20,
according to multiple reports and a 2016 public
statement by then PLAAF Commander General
Ma Xiaotian. The H-20, which may debut
sometime in the next decade, will have a range
of more than 10,000km, enabling the PLAAF to
cover the Second Island Chain and into the
western region of the Pacific. The H-20
bomber's range could be extended to cover the
globe with aerial refueling. It is also expected
to employ both conventional and nuclear
weaponry and feature a stealthy design.
• The PLA Army aviation and air assault units
are enabling highly-mobile, modular ground
task force capable of expeditionary operations.
In 2021, the PLAA added at least six heavy lift Z-
8 transport helicopters and 12 medium lift Z-20
helicopters. According to PRC media, three Z-8
transport aircraft battalions could airdrop a
combat battalion in one lift. The Z-20 is also
expected to fill a variety of missions including
special force insertion and shipborne ASW.
• PRC's outposts in the South China Sea
extends the operating reach of PLA aviation
forces.
Based on the Annual Report by Secretary of
Defense to U.S. Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People's Republic
of China
21
 CHINA
PLA Advancing Toward
an Informatized Military
IMR Special Report

Key Takeaways Major Ground Units

• The PLA considers information operations
(IO) as a means of achieving information
dominance early in a conflict, and continues to
expand the scope and frequency of IO in
military exercises.
• The PRC presents a significant, persistent
cyber-enabled espionage and attack threat to
an adversary's military and critical
infrastructure systems.
• The PLA is pursuing next-generation
combat capabilities based on its vision of
future conflict, which it calls "intelligentized
warfare," defined by the expanded use of AI
and other advanced technologies at every level
of warfare.
Chairman Xi Jinping has called for the PLA
to create a highly informatized force capable of
dominating all networks and expanding the
country's security and development interests.
PRC military writings describe informatized Radar systems on display at the 9th World Radar Expo in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, China on April 22, 2021
warfare as the use of information technology
to create an operational system-of-systems,
which would enable the PLA to acquire,
transmit, process, and use information during
“ PRC military writings
describe informatized
decision making. The PLA is continuing
modernization and reform efforts, both
technologically and organizationally, to
a conflict to conduct joint military operations e f fe c t i v e l y c o m m a n d c o m p l ex , j o i n t
across the ground, maritime, air, space, warfare as the use of operations across all warfare domains and
cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum potentially in multiple theaters.
domains. The PLA is accelerating the information technology The PLA sees networked, technologically
incorporation of command information advanced C4I systems as essential to providing
systems, providing forces and commanders to create an operational reliable, secure communications to fixed and
with enhanced situational awareness and
decision support to more effectively carry out
system-of-systems, mobile command posts, thereby enabling
rapid, effective, multi-echelon decision
joint missions and tasks to win informatized which would enable the making. These systems are designed to
local wars. The PLA continues to expand the distribute real-time data-including
scope and regularity of military training PLA to acquire, transmit, intelligence, battlefield information, logistical
exe rc i s e s t h at s i m u l ate i nfo r m at i ze d information, and weather reports via
operations and likely views offensive and
process, and use infor- redundant, resilient communications
defensive cyberspace operations as a means to
achieve information dominance early in a crisis
mation to conduct joint networks-to improve commanders' situational
awareness. PLA field commanders view near-
or conflict. military operations real-time ISR and situational data as well as
Command, Control, Communications, redundant and reliable communications as
Computers, and Intelligence Modernization across the ground, mari- essential to streamlining decision making
(C4I). The PRC continues to prioritize C4I processes and shortening response timelines.
modernization as a response to trends in
time, air, space, cyber- China has expanded its communications and
m o d e r n wa r fa re t h at e m p h a s i ze t h e space, and electromag-
“ intelligence gathering capabilities in key
importance of rapid information collection, regions like the South China Sea, where it has
processing, and sharing and accelerated netic spectrum domains. rapidly constructed new facilities and antennas

22

likely supporting satellite communications and
technical collection between 2018 and 2021.
The PRC is also fielding the Integrated
Command Platform to units at multiple
echelons across the force to enable lateral and
cross- service communications and
intelligence sharing required for joint
operations. Digital databases and command
automation tools allow commanders to
simultaneously issue orders to multiple units
while on the move and enable units to quickly
adapt to shifting conditions in the battlespace.
As the PLA continues to focus on improving
its ability to fight and win informatized wars,
future information systems will likely
implement emerging technologies such as
automation, big data, the internet of things,
artificial intelligence (AI), and cloud computing
to improve process efficiencies. The PLA has
already begun this process by embracing big
data analytics that fuse a variety of data to
improve automation and to create a
comprehensive, real-time picture for
warfighters.
Electronic Warfare (EW). The PLA
considers EW to be an integral component of
modern warfare and seeks to achieve
information dominance in a conflict through
the coordinated use of cyberspace and
electronic warfare to protect its own
information networks and deny the enemy the
use of the electromagnetic spectrum. The
PRC's EW strategy emphasizes suppressing,
degrading, disrupting, or deceiving enemy
electronic equipment throughout the
continuum of a conflict. The PLA will likely use
electronic warfare early in a conflict as a
signaling mechanism to warn and deter
adversary offensive action. Potential EW
targets include adversary systems operating in
radio, radar, microwave, infrared and optical
frequency ranges, as well as adversary
computer and information systems. PLA EW
units routinely train to conduct jamming and
anti-jamming operations against multiple
communication and radar systems and Global
Positioning System (GPS) satellite systems
during force-on-force exercises. These
exercises test operational units' understanding
of EW weapons, equipment, and procedures
and they also enable operators to improve
confidence in their ability to operate
effectively in a complex electromagnetic
environment. In addition, the PLA reportedly
tests and validates advances in EW weapons'
R&D during these exercises.
Cyberspace warfare. The development of
cyberspace warfare capabilities is consistent
with PLA writings, which identify information
operations (IO)-comprising cyberspace,
electronic, space, and psychological warfare-as
integral to achieving information superiority
Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023
“In October 2020, the
CCP announced that
modern warfare was
evolving to include
intelligentization and
incorporated the
concept into its 14th “ to develop its capabilities and further integrate
Five-Year Plan.
early in a conflict as an effective means to
counter a stronger foe. The PRC has publicly
identified cyberspace as a critical domain for
national security and declared its intent to
expedite the development of its cyber forces.
The PRC presents a sophisticated,
persistent cyber-enabled espionage and attack
threat to military and critical infrastructure
systems, and presents a growing influence
threat. The PRC seeks to create disruptive and
destructive effects-from denial-of-service
attacks to physical disruptions of critical
infrastructure-to shape decision-making and
disrupt military operations beginning in the
initial stages and throughout a conflict. The
PRC can launch cyberspace attacks that, at a
minimum, can cause localized, temporary
disruptions to critical infrastructure within the
United States, and the PRC believes these
capabilities are even more effective against
militarily superior adversaries that depend on
information technologies. As a result, the PRC
is advancing its cyberspace attack capabilities
and has the ability to launch cyberspace
attacks-such as disruption of a natural gas
pipeline for days to weeks-in the United States.
Authoritative PLA sources call for the
coordinated employment of space,
cyberspace, and EW as strategic weapons to
"paralyze the enemy's operational system of
systems" and "sabotage the enemy's war
command system of systems" early in a
conflict. PLA writings judge other countries
have effectively used cyberspace warfare and
other IO in recent conflicts and argue for
attacks against C2 and logistics networks to
affect an adversary's ability to make decisions
and take actions in the early stages of conflict.
The PLA also considers cyberspace capabilities
to be a critical component in its overall
integrated strategic deterrence posture,
alongside space and nuclear deterrence. PLA
studies discuss using warning or
demonstration strikes-strikes against select
military, political, and economic targets with
clear awing effects-as part of deterrence.
Accordingly, the PLA probably seeks to use its
cyber- reconnaissance capabilities to collect
data for intelligence and cyberspace attack
purposes; to constrain an adversary's actions
by targeting network-based logistics, C2,
communications, commercial activities, and
civilian and defense critical infrastructure; and,
to serve as a force- multiplier when coupled
with kinetic attacks during armed conflict.
The PLA's recent structural reforms may
further change how the PLA organizes and
commands IO, particularly as the SSF continues
into joint planning, exercises, and operations
with other PLA forces. The SSF likely is
generating synergies by combining national-
level cyberspace reconnaissance, attack, and
defense capabilities in its organization,
alongside other strategic IO capabilities.
Intelligentized Warfare. In October 2020,
the CCP announced that modern warfare was
evolving to include intelligentization and
incorporated the concept into its 14th Five-
Year Plan. Beijing anticipates that AI and other
advanced technologies, such as cloud
computing and big data analytics, will be key to
success in future warfare. As a result, it is
adjusting the PRC's defense modernization
plans to focus on integrating the development
of "mechanization, informatization, and
intelligentization," suggesting the PLA will field
some intelligentized capabilities as it
completes mechanization and informatization
over the next decade.
PLA strategists have stated new
technologies will increase the speed and
tempo of future warfare, and that
operationalization of AI will be necessary to
improve the speed and quality of information
processing by reducing battlefield uncertainty
and providing decision making advantage over
potential adversaries. The PLA is researching
various applications for AI including support
for missile guidance, target detection and
identification, and autonomous systems. The
PLA is exploring next-generation operational
concepts for intelligentized warfare, such as
attrition warfare by intelligent swarms, cross-
domain mobile warfare, AI- based space
co nf ro ntat i o n , a n d co g n i t i ve co nt ro l
operations. The PLA also considers unmanned
systems to be critical intelligentized
technologies, and is pursuing greater
autonomy for unmanned aerial, surface, and
underwater vehicles to enable manned and
unmanned hybrid formations, swarm attacks,
optimized logistic support, and disaggregated
ISR, among other capabilities.
Based on the Annual Report by Secretary of
Defense to U.S. Congress: Military and Security
Developments Involving the People's Republic
of China, 2022
23
 DEFENCE INDUSTRY
Industry News
An IMR Report

Two Indian firms to

manufacture 307 ATAGS
howitzers
The Indian Army is going to place orders for
307 advanced towed artillery gun system
(ATAGS) howitzers, which are going to be
manufactured by two private firms in India.
The proposal, worth over Rs 8,000 crore,
has been floated by the Indian Army and is
expected to be cleared soon, top government
officials told India Today.
The Indian Army has conducted trials of the
gun in different altitudes and terrains and the
weapon has been upgraded as per the
suggestions made by the users, said officials.
The Defence Research and Development
O rga n i s at i o n ( D R D O ) h a s s h a re d t h e
technological know-how of the howitzer with
Tata and Bharat Forge. The two private firms
will be supplying the system to the Army,
including over 320 high mobility-vehicles. The
trials of the 155mm/52 calibre ATAGS
howitzers were completed at the Pokhran Field
Firing Range (PFFR) between April 26 and May
2 last year.
The ATAGS is an indigenous towed artillery
gun system project undertaken in mission
mode by the DRDO as a part of the artillery
modernisation programme of the Indian Army,
said the statement of the Indian Army.
The Armament Research & Development
Establishment (ARDE) Pune is the nodal
laboratory of the DRDO for the design and
development of ATAGS, along with other DRDO
laboratories.
Bharat Dynamics
receives export order
worth $255 million
Bharat Dynamics (BDL), on 20 February,
said it received an export order worth $255
million. It also said the order will be executed
subject to government clearances.
The state-owned aerospace and defence
company said earlier on 16 February that it
entered into 10 deals with several foreign and
Indian companies during Aero India, 2023.
Advanced Towed Artillery Gun Systems (ATAGS) manufactured by Bharat Forge
According to information available on the
company's website, BDL entered into MoU with
UK company Thales to set up manufacturing
facilities for laser-guided rocket and its major
components in India. In addition, an agreement
was signed by BDL with EDGE Group entity, AL
TARIQ, UAE, to jointly produce an all-weather,
day or night, long-range precision guided
munition (LR-PGM) kits in India.
Last year in October, Bharat Dynamics and
Dassault Aviation entered into a MoU for
Integration of the Bharat Dynamics' Weapon
Systems like Astra and Smart Anti-Airfield
Weapon on Rafale Aircraft for the Indian
Armed Forces and future export market.
BDL is a defence public sector undertaking,
engaged in the production and supply of
various missile systems to the Indian Armed
Forces. It has graduated from being a missile
manufacturer to a Weapon System Integrator
and has emerged as a complete solution
provider for the Indian Armed Forces.
Cabinet nod for purchase
of 3 training ships, 70
trainer aircraft
In a shot in the arm for the country's self-
reliance campaign, the Union Cabinet, on 1
March, approved the purchase of 70 locally
made basic trainer aircraft for the Indian Air
Force (IAF), and three cadet training ships for
the India Navy at a cost of ?6,838 crore and
?3,100 crore respectively.
The contract for the basic trainers will be
signed with state-run plane maker Hindustan
Aeronautics Limited (HAL) while private sector
major Larsen & Toubro will get the order for the
training ships.
The new aircraft, a longstanding need, will
provide a boost to the ab initio training of air
force pilots. Basic trainers figure on the long list
of weapons and systems that India has
imposed an import ban on during the last 30
months. HAL will supply the Hindustan Turbo
Trainer-40 (HTT-40) planes to IAF over a period
of six years.
T h e H T T- 4 0 c o n ta i n s a ro u n d 5 6 %
indigenous content, which will progressively
increase to over 60% through further
indigenisation of major components and
subsystems. The order is likely to generate
1,500 direct, and 3,000 indirect jobs across 100
MSMEs, according to defence ministry's
estimates.
Currently, ab initio, or early, training of all
rookie pilots is carried out on Swiss-origin

24

Pilatus PC-7 Mk II planes and Kiran Mk-1/1A
trainers. Those training to become fighter
pilots further train on the British-origin Hawk
advanced jet trainers.
The HTT-40 is a turboprop aircraft and
designed to have good low speed handling
qualities and provide better training
effectiveness, officials said.
This fully aerobatic tandem seat turbo
trainer has air conditioned cockpit, modern
avionics, hot refueling (refuelling with the
engine running on the ground), and zero-zero
ejection seats (providing for safe ejection at
low speeds and low heights).
The delivery of the indigenously designed,
developed and manufactured training ships is
expected to begin in 2026, the ministry said.
These ships will cater to the training of officer
cadets, including women, at sea after their
basic training to meet the future requirements
of the navy.
The ships will be constructed at L&T's
Kattupalli facility in Tamil Nadu. The project will
generate an employment of 2.25 million man-
days over a period of four-and-half years, and
encourage the participation of Indian
shipbuilding and associated industries,
including MSMEs.
India in talks with
Embraer, Sukhoi to make
small jets locally
India is looking to partner with global
aircraft manufacturers, including Embraer SA
and Russia's Sukhoi, to make small planes
locally as it seeks to improve connectivity in
tiny towns and far-flung areas, according to
people familiar with the matter.
The government will keep 51% equity with
an Indian company, while asking the foreign
partner to do technology transfer, the people
said, asking not to be identified as the
deliberations are at an early stage. The jets,
which typically seat less than 100 people, are
likely to be produced in Prime Minister
Narendra Modi's home state of Gujarat, they
said.
India has completed preliminary
discussions with Embraer, while Sukhoi has
expressed interest in manufacturing regional
jets locally, the people said. In addition, the
country has also approached ATR, a joint
venture between Airbus and Leonardo SpA of
Italy, to make in India, they added.
ATR small planes are the workhorse of
regional routes in India with the nation's top
carrier, IndiGo, operating 39 of them. Rival De
Havilland's Dash-8 Q400 turboprops, which
seat between 78 and 90 people, are operated
by SpiceJet Ltd. State-owned Hindustan
Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023
Embraer ATR 42 an ATR 72
Aeronautics Ltd. is already manufacturing the
19-seater Dornier 228 aircraft used by the
armed forces and Alliance Air.
The plan is vital to Modi's push to promote
manufacturing and boost economic
productivity while creating jobs. The
government is strengthening last-mile
connectivity by giving subsidies to airlines to
make air travel more economical. As part of a
regional connectivity program, India has
allocated 45 billion rupees ($545 million) to
develop 100 inadequately-served airports,
heliports and water aerodromes, besides
opening 1,000 new routes by next year.
Defence ministry inks
contract with HAL for six
Dornier aircraft
The defence ministry, on 10 March, signed
a ?667-crore contract with state-run plane
maker Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) for
six Dornier-228 aircraft for the Indian Air Force
(IAF) to boost its operational capabilities.
The Dornier order for HAL comes on the
back of a ?6,838-crore contract awarded to it
by the defence ministry on Tuesday for 70 HTT-
40 basic trainer aircraft. The new trainer
aircraft, a longstanding need, will provide a
boost to the ab initio training of air force pilots.
Basic trainers figure on the long list of weapons
and systems that India has imposed an import
ban on during the last 30 months. HAL will
supply the Hindustan Turbo Trainer-40 (HTT-
40) planes to IAF over a period of six years.
Currently, ab initio training of all rookie
pilots is carried out on Swiss-origin Pilatus PC-7
Mk II planes and Kiran Mk-1/1A trainers. Those
training to become fighter pilots further train
on the British-origin Hawk advanced jet
trainers.
Genser Aerospace to
manufacture aircraft in
UP defence corridor
A complete aircraft manufacturing unit will
be set up at the Kanpur node of Uttar Pradesh's
defence industrial corridor (UPDIC) by Genser
Aerospace Private Limited. The manufacturing
will start by 2024 at the first complete aircraft
manufacturing private industry.
UP defence industrial corridor chief nodal
officer, former Air Chief Marshal RKS Bhadauria
and UPDIC chief general manager Rakesh
Mishra held a meeting with Genser Aerospace
at Aero India to consolidate the MoU signed
and announced at the UP Global Investor
Summit 2023.
During the meet, Genser CEO Arunakar
Mishra also announced the design of defence
aircraft RAJAS-Rakshan. Genser, under the
aegis of Aerospace Foundation of India
(Aerofi), has been working for over five years
on the development of the defence transport
aircraft RAJAS-Rakshan.
Mishra said that RAJAS-Rakshan is a two
pilot plus seven seat aircraft, with 5 tonnes all-
up weight, having a twin turbofan engine with
cruise speed of over 0.7 Mach (over 800 kmph)
and a range of over 2,000 nautical miles (4,000
km) to travel across India.
ICOMM partners UAE-
based CARACAL to
manufacture small arms
ICOMM, a group company of Megha
Engineering and Infrastructures Ltd (MEIL)
signed a licensing agreement with UAE-based
C A R AC A L , o n 2 1 Fe b r u a r y, to l o ca l l y
manufacture small arms for the Indian market.
25
 DEFENCE INDUSTRY
Under this partnership, ICOMM will locally
manufacture Caracal's complete line of small
arms under the 'Make in India' initiative of the
government. The production will take place at
c o m p a ny ' s m a n u fa c t u r i n g fa c i l i t y i n
Hyderabad. The two companies signed the
agreement at the IDEX 2023 show in Abu
Dhabi.
ICOMM will manufacture the full range of
Caracal small arms, including the versatile
Caracal EF pistol, modern CMP 9 submachine
gun, CAR 814, CAR 816 and CAR 817 tactical
rifles, CAR 817 DMR tactical sniper rifle, CSR 50
anti-material sniper rifle, CSR 338 and CSR 308
bolt action sniper rifles and the CSA 338 semi-
automatic sniper rifle.
As per reports, the two sides had been in
talks for a while and the signing of this
agreement makes the UAE defence company
eligible to do business as per Defence
Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2020.
Privately Manufactured
Indigenised Fuze of ASW
Rocket Handed Over
Indian Navy, on 3 March, today received a
fully indigenised fuze YDB-60 for underwater
Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) Rocket RGB-60
used from major warships, through Economic
Explosives Limited (EEL), Nagpur.
Satyanarayan Nuwal, the CMD of EEL,
Nagpur handed over the first consignment of
the fuze to Vice Admiral SN Ghormade, Vice
Chief of Naval Staff.
Technical assistance to the manufacturer
towards creating a vibrant ecosystem for
manufacture of ammunition and fuze in India
in pursuit of AatmaNirbharta' was provided by
the Directorate General of Naval Armament
(DGONA) and Directorate General of Naval
Armament Inspection (DGNAI), Indian Navy.
Defence Minister invites
global OEMs to Co-
Develop, Co-Produce in
India
Defence minister Rajnath Singh met the
CEOs of Original Equipment Manufacturers
(OEMs) on the sidelines of Aero India show on
February 14, 2023. During the interaction, he
highlighted that India offers significant
advantages of competitive land costs, skilled
human capital, a vibrant start-up ecosystem
and a huge domestic defence market to the
Global Defence industry. He described this as a
win-win situation where defence
manufacturing companies from across the
26
First ever privately manufactured indigenised fuze YDB-60 for underwater Anti Submarine Warfare
Rocket RGB-60 was handed over to the Indian Navy, on 3 March, by Economic Explosives Ltd
world can become a part of the Indian growth
story.
Rajnath Singh emphasised the importance
of the defence sector for India saying, "Defence
production meets the twin goals of becoming
self-reliant in a critical sector as well as
generating jobs for our people." He also
mentioned the incentives given by Uttar
Pradesh and Tamil Nadu state governments for
investment in Defence Industrial Corridors,
central government policies promoting FDI and
defence manufacturing in India, the strong
legal system protecting stakeholders' interests
and improvements in ease of doing business.
The CEOs gave their suggestions to
facilitate Global investment in Indian Defence
Manufacturing and Raksha Mantri assured
them of government efforts to remove
regulatory hurdles for private industry.
CEOs and senior management of General
Atomics, Safran, Boeing, Embraer and Rafael
Advanced Defence Systems attended the
interaction.
Rs 900-cr deal inked to
refit Sindhukirti
submarine
The defence ministry, 13 March, signed a
more than Rs 900 crore contract with the state-
owned Hindustan Shipyard Limited,
Visakhapatnam for a refit of the Kilo-class
submarine INS Sindhukirti.
After completion of the Rs 934 crore refit,
Sindhukirti will be combat-worthy and join the
active submarine fleet of the Indian Navy.
The Russian-origin submarine which was
commissioned in 1989, had earlier spent more
than nine years between 2006-2015 at HSL for
a mid-life refit, for which the shipyard drew flak
from various quarters. The refit was planned to
be completed in three years, but eventually
took nine years because of the
mismanagement on the part of the shipyard
and the delay caused by Russian experts.
The new refit would help to develop
alternate repair facilities for submarines and is
a fresh step towards undertaking medium refit
with life certification at HSL, the defence
ministry said in a statement.
Indian Army Awards First
Contract For IDEX Project
The Indian Army has taken a lead in
awarding the first ever procurement order of
an Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX)
project as per the revised procedure. The
contract for procurement of an indigenously
developed 'Integrated Mobile Camouflage
System (IMCS)' for Mechanised Forces was
signed with Indian Startup Hyper Stealth
Technologies Pvt Ltd on 14 March 2023.
The Integrated Mobile Camouflage System
(IMCS) comprises of low emissivity and/or
CAM-IIR coatings and Mobile Camouflage
System materials providing the ability to the
Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) to merge with
a terrain background. The technology
comprises of low emissivity coatings and
mobile camouflage system material and will
provide significant capability enhancement in
stealth for AFVs. The niche technology will be a

The Indian Army awarded the first contract under IDEX project for Integrated Mobile Camouflage System
to Hyperstealth Technologies on 14 March 2023.
great leap in indigenous stealth technology
and provide a boost to Aatmanirbharta. IMCS
will achieve a reduction in the detection range
of AFV when viewed through Hand Held
Thermal Imager (HHTI) / Battle Field
Surveillance Radar (BFSR) tank-based thermal
camera under given environmental and
weather conditions and signature
management by controlling the Visual,
Thermal, Infra-red & Radar Signatures of
object.
Currently, there are a total of 48 projects of
the Indian Army as part of Defence India
Startup Challenge (DISC), Open Challenges,
iDEX4 Fauji & iDEX PRIME scheme which
involves handholding of 41 Startups for the
development of the latest state of art solutions
for the challenges posed by Indian Army.
IMCS was the first system to be trial
evaluated as per 'Single Stage Composite Trial'
methodology based on revised DAP 2020.
Tata-Lockheed Martin JV
to make fighter plane
wings in India
Global defence aerospace player Lockheed
Martin and India's Tata Group have inked an
agreement for the production of fighter plane
wings at their joint venture Tata Lockheed
Martin Aerostructures Ltd (TLMAL) in
Hyderabad.
According to Lockheed Martin, the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
envisions production of 29 fighter wing
shipsets, with an option of additional shipsets,
with deliveries commencing in 2025.
Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023
Lockheed Martin formally recognised
TLMAL as a potential co-producer of fighter
wings in October 2021 after the latter's
successful production and qualification of a
prototype fighter wing shipset.
Through this prototype project, TLMAL
was required to demonstrate the capability to
perform detailed part manufacturing and
delivery of a fully-compliant fuel-carrying 9-g,
12,000 hour, interchangeable/ replaceable
representative fighter wing, Lockheed Martin
said on 10 March.
TLMAL serves as the single global source of
C-130J empennage assemblies that are
installed on all new Super Hercules aircraft. To
date, TLMAL has manufactured and delivered
nearly 200 C-130J empennages.
James Taiclet, Chairman, President, and CEO
of Lockheed Martin, expressed the company's
commitment to a self-reliant India and the
confidence that exists in its relationships with
partners in India. “Lockheed Martin's 21st
Century Security vision aims to deliver
integrated mission-focused defence capabilities
with innovation and urgency, and with that, we
are one of the only aerospace companies with a
complex aerostructure capability for advanced
fighters in India,” he said. “This strong
partnership embodies our principle of For India,
From India, For the World.”
N. Chandrasekaran, Chairman of Tata Sons
Pvt. Ltd, expressed his pride in the Tata Group's
partnership with Lockheed Martin, stating that
he is confident the initiative of manufacturing
fighter wings in India will strengthen the
aerospace and defence manufacturing
ecosystem in India.
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27
 DEFENCE RESEARCH
DRDO News
An IMR Report

Army, paramilitary may

procure DRDO's Archer
UAV
If the missile evaluation trials of the Short
Range-Unmanned Aerial Vehicle-Weaponised
(SR-UAV-W) are successful, the Indian Army
and the paramilitary forces might procure
these, said officials of the Aeronautical
Development Establishment, a laboratory of
Defence Research Development Organisation
(DRDO).
SR-UAV-W, also called the Basic Archer, has
undergone flight demonstration and will
undergo missile evaluation soon. DRDO has
made two versions of Archer-one - a basic
archer also called SR-UAV-W - and Archer-Next
G e n e rat i o n ( A rc h e r- N G ) . T h e m i s s i l e
evaluation trials of basic Archer are left where DRDO's Archer armed UAV
DRDO will arm the UAV with anti-tank missiles
and hit a dummy target. If the trials are Bengaluru originally for Light Combat Aircraft the Maritime Patrol radar.
successful, the Army and the paramilitary (LCA) Tejas, is now ready for export.
forces could induct these. Aside from this, DRDO is also working on
While working on RUSTOM 1 (a short range other electronics that are export worthy, DRDO Surveillance system for
director-general (electronics &
remotely piloted aircraft system), DRDO came
up with the idea of Archer. Basic Archer can be communication system) BK Das said. The
defence establishments
development is in line with the Centre's push Defence Research and Development
used to cater to the requirement of
for not just self-reliance in defence but also Organisation (DRDO) has designed and
intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition,
enhancing exports. developed a perimeter surveillance system
tracking and reconnaissance (ISTAR). It gathers
According to DRDO, Uttam can track called Surveillance Using Multilayer Intelligent
real time and high quality imagery. It can
multiple targets at a time and also take hi- Tracking, Response and Analysis (SUMITRA)
operate up to a height of 22,000 feet with an
resolution pictures of enemy targets to aid in which is aimed at augmenting the security at
endurance of up to 12 hours. It also carries
reconnaissance missions. Uttam is a fully any defence establishment.
Electro Optical and Infrared (EO/IR) payload.
electronically scanned agile beam radar which SUMITRA is also integrated with High
ADE is also working on finalising the air
uses a transmit-or-receive module and has Payload Multi Copter, an unmanned aerial
frames for Archer-NG. The airframe is the
features that allow the aircraft to boast of low vehicle (UAV) which can track intruders, so that
mechanical structure of the aircraft that
probability of intercept and non-cooperative the Quick Response Team (QRT) present at the
includes wings, fuselage and undercarriage.
target recognition. establishment could reach the spot.
Archer-NG can operate up to an altitude of
It also provides better situational It has multiple sensors which detect
30,000 feet and can be used for ISTAR. The
awareness of the modern battlefield scenario intruders. The data from the sensors go to the
basic airframe structure will be ready in a
and is capable of tracking multiple targets with control centre from where the UAV, in this case
couple of months. Archer-NG can also be used
high accuracy suitable for firing missiles and a High Payload Multi Copter, gets the signal to
for battlefield post-strike assessment.
has interleaved air-to-air, air-to-ground and air- track intruders. Even if an intruder hides
to-sea modes for all terrain solution, according behind a bush, the UAV would hover over him
DRDO-built Uttam radar to E l e c t ro n i c s & R a d a r D eve l o p m e nt and the QRT could take the necessary action.
Establishment, the Bengaluru-based lab which Due to Artificial Intelligence based
ready for export has developed the radar. classification, SUMITRA can easily differentiate
Uttam, the state-of-the-art Active Sanctioned in 2012, the project team between our patrolling security personnel
Electronically Scanned Array Radar (AESAR), included people with the experience of making from the intruders.
developed by a Defence Research and the main radar on the indigenous Airborne Being an indigenously developed system, it
Development Organisation (DRDO) lab in early Warning And Control System - Netra - and would remove our dependence on foreign

28

Uttam AESA radar munted ona Tejas LCA
solutions thereby ensuring the secrecy of our
vital defence establishments. SUMITRA also
has inbuilt Aerial Threat Detection System for
identifying incoming aerial threats.
SUMITRA is presently installed at
Aeronautical Test Range, Chitradurga. The High
Payload Multi Copter has a high payload
capacity. It can carry a payload and release at
the designated spot and can come back to the
home location.
The range is 5 km and it can fly at an
altitude of 300 metre. It has an endurance of 30
minutes.
DRDO develops EO IR
system for surveillance
The Centre for Air Borne Systems (CABS), a
DRDO has developed electro-optical infrared system for surveillance from airborne, land and naval platforms
Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023
l a b o ra t o r y o f t h e D e fe n c e Re s e a rc h
Development Organisation (DRDO), has
indigenously developed electro-
optical/infrared (EO/IR) system to carry out
surveillance from airborne, land and naval
platforms.
The EO/IR system can be mounted on
ships, aircraft and vehicles. It has the capability
to detect objects even behind fire and smoke.
The EO/IR system has a short wave infrared
(SWIR) imager, laser range finder, laser pointer
and cameras. The sensors can operate
simultaneously depending on daylight
weather conditions and display HD images to
the operator. It is also integrated with a video
tracker which can track moving targets.
CABS will equip multi-mode maritime
aircraft (MMMA) with the EO/IR system, which
can be used to identify ships responsible for oil
spilling in seas and oceans.
EO/IR can be integrated with a multi-
functional tactical console (MTC), which
consists of monitors on which real time
maritime and air situations are displayed.
Through this integration, users (Army, Navy
and Coast Guard) will get to know about the
situation. Presently, DRDO is equipping this
with multi-mode maritime aircraft (MMMA)
and is being developed for the Indian Coast
Guard. One of the roles of MMMA is pollution
surveillance. Oil spills are one of the major
pollutants in the oceans. EO/IR would detect
ships responsible for the oil spills as it has
artificial intelligence-enabled object detection
and tracking. The EO/IR is equipped with a
laser illuminator that could help in reading the
names of the ships and it also has a laser-range
finder that could be used to find the range of
the target.
Godrej Aerospace to
manufacture modules of
DRDO turbojet engine
In a first for an Indian private company,
Godrej Aerospace has bagged the order to
manufacture eight modules of the DRDO's
turbojet engine.
On 20 February, Godrej & Boyce, the
flagship company of the Godrej Group,
announced that its business Godrej Aerospace
is the first Indian private company to win the
order for manufacturing eight modules of the
DRDO Engine for aerial applications.
G o d re j A e ro s p a c e w o n t h e o rd e r
competing with over 25 companies owing to its
strong infrastructure, proficiency in working
with unique materials, and decades of
experience in producing liquid engines for
rockets, as well as its service to global aviation
majors.
Commenting on this milestone, Maneck
Behramkamdin, AVP & Business Head, Godrej
Aerospace said: "We are thrilled to have won
the project to manufacture the DRDO Engine
modules, which is a testament to our
capabilities and expertise in the aerospace
sector. This achievement reinforces our
commitment to making India self-reliant in
a e r o s p a c e m a n u f a c t u r i n g t h e r e b y,
contributing to the country's economic
growth.
This experience will pave the way for future
projects to develop modules for civil aviation
engines as well, the release noted.
The company has made an investment of
around 500 crores for aerospace and defence
projects and has incorporated new processes
into its manufacturing processes.
29
 All content © 2023, SIGHTLINE Media Group

Meloni Visits India, UAE To

PatchUp Old Defense Kerfuffles
BY TOM KINGTON

ROME — Italy’s prime minister visited

India and the United Arab Emirates March
2-3 to reset defense ties after a series of
diplomatic crises saw Italian defense sales
banned in India and Italian military
personnel ejected from a key base in the
Gulf.
Prime minister Giorgia Meloni landed in
New Delhi March 2 to meet Indian leader
Narendra Modi ahead of a trip to Abu Dhabi
on Friday and Saturday - a tour which Rome
officials hope will sweeten up soured

Photo by -/AFP via Getty Images

relationships with India and Dubai.
In New Delhi, Meloni told Modi she
wanted to get defense sales back on track,
while Modi talked up opportunities for
defense industry coproduction between the
two countries.
The Indian leader also announced the
two countries would start joint military
exercises and training.
“Prime Minister Meloni’s visit is
expected to further strengthen and deepen
the long-standing relationship between
India and Italy,” the Indian foreign ministry
said in a statement.
Managers from Italian state defense
firms Leonardo and Fincantieri attended a
business forum with Indian CEOs hosted by
Italy’s foreign minister Antonio Tajani and
Indian commerce and industry minister
Piyush Goyal.
“This was a reopening of channels, a
return to normal - there was no deals but it
was about the building of a framework,” an
Italian government source told Defense
News.
The Italian visit to India marked a
remarkable turnaround in relations that
have been stalled for a decade over an
India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi (R) walks along with his Italian counterpart
Giorgia Meloni during her ceremonial reception at presidential palace Rashtrapati Bhavan
in New Delhi on March 2, 2023.
alleged corruption scandal.
In 2013, the head of Leonardo, then
named Finmeccanica, was arrested in Italy
amid a probe into alleged kickbacks paid by
the firm to Indian officials to land a 560
million euro ($593.5 million) deal to sell 12
AW101 helicopters to India.
As the case wound through the Italian
courts, it sparked parallels probes in India
before finally fizzling out in Italy in 2019
after multiple trials with the supreme court
handing down a definitive acquittal.
By that time, India had ordered a ban on
the buying of defense products from Italy,
which was only lifted last year.
A second, recently resolved row
between Italy and India dates back even
further, to 2012, when two Italian Marines
shot at an Indian fishing boat which
approached the ship they were guarding and
killed two Indian fishermen on board.
As India held the Marines in custody, the
row became a diplomat spat which saw Italy
vetoing India’s entry into the key Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an
exclusive club which counts 34 member
states and controls access to missile and
UAV technology by non-members.
It was only last year that India’s supreme
court ended all proceedings against the
Marines as Italy handed over $1.36 million in
compensation.
As she heads from India to Abu Dhabi in
the UAE, Meloni will be looking to bury the

30 IMR
 Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023

hatchet over another diplomatic row, which
was sparked by an Italian embargo on arms
sales to the UAE ordered in early 2021 by a
previous Italian government to protest the
UAE's military campaign in Yemen.
The UAE subsequently evicted Italian
aircraft and personnel from the Al Minhad
air base in the UAE and denied use of its
airspace to Italian military aircraft.
Al Minhad was at the time a crucial
staging post for Italian military aircraft
heading to the Middle East, the Horn of
Africa and the Indian Ocean.
Defense industrial ties between Italy
and the UAE were also strained by the
complex saga of the Hammerhead drone, a
UAV developed from Piaggio Aero's P180
business aircraft.
Italy-based Piaggio got to work on the
Hammerhead after it was taken over in 2014
by Mubadala Development Company, an
Abu Dhabi-based strategic investment and
development company.
The UAE wanted to buy the
Hammerhead, but also wanted Italy to buy a
version and Rome agreed. But when Italy
wavered on its purchase, the UAE walked
away, cancelling its orders and placing the
firm in receivership in 2018.
Now, Meloni will be seeking a reset in
defense relations in Abu Dhabi,
accompanied by Italian defense minister
Guido Crosetto, who was also in India with
the prime minister and previously visited
the UAE in February.

India Approves Purchase of 70

HTT-40 Basic Trainer Aircraft
BY VIVEK RAGHUVANSHI

NEW DELHI — India’s top decision-maker

on defense matters has endorsed the
purchase of 70 locally made HTT-40 basic
trainer aircraft for $388.5 million.
Defence Minister Rajnath Sigh tweeted
on March 1 that the Cabinet Committee on
Security, chaired by Prime Minister
Narendra Modi, approved the procurement
plan.
The government will sign a contract for
the HTT-40 aircraft later this month, the
Ministry of Defence told Defense News.
The new aircraft will complement the
existing basic training fleet of Swiss-made
PC-12 Mark II basic trainers with the Indian
Air Force. The service currently operates
260 trainer aircraft - a combination of basic
and advanced trainers - against the
requirement for 388.
The MoD said the aircraft will help with
a shortage of basic trainer aircraft of the Air A Dornier, right, an HTT-40, top, and an Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer fly during a 2019 air show
Force as it trains newly inducted pilots. in Bangalore, India.
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. will provide
70 HTT-40 aircraft, associated equipment components, and the ministry expects that capabilities. It also features zero-zero
to increase to 60%. The acquisition of the ejection seats, meaning they function as
and training aids, including simulators,
HTT-40 provides a fillip to the Indian zero altitude and zero airspeed.
over a period of six years, the ministry said. aerospace defense ecosystem and boosts Costing about $7 million per unit, HAL
The company did not respond to a request India's efforts to become self-reliant, the also plans to offer the HTT-40 to foreign
for comment. ministry added.
The HTT-40 program is supported by a customers, a company executive told
India will use its HTT-40 aircraft for
supply chain of more than 100 domestic, Defense News on the condition of
basic flight training, aerobatics, instrument
private, small-scale enterprises that will flying and close formation flights, with anonymity, as the individual was not
provide 1,500 direct and 3,000 indirect secondary roles including navigation and authorized to speak to the media.
employment opportunities through local night flying, HAL said. The executive also said HAL spent $85
suppliers, according to the ministry. This fully aerobatic tandem-seat turbo million on the design and development of
The aircraft currently includes up of trainer has an air-conditioned cockpit, the HTT-40, which included the creation of
56% of Indian-made systems and modern avionics and hot refueling two porotypes and at least 550 test flights.

IMR 31
 SIGHTLINE

India To Buy Three Homemade

Cadet Training Ships
BY VIVEK RAGHUVANSHI

NEW DELHI — The Indian government

March 1 approved the purchase of three
training ships cadets for $388.5 million from
local private defense company Larsen &
Toubro.
Defence Minister Rajnath Sigh tweeted
on March 1 that the Cabinet Committee on
Security, chaired by Prime Minister
Narendra Modi, endorsed the signing of a
contract for the vessels. The Ministry of
Defence said it will ink the contract later
this month, with deliveries to start in 2026.
The ships are to help train officer cadets

Arun Sankar/AFP via Getty Images

at sea following basic training for the Indian
Navy. India could also use the ships for
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
missions.
The MoD said the ships would also
provide training to cadets from friendly
countries, with the aim of strengthening
diplomatic relations.
The planned order is expected to Cadets of the Indian Navy rehearse for an upcoming parade on Jan. 22, 2022.
bolster the Indian Navy's training
capability. The service currently operates
three cadet training ships. town of Kattupalli in Chennai, southern feature an endurance of 60 days and 7,500
Larsen & Toubro won a tender for the India, is to construct the three ships. miles at 15 knots.
naval program last year under the ministry’s The MoD noted that with the majority of Each ship should house 20 officers, 150
Buy Indian-IDDM (Indigenously Designed, equipment and systems sourced from sailors and 200 cadets. Additionally, they will
Developed and Manufactured) indigenous manufacturers, these vessels have an bridge and a chart house dedicated
procurement category, beating out five will serve as an example of India’s effort to for cadet training, plus three classrooms
state-run shipyards: Mazagon Dock become self-reliant. with a seating capacity of 70 in each.
Shipbuilders Ltd.; Garden Reach The company said each training ship The ships will also feature 75mm and
Shipbuilders and Engineers; Goa Shipyard will be 122 meters in length and 18 meters in 12.7mm guns, close-in-weapons with fire
Ltd.; Hindustan Shipyard Ltd.; and Cochin breadth. They are to have a displacement of control systems, combat management and
Shipyard Ltd. 4,700 tons, the contractor added, while data link systems, and advanced composite
The Larsen & Toubro shipyard in the being able to reach a speed of 20 knots, communication technology.

The Time Is Now To Prepare For

China Conflict: U.S. Army Leaders
BY ZAMONE PEREZ
WASHINGTON — Top civilian and
uniformed Army leaders said 2023 will be a
pivotal year to train new capabilities and
equip U.S. forces to deter China from
attacking Taiwan.
During a panel discussion at the
American Enterprise Institute, Secretary of
the Army Christine Wormuth and U.S. Army
Pacific Commander Gen. Charles Flynn
spoke about the “linchpin” role the service
plays in joint force operations, despite
perceptions that the Indo-Pacific is a Navy
and Air Force dominated theatre.
“We’re really building out our integrated
air and missile defense capabilities, for
example, to be able to protect those kinds

32 IMR

of staging bases that are going to be key,”
Wormuth said at the Feb. 27 event. “We
offer the opportunity to provide security
indications to the broader course to again
to provide intra-theatre sustainment,
setting up initial stockpiles, setting up
forward air refueling points, protecting
them.”
The Army will also play a pivotal role in
sustaining the joint force through battle,
such as through theatre distribution
centers, Wormuth added.
Part of those missile defense
capabilities include long-range hypersonic
weapons. Wormuth announced during the
panel that the Army's first battery of long-
range hypersonic weapons will be a part of
the service’s first multi-domain task force in
the fall, following current training at Joint
Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state.
Despite efforts by Washington and its
allies to dissuade China against invading
the self-governing island, Flynn said the
People’s Liberation Army’s preparations do
not reflect a country building up its
defenses, rather a country preparing for a
military conflict outside of its borders.
“They are rehearsing, they are
practicing, they are experimenting, and
they are preparing those forces for
something,” he said. “But you don’t build up
that kind of arsenal just to defend and
protect. You probably are building up for
other purposes.”
In January, Gen. Mike Minihan, who
Weaponized Balloons Challenge
US Air Superiority - Littorally
BY KELLY A. GRIECO AND MAXIMILIAN K.
BREMER
The future of 21st century air warfare
conjures up images of hypersonic missiles,
swarms of smart drones, directed-energy
weapons and artificial intelligence.
Balloons don’t immediately come to mind.
But with the recent downing of a Chinese
high-altitude surveillance balloon over the
Atlantic Ocean, after it crossed the
continental United States, we are reminded
that what was once old is new again.
Just as the emergence of the submarine,
the self-propelled torpedo, mines and
Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023
SIGHTLINE
Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth
leads Air Mobility Command, urged his
troops to prepare for war in memo leaked
on social media. He predicted Chinese
President Xi Jinping, now in his third term,
would take advantage of possibly fraught
elections in Taiwan and the United States in
2024.
Wormuth, although not directly
mentioning the memo, said she did not
agree with Minihan’s perspective on
China's timeline. Flynn highlighted how
much manpower and resources it would
take to build an invasion force to even get
off of mainland China - and the
aircraft during the early 20th century added
subsurface and above-surface threats in the
contest for sea control, so too do small
drones, loitering munitions, missiles and,
yes, balloons add threats to air control from
above and below the altitudes of
conventional air superiority.
To gain an asymmetric advantage, U.S.
adversaries increasingly seek to operate at
the edges of the air domain – that is, at
altitudes below and above the “blue skies,”
where high-end fighter and bombers
typically fly. In the air littoral, located below
15,000 feet, adversaries can exploit a mix of
old and new technologies – such as man-
complexities of crossing more than 80
miles of water and holding gains once
forces have landed.
“The complexity of a joint Island
random campaign is not a small matter,”
Flynn said. “You have to be an incredibly
professional, well trained, well led force,
and they’re working on it. But I will tell you
that, in my part, from my perspective,
they’re not 10 feet tall. They have work to
do, and I think that now’s the time for us to
get into position to be able to deter that
event from happening.”
portable air defense systems, radar-guided
anti-aircraft artillery, cruise missiles, dual-
use drone technologies and loitering
munitions - to keep the airspace contested.
The recent intrusion of a Chinese
surveillance balloon into American
airspace points to the potential emergence
of an analogous set of littoral threats at the
highest reaches of the air domain.
The space littoral
The Chinese balloon incident offers a
first glimpse of the contest to control the
“space littoral” – that is, the airspace at
altitudes between about 60,000 feet (known
IMR 33
 SIGHTLINE

as the Armstrong limit) and the edge of

space, roughly 330,000 feet (or the Kármán
line).
The use of high-altitude spy and military
balloons is itself not new. The Japanese
lofted incendiary balloons into the jet
stream toward the West Coast in World War
II. The United States conducted a series of
spy balloon missions over the Soviet Union
in the 1950s and even more recently tested
the use of mass surveillance balloons

Photo by U.S. Department of Defense via Getty Images

across the United States.
What’s different today is that balloons
guided by artificial intelligence can both
cheaply access and persist in the space
littoral, thanks to a combination of
technological advancements and
commercial processes. Commercial
companies are increasingly accessing the
space littoral, using high-altitude balloons
for ultrahigh-resolution imagery, internet
communications and scientific research.
These dual-use space assets will
increasingly place the capabilities to
contest the space littoral in more
adversaries’ hands.
Adversaries will seek to gain an
advantage by operating in the zone of
domain convergence between air and
space. A 2018 article in the PLA Daily, the
official newspaper of the Chinese People's
Liberation Army, called the space littoral a
"new battlefield in modern warfare."
Though a Chinese spy balloon floating
across the United States is not contesting
air superiority – it is transiting airspace - the
episode hints at other possibilities.
Beijing could use high-altitude balloons
to launch missiles or swarms of drones
against air bases and known radar sites.
China seems to recognize these
possibilities. “At present and for a long time
to come, the vast majority of air defense
weapons will not threaten targets in near
space,” China’s Aerospace Security
Strategic Concept concluded in 2016,
characterizing the space littoral as “an
important penetration channel for rapid
and long-range strikes.”
But these are more than mere words. In
2018, the Chinese state media reported the
test of a high-altitude balloon carrying
hypersonic missiles.
Other Chinese military writings also
demonstrate interest in these ideas. In 2020,
two Chinese strategists argued that “near-
space weapons have incomparable
advantages over traditional weapons.”
Owing to the advantage of height, they
explained that the “reconnaissance field of
view and strike coverage” area of
high–altitude balloons is "much larger than
that of traditional aircraft,” adding that
“near space-weapons enable fast, agile, and
In this handout image provided by the Department of Defense, a U.S. Air Force U-2 pilot looks
down at the suspected Chinese surveillance balloon on Feb. 3, 2023 as it hovers over the
Central Continental United States. Recovery efforts began shortly after the balloon was downed.
stealthy ground strikes” and “its stealth
ability is strong, so it is not easy to be
detected and identified by radar, infrared
and other detection equipment.”
Because these balloons have a very
small radar cross section, which renders
them harder to detect and eliminate, they
could pose a persistent threat to airborne
systems, including aircraft, operating in the
blue skies below them.
Indeed, Gen. Glen VanHerck, the head
of North American Aerospace Defense
Command and U.S. Northern Command,
has acknowledged the United States failed
to detect previous incursions by Chinese
spy balloons into American airspace,
exposing a “domain awareness gap.” Last
month, after NORAD expanded its filter for
slow-flying objects, it started detecting
more objects, leading to the shoot-down of
three other objects later determined to
have a “benign purpose,” having most likely
been launched by private companies or
research institutions. Even if detected,
high-altitude balloons will still pose the
challenge of filtering out actual threats
from the background noise.
China also might employ balloons to
detect and engage American air defense
radars, effectively blinding the entire
system. Chinese researchers have made the
case for employing balloons to “induce and
mobilize the enemy’s air defense system,
providing the conditions for the
implementation of electronic
reconnaissance, assessment of air defense
systems’ early warning detection and
operational response capabilities.”
Even if the United States manages to
intercept enemy balloons, they are cheap.
The United States used a $250 million F-22
fighter armed with a $472,000 AIM-9
Sidewinder missile to shoot down a
Chinese surveillance balloon that probably
cost thousands of dollars. The exchange
rate for the other three shoot-downs was
likely even more unfavorable. If an
adversary were to employ hundreds of
these balloons, this approach would
quickly become unsustainable.
In short, the Chinese balloon incident
portends a future in which cheap,
persistent capabilities will challenge
aspects of U.S. air superiority.
A littoral paradigm
The U.S. Air Force needs to prepare
for this future now. This calls for
doctrinal innovation, not technological
invention or incremental adaptations of
existing weapon systems. New thinking,
not technology or legacy ideas, is the
answer.
The first step is to recognize and name
the problem. Incorporating the concepts of
the “air littoral” and “space littoral” into
service and joint doctrine would help to
build a common language around the
problem the force wants to solve. The
second step is to develop new operational

34 IMR
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SIGHTLINE

concepts and vertical schemes of maneuver
for operating in these zones.
The littorals are the messy middle area
between sea and land, ground and sky, and
air and space. The characteristic of domain
convergence makes them simultaneously
more challenging and more critical for
military operations: They are the avenues of
transit, paths of attack and waypoints of
cross-domain maneuver. They are also now
becoming areas of persistent contestation,
whether the U.S. Air Force likes it or not.
U.S. Air Force Col. Maximilian Bremer
is the director of the Special Programs
Division at Air Mobility Command. Kelly
Grieco is a senior fellow with the
Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy Program
at the Stimson Center think tank and an
adjunct associate professor of security
studies at Georgetown University. This
commentary does not necessarily reflect
the views of the U.S. Defense Department
nor the U.S. Air Force.

‘Smaller, Better And Cheaper’:

Portable Drone Interceptors
BY ELISABETH GOSSELIN-MALO

MILAN, Italy — Manufacturers of

counter-drone weaponry say they are
increasingly miniaturizing and simplifying
their solutions to meet rising demand for
man–portable weapons, as recent conflicts
have accentuated the importance of mobile
capabilities.
Man-portable, counter-unmanned
aerial systems (C-UAS) have been around

Photo by Rob Engelaar/ANP/AFP via Getty Images

for some time, however, with the growing
threat of weaponized commercial drones in
recent years, their proliferation has
accelerated. In a 2019 C-UAS database
report compiled by the Center for the Study
of the Drone at Bard College, out of 537
market products analyzed, 111 (21%) were
hand-held solutions, offered by over 29
different countries.
Warren Brown, vice president of
Marketing at Fortem Technologies,
explains that the purpose and ways these
systems are used today have also changed
over the last decade. “Historically, security
detail and protection of major events or key
infrastructure has been focused on fixed
solutions. The more recent conflicts in the
Middle East and Ukraine have shifted the
focus to 'on-the-move' systems that provide
advanced radar detection capabilities, ease
of deployment and portability, low overall
cost of operation as well as low per-use
cost,” he said. There seems to have also
been to an extent a change in the belief that
C-UAS measures must be large in order to
be good.
Previously, many militaries relied on
more conventional jamming alternatives to
counter hostile drones, either because they
lacked the access or resources to acquire
more proper and reliable systems.
However, Brown states that resorting to
deploy legacy equipment is not always
effective, as they were not necessarily
developed to address the full and ever-
Dutch soldiers take part in a counter-drone exercise at the Lieutenant General Best Barracks
in Vredepeel, Netherlands, on Sept. 22, 2022. Companies are upping their offerings of
portable equipment capable of taking down hostile drones.
evolving technology behind drone threats. Te c h n o l o g y s e n t i t s m a n - p o r t a b l e
“Traditional jamming solutions have DroneHunters to Ukraine, stating in a press
had a low success rate, forcing the use of release that it had taken the pre-existing C-
costly and impractical systems such as UAS system and further miniaturized and
larger missile weapons, and even deploying simplified it for use as an expeditionary
fighter aircraft to attempt to mitigate the rapid deployment weapon.
threat – often ineffective on small, Matt McCrann, CEO of DroneShield,
maneuverable and hard-to-detect UAVs,” he believes this is telling of where these types
said. Such a scenario was most recently on of technologies are heading. “Absolutely,
display in South Korea’s failed attempt to the goal is always to take a capability and
shoot down its neighbors' drones for make it easier to use, more effective and
several hours. cost-effective. Smaller, better and cheaper,”
Manufacturers have taken notice of he said.
these issues, building on existing DroneShield’s hand-held
technologies but reimagining them to more countermeasures, such as its DroneGuns,
effectively address the dangers drones provide a number of advantages. As a small
pose, specifically smaller ones that may be and lightweight system, it is an easily
harder to counter. In May 2022, Fortem transportable C-UAS capability that can be

IMR 35
 SIGHTLINE

stowed in a vehicle, rucksack or body-work
with a sling as the battlefield shifts. Powered
by swappable batteries, DroneGuns are non-
kinetic, utilizing an electronic attack method
meaning that they can provide unlimited
“rounds” which is more economical than
kinetic systems and safer to operate with
minimal training required.
In a similar fashion, other man-portable
systems such as Fortem’s DroneHunters
F700, present countries with a lower per-
use cost alternative than other pricier
systems on the market. On this, Brown
points out that each shot of their weapon
costs only a few hundred dollars,
considerably cheaper than high-energy
systems like Electro-Magnetic Pulse (laser)
weapons, which also require extensive
power source.
An additional benefit of the Fortem
system for neutralizing drones is that the
system can take them down in a controlled
manner with a drogue parachute, allowing
for reconnaissance and analysis of the
enemy system as well as reducing collateral
damage. This is in contrast to more
conventional defensive techniques that can
cause the hostile UAV to explode or fall
from the sky, often damaging in the process
civilians and infrastructure, or allowing it to
return to its launch point with no potential
study of its mission or where it came from.
Brown claims that in Fortem’s 5,000-
plus documented captures, its solutions
have a success rate of 92%. DroneHunters
further deployed to protect multiple
stadiums during the FIFA World Cup in
Qatar. For DroneShield, McCrann says that
their operational effectiveness have been
high in both military and more traditional
security environments, pointing to the
recent instance where its DroneGun
Tactical was used to neutralize 4 hovering
drones during the presidential inauguration
in Brazil.
Despite the advantages these systems
offer, McCrann warns that shrinking any
given capability generally involves one or
several tradeoffs. “For electronic
countermeasures, that (miniaturizing)
tradeoff is usually seen in the total output
power of the system where smaller may
indicate its less effective range and the need
to get in closer,” he explains. However, in a
drone-on-drone scenario, such as with the
DroneHunter or similar systems, that
tradeoff of an electronic warfare payload
might be acceptable because the
engagement happens at close range
anyway.

Hydrogen-Fueled Drones Offer

Increased Payloads, Endurance
BY SETH J. FRANTZMAN

JERUSALEM, Israel — An Israeli

company said it's working with country’s
Ministry of Defense on supplying drones
fueled by hydrogen that can carry payloads
that are larger than what traditional
quadcopters can handle, and for greater
distances.
HevenDrones said that “with 5-times
greater energy efficiency than traditional
lithium battery-powered drones, the H2D55
is capable of flying for 100 minutes” with a
payload capacity of 7 kilograms (15
pounds).
Chief Executive Officer Bentzion
Levinson, speaking ahead of next week’s
IDEX defense and security exhibition in
Abu Dhabi, said that HevenDrones seeks to
provide drones that fill a capability gap that
exists between large HALE and MALE
drones, and smaller quadcopters that carry H2D55 hydrogen fuel cell drone
cameras and other sensors.
“Between those two types there is a big onto the payload, Levinson said. company worked closely with Israel's
lack of drones, not only taking pictures but One limitation drones face is that a Ministry of Defense on this project over the
taking a role on the battlefield, so we call it larger payload means a drone needs more last year and a half.
taking drones from a flying camera to battery power, and then the weight “Essentially we create energy in the sky
robot,” he told C4ISRNET in an interview. becomes larger, meaning the drone needs with a hydrogen tank and cylinder that is
The dronemaker has launched drones larger engines. This triangle of size issues highly pressurized and it makes the gas into
that carry a 20 pound and 70 pound has kept smaller drones from achieving energy and that goes into a battery that
payloads, which can be useful to supply long ranges and endurance in terms of powers the drone,” Levinson said.
soldiers on the battlefield, carrying things flying time. Levinson says that using
like water, ammunition or medical supplies. hydrogen fuel enables a longer flight time Swappable fuel cells
The company also integrated land robots and a better energy-to-weight ratio. The HevenDrones worked with hydrogen

36 IMR
 Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023

SIGHTLINE

fuel energy developers in New York state
and the U.K. to customize an energy source
for the drones. Hydrogen fuel cells can be
swapped out, like a battery, and armies can
bring fuel to a base to portably refuel tanks,
and one can have an electrolyzer in the
field, with water and electricity, to create
the hydrogen fuel source, according tot he
company.
The company has tested these energy
sources to make them safe, subjecting them
to small arms fire and also dropping them
from a height. It’s planning to open an office
in Miami says it is starting to see global
growth in partnerships.
“The hydrogen tailored factories has
opened a new capability and new
generation…if you can imagine the changes
on battlefield for instance,” said Levinson, a
f o r m e r s o l d i e r. “ I w a s a c o m b a t
commander, we find ourselves as military
people in difficult situations and having
flying robots that can fight the war with us
and carry our bags or fly in a few hundred
feet ahead of us with thermal cameras and
eliminate risks, that can eliminate risk to
our soldiers.”
HevenDrones sees the potential for
partnerships in the UAE. In the wake of the
peace deal with Israel, called the Abraham
Accords, Israeli companies have been
appearing at IDEX. CEO Levinson says he sees
growth, resources and also an "innovation
mindset” in the UAE that has potential for
“strengthening the region and that is a key
priority. We see it as a top market.”
Like most Israel companies in the
defense sector, HevenDrones doesn’t
disclose its other customers but says it has
drones “flying on two continents.” The
battery-powered drones are already
operational and the hydrogen-powered
drone has passed a proof of concept, with
the company expecting to deliver the first of
these drones to the market in the next
couple of months. It describes the H2D55 as
the first hydrogen-powered drone for
commercial use, and said its working with
an unnamed global parter to roll it out in the
second half of 2023."
“Imagine 30 drones advancing in a
swarm and if they don’t have to come back
every 30 minutes but in a few hours,"
Levinson said. “Hydrogen can mean 4-5
hours of flight time, so it’s a big jump; it’s a
new capability of what we can do with
payloads and flight time.”

What Will ChatGPT Mean For

The US Defense-Industrial Base?
BY NOAH RIVERS AND OLIVIA LETTS

ChatGPT is an artificial intelligence-

enabled chatbot tool developed by U.S.-
based AI lab OpenAI. Two months after its
launch in November, it became the fastest
consumer application in history to reach
100 million active users, and it has already
started to have a noticeable impact in
business and academia.
The extent to which ChatGPT (or its
technological successors and relatives) will

Photo by Lionel Bonaventure/AFP/Getty Images

have an impact on national security and
defense acquisitions is still unclear, as the
technology has yet to replace humans in
any meaningful capacity. However, based
on initial use cases and reactions to the tool,
ChatGPT is already creating benefits as
well as risks for defense professionals.
ChatGPT, derived from a machine
learning-based language model known as
GPT-3.5, is considered a groundbreaking
form of generative AI. This means that it is
capable of interacting conversationally
with users and generating detailed human- This picture, taken on Jan. 23, 2023, in Toulouse, France, shows screens displaying the
like responses to questions or prompts in a logos of OpenAI and ChatGPT.
variety of text formats, proving itself a
useful tool across various fields. has also made headlines for passing a large companies have complaints about
For example, across the health care, variety of benchmark exams, including time-consuming regulations, but smaller
real estate, public relations, marketing, correctly answering technical questions for businesses sometimes face more
customer service, and media industries, an entry-level Google software engineering difficulties complying with Federal
some companies have started using job and achieving passing grades on both a Acquisition Regulation standards due to
iterations of generative AI, especially law school test and Wharton business their unfamiliarity with processes and
ChatGPT, for various tasks from scheduling school paper. procedures associated with government
appointments to writing articles. ChatGPT In the defense sector, both small and contracting. ChatGPT can already help

IMR 37

alleviate this problem.
A s o n e Yo u Tu b e c r e a t o r h a s
demonstrated, the tool can be used to write
the skeleton of a government contract, and
while this is not a comprehensive solution,
it can certainly assist founders of small- and
medium-sized businesses (SMB) who
already firing on all cylinders to get
proposals out and accepted. According to
M e g a n Va n H o r n , p r e s i d e n t o f
Bridge4Acquisitions, ChatGPT is helpful
both for drafting content and conducting
reviews. She noted that without the right
knowledge and experience in the
government contracting world, the tool
does not produce great results, but when
coupled with the right expertise it is a
disruptive technology that helps her save
clients' time and money on the path to
securing government contracts.
The Department of Defense has also
caught on to the benefits of using generative
AI to speed up and simplify the federal
acquisition process. This year, the DoD's
Chief Digital and AI Office announced that
it is prototyping and testing an AI-powered
contract-writing capability, called "Acqbot."
The tool is intended to help contracting
officers write contracts and manage the
contract lifecycle. Currently, the tool is still
being developed and requires substantial
input data and human supervision.
On the flip side of its potential benefits
How the US Navy is creating the
‘nirvana of one combat system’
By Megan Eckstein
ARLINGTON, Va. — The U.S. Navy is
considering how best to equip ships and
sailors to take advantage of fleetwide
connectivity that Project Overmatch will
provide. At the heart of this is the Integrated
Combat System, a single hardware-
agnostic software suite that all ships can
pull from to conduct missions alone or in a
group.
The service is still in the early stages of
developing its Integrated Combat System,
something that the director of surface
warfare says is a concept today but should
translate to a program of record within the
next two or three years.
“ICS will enable a surface action group,
a strike group and a fleet – or any
38 IMR
SIGHTLINE
in the defense sector, ChatGPT also
provides cybercriminals with an arsenal of
potential use cases threatening the
cybersecurity posture of American citizens
and the federal government. It is already
being used by non-state threat actors,
including script kiddies, hacktivists, and
scammers, to engage in various forms of
cybercrime, but in the future, ChatGPT's
technology has the potential to be
harnessed by nation-state actors to conduct
cyberespionage, information operations,
and cyberattacks to increasingly
devastating effect. ChatGPT is easy to use
and accessible to users with elementary
cyber proficiency levels, lowering the
barrier to entry for various criminal actors.
ChatGPT still has a long way to go
before it can be relied upon for the most
important tasks in national security or
defense contracting. The information it
produces is displayed confidently yet is
often unreliable without further
verification-ChatGPT is incapable of
acknowledging potential misinformation.
OpenAI's own FAQ page notes that
ChatGPT sometimes produces incorrect or
biased answers, and it has limited
knowledge of anything that occurred prior
to 2021. Some software developers have
even banned ChatGPT answers because it
often generates code with substantial
errors, an obstacle to individuals using
combination of Integrated Combat
System–equipped ships – to operate as a
single system, to become a system of
systems,” Rear Adm. Fred Pyle said Feb. 1
at an American Society of Naval Engineers
conference in Arlington, Virginia.
The warfighting value of the Integrated
Combat System is its ability to deliver
decision superiority at machine speed, he
added. The business case is that it will allow
the Navy to deliver future capabilities via
software uploads rather than expensive
hardware installations.
The key to this :paradigm shift” – of
connecting a group of ships and allowing
their combat systems to collectively agree
on a best course of action based on ships’
locations, munitions stocks and other
factors – is the aids that will help humans
ChatGPT for either good or nefarious
purposes.
Given the extent of its limitations, the
reality is that the current version of
ChatGPT will not revolutionize national
security or government contracting
immediately. Nevertheless, government
contractors and the DoD workforce should
develop a better understanding of the pros
and cons that AI and ML-based capabilities
will bring to their industry in the coming
years.
When chatbots get even “smarter,”
defense professionals who were shrewd
enough hone their awareness of advances
in AI such as ChatGPT will be most poised
to take advantage of the technology's
benefits and defend against its security
risks.
Noah Rivers and Olivia Letts are
research associates at the Greg and Camille
Baroni Center for Government Contracting
at the George Mason University School of
Business.
Have an opinion?
This article is an Op-Ed and the
opinions expressed are those of the author.
If you would like to respond, or have an
editorial of your own you would like to
submit, please email C4ISRNET and
Federal Times Senior Managing Editor Cary
O'Reilly.
make rapid decisions, Pyle explained.
“The ability for a decision-maker –
whether they're in the fleet, whether they’re
in a strike group, whether they're in ... a
maritime operations center, or whether
they're sitting on a cruiser – to be able to
pair any sensor to any shooter, that’s pretty
powerful,” he told Defense News during the
conference.
Ensign Nancy Smith uses a radio aboard
the destroyer Benfold to speak with a
marine patrol craft. (MC1 Benjamin
Dobbs/U.S. Navy)
Bryan Clark, a naval operations expert
with the Hudson Institute think tank,
recently told Defense News that Project
Overmatch has shifted its focus from
communications to command and control.
That includes the development of
 Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023

SIGHTLINE

"command-and-control tools that we want

to give commanders so they can use the
communications they have available to
them to formulate courses of action,” he
said, “and then implement those at a scale
and tempo that maybe the opponent can't
keep up with.”
These tools don't include a lot of
artificial intelligence yet, he added, but
perhaps enough machine learning to help
the tools weed out ideas that haven’t
worked or weren’t previously selected.
They do, however, rely on modeling and
simulation to pitch possible actions to the
user.

Mc3 Santiago Navarro/U.S. Navy

The value, Clark said, is that U.S.
adversaries like China will expect
American naval formations to behave in
predictable ways in line with established
doctrine. “If we can create more
unpredictability, then that's going to
introduce more uncertainty and potentially
better deter China,” he noted.
Clark said the Defense Department has
made early investments in decision aids.
For example, the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency created an
artificial intelligence program that can win
dogfights in the air; that could be turned
into an autopilot tool for pilots in air-to-air
combat. Other decision aids are aimed at
Marine Corps platoon commanders, as the
service pushes more data and sensors
down to the unit level.
As Project Overmatch evolves, Clark
said, the Navy will likely increase
investments in the decision aids that will
accompany the increased connectivity
between ships.
Pyle said his aim for these aids, as they
related to the Integrated Combat System,
will be to help humans across ships work
together at machine speed. Today, ships
within a battle group share domain
awareness, targeting information and
more, but not always fast enough. With
their combat systems fully netted together
and each ship able to see what the others
see, decision aids will help humans take full
advantage of that connectivity to identify
“the best option for the highest probability
of success available for an engagement.”
This range of options will eventually
include the expenditure of missiles across
ships, as well as directed-energy weapons
and jamming capabilities available
throughout the battle group.
As for the business case - being able to
more rapidly and inexpensively field new
Lt. Cmdr. Joshua Szakal activates a missile firing control in the combat information center
aboard the guided-missile cruiser Shiloh on Jan. 23, 2023.
capabilities - the Navy and its contractors
are working to decouple hardware from
software within traditional combat
systems: the Aegis Combat System for
surface combatants, and the Ship Self-
Defense System for amphibious ships and
aircraft carriers.
Pyle said the military was slow to adopt
software innovations from industry, but
that it was now working to create a better
software environment.
Joe DePietro, Lockheed Martin’s vice
president and general manager for naval
combat and missile defense systems, told
Defense News the company is already
supporting the Integrated Combat System.
When it comes to decoupling hardware
from software, Lockheed is now delivering
containerized and virtualized software that
can run from a computer server much
smaller than what currently resides on
Navy ships. The service hopes it can
periodically replace servers in a hardware
refresh, but also separately push software
updates whenever it wants to send out a fix
or a new capability.
A missile is launched from the destroyer
John Finn, a U.S. Navy ship equipped with
the Aegis ballistic missile defense system.
(Courtesy of the U.S. Missile Defense
Agency)
DePietro said in a December interview
that this decoupling allows the Navy to
move to an information-as-a-service model,
where ships don’t have to store the entire
software library onboard but rather could
pull what is needed on demand.
Lockheed in 2022 completed an effort to
transition both Aegis and the Ship Self-
Defense System into a continuous
integration/continuous delivery pipeline,
which includes tools to pull just the right
pieces of software needed to conduct a
certain mission, DePietro said. These tools
can speed up testing and integration efforts
by weeks and months, and they support the
information-as-a-service model for the
Integrated Combat System.
Pyle said at the conference that these
and other related efforts would “deliver the
software to achieve the merger of Aegis,
SSDS and other systems we have out there,
so we get to that nirvana of one combat
system.”
About Megan Eckstein
Megan Eckstein is the naval warfare
reporter at Defense News. She has covered
military news since 2009, with a focus on
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operations,
acquisition programs and budgets. She has
reported from four geographic fleets and is
happiest when she’s filing stories from a
ship. Megan is a University of Maryland
alumna.

IMR 39
 INDIA-U.S.
India-US agree to expand cooperation

Initiative on Critical and

Emerging Technologies
Dr D Bhalla, IAS

A s the Biden administration looks to

strengthen its connections with Asian
allies and offset China’s dominance of
cutting-edge technologies, India and the
United States agreed, on 1 February, to expand
co o p e rat i o n o n a d va n c e d we a p o n r y,
supercomputing, semiconductors and other
high-tech fields, as the Biden administration
looks to strengthen its connections with Asian
allies and offset China’s dominance of cutting-
edge technologies.
The agreements followed two days of high-
level meetings in Washington between
government officials and executives from
dozens of companies, the first under a new
dialogue about critical and emerging
technologies that President Joe Biden and
India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval met his US counterpart Jake Sullivan met in Washington to elevate
announced in Tokyo in May 2022. India-US strategic partnership with the launch of the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology
The partnerships announced include an
agreement between the US and Indian
national science agencies to cooperate on
artificial intelligence and advanced wireless
“work
Both countries would
together to
semiconductor ecosystems.
India’s space program will work with NASA
on human space flight opportunities and other
technology, as well as in other areas. projects, the Indian statement said.
The countries also pledged to speed up their facilitate the build-out of
efforts to jointly produce and develop certain NSAs Meeting
defense technologies, including jet engines, an advanced mobile National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and his
artillery systems and armored infantry vehicles. US counterpart Jake Sullivan discussed aligning
The United States said it would look to quickly network in India and look India and the US's strategic, commercial and
review a new proposal by General Electric to
produce a jet engine with India.
for new cooperation in scientific approaches specifically in the field of
technology on 1 February.
Both countries would work together to semiconductor
“ Sullivan and Doval, and Commerce
facilitate the build-out of an advanced mobile Secretary Gina Raimondo met with senior
network in India and look for new cooperation in production. officials from both countries at the White
semiconductor production, including efforts to House, on 31 January, to launch the U.S.-India
help India bolster chip research and production space and high-performance quantum Initiative on Critical and Emerging
that would complement major investments in computing. Technologies. Sullivan and Doval participated
the industry in the United States. The two countries also established a in a Chamber of Commerce event with
The new dialogue would include efforts to quantum technology coordination mechanism corporate leaders from Lockheed Martin Corp,
work through regulatory barriers, as well as and agreed to set up a task force with India’s Adani Enterprises and Applied Materials Inc.
visa restrictions that have prevented talented Semiconductor Mission, the India Electronics Jake Sullivan said that the goal was for
Indians from working in the United States, the Semiconductor Association (IESA) and the U.S. technological partnerships to be “the next big
countries said. Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) milestone” in the US-Indian relationship after a
The initiative also includes a joint effort on to promote the development of 2016 agreement on nuclear power

40

cooperation. He described the effort as a “big
foundational piece of an overall strategy to put
the entire democratic world in the Indo-Pacific
in a position of strength.”
"The larger challenge posed by China - its
economic practices, its aggressive military
moves, its efforts to dominate the industries of
the future and to control the supply chains of
the future - have had a profound impact on the
thinking in Delhi," Sullivan said.
Biden and Modi are also propelling closer
US-Indian cooperation in efforts to build out
the industrial and innovation bases of their
countries.
Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology
(iCET)
With the launch of the initiative on Critical
and Emerging Technology (iCET), India and the
United States have elevated their strategic
partnership. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and
US President Joe Biden had announced the US-
India initiative on iCET in May 2022. The aim was
to elevate and expand strategic technology
partnerships and defence industrial cooperation
between India and the US.
On the defence front, iCET aims to expand
India-US cooperation in fields like artificial
intelligence and military equipment. The iCET
announced a new bilateral defence industrial
cooperation roadmap that will be intended to
accelerate defence technology cooperation.
There are other items in the defence
bucket as well, such as launching a new
innovation bridge to connect the US and India.
White House press secretary Karine Jean-
Pierre, on queries whether iCET was to
effectively counter China, said even though the
geopolitical context cannot be ignored, this
initiative is not about any one country. "It truly
is about something bigger than that," she said,
adding that the US will continue to strengthen
its partnership with India.
NSA Jake Sullivan had also acknowledged
the geopolitical dimension of the initiative
saying, "The competition with China has been a
feature of the US-India relationship now for
more than a decade."
Both Biden and Modi are also propelling
closer US-Indian cooperation in efforts to build
out the industrial and innovation bases of their
countries, Sullivan said.
General Electric Co, meanwhile, is asking
the U.S. government for permission to produce
jet engines with India that would power
aircraft operated and produced by India,
according to the White House, which says a
review is underway. New Delhi said that the
U.S. government would review General
Electric’s application expeditiously and that
the two countries would focus on joint
production of “key items of mutual interest” in
Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023
“ China believes India is
willing to ramp up its
ties with the US to
advance technology and
attract more funding to
replace its position in
the global industrial and
“ advantage.
supply chains.
defense.
China Irked
It is noteworthy that iCET has no explicit
reference to China but the new initiative has
irked China, with the state-run Global Times
calling iCET a microcosm of "same bed,
different dreams".
China believes India is willing to ramp up its
ties with the US to advance technology and
attract more funding to replace its position in
the global industrial and supply chains.
"As for Washington, to rope in India, on the
one hand, it has to cater to what the country
wants. On the other hand, it can promote an
agenda that puts India as part of "friend-
shoring," and then India can become a supply-
chain alternative to China," Liu Zongyi of
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies
was quoted as saying by the Global Times. It
also noted that the initiative is part of the US's
"wishful thinking" but is unlikely to bear fruit as
India is unlikely to follow the US's playbook, as
per the Global Times report.
"The US wants to kill two birds with one
stone by luring India to join its initiative to
contain China's tech rise," a Chinese official
told Global Times.
India's Russia Connection
India’s frequent purchases of Russian
military equipment and close ties with Russia
also present another wrinkle to the planned
partnership. But Biden officials said they
believed that the cooperation could accelerate
India’s move away from Russia, to the benefit
of its relationship with the United States.
New Delhi has frustrated Washington by
participating in military exercises with Russia
and increasing purchases of the country's crude
oil, a key source of funding for Russia's war in
Ukraine. But Washington has held its tongue,
nudging the country on Russia while condoning
India's more hawkish stance on China.
Comments
The agreements will be a test of whether
the Biden administration can realize its
proposal for “friendshoring” by shifting the
manufacturing of certain critical components
to friendly countries. Biden officials have
expressed concerns about the United States’
continued heavy reliance on China for
semiconductors, telecommunications parts
and other important goods. In recent months
they have clamped down on the sale of
advanced semiconductor technology to China,
in an effort to stymie an industry that the
White House says could give China a military
Many companies have found it difficult to
obtain the factory space and skilled workers
they would need to move their supply chains
out of China. India has a highly skilled
workforce and a government that wants to
attract more international investment, but
multinational companies seeking to operate
there continue to complain of onerous
regulations, inadequate infrastructure and
other barriers.
The US hopes that the partnership with
India will help the countries compete against
China on military equipment, semiconductors
and artificial intelligence. But the White House
faces an uphill battle on each front, including
U.S. restrictions on military technology
transfer and visas for immigrant workers, along
with India's longstanding dependence on
Moscow for military hardware.
Experts felt that India would need to
continue to reform its permitting and tax
system to lure more foreign manufacturing
companies. And the United States would need
to reform restrictions on transferring defense-
related technology outside the country, they
said, if it hopes to work with India to produce
jet engines and other advanced weapons.
Analysts also noted that many of the
technology partnerships would hinge on new
connections between the countries’ private
sectors, meaning that the agreements could go
only so far.
India has traditionally been known as a
difficult partner for the United States in trade
negotiations. In the talks that the Biden
administration is carrying out in Asia, known as
the Indo-Pacific Economic Forum, India bowed
out of the trade portion of the deal, though it has
continued to negotiate in areas such as clean
energy, supply chains and labor standards.
Although India is part of the Biden
administration's signature Asian engagement
project, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
(IPEF), it has opted against joining the IPEF
trade pillar negotiations.
But analysts said the Indian government
was far more motivated on national security
matters, and particularly tempted by the
prospects of working with the United States to
cultivate cutting-edge tech industries.
41
 DEFENCE DIPLOMACY
Port Calls, Visits and
Defence Dialogues
Visit of Japanese
Naval Ships to Kochi
Japan Maritime Self Defence Force
(JMSDF) Ships Uraga and Awaji made port call
at Kochi from 14 -16 Feb 23. The ship's crew
visited professional training schools and ship of
Southern Naval Command. During the visit,
they were familarised with various training
facilities and activities undertaken at the
Training Command of the Indian Navy. Visit and
professional interaction onboard Japanese
ships were conducted to enhance
interoperability and share best practices
between the Navies.
two countries were reviewed, with both sides
agreeing to increase the complexity of bilateral Visit of French Navy
exercises.
Sri Lanka and India agreed to increase the
Ships to Kochi
French Navy Ships FS Dixmude,an
intensity of bilateral military exercises and
amphibious helicopter carrier and La Fayette,
vowed to avail maximum benefits from each
frigate visited Kochi on 6 - 10 Mar 2023 as part
other's experience and capacities, a move that
of circumnavigation mission. During the
came amid China's attempts to expand its
ongoing visit, the French team visited
influence in the Indian Ocean region.
professional training schools and ships of
ADD is an annual apex-level defence
Southern Naval Command. Cross training
engagement between the two countries to
visits, professional and social interaction
discuss regional security situations, common
including sports fixtures were some of the
security challenges and avenues for closer
highlights of the visit. The French Army
defence cooperation towards ensuring 'Security
embarked onboard ships will also conduct joint
and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR).
military exercise with the Indian Army.

INS Sumedha Visits Abu
Dhabi
INS Sumedha visited Abu Dhabi, UAE to
participate in NAVDEX 23 (Naval Defence
Exhibition) and IDEX 23 (International Defence
Exhibition), from 20 to 24 Feb 2023 and
showcased the strengths of India's indigenous
ship building and underscore the 'Aatma
Nirbhar Bharat' initiative. INS Sumedha is the
third ship of the indigenously built Saryu class
Naval Offshore Patrol Vessels (NOPV) and was
indigenously at Goa Shipyard Limited. She is
fitted with an impressive array of weapons and
sensors, can carry an integral helicopter and
boasts of long endurance. .
To enhance interoperability between the
two navies, Indian Navy-UAE Navy bilateral
exercise, Zayed Talwar, has been held since
March 2018, with the last edition being in
August 2021.
India-Sri Lanka Annual
Defence Dialogue
The 7th Annual Defence Dialogue between
India and Sri Lanka was held in New Delhi on
February 23, 2023. It was co-chaired by
Defence Secretary Giridhar Aramane and his
Sri Lankan counterpart General Kamal
Gunaratne. During the meeting, the ongoing
defence cooperation activities between the
Royal Navy Chief Visits
India
Sir Ben Key First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval
Staff, Royal Navy visited India on 2 – 3 Mar 23 to
participate in Raisina Dialogue at Delhi. During
the visit, he interacted with Adm R Hari Kumar,
Chief of the Naval Staff. The discussions
emphasized on the significance accorded by
both countries for a collaborative approach
towards maritime security in Indo-Pacific. The
bilateral relationship between India and UK
was upgraded to a ‘Strategic Partnership’ in
2 0 0 4 . T h e I n d i a n N av y – Ro ya l N av y
cooperation have been steered in accordance
UK-India Joint statement announced during
PM Boris Johnson’s visit to India in April 2022.
The engagements between Indian Navy and
Royal Navy include operational interactions
such as the Bilateral Ex Konkan and Joint
Services Ex Konkan Shakti, training exchanges
and exchange of Maritime Information and
Subject Matter Experts in various fields. In
addition, warships from both Navies regularly
make port calls at each other’s ports, especially
after the increased significance of the Indo-
Pacific region.
Speaking at the Raisina Dialogue 2023, Sir
Ben Key said that UK is supportive of 'Make in
India'. He said, “India is reaching out for
partnerships, but it is also making sure that it is
personally resilient which is essential as we
move into a complex and uncertain world.”
Australian PM Visits INS
Vikrant
The Australian Prime Minister Anthony
Albanese, visited INS Vikrant in Mumbai on 9
Mar 23 as part of his visit to India from 8 to 11
Mar 2023. He was briefed about the roles and
capabilities of INS Vikrant and introduced to
the Light Combat Aircraft. He announced that
Australia, for the first time, would host the 27th
edition of the annual multilateral naval
wargaming exercise, MALABAR, that was
scheduled later in 2023 among the navies of
the USA, India, Japan and Australia. Australia
and India upgraded their bilateral relationship
from a Strategic Partnership in 2009 to
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) in
2020. Thry now have a the Foreign Ministers’
Framework Dialogue, 2+2 Defence and Foreign
Ministers’ Dialogue, Joint Trade and
Commerce Ministerial Commission, Defence
Policy Talks, Australia-India Education Council
interactions, Defence Services Staff Talks,
Energy Dialogue, and consultations of Joint
Working Groups on different issues. In Jun 20,
the two sides signed the pact that enables
reciprocal access to military bases for logistics
support, the Mutual Logistics Support
Agreement (MLSA) that allows the militaries of
the two countries to use each other’s bases for
repair and replenishment of supplies, besides
scaling up overall defence cooperation.

42
 Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023

INS Sumedha visited Abu Dhabi

Japan Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF) ships Uraga and Awaji visited INS Sumedha on visit to Abu Dhabi
Kochi on their way to Bahrain, 15 Feb 2023

Defence Secretary and his Sri Lankan counterpart reviewed bilateral ties during Sir Ben Key First Sea Lord and RN chief visited India and met the CNS on 2 Mar 23
7th Annual Defence Dialogue in New Delhi, 23 Feb 2023

French Navy Ships FS Dixmude, an amphibious helicopter carrier and frigate Australian prime minister on board INS Vikrant in Mumbai on 9 Mar 2023
La Fayette, visited Kochi, 6-10 March 2023 as part of circumnavigation mission

43
 MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES
Glimpses from Joint
International Exercises
India-Japan Ex Dharma
Guardian held in Japan
The 4th edition of joint military exercise,
DHARMA GUARDIAN, between India and
Japan was conducted at Camp Imazu in Shiga
province, Japan from 17 Feb to 2 March 2023. It
is an annual training event with Japan and
scope of the exercise covers platoon level joint
training on operations in jungle and semi
urban/urban terrain. Troops of the Garhwal
Rifles Regiment and an Infantry Regiment from
the Middle Army of the Japan Ground Self
Defence Force (JGSDF) participated in the
exercise to share experiences gained during
operations in order to enhance inter-
operability in planning & execution. During the
exercise, participants engaged in a variety of
missions ranging from joint planning, joint
tactical drills, basics of establishing integrated
surveillance grids, including employment of
aerial assets.
India-Japan Exercise
Shinyuu Maitri
The Indian Air Force (IAF) participated in
Exercise Shinyuu Maitri with the Japan Air Self
Defence Force (JASDF) from 13 Feb to 2 Mar
2023 at Komatsu, Japan. The IAF contingent
fielded one C-17 Globemaster III aircraft which
participated in flying drills with JASDF C-2
transport aircraft. The exercise enhanced
mutual understanding and interoperability
between the IAF and the JASDF.
International Exercise
Cutlass Express 23
I N S Tr i k a n d p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e
International Maritime Exercise/ Cutlass
Express 2023 (IMX/CE-23) held in the Gulf
region from 26 Feb to 16 Mar 2023. She
exercised with participants from over 50
nations and international maritime agencies
with the common aim of enhancing maritime
security and keeping sea lanes in the region
44
safe for maritime commerce. IMX/CE-23 is one
of the largest multinational maritime exercises
in the world. While this was the Indian Navy’s
maiden IMX participation, it also marked the
second occasion where an Indian Naval ship
participated in an exercise conducted by the
CMF. Participation in such exercises enables
the Indian Navy to strengthen relationships
and enhance interoperability and collective
maritime capability with maritime partners in
the IOR.
International Exercise
Desert Flag VIII in UAE
An IAF contingent comprising of 110 Air
Warriors participated in Exercise Desert Flag
VIII at Al Dhafra airbase of United Arab
Emirates with five LCA Tejas and two C-17
Globemaster III aircraft from 27 Feb to 17 Mar
2023. This was the first occasion when the LCA
Tejas participated in an international flying
exercise outside India. Exercise Desert Flag was
a multilateral air exercise in which Air Forces
from UAE, France, Kuwait, Australia, UK,
Bahrain, Morocco, Spain, Republic of Korea,
and USA participated. The aim of the exercise
was to participate in diverse fighter
engagements and learn from the best practices
of various Air Forces.
Multinational Exercise
Cobra Warrior in UK
An IAF contingent comprising 145 Air
Warriors with five Mirage 2000 fighters, two C-
17 Globemaster III and an IL-78 mid air
refueller aircraft participated in Exercise Cobra
Warrior at the Waddington Air Force Base of
the Royal Air Force in United Kingdom from 6
Mar to 24 Mar 2023. The exercise is a
multilateral air exercise in which Air Forces
from Finland, Sweden, South Africa, United
States of America and Singapore also
participated. The aim of the exercise is to
participate in diverse fighter aircraft
engagements and learn from the best practices
of various Air Forces.
India-Singapore Exercise
Bold Kurukshetra
The Singapore Army and Indian Army
participated in the 13th edition of Exercise
Bold Kurukshetra, a bilateral armour exercise
on 6-13 March 2023 at Jodhpur Military
Station. For the first time in the exercise series,
both armies participated in a command post
exercise, which involved Battalion and Brigade
level planning elements and computer
wargaming. Hosted by the Indian Army, the
exercise involved soldiers from the 42nd
Battalion, Singapore Armoured Regiment and
an Armoured Brigade of Indian Army. The
exercise fostered common understanding of
mechanised warfare in emerging threats and
evolving technologies, developing inter-
operability through a computer simulation-
based Wargame using joint operational and
tactical procedures controlled through a joint
command post.
India-France Maritime
Partnership Exercise
Indian Navy’s indigenously built guided
missile frigate, INS Sahyadri participated in a
Maritime Partnership Exercise (MPX) with
French Navy (FN) ships FS Dixmude, a Mistral
Class Amphibious Assault Ship and FS La
Fayette, a La Fayette Class Frigate, in the
Arabian Sea on 10 – 11 March 2023. The
exercise witnessed a wide spectrum of
evolutions at sea which included cross deck
landings, boarding exercises and seamanship
evolutions.
India-France Exercise
FRINJEX-2023
The maiden Joint Military Exercise
FRINJEX-23 between Indian Army and French
Army was conducted at Pangode Military
Station, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala on 7-8th
March 2023. It is for the first time armies of
both the nations are engaging in this format
 Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023

with each contingent comprising of a Company
Group each from the Thiruvananthapuram
based Indian Army troops and French 6th Light
Armoured Brigade.
The exercise is aimed at enhancing inter-
operability, coordination and cooperation
between both forces at tactical level. The
scope of the exercise involve establishment
and operationalisation of a joint command
post to secure an envisaged area for
undertaking joint humanitarian assistance and
disaster relief, establishing an Internally
Displaced Population (IDP) camp and move of
disaster relief material.
India-Japan Maritime
Partnership Exercise
Continuing with the conduct of Maritime
Partnership Exercises (MPX) with Friendly
Foreign Countries, INS Sahyadri exercised with
Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force (JMSDF)
ship JS Suzutsuki, an Akizuki Class Destroyer in
the Arabian Sea on 11 March 2023. The
exercise was aimed at consolidating their
shared commitment to regional and global
security challenges, the exercise witnessed
cross deck landings by integral helicopters,
tactical manoeuvres and a customary
steampast by the ships.

India-Japan joint training exercise “Dharma Guardian” in japan Ex Shinyuu Maitri - indian air force transport aircraft exercise with the Japanese

INS Trikand participated in Ex Cutlass Express 2023 INS Trikand participated in Exercise Cutlass Express 2023

INS Trikand in Exercise Cutlass Express 2023 Indian Air Force contingent in Exercise Desert Flag VIII

45
 MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES

LCA Tejas fighters in their maiden global air exercise - Ex Desert Flag VIII

An IAF Mirage during Ex Cobra Warrior at Waddington in UK Sand model briefing during joint India-Singapore Exercise ‘Bold Kurukshetra’

Joint India-Singapore Exercise ‘Bold Kurukshetra’ IN ships in Maritime Partnership Exercise (MPX) with the French Navy

Indian and French soldiers train together during FRINJEX 23 at IN and Japanese ships in Maritime Partnership Exercise (MPX)
Pangode military station, Kerala, 7-8 Mar 2023

46
 Indian Military Review, Volume 14, March 2023

JOINT TRAINING
Theatre Level Operational Biennial Maritime Exercise

Exercise TROPEX 23
The 2023 edition of Indian Navy's major
biennial maritime exercise TROPEX, was
conducted over a duration of three months
from Jan to Mar 23 culminating in the Arabian
Sea. Indian Navy, Indian Army, Indian Air Force
and Coast Guard assets took part.
All surface combatants of the Indian Navy
including Destroyers, Frigates, Corvettes as well
as submarines and aircraft were put through
complex maritime operational deployments to
validate and refine the Navy's Concept of
Operations including operational logistics and
interoperability with other Services.
The overall exercise construct included
Coastal Defence exercise Sea Vigil and the
Amphibious Exercise AMPHEX.
Set in the Indian Ocean including the
Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, the theatre of
operations for the exercise extended
approximately 4300 nm from North to South
upto 35 deg South Latitude and 5000 nm from
Persian Gulf in the West to North Australia coast
in the East, spanning an area of over 21 million
square nautical miles. TROPEX 23 witnessed
participation of approximately 70 Indian Navy
ships, six submarines and over 75 aircraft.
The culmination of TROPEX 23 brought to
an end an intense operational phase for the
Indian Navy that commenced in Nov 2022. As
part of the final Joint Phase, the defence
minister spent a day at sea onboard the newly
commissioned Indigenous Aircraft Carrier
Vikrant on 6 March 2023. He reviewed the
Indian Navy's operational preparedness and
material readiness wherein the Navy
demonstrated operational manoeuvers and
various facets of combat operations, including
deck operations of indigenous LCA and live
weapon firings.

Approx 70 IN ships, six submarines and over 75 aircraft took part in TROPEX 23 Heatre level operational readiness exercise was displayed in TROPEX 23

TROPEX 23 included a combat firing phase, In which warships fire torpedoes, Tropex-2023 was Indian Navy’s biggest exercise in 2023
depth charges, SAMs and SAMs

47
 Indian Military Review, Volume 13, March 2022

CEREMONIAL
Battle Honours and
Raising Day Anniversaries
Best wishes from IMR for anniversaries in April 2023
1 April 3 April 3 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles
19 Air Defence Regiment 970 Engineer Works Section 1 Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry
47 Air Defence Regiment 2 Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry
126 Light Air Defence Regt (Composite) 6 April 8 Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry
128 Air Defence Regiment Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry 9 Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry
620 Joint Air Defence Centre Regimental Centre 12 Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry
621 Joint Air Defence Centre Para Regiment Regimental Centre 13 Jammu & Kashmir Light Infantry
10 Engineer Regiment 3 Punjab (Kila Hari Day) 1/9 Gorkha Rifles
12 Engineer Regiment 13 Dogra
60 Engineer Regiment 20 April
62 Engineer Regiment 8 April 70 Tactical Support Unit Air Defence
1 Guards (2 Punjab) 15 Kumaon (Indore)
9 Guards Army Ordnance Corps Day 21 April
9 Mech Infantry (7 Grenadiers) 5 Maratha LI (Kut-al-Amara Day)
19 Punjab 9 April
7 Madras 1 Maratha Light Infantry (Sevio Day) 22 April
9 Madras (Travancore) 13 Grenadiers (Ganga Jaisalmer)
18 Madras (Mysore) 11 April (Dharatol Day)
12 Grenadiers BEG (Param Vir Chakra Day) (104 262 Bomb Disposal Company
16 Rajput Engineer Regiment)
11 Jat 24 April
14 Sikh 12 April 1/1 Gorkha Rifles
7 Sikh Light Infantry Bengal Engr Group (Rajouri Day) 1 Gorkha Rifles
11 Kumaon 1/3 Gorkha Rifles
6 Assam 13 April
7 Bihar JAK Rifles (Zorawar Day) 25 April
5 Recce & Observation Flight 1 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles 2 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles
262 Bomb Disposal Coy
2 April 27 April
Mech Infantry Regimental Centre 15 April 236 Engineer Regiment
664 Recce & Observation Sqn 17 Rajput
665 Recce & Observation Sqn 2 Jat (Rajouri Day)

IAF Raising Day Anniversaries

1 Squadron Tigers Strength in Unity 1 April 1933 Wapiti Mirage 2000
2 Squadron Winged True to Aim 1 April 1941 Wapiti Su-30 MKI
114 Helicopter Unit Siachen Pioneers A friend in time of need 1 April 1964 Chetak Cheetah
115 Helicopter Unit Hovering Angels A friend in time of need 1 April 1967 Chetak
44 Squadron Mighty Jets 6 April 1961 An-12 Il-76
18 Squadron Flying Bullets Swift and Fearless 15 April 1965 Gnat MiG-27

48
A ‘Must Have’ for Every Formation and Unit
Book on 1965 War commissioned by the IAF

The Duels of the Himalayan Eagle was released by the Vice President,
the Defence Minister and the Service Chiefs on 1 September.

Foreword by
Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha
Chief of the Air Staff
The Duels of the Himalayan Eagle describes the First
Air War between India and Pakistan. Commencing from
an analysis of the two air forces and their concept of
operations, every significant aerial and ground
engagement has been covered in detail. These include
Pakistani raids on Pathankot and Kalaikunda, Indian
ventures into Sargodha, Badin and Peshawar as well as
various aerial engagements. These stories are based
on the narratives of the air warriors involved in the
operations or records maintained on a daily basis in the
squadron diaries by various units during the period of
the War.
Pakistani disastrous para drops near Pathankot,
Adampur and Halwara in the West and Gauhati in the
East have been covered in detail. The travails narrated
by seven air warriors, who became POWs have also
been included.
Finally, the author has dissected the entire air war
and has put down his own conclusions – probably the
first such attempt by an Indian author.
320pp, hardcover, illustrated. Rs 1800 (Speedpost charges incl)

Order online at https://rzp.io/l/aQRw5OL or Buy your copy from

IMR Media Pvt Ltd

8A Ashok Marg, Salokhra, South City 1 Enclave, Gurgaon 122001, India
Mob: 09582649663, Email: subscriptions@idyb.com
Roadmap for the Future
Technology Enabled
Sensor-Decision-Shooter
Superiority
Seminar & Exhibition

30 June 2023

Guest of Honour
Gen Anil Chauhan,
PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM, VSM
Chief of Defence Staff

Event Partner
Contact:
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+91-9818984664
Kothari Auditorium, DRDO Bhawan, New Delhi adesh@imrmedia.in