Government Theoretical Models by Robert Elgie
reflect variations in the distribution and exercise of power
In terms of decision-making:
Monocratic Government: In a monocratic government,
such as a dictatorship or autocracy, decision-making
authority is concentrated in the hands of one individual,
typically the head of state or government. This leader has
the power to make most decisions without significant
input from other government officials or institutions.
While this centralized decision-making can lead to swift
and decisive actions, it also carries the risk of
authoritarianism and lack of accountability, as there are
often limited checks and balances on the leader's power.
Ministerial Government: In a ministerial government
system, decisions are made collectively by the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet. The Prime Minister, as the head
of government, holds significant authority, but decisions
are reached through discussions and deliberations within
the Cabinet, which consists of senior government
ministers responsible for different areas of policy. While
the Prime Minister may have a leading role in setting the
government's agenda and direction, the Cabinet provides
input and oversight, ensuring that decisions reflect a
range of perspectives and expertise.
Collective/Cabinet Government: In a collective or cabinet
government model, decision-making authority is shared
among members of the Cabinet, who collectively make
decisions on government policies and actions. Cabinet
members, including senior ministers and department
heads, come together to discuss and debate issues, with
decisions reached through consensus or majority vote.
This model emphasizes collaboration and cooperation
among government officials, with each member
contributing their expertise and perspective to the
decision-making process.
Shared Government: In a shared government system,
decision-making is distributed across different levels or
branches of government, such as in federal systems or
coalition governments. Power is divided among central
and regional authorities or among different political
parties, with decision-making involving negotiation and
compromise among various stakeholders. This model
aims to ensure representation and responsiveness to
diverse interests, with decisions reflecting the input and
preferences of multiple actors.
In summary, the differences in decision-making processes
within different government models, ranging from
centralized authority in monocratic governments to
collaborative decision-making in ministerial,
collective/cabinet, and shared government systems. Each
model has its advantages and challenges, depending on
factors such as political culture, institution.
Example:
Monocratic Government: North Korea is an example of a
monocratic government, where supreme authority is
concentrated in the hands of one individual, Kim Jong-un,
who exercises control over all aspects of governance
without significant checks or balances.
Ministerial Government: The United Kingdom operates
under a ministerial government system. While Queen
Elizabeth II serves as the head of state, executive power is
wielded by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, who
collectively make decisions on government policies and
actions. The Prime Minister, such as Boris Johnson, leads
the Cabinet, comprised of senior ministers responsible
for different government departments.
Collective/Cabinet Government: Canada follows a
collective or cabinet government model. Decision-making
authority is shared among members of the Cabinet, led
by the Prime Minister (e.g., Justin Trudeau). Cabinet
ministers, including the Minister of Finance, Minister of
Health, and others, come together to discuss and decide
on matters of national importance.
Shared Government: Germany is an example of a shared
government system. Power is distributed between the
federal government and the governments of the 16
federal states (Länder). While the Chancellor, like Angela
Merkel, leads the federal government, decision-making
involves cooperation and negotiation among federal and
state authorities on issues such as education,
transportation, and environmental policy.
As for the Philippines, it primarily falls under a
Presidential System, where executive authority is vested
in the President, who serves as both the head of state
and head of government. The President, like Rodrigo
Duterte, leads the executive branch and makes most
decisions regarding national policy and governance.
While the Philippines has elements of collective decision-
making through the Cabinet, the President holds
significant power, akin to a monocratic government.
In conclusion, the Philippines belongs to the category of
presidential systems, where decision-making authority is
primarily concentrated in the hands of the President,
with elements of collective decision-making through the
Cabinet. This system combines aspects of both
monocratic and ministerial government models,
emphasizing strong executive leadership alongside some
degree of collective decision-making.al design, and
governance needs.
Simplified:
Monocratic Government: One person makes most
decisions.
Ministerial Government: Decisions are made collectively
by the Prime Minister and Cabinet.
Collective/Cabinet Government: Group decisions made
within the Cabinet.
Shared Government: Decisions are made across various
levels or branches of government.
In terms of power:
Monocratic Government:
In a monocratic government, power is concentrated in
the hands of a single individual or executive authority.
Decision-making authority is centralized, and there is
little to no formal sharing of power with other branches
or actors.
Examples: Absolute monarchies, where a king or queen
holds supreme authority, such as Saudi Arabia or Brunei.
Collective/Cabinet Government:
In a collective or cabinet government, power is vested in
a group of individuals who collectively make decisions.
The head of government (such as a prime minister) and a
cabinet of ministers are responsible for policymaking and
administration. Cabinet members are typically drawn
from the legislative branch and are accountable to the
parliament.
Examples: Parliamentary democracies like the United
Kingdom, where the prime minister and cabinet exercise
executive authority collectively.
Ministerial Government:
Ministerial government is similar to collective/cabinet
government but places greater emphasis on the role of
individual ministers. Ministers have significant autonomy
and authority within their respective departments or
ministries, overseeing policy implementation and
administration. While decisions may be made collectively
in cabinet meetings, ministers have considerable
discretion in managing their portfolios.
Examples: Countries with parliamentary systems, such as
Canada, where ministers are responsible for specific
government departments (e.g., finance, health, defense).
Shared Government:
Shared government refers to a governance structure in
which power is distributed among multiple actors or
levels of government.
Different levels of government, such as national, regional,
and local authorities, share responsibility for various
policy areas. Decision-making processes often involve
collaboration, negotiation, and coordination among these
different actors.
Examples: Federal systems like the United States or
Germany, where power is divided between the national
government and subnational entities (states, provinces,
etc.), with each level having its own spheres of authority.
Where do Philippines belong:
The Philippines primarily operates under a
collective/cabinet system of government. Here's a
breakdown of the differences between the types of
government systems you mentioned in terms of power
distribution, along with an explanation of where the
Philippines fits:
Monocratic Government:
Power is concentrated in the hands of a single individual,
such as a monarch or dictator. Decision-making authority
is centralized, and there is limited or no institutionalized
mechanism for sharing power.
Examples include absolute monarchies like Saudi Arabia
or authoritarian regimes like North Korea.
Collective/Cabinet Government:
Power is vested in a group of individuals, typically a government, with elements of both presidential and
cabinet or council of ministers, who collectively make cabinet systems.
decisions on behalf of the government. The head of
government (such as a prime minister) is usually a
member of the cabinet and serves as its leader. Decision-
making is collaborative, with ministers representing
different departments or portfolios bringing diverse
perspectives to the table.

Examples include parliamentary democracies like the

United Kingdom, where the prime minister and cabinet
collectively govern and are accountable to the legislature.

Ministerial Government:

This term is often used interchangeably with the

collective or cabinet system of government. It refers to a
government structure where ministers or department
heads hold significant decision-making authority within
their respective portfolios. Ministers are typically
appointed by the head of government and are
responsible for overseeing specific areas of public policy
and administration.

Shared Government:

Power is distributed among multiple levels of

government, such as national, regional, or local
authorities. Different levels of government may have
distinct areas of responsibility, and they often share
power through mechanisms like federalism or
decentralization.

Examples include federal states like the United States,

where power is divided between the federal government
and individual states, each with its own sphere of
authority.

Now, regarding the Philippines, it operates under a form

of government that combines elements of both a
presidential and parliamentary system. The country has a
president as the head of state and government, elected
separately from the legislature. However, it also has a
cabinet system where the president appoints cabinet
members to oversee various government departments.
While the Philippines leans more towards the
presidential system due to the strong executive powers
vested in the president, it also exhibits features of a
collective/cabinet government due to the role of the
cabinet in decision-making. Therefore, the Philippines
could be considered a hybrid or mixed form of

Belgica v. Ochoa | Case Digest
Belgica, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. Nos.
208566, 208493 & 209251, November 19, 2013
FACTS
HISTORY of CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL
The term “pork barrel”, a political parlance of American-
English origin, refers to an appropriation of government
spending meant for localized projects and secured solely
or primarily to bring money to a representative’s district.
The earliest form of the pork barrel system is found in
Section 3 of Act 3044, otherwise known as the Public
Works Act of 1922. Under this provision, release of funds
and realignment of unexpended portions of an item or
appropriation were subject to the approval of a joint
committee elected by the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
In 1950, members of Congress, by virtue of being
representatives of the people, also became involved in
project identification.
The pork barrel system was temporarily discontinued
when martial law was declared.
It reappeared in 1982 through an item in the General
Appropriations Act (“GAA”) called “Support for Local
Development Projects” (“SLDP”). SLDP started the giving
of lump-sum allocations to individual legislators. The
SLDP also began to cover not only public works project or
“hard projects” but also covered “soft projects” such as
those which would fall under education, health and
livelihood.
After the EDSA People Power Revolution and the
restoration of democracy, the pork barrel was revived
through the “Mindanao Development Fund” and the
“Visayas Development Fund”.
In 1990, the pork barrel was renamed “Countrywide
Development Fund” (“CDF”). The CDF was meant to
cover small local infrastructure and other priority
community projects.
CDF Funds were, with the approval of the President,
released directly to implementing agencies subject to the
submission of the required list of projects and activities.
Senators and congressmen could identify any kind of
project from “hard projects” such as roads, buildings and
bridges to “soft projects” such as textbooks, medicines,
and scholarships.
In 1993, the CDF was further modified such that the
release of funds was to be made upon the submission of
the list of projects and activities identified by individual
legislators. This was also the first time when the Vice-
President was given an allocation.
The CDF contained the same provisions from 1994-1996
except that the Department of Budget and Management
was required to submit reports to the Senate Committee
on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations
regarding the releases made from the funds.
Congressional insertions (“CIs”) were another form of
congressional pork barrel aside from the CDF. Examples
of the CIs include the DepEd School Building Fund, the
Congressional Initiative Allocations, and the Public Works
Fund, among others.
The allocations for the School Building Fund were made
upon prior consultation with the representative of the
legislative district concerned and the legislators had the
power to direct how, where and when these
appropriations were to be spent.
In 1999, the CDF was removed from the GAA and
replaced by three separate forms of CIs: (i) Food Security
Program Fund, (ii) Lingap Para sa Mahihirap Fund, and (iii)
Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund.
All three contained a provision requiring prior
consultation with members of Congress for the release of
funds.
In 2000, the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(“PDAF”) appeared in the GAA. PDAF required prior
consultation with the representative of the district before
the release of funds. PDAF also allowed realignment of
funds to any expense category except personal services
and other personnel benefits.
In 2005, the PDAF introduced the program menu
concept which is essentially a list of general programs
and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF
project may be subsequently chosen by the identifying
authority. This was retained in the GAAs from 2006-
2010.
It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal
participation of non-governmental organizations in the
implementation of PDAF projects was introduced.
The PDAF articles from 2002-2010 were silent with
respect to specific amounts for individual legislators.
In 2011, the PDAF Article in the GAA contained an
express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for
individual legislators and the Vice-President. It also
contained a provision on realignment of funds but with
the qualification that it may be allowed only once.
The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as
implementing agencies. Legislators were also allowed to
identify programs/projects outside of his legislative
district. Realignment of funds and release of funds were
required to be favorably endorsed by the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee
on Finance, as the case may be.
MALAMPAYA FUNDS AND PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL
FUND
The use of the term pork barrel was expanded to include
certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya
Fund and the Presidential Social Fund (“PSF”).
The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree (“PD”) No. 910 issued by
President Ferdinand Marcos on March 22, 1976.
The PSF was created under Section 12, Title IV of PD No.
1869, or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (“PAGCOR”), as amended by PD No.
1993. The PSF is managed and administered by the
Presidential Management Staff and is sourced from the
share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings
of PAGCOR.
PORK BARREL MISUSE
In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo
revealed that huge sums of money regularly went into
the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks.
In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the
nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme Court
dismissed the petition for lack of evidentiary basis
regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks.
In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation probed
the allegation that a syndicate defrauded the government
of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of
ghost projects.
In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the
results of a three-year audit investigation detailing the
irregularities in the release of the PDAF from 2007 to
2009.
Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million
from the Malampaya Funds had gone into a dummy NGO.
ISSUE/S
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated
petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy, (b)
the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to
judicial review, (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue,
(d) previous decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation of
the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other
Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional for
violating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers, (b) non-delegability of legislative power, (c)
checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political
dynasties, (f) local autonomy.
RULING
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
(a) There is an actual and justiciable controversy
There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the
cases. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is
satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties
regarding the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged
funds and the laws allowing for their utilization are
currently existing and operational and thereby posing an
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners.
The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the
PDAF and the abolition thereof does not actually
terminate the controversy on the matter. The President
does not have constitutional authority to nullify or annul
the legal existence of the PDAF.
The “moot and academic principle” cannot stop the
Court from deciding the case considering that: (a)
petitioners allege grave violation of the constitution, (b)
the constitutionality of the pork barrel system presents a
situation of exceptional character and is a matter of
paramount public interest, (c) there is a practical need for
a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality to
guide the bench, the bar and the public, and (d) the
preparation and passage of the national budget is an
annual occurrence.
(b) Political Question Doctrine is Inapplicable.
The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System”
is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the
political branches of the government but rather a legal
one which the Constitution itself has commanded the
Court to act upon.
The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of judicial
power such that the Supreme Court has the power to
determine whether there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality on the part of
the government.
(c) Petitioners have legal standing to sue
Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being
taxpayers and citizens of the Philippines.
As taxpayers, they are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds.
As citizens, the issues they have raised are matters of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest.
(d) The Petition is not barred by previous cases
The present case is not barred by the ruling in Philconsa
vs. Enriquez because the Philconsa case was a limited
response to a separation of powers problem, specifically
on the propriety of conferring post-enactment
identification authority to Members of Congress.
On the contrary, the present cases involve a more holistic
examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF
and the PDAF Articles with each other, and (b) the inter-
relation of post-enactment measures contained within a
particular CDF or PDAF article, including not only those
related to the area of project identification but also to the
areas of fund release and realignment.
Moreover, the Philconsa case was riddled with inherent
constitutional inconsistencies considering that the
authority to identify projects is an aspect of
appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of
legislative power thereby lodged in Congress. This power
cannot be exercised by individual members of Congress
and the authority to appropriate cannot be exercised
after the GAA has already been passed.
The case of Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty vs.
Secretary of Budget and Management does not also bar
judgment on the present case because it was dismissed
on a procedural technicality and hence no controlling
doctrine was rendered.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK
BARREL
(a) The separation of powers between the Executive and
the Legislative Departments has been violated.
The post-enactment measures including project
identification, fund release, and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and,
hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume
duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget
execution, which belongs to the executive department.
Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized
to participate in the various operational aspects of
budgeting, including ―the evaluation of work and
financial plans for individual activities and the ―
regulation and release of funds in violation of the
separation of powers principle.
Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of
its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.
That the said authority to identify projects is treated as
merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its
unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law.
Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the
legislators is only recommendatory in nature. They even
admitted that the identification of the legislator
constitutes a mandatory requirement before the PDAF
can be tapped as a funding source.
(b)The principle of non-delegability of legislative
powers has been violated.
The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-
enactment identification authority to individual
legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since
said legislators are effectively allowed to individually
exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in
Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.
That the power to appropriate must be exercised only
through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution which states that: ― No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.
The legislators are individually exercising the power of
appropriation because each of them determines (a) how
much of their PDAF fund would go to and (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine.
(c) Checks and balances
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79
Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since
the said amount would be further divided among
individual legislators who would then receive personal
lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed,
effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own
discretion.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a
―budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
President‘s power of item veto.
It forces the President to decide between (a) accepting
the entire PDAF allocation without knowing the specific
projects of the legislators, which may or may not be
consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the
whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.
In fact, even without its post-enactment legislative
identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would
remain constitutionally flawed since it would then
operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation.
This is because the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s
power of item veto.
(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents
accountability as Congress is incapable of checking itself
or its members.
The fact that individual legislators are given post-
enactment roles in the implementation of the budget
makes it difficult for them to become disinterested
observers when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring
the implementation of the appropriation law.
The conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment
authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in
which they themselves participate.
The concept of post-enactment authorization violates
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
prohibits members of Congress to intervene in any
matter before any office of the Government, because it
renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of
their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the
same post-enactment authority and/or the individual
legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to
perpetuate himself in office.
The use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter
which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on
a case-to-case basis.
(e) The constitutional provision regarding political
dynasties is not self-execution.
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that the state shall prohibit political dynasties as
may be defined by law, is not a self-executing provision.
Since there appears to be no standing law which
crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this
issue.
 (f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates
constitutional principles on local autonomy
The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the
constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows
district representatives, who are national officers, to
substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for
local development.
The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based
solely on the fact of office, without taking into account
the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the
legislator represents.
The allocation/division limits are clearly not based on
genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or
geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.
This concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and
PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local
Development Councils (“LDCs”) which are already legally
mandated to―assist the corresponding sanggunian in
setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts
within its territorial jurisdiction.
Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose
functions are essentially geared towards managing local
affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should
not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators,
who are national officers that have no law-making
authority except only when acting as a body.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK
BARREL
(a) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No.
1869 are valid appropriation laws.
For an appropriation law to be valid under Section 29 (1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that
“No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law”, it is enough
that (a) the provision of law sets apart a determinate or
determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the
same for a particular public purpose.
Section 8 of PD 910 is a valid appropriation law because it
set apart a determinable amount: a Special Fund
comprised of ― all fees, revenues, and receipts of the
[Energy Development] Board from any and all sources.
It also specified a public purpose: energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President.
Section 12 of PD No. 1869 is also a valid appropriation
law because it set apart a determinable amount: [a]fter
deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty
(50%) percent share of the Government in the aggregate
gross earnings of [PAGCOR], or 60%[,] if the aggregate
gross earnings be less than P150,000,000.00.
It also specified a public purpose: priority infrastructure
development projects and x x x the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may
be directed and authorized by the Office of the President
of the Philippines.
(b) Section 8 of PD No. 910 and Section 12 of PD No. 1869
constitutes undue delegation of legislation powers.
The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of
PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient
standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for
which the Malampaya Funds may be used.
This phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct
and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate
public funds beyond the purview of the law.
This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the
rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the
Malampaya Funds ―to finance energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government, remains legally effective and subsisting.
Section 12 of PD No. 1869 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative powers because it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of
the delegating law.
The law does not supply a definition of “priority
infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves
the President without any guideline to construe the
same.
The delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is
too broad of a classification since the said term could
pertain to any kind of facility.