Cognitive Issues in The Long Scotist Tradition: Daniel Heider Claus A. Andersen (Eds.)

Medieval
and Early Modern

Philosophy 5
Daniel Heider
Claus A. Andersen
(eds.)
COGNITIVE
ISSUES IN THE
LONG SCOTIST
TRADITION
https://doi.org/10.24894/978-3-7965-4767-6
.
https://doi.org/10.24894/978-3-7965-4767-6
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Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy 5
Julia Jorati / Dominik Perler / Stephan Schmid (eds.)
https://doi.org/10.24894/978-3-7965-4767-6
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Daniel Heider, Claus A. Andersen (eds.)
Cognitive Issues in the

Long Scotist Tradition
Schwabe Verlag
https://doi.org/10.24894/978-3-7965-4767-6
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This book is a result of the research funded by the Czech Science Foundation
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Contents
Introduction
Claus A. Andersen: Short Introduction to a Long Tradition –
And to this Volume . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
I. Sensory Cognition
Daniel Heider: Suárez vs. Mastri and Belluto on
Species in the Internal Sense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
David González Ginocchio: The Estimative Faculty in Scotus and Scotism 65
II. Intellectual Cognition

Giorgio Pini: In God’s Mind. Divine Cognition in Duns Scotus
and Some Early Scotists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Marina Fedeli: The Species Intelligibilis in the
Cognitive Process in Early Scotism. The Case of William of Alnwick . . . . 119
Damian Park, O. F. M.: The Non-Beatific Vision of God
in the Present Life. Franciscus de Mayronis’s Relational
Theory of Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Anna Tropia: Francisco Macedo on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition . . 177
III. Metaphysical and Theological Implications

Richard Cross: Esse intentionale in Some Early Scotists. At the Origins of
the So-called ‘Supertranscendental’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
Francesco Fiorentino: Esse cognitum and Divine Ideas in
the First Two Centuries of Scotism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
Roberto Hofmeister Pich: Alfonso Briceño on Cognition, Distinction,
and the Knowledge of God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
Lukáš Novák: Making Room for the Virtual Distinction. Bartolomeo
Mastri between Scylla and Charybdis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Claus A. Andersen: Decretum Concomitans. Bartolomeo Mastri on Divine
Cognition and Human Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
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6 Contents
IV. The Influence of Scotism

Ueli Zahnd: The Epistemological Limits of Religious Images. On the
Scotist Sources of a Reformed Theological Tenet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367
Arthur Huiban: Melanchthon and the Will. An Early Protestant
Reception of Scotist Psychology? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393
Giovanni Gellera: Univocity of Being, the Cogito and Idealism
in Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
List of Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447

Index of Names ................................................ 449
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Introduction
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Short Introduction to a Long Tradition –
And to this Volume
Claus A. Andersen
1. The Long Scotist Tradition:

Historiographical Observations
The Scotist tradition is transepochal in nature. It originates in the early four-
teenth century, when the early followers and Franciscan confreres of John Duns
Scotus (1265/66–1308) trotted in his proverbial footsteps, studying, interpreting,
and in many cases significantly transforming his philosophical and theological
doctrines – and it lasted well into the eighteenth century, when the traditional
scholastic schools, including the Scotist one, declined and ultimately vanished
from the scene. In some places, though, namely in such places where the Fran-
ciscan Order maintained its position in the local educational system, Scotist uni-
versity training continued even subsequently. One example of this phenomenon
is the University of Mallorca which had Scotist philosophical and theological
chairs until as late as 1824.1 In addition, the Neo-Scholastic movement of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries displayed a Scotist current independent
of the dominant and much more well-known Thomist one. On top of this, of
course, comes Duns Scotus’s influence on authors not affiliated with the Scotist
tradition proper, but rather adhering to other traditions of thought, be they
scholastic or not.
Work on this introduction as well as the editorial work on the whole volume has been funded
by the Czech Science Foundation (project “Theory of Cognition in Baroque Scotism”, grant no.
GAČR 20–01710S). The volume gathers the papers given at the online conference Cognitive
Issues in the Long Scotist Tradition, February 11–13, 2021, organized by Daniel Heider and
myself and hosted by the University of South Bohemia, České Budějovice (Czech Republic); cf.
Andersen, “Report on the Conference” (with short appreciations also of two papers that for
various reasons did not enter this volume). I thank Daniel Heider for his comments on draft
versions of this introduction and Robert Andrews for proofreading and valuable suggestions.
Daniel Heider and I wish to express our gratitude to the editors of the book series Medieval
and Early Modern Philosophy for adopting the present volume in their series.
1 As documented in Ramis Barceló, “Las cátedras escotistas,” 317. Here and throughout
this section, I draw on the historiographical discussion in Andersen, Metaphysik im Barocksco-
tismus, 3–82. For the history of the shifting (though mostly negative) attitudes toward Scotus
outside of the Scotist tradition, up until the time of Gilson, see Pomplun, “John Duns Scotus in
the History of Medieval Philosophy.”
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10 Claus A. Andersen
The Scotist tradition, however, not only stretches across the accustomed pe-
riodization of the history of philosophy, but indeed also challenges our estab-
lished fields of research that by and large correspond with that periodization.
Long intellectual traditions are, as such, bound to escape scholarly notice in an
“age of departmentalized minds,” to borrow Arthur O. Lovejoy’s apt expression.2
The continuation of scholastic culture far beyond the Renaissance, the Reforma-
tion, the spread of the printing press in Europe, the discovery of the New World
etc., is an obvious case in point, and Scotism plays an integral role in that con-
tinuation. Scholars working with a focus on post-medieval scholastic thought are
increasingly aware that their work is not reflected in the institutional division in
university departments focusing either on medieval or early modern philosophy;
it is an undeniable fact that the way the history of philosophy is taught and stud-
ied in most universities hardly yields any room for a perspective on the scholas-
tic tradition that squares with its real historical – genuinely transepochal – de-
velopment.3
In the predominant historiographical scheme that continues to enjoy insti-
tutional support, scholasticism is something exclusively medieval. From such a
perspective, Parisian intellectual life in the second quarter of the fourteenth cen-
tury may already be seen as representing “the trailing end of the Zenith of Philo-
sophical Theology,” to quote one recent scholar whose merits in the exploration
of the early Scotist tradition are beyond dispute.4 The majority of scholars work-
ing on the usual suspects of Early Modern Philosophy, be they the empiricists or
the rationalists, will hardly protest; certain sections of Early Modern Philosophy
are usually studied without much background knowledge of that period’s scho-
lastic thought. But from the perspective of relevance for this present book, a view
of the fourteenth century as in any way embodying the final spurt of scholasti-
cism is just chimeric. For anyone familiar with Early Modern (or “Baroque”, or
“Second”) scholastic culture and this culture’s vast literary output, it would seem
far more plausible to place that zenith of philosophical theology here, some-
where in the (first half of the) seventeenth century.5 It would not even be partic-
2 Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 22.

3 Cf. Forlivesi, “A Man, an Age, a Book,” 103; Knebel, Suarezismus, 253–55; Novotný, Ens
rationis from Suárez to Caramuel, 14.
4 Duba, The Forge of Doctrine, 233, referencing a phrase in Schabel, “Reshaping the Gen-
re,” 72–73 (“the first quarter of the fourteenth century was the zenith of scholasticism in terms
of numbers of extant works”). In the same category belongs the statement in Courtenay, “Early
Scotists at Paris,” 220, that Scotism is “one of the most important currents of scholastic
thought in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries.” Given the manifest Scotist tradition of the
seventeenth century and later, such a statement comes across as just odd, but of course does
not lessen the merits of its author as regards fourteenth-century scholastic thought.
5 Cf. the discussion of nomenclature in Novotný, “In Defense of Baroque Scholasticism,”
212–18.
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Short Introduction to a Long Tradition – And to this Volume 11
ularly controversial to claim that it is not the Scotists or any other scholastics of
the fourteenth century who are at the long trailing end of the scholastic synthesis
of philosophy and theology, but rather Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, and Leibniz,
or even Kant.6 A younger contemporary of the latter, Wilhelm Ludwig Gottlob
Freiherr von Eberstein (1762–1805), himself an old-guard critic of Kant, cor-
rectly saw Scotism as one of the essential ingredients of this late-scholastic tradi-
tion:
Do not believe […] that they [i. e., the scholastics] went extinct after Gabriel Biel. Who-
ever thinks this should just take a look at the chairs of the Monks, where the disputes
between the Thomists and the Scotists were continued for a long time by the Dominicans
and the Franciscans, yes indeed, where many a classroom until this day resounds with
scholastic quarreling. We may say that after his time they were not that common any
more, but rather primarily dominated the convents.7
This brief report from Eberstein’s two-volume Versuch einer Geschichte der Log-
ik und Metaphysik bey den Deutschen von Leibnitz bis auf gegenwärtige Zeit
(1794) is, of course, incomplete. How could he possibly overlook the dominant
role of the Jesuit Order within Early Modern scholasticism?8 The passage from
Eberstein may nevertheless be read as one reminder not to view the time of
Gabriel Biel, one of the main sources for (even) later scholastic Nominalism, as
the endpoint of scholastic culture. Despite the title of Heiko Augustinus Ober-
man’s influential monograph on Biel, The Harvest of Medieval Theology from
1963, the fruits of scholasticism were not all harvested in Biel’s time. To exploit
Oberman’s metaphor, scholarship on Late-Medieval thought may rather be seen
as uncovering the seeds and growth of what were only to ripen in later times.
Or, one may prefer the imagery of waves: in Scotism proper, we have a
strong first wave in the first half of the fourteenth century and a second, most
likely larger one in the seventeenth century; in between these two main waves,
Scotism had never quite disappeared, thriving as it did in Scotist hotspots such
as various universities with chairs in theology, and in rare cases also meta-
6 Of these authors, Leibniz is the one who most openly displays interest in, and knowledge
of, immediately preceding scholastic thought; cf. his instructive enumeration of scholastic nov-
elties since the Council of Trent in Essais de Théodicée, Discours préliminaire, n. 6, 53. For a
recent reading of Descartes and Spinoza from a scholastic perspective, see Schmaltz, The Meta-
physics of the Material World; for Locke, see Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes, and Specht, Das
Allgemeine bei Locke; for Kant, see Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, 443–63. Note that most
of this literature takes Suárez as representative of Early Modern scholasticism and thereby ig-
nores the long Scotist tradition proper.
7 Eberstein, Versuch einer Geschichte der Logik und Metaphysik, vol. I, 2 (my translation).
8 To be fair to Eberstein, note that other works of his, Über die Beschaffenheit der Logik
und Metaphysik der reinen Peripatetiker (1800) and Die natürliche Theologie der Scholastiker
(1803), do display some knowledge of the Jesuit tradition.
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physics, in via Scoti, and in many local Franciscan educational institutions across
Europe. The exact contours of the waves would be a matter of statistics (e. g.,
based on Scotistic literary output), and since such statistics are not available let
us leave the issue here – although note that a corresponding graph representing
the amount of modern scholarly attention would rather have a huge wave con-
cerning the beginning of the fourteenth century and a disproportionately small
one concerning the seventeenth century.
The first phase of the Scotist tradition, the one that falls within the scope of
traditional medievalist scholarship, has of course attracted most attention, grow-
ing as it does out of natural interest for one of the greatest medieval thinkers and
the immediate reception of his doctrines. Leaving aside the advanced scholarship
on the Subtle Doctor,9 a wealth of recent editions and studies have thrown new
light on the first generations of his followers, among them Antonius Andreae,
William of Alnwick, Henry of Harclay, John of Reading, Francis of Meyronnes,
Petrus Thomae, Francis of Marchia, Nicholas Bonetus, and others. This current
state of research is reflected in a number of articles in this present volume.10 In
spite of the notoriously incomplete state of all of his major works, and in spite of
the equally notoriously demanding style of his thought, Scotus soon emerged as
an intellectual authority within the Franciscan Order.
Already within one decade after Scotus’s premature death in 1308, there
appears to have been talk of “Scotists” (Scotistae).11 Petrus Thomae mentioned a
“Scotist school” (schola Scotica) in a work from around 1325 that has only re-
cently been edited.12 Petrus, who elsewhere claims to have access to Scotus’s own
manuscripts13 and who himself gave birth to a doctrine of seven kinds of distinc-
tions (the formal distinction being just one of them) that became a household
doctrine throughout the Scotist tradition,14 surprisingly distances himself from
9 The current state of research is reflected in the collective volume edited by Pini, Interpret-
ing Duns Scotus; cf. further Hoffmann, Duns Scotus Bibliography from 1950 to the Present (10th
edition of 2022).
10 Cf. the contributions by Pini, Fedeli, Park, Cross, and Fiorentino; cf. further the fairly
recent survey studies Pini, “Scotus’s Legacy” (introduces a row of early Scotists and explains
how they dealt with Scotus’s incomplete works and challenging doctrines), and Courtenay,
“Early Scotists at Paris” (with focus on institutional, rather than doctrinal matters) – these two
studies, with their different approaches to the earliest Scotist school, may be read as comple-
menting one another. Cf. most recently Goris, Scientia propter quid nobis.
11 Cf. Courtenay, “Early Scotists at Paris,” 183 and 217, referring to the Augustinian Diony-
sius de Borgo San Sepulchro, who was a Bachelor reader of the Sentences at Paris in 1317.
12 Petrus Thomae, Quaestiones de ente, q. 2, dist. 1, 13. For the date of this work, see Smith,
“Introduction,” CLXXI.
13 Petrus Thomae, Quodlibet, q. 3, 52–53.
14 Cf. Andersen, “Introduction,” 177–267, with evidence that Petrus Thomae’s doctrine was
still discussed until as late as the 1740s.
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the named school. Add to this the example of Antonius Andreae, who explicitly
professed loyalty to Scotus, but nevertheless left his own mark on what would
later become recognized as Scotist metaphysics by, among other things, signifi-
cantly transforming his master’s famous doctrine of the univocal concept of be-
ing into a doctrine of various degrees of univocity.15 These examples, out of
many, nicely illustrate how uncoordinated the formation of the Scotist school
was and how important Scotus’s rather independent-minded followers eventual-
ly came to be within that school. One cannot grasp the history of Scotism with-
out taking account of the doctrinal adjustments and innovations of the early
Scotists.
Whereas the Scotist school of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, what
one could call Renaissance Scotism, has – with notable exceptions – received
undeservedly scarce attention in recent scholarship,16 the same does not hold
true for the later tradition. Much of the attention Baroque Scotism has attracted
centers on the Cursus philosophicus jointly authored by the Conventual Francis-
cans Bartolomeo Mastri and Bonaventura Belluto as well as their clash with the
Irish Observant John Punch over the true meaning of a number of Scotus’s doc-
trines. Other Baroque Scotists, such as (among many others) Filippo Fabri,
Hugh McCaghwell, Francisco Macedo, Claude Frassen, and some of those Sco-
tist authors who were active in the New World have received attention as well.
15 For this example, see Pini, “Scotus’s Legacy,” 510–15; Pini further mentions Antonius
Andreae’s explanation of the subject matter of metaphysics in accordance with Scotus’s teach-
ing in the Ordinatio that Scotus himself had not yet developed when writing his own Quaes-
tiones on Aristotle’s Metaphysics; Antonius thus creates a Scotist manual of metaphysics in
accordance with Scotus’s mature thought. Antonius’s approach to Scotus’s teaching on uni-
vocity had a parallel in Franciscus de Marchia’s similar transformation of the same doctrine.
Both Antonius and Franciscus had a lasting influence on Scotist discussions of the concept of
being, as documented in Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 362–70; cf. further Smith,
“The Analogy of Being in the Scotist Tradition.” For other aspects of Antonius’s lasting influ-
ence, see Andersen, “Scotist Metaphysics in Mid-Sixteenth Century Padua,” 72–74 and 87–88.
For the current state of the art on Antonius Andreae, see the essays in Cabré Duran and Mensa
i Valls, Antoni Andreu y la filosofía escotista.
16 Cf. the survey studies Hoenen, “Formalitates phantasticae” (historiographical essay on
the broad reception of Scotism, primarily in the fifteenth century), Forlivesi, “Quae in hac
quaestione tradit Doctor […]” (with focus on metaphysical literature), and Zahnd, “Easy-
Going Scholars” (with focus on theological literature); the case study Andersen and Ramis
Barceló, “Jaume Janer OCist […] and the Tradition of Scoto-Lullist Metaphysics,” explores the
understudied influence of Scotism on Renaissance Lullism in the Crown of Aragon. Cf. further
the contributions in this present volume by Fiorentino and Zahnd. Critical editions of this
period’s Scotist output are rare; for one recent example, see Gomes de Lisboa, Scriptum super
Questiones Metaphisice Antonii Andree, a meta-commentary on Antonius Andreae’s commen-
tary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics.
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Again, the current state of research is reflected in several of the articles in this
present volume.17
The testimony of the famous polymath Juan Caramuel Lobkowitz that “the
school of Scotus is more numerous than all the others taken together” (Scoti
Schola numerosior sit omnibus aliis simul sumptis)18 is often cited as evidence of
an extraordinary florescence of Scotism in the seventeenth century. It is not en-
tirely clear, however, whether Caramuel is speaking of the long Scotist tradition
as a whole or rather only has in mind contemporaneous authors; note too that
his testimony is not the result of an objective analysis, but rather serves as a
premise in a probabilistic argument: since the Scotists outnumber the members
of the two other “classic” schools, the Thomists and the Nominalists, any opin-
ion that is supported by the Scotists must at least be considered probable. At any
rate, the Scotist school of the seventeenth century was quite different from the
one of which Petrus Thomae spoke.
In 1500, the General Chapter of the Franciscan Order at Terni had for the
first time officially encouraged the Order’s theologians to follow Scotus when
teaching Peter Lombard’s Sentences (though alternatively, and clearly as a sec-
ond choice, they were allowed to follow Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Fran-
cis of Meyronnes, or Richard of Mediavilla). This decision was the beginning of
a development that only peaked during the time of Caramuel, especially subse-
quent to the General Chapter at Toledo in 1633, when Franciscan educators
were compelled to follow Scotus not only in their theological, but indeed also in
their philosophical teaching.19 Lucas Wadding’s edition of Scotus’s Opera omnia
from 1639 and the plan to produce a “modern” Scotist Cursus philosophicus after
the model of those used in other religious orders, a text that would eventually
replace Pierre Tartaret’s old Scotist textbooks composed in the 1490s and
reprinted several times since then, were significant parts of this endeavor.20
This institutionalization of Scotism, however, quite unintentionally did not
do away with all diversity, and in this respect, at least, the late Scotist tradition
17 Cf. the contributions by Heider, Ginocchio, Tropia, Pich, Novák, and Andersen; cf. also
the overview in Schmutz, “L’héritage des Subtils,” and the extensive discussion of older and
recent literature in Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 45–64.
18 Cf. Bą k, “Scoti schola numerosior est omnibus aliis simul sumptis,” 159, extensively quot-
ing Caramuel’s Theologia intentionalis from 1664. For other aspects of Caramuel’s view of, and
indeed engagement with, the Scotists, see Schmutz, “Was Duns Scotus a Voluntarist?,” and
Andersen and Ramis Barceló, “Jaume Janer OCist […] and the Tradition of Scoto-Lullist
Metaphysics.”
19 For this development, see Etzi, “Duns Scoto e lo scotismo nell’antica legislazione dell’Or-
dine dei Frati Minori,” and Forlivesi, “The Ratio studiorum of the Conventual Franciscans.” Cf.
further Schmutz, “Les normes théologiques de l’enseignement philosophique,” especially 140–
42 (with the salient documents in French translation).
20 Cf. Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 10–19.
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resembles the situation in the early fourteenth century. The aforementioned

clash between Mastri/Belluto and Punch is just one example illustrating this lack
of doctrinal homogeneity. Notably, their disagreement to a considerable extent
had to do with the degree of influence they accepted from Jesuit scholasticism.
One cannot, of course, import methods of education and presentation from oth-
er traditions and then expect that all the doctrinal details remain just as they
used to be. John Punch openly admitted that, since he had studied with the Je-
suits, it was difficult to “unlearn” (dediscere) their principles.21 For their part,
Mastri and Belluto clearly also learned a lot from the Jesuits – in their case espe-
cially from Francisco Suárez – but nevertheless managed to maintain a more
critical distance from this predominant force in contemporaneous Catholic in-
tellectual culture.22
Things become additionally blurred if one considers that Jesuit scholasti-
cism itself draws on the rich heritage from Late-Medieval scholastic philosophy
and theology, including that of the Subtle Doctor. Scholarship on Early Modern
Scotism accordingly distinguishes between an internal or explicit Scotism and an
external or implicit one.23 The former is the kind of Scotism that enjoyed support
from the Franciscan Order and that may best be exemplified by Mastri and Bel-
luto, whereas the latter speaks to the broader influence of Duns Scotus’s thought
in milieus outside the Scotist tradition proper. This broader influence is not re-
stricted to Catholic scholasticism, but rather extends to Protestant and Reformed
milieus. It may be worth mentioning at this place that especially the Reformed
tradition was rich in terminological innovations; thus, it did not only provide us
with the term ‘ontology,’ but also – of special relevance for the present volume –
with that of ‘psychology.’24 Three articles in the present volume explore various
aspects of the presence of Scotist philosophical psychology in the Reformed and
Protestant intellectual traditions.25
21 Cf. Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 881–82, with a quote from Punch as re-
ported by Mastri and Belluto.
22 Cf. in this present volume the contributions by Heider and Andersen, both with refer-
ences to further literature. Suárez’s relative affinity with Scotus and the Scotist tradition has
often been stressed; cf., for instance, Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, 200–94, here especial-
ly 205, and Heider, Universals in Second Scholasticism, 11 and 312.
23 Cf. Honnefelder, “Zum Begriff der möglichen Welt,” 280, and Schmutz, “Le petit sco-
tisme du Grand Siècle,” 429; critical discussion in Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus,
49–55.
24 Lamanna, “On the Early History of Psychology,” 301.
25 Cf. the contributions by Zahnd, Huiban, Gellera; cf. further the groundbreaking mono-
graph Bolliger, Infiniti Contemplatio, on the reception of Scotism in Reformed theology (Zwin-
gli), and Cross, Communicatio Idiomatum, with instructive examples of Scotus’s direct or indi-
rect influence on Reformation authors in the realm of christology.
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2. Cognitive Issues in the Scotist Tradition –

And in this Volume
In his contribution to the Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus from 2003,
Robert Pasnau, somewhat provokingly, downplayed the level of originality in the
Subtle Doctor’s thought, and not only in regard to his view of cognitive issues:
As in most matters, John Duns Scotus does not distinguish himself in cognitive theory by
adopting a radically new perspective. […] Scotus is interesting, then, not because he of-
fers any startlingly new ideas about cognition, but because he gives a careful and pene-
trating analysis of the field as it stood at the end of the thirteenth century.26
Only in the case of Scotus’s criticism of Henry of Ghent’s doctrine of illumina-

tion (with its assumption of direct divine intervention in the human cognitive
process), does Pasnau readily admit that Scotus’s approach “marks a turning
point in the history of philosophy, the first great victory for naturalism as a re-
search strategy in the philosophy of mind.”27 Peter King only slightly later retort-
ed that Scotus’s cognition theory is indeed quite original, in fact a “revolution
[…] in the philosophy of mind.”28 The novelty in Scotus’s approach lies, accord-
ing to King, in his distinction between mental acts and mental content and in his
attempt to grasp the ontological status of that content, the problematic consider-
ation being that – as Scotus came to see after having experimented with the
term “diminished being” (ens diminutum) – this content as such does not repre-
sent any kind of being and thus does not properly speaking possess any positive
ontological status of its own.29 Richard Cross, whose Duns Scotus’s Theory of
Cognition from 2014 may, despite some criticism, be regarded as expressing the
present status quaestionis on Scotus’s contribution to cognitive theory, by and
large supports King’s view of Scotus’s idea of mental content,30 but nevertheless
ends his book on a note that much more resembles Pasnau’s general view –
Scotus, in cognition theory, is a transitional, by no means a revolutionary figure:
26 Pasnau, “Cognition,” 285.

27 Pasnau, “Cognition,” 303.
28 King, “Duns Scotus on Mental Content,” 88; King, ibid., 66, refers to Pasnau’s article.
Other recent reassessments of the originality of Scotus’s cognitive theory include Ginocchio,
“Scotus on Sense, Medium, and Sensible Object,” and Novák, “More Aristotelian than Aristo-
tle. Duns Scotus on Cognizing Singulars.”
29 King, “Duns Scotus on Mental Content,” 77.
30 Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 189–95 and 198; cf. also Richard Cross’s con-
tribution to this present volume. For criticism of Cross’s book (especially his internalist expla-
nation of intentionality), see Pini, “Duns Scotus on Material Substances and Cognition,” 776–
78; interestingly, Pini adds one more detail to his criticism (again concerning intentionality) in
his contribution to this present volume.
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[…] Scotus represents something of a transition position, adopting many aspects of thir-
teenth-century psychology while at the same time inventing, or anticipating, many as-
pects of fourteenth-century psychology.31
We, Daniel Heider and I, did not choose the topic of this present volume, and of
the conference in its background, in order to weigh in on this ongoing debate of
how to estimate the originality of Scotus’s contribution to the history of cogni-
tive psychology. Much more important for us was the fact that cognitive issues,
though certainly interesting in their own right, are of relevance for many, if not
in fact all, aspects of philosophy as well as for a good deal of scholastic theology,
owing to Duns Scotus’s interest not only in that kind of cognitive psychology
that is relevant for human earthly life, but rather also in human cognition both
in the pre-lapsarian state and in the hereafter, as well as in angelic and divine
cognition. The common focus on cognitive issues might thus, we thought, yield
an interesting framework for discussions of a wide range of subjects. According-
ly, this book is divided into four sections that deal with, respectively, sensory
cognition, intellectual cognition, the metaphysical and theological implications
of cognitive psychology, and cognitive and psychological issues in the broader
reception of Duns Scotus’s thought.
This volume’s primary historical focus on the Scotist tradition, rather than
on Scotus, is not at all irrelevant for an estimation of Scotus’s own contribution
to the history of cognitive theory. Just to elaborate upon Peter King’s argument
for Scotus being a revolutionary contributor to cognitive psychology, the distinc-
tion he detects in Scotus’s thought between cognitive acts and mental content
manifestly squares with a distinction well-known to any scholastic in the Early
Modern era, namely the one between a formal and an objective concept (concep-
tus formalis vs. conceptus obiectivus) – a distinction that according to the Scotist
John Punch is indeed accepted by everybody:
Note that, according to everybody, the formal concept is an act of the intellect with
which we apprehend something, whereas the objective concept is the object of that con-
cept, namely the one we apprehend through it.32
Around 1600, the distinction is not seen as being particularly Scotist. Francisco
Suárez rather calls it a “common distinction” (vulgaris distinctio). Only some
Scotists, citing a passage in Scotus’s Theoremata, traditionally insist that the dis-
31 Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 203.

32 Poncius, Integer phil. cursus, Tract. in Met., disp. 69, q. 2, n. 7, 882a: “[A]dvertendum
cum omnibus, conceptum formalem hic esse actum intellectus, quo apprehendimus aliquid;
conceptum vero obiectivum esse obiectum illius conceptus, quod scilicet per eum appre-
hendimus.” I follow the 1659 edition’s emendation of ‘quo scilicet’ to ‘quod scilicet,’ as in An-
dersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 270.
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tinction was in fact an invention of the Subtle Doctor.33 Since the terminology
itself clearly arises later, the question is not whether it can be traced back to
Scotus, but rather whether he knew of the distinction although describing it in
other terms. If we agree with King, Scotus clearly did. The simple point I wish to
make, without delving further into this particular issue, is that Scotus’s contribu-
tion to cognitive psychology must not only be measured against that competi-
tion for originality that took place in his own time and that is first of all relevant
for placing Scotus on the map of intellectual history between, say, Henry of
Ghent and William of Ockham; it is rather also a matter of who most decisively
influenced the later scholastic tradition – and Scotus even had his own long tra-
dition. This point can easily be broadened so as to reply to Pasnau’s dismissal of
any startling originality on Scotus’s part “in most matters” (cf. above), for now
leaving aside whether that statement does any justice to the Subtle Doctor him-
self. In most matters, Scotus undisputedly did leave a significant mark on the
history of philosophy and theology. Our focus on the later scholastic tradition,
and here in particular the Scotist one, is one way, possibly the best, to appreciate
this fact.
2.1 Sensory Cognition
Duns Scotus’s account of sensation, the starting point of all cognition in this
present life (pro statu isto), is closely linked with his fundamental support of the
doctrine of sensible species. Two contributions to the present volume discuss the
details and limits of this doctrine. The first one addresses the problem of how, by
which mechanism, sensible species are processed in sensation. In his contribu-
tion, “Suárez vs. Mastri and Belluto on Species in the Internal Sense,” Daniel
Heider contrasts two divergent views in the Baroque age about interior sensa-
tion. The disagreement concerns how the exterior sensible species are converted
into interior species necessary for sensory cognition, and do so even in the case
of the perceptual awareness of one’s own sensory acts. Whereas Francisco
Suárez assumes that interior species are the products of an agent internal sense
conceived as an activity of the soul, Mastri and Belluto on the contrary deny the
very existence of such an agent sense. The interior species, they hold, are effi-
ciently caused by the exterior ones. Heider argues that Suárez’s model of percep-
33 Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae, disp. 2, sect. 1, n. 1 (Opera omnia XXV), 64b. Ample
documentation of this discussion in Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 268–75; cf.
also Forlivesi, “La distinction entre concept formel et concept objectif,” and Ashworth, “Anto-
nius Rubius on Objective Being and Analogy.”
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tion has an Augustinian bent,34 whereas Mastri and Belluto adopt an Aristotelian
view – which may be surprising, given that Scotus is often seen as a thinker with
Augustinian-Avicennian tendencies. Notably, Suárez’s view was adopted by the
Scotist Hugh McCaghwell. Heider further illuminates the background of the dis-
agreement between Suárez and Mastri/Belluto. The Jesuit advocates a real dis-
tinction between the soul and its powers and among these powers themselves.
Mastri and Belluto rather opt for a merely formal distinction and therefore do
not need to assume any particular agent sense responsible for bridging the “on-
tological gap” between the various powers needed for the perceptual process.
Are there any unsensed species (species non sensatae) at work in sensation?
In his contribution, “The Estimative Faculty in Scotus and Scotism,” David Gon-
zález Ginocchio shows that, on Scotus’s account, this cannot be the case. Ginoc-
chio reconstructs Scotus’s theory of the estimative power and investigates its in-
fluence in seventeenth-century Scotism. Opposing a widespread doctrine of
unsensed species (found in Avicenna and Aquinas), Scotus and the Scotists, here
Mastri/Belluto and John Punch, agree that such intentions as those of hostility or
utility may be explained without assuming any separate kind of species. Animal
behavior that rests upon estimation is rather explicable through the mechanisms
of memory, learning, and instinct. Estimation as such thus is reduced to a modus
loquendi, a way of describing cognitive acts, albeit properly speaking they are not
estimative. Ginocchio highlights the non-biologist, in fact rather theological,
character of the Scotist approach and argues that this approach lies behind what
he identifies as a “modern deflationary presentation of the internal senses.”35
2.2 Intellectual Cognition
One of the arguably most fascinating and certainly defining features of scholastic
epistemology, and here in particular Scotist, is that it accounts not only for hu-
man, but also for angelic and divine forms of knowing. This implies that there
34 Heider, Aristotelian Subjectivism, 270–74, nevertheless maintains that Suárez’s philoso-

phy of perception, globally seen, still belongs under the wide umbrella of Renaissance Aris-
totelianism.
35 It may be worthwhile to add, in support of Ginocchio’s deflationary reading, that John
Punch in this context explicitly appealed to the principle of parsimony, also known as Ock-
ham’s razor, in order to argue against the assumption of any unsensed species: One should not
increase the number of real items without necessity – and since there is no need for unsensed
species, such items do not exist. Cf. Poncius, Integer phil. cursus, Tract. de anima., disp. 59,
q. 10, n. 95, 773a: “[N]on sunt multiplicanda entia sine necessitate; sed nulla prorsus est ne-
cessitas specierum insensatarum: ergo non datur.” Notably, Poncius, ibid., disp. 63, q. 3, nn. 22
and 25, 810a–11a, uses the same tool to do away with the intelligible species too; cf. also Spruit,
Species Intelligibilis, II, 342.
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may likely be more to cognition as such than is applicable to the specific human
condition. In his contribution, “In God’s Mind – Divine Cognition in Duns Sco-
tus and Some Early Scotists,” Giorgio Pini focuses on Scotus’s view of divine
cognition in order to distinguish between what essentially belongs to cognition
as such from what only pertains to human cognition. Pini’s finding is that hu-
man cognition is characterized by the relation of being about something, but this
is not true in the special case of divine cognition, which is not related to any
object; in Pini’s words, “divine cognition is a purely internal affair.” Pini investi-
gates the variations of Scotus’s position. According to Scotus’s first account,
there is only a non-mutual relation – one of “measurement” – between divine
cognition and its objects (the latter are measured by the former, not vice versa as
in the case of human cognition). According to the second and more radical ac-
count, no relation at all is involved in divine cognition. In either case, cognition
as such does not presuppose any relation from the knower to the known. Pini
(elaborating on findings presented in an article by Garrett Smith)36 contends
that some of Scotus’s early followers, William of Alnwick and Petrus Thomae,
altogether missed this crucial point and rather saw human cognition, where an
object is indeed presupposed, as the paradigmatic one.
Not all disagreement among Scotus and his early followers, however, is re-
ducible to misunderstanding. There were also cases where real convictions clash-
ed. Marina Fedeli’s contribution, “The Species Intelligibilis in the Cognitive Pro-
cess in Early Scotism – The Case of William of Alnwick,” uncovers one such
instance. Whereas Scotus sought to restore the Aristotelian doctrine of intelligi-
ble species out of concern that phantasms cannot represent both singular and
universal things, Alnwick, in his early Commentary on the Sentences, rather fol-
lowed Henry of Ghent and rejected the need for any separate intelligible species.
The phantasm sufficiently represents both singular things and the universals that
include singulars. Later in his development, after having moved from Paris to
Oxford, Alnwick changed his mind and now defended the view that the agent
intellect enables intellectual cognition by producing intelligible species. Fedeli
suggests that this change of mind resulted from Alnwick’s encounter with the
loyal Scotist John of Reading at Oxford.37
36 Cf. Smith, “The Origin of Intelligibility.”

37 Let me add that Alnwick, in a newly edited text associated with, but presumably not
belonging within the prologue of his Commentary on the Sentences, explicitly rebukes Reading
for not being loyal to Scotus (Reading’s “own master”) in regard to the distinction between
intuitive and abstractive cognition, another contested aspect of Scotus’s cognitive theory
(Reading is criticized for diverging from Scotus’s view that intuition necessarily is about exist-
ing things); cf. Alnwick, Utrum scientia possit causari in intellectu nostro a Deo immediate sine
obiecto praeostenso, art. 4, n. 91, in id., Questions on Science and Theology, 700. It seems that
future scholarship will be occupied with Alnwick and Reading and their respective reasons for
diverging from Scotus.
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A somewhat similar case is explored in the contribution by Damian Park,

O.F.M., “The Non-Beatific Vision of God in the Present Life – Franciscus de
Mayronis’s Relational Theory of Cognition,” only that Meyronnes, in his devel-
opment, does not move toward Scotus, but rather away from him, partially due
to the influence of Ockham. A celebrated aspect of Scotus’s cognitive psychology
is the distinction between abstractive and intuitive cognition, just mentioned.
Park shows that Meyronnes early on, in his Conflatus (one version of his Com-
mentary on the Sentences, Book I), follows Scotus’s causal explanation of the
distinction: abstractive cognition is caused by the representation of a being,
whereas intuitive cognition is caused by the being itself in its own existence and
presence. Later in his development, in his Quodlibet, Meyronnes rejected this
causal explanation in favor of a relational account. His development marks a
shift away from viewing cognition as a quality (Scotus’s position), toward view-
ing it as a relation – and (as is commonly assumed) knowing a relation implies
knowing its terminus. This is the background for Meyronnes’s view that God, in
this life, may be intuitively known as existent and abstractively known as a quid,
God being the terminus of a cognitive relation in both cases. This earthly cogni-
tion has nothing beatific about it, being rather just, in Park’s words, “an en-
counter with God.”
The success of Duns Scotus’s distinction between intuitive and abstractive
cognition is often illustrated by referring to its presence in later fourteenth-cen-
tury discussions of cognitive psychology. However, it remained a topic for dis-
cussion throughout the Scotist tradition. Anna Tropia’s contribution, “Francisco
Macedo on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” showcases how the distinction
continued to play an important role in seventeenth-century Scotism. Macedo, a
Portuguese Scotist who studied under Francisco Suárez at Coimbra and later
taught at the University of Padua, authored a three-volume doctrinal compari-
son of Scotus and Aquinas. Tropia investigates how Macedo in this work gives a
somewhat paradoxical – according to Tropia, in fact “confused” – account of
angelic intuitive cognition that is modelled after human abstractive cognition.
Particularly problematic in Macedo’s account is the concept of species that re-
mains so undetermined that it is even hard to tell whether it plays any role in
angelic cognition or not. Tropia hypothesizes that Macedo’s views were formed
through his acquaintance with Jesuit discussions of the topic; besides Suárez –
for whom the assumption of intelligible species plays an important role – Juan
Maldonado and Girolamo Dandini are mentioned as likely sources. Contrarily
and somewhat surprisingly, Macedo does not appear to have engaged much with
the more orthodox systems of Scotism of his day.38
38 Tropia, La teoria della conoscenza di Francisco Macedo, 169, similarly says that Macedo’s
understanding of Scotus has “passed through the filter” of the Jesuit views of Scotus. For a
remark on Macedo’s knowledge of Mastri’s works, see the contribution by Andersen to this
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2.3 Metaphysical and Theological Implications
Scotist cognitive psychology is interwoven with both metaphysics and theology.

As for metaphysics, this tight relationship becomes particularly palpable if one
considers the notion of “intentional being” (esse intentionale). In his contribu-
tion, “Esse intentionale in Some Early Scotists – At the Origins of the So-called
‘Supertranscendental’,” Richard Cross lays bare Scotus’s somewhat wavering
stance on the ontological status of that kind of being, namely being known, that
the eternal objects of divine knowledge owe to this knowledge. As Cross points
out, Scotus’s doctrine has a number of “loose ends” that all have to do with the
status of intentional being: it is not clear how exactly Scotus conceives of the
dependence of the objects of divine knowledge on this very knowledge; unclear
too is whether this very broad notion of being is univocal or analogical, a ques-
tion that Scotus explicitly leaves open. Not only modern scholarship is be-
wildered – the early Scotists and their “fellow-travelers” were in no better situa-
tion. Cross thus shows how Scotus’s loose ends occasioned a variety of positions
on the status of intentional being, ranging from the acceptance of intentional
being, exclusive of second intention concepts; having a genuine ontological sta-
tus of its own (James of Ascoli, the early Ockham) as compared to the denial of
any kind of being over and above real being (Alnwick, the later Ockham); and
finally to the extreme position of allowing the widest notion of being, one that
includes second intention concepts, an ontological status of its own (Francis of
Marchia). In the terminology of later times, this widest notion of being is a
“supertranscendental” concept.39
This same story is continued in Francesco Fiorentino’s contribution, “Esse
cognitum and Divine Ideas in the First Two Centuries of Scotism.” Fiorentino
starts out with the various conceptions of ideas available to Scotus and shows
how the Subtle Doctor chose the Augustinian interpretation of the Platonic ideas
as noetic entities in the divine mind. Contrary to Henry of Ghent, Scotus reject-
ed that ideas in any way precede the acts of divine knowledge which, on the
contrary, lend intentional or cognized being to the ideas in a cognitive process of
four steps (called, by Scotus, “instants of nature”) through which the divine in-
tellect moves from knowing the divine essence itself toward establishing and
knowing the ideas. Drawing on a wide range of sources, largely subsequent to
present volume. For discussions of intuition and abstraction in other seventeenth- and eigh-
teenth-century Scotists, see further Andersen, “Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition.”
39 Let me add that the earliest presently known use of this term to describe the subject
matter of a metaphysical treatise is in Pere Daguí’s Tractatus de differentia, n. 5, 120, from
1500. Daguí is a proponent of the aforementioned Scoto-Lullist tradition; cf. note 16. For super-
transcendentality in the later scholastic tradition, see Doyle, “Between Transcendental and
Transcendental.”
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the ones examined in the previous contribution, Fiorentino investigates how

Scotus’s approach and its early interpretations were received within the Francis-
can tradition of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It turns out that Aln-
wick’s dismissal of any being over and above real being was not very successful,
whereas James of Ascoli’s was. Francis of Meyronnes, on the contrary, developed
an original and nuanced position that inspired John Wyclif’s realist view of cre-
ated beings’ eternal esse intelligibile. The four-step doctrine was only rarely de-
fended. In the long run, Scotus’s view of the divine essence as the primary object
of the divine intellect with the essences of creatures as its secondary objects was
a much more popular motif. The Scotist tradition of the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, as portrayed by Fiorentino, is thus one that has considerable room for
individual originality.
Another two articles, both with a focus on seventeenth century Scotism,
demonstrate the link between cognitive psychology and the Scotist doctrine of
distinctions. In his contribution, “Alfonso Briceño on Cognition, Distinction,
and the Knowledge of God,” Roberto Hofmeister Pich investigates one particu-
larly relevant aspect of the Latin American Scotist Alfonso Briceño’s discussion
of distinctions. In his vast (yet incomplete) commentary on Scotus’s Ordinatio I,
published in Madrid during his long stay in Europe, Briceño discusses what kind
of distinction may be compatible with intuitive cognition. This kind of cognition
is seen as grasping its object such as it is in reality. When the object in question
is the divine essence, one might expect that intuition does not detect any distinc-
tion there. Contemporaneous Thomists indeed held that any distinction in that
object rather is imported by a human intellect incapable of grasping the divine
essence such as it is; in other words, only a distinction of reason can apply. Bri-
ceño does admit the relevance of the Thomist notion of a distinction of reason
with a foundation in reality, though only when it comes to Trinitarian specula-
tion. Regarding the divine essence and its attributes he has another solution
ready, one that rests on the insight that intuition must not be comprehension,
i. e., intuitive cognition need not always grasp an object in its entirety, but may
rather focus on certain aspects of the object while leaving other aspects out of
consideration. Intuition, then, does yield room for a certain “precising distinc-
tion” (distinctio praecisiva), a distinction that Briceño does not explicitly equate
with the Scotist formal distinction, but which clearly must be situated in its
vicinity. Pich regards Briceño’s discussion of this precising distinction as an
indirect defense of the formal one. Interestingly, we learn that the precising dis-
tinction is operative both in perception and in intellectual cognition.
Bartolomeo Mastri may be seen, and to some extent saw himself, as a pro-
ponent of orthodox Scotism in the seventeenth century. Occasionally, however,
even Mastri departs from Scotus’s solutions. In his contribution, “Making Room
for the Virtual Distinction – Bartolomeo Mastri between Scylla and Charybdis,”
Lukáš Novák shows that his theory of distinctions is one such case. The formal
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distinction, of course, is Scotus’s key innovation in this area. It is his alternative

to Henry of Ghent’s assumption of a merely intentional distinction. From all of
Scotus’s arguments against Henry’s view, Novák singles out one as being partic-
ularly important. This “Final Blow Argument,” to use Novák’s term, interesting-
ly centers on the notion of objective or cognized being. Scotus critically points
out that an intentional distinction based on this notion does not sufficiently dis-
tinguish between real items, such as a genus and a differentia that are (formally)
different in a thing even before being cognized. Now, Mastri accepts the formal
distinction at the level of categorial being, but not at the level of transcendental
being: genus and differentia are formally distinct, but not being and the tran-
scendentals – these are only virtually distinct, since this kind of distinction is
identical with the intentional distinction. According to Novák, this differentia-
tion is highly flawed, for how can Mastri accept the force of Scotus’s argument
in one context, while rejecting it in another?40
Foreknowledge, of course, is one important aspect of divine cognition. My
own contribution, “Decretum Concomitans – Bartolomeo Mastri on Divine Cog-
nition and Human Freedom,” investigates Mastri’s Scotist doctrine of concomi-
tant decrees against the backdrop of the prevalent positions in seventeenth-cen-
tury scholastic theology, i. e., the Thomist doctrine of physical predetermination
and the Jesuit doctrine of middle knowledge. This latter doctrine was fairly pop-
ular among Baroque Scotists, and Mastri’s project is to show that a more gen-
uinely Scotist approach is possible. Mastri teaches that God through the medium
of his own decrees grasps the future events as secondary objects of his intellect,
and does so infallibly due to the extrinsic determination which God’s own will
bestows on them. According to Mastri, this doctrine does not contradict, but
rather is in perfect coherence with free choices of created wills, due to the rela-
tion of concomitance that holds between decrees of the divine will and those of
free creatures. In debate with proponents of the Thomist and the Jesuit doc-
trines, Mastri translates this doctrine of foreknowledge into conditional lan-
guage: not only God’s knowledge of future events, but also of future condition-
als, is posterior to free divine decrees. Future conditionals, on Mastri’s account,
have their own kind of conditional real being in God’s eternal conditional
knowledge.
40 Let me again add a point of my own: Mastri’s fondness for the virtual distinction (also
called the distinction of reason with a foundation in reality), analyzed by Novák, clearly testi-
fies to his interest in the metaphysics of Suárez and other authors under his influence; in the
realm of transcendental being, Suárez’s metaphysics parsimoniously operates only with a virtu-
al distinction. For Mastri’s interest in the rational distinction with a foundation in reality, see
Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 781–839; for the role of this distinction in Suárez’s
metaphysics, see Darge, Suárez’ transzendentale Seinsauslegung, 121–23. With their theories of
distinction and precision, Mastri and Briceño, each in their own way, respond to developments
in contemporaneous scholasticism outside of the Franciscan Order.
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2.4 The influence of Scotism
An understudied aspect of the Scotist tradition’s broader impact is its influence

in Protestant and Reformed milieus. Three contributions in the present volume
seek to fill this lacuna. In his contribution, “The Epistemological Limits of Reli-
gious Images – On the Scotist Sources of a Reformed Theological Tenet,” Ueli
Zahnd undertakes to show that Scotism, and in particular Scotus’s metaphysics
of the infinite, was in the background of Reformed iconoclasm. Though Scotus
did not develop a position on the veneration of religious images, his view of di-
vine infinity did have consequences for his position on the veneration of Christ,
whose created human nature should not be adored in the same elevated manner
as his divine nature. Drawing on a vast range of sources, Zahnd observes that
whereas most Franciscans in the immediate wake of Scotus ignored this differen-
tiation, in the fifteenth century a number of Scotist theologians, Orbellis, Voril-
lon, and Brulefer, returned to Scotus’s position, which especially Brulefer radi-
calized so as to reject all images of anything divine. Images pertain to the created
world and do not yield any true cognition of God. This stance came to be adopt-
ed in the Reformed branch of the Reformation, where Brulefer’s works had a
rather significant reception (Zwingli is known to have owned and studied
them).41
Protestant circles too were familiar with Scotist thought. Arthur Huiban’s
contribution, “Melanchthon and the Will – An Early Protestant Reception of
Scotist Psychology?,” aims to show how Melanchthon, despite overt criticism of
Scotus and the Scotists in the first edition of his Loci communes (1521), never-
theless can be said to pursue, even to radicalize, certain Scotist motifs in his psy-
chology, especially in regard to the freedom of the will. Melanchthon defines the
will as an indetermined potency and as the very capacity to will and not to will;
he rejects the ability of the intellect to determine the will in its choices; he un-
derstands self-love (affectio commodi) as an intrinsic determination of the will,
not as a sensitive appetite. What in spite of all that radically separates his
thought from that of the Subtle Doctor is his rejection both of any natural affec-
tion for loving God and of man’s ability to make himself worthy of grace. Hui-
ban assumes that Melanchthon always has Johannes Eck’s clash with Luther in
mind when he talks of Scotus in connection with grace, Eck thus clearly being
one of his sources for Scotus. Additionally, Melanchthon – like Eck – was influ-
enced by some Scotist professors at the University of Tübingen. All these obser-
vations attest to a “broad and diffuse reception” of Scotus’s thought in early six-
teenth-century Germany.
Giovanni Gellera’s contribution, “Univocity of Being, the Cogito and Ideal-
ism in Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665),” supplies an interesting aspect to the
41 Cf., again, Bolliger, Infiniti Contemplatio, here 380.
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seventeenth-century continuation of the story of Scotist influence in non-Catho-

lic Europe. The Calvinist Cartesian Clauberg famously authored a manual of
metaphysics called, in its last edition (1664), Metaphysica de ente, quae rectius
ontosophia. Clauberg’s knowledge of the Subtle Doctor’s thought most likely
stemmed from other authors, such as Jacopo Zabarella and Christoph Scheibler.
Accordingly, Gellera is not out to enlist him in the long row of Scotists properly
speaking. Gellera rather aims to demonstrate how Clauberg employs certain mo-
tifs normally associated with Scotism (among them the univocity of being, the
objective reality of ideas, common nature and degrees of nature, the primacy of
the individual, the concept haecceitas, and internalism) in his metaphysics and
that he does so all along in dialogue with Descartes – and that this dialogue
resulted in a kind of metaphysics that cannot be reduced to Schulmetaphysik, to
Cartesianism, or to Scotism, but rather should be seen as an original contribu-
tion to Early Modern idealism, where idealism comes to replace nominalism as
the antipode to realism.
***
Scotism is a tradition, not a position. Not everyone who happens to agree with
Scotus on a particular issue must therefore be a Scotist. The Scotist tradition
moreover has considerable room for internal disagreement, even disagreeing
with Scotus, over particular issues. In written correspondence subsequent to the
conference behind this volume, Giorgio Pini observed that the contributions to
the conference had made it even clearer than before that Scotism is “said in
many ways” and perhaps should be described in terms of “family resemblance”
rather than an adherence to a specific set of doctrines. I see no reason to doubt
the accuracy of this characterization. The present volume may thus be seen as a
collection of components assembled in order to work toward a comprehensive
and differentiated family genealogy of Scotism, here viewed through the prism of
cognitive theory taken broadly.
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I.
Sensory Cognition
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Suárez vs. Mastri and Belluto on
Species in the Internal Sense
Daniel Heider
Introduction
Bartolomeo Mastri’s (1602–1673) interpretation of Scotus’s thought is said by
Marco Forlivesi to represent “a synthesis of the views of a minority line of Sco-
tism and the positions of Francisco Suárez.”1 Indeed, a cursory glance at the phi-
losophy of perception of Mastri and his collaborator Bonaventura Belluto
(1600–1676), presented in the fourth disputation De potentiis vegetantis et senti-
entis animae in communi, in the Disputationes in Aristotelis Stagiritae libros de
anima from 1643 (later adopted in the third volume of their famous Cursus
philosophicus),2 confirms ample similarity with Suárez’s views as laid out in the
fifth and the sixth disputations (De potentiis cognitivis in communi and De sensi-
bus in communi) of his Commentary on Aristotle’s De anima (henceforth CDA)
written in the early 1570s, but first published in 1621. In this paper, however, I
do not aim to deal with these affinities. I instead shall focus on the topic of the
agent sense, conceived as a vehicle which produces the species of the internal
sense, something I consider to be a fundamental difference between the theories
of Suárez and of Mastri and Belluto. To put it briefly, while Suárez endorses that
the agent internal sense produces the interior species, Mastri and Belluto reject
this claim. Although the Jesuit agrees with the two Scotists in denying the neces-
sity of the agent sense in the ‘elevation’ of the sensible qualities to the level of the
exterior species, and they all emphasise the causal activity of the sensory powers
I would like to thank David Ginocchio and Claus A. Andersen for their helpful comments on a
draft version of this article. This study is a result of the research funded by the Czech Science
Foundation (project no. GA ČR 20–01710S, “Theory of Cognition in Baroque Scotism”).
1 Forlivesi, “Mastri, Bartolomeo,” 6; for the affinity between Mastri and Belluto and Suárez
regarding their understanding of “formal” and “objective” concepts, see Andersen, Metaphysik
im Barockscotismus, 268–75.
2 For a detailed account of the publication history of the work, see Forlivesi, Scotistarum
princeps, 361–65. Further consult Forlivesi, ibid., 112–23 and 153–59, for an account of the
background and genesis of Mastri and Belluto’s Cursus philosophicus; for a short reappraisal,
see also Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 30–38. It is assumed that Belluto was the
main author of the Disputationes in De anima (henceforth = In DA). Since this work, however,
was published under the names of both authors, I shall, throughout this article, refer to it as
their joint publication. Andersen, “Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” 188–89, has a brief
overview of the content of In DA.
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34 Daniel Heider
in the production of perceptual acts, they substantially differ in their answer to

the question about the origin of interior species.
Our perceptual experience is far from limited to the apprehension of dis-
crete proper sensibles, such as coloured spots, moving sounds and odours, pure-
ly gustatory (that is, not olfactory) qualities, etc. It includes several psychological
(non-conceptual) mechanisms, which can in a broad sense be regarded as in-
stances of ‘perceiving as.’3 We sense bundles constituted by these sensibles; we
recognize them as belonging to this or that individual; we cognize them as agree-
able or disagreeable; we understand sensible objects as absent or as having oc-
curred in the past; we imagine sensible objects as compounded of distinct sensi-
bles; we perceive not only external objects but we are sensibly aware also of our
episodic sensations when they are present, and of their absence when they are
not. In this paper, I do not attempt to do justice to all the post-sensory processes
which co-constitute our complex and unified sensory perception. Rather, focus-
ing on the doctrinal differences between Suárez and Mastri and Belluto, I shall
discuss only their disagreement concerning four acts and their corresponding
principles on the part of objects. These are as follows: (i) The sensed species
(species sensata), which is the principle of the perceptual operations of objects
first sensed by the five external senses; (ii) the composite species (species com-
posita), the principle of the (imaginary) acts related to impossible objects, such
as a golden mountain; and (iii) the unperceived species (species non sensata),
that is, the principle of estimative operations such as utility or enmity. (iv) In
addition, I shall also consider the acts and their principles relevant to the cogni-
tion of one’s own sensory acts, especially those of the external senses.
I shall proceed in four steps. First, I shall sketch the basic doctrinal agree-
ments between the theories of Suárez and of Mastri and Belluto concerning the
formal, material, and final causes of sensible species. Second, I shall present
Suárez’s views of the abovementioned four kinds of species. I shall argue that
Suárez’s view of their production can be characterized as a top-down causal
model. On this model, the soul (through the internal sense4 ) is conceived as the
principal cause of interior species. Third, I shall introduce Mastri and Belluto’s
3 For a list of these processes, see Toivanen, “Perceiving As: Non-conceptual Forms of Per-
ception in Medieval Philosophy;” for post-sensory operations in Aquinas, see also Barker,
“Aquinas on Internal Sensory Intentions.”
4 Importantly, both Suárez and Mastri and Belluto agree in their reductionism of the inter-
nal senses. They endorse the existence of a single interior sense generating a plurality of func-
tions. See Suárez, CDA, disp. 8, q. 1, vol. 3, 14–46; Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 5, q. 8,
art. 5 (Cursus Philosophicus III), 124a–26a. For Suárez’s view of the single internal sense and
its functions, see also South, “Suárez on Imagination,” and Heider, Aristotelian Subjectivism,
230–54. For the Scotists’ theory of the single interior sense considered against the background
of the doctrine of two internal senses of Pedro Fonseca (1528–1599), see Heider, “Fonseca’s
Halfway Reductionism of the Internal Senses in Light of Mastri and Belluto’s Critique.”
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Suárez vs. Mastri and Belluto on Species in the Internal Sense 35
theory of the efficient cause of interior species, based on what can be called a
bottom-up causal model. On this model, interior species are caused by items re-
lated to external sensation, foremost by sensible species of the external senses.5
Fourth, as a conclusion, beside an attempt to formulate an account of this doc-
trinal difference, I shall show that Mastri and Belluto’s theory was not the only
theory advocated by early modern Scotists; I shall show that the Irish Observant
Hugh McCaghwell (1571–1626) accepted Suárez’s top-down causal model.
1. Shared Assumptions Regarding the Formal, Material

and Final Causes of Sensible Species
Suárez shares with Mastri and Belluto several nontrivial views related to sensible
species. First, they affirm the existence of both external and internal species. Fol-
lowing Aristotle, they say that the external senses must be initially affected by
likenesses emitted from external sensibles. They agree that these intentional spe-
cies must be posited not only in the external senses but also in the internal sens-
es, since without the retention of these species we cannot remember the past.6
Regarding the formal cause of these species, they agree that these species are not
substantial entities (corpuscles) but qualities. As ‘forms without matter’ they dif-
fer from the sensibles represented by them. This difference, however, does not
amount to their literal immateriality but only to their superior material subtlety
when compared to the represented sensibles. A colour does not produce a colour
in the air and does not inhere as such in the eye. There is no red colour in the
medium and in the organ that would thereby colour them. Our pupil does not
turn red upon the reception of the species of a red colour. The red colour emits
sensible species that differ from it in kind.7 All these thinkers make clear that
these likenesses are intentional not because they are not real but only because,
being materially ‘diminished,’ they concur in the production of sensory acts,
which properly are called intentions.8
With some hesitation, especially in the case of Mastri and Belluto, they say
that the species’ ultimate material cause is the sensory power, i. e., a composite of
the organ and the soul. Species must be received in the sensory power as their
ultimate subject since the sensory power, and not merely the organ, concurs with
5 This model is based on Aristotle, De anima III, c. 3, 429a2–3, 163: “[…] imagination
must be a movement produced by sensation actively operating.”
6 Suárez, CDA, disp. 5, q. 1, n. 3 (vol. II), 286; Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 4, q. 4,
nn. 38–39, 69b.
7 Suárez, CDA, disp. 5, q. 2, n. 8, n. 17 (vol. II), 306–8, 316–18; Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA,
disp. 4, q. 4, nn. 41 and 43, 70a–b.
8 Suárez, CDA, disp. 5, q. 1, n. 3 (vol. II), 286; Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 4, q. 4, n.
36, 69a.
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36 Daniel Heider
the species as a co-cause in the production of a perceptual act.9 Contrary to some

Thomists,10 they are adamant in their rejection of the distinction between two
kinds of being of species, namely between a natural and an intentional mode of
being. Sensible species are the accidents that inhere in the sensory power. Ac-
cordingly, Mastri and Belluto deny the existence of the species qua an essence
that would form a kind of unity with the sensory power, one which would be
even more closely united than the substantial unity of form and matter. Thus
they reject an identification at the level of the reception of species, and reserve it
for the so-called second acts, namely vital acts, which are perceptual operations
tending intentionally to their objects.11 Accordingly, for Mastri and Belluto, as
well as for Suárez, the cognitive process is composed of three phases: the first is
the reception of the species; the second is the production of perceptual acts; the
third amounts to the reception of these acts as qualities in the sensory powers
through which these operations have been produced.12
Regarding the final cause, the two Scotists and Suárez endorse two main
functions of the intentional species (both sensible and intelligible). The first is
representational. A species represents an object. In line with their denial of two
kinds of being of species, they agree that a species represents its object not for-
mally but only inchoately and virtually; a formal (perfect) likeness occurs only
at the level of the perceptual act. At the level of the impressed species the repre-
sentation is obscure and imperfect. It may be compared to a seed of the object,
which needs to ‘germinate’ in the second (vital) act. Moreover, a species cannot
be an objective image, such as a painting of Caesar, either. If it were, it would
have to be known first, i. e., before the apprehension of the represented items. In
consequence, it would have to be known in the same way as a painting of Caesar
is known prior to the knowledge of the real Caesar. In such a case, the species
would be a ‘quod,’ rather than a ‘quo,’ i. e., something through which the object
is known.13 A species’ second role is causal. It causally concurs as a partial cause
9 Suárez, CDA, disp. 5, q. 1, n. 6 (vol. II), 292–94; for Mastri and Belluto’s arguments for
both views (arguing that a dead eye, too, can receive species), see Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA,
disp. 4, q. 5, art. 1, nn. 47–48, 71a–b.
10 One of the Thomists mentioned by Mastri and Belluto is John Poinsot (1589–1644). For
the distinction between the species’ entitative and intentional modes of being, see his Naturalis
philosophia, pars 4, q. 6, art. 3 (Cursus philosophicus thomisticus III), 185a–86b.
11 Suárez, CDA, disp. 5, q. 2, n. 24 (vol. II), 326; Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 4, q. 5,
art. 1, nn. 50–52, 71b–72a.
12 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 4, q. 2, n. 14, 65a, and n. 18, 66b; cf. Suárez, CDA, disp.
5, q. 5 (vol. II), 368–414.
13 Although in CDA (disp. 5, q. 2, n. 21, vol. II, 322), the edition based on the early manu-
scripts written in the first half of the 1570s, it is said that “Istae species intentionales sunt
similitudines formales obiectorum;” in his Tractatus de anima, the version edited by Balthasar
Álvares after the Jesuit’s death in 1621, Suárez, otherwise entirely in line with the text of CDA,
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along with the sensory power in the production of perception. All these con-
siderations make it clear that a species generates by efficient (partial) causality.
They cannot be mere ‘exciters’ of the sensory power, nor simply the necessary
condition of the production of some cognitive act. Cognition is an assimilative
process, and as such it must be co-caused by objects through the species.14
2. Suárez on the Production of Interior Species

2.1 Sensed Species
In the second question, “Whether for the Production of Sensible Species It Is

Necessary to Posit the Agent Sense” of the sixth disputation “On the Senses in
General” in his CDA, Suárez begins with an assumption of the existence of
sensed species. As regards their origin, he starts by introducing the bottom-up
causal account, which holds that interior species are produced by exterior species
or, properly speaking, by an external object through this species.15 He has three
reasons for denying this account. (1) In line with his emphasis on the hierarchy
of the powers and his (Augustinian) view of the impossibility of bottom-up
causality,16 he says that exterior species cannot be the cause of interior species,
since the latter is more perfect than the former. Unlike exterior species, an inte-
rior one does not depend on the presence of sensible objects, since the latter are
(also) the principles of abstractive acts. In these acts the sensory power termi-
nates in objects which are absent or even non-existent. Clearly, there is no way
for a less perfect entity to bring about a more perfect one, since a cause must be
at least as perfect as its effect. (2) The organ of the internal sense is the brain.
However, we can have a tactile experience of heat in a foot (for Suárez the tactile
organ is primarily the skin that envelops the body17 ). The question is how a spe-
cies of heat received in the foot (the cause of interior species, according to the
states this: “Species intentionales non repraesentant formaliter obiecta, sed effective tantum.”
(Tractatus de anima, III, cap. 2, n. 20, 620). For Mastri and Belluto’s view, see In DA, disp. 4,
q. 6, n. 101, 79a.
14 Suárez, CDA, disp. 5, q. 4, n. 14 (vol. II), 364; Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 4, q. 6, n.
93, 78a.
15 Suárez, CDA, disp. 6, q. 2, n. 8 (vol. II), 478: “[…] aiunt quidam illas produci ab specie-
bus existentibus in sensibus exterioribus, seu ab obiecto [extrinseco], media illa specie, ut
Petrus visus producit speciem sui in visu, et illa mediante, producit similem in phantasia.”
16 For this axiom based on the impossibility of ascendant causality and its application to
sensory perception, and for the limitation of the causal role of an object in the production of
perceptual acts in medieval Augustinianism, see Silva, “Medieval Theories of Active Percep-
tion.” For Suárez’s adoption of this Augustinian axiom, see Heider, Aristotelian Subjectivism,
for this especially 85–93 and 217–30.
17 Suárez, CDA, disp. 7, q. 14, n. 2 (vol. II), 736–38.
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38 Daniel Heider
thesis being criticized) can be delivered to the brain, or how it can cause a simi-
lar species there. Suárez offers two possible explanations. One is that an exterior
species of heat can cause an interior species at a distance; the other is that nerves
connect the foot to the brain. The former is not possible, since action at a dis-
tance is impossible.18 The other explanation is not possible either. If it were cor-
rect, the heat would have to be felt in all the parts of the bodily medium running
from the foot to the brain, which is not the case. We feel the heat only in the
foot, and not in the abdomen or the chest. (3) If this bottom-up causal account
were correct, then one would have to admit that whenever the external senses
receive species, similar ones are ipso facto received in the interior sensory power.
Again, this is not true. Those who sleep with eyes wide open, or are in ecstasy or
have suffered apoplexy, can receive species in the organs without producing an
interior species in the phantasy. Suárez insists that if exterior species are not ‘re-
duced’ to the second act, i. e., when no vital perceptual act is produced nor is
received in the same sensory power, the phantasy will have no species. More-
over, this theory is not plausible, or else we would have to say that the interior
sense could receive an interior species and then generate acts which represent
objects that have not been consciously cognized by the external senses. Some
perceiver could remember past objects she has never consciously apprehended.
For Suárez, this is not the case.19
Suárez rejects also a qualified version of this bottom-up causal view. Ac-
cording to this version, interior species are caused by exterior species with ap-
prehension by the external senses required as a necessary condition. Suárez is
puzzled by this requirement. Either this external cognition is conceived as a co-
cause, in which case the exterior species will not be the only cause; or this appre-
hension, as asserted, will be a necessary condition, in which case it is not clear
what this requirement entails. Doubtless this view seems to imply that exterior
species can produce an interior species only if the sense pays attention to the
exterior species. Certainly this is not the case when a person sleeps with open
eyes. But what does this attention contribute to the efficacy of the exterior spe-
cies? Suárez shows that this attention may be understood either in the above-
mentioned sense, i. e., in the sense that interior species are caused by external
18 For the impossibility of actio in distans, see Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae (= DM),
disp. 18, sect. 8 (Opera omnia XXV), 650–68. For an analysis of Suárez’s view according to
which the propinquity of cause and effect is taken as a necessary condition of efficient causa-
tion, see Des Chene, “Suárez on Propinquity and the Efficient Cause.”
19 Suárez, CDA, disp. 6, q. 2, n. 9 (vol. II), 478–80: “[…] nam licet sensus exterior immute-
tur, si per species receptas non cognoscit, interior sensus non immutabitur, ut patet in eo qui
patitur [apoplexiam] vel [deliquium] animae vel [extasim], nam licet habeat oculos aptos non
videt, et tunc oculus recipit species ab obiecto; interior tamen sensus non recipit illas, nam si
reciperet conservaret illas, et posset postea recordari eorum [quae] passus est. Quod non facit,
ut experientia [monstrat].”
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acts (we get a different theory then, though), or that this attention is posited
owing to the sensory power’s material disposition to receive the species. Clearly,
the latter must be ruled out, since attention does not constitute a material dispo-
sition for the reception of a species; this species can be received by an inattentive
or distracted power as well. Attention is not required for the reception of the
species of the power, but only for its subsequent utilization.20
Having rejected this version of the bottom-up causal account, Suárez for-
mulates his first conclusion, which he says is only a probable one (tantum prob-
abile), one which is yet another version of the bottom-up causal account: “The
internal senses’ species are not produced by an external object through the spe-
cies, but by the external senses through their cognitive acts.”21 Accordingly, these
acts will not constitute merely a necessary condition, but are the efficient cause
itself. While the first part of this account is clear from what has been said above,
the second part may be justified by reference to his theory of the endpoint of the
cognitive act.22 For Suárez, as for Scotus and the Scotists, this endpoint is a not a
categorial action, but a quality identical to a cognitive act. Thus it seems justifi-
able to say that this quality, as the principle of causation of yet another quality,23
produces an interior species which represents the same external object because
these two distinct powers are coordinated in the common soul. Suárez addition-
ally introduces three supplemental reasons supporting this view. (1) As has been
said, the internal sense receives a species only when the external senses are oper-
ative. (2) The more strongly the external sense attends to its object, the more
vehemently the species is impressed on the internal sense and the more easily it
will be remembered. (3) There is no better (to wit, Aristotelian) candidate for
this cause.24
No matter how probable Suárez thinks this view is, he is clear that it is not
entirely convincing. Although it may be said that external sensation is more per-
fect than interior species, since the former is a vital act while the latter is not, in
his critique of this “merely probable” conclusion the Jesuit revisits the argument
in light of the difference between the perfection of the external senses and the
perfection of the internal senses. He repeats that the latter are not bound to ap-
prehend the objects as present here and now to the perceiver. Consequently, the
only way for Suárez to avoid this implausible assumption inherent in bottom-up
20 Ibid., n. 9, 480–82.
21 Ibid., n. 10, 482: “Species sensata sensus interioris non fit ab alio obiecto extrinseco me-
dia specie, sed a sensu exteriori medio actu cognitionis suae.”
22 For this theory of the expressed species (known in an act of understanding as verbum
mentis) called “idolum” in sensory cognition, which is produced not only in the interior but
also in the external senses, see Suárez, CDA, disp. 5, q. 5 (vol. II), 368–413.
23 For habits as the qualitative termini of immanent actions conceived as qualities, see Suá-
rez, DM, vol. II, disp. 44, sect. 8, n. 13, 684.
24 Suárez, CDA, disp. 6, q. 2, n. 10 (vol. II), 482.
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40 Daniel Heider
causality is to embrace a different theory, one which endorses the top-down

causal model. This theory is formulated by Suárez in the following way: “It is
probable that the interior species result in the interior sense through its own
proper activity and not by means of any efficiency of something external.”25 I
deem this theory expressive of the core of Suárez’s cognitive psychology. It is
backed up by his fundamental theory of the sympathy of the powers, which is
operative not only between the cognitive powers but also between the cognitive
and the appetitive powers rooted in the same soul. Suárez explains this conclu-
sion as follows:
The interior and the exterior senses are rooted in the same soul. Therefore, it is one and
the same soul that sees through sight and imagines through the imagination. According-
ly, there is a natural harmony between these powers in such a manner that, if the soul
sees something through sight, it immediately forms the likeness of that thing in the imag-
ination, and not through a power distinct from the imagination but through the power of
the very same imagination. If an external sensation is perceived, a species naturally en-
sues in the internal sense, yet not through the activity of this sensation but from the
activity of the soul itself by means of the imagination, although only upon the presence of
the sensed thing. Therefore, the imagination does not always produce these species, since
the soul requires a preceding cognition of an object in order to produce in itself (intra se)
a likeness of this object.26
When the soul, through the power of sight, perceives an external object, an inte-
rior species ensues in the interior sense. It is the soul (conceived as ‘an agent
sense’), through the same power, which is active in the production and reception
of these species. There is no need to distinguish between two really distinct sens-
es, namely between the agent sense and the passive internal sense, since it is the
soul that is the principal agent. In analogy to the production of intelligible spe-
cies, where the active intellect (only conceptually distinct from the potential in-
tellect) produces intelligible species, and where the phantasms are the occasional
or exemplary cause, the same description is employed by Suárez here. The active
soul in utilizing the sensory power is regarded as ‘an agent sense,’ and the acts of
25 Ibid., n. 13, 486: “Probabile est huiusmodi species interiores resultare in interiori sensu
propria vi et activitate illius, et non per efficientiam alicuius extrinseci.”
26 Ibid.: “Sensus interior et exterior in eadem anima radicantur, unde eadem est anima quae
videt per visum, et per imaginationem imaginatur; est ergo haec naturalis consensio inter has
potentias, quod eo ipso quod anima aliquid visu percipit, statim format similitudinem illius rei
in imaginatione sua, non mediante potentia ab imaginatione distincta, sed per virtutem eius-
dem imaginationis, ita ut posita sensatione extrinseca, naturaliter resultet species in interiori
sensu, non ex activitate sensationis, sed ex activitate ipsius animae per imaginationem, ad prae-
sentiam tamen rei sensatae. Et ideo imaginatio non semper efficit illas species, quia indiget
anima praevia aliqua cognitione obiecti, ut possit intra se formare aliquam similitudinem il-
lius.”
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the external senses are regarded as occasional or exemplary causes in the pro-
duction of interior species.27
From Suárez’s point of view, this description has two advantages. First, it
does not compromise the immanent status of cognitive acts that are co-pro-
duced by a single power. Although in his first conclusion he conceded that one
quality, i. e. a cognitive act, can produce another quality, namely the species in a
different power, in justifying his second conclusion Suárez is less open to this
option: it is not rational to say that one power generating an immanent opera-
tion can (transeuntly) cause a species in another, really distinct power. This di-
rect inter-power causation is at odds with the essentially immanent character of
the operation of the vital power. Second, this theory is preferable because it
avoids the implausible consequence that is part of the issue with upward causali-
ty. There is no doubt that the soul is not something less perfect than the interior
species that represents absent objects.
2.2 Composite Species
In addition to the apprehension of absent objects, the internal sense is able to

form acts that apprehend a composite object integrated from two or more dis-
tinct sensible objects, one of which does not have a counterpart in external reali-
ty. Suárez mentions the famous example of a golden mountain.28 In his formula-
tion of the status quaestionis, he asks whether these acts have, as their principle,
only two distinct species representing parts of the given whole as their co-princi-
ples, or whether they can be produced also through a single, i. e., composite spe-
cies representing the whole fictive item. Suárez makes it clear that both options
are tenable and even compatible. To demonstrate their compatibility, he distin-
guishes between the first and the subsequent acts. If the imagination apprehends
a golden mountain for the first time, it produces this act representing it on the
basis of two distinct species, those of gold and of mountain. At this stage, there is
no single species representing this impossible object. We have sensed gold and a
mountain; the imagination has stored them in the phantasy and combined them
in a creative manner to produce an act intentionally tending to a single object.
27 For Suárez’s view of phantasms seen as occasional and exemplary causes of the agent
intellect’s production of intelligible species, which is structurally similar to the production of
interior species, see Perler, “Suárez on Intellectual and Occasional Causation.”
28 It is puzzling that a golden mountain is traditionally, including by Suárez, seen as an
example of impossible objects. The famous Cistercian polymath Caramuel y Lobkowitz (1606–
1682) would later argue that a golden mountain is not impossible, since God could make one –
quite similar to the Spaniards, who could build a mountain with all the silver they have found
in the mines of the Mount Potosi (Bolivia); for Caramuel’s view, see Andersen, “The Doctrine
of Beings of Reason in Renaissance Lullism.”
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42 Daniel Heider
However, in line with the abovementioned conclusion based on the soul con-
sidered as ‘an agent sense,’ Suárez adds that, since it is the soul which is opera-
tive through the phantasy and since the primordial act can be taken as an exem-
plary or occasional cause of a new composite species of the same representation,
the single composed species representing a golden mountain can and will result
from the internal sense. It will be stored there and habitually represent a golden
mountain, even if never ‘reduced’ to a second act. If not entirely forgotten, it will
be available for the phantasy’s future reactivation. Moreover, it seems that there
must exist such a species since, as we experience, any subsequent apprehension
will be exercised at greater ease than the original act. Importantly, as many other
theories in Suárez’s metaphysico-psychological cognitive system show, this dis-
tinction has a direct counterpart in Suárez’s theory of the production of an intel-
ligible species, one representing the so-called metaphysical (absolute) universal.
At first, we have intelligible species representing material singulars. Comparing
them helps the intellect to separate out the individual differences (haecceities)
and thus acquire the knowledge of the so-called absolute universal, for which at
this stage no intelligible species is available. However, after such a process of
separation, the intelligible species which represents this universal will be pro-
duced by the intellect and remain in the intellectual memory to be easily reacti-
vated at a later point, e. g., in judgments and syllogisms.29
2.3 Unsensed species
Suárez devotes a paragraph of CDA disp. 6, q. 2 also to the issue of the origin of
action-oriented intentions of convenience and inconvenience. Therein Suárez
starts from the hypothetical assumption of the existence of a distinct unsensed
species, as endorsed in the classical theories of Avicenna, Aquinas, and many
others.30 These species must exist and be distinct from the sensed species since
they represent rationes that are more hidden and more perfect than those sensed
by the external senses. They are distinct because the acts of which they are the
principles can be separated. While the wolf A has a representation of a wolf B
only sub ratione lupi, in a lamb, e. g., it exists also sub ratione inimici. In line
with the abovementioned top-down causal model, Suárez is clear that the origin
of interior sensed species cannot be explained in the bottom-up model. Interior
sensed species cannot be caused by external objects. They can only be produced
29 Suárez, CDA, disp. 6, q. 2, n. 14 (vol. II), 488–90; for the production of the intelligible
species of the metaphysical universal (universale metaphysicum) and for the direct analogy of
this production with the genesis of the composite species, see CDA, disp. 9. q. 3, n. 14 (vol. III),
128–30.
30 For these species in Avicenna, see Liber de anima, pars 1, cap. 5, 86; see also, among
others, Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, q. 25, art. 2 (ed. Leonina 22, 3/1), 733.
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by the soul by means of the interior sense, with exterior apprehension taken as
either an exemplary or occasional cause.
As in other cases, Suárez adopts a more parsimonious ontology than Avi-
cenna or Aquinas. For him, no really distinct species actually need to be posited.
The sensed species, or (as we shall see below) the sensed species with a mode,
are sufficient principles of estimative judgments and trigger emotional responses
and subsequent locomotive actions. Suárez introduces two arguments for this
view. (1) Such distinct species are redundant. As soon as a lamb sees a wolf (sub
ratione lupi), it judges “This wolf is dangerous,” which leads to the response of
fear and the lamb’s escape. The lamb can judge these two aspects through one
and the same sensed species. The argument that these two features are separable
from the species is not cogent. Through one and the same species the power of a
single nature can apprehend and judge different things, due to their apprehen-
sion by different instincts, than can the power of another nature. (2) It is not
only the case that these species are redundant, but they are also impossible. If
really distinct, the intention of hostility could be represented by the species abs-
tractly, i. e., as separated from the subject. In such a case, a sensory power would
be able to cause an act which apprehends the intention of danger (danger as
such) in the wolf, as distinct from the wolf seen under the characteristics of
shape, colour, etc. Clearly, a sensory power is not capable of exercising this for-
mal abstraction of the form from its subject.31
Although the whole thrust of his reasoning looks as though Suárez espouses
the view that these action-oriented intentions are apprehended through a sensed
species of the wolf (this is also Mastri and Belluto’s reading), in his final word
he employs the notion of the (extrinsic) mode, typical of his (and Jesuit) meta-
physics and cognitive theory in general, which seems to constitute the main ex-
planans of his position.32 Suárez repeats that the ratio insensata cannot be repre-
sented as a feature distinct from the ratio sensata. Nevertheless, he adds that it
can be represented as a mode grounded in the ratio sensata (ut modus quidam
fundatus in illa). This formulation seems to suggest that Suárez after all posits
the existence of unsensed species, which is captured not as a really distinct entity
but only as a mode of the interior (sensed) species.33 Again, this modification of
the theory of the sensed species as representing these action-oriented intentions
can have only a top-down origin. This procedure is a result of the soul that oper-

32 For Suárez’s metaphysics of the extrinsic modes (modi extrinseci), see Menn, “Suárez,
Nominalism, and Modes,” 242–50, and Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes 1274–1671, 253–58. For
a broad employment of these modes also in Suárez’s theory of perception, see Heider, Aris-
totelian Subjectivism, 267–70.
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44 Daniel Heider
ates through the internal sense, with the external senses’ apprehension taken as
the exemplary cause.
Suárez ends his section on the origin of the unsensed species with this un-
Aristotelian conclusion: “As regards the internal senses it is necessary to posit an
agent sense [which is productive] of the intentional [interior] sense’s species.”34
As we have seen, this agent sense is not a special sense really distinct from a
passive sense. It rather represents an abbreviation of the soul’s activity in medi-
ating and coordinating the activities coming from the really distinct powers. Far
from being an incidental feature of the Jesuit’s tenet, the emphasis on this effect
of the soul represents the basso ostinato of Suárez’s philosophical psychology.
2.4 The Species of the Acts of the External Senses
Besides apprehending unified sensory forms representing absent objects, action-

oriented intentions and imaginary compounds, the internal sense is also aware
of the acts of the external senses, which for Suárez is also the main reason why
the sentient soul can remember objects with which it has become familiar in the
past.35 This apprehension is for him grounded, again, in his theory of the soul
conceived as an ‘agent sense.’ Before presenting Suárez’s view of the interior
sense’s awareness of exterior sensory acts, two preliminary remarks are in place.
First, like other scholastics, Suárez distinguishes between two kinds of self-
awareness.36 1) An act can be cognized properly, i. e., as the object (quod) of a
higher-order act. Accordingly, a first-order act representing an apple can be ap-
prehended through a second-order act that turns reflexively to the lower-order
act. If the first-order act is apprehended in this way, it is known expressly and
directly, in a so-called designated act (in actu signato). Contemporary authors
have called this kind of self-awareness ‘higher-order consciousness’ (HOC). 2)
An act that intentionally tends to an apple can be cognized also improperly, im-
plicitly, or indirectly, in an exercised act (in actu exercito). In line with this ac-
count, it can be immediately apprehended by the same first-order act, namely as
a “quo,” through which an external object is apprehended. When I perceive an
apple, I am indirectly and experientially aware also of this act through which I
34 Ibid., n. 16, 492: “Respectu sensuum interiorum necessario est ponendus aliquis sensus
agens intentionales species.”
36 Suárez, CDA, disp. 6, q. 4, n. 2 (vol. II), 502. For this distinction in late medieval and
early modern scholasticism, see Knebel, “Das Cogito und die Krise des Schulbegriffs der Re-
flexion.” For its use in contemporary philosophy of mind as related to two competing theories
of introspective consciousness, see, e. g., Kriegel, “The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Con-
sciousness. Second Version.”
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see the apple. In contemporary philosophy, this self-awareness is called ‘same-

order consciousness’ (SOC).
The second preliminary remark concerns the distinction between the ap-
prehension of an act’s existence and of its quiddity. As Suárez notes, sensory
self-awareness can only provide us with an answer to the question ‘An sit’
(‘whether it exists’).
Suárez opens his exposition of this issue of sensory self-awareness with a
flat rejection of the application of HOC to a sensory power.37 This kind of self-
awareness is possible only in the intellect: “No sensory power can cognize its
own operation through a proper and distinct act.”38 Such reflective self-cognition
exceeds the capacity of a merely material power. No material power can perfectly
reflect upon itself because its proper object does not include its acts. These oper-
ations are not per se sensible entities.39
In the second conclusion, Suárez denies this perfect self-awareness at the
inter-power level too: “No sense through its own act can perceive an act of a
distinct sense through its own sensible species and as part of its proper object.”40
In other words, the internal sense cannot cognize the acts of the external senses
through their proper species. Importantly, with this declaration Suárez explicitly
rejects Scotus’s view according to which the internal sense apprehends (and re-
members) the acts of the external senses because these acts-qualities imprint
their proper and distinct species on the internal sense.41 Suárez makes it clear
that an act of vision of white colour does not imprint its special species on the
interior sense. If it did, two species would have to be impressed onto it, one rep-
resenting the white colour, the second the act itself. Consequently, two acts
would have to be simultaneously produced by the interior sense. Referring to our
‘phenomenological evidence,’ Suárez states that this characterisation does not
accord with our perceptual experience or with the proper functioning of the in-
terior sense. And if such were the case, one would not be able to cognize any-
thing with perfect attention, since one’s attention would be always fragmented.
37 For Suárez’s theory of perceptual self-awareness, see Perler, “Suárez on Consciousness,”

264–73, and Heider, Aristotelian Subjectivism, 114–21.
38 Suárez, CDA, disp. 6, q. 4, n. 4 (vol. II), 504: “Nulla potentia sensitiva cognoscit proprie
et actu distincto suam propriam operationem.”
39 This claim is based on Proclus, The Elements of Theology, 18–19: “[…] it is not in the
nature of any body to revert upon itself. That which reverts upon anything is conjoined with
that upon which it reverts: hence it is evident that every part of a body reverted upon itself
must be conjoined with every other part – since self-reversion is precisely the case in which the
reverted subject and that upon which it has reverted become identical. But this is impossible
for a body, and universally for any divisible substance […].”
40 Suárez, CDA, disp. 6, q. 4, n. 6 (vol. II), 508: “Nullus sensus potest proprio actu percipere
actum alterius sensus per propriam illius speciem, et tamquam partem proprii obiecti.”
41 For the loci in Scotus on this position, see Section 4.4.
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46 Daniel Heider
At the same time, this view, epistemologically speaking, is too optimistic regard-
ing sensory self-awareness. If a distinct act which tends to the act were to be
produced, a proper and distinct concept of this act, explicating its quiddity (see
the tension noted in the second preliminary remark), would have to be the re-
sult. This is not what we experience.42
Although he denies the application of HOC, in the third conclusion Suárez
is eager to endorse the SOC: “Every sensory power somehow perceives its own
act, but not through a reflection, but imperfectly and in a quasi-exercised act.”43
Such an implicit reflection is built into all cognitive and appetitive acts, and is
the result of the vital operation of the sensory powers. When we exercise first-
order acts we are not only aware of the sensed objects but at the same time also
of these acts. This conclusion determines Suárez’s fourth (for our comparison
the most relevant) conclusion:
The interior sense cognizes the external senses’ operations in a special way, not through
the proper species but through the species of the external sensibles which somehow be-
come modified in the external senses.44
Suárez agrees with Scotus that at the sensory level we have a memory of sensory
acts. This sensory memory is not only that of the acts of the exterior senses but
also those of the interior sense as well as the acts of the sensory appetite. I re-
member not only Peter sitting yesterday but also that I saw him sitting. I re-
member having experienced a particular emotion of anger when I saw this or
that person. I recollect having imagined this or that kind of object. If we are to
explain the behaviour of non-rational animals, the same operations must be at-
tributed to them, too. However, in the exposition of the mechanism of this self-
awareness Suárez substantially differs from Scotus. Contrary to the Subtle Doc-
tor, Suárez claims that these acts are not apprehended through a proper species
imprinted onto the interior sense. These acts can be apprehended only indirectly
and implicitly, that is, by the modifications of the interior species representing
sensible objects. Suárez explains this conclusion by referring to CDA disp. 6, sect.
2, in which he introduced the theory of the soul conceived as an ‘agent sense.’
He recapitulates that the acts of the external senses serve as exemplary causes, on
the model of which the soul via the internal sense produces its species. But since
these ‘exemplary’ acts do not apprehend merely external objects, but are also
indirectly aware of the acts themselves, the resulting species will be modified ac-

43 Ibid., n. 7, 510: “Omnis sensus percipit aliquo modo actum suum, non per reflexionem,
sed imperfecto modo et quasi in actu exercito.”
44 Ibid., n. 8, 510: “Sensus interior speciali modo cognoscit operationem sensuum externo-
rum, non per proprias species, sed per species sensibilium externorum, quasi modificatas in
ipsis sensibus externis.”
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cording to this self-consciousness as well. Epistemologically speaking, however,

cognition by the interior sense of the acts of the exterior senses will not be more
perfect than the cognition by the external senses. The interior sense’s self-cogni-
tion will not include an additional cognitive perfection above what has been al-
ready attained by the external senses. According to Suárez, the next level of per-
fection, manifested by HOC, is reached only with intellectual cognition.45
3. Mastri and Belluto on the Production

of Interior Species
3.1 Sensed Species
In the second article (called “Which Things Can Produce the Sensible Species?”)
of the fifth question (“On the Material and Efficient Causes of the Sensible Spe-
cies”), included in the fourth disputation of the In De anima, Mastri and Belluto
raise the question of whether sensible species are (at least partly) produced by
the agent sense in the same way as intelligible species are co-caused by the agent
intellect, or whether they are totally caused by a sensible object. The question
can be put tersely also in this form: Is it necessary to postulate an agent sense in
the production by the interior senses? In a preliminary note, the Scotists make it
clear that they do not have in mind the agent sense as a vehicle producing a
perceptual act. For them, as has been said, and in line with Suárez, it is clear that
there must be such an agency in the sentient soul. Considering the distinction
between the production of the intelligible species and the production of intellec-
tion, they regard the agent sense only as a vehicle or power producing the sensi-
ble species. Importantly, in the context of the presentation of the various theo-
ries, they identify Suárez as a proponent of the competing theory according to
which the agent sense must be postulated in the production of interior species.46
That Mastri and Belluto hold an anti-Suarezian position is quite clear: there
is no agent sense, whether in the external or the internal senses. This view, they
say, is common to all the Peripatetics.47 As they see it, in this regard Suárez
clearly does not belong to the Aristotelian camp. Although not stated ex professo
by Scotus, the Subtle Doctor’s negative stance about the existence of the agent
sense, they say, is not difficult to deduce from a number of passages in which the
45 For Suárez’s general restriction of the internal sense’s functional scope as compared with
Aquinas, and in this case also with Scotus, see Heider, Aristotelian Subjectivism, 240–54.
46 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 4, q. 5, art. 2, n. 54, 72a: “Suarez […] has [i. e., the
species of the interior sense] concedit fieri ab internis sensibus, quare admittit sensum agentem
internum.”
47 Ibid., n. 55, 72a: “Dicimus non dari sensum agentem; haec conclusio communis est in
Peripatho.”
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48 Daniel Heider
medieval Franciscan argues for the existence of the agent intellect as a co-cause
of the intelligible species.48 In these passages, Scotus takes the agent intellect as a
vehicle which transfers an object from the order of sensible and material things
to the order of intelligible and immaterial things. Since this transference is not
necessary at the level of the senses, no agent sense at the level of sensory cogni-
tion need be posited.
Moreover, considering explicitly the interior species, Mastri and Belluto say
that the agent sense can be neither the total cause of these species nor a partial
one. It cannot be the total cause, since in the production of intelligible species
the agent intellect is not the only efficient cause; the intelligible species is pro-
duced also through the concurrent (partial) efficiency of phantasms. But the
agent sense cannot be a partial cause either; if a partial efficacy were attributed
to the agent sense, this would have to be done to the detriment of the object’s
total causality. However, to avoid an unnecessary multiplication of principles,
one would have to explain why the exterior species’ representation of the exter-
nal object is not enough to be the total cause of the interior species. Mastri and
Belluto make it clear that there is no such explanation.49 This demonstrates Mas-
tri and Belluto’s scepticism about Suárez’s arguments based on the impossibility
of bottom-up causation between the external and the internal senses. The Sco-
tists introduce also an argument founded on the non-existence of a vis cogitativa
or aestimativa. Since there is no cogitative power in humans or estimative one in
brutes that could extract the latent species from material substances, no agent
sense can be assumed. As likewise claimed by Suárez,50 if this interior sense
could reveal the species of a substance, we would be able to cognize naturally the
mystery of the Eucharist, i. e., the transformed host. Like Suárez, Mastri and Bel-
luto reject the cogitative power as a power that can detect or form latent sensible
species (not known by the external senses) representing these individual sub-
stances.51 Contrary to Suárez, however, they put forward a theory which fully
dispenses with the agent sense. Setting aside Suárez’s second (and more proba-
ble) view, one based on an agent sense qua the agent soul, they list four theories
explaining the origin of an interior species. (i) Since a species must represent an
48 One of these passages is Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 360 (ed. Vat. III), 218.
49 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 4, q. 5, art. 2, n. 56, 72b.
50 For Suárez, see CDA, disp. 9, q. 4, n. 5 (vol. III), 158–60. For Suárez on knowledge of
material substances, see Perler, “Can We Know Substances?,” and Heider, Aristotelian Subjec-
tivism, 242–46.
51 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 4, q. 3, n. 31, 68b: “[…] nullam substantiam esse per se
sensibilis, sed sentiri mediis accidentibus; & probari potest inductione, nam non est sensibilis
sensu interno […] si substantia esse per se sensibilis, certe possemus ejus absentiam cognosce-
re, sicut per speciem ejusdem praesentiam perciperemus, & sic possemus naturaliter cognosce-
re in Sacramento Altaris substantiam panis abesse, quod est falsum.” See also In DA, disp. 4, q.
5, art. 2, n. 57, 72b.
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external thing, the interior species must be caused immediately by an external

object. (ii) Since a sleeping eye, and not the interior sense, can receive a species
representing an external object, the object cannot be an immediate cause of an
interior species; the cause must be an external sense through an exterior sensa-
tion conceived as a necessary condition. (iii) Since an object must concur in the
production of such an interior species, an exterior species must be the cause. (iv)
Since an exterior species is less perfect than an interior one and an exterior spe-
cies in the sleeping eye can exist without a species in the interior sense – and
granting the claim according to which the more perfect is an act of the external
senses, the more perfect is the interior species – the cause of an interior species
must be an exterior sensation.52
In their conclusion, Mastri and Belluto show that both the exterior species
and sensation (theories (iii) and (iv)) must be involved in the production of
interior species. Nevertheless, in the end they incline to the view according to
which the only cause is the exterior species (the view (iii)). They agree that sen-
sation must be included in the production of an interior species, but not as a
true efficient cause. Exterior sensation can be at most the necessary condition
(conditio sine qua non) of this production.53 They introduce three arguments for
this view. (1) The first argument comes from the existence of the special interior
species’ representation of the acts of the external senses (which, as we know, is a
view typically held by Scotists). Mastri and Belluto argue that, if the act of the
external senses were the total cause of the interior species, that act would have to
produce two species in the internal sense – one representing the act, the other
representing the object. However, this seems irrational to say (non videtur ratio-
nabiliter dictum). No doubt this statement could easily be made by Suárez who,
however, rejects the existence of a proper interior species representing the act.
The claim cannot be made by the Scotists, though. (2) Interior species, like exte-
rior ones, are only the virtual representations of sensibles. But sensations or sec-
ond acts as formal representations cannot be the causes of interior species, since
these are only virtual representations. There must be a proportionality between
cause and effect. Accordingly, only exterior species can be the cause of interior
species. (3) Mastri and Belluto employ a parallel to the production of intelligible
species. Contrary to Suárez, for whom the intelligible species are produced only
by the agent intellect, with phantasms concurring only as occasional or exem-
plary causes,54 Mastri and Belluto assert that phantasms must concur efficient-
52 Ibid., n. 72, 74b.

53 Ibid., n. 73, 75a: “[…] quod actus sensationis concurrat, patet ex modo dictis […] potest
sustineri species externas esse totales causas internarum, licet cum advertentia potentiae sensi-
tivae externae tamquam conditione sine qua non.”
54 See Suárez, CDA, disp. 9, q. 2, n. 12 (vol. III), 94–98.
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50 Daniel Heider
ly.55 From this point of view, it is reasonable to consider exterior species to be

the efficient cause of interior species too.56
3.2 Composite Species
In the third article, “On the Internal Sense’s Acts: Whether They Are Judgmen-
tal and Discursive” of the eighth question, “On the Internal Senses,” in the fifth
disputation, “On the Sensory Powers in Particular,” Mastri and Belluto start by
enumerating seven possible acts of the internal sense, including the act of imagi-
nari. This act is characterized by apprehending a sensible unum tertium com-
posed of two simple objects perceived by the external senses. In line with Suár-
ez’s status quaestionis, the question they pose is whether this composition occurs
only at the level of the second act, and having as a principle always two distinct
species that somehow become ‘fused’ in the imaginative act; or whether this
composition exists or can exist also at a prior level, namely at the level of first
acts. They are clear about their rejection of Suárez’s ‘compatibilist view.’ As has
been said, for the Jesuit a composite species of a golden mountain is formed
because the soul through the interior sense operates as an agent sense in its pro-
duction. This imaginative species results from the soul through the internal
sense upon the positing of a particular act of sensing taken as a model for the
effect of the act. For the Scotists this option is not available. Why? The reason is
simple: there is no such agent sense. The production of these imaginative acts
must always come from the plurality of simple species stored in the internal
sense. Unlike Suárez, for them the production of this act is never followed by the
production of a composite species that facilitates its later reactivation.57
3.3 Unsensed Species
It has been shown that, despite Suárez’s temptation by the view that action-ori-
ented intentions are apprehended through sensed species which represent exter-
55 For this non-Suarezian claim, see Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 6, q. 5, art. 1, n. 120,
160a: “[…] intellectum esse causam efficientem specierum intelligibilium, sane id non asser-
imus, quasi sit causa totalis, & integra se solo, nam longe probabilius est, phantasma quoque
[…] active concurrere, & in genere causae efficientis, saltem minus principalis.”
56 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 4, q. 5, art. 2, n. 73, 75a.
57 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 3, n. 261, 120b: “[…] solum posset dubitari,
num sicut actu isto componuntur simplicia objecta, ita quoque componantur species sensibiles,
itaut ex specie montis, & ex specie auri resultet quaedam species composita repraesentans
montem aureum, an vero virtute illarum simplicium specierum sensus eliciat actum compo-
nentem objecta, & quidem haec pars, quod non detur species composita videtur probabilior;
tum quia deberet admitti sensus agens […].” My italics.
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nal sensory forms, the Jesuit finally adopts the position that these attributes are
instead represented through the (extrinsic) modes of the species sensed interior-
ly. Applying his theory of the agent interior sense, the Doctor Eximius states that
these modifications result from the soul by means of the interior sense. As they
do in the case of composite species, Mastri and Belluto instead deny the necessi-
ty of postulating any unsensed species – whether conceived as either really or
modally distinct from the sensed species.58 What is more, contrary to Avicenna,
Aquinas, and Suárez, they reject the view that the internal sense qua an estima-
tive (cogitative) power in its first acts apprehend such intentions at all.59 Accord-
ingly, they do not aim to explain the emotional reactions of animals as anchored
in the special normative qualities conceived as the formal objects of the aestima-
tiva or cogitativa power.
The Scotists allude to Scotus’s entertaining example (introduced as a cri-
tique of the unsensed species) according to which the lamb runs away from an-
other lamb miraculously disguised as a wolf, despite the absence of the intention
of any danger in it. They say, “if there would be a change in a sheep in respect to
the external accidents, it would not become because of that disagreeable and un-
sympathetic to any other sheep.”60 They are certain that Scotus expressly en-
dorsed the claim that there are no action-oriented intentions in first acts.61 The
Scotists argue for this parsimonious view by eliminating all the possible ways
that such action-oriented attributes might be captured. There are in fact three
possible ways how the wolf’s intention of danger can be apprehended by the
lamb. It can be known (i) either through the sensed species representing the
wolf’s sensible qualities; or (ii) through a different species, namely the unsensed
species; or (iii) without a species at all.
They flatly reject the final option. Every sensory apprehension of an object
requires the object’s causal concurrence through a sensible species, which is the
main principle of assimilation. They deny also the first alternative, which they
find embraced by Suárez; on this view, the intention of danger is detected by the
lamb through the sensed species which represents the sensory qualities of the
58 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 247, 118b, speaking of the lamb’s cogni-
tion of the attributes of convenience and inconvenience: “Neque dici potest […] quod cogno-
scat media alia specie; vel enim est alia species solum modaliter, vel realiter [distinct].”
59 Ibid., n. 244, 118a: “Dicimus primo, sensum internum percipere quidem objecta sensu-
um externorum, non tamen ipsorum convenientiam, vel disconvenientiam, amicitiam, aut in-
imicitiam, & hoc primis actibus […].”
60 Ibid., n. 246, 118b: “Si ovis mutaretur quoad accidentia externa in lupum, non idcirco
esset alteri ovi disconveniens, & inimica.”
61 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 1, qq. 1–2, n. 62 (ed. Vat. III), 43–44. For Scotus’s
critique of the view that there is a special normative property in the object represented by an
unsensed species in addition to sensible qualities, see also Perler, “Why is the Sheep Afraid of
the Wolf?,” 38–39, and Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, 266–67.
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52 Daniel Heider
wolf. They are sure that this doctrine is implausible since, if the sensed species of
the wolf represented itself as dangerous to the lamb, it would have to do it all the
time to any perceiver. Obviously, this is false.62 The wolf is not represented as
dangerous to another wolf but to a lamb. As we have seen, Suárez has a prompt
reply: cognition does not depend only upon the received species, but also on
natural instincts. These instincts amount to the foundation of an estimative
power in a given nature. Clearly, the wolf’s nature differs from that of the lamb.
This is also why the lamb will judge the wolf’s presence differently than will
another wolf, and their emotional reactions and behaviours will differ according-
ly.63 The Scotists are far from happy with this reply. They are clear that instinct
cannot be a reason why the aestimativa power does not apprehend an object in
the manner represented by the species. Once the species of the wolf represents
the wolf as dangerous, it has to do it at any time to all potential perceivers.64
In their deflationary account of these instincts, Mastri and Belluto state that
the instincts are nothing other than the animals’ natural sympathies or an-
tipathies to an object. Natural sympathy is the reason why the wolf’s nature is
not antithetical to another wolf’s nature, and natural antipathy is the reason why
it is disconvenient to a lamb’s nature.65 These sympathies and antipathies are a
universal phenomenon. Attractions and repulsions can be found also in non-
living beings, such as in magnets or lead. So, while the lamb’s nature is related to
the wolf by antipathy without apprehending in the first act an intention of dis-
convenience, the wolf stands to it in a relation of sympathy without detecting
any intention of amity. A terrifying cry awakening us at night results in an emo-
tion of fear without having been preceded by the cognitive detection of an at-
tribute of disconvenience. Mastri and Belluto are sure that brutes are moved by
affections to pursue or flee from an object merely based on a cognition of it
according to its sensible qualities, their instincts and divine institution. Detecting
latent unsensed intentions is a fully dispensable mechanism.66 Besides the expe-
riential argument from the ignorance of these attributes, their argument also
considers that even if we conceded the existence of unsensed species, whether as
really or as merely modally distinct, it would be difficult to identify their cause.
The Scotists are clear in their denial of the ‘Deus ex machina’ solution which
posits that these species are infused in brutes by God.67 This opinion is a mere

63 For a summary of this reply, see Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 245,
118a.
64 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 246, 118a-b.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., n. 256, 119b.
67 Regarding this “exotic” view, advocated by Rodrigo de Arriaga (1592–1667), the interior
sense of beasts perceives not only action-oriented intentions but also privations (carentiae),
such as shadows, holes, and darkness. Considering the problematic nature of all the alternative
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fabrication.68 They also reject the view which holds that these distinct unsensed
species are caused immediately by the object. An external object cannot directly
act on the interior sense but must proceed through the external senses. Lastly,
they also deny the theory which holds that these unsensed species are produced
by the estimative power, whether really or as modally distinct from the sensed
species. Why should this view be rejected? It assumes the existence of an agent
sense.69
Denying the existence of these attributes in the first estimative acts does not
mean that no explanation can be given for these intentions advocated by many
venerable authorities. In addition to instinctive behaviour, in the animal king-
dom we find also learned behaviour. Items that cause pain or pleasure may be-
come aversive or desirable through learning. A dog runs away from its master
who is holding a stick because it remembers that it has been beaten with it. In
the opposite manner, it desires to return to the places where it received food or
shelter. Why is this so? The reason is not the perception and conservation of
hidden intentions, but rather the sensory memory of cognitive and appetitive
acts. The dog runs away from the master and returns to favoured places because
it remembers not only the objects but also the past sensory acts, more precisely
the appetitive acts, which it underwent there. The dog’s emotions and its be-
haviour are first of all explained by the memory of these cognitive and appetitive
acts.70 This is also the reason why we now must turn our attention to Mastri and
Belluto’s theory of sensory self-awareness.
3.4 The Species of the Acts of the External Senses
If we consider only the previous two subsections, the Scotists’ account would
have to be regarded as ontologically more parsimonious than that of Suárez’.
Unlike Suárez, Mastri and Belluto reject the existence of both the composite and
the unsensed species. However, as noted above, the evaluation must be upended
if their theory of sensory self-awareness is considered. Having rejected the agent
sense, the Scotists take a different stance, one which Dominik Perler, in the con-
explanations of the origin of these species, Arriaga endorses a peculiar theory based on divine
infusion. For this view, see Rodrigo de Arriaga, Cursus philosophicus, De anima, disp. 5, sect. 5,
722a–23b; see also his Physica, disp. 8, sect. 6, subsect. 2, 355b–57a. For Arriaga’s view, see
also Heider, “Rodrigo de Arriaga (1592–1667) and Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673) /
Bonaventura Belluto (1600–1676) on Animal Perception of Negations.”
68 For the ex professo critique of Arriaga’s view, see Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 4, q. 3,
nn. 20–21, 66b–67a.
69 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 247, 118b: “Contra primum modum est,
quod ponit quendam sensum agentem refutatum disp. praec. […].”
70 Ibid., n. 248, 118b.
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54 Daniel Heider
nection with Scotus (against the background of Aquinas’ theory), has recently
called “eine Subjektivierung der Erinnerung.”71 In fact, Mastri and Belluto’s ac-
count of sensory memory closely follows Scotus’s theory of memory, which is
developed especially in Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 3.72 Three doctrinal points of Scotus’s
view of memory are relevant for us here. First, sensory memory has a twofold
object – remote and proximate. The remote one is the external object, e. g., Peter
sitting yesterday. The proximate object of the memorative act is my act of seeing
Peter sitting yesterday. Second, as noted in 3.4, when this act of my seeing Peter
was experienced in the past, it imprinted a species representing this state of af-
fairs into the common sense.73 Third, an act of recollection of an external object
can occur only through a memory of the proximate object, that is, through the
cognition of a past act.74
At a later point, Mastri and Belluto explicitly take up the issue of whether
these acts are apprehended through a species distinct from those by which exter-
nal objects are perceived (as stated explicitly by Scotus), or through one and the
same species that represents both the object and the act – this they take to be the
common view. They present an argument for this common view, one which re-
minds the reader of Suárez: The object or the exterior species by itself is not
sufficient to cause a species in a sleeping eye. No species can be impressed in the
interior sense without a prior act of vision. But if the act is necessary for the
production of an interior species, this act together with the object must co-con-
stitute the integral cause of the interior species that will represent both the exter-
nal object and the act. The Scotists deny this reasoning. As we have seen, the
necessary existence of the act for the exterior species’ production of the interior
species does not imply that the act is a co-cause. It is only the condition sine qua
non. As a condition, however, it does not identify the total cause of the interior
species with the external species. The interior species which represents the object
thus will not represent the act. Accordingly, the species of the object and that of
71 Perler, Eine Person sein, 262.

72 Duns Scotus, Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 3 (ed. Vat. XIV), 162–74. For an analysis of Scotus’s
theory of memory, see Perler, Eine Person sein, 260–68; McCord Adams and Wolter, “Mem-
ory and Intuition,” 175–79.
73 Scotus posits the common sense for two main reasons. First, this sensory power differen-
tiates between the proper sensibles of different particular sensory modalities. Second, it sensibly
perceives that we perceive. For these two functions of the common sense, see Duns Scotus,
Quaestiones super secundum et tertium de anima, q. 9, nn. 8–10 (OPh V), 71–74.
74 For these characteristics, see Duns Scotus, Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 3, nn. 94–96 (ed. Vat.
XIV), 167–68.
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the act will be distinct.75 Moreover, following Scotus’s Questions on De anima,76

Mastri and Belluto say that through a distinct sensible species the interior sense
apprehends not only the acts of the external senses but also the acts of the senso-
ry appetitive power – and even its own operations: “We say thirdly that the
internal sense apprehends the acts of the external senses, of the sensory appetite,
and probably also its own acts […].”77 How is this possible? There is no other
possibility than that the act of the interior sense produces its own species in the
same sensory power.78
The Scotists are well aware of Suárez’s critique of this view. Therefore, it is
not surprising that most of the objections to their theory which they introduce
are of Suarezian pedigree. I shall present five of them. (1) The acts of the exter-
nal senses cannot be known by the internal sense because a sensory power can
never, properly speaking, be a reflective power. No extended entity can reflect
upon itself since no part of an extended whole can touch or be applied to it itself.
There can only be one part of an extended whole applied to a distinct part of
that whole, similarly to the example of a piece of paper which is folded back on
itself. Accordingly, the internal sense cannot have a species of this act either.79
Moreover, there can be no sensible species of the sensory act since no sensory
act is a sensible item per se. No sensory act can be counted among first and
75 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 251, 119a: “[…] ex hoc, quod requi-
ratur externus actus, ut objectum causet speciem sui in sensu interno solum infert, actum esse
conditionem requisitam, non tamen concausam speciei cum objecto.”
76 Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super secundum et tertium de anima, q. 9, n. 16 (OPh V), 77: “
[…] imaginatio sentit actum proprium; imaginamur enim nos imaginari vel imaginatum fuis-
se, et memoramur nos memoratum fuisse, et somniamus nos somniare, sicut experimur mani-
feste.”
77 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 250, 119a: “Dicimus 3, sensum inter-
num cognoscere actus sensuum externorum, appetitus sensitivi, & probabiliter proprios actus.”
78 Ibid., n. 252, 119a: “[…] actus sensus interni producat speciem sui ipsius in eadem po-
tentia.” Scotus describes a strange process based on the species’ returning to the external senses
from the internal sense and then recurring to the internal senses, this time with the imprint of
its own act. See Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super secundum et tertium de anima, q. 9, n. 16
(OPh V), 77; for a brief description of this complicated mechanism, see Cory, “Conscious-
ness,” 253–54.
79 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 4, q. 5, art. 2, n. 70, 74b; disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 260, 120b.
This objection was introduced also by Scotus to argue for the non-existence of the (sensory)
memory in non-rational animals; cf. Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 3, n. 99 (ed. Vat. XIV), 168–69: “[…]
non potest sensitiva percipere actum sentiendi dum praesens est (saltem non universaliter),
quia actus supremae sensitivae non potest percipi ab aliquo sensu, nec ab inferiore nec a supe-
riore (patet), nec a seipsa, quia non est potentia illa super se vel actum suum conversa, et
tamen cuiuslibet sensationis in nobis potest esse recordatio (ut experimur); ergo non est ista
recordatio generaliter alicuius sensitivae.”
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56 Daniel Heider
second qualities, which are the only ones that are the per se sensibles.80 (2) The
acts of the external senses cannot (transitively) cause a species in a distinct pow-
er such as the interior sense. Such causality would be inconsistent with their im-
manent character. They are categorial qualities and as such they can be called
‘actions’ only grammatically.81 (3) If two species, one of vision and another of
the colour white, become imprinted onto the internal sense, it would have to be
possible to separate the species of the object from the species of the act. Accord-
ingly, it would be possible to perceive the act without the object, which is false.82
(4) Since the interior sense cannot apprehend the external senses, that is, the
sensory powers, it cannot apprehend their acts either. There is a parity between
these two.83 (5) A tactile experience (tactio) in a foot cannot transmit its species
through the nerves to the brain, which is the organ of the internal sense. If it
could, it would have to be felt in the whole body extended between the foot and
the brain. However, we do not have such a bodily experience in these parts.84
In their reply to (1), Mastri and Belluto say that even if we admit that no
sense reflects perfectly upon its own acts (that is to say, upon its present acts),
they hold that exterior acts do imprint their species onto the internal sense in the
same way as external objects impress their likenesses onto the external senses.
Accordingly, the interior sense can perceive these acts as past.85 It is not true that
sensations are per se non-sensible items, nor the second qualities either. Al-
though they are not perceivable by the external senses, and thus there is no HOC
in them, they can be and are per se sensible items for the internal sense. How is
this possible? The explanation lies in Aristotle’s statement that acts of vision are
80 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 259, 120a. This objection can be found
also in Duns Scotus, Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 3, n. 100 (ed. Vat. XIV), 169: “Sed sensatio illa, cuius
est recordatio, non potest aliquo modo poni qualitas sensibilis […].”
82 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 251, 119a; n. 259, 120a.
84 Ibid.; see also In DA, disp. 4, q. 5, art. 2, n. 70, 74b.
85 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 5, q. 7, art. 3, n. 269, 122a: “[…] reflexio sensus solum
cadit supra actum praeteritum, quatenus repraesentat objectum […] imperfecte est reflexivus
[…]”; disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 260, 120b: “[…] sensum non esse perfecte reflexivum supra pro-
prios actus, ut est intellectus, sed aliqualiter tantum, ut dicemus art. seq. cui reflexioni non
obstat extensio, quantitas enim est ratio, cur una pars non possit propter extensionem reduci in
loco alterius, non tamen impedit, quin potentia organica cognitiva per alium actum non possit
supra se quasi reflectere, & cognoscere actum praeteritum […] sensus non est perfecte reflex-
ivus, ut advertat ad proprium actum existentem, ut facit intellectus, ideoque quando actus est
praesens, solum advertit sensus ad objectum, a quo rapitur, non ad actum propter imperfec-
tionem potentiae […].” Cf. also disp. 4, q. 5, art. 2, n. 71, 74b.
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“coloured” by their objects.86 Regarding (2), they agree that cognition is not a
categorial action, but is an action only grammatically or equivocally. However,
obviously, they are much less strict about the immanent character of cognitive
acts than is Suárez. They affirm that cognitive acts qua qualities can be efficient
causes of the interior species that represent them.87 It can be said in their favour
that, if cognitive acts produce habits, it is not clear why they could not bring
about these species as well. As for (3), Mastri and Belluto espouse a different
“phenomenology” from that of Suárez (despite agreeing with him regarding the
simultaneous imprinting of two species and the co-existence of two simulta-
neous acts in the sensory powers). They underline that we often experience re-
membrance that we heard something without remembering exactly what we
heard. We thus often remember only ‘that,’ and not ‘what’, whereas the opposite
happens rarely or even never.88 In the reply to (4) they deny the parity between
the sensory power and the act. While the sensory power is a substantial entity
and is not sensible per se, sensation is a categorial quality and as such it is per se
sensible.89 Concerning the last caveat (5), they leave no doubt that this tactio
would not be felt throughout the body since its species is of a different kind than
the sensible species produced by external objects. Such an act does not produce a
tactile sensation in the body. As being of a different kind, it can produce a per-
ception of itself only if united with the superior (internal) sense located in the
brain.90
Conclusion and Perspective

Much has been written on the topic of the causes of the perceptual act and on
the production of the species of the external sense in medieval and post-medie-
val scholastic philosophy of perception.91 Conversely, the topic of the production
86 Aristotle, De anima III, c. 2, 425b19–20, 147: “Moreover that which sees does in a sense
possess colour.” Cf. also Duns Scotus, Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 3, art. 1, n. 115 (ed. Vat. XIV), 174:
“visio aliquo modo est colorata.”
88 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 251, 119a; ibid., n. 259, 120a.
90 Ibid.
91 The literature is abundant on the topics of the causes of perception and of the agent
sense reducing external sensible forms to sensible intentions. For an explicit connection of
these two issues in the theory of John of Jandun, later criticised by Suárez, see Pattin, Pour
l’histoire du sens agent. For Cajetan’s and Agostino Nifo’s theory of the agent sense, and for
Suárez’s critique of their views, see Leijenhorst, “Cajetan and Suarez on Agent Sense”; cf. also
Heider, Aristotelian Subjectivism, 78–82. For Nifo’s theory of the agent sense, see Mahoney,
“Agostino Nifo’s De Sensu Agente.” For the introduction of the vehicle of the agent sense con-
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58 Daniel Heider
of interior species has received much less attention.92 We have seen that for our
Second Scholastics this issue represents a topic sui generis distinct from the two
mentioned above. In their consideration of the issues of the origin of exterior
species and the causes of perception there is a basic agreement among them –
they deny that sensible qualities are raised to the level of intentions by ‘meta-
physical elevators,’ such as angels or God, and they also reject the view that per-
ception amounts to the mere reception of species –, there is a fundamental dif-
ference among them regarding the origin of interior species and the constitution
of complex perceptual experience. For Suárez perceptual experience at this level
is constituted from within or endogenously and arises in a top-down manner,
since it is the soul that through the interior sense produces interior species and
their modifications. For the Scotists the interior species of the objects ad extra
are caused from outside or exogenously and originate in a bottom-up manner,
since their causes are exterior species with exterior sensations included as a nec-
essary condition.
From a historiographical point of view, the main difference between the
two positions can be regarded as originating in a conflict between Suárez’s Au-
gustinianism (in this instance not applied to the distinction between the spiritual
and the bodily) and Mastri and Belluto’s Aristotelianism. While for Suárez in
CDA an entity of a lower and less perfect power can never be the efficient cause
of an entity in a higher and more perfect power but at most its exemplary or
occasional cause, the Augustinian rule does not play a significant role in Mastri
and Belluto’s account. Compared to Mastri and Belluto, Suárez places emphasis
on the immanent character of the vital acts of the sensory powers, including
those of perception, to the degree that one power, sc. the external senses, cannot
(transitively) cause a species in a distinct power, namely in the interior sense. In
this respect Mastri and Belluto do not follow this principle of the acts’ imma-
nence. They are clear in their endorsement of the Aristotelian bottom-up im-
print of the species upon the acts of the external senses within the common
sense. Species sensed interiorly cannot be caused by the soul conceived as an
‘agent sense.’ The objects represented through the exterior species cannot be the
mere occasions or exempla for the soul’s production of these species from with-
in. In line with their Aristotelian account of cognition based on the notion of
assimilation with an object, Mastri and Belluto highlight the efficacy of external
sensibles (proceeding through species) in the production of internal sensory
representations. If the efficacy of external sensibles was downplayed in favour of
the soul’s activity, so Mastri and Belluto seem to implicitly assume, interior spe-
ceived as an external mover in Averroes and Latin Averroism, see Brenet, “Agent Sense in
Averroes and Latin Averroism.”
92 For an exception, see Heider, Aristotelian Subjectivism, 222–30; id., “Late Scholastic De-
bates about External and Internal Senses,” 176–78.
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cies rather than external sensibles would come to represent the soul. This atti-
tude would eventually transform the Aristotelian object-oriented position into
an implausible subjectivism, which would undermine the epistemological real-
ism so valuable to the Scotists.
But what are the reasons that compelled Suárez to embrace the theory of
the agent sense and the Scotists to dismiss it as the vehicle for the production of
interior species? Beside epistemological reasons, another reason might be found
in their distinct ontologies of sensory powers. While Suárez defends the real dis-
tinction between the soul and its capacities and the real distinction among the
powers themselves (since they are regarded as encapsulated modules within
which only efficient causality can run),93 the Scotists reject this stance. For them,
these powers considered partially, i. e., as denoting a perfection in the soul con-
curring with the organ of sensory operation, are not really but only formally dis-
tinct from the soul;94 at the same time, they are merely formally distinct from
each other also. Accordingly, it may be said that, unlike for Suárez, for the Sco-
tists there is no such ‘ontological gap’ between these powers which needs to be
remedied by the postulation of the soul conceived as an ‘agent sense.’ This also
seems to be the reason why in their reply to the abovementioned fourth argu-
ment, Mastri and Belluto regard the sensory powers to be substantial rather than
accidental entities. Needless to say, such claim would be egregious Suárez.
Against this background it is noteworthy that Mastri and Belluto’s denial of
the agent sense at the level of the interior species is not the only Scotist position
advocated within Baroque Scotism. The Scotist tradition in the early modern era
is far from being doctrinally uniform; there were propounded many other theo-
ries than that of Mastri and Belluto about the production of interior species.
Given the undeveloped character of Scotus’s post-sensory psychology and his
philosophy of perception in general,95 such doctrinal uniformity would be rather
surprising. Mastri and Belluto’s ‘anti-Suarezian’ account of the production of
interior species actually represents only one of a plurality of interpretations ad-
vocated by seventeenth-century Scotists. Let me here mention the prominent ex-
ample of Hugh McCaghwell (or in Latin, Cavellus).96 Just four years after the
93 For his defence of the real distinction between the powers themselves, and the powers
and the soul, see Suárez, CDA, disp. 3, q. 1, 54–82. See also Perler, “Faculties in Medieval
Philosophy,” 124–34; and Heider, Aristotelian Subjectivism, 51–58.
94 For Mastri and Belluto’s theory of the formal distinction between the soul and the pow-
ers, see Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 2, q. 1, art. 2, 44b–46b.
95 For this, see Steneck, The Problem of the Internal Senses in the Fourteenth Century, 132;
according to Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 18, “Scotus is not much interested in
sensation as such, and he never discusses it systematically.”
96 Another example, not mentioned here, could be John Punch’s (1603–1661) position. For
him the cause of interior species is an external sensation. See Poncius, Philosophiae ad mentem
Scoti cursus integer, In De anima, disp. 2, q. 8, 769b–71a.
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60 Daniel Heider
publication of Suárez’s Tractatus de anima in 1621, this Irish Observant pub-

lished as part of his edition of Scotus’s Questions on De anima his Annotationes
and Supplementum ad Scoti Quaestiones in libros De anima. Both the edition
itself and McCaghwell’s own contributions were later incorporated into the
Wadding edition of Scotus’s Opera omnia from 1639.97
McCaghwell’s position on our subject deserves to be labelled ‘Suarezian.’98
Not only did he study in Salamanca, where he certainly became familiar with the
philosophy of Suárez (to whom he refers explicitly in his Annotatio to the ninth
question of Scotus’s Questions on De anima, in which he deals with the issue of
perceptual self-awareness)99 but even more importantly, most of his theories and
arguments related to the issue of the origin of interior species bear a striking
resemblance to those of the Jesuit. Indeed, in all of the sub-issues presented
above, McCaghwell either directly endorses Suárez’s view or takes his theories to
be at least as equally probable as those later endorsed by Mastri and Belluto.
After his critique of the position that interior species are produced by sensible
objects through exterior species (Mastri and Belluto’s account), the Irish Scotist
lays out Suárez’s first view, according to which these interior species are caused
by the external senses through sensation. He considers this to be a probable
opinion. However, this (merely) probable view is for him clearly trumped by a
more probable conclusion, one which is identical to Suárez’s second (and also
for the Doctor Eximius more probable) stance: “Fourth, I say that it is more
probable that the internal sense itself produces its species.”100 In one of his argu-
ments he rehearses Suárez’s crucial argument: “[…] if these species were pro-
duced by sensations they would depend in their being on them, just like the ex-
97 McCaghwell received the Franciscan habit at the Convent of San Francisco in Salamanca,
where he studied under the direction of the famous Spanish Scotist Francisco de Herrera
(1551–1609). Later he was sent to Louvain to the newly established Saint Anthony’s College,
where he taught theology for many years. In 1623, he was called to Rome to the Convent of
Saint Mary in Ara Coeli. In 1626, Pope Urban VIII (pontificate: 1623–1644) appointed him
Archbishop of Armagh in Ireland. He is known as a close collaborator of Luke Wadding
(1588–1657) on his famous edition of Duns Scotus’s Opera omnia (1639). For a brief note
about his life, see Dunne, “Aodh Mac Aingil (Hugh Cavellus, 1571–1626),” 1–2. For a more
detailed exposition, see Giblin, “Hugh McCaghwell, O.F.M., Archbishop of Armagh (†1626).”
98 For other examples of McCaghwell’s doctrinal affinities with Suárez, here with respect to
the issue of the production of the intelligible species and the cognition of material substances,
see Tropia, “McCaghwell’s Reading of Scotus’s De Anima (1639).” For another important as-
pect of McCaghwell’s Jesuit sympathies, see the article by Claus A. Andersen in this present
volume.
99 Cf. Hugo Cavellus, Annotatio to Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in libros De anima, q. 9, concl.
2, n. 14, 520a–b.
100 Hugo Cavellus, Supplementum ad Scoti Quaestiones in libros De anima, disp. 2, sect. 1, n.
6, 690a: “Dico quarto, probabilius forte est ipsum sensum internum producere suam speciem.”
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terior species depends on the sensible object.”101 However, this cannot be the
case because these interior species are also the principles of abstractive cognition.
Furthermore, following Suárez, McCaghwell also affirms the existence of com-
posite species representing imaginary objects, such as a golden mountain, and
says that the composite species of a golden mountain arises as soon as an act
apprehending this object is produced through the internal sense’s activity.102
Moreover, when compared to Mastri and Belluto, McCaghwell is much more
open to accepting the existence of unsensed species as well. In keeping with
Suárez, he regards as probable the view that action-oriented intentions are the
modi extrinseci of sensed species.103 Finally, although he regards the issues of the
sensory awareness of the acts of one’s external senses as “difficilissima,” and he
holds as merely probable the view that these operations are apprehended
through their proper species (the one endorsed by Mastri and Belluto), he is
more than charitable to Suárez’s modal theory:
For these reasons, it is quite likely that exterior sensations are perceived by the internal
sense through the modified species of the external sensibles themselves, […] and this is
not against Scotus […].104
Given the underdeveloped character of Scotus’s philosophy of perception men-

tioned above, it is not surprising that instances of such Scotistic plurality can be
found in other topics in early modern Scotism as well. One such topic in the
philosophy of perception is the famous issue of the number of the internal sens-
es. McCaghwell thus references Filippo Fabri (1564–1630) who defends a theory
that there are three internal senses (the common sense, the phantasy, and the
memory).105 Advocating a Suarezian view of a single internal sense, both
McCaghwell as well as Mastri and Belluto submit Fabri’s pluralist account to an
extensive critique.106
101 Ibid., n. 6, 690a: “[…] si produceretur a sensatione, dependeret in esse ab ea, sicut species
externa ab objecto.”
102 Ibid., n. 6, 690b: “[…] verisimile est cum fingimus montem aureum, speciem etiam fieri,
qua repraesentatur, quia alioquin illa duo non repraesentarentur per modum unius, sed tan-
quam disparata.”
103 Ibid., n. 7, 690b.
104 Cavellus, Annotatio to Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in libros De anima, q. 9, concl. 1, n. 12,
519b: “Propter haec satis probabile videtur sensationes externas percipi a sensu interno per
species ipsorum sensibilium modificatas, […] nec hoc est contra Scotum […].” For a compari-
son between McCaghwell’s and Suárez’s views of perceptual self-awareness, see Heider,
“Suárez and Some Baroque Scotists on Perceptual Self-Awareness.”
105 Phillipus Faber, Philosophia naturalis Joannis Duns Scoti, Theorema 100, 702a–6b.
106 For McCaghwell’s theory and his critique of Fabri, see Quaestiones in libros De anima, q.
9, concl. 3, nn. 16–17, 521a–b; cf. Steneck, The Problem of the Internal Senses in the Four-
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62 Daniel Heider
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The Estimative Faculty in Scotus and Scotism
David González Ginocchio
Introduction
This paper examines the Scotistic view of the estimative power. My main argu-
ment is not only that Scotus aims to deflate the scope of an estimative faculty,
but that such a downgrade is in line with his views on the difference between
nature and freedom, and the role of sense knowledge vis a vis the powers of the
human will. To distinguish the ‘natural’ circuit of estimation from both intellec-
tual cognition and free actions, Scotus and his disciples will ultimately reduce
estimation to a modus loquendi. As Scotus does not treat the estimative faculty
directly or extensively, I attempt to reconstruct this broad argument regarding
the necessity, or lack thereof, of an estimative power against several features usu-
ally ascribed to it, such as animal prudence, learning, and the question of species
insensatae. The first half of this paper is dedicated to this overview, while the
second one aims to show that Scotus’s disciples were aware of the relevant place
of estimation and jointly address all of Scotus’s counterarguments. I divide this
paper into four sections. In Section 1, I briefly deal with Scotus’s views on the
general role of sense knowledge. In Sections 2 and 3, I present his views on esti-
mation against the Avicennian-Thomistic synthesis, to show how Scotus assigns
its functions to imagination (Section 2), memory, and instinct (Section 3). At
the same time, I try to show why Scotus discards the idea of species insensatae.
In Section 4, I follow the way in which Scotus’s disciples assumed his general
framework in a modern deflationary presentation of the internal senses. I do not
presume to be exhaustive, merely to signal their argumentative directions, priori-
tizing the overall Scotistic position on the estimative faculty over the other scho-
lastic traditions available in their time.
1. The Necessity of Sense Cognition

Scotus does not deal at great length with sensibility, though he had a lifelong
interest in the role played by sense cognition with regards to abstraction and
intellectual knowledge. Contemporary scholarship is aware of the paucity of Sco-
I wish to thank Světla Hanke Jarošová for her help with language matters, and Daniel Heider
and Mauricio Lecón for their comments on this paper. A special thanks to Claus A. Andersen,
who provided extensive feedback and comments. Any mistakes that may remain are, of course,
my own.
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66 David González Ginocchio
tus’s theory of sense cognition. Richard Cross, in his comprehensive overview of

Scotus’s epistemology, aptly notes that Scotus “seems to reject the existence of
the vis aestimativa altogether. As he sees it, the vis aestimativa is supposed to
convey additional informational content over and above that provided by the
external senses, and he does not see how it can do this.”1 Amy F. Whitworth’s
dissertation on Scotus’s theory of sensitive knowledge is preoccupied with an
account of the sensitive powers as intentional, active faculties, and thus deals
with intentio in a general sense, as “a representation or likeness (similitudo) that
tends toward its object,”2 not as the object of estimation.
Scotus seems to downplay both this latter sense of intentio and the estima-
tive faculty altogether. This does not mean that he pays no attention at all to
sense knowledge: he dedicates the first seven questions of his De anima to the
external senses, while questions 8–10 deal with the common sense. There are
other extensive treatments in his commentaries on the Sentences. The setting is
usually theological in nature, but there are useful philosophical analyses. In what
follows, I will try to reconstruct his view. I intend to show that the downgrading
of estimation correlates to the upsized part of the will: free action, in Scotus’s
view, is wholly absent from animal behavior, which he aims in turn to confine to
instinctive performance and a limited learning capacity.
According to Scotus, intellectual knowledge in statu isto requires a sensible
species.3 This is not to ensure that the intellect can acquire the knowledge of
something “real”, as it were (i. e., we can apprehend notions of unreal things, like
chimeras and unicorns, and we actually have intellectual knowledge of past
things),4 but rather every intellectual apprehension has, at its root, a sensible
species that provides the likeness for that cognition. Due to the presence of the
sensible species, the conjunction of soul and body is not superfluous: it may well
be that our intellect can acquire its species in another way, for example through

2 Whitworth, Attending to Presence, 192.
3 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 368 (ed. Vat. III), 244: “[V]irtus autem phan-
tastica contingenter coniungitur intellectui in quantum potentia est; ergo intellectus in opera-
tione sua dependet ab alia potentia cui contingenter coniungitur”. Scotus suggests this may be a
consequence of original sin; cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 187 (ed. Vat. III),
113–14: “intellectus noster non intelligat pro statu isto, nisi illa quorum species relucent in
phantasmate, et hoc sive propter poenam originalis peccati, sive propter naturalem concordiam
potentiarum animae in operando.”
4 Duns Scotus, Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 2, n. 65 (ed. Vat. XIV), 157–58: “[Q]uia solum phan-
tasma non sufficit ad cognitionem intuitivam obiecti, quia phantasma repraesentat rem exis-
tentem vel non existentem, praesentem vel non praesentem, et per consequens per ipsum non
potest haberi cognitio de re ut existente.”
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The Estimative Faculty in Scotus and Scotism 67
supernatural action,5 and yet even then the dependence on the sense would not
be in vain, just as a cure by surgery does not make medicine superfluous.6
As our intellect does not provide in statu isto its own cognitive species, in-
tellectual cognition has its starting point in the imagination.7 This form of ‘de-
pendence’ is not due to the necessity of knowing singular beings; it rather plays
into what Scotus calls the “concordia potentiarum” of the soul.8
The phantasm in the imagination brings the intellect into a state of acciden-
tal potentiality.9 Whatever the intellect may know of the singular, it needs a
phantasm to refer itself to this or that object. As the union between rationality
and sensibility is essential, all our powers are ordered according to it (Scotus is
critical even of Averroes for suggesting some sort of accidental union).10 For the
intellect to cognize something that exists only in a singular existent, the singular
representation of its similitude, namely the one in the phantasm, is needed.11
5 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. prol., pars 1, q. un., n. 65 (ed. Vat. I), 40.
6 Duns Scotus, Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 2, n. 68 (ed. Vat. II), 159: “[N]on sequitur quod frustra
uniatur, si per aliam viam posset eam acquirere; si enim aliquid ordinatur ad finem, non frus-
tra fit, si alio modo possit finis acquire, sicut si sanitas possit acquire per lotionem et potionem,
non frustra fit lotio, etsi per potionem possit sanitas haberi; ita etsi cognition possit acquire per
usum sensum, et per alium modum ab anima separata, non frustra fit unio, ex quo ipsa est
conveniens uno modo acquirendi cognitionem.”
7 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. prol., pars 1, q. un., n. 29 (ed. Vat. I), 17–18; Perler, “What Am I
Thinking About?,” 78.
8 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 348 (ed. Vat. III), 209–10: “[P]onitur a
Philosophis, quod intellectus est potentia distincta a potentia sensitiva propter intellectionem
universali, et propter compositionem et divisionem, et propte syllogizationem quam propter
cognitionem, singularis, si posset intelligi singular.” For the convenience of the reader, I shall
generally quote from Peter Simpson’s translation of the Ordinatio (accessible via his webpage:
https://aristotelophile.com/current.htm), except for Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 3, where the translation
is from McCord Adams and Wolter, “A Treatise on Memory and Intuition.” For the “concor-
dia” or “connexio potentiarum,” see Tropia, “Scotus and Suárez on Sympathy”; Tropia, ibid.,
279, notes that “probably inspired by the Prologue of the Ordinatio, Mastri and Belluto call this
the “philosophical reason” that Scotus provides to explain the intellect’s dependence on phan-
tasms in the present state”; Tropia refers to Mastrius / Bellutus, Cursus philosophicus III, De
an., disp. 6, q. 1, n. 12, 139.
9 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 374 (ed. Vat. III), 227–28.
10 Duns Scotus, Ord. IV, dist. 43, q. 2, n. 59 (ed. Vat. XIV), 18–19: “Nec, breviter, invenitur
aliquis philosophus notabilis qui hoc neget, licet ille maledictus Averroes in fictione sua III De
anima, quae tamen non est intelligibus nec sibi nec alii, ponat intellectivam quamdam substan-
tiam separatam, mediantibus phantasmatibus coniunctam, quam coniuctionem nec ipse nec
aliquis sequax potuit explicare, nec per illam coniunctionem salvare ‘hominem intelligere.’
Nam secundum ipsum homo formaliter non esset nisi quoddam animal irrationale excellens,
per quamdam tamen animam irrationalem et sensitivam excellentiorem aliis animalibus.”
11 Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super secundum et tertium de anima q. 11, n. 13 (OPh V), 94:
“[D]icitur quod phantasia proprie non movet intellectum, nec aliquid in ipso imprimit, sed
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In general, Scotus subscribes to the usual views regarding the interior sens-
es. The common sense allows a common object referring to the different quali-
ties perceived by external sensation, the imagination retains the phantasm ‘pro-
duced’ by the common sense. What Scotus more originally revises is the role of
the estimative faculty by considerably limiting its scope. He is not against the
view of the estimative faculty as a place in which animal movement crucially
originates; rather, he aims to markedly distinguish it from the rational features
of the human mind. Unfortunately, as I have noted, Scotus only dealt directly
with the estimative faculty in a couple of passages. What I propose is to take an
indirect approach, namely, by reconstructing the propositions which he negates
regarding estimative powers, so that his actual view may become clearer by con-
trast.
The standard features of the estimative faculty that Scotus has in mind im-
ply that (1) it is a certain judgment about particulars that (2) acquires the inten-
tions ‘hidden behind’ or ‘beneath’ what the other senses perceive. Since Avicen-
na, Aquinas, and Henry of Ghent hold versions of these positions, Scotus mainly
sees them as opposing authorities.
Scotus rejects both tenets; he holds that (1) there are no hidden intentions
behind or beyond the sensory input, no unsensed sensata or connotational at-
tributes,12 and (2) the senses are neither capable of composition of any kind nor
is there any complex knowledge in the internal senses. Thus, the role of the esti-
mative faculty is greatly diminished. What exactly is that role? And how does
Scotus account for complex animal behavior? The main answer is that estima-
tion will be reduced to mechanisms of memory, learning, and instinctual behav-
ior. Since animals are not capable of complex sensory compositions, a point he
carefully makes when dealing with the estimative faculty as an analogous form of
‘prudence,’ the sensory appetite-instinct tandem is sufficient to explain animal
behavior. His goal, as I aim to show in this paper, is to distinguish animal ac-
tions from genuine free praxis.
tantum repraesentat sibi obiectum. Quo praesente, intellectus ex virtute sua activa elicit actuum
suum, sicut praesente sensibili sensus elicit actum sentiendi, et in hoc est convenientia, non
quia phantasmata sunt obiectum intellectus, sicut sensibilia sensus (quae imprimunt, secun-
dum aliquos, speciem sensibilem in sensu); tamen requiritur phantasma ad intelligendum
obiectum, quia sicut quidditas absoluta vel universale, quod est directum obiectum intellectus,
non habet esse extra nisi in singulare, ut homo in Socrate, ita non potest repraesentari intellec-
tui secundum speciem intelligibilem pro statu viae nisi in repraesentatione similitudinis ipsius
singularis, quod fuit in phantasmate.”
12 This is how Dag Nikolaus Hasse translates Avicenna’s ma’nā; cf. Hasse, “Avicenna’s De
anima in the Latin West”, 132–33.
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2. Estimation, Animal Prudence, and Appetite

One first part of our issue concerns the question, whether animals are capable of
judgments in any form? A central locus to explore this issue is Scotus’s com-
mentary on Metaphysics I, q. 3, where he addresses the issue whether animals
possess prudence. Since animals cannot be said, of course, to possess prudence
as a moral habit, the estimative power is usually assumed to be the stand-in fac-
ulty that elicits prudent actions. There are two main arguments here for the use-
fulness of estimation: first, animals provide for the future based on a memory of
the past, which is possible only by comparing the past with the future; but to
compare is the work of reason itself, thus, some sort of comparative or composi-
tive faculty is necessary. Secondly, animals know nothing except through the
senses, but the senses are per se only concerned with the proper and common
sensibles, and since neither the harmful nor the useful nor any intentions with
which prudence is concerned are proper or common sensibles, a special faculty
is needed to grasp intentions. It must be sensitive, because animals also possess
it, and it must be internal, because intentions seem immediately inaccessible to
the exterior ones.
Scotus provides a sed contra, however, derived from Aristotle’s Metaphysics
I, 1 (980b 3–5): animals with memory become apt at learning. Learning, in turn,
could be said to be responsible for prudent behavior, in lieu of a compositive
faculty, making it unnecessary for animals to borrow any features from the ratio-
nal human apparatus. The link between prudence and learning (and future be-
havior) has a literary sense, as seen in Cicero, whom Scotus quotes:
Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum, neutrarumque scientia. Partes eius memoria,
intelligentia, providentia. Memoria est, per quam animus repetit illa, quae fuerunt. Intel-
ligentia est, per quam ea perspicit, quae sunt. Providentia est, per quam futurum aliquid
videtur ante quam factum sit.13
Scotus believes that one can only talk metaphorically of a ‘prudence in brutes,’
which means that actions arising from natural instinct (such as a lamb following
its mother and fleeing from a wolf, or a swallow building a nest, or an ant col-
lecting grain for the winter) are not manifestations of prudence.14 As Cicero
says, prudence involves memory. Instinct has to do with those actions that are
inexplicable even with memory, like the way some animals, born during the
summer, gather grain for the winter. Prudent behavior involves situations in
which more than one way of acting is possible, while instinct-directed actions
13 Cicero, De inventione II, 53; cf. McCord Adams and Wolter, “A Treatise on Memory and
Intuition,” 195.
14 Cf. Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis I, q. 3, n. 5 (OPh
III), 87–88.
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imply a linear, almost mechanical way of acting. Scotus clarifies that instincts
rule the goals of animal actions, and not the contingent way in which animals
may bring about those goals, namely, grain that “could be gathered in this place
or that, or from this heap or that, and from a memory of the place where it had
placed it, or the heap from which it first gathered it.”15 Instinct, furthermore,
rules species-wide behavior, while concrete actions respond to individual knowl-
edge, the hallmark of the sensitive soul. Thus, “experience plays a small role and
as animals somehow have experiential knowledge, so they can in some way com-
pare things, although theirs is not the sort that is characteristic of reasoning,
which moves from the known to the unknown by means of discourse.”16 An
easier case for animal prudence concerns exclusively animals with memory, in
line with Aristotle’s views on the origins of animal movement in De anima III,
where he claims the origins of movement are the noûs and órexis: the latter as
directly related towards an end, while the former calculates the means towards
it.17 Animals capable of learning are, of course, more intelligent, according to
Aristotle.18 Only humans can judge upon art and reasoning, while ‘prudent’ ani-
mals act upon memory and imagination, and animals without memory upon
órexis and imagination.19
The more complicated explanans concerns animals’ ability to compare past
and future. A simple example – like when someone says, “by the shorter way
one gets what we want, this is the shorter way, etc.” – can easily be found repli-
cated in animals, with pseudo-arguments like these, like, for example, when a
hound pursues game. Scotus answers that while the exterior behavior seems the
same, animal and human knowledge are not comparable at all: humans act by
deliberation, “and that which he elicits after deliberating could also be arrived at
15 Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis I, q. 3, n. 6 (OPh III),

88 (transl. by Etzkorn and Wolter in Duns Scotus, Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle,
76): “Prudentia autem sicut in nobis est habitus consiliativus, non de fine, sed de his quae sunt
ad finem, non circa necessaria, sed contingentia; ita etiam in illis est circa illa quae possunt sic
aliter facere, puta quod congregat vel reponat, hoc in loco vel illo, et ex hoc cumulo vel illo, ex
memoria loci, ubi primum granum reposuit, et cumuli unde primum sustulit.”
88 (transl. Etzkorn and Wolter, 76): “[E]xperimenti parum participant; et sicut aliquo modo
habent experimentum, ita et collationem aliquam, licet non illam quae appropriatur rationi
quae est per discusum a noto ad ignotum.”
17 Cf. Aristotle, De anima III, 10, 433a9–12.
18 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics I, 1, 980a 25–28.
19 For Aristotle’s understanding regarding the origin of actions see Sorabji, Animal Minds
and Human Morals, and Rapp, “Tackling Aristotle’s Notion of the Will.”
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without deliberation and from the sense appetite alone.”20 For animals, this latter
human possibility is the standard.
Scotus admits the difference between animals that have memory and can
somehow compare it to the past, animals that have only the present knowledge
and have no memory or instinct, and animals that know only the present but do
have instinct. Common to all is not being ‘masters of their actions’ (nullius ac-
tionis sint domini proprie), which means that “they act necessarily and not out of
any precognition, nor is there any freedom.”21 If instinct works at the level of the
whole species, “it would seem to follow that prudence is less involved with what
is not uniform than with what is uniform,”22 which is, of course, wholly different
from phronesis, which concerns actions involving deliberation. Imprecise lan-
guage use is a problem here, as Scotus notes that
here [Aristotle] does not distinguish between the phantasy and memory, nor between
sense and the estimative ability; and to every apprehensive potency there is a correspond-
ing appetitive one. Consequently, every animal has a twofold appetite: one sensitive and
the other estimative.23
This sense of estimation, however, is not the estimative faculty of Aquinas and
Avicenna (as Scotus later shows in Ord. IV, dist. 45); it corresponds only to
animals who have retentive power.24 According to Scotus, what we call an esti-
mation is in fact some sort of closed circuit between instinct and phantasy,
sometimes aided by strong impressions in the retentive faculty. It is due to im-
pressions such as these that the animal is compelled to act, even when the exter-
nal senses do not face a particularly threatening or appealing object. As Scotus
explains, this is due to estimation (a connection between perception and an

89 (transl. Etzkorn and Wolter, 77): “Nam illud quod elicitur ex deliberatione, posset etiam
idem non eligi ex deliberatio, sed ex solo appetito sensitive.”
91 (transl. Etzkorn and Wolter, 78): “Tamen necessario agunt non ex praecognitione, nec libe-
re.”
91 (transl. Etzkorn and Wolter, 79): “[S]ed ex hoc videtur sequi quod minus sit prudentia
quoad difforme, quam quod uniforme, quia in apprehension sensitive nullus point prudentiam,
quod autem difforme ibi est, pertinent ad sensum praecise.”
92 (transl. Etzkorn and Wolter, 79): “Hic non distinguit inter phantasiam et memoriam, nec
inter sensum et aestimativam, quia omne animal sicut habet sensum, ita et aliquam aestima-
tionem; et tamen omnis potentia apprehensive habet propriam appetitivam; ergo omne animal
habet duplicem appetitum, unum sensitivae, alium aestimativae.”
24 Cf. ibid.
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elicited appetite) acquiring the knowledge of something convenient or inconve-

nient to one’s nature:
a memory that retains the species of an agreeable or desirable situation once present in
the estimative power […] [so that] though the imaginative power does not impel action,
perhaps, because what is imagined is not delectable to the sense, nevertheless, if it is
agreeable to the nature of the animal, it will impel the appetite of the estimative faculty.
And thus, from such a memory, evaluation, and desire, it will go after what is absent; not
as something delectable to the senses, but as agreeable to its nature.25
Estimation perceives something the exterior senses do not, and is referred to as

having an appetite, either through a strong impression formed by experience
and retained in memory, or through the connection of the internal species to
animal instincts. In other words, the estimative faculty as Scotus here refers to is
rather a sort of modus loquendi to link the species in the phantasy with the ap-
petite. Animal behavior may change depending on how strongly an impression
came onto the animal’s imagination; when external perception ceases, whichever
phantasm impressed itself more forcibly will be the first one recalled.
Avicenna claimed that the convenience or inconvenience of the perceived
object to the animal’s nature is the result of perceiving intentions (ma‘anî) that
are inaccessible to the external senses (thus, species insensata, or connotational
attributes). Even if “what exactly counts as an intention is never fully spelled
out,”26 we can form a somewhat accurate picture of what the estimative faculty
entails, namely a distinct judgment of the relation between the phantasm and the
intention dug up by the estimative faculty.
Whenever an animal undergoes pain or pleasure, either sensible utility or harm joined to
a sensible form reaches it, and the form of this thing and the form of what is joined to it
is imprinted in the formative power [i. e., imagination], and the intention of the relation
which exists between them has been imprinted in the memory, along with the judgment
regarding [that relation].27

92 (transl. Etzkorn and Wolter, 80): “Quod autem habet phantasiam retentivam speciei sensi-
bilis, et memoriam retentivam speciei convenientis aestimati, si in absentia actu phantasietur
de sensibili, actu etiam aestimabit de convenienti. Et licet appetitus phantasiae non impellat,
quia forte phantasiatum non est sensui delectabile, tamen si est conveniens naturae appetitus
aestimativae impellet. Et tunc ex tali memoria et aestimatione, et appetite, prosequendo absens,
non delectabile sensui, sed conveniens naturae, est actus bruti simillimus actui prudentiae in
nobis.”
26 Black, “Imagination and Estimation”, 60.
27 Avicenna, Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus IV, chp. 3 (vol. 2, 39): “Animal et-
enim cum habuerit dolorem aut delicias, aut pervenit ad illum utilitas sensibilis aut nocumen-
tum sensibile adiunctum cum forma sensibili, et descripta fuerit in formali forma huius rei et
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While the term ma‘na denotes in Arabic philosophy the general directedness of
any cognitive content of any faculty to its object, Avicenna also employs it for
the specific object of the estimative faculty (al-wahm).28 This involves actual
cognitive content, a form of judgment or opinion (zinn) correlated to ‘states of
hope and desire.’ We know this through observation of animal actions, where
estimation seems to judge a future state or plan of action concerning the object
considered.29 Avicenna consistently describes the activity of estimation as judg-
ing (hakama, hukm). This allows him to explain, e. g., errors in perceptive judg-
ment: we see something yellow and may assume it is, for example, honey, or
bile. We know what the yellow substance tastes like, because our earlier experi-
ence of a yellow object affected our taste, or smell. The act of judgment, then,
consists of three things, of which two are sensible forms (the yellow substance and the
sweetness), one actually perceived, the other aroused in the very act of judgment. But the
pivot of the judgment is the third feature, which relates the two sensible features without
itself being sensible, namely ‘honey.’30
A dog, when confronted with an object perceived as a stick, will, through mem-
ory, naturally recover the intention of disagreeableness and pain, even if, for ex-
ample, the stick is just an umbrella: the dog perceives ‘stick’ and, through an
estimative judgment, tries to avoid it. There is no underlying psychological pro-
cess here but a sort of simultaneous apprehension: estimation is said to be a
compositive faculty precisely because it immediately apprehends the proper in-
tention when presented with the relevant species. The judgment or composition
here corresponds to perceiving or connecting the impression of pain while per-
ceiving the stick or perceiving the sweetness of honey while perceiving the yellow
liquid. Behind a seemingly simple perception, the estimative power impels the
imagination to connect the retained form of sweetness or bitterness with the yel-
low substance (rendering the estimative a collative power).31
According to Deborah Black, “most of [Avicenna’s] examples involve
properties related to appetition and motion, such as pleasure and pain.”32 Scotus,
following Aristotle, claims that such phenomena are perfectly explainable by the
forma eius quod adiunctum est illi, et descripta fuerit in memoria intentio comparationis quae
est inter illas et iudicium de illa.”
28 Cf. Hasse, “Avicenna’s De anima in the Latin West”, 127–30; 141–43.
29 Cf. Kaukua, “The Problem of Intentionality in Avicenna,” 232.
30 Kaukua, “The Problem of Intentionality in Avicenna,” 234.
31 Ibid. Avicenna even studies the case of madness: some individuals have disproportion-
ately strong imaginative powers capable of activating the estimative power and setting their
peculiar disposition even when confronted with hallucinations (cf. Black, “Imagination and
Estimation,” 71).
32 Black, “Imagination and Estimation,” 60.
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generation of appetites through the connection between apprehension and orex-

is, that is, through an instinctual process that needs no unsensed perception.
This connection corresponds, physiologically, to the one between brain and
heart; for his part, Avicenna is in a way constrained by his method of matching
brain cavities with perceptive faculties. (Scotus prioritizes a functional, not phys-
iological, approach, just like Averroes).33 Even with deceivingly simple examples
like this, Avicenna will have a hard time explaining how non-material properties
are objects of perception attached to material forms.34
Aquinas ‘complicates’ matters further by associating the estimative faculty
to rational mental activity. In his view, the estimative faculty becomes a neces-
sary link between perception and intellection. In the Summa I, q. 78, a. 4, Aqui-
nas is clear about the necessity of an estimative faculty to explain animal actions:
as is plain, the external senses are not sufficient to perceive all that is agreeable
and disagreeable, so that the animal necessarily seeks what is advantageous and
flees what is disadvantageous; as the external senses will not do, a distinct princi-
ple (aliquod aliud principium), the estimation, is necessary.35 Aquinas makes a
further assertion: while animals perceive intentions through a natural instinct,
humans do so “per quandam collationem”; he goes on to claim that this implies
some sort of collation between the intellect and the internal sense,36 which allows
him to also claim that the cogitative power is capable of apprehending individual
beings as existing under a common nature, “sub natura communi.”37 Scotus, in
33 Cf. Tellkamp, “Vis aestimativa and vis cogitativa,” 636.

34 Cf. Black, “Imagination and Estimation,” 60.
35 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, S. Th. I, q. 78, a. 4, corpus (ed. Marietti I, 381): “Rursus consideran-
dum est quod, si animal moveretur solum propter delectabile et contristabile secundum sen-
sum, non esset necessarium ponere in animali nisi apprehensionem formarum quas percipit
sensus, in quibus delectatur aut horret. Sed necessarium est animali ut quaerat aliqua vel fugiat,
non solum quia sunt convenientia vel non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed etiam propter ali-
quas alias commoditates et utilitates, sive nocumenta, sicut ovis videns lupum venientem fugit,
non propter indecentiam coloris vel figurae, sed quasi inimicum naturae; et similiter avis col-
ligit paleam, non quia delectet sensum, sed quia est utilis ad nidificandum. Necessarium est
ergo animali quod percipiat huiusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit sensus exterior. Et huius
perceptionis oportet esse aliquod aliud principium, cum perceptio formarum sensibilium sit ex
immutatione sensibilis, non autem perceptio intentionum praedictarum.”
36 Ibid.: “Considerandum est autem quod, quantum ad formas sensibiles, non est differentia
inter hominem et alia animalia, similiter enim immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus. Sed
quantum ad intentiones praedictas, differentia est, nam alia animalia percipiunt huiusmodi in-
tentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu, homo autem etiam per quandam collationem. Et
ideo quae in aliis animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis, in homine dicitur cogitativa, quae
per collationem quandam huiusmodi intentiones adinvenit.”
37 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, In Aristotelis De anima commentarium II, lect. 13, n. 122 (ed. Ma-
rietti, 394): “Differenter tamen circa hoc se habet cogitativa, et aestimativa. Nam cogitativa
apprehendit individuum, ut existens sub natura communi; quod contingit ei, inquantum uni-
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turn, believes Aquinas has confused the roles of the estimative faculty and the
intellect. In the end, the cogitative faculty has both a cognitive and an appetitive
function, generating both intentions of singulars (sensibiles per accidens) and ac-
tion-oriented intentions.38 This is problematic, as it turns the cogitative faculty
into one with seemingly two objects.
A radically different account can be found in Peter of John Olivi, in whom
we find the notion that the functions of internal perception can be satisfied by a
numerically one internal sense. He acknowledges the pluralistic view of the in-
ternal senses and their relation to bodily differences,39 but still holds that one
internal sense accommodates all these functions through the different physiolog-
ical structures, as the “powers of the sensitive soul are extended throughout their
organs and do not exist in one simple point.”40 Olivi distinguishes between the
apprehension of pain and pleasurable experiences and the estimative function,
which he deems a certain habit of the common sense capable of perceiving the
agreeableness of harmfulness of external objects. For example, when a child gets
burnt, it generates a habit in the common sense, through which it now associates
pain to fire: such remaining habits, dispositions and associations are what we
call estimation.41
From here, Scotus disentangles two strands: on the one hand, the appre-
hension of pleasure and pain, and on the other, the role of estimation as related
to certain strong impressions that lead to learning (and memory). The first one
will ultimately suggest that there is no apprehension of unsensed species beyond
what is given by the external senses; the second one, that such a perception
would be unnecessary, as the phantasm is by itself capable of triggering either an
instinctual or a learned response. This suggests a way to reconstruct the circuit
of animal action without positing an estimative faculty: the external senses along
with the common sense are sufficiently capable of perceiving pain and pleasure,
while sensitive memory makes it unnecessary to posit a special habitus of the
common sense.
The question of pain arises because an internal discomfort, different from
external harm and only accessible to an internal power, would provide a suitable
object for an estimative faculty. As in statu isto the powers of the soul are or-
dered among themselves, the soul’s pain can be ‘shared’ by the body, the ques-
tion being how so. While dealing with the possibility of pain in Christ’s soul,
tur intellectivae in eodem subiecto; unde cognoscit hunc hominem prout est hic homo, et hoc
lignum prout est hoc lignum.”
38 Cf. Barker, “Aquinas on Internal Sensory Intentions.” Scotus ascribes this function to the
intellect; cf. Tropia, “Scotus and Suárez on Sympathy,” 280–81.
39 Cf. Toivanen, Perception and the Internal Senses, 249.
40 Ibid., 250.
41 Cf. Toivanen, “Peter Olivi on the Internal Senses,” 443.
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Scotus shows that what is at work here is not the apprehension of an intention in
a cognitive sense, but rather a bodily response to the phantasm.42 Notably, he
explains Christ’s suffering by describing an “estimation” without an estimative
faculty, by just highlighting the concordia potentiarum of the powers of the soul:
as he explains it, Christ suffered because his intellect showed his future suffering
(ostendit passionem futuram), his imagination pictured this suffering as sad and
painful (terribile vel tristabile), and this portrayal arose from the sensitive ap-
petite (appetitus illius potentiae [imaginativa] apprehensivae).43
The key is, as I take it, to disassociate pain from cognition. Hence, he agrees
with Henry of Ghent, against Olivi, that perception is different from the associ-
ated intention of agreeable and disagreeable, but he disagrees with Henry’s doc-
trine that a sense perceives its object while simultaneously apprehending its con-
venience or inconvenience. According to Henry, pain (dolor) is the perception
of a corruptive alteration of a natural disposition. His definition, in Scotus’s
view, relies on a distinction between the apprehension of an object (that has it as
its proper terminus) and its perception (the object’s condition of agreeableness
or harmfulness). If this were the case, every sense would seem to be capable of
two simultaneous operations;44 Scotus rejects this on the grounds of the perfec-
tion of the sense, which can perceive its proper object,45 not relations.46
Discussing the correct interpretation of Aristotle’s De motu animalium
with Henry, Scotus opts for an economic solution: it is the simple perception of
an object that elicits movement, just like a change in the ship’s wheel steers the
42 In general, ‘dolor’ refers to pain in the body and ‘tristitia’ to pain of the soul, a distinc-
tion taken usually from Augustine’s De civitate Dei XIV, 15, whom Scotus quotes in Ord. III
dist. 15, q. un., n. 25 (ed. Vat. IX), 485. He acknowledges that the soul can feel pain (tristitia)
when facing an object that disagrees with its nature or the appetite (nn. 51–57, ed. Vat. IX,
501–3), but this kind of sadness is predicated on a disagreeableness to the will. For the Francis-
can context of pain in the body and soul, see Rosaro, “The Passions of the Will and the Passion
of Christ in Franciscan Theology.”
43 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 15, q. un., n. 71 (ed. Vat. IX), 510.
44 Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 15, q. un., n. 36 (ed. Vat. IX), 491: “[S]i ponantur ista esse
obiecta alterius actus ab apprehensio, videtur quod oportet ponere duos sensus visus et duos
sensus auditus (et sic de singulis), quorum alter apprehendat colorem vel sonum, alter percipi-
at intentiones illas circumstantes, quia secundum prima obiecta distincta distinguuntur poten-
tiae.”
45 Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 15, q. un., n. 34 (ed. Vat. IX), 490: “[U]nius potentiae non sit
nisi unus actus perfectus simul; igitur sensus circa obiectum suum non sunt simul ponendi duo
actus, licet idem ut ‘perfectus’ posset dici perception et ut ‘imperfectus’ posset dici apprehen-
sio.”
46 Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 15, q. un., n. 35 (ed. Vat. IX), 491: “[N]ullus sensus potest
illas relationes percipere, sed tantum aliqua absoluta quae sunt principia movendi sensum; re-
lationes autem non sunt principia movendi sensum aliquem ad quemcumquem actum.”
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whole ship.47 On the Aristotelian account, external perception apprehends the

object as agreeable or harmful through accompanying changes in the body, mov-
ing from the brain to the heart, which we experience as pleasure or pain. Aristo-
tle regarded this complex relation between perception and action as mediated
through the desiderative powers of the soul, which account for the internal
changes in the body that produce movement.48
To avoid the need of a sense apprehending relational attributes, Scotus
highlights the object’s agreeableness or disagreeableness as referring just to the
coming together of absolute natures, namely an active and a passive power, so
that
the relation that is the term of the relation of the disposing to the disposed is called
‘agreement’ and the contrary is called ‘disagreement’ […] insofar as the ‘agreeable’ is
said to be that to which it is dispositionally inclined (that is, to something extrinsic which
is perfective of it), and the ‘disagreeable’ that from which it is dispositionally disinclined
as from something extrinsic that is corruptive and offensive to it.49
In other words, the relation of the active and the passive power is founded on
the powers themselves, so that it is just their coming together in terms of abso-
lute natures: agreeable and disagreeable refer to the natural disposition of the
faculty and its object. In the case of perception, Scotus calls this agreeableness
pleasure,50 not as a follow-up to perception or a secondary apprehension, but
rather as the name of the absolute form of the object, causing the absolute rela-
tion ‘pleasure,’ in the appropriate power inclined to this form (and likewise with
pain).51
47 Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 15, q. un., n. 37 (ed. Vat. IX), 491–92: “[Q]uod addicitur De
motu animalium, non est ad hoc quod istae intentionis convenientis et nocivi causent primas
passions corporals cordis, quas concomitantur animals, neque etiam quod causent ipsas pas-
sions animales, –sed magis est ad hoc quod ipsa obiecta sensibilia, quae relucent phantasmati-
bus […] sive ipsa phantasmata virtute obiectorum causent tales passions; et ideo illa littera
facit ad hoc quod oportet ponere alias rationes obiectivas – causantes dolorem – quam quae
sunt relationes.” Cf. Aristotle, De Motu Animalium 7.701b16–32.
48 Cf. Rapp, “Tackling Aristotle’s Notion of the Will”, 73–74.
49 Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 15, q. un., n. 38 (ed. Vat. IX), 493 (transl. Simpson, cf. note
8): “[E]t tunc relatio terminans relationem inclinantis ad inclinatum dicitur ‘convenientia,’ et
alia vocatur ‘disconvenientia’ […] prout ‘conveniens’ dicitur quod inclinatur (puta ad aliquod
perfectivum extrinsecum), et ‘disconveniens’ a quo declinatur ut a corruptivo vel offensivo ex-
trinseco.”
50 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 15, q. un., n. 39 (ed. Vat. IX), 493–94.
51 Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 15, q. un., nn. 40–41 (ed. Vat. IX), 494: “Non igitur ratio
causandi istam delectationem est convenientia quae fuit relatio, neque etiam praesentia per
perceptionem, quae est alia relatio (quasi approximatio agentis ad passum), sed sola forma
absoluta – super quam fundatur relatio activi obiecti – est ratio causandi et istud absolutum
quod est delectatio in illo absoluto quod inclinatur ad istum absolutum ut ad perfectivum ex-
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Scotus reminds us that the relation is not causal, in the sense that some-
thing agreeable causes pleasure, and something disagreeable causes pain, because
he is referring to the natural disposition of these absolute powers in themselves.
It is from these absolute things, i. e., from the correspondence of certain objects
which cause pleasure and pain, that we abstract general rationes of the agreeable
and disagreeable, which we modo loquendi take as efficient causes of pleasure
and pain, just like when we speak of active or passive things, which are just gen-
eral ways of speaking about relations that refer to the things themselves.52
Instead of pointing towards an unsensed species that would need to be a
subjective apprehension objectively related to the thing perceived, Scotus sug-
gests that the phantasm itself, as agreeable or disagreeable to the sense, elicits a
sensitive appetite:
because we can distinguish the power by which the soul can apprehend something from
the power by which the soul is inclined to some extrinsic thing that is perfective of it, and
the inclination naturally has the preceding apprehension as term. And so, just as we at-
tribute apprehension per se to sense, so it seems that the inclination (the inclination
namely whose term follows on the apprehension) belongs to the sensitive appetite; for
we posit a sensitive appetite only because of such a term and the pleasure that follows
apprehension; and so, since the form that terminates the inclination belongs to the same
thing that the being inclined belongs to, pleasure will be in the appetite that was in-
clined.53
trinsecum. Ita etiam per oppositum dolore, quia absolutum contra-inclinatum ab obiecto cor-
ruptivo quod dicitur ‘disconveniens,’ ut refertur ad potentiam, sequitur approximatio, et ex hoc
tertio sequitur impression huius passionis quae est ‘dolor,’ quae est contra inclinationem ipsius
recipientis ut forma intrinseca, sicut passivum est contra eius inclinationem ut extrinsecum.”
52 Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 15, q. un., n. 42 (ed. Vat. IX), 495: “Quod ergo dicimus com-
muniter quod ‘conveniens delectate et disconveniens tristat,’ hoc non debet intelligi causaliter,
quasi convenientia et disconvenientia sint rationes causandi delectationem et dolorem in po-
tentia; sed abstrahimus quasdam rationes generales ab absolutis distinctis, quibus convenit is-
tos effectus causare, et ab illis quibus convenit effective causare delectationem et dolorem abs-
trahimus rationes convenientiae et diconvenientiae, ut ab illo quod effective causat dolorem
abstrahimus vel accipimus rationem disconvenientiae et ab illo quod effective causat delecta-
tionem accipimus rationem convenientiae – sicut si diceremus quod omne activum approxi-
matum agit in passivum: activum et passivum non sunt rationes agenda et patiendi, loquendo
de istis relationibus, sed ut circumloquuntur absoluta.”
53 Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 15, q. un., n. 43 (ed. Vat. IX), 495–96 (transl. Simpson, cf.
note 8): “[Q]uia possumus distinguere potentiam qua anima potest hoc apprehendere et qua
inclinatur in hoc ut perfectivum extrinsecum, quae inclinatio nata est terminari apprehensione
tantum praecedente; et ita sicut sensui per se attribuimus apprehendere, ita videtur quod sic
inclinari, ita scilicet quod terminatio illius inclinationis sequatur ad apprehensionem, conveniat
appetitui sensitivo: propter nihil enim aliud ponimus appetitum sensitivum nisi propter talem
terminationem et propter delectationem consequentem apprehensionem; et ita, cum eiusdem
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This natural agreement (or disagreement) is of such a nature “that when noth-
ing else is posited with respect to them save only that they are apprehended,
then an act of being delighted or sad, of fleeing or pursuing, is of a nature, as far
as concerns itself, to follow on necessarily,” that is, without the intervention of
any collative power.54
In sum, two arguments are crucial here for Scotus. First, a cognitive power
cannot have two objects, namely a proper one and an accompanying intention;
thus, an estimation or apprehension cannot be adjoined to the same act as per-
ception. Secondly, cognizing something cannot be the same thing as appetizing
something; only the latter is a direct principle of action.55 An estimation, there-
fore, cannot provide an action-oriented, specific, principle of movement. The
question whether animal action can be reduced to natural instincts is then, per-
haps, not so surprising, though one may ask whether the phantasmata can pro-
vide an appetite that is concrete enough for a specific action. Scotus, however,
seems to believe that i) cognizing something as agreeable to us just means cog-
nizing a particular that elicits a particular appetite (and not the thing ‘in itself,’
as the sensitive powers cannot apprehend the nature of things),56 and ii) cogniz-
ing the ratio of the agreeableness of some particular thing for us is a matter for
the intellect. We should be careful to posit a faculty that can apprehend some
individual thing as agreeable to us, so as to avoid an a parte post projection of
human reason into animal minds.
sit forma terminans inclinationem cuius erat inclinari, delectatio erit in appetitu qui inclina-
batur.”
54 For its part, the object of the irascible appetite is what impedes something agreeable:
Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 34, q. un., nn. 35–36 (ed. Vat. X), 193–94: “[N]otandum est quod
‘concupiscibile’ respicit illud quod natum est ex se esse conveniens vel disconveniens, ita quod
nullo alio posito circa ipsum nisi solum apprehensione, necessario natus est sequi actus
delectandi vel tristandi, vel fugiendi vel prosequendi, quantum est ex parte eius. […] istud
‘offendens’ non dicitur quod statim est disconveniens concupiscibili, sed quod impedit illud
quod est primo conveniens (puta, si cibus est primo conveniens appetitui gustativo avis et ideo
concupiscitur, prohibens hunc cibum vel removens offendit animal concupiscens). Hoc ‘of-
fendens’ est obiectum irascibilis – circa quod irascibile habet quoddam ‘nolle,’ non quidem
proprie refugientis (sicut concupiscibile nolens refugit), sed magis respuentis sive repellentis,
quia irascibile volens repellit: non tantum cupit impediens illus amoveri, sed amovere, et ultra
punire.”
55 Cf. Drummond, “Duns Scotus on the Passions of the Will,” 63.
56 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 34, q. un., n. 34 (ed. Vat. X), 193.
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3. Animal Learning and the Unsensed Species

Scotus has obviated any kind of ‘digging down’ to find secret intentions linked
to either external perception or the phantasmata. He famously renders the spe-
cies insensata irrelevant through a controversial thought experiment that aims to
show that there is no perception of the nature of the species that moves the esti-
mative faculty, but rather only actual cognizable accidental features:
If a sheep remains in the same nature and with the same natural affection for the lamb
and yet it were changed, by a miracle, to be like a wolf in all sensible accidents, as color,
shape, and sound and the rest, the lamb would flee a sheep thus altered as it would flee a
wolf. And yet in the sheep thus altered there would be no conceptual idea of the harmful
but of the agreeable. Therefore, the estimative power of the lamb would not dig down to
discover under the sensible species the conceptual content of the agreeable but would be
precisely moved by its sense appetite in the way the sensible accidents would move it.57
The sheep can only flee a wolf because it senses either (i) the wolf-like accidents,
or (ii) the wolf’s nature. In the former case, it will flee anything that resembles a
wolf; the latter, on the other hand, is impossible, because a sheep cannot concep-
tualize the nature of anything. A sheep ‘in wolf clothing’ can only be perceived
as a wolf. The hypothetical change of a sheep dressed up as a wolf may look like
a misleading premise; the point is that it is through the accidents that we know a
nature is agreeable to us. This can only mean, Scotus claims, that ‘perceiving
something as agreeable’ is nothing else but the perception of a certain set of
accidents that trigger an instinctual response. If a lamb appears to be a wolf, the
other lamb will perceive it as disagreeable and flee, even as its proper nature
remains agreeable. That this is the case just proves that the internal senses are
not capable of perceiving the nature that gives way to its perception in any case:
animal actions are just reactions to what they are actually capable of perceiving.
Perception is of course limited, as the senses do not know substance be-
cause their cognitive power is insufficient (not because there is something lack-
ing in the representative power of the species). This does not mean that animals
cannot adequately cognize things, just that perception cannot cognize unsensed
species that somehow relate perceivable qualities to their substantive nature. The
57 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, qq. 1–2, n. 62 (ed. Vat. III), 248 (transl. Simpson, cf. note 8):
“Et quod adducitur simile de aestimativa, dico quod videtur adduci falsum ad confirmationem
alterius falsi, quia si maneret ovis in propria natura, et in eodem affectu naturali ad agnum,
mutaretur tamen ovis ut esset similis lupo per miraculum, in omnibus accidentibus sensi-
bilibus, puta colore, figura, sono, moto, et huiusmodi, agnus fugeret lupum, et tamen in ove sic
mutata non esset intentio nocivi, sed proficui et convenientis, et ita aestimativa agni non suf-
foderet ad inveniendum intentionem convenientis sub speciebus sensibilibus, sed praecise ita
moveretur secundum appetitum sensitivum, sicut accidentia sensibilia moveret.”
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animal appetite is elicited through perception without need for a collative power;
or better yet, a real collative power can only be a rational power.
In order to properly sort the powers at work in an estimation, we must go
back to the same background principle: every faculty has its own proper object.
Still, the act of one faculty can be an object of some superior faculty, e. g., the
common sense can discriminate external perceptions. In this case, the intellect
can intuitively apprehend the act of the imagination and memory. This hitherto
missing element in Scotus’s account of estimation may be gathered from Ord.
IV, dist. 45, where Scotus explains that I can only remember a past action be-
cause I have experienced it. That is, I have an intuitive cognition of a previous
act or perception. I cannot remember when I was born or when the world was
created: “I only remember that you sat there because I recall I have seen or have
known you to be sitting there.”58
When taken as a whole, Scotus continues, remembering can be seen as a
complex set of acts belonging to different faculties: the act of remembering must
involve a lapse of time, an act that perceives the flow of time, a remembered
object not present in itself but in a likeness or species, “and then the memory
will be conserving the species – speaking here of the remembering potency as a
whole. I don’t care whether there is one potency or two – where one conserves
the species and the other remembers it. At least the conservation of the likeness
of the memorable object is required for remembrance.”59 Thus, taken as a whole,
remembering involves two objects: a remote one, namely, something that is re-
membered, and a proximate one, which is the act that cognized the remote ob-
ject. Scotus accepts that we can perceive an object P, retain that object through
the act of the phantasy (FP ), and remember that action through memory (MFP ).
But Scotus is also clear that knowing the past qua past is a feature of human
cognition: the intellect knows both FP and MFP, and knowing this difference is
what provides us with the distinct human experience of the past qua past (a real
collative operation, we should add), and a certain indirect recollection of the
original object of perception P. I can for example conjure the image of someone
and recall their name: this would be an act of the phantasy (FP ). I can also re-
member having heard their name, even if I do not remember what their actual
58 Duns Scotus, Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 3, n. 87 (ed. Vat. XIV), 165–66 (transl. McCord Adams
and Wolter, 214; note that their own edition of the Latin text that forms the basis for the
translation differs slightly from the following text): “[N]on enim recordor eius quod est ‘te
sedisse’ nisi quia recordor me vidisse vel nosse te sedisse.”
59 Ibid. (transl. McCord Adams and Wolter, 214; note that their own edition of the Latin
text that forms the basis for the translation differs slightly from the following text): “[E]t tunc
potentia recordativa erit conservativa specie, et hoc loquendo de totali potentia requisitiva ad
recordationem. Sive enim sive sint duae, quarum unam conservat speciem et alia recordetur,
sive ut una, habens utrumque actum, non curo – saltem ad recordationem requiritur conserva-
tio speciei obiecti recordabilis.”
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name P was, and this would be an act of the sensitive memory (MFP ). I can also
sit down and, in a completely intellectual exercise of recollection, for example
when I write down the events of the day, reminisce people I have met (FP ), re-
member when I heard their names (MFP ) and then remember knowing their
names as soon as their image appears in my mind. In this case, I am working on
my intellect’s intuitive cognition of FP and MFP, even if I had forgotten about P
in the first place.60
In the case of sensitive memory, Scotus claims we cannot attribute anything
to it that we cannot find in brutes.61 Just as he did in the questions on the Meta-
physics, when dealing with kinds of animal actions that seem to imply a form of
remembrance, namely 1) acts of provision, like collecting grain for the winter, 2)
acts of vindication or quasi-retributive justice (“actus vindicandi vel quasi iustiti-
ae retributivae”), 3) acts aimed at the conservation of the species, e. g., feeding
the young, and 4) acts acquired through learning disciplinabilia,62 he explains
how all can be explained solely with recourse to phantasy and the apprehension
of what is delectable. In every case, an applied stimulus elicits a response. In-
deed, strong impressions held by the phantasy continually compel animals to
behave in a certain way:
The sense image or phantasm of what was pleasant or offensive is impressed and contin-
ues to pressure the sensitive appetite to move in an appropriate manner towards that
object, namely to act vindictively or beneficently, at least when no other more pressing
delightful or distressing situation prevails. Therefore, if such an action is suspended for a
certain time by the presence of something else, when the interlude is over, this sense
image moves immediately and a movement follows in the sense appetite appropriate to
that object, a movement which did not occur before because it was impeded by another
more forceful object. Here then, there is no apprehension of the past as past, but only one
60 Scotus also suggests people can have different memories regarding the same remote ob-
ject, since they do not remember P as such, but rather their own acts of remembering P (each
subject would actually be MFP-ing).
61 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 3, n. 132 (ed. Vat. XIV), 179.
62 Duns Scotus, Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 3, nn. 102–5 (ed. Vat. XIV), 170: “Videmus omnes
actus istos brutorum, ex quibus posset magis concludi, utpote qui videntur esse actus prudenti-
ae vel providentiae, ut patet de formica recolligente grana ad eundem locum et tempore deter-
minato (ut in aestate). Similiter, actus vindicandi vel quasi iustitiae retributivae, puta obse-
quendi benefacientibus et puniendi offendentes, videntur in brutis competere eis in quantum
cognoscunt praeteritum ut praeteritum. Similiter, tertio, de actibus pertinentibus ad conserva-
tionem speciei (ut de nidificatione avium et nutritione pullorum et huiusmodi), quae non vi-
dentur eis competere regulariter absque cognitione praeteriti ut praeteriti. Quartum, quia ali-
qua sunt disciplinabilia, ut vult Philosophus in libello De memoria et reminiscentia et De sensu
et sensato; disciplina autem non est sine memoria praeteriti ut praeteritum.”
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of something past, whose residual species moves the animal to retaliate or show favor,
once the stronger incentive is removed.63
It is true that Scotus offers a contrary reading in favor of sense memory cogniz-
ing the past as past, but while this new set of arguments is presented as ‘proba-
bilior’ by the Vatican editors, they seem weaker than the long, detailed argu-
ments against it.64 Thus, while he claims sense memory would more easily
explain the four mentioned cases, he relies on examples and barely touches on
the mechanisms of such explanations. According to Scotus, the difference be-
tween sense and intellectual memory is that sense memory can only sense the
“past” if both the act of the phantasy and its object are perceived as “past” (a
sensible object can only be perceived according to its state during sensation); the
intellect, on its part, only requires its proximate object, the act of the sense, to be
in the past, because it can recognize the ratio of pastness.65 So in the end sense
memory can only recall the past object of a past act, not the ratio of pastness.
The proper object of memory is the past act, while its remote object is the
act of the phantasy. Animals perceive an imperfect sense of the past, as some-
thing that was present insofar as it is now retained by the phantasy. How can we
explain that a bird hatched this very year provides what is needed as if it were
any number of years old, if it has no past knowledge? With no past impressions,
we must appeal to instinct. In fact, in many cases, what seems to be animal
memories directing their actions is just a present delight (or disagreeableness)
experienced through the act of the phantasy as a stimulus that elicits an associat-
ed response.66 If this stimulus is repeated, it leaves a lasting impression recalled
by sense memory, and the impression can be remembered and compel the ani-
mal to act; here, we say the animal learns. Thus, animal knowledge involves
memory and yet no actual knowledge of the past qua past: just the capacity to
recall a repeated or sufficiently strong impression in the phantasy that elicits an
appropriate response by the appetite. For example, when the animal is given
63 Duns Scotus, Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 3, n. 108 (ed. Vat. XIV), 171–72 (transl. McCord
Adams and Wolter, 217–18; note that their own edition of the Latin text that forms the basis
for the translation differs slightly from the following text): “[B]reviter enim phantasma del-
ectabilis placentis, vel tristabilis offendentis, formaliter imprimitur et semper pulsat appetitum
sensitivum ad motum conformem illi obiecto, puta vindicandi vel benefaciendi, saltem quando
cessat aliud delectabile vel tristabile praesens, fortius movens. Ideo si tempore intermedio sus-
pendatur ista actio per aliquod praesens, in fine temporis statim istud phantasma movet, et
sequitur in appetitu sensitivo motio proportionata isti obiecto, quae prius non sequebatur, quia
erat impeditum ab aliquo obiecto fortis movente. Non est igitur hic apprehensio praeteriti ut
praeteriti, sed tantum eius cuius praeteritum, cuius species manens movet ad vindictam vel
gratiam cessante alio fortius movente.”
64 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 3, nn. 111–16 (ed. Vat. XIV), 172–75.
65 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 3, nn. 129–30 (ed. Vat. XIV), 179.
66 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. IV, dist. 45, q. 3, n. 110 (ed. Vat. XIV), 172.
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food and, recalling the past impression of the stick, recoils, taking the food as
something unpleasant.67 There is no estimative judgment at work here. Stronger
or repeated impressions have a longer and deeper effect. Animal cognition is a
natural process; properly speaking, then, animals do not learn anything, except
in the perhaps narrower sense of ‘being conditioned’ by past impressions. They
are just capable of either referring to their instinct as a sort of first object, or they
acquire behavioral patterns due to a strong sensible impression in the phantasy.
Scotus is a theologian, not a biologist. He agrees with the science of his time
in rejecting a cardio-centric paradigm; the internal senses reside in the brain, as
shown by the connection with the nerves.68 But Scotus’s arguments are less cen-
tered on neurophysiology than on securing these two points: 1) animals cannot
operate by their own volition, and 2) empirical cognitive content is objective and
belongs to the senses. We can now construct a theory of estimation that ironical-
ly needs no estimative faculty: estimation cannot perceive unsensed species (be-
cause properties relating to the object are perceived by the external senses), nor
is it needed for cognizing the singular. Animal movement, then, can be wholly
explained by natural responses, either due to a naturally perceived affinity or
aversion, instinct, or the recollection of strong past impressions: in all these cas-
es, the proper sensitive appetite elicits a ‘natural’ response following the phan-
tasm, not a hypothetical collative sensitive judgment. The difference between
natural and rational faculties plays a defining role throughout.
4. Mastri, Belluto, and Punch

Let us now turn to Scotus’s disciples in the seventeenth century. My main aim
here is to show how these authors brought together the different strands of Sco-
tus’s unorganized doctrine of estimation. I will focus on two of the great Scotis-
tic Cursus: the De anima (1643) within the five-volume Cursus philosophicus of
Bartolomeo Mastri and Bonaventura Belluto,69 and the corresponding section
67 Ibid.: “Ergo quando cibus praesens movet appetitum ad summendum, statim phantasma
virgae percutientis simul movet, et per consequens, ut tristabile ad fugiendum; et si ex magna
frequentatione imprimatur phantasma huius valde tristabile, magis retrahit a delectabili quam
delectabile alliciat ad se ipsum.”
68 Cf. Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super secundum et tertium de anima q. 2, nn. 6–10 (OPh
V), 14–16.
69 Within the tradition of the Cursus as organized philosophical textbooks, Mastri and Bel-
luto aimed to set a Scotistic standard. The publication of their monumental work started in
1637; the part on the De anima was published in Venice in 1643 (according to the present
state of research, this part of the work was mainly authored by Belluto). I use the 1727 Venice
edition; cf. Forlivesi, Scotistarum princeps, 114–23, 174–75, 361–65.
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within John Punch’s Integer philosophiae cursus ad mentem Scoti (1642–1643).70

Both feature detailed analyses that mostly address other philosophers and the-
ologians (notably Suárez, Arriaga, Hurtado, and Raffaele Aversa), not physi-
cians. My aim here is to summarize some of their main arguments to show how
the two texts reconstruct Scotus’s views of the estimative power as I have tried to
do above.71 The similarities in the way both works do away with unsensed spe-
cies is notable, especially considering their authors’ stark differences regarding
so many other issues.72
Mastri and Belluto deal with the question of the estimative power in De
anima disp. 5 (De potentiis sensitivis in particulari), questions 8 (De sensibus
internis) and 9 (De appetitu sensitivo). They first note that the internal powers
are distinct from external perception, referring to Scotus’s proofs in Ord. IV,
dist. 45, q. 3, and In De an. q. 9.73 The arguments are conventional: brutes re-
member past things, and they distinguish color from flavor, etc., and these dis-
tinct objects and acts can only be distinguished by a superior sensitive power,
which sets up the question for the subject, organ, number, and acts of the inter-
nal sense.
They first claim that the internal sense (there is just one, as we shall see) is
not in the heart but in the brain, and not in the meninges (subservient structures
protecting the brain) but in the medulla (which is made of the same substance
as the brain and allows it to obtain its object from the particular senses).74 Fol-
lowing Scotus, against Avicenna, they distinguish the senses from the ventricles,
because otherwise the number of cavities would needlessly multiply the senses
(rather the spiritus animales move constantly through them).75
70 First published in 1642–1643; I use the second edition with corrections and additions of
1649. Cf. Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 881.
71 For a systematic exposition of the species of all internal senses in Mastri and Belluto’s De
anima, vis a vis Suárez, see Daniel Heider’s contribution in this same volume (especially sec-
tion 4.3, which deals with the unsensed species).
72 Forlivesi “John Punch on the Nature and Object of Metaphysics”, 122, aptly describes the
relationship between Mastri and Punch as “a two decade-long clash, of no mere doctrinal na-
ture”; cf. further Forlivesi, Scotistarum princeps, 208–18.
73 Cf. Mastrius / Bellutus, Cursus philosophicus III, De an., disp. 5, q. 8, n. 236, 117a.
74 Mastrius / Bellutus, Cursus philosophicus III, De an., disp. 5, q. 8, n. 238, 117a: “[…]
quae, cum sit materiae aliquantulum fluxilis, nec nimis dirae, nec nimis mollis, commode po-
terit recipere species sensibilies.”
75 Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super secundum et tertium de anima q. 10, n. 10 (OPh V), 83,
quotes Avicenna’s dictum (Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus vol. I, chp. 5, 87) that the
phantasy is “in prima concavitate cerebri”; Mastrius / Bellutus, Cursus philosophicus III, De an.,
disp. 5, q. 8, n. 241, 117b), acknowledge this is not his own opinion: “Ad Scotum dicimus ibi
non loqui ex propria sententia, sed ad mentem Avicennae, ut ibi se declarat.”
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According to the authors, as all powers of the soul are cognitive or appeti-
tive, and the internal sense is a cognitive power, the question is whether it knows
(only) res sensatae or (also) insensatae. They define the unsensed species as
“those [features] that are not attained by the external, but only by the internal
senses, such as external or internal sensations, affections of sensible things, and
privations.”76 These are sensed in the sense that they are objects of the internal
sense, but unsensed in that they are immediately and first known by the internal
sense, and not by any of the external senses. Mastri and Belluto hold that the
internal sense perceives some objects of the external senses, namely, the acts of
the external senses and thus the differences between external sensibles, “but not
their convenience or inconvenience.”77 This is necessary for the operation of the
intellect, which does not operate on the external senses, but on the object of the
internal sense.78
As for the fact that there is no knowledge of res insensatas, they refer to the
familiar loci in Scotus: Ord. I, dist. 3, q. 2, and IV, dist. 45, q. 3, art. 1.79 They
prove this point by examining the three possibilities of knowing an unsensed
species in the case of the wolf and the sheep. The sheep cannot know that the
wolf is an enemy “absque ulla specie,” nor can it do so through a species belong-
ing to the wolf itself (a view they ascribe to Suárez and Aversa), since then an-
other wolf would also perceive it inimically. The only workable answer is that
knowing the wolf as an enemy “requires a natural instinct,” and since the wolf
and the sheep have distinct instincts, their perceptions are different.80 There is
no need for a species insensata, since such a hypothetical item would beg the
same principle: a natural capacity in the perceiving power to divine the inimical
aspect of the wolf. This capacity, however, is already present in the nature of the
sheep so as to perceive the wolf as inimical, just as another wolf would, by its
nature, perceive it as agreeable: it is “like a natural sympathy or antipathy of the
76 Mastrius / Bellutus, Cursus philosophicus III, De an., disp. 5, q. 8, n. 242, 118a: “[R]es
insensatae sunt, quae ab externis non attinguntur, sed a solis internis, sub hoc genere continen-
tur sensationes tum externae, tum internae, affectiones rerum sensibilium, et privationes.”
77 Cf. Mastrius / Bellutus, Cursus philosophicus III, De an., disp. 5, q. 8, n. 244, 118a: “[S]
ensum internum percipere quidem obiecta sensuum externorum, non tamen ipsorum conveni-
entiam, vel disconvenientiam.”
78 Ibid.: “Tum quia intellectus non movetur immediate a sensu externo, sed interno, seu ab
obiecto ut cognito a sensu interno.”
79 They acknowledge Scotus’s position as “expresse docetur” and “nec obscure colligetur”;
Hurtado de Mendoza is mentioned embracing his views, while Cavellus (“non Scotice loqui-
tur”) takes the opposite view (the interior senses acquire unsensed species) as more probable.
For Suárez’s views, also mentioned, cf. Daniel Heider’s contribution to this present volume.
80 Cf. Mastrius / Bellutus, Cursus philosophicus III, De an., disp. 5, q. 8, n. 245, 118a.
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object with its nature.”81 If the estimative faculty were capable of apprehending
this sympathy, then we would be able to experience the convenience or inconve-
nience of any object. Mastri and Belluto find this false, since we are incapable of
experiencing, e. g., whether some herbs are medicinal or poisonous. If an herb
was medicinal for us and brutes, and we are not able to perceive it as such, why
should the estimation of animals be any different? Correspondingly, animals can
avoid natural poisons that we cannot recognize, even if we share similar external
sensations. It follows then, according to Mastri and Belluto, that
external accidents are not inconvenient for the sheep, but rather the nature itself of the
wolf is, even while the sensible species only represent the accidents of the wolf and not its
nature; therefore, they also do not represent its inconvenience. The major is clear, since,
as the Doctor says, if the sheep changed its external appearance to resemble a wolf, it
would not then be inconvenient and inimical to another sheep.82
They do not accept the possibility of another perceived species or modus because
they believe there is no sufficient explanation for its generation, and we do not
seem to experience such species or modus ourselves. They acknowledge but dis-
charge Arriaga and Rubio’s hypothesis that God could provide such a species.
Just like Scotus, they admit an animal may acquire knowledge of the conve-
nience or inconvenience of an object through experience. Based on past experi-
ences, a dog may indeed flee from a man with a stick or search for nourishment,
etc. Animals may also, “not formally but materially, and in a confused way”,83
know of privations through memory and the object of the common sense; an
animal may thus know, e. g., if its offspring lacks something. The internal sense
thus knows the acts of the external senses (which is necessary to have a memory
of the past and explains how we can remember hearing something, but not
specifically what), the sensitive appetite (something we easily experience) and
probably its own act (a thesis they ascribe probabiliter to Scotus). They argue
that the species of the internal sense is different from those of the external sens-
es, and thus that the pursuance of a convenient good, as well as the flight from
an inconvenient one, together constitute the formal object of the sensitive ap-
petite.
81 Mastrius / Bellutus, Cursus philosophicus III, De an., disp. 5, q. 8, n. 246, 118a: “[…]
quam naturalis sympathia vel anthypathia obiecti cum natura.”
82 Ibid., 118b: “Accedit, quod colores, figura, magnitudo, vox et accidentia externa lupi non
sunt disconvenientia ovi, sed potius natura ipsius lupi est disconveniens, sed species sensibilis
solum repraesentat accidentia lupi, non naturam, ergo nequit repraesentare disconvenientiam,
maior patet, quia ut ait Doctor citat. si ovis mutaretur quoad accidentia externa in lupum, non
idcirco esset alteri ovi disconveniens et inimica.”
83 Mastrius / Bellutus, Cursus philosophicus III, De an., disp. 5, q. 8, n. 249, 119a: “[…] non
est intelligendum formaliter, ut vere advertat rationem futuri, praesentis, aut praeteriti, sed ma-
terialiter, et confuso quodammodo.”
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They consider the following argument for the existence of the estimative
power: since appetites are blind, a cognitive power is needed to provide the for-
mal ratio of its object as agreeable or disagreeable (an external apprehension of
the object would be insufficient).84 Mastri and Belluto respond that this is all due
to natural antipathy or sympathy, which is found not only in brutes but also in
inert beings, such as magnets, so “when you say that the formal object of the
appetite must be formally known as a convenient good, we answer that it is
enough that it is materially known as a convenient thing, and not formally, and
either way the sensitive appetite is naturally elicited to operate.”85 Mastri and
Belluto explicitly distinguish this operation from the will, because the will is a far
more perfect power that wills itself formally to attain what is convenient, that is,
it moves by the formally known good.86
Acting on instinct is not against nature, since all living beings are directed
by instinct (i. e., by God ut authore naturae), as we see when mammals seek
nourishment after being born, or when they seek unknown herbs to heal them-
selves, etc. This does not presuppose that God induces unsensed species, but
rather “they operate just by natural instinct, when an object is provided for con-
venient apprehension even if not formally apprehended as convenient.”87 This is
the reason why Mastri and Belluto claim that animals operate materially for
their own ends, and not formally, and why they link means to certain ends, even
if they have no formal knowledge of the order among them. If Mastri and Bellu-
to deny any sort of discursive reasoning in animal actions, it is not just because
their actions are not as perfect (free) as human actions informed by virtues, but
because it suffices to assume that a direct apprehension elicits an appetite moved
towards an instinctive end, with the added cases of experience and memory.88
84 Cf. Mastrius / Bellutus, Cursus philosophicus III, De an., disp. 5, q. 8, n. 255, 119b.
85 Mastrius / Bellutus, Cursus philosophicus III, De an., disp. 5, q. 8, n. 256, 119b: “[…] cum
dicitur obiectum formale appetitus esse bonum conveniens, quod debet cognosci, respondemus
sufficere quod cognoscatur materialiter, idest res conveniens, non formaliter, ut conveniens, et
utroque modo appetitus sensitivus natus est operari.”
86 Ibid.: “An autem idem sit dicendum de voluntate, est dubium, videtur enim quod sicut
cognitiva potentia illam dirigens, qualis est intellectus, est perfectior sensitiva, volens ex se at-
tingere convenientiam formaliter, pariformiter voluntas videtur operativa ex motivo bonitatis
formaliter cognitae.”
87 Mastrius / Bellutus, Cursus philosophicus III, De an., disp. 5, q. 8, n. 257, 119b: “[…]
quare remanet, ut ex solo naturae instinctu operentur, posita obiecti convenientis apprehen-
sione licet non ut convenientis formaliter apprehensi.”
88 They of course asume a natural physical connection between appetites and cognitive
powers; cf. Mastrius / Bellutus, Cursus philosophicus III, De an., disp. 5, q. 9, n. 307, 128a:
“[D]icimus appetitus particulares residere in organis sensum particularium, appetitum com-
mune residere in cerebro, ubi etiam collocatur sensus internus, a quo talis appetitus movetur.”
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This leads them to posit a single internal faculty, which they acknowledge
Scotus does not explicitly endorse, even while he holds that faculties are not real-
ly distinct from the soul, and so they conclude there is no need to posit an esti-
mative or cogitative faculty.89 In conclusion:
There is only one sensitive internal faculty in a single organ, namely the brain, which
[the faculty] can exert various functions, for which we have different names […]. For
when this faculty perceives objects known by the external senses, and external actions,
and receives its species, it is called common sense; when it cognizes objects that are not
present, it is called fantasy or imagination; when these varied objects are connected with
each other, it is called imagination or, by some, phantasy; and when it perceives objects
as convenient or inconvenient so that the sensitive appetite is moved, it is called estima-
tion; and when it often apprehends the same previously known objects as past, and the
sensibles of other acts, it is called memory, and reminiscence when it looks for a previous
knowledge with the help of the intellect.90
In contrast to Mastri and Belluto’s copious arguments, John Punch reads as a

much more succinct and analytic voice. I will focus here on the question
“Whether there are species insensata” (Tractatus de anima, disp. 59, q. 10). His
definition of these, like in Mastri and Belluto, refers to species that represent an
object through a ratio only available to the internal sense and not perceived by
any external sense.91 He adds some further clarification: we know that the (nu-
merically one) internal sense perceives many objects that are not perceived by
the external senses, namely their acts, as well as pleasure and pain, through dif-
ferent species than those available to the external senses themselves.92 These spe-
89 Mastrius / Bellutus, Cursus philosophicus III, De an., disp. 5, q. 8, n. 283, 124a.

90 Mastrius / Bellutus, Cursus philosophicus III, De an., disp. 5, q. 8, n. 294, 126a: “Conclu-
dendum est igitur, unicam esse potentiam sensitivam internam in unico organo, scilicet cere-
bro residentem, quae varias functiones potest exercere, iuxta quarum varietatem varia fortitur
nomina […]; nam haec potentia ut percipit obiecta exterius sensata, actiones externas, et recip-
it species, dicitur sensus communis; ut eadem obiecta cognoscit, quando non sunt praesentia,
dicitur phantasia, ab aliis imaginativa; ut illa obiecta varie inter se connectit, dicitur imaginati-
va, ab aliis phantasia; ut eadem sensibilia percipit, ut convenientia, vel disconvenientia, movet-
que appetitum sensitivum, dicitur aestimativa; ut eadem obiecta saepius cognoscit ut praeterita,
et sensata aliis actibus, dicitur memoria, quae si sit cum auxilio rationis quasi inquirendo prius
cognitum […] dicitur reminiscentia.” Further names listed are ‘prudentia sensitiva’ and ‘disci-
plinibilitas.’
91 Poncius, Integer philosophiae cursus, Tract. de anima, disp. 59, q. 10, n. 93, 772a–b: “Per
species insensatas intelliguntur illae, quae repraesentant obiectum potentiae internae secundum
aliquam rationem, secundum quam non percipitur sensu viso externo, sive illa species, quae sic
repraesentat obiectum, etiam repraesentet ipsum secundum rationes perceptibiles a sensu in-
terno, sive non.”
92 Ibid., 772b: “[S]ed dubium praecise est, ut dixi, an percipiat obiecta sensuum externorum
sub aliqua ratione, sub qua ab ipsis sensibus externis non percipiuntur.”
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cies may be called insensatae, but the question here is whether the internal sense
perceives something proper to the object of the external senses through a species
they are not able to perceive. Punch joins Scotus and Hurtado in denying their
existence (opting against the position of Aquinas, Rubius, the Complutenses,
Aversa and Arriaga).
Punch offers several reasons for denying the existence of unsensed species.
One of them is deflationary: he states that the species of the internal sense must
somehow be a determination or attribute of the thing known; yet it is not an
‘objective’ species at all, as it is not a species of the external sense, nor an at-
tribute of the thing itself; it cannot be an object of the internal sense either (as
the internal sense cannot cognize by itself), nor a sum of all these. The internal
sense can only be determined by an external species; claiming it determines itself
by an unsensed species would just beg the question.93
Another reason for rejecting the existence of unsensed species is that the
only way to perceive a wolf as an inimical object would be through perceiving it
as dangerous or potentially (aptitudinalis) dangerous, something for which the
external senses should be sufficient, as the sense would perceive aliqua molestia.
The only other possibility would be for it to be shown to the internal sense as
inimical through some ratio in the external sense, which was denied by the very
definition of the species insensata. Calling it a ‘potentially offensive object’ is just
deferring the problem, since this can only be known through a previous experi-
ence of an object as offensive.94
One could object that the sheep does not run away from the wolf due to a
perceptible quality, but rather out of the wolf being “inimicus naturae suae.” But
this inimicitia is not something externally perceived; rather it must be said that
nature “non deficit in necessariis”, and it would fail if animals were incapable of
somehow acquiring this inimicitia.95 If the sheep flees because it perceives aliqua
molestia caused by the external accidents of the wolf, either immediately or me-
diately, where there is no previous experience, then this is just an action owing
to the natural instinct, as can be seen in the wolf causing a molestia in animals of
a certain species and not in others. Nature thus sufficiently endows animals with
instincts.96
Any other way of speaking of the estimative faculty, says Punch, assumes
some sort of discursive power in brutes, for example the ability to relate means
to ends. But this is just a way of speaking, based on our own way of relating ends
93 Poncius, Integer philosophiae cursus, Tract. de anima, disp. 59, q. 10, n. 94, 772b.
94 Poncius, Integer philosophiae cursus, Tract. de anima, disp. 59, q. 10, n. 95, 773a.
96 Poncius, Integer philosophiae cursus, Tract. de anima, disp. 59, q. 10, n. 97, 773a: “[…] na-
turam sufficienter animalibus tribuendo ipsis illum instinctum.”
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and means.97 Moreover, as he explains in his disputatio 61, on the internal sens-
es, there is only one internal sense, and it takes different names according to the
acts it elicits. This internal sense is capable of being inclined through a natural
appetite; not only through innate appetites (not brought about by cognitive
states), but also by the elicitive appetite, through which we follow the sensible
good and flee sensible evils.98 We know this because it is evident from animal
conduct – as Scotus’s examples showed –, and the same should be said about us
humans. We can see it in children, who follow some things and avoid others
even before being fully capable of reasoning, and we can internally experience in
ourselves an appetite for desirable goods even against our own will.99
The key here is to acknowledge that it is the same appetite in animals and
humans: just as the will is capable of eliciting diverse acts, so is the sensitive
appetite (which for Punch is numerically one, containing both the concupiscible
and irascible appetites).100
Conclusion
There is no denying, according to Scotus, that internal senses are necessary for
intellectual cognition. Not because the senses can access the nature (or essence)
of an object in any way, but rather because they provide the adequate similitude
for abstraction. While Scotus did systematically deal with animal cognition as
such, he adapted as much natural philosophy as possible to provide a distinctive
view of human actions and freedom, even if he appears more resolute on setting
negative boundaries between sensitivity and rationality than in exploring the
whole range of issues concerning perception.
In his questions on the De anima, he seems more concerned about distin-
guishing the possible influence of external, corporeal bodies in the internal sens-
es and how they might influence our rational mind than in mapping internal
sensibility. This is my proposal here: Scotus aims to separate estimative, and in
97 Poncius, Integer philosophiae cursus, Tract. de anima, disp. 59, q. 10, n. 98, 773b: “Obii-
cies tertio, ex eodem. Bruta agunt propter finem applicanda media ad eius acquisitionem: ergo
cognoscunt utilitatem medii respectu finis: sed hanc non percipit sensus internus, ergo. Re-
spondeo distinguendo antecedens: formaliter loquendo, omnino deberet discurrere, et ex effec-
tu procedere ad causam, neque enim ipsemet homo potest alia via cognoscere media apta ad
finem. Quod si concedatur semel brutis vis discurrendi, non est dubium, quin possint sibi ac-
quirere species insensatas; unde conclusio nostra, et tota controversia haec supponit bruta non
discurrere: quare haec obiectio non est ad propositum, quia est contra hypothesim conclusio-
nis et controversiae.”
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general, biological natural functions as much as possible from rational ones, and
he does so in accordance with his views on nature and freedom. The estimative
and cogitative powers are an obvious target, as previous philosophers assimilated
them to a quasi-rational judging or collative faculty. To this end, Scotus aims to
prove: (i) that there are no unsensed sensibles that can be ‘dug up’ from the
external senses or from the phantasy; and (ii) that they are not necessary at all,
since the path from perception to the sensitive appetite suffices to account for
animal movement. Scotus can further simplify the biological to a functional ac-
count (to some extent following Aquinas’s lead) while keeping his metaphysical
aims in mind. He then tries to recognize estimation as an action of the internal
sense, even while unfolding the very meaning of ‘estimation,’ or in other words,
to show that our human estimations are mostly just a modus loquendi (confus-
edly) combining different acts of our internal senses, and sometimes even of the
intellect.
Mastri, Belluto, and Punch propose extensive analytical arguments to show
the unfeasibility of positing the existence of species insensata. Their arguments
follow Scotus’s lead: every faculty has a proper object, one act cannot have two
simultaneous objects, and sense knowledge cannot apprehend the substantive
nature of its objects, as it is limited to sensible qualities. The appetite is the pow-
er that can respond to these perceived qualities and elicit the appropriate re-
sponse. By showing how these otherwise differing authors follow Scotus’s gener-
al strategy, I hope to have shown how integral this treatment is to the whole of
Scotus’s and indeed to any Scotist psychology.
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II.
Intellectual Cognition
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In God’s Mind
Divine Cognition in Duns Scotus and Some Early Scotists
Giorgio Pini
Introduction
Can God know what is different from himself, such as donkeys and human be-
ings? This question poses a formidable challenge to anyone maintaining the
philosophical viability of theism in one of its standard forms. To see where the
problem lies, let us consider these four theses:
(1) Divine omniscience: God knows everything;
(2) Divine aseity: God is prior to (and so independent of) anything differ-
ent from himself;
(3) Existence of the created world: God creates things different from him-
self;
(4) Priority of the object: the object of a cognitive state has some sort of
priority over that cognitive state.
The priority established in (4) should be taken in a generic way. Specifically, the
object of a cognitive state does not need to be one of its causes. Rather, the point
is that, just because a certain state is directed at a certain object (say, your
thought about donkeys is directed at donkeys), there is an asymmetry between
that state and its object. Your thought about donkeys cannot be the thought it is
if it is not about donkeys. By contrast, donkeys are what they are no matter
whether you think about them or not.
A standard theist is committed to the truth of (1), (2), and (3). On the face
of it, (4) looks plausible. In particular, scholastic thinkers were committed to its
truth. These four theses, however, cannot all be true at the same time. Specifical-
ly, if God is omniscient – as per (1) – and he creates things different from him-
self – as per (3) –, he knows those things. But if the object of a piece of knowl-
edge (which is a cognitive state) is prior to that piece of knowledge – as per (4)
–, then something is prior to divine knowledge, which is incompatible with di-
vine aseity as described in (2).
The scholastics’ standard way out of this conundrum was to reject (4).
They claimed that in the divine case, it is not true that cognizing an object en-
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98 Giorgio Pini
tails any dependence on the object of cognition; rather, the dependence goes the
other way: it is the cognized object that depends on the divine intellect.1
Apart from the intrinsic interest of this solution, there is also another rea-
son why an historian of philosophy finds this question worthy of attention. For
divine knowledge is an instance of cognition (albeit a very special one) – actual-
ly, it is the perfect instance of cognition. Accordingly, all the necessary features
characterizing cognition must be found (and found at their highest degree) in
divine knowledge. Conversely, if a certain characteristic is not found in divine
knowledge, that characteristic might well pertain to another kind of cognition
(for example, human cognition) but not to cognition in general. Thus, consider-
ing divine knowledge can tell us something interesting about cognition in gener-
al. It can also provide helpful information about human cognition because it can
help us distinguish what is essential to cognition from what characterizes human
cognition not as cognition but as a specifically human phenomenon.
It is from this perspective that I intend to consider Duns Scotus’s treatment
of divine cognition in this paper, namely not so much to find out more about the
divine case per se as to discover something about Duns Scotus’s theory of cogni-
tion in general. More specifically, I will focus on the relationship between cogni-
tive states and their objects. If any cognitive state is about something, we might
initially think that such a relation between a cognitive state and its object is
essential to cognition. Duns Scotus, however, argues that the divine case shows
us that this is not the case: divine cognition is definitely an instance of cognition
but is not related to the object it is about. By contrast, human cognition is not
only related to its object, it is also necessarily related to its object, but Duns Sco-
tus argues that this is not because it is cognition, but because it is human. So
entrenched is our habit to consider human cognition as the main instance of
cognition that this important aspect can be easily missed, according to Duns
Scotus. We unwittingly project some of our limitations on the divine case and on
cognition in general.
In what follows, I will first consider three views on divine cognition that
take human cognition as the paradigmatic case of cognition and I will present
what I take to be the main reason why Duns Scotus rejected them. Second, I will
turn to Duns Scotus’s own views on divine cognition – and I stress the plural:
views. For over the course of his career, Duns Scotus held not one, but two dif-
ferent views on divine cognition, which he took to be equally plausible. Third, I
will consider some consequences that Duns Scotus’s position on divine cogni-
tion has on his interpretation of human cognition. Fourth and finally, I will
1 This is a consequence of the more general claim that the relation from creatures to God
is real while the relation from God to creatures is conceptual. For this general claim, see for
example Thomas Aquinas, STh I, q. 6, a. 2, ad 2. Specifically on creatures’ dependence on
God’s knowledge, see STh I, q. 14, a. 8.
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In God’s Mind 99
briefly consider what I think is a misunderstanding of Duns Scotus’s position to

be found in some of his followers.
1. Divine Ideas and Divine Cognition: Three Views

So how does God know things different from himself? Before giving his own
answer to this question, Duns Scotus presents – and rejects – three alternative
treatments.2 Although these three treatments are quite different from each other,
they all have something in common: they all assign a key role to divine ideas.
Their common (and unquestioned) assumption is that God knows other things
through some mental likenesses of those things – his own ideas, which are rela-
tive items connecting the divine intellect to its objects.
According to the first view (which the Vatican editors attribute to Bonaven-
ture),3 divine ideas are in the divine essence. Thus, by the very act of knowing
the divine essence, the divine intellect also knows the things divine ideas repre-
sent. As Duns Scotus presents it, the key aspect of this view is that the divine
essence is that through which other things are known (their ratio cognoscendi).4
This view can be illustrated by the diagram in fig. 1.
represents
Idea 1 object 1
cognizes
Divine intellect Divine essence
represents
Idea 2 object 2
Fig. 1: First view.
According to the second view (which, as the Vatican editors note, was held by
Henry of Ghent),5 divine knowledge includes two conceptually distinct stages.
2 Compared to the Lectura and the Reportatio, the Ordinatio leaves out the third view. The
Lectura refers to three views but only presents their refutations.
3 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 35, q. unica, apparatus fontium (ed. Vat. VI), 247; Lect. I, dist.
35, q. unica, apparatus fontium (Ed. Vat. XVII), 447. See Bonaventura, Liber I Sententiarum,
dist. 35, art. unicus, qq. 1, 3, and 5 (ed. Quaracchi I), 601, 609–10.
4 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 35, q. unica, nn. 9–11 (ed. Vat. VI), 247–48; Rep. I-A, dist. 36,
pars 1, qq. 1–2, nn. 35–36 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov II), 390–91.
5 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 35, q. unica, apparatus fontium (ed. Vat. VI), 248–49; Lect. I,
dist. 35, q. unica, apparatus fontium (Ed. Vat. XVII), 447. See Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet VIII,
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100 Giorgio Pini
First, God knows his essence as unrelated to anything else. Second, God con-
siders his essence as the model of all the things that can imitate it. The divine
essence considered as imitable by other things is nothing else than the set of
divine ideas.6 This view can be illustrated by the diagram in fig. 2.
Divine intellect
cognizes
imitability (divine idea 1)

object 1
Divine essence Divine

imitability (divine idea 2)
object 2
Fig. 2: Second view.
According to the third view (which the Vatican editors attribute to Peter of John
Olivi),7 divine ideas are relations connecting the divine intellect to its objects. So
unlike in the first and in the second view, the divine essence does not play any
intermediary role between the divine intellect and its objects; rather, divine ideas
are directly attached to the divine intellect.8 This view can be illustrated by the
diagram in fig. 3.
cognizes (divine idea 1)

object 1
Divine intellect
cognizes (divine idea 2)

object 2
Fig. 3: Third view.
q. 1 (ed. Badius), f. 300B; q. 8 (ed. Badius), f. 313F; Quodlibet IX, q. 2 (Opera omnia IX), 26–
29.
6 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 35, q. unica, nn. 12–13 (ed. Vat. VI), 248–49; Rep. I-A, dist.
36, pars 1, qq. 1–2, nn. 35, 37, 38 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov II), 390–91.
7 Duns Scotus, Lect. I, dist. 35, q. unica, apparatus fontium (ed. Vat. XVI), 447. See Peter
of John Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, q. 3 (ed. Jansen I), 57–58.
8 Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 36, qq. 1–2, nn. 35–39 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov II), 390–91.
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In God’s Mind 101
Although Duns Scotus considers the second view preferable to the other two, he
ends up rejecting them all.9 What I am interested in here is what these three
views have in common. As I have mentioned, they all attribute a central role to
divine ideas, and for a simple reason: they take either the divine essence (the
first and the second view) or the divine intellect (the third view) as something
indeterminate, which must be determined to a specific object by a divine idea.
Divine ideas connect the divine essence or the divine intellect specifically to a
certain object rather than to another one. Accordingly, all the three views con-
sidered by Duns Scotus posit divine ideas to solve what has been called the “spe-
cific question” of intentionality.10 God can think specifically about a certain ob-
ject rather than another one because his essence or his intellect is directed at that
specific object (say, a donkey rather than a horse) by a relation. Such a relation
is a divine idea.
This is precisely where the problem lies, according to Duns Scotus. Apart
from the criticisms targeted at specific points pertaining to each of the three
views he considers, he raises what I believe is a more general point. The reason
why those three views assume that there is a need for divine ideas linking the
divine intellect or the divine essence to specific objects (say, to a donkey rather
than a horse) is that they model the divine case on the human case. For the
human intellect (which in itself is able to think about anything whatsoever) can
think about a specific object only if it has in itself something that relates it to
that object. When that relation to the object is present, the human intellect pass-
es from a state of potentiality (in which it can think about anything but doesn’t
think about anything in particular) to a state of actuality (in which it thinks
about something in particular). Although each of these three views gives a differ-
ent account of what divine ideas are, they all posit divine ideas as a necessary
link between divine cognition and specific objects. So they all assume that in this
crucial respect the divine intellect is like the human intellect. But Scotus holds
that this is a mistake – in this aspect, the way divine cognition occurs is radically
different from the way human cognition occurs:
[…] there are only two possible reasons why something might not be able to perfectly
represent many things without being determined to them. First, this is due to its poten-
tiality in itself, as the Philosopher says in the last chapter of Bk. IX of the Metaphysics.
Second, this is on account of its being confused, because it contains those things confus-
edly. But neither of these reasons obtains in the case of the divine essence, because the
divine essence is by itself most actual and most distinct, and so it contains everything.
9 Duns Scotus’s rejection of the first two opinions is found in Ord. I, dist. 35, q. unica,
nn. 14–26 (ed. Vat. VI), 249–255. All three positions are compared to each other and ulti-
mately rejected in Rep. I-A, dist. 36, pars 1, qq. 1–2, nn. 40–58 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov II),
391–99. See also Lect. I, dist. 35, q. unica, nn. 8–13 (ed. Vat. XVII), 447–49.
10 Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aquinas on Mental Representation,” 194.
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102 Giorgio Pini
Therefore, it is able to represent everything to its intellect as the first object of that intel-
lect without any relation, whether real or conceptual.11 (Trans. Wolter-Bychkov modi-
fied).
The human intellect, says Duns Scotus, is both potential and confused. Let us
consider first its potentiality. The human intellect is potential because by itself it
is not specified (even though it is able to be specified) to any object. As it hap-
pens, the human intellect reveals its potentiality in two distinct situations. First,
before learning about a specific thing, the human intellect has the ability to ac-
quire the necessary information to become able to think about that thing (it is in
a state of first potentiality) but is not yet able to think about it. Only after having
acquired an intelligible species conveying the necessary information about a spe-
cific thing can the human intellect think about that thing. Second, even after
having acquired that information, the human intellect does not need to make
use of that information to form an actual thought about that thing. To use the
Aristotelian jargon, it is in first actuality (or equivalently, second potentiality),
not in second actuality. This is a very common condition: we do not think about
all the things we know. Rather, we can think only about one thing at a time. For
example, we have knowledge of mathematics even when we do not do mathe-
matics. Consequently, we need some device to make us think about a specific
thing among the many we already know and about which we can (but do not)
think. That device can play such a role because it relates our intellect to a specific
object.12
Incidentally, note that, according to Duns Scotus, what makes the intellect
pass from potentiality to actuality – in both the cases I have mentioned – is a
quality, not a relation (it is an intelligible species in the first case, an intellectual
act or thought in the second case). But in both cases that quality is necessarily
11 Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 36, pars 1, qq. 1–2, n. 55 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov), 397:
“[…] quod aliquid non possit perfecte repraesentare plura sine determinatione ad illa, hoc non
est nisi vel propter potentialitatem eius in se, secundum Philosophum IX Metaphysicae, ultimo
[cap.], aut propter confusionem eius, quia confuse illa continent. Sed neutrum istorum est in
essentia divina, quia de se est actualissima et distinctissima, et ita omnia continent. Ergo sine
omni respectu rei vel rationis potest distincte ut primum obiectum intellectus sui omnia suo
intellectui repraesentare […].”
12 The human intellect passes from a state of first potentiality to a state of first actuality (or
equivalently, second potentiality) by an act of abstraction, which produces an intelligible spe-
cies. See Duns Scotus, Lect. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, nn. 249–305 (ed. Vat. XVI), 325–48; Ord. I,
dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, nn. 333–400 (ed. Vat. III), 201–44; Rep. I-A, dist. 3, qq. 4 and 5, nn. 84–
160 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov I), 207–32. The human intellect passes from a state of first actu-
ality (or equivalently, second potentiality) to a state of second actuality by the production of an
act of thinking (intellectio). See Lect. I, dist. 3, pars 3, qq. 2–3, nn. 308–426 (ed. Vat. XVI),
349–95; Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 2, nn. 401–553 (ed. Vat. III), 245–330; Quodl., q. 15, nn. 7–9
(ed. Vivès XXV), 137–41. See Pini, “Two Models,” 94–96.
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In God’s Mind 103
accompanied by a certain relation. So once our intellect acquires that quality, it

becomes related to a certain object. In this respect, the way a thought (or rather,
a human thought) and its object are related is just like the way two similar
things (say, two objects of the same color) are related. What makes a wall simi-
lar in color to another wall is a quality (say, its color yellow), thanks to which
the two walls are related to each other.13
Also, note that Duns Scotus’s assumption here is quite general. He does not
say what relates the human intellect (or for that matter, any human cognitive
power) to its objects. Rather, he only assumes the human intellect must receive
or have something (for Duns Scotus, a quality accompanied by a relation) by
which it might become related to its object and so pass from a state of potentiali-
ty to a state of actuality (namely, from being able to think about a certain thing
to actually thinking about that thing). That this is the case depends on an essen-
tial feature of the human intellect: by its very essence, the human intellect is
potential.
Sometimes, however, the human intellect needs to be related to a specific
object not because of its potentiality but for another reason. Although this situa-
tion does not characterize every instance of thought, it is nevertheless quite com-
mon. Sometimes the object of our thought is present to our intellect (so we can
actually think about it), but our thoughts about it are confused. Suppose for ex-
ample that you do not know what platypuses are. You can still think about platy-
puses as beings. And if you know that they are animals but not what kind of
animals, you can think about platypuses as animals. So you can think about
platypuses, but only in a confused way: your thoughts are definitely about them,
not about something else, but they are generic. In order to start thinking about
platypuses in a distinct way (in a way different from the way you think about
other beings or other animals), you need to acquire more information. Once
your intellect is in possession of that information (something that for Duns Sco-
tus comes again in the forms of qualities in the intellect, namely intelligible spe-
cies), you can have thoughts about platypuses that are different from your
thoughts about other beings and other animals. Only then do you have a distinct
(as opposed to a confused) thought about platypuses. What you need is some-
thing (according to Duns Scotus, a mental quality) that links your intellect
specifically to platypuses (as opposed to other things).14
13 On intelligible species as qualities, see Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, n. 32 (ed. Vivès
XXV), 582; cf. Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 100. On acts of thinking as qualities,
see Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 13, nn. 3–4 (ed. Vivès XXV), 508–9; Rep. I-A, dist. 3, q. 6, n. 169
(ed. Wolter and Bychkov I), 234–35; cf. Pini, “Two Models,” 96–100.
14 On cognizing something confused (confusum), see Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 1,
qq. 1–2, n. 72 (ed. Vat. III), 49–50. On being as the most common concept, quidditatively
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104 Giorgio Pini
So Duns Scotus holds that the reason why the human intellect needs mental
devices such as intelligible species and intellectual acts is that it is potential and
its thoughts are often confused. The divine intellect, however, is not potential
and its thoughts are never confused. It is not potential because God always
thinks about all the things he can think about (which is anything whatsoever,
whether actual or merely possible), and he thinks about them through his own
essence, not through some device distinct from his essence (such as an intelligi-
ble species or a cognitive act). And God always thinks about all the things he
thinks about in a distinct way. He always knows platypuses as platypuses and
donkeys as donkeys, not merely as beings or animals. As a matter of fact, God
knows this particular platypus as this particular platypus, not just as a platypus.
And he knows you as you, not just as a person with certain features that happen
to be different from my features. So, unlike human beings, God does not need
anything special to allow him to actually think about what he thinks or to make
him think specifically and distinctly about a certain thing; rather, he does so by
his very essence.
2. God’s Knowledge of Other Things

Now that we have identified the main reason why Duns Scotus rejects the three
views of divine cognition that he takes as representative of his contemporaries,
we may ask: what about his own view? The key feature of Duns Scotus’s account
of divine cognition – which comes in two variants – is that the divine intellect is
not related to any of its objects, either directly or by way of the divine essence.
Accordingly, divine ideas play no role in divine cognition, at least if they are
conceived as what relates the divine intellect or the divine essence to things dif-
ferent from God himself. Rather, divine cognition is a purely internal affair. To
see how this happens, we should distinguish between God’s cognition of possible
essences (namely, uninstantiated essences), which are necessary beings, and
God’s cognition of things that exist, existed or will exist (namely, instantiated
essences), which are contingent beings.
Perhaps surprisingly, Duns Scotus’s account of God’s cognition of contin-
gent beings is easier to describe. All contingent beings exist because God creates
them through a contingent decision. According to Duns Scotus, God knows
those things not because his intellect is related to them, either directly or by way
of representations. Rather, God’s thoughts are directed at his own decision to
create certain things rather than others. For example, God knows this particular
donkey because he knows that he decides to create this particular donkey.
contained in any other concept, see Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 3, nn. 137–46 (ed. Vat. III), 85–
91.
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In God’s Mind 105
Whether this explanation works or not is controversial, but this point does not
need to detain us here. Rather, the key aspect to note is that God knows contin-
gent things because his intellect is related not to them but to some decisions
internal to God himself.15
The way God cognizes possible essences is less easy to grasp. It occurs
through two conceptually distinct stages. In the first stage, God knows his own
essence. In the second stage, God “produces in intelligible being” an object of
thought different from himself. This “production in intelligible being” is not a
genuine production at all – rather, it is a production only metaphorically speak-
ing. The point is that, by turning towards the divine essence (which is of course
infinite), the divine intellect conceives the thoughts of all realizable possibilities
(the essence of a donkey, the essence of a horse, the essence of a human beings,
and so on). Those thoughts are not related to anything external to God. As it
happens, they are related to nothing at all.16
So is it really the case that relations play no role at all in divine cognition?
Here we should distinguish between two accounts present in Duns Scotus’s
works. According to the first account, there is indeed a relation: not between the
divine intellect and its object, but between the intellect’s objects and the intellect
itself. According to the second account, there is no relation in any direction, ei-
ther from the intellect to its object or from the intellect’s objects to the intellect
itself. Let us consider each one of these accounts in turns.
2.1 The First Account
Duns Scotus’s first account is the only one found in his Lectura and in the main
text of his Ordinatio and it is the first of the two accounts presented in the Re-
15 Duns Scotus, Lect. I, dist. 39, qq. 1–5, nn. 53–68 (ed. Vat. XVII), 496–502; Ord. I,
dist. 39, qq. 1–5, nn. 21–25 (ed. Vat. VI), Appendix A, 425–31; Rep. I-A, dist. 39–40, qq. 1–3,
nn. 38–66 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov II), 475–84. It is interesting to note that Duns Scotus
reframes the standard problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents as a general question
concerning God’s knowledge of any contingent entity. For a discussion of some controversies
surrounding Duns Scotus’s position on divine knowledge, see Frost, “John Duns Scotus on
God’s Knowledge of Sins.”
16 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 35, q. unica, n. 32 (ed. Vat. VI), 258: “Hoc potest ponit sic:
Deus in primo instanti intelligit essentiam suam sub ratione mere absoluta; in secundo instanti
producit lapidem in esse intelligibili et intelligit lapidem, ita quod ibi est relatio in lapide intel-
lecto ad intellectionem divinam, sed nulla adhuc in intellectione divina ad lapidem, sed intel-
lectio divina terminat relationem ‘lapidis ut intellecti’ ad ipsam […].” See Pini, “Duns Scotus
on What is in the Mind,” 339–42. That the production of intelligible being is to be interpreted
in a metaphorical way, at least in Duns Scotus’s most mature works, is argued in King, “Duns
Scotus on Mental Content,” 83–85, and Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 182–99.
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106 Giorgio Pini
portatio.17 According to this account, relations play some role when it comes to
explaining the way God knows things different from himself, but, as Duns Sco-
tus stresses, this is true not of any kind of relations but only of third-kind rela-
tions. These are so-called ‘non-mutual’ relations. Consider two things, A and B.
The relation between A and B is non-mutual if and only if A is related to B but B
is not related to A. Admittedly, even when talking about non-mutual relations,
we might sometime suggest that there is indeed a relation from B to A corre-
sponding to the relation from A to B. But this only depends on a language quirk,
not on the way things actually are. Take for example the act of seeing: when I
say that I see something, I can also say that something is seen by me. As a matter
of fact, however, nothing happens to the thing that is seen by me just by virtue
of its being seen by me. When I see a donkey, I have a quality – an act of see-
ing – that isn’t there when I don’t see that donkey. But whether I see it or not,
the donkey is exactly the same – it doesn’t acquire or lose any property just
because I do or do not see it.18
Following Aristotle, Duns Scotus and his contemporaries described any re-
lation of this kind by appealing to what was taken to be the standard case of a
non-mutual relation: measuring. When we measure something, we use a certain
thing we know (for example, a certain length or a certain weight) to find out
another thing we don’t know (for example, an unknown length or an unknown
weight). As Duns Scotus analyzes it, measuring involves three elements: some-
one who measures, something that is measured, and something by which the
measuring is done. Suppose you ask me what the distance between New York
and Prague is. To find that out, I use a known length (say, a mile) and I figure
out how many times that known length is contained in the distance between
New York and Prague. The answer is: 4036 times. So I say that the distance
between New York and Prague is 4036 miles. In this example, I am the one who
measures, the distance between New York and Prague is what is measured, and a
mile is that by which the measuring is done. Now focus on that by which the
measuring is done, on the one hand (which is usually called ‘what measures’ and
I, for brevity’s sake, will call ‘a unit of measurement’) and what is measured, on
the other hand. The key point here is that I use a unit of measurement (for
example, a mile) to find out what is measured (for example, the distance be-
17 Duns Scotus, Lect. I, dist. 35, q. unica, nn. 7, 22 (ed. Vat. XVII), 446, 452; Ord. I, dist. 35,
q. unica, nn. 27–28 (ed. Vat. VI), 256–57; Rep. I-A, dist. 36, pars 1, qq. 1–2, n. 60 (ed. Wolter
and Bychkov II), 399–400.
18 Aristotle, Met. V, c. 15, 1020b30–32. See Duns Scotus, Lect. I, dist. 30, qq. 1–2, nn. 36–
44 (ed. Vat. XVII), 407–11; Ord. I, dist. 30, qq. 1–2, n. 31 (ed. Vat. VI), 181–82; Quodl. q. 13,
nn. 22–23 (ed. Vivès XXV), 550–51. See also Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aris-
totelis, V, q. 11, n. 60 (OPh III), 586; qq. 12–14, nn. 94–99 (OPh III), 637–38. On the three-
fold distinction of relations, see Henninger, Relations, 6–8.
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In God’s Mind 107
tween New York and Prague), but I do not use what is measured (the distance
between New York and Prague) to find out the unit of measurement (a mile).
So what is measured depends on the unit of measurement, but not the other way
around.19
At first sight, this sounds implausible. The distance between New York and
Prague remains the same whether I measure it or not, so why could it possibly
depend on the unit of measurement I use to measure it? As Duns Scotus clari-
fies, however, the idea here is that the distance between New York and Prague
depends on the unit of measurement not in its being but in its being known.
Without using some unit of measurement such as a mile, I would never know
how distant New York is from Prague. Accordingly, it is true that the unit of
measurement does not determine the nature of what is measured; it does, how-
ever, determine its being known. A confirmation of this is that, if you change the
unit of measurement, what is measured is known in a different way. For exam-
ple, if instead of miles you use kilometers, the distance between New York and
Prague is known not as 4036 but as 6495 times the unit of measurement.20
Like his contemporaries, Duns Scotus takes the relation of measuring (or,
as he prefers to say, measurability) as an illustration of all non-mutual relations.
In any non-mutual relation, there is something that plays the role of a unit of
measurement and something else that plays the role of what is measured by way
of that unit of measurement. What plays the role of what is measured depends in
some way on what plays the role of the unit of measurement, but not the other
way around. So there is a real relation between what is measured and the unit of
measurement, but not between the unity of measurement and what is measured.
Specifically, this applies to cognition. But Duns Scotus (again, in agreement
with his contemporaries) maintains that there is a difference between the human
(and angelic) case and the divine case. In human (and angelic) cognition, the
object is what measures and the cognitive power or act is what is measured. By
contrast, in the divine case, the opposite is true: the object is what is measured,
the intellect is what measures. So while human and angelic cognition depends on
their objects, divine cognition does not depend on its object – rather, its objects
depend on it.21
Let me illustrate this with an example. Consider your cognition of a work of
art – say, your act of seeing Rodin’s sculpture, The Age of Bronze, or your act of
thinking about it or the image you have in your memory when you remember it.
19 Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 13, n. 12 (ed. Vivès XXV), 525–26.

20 Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 13, n. 12 (ed. Vivès XXV), 525: “[…] ista habitudo dependentiae,
non quidem ipsius cognitionis ad causam cognitionis (quae bene est realis), sed dependentiae
obiecti ut cogniti ad obiectum ut per quod cognoscitur, est inter extrema, non ut habentia esse
reale, sed tantum ut habentia esse cognitum […].”
21 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 35, q. unica, n. 27 (ed. Vat. VI), 256.
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108 Giorgio Pini
Your act of seeing The Age of Bronze, your act of thinking about it, and the
image of it you keep in your memory can all be judged according to how faith-
fully they represent the sculpture, The Age of Bronze. Admittedly, it might be
tricky to establish exactly what counts as a representation and what counts as a
faithful representation, but this is not relevant for my point here. What matters
is the direction of the relation between your cognitive states and their object: the
object is the standard according to which your cognitive states are judged. This
is what the claim “the object measures my cognitive states” means. By contrast,
consider Rodin’s own way of thinking about The Age of Bronze before creating it
and the way he considered that sculpture once he created it. Presumably, before
creating that sculpture, Rodin had some conception of it, and that conception
guided him in its realization. Rodin’s idea of his sculpture did not depend on its
realization (indeed, it preceded it). Rather, it is the sculpture Rodin created that
depended on his idea of it. And we can imagine that, once Rodin created The
Age of Bronze, he must have judged whether it was a good sculpture or not ac-
cording to the extent it conformed to the idea he had of it before creating it. So,
while The Age of Bronze is the standard against which your idea of that sculpture
is judged, Rodin’s idea of The Age of Bronze is the standard against which The
Age of Bronze is judged. Human (and angelic) cognition is analogous to your
cognition of Rodin’s The Age of Bronze. By contrast, divine cognition is analo-
gous to Rodin’s thinking about The Age of Bronze, both before creating it and
after, when he judged how close it was to his original intentions.22
This difference between human and angelic cognition, on the one hand,
and divine cognition, on the other hand, was commonly admitted by Duns Sco-
tus’s contemporaries. But Duns Scotus seems to take it more seriously than his
contemporaries did, for he took it not merely as an illustration but as an expla-
nation (or at least the hint at an explanation) of the contrast between the way
creatures and God cognize things: unlike his creatures, God does not need to (as
a matter of fact, cannot) be related to the objects of his cognition in order to
cognize them. Just as the donkey I see is not related to me and nothing happens
to that donkey when I see it, so the divine intellect is not related to its objects
and nothing happens to the divine intellect when it thinks about those objects.
22 The parallelism between divine ideas and the forms of artificial things in their maker’s
intellect, on which I have based my illustration, was extremely common. See for example Tho-
mas Aquinas, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum I, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 2 (ed. Mandonnet), 814;
dist. 36, q. 1, art. 1 (ed. Mandonnet), 832; dist. 36, art. 3, ad 3 (ed. Mandonnet), 837. I take
these references from Boland, Ideas in God, 201, note 35. As I indicate below, I believe that
Duns Scotus’s originality lies in holding that, once this traditional way of understanding divine
cognition is taken seriously, it becomes clear that divine ideas conceived as relations between
God and the objects of his thought cannot play any role in explaining how God knows things
different from himself.
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In God’s Mind 109
Rather (at least according to Duns Scotus’s first account of divine cognition),
those objects are related to (namely, measured by) the divine intellect.23
One might doubt whether this explains much. Duns Scotus rejects his con-
temporaries’ view that divine ideas play a genuine role in divine cognition, but
what he offers instead looks more like rehearsing a general point – on which,
incidentally, his contemporaries agreed – than an explanation. But I think that
Duns Scotus’s point is precisely that once we take seriously the uncontroversial
claim that divine cognition is not modeled on its objects (rather, its object are
modeled on it), we must draw the conclusion that most attempts to explain di-
vine cognition are flawed, because they take human cognition as the standard
case of cognition and project some of its features on the divine case. This might
happen inadvertently, as when we explain divine cognition in terms of divine
ideas that determine the divine intellect or the divine essence to specific objects.
But whether inadvertently or not, it does happen. What we should conclude is
that there is not much more to say about the way God cognizes things different
from himself in addition to the claim that divine cognition is the standard on
which those things depend and against which they have to be judged.
2.2 The Second Account
Side by side with this account of divine cognition based on non-mutual rela-
tions, in an addition to his Ordinatio and again and more elaborately in the Re-
portatio Duns Scotus puts forward a second view, which can be taken as a fur-
ther step in the direction he had already taken with his first view.24 Now Duns
Scotus suggests the possibility that not only there is no relation from the divine
intellect to its objects, but there isn’t even a relation from those objects to the
divine intellect.
Duns Scotus’s argument in support of this position can be reconstructed as
follows. Suppose (contrary to what Duns Scotus holds) that there is indeed a
relation from the divine intellect to its objects or from those objects to the divine
intellect. Any relation is either real or conceptual. Now a relation is conceptual if
and only if some intellect establishes that relation by comparing two extremes
that have been previously cognized. For example, only after I have learned what
a donkey is and what an animal is can I relate the two as genus and species in
the sentences ‘The genus of donkeys is animal’ and ‘Donkeys are a species of
animal’ (genus and species, like all so-called “second intentions,” being typical
examples of conceptual relations.) So any conceptual relation presupposes two
23 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 35, q. unica, n. 27 (ed. Vat. VI), 256.
24 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 35, q. unica, n. 51 (ed. Vat. VI), 266–67; Rep. I-A, dist. 36,
nn. 61–65 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov II), 400–3.
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110 Giorgio Pini
non-comparative acts of the intellect turned towards two distinct objects. And
since a conceptual relation presupposes a non-comparative act of the intellect, it
can neither be prior nor simultaneous to that act. But the act of divine cognition
we are considering is non-comparative. So conceptual relations do not accompa-
ny or precede divine cognition – at best, they can follow it. So there is no con-
ceptual relation either from the divine intellect to its objects or from those ob-
jects to the divine intellect.
But there cannot be a real relation either. Clearly, there is no real relation
from the divine intellect to its objects, because the divine intellect does not de-
pend on its object (rather, the other way around). But neither can there be a real
relation from the objects of the divine intellect to the divine intellect, because
those objects do not exist outside God before God creates them. God, however,
knows them eternally, so he knows them even when they are merely thoughts in
his mind. But what is not extramental cannot be the foundation of a real rela-
tion.25
Accordingly, God’s knowledge of things different from himself is reduced
to his knowledge of himself. This might sound not so extraordinary: after all, it
was a common view that God knows things different from himself by knowing
his essence. By taking this claim to its extreme consequences, however, Duns
Scotus ends up making a radical point, which was not made by his contempo-
raries: we can give a coherent account of how divine cognition occurs without
positing any real or conceptual relation either in the divine intellect or in the
objects of divine cognition. Those objects are indeed contained (eminently) in
the divine essence, but they cannot serve as the foundation of a relation, whether
real or conceptual. In the fourth section below, I will say more about what we
should make of this talk of eminent containment.
3. Cognition without Relations

Let us take a step back and consider what Duns Scotus’s treatment of divine
cognition tells us about cognition in general. Since divine cognition is an admitt-
edly exceptional kind of cognition, but still a kind of cognition, it follows that a
relation between a cognitive power or act and its objects is not an essential fea-
ture of cognition. And in light of Duns Scotus’s second account, we might even
say that cognizing, by itself, might not entail a relation of any sort, either from
the cognitive power or act to the object or from the object to the cognitive power
or act. Cognition is a non-relative phenomenon.
Still, one might contend that I am moving too fast here. Isn’t the divine
case too mysterious to be taken as a model for the human case? A well-experi-
25 Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 36, nn. 61–62 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov II), 400–2.
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In God’s Mind 111
mented Aristotelian practice suggests taking the better known – which in this
case is clearly human cognition – to investigate the less known, divine cognition.
Doing the opposite seems a risky and questionable strategy. After all, when Duns
Scotus considers human cognition, he says that cognitive acts are necessarily ac-
companied by a relation – actually, two relations. And it seems quite natural to
take one of those two relations as explaining intentionality, namely why a certain
cognitive act is about a certain object.26 That this is not the case in divine cogni-
tion would then indicate not that cognition can be explained without relations
but that the divine case is so special that it cannot be taken as a guide to identify
the necessary features of cognition.
I believe, however, that there is a very strong reason to take a different ap-
proach. For Duns Scotus explicitly claims that the presence of a relation is some-
thing that characterizes cognition only when it is dependent on its objects and
only because it is dependent on its objects:
Therefore, the act of intellectually cognizing something, strictly conceived, does not re-
quire a relation, either in one extreme or in the other one. There must therefore be an-
other reason why there is a relation in one of the two extremes. And there does not seem
to be any other reason apart from either the extremes’ mutual need, if the relation is
mutual, or the dependence of one extreme on the other one, if the relation is not mutual.
But in this case, when God cognizes something different from himself, a mutual need
cannot be posited in both extremes, as it seems. Therefore, it is sufficient to posit a rela-
tion only in the extreme where there is dependence, and that is the object as cognized.
(Trans. mine.)27
26 Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 13, nn. 11–12 (ed. Vivès XXV), 525–26. Cross takes the so-called
‘tending relation’ (relatio attingentiae), as opposed to the measurability relation, to be the in-
tentionality relation between a cognitive act and its object. See Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of
Cognition, 154 (the same view is suggested in King, “Duns Scotus on Mental Content,” 87). By
contrast, I think that, if one were to choose between the two relations, measurability might be
closer to intentionality (and I would translate relatio attingentiae not as ‘tending relation’ but
rather as something like ‘relation of contact,’ which characterizes intuitive cognition as op-
posed to abstractive cognition). But I ultimately think that neither of the two relations distin-
guished by Duns Scotus in Quodl. q. 13 can be identified with intentionality, as should be clear
from my argument in this section. Duns Scotus, however, sometimes does consider intention-
ality as a clearly identifiable relation, at least in human cognition. See Pini, “Can God Create
My Thoughts?”
27 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 35, q. unica, n. 28 (ed. Vat. VI), 256–57: “Non oportet ergo
propter intellectionem alicuius obiecti praecise, quaerere relationem, nec in utroque extremo
nec in altero, – ergo oportet aliquid aliud addere, propter quod sit relatio in utroque vel in
altero; illud autem non videtur esse nisi vel mutua coexigentia, si est relatio mutua, – vel de-
pendentia in altero extremo, si non est mutua; hic autem quando Deus intelligit aliud a se, non
potest poni mutua coexigentia in utroque extremo, ut videtur, – ergo praecise sufficit ponere
relationem in altero extremo, ubi est dependentia: illud est obiectum ut cognitum.”
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112 Giorgio Pini
In this passage, Duns Scotus assumes his first account of divine cognition, ac-
cording to which the objects of divine cognition are referred to the divine intel-
lect but not the other way around. As he explains, cognition qua cognition does
not require a relation to its object. In the human case, there is indeed a relation
between the cognitive state and its object. In the divine case, however, there is no
such relation. Rather, there is a relation between the object and the divine intel-
lect.
Accordingly, one might be tempted to conclude that Duns Scotus’s account
of intentionality is disjunctive: intentionality is explained either by a relation
from a cognitive state to its object (as in the in human case) or by a relation
from an object to the intellect cognizing that object (as in the divine case). This,
however, would not fit with Duns Scotus’s second account of divine cognition,
according to which there can be cognition without any relation, either from a
cognitive state to its object or from an object to the cognitive state that is about
it. Does that mean that Duns Scotus’s second view is just hopeless?
Rather, I think that this should be taken as an indication that when Duns
Scotus talks of relations between cognitive states and their objects he does not
intend to give an explanation of intentionality. Even in the human case, he only
means to single out a feature that necessarily accompanies cognitive states as a
consequence, not as an explanation of their being about something.
In order to see that this is the case, we should turn our attention to what I
take to be a defining aspect of Duns Scotus’s view on relations. For Duns Scotus,
it is impossible for a relation to be a constituent of its foundation or of its term.
Consequently, we might say that relations are posterior to the extremes they
link. This posteriority does not have to be temporal: a certain thing might al-
ways be accompanied by a certain relation to another thing. It might even be the
case that a certain thing is necessarily accompanied by a relation to a certain
thing. Nevertheless, such a relation is explanatorily posterior to its foundation
and its term – those extremes are what they are not because of the relation.28
When it comes to cognition, the implications of this fundamental fact in
Duns Scotus’s metaphysics of relations are momentous. Consider for example
the view he expresses in q. 13 of his Quodlibet, namely that all cognitive states
are necessarily accompanied by a relation to their objects (the so-called “relation
of measurability”).29 As I have already mentioned, this claim must be qualified,
28 I base these claims on Duns Scotus’s account of relations as distinct (either really or,
minimally, formally) from their foundations. See Lect. II, dist. 1, qq. 45, nn. 155–271 (ed. Vat.
XVIII), 51–93; Ord. II, dist. 1, qq. 4–5, nn. 179–295 (ed. Vat. VII), 91–146. The posteriority
of relations on their foundations is assumed in Quodl. q. 13, n. 18 (ed. Vivès XXV), 545. On
Duns Scotus’s theory of relations, see Henninger, Relations, 68–97.
29 Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 13, nn. 13–14, 16 (ed. Vivès XXV), 539–40, 544–45. As I have
mentioned above in note 26, Duns Scotus posits also another relation from a cognitive state to
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In God’s Mind 113
because it pertains only to human (and angelic) cognitive states, not to divine
cognition and so not to cognition qua cognition. But what is more, my sugges-
tion is that even in human (and angelic) cognition, the relation between a cogni-
tive state and its object (say, between my thinking about donkeys and donkeys)
does not play any role in explaining why a certain cognitive state (my thinking
about donkeys) is about a certain object (donkeys). For that relation is posterior
to the two extremes it links, namely the cognitive state and its object: from a
conceptual point of view, first the extremes must be posited, then the relation
necessarily follows. It is the cognitive state (which according to Duns Scotus is a
non-relative item, and more specifically a quality) that explains why there is a
relation and why there is that kind of relation between that cognitive state and
that object.
So my suggestion is that in Quodl., q 13 Duns Scotus is not answering the
question: why is a certain cognitive state about a certain object? Rather, we
should read Duns Scotus’s treatment as a descriptive analysis of human cogni-
tion: given a cognitive state, it is necessarily accompanied by a relation to its
object. Moreover, just as that relation does not explain why a certain cognitive
state is about a certain object (the so-called “specific question” concerning inten-
tionality), it does not explain why that state is cognitive (the so-called “general
question” concerning intentionality).30 Rather, it is because that state is cognitive
that it bears such a relation to its object.
This fits well with Duns Scotus’s claim that our way of identifying a cogni-
tive state by referring to its object is the result of our limitations and does not
depend on the nature of the cognitive state itself. If we had a deeper access to the
nature of cognitive states (both our own and those of other cognizers), we could
speak and think about them without any reference to the relations between them
and their objects.31
But then, what explains intentionality, if it is not a relation between a cogni-
tive state and its object? I believe that Duns Scotus’s answer would be: only the
special nature of a certain act or of a certain power. That a certain state is about
something and in particular a certain object is due to what that state is in itself,
not to any relation that it might have to that object. In human cognition, cogni-
tive states are qualities. In divine cognition, everything is explained by the nature
of the divine intellect, which is really identical with the divine essence. So in both
cases what explains intentionality is a non-relative item.
its object, the relatio attingentiae, but he thinks that such a relation characterizes only intuitive
cognition (at least, as a real relation; it is only as a conceptual relation that a relatio attingenti-
ae can pertain to abstractive cognition).
30 For the two questions concerning intentionality, see Brower and Brower-Toland, “Aqui-
nas on Mental Content,” 194.
31 Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 13, nn. 30–31 (ed. Vivès XXV), 577–78.
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4. The Cause of Intelligible Being among the First Scotists

Duns Scotus’s account of cognition as a sui generis phenomenon, which in itself
is not necessarily related to its object even though it is by its very nature about
an object, might be easy to misunderstand. The cause of this misunderstanding
is a widespread tendency of taking human cognition as the archetypical case of
cognition – a strategy that seems to fit more Thomas Aquinas’s approach to
cognition than Duns Scotus’s one. In a connected way, it is easy to fail to distin-
guish what pertains to cognition in itself and what specifically characterizes hu-
man cognition not because it is an instance of cognition but because it is human.
This misunderstanding began very early in the history of the reception of Duns
Scotus’s thought. Let me conclude with an example of this phenomenon among
some of his first followers.
In a recent article, Garrett Smith has called attention to a tension in Duns
Scotus’s position on divine cognition that was identified by two of his four-
teenth-century followers, William of Alnwick and Peter Thomae.32 The question
that those two thinkers raised was: What is the cause of the intelligibility of
things different from God? Or in other terms: what is the cause of esse intelligi-
bile? Smith argues that Duns Scotus sometimes holds that the origin of intelligi-
bility is the divine intellect while other times he suggests that it is the divine
essence. And as Smith sees the situation, there seems to be no way to reconcile
these two views, and “we are left with a basic contradiction in Scotus’s thought
concerning the origin of intelligible essences.”33 By contrast, I intend to suggest
that Duns Scotus is consistent in upholding only one view about the origin of
intelligibility throughout all his writings.
The key to see that this is the case is to realize that the objects of divine
cognition are not present in the divine essence prior to the divine intellect’s cog-
32 Smith, “The Origin of Intelligibility.”

33 Smith, “The Origin of Intelligibility,” 39–50, in particular 49. As Smith indicates, the
passages where Duns Scotus refers to the divine intellect as the origin of intelligibility include
Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 4, nn. 262–68 (ed. Vat. III), 160–64; Ord. I, dist. 35, q. unica, n. 47
(ed. Vat. VI), 264–65; Ord. I, dist. 36, q. unica, nn. 28–29 (ed. Vat. VI), 282–83; Ord. I, dist.
43, q. unica, n. 14 (ed. Vat. VI), 358–59; Rep. I-A, dist. 10, q. 1, n. 22 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov
I), 392; Rep. I-A, dist. 41, q. unica, n. 55 (Ed. Wolter and Byckhov II), 502; Rep. I-A, dist. 43,
q. 1, n. 22 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov II), 526. See Smith, “The Origin of Intelligibility,” 42–43,
note 16. Smith finds Duns Scotus holding that the divine essence is the origin of intelligibility
in several other passages, including among others Lect., prol., pars 2, qq. 1–3, n. 103 (ed. Vat.
XVI), 36–37; Lect. I, dist. 2, pars 1, qq. 1–2, n. 80 (ed. Vat. XVI), 140; Lect. I, dist. 39, qq. 1–5,
n. 65 (ed. Vat. XVII), 501; Ord. I, dist. 2, pars 1, qq. 1–2 (ed. Vat. II), 174; Rep. I-A, dist. 35,
q. 2, n. 90 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov II), 379; Rep. I-A, dist. 36, pars 1, qq. 1–2, nn. 41, 54, 70
(ed. Wolter and Bychkov II), 392, 397, 404. See Smith, “The Origin of Intelligibility,” 46, note
23.
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In God’s Mind 115
nizing them. Rather, the divine intellect, by turning to the divine essence, pro-
duces those objects in intelligible being. To say that those objects are eminently
contained in the divine essence only means that the divine essence can represent
those objects once the intellect takes the divine essence as a representation of
those objects.
In the human case, however, things are different. The objects of human in-
tellectual acts are prior to the cognitive states directed at them (this is the fourth
thesis that I have mentioned at the beginning of this paper). We do not produce
the objects of our thoughts in intelligible being by thinking about them. Rather,
those objects must be present in an intelligible species presented to the intellect
prior to its act of thinking. This is the reason why human thinking occurs in two
stages: first, a passage from first to second potentiality (or first actuality), then a
passage from second potentiality (or first actuality) to second actuality, as I have
indicated above. And this is why we need intelligible species before being able to
produce acts of thought.34
My suggestion is that William of Alnwick and Peter Thomae saw a tension
between two accounts of the origin of intelligibility in Duns Scotus because they
took the human case as the paradigmatic case of cognition according to which
the divine case should be interpreted. Since in human cognition the object pre-
cedes the act of the intellect, they assumed that something similar should be
posited in the divine case as well. But as I have argued above, Duns Scotus denies
this.35
I take this as an example of how important (and difficult) it is to follow
Duns Scotus’s strategy with attention. Duns Scotus doesn’t start from human
cognition and then extends its requirements to explain divine cognition. Rather,
he takes divine cognition as a test case to distinguish what pertains to cognition
as such from what pertains to it as a specific kind of cognition.
34 Duns Scotus, Lect. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 267 (ed. Vat. XVI), 332; Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3,
q. 1, n. 349–350 (ed. Vat. III), 210–11; Rep. I-A, dist. 3, q. 4, nn. 95–96 (ed. Wolter and Bych-
kov I), 210. According to Duns Scotus, intelligible being characterizes only abstractive cogni-
tion, namely cognition through representation, and for human beings cognition through repre-
sentation is cognition through species, as I argued in Pini, “Duns Scotus on What Is in the
Mind,” 321–30 (intelligible being in the human case), 339–42 (intelligible being in the divine
case).
35 William of Alnwick, Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili, q. 6, 161; Peter Thomae,
Quaestiones de esse intelligibili, q. 2, concl. 2 and concl. 4, 33, 36–37. See Smith, “The Origin of
Intelligibility,” 50–72.
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116 Giorgio Pini
Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued that Duns Scotus’s treatment of God’s cognition of
things different from himself can provide some helpful information to under-
stand his approach to cognition in general. One of the most surprising conse-
quences of taking this approach is that for Duns Scotus the relation to the object
turns out not to pertain to cognition as such. In the human case, a relation to an
object necessarily pertains to cognition, because the object of human cognition is
prior to it. Specifically, the human intellect, when it carries out cognitive acts,
finds its objects as given to itself, present in objective being in the intelligible
species prior to those acts (except when God miraculously creates a cognitive act
in the human intellect).36 By contrast, when it produces an intelligible species,
the human intellect finds its objects outside itself, as presented to it through sen-
sory images, which are ultimately caused by mind-independent things. Failing to
realize that this characterizes only human cognition and not cognition as such
induced William Alnwick and Peter Thomae to see a tension between Duns Sco-
tus’s claim that esse intelligibile is caused by the divine intellect and his claim
that esse intelligibile is caused by the divine essence. In Duns Scotus, however,
there is no contradiction, because the claim that the divine essence is the cause
of esse intelligibile does not entail that esse intelligibile is prior to the divine intel-
lect’s turning towards the divine essence – that would indeed be the case if the
divine intellect worked like the human intellect, whose objects have their identity
independently of and prior to the cognitive act directed at them. But this is not
the case with God. Once we grasp this point, we realize that the divine intellect
and the divine essence are co-causes of esse intelligibile and so can be both de-
scribed as a cause of intelligibility.
Bibliography
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–. Summa theologiae. Edizioni san Paolo: Cinisello Balsamo (MI), 19993.
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36 On this case, see Pini, “Can God Create My Thoughts?,” 50–52.
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In God’s Mind 117
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The Species Intelligibilis in the
Cognitive Process in Early Scotism
The Case of William of Alnwick
Marina Fedeli
Introduction
William of Alnwick († 1333) is known to have been Scotus’s secretary (socius);
he belongs to the very first generation of Scotists.1 An analysis of his thought is
important for two particular reasons: first, this endeavor allows us to know the
early reception of Scotus’s doctrine; second, it helps us to understand the philo-
sophical developments of theories of knowledge at the beginning of the 14th cen-
tury. This article focuses on the role of the intelligible species in the cognitive
process, highlighting the development of William of Alnwick’s thought within
the Scotist paradigm.
As a result of the reception of Aristotle’s thought, a philosophical debate
arose concerning human knowledge. How is it possible that an immaterial and
inorganic mind is able to understand material realities? In the Aristotelian tradi-
tion the intellect is a tabula rasa, and cognition needs and starts out from the
senses. An external object makes imprints on the external senses, which in turn
produce a sensible image (the so-called phantasm) in the faculty of imagination.
When the intellect actually thinks of a concept of an extramental object, the cog-
nitive process comes to an end. However, the main point here concerns the pas-
sage from the sensible to the intelligible level. In fact, a phantasm is still an im-
age representing a concrete and singular object and it includes material
conditions. Concepts, on the other hand, are abstract, universal, and immaterial.
Here, the intelligible species comes into play: it is the cognitive principle used to
bridge the gap between the sensible and the intelligible level. According to this
theory, the agent intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the sensible ones,
eliminating all the material and accidental features. This species is then im-
Research for this paper was part of the project PRIN 2017 Averroism. History, Developments
and Implications of a Cross-cultural Tradition (2017H8MWHR). I thank the editors of this
volume for their suggestions.
1 For Alnwick’s biography and works, see Alliney, “È necessario amare Dio?,” 87‒89; Alli-
ney, “Time and Soul in Fourteenth-Century Theology,” XI‒XIII; Dumont, “William of Aln-
wick”; Ledoux, Praefatio, X–XLVI; Fiorentino, “Introduction.”
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120 Marina Fedeli
pressed upon the possible intellect, and this last faculty precisely thinks in act the
essences of material things, namely the universal.
To return to the debate, at the end of 13th century, as Peter King remarks,
John Duns Scotus deals with the crisis of the Aristotelian psychological tradition.
Thinkers such as Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Peter John Olivi
deny the need for the intelligible species in the process of cognition. A further
point of discussion concerns the role of the agent intellect: is it a total or only a
partial cause of intellectual cognition? Scotus defends the mediation in the abs-
tractive knowledge with new arguments, leading to a transformation of the tradi-
tional account.2 According to Scotus, the human intellect can have cognition of
the universal, for this to occur a material and singular object of the extramental
world must be represented adequately to the human mind, namely it must be
represented in a form accessible to the intellect. Therefore, the intellect must
naturally have an object that is a universal in act, prior to the act of cognizing.
This present object is the intelligible species that is in the possible intellect and
derives from the external object as represented in the phantasm and by the act of
the agent intellect.3 According to Scotus, the intelligible species is a mental repre-
sentation of an exterior object impressed upon the intellect.4 This species is the
intelligible similitude different from the thing in the extramental world but rep-
resenting it. In support of the necessity of the intelligible species, Scotus provides
three arguments. The first concerns the required universality of objects in order
to have an abstractive cognition of them; the second results from the role of the
agent intellect; and the third focuses on more or less universal habitual cogni-
tions. Scotus thus first argues that the species has a particular and unique way of
representing reality. However, to think of an object under the aspect of the uni-
versal and under the aspect of the singular requires two different ways of being
representative; thus, a unique species cannot represent both the singular and the
universal aspects.5 Scotus secondly argues that the agent intellect is able to carry
2 King, “Duns Scotus on Mental Content,” 66‒70. On Scotus’s doctrine on intelligible spe-
cies see Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition; Dumont, “The Role of the Phantasm in the
Psychology of Duns Scotus”; Perler, “Things in the Mind”; Spruit, Species intelligibilis, 257–66;
Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 55–83.
3 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 349 (ed. Vat. III), 210: “Ex hoc ergo mani-
festo, scilicet quod intellectus potest intelligere universale, accipio hanc propositionem: ‘intel-
lectus potest habere obiectum actu universale, per se sibi praesens in ratione obiecti, prius nat-
uraliter quam intelligat.’ Ex hoc sequitur propositum, quod in illo priore habet obiectum
praesens in specie intelligibili, et ita habet speciem intelligibilem priorem actu.”
4 Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in primum librum Perihermenias, q. 2, n. 1 (OPh II), 47: “Dico
autem speciem intelligibilem vel similitudinem quae est in intellectu ut in subiecto”; cf. similar-
ly Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 388 (ed. Vat. III), 236.
5 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 352 (ed. Vat. III), 211‒12: “Primo arguo sic:
species ex hoc quod est talis species, habet talem rationem repraesentandi, et hoc respectu
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The Species Intelligibilis in the Cognitive Process in Early Scotism 121
out a real action. Every real action has a real end term, but this end term is
necessarily a universal object, that is an intelligible species, resulting from the
action of the agent intellect.6 By way of the third argument, Scotus asserts that
we can use a more universal habit without implying the use of some less univer-
sal habit, but we do not have an act of thinking about something more universal,
unless it is presented to the intellect with the same degree of universality. Thus,
if an object were thought exclusively on the basis of a phantasm, its more univer-
sal aspect would never become present in separation from the imaginable singu-
lar. Thus, a distinct and universal representation is necessary.7
On Scotus’s view, the agent intellect abstracts a universal form from the
phantasm; this form is the intelligible species, which the possible intellect then
receives.8 The production of the intelligible species and its reception are identi-
obiecti sub tali ratione repraesentati; ergo eadem species manens, non habet duas rationes
repraesentativas, nec est repraesentativa respectu duarum rationum in repraesentabili. Sed in-
telligere obiectum sub ratione universalis et singularis requirit duplicem rationem repraesenta-
tivam vel repraesentandi, et est respectu duplicis rationis ‘repraesentabilis’ formaliter; ergo
idem manens idem, non repraesentat sic et sic: ergo phantasma, quod de se repraesentat obiec-
tum sub ratione singularis, non potest repraesentare ipsum sub ratione universalis.” For an
explanation of this argument, see Perler, “Things in the Mind,” 236‒38.
6 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 359 (ed. Vat. III), 216‒17: “[…] intellectus
agens est mere potentia activa […]; ergo potest habere actionem realem. Omnis actio realis
habet aliquem terminum realem. Ille terminus realis non recipitur in phantasmate, […] ergo
tantum recipitur in intellectu possibili, quia intellectus agens nullius est receptivus. Illud pri-
mum causatum non potest poni actus intelligendi, quia primus terminus actionis intellectus
agentis est universale in actu, quia ‘transfert de ordine in ordinem’; universale autem in actu
praecedit actum intelligendi […], quia obiectum sub ratione obiecti praecedit actum.” For an
explanation of this argument see Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 88‒89.
7 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 364 (ed. Vat. III), 220‒21: “[…] habitus
minus universalis et magis universalis sunt distincti habitus proprii, alioquin metaphysica ut
metaphysica non esset habitus intellectus, quia esset de obiecto universalissimo ad omnia alia
obiecta. Habitu autem universaliore contingit uti non utendo aliquo alio habitu minus univer-
sali, sicut contingit habere actum intelligendi circa universalius – eodem modo quo respicitur
ab habitu illo ‒ non habendo actum circa minus universale; sed non habetur actus intelligendi
circa universalius, ipsum sub tali ratione sit praesens intellectui; ergo universalius potest esse
praesens intellectui per aliud quam per quod est apud intellectum praesentia alicuius minus
universalis: sed si praecise intelligeretur obiectum in phantasmate, numquam esset magis uni-
versale praesens nisi in minus universali, quia numquam nisi in singulari phantasiabili, ‒ ergo
etc.”
8 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 360 (ed. Vat. III), 218: “[…] realis actio
intellectus agentis terminatur ad formam aliquam realem, in exsistentia, quae formaliter
repraesentat universale ut universale, quia aliter non posset terminari actio eius ad universale
sub ratione universalis”; n. 363, 220: “[…] primus terminus actionis intellectus agentis recipi-
tur in possibili, et ita cum prima actio intellectus agentis sit ad universale in actu, istud univer-
sale ‒ vel illud quo ipsum habet ‘esse’ tale – recipitur in intellectu possibili.”
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122 Marina Fedeli
cal. As Giorgio Pini says, they “are just two descriptions of one and the same
process.”9 It is important to note that the intelligible species is a real form im-
pressed upon the possible intellect, that is, an accident inhering in the intellect,
in which the universal object ‘shines up.’10 Once the intelligible species is in the
intellect as object, another action takes place: actual intellection itself. This sec-
ond action has in fact two partial causes: the intelligible species and the intel-
lect.11
Scotus’s theory of cognition is at the heart of the debate at the beginning of
the 14th century and, indeed, of its later development. Subsequent to Scotus’s
death, the intelligible species remained a central issue in the philosophical de-
bate, as Leen Spruit has clearly shown. On the one hand there are those who
variously support the intelligible species as a mediating principle ‒ among these
supporters there are some Scotists (such as Francis of Meyronnes, Peter of Aqui-
la and in particular John of Reading) and some Dominicans (such as Hervaeus
Natalis and Thomas Sutton). On the other hand, there are those who deny it,
like Durand of St. Pourçain, John Baconthorpe and, above all, William of Ock-
ham.12
Within this debate, it is interesting to underline that not all Scotists faithful-
ly followed their master. This is the case with William of Alnwick. As Guido
Alliney has pointed out, he contributed to the dissemination of Scotism, al-
though his thought had numerous original features.13 Though Alnwick was cer-
tainly well acquainted with Scotus’s texts, he has frequently been described as
‘an independent Scotist,’ due to some disagreements with Scotus’s theories.14 In
9 Pini, “Two Models of Thinking,” 95.

10 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 386 (ed. Vat. III), 235: “[…] dico quod
intellectus non tantum patitur realiter ab obiecto reali, imprimente talem speciem realem, sed
etiam ab illo obiecto ut relucet in specie patitur passione intentionali: et illa secunda passio est
‘receptio intellectionis’ – quae est ab intelligibili in quantum intelligibile, relucens in specie
intelligibili – et illud ‘pati’ est ‘intelligere’.”
11 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 3, n. 563 (ed. Vat. III), 335: “[…] dico quod duplex
est actus intellectus respectu obiectorum quae non sunt praesentia in se, qualia sunt illa quae
modo naturaliter intelligimus: primus actus est species, qua obiectum est praesens ut obiectum
actu intelligibile, secundus actus est ipsa intellectio actualis […]. Ad primum autem actum agit
intellectus agens cum phantasmate, et ibi intellectus agens est principalior causa quam phan-
tasma, et ambo integrant unam totalem causam respectu speciei intelligibilis. Ad secundum
actum agit pars intellectiva (sive intellectus agens sive possibilis, non curo modo) et species
intelligibilis sicut duae partiales causae.” On this point, see also the long discussion in Duns
Scotus, Quodl., q. 15, 539‒79.
12 Spruit, Species intelligibilis, 257–351.
13 Alliney, “È necessario amare Dio?,” 88.
14 Brown, “Sources for Ockham’s Prologue to the Sentences – II,” 61‒62; Ledoux, Praefatio,
IX. There are even those who have argued that Alnwick is not a Scotist at all, cf. Veliath, “The
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the context of cognition, Alnwick shows a controversial attitude toward the in-
telligible species. In his Commentary on the Sentences, he claims that for intellec-
tual cognition the species in the phantasm is sufficient to represent the external
object to the intellect. By contrast, in his Disputed Questions on Intelligible Being
and in his Determinations, he argues for the need of the species in the intellect.
1. The Cognitive Process in Alnwick’s

Commentary on the Sentences
According to Stephen Dumont and other scholars, Alnwick’s Commentary on
the Sentences dates from 1314, when he was in Paris.15 In this work the issue of
the intelligible species is discussed in Book I, dist. 3, question 1, entitled Utrum
sit necesse ponere species intelligibiles impressas in memoria praeter speciem que
est in phantasia. Here, Alnwick immediately clarifies that his opinion contrasts
with that of Scotus. He claims right away that the species in the faculty of imagi-
nation is sufficient for an act of thinking.16 The question is transmitted in a sin-
gle manuscript, namely Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, Ms. 172. It is the only ques-
tion entirely devoted to this issue; it still remains unedited. The structure of the
question is as follows:
– Three arguments against Scotus’s doctrine of the necessity of the species,
partly drawing on Henry of Ghent’s arguments (“contra hoc quere etiam
alias rationes Henrici”);17
– The solution to the question that coincides with the exposition of Aln-
wick’s doctrine;
– Five objections to Scotus’s arguments in support of the intelligible spe-
cies;
– Seven adverse arguments against Alnwick’s own opinion and the respec-
tive answers.
In the solutio, Alnwick immediately states that in order to explain intellectual
cognition it is not necessary to involve the presence of the intelligible species,
Scotism of William of Alnwick in His Determinationes De Anima,” 133: “William can by no

means be styled a ‘Scotist,’ if the appellative is to have any significance.”
15 Dumont, “William of Alnwick,” 676. See also Fiorentino, “Introduction,” 1.
16 Guillelmus de Alnwick, Quaestiones in quatuor libros Sententiarum (henceforth Sent.) I,
dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Ms. 172), 48r: “Hic quere opinio Scoti contra quam arguitur; et
probo quod sufficiat species, que est in fantasmate.”
17 Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Ms. 172), 48r.
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124 Marina Fedeli
because the species in the phantasm is sufficient.18 In support of this statement,

he says:
What is more universal is distinctly represented in what represents the less universal or
even singular. For what distinctly represents an individual and a singular can also dis-
tinctly represent everything superior to it. But the species in the phantasm distinctly rep-
resents the singular; therefore, the species is sufficient for a representation of every supe-
rior universal.19
In other words, if the phantasmic species is able to represent ‘this man,’ it can
represent ‘man as such’ or also ‘animal,’ which is more universal. He says that
knowing distinctly something means knowing its essence; animal is a part of the
essence of human; therefore, something that represents the singular, also repre-
sents what is more universal.20 Alnwick proves to have grasped the reason that
pushes Scotus to argue for the need of the intelligible species. William’s answer,
in fact, identifies one of Scotus’s main arguments: in order to think of a univer-
sal essence it is necessary to pass from one order to another, namely from the
particularity of the phantasm to the universality of the intellect.21 According to
Scotus, “[the concept] is not conceived precisely as the more common in the
lesser common or as the universal in the singular and so not precisely as the
universal in the phantasm.”22 An additional species, besides the one contained in
the phantasm, is therefore required in order to represent the universal. In con-
trast, Alnwick argues that the same phantasmic species can represent both the
particular and the universal. This is an important difference between the two
authors.
18 Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Ms. 172), 48r: “Dico igitur quod non
videtur mihi necesse ponere aliquam speciem impressam in memoria, sed sufficit illa, que est
in virtute fantastica, ad representandum intellectui quodcumque intelligibile universale.”
19 Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Ms. 172), 48r: “Quod sic patet: magis
universale representatur distincte in representativo minus universalis, vel etiam singularis;
quod enim representat disticte individuum et singulare potest distincte representare quodlibet
eius superius; sed species in fantasmate representat distincte singulare. Igitur ipsa sufficit ad
representandum quodlibet superius universale.”
20 Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Ms. 172), 48r‒v: “Assumptum probatur,
quia distincte cognoscentem aliquid oportet distincte cognoscere quicquid est de essentia eius:
huiusmodi autem sunt superiora respectu inferiorum, sicut animal est de per se intellectu ho-
minis et de essentia eius; sed magis universale non cognoscitur distincte nisi per distinctum
representativum. Igitur oportet quod distincte representans singulare etiam distincte represen-
tet omnia eius superiora.”
21 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 359 (ed. Vat. III), 216‒17.
22 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 365 (ed. Vat. III), 222: “[…] non concipitur
praecise communius in minus communi vel universale in singulari, – et ita non praecise uni-
versale in phantasmate.” English translation by J. van den Bercken in Duns Scotus, On Being
and Cognition, 180.
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In support of this statement, William resorts to an argument of his adver-

saries. Those who claim the necessity of the species argue that, in order to un-
derstand essentially ordered universals, the intellect does not need all species, but
rather only the first species, i. e., the species specialissima, which includes the
higher species.23 Just like these specific species are representative of all the oth-
ers, so too the impressed species is not necessary, since the sensible species alone
is sufficient for a representation of what is more or less universal. Alnwick con-
tinues claiming that the same phantasmic species is sufficient to represent both
the singular of a major universal and the singular of a minor universal. He gives
an example: at sunset we may see something that at first it looks like a body to
us, then at sunrise it seems like an animal, and finally we see a man. In this case,
the same species represents a body, an animal, and a man. Therefore, the same
species contained in the phantasm is able to represent the object both as particu-
lar and as universal.24
The uselessness of intelligible species is also closely linked to what, accord-
ing to Alnwick, a universal is. Alnwick makes use of the triple division of the
meaning of the universal term, offered by Scotus in his Questions on the Meta-
physics, book VII, quaestio 18. The universal can be taken for a second intention,
namely the predicability de multis that is the rational relation resulting from the
operation of the intellect, when it compares the predicable to that of which it is
predicated. In a second way, the universal can be taken for something denomi-
nated by this intention, which is a thing of first intention. The latter may be
understood in two ways: in one way, it refers to the remote subject of a second
intention; in the other way, it designates the proximate subject of this. As remote
subject, the quidditas, or nature absolutely taken, is said to be a universal. This
23 Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Ms. 172), 48v: “Confirmatur. Nam di-
centes oppositum dicunt quod, adhoc quod intellectus intelligat universalia essentialiter ordi-
nata, non oportet quod habeat tot species quot sunt illa, quia prima species, que imprimitur,
est species speciei specialissime, ut ipsi probant: species autem specialissima includit omnia
superiora essentialiter ordinata. Igitur eius representativum est sufficiens representativum
obiectum illorum.” Probably, Alnwick quotes an argument from Scotus; cf. Duns Scotus, Ord.
I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 553 (ed. Vat. III), 329‒30: “[…] respondeo quod una species specialis-
sima, potest includere multas species alias virtualiter (sive passiones earum, sive per modum
causae, sive secundum alium ordinem essentialem), et tunc habitus ille qui est formaliter illius
primi includentis alia, est virtualiter aliorum obiectorum, licet non formaliter et primo.”
24 Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Ms. 172), 48v: “Preterea, sicut species
sensibilis se habet ad sensum imprimendo, ita species intelligibilis ad intelligendum; sed eadem
species sensibilis sufficit ad representandum singulare magis universalis et singulare minus uni-
versalis […]. Nam primo videtur aliquid, inquantum est singulare magis universalis, puta in-
quantum est substantia, postea inquantum corpus etc. Et hoc non per diversas species sed per
eadem, sicut videndo aliquid in crepuscolo primo iudico illud esse corpus, secundo crescente
die animal, et ultimo hominem et non per aliam et aliam speciem, sed per eadem, que primo
movet sensum […].”
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126 Marina Fedeli
Guillelmus de Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Duns Scotus, Met., VII, q. 18, nn. 38–41 (OPh IV),
Bibl. Com., Ms. 172), 48v 347
[…] universale potest sumi tripliciter: uno modo [Universale] sumitur enim vel sumi potest trip-
pro intentione secunda, et sic non dicit nisi respec- liciter. Quandoque pro intentione secunda, quae
tum rationis consequentem operationem intellec- scilicet est quaedam relatio rationis in praedicabili
tus comparantis predicabile eidem quo predicatur ad illud de quo est praedicabile […]. Alio modo
[…]. Alio modo accipitur universale pro eo quod accipitur universale pro illo quod denominatur ab
[…] denominatur ab ea, cuiusmodi est res prime ista intentione, quod est aliqua res primae inten-
intentionis et hoc convenit dupliciter, quia vel si- tionis […]. Et sic accipi potest dupliciter: uno
cut subiectum propinquum vel sicut remotum. modo pro illo quod quasi subiectum remotum de-
Subiectum remotum est ipsa quidditas, que est tota nominatur ab ista intentione; alio modo pro
in omnibus et de se non est ‘hec,’ sed plurificabilis subiecto propinquo. Primo modo dicitur natura
et est apta nata denominari ab illa secunda inten- absolute sumpta universale, quia non est ex se
tione, non actualiter sed in potentia. haec, et ita non repugnat sibi ex se dici de multis.
Subiectum propinquum est ipsa eadem notitia, con- Secundo modo non est universale nisi sit actu inde-
siderata ab intellectu secundum suam indifferenti- terminatum, ita quod unum intelligibile numero
am ad multa in quibus plurificatur, et sic attribui- sit dicibile de omni supposito, et illud est complete
tur ibi intentio non solum in potentia sed actu. universale.
Fig. 1.
nature is universal, because it is not particularized, specifically it is not just the

‘haec’ of itself and hence may be affirmed of a multitude; it is only potentially
denominated by second intentions, and not as it actually exists. As proximate
subject, the universal is the actual knowledge (notitia) which the intellect con-
siders according to its indifference to the many by which it is multiplied. In this
third way, the universal is actually indeterminate, i. e., despite being one it is
predicable of many.25 This universal is, as Giorgio Pini puts it, “ready for predi-
cation.”26 Alnwick’s exposition follows Scotus’s conception of universals as sec-
ond intentions or as their remote or proximate subjects. A comparison between
the texts shows just how similar Alnwick’s and Scotus’s accounts are (cf. fig. 1).
Alnwick goes on arguing that there is some order among these ways of con-
sidering universals: first, there is the universal as quiddity and absolute nature,
which precedes any act of the intellect; this is an imperfect universal. Second,
there is the universal as absolute nature according to its indifference to every
supposit; this is a perfect universal. Finally, there is the logical universal that is
25 Regarding the three ways to consider the universal in Duns Scotus, see De Libera, La
querelle des universaux, 344‒45.
26 Pini, “Scotus on Objective Being,” 342. These three ways to consider universals – tradi-
tionally called physical, metaphysical, and logical – had a significant influence in the following
centuries; cf. Heider, Universals in Second Scholasticism (with focus on the 16th and 17th cen-
turies).
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produced by the possible intellect, which predicates this nature of various indi-
vidual subjects, causing the intellection through the comparison of this sub-
jects.27
The problem is that the two authors use these three ways to consider the
universal to reach two different conclusions: Scotus wants to affirm the need of
the intelligible species, whereas Alnwick wants to deny it. So, it is necessary to
analyze both Scotus’s and Alnwick’s expositions.
According to Scotus,28 the common nature as it is in itself, considered as a
remote subject, is neither particular nor universal; it is thus neither in the intel-
lect nor in the individuals.29 Thus, this nature can indeed exist in individuals in
extramental reality, but this is not relevant for the present problem.30 What is
important here is that the common nature can be universal, when it is an object
of thought, and as such it is considered as a proximate subject. In other words,
the complete universal is an object of thought and hence is in the intellect objec-
tively. Now, Scotus distinguishes two ways for it to be objectively in the intellect:
habitually or actually. Something is objectively in the intellect in an habitual way,
when it is there as an immediate motive to an act of thinking. Something is ob-
jectively in the intellect in an actual way, when it is actually being thought about.
Being objectively in the intellect habitually requires an intelligible species that is
the motive reason (motivum) for the act of thinking. Scotus thus uses this triple
way to consider universals in order to argue that the complete universal must be
27 Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Ms. 172), 48v: “Unde, hoc se habet per
ordinem: primo enim est universale quod est ipsa natura et quidditas in se et absolute, quod
eadem precedit omnem actum intellectus, et est subiectum in scientia et obiectum intellectus et
dicitur universale imperfectum. Secundo modo est universale quod est ipsa natura et quidditas,
inquantum considerata […] secundum eius indifferentia ad omnia supposita, et est universale
perfectum, quod est unum in multis et dicitur de multis. Tertio est universale quod est secunda
intentio, causata ab intellectu […] possibili, que realiter intelligit naturam secundum se et at-
tribuendo ipsa individuis multis; et comparando ipsa adinvicem et ad diversam causat illam
intellectionem.”
28 Regarding Scotus’s theory of universals and the common nature, see Boulnois, “Réelles
intentions: nature commune et universaux selon Duns Scot”; King, “Scotus on the Common
Nature and the Individual Differentia”; Noone, “Universals and Individuation.”
29 Duns Scotus, Ord. II, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 33 (ed. Vat. VII), 403: “Non solum autem
ipsa natura de se est indifferens ad esse in intellectu et in particulari, ac per hoc et ad esse
universale et particulare (sive singulare), ‒ sed etiam ipsa, habens esse in intellectu, non habet
primo ex se universalitatem.” On this point, see Pini, “Scotus on Objective Being,” 342.
30 Duns Scotus, Ord. II, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 34 (ed. Vat. VII), 404: “Et sicut secundum
illud esse non est natura de se universalis, sed universalitas accidit illi naturae secundum pri-
mam rationem eius, secundum quam est obiectum, – ita etiam in re extra, ubi natura est cum
singularitate, non est illa natura de se determinata ad singularitatem, sed est prior naturaliter
ipsa ratione contrahente ipsam ad singularitatem illam, et in quantum est prior naturaliter illo
contrahente, non repugnat sibi esse sine illo contrahente.”
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128 Marina Fedeli
in the intellect habitually, “so that unless the object has this concomitant pres-
ence in the intellect, universality is not in it.”31 Scotus reaffirms the need for the
intelligible species, considered as an accidental form impressed upon the intel-
lect. This form contains the universal as an object that naturally precedes the
intellection.32 As Giorgio Pini explains, “Scotus also thinks that when I think
about what a horse is (so when a universal such as horse is in my intellect objec-
tively or, equivalently, an essence such as horseness is in my intellect as an object
of thought), it is also the case that some items are in my intellect as accidents are
in their subjects.”33 The intelligible species and an act of thinking are subjectively
in the intellect inasmuch as they are representations of the object.34 In other
words, the species is the vehicle of whatever is in the intellect objectively; this
objective content ‘shines up’ in the species.35 According to the Doctor Subtilis, in
order to have a common nature that is in proximate potency of being predicable
de multis, it needs to be objectively in the possible intellect.36
Alnwick, by contrast, does not explain the reason of these three ways to
consider the universal. I believe that Alnwick thinks there is no need of any im-
pressed species in which the universal object is contained. The object that pre-
cedes the intellect is the absolute nature present in the phantasm. I find support
of this interpretation in Alnwick’s own words: “The universal, considered in the
first way is not caused by the agent intellect; it rather precedes any act of the
31 Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis VII, q. 18, n. 46 (OPh
IV), 350: “[…] universale tertio modo dictum non est in intellectu secundo modo ex necessi-
tate […], sed necessario est in intellectu primo modo, ita quod sine illo concomitante obiec-
tum non inest ei universalitas.” English translation by Wolter and Etzkorn in Duns Scotus,
Questions on the Metaphysics, 301.
IV), 345.
33 Pini, “Scotus on Objective Being,” 346.
34 On this point, the definition of species, provided by Scotus, is clearer: “Dico autem spe-
ciem intelligibilem vel simitudinem quae est in intellectu ut in subiecto”; Duns Scotus, Quaes-
tiones in primum librum Perihermenias, q. 2, n. 1 (OPh II), 47; cf. Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n.
388 (ed. Vat. III), 236.
35 Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 3, q. 4, n. 119: “Prima ergo passio est in intellectu per spe-
ciem praesentem receptam in intellectu, secunda est ab obiecto ut in specie relucente.” Regard-
ing Scotus’s theory of objective being, see Cross, “Duns Scotus on the Semantic Content of
Cognitive Acts and Species”; King, “Duns Scotus on Mental Content”; Pini, “Scotus on Objec-
tive Being,” 79‒85.
36 Duns Scotus, Ord. II, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 1, n. 38 (ed. Vat. VII), 407: “[…] nam ubicumque
est antequam in intellectu possibili habeat esse obiective, sive in re sive in phantasmate, sive
habeat esse certum sive deductum per rationem […], non tamen est tale cui potentia proxima
conveniat dici de quolibet, sed tantum est potentia proxima in intellectu possibili.”
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intellect as its object.”37 In other words, the universal as an absolute nature, i. e.,
the remote subject, is the only necessary object to the intellect, and it is represen-
tatively in the phantasm. In fact, the imperfect universal is the object that antici-
pates any act of an intellect, whereas the perfect universal, as proximate subject,
is situated objectively in the possible intellect.38 According to Alnwick, only
when the possible intellect considers the common nature, as a remote subject, it
obtains the perfect universal, as a proximate subject.39 Alnwick does not go
deeper into this question, which makes it difficult for us to reach a conclusion.
Alnwick certainly denies that the species is in a subject in the way accidents are,
but he does accept that it is sort of something in a certain place. Indeed, in the
final arguments, he asserts that the species is “expressive” in the intellect: the
species is an object that expresses itself to the intellect, without impressing it-
self.40 This statement immediately recalls Henry of Ghent’s theory.41 Henry de-
nies the need of intelligible species because, as he sees it, the species in the phan-
tasm is sufficient.42 He does admit the expressive species, which exists in the
intellect as an object in a knower.43 Thus, Henry does not accept the intelligible
37 Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Ms. 172), 49r: “[…] universale primo
modo non causatur per intellectum agentem, sed precedit omnem actum intellectus sicut eius
obiectum.”
38 Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Ms. 172), 49r: “[…] sed universale se-
cundo modo, scilicet secundum ideam consideratum, non est nisi intellectu possibili obiective,
et in nullomodo subiective, nec in aliquo representativo quia sic est ubique et semper.”
39 Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Ms. 172), 48v‒49r: “Dicendum quod
licet intellectus possibilis sit passivus in recipiendo actum suum, tamen in eliciendo ipsum est
activus; et sic ipse idem intellectus ‒ et non alius ‒, inquantum activus, facit de non universali
universale, id est de universali imperfecto universale perfectum; inquantum scilicet intelligens
naturam, que dicitur universale primo modo, considerat ipsam secundum eius indifferentiam
ad multa in quibus plurificatur et de quibus dicitur; et eius representatum non ponitur aliud
quam illud quod est in fantasmate secundum aliam rationem consideratam.”
40 Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Ms. 172), 49v: “[…] in aliis potentiis
imprimitur aliquid ut forma in materia et accidens in subiecto, sed in intellectu sicut locatum
in loco: nunc autem locatum est aliquid expressum loco, non impressum. […] species est in
intellectu expressive, non impressive.” Alnwick does not explain the meaning of ‘species ex-
pressa.’ ‘Expressive’ indicates that this species expresses itself in the intellect as an object and so
is objectively in the intellect, and not as a form in a subject.
41 I am aware that there is no consensus about Henry of Ghent’s theory of cognition. I refer
to the important study by Rombeiro, “Intelligible species in the Mature Thought of Henry of
Ghent”, and the literature quoted there. Rombeiro explains that the notion of expressive spe-
cies is related to the Augustinian notions of notitia and verbum.
42 Henricus de Gandavo, Quodl. V, q. 14, 176vO: “Post hoc sequitur operatio intellectus
agentis in nobis circa phantasmata, hoc est non circa species impressas in memorativa vel
imaginativa: sed circa obiectum particulare imaginatum intra, quod prius sentiebatur extra.”
43 Henricus de Gandavo, Quodl. IV, q. 21, 136vH‒37vI: “[…] sensus ab obiecto habet spe-
ciem receptam impressivam qua deducitur per transmutationem naturalem sensus de potentia
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130 Marina Fedeli
species as a form impressed upon the subject; he rather considers the expressive
species as an object in the intellect. As Rombeiro specifies, an expressive species
is the same phantasm that both presents the intelligible object to the possible
intellect and moves it to an act of understanding. In this way, the object exists in
the intellect and informs the act of understanding.44 Alnwick’s position on intel-
ligible species is thus very similar to that of Henry of Ghent, which, moreover, is
explicitly mentioned at the beginning of the question. Indeed, the object is nec-
essary, because in the current state – that is, the state of the viator – the object
of cognition derives from the phantasm, but the immaterial nature of the intel-
lect prevents the impression of a species upon it.45
Now, returning to the difference between the Doctor Subtilis and his socius,
the same ways of understanding the universal are employed to assert different
theories: in the one case, we have a theory of an intelligible species impressed in
the intellect in which the universal ‘shines up,’ whereas in the other case, we
rather have theory of a species that is expressed, that is as something appears in
a place. It would be interesting to compare Alnwick’s theory of esse obiective and
that of Scotus. Although in fact there are some studies on this subject,46 these
focus only on Alnwick’s Disputed Questions on Intelligible Being and disregard
his Sentences. But, as we shall see, Alnwick’s opinion on intelligible species
changes in that later work, wherefore studies on works subsequent to the Sen-
tences lose their relevance.
Before we move on to another work, let me briefly draw attention to an-
other aspect of the question, namely Alnwick’s answers to Scotus’s objections –
we here find a rather curious fact: Alnwick replies to five arguments that are not
reported in his question. However, it is easy to recognize the source of these
arguments, since they are those employed by Scotus in his various Commentaries
on the Sentences in response to Henry of Ghent’s and Godfrey of Fontaines’s
in actum non solum ut in potentia formatum actu informetur receptione speciei impressivae in
subiecto: ut ibi sit status: sed ut ulterius potentia sentiens fiat actu sentiens receptione speciei
expressivae: non ut in subiecto sed in cognoscente. […] abstractio tamen non sit neque a spe-
cie impressa: quia intellectus speciei materialis impressionem non recipit, quia esset vere alter-
abilis et transmutabilis sicut sensus […]: obiectum vero intellectus est idem sub ratione univer-
salis quod conspicit in phantasmare absque omni specie impressiva.”
44 Rombeiro, “Intelligible species in the Mature Thought of Henry of Ghent,” 218.
45 Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Ms. 172), 49r: “Dicendum quod intellec-
tus noster pro statu isto non potest habere obiectum presens nisi per fantasmata quia nihil
intelligeremus nisi in fantasmatibus secundum Philosophum. […] intellectus autem est poten-
tia immaterialis et non organica et ideo perfectiori modo immutatur a suo obiecto quia secun-
dum esse immateriale.”
46 de Rijk, “A Study on the Medieval Intentionality Debate up to ca. 1350,” 86‒95; Perler,
“What Are Intentional Objects?”; Riserbato, “Ut induit rationem ideae”; Tweedale, “Represen-
tation in Scholastic Epistemology,” 75‒78.
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Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. Scotus, Lect. I, dist. 3, q. Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, q. Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 3,
3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. 1, n. 267 (ed. Vat. XVI), 1, n. 349 (ed. Vat. III), q. 4, n. 95 (ed. Wolter
Com., Ms. 172), 48v 332 210 and Bychkow), 210
Ad primam cum ar- […] intellectus prius […] intellectus potest […] intellectus potest
guitur quod “oportet naturaliter antequam in- intelligere universale, ac- habere obiectum actu
intellectum habere telligat potest habere cipio hanc proposi- universale perfecte sibi
speciem represen- obiectum actu universale tionem: ‘intellectus praesens antequam vel
tatem obiectum uni- praesens sibi sufficienter potest habere obiectum prius naturaliter quam
versale sub ratione in ratione obiecti, quia actu universale, per se intelligat: ergo habet
universalis, prius nat- prius naturaliter obiec- sibi praesens in ratione speciem obiecti in intel-
uraliter quam intelli- tum est praesens intel- obiecti, prius naturaliter lectu et non solum in
gat ipsum,” concedo lectui quam actus eli- quam intelligat.’ Ex hoc phantasmate priusquam
de universali […]. ciatur; ergo intellectus sequitur propositum, intelligat.
habet obiectum univer- quod in illo priore habet
sale sibi praesens in ra- obiectum praesens in
tione speciei intelligibilis specie intelligibili, et ita
prioris naturaliter actu habet speciem intelligi-
intelligendi. bilem priorem actu.
Fig. 2.
denial of the intelligible species. In these objections, all of which are partially
quoted by Alnwick, Scotus makes the point that if the intellect can know any
object under the aspect of a universal (such as ‘triangle’), then the intellect must
have the universal as a present object before any act of the intellect. Scotus holds
that this universal object is identical with the intelligible species. This conclusion
is proved by way of various arguments that all concern the universality of the
object and its presence.47 The schematic comparison in fig. 2 shows, how easy it
is to recognize Scotus’s argument in Alnwick’s text.
As the comparison shows, it is difficult to recognize which text Alnwick
refers to. The idea that Alnwick wants to convey in his discussion of these objec-
tions is this: it is true what Scotus says, namely that the intellect can naturally
have a universal object present to it before it may think, but this universal object
must be regarded as the remote subject of the first intention. The imperfect uni-
versal, the first one in that order which Alnwick had previously established, is
present to the intellect as an object. But for this to happen, no further species is
required, because the singular and the universal are not opposite, but rather
subordinated aspects. According to Alnwick, the ratio of the singular is included
in the ratio of the universal, taken as an absolute nature. In other words, ‘hu-
47 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 349‒68 (ed. Vat. III), 210‒24.
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132 Marina Fedeli
manity’ as a quiddity includes ‘this humanity’ that is contained in the phantasm,

being the result of the perception of a human being in front of me.48
To sum up Alnwick’s position in his Commentary on the Sentences, he
clearly asserts that there is no need for the intelligible species impressed upon
the possible intellect and numerically distinct from that of the phantasm. He
believes that the phantasmatic species is sufficient in order to represent both the
universal and the singular. Alnwick explains that these two are subordinated,
that is, the universal, meant as a quiddity, includes the particular. This diverges
remarkably from Scotus’s thought on the matter because, as Dominik Perler has
been shown, according to Scotus the two aspects ‘universal’ and ‘singular’ are
formally distinct and so one of them cannot exist apart from the other. But in
order to represent the same thing both as singular and universal we need two
different categories of devices.49 On Scotus’s account, the phantasm always rep-
resents the thing as something singular and it cannot represent something uni-
versal. No species can have two different ways of representing. According to Al-
nwick this is possible: the phantasm has the double function of representing
both the singular and the universal nature. In light of my analysis, it seems to me
that at this early stage of his career Alnwick’s position is quite close to the one
endorsed by Henry of Ghent.
Secondly, Alnwick denies that the intelligible species is impressed upon the
possible intellect, that is, he does not accept that the species is in the intellect as
an accident in a subject. Rather, he proposes to consider it as an expressive spe-
cies, namely as an object in the knower.
Apart from this, I believe that there is an additional difference between Aln-
wick’s and Scotus’s theories of cognition, here especially in regard to the role
48 Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Ms. 172), 48v: “Per hoc ad rationes pro
opinione Scoti. Ad primam cum arguitur quod ‘oportet intellectum habere speciem represen-
tantem obiectum universale, sub ratione universalis, prius naturaliter quam intelligat ipsum,’
concedo de universali quod est natura in se absoluta. Et cum dicitur ‘ergo non nisi impressa,’
nego quia non oportet quod habet aliam speciem quam speciem singularis. Et ad probationem
consequentie etiam dico quod impossibile est eandem speciem et eiusdem rationis representare
obiectum idem sub oppositis rationibus, puta sub ratione singularis et universalis. Dicendum
quod iste rationes non sunt opposite sed subordinate: nam ratio singularis includitur in univer-
sali primo modo et subordinatur ei.”
49 Perler, “Things in the Mind,” 237‒38: “The two aspects ‘universal’ and ‘singular,’ howev-
er, are not such qualities. They are rather the two most basic aspects which a thing has in virtue
of its two metaphysical constituents […]. These aspects are always formally distinct; in extra-
mental reality, one of them cannot exist apart from the other. […] As we need one device for
representing the tree qua something green (e. g. a drawing) and another device for represent-
ing it qua something having such and such a structure (e. g. a chemical formula), we also need
two different categories of devices for representing a tree qua something singular and qua
something universal.”
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played by the possible and the agent intellects. According to Scotus, the first op-
eration of the agent intellect consists in the abstraction and production of intelli-
gible species in the possible intellect, and the perfect universal is contained in the
species. The second action, less important in our context, is the joint production
of an act of thinking by the intellect and the intelligible species.50 Alnwick, on
the contrary, holds that it is the possible intellect that makes the perfect univer-
sal. He says that the possible intellect, when it understands the common nature
as an imperfect universal,51 considers it according to its indifference in regard to
the multiplicity in which it plurifies itself; in this way, it causes the perfect uni-
versal. Obviously, the agent intellect abstracts from the phantasm, but it does not
produce any real inhering form. The perfect universal is in the intellect only as
an object in the possible intellect.
Regarding the role of the intellect, a deeper analysis would be desirable, but
at this time we have no edited texts available on this topic. A quick look at the
following question can help us to understand Alnwick’s view. The second ques-
tion of distinction 3 of his commentary on the Sentences I is entitled “Whether
the agent intellect is something of that image or some part of it” (Utrum intellec-
tus agens sit aliquid ipsius imaginis vel alicuius partis eius).52 Here, he argues that
the agent intellect is not required in the abstraction process, because the species
in the phantasm is sufficient to move the possible intellect. The agent intellect is
necessary for the act of understanding, because the actus intelligendi requires an
active principle from which it is produced. Therefore, the agent intellect causes
intellection, and it must be involved in the cognition process.53
50 On this topic, see Duns Scotus, Ord. II, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 2 (ed. Vat. VII), 245–330, and
in particular Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 15, 410‒45.
51 It would be interesting to compare Alnwick’s early theory on common nature and that of
Scotus. On Alnwick’s view see Stella, “Illi qui student in Scoto,” and Petagine, “Natura comune
e individuazione per materiam.”
52 This question deals with the theological problem, deriving from Augustine, whether the
human mind (and its faculties) is an image of the Trinity.
53 Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 2 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Ms. 172), 49v: “Ponitur ergo intellectus
agens propter aliam necessitatem, que est a parte actus intelligendi, quia, ut dictum est in ques-
tione precedenti, sicut individuum continet in se omnia superiora, ita eius representatum
potest representare omnia superiora. Et ita, propter obiectum, non est necessarius intellectus
agens; sed est necessarius propter actum quia, quando aliquis effectus, non per se existens, est
aliquando in actu et aliquando in potentia – qualis est actus intelligendi – requirit principium
activum a quo producatur et passum in quo recipiatur […]. Igitur et principium activum erit
intellectus, qui dicetur intellectus agens, eo quod est causans actus.”
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134 Marina Fedeli
2. The Intelligible Species in Alnwick’s Later Works

The question from the Commentary on the Sentences is certainly Alnwick’s
broadest and most interesting exposition on the issue of the intelligible species.
But Alnwick seems to have changed his mind in his later works. Both in his
Disputed Questions on Intelligible Being and in his Determinations, Scotus’s for-
mer secretary affirms the need for the intelligible species. Recently, Francesco
Fiorentino has suggested that Alnwick’s work can be dated to some time just
after 1316, the year he left Paris due to his new appointment as Master of Theol-
ogy in Oxford.54 In question 1 of his Disputed Questions on Intelligible Being,
Alnwick argues that:
the agent intellect makes nothing but an intelligible species (or an act of intellectual cog-
nition), because whatever it might be supposed to make in the faculty of imagination or
phantasia would be material and extended the length of the material or corporeal facul-
ty’s organ.55
Thus, Alnwick reconsiders both the role of phantasms, which can represent an
object with all material conditions, and that of the agent intellect which makes
the intelligible species. In this text Alnwick uses the argument of material exten-
sion of phantasia because it is a material faculty and so its intelligible content
would be material. This argumentation is similar to that used by Scotus in the
Ordinatio and in the Reportatio, according to which the end term of a real action
of an agent intellect cannot be received by the phantasm, because the thing re-
ceived would be extended. However, then the agent intellect would not bring
about a transfer from one order (that of the particularity of the phantasm) to
another (that of the universality of the intellect).56
Nevertheless, in support of the hypothesis that he changed his mind there
are also the Determinations. This work dates from 1321–1322, when Alnwick
was in Bologna.57 In question 1, edited by Tommaso Stella, Alnwick deals with
the topic of the intelligible species in response to Prosper of Reggio Emilia,
54 Fiorentino, “Introduction,” 1.
55 Alnwick, Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili, q. 1, 10: “Sed intellectus agens non
facit nisi speciem intelligibilem sive actum intelligendi, quia quidquid poneretur facere in vir-
tute imaginativa sive phantastica esset materiale et extensum ad extensionem organi virtutis
materialis.” English translation from Pasnau, “William Alnwick. Intelligible Being,” 160.
56 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 1, n. 359 (ed. Vat. III), 216‒17: “[…] intellectus
agens est mere potentia activa, […]; ergo potest habere actionem realem. Omnis actio realis
habet aliquem terminum realem. Ille terminus realis non recipitur in phantasmate, quia illud
receptum esset extensum, et ita intellectus agens non transferret ab ordine in ordinem, – nec
illud esset magis proportionatum intellectui possibili quam phantasma.” Cf. further Rep. I-A,
dist. 3, q. 4, n. 103, 212.
57 Dumont, “William of Alnwick,” 676. See also Fiorentino, “Introduction,” 1.
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whose name is indicated in the margin of the manuscript Palatinus Latinus 1805
of the Vatican Library. Prosper claims that the intelligible species is not formally
in the intellect, but only in the senses. In the replies, Alnwick informs his reader
that in another place there are many arguments against the intelligible species as
forms in the senses. Alnwick says: “Contra secundam conclusionem suam, in
qua dicit quod species intelligibilis non est formaliter in intellectu sed in sensu,
habes alibi plura argumenta. Quaere contrarium ibi.”58 Stella suggests that Aln-
wick is referring to the question about second intentions found in Vaticanus Lat-
inus 6768, but Roberto Lambertini proved that this question is not attributable
to Alnwick.59 It is possible that he is referring to distinction 3, question 1, of his
Sentences I, but the Determinatio speaks about ‘plura argumenta’ that in the
question of the Sentences would be Scotus’s argumentations. If this is the case,
then ‘quaere contrarium ibi’ indicates that in the Determinations Alnwick ex-
plicitly points to his change of mind regarding the role of the intelligible species.
In reality, here Alnwick claims that the human intellect, in its present state,
understands through the mediation of phantasms, which means that in our pres-
ent state the connection between the powers of the imagination and of the intel-
lect is such that we can know nothing about the universal unless we imagine a
singular instantiation of it.60 Alnwick argues that intellectual cognition requires
the presence of the object as the intelligible species, which represents it. The in-
telligible species precedes the act of the intellect, and it is generated by both the
object and the intellect.61 The object is formally present in the intellect, since the
species, which represents it, is as a form in the intellect.62
Now, Alnwick considers the intelligible species as a form in the intellect
that is necessary for the cognition, because it represents the object. Furthermore,
58 Alnwick, Determinationes, q. 1, in Stella, “La sindrome della scienza,” 780.

59 Lambertini, “Intentions in Fourteenth-Century Bologna,” 447: “A comparison with some
of Alnwick’s positions revealed that this Franciscan theologian active in Bologna supported a
theory of intentions which was different from the one championed by the Bolognese masters.”
60 Alnwick, Determinationes, q. 1, in Stella, “La sindrome della scienza,” 784: “[…] intellec-
tus noster pro statu isto capit praesentiam obiecti sui a sensu, ut speciem intelligibilem, et ideo
nihil intelligit nisi per conversionem ad phantasmata, propter quod intellectus noster prius in-
telligit alia quam se.”
61 Alnwick, Determinationes, q. 1, in Stella, “La sindrome della scienza,” 781: “Sed actus
intelligendi praesupponit praesentiam obiecti; nihil enim potest intelligi nisi sit praesens intel-
lectui in ratione obiecti; est autem obiectum intelligibile praesens intellectui per speciem intelli-
gibilem rappresentantem obiectum. […] sed species generatur ab obiecto et intellectu et non
ab actu intelligendi […]. Sed obiectum et intellectus agens sunt agentia naturalia, et intellectus
possibilis est dispositus ad recipiendum. Ergo ipsis ad invicem approximatis et non impeditis
causabitur perfecta species intelligibilis.”
62 Alnwick, Determinationes, q. 1, in Stella, “La sindrome della scienza,” 784: “Obiectum
dicitur esse formaliter praesens in potentia aliqua quia eius species repraesentans ipsum est
formaliter in illa potentia.”
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136 Marina Fedeli
the agent intellect has an indispensable function not only for the act of under-
standing, but in particular insofar as it is a concurrent cause of the intelligible
species.
Although it is impossible to compare two questions about the same issue, it
seems quite evident that Alnwick changes his mind about how the cognitive pro-
cess happens from the Commentary on the Sentences to his later works. At first,
Alnwick states that the intelligible species is unnecessary since the species in the
phantasm is sufficient for intellectual cognition: it can represent both the singu-
lar and the universal aspects. Therefore, a species impressed upon the intellect is
not necessary. A few years later, in his Disputed Questions on Intelligible Being,
and in particular in his Determinations, Alnwick claims that the intelligible spe-
cies as a form is necessary in order to present the object to the intellect. This
species is produced by the object and the agent intellect before the act of under-
standing. What remains constant is the link between the two faculties: in our
present state, in fact, the intellect and the imagination cooperate. Thus, knowing
the universal is possible only if the representation of a singular is present in the
imagination.
What is the reason for this change in Alnwick’s thought? The encounter
with other Scotists could have influenced Alnwick’s ideas. In fact, once Alnwick
was in Oxford, he almost certainly met John of Reading,63 often described as the
most loyal among Scotus’s followers.64 I think that Alnwick’s change of mind
may have derived from the confrontation with a faithful Scotist like Reading. In
fact, in the Determinatio 16, Alnwick says that he was able to reconsider some of
his positions thanks to “those who study Scotus” (illi qui in Scoto student).65 In
Reading’s Commentary on the Sentences I, dist. 3, question 3, which has been
edited by Gedeon Gàl, he now presents himself precisely as a defender of Sco-
tus’s position about intelligible species. In this question, first he reports the opin-
ions of those who deny the species. Second, in the main response to the ques-
tion, he defends Scotus’s arguments in support of the necessity of the species
(namely the three arguments about universality) from the attacks of opponents
such as Richard of Drayton and William of Ockham.66 Now, in the first part of
63 Alnwick became the forty-second regent Franciscan Master in Theology in Oxford prob-
ably in 1316. In the same year John of Reading was probably in Oxford as Bachelor and read
his Sentences; cf. Ledoux, “Praefatio,” X, and Alliney, “Fra Scoto e Ockham,” 275‒76. See also
Fiorentino, “Introduction,” 1.
64 Alliney, “Fra Scoto e Ockham,” 274.
65 Alnwick, Determinationes, q. 16, (Civitas Vaticana, BAV, Ms. Palatinus Latinus 1805),
128r: “Et hanc opinio ad presens tenui gratia illorum qui in Scoto student”; cfr. Ledoux, “Prae-
fatio,” XXXVIII.
66 For the division of Reading’s question, see Gál, “Quaestio Ioannis de Reading De Neces-
sitate Specierum Intelligibilium Defensio Doctrinae Scoti,” 69‒74. For Reading’s view of cogni-
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Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Reading, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 3, n. 27, in Gàl, “Quaes-
Ms. 172), 48r‒v tio Ioannis de Reading,” 82
Dico igitur quod non videtur mihi necesse ponere Dicitur tunc quod non requiritur species in intel-
aliquam speciem impressam in memoria, sed suf- lectu ante actum intelligendi ad hoc quod obiec-
ficit illa, que est in virtute fantastica, ad represen- tum sit praesens, quia obiectum sufficienter
tandum intellectui quodcumque intelligibile uni- repraesentatur in phantasmate.
versale.
Quod sic patet: magis universale representatur dis- Hoc probatur, quia ideo ponitur species in intellec-
tincte in representativo minus universalis, vel eti- tu ante actum intelligendi ut repraesentet univer-
am singularis; quod enim representat distincte in- sale, quia phantasma non potest repraesentare nisi
dividuum et singulare potest distincte representare singulariter, secundum eos; sed propter hoc non
quodlibet eius superius; sed species in phantas- oportet ponere; igitur etc. Probatio minoris: ea-
mate representat distincte singulare. Igitur ipsa dem species in intellectu minus universalis ‒ si
sufficit ad representandum quodlibet superius uni- ponatur ‒ repraesentat magis universale. Similiter,
versale. Assumptum probatur, quia distincte minus commune includit magis commune, et ideo
cognoscentem aliquid oportet distincte cognoscere cognoscens hominem cognoscit animal.
quicquid est de essentia eius: huiusmodi autem
sunt superiora respectu inferiorum, sicut animal
est de per se intellectu hominis et de essentia eius.
Fig. 3.
this question, Reading reports the opinions of those who deny the species, in-
cluding Henry of Ghent and those who support his doctrine in other ways. Of
these opinions, as Gàl notes, five out of 20 arguments are present in the question
of Alnwick’s Commentary, previously analyzed. Even though the two texts are
not verbatim identical, it is a fair bet that Reading refers precisely to Alnwick’s
text; cf. the comparison in fig. 3.
There is one more argument where the similarity is quite manifest: here,
both Alnwick’s argument and Reading’s text speak about the species as some-
thing expressed in a place; cf. the comparison in fig. 4.
These examples prove that John of Reading knows the position of Aln-
wick’s Sentences on intelligible species. In his question, Reading reports both
Scotus’s arguments and the objections that circulated in his own milieu. He
carefully replies to them, including Alnwick’s argument. There is therefore a
chance that Alnwick’s encounter with Reading led the former to change his
mind regarding intelligible species. It could be argued that Alnwick did not need
Reading to understand Scotus’s opinion because he knew very well Scotus’s
texts. I believe that, if Reading played a part in the development of Alnwick’s
tion, see also Fiorentino, “Species nei secoli XIII–XIV,” and Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 166‒
79.
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138 Marina Fedeli
Alnwick, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 1 (Assisi, Bibl. Com., Reading, Sent. I, dist. 3, q. 3, n. 13, in Gàl, “Quaes-
Ms. 172), 49v tio Ioannis de Reading,” 79‒80
[…] in aliis potentiis imprimitur aliquid ut forma […] locatum non est in loco formaliter sicut acci-
in materia et accidens in subiecto, sed in intellectu dens in subiecto vel sicut forma in materia. Sed
sicut locatum in loco: nunc autem locatum est <secundum Philosophum> III De anima, “anima
aliquid expressum loco, non impressum. est locus specierum, non tota sed intellectiva”; et
ita species est in intellectu sicut quasi in loco; igi-
tur formaliter species <non est> ponenda in intel-
lectu.
Fig. 4.
theory of cognition, his role is to have shown the inconsistency of some part of
Alnwick’s doctrine (but I don’t know which one!). In other words, I think that if
Alnwick changed his mind about intelligible species, this is a consequence of a
reorganization of his general thought.
My comparative analysis is admittedly reductive, since it is conducted on
the basis of a few texts. If there were any presently known direct quotes from
Reading concerning species in Alnwick’s Determinations or in his other later
works, then we would have been able to say with more certainty that the origin
of Alnwick’s change of mind lies in the debate between the two Scotists. In the
absence of such evidence, this reconstruction is at least quite probable.
Conclusion
At different stages of his career, William of Alnwick has proposed two different
approaches to the cognitive process. Certainly, there are still many points that
deserve further clarification, a difficult task, however, given the lack of published
texts. Currently, we can say that in an early work ‒ his Commentary on the Sen-
tences ‒ Alnwick argues against Scotus’s theory of the intelligible species. He
claims that they are unnecessary, because the species in the phantasm can pro-
vide both the singular representation and the universal. What can represent an
individual distinctly, can also represent something more universal. The same
species can thus represent two distinct ways due to subordination, namely inas-
much as the universal, understood as absolute nature, includes the singular. In
this early phase, Alnwick’s thought is closer to that of Henry of Ghent than to
that of Scotus. Indeed, he denies the impressed species in the memory (he is
here speaking of the expressive species). As other scholars on Alnwick have al-
ready noted, he seems to have been influenced by Henry’s view in different areas
of his thought. As Maarten Hoenen states, “most Scotists associated themselves
with the position of Henry of Ghent without taking too much notice of the re-
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statements of Scotus.”67 However, Henry’s and William’s theories are not com-
pletely convergent, since the former identifies a virtual separation,68 whereas the
latter speaks of subordination between the singular and the universal aspect.
At a later moment, as a result of his stay in Oxford, William of Alnwick
changes his view of the intelligible species, now considering them as necessary
for any act of thought. The intellect must have the object present in the form of
the species that represents it. In the Determinations, the agent intellect has an
active role in the production of the universal since it produces the universal in
the species by involving the phantasm.
Finally, we have seen how this change in Alnwick’s mind is probably due to
the confrontation in Oxford with John of Reading, who was a loyal Scotist.
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-XIVth Century). Edited by Jacopo Francesco Falà and Irene Zavattero, 177‒201. Rome:
Aracne, 2018.
Spruit, Leen. Species Intelligibilis. From Perception to Knowledge. I: Classical Roots and Medie-
val Discussions. Leiden‒New York‒Köln: Brill, 1994.
Stella, Prospero T. Illi qui student in Scoto: Guglielmo di Alnwick e la ‘haecceitas’ scotista. Tori-
no: Società editrice internazionale, 1969.
Tachau, Katherine H. Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology, and the
Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345, Leiden: Brill, 1988.
Tweedale, Martin M. “Representation in Scholastic Epistemology.” In Representation and Ob-
jects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy. Edited by Henrik Lagerlund, 65‒80. Ashgate:
Aldershot, 2005.
Veliath, Dominic. “The Scotism of William of Alnwick in His Determinationes De Anima.”
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The Non-Beatific Vision of God in the Present Life
Franciscus de Mayronis’s Relational Theory of Cognition
Damian Park, O. F. M.
Introduction
Franciscus de Mayronis was a Franciscan friar and one of John Duns Scotus’s
primary students; he became a master of theology in 1323. His Commentary on
the Sentences is preserved in more than 100 medieval manuscripts, a striking
number given that the printing press only became widespread in Europe after
the middle of the fifteenth century.1 There were even some scholars of the fif-
teenth century referred to as mayronistae, another mark of the influence his
writings had in those times. Even well into the seventeenth century, some
prominent Scotists, such as Bartolomeo Mastri and Bonaventura Belluto, used
Mayronis’s works as important Scotist sources.2 In recent literature, although
not as much as it deserves, Mayronis’s work has received considerable attention,
and not only his cognitive theory but also his metaphysics and theology.3 How-
ever, Mayronis especially occupies a significant place in the early fourteenth cen-
tury’s Franciscan intellectual tradition, particularly in the onset of the Scotist
tradition. For Mayronis not only creatively explicated and developed Scotus’s
thoughts in his writings, but also actively engaged in conversation with Peter
Auriol and William Ockham as the “first” Scotist.4
For Mayronis, cognition (notitia) is a relation between an act of cognition
on the part of the subject and an object that terminates the act. Cognition is
neither just some information that an object simply causes in us, nor an inde-
I wish to express my gratitude to Stephen Brown, Mary Beth Ingham, and Eileen Sweeney for
their comments and advice on a draft of this paper. I am also grateful to the editors of this
volume, Daniel Heider and Claus A. Andersen for their corrections and suggestions.
1 Cf. Möhle and Pich, “Einführung,” 12–14.
2 Cf. Andersen, “Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” 194–211.
3 Concerning Mayronis’s cognitive theory, to list some closely related to this paper among
many, see Maurer, “Francis of Meyronnes’ Defense of Epistemological Realism” and “The Role
of Infinity in the Thought of Francis of Meyronnes;” Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 327–32;
Etzkorn, “Franciscus De Mayronis: A Newly Discovered Treatise on Intuitive and Abstractive
Cognition,” 15–20; Cesalli, “Objects and Relations in Correlational Theories of Intentionality;”
Möhle, Formalitas und modus intrinsecus, 220–57; Pickavé, “Francis of Meyronnes on Beings
of Reason.”
4 For the epithet “Scotistarum princeps”, see Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 94.
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144 Damian Park, O. F. M.
pendent cognitive act of our own. Hence, the cognition or vision of God is also a
relation between our act of cognition and its object, i. e., God. Through his rela-
tional account of cognitive theory, Franciscus de Mayronis argues that whether it
be in the present or in the afterlife, wherever God exists, we can have a vision of
God. To argue this point, Mayronis, under William Ockham’s influence, cre-
atively modifies Scotus’s much celebrated doctrine of intuitive and abstractive
cognition.
Duns Scotus’s distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition first
appears in Book II of his early Oxford Commentary on the Sentences known as
the Lectura.5 Although the distinction appears throughout his entire corpus, the
core definition of the distinction, i. e., how each of them happens, remains the
same over time. In the Lectura, he first distinguishes them by considering their
cause. The res in se, existent and present, causes intuitive cognition and not abs-
tractive cognition. The res repraesentativa causes abstractive cognition and not
intuitive cognition.6 Secondly, he distinguishes them by considering their con-
text. Abstractive cognition only happens in via, and intuitive cognition only hap-
pens in patria.7 These two points are closely connected to each other because
Scotus’s prime example of intuitive cognition is the beatific vision, which is not
possible in the present life.8
In contrast, Mayronis was more interested in what each cognition is termi-
nated in, rather than how each cognition occurs. In his early writings he defend-
ed Scotus’s causal account against Ockham’s nominalist criticism, because Ock-
ham rejected the decisive causal role of an existing object as existing in Scotus’s
characterization of intuitive cognition. Ockham also claimed that the existence
of an object is only a condition of cognition, just as an absence of an object is.
Mayronis could never accept this claim because of his understanding of cogni-
tion as a relation to its object. In later years, Mayronis rejected Scotus’s causal
5 Duns Scotus, Lect. II, dist. 3, pars 2, q. 2, n. 288 (ed. Vat. XVIII), 322: “[…] prout distin-
guitur contra abstractivam qua per speciem, cognoscitur res in se”; Ord. II, dist. 3, pars 2, q. 2,
n. 321 (ed. Vat. VII), 553: “[…] eo modo quo dicimur intuieri rem sicut est in se.”
6 Concerning Scotus’s causal account of the distinction, see Pini, “Scotus on Intuitive and
Abstractive Cognition,” 348–54.
7 Duns Scotus, Lect. II, dist. 3, pars 2, q. 2, n. 289 (ed. Vat. XVIII), 322: “Primam autem
cognitionem non exspectamus in patria, quae est abstractiva, quia illa possumus Deum cognos-
cere posito – per impossibile – quod non esset (sicut modo cognoscimus rem cognitione abs-
tractiva, quae abstrahit ab exsistentia, etsi res non sit); sed aliam cognitionem, qua videtur
Deus intuitive, exspectamus in patria.”
8 Dumont, “Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus’s Distinction between Intuitive and
Abstractive Cognition,” 581–82, shows that Scotus uses the term “intuitive” only in the context
of the beatific vision in the Lectura. Scotus expands his usage of intuitive cognition in his later
writings.
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The Non-Beatific Vision of God in the Present Life 145
account for two reasons. First, he was influenced by Ockham’s critique. Second,
he sought to secure more firmly a relational account of cognition to its object.
This essay will proceed in two main steps: first, with Mayronis’s position
that cognition is a relation; second, with Mayronis’s modification of Scotus’s
doctrine of intuitive and abstractive cognition.
1. Cognition as a Relation
This section has two subsections. First, I will present how Duns Scotus deals
with relation in his cognitive theory, while taking cognition as an absolute quali-
ty based on his Quodlibet 13. Then, I will turn to Mayronis’s relational account
of cognitive theory in terms of how he developed on what his master left off
from. Finally, I will focus on Mayronis’s ontology of relation.
1.1 Duns Scotus: Cognition as a Quality
For Scotus, the act of cognition is essentially a standalone quality, rather than a
relation. This will become clearer as we consider the textual arguments. In his
metaphysics of act and potency, Scotus defines the intellect, with the will, as an
“active potency” that self-changes as well as brings about a change in another.9
The intellect first receives a form of an object, which we call the agent intellect’s
abstraction of the intelligible species or the possible intellect’s reception.10 Then,
the intellect internally produces the act of cognition proper.11 In reflecting on the
knowledge that we have already gained through the reception of the species, the
intellect perfects what is already there. Scotus is more interested in the second,
the self-reflected act, and takes it as more truly active than the first because the
cognitive potency, i. e., the intellect, actualizes itself in the second act, whereas
something else, the extra-mental object, causes the intellect to act in the first
act.12 This second cognitive act has again two distinct components: the produc-
9 Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super lib. Met. Arist. IX, qq. 3–4, n. 11 (OPh IV), 538, and
ibid., n. 48 (OPh IV), 556–57; Aristotle, Met. IX, c. 1, 1046a 9–12.
10 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 2 (ed. Vat. III), 245–330; Cf. Giorgio Pini, “Two
models of Thinking,” 94–96.
11 Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 13, n. 2 (ed. Vivès XXV), 507: “Quaestio ista non quaerit de actu
terminato ad cognitionem tanquam ad terminum, quo scilicet actu producitur vel educitur, vel
inducitur ipsa cognitio, sed quaerit de actu cognoscendi, qui, scilicet est ipsa cognitio actualis,
ita quod iste actus, si dicatur actio, non intelligitur quod sit de Genere Actionis, quia ipsa est
semper ad terminum aliquem accipientem aliquo modo esse per ipsam actionem, sed intelligi-
tur quod sit actio, hoc est, operatio, qua agens tanquam actu ultimo perficitur.”
12 Scotus develops the notion of self-change based on this second act in Duns Scotus,
Quaestiones super Lib. Met. Arist. IX, q. 14 (OPh IV), 625–73.
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tion of knowledge and the produced knowledge itself. Scotus rejects the former,
the productive, as the cognitive act proper and focuses on the latter, the pro-
duced knowledge, which is an immanent act, and sees it as the cognition.13
In Quodlibet 13, Scotus considers the cognitive act in terms of three out of
the ten Aristotelian categories: action, quality, and relation.14 He quickly catego-
rizes the act that produces knowledge as an action, which brings about some-
thing. For those who regard this production of knowledge as the cognitive act
proper, cognition is an action, but Scotus points out that only a certain aspect of
the cognitive act can be seen as an action.15 He spends the entire quodlibet ques-
tion examining the characteristics of the latter act, the produced knowledge,
which he calls an ‘operation’ as opposed to an ‘action.’
This Quodlibet question is designed to defend his position that the cogni-
tive operation is essentially an absolute entity, i. e., a quality, against a position
that it is essentially a relation. Absolute entities do not need anything other than
themselves to be defined as individual entities, whereas relations exist only in
regard to something else. Consider relations like ‘father’ or my ‘being taller.’ A
man is a father only in relation to his son and I am only taller than someone
who is shorter than me. Scotus’s anonymous opponent in this Quodlibet ques-
tion sees cognition as a relation because one cannot understand cognitive acts
apart from their terms.16 However, Scotus does not think that an act of cognition
always requires an object, and even when it does, he thinks it is not the object
but the cognitive operation itself as an absolute entity that is more essential in
cognition. Scotus first shows that an absolute entity is necessarily involved in
every operation, including cognitive operation in art. 1. He then shows how this
absolute entity is related to the object to create a relation in art. 2, and that this
13 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 27, qq. 1–3, n. 55 (Vat. VI), 86.
14 Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 13 (ed. Vivès XXV), 507–86.
15 Pini, “Two Models of Thinking,” and Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 107–10,
present the common interpretation of Aquinas’s cognitive theory that Aquinas understands
cognition as an action. However, it does not seem to be the case with some Thomist commen-
tators. They say that cognition is a quality for Aquinas too, since it is not “kinesis” (the act of
the imperfect, i. e., transient act) but “energeia” (the act of the perfect). For instance, Pseudo-
Aquinas, Summa totius Logicae Aristotelis, Treatise 5, Chapter 7 quoted in George, “On the
Meaning of Immanent Activity according to Aquinas,” 538, says, “Similiter intelligere et sentire
sunt actiones immanentes, quia dicunt actum intelligendi vel sentiendi esse actu in intelligente
vel sentiente. Haec autem actio immanens non est directe in praedicamento actionis […].”
Similar positions can be found in John Poinsot, Ferrariensis and other Thomists, including
Bernard Lonergan, who says in Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, 148: “[…] it was Scotus
who affirmed immanent action to lie in the first species of the predicament quality. I have not
noticed such a statement in Aquinas, but I suggest that it would be Thomistic to affirm that, as
esse is substantial, so immanent act is qualitative.” I thank Daniel Heider for these references.
16 Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 13, n. 1 (ed. Vivès XXV), 507: “Arguitur quod relativi, quia talis
actus non potest intelligi, nisi cointelligendo terminum.”
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relation to the object is not essential to the act of cognition, unlike how the abso-
lute entity is essential in art. 3. Thus, Scotus’s conclusion is: a cognitive opera-
tion is essentially an absolute entity, which falls into the category of quality, and
involves usually – but not necessarily – a relation to the object, which falls into
the category of relation.17
In article 2, Scotus shows how the act of cognition, understood as a quality,
can have two different kinds of intentional relations to the object.18 One is a
‘relation of the measurable to the measure’ (relatio mensurabilis ad mensuram),
and the other is called a ‘relation of contact’ (relatio attingentiae) or a ‘relation
of tending’ (relatio tendentiae).19 The former is always quasi-real. In its actual
form, it concerns intuitive cognition, and in its potential form, abstractive cogni-
tion. The latter is always actual. In its real form, it concerns intuitive cognition,
and in its conceptual form, abstractive cognition.
With the former, i. e., the relation of measurability, Scotus refers to the third
type of the Aristotelian notion of relation that explains our cognition in general,
be it sensitive or intellectual.20 Relations in this third category, including cogni-
tion, are relative not in a mutual way as we might naturally assume about rela-
17 Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 13, n. 16 (ed. Vivès XXV), 544: “[C]oncedo quod operatio, quae
est ultima perfectio naturae operantis, necessario habet annexam relationem […]. Sed cum
dicitur, quod ipsa est ultima perfectio praecise inquantum connectit cum objecto, dico quod
ultima perfectio potest intelligi, vel aliqua summa perfectio per se una, vel perfectio integrata ex
illa, et omnibus necessario concomitantibus. Primo modo dico, quod operatio est ultima per-
fectio, et est simpliciter perfectior quocumque concomitante ipsam, etiam illa relatione, quam
formaliter importat connexio, quia si possem habere operationem beati, sine illa relatione
essem beatus, non autem essem beatus, si haberem relationem sine operatione.” Also, concern-
ing that one thing cannot be both absolute and relative at the same time, and thus, a relation is
distinct from its foundation (e. g., an absolute quality), see Duns Scotus, Ord. II, dist. 1, q. 4–5,
n. 219, 222 (Vat. VII), 110 and ibid., n. 244, textus interpolatus (Vat. VII), 122; cf. Henninger,
Some Late Medieval Theories of the Category of Relation, 150–54.
18 We will see in section 1.2 how Mayronis adapts these in his theory of cognition.
19 Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 13, n. 11 (ed. Vivès XXV), 525: “Ista distinctione actus
cognoscendi supposita potest dici quod primus, scilicet, qui est rei existentis, in se necessario
habet annexam relationem realem et actualem ad ipsum objectum…In speciali autem videtur
esse duplex relatio actualis in isto actu ad objectum. Una potest dici relatio mensurati, vel ver-
ius mensurabilis ad mensuram. Alia potest dici relatio unientis formaliter in ratione medii ad
terminum, ad quem unit, et ista relatio medii unientis specialiori nomine potest dici relatio
attingentiae alterius, ut termini, vel tendentiae in alterum, ut in terminum.” Ibid., n. 13 (ed.
Vivès XXV), 539–40: “Secundus actus cognoscendi qui scilicet non est necessario existentis, ut
existentis […] potest poni habere ad objectum relationem realem potentialem, et hoc primam,
de qua in praecendenti membro dictum est, scilicet mensurabilis vel dependentiae; non autem
secundam, scilicet unionis vel attingentiae. Potest etiam ista cognitio habere ad objectum rela-
tionem rationis actualem, sed illam necessario requirit ad hoc, quod sit ipsius objecti.”
20 Aristotle, Met. V, c. 15, 1020b26–32.
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tion – just like Aristotle himself who did not deal with this type in the section
about relation in the Categories – but in a non-mutual way, unlike the first type
of Aristotelian relations, i. e., numbers (all numbers are relative to ‘one’ and to
one another), and the second type of relations holding between actions and pas-
sions (e. g., a father and his son are in mutual relation); the act of cognition, the
third type, is relative to the object, but not vice versa. In Ordinatio I, Scotus
mentions the relation of measurability only in a passing way to categorize the
other relation, i. e., the relation of tending, in the third type of Aristotelian rela-
tions. Scotus stresses that these two relations are not identical but merely similar
to each other, as they are under the same type of relation.21 In this Quodlibet,
which is most likely a later work than the passage in the Ordinatio, Scotus now
elaborates on this well-known Aristotelian relation.
Even though we commonly speak of both the knowledge of the knower and
of the knowledge of the object, in the context of the relation of measurability,
Aristotle, and St. Thomas in his Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle,
both make it clear that knowledge is relative to the object, not to the knower.22
Scotus partially accepts this position, where he clarifies that knowledge indeed
has relations to both the object and the intellect. However, he accepts that it is
the relation to the object that provides the certainty of knowledge, and that the
truth of knowledge thus is measured by its object. In this way, to deal with the
passive character of intellection with respect to its object, Scotus develops his
own version of the relation of measurability.23 He says:
Here it should be noted that for “something to be measured” means that it is made cer-
tain of the specific quantity by the other [i. e., the measure], so that it implies a relation-
ship both to the intellect that gets the certitude and to the measure which imparts it. The
first of these is not real, just as the relationship of the knowable to the knowledge is not
real. The second relationship is of the caused, not in being, but being known, to the cause
of its being known, and this relationship is real insofar as the dependence of the caused
upon the cause is concerned, which dependence arises from the character of the relata
and not just because of an act of the mind referring one to the other.24
Our cognition is causally dependent on its extra-mental object and this relation
between cognition and its object is real. However, this causal relation is distinct
from the relation of measurability. This distinction is not quite intuitive because,
in both relations, intellection is coming from the object in a passive way, and
21 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, p. 2, q. 2, nn. 478–79 (Vat. III), 286–87.

22 Aristotle, Met. V, c. 15, 1020b26–32; Aquinas, In Metaphysicam V, lect. 17, n. 1026 (ed.
Marietti), 320–21.
23 For the passive and active character of cognitive acts in Scotus, see Pasnau, “Cognition,”
290–93.
24 Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 13, n. 12, translated by Wolter and Alluntis in God and Creatures,
293.
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Scotus’s rather hasty presentation does not make it clearer either. Nevertheless,
the rationale of the distinction is rather simple: one is a real relation and the
other is not. The causal relation is a real relation, the object is the cause and the
act is the caused. When it comes to the intentionality of the act, the relation of
the measurable to its object is not entirely real because cognized being (esse cog-
nitum) is involved. Scotus says:
Nevertheless, because this relationship of dependence (not indeed of the knowledge itself
upon the cause of that knowledge, which is quite real, but of the object as known to the
object as that by which it is known) is between the relata insofar as they have this char-
acteristic of “being known” [esse cognitum], it follows that this relationship is not, simply
speaking, real.25
When Peter is looking at a solar eclipse, for example, Peter has an intuitive cog-
nition of the eclipse. The eclipse is the cause and the act of cognition is the
caused, not vice versa, and they have a real causal relation – a relation of depen-
dency, as Scotus calls it. However, there is another relation of dependency in
Peter’s mind between the eclipse cognized and the eclipse itself, and this is not
quite real, and thus conceptual. Nevertheless, this latter relation is not entirely
conceptual like the relation of the universal to the particular, because the act of
cognition participates in or imitates the reality of the extra-mental object. Scotus
explains this quasi-real dependency of the act of cognition on the extra-mental
object, not as a similarity between two similar things, but as a similarity between
God’s idea and a created object that corresponds to it.26 Although the likeness of
a mental idea and the object makes our cognition possible, in the perspective of
intentionality, as the likeness is not quite the sameness, it retains a barrier be-
tween the reality and our cognition that even a direct vision of a singular present
object cannot ignore. In this dependency of the measurability under this Aris-
totelian understanding of relation, the object is the truth-bearer that ‘measures’
the act of cognition and centers on this relationship.27
25 Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 13, n. 12, translated by Wolter and Alluntis in God and Creatures,
293. This passage follows the quoted passage above. “The second relationship” refers to the
relation of the measurable to its object rather than to the intellect.
26 Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 155; Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 13, n. 12 (ed.
Vivès XXV), 526: “Non dico similitudo per communicationem ejusdem formae, sicut est albi
ad album, sed similitudo per imitationem, sicut est ideati ad ideam.”
27 Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 153–67, here especially 158–61, sees that, in a
relation of the measurability in which Scotus deals with counterfactual cognitions as well, cog-
nition is intentional, not because it is in a relation to external things, but because it contains
information about its object and its intentionality is intrinsic. The relation of contact is a real
relation to its object simpliciter, and its intentionality is relational. Cross argues that because
the former concerns both cognition and the latter only intuitive cognition, intentionality of a
cognitive act is not essentially relational in Scotus. Then, he reads Scotus’s account of mental
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To this top-down approach – I call it ‘top-down’ because cognition is pas-

sively given truth by the object – Scotus adds his own cognitive story with the
relation of tending, one in which cognition actively tends toward its object. In
the example above of Peter’s cognition of the eclipse, we see a relation that ac-
tively tends toward its object without any dependency on the object. In the Ordi-
natio, the relation of tending is distinguished from the causal relation for two
reasons. First, they are distinct because the relation of causality is a mutual rela-
tion (the second type Aristotelian relation) and the relation of measurability is a
non-mutual relation (the third type). Secondly, they are distinct because the re-
lation of causality is about the cause of cognition and the relation of tending is
about the content of cognition, and one relation does not entail the other. That
is, cognition can be caused by something, but the content of the cognition does
not have to be about its cause.28 These two reasons also distinguish the relation
of measurability from the relation of causality.
Scotus distinguishes between the two intentional relations, i. e., relations of
measurability and of tending, with ‘dependence.’ Dependency includes causality,
but not vice versa. The causal relation and the relation of measurability can each
be called a relation of dependency, but the relation of tending cannot. The act of
cognition, i. e., operation, does not tend toward its term through the relation of
tending in a dependent way.
Three relations are involved in this discussion: the causal relation, the rela-
tion of measurability, and the relation of tending. The real causal relation be-
tween the act of cognition and its object explains the production of cognition.
Intuitive cognition as an operation is not involved in the causal relation but is
involved in the other two intentional relations. The relation of measurability de-
scribes the passive or dependent character of intuitive cognition and the quasi-
real relationship between the object cognized and the extra-mental object. It is
an actual relation, since the existing object actually measures the intuitive cogni-
content as internalist. Pini, throughout his writings on Scotus’s cognitive theory, reads Scotus’s
cognitive theory as externalist, which essentially concerns items in the world. Pini, “Can God
Create My Thoughts?,” 56–61, understands the intentionality expressed in the relation of mea-
surability as essentially relational. In my reading of the Quodl., because the relation of measur-
ability is Scotus’s adaptation of the third Aristotelian notion of relation centered on the object,
it is awkward to read Scotus’s account of the relation of measurability as internalist.
28 For a comprehensive discussion on the causal relation and intentionality, see Pini, “Can
God Create My Thoughts?” Pini shows that the causal relation between an act of cognition and
its term does not necessarily account for the intentionality of cognition in Scotus. For Scotus,
the causal relation belongs to the second type of Aristotelian relations, whereas the intentional
relation belongs to the third type of Aristotelian relations between the measurable and the
measure. Scotus argues that, because, in an improbable situation, God can put into us some
knowledge about an object by means of intelligible species, the cause of knowledge (in this case
God) is not equal to what the knowledge signifies.
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tion. Yet, because a cognitive act is never a mere passive operation for Scotus, its
relation as tending toward its object is as essential as its relation as being mea-
sured by the object. According to the relation of tending, we can picture our
cognitive act as it actively tends toward its object. So, the relation describes intui-
tive cognition’s actual attaining of a real object. Consequently, intuitive cogni-
tion has the real and actual relation to its object (“anexam relationem realem et
actualem ad ipsum obiectum”).29
Say, the eclipse is over now, and Peter learns about it in his classroom with
an abstractive cognition of the eclipse. On the one hand, the relation of measura-
bility between the eclipse and Peter’s act of cognition is now only potentially real
(“ad obiectum realem potentialem”).30 It is potential but not actual, because the
object does not exist anymore. It is real in a qualified way, in the same sense that
the relation of the measurable in intuitive cognition is real, as we have seen
above. On the other hand, the relation of tending is actual, since the act of cogni-
tion can always tend toward anything whether or not it really exists. Yet, it is an
actuality of a conceptual, not real, relation to its term not existing.31
The beatific vision is a standard example of intuitive cognition that requires
a relation to its object. Unlike God’s uncreated beatitude, which is an intuitive
cognition and an operation that does not require any relation to the object – or
anything, the created beatitude is an operation that necessarily requires an actu-
ally real relation to the object for its ultimate perfection. On the other hand, our
knowledge of God as an abstractive cognition does not require an actual real
relation to the object. Although not required, when it has a relation, it is one of a
potentially real relation of the measurable, or one of an actually conceptual rela-
tion of tending, to the object, i. e., God.32
Note that, for Scotus, a relation – even in the case where it is necessarily
required – does not in any essential way constitute the operation that is the be-
atific vision. Because Scotus defines the cognitive operation as a quality that
stands alone and can never be a relation, the operation is one thing, and its rela-
tion to the extra-mental object is another. The cognitive act as an operation is a
quality that holds the relation to the extra-mental object. Scotus makes sure that
the perfection in created beatitude is ultimate not because it is formally a rela-
tion but because the cognitive act itself, which is a quality, is connected to its
object.33 However, while trying to find the principle of cognition in the cognitive
operation itself rather than in the extra-mental object, Scotus, to ensure the ob-
29 Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 13, n. 11 (ed. Vivès XXV), 525.

32 Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 13, n. 13 (ed. Vivès XXV), 539–40.
33 Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 13, nn. 16–17 (ed. Vivès XXV), 544–45; Ord. IV, dist. 49, p.1,
qq. 1–2, nn. 27–32 (ed. Vat. XIV), 294–96.
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jectivity of the cognitive operation, has no other way than relying on some form
of causal relation between the object and the operation, which he calls a depen-
dency to minimize the impression that it is indeed a causal relation (although he
completely changes his tone later in Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle,
IX, q. 15 where he treats the intellect as a potency determined by another and
develops the self-change motive only in the will).34 Mayronis, the first Scotist,
moves Scotus’s project forward by legitimating the relation between the cogni-
tive operation and the object as necessary to attain a firm objective foundation.
Scotus argued against a position that the act of cognition is a relation. Instead,
the act of cognition is relational as a quality: the cognitive act is the ground of
the relation to the object. Mayronis concedes this conclusion. Now, Mayronis’s
critical move is this: cognition is the relation per se whose ground is the act of
cognition.
1.2 Franciscus de Mayronis: Cognition as a Relation
Mayronis defines relation, according to Aristotle, as that which is ‘to something’

(ad aliquid).35 Then, by definition, a relation is not a ‘something’ or an ‘absolute
thing,’ but it is ‘to something.’ Therefore, a relation always consists in more than
one element; in fact, in three elements: a ground (fundamentum), a term, and
the relation itself between these two.36 In considering cognition as a relation, the
ground is the subject’s act of cognition (‘that one knows’), its term is the object
of the act of cognition (‘what is known’), and the relation is the cognition itself
(‘what one knows as known’).37
Mayronis develops his master’s point that the cognitive operation, i. e., the
produced knowledge, is essentially separated from its relation to the object. First,
there is an action that produces a cognition. Secondly, there is the operation,
which is an absolute entity. This absolute entity also functions as the ground of
its relation to the object. Finally, there is a relation. In this way, the cognitive act
as a whole includes aspects of all three categories: action, quality, and relation. It
is with this overall ontological system of cognitive act that Mayronis starts the
engine of Scotism.
There are two questions in his Commentary on the Sentences that explain
the direction he is headed towards. In the prologue to the final version of his
34 Cf. Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 163–64, note 27.

35 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus (henceforth Confl.), dist. 8, q. 1, 43rbH: “illud quod
secundum suam rationem formalem est ad aliquid est relatio.”
36 Bos, “Francis of Meyronnes on Relation and Transcendentals,” 329.
37 Cesalli, “Objects and Relations in Correlational Theories of Intentionality,” 271–80, pro-
vides an excellent summary of the relational aspect of cognition relevant to this paper. Some of
the passages in the Conflatus in this section are quoted and commented on by Cesalli.
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Commentary, also known as the Conflatus, we see two entire questions Mayronis
reserved to address in response to the challenges from two of his Franciscan
confreres, Peter Auriol and William Ockham.38 In those questions, Mayronis
wrote against the tendency of moving toward phenomenalism and skepticism of
his time and provided a powerful argument for epistemological realism based on
his theory of relation.39 It is, indeed, the link between our cognition and the real-
ity that Mayronis tried to preserve against the challenge. Mayronis did not hesi-
tate to modify the details of his master’s presentation to make the Scotistic sys-
tem stronger. Mayronis boldly defines the relation between the cognitive
operation and its term as cognition simpliciter.40 If the operation is intentional, it
is because of the relation. By elevating the relation as the ultimate perfection in
the cognitive process, he secures both a firm objectivity of cognition and the
agency of our intellectual power.
In Book I, distinction 29, of the Conflatus, where he lays out his theory of
relation, Mayronis makes clear that his point of emphasis on relation is its con-
tribution to the certitude of knowledge. He lists as the first property of relation,
the concomitant intellection of relation and its term, i. e., that when a relation is
known its term is necessarily known as well. He writes:
The first [property] is that it is proper to relation that it is known concomitantly with its
term. Indeed, everything that is to itself, or taken generally, what is not to the other, can
38 The topic of skepticism around the writings of Ockham and Auriol have attracted much
attention. Cf., among others, Boehner, “Notitia Intuitiva of Non-Existents according to Peter
Aureoli, OFM. (1322)” and “The Notitia Intuitiva of Non-Existents according to William Ock-
ham;” Adams, “Intuitive Cognition, Certainty, and Scepticism in William Ockham;” Tachau,
Vision and Certitude, 85–156; Perler, “Does God Deceive Us?;” Heider, “The Notitia Intuitiva
and Notitia Abstractiva of External Senses in Second Scholasticism,” 175–80; Pini, “Scotus on
Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition.”
39 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 18, 10vaM–11raD: “Utrum per potentiam divinam de non-
existente possit esse notitia intuitiva?”; q. 19, 11raD–11vbP: “Utrum potentia sive sensitiva
sive intellectiva possit cognoscere naturaliter non-existens?”; Maurer, “Francis of Meyronnes’
Defense of Epistemological Realism,” 311–31, eloquently presents Mayronis’s responses to the
two Franciscans in the prologue questions as an effort to bridge the gap between experience
and the reality of the world.
40 Mayronis, Quodl. q. 5, 234vaM: “Si deus faceret actum intuitive notitiae, supposita possi-
bilitate sine obiecto, si tunc esset intuitiva. Dicitur quod non esset intuitiva, nec abstractiva, nec
omnino notitia, sed quaedam qualitas absens: quod de ratione notitiae est respectus ad obiec-
tum.” Confl., prol., q. 18, n. 222, ad b (ed. Möhle & Pich), 294: “[…] quia actus intelligendi et
notitia sunt duo; actus autem intelligendi est qualitas et non dicit perfectionem simpliciter,
notitia autem dicit respectum ad obiectum et est perfectio simpliciter. Si ergo manet illa quali-
tas, non diceretur notitia, quae est perfectio simpliciter, nec aliquid ipsa intelligeretur.”
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be known without knowing another thing concomitantly. However, relation, if it has to

be known, necessarily requires that its own term should be known concomitantly.41
Against this point, he presents an opinion of an anonymous critic:
Whoever understands the act of seeing, necessarily understands the object concomitant-
ly. But it is certain that the act of seeing is not a relation, but an absolute [entity]. There-
fore, this [position] is not proper to relation that it cannot be understood without the
other understood concomitantly.42
This critic contends that the concomitant understanding happens even when we
understand knowledge as an absolute entity, not a relation. His argument is
based on the position that the act of cognition is a quality. It sounds sympathetic
to Scotus’s position and the critic could be claiming to be more faithful to Scotus
than Mayronis is. Then, Mayronis responds:
To the first, I say that, without the object, one can neither see nor understand the act of
knowing or [the act] of seeing that has its relation to the object. This is not [in this way]
by the aspect of an absolute [entity] that is in the act, but is by the aspect of relation
grounded in that absolute [entity], which cannot be understood without the object being
concomitantly understood. However, as one cuts off that quality, which is an absolute
[entity] in the act [of knowing and of seeing], from the relation, which is an act to the
object, certainly, this [quality] can be known similarly without any other thing being
known concomitantly and just as other absolute [entities].43
Recall that Scotus explains a similar dynamic of quality and relation in a quite
different way by saying that, even when a relation is necessary for a cognitive act,
it is the absolute entity connected to its object that makes cognition possible, not
the relation. On this point, Mayronis clearly distances himself from Scotus. He
makes it clear, in his definition of both sensitive and intellectual cognition, that
cognition is formally a relation, not a quality. It is not that Mayronis rejects the
role of the operation, an absolute quality, in a cognitive process. He admits that
41 Mayronis, Confl., dist. 29, q. 1, 88rbH: “Prima est quod proprium est relationi quod coin-
telligatur cum suo termino. Omne enim quod est ad se: vel generaliter sumendo: quod non est
ad aliud: potest intelligi nullo alio cointellecto. Relatio autem si debeat intelligi necessario re-
quirit suum terminum cointelligi.”
42 Ibid.: “Quicumque intelligit actum videndi necessario cointelligit obiectum. Sed constat
quod actus videndi non est relatio: sed absolutum: ergo hoc non est proprium relationi quod
non possit intelligi sine alio cointellecto.”
43 Mayronis, Confl., dist. 29, q. 1, 88vaI: “Ad primum dico quod actum intelligendi vel vi-
dendi cum respectum ad obiectum nullus potest videre nec intelligere sine obiecto: sed hoc
non est ratione absoluti quod est in actu: sed ratione respectus fundati in illo absoluto quod
non potest intelligi sine obiecto cointellecto. Qualitatem autem illam quae est absoluta in actu
ut praescindit a relatione quae est actus ad obiectum: certe ista potest intelligi sine quocumque
alio similiter cointellecto sicut et alia absoluta.”
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there is indeed an aspect of quality in cognition as well, but because one can
know the quality independently from the object by the definition of quality as an
absolute being, it would not qualify as a cognition, which must essentially pro-
vide an intentionality to the object. A relation connects a ground with its term.
For Mayronis, the property of concomitant intellection of a relation specifically
concerns its term rather than its ground.44
That a relation is necessarily known with its object, however, does not mean
that cognition is essentially defined in terms of its term. It is the intentionality of
relation to its term that defines relation, not the term per se. The term is distin-
guished from the cognition. It is true that when cognition is known, its term is
also necessarily known and that cognition aims to attain the same formal con-
tent with the term. However, it is not that the term or object that defines the
cognition, but the intentionality of the cognition to the term that defines it.45
When we take a look at a cognitive act in relational terms, cognition is a relation,
the cognitive operation is its ground, and the object is its term. When we can say
that the Thomistic Aristotelian cognition theory places the object, i. e., the term,
at the center as the truth bearer, we can also see that Scotus tried to shift the
paradigm and focus on the self-causing cognitive operation. However, in Mayro-
nis, we see these two divided streams of discourse become merged to form one
unified account around the notion of relation, with a much-enhanced explanato-
ry power.
Mayronis also presents the property of the concomitant intellection in
terms of intuitive and abstractive cognition. As we have seen above in Scotus, on
the one hand, the relation of measurability can be actually real or potentially
real, and on the other hand, the relation of tending can be actually real or actual-
ly conceptual. We saw that the former of each, i. e., the actual real relations of
measurability and of tending account for intuitive cognition, whereas the latter
of each, i. e., the potential real relation of measurability and the actual conceptual
relation of tending account for abstractive cognition. Mayronis simplifies these
two accounts and understands a relation as either actual (actualis) or founda-
tional (fundamentalis).46 Although it is not explicitly stated in the text, its refer-
44 Mayronis, Confl., dist. 29, q. 5, 91rbH: “dico quod relatio diffinitur per duo additamenta,
scilicet, per fundamentum. Et in hoc aliis accidentibus equiparatur: et sine isto potest intelligi:
et per terminum. Et sine illo non potest intelligi. Inter additamenta enim potest esse gradus: ita
quod terminus sit intimior.”
45 Mayronis, Confl., dist. 29, q. 5, 91vaI: “dico quod habitudo relationis ad fundamentum
est de secundo modo: et est eius passio fundata in eius quidditate. Habitudo autem relationis
ad terminum est eius quidditas non tamen terminus eius et de eius quidditate.” Cf. Cesalli,
“Objects and Relations in Correlational Theories of Intentionality,” 276 and 279.
46 Mayronis, Confl., dist. 29, q. 1, 88raC–D: “Ad primum videtur dicendum quod relatio
potest esse sine termino. Dico ergo quod duplex est relatio in universali, scilicet, actualis et
fundamentalis […]. Dico quod ex sua quidditate est ad terminum, tamen quia fundamentalis
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ence to Scotus’s two notions of relation, i. e., the relation of measurability and
the relation of tending seems logical.47 We should note, however, that the char-
acter of the relation of tending is not very obvious in Mayronis’s notion of actual
and foundational relations, especially in its relevance to abstractive cognition. As
a firm realist, Mayronis seems to focus more on the positive aspect of abstractive
cognition – that it is founded on quiddity – rather than its negative aspect –
that it is lacking the real contact to the extra-mental object. The meaning of
‘foundational’ relation is twofold. It first means that a relation is potential, not
actual. Second, the fact that it is ‘foundational’ also means that it does retain
reality though it is real only in a qualified way, and its reality is founded on
something else. The distinction between actual and foundational relation pro-
vides a basis for Mayronis’s relational account of intuitive and abstractive cogni-
tion.
The term of an actual relation is an actually and accidentally existing thing,
such as a yellow butterfly flying in front of my eyes.48 As this relation is acciden-
tal, it does not pertain to the permanent quiddity of the extra-mental object, and
it ceases to exist when its term does not exist anymore. When an actual relation
between a cognitive act and its actually existing term is known, the term is nec-
essarily known concomitantly, and this explains intuitive cognition.49 My vision
non requirit terminum nisi in potentia, vel potest dici quod abstrahit ab esse ad se, et ab esse ad
aliud.” Here, the adjective ‘foundational’ (fundamentalis) expresses the distance in meaning
between ‘actual’ and ‘foundational’ to articulate the difference between intuitive and abstrac-
tive cognition. Intuitive cognition, which is an actual relation, requires the existence of the
term, whereas abstractive cognition, which is a foundational relation, does not require it. We
will also see later in Mayronis’s ontology that he also uses ‘foundational’ to express the dis-
tance between ‘real’ and ‘conceptual.’ In this latter usage, both actual relation and foundational
relation here are ‘formal beings,’ i. e., not simply real, that gain reality foundationally. For the
relatio fundamentalis, see Bos, “Francis of Meyronnes on Relation and Transcendentals,” 329–
30.
47 Mayronis’s relatio fundamentalis clearly refers to abstractive cognition. Cf., e. g., Francis-
cus de Mayronis, Confl., dist. 29, q. 1, 89raD. Yet, I did not find any direct reference in Mayro-
nis that connects the relatio actualis to intuitive cognition. However, the connection seems
substantial because of the striking resemblance of Mayronis’s distinction with Scotus’s distinc-
tion between cognitive relations.
48 Mayronis, Confl., dist. 30, q. 3, 94vaK: “illum voco respectum fundamentalem qui est in
suo fundamento non per accidens sed per se. Formalis vel actualis est ille qui inest suo funda-
mento per accidens.”
49 One might ask if one apprehends relation concomitantly by knowing the object first.
However, one should keep in mind that, in Mayronis, when we are aware of an object, that
awareness itself is a relation, through which we come to know the object. Therefore, logically,
relation comes first and then the knowledge. It is clearer when he talks about how we come to
know the Divine Essence. We come to know the Divine Essence through an extrinsic relation,
i. e., cognition, added between God and us. Cf. Mayronis, Confl., dist. 1, q. 4, art. 1, 13vbO.
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of the butterfly, for example, is necessarily about the butterfly. Mayronis treats
accidentality as an important characteristic of intuitive cognition, which we did
not see to be the case in Scotus. It might be due to the fact that Mayronis exten-
sively considers intuitions in the context of the present life more than Scotus did.
An accidental cognition, such as that of a flying yellow butterfly, would vanish
when I turn my attention away from it. This point about intuition’s accidentality
will be important when we consider Mayronis’s notion of the vision of God in
section 2.2 below.
A foundational relation does not require its term to actually exist. Even if I
had never seen a butterfly before and it did not exist anymore, I can still learn
and gain some knowledge about it in a similar way to how I learned about di-
nosaurs. A foundational relation concerns its term’s quiddity, not its existence.
In other words, there can be a foundational relation of an act of cognition to the
quiddity of the butterfly, even when it does not exist. It is crucial to understand
that for Mayronis, existence is a mode of the essence of a substance, and thus, it
is not a part of the essence or quiddity of a substance.50 The fact that a founda-
tional relation’s term does not exist does not hinder the quiddity of its term to
be communicated to an act of cognition. It is foundational because its term is in
potentiality, which does not mean that the relation is entirely made up by rea-
son. A foundational relation is indifferent to the existence of its term, as it is
about the quiddity of the term. We will examine the ontological meaning of this
point in the next section. This foundational relation corresponds to the poten-
tially real relation in Scotus and thus explains abstractive cognition. Again, when
the relation is known, then the term, i. e., the quiddity of the object, is known
concomitantly. If not, it is not a relation, and thus is not cognition at all. Abs-
tractive cognition is about knowledge of the essential features of an object. Be-
cause the essence of a substance does not change, the relation of an act of cogni-
tion to the essence of the object does not depend on its mode of existence.
Mayronis’s preference of ‘fundamentalis’ to ‘potentialis’ in the context of abs-
tractive cognition can be read as his stronger commitment to relational charac-
teristics of cognition. The cognized beings are ‘well founded’ in their terms rath-
er than ‘potentially connected.’51 Abstractive cognition is apt to describe
scientific knowledge that is about things in themselves rather than their acciden-
tal properties. Mayronis consider two more types of cognition that are discursive
other than intuitive and abstractive cognition and reserves scientific knowledge
only to abstractive cognition.52
50 For Mayronis, even the divine existence is not in the divine essence; cf. section 2.2 below.
51 For Mayronis’s two different kinds of non-actual relations, i. e., ‘respectus potentialis’
and ‘respectus aptitudinalis,’ see Cesalli, “Objects and Relations in Correlational Theories of
Intentionality,” 278–79.
52 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 20, n. 247 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 320.
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So far, we have seen that relation is ‘to something’ or it is essentially about

its term. Then, in what way is relation ‘to something’? To understand the meta-
physical significance of ad aliquid, it will benefit us to see how Mayronis de-
scribes the relation to its object on an ontological level in terms of his notion of
real being (ens reale) and conceptual being (ens rationis). I will first briefly sum-
marize Mayronis’s ontology and identify the ontological statuses of the elements
of cognitive acts. Then, I will present how he argues for the univocity of being
predicated of real being and conceptual being.53
1.3 Mayronis’s Ontology of Relation
Mayronis’s ontology first divides ‘being’ into mental being (ens in anima) and
extra-mental being (ens extra animam).54 Then, he divides both categories in
terms of their reality, i. e., whether they are real or conceptual. Extra-mental be-
ing is divided into real extra-mental being, such as substances and accidents, and
conceptual extra-mental being, such as quiddity.55
53 Cf. also Cesalli, “Objects and Relations in Correlational Theories of Intentionality,” 273–
77.
54 Mayronis, Confl., dist. 8, q. 5, n. 36 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 382–84: “[…] ens in prima sui
divisione dividitur in ens in anima et extra animam. Et quando dicitur quod omne quod est
extra animam est reale dico quod falsum est, nam quidditates in potentia obiectiva sunt extra
animam et non sunt fabricatae ab anima, alioquin, cum sint eiusdem rationis in potentia et in
actu, quidditates in actu essent entia rationis, quod est falsum. Constat autem quod tales quid-
ditates non sunt reales.”
55 Mayronis calls ens rationis ‘non-reale.’ Non-real is here not nothing. It is not real in the
trichotomy of real, formal, and conceptual, each of which is not necessarily mutually exclusive
to one another. What is not real means formal or conceptual, which still shares the meaning of
‘real’ in a certain sense. Möhle, Formalitas und modus intrinsicus, 218–33, shows how Mayro-
nis, in Quodl. q. 6, first defines ens rationis negatively as least real but embraces a more real
notion eventually. According to Mayronis’s initial definition, ens rationis is a being neither
‘causatum,’ i. e., caused by reason in the intellect, nor ‘regnante,’ i. e., determined by reason in
the will, nor ‘derelictum,’ i. e., produced and left behind from the object by reason in the act of
cognition, but ens rationis is a being ‘confictum,’ i. e., fabricated by reason with a reference to
the object. However, Möhle sees that Mayronis eventually moves away from this narrow defini-
tion of ‘ens confictum’ as the only kind of ens rationis and includes ‘ens derelictum’ and treats
the latter the more important meaning of ‘ens rationis.’ Being can be univocally predicated of
ens reale and this sense of ens rationis. Cf. Mayronis, Quodl. q. 6, 235rbE. Pickavé, “Francis of
Meyronnes on Beings of Reason,” presents the same quodlibetal question quite differently from
Möhle and highlights Mayronis’s critique of the general notion of ens rationis and his prefer-
ence for taking items that are commonly considered to be entia rationis as entia realis, such as
universals, privations, and impossible things. Regardless of Mayronis’s position on the general
notion of ens rationis, it is clear to me that the notion of ens rationis includes the notion of ens
derelictum in an important sense, through which he describes the ontological state of the third
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Quiddity (or ‘whatness’) is a being in the extra-mental object and not of the
soul. If quiddity is in a thing actually, it is the thing itself, which is real and
cannot merely be conceptual. If quiddity is in a thing only potentially without
the actual mode of existence, i. e., without the thing existing, then can it be still
considered as real or is it only conceptual? In fact, Mayronis warns the readers
before he discusses these divisions that some descriptions would be denomina-
tive rather than quidditative.56 While keeping his heads-up in mind, we can un-
derstand that, speaking in a denominative way, quiddity can fall into both cate-
gories, i. e., real (realis) or conceptual (rationis). For example, we think of the
quiddity of a donkey in a loose way as both real and conceptual. It is real be-
cause it is not simply something our mind made up, but it is also conceptual
because our mind can completely hold it in its own capacity. In this way, some
aspects of ‘quiddity’ can be predicated of ‘real’ and some other aspects of quiddi-
ty can be predicated of ‘conceptual’ in a denominative way. Now, speaking more
precisely, however, i. e., in a quidditative way, quiddity is neither real, nor con-
ceptual, but formal. Quiddity in potentiality is neither a thing nor nothing, but is
precisely a formality. Although it is not a real being, it is not a conceptual being
either, because it is not made by the soul and is still outside the soul. The quiddi-
ties, each of the formalities in actuality, of a donkey and a man, will remain the
same long after its substrate dies, decomposes, and is completely disfigured, i. e.,
in potentiality. The entities will not be distinguished really, but its quiddities will
still be distinguished formally, i. e., by a formal distinction.57
Afterwards, Mayronis divides mental beings into real mental beings and
conceptual mental beings. Just as we saw that quiddities are non-real or formal
extra-mental beings, there are also real mental beings, such as acts, habitus, dis-
positions, and intelligible species. These real mental beings are standalone enti-
ties that need not depend on other real objects for their own reality.58 A concep-
type of Aristotelian relations, such as cognition and volition, and thus, there is a critical role
that the notion of ens rationis plays in Mayronis’s cognitive theory.
56 Concerning quidditative vs. denominative, see Franciscus de Mayronis, Confl., dist. 8, q.
5, n. 35, 3 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 382. Qudditative predication predicates an essential aspect of a
subject, such as “man is a rational being.” Denominative predication predicates an accidental
aspect of a subject, such as ‘man breathes,’ or ‘man has two legs,’ which is not necessarily true.
57 Mayronis, Confl., dist. 8, q. 5, n. 36 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 384: “Hoc patet ex hoc, quia
quae formaliter et cum hoc realiter distinguuntur, ut homo et asinus, si amittant modum suum
realitatis per adnihilationem vel corruptionem, non distinguuntur ultra realiter. Tamen bene
distinguuntur formaliter sicut prius, quia easdem diffinitiones habent in potentia et in actu, in
potentia dico obiectiva.” Concerning how quiddity is related to formalitas, see Mayronis,
Confl., dist. 8, q. 5, 50raB–D.
58 Mayronis, Quodl. q. 6, 235vaI–K: “Dicitur autem communiter quod ens rationis est illud
quod est ab anima nostra fabricatum […]. Sed contra […] habitus intellectuales originantur a
ratione et tamen non ponuntur entia rationis; […] actus intelligendi fabricantur a ratione et
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tual mental being is again divided into a being that is purely conceptual, i. e., a
fictional being (ens rationis fabricatum), and a being neither purely real nor
purely conceptual, i. e., an intentional being (ens rationis derelictum).59 The on-
tology of a fictional being is simple. It is not real at all, but completely made up
by the mind. A ‘unicorn,’ for example, is a fictional being entirely produced by
reason, and it only refers to itself and does not refer to anything real. On the
other hand, an intentional being, ens derelictum, is somewhat complicated. It re-
tains its quasi reality in relation to another simple reality. ‘Derelictum’ describes
how the reality “leaves behind” its vestige or phantasm in the intellect, and thus,
the intentional being is how Mayronis’s ontology understands the third type of
Aristotelian relation. Intentional beings are “the relations (respectus) of intellec-
tion, of volition, of love, etc.”
Mayronis says that cognition and its relation to the object cannot be sep-
arated, and therefore, they are really identical, but somehow different.60 This
statement touches upon the real identity of a being and a relation. How can a
being be a relation as well? For medieval thinkers, this question might have
more immediate significance in theology than in philosophy. In theology, it is
asked, how can the notion of Divine Essence include the notion of the relation of
the Trinity? One cannot simply say that the Divine Essence includes the rela-
tions because God is a simple being that does not have parts. Mayronis answers
this question by appealing to the fact that being is a genus and relation is its
property.61 That is, being and relation are two different aspects of one identical
thing. In this way, relation is not ‘to another’ as a whole as its being, but it is
tamen ponuntur entia realia; […] dispositiones ad virtutes intellectuales sunt realia: et tamen
sunt ab ipsa ratione originata; […] species intelligibiles in nostro intellectu possibili fabrican-
tur ab intellectu agente et tamen non sunt entia rationis.”
59 Cesalli, “Objects and Relations in Correlational Theories of Intentionality,” 274; Mayro-
nis, Confl., dist. 17, q. 1, 68vbQ: “Dico quod ens rationis quantum ad praesens spectat est in
duplici differentia. Quoddam enim est fabricatum a ratione sicut respectus ad seipsum. Et per
tale ens rationis nunquam salvatur aliquid reale. Aliud est ens rationis non a ratione fabricatum
sed a ratione derelictum et huiusmodi sunt respectus intellecti, voliti, dilecti et huiusmodi.” For
Scotus’s use of ‘derelictum,’ see Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 448 (ed. Vat. III),
270.
60 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 18, n. 228 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 300: “[…] quandocumque sunt
aliqua duo quae separari non possunt, ista sunt idem realiter. Et tunc concedo quod notitia et
sui relatio ad obiectum sunt idem realiter, licet aliquo modo distinguuntur.”
61 Mayronis, Confl., dist. 29, q. 1, 88raD: “Dico quod ens non habet conceptum absolutum
nec respectivum: sed abstrahit ab utroque sicut divisum a suis dividentibus: sicut substantia a
corporeo et incorporeo.”
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indeed ‘to another’ according to its specific aspect.62 The Divine Essence is thus
the common nature and the Divine Relations in the Trinity are properties of
God. An intentional being is a being and a relation in the way that being is the
common nature and relation is its property.
Now, we can identify four elements of cognitive acts as a whole in terms of
Mayronis’s various divisions of beings: an object (real extra-mental being),
quiddity (formal extra-mental being), cognitive operation (real mental being),
and cognition (intentional being/relation). Given this ontological overview of
the elements in the cognitive act, let us have a closer look at the ontology of an
intentional being as a relation, and its relation to its term, i. e., a real extra-men-
tal being.
Mayronis, in order to provide an ontological basis for the intentional being
(ens derelictum) in its “vestige” (derelictum) of the object, argues for the univoc-
ity of being in extra-mental being and mental being. As a faithful interpreter of
his master, he holds Scotus’s doctrine of univocity of the concept of being where
‘being’ is said univocally of both the infinite being, i. e., God, and finite beings,
i. e., creatures. Mayronis expands this common denominator, ‘being,’ to this spe-
cific kind of conceptual beings, i. e., intentional beings or cognitive relations.
However, ‘being’ cannot be univocally predicated of the other type of conceptual
beings, i. e., fictional beings, and other real beings.63
There are two ways of looking at the ontological status of conceptual beings
(ens rationis).64 On the one hand, one can see ens rationis as caused by the soul
according to its whole being (se totum) without any real reference to an extra-
mental object. In this case, a conceptual being is at best a “diminished” being
compared to an extra-mental being. For mental beings are called ‘beings’ only in
a certain respect (secundum quid), whereas extra-mental beings are called ‘be-
ings’ simply (simpliciter).65 As an analogy, think of a painted man and an actual
62 Ibid.: “Uno quod ens non dicitur quidditative de relatione: sed solum eo modo quo su-
perius fuit dictum: sicut genus de differentia: quia dato quod sic: tunc relatio non esset ad
aliud secundum se totam: sed secundum rationem specificam tantum.”
63 For a fuller discussion of Mayronis’s argument of how being can be said of both ens reale
and ens rationis according to Franciscus de Mayronis, Confl., prol. q. 10, nn. 107–19 (ed.
Möhle & Pich), 186–99, see Möhle, Formalitas und modus intrinsecus, 241–57.
64 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 10, n. 107 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 186–88: “Circa primum est
intelligendum quod ens in anima dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro illo quod secundum se
totum est causatum ab anima. Alio modo pro illo quod secundum esse cognitum est produc-
tum ab anima.” In this text, Mayronis deals with ‘ens in anima’ in a denominative way, and
what he is actually dealing with is not ‘ens in anima’ but ‘ens rationis.’
65 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 10, n. 109 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 188: “[…] quia ens in anima
dicitur ens secundum quid et ens extra animam dicitur ens simpliciter.”
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man.66 Even though one could compare these with one another as two ‘men,’
say, one has darker hair than the other, these are two completely different ways
of understanding of ‘man.’ The man painted is only a “diminished” being com-
pared to the actual man.67 In the same way, when we understand ens rationis as
entirely caused by the soul, ‘being’ cannot be univocally said of the extra-mental
being and mental being because they are simply not the same kind and cannot
be defined on the same level.
On the other hand, we can see the ontological status of conceptual beings
foundationally (fundamentaliter), i. e., depending for their reality on their terms.
In this way, we regard, in a narrow way, a conceptual being as a cognized being
(esse cognitum) and it is seen as grounded on the real objects.68 Now, this de-
scription of conceptual being corresponds to intentional being (ens derelictum).
An intentional being is generated by the mind, and its being known does not
make it an existing being. Nevertheless, its formal content is produced by a cog-
nitive act according to the quiddity of its object foundationally, and the quiddity
is not destroyed or diminished by the act. For example, I have knowledge of a
table in my room. Although my knowledge of the table is a mental being and the
actual table is an extra-mental being, as my knowledge of the table is from the
actual table and the quiddity of the table in the table is preserved in my cogni-
tion of the table, I have the knowledge of the table not in a diminished (diminu-
it) way, but in an abstractive (dimittit) way.69 In this narrow sense, the concept
of being can be univocally said of the intentional being and the real object, and
the intentional being includes the same formal content as the quiddity in the
object.70
66 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 10, n. 112 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 192: “Ad secundum dico quod
proprie non numerantur nisi quia sunt diversae acceptationes entis, sicut homo non numeratur
in homine vero et picto et tamen dicuntur duo homines hoc est duae acceptationes hominis.”
68 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 10, n. 119 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 198: “Aliter potest dici quod
esse cognitum potest accipi dupliciter: vel formaliter et sic dico quod forte non est nisi ens
rationis et diminutum. Alio modo fundamentaliter, scilicet pro substrato vel obiecto. Et isto
modo est eadem quidditas quae est in re.”
69 Ibid.: “Non enim diminuit de ratione eius cuius est, licet non ponat esse quantum ad esse
existentiae, quia non sequitur ‘est cognitum, ergo est’; tamen rationem formalem non diminuit,
sed dimittit.” I understand ‘dimittit’ in the same way as ‘derelictum,’ namely, the formal ratio
remains or it leaves its reality in the soul. Cf. also Cesalli, “Objects and Relations in Correla-
tional Theories of Intentionality,” 275.
70 Unlike Mayronis, Scotus rejects this univocal predication of being in ens reale and ens
rationis. Möhle, Formalitas und modus intrinsecus, 206–9, 256–57, interprets Mayronis’s ex-
pansion of Scotus’s univocity thesis as not a rejection of Scotus, but Mayronis’s emphasis on
the realistic element of our cognition, which he might have developed against William Ockham
and other nominalists of his time.
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Mayronis argues for the same univocal concept of being more specifically in
intuitive and abstractive cognition. Against an opinion, that what is produced in
abstractive cognition is different from its object, he says:
I say that, in abstractive cognition, although nothing is produced as to being simpliciter

except act or species, nevertheless as to the cognized being itself, the species is not pro-
duced but quiddity [is produced]. However, the first produced [i. e., act or species] is not
a thing cognized, but only that the second [produced, i. e., quiddity, is a thing cog-
nized].71
In abstractive cognition, an act of cognition, the species of the object, and the
quiddity of the object are produced. However, neither the act nor the species
produced belongs to the cognized being, but only the quiddity does.72 As the
quiddity produced in an abstractive way, it is not the same as the object, but is a
foundational being essentially grounded in the reality of the object through a
foundational relation. Therefore, ‘being’ can be said of univocally both in the
extra mental object and the abstractive cognition.
In intuitive cognition, the relational character of cognition becomes simpler
because one cognizes what is in the object itself, and “what is in the thing and
what is cognized are of the same formal aspects.”73 Against the idea that what is
produced in intuitive cognition is entirely different from the object because, in
intuitive cognition, only an act of cognition is produced and this is the only
thing cognized, Mayronis says:
I say that in intuitive cognition something is produced by the act because a cognized
being – and this is formally in the object – is produced through the act, and consequent-
ly, is not the act that is produced according to the real being.74
71 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 10, 7vaK: “[…] dico quod in cognitione abstractiva licet nihil
producatur quantum ad esse simpliciter nisi actus vel species tamen quantum ad ipsum esse
cognitum ipsa species non producitur sed quidditas. Primum autem produci non est rem
cognosci: sed secundum solum.” In (ed. Möhle & Pich), 198, the last sentence says: “Principi-
um autem producendi non est rem cognosci sed secundum principium tantum,” which seems
to be from a different manuscrtipt.
72 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 15, n. 185, ad 2 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 252: “Ad secundum dico
quod in visione oculi species et ipsa visio sunt duo effectus essentialiter ordinati, sic illuminare
et calefacere, et ista sunt ab eadem causa quia unus non causat alium. Unde tam species in
oculo quam visio causatur ab obiecto et visio non causatur a specie.”
73 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 10, n. 116 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 194: “quaecumque sunt idem
numero videntur esse idem specie et videntur habere eandem rationem formalem; sed idem
numero quod est in re est cognitum; igitur illud quod est in re et quod est cognitum sunt
eiusdem rationis formalis.”
74 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 10, n. 118 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 196: “Ad tertium dico quod in
cognitione intuitiva aliquid producitur ab actu quia esse cognitum – et istud formaliter est in
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Here we see all three categories involved in cognition: action, quality (opera-
tion), and relation. What initially produces according to the real object is an
action, the first act. Then, what is produced by the action is a cognitive opera-
tion, the second act. Finally, this operation produces a cognized being (esse cog-
nitum), which is a relation that is formally in the object. What Mayronis has in
mind seems to be an actual relation (relatio actualis) that is accidental and thus
exists only when the object exists for an intuition. Therefore, ‘being’ is univocal-
ly predicated of intuition and its object.
In sum, cognition is not an act, i. e., real mental being, but an intentional
being, i. e., conceptual mental being. Cognition is a relation. Hence, it is not real
in its own right but participates in the reality of its object, i. e., an extra-mental
being, foundationally (fundamentaliter). Cognition as an intentional being is
different from a fictional being, which is entirely conceptual. As an intentional
being is essentially an ad aliquid, where it is related to a real extra-mental being,
the concept of being is univocally predicated of an intentional being and a real
extra-mental being. In this way, the term of abstractive cognition is the quiddity
of its object, either existent or non-existent, although it is obtained not actually
but foundationally; intuitive cognition is an actual relation to an object that is
accidentally formed according to the object’s actual existence.
Now we are ready to move on to the second section of this essay to examine
how Mayronis develops Scotus’s doctrine of intuitive and abstractive cognition
and on what ground he argues for the non-beatific vision of God in the present
life.
2. Mayronis’s Modification of Scotus’s Doctrine of

Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition
This section has two subsections. First, Mayronis’s defense of Scotus’s causal ac-
count against Ockham in the prologue of the Conflatus is presented. Second, his
final position on the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition in
his Quodlibet is presented and his notion of non-beatific vision is considered.
2.1 Mayronis’s Defense of Scotus against Ockham in the Conflatus
Mayronis deals with the question of the non-beatific intuition of God twice in
his teaching career at Paris, once in the prologue’s q. 17 of the Conflatus and
again in his Quodlibet q. 5. These are around three years apart from one another.
obiecto – producitur autem per actum, et per consequens non est actus qui producitur secun-
dum esse reale.”
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In the former, Mayronis, while holding a relational account, defends Scotus’s

causal account against their common opponent, Ockham. However, in the latter,
Mayronis, under Ockham’s influence, completely rejects Scotus’s causal account
and develops a stronger relational account. In both texts, Mayronis’s relational
account of cognition plays a critical role. In the following two sections, I present
Mayronis’s revision of the distinction as a gradual progression.
In q. 17 of the prologue of the Conflatus, Mayronis defends Scotus’s causal
account that intuitive cognition is caused by a particular thing and abstractive
cognition by a representation. He deals with four criticisms directed to Scotus’s
causal account.75 Two of them, the first and the fourth, point out that there seem
to be some cases of causal mismatch. On the one hand, the first criticism says
that some abstractive cognition is caused by a real object, and not by a represen-
tation. For example, the soul seems to cognize itself abstractly without any repre-
sentation. On the other hand, the fourth criticism says that some intuitive cogni-
tion is caused by species. For example, God and the blessed see creatures
intuitively through the divine essence, which is a representation. Mayronis an-
swers the first by saying that the soul cognizes itself neither intuitively nor abs-
tractly, but discursively. For Mayronis, discursive cognition occupies another
third category. It is neither intuitive nor abstractive cognition, but a cognition
discursively derived from either intuitive or abstractive cognition.76 For the
fourth criticism, he gives Scotus’s clarification that, while the divine essence is a
representation of every creature in the world, it is a supreme kind that “repre-
sents a [created] thing more truly than it is in itself.”77 Therefore, the cognition
of God and the blessed of the representation through the divine essence is prop-
erly intuitive.
The other two criticisms, the second and the third, are specifically against
the object’s causal role in intuitive cognition. The second criticism points to the
examples like relations and prime matter that do not cause intuitive cognition.
Mayronis answers that only the things that have the power to cause would cause
it. So, the fact that relations and prime matter do not cause an intuition proves
that intuitive cognition needs an existing object that can cause it directly. The
75 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 17, n. 210 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 280: “Dicitur ad hoc quod licet
in hoc convenient scilicet in terminando, quia utraque terminatur ad rem in se, tamen dif-
ferunt quia sic abstractiva terminatur quod res non causat eam nec movet sed repraesenta-
tivum. Intuitiva autem terminatur ad rem in se et causatur a re in se ipsa.”
76 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 17, n. 211–12 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 280–82, and q. 20, n. 249
(ed. Möhle & Pich), 322.
77 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 15, n. 186 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 254: “Doctor autem noster dicit
quod illa est abstractiva quae est in aliquo deficiente repraesentativo et non supereminente;
divina autem essentia est repraesentans quae verius repraesentat rem quam sit in se ipsa, ideo
intuitive contingentia cognoscuntur.” Cf. also Duns Scotus, Ord. II, dist. 9, qq. 1–2, n. 65 (ed.
Vat. VIII), 164–65; Mayronis, Quodl. q. 4, 233rbF, and Quodl. q. 5, 234rbG.
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third criticism is from one of the criticisms of William Ockham against Scotus’s
causal account in his Commentary on the Sentences. Mayronis takes this chal-
lenge seriously and deals with it several times in the prologue and also later in
his Quodlibet.78
This third criticism appeals to a dictum generally accepted in his time:
everything that God can do by means of a secondary cause, God can do immedi-
ately. So, Ockham claims that because God can cause an intuitive cognition by
means of an object, which is a secondary cause, God, as the primary cause, can
cause it directly without any mediation of an object. Therefore, Ockham argues,
an existing object is necessary neither for intuitive cognition nor abstractive cog-
nition. His criticism is twofold. It is first a rejection of the necessity of the two
different causes for the two modes of cognition, and secondly a rejection of the
necessity of an existing object as the cause for an intuition.
Mayronis is sympathetic to the former criticism but rejects the latter. He
will fully embrace the former, that the distinction is not about two different
causes, later in his Quodlibet. He will now defend Scotus’s causal account to re-
ject the idea of an intuition of a non-existing object. However, his main argu-
ment against the criticism shifts from the object’s role as the cause to its role as
the term of cognition. For Mayronis, what is important is not the object’s causal-
ity, namely, how the act of cognition happens, but is the cognition’s intentionali-
ty to the object, namely, what the cognition is about.
The dictum is valid for him as well: everything that God can do by means
of a secondary cause, God can do immediately. Although it would not be our
usual experience, it should be possible for God to cause an intuitive cognition if
God wanted to. However, it is never a possibility for God to be the term of intui-
tive cognition unless God is the object Himself. Mayronis says:
I concede that God can take the place (supplere vicem) of the causing one (causantis);
nevertheless, not the place of a terminating one (terminantis) because this act [of cogni-
tion] requires the existence of the terminating one.79
Yet, Ockham has a ready response to Mayronis. Ockham pulls out his razor and
says that if anyone wants to say that an object is required for intuition as termi-
nus, one has to show that it has an aspect of the essential cause. Otherwise, even
78 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ord. I, prol., q. 1, 35 (l. 3–21).

79 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 17, n. 212, ad 3 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 282: “concedo quod deus
posset supplere vicem causantis, non autem terminantis quia iste actus requirit existentiam
terminantis.” Cf. also ibid., prol., q. 18, n. 226 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 300. Scotus also uses this
expression, ‘vicem supplere,’ when he explains God’s revelation; cf. Duns Scotus, Ord., prol., q.
1, art. 3, n. 63 (ed. Vat. I), 38.
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without the object that terminates, intuition can occur.80 Mayronis concedes that
in a rare case God can take the causal role of the object. However, he does not
accept Ockham’s claim that intuitive cognition, therefore, does not require any
existing object. The existence of an object is still essential for an intuitive cogni-
tion because the intuition itself is an actual relation that requires an existing
term. The object’s existence is a necessary prerequisite of the act of intuitive cog-
nition, which is a relation, but this intentional relation is distinct from the causal
relation. The ‘dependence’ of the act on the object requires the existence of the
object but it is not necessarily reduced to the genus of ‘cause.’81 In his prologue
questions, Mayronis continues to defend Scotus’s causal account because the
two different causes, i. e., res in se and res representativa, are still the key to the
distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition. Additionally, except in a
miraculous situation, intuitive cognition is indeed caused by the existing object,
in which the cognition is terminated.82
Cognition is a ‘pure perfection,’ while both the production of cognition,
which is an action, and the cognitive operation, which is a quality, need to be
perfected.83 Both cognitive action and operation may happen without an inten-
tional relation to the object, but neither action and operation is a cognition with-
out the relation. Say, Paul is good at math and Peter is desperate. Paul takes a
calculus exam on behalf of Peter. Paul does well in the exam, and as a result,
Peter receives an A. As an analogy, all Paul did for Peter to receive an A is an
action, Peter’s receiving an A is an operation, and Peter’s grade A is supposed to
be a relation of the operation to his grade. Even though Paul did take the exam
and Peter received an A, the A is not Peter’s grade and Peter and Paul know that
it is not. As his grade is distinct from these previous steps, an action and an
operation are distinct from their relation to the object.
80 Guillelmus de Ockham, Ord. I, prol., q. 1, 35 (l. 22)–36 (l. 14), especially, 36 (l. 4–8):
“Igitur si obiectum in quantum terminans non habet rationem causae essentialis respectu noti-
tiae intuitivae, si obiectum in quantum terminans simpliciter destruatur secundum omnem ex-
sistentiam sui realem, potest poni ipsa notitia intuitiva; igitur ipsa re destructa potest poni ipsa
notitia intuitiva.”
81 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 18, n. 228, ad 2 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 300: “dico quod depen-
dentia, si dicat necessario praeexigere, sic non reducitur ad aliquod genus causae necessario.
Nam actio praesupponit approximationem agentis ad passivum et tamen illa approximatio non
est causa. Similiter secundum aliquos actus voluntatis praesupponit actum intellectus, ita in
proposito de actu et obiecto.”
82 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 17, n. 213 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 282: “Tertium est causatio nam
de communi lege [notitia intuitiva] causatur a re ad quam terminatur;” prol., q. 15, n. 183 (ed.
Möhle & Pich), 250: “Dico igitur quod illa notitia est de re per aliquid repraesentativum, sed
terminatur ad quidditatem obiecti in se et ad illa quae insunt obiecto per se.”
83 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 18, n. 222, ad b (ed. Möhle & Pich), 294.
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The object is necessary for a cognition, not as a cause, but as a term. For
Scotus, the object is not essential for a cognitive operation, which is an absolute
entity. Yet, Scotus had to posit some exceptions, such as our beatific vision of
God, which can never be an independent act without its object. As we have seen
in the previous sections, an operation is a real mental being and a quality that is
absolute as opposed to relational. It stands alone and does not depend on any-
thing for its act. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that God can create
a cognitive operation without any object (like Peter’s receiving an A without
taking the exam thanks to Paul’s taking it). In Mayronis, the object is necessary
for every cognition as its term. Cognition is an intentional being and a relation.
By definition, relation cannot exist without its term. Therefore, in Mayronis,
cognition cannot exist without its term. Even God cannot create a cognition
without an object (just as Paul cannot do anything for Peter to receive a genuine
A).
Thus, even if God can create an act of intuitive cognition without any ob-
ject, although it would persist as a quality, neither would it be called a cognition
that is pure perfection, nor would anything be cognized through it. Mayronis
says that it would be just like the sunray not produced by the sun, were it created
by God without the sun.84
There are two types of intellective intuition, as opposed to the sensitive
ones, that Mayronis describes in the prologue. One is the intellect’s meta-cogni-
tion of its own act. The other is the intellect’s cognition of other potencies’ acts,
such as the senses. He argues that cognition of these acts is empirical and self-
evident knowledge of accidental and contingent truth in an actually existing ob-
ject as existing.85
Then, what do we know when we know an act intuitively? The Mayronian
version of intuitive cognition is not at all ambitious. Intuitive cognition is not
complete knowledge of a thing. Even if one has an intuition of something, one
does not necessarily see it in every mode of its cognition. When one has a vision
of the divine essence, one has a vision of the divine essence as existing. However,
one does not necessarily have a vision of the divine essence in the other mode
such as infinity or haecceity.86 Nor does the vision necessarily include a vision of
84 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 18, n. 223, ad 1 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 294–96; Scotus, Quodl. q.
13, n. 25 (Vivès XXV), 570. In Mayronis’s example, it might be true that one would not be able
to distinguish between the sunray with a relation to the sun and that without any relation. Yet,
our epistemological capacity is not the concern here. Rather, this example is about the truth of
the intentionality of cognition. That is, because the sunray would have nothing to do with the
sun if God creates it without any relation to the sun, the sunray would not be “about” the sun.
85 Scotus sees the intellect’s meta-cognition as necessary for the sensory and the intellectual
memory. Cf. Adams and Wolter, “Memory and Intuition.”
86 Concerning infinity, haecceity, necessity, and existence, as intrinsic modes, see Maurer,
“The Role of Infinity in the Thought of Francis of Meyronnes,” 339–47.
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the Three Persons, the divine attributes or all the creatures in the divine ideas.87
Concerning the existence of an act, we do not intuitively cognize the existence
under its proper aspect like abstractive cognition. It is not that we have a piece of
complete knowledge about a thing or its existence, but that we only cognize that
it exists.88
Thus, in the prologue, Mayronis holds and defends Scotus’s causal account
of the distinction. In the prologue, Mayronis deems as necessary all four condi-
tions of the object of intuitive cognition: actual existence, presence, causality,
and motion; abstractive cognition abstracts from all of these and does not con-
cern any of these qualities of the object.89
2.2 Mayronis’s Rejection of Scotus in the Quodlibet
Three years later in his Quodlibet, Mayronis treats the question of the earthly
vision of God once again, and there he abandons Scotus’s causal account of the
distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition as a whole. He still treats
the similar examples of causal mismatch but rearranges them and divides them
into two groups. The first group involves intuition through the divine essence,
which can be defended as intuitive by arguing that the divine essence is the
supreme representation of all the creatures, through which one sees a substance
more truly than the thing in itself.
Yet he gives an extensive list of another group that cannot be defended in
such a way. They are 1) sense cognition in general, all of which happens through
a phantasm, 2) empirical recollection of the past, 3) foresight of a future revela-
tion, and 4) every cognition that is terminated in a thing in itself as existing but
caused by a species.90 In spite of the causal mismatch, Mayronis regards all of
these as intuitive cognitions because they are about an existing thing as existing.
Scotus’s definition of intuitive cognition as not through representation is now
abandoned:
Therefore, I say that abstractive cognition is that which abstracts its own object from the
actual existence, just as intuitive cognition that is of existence as existing. [Abstractive
cognition] happens either through representation, just like when a triangle is cognized as
a triangle through an image, or without any representation, just like when God immedi-
ately fills it with supplying a causality of representation.91
87 Mayronis, Confl., dist. 1, q. 4, 13vaK–14raD.

89 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 17 n. 213 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 282–84.
90 Mayronis, Quodl. q. 4, 233rbG; Quodl. q. 5, 234rbG.
91 Mayronis, Quodl. q. 4, 233rbG: “Ideo dico quod notitia abstractiva est illa quae abstrahit
suum obiectum ab actuali existentia: sicut intuitiva quae est de existente ut existens: sive fiat
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Therefore, I say that this definition [of the Subtle Doctor] does not seem fitting because
it is not determined but disunited as it should not be a definition since such is entirely
ambiguous. Then it is said that intuitive cognition is that which is of an existing thing as
it is existing. It would either immediately occur through an object just as an angel intuits
his own essence or occur through representation in the way God intuits creatures
through His own exemplars.92
By shifting the focus from causality to intentionality, Mayronis seamlessly unites

the two cognitive modes into one comprehensive cognition. While Scotus’s
causal account divides our attention between two distinct causes, as Ockham
criticized, Mayronis’s relational account brings it to the object that terminates
both modes of cognition. Here, Mayronis agrees with Ockham’s worry about the
ambiguity of cognition created by the causal account and provides his relational
account as a solution.
However, Scotus’s main purpose of the distinction is still intact in Mayro-
nis’s account: intuitive cognition is about an existing object as it is existing and
abstractive cognition is about the unchanging science of an object. Ockham re-
garded all the raw material for an abstractive cognition as coming from an intui-
tive cognition prior to that, and in this way, saw that these two kinds of cogni-
tions are essentially connected. Ockham did not consider any substantial
distinction between the two as Scotus did. In Mayronis, the unity of the two
cognitive modes does not destroy the distinction between them. Rather, with his
focus on the object and cognition as a relation to the object, he saw the unity as
making the distinction more succinct and clearer. A cognition is intuitive when
its term is the actual existence93 of an object, and abstractive when its term is the
quiddity of an object with its existence being abstracted.94 No other factor cate-
gorically determines the distinction. Not even its presence is included in the fo-
cus because that intuitive cognition can happen through a representation means
that it can happen without the object’s presence.95 The four extremes of intuitive
per representativum: ut cum per speciem trianguli cognoscitur triangulus. sive sine representa-
tivo: ut cum deus eam infundit immediate supplendo causalitatem representativi.”
92 Mayronis, Quodl. q. 5, 234rbG: “Ideo dico quod ista diffinitio non videtur conveniens:
quia non est determinata: sed disiuncta qualis non debet esse diffinitio: cum talis omnino sit
ambigua: et tunc dicitur quod notitia intuitiva est que est existentis ut existens est: sive fiat
immediate per obiectum: sicut cum angelus intuetur suam essentiam: sive fiat per representa-
tivum: quemadmodum deum intuetur creaturas per sua exemplaria.”
93 It is about the actual existence of an object as opposed to the quiddity of existence.
94 One initiates a cognition either intuitively or abstractly. No cognition is initiated discur-
sively.
95 Mayronis, Quodl. q. 5, 234vaK–L: “Si de absente potest fieri intuitiva notitia: esto quod
non de non existente. Dicitur quod non secundum naturam: quia obiectum absens ipsam cau-
sare non potest: nec speciem eius repraesentantem existentiam: tamen bene per divinam vir-
tutem: quia licet respectus causantis requirat approximationem: non tamen ratio terminantis:
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cognition, i. e., the object’s existence, presence, causality, and productive power,
are still what intuitive cognition concerns, and abstractive cognition abstracts
from. However, only the existence is considered necessary for intuitive cognition
and the rest are no longer considered to be so. Mayronis now holds that in an
improbable situation, God could cause an intuition of an absent thing (but not a
“non-existent thing”), and God himself can take the place of whatever it is that is
causing and moving.96
Mayronis pushes this mutually exclusive borderline of intuitive and abstrac-
tive cognition, i. e., the existence of the term, all the way to the point where the
object is God Himself. Our intuitive cognition of God, i. e., our vision of God, is
about the actual existence of God, and our abstractive cognition is not about the
existence of God but the quiddity of God, i. e., the divine essence.97 In other
words, the divine essence does not include existence, to which Scotus does not
subscribe.98 As paradoxical or even as outrageous as it may sound, Mayronis is
notorious for being the first Scotist who sees existence as one of the intrinsic
modes of God, not as the essence. Therefore, even if our abstractive knowledge
can grasp the divine essence, another kind of knowledge that could inform us of
God’s existence and presence would still be wanted. Through intuitive and abs-
tractive cognition combined, our direct knowledge of God becomes a possibility.
et ideo licet intuitiva concernat necessario existentiam: non tamen necessario praesentiam.”
Here, God’s absolute power is considered. Even in an intuition that generally requires the pres-
ence of an object, such as a sensitive cognition, if God wills, one can have an intuition of some-
thing absent through a miracle. However, even in this case, this object has to exist. It is an
obvious example of Ockham’s strong influence on Mayronis.
96 Mayronis, Quodl. q. 4, art., 1, 233vaK: “Primum [intuitivae obiecti actualiem existen-
tiam] autem concernit necessario: quia illud ponitur in eius diffinitione. Secundum [presen-
tiam] autem non videtur inconveniens quod deus faceret de absente intuitionem ut quod ocu-
lus videret posteriora. Tertium [causationem] autem et quartum [motionem] consimiliter:
quia deus potest vicem supplere cuiuslibet efficientis et moventis.”
97 Mayronis, Confl., dist. 2, q. 1, art. 2, 16raC: “Si esse includeretur quidditative in divini-
tate, maxime propter istas rationes quae adducte sunt de abstractione de necesse esse, de puro
actu, aeque sapientia intellectus et omnia attributa includerent esse. Hoc autem est falsum.”
Ibid., 16raC–D: “Dico ergo quod actualis existentia vel esse est modus intrinsecus, quod probo
sic. Qundocumque aliquid adveniens alicui non variat eius rationem formalem: illud est modus
intrinsecus. Sed existentia adveniens alicui non variat eius rationem formalem. Nam homo in
potencia, et idem postea in actu est idem homo formaliter. Nec variat eius ratio formalis. Ergo
existentia, vel esse, est modus intrinsecus.”
98 Cf. Duns Scotus, Quodl. q. 1, n. 4, additio (ed. Vivès XXV), 9–10: “In divinis autem
existentia est de conceptu essentiae, et praedicatur in primo modo dicendi per se […].” Cf.
Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 92–95, and Maurer, “The Role of Infinity in the Thought
of Francis of Meyronnes,” 333–48. Gilson mentions another Scotist in the sixteenth century,
Antonio Trombetta, who thought existence is an intrinsic mode and does not belong to the
quiddity of God.
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Otherwise, one has to be content with an indirect kind of knowledge about God.
As Mayronis presents Pseudo-Dionysius’s four ways as a consecutive series, one
can derive a discursive cognition of God first through the way of efficient causal-
ity by noticing some moving things, secondly through the way of final causality
by recognizing ends of the moving things, thirdly through the way of eminence
by seeking higher ends, and finally through the way of negation by removing
anything imperfect to come to know God.99
Our intuitive cognition is an empirical knowledge of accidental and contin-
gent truth in an actually existing object as existing, just like Moses’ seeing God
face-to-face as a person speaks to a friend.100 Mayronis is not particularly inter-
ested in articulating the kind of experience of our vision of God, whether it is a
sensitive or intellective intuition. The vision can happen in either way. What is
important for Mayronis is what or whom one intuits, not how. Whether the vi-
sion is caused by the divine essence per se or its species is not an issue either.
The vision can legitimately happen through the species as long as its primary
object is God. We understand how abstractive cognition of God happens for
Mayronis. It is logically or ‘scientifically’ known through the univocal concept of
being, which ens infinitum, ens finitum, and ens rationis share. However, we can-
not generally understand how the intuition of God happens through either God
himself or God’s species, because intuition is accidental. When it happens, it
happens.
What do we know when we have the non-beatific vision of God? Do we
know ‘that God is’? Mayronis’s answer seems to be positive. In dist. 2 of the
Conflatus, where he asks whether ‘that God exists’ is self-evidently known, he
does say that it is the case for the intellect that sees God intuitively.101 Although
99 Mayronis, Confl., dist. 2, q. 8, 19vaK; ibid., dist. 3, q. 1, 23vbN–O; Maurer, “Infinity in

the Thought of Francis of Meyronnes,” 349–57; ibid., 348: Notice that Maurer writes while
commenting on Confl., dist. 2, q. 1, “If we had intuitive knowledge of his essence, we would see
his existence and no proof of it would be needed; but in the present life we are denied intuitive
knowledge of God.” It is true that in this question, Mayronis says that our intellect (de intellec-
tu nostro) does not have a self-evident knowledge of God’s existence, whereas the intellect that
sees God intuitively has it. It is clear enough that Mayronis does not regard the non-beatific
intuition as a usual experience for us because he never talks about what it is like even in the
questions he argues for the intuition of God in the present life. And, Maurer seems to speak
about Mayronis’s understanding of our daily experiences. However, Mayronis never says here
that we are denied or it is impossible for us to have intuitive knowledge of God in the present
life. On the contrary, in prol., q. 17, and Quodl. q. 5, he clearly affirms the non-beatific vision
of God in the present life as possible.
100 Exo 33:11; Mayronis, Quodl. q. 5, 234rbE: “Sed contra, quia scribitur in eodem capitulo
quod loquebatur dominus ad Moysen facie ad faciem: sicut solet homo loqui ad amicum su-
um: sed facialis notitia est intuitiva: igitur viator Moyses vidit deum facie ad faciem que est
notitia intuitiva.” Cf. also Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 17, n. 208 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 278.
101 Mayronis, Confl., dist. 2, q. 1, art. 2, 15vbQ–16raA.
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he says this only in the context of the beatific vision of God, I do not find any
reason as to why we should not also apply it to his understanding of the non-
beatific vision of God. We should remember, however, that this intuitive knowl-
edge, ‘that God is,’ is an accidental and contingent knowledge, which is not
about God’s eternal quiddity. Our intellectual vision of God is accidental just as
my sensitive vision of a table is accidental, which disappears when I close my
eyes. We will not have the knowledge when we do not have the vision or intui-
tion anymore, simply because the vision is the knowledge itself. If one asks about
the knowledge about God’s existence that is rather permanent in the present life,
it would be either what an elevated soul can abstractively cognize through an
infused species like in St. Paul’s mystical experience or what we derive discur-
sively.102
Then, when our intuition happens – Mayronis does not say when or in
what way it might happen at all – it is self-evident that we are having an intui-
tion of God and that God exists, and God is necessarily the term of the intuition.
Without the term, whatever we see, it is not a cognition. Theologically speaking,
it is an encounter with God. The knowledge one attains through the encounter
does not have to be the complete knowledge about God. At least in Mayronis’s
theory of cognition, there is no reason as to why the vision of God should only
be reserved for the blessed.
Conclusion
Thus, in looking at Mayronis’s two different writings across time, we see an in-
teresting Franciscan distillation of Scotist thoughts. Mayronis’s main concern in
his cognitive theory is to preserve cognition’s intentionality to the object. He
inherits Scotus’s overall structure of cognitive theory and understands cognition
in terms of three Aristotelian categories: action, quality, and relation. However,
unlike his master, Mayronis begins to regard the relation of the cognitive opera-
tion to the object, not the cognitive operation, i. e., a quality, as the central act of
cognition. When one knows a relation, one knows its term necessarily. Based on
this strong sense of concomitant intellection in the notion of relation, Mayronis
attains a well-founded intentionality in his theory of cognition.
In the Conflatus, the early Mayronis defends Scotus’s causal account of the
distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition against Ockham. Scotus
defines intuitive cognition as caused by an object in itself existent and present
and abstractive cognition as caused by a species. Ockham claims that, because
God can be the immediate efficient cause of every cognition, a cause other than
God is not essential for an intuition and cognition of non-existing things to be
102 Mayronis, Confl., prol., q. 15, nn. 190–1 (ed. Möhle & Pich), 256–58.
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possible. In this text, Mayronis argues with Scotus for the object’s causal roles
for cognition as well as its intentional role as the term of cognition. However, in
his Quodlibet, the mature Mayronis rejects Scotus under the influence of Ock-
ham’s criticism of Scotus and argues that a cognition, whether intuitive or abs-
tractive, has to be terminated in the same thing. Mayronis shifts the focus of the
distinction of intuitive and abstractive cognition from the causality of the object
to the intentionality of cognition and shows that intuitive cognition is terminat-
ed in the object as it is existing, and abstractive cognition is terminated in the
object in the aspect of its quiddity. Mayronis focuses on what one knows, i. e.,
the term of cognition, rather than on how one comes to know, i. e., the efficient
causality of cognition. In his relational account of intuitive and abstractive cog-
nition, one comes to know God intuitively in terms of God’s existence, and abs-
tractively in terms of God’s quiddity. For Mayronis, one discursively derives a
discursive cognition of God either from an intuitive cognition or an abstractive
cognition.
Mayronis’s relational account of cognition theory further develops on his
master’s position and is ultimately able to provide a creative way to encompass
two major medieval academic traditions into one unifying cognition theory. One
tradition is the approach of the Thomistic Aristotelian intellectualism that focus-
es on the object as the truth-bearer, and the other is the approach of the Francis-
can voluntarism that emphasizes the agency of the rational capacity as the truth-
seeker. Mayronis, as a true Scotist, skillfully balances the two approaches
through the notion of relation, which treats one as a ground and the other as a
term. His theory of relation also functions in his understanding of volition in a
similar way. In this study of the dynamic development of the relational account
of Mayronis’s theory of cognition, we catch a glimpse of a more empowered
synthesis of intellectualism and voluntarism.
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Francisco Macedo on Intuitive
and Abstractive Cognition
Anna Tropia
Introduction
The distinction elaborated by John Duns Scotus between intuitive and abstrac-
tive cognition aims to define two diverse kinds of cognitive acts: the first actual-
izes the cognition of a thing insofar as it is present and existent (e. g., my act of
seeing the cup of coffee that my friend just brought to my table); the second
actualizes the cognition of something that is not present and that is, so to say,
‘presentified’ by a medium (e. g., my act of seeing a type of coffee in the menu of
a coffee-shop counter).1 The second kind of cognitive act is characterized by the
presence of this medium (in my example, the entry in the menu), which Scotus,
along with a strong and well-represented medieval tradition, calls ‘species.’2 In
the case of intuitive cognition, the entire path of knowledge, meant as a long
refining process that goes from the external material world to the inner immate-
rial domain of the mind, is shortened, and the cognitive capacities of the mind
are drastically augmented: there is no need for any mediation between the mind
and its cognitive objects, since the former is capable of grasping them directly.
The success of this distinction after Scotus is well-known: it permeates the
philosophical lexicon and ‘intuitive cognition’ remains, up to Descartes and even
later, the synonym of a direct, non-mediated and perfect kind of cognition. In-
This work was supported by the Czech Sciences Foundation, financing the project “Intention-
ality and Person in Medieval Philosophy and Phenomenology” (GAČR 21–08256S), as well as
by the European Regional Development Fund-Project “Creativity and Adaptability as Condi-
tions of the Success of Europe in an Interrelated World” (No. CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/16_019/
0000734).
1 Regarding intuitive cognition, see the classical works by Day, Intuitive Cognition; Du-
mont, “The Scientific Character of Theology;” and Wolter, “Duns Scotus on Intuition, Mem-
ory, and Our Knowledge of Individuals” (contains an overview of the passages in which Scotus
makes use of this distinction); Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 78–84. See further Pasnau, “Cog-
nition,” 296–300, and Pini, “Scotus on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition” and “Duns Scotus
on What is in the Mind,” 330–39.
2 The literature on species theory is extensive. I limit myself to refer to the classical works
by Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 3–75; Spruit, Species Intelligibilis, as well as to some more
recent publications: Pini, “Il dibattito sulle specie intelligibili;” Perler, “Things in the Mind”
and Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter; Spruit, “Species, Sensible and Intelligible,”
1211–12.
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178 Anna Tropia
terestingly, it is the abstractive kind of cognition that seems to become ‘old’ in

early modern times. In the wake of Ockham, many are those who claim that the
intellect is able to grasp its cognitive objects directly, bypassing the mediation of
the species. The same ‘modern’ tendency is embraced by a Scotist philosopher
and theologian, a couple of generations after Descartes. In his three-volume
work Collationes doctrinae Sancti Thomae et Scoti, cum differentiis inter utrum-
que (Padua, 1671, 1673, 1680), the Augustinian Francisco Macedo (Coimbra
1596–Padua 1681) offers a confused account of angelic abstractive and intuitive
cognition of material objects. Confused, insofar as, in following his project, it is
hard to tell if the angelic mind knows the worldly objects through or without
species. Macedo models the angelic acts of intuitive cognition upon human abs-
tractive acts of cognition. The use of the term ‘species,’ as it will be shown, is at
the origin of this confusion. But the result is clear: Macedo aims to model the
angelic model of cognition on the human one, thereby eliminating almost all the
differences between the angelic and the human mind.3 This early modern Scotist
account of cognition is indeed sui generis. It is not in line with the debates of
more famous Scotists, like Mastri and Belluto, and seems to rely upon other the-
ories of cognition, especially one that was endorsed by some Jesuits.
In this paper, (1) Macedo himself will shortly be presented; I shall then
examine his accounts of human (2) and angelic (3) cognition; finally (4), some
sources that possibly constitute Macedo’s background will be presented in order
to shed some light on the tradition he follows.
1. Francisco Macedo and His Collationes

Francisco Macedo is indeed an eclectic figure.4 He lived his life in the manner of
some intellectual ‘knight-errant,’ as Pierre Bayle put it.5 Born in Coimbra, he
attended the courses given there by the famous Jesuit Francisco Suárez (1548–
1617). In the Collationes, Macedo says that it was from him that he learned free-
dom of thought and independence from the Thomist party:
I remember that Suárez (who, when I was a student, gave public lectures at the famous
university of Coimbra and had the task of reading Aquinas), when the Thomists told
him that he had either to stick firmly to Aquinas’s word or to stop commenting on him,
3 I present this thesis in Tropia, La teoria della conoscenza di Francesco Macedo.

4 For biographical information on Macedo, see Troilo, “Franciscus a S. Augustino Mace-
do,” and Sousa Ribeiro, Francisco Macedo. On his teaching activity in Padua, see Baù, “P. Fran-
cesco Macedone e P. Antonio Maria Bianchi.” See also Ventosa, “Der Scotismus,” 376–83.
5 Cf. Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, 1951B–C: “C’étoit un ésprit ardent, et
assez universel, et qui a eu beaucoup des querelles […]. La république des lettres a ses breteurs;
Macedo en étoit un.”
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Francisco Macedo on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition 179
said: “I will stop commenting on him.” That he did: from then on, he stopped comment-
ing on Aquinas. Mindful of this event, I found shelter among the supporters of Scotus; I
fight for Scotus.6
Independence and unsettledness mark his path. Having been a member of the
Society of Jesus, Macedo changes his religious order by joining the Franciscans.
After a period of traveling in Italy and France, as ambassador of the King of
Portugal, he finally enters the order of the Discalced Augustinians.
The Collationes doctrinae Sancti Thomae et Scoti is a formidable compari-
son of the whole Thomist system with Scotus’s. The work follows the order of
the first three books of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, and point by point compares
Aquinas and Scotus on selected questions and problems. In the note to the read-
er, quoted above, in which he attributes to Suárez the merit of having taught him
independency of thought, Macedo also claims to belong to Scotus’s party and to
fight to defend the Subtle Doctor’s thought (pro Scoto pugno). His adherence to
Scotism, however, is quite peculiar, as we shall see. His defense of Scotus is more
of an attack on Aquinas’s positions presented in an Augustinian-flavored sauce
than a faithful commentary on Scotus’s texts.
2. Human Cognition
Following the order of the Sentences, Macedo reserves the treatment of human
cognition to the first part of his work. The occasion is provided by the question
concerning the intellect’s first object. In this context, Macedo formulates very
clearly his criticism of Aquinas – less clearly his defense of Scotus. After report-
ing the texts by Aquinas concerned with the human intellect’s first object (STh I,
q. 12, art. 4 and q. 84, art. 7) and Scotus’s texts from Ordinatio (passages from I,
dist. 3, q. 3), Macedo makes two moves. The first is that of equalizing Aquinas’s
position on the cognitive priority of the essences of material things (quidditates
rerum materialium) with Scotus’s position on the cognitive priority of being qua
being: despite their use of different terms, both philosophers aimed to define
what is the first object understood by the human intellect.7 The second is to use
6 Macedo, Collationes I, Preface (Lectori curioso), unpaginated: “Accidit mihi quid Suario;
quem memini me puero cum ille Conimbrice in illustri illa Academia palam doceret, et S. Tho-
mam ex instituto commentaretur, audire interdum a Thomistis ut vel a S. Thoma non reced-
eret, aut eum commentari desineret: eumque respondere. Desinam deinceps commentari.
Quod praestitit. Exinde quippe abstinuit a commentariis. Memor huius eventus ad Scoti me
castra recepi. Pro Scoto pugno.” Collationes I refers to the first volume of the work, Collationes
II to the second; each volume is divided into several collationes.
7 Cf. Macedo, Collationes I, coll. 4, diff. 1, sec. 1, 76a–b: “Sic refert Scotus sententiam S.
Thomae, ac eam incipit oppugnare. Quoad primum bene, ac fideliter egit, nec eum Thomista,
quod sciam, quispiam in eo reprehendit. Nam licet S. Thomas quaestionem propriis, ac diversis
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180 Anna Tropia
Aquinas’s principle of proportion (each mind cognizes something according to

the state it has: e. g., the human soul is the form of a material body, therefore, it
is proportionate to cognizing the essences or forms of the material things) to
make the following point: as the intellect is immaterial, its nature cannot be pro-
portioned to cognizing material bodies (nor their essences). The principle of
proportion is used against Thomas in order to expand and augment the capaci-
ties of the intellect:
According to Aquinas the first and adequate object of the human intellect is the quiddity
of material being. First object: because the intellect, which is immersed in matter, re-
ceives its species from the senses, and knows first the material objects; adequate: for,
although the intellect knows what is deprived of matter, such cognition is grasped only
by making abstraction from the matter in which the intellect is immersed. And, accord-
ing to Aquinas, the intellect is imprisoned in the prison of matter.8
According to Macedo, the principle of proportion functions only if the focus is

completely on the immaterial nature of the intellect, regardless of its state:
By its nature, the intellect is spiritual and immaterial; by its nature, it requires a propor-
tionate cognition: that of the spiritual and immaterial substances. These are the
substances the intellect desires to know by its nature and, by its nature, it knows them.
Both philosophers [Aquinas and Scotus] agree on the first claim, for, Aquinas always
believed the proportion between the essence of a substance and its cognitive capacity –
between the faculty and the object – to be necessary. Secondly, the cognition of the im-
material and spiritual substances corresponds by nature to the spiritual and immaterial
nature of the intellect. This follows from the first claim. One can object that the state in
which the intellect is, makes it dependent on the senses as well as on the phantasms […]
this is claimed by the Angelic Doctor and Cajetan along with other Thomists.9
Scoti verbis posuerit. Tamen sensus est idem. [….] Et quanquam [Thomas] non dicat adaequ-
atum, sed solum proprium, recte ex hoc sequitur, cum id sit proprium quarto modo, ut apparet
ex adductis exemplis naturae lapidis, et equi.”
8 Macedo, Collationes I, coll. 4, diff. 1, sec. 1, 76b: “Liquet ergo ex his sensisse D. Thomam
obiectum primum, et adaequatum esse quidditatem rei materialis. Primum, quia intellectus im-
mersus in materiam accipit species a sensibus, et immediate cognoscit materialia; adaequatum,
quia etsi cognoscat immaterialia, ea non abstrahendo a materia in qua versatur, agnoscit; unde
stringitur, et clauditur in materiae carceribus.”
9 Macedo, Collationes I, coll. 4, diff.1, sec. 1, 77a–b: “Natura intellectus est omnino spiritu-
alis, et immaterialis, et natura sua exigit cognitionem sibi proportionatam, haec est rerum spiri-
tualium, et immaterialium; ergo eas naturaliter cupit agnoscere, et cognoscit. Maior est certa
quoad utramque partem, ac conformis S. Thomae, qui requirit semper proportionem essentiae,
et intelligentiae, potentiae, et obiecti. Minor patet, et quia natura spiritualis, et immaterialis
respondet obiectis spiritualibus, et immaterialibus; consequentia est in forma. Sed. Obijcitur
status in quo est intellectus dependens a sensibus, et addictus phantasmatibus, […] uti argu-
mentatur Doctor Angelicus et Caietanus cum Reliquis Thomistis.”
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The term ‘state’ recalls indeed Scotus’s distinction between the present state (the
status praesentis vitae), in which the intellect is joined to the body, and the after-
life (the status ille), in which the union between soul and body will be broken –
and, as Scotus suggests in diverse cases, the human cognitive capacities will be
restored.10
Yet, interestingly, the distinction among the states of the human intellect is
ignored by Macedo throughout his work.11 Differently from Scotus, who distin-
guished the capacity of the intellect as a power (natura potentiae) in general
from its current state, Macedo seems to proceed only with regard to the first and
to be oblivious of the second state. In the above-mentioned passage, he refers to
Aquinas and the principle of proportion as a limitation of the human cognitive
extension. Macedo there claims that not only the human intellectual capacity
includes the cognition of the immaterial substances, but also that it is unfettered
by any state. Macedo plainly holds that the human intellect does not depend on
the senses for the acquisition of knowledge. This last point constitutes a leitmo-
tiv, since Macedo repeats it on every possible occasion: the intellect does not
depend on the phantasms. To sum up briefly, according to Macedo:
1) The human intellect knows first the immaterial substances.
2) The proportion between knower and known is not necessary (or: ‘pro-
portionate’ is not understood in the same way as Aquinas conceived it).
3) The intellect does not depend on the senses to acquire cognition (no
conversio ad phantasmata).
4) The agent intellect is the main instrument through which human beings
acquire every kind of cognition.
What clearly emerges from this picture, is Macedo’s intention to highlight the
autonomy of the intellect in the process of knowledge acquisition:
10 Famously, Scotus does not decide whether the limitations of the human mind in the pre-
sent state follow from original sin – which would have frustrated the intellective capacities by
making them less operative – or from the natural connection of the soul’s powers, namely
from the connection of the intellective soul with the body. Cf. in particular Duns Scotus, Ord. I,
dist. 3, pars 1, q. 3, n. 187 (ed. Vat. I), 113–14; Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 14, q. 3, n. 123 (ed.
Vat. IX), 473–74; Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super secundum et tertium de anima, q. 19, n. 18
(OPh V), 190–91, and ibid., q. 21, n. 38 (OPh V), 224–25. The distinction between the two
states has consequences in Scotus’s thought, and is evoked each time he wants to underline the
imperfection of the human nature. See Dumont, “Scotus’ Intuition Viewed in the Light of the
Intellect’s Present State,” and “The Role of Phantasm in the Psychology of Duns Scotus;” Pas-
nau, “Cognition,” 293–96; Pini, “Scotus on Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” 352–54.
11 Macedo was not alone in this; according to Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus,
159–203, Scotus’s distinction was either ignored or completely transformed by the Scotists of
the seventeenth century.
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182 Anna Tropia
The intellect rejects, does not receive the sensible and material species. It abstracts and
forms immaterial intelligible species from them, leaving them and preserving the latter; it
thinks through them. […] this is not a turn (conversio) [to] but a departure (aversio)
from matter, a rejection of the material thing and a turn towards immaterial ones, that it
immediately grasps and cognizes.12
This autonomy is entirely justified by the presence of the agent intellect, which is
capable of actively engaging itself in the acquisition of knowledge and enables
the mind to cognize. Macedo has two arguments to prove that the agent intellect
is independent from matter, both of which stem from a comparison of the hu-
man agent intellect with that of the separate soul and of the angel’s soul. The
fact that both of these latter are deprived of bodies, but are attributed an agent
intellect, shows that the intellect as such can exert its dynamic power and gather
cognition independently from the senses and sensible material species.
The soul has an agent intellect, so that it can separate what is immaterial from what is
material and make the cognitive object proportionate to the patient intellect […]. If the
separate soul too has an agent intellect, as it is commonly stated by common opinion, it is
clear that, by its nature, the intellect cognizes without making any use of phantasms and
that it does not depend on them; nor does the union with matter fetter its perfection or
its natural way of cognizing. The proper object of the intellect thus is not the quiddity of
material beings, but the quiddity of what is universal and immaterial. Nothing material
can serve as medium or as ratio cognoscendi of an immaterial thing; but the immaterial
thing itself is the medium and the ratio cognoscendi of material things, like in the case of
the angel (sicut in angelo), who understands the material objects by means of immaterial
species.13
Two things are worth noting. First of all, Macedo’s insistence in underlining the
human intellect’s behavioral resemblance with the separate soul’s and the an-
gel’s. He basically equates them. Macedo seems to portray some unique mind,
regardless of what could be its subject. If one then asks, what this agent intellect
12 Macedo, Collationes I, coll. 4, diff. 1, sec. 2, 77b: “[…] intellectus reijcit, non recipit illas
species sensibiles, et materiales, et ex illas abstrahit, et format species intelligibiles immateriales,
illas relinquens, has retinens, et per has immediate intelligens. […] nec illa est conversio, sed
aversio a materia, et reiectio rei materialis, et conversio ad res immateriales, quas immediate
attingit, et cognoscit.”
13 Macedo, Collationes I, coll. 4, diff. 1, sec. 2, 77b–78a: “[D]atur intellectus agens in ani-
ma, ut secernat materiale ab immateriali, et faciat obiectum proportionatum intellectui patienti
[…]. [S]i intellectus agens datur in anima separata, uti communis opinio fert, manifeste patet
ex natura sua intellectum cognoscere sine ulla dependentia, et recursu ad phantasmata, et illum
statum societatis cum materia nihil detrahere eis perfectioni, nec modo naturali cognoscendi.
Igitur non est eis obiectum quidditas rei materialis, sed quidditas rei universalis, et immateri-
alis, nec res materialis est medium, et ratio cognoscendi materiales, sicut in angelo, qui virtute,
et opera specierum immaterialium intelligit res materiales.”
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is, or has, or does, the answer is provided by its very activity: the agent intellect
is a force belonging to the human soul (but also to the angelic intellect and the
separate soul), which has the capacity to separate material and immaterial fea-
tures in cognitive objects, and to make cognition actual. Such activity was tradi-
tionally attributed by Scotus – and the Scotists – also to separate souls and an-
gels.14 The second remarkable element is the confusion that Macedo’s text
transmits: he seems to describe a sort of mirror-game between the human and
the angelic and separate mind, although this is not clearly explained at all. How
does the human intellect acquire knowledge of the world independently from the
senses and sensible species? What are the immaterial substances acquired by the
human intellect? We will see that Macedo’s comparison of the human intellect
with the angelic one – or the separate soul’s – describes, in a sort of back-and-
forth movement, how the human intellect cognizes (without depending on sen-
sible species, like the angel does) but also how the angel cognizes the material
world by means of an immaterial medium. Does this mean that the angel and
the human intellect cognize the world in the same way, namely through intelligi-
ble species? In one passage, Macedo claims that the only difference between the
angel and the human soul is that “the angelic species are infused by God, where-
as the human species are acquired.”15 If we consider the problem of the intel-
lect’s first object, and the principle of proportion revised by Macedo, what is this
object that is acquired, immaterial (as the intellect’s nature commands), and
known without dependency on the species?
These questions remain open until the treatment of the angelic intellect in
the second volume of the Collationes; they are, for the most part, permeated by
his anti-Thomist polemical and rhetorical tones. What is possible to say so far is
the following.
1) According to Macedo, the human intellect’s first object includes/are the
immaterial objects.
2) His main reasons are: a) that the intellect’s immateriality requires it
(revised proportion principle); that b) the active nature of the intellect
supports this view; c) that the nature of the intellect(s) is basically the
same: equation of conjoined, separate, and angelic intellect.
14 Cf. Macedo, Collationes I, coll. 4, diff. 1, sec. 2, 78a: “Nam in probabili sententia intellec-
tus agens datur in Angelo, sive distinctus, sive non a possibili, sicut in anima humana. Igitur
sicut ille naturaliter intelligit spiritualia, et immaterialia immediate, et ex illis materialia, ita et
homo cognoscit per suum intellectum res immateriales, ac per eas res materiales, et sensibiles
[…]. Equidem censeo nihil aliud interesse inter cognitionem angelicam (omitto nobilitatem
essendi) et humanam, nisi quod species angelicae sunt a Deo infusae, hominis vero acquisitae.”
For a list of all the Scotists attributing to Scotus the claim that the angels have an agent intel-
lect, see Macedo’s doxography in Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 3, sec. 1, 155b.
15 See note 14.
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184 Anna Tropia
3. Angelic Cognition
Macedo deals with angelic cognition in the second part of his commentary to the
Sentences. Concerning the cognition the angel has of the world, Macedo’s ac-
count can be summarized as follows:
1) The angelic mind has a similar structure to the human one.
2) The angel has both an agent and a patient intellect; it acquires knowl-
edge directly from the objects.
3) In this regard, there is no difference between angels and human beings.
Once again, the target of criticism is Aquinas. Macedo reproaches him for hav-
ing construed an account of cognition that literally revolves around a “machine
of proportions” (machina proportionum):16 what a cognitive subject knows and
how she knows it depends on her nature. This state-of-things determines the
differences between diverse cognitive subjects, like human beings, separate souls,
angels, blessed souls: the minds that populate Aquinas’s world. Each, according
to Macedo, has a precise cognitive modality: acquired species in the case of the
human intellect, infused species in the case of the separate soul, innate species in
the case of the angel, and a direct vision of the divine mind in the case of the
blessed soul.17
Macedo firmly rejects this system of proportions. According to him, the
state of a subject does not determine her cognitive modalities nor her cognitive
objects and, mostly, there is no proportion among the cognitive modalities of
each subject. That is, how the human intellect knows is independent on how the
angel or other subjects know.
It does not follow from the union of the soul with the body that angels have infused
species, because there is no connection between the two things; the connection is rather
16 Macedo uses this expression in one of his arguments against Aquinas, after presenting
the argument according to which angels too, can acquire species from the things (and have not
only innate ideas): cf. Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 4, sec. 3, 166b: “[…] quia in Deo
sunt creaturae in ideis representatae in singulis singulae, quemadmodum toties ostendimus;
igitur et in speciebus angelicis debent omnia singillatim, et per singulas species repraesentari,
sicut in nobis repraesentantur universalia universalibus, singularia singularibus: unde corruit
tota machina proportionum, et accommodationum ordinate ad inducendam diversitatem An-
geli ab homine per species innatas et acquisitas; cum ex ratione ultima genuine S. Thomae,
deducatur similitudo, et aequalitas cognoscendi omnia per species singillatim sumptas, et sin-
gulas res repraesentantas, sicut cognoscuntur a nobis. Utcunque sit certe illud exemplum non
concludit: angelos cognoscere per species innatas et concreatas.”
17 Regarding the different modalities of cognition proper to each mind, see Scribano, Angeli
e beati, 9–67. There is extensive literature on the blessed souls’ vision in God; beside the refer-
ential work by Trottmann, La vision béatifique, see also Pini, “Il dibattito sulle specie intellegi-
bili,” 281–91, and Krause, Thomas Aquinas on Seeing God.
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between the way one is in the body and how the species are received through the body,
for what concerns the soul; this is the only proportion. But there is no connection be-
tween subjects of different order, like angels and souls, so that it is possible to say that, as
the soul receives its species from the objects, the angel must receive them from God. It is
correct to claim that, as it has no body, the angel does not receive the species from bod-
ies, unlike souls; but it is not correct to deduce from this that it receives them directly
from God, for, there are also other ways to receive them.18
Once again, Macedo defends not only the independence of each subject’s cogni-
tive modality from the others, but also from the state in which a cognitive sub-
ject is. Our scholastic is indeed married to the Scotist idea according to which
angels have an agent intellect: this is the real difference in comparison with Tho-
mas and his school. The attribution of an agent intellect and the agent intellect’s
specific nature in itself – namely, that of a dynamic force able to make potential
cognition actual –not only enables the angels to acquire cognition but is also the
main element upon which the entire analogy with the human intellect is based.
Differently from Thomas, in fact, Scotus holds that the angel has a less actual
nature, and therefore needs to acquire cognition. It is the case of contingent ob-
jects, as Macedo points out.19 Moreover – and this is an argument that Macedo
strongly emphasizes –, having an agent intellect is in no way a punishment, or
something that negatively marks the nature of a subject: on the contrary, the
agent intellect is a perfection, and is to be found in each created subject.
The agent intellect is a perfection that does not depend on the subject that has it but a
perfection in general and overall […]; it is thus worthy of the angel and can be attributed
to it. […] By its nature, it is not something added to the compound of matter and form –
the human being –, it is there only by accident, like when it is in the soul of our Lord
Jesus and in the separate soul. Thus, it is free from that boundary and is to be found in
each intellective subject, of any species, like in all the species of the angels. According to
the perfection of their nature, angels are able to free the agent intellect from every materi-
al aggregate: they unite themselves to them only by accident.20
18 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 4, sec. 3, 165a: “Non ergo sequitur ex illa unione ani-
mae ad corpus illa infusio specierum in angelo, cum nulla sit connexio inter utrumque: con-
nexio quidem est inter modum essendi in corpore, et recipiendi speciem per corpus respectu
eiusdem animae, in qua est proportio: sed non est connexio inter duo diversi ordinis subiecta,
angelum, et anima, dicendo: anima accipis species ab obiectis, ergo angelus accipit a Deo per
infusionem. Bene sequitur angelus carens corpore non eas accipit a corpore, cui unitur sicuti
anima, sed non sequitur: accipit immediate a Deo cum alii modi supersint accipiendi.”
19 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 3, sec. 2, 158a: “[…] non omnes species sunt congen-
itae angelo, cum multas ille de novo acquirat, quales sunt futurorum contingentium praesertim
liberorum: secretorum cordis humani; et illae quae ad angelicam locutionem pertinent, quae
magna pars specierum est, ad quas necessarius omnino est intellectus agens […].”
20 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 3, sec. 3, 160a: “Intellectus agens est perfectio non
respectiva ad subiectum, sed absoluta ab omni subiecto, ac per se, ac in se consideratus perfec-
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186 Anna Tropia
Macedo gives a long and rhetorically rich peroration on the agent intellect’s per-
fection, which goes hand in hand with the exaltation of human dignity. The
main point is that it is not a sign of imperfection to acquire cognition. The cog-
nitive model of the innate species, the one that Thomas attributes to the angels,
is reserved only to the knowledge of things that are immutable, eternal and do
not change. Scotus’s text that Macedo here comments upon (Ordinatio II, dist.
3, q. 11) is clear on this point: the angel has innate species of the objects con-
sidered as universals but not as singulars. The nature of the singular and individ-
ual impedes this: if the angel had innate species of things considered as univer-
sals (e. g., the essence of cat, or cat-ness, namely what it is to be a cat) and as
individuals (e. g., all the individual cats existing in the world: my cat Camilla, my
friend Michela’s cat etc.), then the angel would actually need an infinite number
of innate species. But there is more: Scotus combines the absurdity of having an
infinite number of species with the peculiar and fleeting nature of the individu-
al.21 He clearly claims that the individuals must be understood by the angels as
present, namely through an act of intuitive cognition.22 This is exactly what it is
tio; ergo dignus angelo, et ponendus in angelo. […] natura sua non est addictus composito ex
materia et forma, qualis est homo, nam id per accidens est illi, dum sit in anima Christi Domi-
ni et in anima separata. Igitur de se est liber ab illo vinculo et reperitur in omni subiecto intel-
lectivo, cuiuscunque id specie fit, uti in omnibus speciebus angelorum, qui iuxta suae perfec-
tionem naturae intellectum agentem sortiuntur ab omni concretione materiali liberum: quae
illi per accidens accedit.”
21 Besides the already quoted works on the Scotist distinction and usage of intuitive and
abstractive cognition, concerning his position on the singulars, see the classical work by Béru-
bé, La connaissance de l’individuel au moyen âge, and the recent monograph by Lazella, The
singular voice of being.
22 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 4, sec. 3, 162a, quotes some passages from Scotus’s
question “An angeli possint proficere accipiendo cognitionem a rebus?,” where Scotus distin-
guishes between angelic abstractive cognition of the universals and angelic intuitive cognition
of the singulars. Macedo does not quote but summarizes the following passage from Duns Sco-
tus, In Sent. II, dist. 3, q. 11, n. 12 (ed. Wadding VI.1), 493: “Tertio dico, quod quantum-
cumque [Angelus] haberet concreatam sibi notitiam singularis, et notitiam existentiae contin-
gentis, tamen cognitionem intuitivam singularium necessario recipit a rebus. Non enim omnis
cognoscens existentiam alicuius, cognoscit ipsam intuitive, quia potest ipsam cognoscere abs-
tractive, nam cognitionem intuitivam singularium, non potest habere in Verbo, ubi tamen cog-
nitionem existentiae habet, et ideo ad cognitionem intuitivam rei necessario concurrit objec-
tum reale, vel ipsa res ut praesens.” This whole quaestio is not included in the Vatican edition;
according to Bazán, “Conceptions on the Agent Intellect and the Limits of Metaphysics,” 196,
it is considered “an interpolated text coming from Rep. Paris. II B, dist. 11, q. 2.” In the same
column, Macedo also quotes a text from the Reportata Parisiensia (II, dist. 3, q. 3, Wadding
XI.1, 277) that allows him to formulate the discrepancy between Aquinas and Scotus as fol-
lows: “Itaque convenit Scotus cum D. Thoma in eo, quod Angelus habet species concreatas,
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meant, when we learn that the angel acquires cognition of certain objects that
have certain characteristics – such as being contingent, mutable, individual, and,
I would add, material. It knows them as actually present, and it knows them
such as they are.
Now, Macedo takes on Scotus’s page; but what is striking is that in his own
pages, the discourse on the cognition of certain objects (contingent, mutable
etc.) is not linked to the angel’s capacity of cognizing them through an act of
intuitive cognition. Moreover, the term “intuitive” is not to be found at all within
his commentary. Secondly, human cognition is the laboratory for explaining
how the angels acquire cognition. Before clarifying how this happens, in fact, the
Portuguese scholastic indulges in the description of the human process of ac-
quiring cognition. Via acquired species, of course, and through the agent intel-
lect’s illumination:
I think that the illuminative action of the intellect does not concern the phantasm but
rather something that is produced after the phantasm. As the latter is at the base of the
cognitive process, illumination concerns the intelligible species […] and the possible in-
tellect: it is the possible intellect that receives the species thereby originating the cognitive
process. […] The phantasm put aside (secluso phantasmate), [the agent intellect] illumi-
nates the intelligible species by exciting them and making them ready in a first act to
make the possible intellect think […]. It is therefore evident that, even without phan-
tasm, there still is this illuminative activity of the agent intellect.23
Macedo highlights how one of the activities traditionally attributed to the agent
intellect – its “illuminative” act – does not concern the phantasm, the material
image impressed by the object on the senses, but rather is directed towards the
possible intellect, namely that part of the intellective faculty which “receives” in-
tellectual contents and hence cognizes them. His aim is to underline the separa-
tion of the intellectual activity, which is characterized by its immateriality, from
the domain of all that is material. Again, the phantasm is not deemed necessary
in the production of an act of intellection, which instead seems to be something
“happening” within the intellective faculty, and only there. The goal is to reveal
the common ground between the embodied mind and the angelic one that is
naturally deprived of a body: the more the human intellect is described as inde-
sive ut dicit D. Thomas, connaturales rerum universalium: discrepant in eo, quod habet species
concreatas etiam singularium, quod admittit D. Thomas, et negat Scotus.”
23 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 3, sec. 3, 159b: “Ego existimo illam illuminationem
non esse praecise respectu phantasmatis, sed etiam respective ad illud dici, verum eo quoque
sublato locum esse illuminationi respectu specie intelligibilis […] et intellectus possibilis, qu-
atenus ei species ad intelligendum applicatur. […] secluso phantasmate illuminat species intel-
ligibiles excitando eas, et proponendo illas expeditas in actu primo ad intelligendum intellectui
possibili […]. Unde colligitur, licet non esset phantasma adhuc manere illam illustrationem
factam ab intellectu agente.”
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pendent from its body, the more the comparison with the angel becomes rele-
vant. In the next section, which constitutes the very core of Macedo’s account of
both intellects, we finally find some clear statements regarding the species and
the dependency of the human intellect on the body. Macedo explains what he
deems to be the “whole knot of the difficulty” (totus nodus difficultatis)24 in the
debate between the Scotists and the Thomists. According to Macedo, the Tho-
mists claimed that angels possess innate species only, because they could not
explain how an immaterial substance acquires cognition from material sub-
stances.25 But certain objects do require such an interaction:
What does not have any movement is innate and inborn [in the angelic mind]; but what
is subject to movement is or can be adventitious. In the constitution of the heaven noth-
ing is mutable, because it is eternal […]. [B]ut the intelligible species augment and grow,
like in the case of angelic language. Thus, the nature of the species is adventitious.26
This text shows how Macedo thinks about the species: the nature of these instru-
ments, whose task is to transmit information on the objects, is “adventitious”,
and always entails a sort of exchange and interaction between the cognizer and
the cognized object. What is here meant by ‘species’ might be an object of dis-
cussion and require some adjustment; however, note, again, that there is no ref-
erence to an intuitive modality of cognition.
To explain how the angelic intellect “abstracts” cognition from material ob-
jects, Macedo develops his comparison with the human intellect. In this occa-
sion, he finally provides more information about the human process of knowl-
edge acquisition:
In order to become spiritual, the fantastic species is not subordinated to the agent intel-
lect but to fantasy; but it receives immateriality from the spiritual agent intellect. From
this, I deduce that, in order for the material species to become spiritual, it must not be
received within the spiritual power – which is impossible. The sole necessary thing is
that this species unites itself with the intellective power and becomes ready to receive a
24 Cf. Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 2, diff. 4, sec. 5, 170a: “Hic est totius nodus difficultatis:
quem quia Scoti adversarij solvere non audent, nec solutionem eius audire volunt: haerent, et
adhaerent suae de speciebus concreatis sententiae, negant igitur inveniri posse modum proba-
bilem, quo species ab extra praesertim materiales advenire angelo possint, qui omnino spiritu-
alis cum sit, eas recipere nullo modo potest.”
25 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 4, sec. 2, 163b: “Hanc partem […], quem ponit con-
traria Scoti, qui non videtur intelligibilis, nedum probabilis, cum intelligi nequeat, quomodo res
materiales possint immittere species in intellectum rei spiritualis […].”
26 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 4, sec. 3, 164a–b: “Ea in quibus non est mutatio sunt
innata, et coniuncta: quae vero mutationem subeunt, ea sunt, et possunt esse adventitia. Tunc:
in coeli constitutione nihil est mutabile, cum sit aeternum […]. At vero species intelligibiles, et
augentur, et crescunt, ut apparet in locutione angelica; itaque earum specierum natura est ad-
ventitia.”
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sort of weakening (attenuatio) and refinement (subtilizatio). We see it in the case of the
fantastic species, that is not received in the agent intellect but, remaining in phantasy,
becomes immaterial after the agent intellect’s adapted treatment and appropriation (ac-
commodatio).27
One more time, Macedo defends the view according to which the interaction
between the material domain – represented by the fantastic species or the mate-
rial phantasm – and the immaterial one – represented by the intellect – is im-
possible. In the passage quoted above, he claims that the phantasm “remains”
within the fantasy and that the intellect does not in any way alter it. Neverthe-
less, there is room for a sort of interaction between the phantasm and the intel-
lect: as a result of their encounter, the former is made “subtler.” How this hap-
pens is clarified in the following passage:
I don’t see what should prevent the angel from uniting itself to species and adapt to be
abstracted; nor why the angel should not be able to produce immaterial species of mate-
rial objects; for, angels move and are moved, act and are acted upon by heavy material
bodies, to which they are intimately and directly united. Therefore, it is clear that also
angels can be associated to those very subtle species that are more intentional than real
and that through them, they acquire the species of material objects. If this required an
internal and local union, it would not be different than saying that the angelic mind uni-
tes itself to those species through a sort of sympathy or internal proximity with those
material species, so that they can serve to the task of that production.28
Macedo’s argument runs as follows: let us start by the presupposition that angels
interact with bodies. They interact with them by maintaining their fully spiritual
nature but, just like human beings, they are able to produce (thanks to their
agent intellect) species that are “more intentional than real.” Through them,
27 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 4, sec. 5, 171a–b: “[Species phantastica] ad hoc ut
spiritualizetur non subiectatur in intellectu agente, sed in phantasia, et tamen recipit ab intel-
lectu agente spirituali immaterialitatem. Unde deduco non esse necessariam receptionem spe-
ciei materialis in potentia spirituali, quam puto impossibilem, ut evadat spiritualis, sed tantum,
ut apte coniungatur, et accommodetur ad recipiendam illam attenuationem, et subtilizationem;
quemadmodum vidimus in exemplo specie phantasticae, quaecunque illa fit, quae non recepta
intra intellectum agentem, sed manens intra phantasiam recipit immaterialitatem ab illo pro-
pter debitam applicationem, et accommodationem.”
28 Macedo, Collationes II, coll. 3, diff. 4, sec. 5, 172a: “Quomodo autem angelus uniri possit
illis speciebus apte ad eas elevandas, et cum ijs elevates speciem in se immaterialem producen-
dam exponere, non video qua possit ratione negari, cum constet Angelos movere, et moveri, et
agere, et agi cum corporibus maxime crassis, et materialibus, et immediate, et intime ijs coni-
ungi. Unde liquet posse eos cum subtilissimis ijs formis, quae potius sunt intentionales, quam
reales uniri, et simul cum ijsdem productiones specierum materialium efficere. An autem ad id
necesse sit localis et intima coniuncio nihil interest utrum dicas: dummodo obtineas posse per
intimam quondam, vel propinquitatem, vel sympathiam cum ijs materialibus speciebus con-
iungi ad officium illud productionis praestandum.”
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190 Anna Tropia
they acquire knowledge (the species) of material objects. Eventually, Macedo

says that we can conceive of such union, or interaction, as a local one, “a sort of
sympathy” or “an internal proximity.”
There are of course many points left unclear. What does Macedo refer to,
when he talks about ‘species’? If he were following Scotus faithfully (thereby em-
bracing the doctrine of intuitive cognition, so, no species at all), ‘species’ would
be a synonym of cognition or knowledge. In this case, the angel would be able to
acquire cognition of material objects owing to its agent intellect, without medi-
um, and through its sole capacity. Yet, Macedo talks of species that are “more
intentional than real.” They belong more to a cognitive domain than to the ex-
ternal and material world. The human acquisition of species is a process that
goes from the objects to the mind via a medium (the species) that is appropriate
and adequate to the nature of the latter. But, in the case of Macedo, no full ex-
planation of how this acquisition happens is provided. We only learn that the
phantasms are deemed incapable of exerting a direct influence upon the mind.
The reference to ‘sympathy’ is helpful to solve the question. Although it is brief
and not fully delineated, Macedo’s way of sketching human (and angelic) cogni-
tion could be seen as moving toward a theory of cognition with a full-fledged
account of sympathy.
Famously, Macedo’s former professor, Francisco Suárez, exposed in his De
anima the doctrine according to which each soul’s faculty acts separately from
the others, but is “informed” of the activities of the others through their com-
mon root, i. e., the soul.29 Suárez explains the production of the intelligible spe-
cies through this mechanism: when the sensitive faculty is engaged in the cogni-
tion of a material object through the production of a material species, at the
same time the intellect is stimulated to produce an intelligible species entirely on
its own, and without contact with the world.30 The whole process is possible be-
cause the two faculties are rooted in the same soul. If we go back to the case of
the angels, which Macedo deals with, sympathy does not refer to diverse faculties
of the soul – like in the case of human beings, who are provided with imagina-
tion and intellect –, but to the intellect and the external world. Angels react to
the presence of the material objects by producing an intentional species of them
– by grasping their ideas – without engaging with them.
This explanation might fill in the blanks left by Macedo in his own account
of human and angelic cognition. Human beings acquire intellectual cognition
29 Cf. Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 2, n. 8, 90.

30 Regarding the production of the intelligible species and sympathy in Suárez, cf. Spruit,
Species Intelligibilis, 301–3; South, “Suárez on imagination” and “Singular and Universal in
Suárez”; Perler, “Suárez on intellectual cognition and occasional causation”; Tropia, “Scotus
and Suárez on Sympathy.” As for the production of the sensible species, see Daniel Heider’s
contribution to this present volume.
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through the sympathy among intellect and imagination (or fantasy); similarly,
angels have a sort of sympathy with material and singular objects that enables
them to produce a species of them. Macedo’s account is, eventually, rather pecu-
liar. Intuition might still seem to be lurking in the background as a possibility,
somehow tied to the necessary interaction of the angelic mind with objects that
are present and existent in the moment they are cognized. However, Macedo
talks about species. If he uses the term as synonym for ‘cognition’ or for ‘ideas,’
then he subscribes to a tendency common to those scholastics, who deny the
existence of the species but keep using the term as a synonym for ‘cognition’ (see
chapter 4). If he talks about species as something capable of actualizing the an-
gelic mind, then he presses the comparison with the human mind; cognition
may then, in both cases, be described in occasionalist terms. To summarize:
1) Macedo claims that the angels acquire cognition of material objects like
human beings do.
2) They do so by ‘species.’
3) By ‘species,’ he either refers to the immaterial species of the material
objects or to objects themselves, insofar as they are cognized.
4) The interaction between the material domain and the immaterial mind
of the angel is quickly explained through sympathy, a form of occasion-
alism that Suárez and others employed in order to account for the hu-
man acquisition of the species.
4. A Jesuit Background?
In the Collationes, Macedo has Scotus’s text in mind. Sometimes, he reappraises
it literally, like in the defense of human dignity against the Thomistic account of
different minds. Sometimes, he follows it more loosely, like it happens in his
account of human and angelic cognition. Explaining cognition through a unique
model of mind is not something alien to Scotus, according to whom there is no
specific difference between the angelic and the human mind.31 Nevertheless, in
Macedo’s account of angelic cognition, which is modeled on human cognition,
and, first of all, in his confusion regarding intuitive and abstractive kinds of cog-
nitive acts, one hears echoes from other traditions.32 Macedo writes the Colla-
31 Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. II dist. 1 q. 6, d. I (ed. Vat. VII), 156–57. Cf. Macedo’s commen-
tary in Collationes II, coll. 1, diff. 2, Iudicium, 17a: “Equidem iudico non esse improbabilem
sententiam affirmantem Animam rationalem equalem esse Angelo in essentiali perfectione.”
32 I have argued in favor of a partial reappraisal of Scotus by the Jesuits, specifically in the
case of Suárez; cf. Tropia, “Scotus and Suárez on Sympathy” and “McCaghwell’s Reading of
Scotus’s De anima.” That Jesuits mixed up traditions and interpretations is generally accepted
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192 Anna Tropia
tiones thirty years after Descartes published the Meditations. As Maritain has
aptly put it, the French philosopher described the human mind by attributing to
it most of the features Thomas Aquinas attributed to the angelic one.33 But
Macedo’s confusion between the two minds or, better, between the two models
of mind, does not originate in the Meditations. The two aspects that most signifi-
cantly characterize his account of cognition – namely, the independence of the
intellect from the senses and the similarity between angelic and human mind –
rather seem to echo some elements that are traceable in the early Jesuit discus-
sions. As already mentioned, one may reasonably assume that texts like Suárez’s
De anima may have cast a long shadow on the Collationes.
The separation between the intellect’s activities from the sensible faculty’s
is a recurring element in Jesuit texts since the very beginning of the Society’s
philosophical and pedagogical production. Suárez introduced the mechanism of
the connection of the soul’s faculties to explain the independency of the intellect
from the senses:
Fantasy and intellect are rooted in the same (human) soul, and for this reason there is a
natural order and consonance in their activities. For example, the object that is known by
the intellect, is also known by fantasy. If on the one hand the possible intellect has no
species, on the other the soul has the spiritual capacity of producing the species of the
things that are cognized by the senses in the possible intellect. In this process, the sensible
imagination exerts no efficient causal role but is almost like matter (quasi materia),
namely that which stimulates the soul, or an exemplar. So, in the very moment the soul
knows an object via fantasy, its spiritual capacity paints that very object in the possible
intellect. […] The agent intellect, as such, has no other action than producing the intelli-
gible species, despite the fact that this process has been called in many ways. Notice that
a triple activity is usually attributed to the agent intellect: (1) the illumination of the
phantasm; (2) making things actually intelligible and (3) abstracting from the phan-
tasms. […] Actually, the illumination of the phantasm doesn’t directly concern the
phantasm […], it is rather directed toward the potential intellect. But the agent intellect
has no other operation, regarding the potential intellect, than that of producing the intel-
ligible species.34
in scholarship; for an overview of their internal regulations and pedagogical plans, see Casalini,
“The Jesuits.”
33 See Maritain, “Descartes ou l’incarnation de l’ange”, 75–126. Maritain’s intuition has
been reappraised and developed by Scribano, Angeli e beati, 119–93. Scribano’s important
book has been recently translated into French; cf. Scribano, Anges et bienheureux: la connais-
sance de l’infini de Descartes à Spinoza.
34 Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 2, n. 12, 96, and nn. 14–15, 98: “[P]hantasiam et
intellectum hominis radicari in una anima; et hinc est quod in suis operibus habent ordinem et
consonantiam; unde patebit, infra, quod eo ipso quod intellectus operatur, etiam imaginatio
operatur. Ad hunc ergo modum arbitror intellectum possibilem de se esse nudum speciebus,
habere tamen animam virtutem spiritualem ad efficiendas species earum rerum, quas sensus
cognoscit, in intellectu possibili, ipsa imaginatione sensibili non concurrente effective ad eam
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In these quotes, Suárez has the same concerns as those that will occupy Macedo.
Just like the latter shall do, Suárez denies the possibility of any direct contact or
exchange between the domain of sensibility and that of the intellect; the intellec-
tive act is described as something that affects the very intellect. The two parts of
the soul participating in the act of cognition are thus separate, and communicate
only through their common root, the soul. The passage of abstraction is thus
redefined, and the role of the intellect amplified, in a certain sense, with respect
to that of the sensitive faculty.35 Moreover, in Suárez’s De anima, the attention
given to this epistemological problem – the interaction between sensitive and
intellective faculty – is extensive, and the discussion of problems and sources
seem to precede, somehow, the long defense of the human intellect’s indepen-
dence that we know from Macedo’s text. Both scholastics describe the act of
intellection as an activity developing – starting, happening, and ending – exclu-
sively within the intellective power.
There are of course significant differences between Suárez’s and Macedo’s
texts. The first rejects the Scotist claim, according to which there is no specific
difference between the angel and the human soul.36 So, at least on the surface,
Suárez is not favorable toward the similarity between the angelic and the human
mind. Nevertheless, when, in the same text, the Jesuit elaborates on the possibili-
ty of grasping knowledge of the singulars, not only does he side with Scotus,
from whom he borrows both examples and arguments;37 but he also describes
the process of grasping knowledge of the material singulars in similar terms to
actionem, sed habente se quasi materia, aut per modum excitantis animam, aut sane per
modum exemplaris. Et ita fit quod statim ac anima per phantasiam cognoscit aliquid, per vir-
tutem suam spiritualem quasi depingit rem illam in intellectu possibili. […] Intellectus agens
ut sic nullam aliam actionem habet nisi productionem specie intelligibilis, quamvis haec actio
diversis nominibus explicetur. Nota quod intellectui agenti triplex solet tribuit operatio: prima,
illuminatio phantasmatis; secunda, facere res actu intelligibiles; tertia, abstrahere a phantas-
matibus. Quarta etiam solet tribui, quae est illustrare prima principia. […] Nam, illuminatio
phantasmatis non est actio circa phantasma […] illa est circa intellectum possibilem; at vero
circa intellectum possibilem nullam aliam actionem habet intellectus agens praeter specie pro-
ductionem.”
35 Of the same advise Spruit, Species Intelligibilis, 303.
36 Cf. Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 1, n. 8, 74–76.
37 The examples made by Suárez are numerous and echo some of those present in Scotus’s
De anima. For instance: the human intellect can tell the difference between two individuals
(e. g., Peter and Paul); as human beings, we know individuals; if the angels can know the mate-
rial individuals, the human intellect must be able to know them as well (this argument itself is
not from Scotus’s De anima but from the text Macedo commented on: In II d. 3 q. 11). Cf.
Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 3, nn. 7–10; cf. Scotus, De anima, q. 22 (OPh V), 230–
33. It is worth observing that the only argument Macedo refers to is the one of the similarity
between angelic and human intellect.
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194 Anna Tropia
those Macedo will use in his account of angelic cognition.38 Distancing himself
from the Aristotelian (then Thomist) claim, according to which the intellect
knows beings qua universals, whereas the senses know beings qua singulars,39
Suárez, employing a list of arguments, proves that the human intellect is indeed
able to cognize singulars. One of these arguments asserts that if the angelic intel-
lect, which is further away from matter than the human one, knows material
singular things, then the human intellect must be able to know them as well.40
This argument, based on the similar structure of the two intellects, is offered by
Suárez as evidence of the material singular’s knowability. The similarity between
the angelic and the human mind is, therefore, not rejected in toto by Suárez, who
takes on this argument from Scotus and does not even spend time discussing it;
that the human intellect can know the material singulars, “as is clearly the case
with the angels” (ut in angelis patet), is presented as evidence.41
Without entering into the details of Suárez’s text, it is worth noticing that
according to the Jesuit the cognition of the material singular is acquired by the
intellect through the already mentioned mechanism of sympathy, namely
through the concomitant activity of the intellect and the sensitive faculty, which
results in the production of an intelligible species of the cognitive object. The
intellect has the power to dematerialize the material individual outside the mind,
if such cognition is supported by the concomitant acquisition of knowledge of
that individual by the sensitive faculty. This is the measure of the intellect’s de-
pendence on the phantasms, according to Suárez.42 The human acquisition of
the material singulars cannot be compared to the intuitive cognition that Duns
Scotus talks about, because such acquisition of knowledge is acquired from the
external objects through abstraction and is, almost by definition, discursive,
38 Cf. Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 3, n. 3, 110. Regarding Suárez’s cognition of

the singular, cf. the clear work by South, “Universal and Singular in Suárez.” Most of the schol-
arship has focused on the proximity between Suárez and Ockham concerning the cognition of
the singulars; see for instance Alejandro, La gnoseología del Doctor Esimio y la acusación nomi-
nalista; De Vries, “Die Erkenntnislehre des Franz Suárez und der Nominalismus;” Peccorini,
“Knowledge of the Singular;” Noreña, “Ockham and Suárez on the Ontological Status of Uni-
versal Concepts.” I have claimed that more attention should be paid to Suárez’s Scotist roots;
cf. Tropia, “McCaghwell’s Reading of Scotus’s De anima,”, and Tropia, La teoria della
conoscenza di Francisco Macedo, 142–48. Of the same similar advise, see Aho, “Suárez on cog-
nitive intentions.”
39 Aristotle, Phys., I, 5, 189a5–10 and Met., V, 11, 1018b31–34.
40 Cf. Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 3, n. 11, 122: “[I]ntellectum esse potentiam
spiritualem abstrahentem a conditionibus materiae, non tollit quin possit cognoscere res mate-
riales cum omnibus conditionibus individualibus, ut in angelis patet. Solum ergo potest inferri
quod species, per quam intellectus cognoscit singulare, debet esse spiritualis, cum quo stat
quod sit repraesentativa rei singularis, ut ostensum est.”
41 See previous note.
42 Cf. Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 7, n. 6, 202–4.
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since it is and is not immediately at the disposal of the mind.43 Nevertheless,

Suárez, as many of his predecessors and contemporaries, is against the idea that
material singulars are not directly intelligible by the human intellect. In a more
sustained way than Macedo, the Jesuit reappraises Scotus’s overall discourse on
the state of the intellect and its temporary – though diminished – dependence
on the phantasms.44 One important outcome of Macedo’s comparison with
Suárez is that at least in one case – the cognition of the material singulars – the
functioning of the human intellect can be clarified by the example of the angelic
one. There are points in common between the two kinds of mind, owing to their
immateriality. Furthermore, the insistence on the necessary separation between
the intellect and the senses is a central motive in both authors’ account of hu-
man cognition.
The superiority of the intellect and its prior role in the acquisition of cogni-
tion was also highlighted by other Jesuits, who are less well-known today than
Suárez. This is the case with the Spaniard Juan Maldonado, who inaugurated the
chair of philosophy in Paris from the very beginning of the College de Clermont
in 1564. Maldonado precedes in time both Suárez and Macedo, but equally ar-
gues against any interaction between the intellect and the senses. In contrast to
Suárez and Macedo, though, the incompatibility of intellect and senses is what
moves Maldonado to reject in toto the species theory. According to Maldonado,
the acts of intellectual cognition are direct.
According to philosophy, a spiritual thing can never be generated by a bodily one. Also,
if [material species] are made spiritual, they are still made of the same matter from
43 Moreover, Suárez has a complex account of cognition of the material substances. He

claims the intellect first grasps the singular accidents belonging to the substance, and only after
“reconstructs” the concept of the underlying substance. See, e. g., Francisco Suárez, De anima,
disp. 9, q. 4, n. 2, 154: “Species quae primo fit ab intellectu agente fit omnino similis in reprae-
sentatione phantasmatis; sed per phantasma tantum repraesentatur res secundum accidentia
sensibilia per se; ergo eandem rem et eodem modo repraesentat species intelligibilis facta ab
intellectu agente. Maior patet, quia cognitio sensitiva est principium cognitionis intellectivae,
nam determinat intellectum agentem ad productionem talis specie; ergo talis est res repraesen-
tata ab intellectu agente per speciem intelligibilem productam ab illo, qualis est cognitio per
sensum et repraesentata in phantasmate.” I have argued that Suárez’s account is close to Sco-
tus’s in Tropia, “McCaghwell’s Reading of Scotus’s De anima,” 103–9.
44 Although not explicitly: Suárez claims not to agree with Scotus concerning this precise
point, although he reappraises many elements from his texts. I studied this in Tropia, “Scotus
and Suárez on Sympathy.” See also Francisco Suárez, De anima, disp. 9, q. 7, n. 8, 206–8:
“[H]aec dependentia provenit ex imperfectione status, nam intellectus nunc non recipit spe-
cies, nisi dum actu operatur phantasia; phantasia autem et intellectus radicantur in eadem ani-
ma et ideo sibi invicem deserviunt et sese impediunt; et ideo dum phantasia laeditur et insanit
secum trahit attentionem animae, atque adeo intellectum; et ideo laesio redundant in intellec-
tum.”
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196 Anna Tropia
which they come. This can happen only in two ways: either [such matter] is transformed
into nothing, or it remains without form. Both options are absurd. Accordingly, from the
<material species> something would be generated. But that every time we think about
something, a natural being is generated in our imagination is just ridiculous; what would
be generated in this way, a stone perhaps? Furthermore, the agent intellect cannot make
the material forms spiritual, even if they could [be made spiritual]: for, either it can
transform them, or it cannot. If it cannot, how does it make them spiritual?45
The Jesuit’s text does not contain any explicit reference to Scotus. However, its
anti-Thomistic orientation is evident also in other cases, like in the cognition of
the singulars (something he shares with all the Jesuits and scholastics of his day)
and the entire account of the soul and its unity. Maldonado actually holds that
singulars are what the intellect first knows and ascribes a certain actuality also to
the material body – thereby taking on the famous “form of the bodyliness” (for-
ma corporeitatis) from medieval anti-Thomist philosophers.46
Maldonado’s short tract has a special focus on the immortality of the soul,
that he aims to defend philosophically from the danger represented by the vari-
ous forms of Averroisms that were spreading in his day. His worry regarding the
intellect’s independence from the senses – something he shares with Macedo
and Suárez – is therefore mainly concerned with its separability from the body.
Maldonado thus gives maximal attention to all the arguments that support the
intellect’s independence of the intellect from the body. This, of course, is reflect-
ed in his theory of cognition. The Jesuit in fact underlines that the intellect is
free (libere) to direct itself towards one or the other object, therefore cognizing it
directly and by its own means, namely independently from the senses as well as
from any species acquisition.47
45 Juan Maldonado, De origine, natura et immortalitate animae, 252: “Res enim spiritalis
secundum philosophiam numquam fit ex corporea. Praeterea si fiant res spiritales, de materia
illa fiunt quam exuunt, quod fit dupliciter: aut enim convertitur in nihil, aut manet sine forma.
Utrumque est absurdum. Ergo ex illa aliquid gignitur. Quod autem quoties intelligamus gig-
natur in imaginatione aliquod ens naturale, ridiculum est; quid enim gignitur, lapisne? Praete-
rea intellectus agens non posset illas facere spiritales etiam si illae possent; aut enim aliquid
ageret in illas aut nihil. Si nihil, quomodo facit spiritales?”
46 For the cognition of the singulars and the reappraisal of the forma corporeitatis, see re-
spectively Juan Maldonado, De origine, natura et immortalitate animae, 257–58 and 239–40;
extensive comment on the last passage in Tropia, “The unity of the soul.”
47 This is how Maldonado reconfigures abstraction; cf. Juan Maldonado, De origine, natura
et immortalitate animae, 254–55: “Multis autem rebus differt sensus ab intellectu. Primo, quia
nunquam abstrahit a proprio obiecto sed ab alieno, ut aspectus non abstrahit a colore, sed ab
odore; intellectus, qui habet obiectum proprie infinitum, non potest abstrahere ab alieno, sed a
proprio. Secundo, sensus necessitate quadam abstrahit, quia nulla potentia percipit alienum
obiectum; intellectus non necessitate, ut quando non potest multa simul comprehendere, sep-
arat, aliquando libere, quia vult unum et non alterum contemplari.”
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The same issues are present in the texts by other Jesuits of the same period,
such as the Italian Girolamo Dandini (1554–1634), who held the chair of Mal-
donado in Paris in the last two decades of the sixteenth century.48 In his massive
and understudied commentary to Aristotle’s De anima (to my knowledge, the
first printed work issued at the Parisian Jesuit College), Dandini too brings to
the table the superiority of the intellect over the senses. In the footsteps of Mal-
donado, this worry leads him to eliminate the species – both sensible and intelli-
gible species; the intellect can be the storage space of its thoughts (its acts) on-
ly.49 Like Suárez, Dandini refers to the mechanism of the connection among the
soul’s powers to explain their interaction (coordinatio facultatum). The princi-
ple according to which nothing material (like the material impression stored
within the sensitive faculty) can be ever made material (by the agent intellect) is
central and determines the Jesuit’s entire account of human cognition.50
In the three Jesuit accounts that have been rapidly presented, the problem
of the impossibility of any interaction or reception of anything material in the
intellect is central and determines the authors’ choices in their theories of cogni-
tion. Certainly, the mechanism of sympathy – which can also be attributed to
Maldonado to make sense of his own account of human cognition – does not
make the human mind the alter ego of the angelic mind. Nevertheless, the per-
ception these Jesuits had that the introduction of such a mechanism is necessary,
owing to the immateriality of the intellect, paves the way for a new conception of
the human intellect with a strong emphasis on the intellect’s autonomy and in-
dependence from the senses and their activities; the intellect is gradually seen as
more and more distinct (separable, different, insofar as it functions in different
ways) from the body.
48 Regarding Dandini and his possible influence on other Jesuits, see Edwards, “Digressing
with Aristotle: Hieronymus Dandinus’ De corpore animato (1610).”
49 Cf. Girolamo Dandini, De corpore animato, lib. III, comment. 81, 1892B–C: “A quibus
[Thomas et alii] ego multis modis dissentio. Primum, intellectilem speciem nil aliud esse arbi-
tror, quam ipsam intellectionem, quam actu promit intellectus, phantasmatibus inspectis
[…].” Cf. also ibid., comment. 95, digressio 29, n. 13, 1982B: “[…] specierum inanitatem os-
tendamus. In phantasmate namque satis est intellectui praesens obiectum, satis cum eo coni-
unctum, satisque ab illo intelligendum, tum provocatur intellectus, tum determinatur. Neque
cogitandum est obiectum vera e propria in intellectum actionem agere (quae enim sit vel etiam
intellectilis speciei actio?) sed intelligendum, intellectum potius velut cognoscentem facultatem
in illud vel circa illud operari, dum illud comprehendit et iudicat. […] Nulla igitur ante intel-
lectionem esse in intellectu potest intellectilis species, aut post eam superesse: immo nil aliud
est, intellectio ipsa quae est communis forma, quarum intellectus sit actu intelligens, tum res
actu intellecta; haecque vere in intelligentem transit.”
50 Cf. Girolamo Dandini, De corpore animato, comment. 95, digressio 29, n. 13,1982B–C:
“Quare ut intellectus est naturaliter coordinatus phantasiae, sit phantasma illius optime com-
paratum ad movendum intellectum; quique hoc neget, coordinationem facultatum harum ne-
gabit.”
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198 Anna Tropia
Conclusion
Let us now return to Macedo’s treatment of intuition. As it has been shown, our
scholastic follows Scotus’s text (Ordinatio II, dist. 3, q. 11) but allows himself to
take some liberties (cf., e. g., his ignoring of Scotus’s distinction between the
states of the intellect). Macedo’s main move is that of equating the angelic and
the human mind: both reciprocally clarify and illuminate features and functions
of the other. Take for example the case of the angelic cognition of the material
singulars: instead of referring to Scotus’s discourse on the intuitive capacity of
the angel, Macedo explains how an immaterial mind – the angel’s – can acquire
cognition of a material individual object by basing himself upon the human in-
tellect, i. e., an immaterial mind bound to a material body. The latter provides
him with a solution through the mechanism of sympathy. Here, let us observe
that Macedo does not talk about an act of intuitive cognition but refers to the
species acquired by the angel, just like the human intellect does. But then what
are we to understand by ‘species’? What is the species acquired by the angel?
One hypothesis is that Macedo employs the term ‘species’ as synonymous with
cognition. In that case, the angel would understand the external and contingent
objects just like human beings, through sympathy, are able to understand the
external and material objects, namely without any direct contact with them
(nothing material can affect something immaterial), through a sort of occasion-
alism. As for Macedo’s sources, I have presented the hypothesis that Macedo
derives his views from some Jesuits of the preceding generations. It is worth
noticing that instead of focusing on the specificity of the act of intuitive cogni-
tion, Macedo completely turns his attention toward the possibility of such an act
in itself. In his view, such an act can be clarified only by the comparison with the
human mind.
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III.
Metaphysical and Theological Implications
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Esse intentionale in Some Early Scotists
At the Origins of the So-called ‘Supertranscendental’
Richard Cross
Introduction
Duns Scotus’s untimely death bequeathed to his followers some very complex
intellectual problems. I shall consider two interrelated ones here: the ontological
status of intentional being – the being had by the contents of concepts – and the
possibility that intentional being might be included, along with real being, under
the scope of the transcendental concept being. On both issues, Scotus says things
that push in favour of both positive and negative answers, and his various stu-
dents, accordingly, defended different answers to the two questions. In what fol-
lows I begin by presenting some of the ambiguities as found in Scotus, and then
consider the overlapping debates between some of his early followers. At its cen-
tre is the so-called ‘supertranscendental’: the concept of being that includes both
real and intentional being. This view is paradigmatically associated with Nicho-
las Bonetus, writing in the early 1330s.1 Here I propose to consider the develop-
ment of the notion in the first two decades of the fourteenth century.2
1. Duns Scotus
Scotus’s principal discussion of the ontological status of intentional being is
found in the context of his treatment of the divine ideas. For the most part, he
treats the intentional being of the eternal objects of God’s knowledge as some-
thing that in some sense ‘depends’ on God’s act of knowledge, or as something
that is in some minimal sense ‘produced’ by God:
[Something created] can [terminate the act of the divine intellect as a secondary object
terminating that act], because such an object is not necessarily a prerequisite for the act,
but, rather, follows and depends on the act. For it does not comport itself as an object for
the divine intellect as a measure to what is measured by it, but rather the other way
round.3
1 See Mandrella, “Metaphysik als Supertranszendentalwissenschaft ?”

2 On the supertranscendental, see too Folger-Fonfara, Das ‘Super’-Transzendentale und die
Spaltung der Metaphysik, and the useful additions in Duba, “Neither First, nor Second.”
3 Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 36, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 16 (ed. Wolter / Bychkov II), 385:
“Potest [aliquid creatum terminare actum divini intellectus tamquam obiectum secundario ter-
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206 Richard Cross
So the idea is that an object with intentional being is not presupposed to God’s
act of cognition, but is rather produced by it, or dependent on it, as a kind of
necessary consequence of the act. And what explains this dependence relation is
the fact that the divine intellect ‘measures’ the object, which is a technical Aris-
totelian way of saying that the object in some sense ‘represents’ the divine intel-
lect: the divine intellect in some sense explains the content of the representation-
al object.
There is no thought here that the produced object is itself something creat-
ed, despite the way the position is phrased. The created thing is the real, extra-
mental, object; for such an object to be cognized is for a representation internal
to God to be produced in the sense outlined. Scotus puts the point a bit more
clearly elsewhere: “God […] produces a stone in intelligible being, and thus cog-
nizes the stone.”4
As he sees it, Scotus’s opponents here suppose that God’s cognition con-
sists in a relation between the divine intellect and the object of cognition. Aqui-
nas, for instance, had maintained, earlier, that the divine ideas consist in com-
parisons God makes between his essence and “other things” (alia),5 and that
these ideas are the divine essence, “in so far as it is a likeness or an idea of this or
that thing.”6 For Aquinas, then, there is the one utterly simple divine essence;
this essence is a likeness of all possible creatures; and these creatures are known
in virtue of God’s cognizing his essence in its likeness to such creatures. He ob-
serves the likeness, so to speak, and to observe a likeness-relation it is necessary
to mentally compare the two relata.
The account leaves a number of loose ends which Scotus attempts to tie up.
For example, what is the ontological status of the cognized object? And the com-
parison is a kind of asymmetrical one: the divine essence is what is imitated or
represented, and the object is what imitates or represents. So what is the direc-
tion, so to speak, of the comparison? And tying up these loose ends results in a
much more complex picture. As Scotus sees it, Aquinas and others have over-
looked the thought that the object, in order to be compared, must on the face of
it have some kind of ontological status; and that ontological status must be the
minans illum actum], quia tale obiectum non necessario coexigitur ad actum, sed magis sequi-
tur et dependet ab actu. Non enim se habet huiusmodi obiectum ad actum intellectus divini ut
mensura ad mensuratum eius, sed e converso.” All translations are my own unless otherwise
stated. The dependence-language is characteristic of Scotus’s Parisian lectures; for the language
of production, characteristic of his earlier, Oxford, lectures, see e. g. the next passage quoted.
For a related observation, see Smith, “The Origin of Intelligibility,” 44.
4 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 35, q. unica, n. 32 (ed. Vat. VI), 258: “Deus […] producit
lapidem in esse intelligibili et intelligit lapidem.”
5 Aquinas, STh I, q. 15, a. 1 ad 2.
6 Aquinas, STh I, q. 15, a. 2 ad 1: “Inquantum est similitudo vel ratio huius vel illius rei.”
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Esse intentionale in Some Early Scotists 207
result of divine cognitive activity, such that, as we have just seen, the divine in-
tellect in some sense produces the relevant object. Once produced, the object can
be compared to the divine essence, as Aquinas and others suppose. But, in order
to be known, does it have to be so compared? Scotus answers negatively, and in
so doing in effect undermines the thought that the divine essence’s imitability is
sufficient to ground God’s knowledge of things other than the divine essence:
“No such relation is necessarily required in order to have distinct and determi-
nate cognition.”7 So for God to know creatures all that is required is the divine
cognitive act and (on the face of it) the consequent object produced by that act.
How that object may or may not be an imitation or representation of the divine
essence is a further thing for God to know, and is not required for God’s knowl-
edge of the creature.
Scotus offers two possible ways of understanding the position thus far
sketched out. On the first, what is required for God’s cognition of the creature is
merely that God’s act of cognition measures the object – is represented by the
object, or is such that the divine intellect is in some sense responsible for the
object’s intelligible content, as in the basic account spelled out above:
In one way thus: […] the divine cognition is the measure of all intelligibles […] and for
this reason each other thing is referred to the divine intellect as measured to measure,
and it terminates the relation of any intelligible thing as merely absolute, and not by any
relation in God, corresponding to the relation of the measured to [God].8
So this cognition requires a relation between the object and the divine essence,
but no corresponding relation between the divine essence and the object – the
very relation, in other words, posited by Aquinas and others. It does not, in
short, require God to compare his essence to the object in a kind of reflex act.
The second approach is more reductionist, though admittedly not entirely
clear. The basic thought is that God’s cognition does not even require a relation
between the object of cognition and the divine intellect: “In another way it can
be said that no relation in God is required for his cognizing things other than
himself (neither, on the other hand, is there required a relation of the intelligible
object to him).”9 The reasoning is a bit obscure. Basically, Scotus considers in
7 Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 36, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 59 (ed. Wolter / Bychkov II), 399: “Nulla
relatio talis requiritur necessario ad cognitionem habendam distinctam et determinatam.”
8 Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 36, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 60 (ed. Wolter / Bychkov II), 399‒400:
“Uno modo sic: […] ipsum divinum intelligere est mensura omnium intelligibilium […] et
ideo quaelibet res alia refertur ad intellectum divinum ut mensuratum ad mensuram, et ipsum
terminat relationem cuiuscumque intelligibilis per rationem mere absolutam, et non per rela-
tionem aliquam in Deo correspondentem relationi mensurati ad ipsum.”
9 Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 36, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 61 (ed. Wolter / Bychkov II), 400: “Alio
modo potest dici quod nulla relatio requiritur in Deo ad hoc quod intelligat alia a se (nec e
converso requiritur relatio obiecti intelligibilis ad ipsum).”
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208 Richard Cross
turn two possible relations: the object’s being measured, or representing the di-
vine intellect; and the object’s relation of dependence.
In relation to the first, Scotus wonders whether the relation between the
object and the divine intellect is a real relation or a relation of reason. On the
one hand, it cannot be a real relation, because real relations require really dis-
tinct relata, and this clearly does not exist in the case at hand:
Wherever really distinct things are really related, in the same way, in the case in which
they are not really but merely eminently distinct, they are not really related. […] In God
[…] the intellect or the object, and the cognition, […] are not distinguished, because
they are really the same.10
But on the other hand it cannot be a relation of reason either, because such a
relation requires contingent intellectual operation over and above the termini of
the relation, and in the case at hand the object and its representational capacity
is a necessary consequence of the cognitive act: “Nevertheless, the divine cogni-
tion is not referred to its cognized object by a relation of reason, because they are
really, naturally there, and pertaining to eminence (though they are not really
distinguished).”11 That is to say, the reality and presence of the objects mean
that there is no necessary relation of reason – a ‘comparison’ – between them.
The argument just quoted attempts to show that the notion of relation is
inapplicable. It does so by an analysis of the nature of relations. The argument
against dependence is altogether more radical, starting from an analysis of the
nature of intentional being:
Neither do I see that it is necessary to posit a relation in one extreme on account of its
dependence on the other: not in the divine cognition with respect to the stone (because a
measure never depends on what is measured); nor the other way round, in the measured
and cognized stone to the divine intellect, because a stone in cognized being is nothing in
reality, and therefore has no dependence (because what is nothing does not depend), and
if it is something, it is not merely a relation, but something absolute.12
10 Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 36, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 62 (ed. Wolter / Bychkov II), 401: “Ubi-
cumque aliqua distincta realiter referuntur realiter, eodem modo ubi non sunt distincta realiter
sed eminenter non referuntur realiter. […] In Deo […] non distinguuntur […] intellectum
sive obiectum et intelligere quia sunt idem realiter.”
11 Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 36, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 62 (ed. Wolter / Bychkov II), 401: “Et
tamen non refertur intelligere divinum ad obiectum suum intellectum relatione rationis, quia
sunt ibi ex natura rei eminentis (licet non distinguantur realiter).”
12 Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 36, p. 1, qq. 1–2, n. 65 (ed. Wolter / Bychkov II), 402‒3:
“Nec video quod sit necessarium ponere relationem in aliquo extremo propter dependentiam
eius ad aliud: non in intelligere divino per respectum ad lapidem, quia numquam mensura
dependet ad mensuratum; nec etiam e converso, in lapide mensurato intellecto ad intelligere
divinum, quia lapis in esse cognito tantum nihil est secundum rem, et ideo nullam habet de-
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Clearly, God does not depend on the object. But neither does the object depend
on God, since the object “is nothing in reality” (nihil secundum rem), and “what
is nothing does not depend.” Now, ‘nothing’ is something of a weasel word. It
might mean that the ‘stone in cognized being’ is excluded from the domain of
being since that domain is restricted to real being; or it might mean that the
stone is excluded from the domain of real being, but not from the domain of
being as such. In the former case, the non-dependence of the stone is explained
by the fact that there is absolutely nothing that is the stone; in the latter, the
non-dependence of the stone is explained by the fact that only real beings de-
pend.
The decision that one makes here affects both the possibility of a supertran-
scendental and the nature of intentional being. If the former is correct, there is
no supertranscendental and no intentional being; if the latter, there is both a
supertranscendental (at least in principle), and intentional being is an instance
of it, along with real being. It strikes me that the former reading is more plausi-
ble, since Scotus’s claims lack any kind of restriction or qualification.
But Scotus elsewhere, in a well-known passage, provides a helpful disam-
biguation of the term ‘nothing’ that probably pushes in the other direction:
This noun ‘thing’ […] is equivocal. For this reason, we should first make a distinction
about the noun ‘thing.’ […] This noun ‘thing’ can be taken most generally, generally,
and most strictly. Most generally, as its extension includes whatever is not nothing. And
this can be understood in two ways. For most truly that is nothing which includes a
contradiction, and only that, because it excludes any being outside and within the intel-
lect. […] In another way ‘nothing’ means what neither is nor can be something outside
the soul. Therefore ‘being’ and ‘thing’ in this first way is taken utterly generally, and its
extension includes whatever does not include a contradiction, whether it be a being of
reason or a real being having some entity outside the intellect’s consideration. […] And
of these two options […] the first seems to extend the term ‘thing’ excessively, but never-
theless it is sufficiently shown from the general way of speaking. For we generally say that
logical intentions are things of reason, and relations of reason are things of reason, and
yet these cannot be outside the intellect. […] Therefore, in this most general sense, as
anything conceivable that does not include a contradiction is said to be a ‘thing’ or a
‘being’ (whether this commonality is one of analogy or univocation, about which I do not
at the moment care), being can be posited to be the first object of the intellect.13
pendentiam (quia quod nihil est non dependet), et si sit aliquid, non est solus respectus sed
absolutum.”
13 Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 3, n. 2 (ed. Wadding XII), 67: “Hoc nomen ‘res’ […] est ae-
quivocum. Ideo primo distinguendum est de hoc nomine ‘res.’ […] Hoc nomen ‘res’ potest
sumi communissime, communiter, et strictissime. Communissime, prout se extendit ad quod-
cumque quod non est nihil, et hoc potest intelligi dupliciter. Verissime enim illud est nihil
quod includit contradictionem, et solum illud, quia illud excludit omne esse extra intellectum
et in intellectu. […] Alio modo dicitur nihil quod nec est nec esse potest aliquod ens extra
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210 Richard Cross
So here we have two relevant senses of ‘nihil,’ and correspondingly two senses of
‘ens.’ The first sense of ‘nihil’ is simply the contradictory; the second, wider
sense includes too that which cannot be extramental – Scotus’s examples being
beings of reason and logical concepts. Accordingly, then, one sense of ‘ens’ in-
cludes whatever is non-contradictory, including for example logical concepts
and relations of reason (all second intention concepts, concepts of concepts, not
concepts of things); and the second sense of ‘ens,’ narrower than the first, in-
cludes merely whatever can be extramental.
But note an ambiguity in the narrower sense here: “real being having some
entity outside the consideration of the intellect” seems to suggest merely extra-
mental existents; but the relevant contrast cannot be merely between second in-
tention concepts and extramental existents, because the contrast is supposed to
be exhaustive and as thus set out it fails to include first intention concepts, con-
cepts of things. I assume that the intended contrast is between extramental be-
ing, on the one hand, and intentional being on the other, including both first
and second intentions.
Be this as it may, of interest here is Scotus’s account of the first sense of
‘ens.’ He notes, first, that common usage refers to ‘beings’ of reason, which sug-
gests that there is indeed such a sense, covering ‘anything that can be conceived.’
Secondly, he suggests too that being in this sense is the first object of the intel-
lect, since, presumably, logical intentions and the like can be understood: logic
and mathematics fall under the scope of the intellect’s power. Finally, however,
he notes that he “does not care” for the purposes of his discussion whether this
common concept should be univocal or analogous. This final point makes all the
difference when appraising whether or not Scotus would accept that being in this
sense – the being that covers both real and intentional items – is a transcenden-
tal, because according to Scotus transcendental concepts are necessarily univocal.
If it is a transcendental, then it is also in some sense a supertranscendental, since
the standard sense of ‘transcendental’ covers merely real being.
Elsewhere, Scotus seems to suggest both that real and intentional being
count as categorial beings – they both belong to the categories – and that they
both straightforwardly fall under the scope of the concept of being:
animam. Ens ergo vel res isto primo modo, accipitur omnino communissime et extendit se ad
quodcumque quod non includit contradictionem, sive sit ens rationis […], sive sit ens reale
habens aliquam entitatem extra considerationem intellectus. […] Et istorum duorum mem-
brorum […] primum videtur valde extendere nomen rei, et tamen ex communi modo loquen-
di, satis probatur. Communiter enim dicimus intentiones logicas esse res rationis, et relationes
rationis esse res rationis, et tamen ista non possunt esse extra intellectum. […] Et isto intellec-
tu communissimo, prout res vel ens dicitur quodlibet conceptibile quod non includit contra-
dictionem, sive illa communitas sit analogiae sive univocationis, de qua non curo modo, posset
poni ens primum obiectum intellectus.”
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That a relation of reason is unqualifiedly in a category is evident, if that final opinion

about number posited in distinction 24 is correct, namely, that number according to its
formal definition is from the soul. […] And nevertheless it is evident that number is a
true species of quantity, such that the category of quantity is divided into magnitude, as
into a real species and real being, and into multitude as into a species and being of rea-
son. And it is similar for real relation and relation of reason, just as being in its primary
division is divided into real being and being of reason. Neither is it repugnant to a being
of reason that it is in a category. But I leave this as something uncertain.14
The argument is that the category of quantity includes both real and intentional
items, since magnitude is real, whereas multitude is merely intentional, the result
of counting. And if this is correct, then Scotus concludes that it is possible for
the category of relation to include both real and intentional items: in this case,
real relations and merely rational relations. Thus, as he concludes, ‘it is not im-
possible for a being of reason to be in a category.’ But Scotus’s final sentence is
non-committal: “I leave this as something uncertain.”
2. James of Ascoli
Scotus’s discussion in fact leaves more than just this uncertain. We do not know
whether the most general sense of being would make being univocal or analo-
gous, whether it would make it a transcendental or a supertranscendental (or
neither); or whether beings of reason are categorial or not, and thus whether or
not the most general sense of being would include non-categorial things as well
as categorial things. Scotus’s followers confronted these various issues and came
up with quite different conclusions, both on the substantive philosophical issues
and on the correct interpretation of Scotus.
I begin with James of Ascoli, who holds that intentional being has some
kind of ontological status; that there is a general sense of ‘being’ that includes
real and intentional being; and that this sense is univocal. Again, the context is a
discussion of the divine ideas, usually dated to around 1310.15
14 Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 29, q. unica, n. 12 (ed. Wolter / Bychkov II), 240: “Quod
autem relatio rationis sit simpliciter in genere patet, si illa opinio de numero ultimo posita
distinctione 24 sit vera, quod scilicet numerus secundum rationem eius formalem sit ab anima.
[…] Et tamen constat quod numerus est species vera quantitatis, ut sic genus quantitatis de-
scendat in magnitudinem ut in speciem realem et ens reale, et in multitudinem ut in speciem et
ens rationis. Et similiter de relatione in relationem realem et rationis, sicut ens primaria sui
divisione descendit in ens reale et in ens rationis. Non ergo repugnat enti rationis quod sit in
genere. Sed hoc tamquam dubium dimitto.”
15 For a discussion of James’s views on the nature of esse intelligibile, see Perler, “What are
Intentional Objects?”; for the date, see in particular 211.
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212 Richard Cross
The basic argument for the ontological status of intentional being relies on
an assumption that an intentional being and a real being are the subject of a
univocal predicate: for example, that a stone with intentional being and a stone
with real being are univocally stones:
From eternity, a creature had some entity actually distinct from God, which I prove first-
ly thus: nothing said of being and what is totally non-being is said univocally by a univo-
cation that is greater than the univocation of genus or species. This is evident of itself,
because there is no one notion of substance between being and what is totally non-being.
But univocals are those of which the notion of substance is one (see the Categories). But
‘stone’ said of a stone produced in time and of a stone cognized from eternity is said
univocally by a greater univocation than the univocation of genus or species is. There-
fore, if a stone produced in time was a being, and a stone cognized from eternity was a
being, consequently [the latter] was not utterly nothing. But a stone cognized from eter-
nity was not God. Therefore it was a being other than God. Therefore a stone cognized
by God had some entity distinct from God.16
Since the univocation that obtains in the stone case thus described is greater
than the univocation that obtains between two distinct real stones, it follows that
the stone with intentional being cannot be “utterly nothing” – it cannot be nihil
in, I take it, Scotus’s narrow sense.
Clearly, the assumption about univocity is crucial here, and James defends
it by simply noting that what has intentional existence is supposed to explain the
fact that God can have knowledge of a real stone (even in the absence of that
stone’s current real existence), and that it can only do this if the stone with in-
tentional existence is identical with the stone with real existence. And if the two
are numerically identical, then ‘stone’ is predicated of them with a greater degree
of univocity than it is predicated of two things that are merely specifically identi-
cal:
Proof of the minor: that which is said of some things according to a numerical unity is
said univocally by a greater univocation than the univocation of genus or species is,
Metaphysics 5. But ‘stone’ said of a stone produced in time and of a stone cognized by
16 James of Ascoli [Jacobus de Aesculo], Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 5, a. 1, ll. 4‒15, in

Yokoyama, “Zwei Quaestionen des Jacobus de Aesculo über das Esse Obiectivum,” 38: “Creatu-
ra ab aeterno habuit aliquam entitatem distinctam actu a Deo. Quod probo sic: primo, nihil
dictum de ente et totaliter non ente dicitur univoce maiori univocatione quam sit univocatio
generis vel speciei. Hoc patet de se, quia entis et totaliter non entis non est aliqua ratio substan-
tiae una. Univoca autem sunt quorum ratio substantiae est una, in Praedicamentis. Sed lapis
dictus de lapide producto ex tempore et de lapide cognito ab aeterno dicitur univoce maiori
univocatione quam sit univocatio generis vel speciei, ut probabo. Igitur si lapis productus ex
tempore fuit ens, et lapis cognitus ab aeterno fuit ens et per consequens non fuit omnino nihil.
Sed lapis ab aeterno cognitus non fuit Deus. Ergo fuit ens aliud a Deo. Ergo lapis cognitus a
Deo habuit aliquam entitatem distinctam a Deo.”
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God from eternity is said of them according to numerical unity. Proof: a stone produced
in time is either numerically the same stone that was cognized from eternity, or a differ-
ent one. If it is numerically the same, then ‘stone’ is said of each one according to numer-
ical unity, which is what is proposed. If you say that it is a different one, then the stone
that is produced in time was never foreknown by God, which is absurd. […] Therefore
‘stone’ said of a stone produced in time and of a stone cognized from eternity is said
univocally with a greater univocation than is the univocation of genus or species, and this
is the minor premise of the whole argument.17
James does not make the point explicitly, but this line of argument presupposes
in turn that ‘ens’ is univocal—thus deciding something that Scotus set aside for
later discussion. After all, according to the first passage just quoted, each of the
stone with real being and the stone with intentional being is a being; if one of
them were not, then there would be no ‘notion of substance’ in common be-
tween them.
But James expressly rejects, as a point of philosophy, Scotus’s apparent
claim that the domain of being might include second intention concepts: logical
intentions and the like. Among intentional items, he restricts the domain of be-
ing to those items that can be realized extramentally: first intention concepts, in
short. Thus he claims that “the first18 division of being” is “between a being in
the soul and a being outside the soul,”19 and the former is defined as ‘being in
the soul objectively.’20 This kind of being extends both to items that are possibly
extramental, and to items that are not possibly extramental, be they ‘beings of
reason’ or ‘fictitious’ beings (impossibilia, I assume):
To be in the soul objectively […] is either such that it is not repugnant [for the thing in
the soul objectively] to be formally outside the soul (as is the form of a house, which,
although it has being only objectively in the mind of the artificer before it is made, never-
theless it is not repugnant to it to be produced outside the soul); or is such that it is
17 James of Ascoli, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 5, a. 1, ll. 25‒35, 39: “Probatio minoris, quia
illud quod dicitur de aliquibus secundum unitatem numeralem dicitur univoce maiori univoca-
tione quam sit univocatio generis vel speciei, 5 Metaphysicae. Sed lapis dictus de lapide produc-
to ex tempore et de lapide cognito ab aeterno dicitur de eis secundum unitatem numeralem.
Probatio, quia lapis productus ex tempore aut est idem lapis numero qui fuit cognitus ab aeter-
no aut alius. Si est idem numero, tunc de utroque dicitur lapis secundum unitatem numeralem,
quod est propositum. Si dicis quod est alius, iste lapis qui est productus ex tempore numquam
fuit praecognitus a Deo, quod est absurdum. […] Ergo lapis dictus de lapide producto ex tem-
pore et de lapide cognito ab aeterno dicitur univoce maiori univocatione quam sit univocatio
generis vel speciei, et ista fuit minor totius rationis.”
18 The edition has ‘plena’ (James of Ascoli, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 5, a. 2, l. 5, 43), but I
assume the expected ‘prima’ is the correct reading of ‘pa’ in the manuscript.
19 James of Ascoli, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 5, a. 2, l. 5, 43: “In ens in anima et ens extra
animam.”
20 James of Ascoli, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 5, a. 2, ll. 9–10, 43: “Esse obiective in anima.”
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214 Richard Cross
utterly repugnant to it to be outside the soul, or even in the soul subjectively (such as
fictitious things, and beings of reason, which are very close to each other).21
James claims that the second of these – any item that is not possibly extramental
– has nothing in common with the being that is shared by things that are actual-
ly or possibly extramental, such that the division between these two types of be-
ing is ‘essential’; whereas the division between extramental being and possible
being is ‘accidental,’ a division of what is univocal into two sub-kinds:
If in the first way, then the division of being into a being in the soul and [a being] out-
side [the soul] is an accidental division, not an essential one. Proof: the same (in genus,
species, or number) can be in the soul objectively in any of these three ways, and can be
outside the soul really, and for this reason each is accidental to it. If however in the sec-
ond way, then the division of being into a being in the soul and outside the soul is an
essential division, because the dividing members are primarily diverse beings, with noth-
ing the same.22
This, of course, requires that, while there is a sense of ‘being (ens)’ which is
univocal to real beings and merely possible beings, nevertheless this univocal ens
is divided into real and merely possible beings such that two kinds of ens result:
real being, I take it, and merely possible being. One might suppose that those
two complex concepts, real being and merely possible being are analogous to each
other, though James does not say this. Be that as it may, James points out that,
despite the difference between the two complex concepts of being, it is neverthe-
less the case that ‘stone’ is straightforwardly univocal: there is no special concept
of real stone as opposed to merely possible stone:
Although real being and intentional being are of a different kind, nevertheless that which
exists really and intentionally can be of the same kind. For example, numerically the
same colour, which is formally or really in the wall, is intentionally in the medium.23
21 James of Ascoli, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 5, a. 2, ll. 21‒27, 43: “Esse autem obiective in
anima […] vel est tale quod sibi non repugnat esse extra animam formaliter, sicut est forma
domus, quae, licet ante sui factionem habeat esse solum obiective in mente artificis, tamen sibi
non repugnat posse produci extra animam; vel est tale cui omnino repugnat esse extra animam
vel etiam in anima subiective, cuiusmodi sunt ficitia et entia rationis quae sunt valde propinqua
ad invicem.”
22 James of Ascoli, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 5, a. 2, ll. 27‒33, 43–44: “Si primo modo, tunc
divisio entis per ens in anima et extra est divisio accidentalis et non essentialis. Probatio, quia
idem genere speciei numero potest esse in anima obiective quocumque istorum trium modo-
rum, et potest esse realiter extra animam, et ideo utrumque accidit sibi. Si autem secundo mo-
do, tunc divisio entis in ens in anima et extra animam est divisio essentialis et non accidentalis,
quia membra dividentia sunt primo divisa nihil idem entia.”
23 James of Ascoli, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 5, a. 2, ll. 125–28, 47: “Licet esse reale et esse
intentionale sint alterius rationis, tamen illud quod existit realiter et intentionaliter potest esse
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Given his commitment to the reality of the divine ideas as items distinct from
the divine essence, it is no surprise to find James giving an account of their pro-
duction by the divine intellect. He contrasts the case with that of the real pro-
duction of extramental objects, the result of the real explanatory exercise of caus-
al powers. Items with esse intentionale are produced ‘metaphorically’:
Something is said metaphorically to be caused by another when the thing caused is not
produced by the other efficiently, with the mediation of some production, but merely
depends on it by following [it] (consecutive), such that if we posit the prior thing it fol-
lows it by a natural order. […] To the issue at hand, I say that a creature, both with
respect to the intelligible being that it has objectively in the divine intellect, and with
respect to the being of reason that it has objectively in a comparing intellect, has being
metaphorically caused from eternity by God.24
Metaphorical production is a bit like Hume’s constant conjunction, it seems: the

one thing always follows from the other, but this ‘consecutive’ dependence is just
a kind of natural ordering, without any kind of efficiently causal production.
And of course what depends in this way is not a real thing, but a merely inten-
tional being.25
3. William of Alnwick
James takes a rather expansive view of the ontological status of esse intentionale,
and of the consequent commitment to a supertranscendental that this might
seem to involve. Another of Scotus’s students – William of Alnwick – writing
five or six years later, adopts a far more reductionist account, and expressly tar-
gets James’s position in making his case.26
eiusdem rationis. Verbi gratia, item color numero, qui est formaliter sive realiter in pariete, est
intentionaliter in medio.” See too ibid., a. 4, ll. 33–45, 57.
24 James of Ascoli, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 5, a. 3, ll.11–23, 52: “Metaphorice vero dicitur
aliquid esse causatum ab alio, quando ipsum causatum non est productum ab alio effective
mediante aliqua productione, sed solum dependet ab illo consecutive, ita quod posito illo priori
istud naturali ordine sequitur. […] Ad propositum dico quod creatura et quantum ad esse
intelligibile quod habet in essentia divina obiective, et quantum ad esse cognitum in actu quod
habet obiective in intellectu divino, et quantum ad esse rationis quod habet obiective in intel-
lectu comparativo, quantum ad quodlibet istorum dico quod creatura habet esse caustaum ab
aeterno a deo metaphorice.”
25 For the treatment of metaphorical production in Petrus Thomae, slightly later than
James’s work, see Smith, “The Origin of Intelligibility,” 57–59.
26 For discussion of William’s views on esse intelligibile, see Perler, “What are Intentional
Objects?,” 217–25; Smith, “The Origin of Intelligibility,” 50–56 (for the date, see in particular
50). I defend this sort of reductionist view, as a reading of Scotus, in Duns Scotus’s Theory of
Cognition, 189–99.
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216 Richard Cross
William’s basic insight is that there is no distinction between the (real) ve-
hicle of representation and the (intentional) contents of the representation –
thus, in the case of the divine ideas, no distinction of any kind between the di-
vine essence and its representational capacity: just the opposite, in short, of
James’s view, owing more to Scotus’s “nihil […] secundum rem” than to his
notion that representations need to be ‘produced.’ Thus, for an object of cogni-
tion to be represented is just for something real to represent it, and being repre-
sented is simply an extrinsic denomination of the represented object:
The represented being of an object is not a thing distinct from the representing form.
The represented being of Caesar, for instance, represented by a statue, does not differ
from the representing statue except in the mode of signifying. For when I say that a stone
is represented by a species (or by the divine essence) and cognized, this description is
based on either an intrinsic or an extrinsic form. But not on an intrinsic form inhering in
the stone, because then represented being would have real subjective being in the stone.
This cannot be the case because [represented being] belongs to the stone even if the
stone does not exist. […] Therefore, when I say that a stone is represented or cognized,
this description is based solely on an extrinsically describing form, which is nothing other
than the form that represents it or the form of the intellection. […] When a stone is said
to be represented or intellectively cognized through a species, its represented being is no
other entity than that of the species signified in a kind of coalescence with the stone, and
the intellectively cognized being of the stone is nothing other than the intellection of the
stone signified in a kind of coalescence extrinsic to the stone.27
William attempts to show this by appeal to Aristotle’s primary division of being

into real being and being in the soul. Real being is categorial being; being in the
soul is pure mind-dependence. The argument is that the existence of mental rep-
resentations – be they intelligible species or the divine essence – is antecedent to
any “operation of the intellect or soul,” and is hence something real (a categorial
accident or the divine essence), since “a species would represent even if the intel-
lect did not cognize”:
27 William of Alnwick, De esse intelligibili, q. 1 (in William of Alnwick, Quaestiones dispu-

tatae de esse intelligibili), 15‒16 (translation in Pasnau (ed.), Mind and Knowledge, 164–65):
“Esse repraesentatum alicuius obiecti non est res distincta a forma repraesentante, sicut esse
repraesentatum Caesaris per statuam repraesentantem non differt a statua repraesentante nisi
in modo significandi, cum enim dico quod lapis est repraesentatus per speciem aut per essenti-
am divinam et cognitus, aut fit denominatio a forma intrinseca aut extrinseca; non a forma
intrinseca inhaerente lapidi, quid tunc esse repraesentatum haberet esse reale subiectivum in
lapide, quod non contingit cum conveniat ei etiam si lapis non sit. […] Igitur cum dico lapis
est repraesentatus aut cognitus, solum fit denominatio a forma extrinsecus denominante quae
non est nisi forma repreaesentativa aut forma intellectionis. […] Cum dicitur lapis est reprae-
sentatus aut intellectus per speciem, esse repraesentatum non est alia entitas quam entitas spe-
ciei in quadam concretione significata respectu lapidis, et esse intellectum lapidem non est ali-
ud quam intellectio lapidis significata in quadam concretione extrinseca ad lapidem.”
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I show that represented being is the same in reality as the representing form, and cog-
nized being the same in reality as the cognition. Every positive entity not dependent on
the soul is a real entity, because such an entity would have being even if the soul were not
to exist. Thus the Philosopher and the Commentator, in Metaphysics VI, make a first
division of being into being in the soul and being outside the soul. They say that being
outside the soul is real being, because they divide it into the ten categories, each of which
is a real being or real entity. For it is clear that [if] no thing exists [then] nothing exists.
Therefore it is clear that being that is not dependent on the soul is real being. But repre-
sented being is a positive being and a kind of positive entity, as they too grant, and it is
not dependent on the operation of intellect or soul, as they also grant, because the species
would represent even if the intellect were not cognizing. Therefore, if that which is repre-
sented is a real being or a real entity, it is nothing other than the entity of what represents
it. For if it were a different real entity outside the soul, it would have subjective being
distinct in reality from what represents it. Therefore, represented being is the same in
reality as the representing form.28
The same, obviously, will go for the divine essence. So for his argument to go
through universally William will be constrained to reverse Scotus’s ordering be-
tween divine cognition and the object of cognition: the divine essence must be
the object of cognition antecedently to the act of cognition, a point that William
makes expressly elsewhere.29
William gives James’s argument from univocity very short shrift. If some-
thing is said of two things with a greater univocation than the one that obtains
between items in the same genus or species, those two things must be real. A
non-existent possible – such as James’s stone, or, in Alnwick’s example, the soul
of the Antichrist – “lacks a quiddity,” and hence cannot be univocally the same
as something real:
I take this as his major premise: ‘If something is said of two things through a greater
univocation than the univocation of genus or species, then each of those things is a real
28 William of Alnwick, De esse intelligibili, q. 1, 8–9 (Pasnau, 159): “Ostendo quod esse
repraesentatum est idem realiter cum forma repraesentante et esse cognitum idem realiter cum
cognitione, nam omnis entitas positiva non dependens ab anima est entitas realis, quia talis
entitas haberet esse etsi anima non esset. Unde Philosophus et Commentator, VI Metaph., di-
vidunt ens prima divisione in ens in anima et ens extra animam, et ens extra animam dicunt
esse ens reale quia illud dividunt in decem praedicamenta quorum quodlibet est ens reale sive
entitas realis. Quod enim nulla res est nihil est, patet; igitur patet quod esse non dependens ab
anima est reale; sed esse repraesentatum est esse positivum et entitas quaedam positiva, ut
etiam concedunt, et non dependens ab operatione intellectus vel animae, ut etiam concedunt,
quia species repraesentaret etsi intellectus non intelligeret; ergo si repraesentatum est esse reale
sive entitas realis, non alia quam entitas ipsius repraesentantis, quia si esset entitas alia extra
animam realis, haberet esse subiectivum distinctum realiter a repraesentante; igitur esse
repraesentatum est idem realiter cum forma repraesentante.”
29 On this, see Smith, “The Origin of Intelligibility,” 53.
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218 Richard Cross
being. I prove this major premise in the same way as he proves his own: for things are
univocal that have the same substantial nature. But that which is a real being and that
which is not a real being but purely nothing (such as something that could be created)
do not have the same substantial nature. For example, the soul of Peter and the not-yet-
existent soul of the Antichrist do not have the same substantial nature, because the soul
of the Antichrist has no quiddity, as I suppose with him.30
Conversely, supposing with James that univocity obtains, the following predica-
tion will be true, using ‘stoner’ here as a proper name for a stone with intention-
al being: ‘stoner is a stone.’ But this is clearly absurd:
If something is said univocally of two things through a greater univocation than that of
genus or species, then each of those things truly is the thing said univocally of them in
this way. But, according to you, ‘stone’ is said in this way of both a stone in cognized
being and a stone in external reality. Therefore the stone in cognized being is truly a
stone.31
How, then, does William get around James’s view that the denial of univocity
will entail the denial of numerical identity, and thus that God’s knowledge of a
possible stone will not be knowledge of the self-same actual stone? He maintains
that ‘being represented’ is a ‘diminishing’ determination: since being represent-
ed is an extrinsic denomination of the stone, the stone represented – that is to
say, the representation – does not count as a stone:
I reply to the argument by granting the major and denying the minor. For ‘stone’ is not
said univocally, through the univocation of species, because being-in-cognition, like be-
ing-in-opinion, is a diminishing modifier. Thus a stone in cognized being is a stone in a
qualified way. […] Therefore I grant that the stone is numerically the same in external
reality and in cognized being. The same stone that in reality and without qualification
exists externally is in cognition as well, because relative to a third [term] the stone is
diminished though being-in-cognition. So it does not follow that ‘stone’ is said univocally
30 William of Alnwick, De esse intelligibili, q. 1, ad 1, 18 (Pasnau, 167): “Accipio pro mai-

ori: si aliquid dicitur de duobus maiori univocatione quam sit univocatio generis et speciei,
utrumque illorum est ens reale. Hanc maiorem probo eodem modo sicut ipse probat suam,
quia univoca sunt quorum ratio substantialis est eadem. Et autem quod est ens reale et ei quod
non est ens reale sed purum nihil sicut creabile, non est ratio substantialis eadem, sicut animae
Petri et anima antichristi quae nondum est non est ratio substantialis eadem, quia anima an-
tichristi non habet quidditatem, ut suppono cum ipso.”
31 William of Alnwick, De esse intelligibili, q. 1, ad 1, 19 (Pasnau, 168): “Si aliquid dicitur
univoce de duobus maiori univocatione quam sit univocatio generis aut speciei, utrumque illo-
rum est vere illud quod sic dicitur univoce de illis; sed per te lapis sic dicitur de lapide in esse
cognito et de lapide in effectu; igitur lapis in esse cognito vere est lapis.”
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or is a result of numerical unity of both a stone in cognized being and a stone in external
reality.32
This does not commit William to holding that there is a kind of diminished
being, attaching to cognitive objects; merely that the representation, albeit that it
is a representation of a stone, does not itself count as a stone. For a stone to be
known, it is not necessary that its representation is a stone. The representation is
merely the vehicle by which the stone is known.
James’s analysis entails a three-fold division of being, albeit that mere be-
ings of reason – as opposed to real and possible being – are beings only equivo-
cally. William resists the three-fold analysis. He restricts the division of being
into things ‘of first intention’ and things ‘of second intention.’ Real being is what
is represented by first intentions, and rational being what is represented by sec-
ond intentions. But in both cases the representational concepts or intentions are
real. The difference is only in what is represented:
To the second argument, when it is argued that represented being is a state of existence
intermediary between real being and the being of reason, I say that absolutely speaking
there is no such real intermediary state, because every state of existence is either of first
or of second intention. For there is no intention intermediary between first and second
intention. But if this existence is of second intention, then it is the existence of reason,
whereas if it is of first intention, then it is real, because then it is put into being by a first
intention of nature and not one of reason. To the proof, when it is argued that the repre-
sented being of a stone is not the existence of reason because it precedes the act of intel-
lect, I grant this. And when it is further argued that it is not real existence, because it is
diminished being, I reply that although represented being is the diminished being of the
represented stone, nevertheless it is real being, the same in reality as the being of the
representing form.33
32 William of Alnwick, De esse intelligibili, q. 1, 19–20 (Pasnau, 168–69, slightly altered):

“Respondeo igitur ad rationem, concedendo maiorem et negando minorem, non enim lapis
dicitur univoce univocatione speciei de lapide in esse cognito et de lapide in effectu nec per
consequens dicitur de eis maiori univocatione quam sit univocatio speciei, quia esse in cogni-
tione sicut esse in opinione est determinatio diminuens; unde lapis ut in esse cognito est lapis
secundum quid. […] Concedo igitur quod idem est lapis numero in effectu et in esse cognito,
idem lapis qui est realiter et simpliciter in effectu est in cognitione; quia tamen respectu tertii
lapis diminuitur per esse in cognitione, ideo non sequitur quod lapis dicitur univoce nec uni-
tate numerali de lapide in esse cognito et de lapide in effectu.”
33 William of Alnwick, De esse intelligibili, q. 1, ad 2, 20–21 (Pasnau, 169–70): “Ad argu-
mentum secundum, cum arguitur quod esse repraesentatum est entitas media inter esse reale et
esse rationis, dico quod absolute loquendo nulla est realis talis entitas media, quia omnis enti-
tas aut est primae intentionis aut secundae: non enim est intentio media inter primam inten-
tionem et secundam; si autem sit entitas secundae intentionis, tunc est entitas rationis, si pri-
mae, tunc est realis, quia tunc prima intentione naturae et non rationis instituitur in esse. Ad
probationem, cum arguitur quod esse repraesentatum lapidis non est entitas rationis, quia
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220 Richard Cross
To the extent that there are kinds of being, these are determined simply by the
object of cognition (something extramental or something mental, respectively).
There is thus no supertranscendental. Rather, the representation is real; and as a
representation it is in no sense an instance of the kind it represents (hence ‘being
represented is a diminished being of the represented stone’).
4. William of Ockham
Ockham plays a somewhat unexpected but significant part in this little story,
and that part can remind us just how closely in the circle of early Scotists Ock-
ham should be located. As is well known, Ockham changed his view on the na-
ture of universals, from the view (held in 1318 and before) that the universal is
some kind of mental representation present as the object of a cognitive act, to
the view (held sometime after 1318) that the universal is just the act itself, a
natural sign of a collection of extra-mental objects. The earlier of these two views
– the so-called ‘fictum’ theory – shows very evident traces of the problematic
just discussed. And the later view shows the razor eliminating such ficta alto-
gether, more in the manner of Alnwick’s view.
The fictum, according to Ockham, is not a categorial item. It has no ‘subjec-
tive’ being – it is not an inherent accident. But it has a certain sort of being:
‘objective’ being, the being attaching to purely mental items.34 To establish the
possibility of such an item, Ockham adduces no fewer than six arguments to
“prove that there is something in the soul having objective being only, not sub-
jective being.”35 The first is Aristotle’s division of being into “being in the soul”
and being “divided into the ten categories.”36 It is not possible that it have sub-
jective being, else Aristotle’s division would not be exclusive. And if the former,
then Ockham’s point is established: objective being is a kind of being.
The remaining arguments appeal to particular kinds of mental item that
could not be real beings: figments such as a goat-stag or a chimera – logically
impossible beings, I take it;37 the objects of logic such as “propositions, syllo-
gisms, and the like”;38 “artificial things in the mind of the artisan” prior to their
praecedit actum intellectus, concedo; et quando arguitur ulterius quod non est entitas realis
quia est esse diminutum, respondeo quod licet esse repraesentatum sit diminutum esse lapidis
repraesentati, est tamen esse reale idem realiter cum esse formae repraesentantis.”
34 Ockham, Ord. I, dist. 2, q. 8, n. 22 (Opera theologica II) 271.16; translation in Paul Vin-
cent Spade, Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals, 218.
35 Ockham, Ord. I, dist. 2, q. 8, n. 25 (Opera theologica II), 273.1–3; Spade, 219.
37 See Ockham, Ord. I, dist. 2, q. 8, n. 27 (Opera theologica II), 273.15–18; Spade, 219.
38 Ockham, Ord. I, dist. 2, q. 8, n. 28 (Opera theologica II), 271.19; Spade, 219.
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construction;39 relations of reason;40 transcendental concepts;41 and “second in-

tentions.”42
So here objective being is distinguished from categorial being. But it is ap-
parently no less a kind of being. Ockham in this text denies that “being indicates
a univocal concept.”43 I take it that, a fortiori, he would deny that the concept of
being common to subjective and objective being is univocal. So the division of
being is non-univocal, and there is thus no supertranscendental.
Ockham’s later view is reminiscent of Alnwick’s, and still less compatible
with the possibility of a supertranscendental:
One who does not like this theory of ficta in objective being can hold that a concept, and
any universal, is a quality existing subjectively in the mind. It is a sign of an external
thing just as much from its nature as a spoken word is the sign of a thing according to
the will of the one who institutes it. […] There seems to be no greater problem in being
able to call forth in the intellect qualities that are natural signs of things than there is for
brute animals and human beings naturally to emit sounds to which signifying other
things naturally pertains. Yet there is a difference, in that brutes and human beings do no
emit such sounds except for the sake of signifying passions or accidents existing in them.
But the intellect, because it is a greater power in this respect, can call forth qualities for
the sake of naturally signifying any things whatever.44
The similarity with Alnwick’s view is very evident. Ockham has replaced the
ontologically laden notion of representation with the perhaps less-controversial
notion of natural signification, using the example of the instinctive but neverthe-
less significative sounds produced by humans and non-human animals.

40 See Ockham, Ord. I, dist. 2, q. 8, n. 30 (Opera theologica II), 274.3; Spade, 219.
44 Ockham, Ord. I, dist. 2, q. 8, nn. 86–87 (Opera theologica II), 289.12–15, 290.3–11; Spa-
de, 229: “Cui non placet ista opinio de talibus fictis in esse obiectivo potest tenere quod con-
ceptus et quodlibet universale est aliqua qualitas exsistens subiective in mente, quae ex natura
sua ita est signum rei extra sicut vox est signum rei ad placitum instituentis. […] Nec videtur
hoc magis inconveniens in intellectu posse elicere aliquas qualitates quae sunt naturaliter signa
rerum, quam quod bruta animalia et homines aliquos sonos non emittunt quibus naturaliter
competit aliqua alia significare. Est tamen in hoc differentia quod bruta et homines tales sonos
non emittunt nisi ad significandum aliquas passiones vel aliqua accidentia in ipsis exsistentia,
intellectus autem, quia est maioris virtutis quantum ad hoc, potest elicere qualitates ad quae-
cumque naturaliter significandum.”
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222 Richard Cross
5. Francis of Marchia (Ascoli)

Writing shortly before 1319,45 Francis holds, in standard Scotist fashion, that
“the intention of being (intentio entis) is univocal according to the notion of the
ten categories,”46 but makes it clear that he understands the categories properly
to include both real being and first and second intention concepts.
Francis, reflecting one standard early fourteenth-century practice,47 uses the
term ‘first intention’ to pick out both extramental natures and the concepts that
represent them, and restricts the term ‘second intention’ to concepts of concepts.
He introduces the various distinctions like this:
Of positive intentions, some are first intentions, namely, man or animal; some are sec-
ond, such as species and genus; some are real beings, and some beings of reason. For this
reason, there is a difficulty, whether beings of reason are formally and of themselves in a
category; and in particular [whether] second intentions are [in a category] of themselves
or merely by reduction.48
Here we have several overlapping categories: first intentions, some of which are
‘real,’ and some of which are concepts of such real beings. Note that there ap-
pears to be some slippage in Francis’s use of the term ‘being of reason.’ Here
first intention concepts seem to be a subclass of beings of reason; in a passage
below, Francis identifies beings of reason as merely second intention concepts.
So the treatment requires a bit of care, but I think the difficulty is primarily ter-
minological.
Francis’s aim is to show that all of these – real objects, concepts of such
objects, and second intentions – are categorial items: “For this reason it should
be said otherwise, that first and second intentions are of themselves in a catego-
ry, and not just by reduction.”49 Here, again, ‘first intentions’ refers to both real
45 Duba argues that the discussion I consider here, despite apparently being a quodlibetal
disputation, must be dated earlier than Francis’s Sentences commentary, which latter, dating
from 1319–20, contains a discussion that deals with certain difficulties left over from the ac-
count discussed here; cf. Duba, “Neither First, nor Second.”
46 Francis of Marchia, Quodlibet, q. 5, a. 4, ll. 3–4, 207: “Intencio entis est univoca secun-
dum rationem x. praedicamentis.”
47 This is characteristic of early fourteenth-century accounts of first intentions; see for in-
stance Hervaeus Natalis, De secundis intentionibus, d. 1, q. 1, nn. 15–17 (ed. Judith Dijs), 116–
17.
48 Francis of Marchia, Quodlibet, q. 5, a. 3, ll. 11–15, 192: “Intencionum autem positiuarum
quedam sunt intenciones prime, scilicet homo uel animal; quedam secunde, sicud species et
genus; quedam sunt encia realia, quedam encia rationis; et ideo est dubium utrum encia racio-
nis sint formaliter per se in predicamento, et specialiter intenciones secunde per se uel sint
solum per reduccionem.”
49 Francis of Marchia, Quodlibet, q. 5, a. 3, ll. 124–25, 197: “Ideo dicendum est aliter, quod
intenciones prime et secunde sunt per se in genere et non tantum per reduccionem.”
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things and concepts of real things, and Francis claims that each of these is in the
same category: concepts of substance in the category of substance, concepts of
quality in the category of quality, and so on. In response to an objection that real
items have more in common with each other than a real item and its representa-
tion do, Francis reasons as follows:
And when it is argued that real things have more in common with each other than [they
have] with a being of reason, it should be said that this is true with respect to their real
mode of being, but it is not true with respect to their formal quidditative notion. For
things are posited in their proper category by their proper formal notion, not by their
mode of being.50
Now, this might make it look as though we would want to say (as James of As-
coli does) that a representation of a stone is a stone. But this is not quite what
Francis thinks. The claim is merely that the concept is in the category of subs-
tance, since the thing it represents is in the category of substance:
To the last, that a real human being and a human being depicted are not univocally a
human being, it should be said that the case is not alike, because a depicted human being
is not formally a human being in the way that a real human being [is]. But a being of
reason is formally a being, like a real being [is].51
So much, then, for first intentions. Real items and representational items are in
the same category. The situation with second intentions is a bit more complex:
But here there is a certain difficulty: whether second intentions are in different categories
like first intentions are in different categories, for not all first intentions are in the same
category, but some are only in one, and others in another. Whether this is the case for
second intentions is a puzzle.52
The reply is that second intentions are rational relations:
50 Francis of Marchia, Quodlibet, q. 5, a. 3, ll. 261–65, 203: “Et quando arguitur quod magis
conueniunt encia realia ad inuicem quam cum ente racionis, dicendum quod uerum est quan-
tum ad modum essendi realem, non autem uerum est quantum ad racionem quiditatiuam for-
malem; unumquodque autem ponitur in proprio genere per propriam racionem formalem,
non autem per modum essendi.”
51 Francis of Marchia, Quodlibet, q. 5, a. 3, ll. 317–20, 205: “Ad ultimum, quod homo uerus
et homo pictus non est homo uniuoce, dicendum quod non est simile, quia homo pictus non
est formaliter homo sicud est homo uerus; ens autem racionis est formaliter ens sicud ens
reale.”
52 Ibid., ll. 139–43, 198: “Set hic est quoddam dubium. Vtrum intenciones secunde sint in
diuersis generibus sicud et prime sunt in diueris generibus; non enim omnes intenciones prime
sunt in eodem genere, set alique tantum in uno genere et alique in alio. Vtrum ita sit de inten-
cionibus secundis dubium est.”
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224 Richard Cross
It can arguably be claimed that, since second intentions are all constituted by an act of
reason, for this reason all second intentions and all beings of reason are in the same
category. It is not like this for first intentions, since they are made not by a created intel-
lect but by God, who is of greater power than a created intellect is. But which genus they
are in is a puzzle, and it seems to some that they are in the category of relation, because
the intellect does not constitute anything in being other than relations of reason.53
Here the terminological difficulty shows up: second intentions “and all beings of
reason” are in the same category. But this is contrary to the apparent claim that
concepts of real beings are in the same category as the real beings they represent.
Again, however, it strikes me that the difficulty is terminological. First in-
tention concepts are in the same category, but not always of the same kind, as
the first intention natures they represent. The case of second intentions is clear
enough. Francis argues, like Scotus, that both real and rational relations have the
formal character of relations:
Each thing is in its proper category through its proper formal notion, by which it is what
it is. But real relations and rational relations have the same formal notion. Proof: the
formal notion of a real relation is to be to another; this is its formal notion; so too a
relation of reason is formally being to another.54
Here, then we have an example of a real item and a second intention sharing the
same formal character. Since formal character is the basis of category-member-
ship, second intentions are categorial items in the category of relation.
I assume, too, that all these items fall under the general extension of the
concept of being. But in this case, the position is open to an objection that we
have already encountered:
53 Francis of Marchia, Quodlibet, q. 5, a. 3, ll. 143–50, 198–99: “Potest dici probabiliter

quod, quia intenciones secunde sunt omnes constitute per actum racionis, et ideo omnes inten-
ciones secunde et omnia encia racionis sunt in eodem genere; non sic de intencionibus primi,
qua ille non sunt facte ab intellectu creato, set a Deo, qui est maioris uirtutis quam sit intellec-
tus creatus; in quo autem genere sint, dubium est, et uidetur aliquibus quod sint in genere
relacionis, quia intellectus in actu suo non constituit aliquid in esse nisi relaciones racionis.”
54 Francis of Marchia, Quodlibet, q. 5, a. 3, ll. 91–95, 196: “Vnumquodque est in proprio
genere per propriam racionem formalem qua formaliter est illud quod est; set eadem est racio
formalis relacionis realis et racio formalis relacionis racionis. Probacio: quia formalis racio
<relacionis> realis est esse ad aliud: hec est formalis racio sua; ita eciam relacio racionis est
esse ad aliud formaliter.”
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Against this, the Philosopher in Metaphysics VI first divides being into real being and
[being] of reason, and then [divides] real being into the ten categories. Therefore a being
of reason, according to him, is not of itself in a category.55
The gist of this is that, on Aristotelian principles, ens rationis is not included
under the extension of categorial being. Francis offers a way of reading the text
that circumvents this:
Reply. To this, it should be said that the Philosopher did not divide being into real being
and being of reason, before [division] into the ten categories. This is not true, and [those
who argue this] do not understand the Philosopher well. Rather, he first divided being
into true being and the being that signifies the essences of the ten categories. But being of
reason is different from true being. Thus in Metaphysics V [he says that] the relations of
knowable to knowledge, and of measure to measured, are in the category of relation, and
nevertheless they are things of reason.56
The basic division of being is between “true being” and categorial being. (I as-
sume that the former attaches to complexes such as propositions, and thus not
to particular items that could be in a category.) And as evidence that Aristotle
holds beings of reason to belong to a category, Francis gives examples of cases in
which Aristotle holds rational relations to count as belonging to the category of
relation.
And, finally, the famous passage in which Francis offers his account of what
the supertranscendental concept of being is:
To the first, [I reply] that the intention quidditatively included in a real being and in a
being of reason is a formally neutral intention; it is neither an intention of reason, nor
real, but neutral. To the proof – that every intention is either made by the intellect (and
is a being of reason) or is not made by the intellect (and is real) –, I reply that we can
talk about that neutral intention in two ways: either in itself and absolutely, or acciden-
tally, in relation to what is below it: that is to say, [in relation] to real intention and
intention of reason. If [we talk] in the second way, accidentally, by reason of what is
below it, then I say that it is made by the intellect, by reason of the real intention in
which it is included. If however we talk about it in the first way, by reason of itself, and
absolutely, then I say that it is not made by the intellect. […] This neutral intention is
55 Francis of Marchia, Quodlibet, q. 5, a. 3, ll. 174–77, 200: “Contra. Philosophus, 6o Metha-

phisice, prius diuidit ens in ens reale et racionis, <postmodum> ens reale in x. predicamenta;
ergo ens racionis, secundum ipsum, non est per se in predicamento.”
56 Francis of Marchia, Quodlibet, q. 5, a. 3, ll. 178–85, 200: “Responsio. Ad hoc dicendum
quod Philosophus non prius diuidit ens in ens reale et ens racionis quam in x. genera: non est
uerum, non bene accipiunt Philosophum; set prius diuidit ens in ens uiridicum et in ens quod
significat essencias x. predicamentorum; ens autem racionis est aliud ab ente uiridico; unde in
5o Methaphisice: quod respectus scibilis ad scienciam et mensure ad mensuratum sunt in
predicamento relacionis, et tamen sunt res racionis.”
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226 Richard Cross
not of itself made by the intellect, but it is nevertheless not of itself not made by the
intellect.57
The basic worry is that the division between an intention “made by the intellect”
and an intention “not made by the intellect” is exhaustive, thus precluding the
presence of an intention made by neither. Francis makes a rather obscure dis-
tinction between the neutral intention taken “absolutely” and the same intention
taken “accidentally, by reason of what is below it.” It seems to me the that first of
these is a way of talking about the content of the neutral intention: not of itself
real being nor rational being, albeit necessarily one or the other, disjunctively.
The second, then, the neutral intention taken accidentally is the ontological sta-
tus of the neutral intention: necessarily made by the intellect.
The story of Francis’s developing thought on the supertranscendental is
continued in a brilliant article by William Duba.58 I have one possible corrective
to add, and it has to do with the coherence of the position as presented in the
Quodlibet. Duba argues that the notion of the neutral intention is incoherent:
According to Francis in the Quodlibet, a first intention is a concept of an extra-mentally

existing being, and a second intention is a concept of a purely mental being, but a neutral
intention refers to what is common to both. As such, it cannot be a concept. For if a first
intention is a real being as present to the intellect, and this intention is itself real, and a
second intention is a mental being as present to the intellect and this intention is itself
created by the mind, a neutral intention […] cannot be neither made by the intellect nor
made by nature.59
As Duba sees the matter, this apparent contradiction caused Francis to modify
his views in the Sentences and in his commentary on the Metaphysics. But recall
that a neutral intention is certainly a concept; the point of the logical gymnastics
in the last passage quoted from Francis is just that the content of such intentions
does not have to be a concept: such intentions can have, variously, real things
and mental things as their objects. The neutral intention is not something really
57 Francis of Marchia, Quodlibet, q. 5, a. 3, ll. 187–208, 200–1: “Ad primam, quod illa in-
tencio inclusa quiditatiue in ente reali et in ente racionis est intencio formaliter neutra: nec est
intencio racionis nec realis, set neutra. Ad probacionem, quod omnis intencio uel facta est ab
intellectu et est ens racionis, uel non est facta ab intellectu et est realis, respondeo quod de illa
intencione neutra possumus loqui dupliciter: uel secundum se et absolute, racione sui, uel per
accidens, racione sui inferioris, scilicet intencionis realis et intencionis racionis; si secundo mo-
do, per accidens, racione sui inferioris, sic dico quod est facta per intellectum racione intencio-
nis realis in qua est inclusa. <Si> autem loquamur de ipsa primo modo, scilicet racione sui,
secundum se et absolute, sic dico quod non est facta per intellectum. […] Illa intencio neutra
‘secundum se non est facta per intellectum,’ non tamen est ‘secundum se non facta per intellec-
tum’.”
58 See his “Neither First, nor Second.”
59 Duba, “Neither First, nor Second,” 310.
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common to both first and second intentions. It is simply a concept (of, let us say,
being) under the extension of which both real and mental beings fall.
Conclusion
I noted at the beginning of section 2 that Scotus’s discussion leaves a number of
things unclear: we do not know whether the most general sense of being would
make being univocal or analogous, whether it would make it a transcendental or
a supertranscendental (or neither); or whether beings of reason are categorial or
not, and thus whether or not the most general sense of being would include non-
categorial things as well as categorial things. The Scotists (and fellow-travellers)
I consider here take up all of the options. James of Ascoli grants to intentional
being an ontological status (I assume categorial, since he holds that intentional
beings are the same in kind as the real beings that they represent); and allows a
supertranscendental including real beings and first-intention concepts, but not
second-intentions and impossibilia (I assume since such things are apparently
non-categorial). William of Alnwick denies that there is any intentional being
over and above real being, and thus denies any supertranscendental. The early
Ockham allows that intentional being is a kind of being, but denies that being is
univocal to real and intentional being, and thus denies a supertranscendental.
The later Ockham denies that there is any intentional being over and above real
being, thus coming close to Alnwick’s position. Francis of Marchia grants to in-
tentional being, including second intention concepts, a categorial ontological sta-
tus. But whereas James of Ascoli holds that intentional beings and real beings are
the same in kind, Francis denies this, and thus can allow second intentions be-
longing to the category of relation. And so the story continues.
Bibliography
Sources
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Quaestionen des Jacobus de Aesculo über das Esse Obiectivum.” In Wahrheit und
Verkündigung. Edited by Leo Scheffczyk, Werner Dettloff, and Richard Heinzmann, two
volumes, vol. 1, 31‒74. Munich, Paderborn, Vienna: Schöning, 1967.
Alnwick, Guillelmus de. Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili et de quolibet. Edited by
Athanasius Ledoux. Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1937.
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa theologiae. Edited by Pietro Caramello. Three volumes. Turin and
Rome: Marietti, 1952–1956.
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228 Richard Cross
–. Reportatio I-A. The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture. Edited by Allan B. Wolter and
Oleg V. Bychkov. Two volumes. New York: The Franciscan Institute, 2004 and 2008.
Marchia, Franciscus de. Quodibet. Edited by Nazareno Mariani. Rome: Collegium S. Bonaven-
turae, 1997.
Natalis, Hervaeus. De secundis intentionibus. Edited by Judith Dijs, Ph.D. dissertation, Leiden
University, 2012 (http://hdl.handle.net/1887/18607; last checked December 15, 2021).
Ockham, Guillelmus de. Opera theologica. Edited by Iuvenalis Lalor et al. Ten volumes. St.
Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University Press, 1967–1986.
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Duba, William. “Neither First, nor Second, nor… in his Commentary on the Sentences. Francis
of Marchia’s intentiones neutrae.” Quaestio 10 (2010), 285–313.
Folger-Fonfara, Sabine. Das ‘Super’-Transzendentale und die Spaltung der Metaphysik: Der Ent-
wurf des Franziskus von Marchia. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008.
Mandrella, Isabelle. “Metaphysik als Supertranszendentalwissenschaft? Zum scotistischen
Metaphysikentwurf des Nicolaus Bonetus.” Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médié-
vales 75 (2008), 161–93.
Pasnau, Robert (ed.). Mind and Knowledge: The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philo-
sophical Texts: Volume 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Perler, Dominik. “What are Intentional Objects? A Controversy Among Early Scotists.” In An-
cient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality. Edited by Dominik Perler, 203–26. Leiden,
Boston, Cologne: Brill, 2001.
Smith, Garrett R. “The Origin of Intelligibility According to John Duns Scotus, William of
Alnwick, and Petrus Thomae.” Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 81
(2014), 37–74.
Spade, Paul Vincent. Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius,
Abelard, Scotus, Ockham. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994.
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Esse cognitum and Divine Ideas in
the First Two Centuries of Scotism
Francesco Fiorentino
Introduction
Esse cognitum, or esse obiectivum, is a relative kind of being in the sense that it
depends on an extramental reality as subjected to an intellectual act. Hence, cog-
nitive being has some intermediate status between the real being of material
things and the rational being of universal concepts. In order to understand the
remarkable theoretical innovation of John Duns Scotus, especially in comparison
with Henry of Ghent, as well as the reception of Scotus’s theory, this notion of
‘cognitive being’ must be held up against the doctrine of divine ideas. For Scotus,
this kind of being has that kind of intelligibility that is produced by the divine
intellect and that leads to the formation of ideas.
As we shall see, this is properly speaking the fundamental core of Scotus’s
theory – and of the difference between his theory and that of Henry of Ghent.
While for Henry, the ideas derive from the comparison that the divine intellect
carries out between the divine essence that includes the essences of all creatable
things, and the essences of things as different from the divine essence which they
imitate, for Scotus, before the ideas with their relations of imitability are known,
the inclusion of the essences of things in the divine essence is not sufficient. Sco-
tus admits the virtual inclusion of the essences of things in the divine essence,
i. e., the potentiality or the predisposition of the essences of things to exist as
representative contents in the divine essence; but, for Scotus, the divine intellect
must think the essences of things before knowing them; this absolute act of
thought creates the purely possible and thinkable essence of the thing; this
essence, before being known by the divine intellect, does not depend on this in-
tellect, because it only relates to this intellect by way of a relation of the third
class in the Aristotelian classification of relations, i. e., a rational relation between
the intellect as measured and the object as its measure.1 This relationship is not
mutual, unlike those of the first two classes, and does not tolerate any modifica-
tion of the intellect on grounds of the appearance or disappearance of the object.
I thank Claus A. Andersen and Daniel Heider for their many suggestions. I also thank Babette
Pragnell and Claus A. Andersen again for improving the English text.
1 Cf. Aristotle, Phys. VII, 3, 246a30 (Aristot. Lat. VII 1.2, 266, ll. 1–11); ibid., 247a25–
248b30 (Aristot. Lat. VII.1.2, 267–68, ll. 8–5); Met. V, 15, 1021a30–b3 (Aristot. Lat. XXV3.2,
113–14, ll. 614–21); cf. also Henninger, “Thomas Wylton’s Theory of Relations,” 459–61.
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230 Francesco Fiorentino
What, for Henry, is an intentional being following from a relationship of im-

itability, for Scotus, becomes an esse cognitum, a genuinely intelligible being; the
essence of the thing thus exists as a pure noetic entity, because it is thought of by
the divine intellect. Only after this operation, the same essence can enter into a
relationship with the divine essence and be known as an idea by the divine intel-
lect.
This present study aims to examine the relationship between cognitive be-
ing and the divine ideas. I start out from Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus,
drawing on some of my own previous research; I then follow the doctrinal de-
velopment in the two first centuries (the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries) of
the long tradition of Scotism. I shall consider various authors who are represen-
tative of both the legacy of Scotus and the original and innovative evolution of
Scotism beyond Scotus: Peter Auriol,2 Landulph Caracciolo of Naples,3 Francis
of Ascoli (also known as Francis of Marchia),4 Peter Thomae,5 Francis of Mey-
2 Peter Auriol taught in the Franciscan convent in Toulouse before going to Paris, where
he lectured on the Sentences from 1317–1318 and served as the Franciscan regent master in
theology until 1320 or 1321. Cf. Tachau, Vision and Certitude, 85–89.
3 Landulph Caracciolo lectured on the Sentences in Paris around 1320. Subsequently, Lan-
dulph held the first chair in theology at the Franciscan Studium of Naples, where he intro-
duced the Scotist tradition; he later was provincial minister of Terra di Lavoro and carried out
several diplomatic missions on behalf of Queen Johanna I of Naples. In 1327 he was designated
bishop of Castellamare di Stabia by Pope John XXII and four years later archbishop of Amalfi,
actively engaging in the persecution of the Fraticelli. Cf. Fiorentino, “Conoscenza e scienza in
Landolfo Caracciolo.”
4 Francis of Ascoli read the Sententiae in Paris in 1319–1320; his commentary has come
down to us in at least two different versions, one of which corresponds with the reportatio
made by William of Rubione, whereas the other consists of a Scriptum. Cf. Friedman, “Francis
of Marchia and John Duns Scotus.”
5 Peter Thomae spent most of his career in Barcelona; in 1303 he was listed as an advisor
to the bishop of Barcelona, and in 1316 he was present at the investigation of Arnau of Vil-
lanova. Cf. Smith, “Bibliotheca manuscripta Petri Thomae,” and Schabel and Smith, “The
Franciscan studium in Barcelona in the Early Fourteenth Century.”
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Esse cognitum and Divine Ideas in the First Two Centuries of Scotism 231
ronnes,6 Peter of Navarre,7 Peter of Aquila,8 John of Ripa,9 Peter of Candia,10 and
Nicholas of Orbellis.11
These authors do not merely repeat what Scotus said. To understand this,
we must specify the definition of Scotism, a definition that is by no means obvi-
ous due to the understanding that a present-day scholar may have of the rela-
tionship between a teacher and a disciple in general. As Ludger Honnefelder has
explained, this relationship, in the case of the Scotist tradition, does not consist
in uncritical and monotonous following of Scotus’s thought, but rather is open,
free and flexible; the disciples consider the thought of their master as a starting
point, a useful stimulus to develop their own innovative and original theories.12
The disciples go so far as to transform the teacher’s texts according to their own
convictions and needs. Thus Scotus, although dead at a young age, comes to life
under the quills of his disciples, who in their turn become his compilers and
editors. This prevents precise lines of progression and identity traits of the Sco-
tist tradition from appearing. This results in what Guido Alliney has described as
a wide range of positions among Scotus’s disciples; all of these positions are Sco-
6 Francis of Meyronnes became regent master in Paris in 1323, at the request of Robert of
Anjou, king of Naples, after lecturing on the Sentences first in French and Italian convents, and
finally in Paris in 1320–1321. Cf. Fiorentino, Francesco di Meyronnes, 22–30.
7 Peter of Navarre read the Sententiae in Barcelona in the early 1320s; cf. Sagües Azcona,
“Un escotista desconocido. El Maestro Pedro de Navarra OFM (d. 1347),” and his monograph
El maestro Pedro de Navarre O.F.M. (d. 1347).
8 Peter of Aquila taught theology at the University of Paris sometime between 1330 and
1340. He became Provincial Minister in 1334, chaplain of Queen Giovanna of Sicily in 1344,
bishop of Angelo dei Lombardi in Calabria (1347) and of Trivento (1348). Cf. Amerini, “La
dottrina dell’univocità dell’essere nel Commento alle Sentenze di Pietro d’Aquila;” Chiappini,
“Fra Pietro d’Aquila ‘Scotello’ O. Min.”
9 John of Ripa read the Sentences at the University of Paris around 1352. He was associated
with the censorship that affected the theses of Ludovico del Fiume. He presided over Francis of
Perugia’s lecture on the Sentences in 1368. Cf. Fiorentino, “Libertà e contingenza in Giovanni
di Ripa,” and Ghisalberti, “Giovanni Duns Scoto e la scuola scotista,” 366–70.
10 Peter of Candia joined the Franciscan Order at the age of seventeen; he studied in the
Franciscan Studium at Norwich before studying theology at Oxford. His Order sent him to
Paris, where he began lecturing on the Sentences in September of 1378 and was Bachelor of the
Sentences until 1380. In 1381, the University of Paris made Peter Master of Theology. In 1384,
and again in 1385, we find Peter lecturing in the Convent of Saint Francis in Pavia, where he
moved in the humanistic circles of the Visconti. Cf. Schabel, “Peter of Candia and the Prelude
to the Quarrel at Louvain.”
11 Nicholas of Orbellis was master of theology and philosophy at the University of Angers;
he composed commentaries on both Aristotle and the Sentences. Cf. Zahnd, “Easy-Going Scho-
lars,” 290–99; Sousedík, “Nicolai de Orbellis Tractatus de distinctionibus.” A transcription by
Claus A. Andersen of his discussion of distinctions in his commentary on the Physics is ap-
pended to Petrus Thomae, Tractatus brevis de modis distinctionum, 383.
12 Honnefelder, “Scotus und der Scotismus,” 252.
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tist, and yet they are all different and indeed lay the foundations of various cur-
rents.13
This range of positions is initially facilitated by various factors, among
which we may mention 1) the coexistence of different versions of Scotus’s com-
mentaries on the Sentences, 2) the inclusion of spurious texts into the corpus of
Scotus’s works, 3) the suspicion of problematic innovation that weighs upon
some of Scotus’s theological doctrines, and 4) Scotus’s own change of mind re-
garding a number theories, something that is reported already by the earliest
Scotists.14 Anyone who imagines the ‘Scotist’ as a disciple who follows in the
footsteps of Scotus in a faithful and conservative way is bound to be disappoint-
ed. Both in early Scotism and in that of the seventeenth century there is no lack
of critical issues and internal disagreements. This may be seen as a positive as-
pect of the Scotist tradition; as Camille Berubè reminds us, “le meilleur pro-
fesseur n’est pas celui qui sait seulement instruire ses élèves, mais celui qui les
rend capables d’être maîtres à leur tour!”15 It is therefore also not so surprising
that elements foreign to Scotus entered the initial body of Scotist doctrines.
These elements accumulate with the progress of the Scotist tradition. The second
and third generations of Scotists thus did not only have Scotus as a point of
reference, but in fact Scotus with all the mediations of the previous Scotists.
These mediations make the entire scene of early Scotism both rich and varied.
1. Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus

Timothy B. Noone and Carl A. Vater, tracing the sources of Scotus’s theory of
divine ideas in Peter John Olivi and Peter de Trabibus, have recently drawn at-
tention to the second question in the first part of distinction 36 in Scotus’s Re-
portatio I-A as a text of particular importance in regard to Scotus’s theory of
ideas.16 This question envisages the divine intellect as active. The divine intellect
compares its secondary object, which represents the possible creatures, with its
primary object, i. e., the divine essence as imitable; through its intellective acts, it
conceives the ideal creatures with their esse cognitum.17 The discussion whether
ideas are complete entities or rather relations of reason intermittently, however,
13 Alliney, “Utrum necesse sit voluntatem frui,” 138.

14 Cf. Fiorentino, “Introduzione. Conoscenza e attività in Giovanni Duns Scoto,” 15–26,
133–52; cf. also my introduction to the volume Lo scotismo nel Mezzogiorno d’Italia.
15 Bérubé, “La première école scotiste,” 15.
16 Noone and Vater, “The Sources of Scotus’s Theory of Divine Ideas.”
17 Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 36, pars 1, q. 2, nn. 45–48 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov II),
393–95.
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is found also in Book I, dist. 35, of both the Lectura and the Ordinatio as well as
in the Collationes 8 and 9 of the Oxford lectures.18
As Marina Fedeli has recently emphasized, Henry of Ghent – in his Quodli-
bet IX q. 2 and Quodlibet III q. 3 – envisaged the divine ideas as respectus im-
itabilitatis, i. e., as relations of imitability present in the divine essence; God’s
necessary and true knowledge has as its primary object the essence of God, and
as the secondary object everything that is other than God. On this model, God
comes to know His secondary objects through two separate moments. The first
moment marks the consideration of the essence of the creature as identical with
the divine essence; the latter essence here only verifies a relationship of reference
to whatever is different from itself. In the second moment, the essence of the
creature is known as a being in itself and as other than God; what is other than
God has no real existence and persists within the divine knowledge until the
divine intellect establishes a relation between that object and the divine essence.
This relation is the formal cause of the essences of creatures. Fedeli notes that
James of Ascoli, in the fifth of his Quaestiones ordinariae, attributes both inten-
tional being and being of reason to the creature: the former inasmuch as the
creature is represented in the divine essence, and the latter in regard to the di-
vine intellect that compares the essence of the creature with the divine essence.19
By contrast, Scotus’s own opinion is that ideas are produced by the acts of
the divine intellect. Scotus is grappling with two different historical mediations
of the Platonic doctrine of ideas:20 (1) the Augustinian mediation and (2) the
Aristotelian mediation.21 In question 46 of his De diversis quaestionibus 83, Au-
gustine of Hippo presented the divine ideas as stable, immutable, eternal, un-
generated, and incorruptible forms or rationes. He included them in the divine
intelligence, seeing them as not pre-existing to it or to the demiurge. On the
basis of Plato’s Timaeus, Augustine thus converted the eternal ideas into the ex-
emplars according to which all changing creatures are formed in their nature
18 Cf. Falà, “Divine Ideas in the Collationes Oxonienses.”

19 Cf. Fedeli, “Le idee divine e la relazione di imitabilità dell’essenza in Giacomo d’Ascoli.”
20 Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 39e–40b, ll. 15–14, 32–33.
21 Cf. Aristotle, Met. VII, 15, 1040a27 (Aristot. Lat. XXV3.2, 163, ll. 844–45), and Augus-
tine, De diversis quaestionibus 83, q. 46, 70–73. I have discussed these two divergent approach-
es in Fiorentino, “Giovanni Duns Scoto di fronte a Platone sulle idee divine.” For the Augus-
tinian reception of Plato’s Timaeus, see in particular Fiorentino, Francesco di Meyronnes, 126–
32; Pépin, Idea dans la Patristique grèque et latin, 23–36. Sometimes Augustine is found in
association with Seneca who, in letter 58 of his Epistolae Morales, proposed an equivalence of
the Platonic idea with the eternal exemplar; cf. Seneca, Ad Lucilium epistulae morales, 58,
ll. 13–16, 157. For an exposition of Seneca’s complex interpretation (which describes the hier-
archical descent from the more universal idea, through a subsequent articulation of genera and
species, to the production of multiple individuals that are subjected to accidentality and chan-
ge), see d’Onofrio, Storia del pensiero medievale, 22–23.
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and in their order. Scotus finally subscribes to this Augustinian mediation: the
ideas are, for him, pure noetic entities and therefore created, dependent, and re-
lated to the divine intellect which produces them with its necessary acts. In this
way, the divine intellect confers a kind of existence upon them; this existence is
weaker than the real or extra-mental being of material entities, but stronger than
the being of reason of universal concepts.22 Now, Aristotle, in the seventh book
of the Metaphysics, rather considered the Platonic ideas as universals and as spa-
tially separated from empirical reality. These uncreated essences, in Henry of
Ghent’s view, precede the divine intellect, are certified in their truth thanks to
the comparison with the divine exemplar, and come into real existence, with the
addition of the being of existence (esse exsistentiae); this addition is due to the
contingent acts of the divine will. One finds traces of these two mediations
throughout the history of Scotism. They fuel incessant disputes – like the one
between James of Ascoli and William of Alnwick in early Scotism, or the one
between John Punch and Bartolomeo Mastri in what may be called the tri-
umphant Scotist period of the seventeenth century.23
James of Ascoli opts for a tripartite system, in which the intelligible or in-
tentional being is located midway between the real and the rational being. The
intelligible being is coeternal with the eternal and self-sustained divine essence
that lets flow ad extra, not so much the creatures themselves, as rather that cor-
relative and intelligible status of the possible essences of creatures. In other
words, what emerges from the divine essence is not the creature as such, but the
creature as possible and intelligible, the pure possibility and intelligibility of the
creature. Moreover, the intelligible being is un-caused, precedent, independent
from the operations of the divine intellect and founded on real potential being,
in other words on that non contradictory possibility which places only the possi-
ble entity, in contrast to some impossible or purely rational entity, in such a
condition as to be effectively produced into real existence by an efficient cause in
time, regardless of any previous operation by the divine intellect. This latter
identifies the real potential and intelligible being, to which it adds the rational
relation of knowledge, passing from habitual knowledge, which is independent
from real existence, to actual knowledge; actual knowledge arises from the actu-
alization of the possible entity in time. At the other end of the spectrum we find
22 Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 36, pars 1, q. 2, vol. II, nn. 74–75 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov
II), 405, and Ord. I, dist. 35, q. unica, n. 40 (ed. Vat. VI), 262.
23 I have discussed this in previous publications: Fiorentino, “L’autonomia ontologica delle
idee platoniche;” Fiorentino, “La disputa tra Giovanni Punch e Bartolomeo Mastri;” Fiorenti-
no, “Lo scotismo trionfante nella prima epoca moderna.” For the debate between Alnwick and
Ascoli, see also Richard Cross’s contribution to this present volume; cf. further Perler, “What
are intentional objects?” For the debate between Mastri and Punch, see the survey of literature
in Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 259.
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Alnwick, who rather prefers a bipartite system which reduces the intelligible be-
ing to the real being of the essence of the creature, which has a life of its own,
apart from the divine intellect; to this real being is then added extrinsic denomi-
nations or absolute accidental properties, such as being represented in the divine
essence, being known by the divine intellect, or being known to be known (by
way of reflexion). The ontological consistency of this essence is composed of the
weakened, or ‘diminished,’ denomination (denominatio deminuens) which cor-
responds to ‘represented being,’ which is eternal, necessary, simple, and im-
mutable, as well as that intrinsic and logical non-repugnance that enables the
intelligibility in the divine intellect.24
Now, it was not Scotus’s intention to renounce the creation from nothing
by God as the absolute agent in favour of some sort of neo-Platonic doctrine of
emanation; therefore, he elaborated the theory of the esse cognitum as a purely
intelligible and diminished kind of being that only exists in relation to a thinking
intellect. Scotus’s theory of ideas, as expressed in the only question of Book I,
dist. 35, of the Lectura and of the Ordinatio and in the second question of the
first part of dist. 35 in the Reportatio I-A, includes four metaphysical instants
(instantia naturae). In the first instant, the divine intellect thinks up the divine
essence as an absolute or autonomous and independent entity. In the second
instant, the divine intellect, by means of an absolute act, constitutes a creature
that is virtually included in the divine essence according to its esse intelligibile, or
mere intelligibility. The divine intellect thinks of the creature by the means of a
rational relation (i. e., a third-class relation in the Aristotelian classification): at
this stage, the divine intellect is the terminus of the relation in which the crea-
ture, as intelligible, determines its knowledge. This relation is not reciprocal, and
so does not proceed from the intellect to the creature as intelligible. This could
seem to make the esse cognitum dependent on the thinking intellect. Scotus,
therefore, specifies that in this instant, the creature is thought of or constituted
in its intelligibility, but it is not yet known by the divine intellect; this knowledge
itself is delayed until the fourth instant. The third instant is characterized by the
movement beyond the rational relation; here, the divine intellect compares the
divine essence (according to the Lectura) or its act of intellection (according to
the Ordinatio) with the intelligibility of the creature as extrinsic to the intellect,
and it does so by instituting an ideal relation or mental idea which was not yet
24 For all of this, see Fiorentino, “L’autonomia ontologica delle idee platoniche.” Notably,
the Scotist Alanus Gonteri shares with James of Ascoli the doctrine of the eternal causation of
the essences that are represented in the divine essence owing to their intelligible being; cf. Ala-
nus Gonteri, Quodlibet, I, q. 2 (Vatican City, BAV, Ms. Vat. Lat. 1086), 238v; Iacobus de Aes-
culo, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 1, in Yokoyama, “Zwei Quaestionen des Iacobus de Aesculo
über das Esse obiectivum,” 51–55; Iacobus de Aesculo, Quaestiones ordinariae, q. 3 (Vatican
City, BAV, Ms. Vat. Lat. 1012), 64rb, and ibid., q. 5, 66ra–b.
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necessary for thinking the creature in the second instant. Finally, in the fourth
instant, the divine intellect, reflecting on its act of comparison, knows the idea
and its relation through which the esse cognitum is acquired.25
It is therefore important to distinguish the intellectual production into in-
telligible being, from the knowledge of creatures as ideas. The rational relation of
the second instant proceeds from the thought creature to the thinking intellect,
while the rational relation of the third instant proceeds from the intellect to the
creature. The intellectually produced creature as thought in the second instant
must become extrinsic to the divine essence in which this creature is already
potentially included, or to the very act with which this creature has just been
thought, in order to enter into a relationship of comparison with the divine in-
tellect or the divine essence; at this point, this intellect knows this creature as
distinct from the divine essence or the intellectual act and compares the creature
with the divine essence or this act; but, in order for the divine intellect to know
the creature conceived as an idea, a last step is necessary: the divine intellect
must realize that it has completed the act of comparison in a reflexive way, that
is, turning towards itself. In the words of Michio Kobayashi, “[C]e qui est à re-
marquer dans la conception de l’idée divine chez Duns Scot, c’est qu’en s’écar-
tant de la tradition platonicienne qui règle la création sur le modèle d’idées éter-
nelles, il n’accorde plus à l’idée divine le rôle exemplaire et déterminant dans la
création.”26 Scotus does not consider an idea as an exemplar, but rather as the
content of a thought – much in the way we understand ideas today.27
Insofar as it is an intelligible object, in Scotus’s theory, it is not eternal, un-
generated, immutable, or incorruptible; it is rather conceived and produced by
the divine intellect that carries out two operations. The first operation is an ab-
solute operation in which it noetically forges the possible essence that is, with its
status as pure intelligibility, virtually included in the divine essence.28 The second
operation occurs when the intelligibility of the possible essence, that has just
been constituted, is reached by the intellect. This intelligibility gives rise to a re-
25 Cf. Duns Scotus, Lect. I, dist. 35, q. unica, n. 22 (ed. Vat. XVII), 452–53; Rep. I-A, dist.
36, pars 1, q. 2, nn. 77–78 (ed. Wolter and Bychkov II), 406; Ord. I, dist. 35, q. unica, n. 32
(ed. Vat. VI), 258; cf. also Fiorentino, “Giovanni Duns Scoto di fronte a Platone sulle idee
divine,” and “The Idea in John Duns Scotus’ Turn-about between Plato and Descartes.”
26 Kobayashi, “Création et contingence selon Descartes et Duns Scot,” 80.
27 Cf. again Fiorentino, “The Idea in John Duns Scotus’ Turn-about between Plato and
Descartes.”
28 ‘Virtual’ in Scotus means the potential state of an entity in itself; this state can be chan-
ged by the intervention of an external agent that produces the transition from potentiality to
act; but this potential state remains intrinsic in any case, since it does not depend upon this
agent, but rather upon an intrinsic property that predisposes this entity to allow the passage
from the potentiality to the act. Cf. Martínez Rius, “De distinctione virtuali intrinseca et dis-
tinctione formali a parte rei.”
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lation, in which it is the possible essence that determines the divine intellect’s act
of thinking. However, at this stage the idea itself has not yet appeared, but rather
is only an esse deminutum or something relative that links the possible essence
to the divine intellect. For the idea to appear, the divine intellect must compare
the divine essence, as the representative container of every possible essence, with
the intelligibility of this last essence. The latter is no longer the result of the
thinking act; it is now rather a noetical entity, extrinsic to the divine intellect.
The act of comparison replaces all traces of Platonic-Augustinian exemplarism
and generates an ideal relation in the direction from the divine intellect toward
the intelligibility of the possible essence, not vice versa. Finally, the intelligibility
is known by the divine intellect.
2. The Immediately Following Debate

The theory of an esse obiectivum as distinct from real being found supporters in
Henry of Harclay, Hervaeus of Nedellec, Peter Auriol (in the form of esse ap-
parens), and then most notably in the early William of Ockham (in the form of
ens fictum). It came under attack, however, from two different directions.29 One
line of criticism was promoted by Chatton and Ockham himself in a later stage
of his thinking. In their view, being known is surely not a property of the thing,
but rather only a quality of the mind, a mere change of the intellectual state, or a
pure mental content that refers to multiple material realities. Another line of
criticism is found in various guises in the works of William of Alnwick, Lan-
dulph Caracciolo, Francis of Meyronnes, Walter Chatton, and Adam of Wode-
ham. They do operate with a notion of esse obiectivum, in the form of known or
intentional being, but it is reduced to real being, which prevents a distinction
between what is represented and that which represents (the basic idea is that two
entities, A and B, cannot be distinguished at all, if A is really identical to B; if B
is represented by A, i. e., is the representative content of A, then it is impossible
to distinguish between A as a container and B as a content). This being is per-
fectly equivalent to the thing itself – it is its mode of meaning (modus significan-
di) and refers to the thing itself in the first place and to the knowing intellect in
the second place. The intellect has a subjective act, which is a quality of the mind.
For Alnwick, Chatton, and Wodeham, it is an absolute property; for Meyronnes,
it is a relative property. This property is accidentally inherent in the thing and
represents its possibility and intelligibility, first of all ad intra and then in regard
29 Let me again refer to my previous publications (with references to further literature):

Fiorentino, “L’autonomia ontologica delle idee platoniche”; id., “Lo scotismo trionfante nella
prima epoca moderna;” id., “La disputa tra Giovanni Punch e Bartolomeo Mastri.” For the
development of Ockham’s position on this issue (including the proximity of his later view to
that of Alnwick), see Richard Cross’s contribution to this present volume.
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to the divine intellect. When the latter conceives of a thing as possible and intel-
ligible, it incorporates into the divine essence the formation of another absolute
property; this property is accidentally predicated of the divine essence and is, in
other words, the very capacity to think that particular thing as a possible entity.
In this way, some particular thing is always known in itself, though according to
various kinds of being, namely intelligible being, known being and being (reflex-
ively) known to be known; the risk of an indefinite multiplication of absolute
entities, and hence the Aristotelian third-man argument, is thus circumvented.
Yet another reaction is found in Peter Auriol, who distances himself from
Scotus in the second and the third questions of dist. 35 of his Scriptum; he as-
sumes that the divine essence is a unique indivisible principle of resemblance
between all real and possible things. The divine intellect firstly refers to the di-
vine essence and then to the essence of the creatures represented in this
essence.30 In the third question of dist. 35 of his commentary on the Sentences I,
Landulph Caracciolo interestingly denied Auriol’s theory in favour of Scotus’s,
holding that it is the idea that is an eternal principle in the divine mind. God
produces all things into intelligible being, compares this intellectual production
with the intelligible being itself, and then reflects upon this relation of reason.
The objects that now exist in intelligible being are secondary objects, virtually
and eminently included in the divine essence; these secondary objects are
ideas.31 In the subsequent distinction, Landulph follows up with a rejection of
Auriol’s theory of relations; he insists that ideas are infinite due to their status as
objects or known beings.32
3. Francis of Ascoli
In the second article of distinction 39 in his commentary on the Sentences I,
Francis of Ascoli, following Auriol, aims to demonstrate that God has immediate
knowledge only through the means of His essence taken in the absolute sense,
i. e., without any relation to knowledge or production.33 Ascoli explains that the
30 Cf. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia on Divine Ideas,” 1598–99, and Paladini, “Exemplar
Causality as similitudo aequivoca in Peter Auriol.”
31 Landulphus Caracciolus, In Sent. I, dist. 35, q. 3 (ed. Duba and Schabel), in Duba, “From
Scotus to the Platonici,” 317–20; cf. Duba’s discussion in the same article.
32 Landulphus Caracciolus, In Sent. I, dist. 36, q. 2 (ed. Duba and Schabel), 328–36; cf. also
Schabel, “Francis of Marchia on Divine Ideas,” 1598–99, and Duba, “From Scotus to the Pla-
tonici.”
33 Franciscus de Esculo, In Sent. I, dist. 39, art. 2. In the following, I quote from Christoper
D. Schabel’s unpaginated online edition in the supplement to Schabel, “Francis of Marchia”; I
additionally refer to Nazareno Mariani’s edition (here, n. 31, 467). See further Fiorentino,
“Idee divine secondo Francesco di Appignano.”
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divine essence, being the only principle of knowledge, in a supereminent manner

includes an infinity of objects that are potentially knowable.34 Taking the abso-
lute character of the divine essence for granted, Ascoli clarifies the role of the
human intellect:
Secundo declaro hoc idem ex parte potentie. Ubi advertendum quod nos per eandem
numero potentiam sine distinctione aliqua ex parte potentie possumus successive intel-
ligere infinita cum sola distinctione et successione actuum. Licet enim eadem potentia
omnia intelligamus, tamen non eodem actu, nec eadem ratione intelligendi, sed alio et
alio, et hoc est ex limitatione nostri actus intelligendi, sicut ex illimitatione potentie, quod
eadem indistincta possit in infinita obiecta. Unde si nos haberemus unum actum intelli-
gendi eque illimitatum in genere actus sicut est potentia in genere potentie, et semper
stantem ut ipsa sicut erit in patria […], tunc quidquid intelligimus, intelligeremus per
illum actum potentie adequatum, sicut per eandem potentiam. Nunc autem non, quia
potentia est illimitatior ipso actu.35
Thus, the plurality of secondary objects does not depend on any intrinsic ratio –
the divine essence, which remains the only ratio intelligendi, or principle of
knowledge –, but rather on the gnoseological features of the finite intellect of
man in statu viae. In fact, this finite intellect knows, through distinct sequential
acts, that which exists in a unitary and simultaneous manner in the divine
essence. This unity is known by the human intellect in the beatific state, in
which the human intellect succeeds in attaining a unique act of cognition of the
divine essence.
Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod agens per intellectum habens duas vel plures
operationes subordinatas, vel unam continentem duas sic subordinatas sicut habens op-
erationem immanentem et transeuntem, vel unam utramque continentem, propter or-
dinem istarum, sicut operatio immanens est prior, ita prius agens habet terminum opera-
tionis immanentis quam terminum operationis transeuntis. Vel si sit idem terminus
utriusque, primo habet ipsum ut est terminus operationis immanentis quam ut est termi-
nus transeuntis. Tunc ad propositum, Deus habet circa creaturam duplicem opera-
tionem, videlicet immanentem, ut velle et intelligere, et transeuntem, sicut actum creandi,
qui est quasi transiens secundum rationem, non tamen realiter magis quam operatio im-
manens, quia nec iste due operationes sunt, ut puto, distincte in Deo. Deus ergo propter
ordinem istorum actuum predictorum prius habet terminum intellectionis quam ter-
minum creationis. Idee autem non sunt nisi ipsa obiecta secundaria actus intelligendi ut
actum ipsum terminantia, ita quod lapis ut cognitus est idea lapidis ut lapis est terminus
actionis sive operationis transeuntis, puta creationis. Et ita de aliis secundariis obiectis
omnibus divini intellectus, ita quod sicut operatio immanens est quasi via ad opera-
tionem transeuntem, ita terminus operationis immanentis ad terminum operationis
34 Franciscus de Esculo, In Sent. I, dist. 39, art. 2, q. 1 (ed. Schabel); nn. 34–35 (ed. Mariani),
469–70.
35 Franciscus de Esculo, In Sent. I, dist. 39, art. 2, q. 1 (ed. Schabel); n. 36 (ed. Mariani), 471–
72.
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transeuntis. Et ita idee non sunt rationes proxime intelligendi, nec rationes etiam pro-
ducendi ex parte producentis, ut imaginatur quidam. Deus enim eadem volitione qua ab
eterno voluit res contingenter, illa semper stante eadem ponit res in esse pro tempore pro
quo ponit.36
In other words, in regard to the creature, God operates two acts that are actually
identical, but formally distinct, namely that of knowing and that of creating. The
first act is immanent, or ad intra, while the second is transeunt, or ad extra, in
relation to God, in which essence and intellect coincide in each case. The idea is
generated by the first act, when the creature becomes known by the divine intel-
lect. For example, a stone is known through an immanent act of knowing and is
then created through the transeunt act of creating. The stone that is known in
the first act is the idea of the stone. Inherent in the uniqueness of the divine
essence and intellect, God accomplishes a unique and infinite act of cognition; it
is the divine essence itself that is the unique ratio of divine cognition.37
Ascoli thus confers to the idea, as a known quiddity, an esse deminutum or
secundum quid that is dependent on the immanent act of intellection or volition.
This act differs from the unqualified being of the creature as created into actual
reality by the act of intellection.38
Secundum hoc ergo, tenendo hoc posset dici quod esse cognitum vel volitum dicit duo.
Dicit enim concretum denominativum intellectionis, et quantum ad hoc esse cognitum
non differt ab actu cognitionis nisi secundum rationem, sicut nec album ab albedine vel
quodcumque aliud concretum a suo abstracto. Secundo dicit substratum, quod quidem
denominatur ab ipso cognitionis actu, quod quidem est esse diminutum factum vel for-
matum per ipsum actum cognitionis, qui fuit ab eterno, sicut et huiusmodi esse diminu-
tum.39
In Ascoli’s opinion, then, the esse cognitum has a dual meaning, a concrete and
an abstract one. This dual meaning corresponds with two elements: (1) a de-
nominatio, which is a quality of the mental act; (2) the dimished being which
derives from the known being that corresponds with the mental act.
474–75.
472.
480–81.
39 Franciscus de Esculo, In Sent. I, dist. 39, art. 2, q. 3 (ed. Schabel); n. 56 (ed. Mariani), 481.
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4. Peter Thomae
As Garrett Smith has pointed out, Peter Thomae was indebted to James of As-
coli, from whom he takes the intelligible being as a correlate object of the divine
essence.40 In the second quaestio of his Quaestiones disputatae de esse intelligibili,
Peter Thomae claims that the divine essence, as the primary and most adequate
representative content of the divine intellect, is capable of assigning intelligible
being to the essence of a creature that by way of perfection is included in this
essence.41 In this intelligible being lies the esse obiectivum of the creature, i. e., its
primitive representative content.42 In the seventh question, Peter Thomae adds
that this representative being is intentional being and is found midway between
real being and being of reason.43 In the third quaestio, Peter assimilates this in-
tentional being to that kind of real self-sufficient being that precedes not only
the act of comparison that Henry of Ghent confers to the divine intellect, but
also the absolute act that Scotus assigns to the divine intellect that, in the second
istant, produces intelligible being.44 In the eighth quaestio, Peter shows aware-
ness that he is drawing on elements from Scotus’s model, though without sup-
porting the whole theory:
Secundum est quod tamen dico sine assertione quod creatura ab aeterno habuit esse ali-
quod verum reale. Hoc ostendo ex dictis Scoti, licet ipse sentiat oppositum huius, et hoc
sic: esse praecedens omnem actum intelligendi comparativum est esse reale; sed creatura
ab aeterno habuit aliquod esse praecedens omnem actum huiusmodi; ergo habuit ab
aeterno aliquod esse reale. Maior patet. Minorem ostendo per ipsum: secundum enim
quod ipse ponit distinctione 35, in primo signo intellectus divinus intelligit essentiam
suam. In secundo intelligit essentiam creaturae et intelligendo eam producit ipsam in esse
intelligibili, ita quod adhuc – secundum ipsum in isto secundo signo – nulla est compa-
ratio, nec per consequens pro tali signo ponitur intellectus aliquis actus comparativus.
Sed secundum ipsum in tertio signo ponitur huiusmodi comparatio, seu actus compara-
tivus, quo ipsa creatura in secundo signo concepta comparatur per divinum intellectum
vel ad divinam intellectionem vel ad omne aliud ad quod comparatur. Relinquitur ergo
secundum ipsum quod creatura habuit esse repraesentatum et intellectum ante omnem
actum conparativum divini intellectus, ergo per consequens habuit aliquod esse reale.
Nec valet fugere dicendo quod omnia illa tria signa sunt in eodem instanti aeternitatis,
nec enim de hoc est aliquod dubium, nec dicendo quod illa praedicta tria signa, licet
secundum modum nostrum intelligendi distinguantur, tamen in re simul ponuntur,
simul enim est huiusmodi conversio seu comparatio creaturae ad divinam intellectionem
et eius intellectio. Hoc siquidem non valet, quia ipse vult quod pro illo secundo instanti
40 Cf. Smith, “The Origin of Intelligibility,” 60–69.

41 Petrus Thomae, Quaestiones de esse intelligibili, q. 2, art. 2, ll. 193–242, 36–39. For the
following, see also Smith, “Petrus Thomae on Divine Ideas and Intelligible Being.”
42 Petrus Thomae, Quaestiones de esse intelligibili, q. 7, art. 3, ll. 187–97, 144.
43 Petrus Thomae, Quaestiones de esse intelligibili, q. 7, ll. 367–89, 152–53.
44 Petrus Thomae, Quaestiones de esse intelligibili, q. 3, art. 1, ll. 35–148, 46–52.
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essentia divina sub ratione mere absoluta terminat intellectionem divinam et quod crea-
tura non producitur in actu intelligendi per actum intellectus comparativum, ergo secun-
dum ipsum huiusmodi esse creaturae intellectum et repraesentatum praecedit omnem
actum comparativum.45
Although Peter Thomae carefully avoids any assertion, he clearly misapprehends

Scotus’s opinion. Peter recognizes the eternity and the order of the instants of
nature, as well as the relative act with which the divine intellect compares the
intelligibility of the essence of the creature to the divine essence or to the abso-
lute act of the intellect in the third instant. He manages to admit the eternity of
the intelligible being as the real being of the creature, because he omits the intel-
lectual production of the thought creature in the second instant, replacing the
divine intellect with the divine essence as the terminus of the rational relation
that proceeds from the thought creature of this intellect, rather than vice versa.
In the second quaestio, Peter Thomae makes no attempt to hide his speculative
distance from Scotus’s theory of the esse cognitum, even though he says he gen-
erally follows this theory (“cuius doctrinam sequor ut plurimum”):46
[…] si Scotus velit dicere quod divinus intellectus ut ab essentia distinctus producat
quidditates in esse intelligibili, loquendo proprie de productione, non teneo cum eo. Si
tamen dicatur quod ista productio est mere aequivoca et metaphorica, ut ipse videtur
dicere, detur sibi, licet improprie dicatur.47
Peter Thomae’s adherence to Scotus is thus conditioned on a hermeneutic crite-

rion: he is willing to follow Scotus on condition that the fundamental core of
Scotus’s theory, i. e., the intellectual production of the intelligibility of the
essence of the creature, be understood in a merely metaphorical and improper
sense.
5. Francis of Meyronnes
In the first two questions of distinction 47 of the Conflatus, Francis of Mey-
ronnes articulates his theory of the divine ideas within his theory of the funda-
mental relation. Ideas are not active cognitive principles of assimilation. They
rather constitute the foundation of a relation that stems from God without lead-
ing to any real or possible entity other than God. They subsist in themselves and
in the deity or divine essence with which they are co-essential, though without
any degree of effective existence. Egbert P. Bos has compared Meyronnes’s
world of ideas with Gregory of Rimini’s complexe significabilia, i. e., such enunci-
45 Petrus Thomae, Quaestiones de esse intelligibili, q. 8, art. 1, ll. 71–95, 158–59.

46 Petrus Thomae, Quaestiones de esse intelligibili, q. 2, art. 3, l. 252, 40.
47 Petrus Thomae, Quaestiones de esse intelligibili, q. 2, art. 3, ll. 283–86, 41.
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ations that, if taken in their entirety, are true in themselves and need not be
formulated in the mind in order to be and to be true, and with Karl R. Popper’s
Third Reich of objective contents of thought or of works of art.48
Properly speaking, in Meyronnes’s understanding divine ideas do not either
exist or not exist, since they are rather beyond existence and non-existence in
every way. They have this status, because they are beings not existing in a quid-
ditive sense, but only in a qualitative sense. They are qualities, not res. This
world of mere essences, unlike in Scotus, is neither produced nor caused, but
rather is eternal, ungenerated, incorruptible, indestructible, and certainly not
separate from God. It is co-essential with God, despite being formally distinct
from Him. The essences are intelligible in themselves, regardless of the intellect
that conceives them.
This complex theory advanced by Meyronnes has a theological interpreta-
tion of the Platonic ideas in common with Henry of Ghent, Scotus, and Peter
Thomae, one that is based on the conception of ideas as stable, immutable, eter-
nal, ungenerated and incorruptible forms that (in accordance with Augustine)
are contained in the divine mind. This theory can be seen as the last stage in
Meyronnes’s evolution of thought concerning the divine ideas. We find it in
many places throughout the Conflatus, for example, in the first question of dis-
tinction 42, where Meyronnes founds all relative beings, like those thought of by
the divine intellect or those desired by the divine will, on being of essence; he
there describes being of essence as indifferent to contingent existence or non-
existence, real or mental being, singularity or universality, act or potency, neces-
sity or contingency, causation or non-causation, time or eternity.49 Other prop-
erties of this being are its logical possibility and producibility before its creation
as well as its indestructibility. In the second quaestio, Meyronnes concedes eter-
nity to pure essences, albeit only in a privative sense, namely due to the absence
of any form of duration. Similarly, these essences are necessary in a privative
sense, namely due to not being impossible.50 In the third quaestio, Meyronnes
reiterates that God, as an exemplar or efficient cause, did not produce these
essences; it is rather with the act of creation that the divine will adds existent
actual being to these essences.51
48 Cf. Bos, “The Theory of Ideas according to Francis of Meyronnes,” 215 and 226–27;
Fiorentino, Gregorio da Rimini, 11–52; Popper, Objective Knowledge, 106–52. I have discussed
Meyronnes’s doctrine of ideas in Fiorentino, “Le idee divine nelle prime due questioni della
distinzione 47 del Conflatus.” Cf. also Damian Park’s contribution to this present volume.
49 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus, dist. 42, q. 1, 117vab. We already find this indiffer-
ence in distinction 35 of Meyronnes’s first version of his commentary on the Sentences, the so-
called Ab Oriente redaction; cf. Franciscus de Mayronis, Ab Oriente I, dist. 35, q. 1, especially
the articles 8–12 and 27–28 (ed. Möhle), 761–64 and 772.
50 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus, dist. 42, q. 2, 118va–b.
51 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus, dist. 42, q. 3, 119vb–120va.
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In the first three quaestiones of distinction 46, Meyronnes clarifies that be-
ing thought of (esse intellectum) and being willed (esse volitum), since they are
relative, presuppose the absolute being of essence.52 In the third quaestio, Mey-
ronnes establishes that the being thought of, which is relative and diminished, is
produced, in contrast to the intelligible being that descends from a formal ratio
of the essence and not from an act of the intellect or will. This last kind of being
is not relative and diminished, because it coincides with the esse essentiae itself.53
In the third quaestio of distinction 47, we furthermore learn that the pure
essence possesses the intrinsic property of abstractability that makes it indiffer-
ent to both real and mental being; Meyronnes quotes Avicenna’s famous dictum
“equinitas est equinitas tantum.”54 This diverges from Aristotle, who imposed
both singularity and spatial separation from reality on the divine ideas; Mey-
ronnes, the “magister abstractionum”, rather prefers abstraction. Perhaps not so
surprisingly, Meyronnes in fact saw Aristotle as an “optimus physicus”, but a
“pessimus metaphysicus”!55
Let me finally turn to Meyronnes’s eighth quodlibetal quaestio, also called
Vinculum de esse essentiae et existentiae. Here, we again find the motif of the
pure, uncreated, uncaused and indifferent essences that exist prior to their cre-
ation; these essences are formally and, as we here learn, essentially distinct from
the divine essence.56 Meyronnes inveighs both against Scotus’s notion of intellec-
tual production and against Alnwick’s solution with the extrinsic denomination.
According to Meyronnes, this denomination only has an arbitrary or ad placi-
tum semantic value and cannot be an intrinsic property of the essence.57
Meyronnes arrived at a highly original and innovative theory that attempt-
ed to develop the Platonic conception of ideas in the light of Avicenna’s meta-
physics as mediated by Henry of Ghent. This led to a shift in Meyronnes’s
thought, largely on a subsurface level, toward the concept of ‘praecisio’ as a
definining feature of pure essence as prior and indifferent to all ontological bi-
partitions, as self-sufficient at the qualitative level, and as intelligible in itself.
52 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus, dist. 46, q. 1, 132ra; cf. also ibid., q. 2, 132va.
53 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus, dist. 46, q. 3, 132vb. Interestingly, Ioannes Anglicus
Foxholes (or John Foxal), Tractatus de productione creaturae (Vatican City, Vatican Apostolic
Library, ms. Vat. lat. 9402), 227vb, remarks there is “dissonantia non parva” between Scotus
and Meyronnes regarding the production of intelligible being (endorsed by Scotus and denied
by Meyronnes).
54 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus, dist. 47, q. 3, 134ra.
55 Franciscus de Mayronis, Conflatus, dist. 47, q. 3, 134rb; cf. Bianchi, “Aristotele fu un
uomo e potè errare,” and Möhle, “Aristoteles, Pessimus metaphysicus,” 748.
56 Franciscus de Mayronis, Tractatus de esse essentiae et existentiae, especially the articles 1–4,
9, 10, 13, 15, 17–18 (ed. Lánský et al.), 283–91, 301–3, 306–8, 310–11, 313–15.
57 Franciscus de Mayronis, Tractatus de esse essentiae et existentiae, art. 6 (ed. Lánský et
al.), 295–96.
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This indifference does not seem to correspond with anything in Avicenna’s au-
thentic thought in itself, i. e., without Henry of Ghent’s mediation. According to
Avicenna, the indifference of the essence, unlike the Aristotelian principle of the
excluded middle, may not imply neutrality or some third option; it rather im-
plies positivity or a composition in which the extremes are concordant rather
than mutually exclusive.58 To this conception of indifference, Meyronnes adds
the formal inclusion of the ideas in the divine mind, combining motifs from Au-
gustine and Scotus.
Meyronnes’ theory achieved some success in the later Franciscan tradition,
as seen, e. g., in John of Ripa in the fourteenth century and John Punch in the
17th century, as well as outside of the Franciscan family, as seen, e. g., in Nicholas
of Autrecourt. It was criticized, however, by Jean Gerson, Chancellor of the Uni-
versity of Paris, along with Plato, the formalizantes, and the ultra-realism of John
Wyclif, who in De ideis attributed the truly real being of the creatures to their
being known by God. John Kenningham and Thomas Netter accused Wyclif of
heresy, recognizing in these creatures Scotus’s diminished and only relative be-
ings, and deprecating the Augustinian interpretation of Plato. By contrast, to-
ward the end of the fourteenth century, Plato was defended by Peter of Ailly,
who had read Calcidius’s translation of Timaeus. According to Ailly, and in
stark contrast to Meyronnes, Plato is the one philosopher who has best under-
stood God’s secrets, one example of this being his doctrine of ideas.59
6. Peter of Navarre
In the second quaestio of distinction 36 in his Scriptum in primum librum Sen-
tentiarum, Peter of Navarre, also called de Atarrabia, rejects the preexistence of
the intelligible being of the creatures as an actuality in the divine essence prior to
the act of the divine intellect:
Ideo aliter dico quod, formaliter loquendo, secundum quod aliquid dicitur formaliter in-
telligibile, creatura non prius habet esse intelligibile quam esse intellectum, nec praesup-
ponitur intellectioni, sed ipsam praesupponit, et per ipsam habet primum esse et expres-
sum et intellectum; immo per hoc quod habet esse intellectum, habet formaliter esse
expressum. Loquendo autem virtualiter, bene praesupponitur in ipsa essentia, ut virtu-
aliter intelligibile et expressibile. Ad hoc me movet quod multa inconvenientia sequuntur
oppositum […].60
58 Cf. Porro, “Universaux et esse essentiae,” 21–23 and 44.

59 For these developments, see Fiorentino, “La disputa tra Giovanni Punch e Bartolomeo
Mastri;” Hoenen, “A Oxford: dibattiti teologici nel tardo Medioevo;” Hoenen, “Modus loquen-
di Platonicorum.”
60 Petrus de Atarrabia sive de Navarra, In Sent. I, dist. 36, q. 1, n. 23, 814.
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This passage discriminates between two different planes: the formal or actual
one and the virtual or potential one. While on the formal or actual plane the
creature is not preexistent in the divine essence simply due to its intelligibility, it
is this latter quality that marks the virtual or potential status of the creature in
the divine essence. In other words, the creature exists in the divine essence in
potency but not in act, being intelligible prior to being actually thought of by the
divine intellect.
In the third quaestio, Navarre first criticizes three opinions, stating that the
divine essence considered as an idea that is imitable by the creatures, by means
of various relations of reason, cannot be multiplied in accordance with these re-
lations.61 He further refutes the first alternative to the second opinion, which
assumes that the idea is a principle of production of the creature owing to the
imitability relation of the real creature toward the divine essence. According to
Navarre, this relation follows rather than precedes the production of the crea-
ture.62 The third opinion holds that the idea is coincident with the act with
which God thinks of the creature; this act is linked to God’s real relation to the
creature; Navarre objects that the creature is intelligible regardless of this rela-
tion.63 The fourth quaestio introduces Augustine’s definition of ‘idea’:
Quantum ad primum, secundum Augustinum, 83 Quaestionum, quaestione 46, nomen

ideae fuit inventum a Platone, sed non res ipsa, et – ut dicit – idea vocatur forma, vel
species, vel similitudo, vel ratio (non curo de nomine). Sed quid est idea secundum rem?
Dico quod, secundum Augustinum, ubi supra, quod ideae ‘sunt formae vel rationes pro-
priae rerum incommutabiles, quae ipsae formatae non sunt (ac per hoc aeternae ac sem-
per eodem modo se habentes), quae in divina intelligentia continentur; et cum ipsae non
oriantur nec intereant, secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interiri
potest, et omne quod interit et oritur.’ Dicuntur ‘formae,’ quia secundum ipsas formatur
quidquid formatur.64
This passage is important because it makes clear that the ideas are considered as
forms present in the divine mind and related to that immutable essence which
has no origin nor end, in accordance with Augustine’s interpretation of Plato’s
theory. The insertion of the ideas as forms into the divine mind bestows esse
cognitum on the ideas that are now conceived as objects of knowledge. However,
this conflicts with Aristotle’s interpretation that assigned a separate nature to
Plato’s ideas. Indeed, this conflict is promptly pointed out by Navarre:
Praeterea, Plato posuit ideas esse quiditates rerum; sed Augustinus non deviat ab eo nisi
in hoc quia Plato, sicut imponit ei Aristoteles, posuit illas quiditates separatas per se ex-
61 Petrus de Navarra, In Sent. I, dist. 36, q. 3, nn. 66–67, 826.

62 Petrus de Navarra, In Sent. I, dist. 36, q. 3, nn. 68–71, 826–27.
63 Petrus de Navarra, In Sent. I, dist. 36, q. 3, nn. 75–78, 829–30.
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sistere; Augustinus vero posuit eas exsistere in mente divina; sed ibi non posuit esse nisi
sicut obiectum cognitum. Relinquitur ergo quod ideae sunt quiditates rerum secundum
esse cognitum.65
Defined in this way, the divine ideas, on account of their plurality, are not equi-
valent to the divine essence, but rather to the essences of the single creatures
according to their esse cognitum, even if they are included objectively (obiective)
in the divine mind, owing to their relative existence as objects of knowledge.66
This status of the essences of the creatures is the foundation of the exemplar
character of the ideas included in the divine mind; Navarre explains: “per conse-
quens creatura, secundum esse cognitum, est idea.”67 Therefore, prior to acquir-
ing the being of the essence in effectu, the creature, as a mere exemplar, is seen as
having only a diminished kind of being, namely esse cognitum.68 This being is
coincident with the divine cognition itself; as contained in the divine mind it is
nothing but an entity of reason (ens rationis).69 In reply to the last main argu-
ment, Navarre now adds Boethius’s interpretation of the Platonic ideas that
bends the theory of ideas in a creationist direction:
Augustinus intelligit ibi per illas ‘invisibiles et incommutabiles rationes’ quiditates creat-
urarum secundum esse cognitum, secundum quem modum dicit Boethius quod in Deo
est mundus archetypus, quod non est nisi creatura secundum esse cognitum. Unde dicit,
secundo De consolatione philosophiae, loquens ad Deum sic: “Pulchrum, pulcherrimus
ipse, – mundum mente gerens similique imagine formans.” Quomodo ergo potest salvare
quod ideae sunt creatrices? Respondeo: sicut domus in mente dicitur factrix, quia est
exemplar secundum quod artifex operatur domum extra, sic ideae possunt dici creatrices
quia sunt exemplaria secundum quae, sicut obiecta cognita, Deus creando res producit in
effectum.70
The Boethian interpretation remarkably allows Navarre to connect the esse cog-
nitum of the creatures with their essences; together they provoke the effective
production of the corresponding things. The following quaestio, finally, reaffirms
that the ideas are cognized creatures (“per ideam intelligo creaturam ut cognitam
obiective secundario ab intellectu divino”).71
65 Petrus de Navarra, In Sent. I, dist. 36, q. 4, n. 110, 837.

68 Petrus de Navarra, In Sent. I, dist. 36, q. 4, n. 118, 838–39.
70 Petrus de Navarra, In Sent. I, dist. 36, q. 4, nn. 123–24, 839–40. The quote is from Boe-
thius, De consol. phil., III, 9, 7–8, 80.
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7. Peter of Aquila
In the first quaestio of dist. 36 in his commentary on the Sentences I, Peter of
Aquila succinctly contrasts the Aristotelian and Augustinian interpretations of
Plato’s theory of ideas as forma intellectualis exemplaris:72
Dico quod aut ideae ponuntur separatae sicut imposuit Aristoteles Platoni 7. Metaph.,
aut ponuntur ideae in intellectu sicut Augustinus exposuit Platonem […]. Primo modo
ideae non sunt ponendae; secundo modo sic, quia nobilissimus modus producendi non
deficit in universo; sed nobilissimus modus producendi est per intellectum et voluntatem
per rationes ideales; ergo ideae sunt ponendae.73
Aquila supports the Augustinian interpretation of the idea as an exemplar in the

divine mind, thus opting against Aristotle’s attribution of a separate status to the
ideas. In Aquila’s conception, the inclusion of the ideas in the divine mind auto-
matically implies their productive character. To explore the relation of ideas as
exemplars of the creatures to God as their author, Peter mentions two opinions.
The first is Scotus’s opinion of which Aquila accepts only the notion of esse
obiectivum:
Una [opinio est] Scoti, quod ideae nihil aliud sunt in Deo nisi res objective cognitae.
Quod probatur sic: Illud est idea in Deo ad cuius similitudinem producitur res extra; sed
res extra producitur ad similitudinem rei cognitae; ergo res objective cognitae sunt ide-
ae.74
The second opinion denies the ideas as entities of reason or cognized objects;
they are rather the divine essence itself as “continens in se perfectiones omni-
um.”75 Whereas this quaestio ends without a definite determination,76 the follow-
ing quaestio provides one:
[…] omnia habent ideam in Deo, omnia dico positiva sive entia naturalia, sive artifi-
cialia, genera, species et individua, relationes, materia, compositum et partes. Cujus ratio
est quia idea est res objective cognita; sed omnia praedicta sunt res objective cognitae;
ergo omnia praedicta habent ideam in Deo.77
Every positive entity, being known as an object, is thus connected with an idea in
God. In the third quaestio, Peter of Aquila eventually excludes any possibility
72 Petrus de Aquila, In Sent. I, dist. 36, q. 1, 362–63.

73 Petrus de Aquila, In Sent. I, dist. 36, q. 1, 363.
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that creatures have real being in the divine essence before having been pro-
duced.78
8. John of Ripa
Camille Bérubé counted John of Ripa among the Scotists due to his contribution
to the circulation of Scotus’s doctrines in the Minorite Studia.79 Ludger Honne-
felder reached the same conclusion by emphasizing the free relationship between
teacher and disciple.80 In the only quaestio of his Lectura I, dist. 35, as witnessed
in Paul of Venice’s Abbreviatio, as well as in his Conclusiones, John of Ripa di-
vides the perfectiones, i. e., self-sustained and complete features, inherent in the
divine essence into three classes: 1) the rationes essentiales, such as the being of
entity, life, and intellect; 2) the modes of these essential perfections, such as sim-
plicity, necessity, eternity; 3) the causal and effective rationes that are the prop-
erties or features of the essential rationes. The essential rationes are in the divine
essence owing to essential denominations. These are extrinsic and secondary
properties of the divine essence ad extra and inherent in the divine essence;
upon these qualities depend the essential denominations of the creatures, i. e.,
those extrinsic and secondary properties that are inherent in the essences of the
creatures. The essential rationes of the creatures have the status of vestigia. There
is symmetry between the divine and the creaturely denominations; the relation-
ship between these perfections is one of participation and variously intense
grades.81 The divine essence does not directly include the species itself of some
essential ratio of a creature as an intrinsic perfection, but rather only the vari-
ously intense grades of these creaturely rationes on an imaginary level (imagi-
naria latitudo) and according to the symmetry of the denominations.82

79 Bérubé, “La première école scotiste,” 15–16.
80 Honnefelder, “Scotus und der Scotismus,” 252.
81 John of Ripa composed a commentary on the Sentences, which has only in part been
critically edited. Distinction 35 that interests us here has not yet been edited. I therefore resort
to two other sources for the first book of Ripa’s commentary, namely Paul of Venice’s abbrevi-
ation and Ripa’s own Conclusiones extractae; cf. Paulus Venetus, Super primum Sententiarum
Johannis de Ripa Lecturae abbreviatio I, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 1, 519–20; Ioannes de Ripa, Conclu-
siones I, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 14–29, 210–11.
82 Paulus Venetus, In Sent. abbreviatio I, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 1, 521–22; Ioannes de Ripa, Con-
clusiones I, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 1, 30–31, 211. John of Ripa’s source for the notion of imaginary
latitudo is the theory of the socalled Calculators of gradable forms and more or less intense
degrees of qualities in the theories; cf. Coleman, “Jean de Ripa and the Oxford Calculators.”
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Generaliter divina essentia secundum plures rationes essentiales est causa speciei superi-
oris in latitudine entis perfectionaliter contentiva quam inferioris.83
The divine essence is infinite and therefore includes all the essential rationes;
these are essentially ordered and, in their turn, include the species of the crea-
tures as perfections.84 The essential rationes of the divine essence are the exem-
plar causes of the denominations of the creatures.85 These rationes, to which the
essences of the creatures connect by way of participation, are the exemplar ideas:
Ratio divina participata a creatura est proprissime ipsius creature idea. Probatur. Nam
omnes conditiones quas attribuit beatus Augustinus ideis in libro 83 Questiones, questio
46 competunt vere et proprie huiusmodi rationibus. Sunt enim huiusmodi rationes prin-
cipales forme et rationes rerum substantiales et incommutabiles, secundum quas omnia
formantur et quarum participatione sit quidquid est. Ista conclusio patet per beatum Au-
gustinum, XV de Trinitate, c. 13–16, ubi dicit quod Verbum Dei est Verbum perfectum
cui non desit aliquid et ars omnipotentis et sapientia Dei plena omnium rationum viven-
tium. Hec sunt, ut ait idem Augustinus in alio loco, que a Philosophis secularibus et a
Platone primo appellate sunt idee et Seneca ad Lucillum […].86
For the view of ideas as forms of immutable things, Ripa relies on Augustine’s
interpretation combined with a quotation from Seneca; he does not take the
Aristotelian mediation into account. Of importance in our context is that he lat-
er connects Augustine’s interpretation with Scotus’s theory of esse cognitum that
turns the ideas into secondary objects of the divine intellect, whereas the divine
essence remains its primary object:
Aliter ymaginatur Doctor Subtilis, videlicet quod idee sunt ipsemet creature secundum
quod obiective relucent in mente divina ut obiecta secundaria et ipsis creaturis ut sic –
habent esse cognitivum in mente divina – attribuit omnes conditiones quas Augustinus,
ubi prius, dixit ideis competere. Dicit enim quod sine ipsis Deus sapiens esse non potest
et sine cognitione ipsarum; et huiusmodi rationes sunt incommutabiles et eterne, quon-
iam eternaliter cognite.87
John of Ripa, however, does not understand the point concerning the passage
from the esse cognitum as the relative ontological status of the creatures to the
83 Paulus Venetus, In Sent. abbreviatio I, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 1, 523; Ioannes de Ripa, Conclu-
siones I, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 1, ll. 33–35, 211.
84 Paulus Venetus, In Sent. abbreviatio I, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 2, 523–24; Ioannes de Ripa,
Conclusiones I, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 2, ll. 5–17, 211.
85 Paulus Venetus, In Sent. abbreviatio I, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 3–4, 524–27; Ioannes de Ripa,
Conclusiones I, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 3–4, ll. 5–8, 211–12.
86 Paulus Venetus, In Sent. abbreviatio I, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 4, 527; Ioannes de Ripa, Conclu-
87 Paulus Venetus, In Sent. abbreviatio I dist. 35, q. 1, art. 4, 528; Ioannes de Ripa, Conclu-
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extrinsic causation of the creatures that stems from the divine essence. Also, in
Scotus’s writings, one does not find that symmetry between the attributes of the
divine essence and those of the creatures, as secondary objects of knowledge,
that on Ripa’s model would allow the causation of the creatures according to
their exemplars.88
9. Peter of Candia
In the first article of the sixth quaestio in the Book I of his commentary on the
Sentences, Peter of Candia gives an outline of the positions at stake:
Advertendum est quod circa istam materiam est duplex modus dicendi: unus ponit idea-
rum pluralitatem, et alius simpliciter negat. Sed primus modus habet tres modos: quidam
ponunt rationes ideales ex parte divinae essentiae, quidam ex parte quidditatum, et qui-
dam ex parte ipsarum creaturarum in esse actuali. Primus modus est Magistri Iohannis
de Ripa, secundus videtur Platonicus, et tertius est ipsius Ockham.89
Peter identifies two main opinions concerning the plurality of ideas: the first is
affirmative, the second negative. The affirmative position comes in three distinct
versions. The first, ascribed to John of Ripa, posits this plurality within the di-
vine essence. Importantly, the second, which at first is considered Platonic and
then subsequently attributed to Scotus, connects this plurality with the essences
of the creatures. The third, attributed to William of Ockham, assumes the plural-
ity of ideas within the sphere of actually existing creatures.90
Peter quotes Ockham’s definition of ‘idea’ as “aliquid cognitum a principio
effectivo intellectuali ad quod tale principium aspiciens potest aliquid in esse re-
ali producere,” i. e., as an entity known by the active divine intellect that, like a
supernatural artificer and with this content in view, may produce something into
reality.91 This production implies that ideas have the character of exemplars that
ensure a correspondence between the idea and the essence of a thing.92 We learn
that, “idea Sortis est Sortes quem importat in recto et in obliquo et similiter con-
88 Paulus Venetus, In Sent. abbreviatio I, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 4, 528–29; Ioannes de Ripa,
Conclusiones I, dist. 35, q. 1, art. 4, ll. 30–34, 212.
89 Petrus de Candia, In Sent. I, q. 6, art. 1, n. 6. I refer to Christoper D. Schabel’s unpaginat-
ed online edition.
90 Petrus de Candia, In Sent. I, q. 6, art. 1, n. 33.
91 Petrus de Candia, In Sent. I, q. 6, art. 1, n. 8; cf. Ockham, Scriptum I, dist. 35, q. 5, ll. 1–4,
486: “Et propter hoc habet tantum quid nominis et potest sic describi: idea est aliquid cogni-
tum a principio effectivo intellectuali ad quod ipsum activum aspiciens potest aliquid in esse
reali producere.”
92 Petrus de Candia, In Sent. I, q. 6, art. 1, nn. 17–19.
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notat Deum qui praecognoscit Sortem antequam existat in rerum natura.”93 The
idea refers to Socrates both in a direct and an oblique manner, and it also refers
to God who knows Socrates before his effective and actual existence. A plurality
of ideas is present to the divine intellect in the form of objects of knowledge; the
ideas are objectively only, not subjectively, in the divine intellect.94
By contrast, the Scotist position understands the ideas in the Platonic fash-
ion; ‘idea’ here means a “ratio aeterna in mente divina secundum quam aliquid
est formabile ut secundum propriam rationem eius.”95 This view of the idea as
the form of an immutable thing is combined with the Scotist theory of esse cog-
nitum: the idea is an “obiectum cognitum per intellectum divinum in esse intel-
ligibili derivatum.”96 The divine essence is metaphysically antecedent, since it is
the primary object of the divine intellect. This intellect produces the intelligibili-
ty of the essences of creatures. Ripa here introduces a new motif: this intelligibil-
ity presupposes the emanation of the divine persons; the divine essence has its
intelligible being in common with the Word which is the explicit image of the
Father’s mind ad extra. In comparison with real being, this intelligible being of
the essences has a diminished ontological status; it is only esse obiectivum.97
John of Ripa’s opinion is reported in detail. It is founded on the inclusion
of the essential rationes in the divine essence; these rationes include the species
of the creatures as essentially ordered perfections. These “ideal” rationes consti-
tute the creatures in a causal and exemplar manner; they are modulated accord-
ing to various degrees of participation and correspond with the denominations
of the creatures (“huiusmodi rationes essentiales a creatura participatae sunt ra-
tiones omnium rerum creabilium ideales).”98 Candia closely summarizes Ripa’s
definition of ‘idea’:
Ex quibus potest idea taliter describi: idea est divina essentialis ratio, forma principalis, a
nullo formata, incommutabilis et aeterna, rei creabilis denominationis consimilis forma-
tiva, ipsius repraesentativa perfectissime, et eiusdem limpide cognitiva. Ista descriptio se-
quitur formaliter ex dictis Magistri Johannis.99

95 Petrus de Candia, In Sent. I, q. 6, art. 1, n. 34; cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 35, q. unica,
nn. 38–39 (ed. Vat. VI), 260.
98 Petrus de Candia, In Sent. I, q. 6, art. 1, nn. 89–103. Peter of Candia appears to be well
acquainted with John of Ripa; for John of Ripa’s influence on Peter of Candia regarding the
divine prescience of future contingent events, see Schabel, “Peter of Candia and the Prelude to
the Quarrel at Louvain.”
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Contained in this definition is the Platonic view of the idea as the form of im-
mutable things. This element is absorbed into Ripa’s notion of a correspondence
between the denominations and the essential rationes. The idea is, on the one
hand, an essential ratio of the divine essence; on the other hand, it is the princi-
ple of the knowledge of the denominations of creatures. The divine essence is
not the ratio essentialis of creatures; the exemplar idea as denomination in the
divine essence rather corresponds with creatures owing to a certain essential be-
ing of the creature itself.100
Verbi gratia, pro intellectu conclusionis, signata una ratione essentiali, ut pote vitae, licet
Deo correspondeant infinitae sine quacumque formali distinctione in tali denominatione,
tamen creaturae multae non aequaliter participant vitam, et tamen talibus participation-
ibus correspondent diversae causalitates, et ita cum unitate essentialis denominationis
stat pluralitas causalium rationum.101
For example, the essential ratio of life, although it coincides with a unique de-
nomination of the divine essence, stimulates various degrees of participation that
actually correspond with as many causal rationes of the creatures. Peter of Can-
dia gives a summary which both demonstrates his philological acumen and illu-
minates Ripa’s opinion:
Imaginatio ergo totius positionis per modum epilogi recollecta in hoc consistit: intellec-
tus inamque corpori alligatus a visibilibus ad Dei invisibilia procedit, iuxta dictum Apos-
toli: “Invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur.”
Unde, quia in creaturis reperit distinctionem multiplicem et non primariam, ideo ipsam
ad invisibilia Dei reducit, quae, quia non potest bono modo realis intelligi, ab elevatis
theologis fuit ‘formalis distinctio’ merito appellata. Et idcirco, infinitarum essentialium
rationum in Deo fuit locata pluralitas, quae sunt denominationum consimilium in crea-
turis perfectionaliter contentivae. Et quia ipsas reperit intellectus infinitas simpliciter,
ideo ipsis attribuit condiciones perfectionis, ut pote formare, repraesentare, et esse ra-
tionem cognoscendi. Ex quibus illative ‘ideales formas’ voluit appellare. Et quia rerum
incommunicabiles rationes non poterant per modum idealem intelligi in supersimplici
substantia Conditoris, quia sic esset quodam modo ut bos vel asinus effigiata, ideo adver-
tit alias rationes divinas a primis per modum proprietatis intrinsecae naturaliter pullu-
lantes, quas ‘causales’ censuit nominare, per quas rerum incommunicabiles existentiae
sunt derivabiles et certis limitibus circumclusae. Et quia hoc videt intellectus infinitis
modis posse fieri, animadvertit ipsas sub certo finito numero minime contineri. Cumque
conspiciat tripliciter effectum fieri – videlicet exemplative quo ad rationes essentiales,
executive quo ad gradus varios in rationibus essentialibus participabiles, et determinative
quo ad talium continuam conservationem – ideo causales rationes tripliciter nominavit:
formativas videlicet, executivas, et determinativas. Nunc autem, quia omnes istae rationes
sunt in arte Omnipotentis Artificis, ideo clarissime conspicit omnem rei circumstantiam

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essentialem vel incommunicabilem, et si non tales singulas per ideas proprias, cum non
habeant, tamen per rationes determinativas cuncta alia circumspicit limpide vel per ra-
tiones causaliter executivas. Et ista credo fuisse imaginationem huius doctoris, cuius
speculatio sufficiat pro praesenti.102
Peter of Candia’s summary reveals that Ripa’s argument works in two direc-
tions: it both proceeds quia, i. e., from the creatures to the divine essence, or
from the visible to the invisible things, and propter quid, i. e., from the divine
essence toward the creatures. This dual argument seems to justify the employ-
ment of two orders of rationes that at first sight appear to be in conflict with one
another, though they are in fact rather complementary, namely the orders of the
ideal and the causal rationes. The plurality of visible creatures explains the for-
mal distinction among the essential rationes that include, in the divine essence,
the denominations of the creatures as perfections. These behave in the same way
as the ideal forms. They constitute, represent and enable knowledge of creatures.
At the other end, the simplicity of the divine essence is the foundation of the
causal rationes; these rationes cause the effective existence of the creatures, act-
ing as exemplars of the essential rationes. The causal rationes, being the exem-
plars of the essential rationes, are operative in the various degrees of the essential
rationes in creatures; they continue to sustain these rationes after creation and
throughout the course of created reality. The causal rationes thus concern the
effective work of the Creator.
Peter himself does not follow John of Ripa, but rather supports the opposite
opinion, vouching for the uniqueness of God as the exemplar idea of all crea-
tures. The divine essence, being infinite, behaves as a likeness that represents
everything, including itself, without drawing any, not even a formal, distinc-
tion.103 Candia succinctly places his own solution in the landscape of positions;
he explicitly mentions those of Ockham, Henry of Ghent, Scotus, and Ripa:
Unde ex ista positione sequitur manifeste quod idea non est creatura, ut docet Ockham;
nec relationes reales importantes respectum ad creaturas, ut dicit Gandavus; nec obiecta
cognita, ut dicit Scotus; nec tales denominationes essentiales, ut dicit Magister Johannes.
Sed est ipsa deitatis ratio omnimode indistincta. Sed ista opinio inter omnes rationabilior
mihi videtur.104
Candia’s solution occupies the intermediate position between that of Ockham,

who denies that ideas are principles of knowledge, and that of Scotus and Ripa,

103 Petrus de Candia, In Sent. I, q. 6, art. 1, n. 150: “[…] aliqua similitudo quae sic est
repraesentativa istius quod non alterius, et est alia quae repraesentat tantum res consimilis spe-
ciei et alia generalis. […] Et isto modo, sine quacumque reali vel formali distinctione, Deus
intelligatur perfectissima similitudo cuiuslibet rei.“
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who multiply the ideas or formal rationes. For his view, Peter interestingly draws
on a remote source: Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. The latter assigned to
God an immense, super-simple and super-indivisible knowledge rather than a
knowledge that would include, in a separate manner, both his own essence and
all the creaturely essences:
Et sic apparet qualiter est ad istum articulum respondendum, nam secundum viam Ock-
ham Deus per nullam ideam formaliter intelligit, et sic intelligendo rationem essentialem
consimiliter diceret. Secundum vero Doctorem Subtilem et Johannem de Ripa, per plures
rationes ideales creaturas intelligit. Sed secundum istam opinionem ultimam, quae mul-
tum rationabilis videtur, per unicam et simplicissimam rationem se ipsum et cuncta alia
intelligit sine qualicumque distinctione ex parte sua. Et ista videtur fuisse opinio beati
Dionysii in De divinis nominibus, dicentis: “Divina sapientia se ipsam cognoscens
cognoscit immaterialiter omnia materialia, indivisibiliter divisibilia, et multa unione in
ipso uno, etenim sicut Deus secundum unam causam omnibus existentibus esse tradidit,
ita secundum eandem causam scit omnia sicut in ipso existentia. Non igitur Deus habet
propriam sui ipsius cognitionem et aliam communem existentia omnia comprehenden-
tem, sed unicam supersimplicem, superindivisibilem, et immensam.” Haec ille.105
10. Nicholas of Orbellis

In the only quaestio of distinction 35 in Book I of his commentary on the Sen-
tences, Nicholas starts from the Scotist distinction between the primary and the
secondary objects of the divine intellect, i. e., respectively the divine essence and
the creatures in their esse cognitum. This distinction leads up to an explanation
of Scotus’s own authentic theory:
Unde Deus in primo instanti naturae intelligit essentiam sub ratione mere absoluta quae
est ei ratio cognoscendi omne cognoscibile. In secundo intelligit lapidem et sic ipsum
producit in esse intelligibili et producendo eum in tali esse intentionali producit ut
habens dependentiam ad ipsum ita quod ibi est relatio rationis in lapide intellecto ad
intellectionem divinam; sed nulla adhuc in intellectione divina ad lapidem. In tertio ta-
men instanti potest intellectus divinus comparare suam intellectionem ad quodcumque
intelligibile et sic causare in se relationem rationis.106
This passage reports the sequence of instants of nature as described by Scotus in

the Lectura and in the Ordinatio, proceeding from the divine essence as the pri-
mary object of the divine intellect over the production of the intelligibility of the
essences of creatures by the divine intellect in an absolute act, to the comparison
by the divine intellect of that act with the intelligibility of the creatures. This
105 Petrus de Candia, In Sent. I, q. 6, art. 1, n. 158; cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis no-
minibus, 398–40.
106 Nicholaus de Orbellis, In Sent. I, dist. 35, q. unica, sine numeratione.
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comparison establishes a rational relation. On Scotus’s theory, with its adher-

ence to Augustine, the idea corresponds with the stone as objectively known by
the divine mind; Nicholas emphasizes that this is in line with Plato’s doctrine.107
Scotus’s opinion allows Nicholas to harmonize the plurality of the ideas with the
unity of the divine essence. On the one hand, the divine essence represents, in an
eminent and unitary manner, every producible creature. On the other hand, all
the creatures are known by the divine intellect, being objects of knowledge ow-
ing to their own esse cognitum.108 Both in the only quaestio of distinction 36 of
the Book I and in the first quaestio of the first distinction of Book II, this cog-
nized being is conceived as a diminished kind of being that owes itself to a ratio-
nal relation and to the simple possibility of the creaturely essences.109
Conclusion
We have seen abundant evidence of the sheer complexity of the Scotist tradition
as it unfolded during its first two centuries. This tradition clearly does not oper-
ate with any common criterion of Scotist thought, but rather remains essentially
fragmented. Various contributions tend to converge, but never become mutually
coherent. Two places in Scotus’s corpus – namely distinction 36 of the Reporta-
tio I-A and distinction 35 of Book I of the Lectura and the Ordinatio as well as,
again, of the Reportatio I-A – gave rise to quite divergent views of esse cognitum
and divine ideas. Let me briefly summarize what we can now say about the re-
ception of these two places.
1) In distinction 36 of the Reportatio I-A, Scotus, in partial agreement with
Henry of Ghent, compares the divine essence as the primary object of the divine
intellect and the essences of the creatures as its secondary objects. The latter are
endowed with a particular kind of diminished being, namely esse cognitum. The
status of this diminished being stimulated an intense debate, both in early Sco-
tism and in the later tradition. Within the first generation of Scotists, James of
Ascoli supported the status of the esse cognitum as intermediate between real
and rational being, while William of Alnwick rather reduced the esse cognitum to
the real being to which, then, are added the extrinsic denomination of being rep-
resented as well as the intrinsic ratio of logical non-repugnance that enables an
intelligible idea to arise in the divine intellect.
In the subsequent tradition, Alnwick’s theory is partially accepted by Fran-
cis of Ascoli; he adds Ockham’s quality of mind to the extrinsic denomination.
107 Nicholaus de Orbellis, In Sent. I, dist. 35, q. unica, sine numeratione: “Hoc […] consonat
dicto Platonis ponentis ideas esse rerum quidditates.”
108 Nicholaus de Orbellis, In Sent. I, dist. 35, q. unica, sine numeratione.
109 Nicholaus de Orbellis, In Sent. I, dist. 36, q. 1, sine numeratione; In Sent. II, dist. 1 q. 1,
sine numeratione.
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Diminished being Real being
James of Ascoli William of Alnwick + extrinsic denomina-

Landulph Caracciolo tion
Francis of Ascoli + extrinsic denomination or quality of Peter Thomae + intentional being
mind
Francis of Meyronnes + intelligible being
Peter of Navarre
Peter of Aquila
John of Ripa
Peter of Candia
Nicholas of Orbellis + intrinsic ratio
Fig. 1: Overview of positions regarding the status of esse cognitum.
James of Ascoli’s position is much more successful: Landulph Caracciolo, Peter

Thomae, Peter of Navarre, Peter of Aquila, John of Ripa and Peter of Candia all
basically follow his doctrine, albeit with some variations. Peter Thomae recog-
nizes three kinds of being, but eventually sees intentional being as one kind of
real being. Nicholas of Orbellis bases the diminished being on an intrinsic ratio.
Francis of Meyronnes distinguishes the esse cognitum as thought by the divine
intellect from the intelligible being that depends upon the divine essence; the
latter being precedes the esse cognitum. Peter Auriol and William Ockham go
beyond the theory of esse cognitum, with their respective theories of esse ap-
parens and ens fictum or quality of mind. Fig. 1 schematically summarizes the
various positions.
2) In distinction 35 of Book I of his various commentaries on the Sentences,
Scotus shows awareness of the importance of the Augustinian interpretation of
Plato’s ideas as noetic entities that are produced by the intellect into their dimin-
ished being and then endowed with existence by the divine will, a view that con-
trasts with Aristotle’s interpretation of Plato’s ideas as separate essences to
which being in existence is added. With his theory of the four instants of nature,
Scotus overcomes the Platonic-Augustinian exemplarism, entrusting the produc-
tion of the intelligibility of the essences of creatures to an absolute act by the
divine intellect, which conceives of the creature by means of a rational relation.
Later, the divine essence (according to the Lectura) or this act itself (according
to the Ordinatio) are linked with the intelligibility through a rational relation
which the divine intellect comes to know in the last instant. Scotus thus no lon-
ger conceives of the idea as an exemplar, but rather as the content of an act of
thought. For Ockham, this content becomes a quality of the mind, one that con-
notes both the material thing and the intellect that knows it.
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Among the authors considered above, Landulph Caracciolo and Nicholas of

Orbellis explicitly defend Scotus’s theory of the instants of nature. While Lan-
dulph associates a summary of this theory with the consideration of the divine
ideas as secondary objects potentially included in the divine essence owing to
their esse cognitum, Orbellis quite precisely reiterates Scotus’s doctrine of the
four instants of nature. The diminished kind of being is accompanied by the
intrinsic ratio of possibility of the creaturely essences; the Platonic-Augustinian
conception of ideas is particularly important for the authors who support this
approach. Other authors hold divergent views on this issue. Peter Thomae thus
admits the intellectual production of thought creatures only in a metaphorical
and improper sense. Peter of Candia criticizes both Ockham’s conception of
ideas as objects of knowledge and Scotus’s conception, although Peter too main-
tained the intellectual production of the secondary objects into esse cognitum,
i. e., that diminished kind of being that is neither real being nor rational being.110
All of this clearly shows that, even in the case of esse cognitum and divine
ideas, the Scotist tradition must be understood in the sense I explained in the
introduction of this contribution. The reception of Scotus’s thought in Landulph
Caracciolo and Nicholas of Orbellis is not representative of the general tendency
of this tradition; in the overall picture, what actually prevailed of Scotus’s theory
of divine ideas does not correspond with the core of his original doctrine, i. e.,
the theory of the four instants of nature and the production by the divine intel-
lect of the intelligibility of the essences of the creatures. What prevailed is rather
the comparison between the divine essence and the creaturely essences as sec-
ondary objects of knowledge that possess esse cognitum. The focus on this com-
parison does not imply that the Platonic-Augustinian exemplarism was super-
seded, but rather only that the secondary objects were gradually adapted into the
exemplar view. This adaptation was achieved in accordance with one of the fea-
tures of Scotus’s theory, as present in distinction 36 of Reportatio I-A, namely
his distinction between the eminent and the potential inclusion of these objects
in the divine essence. However, this distinction is not the proper textual place for
a discussion of divine ideas. One can say that the current that flowed from dis-
tinction 36 of the Reportatio I-A eventually merged with the one that came from
distinction 35 of the Lectura I, the Ordinatio I, and the Reportatio I-A.
This mergence already began in Landulph Caracciolo and then spread
among later Scotists. It accentuated the role of the divine essence over and above
the divine intellect. Peter Auriol and Francis of Ascoli thus underlined the func-
tion of the divine essence that they saw as the only principle of all real or possi-
ble things. Francis of Ascoli, providing equipment that will be useful to Peter of
110 Let me here mention that the theory of esse cognitum also appears in metaphysical trea-
ties, e. g., in Antonius Trombetta, In Tractatum formalitatum scoticarum sententia, pars 2,
art. 1, 6va–7rb; cf. Mahoney, “Duns Scotus and the School of Padua around 1500.”
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Candia, preferred a super-eminent kind of inclusion of infinite secondary, po-

tentially knowable objects within the divine essence. Francis, however, contrast-
ed the finite nature of the subsequent acts of the human intellect to the infinite,
unique, intrinsic act whereby God knows all the creatures as ideas in their esse
cognitum. According to Francis, this kind of being is composed of two elements:
(1) what Francis considers to be an extrinsic denomination (to speak with Aln-
wick) or a quality of the mind (to speak with Ockham); (2) the diminished be-
ing that depends upon the known object itself.
Peter Thomae, rejecting Scotus’s intellectual production of the intelligibility
of creatures in the proper sense and the Aristotelian interpretation of Plato’s
ideas as separate essences, continued to uphold the view that the divine essence,
like the divine intellect, eminently includes the intelligibility of the essences of
the creatures owing to their esse obiectivum. Peter of Navarre, in favor rather of
potential inclusion of the creaturely essences in the divine essence, combined the
Platonic-Augustinian view with that of Boethius and emphasized the productive
aspect of the archetypal ideas. Peter of Aquila, who subscribed to the Augustini-
an interpretation of the Platonic ideas as exemplars in the divine mind, also em-
phasized the productive character of the ideas. In accordance with Scotus, he
furthermore held a view of the esse obiectivum as preceding real being; the latter
only follows upon the effective production of the creatures.
The theory of inclusion is thus progressively reworked. In this process, in-
novative elements are added to Scotus’s original theory, which is thus being
gradually transformed. Obvious examples are Francis of Meyronnes and John of
Ripa. Francis openly criticized both Scotus’s theory of intellectual production of
the ideas and Alnwick’s semantic and arbitrary denomination; he supported the
formal inclusion of the ideas in the divine mind, following Augustine’s ap-
proach. Francis linked the exemplarist approach to Avicenna (as interpreted by
Henry of Ghent) and developed a theory of simple, eternal, and necessary essen-
ces that are formally distinct from the divine essence. These essences are indif-
ferent to all ontological bipartitions; they are equivalent to the ideas and en-
dowed with simple, real being. This inspired Wyclif’s ultra-realism. John of
Ripa, in his turn, considered the ideas as forms of immutable things, following
Augustine and Seneca. Like Scotus, he held that the ideas were secondary objects
of the divine intellect endowed with esse cognitum. To solve the problem of their
causation, Ripa combined the causal with the essential rationes. While the latter
include, in the divine essence, the denominations of the creatures as perfections
in the same way as the ideal forms constitute, represent and allow knowledge of
creatures, the former rather give rise to the effective existence of the creatures.
The causal rationes act as exemplars of the essential ones and as principles that
enable the real application of the degrees of the essential rationes as well as the
preservation of the activity of these rationes beyond the creation and throughout
created reality.
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Four instants Eminent or potential inclusion Negative theology
Landulph Caracciolo Landulph Caracciolo Peter of Candia

Nicholas of Orbellis Peter Auriol
Francis of Ascoli + act of divine and human intellects
Francis of Meyronnes + pure essences
Peter Thomae
Peter of Navarre + archetypal ideas
Peter of Aquila
John of Ripa + causal and essential rationes
Fig. 2: Overview of the main motifs in the debate over the origin of ideas.
Peter of Candia, finally, explicitly assimilates the Platonic position to Scotus’s

theory of the production of the secondary objects by the divine intellect into a
kind of diminished being that is intermediate between real and rational being.
He supports the theory of the divine essence as the principle of resemblance, but
for this he does not refer to Peter of Auriol or Francis of Ascoli, but rather to
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. Peter of Candia intends to elevate God’s
knowledge to supersimplicity and superindivisibility, following a negative-theol-
ogy approach, by which, in the end, he dissolves the whole theory of eminent or
potential inclusion, since God’s knowledge, owing to its immensity, does not
separately include any creatures. Fig. 2 summarizes the main motifs in this long
debate over the origin of the divine ideas.
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Alfonso Briceño on Cognition, Distinction,
and the Knowledge of God
Roberto Hofmeister Pich
Introduction
Born in Santiago de Chile, Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668) belongs to a second
generation of Scotist thinkers who received academic education in Peru, at the
Convento de San Francisco de Lima.1 The Franciscan friar Jerónimo Valera
(1568–1625), who published the first philosophical book in the history of South
America, namely, a logic ad mentem Scoti,2 was one of his masters in the capital
of the viceroyalty. Briceño’s career was outstanding. Especially between 1637
and 1646, during his stay in Madrid and Rome, Briceño became known in Euro-
pean Franciscan circles as a remarkable reader and interpreter of Scotus. His two
large volumes of Controversiae around key topics of Scotus’s Ordinatio I ap-
peared in Madrid in 1639.3 Back in the New World, Briceño was made Bishop of
Nicaragua (1646) and later of Caracas (1649), Venezuela, where he died in the
city of Trujillo.4
The Controversiae can be seen as a useful tool for understanding the extent
and characteristics of Scotism in Latin America in the first half of the 17th centu-
ry – in fact, the spectrum and the depth of the debates in which Briceño engaged
I wish to express my gratitude to the Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technologi-
cal Development (CNPq), of which I am now a Researcher Level 1B, for the invaluable support
given, since 2015, to my research on Latin American Scholasticism in general and the thought
of Alfonso Briceño in particular; the present study is one more result of this support.
1 See Céspedes Agüero, “La filosofia escotista de Jerónimo de Valera,” 481, note 182.
2 Pich, “Notas sobre Jerónimo Valera e suas obras sobre lógica,” 171.
3 On Briceño’s life and works, see Urdaneta, Alonso Briceño: primer filósofo de América,
1973; Manzano, “Alonso Briceño (1587–1668): Franciscano, Pensador, Obispo”; Muñoz Gar-
cía, “Alonso Briceño, filósofo de Venezuela y América”; Skariča, “Alonso Briceño. Apuntes
para una historia de la filosofía en Chile”; Cenci, “Notas bibliográficas sobre Alfonso Briceño”;
Pich, “Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668) and the Controversiae on John Duns Scotus’s Philosophi-
cal Theology,” 65–69. For information about Briceño’s volumes in inventories and catalogues
of Latin American libraries, see Redmond, Bibliography, 20. There is some confusion regarding
the publication year of Briceño’s two volumes (1638/1639 or 1642); cf. the remarks in Ander-
sen, “Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” 235–36.
4 See Hanisch Espínola, En torno a la filosofía en Chile (1594–1810), 26–28; Urdaneta,
Alonso Briceño: primer filósofo de América, 99; Muñoz García, “Alonso Briceño, filósofo de
Venezuela y América,” 126.
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268 Roberto Hofmeister Pich
are rather impressive. Due to the comprehensive character of his knowledge of

Scotus’s works and Scotism, as well as to the quality of his intellectual skills,
which were considered congenial to Scotus’s subtlety, one of his censors did not
hesitate to call him “Scotulus” or “little Scotus.”5 In the two volumes of the Pri-
ma Pars of his incomplete project6 of commenting on open disputes raised by
Scotus’s Ordinatio I (a project actually related to Scotus’s whole opera),7 Brice-
ño, in a total of 12 Controversiae of different length, both offers an exposition of
what is for him the metaphysical basis8 of Scotus’s theology, and systematically
reconstructs Scotus’s theology as a metaphysical doctrine of God: “metaphysi-
calia”9 are treated everywhere in his published works. We should highlight the
expositions in Controversies 1–8, structured according to the metaphysical prop-
erties of God, such as unity, truth, and goodness, as well as to divine “[pure]
perfections” and “modes of being.”10 Every interpretation is accompanied by and
every final stance preceded by controversies with Thomistic authors and ‘Scoti-
zantes,’ a term that bears the twofold meaning of authors aligned with Duns
Scotus’s doctrine and those unable to correctly render his thought.11
5 This expression is used by Dr. Pedro de Ortega Sotomayor, Professor in Lima, in one of
the approbationes in Briceño, Prima pars celebriorum controversiarum in primum Senten-
tiarum Ioannis Scoti Doctoris Subtilis (henceforth Prima pars celeb. contr.); Sotomayor’s un-
paginated recommendation is contained in the second volume.
6 A Pars Secunda – in a third volume, or even more volumes – covering such themes as
God’s will and power, predestination and Trinity, has either disappeared or was in fact never
written; the whole project would have covered all major topics in John Duns Scotus’s Ord. I.
See Cenci, “Notas bibliográficas sobre Alfonso Briceño,” 218–19.
7 Usually quoted from Cavellus’s edition. On early printed editions of Scotus’s opera, see
Smeets, Lineamenta bibliographiae scotisticae, 2–4.
8 For systematic presentations of Scotus’s metaphysics, see Honnefelder, Ens inquantum
ens; Honnefelder, Scientia transcendens, 3–199; Honnefelder, Duns Scotus, 48–112; Sondag,
Duns Scot. The metaphysical basis of the most central theological topics for Scotus – especially
the doctrine of the Trinity and of the incarnation – is explored in works by Richard Cross, cf.
Cross, Duns Scotus; Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation; Cross, Duns Scotus on God. For
a comprehensive exposition of Scotus’s theology, see Vos, The Theology of John Duns Scotus.
9 See Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, 106–7. A brief description of the content
of each of the 12 Controversiae can be found in Pich, “Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668) and the
Controversiae on John Duns Scotus’s Philosophical Theology,” 67–69.
10 See Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, 106. Contr. 5, on infinite being and
infinity, has been the object of several studies; see Pich, “Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668) and the
Controversiae on John Duns Scotus’s Philosophical Theology”; Pich, “Alfonso Briceño (1587–
1668) e a recepção de Scotus na América Latina”; Pich, “Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668) sobre o
conceito de infinitude”; Pich, “Alfonso Briceño O.F.M. (1587–1668) on John Duns Scotus’s
Metaphysical Groundworks of Theology.”
11 See Pich, “Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668) and the Controversiae on John Duns Scotus’s
Philosophical Theology,” 66–73.
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Alfonso Briceño on Cognition, Distinction, and the Knowledge of God 269
In recent research on Briceño, attempts have been made to highlight the

significance of five “Metaphysical Appendixes,” which appear as a conceptual
apparatus in Controversies 1, 2, 11, and 12, to be used in reading his difficult
theological discussions. They have a philosophical importance of their own; we
find in them Briceño’s most explicit understanding of the central views of and
the existing controversies surrounding the interpretation of Scotus’s philosophy.
(1) The first Metaphysical Appendix is about created being and existence;12 (2)
in the second Metaphysical Appendix, Briceño explains created subsistence and
its cause.13 (4) In the fourth Appendix, Briceño deals with the divine will and its
formal object;14 (5) the fifth Metaphysical Appendix is about the objective being
that creatures have from eternity (and “to which Scotus attributes an exemplary
causality”).15 The present study focuses on (3) the third Metaphysical Appendix,
which is “about the division of being into genus and species.”16 It would be fair
to call this Appendix a late Tractatus de distinctionibus et formalitatibus. In oth-
er studies of mine about Briceño’s Metaphysical Supplements,17 I focused on
12 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 1 (Controversia prima de essentia, et simplici-
tate divinae naturae) art. 2 (Utrum actualitas sit de essentiali Dei conceptu?), “Appendix meta-
physica; de esse, et existere, creatis,” nn. 1–24, 8–24.
13 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 1, art. 3 (Utrum in Deo subsistentia aliqua
essentialis astruenda sit?), “Ad tertium articulum theologicum, de subsistentia absoluta Dei:
Metaphysica appendix. Quid addat subsistere creatum, et quae sit eius causalitas?,” 31–61
(membr. 1: nn. 1–32, 31–41; membr. 2: nn. 1–36, 41–52; membr. 3: nn. 1–30, 52–61).
14 Briceño does not explicitly call this excursus a Metaphysical Appendix. See Briceño, Pri-
ma pars celeb. contr., II, contr. 11 (Controversia undecima generalis, de scientia Dei), dist. 1
(Distinctio Prima de Scientia Dei in se, et prout refertur ad obiecta non contingentia), “Ad Pri-
mum [An praedicatum Scientiae congruat Deo per modum actus primi, vel secundi?], et Se-
cundum Articulum [De scientia Dei comparata ad creaturas possibiles; utrum ad illas in se
ipsis terminari queat, tanquam in medio ex parte obiecti?] praecedentis distinctionis de Scien-
tia Dei, Appendix Disputatio; de actualitate attributi voluntatis divinae, et obiecto formali il-
lius,” art. 1–2, 38–98. Contr. 11 is about God’s knowledge of future contingents, cf. Briceño,
Prima pars celeb. contr., II, contr. 11, 1–444; cf. Skariča, “Si los futuros contingentes son cono-
cidos por Dios en si mismos, o sea, en su verdad determinada”; Skariča, “Predeterminación y
libertad en fray Alonso Briceño”; Skariča, “El conocimiento divino de los actos futuros en
Báñez, Molina, Suárez y Briceño.”
15 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., II, contr. 12 (Controversia duodecima de ideis, sive ex-
emplaribus intellectus divini), “Appendix metaphysica; de obiectivo esse creaturarum ab aeter-
no, cui Scotus exemplarem causalitatem adscribit,” art. 1–4, 483–565.
16 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2 (Controversia secunda de unitate Dei), “Ad
Controversiam secundam de unitate Dei Metaphysica appendix; de distinctione entis in gene-
re, et specie,” art. 1–4, 166–202. Pich, “Alfonso Briceño O.F.M. (1587–1668) sobre o ente e a
distinção,” 194–204, offers detailed summaries of the first three appendixes of volume I of
Briceño’s Prima pars celeb. contr.
17 Pich, “Alfonso Briceño O.F.M. (1587–1668) sobre o ente e a distinção”; Pich, “Alfonso
Briceño O.F.M. (1587–1668) sobre a distinção de razão.”
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Briceño’s account of (a) distinction as such and (b) the distinction of reason. As
we might expect, due to the role it plays in the doctrine of God’s ontological
simplicity, Briceño pursues in that ‘treatise’ a defense of the formal distinction. I
will focus now on what Briceño says about a special kind of distinction, namely,
the (c) “precising distinction” (distinctio praecisiva). Briceño’s digression on the
precising distinction anticipates his explanation of real distinctions – that is, the
real distinction (d) in general, (e) then the “modal distinction,” and (f) the “for-
mal distinction ex natura rei.”18 The precising distinction is closely connected to
a core topic of Alfonso Briceño’s Scotistic theory of cognition, namely, intuitive
cognition.19 He inquires “About the precising distinction, whether it can accede
to intuitive apprehensions?”20 As it turns out, Thomistic authors deny the exis-
tence of the precising distinction; Briceño, however, finds in Scotus’s theory of
intuitive cognition a connection with that particular distinction, which prima fa-
cie should not be taken as a distinction of reason. The precising distinction, thus,
concerns the characteristics of the “vision of God” and the question of the for-
mal identity or the formal distinction between divine essence and divine at-
tributes. The explanation of the distinctio praecisiva will be useful to interpret
Briceño’s main topic in cognition theory, i. e., “the vision of God,” treated in his
long Controversy 9, in which he discusses “the knowability of God through us.”21
It can also be taken as an indirect defense of the formal distinction.
1. Distinction as Such and Distinction of Reason

In Article 1 of his Third Metaphysical Supplement, Briceño, after dealing with
the transcendentals “being” and “unity,” defines metaphysical “distinction” as a
negation in the sense of non-identity with another. The basis of distinction is
“being” or any given “formality” (formalitas), since formalities express being.
“Unity” (unitas) as a positive concept expresses a negation too, namely the
negation of a plurality or multitude of things. Unity, however, as “entirety” or
18 The metaphysical grounding of distinctions is presented in art. 1 of the third Metaphysi-

cal Appendix. In art. 2, Briceño discusses “distinction of reason” (distinctio rationis). He then
explains, in art. 3, the “real distinction” (distinctio realis) in general and Scotus’s (or the Sco-
tistic?) “modal distinction” (distinctio modalis) in particular, finishing his third Metaphysical
Appendix with a firm defense of the “formal distinction” (distinctio formalis) ex natura rei
(art. 4).
19 I have rendered both the expressions ‘cognitio intuitiva’ and ‘notitia intuitiva’ into En-
glish as “intuitive cognition.”
20 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., nn. 26–42, 181–86.
21 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 9 (Controversia nona generalis de cognoscibili-
tate Dei a nobis), 388–713. In extension, contr. 9 is second only to contr. 11, which covers 444
printed pages.
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“being-a-whole” does not explain distinctio as a central metaphysical difference.

After all, distinction needs to be explained in relation to the difference between
being and the convertible transcendental attributes.22
Unsurprisingly, for Briceño the first division of “distinction” is the one be-
tween “real” and “of reason.”23 Briceño initially establishes the debate on the dis-
tinction of reason by comparing the notions – inspired by Francisco Suárez SJ –
of “distinction of reasoning reason” (distinctio rationis ratiocinantis; from now
onwards: DRR1) and “distinction of reasoned reason” (distinctio rationis ratioci-
natae; from now onwards: DRR2 ) both with one another and with John Duns
Scotus’s formal distinction.24 Essentially, a given distinction is “of reason” if it is
caused by the intellect. In Suárez’s metaphysics, the distinctions just mentioned,
since they are sub-kinds of “relations of reason,” may be understood as beings of
reason themselves.25 In general, Briceño accepts the idea that a being of reason,
which can have some basis in reality or none,26 has a beingness that is invented
by the intellect and an existence that depends on the intellect. Accordingly, a
being of reason has objective being only.27 A being of reason is not itself or by
itself suitable for real existence. Its cognoscibility or its cognizable content, thus,
is an extrinsic one, in the sense of not being derived from the thing itself, but
rather determined and denominated by the mind (depending, therefore, on “be-
ing thought” or “being known” by a given intellect).28
22 Pich, “Alfonso Briceño O.F.M. (1587–1668) sobre o ente e a distinção,” 172–93; Briceño,
Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 1, nn. 1–24, 167–73.
23 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, nn. 1–25, 173–81.
24 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, n. 1, 174.
25 See Novotný, Ens rationis from Suárez to Caramuel, 98–100. Andersen, “Ens rationis
ratiocinatae and ens rationis ratiocinantis,” 325, exposing Suárez, refers to DRR2 as having a
fundament in reality and to DRR1, in contrast, as being a pure product of the mind. On these
distinctions, see Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae, disp. 7 (De variis distinctionum gener-
ibus), sect. 1, nn. 4–8 (ed. S. Rábade Romeo, S. Caballero Sánchez, A. Puigcerver Zanón, vol.
II), 11–15; on beings of reason (and relations of reason), see Suárez, Disputationes metaphysi-
cae, disp. 54, sect. 1, n. 8 (ed. cit., vol. VII), 395–96; ibid., sect. 6, nn. 1–11, 446–53. On the
terminology ‘ens rationis ratiocinatae’ and ‘ens rationis ratiocinantis’ (posterior to Suárez,
though influenced by him), see again Andersen, “Ens rationis ratiocinatae and ens rationis ra-
tiocinantis,” 325–26. On these beings and distinctions treated here, see also Andersen, Meta-
physik im Barockscotismus, 781–833.
26 According to Andersen, “Ens rationis ratiocinatae and ens rationis ratiocinantis,” 320–
21, despite some variances Franciscan masters, such as Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673) and
Bonaventura Belluto (1603–1676), remained close to Suárez in this regard. See also Novotný,
Ens rationis from Suárez to Caramuel, 138–63.
27 On “Suárez’s objectualism” behind this approach, see Novotný, Ens rationis from Suárez
to Caramuel, 34.
28 See, for example, Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, n. 38, 185:
“Respondetur; ens rationis esse illud, quod non existit ante actum intellectus concipientis ana-
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Although the details are beyond the scope of this discussion, Briceño con-
tends with Gabriel Vázquez SJ (1549/1551–1604)29 in order to defend the thesis
that DRR1 and DRR2 do not amount to one and the same distinction. He argues
that there is an objective basis for affirming that they explain different inven-
tions by the intellect. Firstly, DRR1, unlike DRR2, is not “founded in a multitude
[of aspects] of the object [my italics]” that is perceived. DRR1 draws on the “fe-
cundity of the intellect,” which repeats and reflects its concept “upon the same
objective ratio,” submitting it to “diverse relations of subjection and predica-
tion.” This is what happens when (a) “the same is said of itself,” like in ‘Peter is
this man;’ or when (b) “the same objective ratio” assumes opposite aspects “of
term, subject, [and thus also of] identity:” it occurs when an individual is re-
ferred to itself “through a relation of identity, insofar as it is conceived of as
identical to itself,” like in ‘Peter is Peter.’ In that case, the distinction between
‘Peter’ as the foundation, the substrate or the subject of that relation of identity,
and ‘Peter’ as the term of such a relation of reflexivity, is of reason alone. Quite
differently, DRR2 proceeds from the “eminence of the thing,” which is “divisible
through the intellect,” where the intellect – because of its narrowness when
compared to the nature of the known object – is incapable of covering, through
“one single concept,” “the entire objective ratio of the thing.”30 The only aspect,
thus, in which Briceño finds agreement with Gabriel Vázquez’s quite different
thesis31 is that both DRR1 and DRR2 have extrinsic bases, although one should
see that each extrinsic principle is differently explained each time.
logice ipsum ens fictum adinstar entis veri; quare tunc daretur discretio rationis, quando ap-
prehenderetur pluralitas in obiecto, quae re vera non inesset; […].” See also Doyle, “The Bor-
ders of Knowability,” 645–47 and 649.
30 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, n. 9, 176: “Observandum
igitur est pro comparatione distinctionis ratiocinatae cum distinctione rationis ratiocinantis;
quod haec distinctio, quae intellectus ratiocinantis dicitur, non fundatur in eminentiali aliqua
multitudine obiecti, quae a mente percipiatur; sed in foecunditate intellectus geminantis seu
conceptum suum repetentis circa eamdem rationem obiectivam, prout tantum substernitur di-
versis habitudinibus subiectionis et praedicationis. Ut quando idem de se ipso enuntiatur; verbi
gratia, Petrus est hic homo; vel quando eadem ratio obiectiva subit munera per rationem op-
posita, termini, et subiecti, relationis identitatis. Quando nimirum individuum per identitatis
respectum refertur ad se ipsum, quatenus concipitur ut idem sibi: quod idem genus distinctio-
nis intercedere astruimos in omnibus aliis collationibus, quae inter eamdem omnino rationem
obiectivam ad se ipsam relatam, haberi possunt. Quo fit, ut haec distinctionis ratio non oriatur
ab eminentia rei, quae eatenus ab intellectu partibilis sit, quatenus per unicum conceptum ex-
hauriri nequeat tota ratio obiectiva illius; ac proinde nec ex naturali impotentia seu defectu
intellectualis virtutis.”
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At any rate, DRR2 is much more important for Briceño, and for our reflec-
tion on the distinction of precision. To say that the foundation of DRR2 is ex-
trinsic amounts to saying that, due to an intellectual insufficiency that generates
“insufficient knowledge” of a given object, a distinction “is produced between
partial concepts,” through which one gets only to “explicit objective contents
that are completely distinct from each other.”32 They fall short, however, of ex-
pressing what the thing is as such. Briceño affirms that any new “virtual differ-
ence” that the mind makes can be understood as a “denomination that comes
extrinsically” to the thing, i. e., through concepts that in the end are inadequate
and analogous only.33 Keeping in mind that our discussion about metaphysical
distinctions is inserted by Briceño in his Controversy 2 (about the unity of God),
DRR2 as the performance of an intellect that represents something through a
multitude of objective rationes contrasts with the object such as it is in itself, i. e.,
God in his own being, which is “totally identical, and not partitioned.”34
Of course, Briceño is interested in avoiding any mixture of Scotus’s formal
distinction with DRR2 as described so far. Calling it either ‘distinction of rea-
soned reason’ or ‘virtual distinction,’35 Suárez and Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza
SJ (1578–1641)36 had allegedly obfuscated this most famous distinction of Sco-
tism. Again, Briceño emphasizes that Scotus’s formal and Suárez’s virtual dis-
tinction explain different things. The formal distinction offers a “convenient ba-
32 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, n. 11, 177: “Unde, apparet
manifeste disparilitas inter discretionem rationis ratiocinantis, et ratiocinatae; esto enim quod
Gabrieli Vazquez detur, fundamentum utriusque distinctionis ab extrinseco spectatum iri; ad-
huc tamen intra extrinseci fundamenti latitudinem maxime dissidet repetitio, et geminatio
eiusdem omnino conceptus (prout tantum diversis habitudinibus rationis substernitur) a dis-
cretione rationis ratiocinatae, quae constituitur inter conceptus partiales, a quibus rationes
obiectivae explicitae prorsus condistinctae accipiuntur.”
33 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, n. 19, 179: “Addimus ta-
men, quod ex eo, quod haec virtualis discretio sit denominatio quaedam analogicis conceptibus
extrinsece accedens; non sequitur, quod sic eadem cum distinctione rationis ratiocinantis; cum
intra fundamenti extrinseci latitudinem detur diversitas ea, quae discretionem inter species dis-
tinctionis rationis praestare valeat; ut ex dictis satis superque constat.”
34 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, n. 11, 177: “Licet enim ad
obiectum in esse rei, et extra intellectum omnino idem, et non partitum, attineant; adhuc ta-
men asserendum est, dari fundamentum pluralitatis virtualis per habitudinem ad notitiam non
comprehensivam; quatenus res maior sit, quam quod per inadaequatam conceptionem exprimi
queat.”
35 On this distinction, see also Heider, “Suárez on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of
Universals,” 166–68.
36 On Hurtado de Mendoza’s theory of beings of reason, see Novotný, Ens rationis from
Suárez to Caramuel, 111–37. See Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2,
n. 4, 174.
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sis for contradictions” formed by the intellect.37 By means of this distinction, one
can verify contradictory statements about one and the same object in a very spe-
cific way: it is a tool to realize that propositions non-equivalent to each other on
the conceptual level – e. g., ‘God is true’ or ‘God is good’ – are also different
attributions and are accordingly true of the same simple subject matter; one may
thus affirm that ‘divine truth and divine goodness are really identical,’ but also
that ‘divine truth and divine goodness are not (really) the same.’ The virtual
distinction introduces a “virtual plurality” (of concepts that can be indefinitely
produced by a mind unable to perfectly apprehend some object), whereas the
formal distinction introduces “actual plurality” (of real aspects that are actually
distinct). The formal distinction and DRR2 detect and explain contradictions or
formal irreducibilities with regard to an ontologically simple object, respectively,
either because of a real-actual or because of an objective-actual plurality of as-
pects.38 For reasons of space, I shall not here discuss why that alleged actual plu-
rality should be explained by means of the formal distinction rather than just
being taken as a sign of epistemic inadequacy.39
Briceño has so far discussed what the formal distinction is not: it is not a
virtual distinction, because any instance of that distinction is a non-actual, emi-
nent multitude. In the case of a DRR2, the plurality of formal aspects exists only
because of the mind’s inadequacy, because of which the mind is unable to appre-
hend at once the thing in its entire cognoscibility as the term of a single act of
apprehension. Any actual plurality of aspects remaining is the result of several
37 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, n. 5, 174–75: “Secundo:
quia distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, prout a communi Doctorum schola astruitur, est virtualis
discretio, seu una res formaliter, et multa per aequivalentiam; eoquod distinctis intellectus con-
ceptionibus aequipolleat. Sed distinctio formalis, ut ab Scoto expressa, nil aliud refert quam
habile fundamentum contradictionum, quas format intellectus; cum eo praecise hoc distinctio-
nis genus tradiderit, ut contradictoriae enuntiationis de eodem obiecto verificari possent: ergo
cum id praestet virtualis discretio, reliquum est, ut a communi sententia non dissideat Scotus.”
See also footnotes 40 and 41, below.
38 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, n. 14, 177–78: “Ex quo
sequitur discrimen inter distinctionem rationis ratiocinatae, et distinctionem formalem ex
natura rei, quam astruit Scotus; et quare admissa distinctione virtuali, sive rationis ratiocinatae,
adhuc necessaria sit formalis distinctio ex natura rei, quae actualem pluralitatem rationum for-
malium referat. Quia distinctio rationis ratiocinatae tantum valet ad verificandas contradic-
tiones, quae ex partialibus, et inadaequatis conceptibus proveniunt, ad quas necessaria non est
actualis distinctio ex natura rei; formalis vero discretio, quam constituit Scotus, necessario as-
serenda est pro contradictoriis, quae verificantur de re, non secundum obiectivum, ac denomi-
nativum esse, quod a cognitione nostra trahitur; sed secundum quidditativas rationes, quae rei
congruunt, prout extra intellectum existit.”
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inadequate conceptions and exists only on the level of “objective” being.40 This is
also the level on which contradictory statements about one and the same onto-
logically simple object – statements which are attributions of different properties
that are formally irreducible to each other – are resolved.41 Briceño does appre-
ciate the explaining power of DRR2 in such important areas as the ontology of
the divine persons. An example: “divine paternity” may be said to suffer from
DRR2 when it is dissociatively conceived both as a hypostatic form and a rela-
tion-with-the-son: “the father is not constituted, in the way of conceiving, by
paternity as it is a relation, but as it is a hypostatic form.” Ex parte rei, this is not
a true distinction about God, but ex parte mentis this is an explainable virtual –
though really false – distinction between paternity as hypostasis and as relation.
In this case, we cannot but produce a plurality of objective and analogous ra-
tiones about one and the same thing. The use of DRR2 somehow helps detect
errors and understand both our cognitive equipment42 and the inadequacy of
our metaphysical apparatus to conceive both Trinity and simplicity.43
40 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, n. 12, 177: “Pro compara-
tione distinctionis rationis ratiocinatae cum distinctione formali ex natura rei, adnotandum est;
quod cum fundamentum distinctionis rationis ratiocinatae non sit actualis, sed tantum emi-
nentialis multitudo, quae quia maior est, quam quod ab uno actu intellectus finiri possit, ac
proinde a pluribus compartialibus cognitionibus exhauriatur; ideo fit, ut multitudo actualis,
quae ad tales inadaequatas conceptiones accedit, non sit pluralitas ex natura rei, sed tantum
obiectiva.”
41 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, n. 12, 177: “Quare, licet
fundamentum esse queat illarum contradictionum, quae ex sola pluralitate inadaequatarum
conceptionum emergunt; eoquod esse obiectivum explicitum, quod vi huius cognitionis fit,
non sit illud esse obiectivum, quod vi alterius cognitionis formatur. At haec obiectiva discretio
non praestat pro illis enuntiationibus contradictoriis verificandis, quae non cadunt supra obiec-
tivum, aut denominativum esse, quod ab ipsa apprehensione trahitur; sed supra illud esse
obiecti, quod extra intellectum existit.”
42 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, n. 13, 177: “Quo fit; ut licet
distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, quae constituitur inter paternitatem divinam, inquantum adit
munus formae hypostaticae; et eamdem paternitatem, prout exercet relationem ad filium;
praestare possit, ut ex modo concipiendi vera sit assertio ista; pater non constituitur ex modo
concipiendi per paternitatem, ut relatio est, sed ut forma hypostatica est: at discretio ea, quae
inter paternitatem, ut hypostasim, et ut relationem, posita est, non conferet, ut verum esse
queat, quod pater non constituatur ex natura rei per relationem sub forma relationis; eoquod a
parte rei, et extra conceptiones nostras nulla prorsus sit actualis discretio inter paternitatem, ut
hypostasim, et ut relationem.”
43 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, n. 18, 179: “Ut apparet in
conceptibus inadaequatis relationis, et hypostasis in paternitate divina; et in conceptibus hy-
postasis, et dictionis, vel generationis activae in eadem relatione paternitatis. Quia secundum
nostrum modum concipiendi inadaequatum, et analogicum, pater aeternus constituitur pater-
nitate, non sub explicita forma relationis; sed suppositalitatis, et hypostasis. […]. Igitur funda-
mentum harum contradictionum, quae ex conceptibus relationis, hypostasis, et dictionis, in
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Its proponents understood DRR2 as a result of the intellect’s insufficiency in

conceiving a given res, here in particular the divine essence. It arises because the
thing is beyond any given concept and cannot be contained in what is virtually
apprehended by a cognizing mind. Assigning it a different field of application,
namely the metaphysics of the divine Trinity, Briceño explicitly claims that a
Scotist thinker does not need to dismiss DRR2. He is convinced that DRR2 has to
be admitted in “the school of Scotus” – for him, Scotus never rejected it.44 In this
sense, the comparison between DRR2 and the “precising distinction” both con-
firms the emergence of a new distinction and further clarifies DRR2.
2. What Is a “Precising Distinction” and Why Is It Rejected

by the Thomists?
Both the question of whether there is a further kind of distinction of reason
called ‘precising distinction’ and the question of whether DRR2 can be reduced
to this kind of distinction are disputed among the Thomists and the Scotists. But
paternitate divina conflantur, est distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, seu virtualis, prout relata ad
analogicos conceptus; qui creaturarum instar rationem hypostasis, relationis, et generationis,
partiuntur: quod idem asserendum est de aliis rebus, in quibus propter obiectivam tantum dis-
tinctionem contradictiones verificantur.” Cf. ibid., art. 2, n. 22, 180: “Ad tertium: quod sola
distinctio virtualis ex parte rei cum distinctione actuali inadaequatarum rationum obiectivarum
suppetit ad verificandas contradictiones, quae enuntiantur de obiecto, non qua existit a parte
rei, sed qua inadaequate concipitur. […]; at in re ipsa sicut pater aeternus per paternitatem, ut
relatio est, constituitur, ita falsum est astruere, patrem ita per paternitatem constitui, ut refert
formam hypostasis, quod non constituatur per paternitatem, ut exprimit habitudinem ad fili-
um. Quo fit, ut ad verificandas contradictiones eas, quae spectant esse obiecti, quod extra intel-
lectum sortitur, et non obiectivas tantum rationes, quae ab analogia conceptuum prodeunt;
non praestet sola virtualis distinctio.” On the use by Briceño of the metaphysical apparatus to
comprehend the Trinity and on some theoretical consequences of this application (in particu-
lar the impossibility of reaching any univocal concept of relation applicable in both the created
and the uncreated spheres), see Pich, “Alfonso Briceño O.F.M. (1587–1668) sobre a distinção
de razão.” On the debate on the constitution of persons through relational properties, see, e. g.,
Cross, Duns Scotus, 65–67; Cross, Duns Scotus on God, 233–40.
44 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, n. 18, 178–79: “Dicendum
secundo: astruendam esse in schola Scoti distinctionem rationis ratiocinatae, etiam admissa
distinctione formali ex natura rei. Et probatur: quia nunquam Scotus distinctionem rationis
ratiocinatae, ut sic, seu in tota sua latitudine inficiatus est; […]. Licet enim distinctio actualis
ex natura rei omnino necessaria sit pro illis contradictionibus, quae de eadem entitate verifi-
cantur a parte rei propter quidditatum diversitatem; dantur aliae enuntiationes, quae contra-
dictionem non involvunt ex natura rei, sed ex modo inadaequatae conceptionis nostrae; pro
quibus non distinctio ex natura rei, sed sola obiectiva, quae ab inadaequatis conceptibus pati-
tur, constituenda est.”
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behind the assumption of a precising distinction there is – and in Briceño’s

work this is the most characteristic dimension of that assumption – a further
metaphysical and theological dispute about the kind of distinction that can be
affirmed to exist between the divine essence and its attributes. This dispute has
to do with the objective content of knowledge that someone will have through a
notitia intuitiva, an intellectual “vision” of what God is, i. e., a “quiditative vi-
sion” of God. Briceño affirms that those who reject a distinction, based on reali-
ty, between the divine essence and the attributes, also have to claim that it is
strictly impossible, even through God’s absolute power, that someone has a “vi-
sion” of what God’s essence is without the attributes, for the attributes are not
really distinct from the essence. Being assumed that intellectual intuitive cogni-
tion is, by definition or at least as a rule, a full or perfect cognitive performance
– a cognitive performance without flaws –, and thus the apprehensive knowl-
edge of the thing such as the thing is, Thomistic authors would say that, since
intuitive cognition as such does not produce any distinction ex parte rei, it can-
not result in any distinction of reason, such as the distinction between the deity
and its attributes.45
This is the initial thesis of these (unnamed) Thomists: an intuitive cogni-
tion does not leave behind a precising distinction (taken here as DRR2 ). Briceño
reports five arguments in favor of their thesis, of which I mention only two.
In the first argument, the Thomists rely on a passage in Scotus’s Ordinatio I
d. 846 to affirm that, for Scotus, the intuiting intellect can only find a distinction
in the thing insofar as the distinction exists there. The formula is well known:
45 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 26, 181: “Commu-
nior Thomistarum sententia asseverat, ab intuitivis apprehensionibus peti non posse discre-
tionem aliquam rationis. Ita omnes, qui cum distinctionem ex natura rei inter Deitatem, et
attributa inficientur; etiam de absoluta Dei potentia impossibilem faciunt quidditativam Dei-
tatis visionem sine attributis; eoquod implicatorium iudicent, intuitivam notitiam praestare
posse distinctionem rationis, ubi ea non insit.” I return to the problem of a visio Dei in section
3; cf. also the contribution by Damian Park in this present volume.
46 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 26, 181: “Et pro-
batur primo authoritate Scotu in 1. Sent. distinct. 8. quaest. 4. §. […].”. See Duns Scotus, Ord.
I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 4, n. 187 (ed. Vat. IV), 257: “Praeterea, intellectus intuitivus nullam habet
distinctionem in obiecto nisi secundum quod exsistens est, quia sicut non cognoscit aliquod
obiectum nisi ut exsistens, ita non cognoscit aliqua distincta formaliter in obiecto nisi ut exsis-
tens est. Cum ergo intellectus divinus non cognoscat essentiam suam nisi intellectione intuiti-
va, quaecumque distinctio ponatur ibi in obiecto – sive sit distinctorum obiectorum formali-
um, sive ut rationum causatarum per actum intellectus – sequitur quod ista distinctio erit in
obiecto ut actu exsistens est: et ita si ista est obiectorum formalium distinctorum in obiecto,
erunt ista distincta formaliter (et tunc sequitur propositum, quod talis distinctio obiectorum
formalium praecedit actum intellectus), si autem sit rationum causatarum per actum intelli-
gendi, ergo intellectus divinus causabit aliquam intellectionem in essentia ‘ut relationem ratio-
nis,’ ut est exsistens, quod videtur absurdum.”
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intuitive cognition is an apprehension of the thing insofar as the thing exists and
is present.47 If through intuitive cognition the existing thing is known, any as-
pects “formally” distinct ex parte rei are not known by the intellect unless they
exist and are as such distinct. In the case at issue, intuitive cognition, by defini-
tion, would recognize in the divine essence, existing and present, “formally” dis-
tinct aspects ex parte rei only if they exist as such. The distinction ex natura rei
between the divine attributes was already assumed early on by Briceño, in his
Controversy 1.48 In fact, Briceño had admitted there, based on the performance
of the intuiting intellect, that, the prerrogatives of intuitive cognition being rec-
ognized, “contradictory enunciations” in divine attributes are in fact apprehend-
ed. Of course, he endorses the view that any actual distinction recognized in an
intuitive cognitive act presupposes the pre-existence of that distinction in the
thing as such – and he will also endorse the idea of a connection between a
successful intuitive cognition and the effecting of a distinction called ‘precising
distinction’49 too (see below, section 3). But what is central in this first argument
is that the Thomists, in their turn, contrary to that assumption, proposed that
the foundation of a precising distinction is not and cannot be “an actual and
formal plurality,” but rather an “eminential and virtual” plurality.50 To be sure, if
Thomistic authors – in contrast to Briceño and the Scotists – reject, in divine
reality, the distinction of attributes among themselves on an objective basis
(based on the thing itself), it is not possible to claim, by means of intuitive cog-
nition, granted its definition and its proper (perfect) cognitive performance, that
it leaves behind any kind of “actual plurality.”51 Intuitive cognitions of God do
47 See Pasnau, “Cognition”; Honnefelder, Duns Scotus, 34–36; Sondag, Duns Scot, 33–38;
Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, 322–30; Sondag, “Jean Duns Scot sur la connaissance
intuitive intellectuelle (cognitio intuitiva)”; Pich, “Cognitio intuitiva e modalidades epistêmi-
cas.”
48 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 1, art. 5, nn. 36–43, 88–90.
49 ‘Precising distinction’ is taken, here, as a distinction or an act of distinction by the intel-
lect that apprehends total or complete separations of an intelligible content with regard to an-
other intelligible content in an eminential and virtual sense; the intellect does not apprehend
the thing in its totality, and therefore can only again and again approach the thing.
50 Again, apprehending contradictory enuntiations seems to amount to the knowledge of
formal differences in the attributes – and, thus, of different formalities in the same object(s) –,
that is, of aspects of things that are not apprehended according to an identity. In any case,
propositions such as “the divine justice is (identical with) the divine goodness,” which seems to
contradict the contents of its enunciation themselves, needs an explanation in terms of formal
and / or virtual distinction.
51 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 26, 181: “Adde;
quod nos supra in 1. controv. art. 5. num. marg. 39 vel eo contra Thomistas distinctionem ex
natura rei inter attributa confirmavimus, quo intellectus intuitivus apprehendat contradictorias
enuntiationes in attributis; cum actualem distinctionem concipere non valeat, si ipsa ex natura
rei non praeexistat. Ergo cum distinctio praecisiva non praemittat, ut fundamentum, actualem,
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not produce precising distinctions of certain actual aspects apart from others be-
cause there is no distinction to be seen in the existing thing. If the intellect
makes the distinction of one formal aspect from another when conceiving of
God, this can only be caused by reason and be a distinction of reason. By the
definition of intuitive cognition and what is assumed about the object,52 the
“separation” (praecisio) at issue – of one aspect from another or others – can
only be the result both of an effort to conceive the whole eminent thing and of
the limitation of reason in the face of what the thing is in its actuality. What the
precising distinction does cannot be done by intuitive cognition; the precising
distinction rather amounts to a virtual distinction as explained in terms of DRR2.
In the third Thomistic argument reported by Briceño, which gives further
support to the thesis that an intuitive cognition does not produce any precising
distinction qua DRR2, we are reminded that “the existence of the object, as in
itself, is what formally specifies intuitive cognition.” As a cognitive act, thus, in-
tuitive cognition is “formally” (formaliter) and “precisely” (praecise) set apart
from “abstractive” cognition, since abstractive cognition “abstracts from the exis-
tence of the object.” Intuitive cognition, on the contrary, essentially concerns the
object’s actual existence (and presence) and in this epistemic mode quiditatively
knows of it; intuition is not a cognition through a mediation in place of the
object’s existence and presence. Of course, the real and formal unity of the di-
vine essence and its attributes is again presupposed in the argument. The “undi-
vided quiddity of the object” that is God offers no ground for any “actual parti-
tion of formal contents ex natura rei,” that is, of aspects that are “completely
identical” before any activity of the intellect. Therefore, if there happens to occur
here any cognition that actualizes an “objective actual plurality,” it could only be
“abstractive” or even “precising” (used then as synonyms), since it would abs-
tract or be separated from “the total indivisibility of the object,” which, in extra-
mental reality, is indivisible and simple.53
et formalem pluralitatem, sed solum eminentialem, et virtualem; fiet, ut ab intuitiva notitia peti
nequeat actualis pluralitas.”
52 See also the fourth initial argument by the Thomists in Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr.,
I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 29, 181–82: “Quarto arguitur ratione, quam Vazquez evi-
dentem iudicavit, 1. part. disputation. 48. capit. 2. numer. marginal. 7. procedens in obiecto
omnino simplici puro, et indiviso qualis est Deus; in quo contradictio manifeste apparere vide-
tur, quod sub quidditativam intellectus intuitionem cadere queat, si aliquid formale obiecti
lateat videntem. Quia cum in substantia, et proprietatibus attributalibus Dei non detur distinc-
tio aliqua, aut intensiva graduum latitudo; fieri nequit, ut aliquid Dei lateat videntem, quin tota
Deitatis quidditas, et substantia ipsum etiam videntem lateat; cum in Deo non detur aliud,
quod obiiciatur menti, et aliud, quod effugiat mentis intuitum. […].”
53 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 28, 181: “Tertio;
quia existentia obiecti, ut in se, est formale specificativum intuitivae notitiae; quae in hoc for-
maliter, et praecise ab abstractiva secernitur, quod haec abstrahat ab existentia obiecti; intuitiva
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3. Briceño and the Scotists on Intuitive Cognition

and the Precising Distinction
Briceño defends the thesis that “a precising distinction can be produced by an
intuitive cognition” (in my concluding remarks, I shall return to what he seems
to think about the precising distinction being “of reason” or “real”.) Taking into
consideration both natural objects and the supernatural object, Briceño works
with the idea of a “non-comprehensive intuition.” In the first argument for this
thesis, he claims together with Christian tradition that “God is not comprehend-
ed by the blessed.” Even in the beatific vision – a human act of intuitive cogni-
tion of God –, some formal aspect of God remains hidden. Briceño calls upon
several different authors, most of them from Spain, such as Pedro de Lorca
OCist (1561–1612), Professor at the Universidad Complutense de Alcalá, and
Juan de Salas SJ (1553–1612), Professor in Salamanca (at the Colegio del Espír-
itu Santo) and in Rome (at the Collegium Romanum). Juan de Salas holds that
the blessed do not have cognition of “all formal predicates pertinent to God in
[His] order toward creatures.” But Juan de Salas and his followers did not accept
any “distinction ex natura rei” between God – whom the blessed apprehends
“quiditatively” in vision – and the attributes not seen in the cognitive act. It is
only the case that these (Thomistic?) authors interpret the beatific vision or the
act of intuitive cognition of God in such a way that it is compatible with the
precising distinction (of reason). The further reference to the Jesuit Pedro Hur-
tado de Mendoza (1578–1641), who taught philosophy at the Colegio de Pam-
plona (1608–1611) and later theology at the Universidad de Salamanca, makes
clear that those authors understand that “quiditative intuition” is not equal to
“comprehension of the object” or complete apprehension of it, and therefore in-
tuition allows for a “distinction of reason.”54 Quiditative intuition as an act of
vero illam essentialiter concernat. Sed cognitio ea, quae praesefert actualem pluralitatem obiec-
tivam, non importat modum, et rationem existendi ipsius obiecti, quo existens est; cum indi-
visa obiecti quidditas non sustineat partitionem actualem ex natura rei rationum formalium,
quae omnimodo identificantur ante intellectum: igitur notitia illa abstraheret ab omnimoda
obiecti indivisibilitate, ac proinde abstractiva, seu praecisiva notitia asserenda esset, non vero
intuitiva.”
54 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 31, 182: “At his non
obstantibus probatissima, quam nos sequimur, sententia constituit; praecisivam distinctionem
ex intuitiva notitia relinqui posse. Quam in primis tradunt omnes, qui ideo constanter autu-
mant, Deum a beatis non comprehendi; quia aliquid formale Dei beatum lateat. Sic Petrus de
Lorca primarius Complutensis alios referens, 1.2. tom. 1. in trac. de beatitudine, disp. 33.
memb. 3. idem asserit Ioannes de Salas, tom. 1. in 1.2. quaest. 3. tract. 2. disp. 4. sect. 2.
num. 10. multos authores enumerans, quos dum sequitur, astruit, de facto non cognosci a
beatis omnia praedicata formalia, quae Deo congruunt in ordine ad creaturas; cum tamen tam
Salas, quam hi, quos sequitur, authores, nullam distinctionem ex natura rei agnoscant inter
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apprehension of what the thing is as long as it exists and is present can be a non-
omni-comprehensive act. Preserving the central Thomistic thesis that ex natura
rei there is no distinction between essence and attributes in God, other authors
saw in intuitive cognition the quiditative vision of God, arguing that it was
nonetheless possible “de potentia absoluta Dei” to see what God is without
through that vision comprehending God’s attributes. This was the understanding
of Diego Granado SJ (1571–1632), professor at the Colegio San Hermenegildo
de Sevilla, Ambrosio Machin de Aquena (Ambrosius Machinus OMerc, 1580–
1640), Bishop of Alghero and Archbishop of Cagliari, and Diego de Alarcón SJ
(1585–1634), who had taught in several Jesuit Colleges, such as those in Toledo,
Múrcia, Alcalá, and Madrid.55
The opinion common to Briceño (and the “Scotists”) and those Thomists
is, thus, that the quiditative intuitive cognition of something existent and present
can be a cognition that is not comprehensive, but rather a cognition that does not
see aspects, being, thus, non-comprehensive and, because of that, precising: what
is apprehended is “cut off,” as it were, and all the rest that is not apprehended is
“denied,” “ignored” or “supressed.” But does this incomprehensive intuitive cog-
nition cause a precising distinction qua a distinction of reason? And what specif-
ically characterizes it as a “Scotist” distinction of precision? The dissent about
the link between intuitive cognition of the divine being and the resulting precis-
ing distinction between “Scotists” and the new group of authors that accept a
non-comprehensive vision presupposes perhaps the thesis and the defense of the
formal distinction. In any event, it certainly presupposes two things: a different
account of what is an accurate description of the act of making precision(s) of
ratio(nes) connected to intuitive cognition and a different view of how the real
Deum a beatis quidditative apprehensum, et attributa ea, quae de facto non videntur. Idem
tuetur Petrus Hurtado in sua Metaph. disp. 6. sect. 6. subsect. 2. §. marg. 176. ubi universaliter
constituit, ad omnem intuitionem quidditativam, quae comprehensio obiecti non sit, distinc-
tionem rationis accedere posse.” Hurtado de Mendoza’s Disputationes a summulis ad meta-
physicam was first printed in 1615; Briceño uses a later edition with subsections and a new
division into paragraphs. For Hurtado de Mendoza’s view of intuition and comprehension, see
Andersen, “Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza on Abstractive, Intuitive, and Comprehensive Cogni-
tion.”
55 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 31, 182: “[…].
Nostrae etiam sententiae aperte suffragatur Iacobus Granado in 1. part. tract. de visione Dei
disp. 5. num. marg. 6. ubi asseverat, quod stante omnimoda indiscretione ex natura rei inter
attributa, et essentia; videri potest Deus quidditative a beatis, sine attributis, saltim de absoluta
Dei potentia. Quod etiam probabile iudicavit Ambrosius Machin. Episcopus Algarensis, 1. part.
disp. 19. section. 2. licet propter authoritatem D. Thomae, a nostra sententia se recedere au-
tumet. Etiam nostrae sententiae suffragatur Alarcon, 1. p. tract. 1. de visione Dei, disp. 4. cap. 2.
concl. 2. numer. margin. 5”. The biographical facts concerning the authors mentioned in this
paragraph are gathered from Jacob Schmutz’s Scholasticon website.
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content expressed by intuitive cognition is possibly expressed more fully by sub-

sequent acts of abstractive cognition.
3.1 Sensorial Intuition and Precising Distinction
To answer these questions, more details about intuitive cognition are needed.
Briceño firstly explains “sensorial intuition” (sensibilis intuitio), and secondly
“intellective intuition” (intuitio intellectiva). A connection between the theory of
intuitive cognition and the theory of perception is obvious here, where percep-
tion is understood as the apprehension of something of the external world, natu-
rally connected to a judgment of existence.56 (i) “Sensorial intuition” already
shows that intuitive cognition can cause a precising distinction. It is explained as
a “corporeal vision” that reaches “the form of color” but does not see “the degree
[or form] of corporeal being and of quality.” These last aspects in that vision are
contracted “to that form of color.” A corporeal vision that attains the form of
color and does not attain the degrees (or formal aspects) of corporeal being and
quality is non-comprehensive. But this does not prevent that a vision of one as-
pect without the other can happen. Briceño makes use of rather hermetic termi-
nology and the level of abstraction in his exposition is high. Talking about sen-
sorial vision, he affirms then that, from the “figure” (idolum) and the “sensorial
expressed image” (expressa imago sensibilis) of a material thing perceived, a pre-
cision can be produced, as well as the “negation of the degree [form] of being
not apprehended through such an act.” This can also happen when an “actual
distinction ex natura rei” between what is apprehended by vision and what is
not is not presupposed.57
According to Briceño, Scotus too subscribed to the thesis that intuitive cog-
nition can be non-comprehensive, divided between what is apprehended and
what is not apprehended by way of a negation of a degree of being. Briceño at-
tempts to show this in several passages of his Controversy 9 (On the Vision of
56 Pich, “Cognitio intuitiva e modalidades epistêmicas,” 358–59, 366–74, 380–82; Pich,

“Tópicos de teoria do conhecimento em João Duns Scotus e Guilherme de Ockham,” 61–68.
57 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 32, 182: “Probatur
autem assertio nostra, primo in sensibili intuitione; deinde in intuitione intellectiva. Quia visio
corporalis attingens formam coloris, non intuetur gradum entis corporei, et qualitatis; qui ad
talem coloris formam contrahitur; atqui apud Thomistas gradus generici, et specifici ex natura
rei non secernuntur a gradibus numericis: igitur ad idolum expressamque imaginem sensi-
bilem consequi potest praecisio, et negatio gradus essendi non apprehensi per talem actum,
esto quod nulla actualis distinctio ex natura rei supponatur.”
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God).58 By criticizing Henry of Ghent,59 Scotus was able to show that “the ratio
of the intuition or the apprehension of the object as existent” does not require
that the object is seen “according to the entire ratio of being that it brings with
itself as it exists a parte rei.” In other words, if it belongs to the definition of
intuitive cognition that it is of the existent thing as it exists and is present as
such, it does not belong to its definition that it is comprehensive of the entire
cognoscibility of the thing that is apprehended. Within the realm of natural
(perceptual) experience, our author can give even more subtle examples: “cor-
poreal vision” reaches the color of some object or “whiteness composed with the
supposit [the material substrate],” but it does not apprehend the “suppositality”
– as a formal aspect ex parte rei – of that composite. There are many other
knowable formal aspects that are not apprehended in a vision of this kind: the
vision of whiteness (or of something white) does not necessarily apprehend the
“inherence of whiteness” or “its composition with the underlying substrate.”60 It
is assumed that these last aspects or contents could in principle be available to
an actual mental-sensorial vision like that; in other words, they could in princi-
ple be apprehended in the material object that is actually seen. After all, they do
belong to the thing in its ontological entirety. But apprehensions of colored ma-
terial things can – and probably usually are – non-comprehensive.
The Mercedarian Ambrosio Machin de Aquena et alii raised objections
against the relevance of the analogical use of corporeal vision to prove the point
about the non-comprehensive character of intuitive cognition. We are told that
corporeal vision as such is not a “quiditative vision of the object” (italics mine).
Machin de Aquena claims that corporeal vision is only the “form-figure” (ido-
lum) and the “image” of the sensorial object “insofar as it is formally and redu-
58 More exactly, on the “knowability of God through us;” see Briceño, Prima pars celeb.
contr., I, contr. 9, 388–712. See ibid., I, contr. 9 (De cognoscibilitate Dei a nobis), dist. 3 (De
actu visionis, et obiecto illius), subdist. 2 (De obiecto actus visionis), art. 2 (An videri possit
essentia non visis relationibus?), n. 1, 34, 649–50, 664–65. The articles 1–2 of subdist. 2 of dist.
3, in contr. 9, are important sources for Briceño’s position on intuitive cognition and precising
distinction.
59 On Henry of Ghent’s account of intuitive cognition, see Dumont, “Theology as a Science
and Duns Scotus’s Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” 579–81, 592–93.
See also Brown, “The Medieval Background to the Abstractive vs. Intuitive Cognition Distinc-
tion.”
60 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 32, 182–83: “Haec
ratio petitur ab Scoto, ut patet ex textu illius, quam expendimus infra in controv. 9. de visione
Dei, dist. 3 sub distinct. 2. art. 2. numer. marginal. 34. Ubi dum agit contra Henricum, egregie
ostendit Scotus ad rationem intuitionis, seu apprehensionis obiecti, ut existentis, non exposci,
quod inspiciatur obiectum secundum omnem rationem essendi, quam importat prout a parte
rei existit; cum visio corporalis attingat albedinem compositam supposito, et non apprehendat
suppositalitatem illius; addo et ego: nec visionem albedinis apprehendere inhaerentiam albedi-
nis, vel compositionem illius ad substratum suppositum.”
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plicatively sensorial.”61 Sensorial intuition, thus, does not express “the ratio of
being and of quality,” which are predicates that “formally make no reference to
sensoriality perceptible to corporeal senses,” even though “the object, insofar as
it is formally sensorial, will be quiditatively represented by visible sensation [per
visivam sensationem].”62 This is a difficult text! The basic idea is that objects that
are cognizable through the senses, with regard to what they are, require sensorial
aspects for their presentation: they have to be sensorially expressed. An example
of this: something “colored” can never be known unless accompanied by some
sensorial presentation.
This is Briceño’s reply: “the ratio of color, as it refers to the form of the
perceptible object by the power of vision, essentially absorbs [imbibit] the ratio
of being and of accident.” This argument touches the idea that “being,” the first
transcendental predicate, is the most common one.63 Our author says that “no
positive and real concept can evade the broadest degree of being.” Any philoso-
pher has to recognize that “it is more than certain that the ratio of being and of
accident” transcend “the ultimate differences of every and any positive form,”
that is, are somehow absorbed in every positive form and in all positive and real
concepts. Nothing can escape the real (either common-quididative or virtual)
predicative primacy64 of being (and, because of this primacy, of the co-extension
of properties that necessarily belong to it such as substantial-or-accidental).65 As
a result, either “colored” (coloratum), as an aspect that specifies “intuition as
61 Both ‘idolum’ and ‘imago’ can be translated as ‘image’ or ‘form.’ But ‘imago’ bears the
broader meaning of ‘representation,’ ‘presentation,’ and ‘appearance,’ expressing more fully the
act of apprehension and the sensorial content. A corporeal vision as image of the sensorial
object as sensorial seems to regard the idea that that reduplication specifies the formal aspect of
the apprehended object, with the aim of removing from it transcendental contents or categories
that would rather be purelly intellectual.
62 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 33, 183: “Quae ratio
acriter perstringit adversarios, multaque comminiscuntur, ut se expediatur. Respondet Ambro-
sius Machin. loco citato in solutione ad 3. arg. visionem corpoream non esse quidditativam
obiecti sicuti est perceptionem; sed tantum esse idolum, et imaginem obiecti sensibilis, quo
sensibile est formaliter, ac reduplicative. Ac proinde non exprimere rationem entis, et quali-
tatis, quia haec praedicata non referunt formaliter sensibilitatem a corporeo sensu percepti-
bilem; esto quod obiectum, prout formaliter sensibile est, quidditative representetur per visi-
vam sensationem.”
63 On the double (and mutually complementary) predicative primacy of ‘being’ as a univo-
cal concept, that is, of “community” and of “virtuality,” by means of which “ens” effectively
qualifies to be taken as the first adequate object of the human intellect (and the first object of
metaphysics), see Honnefelder, Duns Scotus, 63–67. See also King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,”
18–21.
64 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 1, q. 3, nn. 137–51 (ed. Vat. III), 85–94.
65 On this disjunctive property, see Wolter, The Transcendentals and their Function in the
Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, 152–53.
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vision,” “essentially is not being,” hence it is “nothing,” or the degree or formal

aspect of being “is absorbed in the ultimate specifying ratio of the object of vi-
sion,” i. e., in the form of color. “It is evident,” affirms Briceño, and “certified by
experience itself” that the “form-figure of vision” (idolum visivum) or the ap-
pearance of the thing in the mind by the act of sensorial intuition “is no vision of
the ratio of being or accident” in the act itself in which something colored is
apprehended. Other (quite subtle) formal aspects would be left out of that “ap-
pearance of vision” or of that singular apprehension of something colored as
well, such as “the aptitudinal inherence to the seen corporeal [thing]” or “the
ratio of the material being as opposed to the spiritual being.” “Colored” or even
“color” is precisely that aspect which, through “sensorial intuition,” is separated
from the seen material corporeal thing. Briceño ends this remarkable passage by
saying that “visual sensation” (sensatio visiva)66 “infers” a “precising negation”
(negativo precisiva), insofar as it is “percipient of the colored thing [alone].” In
other words, insofar as vision remains “in the perceived ratio” – which is color
–, it “does so without [considering] the other degrees” that formally compose
the existing material thing and that, “through the force [or: the capacity] of the
form-figure [idolum] and of the vision image [imago visiva],” “are not ex-
pressed by the eyes through the seen body.”67
Each objection to Briceño’s explanations of the connection between intui-
tive cognition and precising distinction by means of analogies with sensorial in-
tuitions is important, but I shall describe just one further example – the third in
the sequence of his exposition –, as well as Briceño’s reply to it. The objection is
proposed by Valentín de Herice SJ (1572–1636), who for more than twenty
years had been professor of theology at the Jesuit Colleges of Valladolid and
66 It is difficult to judge if, when he talks of ‘sensation’ (sensatio) or ‘visual sensation’ (sen-
satio visiva), Briceño means anything different to the actual perception itself or the act of per-
ception as accompanied by sensation or some attached sensorial impression.
67 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 33, 183: “Sed effu-
gium istud manifesta ratione ita occluditur: ratio coloris, ut refert formam obiecti perceptibilis
a potentia visiva, essentialiter imbibit rationem entis, et accidentis; cum nullus positivus, et
realis conceptus latissimum gradum essendi subterfugere valeat; et apud Thomistas certo cer-
tius sit, rationem entis, et accidentis, ultimas differentias cuiuslibet positivae formae transcen-
dere. Aut ergo coloratum, quo specificativum est intuitionis visivae, essentialiter non est ens, ac
proinde ut sic esset merum nihil; aut gradus entis imbibitur in ultima ratione specificativa
obiecti visionis, quod innegabile est. At evidens etiam est, et ipsomet experimento compertum;
idolum visivum rationem entis, et accidentis non intueri, dum coloratum apprehendit; non
enim inspicit aptitudinalem inhaerentiam corporeo obtutu; nec rationem entis materialis, pro-
ut opponitur enti spirituali, sed qua coloratum est praecise. Infert igitur sensatio visiva nega-
tionem praecisivam, dum percipiens coloratum, et sistens in ratione percepta, praescindit a
gradibus aliis, qui vi idoli, imaginisque visivae, non exprimuntur ab oculo per corporeum obtu-
tum.”
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Salamanca – where Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza was among his colleagues. For
Valentín de Herice, irrespective of the merits of an analysis of sensorial intuition
that reveals the intrinsic formal complexity of the perceived item and the ar-
guably non-comprehensive character of vision, the analogy itself between senso-
rial intuition and intellectual intuition is not valid, because “absolutely speaking”
corporeal vision, though certainly intuitive, cannot be a “quiditative” apprehen-
sion of the object seen – and this is exactly what matters regarding intuitive
cognition and its performance qua “vision of God” and as an intellectual act that
helps in understanding it.68
Briceño begins his reply by affirming that an “objective distinction” of
quiditative aspects produced by the intellect where the distinction is not ex parte
rei does not contradict quididative cognition, but, of course, it does contradict
intuitive cognition. The implicit idea is that intuitive cognition addresses the ex-
isting and present item as such, nothing else, and therefore notes and produces a
distinction that exists in act, if it exists in act. He explains his point by saying
that “animal” and “rational” “are quiditatively perceived” according to their
essential definitions. Philosophers separate “the objective rationes” of genus and
difference, although for Thomistic authors they are in a particular thing, apart
from the intellectual act, “the same formality” ex natura rei, expressed by a con-
crete general term, e. g., ‘homo.’ This amounts to saying that it does not contra-
dict cognition – abstractive cognition, we suppose – as quiditative that there is
an “objective partition in the thing,” which as such, the Thomists believe, is
nonetheless simple. But it would be wrong if, for example, corporeal vision qua
intuitive cognition, irrespective of being quiditative or not, were to make a pre-
cising consideration or separation “of a degree of being of the object” – which it
does make, since after all there is an immediate vision of some aspect of the
thing – where the separation as such does not exist. What happens instead is
that corporeal vision precisely “abstracts” or “puts aside” – Briceño uses the verb
“abstrahere” here – something like the intellectual perception of a colored body
from “the degree of being as being and [the degree] of quality.” This is again a
non-comprehensive intuitive cognition, which, in the act of seeing, precisely abs-
tracts something simply because, by actually considering something, it leaves
something outside of its consideration. Briceño, thus, again and again endorses
the important thesis that it does not belong to the definition “of the object of
intuitive cognition that it is expressed according to” its “entire undivided actuali-
68 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 34, 183: “Aliter
nostrae probationi occurrit Valentinus de Herice, tract. 4. de visione Dei, disp. 50. cap. 1. num.
marg. 13. absolute negans, corpoream visionem quidditativam esse obiecti apprehensionem;
esto quod intuitiva est.” For Herice, see again Jacob Schmutz’s Scholasticon website.
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ty” ex natura rei69 – an actuality that could in principle, through more compre-
hensive or even all-comprehensive intellectual visions, be cognized. In principle,
intuitive cognition can produce separations between apprehended aspects and
non-apprehension of something.
Moreover, it is not even true that a corporeal vision is not a “quiditative
perception of the material object.” After all, vision attains “white” “insofar as it is
a separator of vision,” and that should count as “formal reason” of the vision of
something. This passage seems to suggest that white or whiteness, as expression
itself of the principle of light, gives room to color and vision and is as it were the
cause of distinct vision – in opposition to black or blackness, which would be
the cause of confusion or even impossibility in vision. The original idea of
“white” as disgregativum visus or diakritikon opseos is found in Aristotle.70 Bri-
ceño also claims that, “for corporeal sensation of the faculty being considered a
quiditative cognition of the object,” it is not necessary that it attains “all things
that pertain to what is colored.” What is necessary for a corporeal sensation –
perception through the senses – being also a quiditative cognition of the object
is only that it “unconditionally [simpliciter] expresses the object through a prop-
er species,” and “not through any analogous or improper similitude.” In this
sense, “the form-figure” (idolum) or “the image [imago] of the faculty of vision
represents the object under a proper ratio, though material.” Briceño thus equ-
ates corporeal sensation, to which idolum or imago are concomitant, with the
“quiditative apprehension of the object itself.”71 The use of the verb ‘to represent’
69 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 34, 183–84: “Sed
nec vim rationis evacuat: quia partitio, et discretio obiectiva, ubi ea ex natura rei, non insit, non
repugnat notitiae, quo quidditativa est; sed quo intuitiva. Quia animal, et rationale, quiddita-
tive percipiuntur, cum essentiales istorum graduum diffinitiones a philosophis tradantur; et
tamen rationes obiectivas generici, et differentialis gradus, separant, esto quod apud Thomistas
sint eadem omnino formalitas ex natura rei. Igitur non contradicit notitiae, qua quidditativa
est, partitio obiectiva rei omnino extra intellectum simplicis, et indivisae; sed qua intuitiva est,
attingens obiectum iuxta conditionem indivisae existentiae illius. Ac proinde, licet corporalis
visio quidditativa obiecti apprehensio non esset; vel ex eo pr[a]ecise, quod intuitiva notitia
astruatur, praescindere non posset ab aliquo gradu essendi proprii obiecti: at abstrahit a gradu
entis, ut ens est pr[a]ecise, et qualitatis; igitur non est de ratione obiecti notitiae intuitivae,
quod exprimatur secundum omnem indivisam actualitatem, quam sortitur ex natura rei.” It
seems to be fair to affirm that, both in content and in terminology, in this passage Briceño is
close to the idea of an abstractio praecisiva that was forged in early (14th century) Scotism. Of
course, Briceño’s apparent use of it, here, has to do with his efforts of describing non-compre-
hensive intuitive cognitions and the production of a precising distinction. See, for example,
Petrus Thomae, Quaestiones de ente, q. 4, art. 6, dist. 1, ll. 199–224, 46–47.
70 See Aristotle, Top. III, c. 5, 119a30–31.
71 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 35, 184: “Adde, nec
verum esse, quod visio corporea non sit quidditativa obiecti materialis perceptio; cum attingat
album, qua disgregativum est visus, quae est ratio formalis illius. Nec enim, ut sensatio cor-
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(repraesentare) in this context could be misleading. At any rate, Briceño’s ac-

count does not admit the idea that in any intuitive cognition there is mediation,
if that implies cognizing the thing with and/or through species or imago, without
or independently of the presence of the existing thing. In the passage under
analysis, our author is possibly implying that in the image – which accompanies
the perceptual vision – the present and existing thing is, as it were, just present-
ed again.
3.2 Intellective Intuition and Precising Distinction
Finally, let’s recall that the Scotist view that intuitive cognition generates precis-
ing distinctions should be established secondarily – and with a direct connection
to the theological-metaphysical disputes that are important for Alfonso Briceño
– (ii) on the basis of an analysis of “intellectual intuition,” which is also called
“spiritual” or “intellectual and beatific intuition.” It is the human intellect’s vi-
sion of what is immaterial. Intellectual or spiritual intuition refers, thus, to a
special context, namely the vision of a non-material substance, and this is con-
cerned with divine essence and its attributes.
Briceño’s argument works with the premise of God’s intellectual and voli-
tional immutability, as the divine essence freely offers itself to creaturely vision.
God’s intellectual and volitional immutability are themes of Briceño’s Contro-
versy 7.72 He also assumes the theological premise that the blessed, in the vision
of God, “neither reaches all free decrees nor all distinguished aspects [termina-
tiones, or: everything that objectively can be the terminus or the outcome] of the
[complete] science of vision [scientiae visionis] [of the divine essence].” All this
means that the blessed do not “perceive the intellect and the will of God in re-
spect to the entire latitude and the quantity of its actuality”73 – what, in princi-
porea facultatis quidditativa obiecti notitia censeri debeat, necessum est, ut omnes colorati de-
pendentias investiget, ut contendebat Herice; sed quod obiectum per propriam speciem sim-
pliciter exprimat, et non per analogicam, aut impropriam similitudinem. At idolum, seu imago
facultatis visivae repraesentat obiectum sub propria, licet materiali, ratione; ergo est quidditati-
va apprehensio proprii obiecti.”
72 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 36, 184: “Sed et
Theologice assertionem nostram fulciamus, in intellectuali, et beatifica intuitione; de qua sic
instruo rationem. Intellectio, et appetitio libera Dei, qua referunt liberam, et vitalem tendenti-
am in obiectum creatum; non addunt aliquid supra facultatem necessariam intellectivam, et
appetitivam ipsiusmet Dei, ut in controversia de divina immutabilitate manifeste aperiemus;
[…].” See Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr. I, 7, 338–60.
73 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 36, 184: “[…];
atqui incontroversum est, beatum non attingere omnia decreta libera, nec omnes scientiae vi-
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ple, could be taken as an uncontroversial thesis about the vision of God due to
God’s infinity.74 In the face of the premise of the free expression of God towards
human beings and the premise of the limitation of what is contained in the vi-
sion of God by the blessed, the only reasonable conclusion is that that vision
“falls short [praescindit] of” the “objective ratio” of divine perfection.75 From a
theological perspective, in what would count as intellectual intuition alone – in
the established context of the “visio Dei” and, thus, the intuitive cognition of the
divine essence76 –, Briceño also concludes that it does not contradict intuitive
cognition that it is non-comprehensive and brings with itself a separation be-
tween what is apprehended and what is not apprehended in the way of the nega-
tion of precisely apprehending further degrees or formal aspects of a given being.
Briceño’s point is clear: any cognition “that is not the [total] comprehen-
sion of an object” infers, even if it is a quiditative apprehension of the object (as
the intuitive cognition of God is), “a negation of the precision of every other
objective ratio that is not perceived in the vital intuition.”77 The disputes over
the connection between intellectual-spiritual intuition and precising distinction
refer, in the end, to the controversy “over the incomprehensibility of God” (this
is the title of Briceño’s Controversy 10).78 Presupposing divine infinity, the facts
about the intellectual intuitive cognition of God are key to understanding the
“ratio of divine incomprehensibility,” where no created intellect, in a cognitive
act, is able to “exhaust divine actuality with respect to the total quantity of virtue
or the [entire] substantial and formal latitude of its illimitation.”79
sionis terminationes: igitur nec percipit intellectum, et voluntatem Dei quoad omnem lati-
tudinem, et quantitatem actualitatis suae, […].”
74 This is what contr. 5 is about; see Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 5, 253–91.
75 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 36, 184: “[…], ac
proinde praescindit ab illo divinae perfectionis modo, seu obiectiva ratione, quam non exhau-
rit; […].
76 This is from the beginning a Scotist context of the problem of intuitive cognition; see
Pich, “Cognitio intuitiva e modalidades epistêmicas,” 358.
77 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 36, 184: “[…];
atque adeo fit, ut quaelibet cognitio, quae non est comprehensio obiecti, esto quod sit quiddita-
tiva apprehensio eius, inferat negationem praecisionis omnis alterius rationis obiectivae, quae
vitalis intuitionis non percipitur.”
78 See Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 10, 713–38. On the theological-metaphysi-
cal debate on the comprehension / comprehensibility and the incomprehension / incompre-
hensibility of God in Baroque Scotism, see the important study by Andersen, “Comprehension
at the Crossroads of Philosophy and Theology.”
79 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 36, 184: “Verum
exactior nostrae sententiae comprobatio petenda est ex controversia de incomprehensibilitate
Dei, ubi discutiemus an divinae incomprehensibilitatis ratio posita sit in hoc, quod nullus intel-
lectus creatus exhaurire valeat actualitatem divinam quoad omnem quantitatem virtutis, seu
latitudinem substantialem, et formalem illimitationis suae?”
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Concluding Remarks
The primary locus of Briceño’s account of intuitive cognition is his discussion of
the visio Dei as a perfect state of essential knowledge of God as existing and
present. At any rate, intuitive cognition is also used to describe the perception of
the external world as a source of knowledge. This is revealing in regard to the
way that notitia intuitiva, in the history of philosophy, is close to the problem of
perception, which is a major topic in modern epistemology, along with the rep-
resentational or non-representational status of perceptual cognition. In both cas-
es, Briceño provides a revision of Scotus’s textual sources and checks what inter-
preters of Scotus from the early 14th century onwards had to say about the topic
under discussion.80 Intuitive cognition can be divided into sensorial and purely
intellectual. In both cases, it is first of all apprehension of the thing as existing
and present. The debate on the relationship between intuitive cognition and pre-
cising distinction is strongly connected to a theological-metaphysical discussion
on the nature of God and the identity of divine essence and divine attributes.
Briceño’s account of the precising distinction, in its primary context of ap-
plication, is not an attempt to simply prove the formal distinction. Briceño rather
offers reasons not to equate DRR2 and the precising distinction. Let’s keep in
mind that a precising distinction follows or at least can follow intuitive cogni-
tion, but does not represent a distinction between something apprehended (a
part of a whole) and something else not-apprehended (all the rest).81 This would
relate intuitive cognition to a virtual multitude of cognized aspects, where the
second part of the distinction would be a kind of expression for something that
is really not apprehended, but rather is created as an ens fictum and then is sort
of ascribed to the object by the intellect; again, this procedure would be due to
the intellect’s cognitive shortcomings. This is one version of what precising dis-
80 In his Controversiae, Briceño works with the methodological principle of returning ad

fontes. In his interpretations of Scotus, he finds support in ‘Scotist’ authors, or authors he con-
siders to be such, e. g., Francis of Mayronis, John of Bassolis, Peter Aureol, and William of
Rubio; cf. Pich, “Alfonso Briceño (1587–1668) and the Controversiae on John Duns Scotus’s
Philosophical Theology,” 66–67, 70–71. On the reception of 13th –14th century accounts of in-
tuitive cognition – with an emphasis on Scotus’s doctrine – by second-scholastic authors, see
Heider, “The Notitia Intuitiva and Notitia Abstractiva of the External Senses in Second Scho-
lasticism.”
81 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 38, 185: “[…]; quia
vero per intuitivam notitiam non concipitur discretio inter rationem obiecti cognitam, et non
cognitam, ideo distinctio rationis non formatur.” For the rest of this passage by Briceño, see
footnote 28, above.
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tinction means,82 but it is not Briceño’s version. Briceño’s view is that a precis-
ing distinction follows intuitive cognition – either of the limitless divine essence
or of material bodies – as a difference between something apprehended and the
negation or the non-apprehension of something else.83 There is no act of “dis-
cernere” between an apprehended ratio (e. g., a colored thing) and a non-appre-
hended ratio (e. g., being or quality or some devised content in place of them),
but rather an act of apprehension of something (the colored thing) and the
negation of the apprehension of anything else.84 In fact, this is finally what
“praecidere” should be taken to mean: (a) ‘to separate [something] from [some-
thing],’ to ‘put [something] aside,’ ‘to not take [something] into consideration,’
and thus ‘to negate’ as ‘to fall short of [doing something].’85 The two basic direc-
tions in the translation could be summarized as there being at once and in the
same act of perception a separation of one aspect, and attention to this aspect,
and a lack of consideration of all the rest. The distinction can be described as an
effect of intuitive cognitions both of physical and non-physical things. What a
given precising distinction is and, thus what information it provides about
82 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 39, 185: “Sed urge-
bis, distinctionem hanc praecisivam non emergere ex natura rei, sed accedente intellectus func-
tione; ac proinde esse quid rationis.”
83 This idea is also implicit in the following passage, in which Briceño distinguishes the
intellect’s performance in the intuitive and in the abstractive cognition of what something is:
Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 42, 186: “Ad ultimam
rationem; quod licet intuitiva notitia praescindere possit ab aliquo gradu essendi actualis et
existentis obiecti: ab ipsa tamen actualitate obiecti, a qua specificatur intuitio, abstrahere non
valet; alias enim apprehensio intuitiva quidditative non secerneretur a notitia abstractiva, quae
ex modo tendendi ab existentia sui obiecti praescindit: quo fit, ut rationes communes et prae-
cisae ab existentiali, et individuali actu, intuitivum potentiae conatum terminare non possint.”
84 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 37, 184: “Nos ta-
men non astruimus, intellectum quidditative obiectum percipientem apprehendere plurali-
tatem, ubi ea non insit ex natura rei; sed quod sistere potest in aliquo obiecti, non cognita tota
actualitate eius; non tamen ita ut discernat inter rationem apprehensam, et non apprehensam.
Sicut et intuitio visiva attingens coloratum, et praescindens a ratione entis, et qualitatis, non
format distinctionem inter hos gradus essendi; sed simpliciter sistit in ratione percepta. De quo
vide insignem Scoti textum, a nobis explanatum in controv. 9. de visione Dei, dist. 3. subdist. 2.
art. 1. num. marg. 22.” See also Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 9, dist. 3, subd. 2,
art. 1 (Utrum proprietates absolutae Dei sint necessarium obiectum visionis beatificae?), n. 22,
648.
85 In another context, these two aspects of ‘praecidere’ and ‘praecisio’ come together again,
namely in the discussion of the objective precision (praecisio obiectiva) of 17th –18th century
Scotism – and of Jesuit Scholasticism as well. “Objective precisions” concern the intellectual
separation of formal rationes that differ ex parte rei and the formation of the objective concept
(conceptus obiectivus) of them. Cf. Heider, Universals in Second Scholasticism, 188–92. See also
footnote 69, above.
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things, heavily depends on a human being’s cognitive performance. I think that

Alfonso Briceño believes that any singular case of the precising distinction sub-
sequent to an intuitive cognition, and especially subsequent to the visio Dei, is a
kind of soft evidence or indication on the level of (immediate) cognition that
things formally are in fact what abstractive thought afterwards, reflecting and
acting upon the acquired species, show that they are. However, this leaves as un-
decided whether what is formally distinguished is distinguished due to the mind
or whether it is grounded in what the real thing is as a whole.
A precising distinction is a peculiar kind of distinction. Being inferred from
an intuitive cognition, in which an objective ratio is positively apprehended, the
distinction of precision is the objective negation of the apprehension of another
objective ratio, but not of a part of the same apprehended objective ratio, as the
second group of Thomistic authors thought. In this sense, Briceño’s reply to the
first argument of the first group of Thomists (those who defended the idea that
intuitive cognition does not produce any precising distinction, in this case, a dis-
tinction of reason) makes the following point clear: one should deny that, based
on an intuitive cognition, the resulting combination of apprehending a ratio of
the object and making a precision or separation of that ratio from apprehending
another ratio of the object amounts to cognizing a pluralitas.86 In his reply to the
third argument of the first group of Thomists, Briceño insists that intuitive cog-
nition, properly taken, apprehends the existing and present object such as it is.
This principle is not denied when Scotists describe that cognition as being com-
patible with precisely apprehending one objective ratio, and expressing it, and
refraining from apprehending and expressing any other ratio. This does not
amount to apprehending or expressing the thing differently from how it really is.
Cognitive intuition, after all, can be non-comprehensive.87 Also in this case, the
“objective being” (esse obiectivum) reached by intuitive cognition is not different
86 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 37, 184: “Quare pro
nunc breviter ad fundamenta opposita. Ad primum ex authoritate Scoti; quod Doctor tantum
intendit, intellectui quidditative obiectum, ut in se est, intuenti repugnare; quod pluralitatem
apprehendat, ubi ea non existat ex natura rei; quod assertum ut verissimum recipimus. Inficia-
mur tamen, quod intuitio praescindens a ratione obiecti non percepta per illum actum;
cognoscat pluralitatem, aut distinctionem inter rationem cognitam, et non cognitam; cum sim-
plicissime sistat in ratione apprehensa.”
87 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 40, 185: “Ad ter-
tium argumentum, solum obtinere, quod si intuitio obiecti referret pluralitatem obiectivam
non existentem ex natura rei; non attingeret obiectum sicuti est, sed aliter quam est. At vero
quidditativa obiecti apprehensio, quae simplicissime sistit in ratione obiectiva, quam exprimit,
non apprehendit rem aliter quam est; quia illud, quod de obiecto percipit, ita se habet sicut
cognoscitur, licet tota actualitas rei non finiatur vi talis intuitionis. Sicut et visio corporalis at-
tingit coloratum sicuti est; esto quod non inspiciat totam colorati constitutionem ex gradibus
entis, qualitatis, etc.”
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from “the being itself of the object” (ipsum esse obiecti) as it is in extramental
reality.88 Precising apprehension plus negation of a further precising apprehen-
sion does not imply any corrupted or illusory expression of objective reality.89
Perhaps precising apprehension, so understood, can even work as a kind of evi-
dence or indication that the esse obiectivum produced by the cognition bears fur-
ther rationes, possibly to be apprehended in a positive and objective way – sev-
eral distinguished objective aspects that a more comprehensive intuitive
cognition could in principle have apprehended.90
Why does the precising distinction occur? On the cognitive level, it hap-
pens either (a) because the apprehended thing is objectively ‘greater’ or ‘more
comprehensive’ than any power exerted by the intellect or – more simply –
than any cognitive act that it performs or (b) because the apprehended thing
simply is not apprehended according to everything that there is to apprehend of
it, even if in principle it could have been apprehended according to everything
that there is to apprehend of it. In contrast to what some Thomistic authors
would certainly do – including those who accepted the connection between in-
tuitive cognition and precising distinction with regard to the vision of God (cf.
above, section 3) – Briceño never calls this distinction a distinction of reason.
According to him, when this distinction occurs, neither what is apprehended nor
the negation of the apprehension of another objective aspect are just inventions
or beings of reason created by the intellect.91 Although it is true that the second
part of what occurs in a precising distinction – negation, instead of position –
88 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 40, 185: “Sed dices;
a parte rei sortitur obiectum aliquam actualitatem, seu latitudinem quantitatis virtutis, quam
non exprimit intuitiva illa cognitio; ergo esse obiectivum, quod a cognitione trahitur, aliter se
habet, quam ipsum esse obiecti, quod ex natura rei, et extra intellectum existit.”
89 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 40, 185: “Responde-
tur; aliud esse, quod esse obiectivum, quod a cognitione fit, referat totam actualitatem, quam
sortitur obiectum ex natura rei; aliud vero quod illud esse, quod a notitia petitur, non con-
formetur rei, ut est in se. Sicut aliud est, quod visio corporalis non attingat totam colorati com-
positionem ex gradibus entis, qualitatis, etc., aliud vero, quod illud, quod de colorato apprehen-
ditur, ita non fit, sicut per visionem exprimitur.”
90 Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met. app., art. 2, digr., n. 37, 184: “Ad instan-
tiam dicimus; quod ex hoc quod intellectus intuitivus apprehendat distinctionem, aut contra-
dictionem inter rationes obiectivas; optime deducitur, ipsammet distinctionem anteire ex natu-
ra rei actum intellectus intuentis talem distinctionem in obiecto: eoquod notitia intuitiva
formare nequeat obiectivarum rationum pluralitatem.”
91 See footnotes 28 and 81, above. See also Briceño, Prima pars celeb. contr., I, contr. 2, met.
app., art. 2, digr., n. 38, 184: “Ad secundum argumentum, fatemur cum communi sententia,
ens rationis ab intuitiva notitia non formari; nec contrarium ex nostra sententia deduci. Cum
opposita probatio ex falsa assumptione procedat; dum supponit, per notitiam intuitivam prae-
scindentem a non percepta ratione obiecti, concipi pluralitatem.”
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does depend on the intellect, this is not the same as cognizing some other gradus
that is not there but is rather invented.92
By talking about a “given negation of real precision” (negatio quaedam
praecisionis realis), which is, with regard to its cognitive status, “inferred from
intuitive cognition,” Briceño finds a brillant description, in cognitive-mental
terms, of the distinction in question: “it leaves unconsidered [praescindit] any
non-apprehended ratio of the object” and “remains within that objective ratio
that it expresses.” Again, if this is then the positive focus of the intellect’s appre-
hension, “it does not pass over another [objective ratio], which it does not ex-
press.”93 Briceño seems rather to connect the precising distinction with the real
distinction or some quasi-real distinction. What is distinct because of non-ap-
prehension is at least an index of some really distinguishable items.94 However, a
critical reader may still not be entirely convinced by Briceño’s arguments and
may rather wish to concede to both parties in the dispute. We may then con-
clude that this kind of distinction should be situated on the very borderline be-
tween the works of reason and the demands of reality.
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Duns Scotus (1308–2008). Edited by Luis Alberto De Boni and Roberto Hofmeister Pich.
Special issue of Veritas –53:3 (2008), 32–58.
Urdaneta, Ramón. Alonso Briceño: primer filósofo de América. Caracas: Universidad Católica
Andrés Bello, 1973.
Vos, Antonie. The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
2006.
–. The Theology of John Duns Scotus. Leiden – Boston: Brill, 2018.
Wolter, Allan B. The Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus. St.
Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1946.
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Making Room for the Virtual Distinction
Bartolomeo Mastri between Scylla and Charybdis
Lukáš Novák
Introduction
Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673), the Prince of Scotists, cultivated the persona of
a faithful disciple of the Subtle Doctor; in reality, however, he often significantly
departed from the positions of his master. One such case is Mastri’s position on
the matter of distinctions. Unlike Duns Scotus (and many of his followers),
Mastri admitted not only the “Scotistic” formal distinction, but also the “Tho-
mistic” virtual distinction as a possible basis for abstracting a univocal universal
concept. In another paper,1 I have proposed a thorough analysis of Scotus’s ar-
guably most profound and developed philosophical (as opposed to theological)
reasoning in favour of the necessity of the formal distinction, found in his
Quaestiones super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis VII, q. 19. In this paper, I
follow up with an analysis and an assessment of the force of Mastri’s defence of
the virtual distinction vis-à-vis Scotus’s arguments. I will start with briefly out-
lining Mastri’s innovative position on distinctions. Then I will provide a sum-
mary of Scotus’s reasoning for the necessity of admitting the formal distinction
(which is elaborated in the other paper) and point out the problems it poses for
Mastri’s attempt to secure room for the virtual distinction in a Scotist setting.
Finally, I will seek to determine if Mastri can provide a solution to these prob-
lems.2
The research behind this paper has been supported by the Czech Science Foundation (GAČR),
grant project no. 21–35651S “Jsoucno a přirozená teologie ve scotismu.” I am indebted to the
editors of this present volume, Claus A. Andersen and Daniel Heider, for their many helpful
suggestions; and also to Světla Hanke Jarošová for correcting my English.
1 Novák, “Qui melius scit exponere, exponat! Scotus’s Metaphysical Case for the Formal
Distinction.” That paper and this present one originated as two parts of a single presentation at
the conference Cognitive Issues in the Long Scotist Tradition (Faculty of Theology, University
of South Bohemia in České Budějovice, 11–13 February 2021) and belong together.
2 For a systematic exposition of Mastri’s theory of distinctions, see Andersen, Metaphysik
im Barockscotismus, 657–839; cf. further Knebel, “What About Aureol?,” especially 429–36. I
use the 1727 edition of Mastri and Bonaventura Belluto’s Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti Cursus
integer. Mastri’s Disputationes ad mentem Scoti in duodecim libros Metaphysicorum (hencefor-
ward abbreviated as Met.) was first published in two volumes in 1646–1647; his (and Bellu-
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300 Lukáš Novák
1. Mastri’s Innovation
The view on the metaphysical prerequisites of the possibility of abstraction
which Scotus bequeathed to his followers was that the abstraction of a universal
concept is made possible by the existence of a distinctio a parte rei (viz. “in the
thing itself” or “in reality”) between that which is being conceived, on the one
hand, and that from which is being abstracted, on the other – for example, a
distinction a parte rei between the formality of animality and the formality of
rationality (and the individual differentia) makes it possible to abstract the con-
cept animal from Peter. In Mastri’s times, this was commonly expressed in
terms of the so-called objective precision: in order that objective precision can
take place – that is, in order that on the level of intentional objects one aspect of
the conceived thing (e. g., the formality of animality) can be conceived without
other aspects of that thing (e. g., rationality or individuality) being conceived
thereby –, the conceived aspect must be actually distinct from the unconceived
aspects, prior to the work of the conceiving intellect.3
This actual distinction in reality may come in various kinds, of which the
two generally recognized ones are the formal distinction, obtaining between two
a parte rei distinct but really identical formalities, and the modal distinction, ob-
taining between a formality and its intrinsic mode (modus intrinsecus). But re-
gardless of the differences in detail, the crucial tenet of this “orthodox” position
is that in forming universal concepts, the intellect does not (and cannot) draw
the required distinctions but finds them in reality as already actual.
Mastri significantly departs from this “orthodox” Scotist wisdom and ar-
gues extensively that not only the formal distinction (and its weaker sibling, the
modal distinction) is to be admitted in a Scotistic metaphysical and epistemolog-
ical repertory, but also the “Thomist” virtual distinction (distinctio virtualis), or
the distinction of reasoned reason (distinctio rationis ratiocinatae), also often
called “distinction of reason with a foundation in reality” (distinctio rationis cum
fundamento in re).4 Strictly speaking, the virtual distinction and the distinction
to’s) Disputationes in Aristotelis Logicam (henceforward called Logica) was first published in
1639. Both of these works are contained in the Cursus.
3 For an analysis of the notion of objective precision and its bearing on the realism–nomi-
nalism dispute, see Novák, “Confusion or Precision? Disentangling the Semantics of a Pair of
Scholastic Terms”; for the notion of objective precision in Mastri, see Renemann, “Mastri on
‘praecisio obiectiva’,” and Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 833–39.
4 I have not done extensive research on how universally and how explicitly this view had
been accepted by the Scotists before Mastri, but there certainly was a widespread common
sense that the virtual distinction is a “Thomist” thing, whereas Scotists insist on the formal
distinction; and the way Mastri presents the problem makes a clear impression that despite his
assertions that it is his view which is in accord with Scotus, he is well aware that he is in fact
going against the Scotist mainstream: cf. Met., disp. 6, q. 15, art. 1, n. 271, 318a–b: “[O]stendo
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Making Room for the Virtual Distinction 301
of reasoned reason are not the same thing (despite being often so treated by the
Scholastics. The virtual distinction is that which is in the thing itself, prior to, or
independently of, its being conceived; so, it is something real, but – unlike the
Scotist formal or modal distinctions – merely potential. In virtue of this distinc-
tion its terms are not actually distinct, but rather distinguishable by the intellect.
The virtual distinction is, so to speak, an occasion for the intellect to actually
draw a distinction where, in reality, there is none. The distinction of reasoned
reason, on the other hand, is the result of this activity of the intellect. It is, al-
ready, an actual distinction – but it does not exist in reality (i. e., between two
aspects of a thing insomuch as they exist in and for themselves, independently of
being conceived), but merely intentionally (that is, between two aspects of a
thing, insomuch as they are conceived separately by the intellect). In other
words: the virtual distinction is real but merely potential, while the distinction of
reasoned reason is actual but merely intentional – the virtual distinction being
its fundamentum in re. Still, in a sense it is one and the same distinction, con-
sidered now in potency, now in act – and for that reason even the Scholastics
often neglect the difference and use the terms distinctio virtualis and distinctio
rationis cum fundamento in re interchangeably: a distinction that is potentially
in the thing, and comes to be actualized only in the conceiving intellect.5
Now according to Mastri, it is not so that objective precision always re-
quires an actual distinction on the part of the thing itself. An actual distinction
(typically the formal distinction) is only needed for the abstraction of categorical
concepts – that is, genera, species, and differentiae. Transcendental concepts,
i. e., concepts applicable to more than one category or to a category and to God,
only require a potential distinction in the thing in order that they may be abs-
tracted – that is, the “Thomistic” virtual distinction. Besides, Mastri agrees with
the common realist (as opposed to nominalist) wisdom that where there is not
even a virtual distinction in the object at the appropriate place, the intellect can-
not abstract two different concepts from it but is only capable of conceiving one
Scotum, quidquid est de Scotistis formalizantibus, agnovisse et approbasse acceptionem dis-

tinctionis ratiocinatae, in sensu scilicet, quo de ea loquuntur Thomistae […].” Cf. also Mastri
and Belluto’s review of Scotist positions in Logica, disp. 1, q. 5, art. 1, nn. 87–95, 91b–93b,
where they defend the distinction of reasoned reason as rather implied than explicitly taught in
Scotism, and Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 833: “Die distinctio rationis ratioci-
natae wird […] wie ein Fremdelement behandelt, das stets als ‚thomistisch‘ bezeichnet wird
[…];” cf. further the survey of positions at ibid., 705.
5 For Mastri’s exposition of the notion of distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, see Met., disp. 6,
q. 15, art. 1, nn. 269–79, 317b–21b; cf. especially n. 274, 319a–b: “[D]istinctio illa virtualis
coincidit prorsus cum distinctione rationis ratiocinatae, aut certe est fundamentum eius, dicitur
distinctio virtualis, quatenus praecedit huiusmodi fundamentum in re dicitur vero ratiocinata,
quando per actum intellectus inadaequate concipientis, et praescindentis ista virtualitas distinc-
tionis reducitur ad actum formando de eadem re simplici plures conceptus inadaequatos.”
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302 Lukáš Novák
different concepts different concepts different modi concipiendi
A B A ↑
dist.
B A A
↑
rationis distinctio rationis
ratiocinatae ratiocinantis
A B A B A
↑ ↑
distinctio formalis distinctio virtualis
Fig. 1.
and the same thing/concept in two different ways (e. g., once as a subject and
once as a predicate, as in the identical judgement “Peter is Peter”), by means of
two modi concipiendi. Figure 1 summarizes (the relevant part of) Mastri’s reper-
tory of distinctions.
Mastri’s generous approach to other schools’ (and especially the Thomists’)
conceptual resources can be seen as a sign of open-mindedness and commend-
able willingness to give credit wherever it is due. On the other hand, the integra-
tion of elements foreign to the native Scotism into the system may have reper-
cussions. Specifically in the case at hand, one can immediately think of two
connected worries that need to be addressed: viz. 1) Will Mastri be able to avoid,
on the transcendental level, the force of Scotus’s general arguments for the necessi-
ty of the formal distinction? And 2) Will he be able to do so without thereby
compromising the force of the same arguments, or any arguments, on the categori-
cal level? The present paper aims to provide a detailed answer to these two ques-
tions.
2. Scotus’s Case for the Formal Distinction

So, what are Scotus’s arguments? Scotus’s case for the formal distinction falls
apart into two distinct reasoning strategies, linked with the formal distinction’s
two main areas of application. In the first place, Scotus employs the formal dis-
tinction in theology to explain the Holy Trinity (and other things divine). On
this level, the gist of his reasoning is that the formal distinction is needed to
resolve contradictions that would otherwise emerge, such as the divine essence
both having and not having certain properties. The other area of the application
is metaphysics; and here Scotus argues that the formal distinction is needed as a
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sine qua non of the possibility of the abstraction of distinct concepts – that is, in
late scholastic terms, as a metaphysical condition of objective precision.
In this paper, I am only concerned with Scotus’s metaphysical case for the
formal distinction: the point is to see whether and how Mastri’s innovations can
square with it. As has been mentioned, Scotus’s most elaborate presentation of
his metaphysical case for the formal distinction is contained in his Quaestiones
super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Book VII, q. 19, “Whether the concept
of a genus is different from the concept of a differentia.”6 However, Scotus is
actually not focusing on the question of whether a generic concept and a differ-
ential concept differ (this is resolved fairly quickly in the affirmative), but on
what the metaphysical prerequisites of their differing are.
The core of the quaestio consists in Scotus’s complex and detailed evalua-
tion, and ultimate rejection, of Henry of Ghent’s thesis that a sufficient prerequi-
site for the possibility of abstracting two distinct concepts, a genus and a differ-
entia, is the intentional distinction (differentia intentionis). Interestingly,
Henry’s notion of intentional distinction (at least qua understood by Scotus) is
practically identical to the later Thomists’ (and Mastri’s) distinctio rationis ratio-
cinatae (sometimes, simply called distinctio ratiocinata). Scotus’s discussion of
Henry’s theory therefore is of direct systematic relevance for Mastri’s reception
of the Thomist notion.
Scotus’s engagement with Henry is complex and its adequate presentation
is beyond the scope of this paper.7 For the purposes of comparison with Mastri,
we only need to understand what I call Scotus’s “Final Blow Argument,” viz. his
ultimate rebuttal of the most refined formulation of Henry’s case resulting from
the preceding discussion.
In that discussion, Scotus had constantly turned his virtual Henrician oppo-
nent’s (and readers’) attention back to the epistemic aspect of the issue (as op-
posed to the causal one, highlighted in the opponent’s approach). For it may not
be a problem to explain how two different cognitive acts (notitiae, viz., the men-
tal concept of a genus and that of a differentia) can be caused in the intellect by
a single, undistinguished real thing: it is a problem, however, to explain, how
there can be two irreducibly distinct cognized conceptual contents or intentional
objects which, nevertheless, must be identical to the external thing (otherwise we
would not be cognizing the thing itself but something else).
6 The phrases ‘the concept of a genus’ and ‘the concept of a differentia’ are to be unders-
tood in the sense ‘the concept which is a genus’ and ‘the concept which is a differentia,’ not in
the sense ‘the concept genus’ and ‘the concept differentia.’ In other words, they refer to first
intentions, concepts such as animal (a genus) and rational (a differentia), not to second inten-
tions, the predicables genus and differentia.
7 What here follows is a brief summary of my paper cited in note 1.
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304 Lukáš Novák
Now the explanation to which Scotus’s Henrician opponent was finally

obliged to resort – virtually his last chance of vindicating the sufficiency of the
intentional distinction for abstraction – was the following: the conceived object
is completely one and the same really, that is, according to its single real being,
but it makes for two objects in the intellect according to its two distinct inten-
tional beings or esse obiective. Thus, one and the same real thing (say, Socrates)
is conceived as two objects: once (qua animal) by the concept of genus, and
once (qua rational) by the concept of a differentia. In this way, the distinction
between animal and rational only obtains on the level of intentional being – it is
a mere intentional distinction in Henry’s terms –, whereas in reality there is a
perfect identity.
Scotus’s Final Blow Argument consists in showing that this “explanation of
last resort” is untenable – and again on epistemic grounds.8 Scotus points out
that if the only respect in which the single real thing is two is its twofold esse
obiective, then, epistemically speaking, there will not be two distinct cognized
objects but only one. The reason is that the twofold esse obiective is not part of
that which is being cognized. The esse obiective is a property of the conceived
object qua such, but it is not part of its conceptual content.9 A real object receives
objective being in virtue of being conceived, but that which is conceived, by a
real, first-order cognitive act (“formal concept” in later terminology), is just the
real stuff coming from “out there.” In order to conceive the object together with
its esse obiective, another cognitive act (formal concept) would be needed: a re-
flexive, second-order concept such as the concept of animal or the concept of ra-
tional. Such a concept, however, would not be predicable of the real object (Soc-
rates) – i. e., it would not be a genus or a differentia.
IV), 368: “Sed per omnia dicta non videtur prima difficultas soluta quomodo duo obiecta for-
maliter in quantum obiecta et tamen una essentia, si illa essentia aliquo modo cognoscatur.
Quia illa essentia una, si tantummodo per duo esse in intellectu est duo obiecta – et secundum
illa non cognoscitur, quia illa accidunt obiecto –, non videtur quomodo erunt duo in quantum
obiecta.”
9 This is more or less the point stressed by Avicenna in the famous passage in his Meta-
physics V, c. 1 (ed. Verbeke), 228–29, providing a moderately-realist solution to the problem
of universals which came to be almost universally accepted in the Latin High Scholasticism
(including Scotus). Avicenna claims here that “equinity is just equinity” – meaning that the
predicable conceptual content of the concept horse contains only the conceptual marks belong-
ing to the specific essence of horseness, everything else being merely accidental to this “essence
as such,” the predicable content of the concept. And this “everything else” includes, on the one
hand, the real individuating features of individual horses, and, on the other hand, the merely
intentional properties imparted to the essence of horse insomuch as it is conceived by the intel-
lect as a universal – in other words, everything that belongs to its being conceived, i. e., in
Scotus’s terminology, to its objective being.
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But that which formally specifies formal concepts (intellective acts) and
distinguishes them from one another is precisely the conceived conceptual con-
tent, nothing else. Therefore, it follows that the plurality of esse obiective cannot
be the source of the differentiation of the objective concepts to which this esse
belongs. In short – under the proposed scenario, we would not have two distinct
concepts but merely one and the same concept conceived twice.
Thus, Henry’s position appears to be demolished, and Scotus concludes:
“Qui melius scit exponere differentiam intentionis, evadendo dictas difficultates,
exponat.”10
3. The Problems for Mastri

Now let us turn back to Mastri. Now, Scotus’s metaphysical case for the necessi-
ty of the formal distinction is quite broad-scoped: it is not confined to this or
that special case but concerns the possibility of abstracting two distinct concepts
from one and the same object in general. Mastri, on the contrary, asserts that the
formal distinction is only needed as a ground for the possibility of abstracting
categorial concepts, whereas for the possibility of abstracting transcendental
concepts a mere virtual distinction is sufficient. This immediately provokes the
two already mentioned worries that motivate this entire paper:
(1) Can Mastri avoid, on the transcendental level, the force of Scotus’s ar-
gument for the formal distinction, and how?
(2) Can Mastri do so without eo ipso compromising the force of the very
same argument on the categorial level?
Let us see how Mastri fares in navigating through this narrow strait between the
Scylla of making the need of the formal distinction for abstraction universal and
the Charybdis of making it entirely unjustified.
4. Avoiding Scylla: “Melius exponere”?

To avoid the Scylla of ending up asserting what Scotus implies, viz. the universal
need for the formal distinction as the only possible foundation in reality for the
possibility of abstraction, Mastri must face Scotus’s challenge and provide some
“better explanation” of the possibility of a genuine distinction between two con-
cepts which is not based on an a parte rei distinction of their formal objects, or
conceived contents insomuch as they exist in reality – a distinction, let us recall,
that had been called “intentional distinction” (differentia intentionis) by Henry
IV), 369.
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306 Lukáš Novák
and Scotus and “distinction of reasoned reason” (distinctio rationis ratiocinatae)

by Mastri (and late Scholastics in general). I have already mentioned that for
Mastri, who in this point follows the Thomists’ ways, the possibility of this dis-
tinction is based on its having a certain foundation in the intrinsic reality of the
thing, called “virtual distinction” (distinctio virtualis).11 In order to see whether
Mastri is capable of specifically vindicating the possibility of merely rationally
distinct transcendental concepts, we have to explore the merits of this notion.
So: what is a virtual distinction? What is it precisely that its “virtuality” in-
volves?
‘Virtual’ (virtualis, virtualiter, (in) virtute) is a tricky term in scholasticism,
as it tends to be used in various closely connected yet distinct senses – at least
three of them:
(1) “A virtual X” or “being virtually X” can mean as much as being X

merely potentially or merely in virtute: the chance of bringing it about
that the respective thing becomes X is there but it is not (yet) actual-
ized. This meaning of “virtual” seems to be peculiar to the usage of
“merely virtual distinction” in contrast to a distinctio actualis a parte
rei.
(2) “Being virtually X” can also mean “being capable of producing X.”
This meaning is primarily present in the notion of “virtual contain-
ment,” contrasted against “formal containment”: an essence contains
“formally” the formalities that constitute it (i. e., its genera and differ-
entiae), and it contains “virtually” the propria or proprias passiones
which necessarily “flow” from the essence but are not constitutive of it.
In this sense, a man is “virtually” capable of laugh, because this capa-
bility flows from his essence (but he is “formally” rational, because his
essence is constituted by rationality).
(3) Finally, “being virtually X” can also mean “behaving like X (but not
in fact being X),” that is, “performing the causal functions of X.” The
classical scholastic example is the Sun which is not in fact (“formal-
ly,” in a different sense than the one opposed to the previous sense of
11 Mastri seems to concede that a contributing factor to the distinction of reasoned reason’s
foundation in reality may be a diversity of “extrinsic connotations.” Still, the presence of an
“intrinsic” virtual distinction is required at any rate. See Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 15, art. 2, n.
283, 323b: “Media via nobis capienda est, ut scilicet dicamus cum Thomistis pro fundamento
distinctionis ratiocinatae necessariam quidem esse ex parte obiecti virtualem aliquam distinc-
tionem, seu eminentiam rei, non tamen omnino spernendam esse diversitatem extrinsecam
connotatorum […]. Palam igitur est, quomodo sententia nostra mediet inter placita Thomis-
tarum, ac nominalium […].”
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“virtually”12 ) hot, according to the Aristotelian physics (because dry

heat is the property of fire which is not found in the supra-lunar
realm), but it causally behaves as though it were. This is also the sense
in which Aquinas claims that inferior substantial forms are “virtually
contained” in a superior form – e. g., the form of elements or a vegeta-
tive soul in a human rational soul.13 A human soul is not a vegetative
soul, but it can perform the functions of one.
Now it seems that in the notion of virtual distinction, insomuch as it is con-

ceived by Mastri, all these three senses are somehow present, although Mastri
never explicitly distinguishes them:
– The two quasi-formalities which are merely virtually distinct are not,
of course, distinct actually a parte rei: so, in the thing itself, the dis-
tinction is there merely potentially, and this potentiality is only actual-
ized by the conceiving intellect (sense 1).
– At the same time, the thing is, in virtue of having a virtual distinction
in itself, conceived as causally (co‐)responsible for bringing about the
actual distinction in the intellect (actually, this sort of a “causal” expla-
nation of the possibility of having two distinct concepts of a thing
which is a parte rei one and the same was the main strategy underly-
ing the Intentional Distinction Theory as criticized by Scotus):14 the
thing has the virtue of producing two distinct cognitive acts in the in-
tellect, and, by consequence, two distinct objective concepts (sense 2).
– And, finally, the thing behaves, epistemically, as if it were of itself actu-
ally distinct, even though it is not (sense 3).15
On the other hand, Mastri is well aware of the force of Scotus’s Final Blow Argu-
ment which establishes that mere different objective beings cannot distinguish
two objective concepts epistemically, because they are not part of the conceived
12 Both properties contained sense(2)-formally and properties contained sense(2)-virtually

in an object are contained in that object sense(3)-formally: a man truly is capable of laughter,
just like he truly is rational or an animal. On the other hand, the Sun is not truly hot, the
quality of heat is neither contained in its essence nor does it flow from it as its necessary prop-
erty.
13 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, STh I, q. 76, art. 3, co. (ed. Leonina V), 221b.
14 For details, see Novák, “Qui melius scit exponere, exponat!”
15 Cf. Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 14, n. 263, 315a: “[D]istinctio ratiocinata versatur circa
rem, quae licet a parte rei sit una, tamen ob sui eminentem naturam aequivalet pluribus rebus,
ac formalitatibus […], et haec virtualis multiplicitas […] dicitur fundamentum, unde movetur
intellectus ad formandos diversos conceptus […].” (My italics.)
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308 Lukáš Novák
conceptual content, or the objects-qua-conceived. And not only that – Mastri

even himself explicitly argues against such a position (defended by Zaccaria
Pasqualigo, † 1664), asserting that a direct cognitive act (a formal concept grasp-
ing something real) does not conceive the actual plurality of merely virtually dis-
tinct (quasi‐)formalities, but causes it:16
For although by these two cognitive acts the plurality and distinction of these formalities
is not cognized, […], the plurality and distinction of formalities is caused by this twofold
cognition […].17
To conceive (as opposed to produce) this plurality produced by the first, direct
act, a second, reflexive act would be needed:
16 For Mastri’s critique of Pasqualigo’s position, see Knebel, “What About Aureol?” Knebel
makes several intriguing claims on the relationship between Pasqualigo, whose position he signifi-
cantly traces back to Auriol, and Mastri. Although I find his linking of Pasqualigo to Auriol cor-
rect, I disagree with Knebel’s general optics, which, in my opinion, exaggerates the differences
between authors by placing selective emphases on different elements of their doctrines; this also
leads him to several quite inadequate theses, such as his characterizing the Auriol-Pasqualigo posi-
tion as a sort of aprioristic phenomenology. In my view, the crucial difference between the “Auri-
ol-Pasqualigan” and the “Scotus-Mastrian” position stems from Auriol’s contention that the esse
obiectivum (or apparens) is cognitively inseparable from the appearing content: a claim based on
a rather “Berkeleyan” argument that an unconceived thing is inconceivable (under pain of contra-
diction). Cf. Petrus Aureolus, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 2, art. 4, 70bD. Cf. also the brief exposition of
Mastri’s account by Renemann, “Mastri on ‘praecisio obiectiva’,” 405–6. However, Renemann,
although he correctly rejects the misguided traditional label “conceptualist” for Auriol, seems to
tentatively ascribe to him the theory of “abstraction by means of confusion” (as opposed to objec-
tive precision). In fact, Auriol’s theory of universals (well presented, albeit once again under the
misnomer of “conceptualism,” by Friedman in sect. 3 of his article on Auriol in The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy) involves objective precision in everything but a name – and objective
precision is the hallmark of (moderate) realism (see Novák, “Confusion or Precision?,” 171–78).
“Confused,” as applied to a concept, can mean as much as “universal” without any nominalist
implications (ibid., especially 160 and 180–82). This is confirmed by the fact that Mastri does not
attack Pasqualigo’s Aureolian position as “nominalist” (conceptualism is called “nominalism” in
late scholastic jargon), but as a lame defence of realism (which leads to nominalism). For a vindi-
cation of Auriol’s being a realist, cf. Amerini, “Realism and Intentionality,” 250. Amerini (252–
59) also stresses an analogical point about Auriol’s relation to Hervaeus Natalis: Auriol is not less
realist (universals-wise) than Hervaeus, but unlike him he denies (confusedly, according to
Amerini) the possibility of distinguishing the cognized thing from its being cognized. It seems to
me that Amerini’s criticism of Auriol’s misunderstanding of Hervaeus is ultimately the same
point Mastri makes against Pasqualigo. See also Lička, “Perception and objective being,” for a
convincing vindication of Auriol’s direct realism and general closeness to Scotus.
17 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 16, art. 2, n. 304, 333a: “[Q]uamvis enim per illas duas cogni-
tiones non cognoscatur pluralitas, et distinctio illarum formalitatum, sed tantum per actum
reflexum, adhuc tamen illa pluralitas, et distinctio formalitatum per duplicem illam cogni-
tionem causatur […].” (Quotation continued in note 21.)
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It must be said that prior to the direct act by means of which the intellect divides one and
the same object into a plurality of formalities, a virtual and fundamental distinction pre-
exists in the object. This distinction is only reduced to act and completed by the act of
cognition. And just like it was said to exist subjectively in reality […] while it was still
virtual, so also after it has been made actual, it must be said, as far as this foundation is
concerned, to exist subjectively in reality and objectively only in the intellect. Still, it is
true that by means of this direct act the formalities are not perceived as actually many –
rather, by means of that act, they become actually many. The former is only accomplished
in virtue of a reflexive act by means of which the formalities are cognized as actually
many and distinct. In virtue of the direct act they are cognized as merely virtually many
and as fundamentally distinct – even though they become actually many and distinct by
means of that act.18
The esse obiective or esse intentionale which is produced by a cognitive act is not,
therefore, cognized by that very same act, and so it cannot serve as the distin-
guishing factor of the objective concept that terminates this act – which is pre-
cisely Scotus’s point in his Final Blow Argument:
When, in virtue of the distinction of reasoned reason, [the formality] animal is cognized
in a man while [the formality] rational is left uncognized, [the formality] animal is not
cognized according to some intentional being which it has in virtue of being cognized,
but according to its real being – although by means of such an act it is not cognized as
actually prescinded from [the formality] rational (as that would require a reflexive act),
but it is being actually prescinded from [the formality] rational by that very act. It is
therefore wrong to say that the distinction of reasoned reason accounts for a distinction
in the object precisely insomuch as it exists intentionally in the intellect, and that in this
way one and the same real object can terminate distinct acts of cognition, viz. according
to its distinct intentional beings. Proof of the assumption: […] By prescinding animal
from rational, I cognize the animal insomuch as it is an ensouled sensitive substance and
insomuch as it is endowed with sensitive operations; but these and similar predicates
belong to it insomuch as it exists in reality and not according to some objective and
intentional being.19
18 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 16, art. 2, n. 304, 332b: “[D]icendum est antecedenter ad ac-
tum rectum, quo intellectus partitur idem obiectum in plures formalitates, praecedere in objec-
to distinctionem virtualem, et fundamentalem, quae ad actum reducitur, et completur per ip-
sam cognitionem, et sicut quando erat virtualis dicebatur subjective in re, et in objecto, sic
etiam ratione talis fundamenti, postquam facta est actualis, dici debet esse subiective in re, et
obiective solum in intellectu. Verum est tamen per illum actum rectum non attingi formalitates
illas ut actualiter plures, immo potius per ipsum fiunt actualiter plures; sed hoc habetur solum
ex vi actus reflexi, quo cognoscuntur illae formalitates, ut actualiter plures, et distinctae; ex vi
autem actus recti cognoscuntur solum ut virtualiter plures, et fundamentaliter distinctae, licet
per ipsum fiant actualiter plures, et distinctae […].”
19 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 16, art. 2, n. 313, 336a: “Quando ex vi distinctionis ratiocinatae
cognoscitur animal in homine non cognito rationali, tunc non cognoscitur animal secundum
aliquod esse intentionale, quod habeat ex vi cognitionis, sed secundum esse reale, licet per
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310 Lukáš Novák
In short, a direct cognitive act – that is, a formal concept directed at something
real qua real – only grasps the real aspects of its object, i. e., those that had been
out there prior to its being conceived. Intentional or objective being (Mastri uses
these terms interchangeably) is not among them.
But what is then the source of the actual plurality of the cognitive acts, and,
consequently, of the objective concepts intended by these acts – if not the plu-
rality of objective beings? Mastri’s response is that it is sufficiently founded by a
“virtual plurality of the object(s)”:
The plurality of cognitions derives also from the virtual plurality of the object. For an
effect can perfectly well depend, according to its formal being, on a virtual cause – as for
example heat comes from the virtual hotness of light, and a creature from God qua virtu-
ally containing their [viz. creatures’] perfection […]. Wherefore […] it is to be said that
prior to its being cognized, the object has of itself a virtual capacity to terminate a plurali-
ty of inadequate cognitions according to various formalities; and for that reason, this
twofold termination is grounded in the object rather than in the intellect.20
This “virtual plurality” is something that exists really in the object, and so –
unlike the distinct intelligible beings – it can be part of the conceived content, it
can “terminate the cognition”:
For although by these two cognitive acts the plurality and distinction of these formalities
is not cognized, […], the plurality and distinction of formalities is caused by this twofold
cognition, and what is only perceived by it is a virtual and fundamental plurality. There-
fore, […] it is to be said that these cognitions terminate neither at objects distinct actual-
ly ex natura rei prior to being cognized, nor at the object insomuch as it has an actual
talem actum non cognoscatur, ut praecisum actualiter a rationali, quia ad hoc requiritur actus
reflexus, sed eo ipso actu praescinditur a rationali, ergo falsum est ex vi distinctionis ratioci-
natae derivari distinctionem in obiecto praecise, quatenus intentionali modo existit in intellec-
tu, et hac ratione idem obiectum reale secundum diversa esse intentionalia posse diversas ter-
minare cognitiones. Probatur assumptum […] quia in praecisio animalis a rationali cognosco
animal, secundum quod est substantia animata, sensitiva, et secundum quod ei conveniunt ope-
rationes sensitivae, sed haec, et similia praedicata ei competunt, secundum quod est a parte rei,
non autem secundum aliquod esse obiectivum, et intentionale.” Note that Mastri’s argument
here assumes his opponent’s view that the distinction between animal and rational is merely
virtual – which, of course, is not his own position.
20 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 16, art. 2, n. 304, 332b: “[I]psa quoque cognitionum pluralitas
actualis pendet a virtuali pluralitate obiecti, bene enim potest effectus secundum suum esse
formale dependere a causa virtuali, ut calor est a calore virtuali Lucis, et creatura a Deo, ut
virtualiter continente perfectiones illarum […]. Quare […] dicendum obiectum antecedenter
ad cognitionem habere virtualiter, quod possit plures terminare cognitiones sui inadaequatas
secundum diversas formalitates, atque ideo duplex illa terminatio potius ex parte obiecti se
tenebit quam ex parte intellectus.”
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plurality in virtue of its being cognized, but at the object insomuch as it has a virtual
plurality and distinction prior to its being cognized.21
This “virtual and fundamental plurality” which is not “actual and formal plurali-
ty” therefore, according to Mastri, suffices to enable abstraction by means of ob-
jective precision:
Thus, although prior to the cognitive act by means of which, e. g., animal is prescinded
from rational – or, to use an example conceded by all,22 prior to the act by means of
which the calefactive power of the Sun is prescinded from its exsiccative power there are
no ex natura rei distinct formalities in the Sun, still they precede the act as distinct virtu-
ally and fundamentally. And from this virtual plurality of objects also derives the plurali-
ty of acts: for these acts, being confused and inadequate, tend to their objects not inso-
much as they are really and formally a parte rei one, but insomuch as they are virtually
many and distinct. And by this antecedent virtual distinction in the object, objective pre-
cisions made by the intellect are vindicated. For by means of a direct act of intellect one
[formality] is so prescinded from another that although in reality it is formally one and
the same thing and realitas, still, owing to the virtual distinction and multiplication, it
terminates distinct acts of cognition so that one [formality] terminates an act which the
other does not terminate. And so it is clear that objective precisions arising from the
“reasoned” distinction would not be successfully vindicated by saying that the distinct
formalities terminate distinct acts of cognition according to their distinct intentional be-
ings – for the distinction of reasoned reason is not a distinction between two beings of
reason. Rather, [objective precision] is vindicated precisely by means of a diversity of
formalities pre-existing in the object: not, to wit, an actual and formal diversity, but a
virtual and fundamental one.23
21 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 16, art. 2, n. 304, 333a: ”Quamvis enim per illas duas cogni-
tiones non cognoscatur pluralitas, et distinctio illarum formalitatum […], adhuc tamen illa
pluralitas, et distinctio formalitatum per duplicem illam cognitionem causatur, et per illam at-
tingitur pluralitas tantum, et distinctio virtualis, et fundamentalis; unde […] dicendum est illas
cognitiones neque terminari ad obiecta distincta actualiter ex natura rei ante cognitionem,
neque ad obiectum ut habet pluralitatem, et distinctionem ex vi cognitioni, sed ad obiectum, ut
habet pluralitatem, et distinctionem virtualem ante ipsam cognitionem […].” (This is a con-
tinuation of the quotation given in note 17.)
22 Again, Mastri has been assuming here the Thomist position which posits the virtual dis-
tinction on the categorial level.
23 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 16, art. 2, n. 314, 336a: “Quare […] licet antecedenter ad co-
gnitionem, qua animal v. g. praescinditur a rationali, vel ut utar exemplo ab omnibus concesso,
qua virtus calefactiva in Sole praescinditur ab exsicativa, non praecedant in Sole huiusmodi
formalitates ex natura rei distinctae; praecedunt tamen ut distinctae virtualiter, et fundamen-
taliter, et ex hac virtuali pluralitate obiectorum pendet etiam pluralitas actuum, nam isti actus
tendunt in illa obiecta, non quidem ut unum realiter, et formaliter a parte rei, quia sunt actus
confusi, et inadaequati, sed ut virtualiter plura, et distincta. Et ratione istius distinctionis virtua-
lis in obiecto praecedentis salvantur praecisiones obiectivae per intellectum factae, nam per
actum intellectus rectum ita una praescinditur ab alia, quod licet a parte rei sit una, et eadem
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312 Lukáš Novák
So, what are we to make of all this? It is clear that Mastri concedes Scotus’s main
point against Henry, viz. that a plurality of cognitive acts presupposes a certain
plurality on the part of their objects. Moreover, he concedes Scotus’s point that
this plurality on the part of the objects cannot be reduced to the plurality of
intentional beings which, being produced by these acts, is posterior to them and
thus already presupposes the plurality of acts as established on some other
grounds. An object considered qua existing intentionally in the intellect is a be-
ing of reason – i. e., something that as such is not real: it is an objective concept,
not a real thing; therefore, it is not that which real concepts (such as “animal”
and “rational”) intend.
The crucial ingredient of Mastri’s position is, therefore, the notion of “vir-
tual plurality” and his contention that an actual plurality of acts can be derived
from a merely virtual plurality of objects. The notion of virtual plurality is de-
signed to open a loophole in Scotus’s argument as an alternative he had not
considered. But is there room for such an alternative at all? Can the notion of
virtual plurality be given such a meaning as to justify Mastri’s attempt to avoid
the Scylla of a universal need for the formal distinction as a sine qua non of
objective precision?
It is clear from what I have said so far that to understand “virtual plurality”
merely in sense (1) – that is, in the sense of “potential plurality” – would not
help at all. For to say that “the object has a virtual capacity to terminate a plural-
ity of inadequate cognitions” would in this sense mean that the object has a
merely potential capacity to terminate a plurality of cognitions, that is, that the
object can have the capacity but does not actually have it – and therefore it actu-
ally is not capable of terminating a plurality of acts. To be present potentially is,
in plain English, not to be in fact present, and so a plurality which is merely
potential is not, as a matter of fact, a plurality. To do the required job, therefore,
virtuality must mean something more than mere potentiality.
What about adding sense (2)? Thus interpreted, “virtual plurality” would,
in addition to meaning (1), include a capacity to produce a plurality of acts. This
interpretation is strongly suggested by Mastri’s only attempt to anchor his asser-
tions concerning virtuality in a general principle: viz. when he says that “an ef-
fect can perfectly well depend, according to its formal being, on a virtual cause.”
But this is simply the “causal strategy” considered by Scotus and found wanting
res, et realitas formaliter, tamen ob virtualem distinctionem, et multiplicitatem varias terminat

cognitiones, adeo ut una hanc numero congnitionem terminet, quam non terminat alia. Et sic
patet, quomodo praecisiones obiectivae ortae ex vi distinctionis ratiocinatae non per hoc bene
salventur quod distinctae formalitates terminent distinctas cognitiones, secundum diversa esse
intentionalia, quia […] distinctio rationis ratiocinatae non cadit inter diversa entia rationis, sed
salvatur praecipue ob diversitatem formalitatum praecedentem in obiecto, non quidem for-
malem et actualem, sed virtualem et fundamentalem.”
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on epistemic grounds: we must explain not only how the plurality of cognitive
acts is possible causally, i. e., how it is possible that one and the same thing caus-
es more than one cognitive act, but how it is possible epistemically, viz. how
there can be two altogether distinct conceptual contents which are both perfectly
identical to one and the same external reality. And on interpretation (1+2), the
object is one and the same reality or formality – because being “virtually” many
does not mean anything beyond (1) being capable of being multiplied but not in
fact multiplied and (2) being capable of producing many cognitive acts. “To
grasp the object according to its virtual plurality” would therefore just mean to
grasp it according to its non-existent plurality, and so any two concepts of such
an object would have perfectly identical content – they would be just one and
the same concept thought several times over, as we have seen.
Interpretation (3) seems to be the most promising one. Accordingly, an ob-
ject having a virtual plurality means that the object is actually one but it behaves
as if it were many: and, on that account, it is capable of terminating many cogni-
tive acts. For clarity’s sake, let us imagine how that would work on the categorial
level.24 For example, the one and actually undistinguished (let us assume that for
the sake of argument) formality of man might present itself to the intellect either
as the (quasi‐)formality man, or as the (quasi‐)formality animal, or as the for-
mality rational, or as any of the higher-generic formalities such as substance or
living being. Thus, it seems, we would finally have what we had been striving for:
viz. several distinct concepts which truly differ according to their conceptual
content, yet grasp a formality which is really and formally one and the same.
Mastri, of course, would not apply this notion of virtual plurality on the catego-
rial but on the transcendental level, but this is not our concern here: the hypo-
thetical application to categorial concepts only serves to clarify the notion itself.
Unfortunately, the feasibility of this interpretation is just an illusion: for it
merely attempts to solve the problem by a fiat, so to speak. The notion of virtual
plurality in this sense simply stipulates the desired solution, without, however,
securing any conceptual room for it.
For what does it mean that one and the same formality behaves or presents
itself as though it were many? Does the formality man which presents itself now
as if it were the formality animal, now as if it were the formality rational, now as
if it were some other higher genus, merely pretend to be these distinct objects
24 I am taking the same liberty as Mastri by exploring this notion of virtual plurality on the
categorial level, although an example true to Mastri’s actual views would have to involve tran-
scendental, not categorial concepts. But the scope of application is not at issue here: we are
exploring the very notion of virtual plurality as such, and categorial concepts just serve as an
uncomplicated hypothetical example. For, unfortunately, in Mastri the transcendental level in-
volves additional problems which I would like to avoid here – see my “Scoti de conceptu entis
doctrina” and note 36 below).
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314 Lukáš Novák
without actually being them? If so, it would seem that the concepts animal and
rational are in fact fictitious – they grasp not something real but something fake.
Or shall we say that when the formality man presents itself as animal or as ratio-
nal it also truly is these formalities? Then the concepts animal and rational will
be real, they will indeed grasp something that truly is out there – but as a matter
of fact, they will be one and the same concept. For if the formality man is the
same both as the formality animal and as the formality rational, then, by transi-
tivity of identity, man and rational are one and the same formality, one and the
same conceptual content. Ultimately, the dilemma is precisely the one repeatedly
stressed by Scotus.25 No matter how the formality man presents itself or what it
pretends to be, either what is grasped by the concepts animal and rational is
identical to that selfsame and actually undistinguished formality, and then they
are one and the same concept, or it is not, and then it is not anything that can be
essentially predicated of a man.
It seems, therefore, that while Mastri’s notion of virtual plurality captures
the desideratum of his (or, rather, the Thomist) theory, it ultimately fails to pro-
vide any actual vindication of that theory and is open to the same sort of devas-
tating critique which Scotus poured upon the poor Henry.
5. What about Charybdis?

If my analysis is correct, Mastri failed in his attempt to secure a conceptual place
for objective precision without the formal distinction and so fell victim to the
abovementioned Scylla. But let us now suppose, for the sake of analysis, that he
succeeded. Perhaps I have made a mistake, perhaps there is a way to conceive
the virtual distinction or a virtual plurality so as to slip through the net of Sco-
tus’s reasoning. Assuming that Mastri can avoid Scylla, we can still ask: is there
a way that doing so he may escape Charybdis? Assuming that Scotus’s argu-
ments proving the necessity of the formal distinction can be thwarted some-
where, how do we avoid the same strategy being successful everywhere? If the
formal distinction is not a necessary condition for objective precision, how shall
we ever prove its existence at least somewhere? Or, more specifically:
(1) Can Mastri, on this assumption, make Scotus’s argument for the for-
mal distinction from the possibility of objective precision work some-
where?
(2) And, if 1) is not possible, can he possibly prove the formal distinction
in some other way?
25 Cf. Novák, “Qui melius scit exponere, exponat!,” figures 2 and 3 depicting the “Argument
form Veridicity.”
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5.1 An Argument from Objective Precision?
In Mastri’s treatment of the matter I can discern the following main arguments
for the formal distinction:26
(1) From diversity of definitions: a difference in definition presupposes a
distinction between formalities;27
(2) From distinct adequate conceivability: distinct adequate concepts pre-
suppose distinct formalities.28
(3) From composition of created things: created things cannot be as simple
as God is, therefore they must be a parte rei composite;29
(4) From order of metaphysical grades: a genus is ex natura rei prior to a
differentia, therefore they must be ex natura rei distinct;30
(5) From contradiction: contradictory predicates presuppose a parte rei
distinct subjects;31
(6) From Holy Trinity: God’s one essence must be formally distinct from
the relations that constitute the three Persons.32
Now since we are inquiring about Scotus’s philosophical arguments for the for-
mal distinction, we can disregard argument (6). Of the remaining five, the first
two can be interpreted as slightly modified incarnations of Scotus’s argument
from possibility of abstraction; and, as a matter of fact, Argument (1) ultimately
boils down to Argument (2). Mastri first formulates Argument (1) in the follow-
ing way:
The first argument is from definitions: many items which are really identical have differ-
ent definitions […]. Therefore, since a definition expresses the formal and quidditative
being which the thing has in reality prior to any work of the intellect whatsoever, an
actual distinction in reality must be conceded between these items, one that is stronger
than a distinction of reason or a virtual distinction but weaker than a real distinction.
This is confirmed because separability indicates a proportionate distinction of the separa-
ble items. Therefore, just like real separability proves a real distinction between what is
thus separable, so separability according to conceivability required actually ex natura rei
26 See esp. Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 11, art. 1, n. 214ff., 296a ff., and the places cited below. In
my presentation, I am systematizing Mastri’s rather chaotic treatment dispersed over several pla-
ces.
27 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 11, art. 1, n. 214, 296a–b.
28 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 11, art. 1, n. 218, 297a.
29 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 11, art. 1, n. 218, 297b; cf. also Mastrius / Bellutus, Logica,
disp. 5, q. 3, art. 2, n. 127, 182b, and Mastrius, Met., disp. 8, q. 6, art. 2, n. 187, 61a–b.
30 Mastrius, Met., disp. 8, q. 6, art. 2, n. 188–189, 61b–62a.
31 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 11, art. 1, n. 215–216, 296b–7a; but also Met., disp. 6, q. 12, n.
242, 306b, and Mastrius, Met., disp. 8, q. 6, art. 2, n. 190–193, 62a–63a.
32 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 11, art. 1, n. 217, 297a.
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316 Lukáš Novák
proves an actual distinction ex natura rei between thus conceivable contents which is
stronger than a distinction of reason and weaker than a real distinction.33
This argument is certainly prone to criticism in many respects. It seems to be a

concise version of Scotus’s Argument from Veridicity – the veridicity of distinct
concepts or definitions somehow implies the ex natura rei nature (i. e., mind-
independence) of the distinction between their contents – but it is nowhere as
elaborate and explicit as Scotus’s. It remains hazy why the fact that the contents
(rationes) expressed by the distinct concepts are extra-mental should imply that
the distinction between these contents is extra-mental as well. And one cannot
help suspecting that the required conclusion is somehow smuggled in by con-
ceptual separability being qualified as “required actually ex natura rei” – we are
never told what exactly this phrase means.
But the greatest problem of this argument is that it appears to prove too
much for Mastri. For concepts have distinct definitions not only on the categori-
al level, but also on the transcendental level – where, as we know, a mere virtual
distinction suffices to ground them.
Indeed – the same argument is commonly used by Scotits to prove the for-
mal distinction even on the transcendental level, as can be seen, e. g., in the Pra-
gue Scotist Bernhard Sannig (1637–1704), who argues:
I say, fourth, that the objective concept of being is metaphysically prescinded from the
special objective concept[s] of its subordinates and its modes and is formally distinct
from these concepts. […] The second part is proved: First, because being and its subor-
dinates and modes have different definitions […]; therefore, the objective concept of be-
ing is formally distinct from the objective concept[s] of its subordinates and its modes.
The inference holds because, in Scotism, different definitions of two identical things
prove the formal distinction.34
33 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 11, art. 1, n. 214, 296a: “[P]rima est via definitionis, nam multa
realiter identificantur, quae tamen variis definitionibus explicantur […]. [C]um igitur definitio
explicet esse formale, et quidditativum, quod habet res a parte rei antecedenter ad quodcumque
opus Intellectus, concedenda est inter illa plura aliqua distinctio actualis a parte rei, quae sit
maior distinctione rationis, et virtualis, et minor reali. Conf. quia separabilitas indicat propor-
tionatam distinctionem in extremis separabilibus, sicut ergo seprabilitas secundum rem arguit
inter extrema sic separabilia distinctionem realem, ita separabilitas secundum conceptibilitatem
exigita actu ex natura rei arguit actualem distinctionem ex natura rei majorem distinctione
rationis, et minorem reali inter rationes sic conceptibiles.”
34 Sannig, Schola philosophica scotistarum, tom. III, Met., disp. 2, q. 1, n. 11, 177b: “Dico quar-
to: conceptus obiectivus Entis est metaphysice praecisus a conceptu obiectivo speciali suorum in-
feriorum, et modorum; ac formaliter distinctus a conceptu eorundem. […] Probatur secunda
pars: Tum quia Ens, eiusque inferiora, et modi habent diversas definitiones, ut patet ex alibi dictis,
ubi Ens, substantiam, accidens etc. suis locis definivi: Ergo conceptus obiectivus Entis est for-
maliter distinctus a conceptu obiectivo inferiorum, et modorum. Consequentia tenet; quia diver-
sae definitiones duarum rerum identificatarum arguunt distinctionem formalem in via Scoti.”
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But a formal distinction between being and its subordinates is precisely what
Mastri rejects; and so, he needs to restrain the scope of the argument from defi-
nitions somehow. He does so immediately:
However, to tread this path of demonstrating the necessity of the formal distinction cor-
rectly, we must be aware that “definition” must be understood as one composed of ade-
quate concepts: for such [a definition] truly expresses the thing altogether as it is in reali-
ty prior to any work of the intellect whatsoever. A definition composed of inadequate
concepts, on the other hand, does not express the thing altogether as it formally is in
reality, and therefore a plurality of such definitions does not prove a formal and actual
distinction between the many items, but merely a virtual and fundamental one. And this
is why we said above that the formal distinction is concluded from separate conceivabili-
ty by a perfectly conceiving intellect: for if such an intellect says that one content is not
another, certainly such objective contents cannot be altogether identical in reality, or else
such cognition would not be true and perfect.35
So, not every distinction of concepts or definitions is sufficient to prove the for-
mal distinction, according to Mastri: they must be adequate concepts. And what
is an adequate concept? It is a concept that grasps the formality or reality which
it grasps in its entirety. The concept animal is adequate because it grasps the
entire formality animal. The concept of being, according to Mastri, is not adequ-
ate, because it does not grasp any formality in its entirety, but it grasps partially
both the formality of Infinite Being (God) and the formality of finite being.
There is no such item as the formality being as such to be adequately conceived
because the ratio entis is not, according to Mastri, formally distinct from its con-
tracting principles.36
35 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 11, art. 1, n. 214, 296a: “Verum ut hac via recte incedamus ad
ostendendam necessitatem formalis distinctionis, advertendum est, id intelligendum esse de
definitione, quae traditur per conceptus adaequatos; haec enim est, quae vere rem exprimit
omnino ut se habet a parte rei ante quodcumque opus intellectus, definitionem autem, quae
traditur per conceptus inadaequatos, non exprimit rem omnino, ut se habet a parte rei for-
maliter, et ideo pluralitas talium definitionum non arguit inter plura distinctionem formalem et
actualem, sed tantum virtualem, et fundamentalem; et ideo supra diximus distinctionem for-
malem sumi ex separatione conceptibilitatum in ordine ad intellectum perfecte concipientem,
si enim talis intellectus dicit unam rationem non esse aliam, non utique possunt tales rationes
obiectivae a parte rei esse omnino idem, alias cognitio illa non esset vera, et perfecta.”
36 There seems to be a serious confusion in Mastri concerning what exactly these contracting
principles are: viz. whether they are the intrinsic modes of finiteness and infinity or rather some
essential formal rationes, unknown to us, upon which the formally-modally distinct intrinsic
modes are grounded (which I believe is his actual, ill-expressed view). Cf. Novák, “Scoti de con-
ceptu entis doctrina”, 254–57; and the critical response in Forlivesi, “The Nature of Transcen-
dental Being.” Mastri agrees with Scotus in calling the concept of being “inadequate” and “imper-
fect,” but it is not clear whether he means the same thing as Scotus by these terms – in
particular, whether in Scotus it has the implication of the lack of any a parte rei distinction, even
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318 Lukáš Novák
The distinction between adequate and inadequate conceivability is therefore

crucial for the argument, and so Argument (1) really boils down to Argument
(2). But this precisely is the trouble: for how are we to discern which concept is
a modal one, as it seems to have for Mastri. For Scotus, the concept of being is inadequate and
imperfect simply because it abstracts from the intrinsic modi of finiteness and infiniteness (and
not from differentiae); cf. Ord. I, dist. 8, p. 1, q. 3, nn. 138–42 (ed. Vat. IV), 222–24. However,
the distinction between a reality/formality and its intrinsic mode is not a mere distinction of
reason but is a parte rei, both for Mastri and for Scotus – cf. ibid., n. 140 (ed. Vat. IV), 223: “Si
autem tantum esset distinctio in re sicut realitatis et sui modi intrinseci, non posset intellectus
habere proprium conceptum illius realitatis et non habere conceptum illius modi intrinseci rei
[…] sed in illo perfecto conceptu haberet unum obiectum adaequatum illi […].” (Italics mine.)
Mastri, however, seems to be committed to an incoherent triad: (i) the distinction between an
intrisic mode and what it modifies is ex natura rei; (ii) being is contracted by intrisic modes; (iii)
the distinction between being and its contracting principles is not ex natura rei but merely virtu-
al. Forlivesi (272–81) retorts that Mastri’s position can be made coherent sense of, suggesting
(279) that the contracting principles are intrinsic modes which are, exceptionally, merely virtual-
ly distinct from the inadequately conceived ratio entis (while in other cases intrinisc modes are
ex natura rei distinct from what they modify, in agreement with Mastri’s standard teaching on
the nature of modal distinction). But this contradicts Mastri’s explicit teaching that intrinsic
modes are not constitutive parts of an essence (cf. “Scoti de conceptu entis doctrina,” 254).
Moreover, Mastri never ever hints at the existence of any distinctio virtualis modalis in his cata-
logue of distinctions (instead, he clearly associates the modal distinction, which is ex natura rei,
with the contraction of being by the modes of finitude and infinity). At the same time, however,
he claims elsewhere (as Forlivesi himself notes on p. 275) that an ex natura rei distinct common
reality would have to be contracted by differentiae and generally seems to conceptually associate
contraction by modes with a mere rational distinction (which in turn he associates with “inade-
quate conceiving”). But that would rule out an ex natura rei modal distinction altogether, every-
where. So, I do not find Forlivesi’s vindication of the coherence of Mastri’s doctrine successful –
but a satisfactory response would require a separate paper (hopefully to be written, sometime).
Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 492–93, focuses on another aspect of the controversy
and supports Forlivesi’s view that the problem is somehow sidestepped by pointing out that ac-
cording to Mastri, there is no common realitas of being to be contracted, in the first place – the
contraction only takes place in our intellect. This is true, of course, but even a mere conceptual
contraction would require a virtual composition in reality of one contracted ratio and one con-
tracting ratio, merely virtually distinct from each other – and the question is, what these rationes
are like, and, if the contracting ones are intrinsic modes, how that squares with Mastri’s general
doctrine on modal distinction which is ex natura rei and not merely virtual. (Andersen verbally
endorses Forlivesi’s explanation of Mastri’s doctrine, but by acknowledging (492) that for Mastri,
finitude and infinity are modes not of being but rather of the primarily diverse realitates of God
and creature, he implicitly acknowledges my thesis that according to Mastri, the inadequately
conceivable, merely virtually distinct ratio entis must be contracted to the adequately conceivable
reality of either God or creature by some unspecified principles that are prior to the modi – which
contradicts Forlivesi’s position that the virtually distinct contracting principles are the modi.) In
the present paper, I simply assume that according to Mastri there is a virtual distinction between
being and its contracting principles and bracket the question of what their exact nature might be.
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adequate and which is inadequate – without knowing first where there are formal
distinctions in reality and where there are merely virtual ones? If the epistemic
criterion of the formal distinction is adequate conceivability, then the criterion
of adequate concepts cannot be that they are based on formal distinctions –
such an account would be circular. And it seems that the circularity is there in-
deed – for Mastri explicitly defines “formality” by means of adequate conceiv-
ability:
Formality is commonly defined by the Scotists as an objective content in a thing conceiv-

able by a perfect and adequate concept, distinct from a concept by means of which an-
other formality of the same thing is conceived. […] And it is said “by a perfect and
adequate concept” because an objective content which is conceivable inadequately cannot
properly be called a formality – such as, e. g., the ratio of being, of good, and any tran-
scendental grade. For such contents are not conceivable in reality by a perfect and ade-
quate concept but only by an inadequate one […].37
Thus, an adequate concept is such that it grasps a formality in its entirety, and a
formality is that which is conceivable by an adequate concept – there seems to
be no independent criterion of a concept’s adequacy. At any rate it seems clear
that as far as the logical and epistemic nature of the respective concepts is con-
cerned, adequate concepts do not differ from inadequate ones, as both are per-
fectly univocal, perfectly prescinded from their contracting principles etc.
The upshot is that by confining the efficacy of Scotus’s argument from the
possibility of objective precision to adequate concepts, Mastri effectively rejects
this argument, because he no longer regards the possibility of objective precision
as such as a sufficient ground for vindicating the formal distinction. By moving
from separate conceivability to separate adequate conceivability, Mastri in fact
drifts away from Scotus’s original principled reasons why the formal distinction
is necessary in metaphysics. For him, any argument capable of establishing the
formal distinction must be derived from the specific cases of its application, such
as the genus–differentia composition, the relation of an essence to its propria
passio,38 or the Trinity. The answer to the first question of this section must
therefore be no: Mastri cannot possibly adopt, or adapt, Scotus’s main meta-
physical argument for the formal distinction.
37 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 11, art. 1, n. 213, 295b: “Hinc apud Scotistas Formalitas definiri
solet esse rationem obiectivam conceptibilem in re aliquo conceptu perfecto, et adaequato dis-
tincto a conceptu quo concipitur alia formalitas eiusdem rei. […] [D]icitur autem conceptu
perfecto et adaequato, quia ratio obiectiva inadaequate conceptibilis proprie nequit dici For-
malitas, ut ratio entis, boni, et cuiuscumque gradus transcendentis, istae enim rationes non
sunt conceptibiles in re conceptu perfecto, et adaequato, sed tantum inadaequato […].”
38 For brevity’s sake, I leave aside the discussion of this application. Mastri’s treatment can
be found at Logica, disp. 5, q. 4, art. 1, nn. 180–83, 192a–b, and Met., disp. 6, q. 11, art. 1,
n. 218, 297b.
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320 Lukáš Novák
Moreover, the argument from adequate conceivability is as such circular. It

can only be upheld if it is reduced to some other argument that might provide
an independent justification of Mastri’s claim that only categorial grades are ad-
equately conceivable.
5.2 Other Arguments?
The insufficiency – i. e., ultimate circularity – of the argument from adequate

conceivability can be seen from the way Mastri tends to reduce it to his other
arguments. The following is one example:
The opponents concede that there can be a distinction in reality between items that have
an adequate conceivability but not between those that have a merely inadequate one. But
the generic and the differential grade are such that they have different adequate conceiv-
abilities – therefore, etc. Proof of the minor premise: [The formality] animal existing in
the man has of its nature one and the same conceivable content [ratio] as that which is
in the horse; and it can be adequately conceived according to its entire actual perfection
without [the formality of] rationality being conceived. For if it could not be thus ade-
quately conceived, it would include in its perfection some [additional] determining fea-
ture and so it could not posses intrinsically one and the same conceivable content [ratio]
both in the horse and in other species.39
Mastri clearly starts with the adequate conceivability argument but is forced to
vindicate the crucial premise – viz. that the genus and the differentia indeed are
adequately (and not merely inadequately) conceivable. How do we know that?
Well, because otherwise the formality that we grasp by means of a generic con-
cept would in reality include more content than is grasped by the concept – for
example, the formality grasped by the concept of animal would, in the man, also
include the ratio of the differentia rational (since there would be no distinction
a parte rei between the two), but in the horse it would include the ratio of some
other differentia – and so the formality conceived by a generic concept would be
a parte rei different in each species.
The problem is, however – why is this a problem? How do we know it is
not in fact so? For this is precisely how Aquinas and the Thomists understand
39 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 11, art. 1, n. 218, 297a: “Adversarii concedunt posse reperiri
distinctionem a parte rei inter illa, quae habent diversimodam conceptibilitatem adaequatam,
non autem quae habent inadaequatam, sed ita se habent gradus genericus, et differentialis,
quod diversam habent conceptibilitatem adaequatam, ergo etc. Probatur minor, quia animal
quod est in homine ex natura sua est unius, et eiusdem rationis cum eo, quod est in equo, et
adaequate concipi potest secundum totam suam propriam perfectionem actualem absque eo
quod concipiatur rationalitas, si enim ita adaequate concipi non posset, iam in sua perfectione
aliquid includeret ipsum determinans, et sic non posset esse eiusdem omnino rationis intrin-
sece in equo et aliis speciebus.”
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the nature of a genus: recall Aquinas’s insistence in De ente et essentia that a

genus or a species signifies the entire individual essence as a whole, albeit indis-
tinctly.40 It is not a bug but a feature of the Thomist (or, generally, non-Scotist)
position that the entire individual is, as it were, one single formality and any
universal concept only expresses it inadequately (because it at least fails to grasp
its individuality). How is this alternative excluded by Mastri’s argument? The
answer is that so far it is not, and I dare say Mastri knows that: for he rushes to
offer another argument for the crucial minor premise:
Another proof of the same minor premise: God only conceives things adequately and
distinctly. But God conceives the sameness and the difference of the man and the brute,
for he does not conceive them as differing by their entire essence (or else either the man
or the brute would not be an animal) nor as being the same according to their entire
essence (for then he would cognize the brute as being no less a rational animal than the
man). Therefore, to grasp both the sameness and the difference of the man and the brute,
God clearly must conceive those grades as ex natura rei and adequately distinct; and if he
did not so conceive them, he would certainly perceive neither the difference between the
man and the brute nor their sameness, which is absurd.41
We are here witnessing Mastri’s reasoning gradually delving into what seem to
me to be his deepest reasons for the necessity of the formal distinction – viz.
those derived from the need to vindicate the reality of both sameness and differ-
ence (or similarity and dissimilarity) between two species of the same genus (or
two inferior genera of the same superior genus). An immediate retort to the giv-
en argument could be that the very same argument could be applied to the tran-
scendental concept of being: God certainly must perceive both the difference (in
the respective modes of finiteness and infinity) and similarity (in the common
ratio entis) between Himself and the creatures – and yet Mastri does not posit
the ratio entis as ex natura rei distinct from its contracting principles. God, ac-
40 Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia, c. 2 (ed. Leonina XLIII), 373a: “[…] [S]icut […]
genus, prout praedicabatur de specie, implicabat in sua significatione, quamvis indistincte, to-
tum quod determinate est in specie, ita etiam et […] species, secundum quod praedicatur de
individuo, oportet quod significet totum id quod est essentialiter in individuo, licet indistincte.”
Ibid., c. 3 (ed. Leonina XLIII), 374a: “[…] ratio generis vel speciei conveniat essentiae, secun-
dum quod significatur per modum totius, ut nomine hominis vel animalis, prout implicite et
indistincte continet totum hoc, quod in individuo est.”
41 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 11, art. 1, n. 218, 297a: “[P]robatur etiam eadem minor, quia
Deus non cognoscit res, nisi adaequate, et distincte, sed Deus cognoscit convenientiam, et dif-
ferentiam inter hominem, et brutum, non enim concipit illa in tota essentia differe, quia vel
homo, vel brutum non esset animal, neque in tota essentia convenire, quia tunc cognosceret
brutum non minus esse animal rationale, quam sit homo: ut ergo cognoscatur a Deo con-
venientia, et differentia hominis, et bruti, plane concipere debet gradus illos, ut ex natura rei, et
adaequate distinctos, quod si eos non concipit, certe discrimen inter hominem, et brutum, nec
convenientiam inter illa attingit, quod est absurdum.”
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322 Lukáš Novák
cording to Mastri, is both similar and dissimilar to creatures according to one

and the very same formality. So why does a coincidence of sameness and differ-
ence in creatures require the formal distinction (between the grade in which two
species are similar to each other and the grade in which they differ) while in
God it does not? We have just reduced the case to what seems to be Mastri’s
ultimate argument for the formal distinction – viz. to the Argument from Con-
tradiction, either explicitly or implicitly present at many places of his reasoning.
To facilitate understanding, I will first sketch the general outline of the ar-
gument and then proceed to show how Mastri implements it in his texts. The
gist of the argument consists in an inference that can be expressed in the follow-
ing way:
(x is F) & (y is not F),

therefore, there is a distinction between x and y;
or perhaps more precisely,
(x is F qua R) & (x is not F qua S),

therefore, there is a distinction between the aspects R and S.
But what kind of distinction? Well, that depends on the kind of contradiction.
Mastri distinguishes three possible cases:42
42 Mastrius, Met., disp. 6, q. 11, art. 1, nn. 215–16, 296b: “Advertendum est […] non posse
hanc [formalem] distinctionem inferri ex quacumque contradictione absolute sumpta, quia
contradictio infert distinctionem praecise cum ipsa commensuratam, non maiorem, neque mi-
norem; si est contradictio facta per intellectum et secundum esse diversum esse rationis, infert
solam distinctionem rationis, ut constat in propositione identica de Petro posito a parte subjec-
ti, ac etiam praedicati; si est contradictio secundum esse reale, ac entitativum, ut esse, et non
esse absolute sumpta, aut saltem secundum praedicata ad tale esse spectantia, ut esse produc-
tum, vel non productum, causatum, vel non causatum, infert realem, ac entitativam distinc-
tionem inter extrema, de quibus verificatur; si denique est contradictio secundum esse formale,
aut praedicata ad tale esse spectantia, infert tantum formalem distinctionem, non vero realem
[…]. [D]istinctio virtualis non ponit actu aliquid diversum in extremis ante operationem intel-
lectus, ergo fundare non potest veritatem actualem utriusque partis actualis contradictionis, sed
poterit tantum fundare, quando accedente opere intellectus advenit distinctio actualis inter ex-
trema actu multiplicata per intellectum.” Cf. also Met., disp. 6, q. 12, n. 242, 306b: “[Q]ualis est
contradictio, talem etiam distinctionem ex ipsa inferimus; si est contradictio rationis, solam
infert quoque rationis distinctionem, si est contradictio realis, et actu a parte rei verificata, in-
fert pariter distinctionem ex natura rei actualem, et non tantum virtualem inter extrema de
quibus verificatur.”
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– The contradiction is entitative, (i. e., concerning matters of existence,

production, etc.) – then the distinction implied is a real distinction;
– The contradiction is formal and actual (i. e., concerning formal predi-
cates) – then the implied distinction is a formal distinction;
– The distinction is mind-dependent (i. e., only arises in dependence on an
act of the intellect) – then the implied distinction is a distinction of (ei-
ther reasoned or reasoning) reason.
So why, then, must the contradiction between sameness and difference (i. e., not-
sameness) be resolved by means of the formal distinction on the specific or
generic level, whereas on the transcendental level the mere virtual distinction is
sufficient? Elsewhere, Mastri provides an answer: because
God and creature are both the same and different in one and the same respect, but not in
the same way: for their difference is actual whereas their sameness is virtual and disposi-
tional – and this is not a contradiction.43
In other words: a man is both actually similar and actually dissimilar to a horse;
therefore, there must be an actual distinction in reality between the aspect of the
man’s essence according to which he is similar to a horse and the aspect of the
man’s essence according to which he is dissimilar to it. On the other hand, only
God’s dissimilarity to a creature exists actually a parte rei, whereas his similarity
is not actual but merely “virtual” or “dispositional” (aptitudinalis) – that is,
there is a disposition or aptitude a parte rei to be conceived as similar in terms of
the inadequate concept of being, but prior to the abstraction of this concept
there is no actual similarity.44
43 Mastrius, Met., disp. 2, q. 3, art. 1. n. 87, 49b: “Deus, et creatura secundum idem a parte
rei conveniunt et differunt, sed non eodem modo, nam differunt actualiter, conveniunt virtu-
aliter, et aptitudinaliter, quod non contradicit […].”
44 This, however, is not to say that the similarity is not real or a parte rei! According to
Mastri, the “virtual” or “inchoative” similarity between God and creatures is out there a parte
rei and ante opus intellectus, as irrespective of any work of any intellect both God and a crea-
ture are capable of causing a concept common to both (note again the causal language!). There
is a dialectic: qua in the thing, the similarity is real but merely virtual or fundamental, qua
actualized it is no longer real but merely “of reason.” Cf. Mastrius, Met., disp. 2, q. 3, art. 1,
nn. 86–87, 49b: “Circumscripto omni intellectu Deus, et creatura habent aliquam convenienti-
am, quia plus conveniunt, quam ens, et nihil; ergo illa convenientia est realis, et consequenter
fundamentum istius convenientiae debet esse reale, nempe realis unitas alicuius naturae com-
munis, quae conceptui entis correspondeat. […] Deus et Creatura ob infinitam eorum distanti-
am sunt primo diversa in realitate, adhuc tamen conveniunt in conceptu entis, et verum est
unitatem huius conceptus habere fundamentum reale, nempe realem convenientiam Dei, et
creaturae in ratione essendi; sed hic maxime advertendum […] similitudinem hanc realem
[…] ante abstractionem conceptus entis non esse actualem, et positivam […], sed adest tan-
tum convenientia fundamentalis, et aptitudinalis […] et talis convenientia fundamentalis est,
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324 Lukáš Novák
As already Scotus claimed, God and creatures are primo diversa in realitate
(despite not being so in conceptu) – although it is questionable whether he
meant the same thing, or derived from that assertion the same implications, as
Mastri.45 And for that reason, the contradiction of God’s being at the same time
and in the same respect (that is, according to one and the same formality) both
like and unlike the creatures is a mere “contradiction of reason” – it only arises
due to the way we conceive God, it is not an actual contradiction in reality.
It might seem that Mastri’s notion of a mere “virtual and dispositional
sameness/similarity” is an ad hoc construction, designed only to reconcile God’s
simplicity with the univocity of being. But it is not so. It is Mastri’s explicit and
systematic conviction that univocal concepts can be abstracted even from irre-
ducibly diverse realities that have nothing in common:
There are two possible grounds that may allow a thing to be grasped in a confused and
indistinct way according to some common feature. [i] Either that it has some reality ex
natura rei in common with another thing. On that account, whenever that reality is ade-
quately and distinctly conceived, at once anything that contains it and is therefore subor-
dinate to it will be said to be conceived in a confused and indistinct way. This is how
things are said to be conceived confusedly and indistinctly when they are grasped accord-
ing to their common categorial features. […] [ii] Another way a thing may be said to be
conceived confusedly and indistinctly is when it is conceived inadequately owing to a
certain affinity or as if an inchoative similarity which it has to another thing. This is how
things are said to be conceived when they are grasped according to transcendental fea-
tures: for such concepts are grounded not in one common nature existing in reality on
the part of both God and creatures but in a certain virtual and inchoative similarity be-
tween them.46
quod quodlibet istorum natum est causare conceptum communem ambobus, quoad rationem
essendi apud intellectum inadaequate concipientem […].”
45 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 82 (ed. Vat. IV), 190. In Scotus, ‘reality’ here
means the same as ‘formality’; and as it is made clear later (ibid., nn. 138–42, ed. Vat. IV, 222–
24), the “irreducible diversity in realitate” refers not simply to a diversity according to what is
really there, but to the realitates of God and creatures qua including their respective intrinsic
modes (of finiteness and infiniteness). It is doubtful that Scotus wants to imply that the distinc-
tion between a reality and its intrinsic mode is not actual a parte rei. He actually seems to
assert the opposite; cf. note 36 above.
46 Mastrius, Met., disp. 2, q. 3, art. 1. n. 82, 48a: “[R]es […] aliqua potest intelligi confuse,
et indistincte in signo quodam communi ex duplici capite: vel quia realitatem quandam ex
natura rei communem cum alia habet, unde cum illa adaequate, et distincte concipitur, statim
inferiora illam includentia dicuntur concipi confuse, et indistincte; et in hoc sensu res concipi
dicuntur confuse, et indistincte, quando attinguntur secundum gradus communes praedica-
mentales […]. Alio modo dici potest res aliqua concipi confuse, et indistincte, quia inadaequ-
ate concipitur ob aliquam convenientiam, et veluti inchoatam similitudinem, quam habet cum
alia re, et in hoc sensu concipi dicuntur, quando attinguntur per gradus transcendentales, quia
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And the case of God and creatures is not the only instance of this – another one,
explicitly noted by Mastri and quite ubiquitous, is agreement between irre-
ducibly simple finite formalities. Irreducibly simple ultimate generic and specific
differentiae are similar in their function of differentiating; individual differentiae
agree in differentiating individually – and yet they do not and cannot have – on
pain of infinite regress – any a parte rei distinct formality in common.47 Mastri’s
theory of a mere “virtual,” “inchoative,” or “dispositional” similarity can explain
this puzzle in the Scotist theory of common concepts – but not without a price.
The price is, of course, the ever-recurring problem that once the require-
ments on a necessary ground for the abstraction of common concepts are low-
ered in certain cases, their vindication in the other cases becomes problematic.
The argument that there must be instances of a merely “inchoative” or “virtual”
similarity is convincing enough – especially considering the case of the ultimate
differentiae. But how do we know that it is not the case that all instances of
similarity are merely “virtual” or “inchoative”? There is perhaps a certain persua-
siveness to the argument that the similarity of creatures to one another must be
of a substantially stronger sort than that between God and creatures (but could
not even that be explained merely by God’s infinity?). But ultimate differentiae
are not infinitely distant from one another, so what justifies the claim that, say,
an angel and a lump of quartz are substantially more similar than, e. g., the irre-
ducibly diverse ultimate differentiae rational and sensitive?
Unfortunately, Mastri never develops his suggestion that the notion of “vir-
tual similarity” might be applicable to ultimate differentiae or its implications for
the general discussion regarding the justification of the formal distinction. He
focuses on the case of God and creatures and the difference between “transcen-
dental” and “categorial” similarity – but even on this perspective there always is
the same worry lurking: if the formal distinction is not needed on the transcen-
dental level, why do we need it on the categorial level?
One of Mastri’s opponents who voices precisely this concern is his Irish
nemesis John Punch, who maintains the universal necessity of the formal dis-
tinction as a ground of abstraction, even with respect to the concept of being:
I know that the Thomists try to solve this and similar arguments that the Scotists employ
to demonstrate the formal distinction between metaphysical grades by means of their
“virtual” or “fundamental” distinction – and this is perhaps how Mastri will respond,
isti non fundantur in una natura communi reperta a parte rei in Deo et creatura, sed super
quandam virtualem, et inchoatam similitudinem, quae reperitur inter ipsa […].”
47 Mastrius, Met., disp. 2, q. 3, art. 1. n. 88, 49b–50a: “Sed sane non video, cur etiam ulti-
mae differentiae dici nequeant similes saltem fundamentaliter in ratione faciendi differre, cum
omnes eodem modo differe faciant scilicet ultimo, et ideo probabile censemus etiam ab ipsis
inadaequate conceptis abstrahi posse, si non conceptum entis, quia ipsum non includunt, sal-
tem conceptum ultimae differentiae, et haecceitatis […].”
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326 Lukáš Novák
too. But if such a response were valid here, it will be valid everywhere and we won’t be
able to demonstrate the formal distinction anywhere.48
Mastri defends himself, trying to vindicate the disparity between the categorial
and the transcendental level – and this indeed is his ultimate response:
You will object that this solution [viz. that even primo diversa can agree in a concept]
completely demolishes Scotus’s principal grounds for admitting common natures a parte
rei: […]. For [Scotus’s argument] is founded precisely in the contradiction that a man a
parte rei both agrees with a donkey and a horse (in being an animal) and differs from
them (in being rational). This is why these must be formalities distinct ex natura rei,
because simultaneous sameness and difference of two things in altogether one and the
same respect cannot occur.49
I respond by rejecting the validity of the inference. For Scotus is speaking of a real,
actual, and positive similarity in his argument, which is the one that occurs between indi-
viduals of the same species and between a man and a horse in their being sentient. Such,
however, is not the similarity occurring between God and creature in the ratio of being,
because it is merely virtual and fundamental, as has been said.50
You will say: why is the similarity between God and creature in being not actual
and positive while the one between a horse and a man in being sentient is? […] This is
obviously an ad hoc response.
I respond that the response is not ad hoc but well founded. For species and individ-
uals are not irreducibly diverse but “somewhat the same,” i. e., agreeing in some reality,
and therefore they ground a positive similarity to one another. God and creature, on the
other hand, are irreducibly diverse in reality, as everyone concedes, and therefore cannot
ground a real, actual, and positive similarity, but merely a virtual and fundamental one,
thanks to which both can cause the common concept of being in an inadequately con-
ceiving intellect. Besides, there is no doubt that God and creature are incommensurably
more distant than two species, or two individuals of the same species; and so there is no
48 Joannes Poncius, Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer, Met., disp. 2, q. 2, add.,
885a–b: “Scio Thomistas conari solvere haec et similia argumenta, quae adducunt Scotistae ad
probandam distinctionem formalem graduum Metaphysicorum, mediante sua distinctione vir-
tuali aut fundamentali, aut rationis ratiocinatae; et sic etiam fortassis respondebit Mastrius. At
si hic valeat illa responsio ubique valebit, et sic nullibi poterimus probare distinctionem for-
malem.”
49 Mastrius, Met., disp. 2, q. 4, art. 1. n. 88, 49b: “Sed dices per hanc solutionem penitus
enervari principale fundamentum, quo Scotus admittit naturas communes a parte rei […] nam
praecipue fundatur in hac contradictione, quod homo a parte rei convenit cum asino, et equo,
ut animal est, differt ab ipsis, ut rationalis est, ergo istae sunt diversae formalitates ex natura
rei, quia secundum eandem penitus rationem convenientia, et dissimilitudo inter aliqua duo
contingere non potest.”
50 Ibid.: “Respondeo negando consequentiam, quia in ea ratione Doctor loquitur de simili-
tudine reali, actuali et positiva, qualis est illa quae versatur inter individua eiusdem speciei, et
inter hominem, et equum in ratione sentiendi, talis autem non est similitudo, quae inter Deum,
et creaturam invenitur in ratione entis, quia […] est virtualis tantum, et fundamentalis.”
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wonder that there can be a positive actual similarity in the latter case while in the former
case there cannot […].51
It indeed seems that Mastri’s ultimate justification of the formal distinction is

that created things are much more similar to each other than they are to God,
and therefore there must be common natures separated from the differentiating
differentiae ex natura rei. But this is a very vague argument, incomparably less
clear than Scotus’s argument from the possibility of abstraction: for no one be-
side the Scotists has a problem in explaining how God is so much more different
from creatures than the creatures from one another, even though they are all
“irreducibly diverse,” according to the Scotist standards, because there are no
formal distinctions and therefore no ex natura rei common natures. Punch, to
be sure, is not convinced either:
This response, however, strikes me as merely formal, without any probability of its actual
content. Therefore, I say that if God and creature were so irreducibly diverse that they
had no actual similarity to each other but a virtual one,52 so that the formality in which
they agreed would not be a parte rei distinct from that in which they differ, the very same
should be said of created species and individuals in comparison to one another. And to
assert otherwise would be to beg the question, because no argument could be given that
would demonstrate that similarity and distinction in them. And, conversely, if a positive
similarity and an agreement in reality can be demonstrated, e. g., between a man and a
brute, it will be possible to demonstrate the same kind of similarity between God and a
creature in the ratio of being.53
51 Ibid.: “Dices, quare similitudo inter Deum, et creaturam in ratione essendi non est actu-
alis, et positiva, bene tamen inter equum, et hominem in ratione sentiendi […]; plane hoc
prorsus videtur voluntarie dictum. Respondeo non esse voluntarie dictum, sed satis ration-
abiliter, quia nimirum species, et individua non sunt primo diversa, sed aliquid idem entia, id
est in aliquo realiter convenientia, et ideo fundant similitudinem positivam ad invicem; at
Deus, et creatura sunt inter se primo diversa in realitate, ut apud omnes est in concesso, et ideo
fundare nequeunt realem actualem, et positivam similitudinem, sed tantum virtualem, et fun-
damentalem, ratione cuius ambo causare possunt conceptum communem entis apud intellec-
tum inadaequate concipientem; Tum quia nulli dubium est magis distare sine ulla proportione
Deum, et creaturam abinvicem, quam duas species, vel duo individua sub eadem specie, et ideo
mirum non est, si haec aliquam actualem positivam similitudinem fundare possunt, non illa
[…].”
52 Punch rejects that – according to him, God and creatures agree in the formally distinct
ratio entis.
53 Poncius, Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer, Met., disp. 2, q. 2, add., 888a: “Sed
haec responsio mihi videtur esse mere formalis, sine ulla probabilitate in re ipsa. Unde dico si
Deus et creatura sint ita primo diversa ut non habeant similitudinem actualem, sed virtualem
et propterea formalitas in qua conveniunt non distinguatur a parte rei ab illa qua disconveni-
unt, idem omnino dicendum de speciebus, et individuis creatis inter se comparatis, et gratis
asseri oppositum, cum nulla possit dari ratio ob quam similitudo, aut distinctio in ea probari
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328 Lukáš Novák
The plight of the Mastrian position is salient also in another Scotist’s work, that
of Crescentius Krisper (1679/1680–1749),54 a late Scotist who only rarely de-
parts from Mastri (he even provides a list of these exceptional departures in his
Philosophia scholae Scotisticae55 ). In the matter of distinctions, Krisper whole-
heartedly subscribes to Mastrianism and defends the doctrine of merely virtual
distinctions on the transcendental level. Nevertheless, when pressed by argu-
ments like those discussed above – such as the following:
You will object: There is no reason to multiply the formalities, for everything can be
explained by means of a single real ratio and a plurality of merely objectively distinct
rationes, inadequately conceived by the intellect in a thing; consequently, everything can
be achieved by means of [merely] intentional logical abstractions.56
– Krisper gives the following reply:
Against that: I reject the premise, […] because a created essence requires not only a
composition of accidents and modes, but also an intrinsic and essential one, since it can-
not possibly equal the simplicity of God […].57
What has happened here? Obviously, Krisper simply reduced the Argument
from Contradiction to yet another of Mastri’s arguments for the formal distinc-
tion, viz. the argument from necessity of metaphysical composition. This is one
of two arguments put forward by Mastri that I have not discussed so far; suffice
it to say that it ultimately rests upon the premise that the metaphysical composi-
tion of a genus and a differentia contradicts God; but only an a parte rei compo-
sition contradicts God, therefore, metaphysical composition must be a parte
possit. Et e contra si possit probari similitudo positiva, et convenientia aliqua in realitate inter
hominem, v.g. et brutum, posse idem probari inter Deum, et creaturam in ratione entis.”
54 For an overview of Krisper’s metaphysics cf. Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus,
930–32; for a summary of his (thoroughly Mastrian) take on distinctions in relation to intui-
tive cognition, see Andersen, “Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition,” 239–40.
55 Cf. Crescentius Krisper, Philosophia scholae scotisticae, “Indiculus alter materiarum, de
quibus in his operibus Scholae Scotisticae etiam ex Scoto impugnatus fuit Mastrius, alias qui-
dem celeberrimus et prae ceteris sincerior Scotista” at the back of the volume. As for Mastri’s
theses rejected by Krisper, they are eight in number in logic, six in natural philosophy and only
one in metaphysics. The “Indiculus” also lists seventeen of Mastri’s theological theses rejected
in Krisper’s previously published Theologia scholae Scotisticae.
56 Krisper, Philosophia scholae scotisticae, Log., disp. 3, sect. 3, q. 8, 278a: “Dices: frustra
multiplicantur formalitates cum omnia possunt salvari per unam rationem realem, et per plu-
res rationes solum obiective diversas, quas intellectus in eadem re inadaequate concipit: ergo
omnia possunt fieri per abstractiones intentionales logicas.”
57 Ibid.: “Contra nego antecedens, […] quia essentia creata exigit non solum composi-
tionem accidentium et modorum, sed etiam intrinsecam et essentialem, cum non possit ad-
aequare simplicitatem Dei […].”
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rei.58 Mastri’s subsequent discussion of this argument focuses on rejecting re-

sponses that maintain that metaphysical composition would be incompatible
with God’s simplicity even if it were conceived in terms of a mere virtual or
rationis ratiocinatae distinction; but it is hard to avoid the impression that the
cart is somehow put before the horse.
The argument treats the thesis that metaphysical composition contradicts
God’s simplicity as an a priori, undeniable truth – but there is hardly any justifi-
cation for that. If it turned out that the so-called “metaphysical composition”
(i. e., that condition of things which makes the abstraction of generic and differ-
ential concepts possible) in creatures does not, as such, involve any sort of im-
perfection, we would in fact have no reason to deny such composition to God. In
other words: we should first establish, on independent grounds, the nature of the
metaphysical composition in creatis, and then see whether it does or does not
involve an imperfection, and, by implication, whether it is compatible with God.
There is no way to know first that metaphysical composition is incompatible
with God, without having already ascertained its intrinsic nature. This argument,
therefore, seems condemned to epistemic circularity: its premise cannot be
known independently of its conclusion.
We are left with one last major argument put forward by Mastri, viz. the
one from order of priority and posteriority between a genus and a differentia.
Where there is order ex natura rei, there must be a distinction ex natura rei: but
metaphysical grades are ex natura rei ordered (a genus is prior to its differentiae,
since it is indifferent towards them, whereas each of the differentiae presupposes
the genus), ergo etc.59 The problem with this argument seems to be the same as
with the preceding one: viz. that it is ultimately circular. For how can we know
that a genus is ex natura rei prior to its differentiae, unless we have already
established that they are distinct formalities? For if they were not distinct, then
the ordering of the grades would be merely a logical one, only arising on the
level of objective being. Mastri’s reaction to this response is underwhelming: he
accuses the opponent of begging the question:
Against this: this solution obviously begs the question if you consider it well. For it as-
serts without any proof that which is in dispute: viz. that the entity of Peter is altogether
58 Mastrius / Bellutus, Logica, disp. 5, q. 3, art. 2, n. 127, 182b: “Compositio metaphysica ex

gradu generico, et differialis [sic] talis est, quod Deo repugnat, et eius summae simplicitati, ut
passim fatentur omnes, ergo est aliquo modo realis, et non rationis tantum, quia haec non tollit
simplicitatem a parte rei.”
59 Mastrius, Met., disp. 8, q. 6, art. 2, n. 188, 61b: “[I]nter quae est ordo ex natura rei inter
ea est distinctio ex natura rei, sed inter gradus Metaphysicos superiorem, et inferiorem est ordo
ex natura rei, ergo etiam consimilis distinctio.”
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330 Lukáš Novák
simple in reality without any distinction between the grades and any ex natura rei plural-
ity.60
But this is a most unusual reaction to a solution of an argument: instead of pro-

viding a restoration of his argument, Mastri attempts to shift the burden of proof
to his opponent. But the one who responds to an argument has no epistemic
obligation to prove anything! When an argument is discussed, the question is
whether it succeeds in imposing an epistemic duty on the respondent to accept
its conclusion or not; and one way the respondent may evade this duty is to
reject any as yet unjustified premise. In this case, the respondent did precisely
that: he rejected the minor premise of Mastri’s argument, viz. that a genus and
its differentiae are ex natura rei ordered. This rejection alone – without the need
of any proof – divests the argument of its epistemic force (viz. of its power to
impose epistemic duties), unless and until the rejected premise is supported by a
new argument. But instead of providing one, Mastri tries to convince the reader
that it is his opponent’s turn to deliver proofs. This is a logical fallacy known as
argumentum ad ignorantiam: an attempt to present as a proof of one’s own po-
sition the mere absence of a proof to the contrary. Mastri’s accusation of circular
reasoning thrown upon his opponent thus rather strengthens the suspicion that
it is Mastri’s own reasoning which is circular, and that it is Mastri who is out of
his arguments.
Mastri must be aware of this, and this is probably the reason why he offers
a formally correct restauratio argumenti after all: he argues that the ordering of a
genus and a differentia cannot be merely “of reason” because
[…] these grades are such that the prior ones can always be without the posterior ones
but not the other way around, and they can be so by their very nature and without any
fiction of the intellect: for a substance can be without animality, animality without hu-
manity, and humanity, in turn, without Petreity – but not the other way around. There-
fore, there really is between them essential subordination and priority […].61
The problem with this argument is that it again either proves too much or noth-
ing: since it could be, mutatis mutandis, applied to the transcendental level as
well. What hinders us from saying that being can be, of its very nature and with-
out any fiction of the intellect, without the modes of finiteness and infiniteness –
60 Ibid.: “Contra, quia in hac solutione, si bene perpendatur, committitur manifesta petitio
principii, quia in ea sine ulla probatione assertur, quod controvertitur, entitatem scilicet Petri
esse omnino simplicem a parte rei sine graduum distinctione et multiplicitate ex natura rei.”
61 Ibid.: “[…] qui gradus ita se habent, ut priores semper esse possint sine posterioribus,
non e contra, et hoc quidem ex natura sua, et absque ulla intellectus fictione, nam potest esse
substantia sine animalitate, et haec sine humanitate, et rursus haec sine Petreitate, non e con-
tra, ergo re vera inter eos est essentialis subordinatio, et prioritas secundum subsistendi conse-
quentiam.”
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and therefore is ex natura rei prior to these modes and, by implication, ex natu-
ra rei distinct from them? Any response compromising the force of this argu-
ment on the transcendental level could immediately be transferred to the catego-
rial level, because the same general argument applies to both.
Conclusion
With respect to the two questions formulated in Section 2, it seems to me that
Mastri failed in both respects, and thus fell prey, metaphorically, to both Scylla
and Charybdis at once. For one thing, he failed in neutralizing Scotus’s Final
Blow Argument, that is, failed to show how objective precision might be possi-
ble, vis-à-vis Scotus’s argument, without the formal distinction. Besides, he also
failed in providing convincing arguments for the necessity of the formal distinc-
tion that would be applicable exclusively at the categorial level. It seems to me,
therefore, that Mastri failed to show how it is possible to both (i) admit the
virtual distinction as a possible basis for objective precision, and (ii) keep the
formal distinction as justified at least somewhere. Qui melius scit Mastrium ex-
ponere, exponat!
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Decretum Concomitans
Bartolomeo Mastri on Divine Cognition
and Human Freedom
Claus A. Andersen
Introduction
The Disputationes theologiae from 1655 of Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673) is
structured after the model of the medieval commentaries on Peter Lombard’s
Four Books of Sentences and hence has a large section in the first part on divine
knowledge.1 Within this section, called Disputation on the Divine Intellect (Dis-
putatio de divino intellectu), Mastri’s long and nuanced discussion of divine
foreknowledge merits particular attention. In the time of Mastri, the theological
issue of divine foreknowledge and its relation to human freedom had gained
particular prominence, with the Jesuits and the Thomists each opting for their
particular doctrine on this subject as well as the related topics of grace and pre-
destination, thereby competing to establish the definitive Roman Catholic reac-
tion to the Protestant and Reformed views on these matters. Mastri, entering the
debate at a rather late stage (almost half a century after Paul V’s famous attempt
in 1607 to call off the controversy De auxiliis by prohibiting any further polem-
ics on the subject of grace), sets out to locate a clearly Scotist position in this
rather peculiar historical landscape called Early Modern theology.2
I thank those participants in the conference Cognitive Issues in the Long Scotist Tradition who
commented upon my paper; I further thank Daniel Heider (Budweis), Marco Forlivesi (Chi-
eti), Cintia Farago (Naples), and Robert Andrews (Kristinehamn) for their comments on draft
versions of this article (the latter also for accurate proofreading). Work on this article has been
funded by the Czech Science Foundation (project “Theory of Cognition in Baroque Scotism”,
no. GAČR 20–01710S).
1 For the publication history of Mastri’s Disputationes Theologiae, see Forlivesi, Scotis-
tarum Princeps, 394–426. The work had seven editions until 1757. I quote from the 1731 edi-
tion.
2 The literature on this aspect of Early Modern theology is abundant; recent survey studies
include Leinsle, Introduction to Scholastic Theology, 323–46 (especially regarding Mastri, see
331–34); Marschler, “Providence, Predestination, and Grace” (regarding the period’s Domini-
can and Jesuit theology); and Ballor, Gaetano, Sytsma, “Introduction: Augustinian Soteriology
in the Context of the Congregatio De Auxiliis and the Synod of Dordt” (overview of the theo-
logical interaction, in particular in regard to questions of free will, grace, and predestination,
across confessional boundaries in the decades around 1600; for case studies, see their volume).
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Baroque Scotism itself may be seen as a somewhat delayed Franciscan reac-

tion to intellectual developments that had already taken place within the afore-
mentioned as well as other Catholic intellectual schools. The very endeavor to
write an entire Cursus philosophicus ad mentem Scoti was an attempt, supported
by the Franciscan Order, to equal the philosophical cursus literature that for dec-
ades had been standard among the Jesuits and others – and with Mastri, to-
gether with his colleague and Conventual confrere Bonaventura Belluto (1603–
1676), and John Punch (1599 or 1603–1661), who by contrast belonged to the
Observant Franciscans, competing to be the first to complete a Scotist textbook
of philosophy.3 Not surprisingly, in theology we see a similar need to catch up
with what had been going on in the other religious orders in recent times. At the
same time, however, the Franciscans, contrary to the Jesuit newcomers, could
boast of their long Scotist tradition. This historical constellation is the back-
ground of Mastri’s discussion of divine foreknowledge, as is easily seen in his
preliminary presentation of what he perceives as the Scotist approach to this
topic:
We say […] that God from eternity concomitantly has been determining free future
events that stem from a created will, and that such a decree is a sufficient and appropriate
means of knowing them with certainty, also insofar as they happen freely. Since, how-
ever, this position certainly occupies the middle ground between the extremes represent-
ed by the Thomists and the Neutrals [i. e., the Jesuits] – for the first group only admits
antecedent decrees, whereas the second group only admits subsequent decrees based on
middle, or conditional, knowledge, and also for some people among the Scotists this po-
sition appears to be altogether new, something that has only recently been introduced
into our school – let me first show that this is not something new, but rather was the
approach of Scotus and the old Scotists.4
By contrast, there is only scarce literature on the place of the Franciscan and Scotist positions
in this debate; see, besides the mentioned chapter by Leinsle, also Becker, Gnadenlehre; Anfray,
“Prescience divine, décrets concomitants et liberté humaine;” and Forlivesi, “The Creator’s De-
crees and Foreknowledge” (with a helpful summary of the most important events in the con-
troversy De Auxiliis, 216–19).
3 Cf. Forlivesi, “The Ratio Studiorum of the Conventual Franciscans in the Baroque Age,”
and Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 16–18 and 33–38. Other Franciscan authors
competed in this race, as well; cf., particularly as regards the Scotist Gaspare Sghemma, For-
livesi, Scotistarum Princeps, 154–55.
4 Bartholomaeus Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 8, n. 168, 135b: “Dicimus itaque in hoc
sensu, Deum ab aeterno concomitanter determinasse eventus liberos a creata voluntate futuros,
& tale decretum esse sufficiens, ac idoneum medium ad eos certo cognoscendos, etiam qua-
tenus libere eventuros. Quoniam vero sententia haec mediat inter extremas Thomistarum &
Neutralium, admittentibus illis sola decreta antecedentia, istis vero sola subsequentia ratione
scientiae mediae, seu conditionatae; & nonnullis etiam ex Scotistis omnino nova videtur, ac
noviter introducta in nostra schola, prius ostendam, non esse novam, sed fuisse Scoti, & anti-
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Decretum Concomitans 335
Mastri goes on to explain that the first to advocate this Scotist doctrine as a solu-
tion to the contemporary debate was his own teacher at Naples (in the Conven-
tual studium) Giuseppe Napoli from Trapani on Sicily (1586–1649), in a manu-
script treatise on the harmony between the first and the second causes, and that
Trapani’s solution was adopted by another of Mastri’s teachers at Naples, Ange-
lo Volpe from Montepeloso († 1647), who discussed divine foreknowledge in the
second volume of his vast twelve-volume exposition of Scotist theology.5 In his
discussions of divine foreknowledge, Duns Scotus himself employs the terminol-
ogy of ‘concomitance,’ though not yet making this term the key concept of his
doctrine and even himself later discarding one of the most important passages in
question, along with the rest of distinction 39 of Ordinatio I, which was never-
theless included in all historical prints of this work.6 Neither is the announced
support from the earlier Scotist tradition overwhelming: Mastri, reproducing
references already given by Volpe, merely adduces Giovanni Vigerio’s (Minister
General of the Franciscans 1525–1530) explicit talk of the created will as a “con-
quorum Scotistarum.” Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 4, n. 109, 120b, defines the ‘Neutrals’
as Jesuits, who are neither Thomists nor Scotists.
5 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 8, n. 168, 135b–36a. Mastri’s references to Angelo
Volpe at this place are partially inaccurate. Volpe’s commitment to the doctrine of the con-
comitant decree, however, is beyond doubt; cf., e. g., Angelus Vulpes, Sacrae theol. summa, I,
vol. 2, disp. 30, art. 7, n. 8, 35a, and ibid., art. 11, n. 7, 56b. In their logical discussion of the
truth value of propositions concerning contingent future events, Mastrius / Bellutus, Disp. Log.,
disp. 10, q. 2, art. 5, n. 58 (Cursus philosophicus I), 308b, likewise refer to Trapani and Volpe,
and additionally mention Anteo Sassi as another of their teachers who also subscribed to Tra-
pani’s doctrine. Regarding Trapani and Volpe at Naples, see Forlivesi, Scotistarum Princeps,
85–93; according to Forlivesi, ibid., 102–3, Sassi may have been a kind of supervisor (rather
than a proper teacher) to the young Mastri, when the latter taught logic in his order’s studium
in Bologna. Marco Forlivesi confirmed to me that no manuscript with Trapani’s treatise is
presently known to have been preserved.
6 Cf., for instance, Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 39, qq. 1–5, n. 27 (ed. Vat. VI), Appendix A,
434; cf. also Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 40, q. unica, n. 10 (ed. Vat. VI), 313. Becker, Gnaden-
lehre, 64–68, has a useful survey and discussion of the Scotus passages quoted by Mastri in this
context; cf. especially Becker’s remark that ‘concomitance’ in Scotus does not seem to hold the
same technical value as it does for Mastri (ibid., 67). For a recent discussion of the reason why
Scotus ended up inserting blank leaves in lieu of his discussion of divine knowledge of contin-
gents in his personal copy of the Ordinatio (the famous Assisi codex), see Frost, “John Duns
Scotus on God’s Knowledge of Sins”; Frost, ibid., 34, concludes that it was Scotus’s reflection
on human sinful volition that made him realize that his doctrine of human and divine co-
causality in regard to human actions could not universally explain how God knows contingents
by knowing His own will. Among Mastri’s contemporaries, I have not detected any awareness
of Scotus’s later abandonment of his doctrine in the Ordinatio, which was indeed, throughout
the Early Modern period, the prime source of information concerning his view on divine fore-
knowledge.
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comitant second cause” of divine predestination,7 and – as a response to con-

temporaneous attempts to interpret Scotus as a proponent of the doctrine of an-
tecedent divine decrees – quotes the early Scotist John of Bassol († 1333) who
likewise stresses the created free will’s genuine, albeit secondary, causal power.8
In other words, Mastri fails to deliver the promised evidence of a long Sco-
tist tradition supporting the doctrine of the concomitant decree. It is therefore
not surprising that Mastri’s Scotist contemporaries from other Franciscan mi-
lieus did not support that particular interpretation of Scotus’s doctrine proposed
by Trapani. Mastri reports that Gaspare Sghemma (1590–1657), who was one of
Belluto’s early teachers, was critical toward the idea of proper concomitance, and
rather emphasized the subordination of the second causes to the primary cause
(which then seems to pull in the direction of antecedent divine causality).9 We
further learn that other Scotist theologians, such as Filippo Fabri (1564–1630),
Hugh McCaghwell (1571–1626), and the aforementioned John Punch, instead
opted for the Jesuit position.10 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz clearly – though most
7 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 8, n. 168, 136a; cf. Ioannes Vigerius, Lectura resolutissi-
ma, dist. 41, q. unica, 185va: “[A]dde concomitante voluntate creata volente bene uti et sic est
aliqua causa quare istum praedestinat […]. Nam voluntas divina non determinat nisi voluntas
creata se determinaverit, quia voluntas creata concurrit ut causa secunda.” Angelus Vulpes,
Sacrae theol. summa, I, vol. 2, disp. 30, art. 8, n. 6, 37b, already has this quote from Vigerio.
8 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 8, n. 172, 136b; cf. Ioannes de Bassolis, Sent. I, dist. 38,
q. unica, 198vb: “Ad secundum dubium dicitur quod maior est falsa quando prima causa con-
tinet et ambit virtualiter totam virtutem et differentiam cause secunde, que requiruntur cum
ipsa, sicut est in proposito de voluntate divina et libero arbitrio.” Angelus Vulpes, Sacrae theol.
summa, I, vol. 2, disp. 30, art. 8, n. 13, 41b, already has this quote from John of Bassol.
9 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 8, n. 169, 135b, with reference to Sghemma, Scoticum
opusculum, q. 4, 23a. For Sghemma’s profile, see Forlivesi, Scotistarum Princeps, 154–55; his
criticism of the doctrine of the concomitant decrees was noted in Becker, Gnadenlehre, 68.
10 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 4, n. 110, 120b, referencing these three authors; cf.
similarly in regard to Punch and Fabri ibid., q. 4, art. 3, n. 229, 151b. In the case of McCagh-
well, Mastri refers to a manuscript treatise (“P. Cavellus tract. de peccatis in manuscriptis q. an
Deus sit causa peccati”) that does not seem to have attracted any attention from modern schol-
arship; it is uncertain whether it indeed has been preserved to the present day. As for Fabri,
Mastri’s references are inaccurate; cf. however Philippus Faber, Disp. theol., I, disp. 54, cap. 4,
n. 42, 364b, with direct reference to Molina, and ibid., cap. 5, n. 50, 365b, where Fabri explicitly
subscribes to the view that the divine decree follows upon God’s insight into the human will;
both passages are quoted in Anfray, “Molina and John Duns Scotus,” 364. As for Punch, see
Ioannes Poncius, Integer theol. cursus, I, disp. 5, q. 7, nn. 36–37, 81a–b, where he (with some
reservations that shall not occupy us here) supports the idea of a middle knowledge that pre-
cedes the decrees of the divine will. Note that the Wadding edition’s scholia to Scotus’s Ord. I,
dist. 39 and 41, which suggest Scotus endorsed middle (or conditional) knowledge even
though he did not call it thusly, were not written by Punch (as claimed by Frost, “John Duns
Scotus on God’s Knowledge of Sins,” 28–29), but rather by McCaghwell; they are already in-
cluded in McCaghwell’s edition of 1620; cf. Duns Scotus, Sent. I, dist. 39, q. 5 (ed. McCagh-
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likely by indirect acquaintance – draws upon this latter tradition when he says
in his Essais de théodicée from 1710 that the “modern” Franciscans in general
agree with the Jesuits in accepting the doctrine of middle knowledge (as opposed
to the predeterministic position of the Dominicans and the Augustinians).11
From this perspective, Mastri (with Trapani and Volpe) would seem to hold a
rather exotic minority position within the Scotist tradition. Leibniz, however,
fails to notice Mastri’s huge influence on Baroque Franciscan scholasticism. Sco-
tist authors with Mastrian sympathies did not fail to follow him also on this
issue. One of them, in this case a writer who was active decades after Leibniz’s
death, Crescentius Krisper (1679–1749), remarked that someone might object
that the doctrine is rather more Mastrian than Scotistic (“hoc non esse Scoticum
sed Mastrianum”), since the relevant terminology is so infrequent in Scotus; in
reply, he points out that the equivalent terminology of ‘cooperation’ and
‘co-causality’ is common enough in Scotus.12 The type of criticism mentioned by
Krisper is in fact frequent among those 17th- and 18th-century Scotists who reject
the doctrine of the concomitant decree, or rather “Mastri’s decree,” as one par-
ticularly fierce critic calls it.13 Sometimes, this critique (in continuation of the
tradition mentioned by Leibniz) goes hand in hand with overt acceptance of the
well), 420b (with explicit reference to Fabri), and Duns Scotus, Sent. I, dist. 41, q. unica (ed.
McCaghwell), 431b. Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 8, n. 172, 136b, acknowledges that
Punch in his Integer theol. cursus, I, disp. 5, q. 6, n. 27, 79a–b, along with his support for
middle knowledge, also has an alternative explanation of the doctrine of the concomitant de-
cree.
11 Leibniz, Essais de théodicée, I, n. 39, 124 (I retain the spelling of the Gerhardt edition):
“Les Dominicains et les Augustins sont pour la predetermination, les Franciscains et les Je-
suites modernes sont plustost pour la science moyenne.”
12 Crescentius Krisper, Theol. scholae scotisticae, I, tract. 1, dist. 13, q. 5, n. 10, 187a. Other
Scotist supporters of the doctrine of the concomitant decree include, e. g.: Bernardus Sannig,
Schola theol. scotistarum, I, tract. 2, dist. 1, q. 7, n. 1, 115b–16a (reproduces Mastri’s allusions
to the earlier tradition, but strangely fails to mention Mastri at this place); Sebastian Dupas-
quier, Summa theol. scotisticae, I, disp. 8, q. 5, concl. 4, 567 (employs the term ‘decretum con-
currendi’), and ibid., disp. 10, q. 4, concl. 2, 662 (here ‘decretum concomitans’); Kilian Kazen-
berger, Assertiones centum, assertio 9, 11 (1906 reprint, first published 1726). Regarding these
authors’ Mastrian sympathies as seen in the realm of metaphysics, see Andersen, Metaphysik
im Barockscotismus, 914–15 (Sannig), 919–21 (Dupasquier), 930–31 (Krisper), 932–33
(Kazenberger); regarding Sannig, see also Dvořák, “Sannigovo scotistické řešení,” 132.
13 Emmanuel Perez de Quiroga, Quaestiones theol. selectae, q. 16, sect. 2, n. 8, 187b: “Hoc
decretum Mastrii, & Scotistarum non esse Scoti, ut asserunt Scotistae illud tuentes, patet.” This
author has a long and critical discussion of Mastri’s arguments for the concomitant decree; cf.
ibid., sect. 5, nn. 53–70, 195a–98b. He is generally critical toward Mastri; cf. Forlivesi, Scotis-
tarum Princeps, 322–23.
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Jesuit doctrine of middle knowledge,14 while at other times, it is rather comple-

mented by adherence to the Thomist doctrine of antecedent decrees.15 The
whole spectrum of available positions is represented in the Scotist discussions.
With his doctrine of the concomitant decree, Mastri occupies a central, albeit
controversial, place in these discussions.
As Mastri introduces the doctrine of the concomitant decree, it is intended
to ensure equal consideration of both God’s certain knowledge of future events
as well as human free will as the (partial) cause of such events. Exactly for this
reason it would seem to hold a middle position between the Thomist approach
of Domingo Báñez (1528–1604) and the Jesuit approach of Luis de Molina
(1536–1600), each seen by Mastri as overemphasizing one or the other of the
key elements under discussion, i. e., either the predetermining element (God’s
infinite power) or the element of human freedom (as embraced by God’s infi-
nite knowledge). With its double focus, the doctrine of the concomitant decree
strikingly resembles Mastri’s fairly well-known doctrine of the double origin of
possibility in creatures. Drawing on a distinction made by Scotus, Mastri ex-
plained, first in his Disputations on Metaphysics and then later in the Disputa-
tion on the Divine Intellect, that creatures are possible ex se, but not a se, since
their possibility is not entirely independent of the divine intellect.16 Both in the
case of creaturely possibility and in the case of divine foreknowledge of contin-
gent future events, Mastri is concerned with finding the right balance between
the divine and the created spheres. However, in the case of divine foreknowledge
vs. human freedom, the stakes are higher.
Mastri on various occasions, and both in philosophy and theology, thus
makes the point that freedom of will is both what makes a human act specifically
14 Cf. Alipius Locherer, Clypeus philosophico-scotisticus, II, Phys. II, disp. 4, art. 3, concl. 4,
n. 22, 298b (rejection of Mastri’s doctrine), and ibid., concl. 5, n. 23, 300a (acceptance of the
Jesuit doctrine). Locherer is generally not biased against Mastri; cf. Andersen, Metaphysik im
Barockscotismus, 933–35.
15 Cf. Franciscus Macedo, Collationes doctrinae, I, collat. 9, diff. 4, sect. 6, 346a–b; Macedo
reproduces some of Mastri’s references to other authors (including the references to Trapani’s
and McCaghwell’s respective manuscript treatises) and adds some of his own. The Thomist
flavor of Macedo’s position was critically noted by Crescentius Krisper, Theol. scholae scotisti-
cae, I, tract. 1, dist. 13, q. 5, n. 1, 184a; cf. also Sebastian Dupasquier, Summa theol. scotisticae,
I, disp. 10, q. 4, 666. According to Tropia, La teoria della conoscenza, 10, Macedo’s thought in
general is “impregnated with eclecticism”; cf. also Tropia’s article in this present volume.
16 Mastrius, Disp. Met., disp. 8, q. 1, art. 3, n. 36 (Cursus philosophicus V), 26b: “Dicendum
itaque est res possibilitatem, vel impossibilitatem non omnino ex seipsis, & a seipsis habere
independenter prorsus a Deo, sed nec omnino a Divina omnipotentia, aut Divino intellectu
mediantibus Ideis; sed intrinsece, & formaliter ex seipsis, extrinsece vero, & principiative ab
intellectu divino.” Cf. similarly Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 2, art. 2, n. 57, 106b; cf. Duns Sco-
tus, Ord. I, dist. 43, q. unica, n. 7 (ed. Vat. VI), 354.
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human and makes it morally relevant, since only free actions have a moral value;
only such acts can be praised or rebuked.17 One of the contexts where we find
such a statement is the Disputations on De anima, which is a part of the Cursus
philosophicus that Mastri co-authored with Bonaventura Belluto (Belluto is be-
lieved to have been responsible for the part on De anima, but the passage here in
question is found in an “appendix” later inserted by Mastri). In contrast to most
commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima, and indeed to this very work by Aristo-
tle, their work includes a long disputation on the power of will in the human
soul, in which we also find a consideration of the sources of the freedom of will:
whereas its extrinsic cause is God’s own freedom (this is in accordance with
Scotus’s rule that there would be no contingency in the world, were it not exact-
ly for God’s own contingent way of operating),18 its intrinsic cause rather lies in
the nature of the will itself (and this again is in accordance with Scotus’s own
notion of the will as an irreducibly autonomous, rational, and non-natural pow-
er of the soul).19 As for the other side, concerning divine cognition, Mastri main-
tains – following, as he says, “all theologians” (cum omnibus theologis) – that
God has most perfect, that is, quidditative, distinct, and comprehensive knowl-
edge of all possible creatures, both their essences and their individual differ-
ences; these are all eminently contained in the divine essence itself, the implica-
tion being that God inevitably knows them and knows everything about them
when he comprehends Himself.20 What remains to be seen is how exactly this
perfect divine cognition applies to future events caused by free agents.
In the following, I shall discuss the cognitive aspects of Mastri’s doctrine of
the concomitant decree. Having introduced this doctrine, shown (presumably)
that it is indeed in conformity with Scotus’s teaching, and comprehensively de-
17 Mastrius / Bellutus, Disp. De anima, disp. 7, q. 4, appendix, n. 95 (Cursus philosophicus

III), 231b–32a: “[I]llae ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex volitione deliberata
procedunt; si autem aliae actiones homini conveniunt, possunt quidem dici actiones hominis,
sed non proprie humanae, cum non sint hominis, inquantum est homo.” The same point is
made in Mastrius, Sent. II, disp. 5, q. 1, n. 1, 212a.
18 Mastrius / Bellutus, Disp. De anima, disp. 7, q. 3, art. 1, n. 33 (Cursus philosophicus III),
218b: “[D]ivina libertas est prima, & praecipua causa extrinseca nostrae libertatis, & contin-
gentiae in rebus.” Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 39, qq. 1–5, n. 14 (ed. Vat. VI), Appendix A,
416; a longer elaboration of the same issue, but especially emphasizing that the contingency of
human acts stems from both the divine and the human will, in Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 39–
40, qq. 1–3, nn. 31–37 (ed. Wolter / Bychkov II), 473–75.
19 Mastrius / Bellutus, Disp. De anima, disp. 7, q. 3, art. 2, n. 43 (Cursus philosophicus III),
220b: “[R]adix libertatis sit ipsa natura potentiae de se utrumlibet indifferentis”; with explicit
reference to Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 16, n. 16 (ed. Wadding XII), 457–58, where Scotus says
there is no reason why the will is free other than itself; cf. similarly Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 8,
pars 2, q. unica, n. 299 (ed. Vat. IV), 325.
20 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 1, n. 2, 91a.
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fended it against objections from the other Catholic schools (none of which I
shall dwell on now), Mastri, in a separate article within his Disputation on the
Divine Intellect, addresses the question of “how God with certainty knows free
future events through the decrees of His own will without injuring our free-
dom.”21 While questions relating specifically to the relation between divine and
human will are discussed in the next disputation, which is devoted to the divine
will,22 this articulus offers much of what one would like to know regarding the
relationship between divine cognition and human freedom. I shall therefore fo-
cus on this article. I shall complement my treatment with some remarks on Mas-
tri’s specialized discussion included within the last quaestio of the Disputation
on the Divine Intellect concerning the Jesuit doctrine of God’s middle knowledge
of conditional future events.
1. Divine Volition as the Medium of Divine Foreknowledge

Mastri’s article on God’s certain knowledge of contingent future events is struc-
tured as a discussion of four assertions. The fourth assertion is that there is a fine
coherence between the certitude of divine foreknowledge and both the contin-
gency of things in general and the freedom of our will in particular.23 This is the
overall conclusion of the article. The other three assertions, all of which have a
basis in Scotus’s thought on future contingents and divine cognition in general,
rather serve as its premisses. They all focus on how contingent future events can
be objects of divine knowledge.
The first assertion, in accordance with Scotus, states that the primary object
of divine knowledge is the divine essence itself. Only the divine essence can have
a motivating (or causal) effect on the divine intellect. This means that all other
objects must enter divine cognition in some way other than by being its primary
object. From this, Mastri infers that “God knows the future contingents in the
decree of His will like in the medium that determines future events to one of two
members of a contradiction.”24 These “two members of a contradiction” are
21 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, 143b, heading of the article: “Articulus decimus. In
quo declaratur modus, quo Deus certo cognoscit liberos eventus per decreta suae voluntatis
absque laesione libertatis nostrae.”
22 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 4, 165, heading of the disputation: “Disputatio quarta. De divina
voluntate.”
23 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 204, 145a: “Quarto tandem constat ex dictis,
quomodo cum certitudine divinae praescientiae bene adhuc cohaereat, & rerum contingentia,
& nostrae voluntatis libertas.”
24 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 197, 143b: “Primo […] dicendum est, Deum
non praescire eventus liberos in determinatione suae voluntatis, tanquam in objecto, quia uni-
cum tantum habet divinus intellectus primum objectum primitate adaequationis in movendo,
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whether a certain state of affairs will occur or not. The divine will decides, and
its decision, or decree, somehow offers an object to the divine intellect: the de-
cree of the divine will is a medium of knowledge, because it determines that the
divine essence “represents” to God’s own intellect this or that future event.25
Mastri reports that Scotus has two explanations of how this process may work.
There is either a discursive process, where God sees some contingent thing or
state of affairs that His own will has decreed, and by reminding Himself that His
decree cannot be impeded (so that whatever has been decreed is bound to come
into being), He arrives at certain and infallible knowledge of this contingent
state of affairs. Or, God rather has a simple intuition of the state of affairs de-
creed by His will. Scotus introduces this latter intuition as a viable solution if the
assumption of discursivity in God’s cognition is too problematic; and since Mas-
tri at the outset describes divine cognition as instantaneous and immediate (and
indeed often refers to it as intuitive),26 it is clear that this approach better suits
his purposes, although he does not discuss in detail which one of the two ap-
proaches is preferable. Mastri’s most important objective clearly is to ensure that
divine cognition is something that takes place wholly “within God Himself” (in-
tra ipsum Deum).27
There is, however, a serious problem with this perspective considered from
within God, one that Mastri does not really solve. His discussion of it is impor-
tant anyway. The Jesuit theologian Gabriel Vázquez (1549–1604) had objected,
against the doctrine of God’s decrees as the medium of divine foreknowledge,
& illud est essentia divina accepta sub ratione mere absoluta, & ideo nil aliud neque realiter,
neque formaliter ab ea distinctum potest esse ratio motiva intelligendi divino intellectui, novit
ergo Deus futura contingentia in decreto suae voluntatis, tanquam in medio determinante futu-
ra ad alteram contradictionis partem.” Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, n. 72, 112a, mentions the
question of the cognitive medium of future events as one of the important issues to be dealt
with in the discussion of divine foreknowledge.
25 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 200, 144a: “[R]atio tamen, & medium, per quod
procedit Deus ad cognoscendum futura, est ipsum divinum decretum, seu divina essentia per
voluntatem efficacem determinata ad repraesentandum hoc, vel illud futurum.”
26 Cf., e. g., Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 200, 144a, and ibid., n. 201, 144b.
27 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 197, 143b, referencing Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist.
38, pars 2, nn. 22–23 (ed. Vat. VI), Appendix A, 427–28; Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 38,
qq. 1–2, n. 45 (ed. Wolter / Bychkov II), 460. Mastri refers to Maurice O’Fihely and Antonio
Trombetta as proponents of the discursive approach; cf. Antonius Trombetta, Quaest. de div-
ina praescientia, art. 4, 8va and 9ra. As Schabel, Theology at Paris, 44–49, shows, Scotus essen-
tially borrowed the discursive approach from Henry of Ghent; it was, according to Schabel, this
approach that enjoyed most popularity among fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Scotists. Its
popularity, however, faded with time, as Francesco Fiorentino shows in his contribution to this
present volume. For Scotus’s doctrine of divine cognition, see the article by Giorgio Pini in this
present volume.
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that a decree does not add anything to the divine essence beyond a relation of
reason toward future events. This relation of reason is one conceived by human
beings (one would suspect that the people Vázquez has in mind are theologians
grappling with divine cognition and its relation to divine volition, which is not,
in reality, anything different than the divine essence), and not so conceived by
God Himself; and even if God would conceive such a relation, He would first
have to grasp the extremes of the relation, because a relation, generally, cannot
be conceived without prior knowledge of the items between which it holds. Váz-
quez concludes that the divine decrees cannot be more than a “remote” cause of
God’s cognition of future events, its “proper” cause rather lying in the intelligi-
bility of these future events themselves; intelligibility pertains to them qua being
embraced by God’s infinite intellect. As Mastri summarizes, a future event then
is “immediately knowable in itself” (in seipsa cognoscibilis), and as such may be
directly intuited by God.28 Possibly provoked by the fact that Vázquez rather
emphatically claimed to be following Scotus as regards the intelligibility of future
events, Angelo Volpe (as mentioned, Mastri’s teacher at Naples) replied both
that God’s relation to creatures is not merely a relation of reason, but indeed
something real in God, a real inclination toward creatures that, however, does
not add a new reality to the divine essence; he further replied that future events
that formally are nothing apart from God’s decrees cannot in themselves hold
any truth value, whereby the decrees, rather than the events, must terminate the
acts of divine cognition.29 Interestingly, Mastri here intervenes on behalf of the
Jesuit: if a decree of the will does not represent a new reality, then this exactly
28 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 198, 143b, referencing Gabriel Vázquez, In pri-
mam partem, I, disp. 65, cap. 2, nn. 11–13, 519a–b; Vázquez’s own solution (stating the per se
intelligibility of future events) is presented in ibid., disp. 65, cap. 4, n. 18, 521a–b; his point
that the decrees only add a relation of reason to the divine essence is reiterated in ibid., disp.
67, cap. 4, n. 20, 535b (“ut saepius diximus […] decretum Dei de re facienda nihil omnino
addit supra suam nudam essentiam, nisi respectum rationis ad rem futuram”), and disp. 80,
cap. 2, n. 6, 645b (where he also explains that God’s free volition, as a vital act, is in fact God’s
very substance). For a possible response to the view that a relation of reason cannot be a medi-
um of cognition, Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 199, 144a, refers to Franciscus de
Mayronis, Conflatus, dist. 38, q. 2, art. 4, 229–30, who says that a relation of reason, when
conceived in the manner of a being of reason with a foundation in reality, may indeed serve as
a basis for cognition; Mastri, however, dismisses this point of view with an eye to Scotus’s
doctrine of relations, accepted by Vázquez, according to which a relation cannot be conceived
without first conceiving its foundation.
29 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 198, 143b, referencing Angelus Vulpes, Sacrae
theol. summa, I, vol. 2, disp. 30, art. 10, nn. 8–10, 52b–54b, who, in turn, quotes Gabriel Váz-
quez, In primam partem, I, disp. 65, cap. 4, n. 19, 521b; Vázquez stresses that he has, for a long
time and both in Spain and in Rome, taught that propositions about the future must have a
definite truth value and that he in this is following Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 38 (the locus referred to
in note 27).
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means that it is only a relation of reason. Also, future events indeed can be
known in themselves, though only as secondary objects, not as the divine intel-
lect’s primary object (how this works is explained in Mastri’s discussion of the
second assertion).30
If the divine decrees only add relations of reason to the divine essence, then
what exactly do they have to offer to divine foreknowledge? They must convey
some cognitive content, rather than just knowledge of the decree itself. Mastri
resorts to the notion of connotation: the divine decrees connote – bear some
reference or allusion to – what has been decided regarding future states of affairs
within creation. God’s perfect knowledge of “all the power of His will” (called
“knowledge of simple intelligence”), taken as such, is not the same as His knowl-
edge of “all of His reasons for determining what to make or not to make” (called
“knowledge of vision”), which rather connotes the contingent future events that
will take place within creation.31 As vague as this solution is, it is in accordance
with the general assumption stated at the beginning of the Disputation on the
Divine Intellect, in which Mastri explains that God’s omnipotence and omni-
science do not imply any “transcendental order toward creatures,” but rather
only “something absolute” that connotes possible creatures. While such a conno-
tation does not establish a real relation to possible creatures, it does signal these
creatures’ dependence upon the divine powers. These powers are therefore rela-
tional in some qualified sense only; they carry a relation of reason toward crea-
tures, even though this relation is found entirely on the side of us, that is, human
beings trying to understand the workings of divine cognition. We cannot, Mastri
says, understand the divine powers without their extrinsic connotations.32
30 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 198, 143b–44a.

31 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 199, 144a: “[Q]uia ergo Deus perfecte scrutatur
totam suae voluntatis potentiam scientia simplicis intelligentiae, & omnes rationes determina-
tionis ejus circa fienda, vel non fienda scientia visionis, sciens voluntatem suam non sim-
pliciter, & nude sumptam, sed, cum connotatione talis creaturae, quam libere voluit, in tali
differentia temporis esse.” God’s knowledge of simple intelligence is traditionally seen as being
concerned with everything possible, whereas His knowledge of vision rather is seen as being
concerned with such things that actually come into being; cf. section 5 below.
32 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 1, n. 9, 92b: “Respondendum ergo est […] omnipotentiam, &
omniscientiam non esse perfectiones relativas secundum esse, itaut essentialiter includant or-
dinem realem transcendentalem ad creaturas, sed esse perfectiones relativas tantum secundum
dici, quae de principali significato aliquid absolutum important, connotando creaturas possi-
biles, non ob aliquem respectum realem, quem fundent ad illas, sed ob dependentiam essen-
tialem creaturarum a Deo, ut a primo ente; & haec est causa, cur perfectiones hujusmodi
nequeat a nobis saltem quidditative concipi sine creaturis possibilibus; haec est enim natura
relativorum secundum dici, ut nequeant quidditative concipi sine suis extrinsecis connotatis.”
Regarding the notion of ‘transcendental order,’ Mastri refers to the discussion in Mastrius /
Bellutus, Disp. Log., disp. 8, q. 5, art. 1, n. 66 (Cursus philosophicus I), 255a.
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It would thus seem that one and the same model applies both to God’s
knowledge of possibles and to His knowledge of contingent future events. The
analogy, however, not explicitly drawn by Mastri himself, rather holds between
our human understanding of God’s relationship to possibles and God’s own
foreknowledge. This leaves open whether Mastri actually thinks that God’s fore-
knowledge is a recipient (or quasi-recipient) of the divine decrees’ connoted
content, or, alternatively, his talk of connotations merely is meant to provide an
explanation that satisfies our human understanding of how the divine decrees
may work as a cognitive medium. Mastri’s intervention on behalf of Vázquez
(who stressed that the relation of reason in question is only on the part of hu-
man understanding) would seem to incline towards the latter position, while in-
clining towards the first position is the fact that his discussion of the ontological
status of future contingents is based, in this instance, on an explicit comparison
with possibles. Mastri’s position on the issue of the medium of foreknowledge
appears to be ambiguous and may be interpreted as having a dual purpose.
2. The Ontological Status of Contingent Future Events

The second assertion shifts focus from the medium of divine cognition of con-
tingent future events to these events themselves. It states that they indeed can be
objects of divine cognition, albeit only “secondary objects” (objects that are emi-
nently contained in the primary object, the divine essence). They can be so, be-
cause of “that being, which they shall be having in themselves at this or that
point in time.”33 As already mentioned, Mastri’s explanation now rests on an
explicit comparison with God’s cognition of possibles:
The reason is that – just like the possible things are said to pertain to the secondary
object of the divine intellect, because they indeed terminate the divine cognition accord-
ing to that real being, which to have for some time does not contradict them – thus
future things through this are said to pertain to the secondary object of the divine intelli-
gence, because they indeed terminate it according to that real being, which they, per di-
vine decree, will have for some certain and determined time.34
33 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 200, 144a: “Secundo dicendum est, quod licet
Deus futura contingentia cognoscat in essentia sua, tanquam in objecto primario prius cognito,
prout tamen a voluntate determinata est ad hanc partem potius futuri contingentis ostenden-
dam, & non aliam, adhuc tamen ea cognoscit etiam in seipsis per modum objecti secundarii
secundum illud esse, quod sunt in se habitura pro hac, vel illa temporis differentia.” Mastrius,
Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, n. 72, 112a, mentions the ontological status of future events (especially the
problem that they would seem not to be knowable, since they do not have proper existence
themselves) as one of the issues to be addressed in his discussion.
34 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 200, 144a: “[R]atio est, quia sicut res possibiles
ideo spectare dicuntur ad objectum secundarium divini intellectus, quia re vera terminant di-
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Most important in this analogy between possibles and future events, of course, is
the status of this being which possibles can have at some time and which contin-
gent future states of affairs will be having at some time. Mastri, at the outset (in
the above quote), calls it “real being” (esse reale). In his Disputations on Meta-
physics, he explained that real being is usually defined as “non-repugnancy to-
ward existing,” and that this relationship with existence is characteristic of that
essential being which all possible things have, regardless of whether they actually
exist or not.35 We now learn that God’s intellect, overarching all periods of time
and intuiting all things before they actually exist, extends to future events with
their future real existence, and does so “as if they had real presence [in God’s
intellect] in eternity owing to their own proper existence.”36 A little later, Mastri
phrases this so that the divine intellect, following upon the divine will’s decision,
makes the future events “objectively present in the divine essence.”37 This objec-
tive presence or being that future events may enjoy in eternity, though only sub-
sequent to the pertinent decree of the divine will, is crucial. The being that the
future events have in the divine intellect is clearly not exactly the kind of being
which they have in themselves. There is rather a certain resemblance between
the two, as appears from Mastri’s expression that it is “as if” (ac si) they had real
presence in the divine intellect. Here also the terminology of foundation applies:
Mastri says that truths concerning contingent future events decreed by the di-
vine will are founded on these same events’ future real being.38
vinam cognitionem secundum esse reale, quod eis non repugnat habere pro aliqua temporis
differentia, ita res futurae per hoc attinere dicuntur ad objectum secundarium divinae intelli-
gentiae, quia re vera eam terminant secundum esse reale, quod habebunt pro aliqua certa, &
determinata temporis differentia ex decreto divinae voluntatis.” Mastri refers his readers to the
explanation of divine cognition of possibles in Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 1, art. 3, n. 36, 98b;
regarding the termination of acts of divine cognition, see similarly Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3,
q. 3, art. 10, n. 202, 144b.
35 Mastrius, Disp. Met., disp. 3, q. 1, n. 2 (Cursus philosophicus IV), 99b: “[D]efiniri solet
ens reale per non repugnantiam ad existendum, per quam non repugnantiam explicari solet
realis essentia rerum.” For the motif of non-repugnancy toward being in Mastri’s metaphysics,
see Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 251–68 and 450–51.
36 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 200, 144a: “[D]ivinus intellectus, qui ob ejus
infinitatem praecurrit temporum differentias, & intuitu suo praevenit rerum existentias, re vera
attingit futura in seipsis secundum illud esse realis existentiae, quod habent in certa temporis
differentia, perinde ac si forent rei realiter praesentia in aeternitate secundum propriam exis-
tentiam.”
37 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 202, 144b: “[D]ivinus intellectus omnia super-
grediens tempora praeveniens eorum existentias facit sibi eas objective praesentes in divina
essentia post decreta divinae voluntatis.”
38 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 200, 144a: “[Q]uamvis futura ante tale decretum
nullam habeant determinatam veritatem, eam tamen habent post tale decretum, & talis veritas
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Mastri is confident that Scotus agrees with him regarding the divine cogni-
tion of future events in themselves qua secondary objects of the divine intellect.39
But regarding the status of these future events in God’s intellect, he finds himself
in disagreement with both Angelo Volpe and Filippo Fabri. Volpe argued that
the truth about future events cannot be founded on properly real and actual be-
ing in God’s intellect, for to claim this would be an error of faith: it would imply
eternal existence for creatures, something that infringes upon the divine power
of both creation and annihilation. Such truth, then, must rather be founded on
“virtual being” (esse virtuale), that kind of being which future events possess
owing to the pertinent efficient decrees of the divine will and which cannot
properly be said to belong to the future events in themselves, but rather to the
divine essence that virtually contains them.40 Thus, according to Volpe, future
events are not known by God in themselves at all. Mastri’s reply is that this is
indeed true, if we speak of the divine intellect’s primary object, which is God’s
own essence; but certainly not if we speak of its secondary objects.41 Volpe devel-
oped his position partly in reaction against Fabri, who had taken a different
route: he argued that future things, subsequent to the divine decree, are intelligi-
ble and hence must have some kind of being, and since they only have this being
in the divine intellect, the kind of being in question must be “being of reason or
cognized being” (ens rationis sive cognitum).42 Volpe replied that since God’s
foreknowledge is real, it must also terminate in something real. Mastri agrees
with this criticism; he objects that this kind of being does not properly belong to
the future events themselves, but is rather only an extrinsic denomination im-
posed on them solely due to their relationship with the divine intellect.43 Volpe’s
per modum objecti secundarii fundatur in esse reali, quod habebunt in tali temporis differen-
tia.”
39 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 200, 144a.
40 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 201, 144b, referencing Angelus Vulpes, Sacrae
theol. summa, I, vol. 2, disp. 30, art. 10, n. 9, 53b; cf. also ibid., vol. 1, disp. 28, art. 1, n. 4,
417b–18a (where Volpe spells out that the error in fide concerns the theological notions of
creation and annihilation).
41 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 200, 144a, and ibid., n. 202, 144b.
42 Both Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 201, 144a–b, and Angelus Vulpes, Sacrae
theol. summa, I, vol. 2, disp. 30, art. 10, n. 9, 53b, refer to Philippus Faber, Disp. theol., I, disp.
54, cap. 4, n. 44, 364b: “Ita dico, hoc esse verum, & intelligibile, quod habent futura contingen-
tia in intellectu divino per decretum divinae voluntatis esse ens rationis, sive cognitum ipsarum
rerum futurarum, secundum existentiam.” For literature on Fabri’s metaphysics, see Andersen,
Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 869–75.
43 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 201, 144b. It should be noted that Fabri actually
had an answer to this criticism: the ens rationis in question should be understood as something
absolute, rather than as something relative; cf. Philippus Faber, Disp. theol., I, disp. 54, cap. 4,
n. 44, 364b. This could be what the ‘secundum existentiam’ in the quote in the previous foot-
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virtual being, however, does not do the job either, because it does not properly
belong to the future events; their virtual being rather is the formal being of the
divine essence, their cause.44
It is against the backdrop of these competing positions that Mastri stresses
the real character of future events. Yet, even his discussion of the views held by
Volpe and Fabri does not fully solve the riddle of the ontological status of future
events in the divine intellect. Since Mastri’s whole argument is based on a paral-
lel to God’s cognition of possibles, one wonders why he does not resort to his
view, expressed in his Disputations on Metaphysics, that possible creatures can
be said to be “partly real beings, partly beings of reason” (partim entia realia,
partim entia rationis): as contents of divine cognition they are beings of reason,
while as taken in themselves they are real beings and can, exactly for this reason,
terminate the acts of divine cognition.45 The context of this statement is Mastri’s
famous debate with John Punch over the ontological status of possibles, the most
and best researched aspect of Baroque Scotism. Whereas Punch maintained the
view that possibles from all of eternity possess a kind of “diminished” or “inten-
tional being” whose status ranks in the middle inbetween real being and being of
reason,46 Mastri rather denied that there can be any particular kind of being be-
tween real being and being of reason, since these two do not have any univocal
note is alluding to; a few lines later Fabri says that “obiectum determinativum non est solum
secunda intentio, & relatio rationis; sed est ens rationis absolutum.” Mastri fails to notice this
point; possibly, this is because he has studied Fabri’s position through Volpe’s summary.
44 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 201, 144b: “[S]ecundum esse tale nequeunt con-
stitui futura objectum secundarium divini intellectus, quia per hoc non attingeretur ab eo ali-
quod esse formale; & proprium ipsorum futurorum, sed tantum esse formale ipsius divinae
essentiae.” Ironically, Mastri here picks up a tenet from Volpe’s own criticism of a Thomist
view of God’s knowledge of possibles; cf. Angelus Vulpes, Sacrae theol. summa, I, vol. 1, disp.
27, art. 4, n. 12, 383a.
45 Mastrius, Disp. Met., disp. 8, q. 1, art. 2, n. 21 (Cursus philosophicus V), 23b: “[C]reatu-
rae ipsae […] partim entia realia, partim entia rationis dici possunt, entia quidem realia secun-
dum illud esse, quod a divino intellectu noscitur eis non repugnare; entia vero rationis, prout
secundum illud esse substant denominationi cogniti, quia sic considerantur solum, ut habent
esse obiectivum in divina mente.” For the context of this quote, see Andersen, Metaphysik im
Barockscotismus, 262–63.
46 Cf. especially Ioannes Poncius, Integer phil. cursus, Tract. in Met., disp. 69, q. 5, n. 52,
903b: “Illud esse, quod habent creaturae ab aeterno, est esse quoddam diminutum, quasi medi-
um inter esse rationis, et esse simpliciter reale. […] [P]otest autem vocari esse intentionale,
quia sufficit ad terminandam intellectionem.” For a summary of the debate and references to
the comprehensive literature on this aspect of Mastri’s thought, see Andersen, Metaphysik im
Barockscotismus, 257–68. The debate between Mastri and Punch over the ontological status of
possibles has a parallel in early Scotism; cf. the articles by Richard Cross and Francesco
Fiorentino in this present volume.
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concept in common.47 That position does not, however, exclude that possible
real beings may be seen as objective content of the divine mind. This seems to be
the key also to the status of future events. These may then be seen as real beings
when taken in themselves and as the immediate products of the divine will, yet
as beings of reason when taken as objects of divine cognition. Mastri’s talk of
them being “objectively present” (cf. above) in the divine essence owing to their
own real future existence seems to support this interpretation, since to have ob-
jective being, in Mastri’s conception, is exactly to be an object of cognition –
which does not, of course, alter anything as regards the reality of the cognized
thing itself.48 Mastri’s corrective thus consists in a differentiation: he does not
seem to deny the status of future events as cognitive content in the divine intel-
lect, but rather only insists that this status has a foundation in that real being
which eternally pertains to the future events themselves, due to their future state
of actual existence as decreed by the divine will. The ontological character of
future events taken in themselves is thus one of reality.
3. Infallibility and Necessity of Immutability

Mastri next addresses the obvious problem, how God’s knowledge of contingent
future events can be certain and infallible, while these per definition are contin-
gent and thus can be otherwise. There would seem to be a manifest incongru-
ence between infallible knowledge and an object that can yield only uncertain
and changeable knowledge. Mastri’s third assertion is intended to solve this
problem. It states that, although contingent future events are intrinsically and
essentially indifferent toward becoming or not becoming, an extrinsic cause may
very well contingently determine whether they come into being or not.49 The
contingent events’ indetermination, or indifference, in the state of possibility
thus does not exclude determination in the state of actual being. The principle
that “indetermination in regard to possibility is combinable with determination
47 Cf. Mastrius, Disp. Met., disp. 8, q. 1, art. 2, n. 13 (Cursus philosophicus V), 21b, and
ibid., disp. 2, q. 1, n. 1, (Cursus philosophicus IV), 25. For the context of these quotes, see
Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 251–52 and 259–60.
48 Cf. Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 280–83.
49 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 203, 144b: “Tertio, quia dubitari solet, quomodo
scientia Dei respectu contingentium dici possit certa, ac infallibilis, cum ejus objectum sit con-
tingens; quod potest aliter se habere, praesertim cum scientiae certitudo, ac infallibilitas ab
objecto sumatur, siquidem ab eo, quod res est, vel non est, cognitio dicitur vera vel falsa; no-
tandum est, quod futurum contingens, quamvis ex sua ratione formali, & intrinseca possit esse,
& non esse, cum ejus essentia consistat in indifferentia, ac indeterminatione ad fore, & non
fore, potest tamen habere determinationem extrinsece a causa libere, & contingenter ponente
ipsum in esse.”
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in regard to actual being” is one Mastri employs and discusses in various con-
texts.50 The principle itself rests on a distinction introduced, as recent scholar-
ship suggests, by the early and rather independent Scotist Francis of Marchia
(† after 1344) between two kinds of determination, one called ‘de possibili’ and
the other ‘de inesse.’ Mastri clearly is unaware of the precise origin of the princi-
ple, for he refers to it as some principle commonly employed by “logicians.”51 In
our present context, Mastri uses the principle to strike the right balance between
necessity and contingence as regards pre-known future events. He explains:
This determination is certain and infallible, because the free effect, once it is posited out-
side of the cause, is said to be necessary when it is, though not due to plain necessity,
since then it would not be contingent, but rather due to necessity in a certain regard and
under the presupposition that it exists – according to that dictum of the Philosopher in
De Int. I, that “all that is, when it is, necessarily is.” Therefore, since God from eternity
knows the contingent event owing to that present and actual being which it has at such
and such a time, it is already clear in which way He has an object that is certain, determi-
nate, and infallible.52
50 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 203, 144b: “[L]ogici dicunt cum indetermina-
tione de possibili stare determinationem de inesse.” This same principle is discussed in (the list
is likely incomplete) Mastrius / Bellutus, Disp. Log., disp. 10, q. 2, art. 5, nn. 52 and 56 (Cursus
philosophicus I), 307a–8a; id., Disp. Phys., disp. 14, q. 1, art. 1, n. 6 (Cursus philosophicus II),
352b; Mastrius, Disp. Met., disp. 9, q. 4, art. 2, nn. 103 and 106 (Cursus philosophicus V),
104a–5a; id., Sent. I, disp. 4, q. 4, art. 1, nn. 76–77, 186a; id., Sent. I, disp. 5, q. 4, nn. 298–99,
288b. Some of these loci have been commented upon in recent scholarship, though without
mention of the origin of the underlying distinction; cf. Anfray, “Prescience divine, décrets con-
comitants et liberté humaine,” 562, (use of this principle in the context of the discussion of
contingent propositions in logic), and Heider, Universals in Second Scholasticism, 206–7 (use
of this principle in the discussion of universals in metaphysics).
51 Cf. the previous note. For the origin of the principle, see Duba, “The Ontological Reper-
cussions of Francis of Marchia’s Distinction,” here especially 179–80 (with the crucial passage
from Marchia’s Scriptum in I Sententiarum, dist. 35). Schabel, Theology at Paris, 200–1, 209,
211, 218–19, 268, reports the distinction and documents its diffusion in fourteenth-century
discussions of foreknowledge; for this distinction in William of Rubione, see also Fiorentino,
Francesco di Meyronnes, 207. At the time of the Reformation, non-Scotist authors still ascribed
the doctrine to Francis of Marchia; cf. Ioannes Eckius [Johannes Eck], Chrysopassus, centuria
quarta, n. 52, [unpaginated] H2v–3r (Marchia’s doctrine is discussed under the heading Alia
responsio Francisci de Marchia). Eck refers to his contemporary Konrad Wimpina as his source
for Marchia. For Eck’s role in the transmission of knowledge about Scotism among Protes-
tants, see the article by Arthur Huiban in this present volume. The Scotists rather tend to treat
this doctrine as common property of their tradition; cf., e. g., Petrus Tataretus, Sent. I, dist. 39,
qq. 1–5, 347a, and Antonius Trombetta, Quaest. de divina praescientia, art. 2, 4rb; like Mastri,
these Scotists do not mention Marchia as the author of the distinction.
52 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 203, 144b–45a: “[H]aec autem determinatio est
certa, & infallibilis, nam effectus liber semel positus extra causam dicitur necessario esse, quan-
do est, non quidem necessitate simpliciter, alioquin contingens non esset, sed necessitate se-
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In order to explain how God can have certain and infallible knowledge of con-
tingent objects, Mastri has recourse to a determination that itself is certain and
infallible (Marchia’s determination de inesse). This determination renders the
contingent object certain, infallible, and determinate. It is somewhat surprising
to find these attributes on the part of the object, rather than on the part of the
knowing subject. Mastri says that “this is the certitude and necessity that recent
authors attribute to a future contingent object, insofar as it can be an infallible
object of God’s foreknowledge.”53 But how does the object become infallible?
Mastri makes this dependent on the determination. This determination cannot
be too strong, for then it would override the contingency of the object, and God
would then not have infallible knowledge of a contingent object at all. Yet, with-
out determination, there is no infallibility. As already seen in the above quote, to
solve this Mastri resorts to yet another distinction, this time one he knows from
Duns Scotus: the distinction between plain necessity and the necessity of im-
mutability. Plain necessity belongs only to objects that cannot be otherwise, and
hence is not relevant in our present context. Necessity of immutability rather
pertains to the divine will in its workings ad extra, that is, “after it has once from
eternity determined that something shall come to be.”54 We already know that it
is the decrees of the divine will that give real being to contingent future events.
Now we learn that the divine decrees also bestow necessity of immutability on
these events. This kind of necessity that is grounded in the divine will’s un-
changeability does not, on the one hand, override the contingency of the future
cundum quid, & ex suppositione, quod existat, juxta illud Phylosophi, omne quod est, quando
est, necesse est esse 1. Periher, cum ergo Deus ab aeterno cognoscat futurum contingens secun-
dum hoc esse praesens, & actuale, quod habet in tali temporis differentia, jam patet, quomodo
habeat objectum certum, determinatum, ac infallibile.” Cf. Aristotle, De int., ch. 9, 19a23–24.
53 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 203, 145a: “Et haec est certitudo, ac necessitas,
quam Recentiores tribuunt futuro contingenti, ut possit esse objectum infallibile praescientiae
Dei.” Mastri does not specify which recent authors he is thinking of.
54 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 203, 145a: “Ex quo sequitur, necessitatem divinae
praescientiae, ac etiam futuri contingentis, quod ponitur ejus objectum, non esse necessitatem
simpliciter, qualis est ejus objecti, quod impossibile est, aliter se habere ex 1. Post. cap. 2. sed
necessitatem immutabilitatis, qualis est necessitas divinae voluntatis ad extra, postquam semel
ab aeterno determinavit, aliquid fore.” Cf. Aristotle, Anal. post., I, ch. 2, 71b9–16. For this dis-
tinction, Mastri refers to Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 16, n. 7 (ed. Wadding XII), 451–52; Scotus
here distinguishes between “necessitas immutabilitatis” and “necessitas omnimodae evitabili-
tatis sive determinationis”; the terminology used by Mastri is rather found in Duns Scotus,
Ord. I, dist. 39, qq. 1–5 (ed. Vat. VI), 438, and Duns Scotus, Rep. I-A, dist. 39–40, qq. 1–3,
n. 25 (ed. Wolter / Bychkov II), 471–72. Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 2, q. 4, art. 1–4, nn. 133–218,
40b–59a, has a long discussion of God’s immutability.
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events themselves – but it is, on the other hand, sufficient for a termination of
divine infallible cognition.55
The determination (the one de inesse) that bestows extrinsic necessity of
immutability on contingent future events expresses the choice of a will; but why
must this will be God’s will? Mastri argues that a “proximate cause,” such as a
human will, is not sufficient here, because it is only operative for the period of
time when the contingent event enjoys actual existence, whereas God knows the
event, in itself and with its own real being, during the (endless) time that pre-
cedes the event.56 However, although the proximate cause is not sufficient to
render the future infallibly knowable, it is not entirely irrelevant either. This be-
comes clear from Mastri’s explanation of the interplay of divine and created cau-
sation (note that Mastri here draws upon yet another distinction, the traditional
one between a composite and a divided sense of propositions, which in its appli-
cation here squares with Marchia’s distinction):
Hence, recourse is to be had to the extrinsic and absolute decree of the divine will, insofar
as the active determination of the proximate cause also virtually accompanies this [de-
cree] due to its virtual inclusion in the divine will. And because this [decree] is im-
mutable and unimpedible, also the future contingent event, under the aspect of some-
thing to come, receives such objective certitude that suffices for terminating God’s
infallible knowledge. For given this decree, the future event cannot not occur, in the com-
posite sense, for a given period of time, even though absolutely and simply speaking it
could not occur, if separated from this decree.57
55 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 203, 145a: “[U]t igitur scientia Dei libera respec-
tu contingentium sit certa, & infallibilis, opus non est, quod ejus objectum sit necessarium ne-
cessitate simpliciter, sed sufficit, quod sit necessarium necessitate immutabilitatis, quale in
proposito est futurum contingens, ut a divino decreto dependens; nec ei talis necessitas repug-
nat, sed sola necessitas simpliciter.”
56 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 203, 145a: “Verum quia, ut saepe dictum est,
futurum contingens, non tantum attingitur a Deo, ut objective praesens pro tali temporis dif-
ferentia, sed etiam quatenus futurum pro toto tempore praecedenti talem temporis differenti-
am, in qua futurum habet esse actuale extra suam causam, assignanda adhuc est causa extrinse-
ca talis determinatae futuritionis, ut & ipsa quoque possit esse objectum certum, ac infallibile
divinae cognitionis; & quidem haec esse nequit formalis; & actualis determinatio causae proxi-
mae, quia haec non habetur, nisi in ea certa temporis differentia, in qua effectum ponit in esse,
& toto tempore praecedenti manet formaliter indeterminata.”
57 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 203, 145a: “[I]deo recurrendum est ad decretum
extrinsecum, & absolutum divinae voluntatis, quatenus virtualiter ipsum comitatur etiam de-
terminatio activa causae proximae ob continentiam ejus virtualem in divina voluntate, & quia
hoc immutabile est, ac inimpedibile, hinc futurum contingens etiam sub ratione futuri sortitur
certitudinem objectivam talem, qualis sufficit ad terminandam scientiam Dei infallibilem, nam
stante tali decreto non potest futurum non fore in sensu composito pro tali temporis differen-
tia, licet absolute, & simpliciter possit non fore facta praecisione talis decreti.” Regarding virtual
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It is the divine will that infallibly decrees some future event to occur. It is accom-
panied by a proximate cause, a human choice of will that itself only is exerted at
a certain point in time. Mastri understands this accompaniment in terms of vir-
tual inclusion, that is, the free human act of will is included in the divine act of
will that from eternity wills what the human will wills at some point in time.
Because of this inclusion, the human choice and its effect are objects of infallible
divine cognition. Mastri’s explanation of the objective certitude of contingent
future events is thus based on Marchia’s distinction between two kinds of deter-
mination, Scotus’s distinction between two kinds of necessity, and the notion of
virtual inclusion. With the introduction of this latter motif, we have in fact ar-
rived at Mastri’s doctrine of the concomitant decree.
4. Harmony Established – Mastri’s Doctrine

of the Concomitant Decree
The fourth assertion, as we know, draws the conclusion that there is fine coher-
ence between divine foreknowledge and contingency in the created world, in-
cluding the contingency that comes with the freedom of our human will.58 Mas-
tri, at this place, gives the possibly clearest formulation of his doctrine to be
found anywhere in his discussion of this subject; he in particular spells out the
role of foreknowledge:
For because God’s foreknowledge is not the cause why things shall be in the future, but
rather on the contrary – since it is only apprehensive and not determinative of the right-
eousness of the agents, according to Scotus […] –, therefore it is not assumed as antece-
dent to the future state of things, but rather as concomitant or consequent, and therefore
it does not simply impose necessity upon things, but rather only in a qualified sense and
as a consequence, namely insofar as it is warranted to infer a posteriori from the divine
foreknowledge and as if from a sign that a thing determinately shall come to be. And
likewise, since the decree of the divine will is not antecedent, but rather altogether con-
comitant with the free determination of our will, therefore it neither overrides our free-
dom nor imposes any necessity upon it, other than in a qualified sense and as a conse-
quence.59
inclusion of the human will in the divine one, see similarly Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 3,
n. 108, 120b; cf. further Leinsle, Introduction to Scholastic Theology, 333.
58 Cf. note 23.
59 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 204, 145a: “[Q]uia enim praescientia Dei non est
causa, quod res sint futurae, sed potius e contra cum sit tantum apprehensiva rectitudinis agen-
dorum, non autem determinativa ex Scoto 1. d. 38. ad 1. prin. ideo ejus suppositio non est
antecedens rerum futuritionem, sed concomitans, vel consequens, ideo rebus necessitatem sim-
pliciter non imponit, sed tantum secundum quid, & consequentiae, quatenus ex divina prae-
scientia valet a posteriori inferre, & velut a signo rem esse determinate futuram. Et pariter,
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Mastri’s overall message is clear enough: neither divine cognition nor divine vo-
lition imposes any plain necessity on contingent future events, and therefore
they do not endanger human freedom. Some aspects, though, deserve to be high-
lighted. We learn that foreknowledge is not antecedent to some future event; it is
not properly foreknowledge at all. It is rather concomitant with or consequent
upon future events, because these have already, from eternity, been decreed. The
formulation “concomitant with or consequent upon” is somewhat surprising,
since it would seem to make a difference whether foreknowledge accompanies or
rather follows upon future events (or rather, their determination). It would seem
that Mastri thinks that foreknowledge follows upon the determination of the fu-
ture events, for else his talk of an a posteriori inference from foreknowledge to its
content (future events) would not make much sense. As for divine volition, we
learn that it is “altogether concomitant” with the determination of our own will.
Whereas divine volition is strictly simultaneous with human will, divine cogni-
tion is slightly slower, as it were, and this is due to its dependence on the decrees
of the divine will.
This rather counterintuitive a posteriori character of divine foreknowledge
occasions an objection, clearly one of Thomist provenance, according to which
foreknowledge, and indeed also divine decrees, must be altogether antecedent to
the events foreseen and decreed, including human free actions.60 Mastri’s reply is
that theologians do not, generally, understand antecedent necessity as that which
precedes in a temporal sense, but rather that which precedes under the aspect of
causation in the divine cognition, “and in this sense,” Mastri says, “neither fore-
knowledge nor the divine decree precedes my will today or tomorrow.”61 Fore-
knowledge rather presupposes that which shall come to be as its “proper object”
(proprium obiectum); it does not make that which shall come to be.62 As for the
divine decree, it does not belong to what is necessary for carrying out an action,
but rather only to what is concomitant to the action. This is not because the
quoniam decretum divinae voluntatis non est antecedens, sed omnino concomitans liberam
nostrae voluntatis determinationem, ideo nec ipsa nostram libertatem tollit, nec necessitatem
imponit, nisi secundum quid, & consequentiae.” Cf. Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 38, q. unica, n.
11 (ed. Vat. VI), 308; Scotus does not here speak of a determinative, but rather of a directive
habitus. The metaphor of the sign has a basis in Boethius, Philosophiae consolatio, V, prose
4.11, 95–96; a few lines later, Mastri explicitly refers to Boethius.
60 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 204, 145a; cf. the description of the Thomist
position in ibid., art. 8, n. 168, 135b, as quoted in note 4.
61 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 204, 145a: “Resp. negando assumptum cum ejus
probatione, non enim apud Theologos dicitur suppositio, aut necessitas antecedens, quae sim-
pliciter antecedit ordine durationis, & aeternitatis ad tempus; sed quae antecedit in ratione
causae in divina cognitione, in hoc autem sensu neque praescientia, neque divinum decretum
praecedit volitionem meam hodiernam, vel crastinam.”
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decree of the divine will does not make that which shall come to be, but it is
rather the case that it makes it from eternity “simultaneous, at least virtually,
with free will” (simul saltem virtualiter cum libero arbitrio); together, the two of
them bring it about in time, “in simultaneous concourse” (concursu simulta-
neo).63 Mastri’s reply confirms that, whereas the decree is simultaneous with the
actions of our free will, foreknowledge rather presupposes the product of the
human and divine wills’ joint effort. Additionally, it is now clear that the rela-
tionship between God’s foreknowledge and the decrees of His will should be un-
derstood in terms of dependence rather than in temporal categories, which are
only relevant in connection to the actual exertion of those contingent events
which are our actions. The temporal dimension enters only owing to human
will.
A new problem arises: if God’s decrees and foreknowledge are simulta-
neous with, or even, as in the case of foreknowledge, consequent upon the use of
human free will, would it then not lie “in our power” (in nostra potestate) to
change both God’s foreknowledge and the divine decrees?64 Mastri replies that it
is certainly not the case that we can make invalid what God has once decreed,
such that God would not know what He has once decreed, but rather the oppo-
site.65 There may, however, be another way of putting the issue so that it is not
about us humans changing what God has decreed, but rather about God adapt-
ing, at the outset, His decree to the free choices of human will:
In another way, insofar as nothing determines what shall come to be through us, unless
it, with us, at least virtually and by pre-established law, accommodates itself to free causes
and thus allows them to carry out their movements. And nothing determinately fore-
knows what shall come to be through us, except after the absolute determination of His
own will, which also virtually includes the free determination of our will; and in this
sense one can say correctly that both the divine decrees and divine foreknowledge are
founded in our power, from which, however, it does not follow that we can change or
63 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 204, 145a. The simultaneity is also emphasized in
Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 8, n. 167, 135b, where he speaks of God’s “co-determination”
together with the created will: “[N]on determinet voluntatem meam hoc volituram, sed cum
voluntate mea condeterminet hoc volendum fore.” Note that Forlivesi, “The Creator’s De-
crees,” 215, warns his reader not to understand the concomitance in question in terms of “col-
laboration or simultaneousness between the decrees of God’s will and the choices made by the
created will,” but rather as “the fact that none of them […] precedes the other as a cause of the
acts of the latter.” Given Mastri’s explicit talk of “simultaneous concourse” and “codetermina-
tion”, it would seem more adequate to me to understand the simultaneousness and the collabo-
ration in question not in temporal or causal terms, but rather only in terms of virtual inclusion.
Anfray, “Prescience divine, décrets concomitants et liberté humaine,” 591–92, aptly calls the
coherence described by Mastri a “preestablished harmony.”
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impede them, but rather only that if we, at some time, would want differently than we
shall be wanting, then He would also determine this differently with us from eternity,
and He would foreknow it differently.66
Only after God has issued His decree, it becomes unchangeable and established
law; it is, however, at the outset accommodating of, and virtually including, hu-
man free choices, so that whatever we may, with our own free will, choose to do,
this will be exactly what God both decrees and foreknows. Human freedom is at
the outset and from eternity encapsulated into divine law, which then in a sense
is dependent upon and indeed changeable according to our choices. Mastri’s ex-
ample: if I shall be reading tomorrow, then this has been decreed by God; but
that He has decreed and known my reading from eternity stems from my own
free will. I shall thus be reading freely, “as if there were no foregoing decree or
foreknowledge regarding my reading tomorrow”; “all of this,” both my reading
and whatever part God has in it, “is made dependently upon my will.”67 The
example confirms and illustrates what Mastri said just a little earlier, namely that
the decree and the foreknowledge do not belong to what is necessary for carry-
ing out some action, in this case my reading. Despite Mastri admitting that my
reading tomorrow takes place only “as if” (ac si) God had no part in it, in his
understanding, genuinely practical (in exercitio) human freedom of will is a
fact.68
66 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 204, 145a: “[A]lio modo, quatenus nihil deter-
minat a nobis futurum, nisi nobiscum saltem virtualiter ex lege jam statuta se se accomodandi
causis liberis, ut eas suos motus agere sinat, & nihil determinate praescit futurum a nobis, nisi
post absolutam determinationem suae voluntatis, etiam involventem virtualiter determina-
tionem liberam voluntatis nostrae, & in hoc sensu recte dici possunt, tam divina decreta, quam
praescientia divina in potestate nostra constituta, ex quo tamen non sequitur, nos posse illa
mutare, aut impedire, sed tantum quod si aliter nos voluissemus in tempore ab eo, quod sumus
volituri, aliter etiam ipse nobiscum determinasset ab aeterno, & aliter praescivisset.” Cf. simi-
larly Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 206, 145b (“talis determinatio fuerit ab aeterno in
nostra potestate, […] ut poneretur, vel non poneretur”).
68 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 204, 145b: “[L]ibere legam, ac si nullum praeces-
sisset decretum, vel praescientia de mea crastina lectione, quia hoc totum factum est dependen-
ter a voluntate mea.” This genuinely practical nature of human freedom is emphasized vis-à-vis
the charge levelled by the Augustinian theologian Gabrielle Pennotti (1574–1639), a member
of the Roman Curia, in his Propugnaculum, IV, cap. 23, n. 8, 233a, as quoted in Mastrius, Sent.
I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 10, n. 205, 145b, that all previous efforts at reconciling human freedom with
divine foreknowledge have failed to prove that the human will is indeed free in exercitio. For-
livesi, “The Creator’s Decrees,” 216, directs a similar charge against Mastri’s own solution:
“[D]espite Mastri’s opposing claims, every particular possible free will and ‘its’ choices plainly
appear to be nothing but aspects of God’s will.” The critical point may come down to the
question of whether the virtual inclusion of human will in the divine will renders the former a
mere aspect of the latter; to claim that this is the case does not seem to me to adequately take
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5. God’s Free Conditional Knowledge

Mastri offers his doctrine of the concomitant decree as a Scotist alternative to
the two predominant approaches to the problem of divine foreknowledge in the
Catholic scholasticism of his time. That Mastri rejects the Thomist approach of
Domingo Báñez is not so surprising, given that it rests on an assumption of an-
tecedent and predetermining decrees. On this model, according to Mastri, God
first decides what the created will is going to will, and then afterwards, through
subordination of the second causes to the first cause, the created will wills just
this.69 Mastri rather seems to find competition in the Jesuit approach of Luis de
Molina, acknowledging that this model indeed does operate with “absolute con-
comitant decrees,” albeit understood in a different way than on the Scotist ac-
count and not intended as a solution to the problem of divine cognition of future
events, which is rather the task of the so-called “middle knowledge” (scientia
media). Mastri describes this middle knowledge as that knowledge with which
God, on the Jesuit account, “knows, before any decree, be it absolute or condi-
tional, what the created will determinatively is going to do, if it is placed in such
and such circumstances and concourse on the part of God is not denied.”70 Con-
into consideration Mastri’s view that human free decisions may in a certain way indeed change
God’s will and foreknowledge.
69 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 8, n. 166, 135b. This is how Mastri summarizes the
doctrine of the recent Thomists (as opposed to the older Thomists in the wake of Cajetan); he
has a long and nuanced discussion of the versions and aspects of this doctrine in ibid., art. 4,
nn. 141–65, 129a–35a. For Báñez’s doctrine, see Matava, Divine Causality and Human Free
Choice, 37–101; for the further development of the Thomist doctrine of praedeterminatio phys-
ica, see Leinsle, Introduction to Scholastic Theology, 342–46, and Marschler, “Providence, Pre-
destination, and Grace,” 93–96, both with references to further literature.
70 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 8, n. 166, 135b: “Neutrales quoque decreta concomi-
tantia admittunt absoluta respectu absolute futurorum, non tamen eo modo explicant hanc
concomitantiam, sicut Scotistae; neque decretum concomitans volunt, esse rationem primam,
& adaequatam cognoscendi futura, sed hanc vim habere a scientia media; qua divinus intellec-
tus ante quodcunque decretum sive absolutum, sive conditionatum cognoscit, quid sit factura
determinative creata voluntas, si cum his, vel illis circumstantiis poneretur, & concursus ex
parte Dei non negaretur.” Mastri’s description roughly squares with the introduction of “mid-
dle knowledge” as an explanation of God’s conditional knowledge of human actions in Luis de
Molina, Concordia, disp. 52, n. 9, 340. Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 4, art. 3, n. 228, 151b, reports
that Molina is often regarded as the inventor of the doctrine of middle knowledge, though
some people believe that the doctrine really originated with Molina’s teacher Fonseca. It should
be noted that neither of authors occupy any special place in Mastri’s discussion, which rather
tends to draw on more contemporaneous authors. For the development of the doctrine of mid-
dle knowledge in the seventeenth century, see Knebel, Scientia Media, 27–129. There has been
some discussion of the way in which Scotus’s teaching on foreknowledge relates to Molina’s
conception of middle knowledge; cf. Frost, “John Duns Scotus on God’s Knowledge of Sins,”
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comitance here, according to Mastri, means that the divine decrees presuppose
the decrees of the human will as these are viewed in the divine hypothetical or
conditional knowledge (divina scientia ex hypothesi) of what a human will under
any given circumstances shall choose to do. The absolute divine decrees con-
cerning the actions of the created will then follow upon God’s conditional
knowledge of them. That is, God does not make an absolute decision about some
person’s future actions prior to God’s knowledge of what that person would do
under such and such circumstances. On this model, therefore, the divine decrees
should strictly speaking rather be called ‘consequent’ than ‘concomitant,’ Mastri
concludes.71
This issue of whether the divine decrees follow upon or rather precede
God’s conditional knowledge of free agents is crucial. Whereas, as professed by
Mastri, there is consensus among the scholastic schools that God has infallible
knowledge of conditional future events,72 he identifies the issue of the order
among the decrees of the divine will and the divine conditional knowledge as the
main point of contention “between us and the Fathers of the Society,” i. e., the
Jesuits.73 God’s knowledge of conditional future events, according to Mastri
(who also in this assessment agrees with contemporaneous Jesuits and Thomists
alike), never really was an issue for the “old scholastics” (veteres scholastici).74 In
order to countersteer effectively the Jesuit doctrine of middle knowledge that
centers on this kind of knowledge, and indeed to demonstrate the timely rele-
vance of Scotist theology, Mastri must show how the results from his discussion
of absolute future events translate into conditional language. This is basically
what he sets out to do in the last part (the fourth quaestio) of his Disputation on
the Divine Intellect.75
28–29, and most recently Anfray, “Molina and John Duns Scotus” (with references to further
literature).
71 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 8, n. 166, 135b.
72 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 4, art. 1, n. 208, 146a. The scholastic consensus on this issue
is confirmed by Knebel, Scientia Media, 28–29.
73 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 4, art. 3, n. 227, 151a: “Hic est praecipuus punctus propositae
quaestionis de scientia futurorum conditionatorum inter nos, & Patres Societatis.” Cf. similarly
ibid., art. 5, n. 282, 163a.
74 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 4, art. 5, n. 283, 163b. Cf. Hieronymus Fasolus (a Jesuit de-
fender of middle knowledge), In primam partem, vol. 1, q. 14, art. 13, dub. 20, n. 483, 276a,
and Ioannes Paulus Nazarius (a Thomist critic of the Jesuit doctrine), In primam partem, q. 14,
art. 13, controv. 2, 469a; Mastri references both of these authors in the relevant context.
75 Note that Mastri already has a lengthy section on the concept of ‘middle knowledge’
within his quaestio on God’s absolute knowledge of contingent future events; cf. Mastrius,
Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 3, art. 4, 120b, heading: “An scientia media Neutralium sit sufficiens, & pri-
ma ratio ad habendam certam notititam eventus liberi.” In Baroque Scotist theological litera-
ture, discussions of conditional knowledge as such are often treated as a supplement to the
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God only knows conditional future events after the conditional decrees of
His will, because these decrees bestow a determined conditional truth on the
conditional future events, for which it suffices that these events follow from some
condition.76 This formulation is a conditional rendition of Mastri’s view of the
divine will as the medium of divine foreknowledge and as the determining factor
that enables God’s infallible knowledge of future events, despite their contingent
character (cf. above chapters 1 and 3). It forms the basis for Mastri’s position
regarding the issue of whether God’s conditional knowledge is natural or free, or
perhaps instead can be said to constitute a third kind of knowledge that is to be
located in the middle between the two others. Mastri does acknowledge the pos-
sibility of making room, on a purely terminological level, for a third kind of
knowledge between God’s knowledge of possibles (traditionally called ‘scientia
simplicis intelligentiae’) and His knowledge of what shall actually come to be
(‘scientia visionis’). Since the objects of conditional knowledge, future condition-
als, ontologically stand between possibles and future absolutes, conditional
knowledge itself may indeed be granted a middle position (although, even here,
God’s conditional knowledge then would be closer, even reducible, to His
knowledge of possibles, since future conditionals are more akin to possibles than
to future absolutes).77 But if the problem is treated as a real one, rather than just
discussion of absolute divine foreknowledge; this is indeed what we find in the final part of
Mastri’s Disputation on the Divine Intellect.
76 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 4, art. 3, n. 231, 152a: “Vera itaque, ac germana Scoti senten-
tia est Deum futura conditionata libera non cognoscere in ratione futurorum, nisi post decreta
conditionata, a qua determinatam accipiunt veritatem conditionatam, secundum quam actum
divini intellectus terminate possunt” (note that one would expect ‘a quibus’ rather than ‘a
qua’). Cf. further Mastri’s discussion of conditional truth in ibid., art. 1, n. 216, 148a (“ut enim
aliqua propositio dicatur vere conditionalis, sufficit quod consequens aliquo modo sequatur ex
antecedenti”), where he refers back to the discussion of conditional propositions in Mastrius /
Bellutus, Dial. inst., pars 1, tract. 2, cap. 6, n. 64 (Cursus philosophicus I), 20a. See also Leinsle,
Introduction to Scholastic Theology, 334.
77 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 4, art. 5, n. 287, 164b; cf. similarly ibid., n. 284, 163b. Mas-
trius, ibid., n. 279, 162b, following Hieronymus Fasolus, In primam partem, vol. 1, q. 14,
art. 13, dub. 20, n. 480, 275a, informs us that most Jesuits agreed that God’s conditional knowl-
edge is not a wholly distinct kind of knowledge, but rather one that is a part of His knowledge
of possibles. Mastri stresses that the Thomist critique is wrong that holds that the Jesuits have
invented a new kind of divine knowledge that cannot be reduced to the members of the tradi-
tional division. The terminology of ‘scientia simplicis intelligentiae’ and ‘scientia visionis’ is
frequently employed by Mastri; cf. Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 1, n. 1, 91a (at the very outset of
the Disputation on the Divine Intellect), and ibid., q. 3, art. 10, n. 198, 144a, as quoted in note
31. As for the distinction between a real and a purely terminological aspect of the problematic
concerning the status of God’s conditional knowledge, see Mastrius, ibid., q. 4, art. 5, n. 282,
163a (where he describes the problem as being “de solo nomine, ac etiam aliquo modo de re”;
cf. similarly ibid., n. 284, 163b, and n. 287, 164b. Regarding this distinction, Mastri draws
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as one concerning traditional terminology, something else decides the matter,

namely whether God’s conditional knowledge is free, or not – for the principle
of the excluded middle (inter contradictoria nullum datur medium) excludes any
middle between free and non-free knowledge.78
Mastri’s argument favors God’s conditional knowledge as an aspect of His
knowledge of contingent future events. It thus prompts a distinction on the part
of divine free knowledge between God’s “free absolute knowledge” and His “free
conditional knowledge.” These two kinds of free knowledge have in common
that they follow upon decrees of the divine will; they differ from one another in
that the first one follows upon absolute decrees, whereas the second one follows
upon conditional decrees.79 In Mastri’s discussion of future absolutes, we learn
that they, in themselves, possess some real being owing to their future state of
actual existence (cf. above chapter 2). For a successful analogy between free ab-
solute knowledge and free conditional knowledge, one would expect that future
conditionals likewise have some kind of real being, despite their status as condi-
tionals. What is their ontological status? Mastri briefly states that future condi-
tionals do indeed possess “some proportional actuality in themselves and outside
of their causes.”80 Notably, this position on the status of the objects of God’s free
(again) on Hieronymus Fasolus, In primam partem, vol. 1, q. 14, art. 13, dub. 20, n. 501, 285b,
as quoted by Knebel, Scientia Media, 27. The differentiation between a terminological aspect of
this issue and the thing itself was common among Baroque Scotists; cf., e. g., Gaspare Sghem-
ma, Scoticum opusculum, q. 2, 6b, and Ioannes Poncius, Integer theol. cursus, I, disp. 5, q. 7,
nn. 34–35, 81b.
78 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 4, art. 5, n. 284, 163b. Sebastian Dupasquier, Summa theol.
scotisticae, I, disp. 8, q. 7, concl. 2, 592, follows Mastri’s approach to the de re aspect of the
issue and explicitly refuses to discuss whether one can speak of ‘middle’ knowledge in any
other sense (“an alio sensu dicatur media, non curamus”). Crescentius Krisper, Theol. scholae
scotisticae, I, tract. 1, dist. 14, q. 4, n. 10, 232a, rather accepts the whole of Mastri’s differentiat-
ed argument. Mastri’s option that God’s conditional knowledge enjoys the status of free know-
ledge is in line with Angelus Vulpes, Sacrae theol. summa, I, vol. 2, disp. 31, art. 3, n. 5, 76b.
Philippus Faber, Disp. theol., I, disp. 54, cap. 5, n. 51, 365b, rather teaches that God’s condi-
tional knowledge belongs under His knowledge of simple intelligence. This also seems to be the
position of the French Scotist Claude Frassen; cf. Dvořák, “Frassenova třetí cesta,” 110. The
positions of both Volpe and Fabri are referenced by Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 4, art. 5, n. 284,
163a.
79 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 4, art. 5, n. 284, 163b: “[S]cientia visionis coincidit cum sci-
entia libera, quae subsequitur decreta divinae voluntatis; & quae subsequitur decreta condition-
ata, & non ultima, dicitur scientia libera conditionata, quae vero subsequitur decreta absoluta,
& ultima, dicitur scientia libera absoluta; sed inter scientiam naturalem, & liberam in hoc sen-
su, non datur medium.”
80 Mastrius, Sent. I, disp. 3, q. 4, art. 5, n. 285, 164a: “Potest etiam ulterius dici, etiam creat-
uras, ut actu futuras sub conditione, habere sub conditione aliquam actualitatem in seipsis ex-
tra causas sibi proportionatam.”
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conditional knowledge may be seen as a coherent extension of Mastri’s stance

on the ontological status of possible creatures that, from eternity, possess real
possible being, rather than occupying a middle position between real being and
being of reason, and despite being describable also as objects of the divine intel-
lect. Mastri’s reflections on conditional knowledge and its objects thus draw
upon and contribute to his overall Scotist ontology, with its focus on real being
and its exact nuances, an endeavor that may be summed up in the insight that
“not everything that exists in reality, exists in the same way.”81
Conclusion
The main theses of Mastri’s doctrine of divine knowledge of future events are: 1)
God knows future events through His decrees; they are the medium of His cog-
nition of future events, and they are included in the divine essence. 2) Future
events are, in themselves, secondary objects of God’s knowledge; their ontologi-
cal status is real, owing to their future state of real existence. 3) Despite their
contingent character, future events are known infallibly by God due to the ex-
trinsic determination which His own will bestows on them. 4) There is a perfect
coherence between God’s infallible knowledge of contingent future events and
free choices of created wills; this coherence is guarded by the relation of con-
comitance that holds between the decrees of the divine will and those of the
human will.
Mastri intends his Scotist doctrine of the concomitant decree as a viable
alternative to the two competing school doctrines of divine foreknowledge that
dominated Catholic theology in the decades around 1600: the Thomist doctrine
of antecedent decrees (also called the doctrine of physical predetermination),
and the Jesuit doctrine of middle knowledge. The latter is founded in a view of
God’s knowledge of conditionals as being prior to God’s free decrees regarding
future events. According to Mastri, there is no genuine middle knowledge, but
rather knowledge that is either natural or free. All of God’s knowledge of future
events is posterior to His free decrees, including His knowledge of future condi-
tionals. Like future absolutes, future conditionals have their own real being.
Out of this emerges a seemingly coherent theory of divine cognition run-
ning throughout Mastri’s reflections on God’s knowledge of possible creatures
and of contingent future events, both the absolute and conditional ones. The
latter are free actions of creatures. Mastri’s Baroque version of Scotism thus in-
cludes a comprehensive defense of the reality of human freedom. His theology of
81 Mastrius, Disp. Met., disp. 6, q. 7, art. 3, n. 166 (Cursus philosophicus IV), 277b: “[N]on
quicquid a parte rei existit, eodem modo existit”; for the context of this quote, see Andersen,
Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 669.
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freedom clearly belongs under the most sophisticated doctrines in that spectrum
of positions that, at the opposite end of the spectrum, has Martin Luther fa-
mously dismissing the very notion of ‘free will.’82
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IV.
The Influence of Scotism
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The Epistemological Limits of Religious Images
On the Scotist Sources of a Reformed Theological Tenet
Ueli Zahnd
Introduction
The question of religious images, as it was debated in Western theology from the
14th to 17th century, transformed the religious landscape of important parts of
Europe. The abolition of images by the Lollards in England, the rejection of rep-
resentations of the divine in Hussite communities, and the vast iconoclasms in
Reformed territories provoked a reorganization of religious rites and customs
that put an end to essential components of medieval piety.1 In addition to this
practical dimension, however, the question was also of fundamental epistemo-
logical concern. This paper argues that the Scotist heritage played a more impor-
tant role in this epistemological debate than is usually acknowledged.2 It is true
that Scotus himself never addressed the veneration of images in any of his
works,3 but with his metaphysics of the infinite, and his insistence on the radical
difference between extracategorical being on the one hand, and finite, categorical
being on the other, the status of religious images and of their capacity to direct a
human mind to a true cognition of the divine was thoroughly questioned. At
least, this is a type of argumentation that was common in the Reformation de-
bate about images. When, in 1525, the Swiss Reformer Huldrych Zwingli de-
fended in Zurich the abolition of religious images, he did not simply invoke bib-
This publication was produced as part of the project “A Disregarded Past. Medieval Scholasti-
cism and Reformed Thought,” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant num-
ber 192703). I would like to thank the Swiss National Science Foundation for financial support.
1 See the articles collected in Scribner (ed.): Bilder und Bildersturm, as well as Marchal,
“Bildersturm im Mittelalter” and Jones, “Lollards and Images.”
2 Except in over-generalizing ways (as in Houtepen, “The Dialectics of the Icon,” 58), Sco-
tus does not appear in studies on the theology of images; see, e. g., Wirth, “Die Bestreitung des
Bildes”, id., “Theorien zum Bilderkult,” Marchal, “Das vieldeutige Heiligenbild,” and Iserloh,
“Bildfeindlichkeit.”
3 At least not in the expected place in one of his commentaries on Book III, dist. 9, of Peter
Lombard’s Sentences, nor in his quodlibetal questions, see also Wirth, “La critique scolastique,”
106. The discussion that comes closest to a doctrine of religious images is the one on angelic
cognition in Duns Scotus, Ord. II, dist. 3, p. 2, q. 2, where he denies that the image of God in
angels can be a source of their cognizing God, see LaZella, “Remainders and Reminders of the
Divine.”
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368 Ueli Zahnd
lical authority with, in particular, the prohibition of images according to the

Decalogue, but he argued that images “mislead the consciences” of believers: im-
ages, as created things, were not able to provide true knowledge about God.4
Similarly, John Calvin spoke of religious images as “mendacious signs,” and he
said, at some place, that there is “nothing less fitting than to wish to reduce God,
who is immeasurable and incomprehensible, to the five-foot measure” of a stat-
ue.5 As a consequence, in the Reformed, Calvinist tradition, religious images
were removed from the churches, which is all the more noteworthy since Martin
Luther and the Lutheran tradition were by no means as opposed to images as
these Reformed theologians. The Lutherans rejected, of course, the medieval ven-
eration of images, but they did not ban images from their churches, considering
them neutral as regards personal devotion, and keeping crosses and altar pieces
as part of their religious culture.6
Within the Protestant camp, there were thus two opposed stances on the
question of images. In what follows, I would like to explore the hypothesis that
the arguments brought forward by Early Modern Reformed Theologians in order
to defend their rejection of religious images was rooted in an epistemological
framework which was essentially Scotist. This does not seem completely baseless,
for two reasons. First, a few years ago, I came across a treatise written by the
famous late 15th-century Scotist Stephan Brulefer, who had produced a collection
of ten propositions on the depictability of the Trinity.7 Brulefer, building on the
incommensurability of categorical and extra-categorical being, was rather clear
about what he thought of such images meant to depict the divine persons that
prevailed in the material culture of the late 15th century. In the first proposition,
he stated with regard to images of God the Father:
4 Zwingli, “Eine Antwort, Valentin Compar gegeben,” 149: “Sy sind warlich, warlich nütz
anders weder ein verfuernus der conscientzen und vogel kutzen des bapstuoms. Das hatt mit
dem mißbruch der meß, mit der bycht, fegfür und götzendienst me guots zemengelegt, denn
die gantz welt mit barem gelt erkouffen möchte uff ein mal. Daran wäre aber der minste schad,
wenn nit die conscientzen so verderblich damit verfuert wärind.” Cf. ibid., 120: “mag ouch
ieman an eim stummenden bild one underricht des wortes den waren got und herren Jesum
Christum lernen erkennen?”
5 Calvin, Institutio Christianae religionis, I, chapt. 11, n. 4, 77: “nihil minus consentaneum,
quam velle Deum, qui immensus est ac incomprehensibilis, redigere ad quinque pedum men-
suram”; see ibid., n. 5, 78: “Hinc generalis colligenda est doctrina, futile esse, adeo que mendax,
quidquid de Deo ex imaginibus homines didicerint.”
6 See Lentes, “Zwischen Adiaphora und Artefakt,” and Eusterschulte, “Der reformulierte
Bilderstreit.”
7 On Brulefer, who is best known for his tract on the formal distinction that was reprinted
throughout the 16th century, see Zahnd, “Easy-Going Scholars,” 299–311; on his Positio decem
propositionum see also Zahnd, “Bildkritik,” 222–224 (with a German translation of the ten
propositions).
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The Epistemological Limits of Religious Images 369
There is no proportion or similarity of the uncreated paternity with created paternity, or

of God the Father with a human father. […] [Thus,] an image that depicts the Father in
the shape of an old bearded man wrongly and falsely represents what is imagined, and it
totally leads to heresy. […] For it is downright heretical to assume that the Father is such
as represented by it, which is however what simple and unlearned people in particular
are led to firmly believe by such an illustration [my emphasis].8
Later on, in the ninth proposition, Brulefer added regarding the Trinity:
Every entity which is entirely insensible, incomprehensible and unimaginable is entirely

undepictable and unsculpturable. Yet, the divine entity is entirely insensible, incorporeal
and uncircumscribable, incomprehensible and unimaginable. Therefore, it can in no way
be depicted or sculptured, for what is depicted or sculptured is imagined in some way by
the artist and circumscribed by him.9
Brulefer identified, so to say, two different cognitive issues in the question of

religious images: one regarding the mind of the artist who preconceived an un-
conceivable entity, and the other regarding the mind of the simple folk who was
misled by images to a wrong conception of the divine.10 Both issues were also
present in the Reformed debate, and this brings us to the second reason why it is
not unfounded to assume a somewhat Scotist background to the Reformed rejec-
tion of images. Brulefer, in fact, was avidly read by none other than Huldrych
Zwingli himself as we know from Zwingli’s personal library that still exists in
Zurich. Besides some volumes by Scotus and other Scotists (Francis of Mey-
ronnes, John of Cologne, Nicholas de Orbellis), Zwingli owned two volumes of
Brulefer that are full of marginal notes and underlinings from Zwingli’s hand.11
8 Brulefer, Positio decem propositionum an personae in divinis sint ut usus habet depingen-
dae, Prop. 1, 19r–v: “Nulla est habitudo seu similitudo Paternitatis increatae ad paternitatem
creatam, seu Patris in divinis ad patrem hominem. […] huiusmodi imago aut sculptura qua
depingitur Pater in divinis aut figuratur sub effigie hominis antiqui barbati est false et erronee
repraesentativa sui imaginati, et ad haeresim penitus ductiva. […] Nam simpliciter haereticum
est asserere Patrem in divinis esse talem qualis per eam repraesentatur. Ad quod tamen creden-
dum firmiter inducuntur potissime simplices et rudes per talem ymaginationem.”
9 Brulefer, Positio decem propositionum, Prop. 9, 23r–v: “Omnis entitas penitus insensi-
bilis, incomprehensibilis et inimaginabilis est penitus indepingibilis et infigurabilis. Sed entitas
divina est entitas penitus insensibilis, incorporea et incircumscriptibilis, incomprehensibilis et
inimaginabilis. Igitur nullo modo est depingibilis aut figurabilis […] quia quod depingitur seu
figuratur aliquo modo imaginatur a pictore et ab eodem quodammodo circumscribitur.”
10 Since the fundamental problem lies ultimately at the level of mental representations, sys-
tematic connections to other doctrinal discussions emerge, such us the question of mental rep-
resentations in the beatific vision. However, it would lead too far to discuss that here as well;
see Cross, “Beatific Union with God.”
11 See already Schindler, “Zwinglis Randbemerkungen”, Sallmann, Zwischen Gott und
Mensch, 184–97, and in particular Bolliger, Infiniti Contemplatio. For the present purpose, a
passage in Brulefer, Reportata, I, dist. 2, q. 1, 23v, is particularly interesting, where Zwingli
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370 Ueli Zahnd
Yet, even if there is thus a historical link between Brulefer and one of the protag-
onists of the Reformed tradition, underscoring their shared epistemological cri-
tique of images, the question remains as to the extent to which Brulefer himself
is inscribed, on this issue, in Late Medieval Scotism. Therefore, in what follows, I
would like to trace back what happened in Late Medieval Scotism between Sco-
tus and Brulefer as regards the question of images, and to see to what extent
Brulefer, and after him the Reformed tradition, can be regarded as representa-
tives of a Scotist epistemological framework. I intend to do this mainly by look-
ing at several commentaries on the Sentences, Book III, distinction 9, for this was
the place where the question of the adoration of images was usually discussed.
The thesis I will defend is that, in this medieval period, the cognitive dimension
of Scotus’s metaphysics as regards the question of images was passed over for a
long time and only came to notice in reaction to the Hussite revolution.12 Once
it was identified, though, it became part of an intellectual current that eventually
led to the Reformed view on images.
1. From Bonaventure to Scotus

In late medieval theology, the common place to discuss religious images and
their veneration is in Book III, distinction 9, of the commentaries on Lombard’s
Sentences. In this part, the Lombard deals with the incarnation and its conse-
quences, and discussed whether Christ in his human nature and as a human
being shoul be adored with latria – latria, according to scholastic terminology,
being the kind of veneration reserved for God alone and thus distinguished from
dulia, a weaker form of adoration.13 Typically, scholastics of the 13th century
would affirm, however, that latria is the appropriate veneration owed to the hu-
manity of Christ as well, for, as Bonaventure puts it:
Although when taken for itself Christs’s human nature would have had to be adored with
dulia, given that his body is never separated from his divine nature, it always has to be
considered as conjoined to it and thus it always has to be worshiped with latria.14
underlined the following text: “Unde errant hi qui depingunt trinitatem (quod tamen viget
multum in alemania)” (see Bolliger, Infiniti Contemplatio, 652). On Zwingli’s personal library,
see now the catalogue by Leu/Weidmann, Zwingli’s Private Library (in particular, entries
n8 63, 111, 138 f., 171 f. and A73).
12 On this “mechanism” of doctrinal renewal by answering heterodox challenges to the
question of images, see Balzamo, Les êtres artificiels, 89.
13 See, e. g., Thomas Aquinas, STh IIa –IIae, q. 103, art. 3, 525b.
14 Bonaventura, Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarum, III, dist. 9, art. 1, q. 1, 200b–1a:
“Humana natura Christi, quatenus semper est Verbo unita, semper adoranda est latria. […]
Concedendum est ergo, quod non solum Christus homo adorandus est latria, sed etiam humani-
tas eius, in quantum est Verbo unita, quamvis, prout per se consideraturm nunquam ei debeatur
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In the same manner, Bonaventure argues in regard to other created entities with
an intrinsic link to Christ, that is, the cross as an instrument of the redemption
of mankind, but also other crosses as signs of this redemption, and, accordingly,
also in regard to images of Christ:
Since images of Christ have been introduced to represent him who has been crucified for
us, so that they do not stand for themselves, but for him, therefore every reverence that is
given to them is presented to Christ and thus the veneration of latria has to be shown to
images of Christ.15
Typical for this 13th-century approach – Thomas Aquinas argued in similar

terms16 – is the fact that there seems to be only a gradual difference between the
divine and the created sphere. For example, Bonaventure illustrated the one ado-
ration that is due to both natures in the one person of Christ, with the one rever-
ence that someone presents to a human being without distinguishing between
her head and her feet;17 and when he came to argue for the adoration of images
of Christ, he countered the objection that material images might be an improper
means to represent Christ by stating that “a thing of smaller value can designate
a noble thing.”18 Apparently, just as the head and feet of a person are only grad-
ually distinct, and things of smaller or greater nobility still share a common mea-
sure in the category of quantity, the question of the adoration of Christ and his
images seems to have remained inscribed for Bonaventure in the gradual mea-
surement of a more and a less.
With Scotus’s understanding of extra-categorical being, however, this seems
to have been no longer possible. It is true, as already said, that Scotus does not
explain himself on the status of religious images, but his treatment of Book III,
dist. 9, of the Sentences is nevertheless significant. For, in contrast to Bonaven-
nisi dulia. Et quoniam caro Christi nunquam est separata a Verbo, ideo semper consideranda est
ut coniuncta et semper adoranda est latria.”
15 Bonaventura, Commentaria, III, dist. 9, art. 1, q. 2, 203b–4a: “Quoniam igitur imago
Christi introducta est ad repraesentandum eum qui pro nobis crucifixus est, nec offert se nobis
pro se, sed pro illo, ideo omnis reverentia, quae ei offertur, exhibetur Christo. Et propterea
imagini Christi debet cultus latriae exhiberi.”
16 See Thomas Aquinas, STh III, q. 25, art. 3, 171b. For a similar observation in regard to
the specific case of divine and human cognition, see Giorgio Pini’s contribution to this present
volume.
17 Bonaventura, Commentaria, III, dist. 9, art. 1, q. 1, 201a: “Quia est una persona in Chris-
to, cui debetur reverentia summa, una adoratione adoranda est, scilicet latria, quantum ad
utramque naturam, scilicet Deitatem et humanitatem, sicut eadem adoratione adoratur in uno
homine caput et pes.”
18 Bonaventura, Commentaria, III, dist. 9, art. 1, q. 2, 204a: “Res parvi valoris rem nobilem
significare potest. Cum ergo adoratur imago, non adoratur ratione nobilitatis, quam habet in
se, sed ratione nobilitatis significatae in se.”
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372 Ueli Zahnd
ture or Aquinas, Scotus maintains that Christ’s human nature as belonging to

the realm of created things should not be adored with latria, but with some ex-
cellent kind of dulia, namely hyperdulia.19 Asking whether latria was owed to
Christ only according to his divine nature – utrum Christo debeatur latria solum
secundum naturam divinam –, Scotus develops his position by means of a dis-
tinction of what could be meant by ‘only’ (solum or solummodo). He already
introduced this distinction in Book I, dist. 21 of the Ordinatio where he had
asked if it is true that only the Father is God.20 The distinction he used is the one
between the categorematic and the syncategorematic meaning of ‘solum,’ that is,
the meaning the word has when grammatically standing alone (S1), or when
standing in conjunction with another term (S2). In Book I, Scotus had explained
that the autonomous, categorematic meaning of ‘solum’ (S1) is ‘not with some-
thing else’ (non cum alio),21 and with reference to this meaning, he could now
say in Book III:
Taken the first way [that is, the categorematic one], I concede [what is asked], for there
is a sufficient reason of the highest adorable in Christ when he is considered according to
his sole divine nature.22
In other words, taken this way, the quaesitum was to concede since it was not
necessary to combine Christ’s divine nature with something else in order to have
to adore it with latria. More interesting, and more to the point, however, is the
syncategorematic meaning (S2) of ‘solum,’ that is, whether Christ’s divine na-
ture alone is to be adored with latria. Once more, Scotus introduced a distinc-
tion:
The term ‘solummodo’ can exclude something, either from what is the target [termino]
of adoration [S2a], or from what is the cause [ratione] of adoration [S2b]. Taken the
first way, I say that Christ is not to be adored exclusively according to his divine nature,
19 Usually, hyperdulia was reserved for Mary, see Bonaventure, Commentaria, III, dist. 9,
art. 1, q. 3, 206a, and Thomas Aquinas, STh III, q. 25, art. 5, 173b.
20 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 21, q. un., n. 1 (ed. Vat. V), 323: “Utrum haec sit vera ‘solus
Pater est Deus’.”
21 Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 21, q. un., n. 2 (ed. Vat. V), 325: “[…] ‘solus’ potest teneri
categorematice vel syncategorematice. ‘Solus’ enim significat idem quod ‘non cum alio,’ sicut
patet per Philosophum I Elenchorum.”
22 Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 9, q. un., n. 21 (ed. Vat. IX), 325–26: “De tertio articulo, cum
quaeritur an debeatur Christo latria solummodo secundum naturam divinam, – dico quod ly
‘solummodo’ potest accipi dupliciter, scilicet categorematice vel syncategorematice: Primo mo-
do, concedo quod sic, quia Christo – considerato secundum solam naturam divinam – suffi-
ciens est in eo ratio summi adorabilis.”
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for the human nature should not be excluded as if the whole person could not be adored
when including it.23
In this first way of the syncategorematic understanding (S2a) Scotus concedes

thus that Christ’s human nature could also be adored with latria, but he imme-
diately made it clear that this is not a huge concession: for, as he says, it is not
adored in a ‘copulative,’ but only in an ‘associative’ way.24 He explains the
meaning of this with the example of a king wearing a purple robe:
Even if the king must be honored because of himself and in himself, he nevertheless must
also be adored with the robe he wears, however without that robe being the cause of
honor. In the same way, the flesh of Christ should not be adored in the Word as if it was
the motive of the adoration in the Word.25
Peter Lombard had already cited this example of the king’s robe, but he had
done so to show that only when the robe was found lying around it would not
have to be revered, while it must be revered with the king when worn by him.26
Scotus, however, uses this example to stress that, even when worn by the king,
the robe is not the proper object of reverence. Accordingly, understanding ‘sol-
um’ in the second syncategorematic way (S2b), that is, restricting the cause of
adoration, Scotus concludes:
It can be said that [Christ] is only to be adored according to the divine nature, excluding
the other [human] nature as a cause of adoration, since no other [than the divine na-
ture] is the cause […] of adoration.27
23 Ibid., n. 22, 326: “Si autem teneatur syncategorematice, tunc notat exclusionem ab uno
extremo respectu alterius extremi. Hoc modo distinguo, quia aut potest aliud exludi ut a termi-
no adorationis vel ut a ratione adorandi. Primo modo, dico quod non solummodo secundum
naturam divinam est Christus sic adorandus, quia a termino adorationis non debet excludi
natura humana, quasi ipsam includendo non possit totum adorari.”
24 Ibid., n. 23, 326–27: “‘Cum’ accipitur associative, non autem copulative, ut sit sensus:
‘adoramus Verbum cum carne, id est habens carnem sibi unitam,’ non autem ‘cum carne, hoc
est et carnem adoramus’ ita quod sit propositio copulativa.”
25 Ibid., n. 24, 327: “Exemplum ad hoc est de rege et purpura, quia etsi rex propter se et in
se sit adorandus, tamen ipse cum purpura adjuncta: ut purpura sibi adjuncta non est causa
adorationis, ita caro non est ita adorabilis in Verbo, ut sit ratio adorationis in Verbo.”
26 Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae in IV libris distinctae, III, dist. 9, c. 5, 71: “Si quis purpu-
ram vel diadem regale iacens inveniat, numquid ea conabitur adorare? Cum vero ea rex fuerit
indutus, periculum mortis incurrit si ea cum rege adorare quis contempserit.” Lombard wrong-
ly attributed the example to Augustine.
27 Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 9, q. un., n. 25 (ed. Vat. IX), 327–28: “Secundo modo, scilicet
prout ly ‘solummodo’ excludit aliquid ut rationem adorandi, potest dici quod solummodo se-
cundum naturam divinam est adorandus, excludendo aliam naturam ut est ratio adorandi,
quia nulla alia est ratio summi dominii, et ideo nec adorationis debitae summo Domino.”
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374 Ueli Zahnd
Except for the rather weak case of syncategorematical adoration in the first sense
(S2a), Scotus votes, thus in opposition to the scholastic tradition before him,
against an adoration of Christ’s human nature with latria, stressing the gap be-
tween the realm of created, finite things and of the divine.28 The examples he
puts forward – even if they are already present in the discussion before him –
also underscored this gap, for there is a more essential distinction between a king
and his robe than between the head and the feet of a human body, and at an-
other place, Scotus also advanced the example of the conjunction of soul and
body in one person, which again are two ontologically well distinct entities.29 In
doing so, Scotus accentuates his reservation to commit a categorical error by
treating things belonging to the realm of finite being as if they were divine. But
as already said, this is all he does in Ord. III, dist. 9; he does not develop this
reservation any further as regards the adoration of the cross or of images of
Christ.
2. 14th-Century Developments
It is interesting to note that, in the immediate context of Scotus, most scholastics
do not seem to have been eager to continue the direction taken by Scotus on this
issue of the theology of the incarnation. The only Franciscan I found in his after-
math who applied Scotus’s position and even held that, in any regard, Christ’s
human nature is to be adored with hyperdulia, is Peter Auriol. Tackling the
problem from the perspective of what is revered – either a divine or created
object –, he denies that these objects only differ gradually as if it were merely a
matter of a stronger or weaker degree:
Rather, I say that they are of a completely different kind, because however much one
would add to the dependency on a created thing, it would never reach the one which is
on God. Therefore, the act that follows necessarily in the will from the former, is of a
different kind than the one that follows from the latter.30
28 Given the importance the concept of univocity has in Scotus’s thought, this stressing of
the gap between the worldly and the divine sphere might not seem very typical for him. Even
when he presented, however, his notion of univocity, Scotus was clear about the incapacity of
created things to evoke a proper and simple concept of something uncreated – a proper and
simple concept that alone could be, in the present case, the target of adoration. Cf. Duns Sco-
tus, Ord. I, dist. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 35 (ed. Vat. III), 24: “obiectum creatum non essentialiter con-
tinet increatum secundum aliquid omnino sibi proprium et non commune; ergo non facit con-
ceptum simplicem et proprium enti increato.” See also LaZella, “Remainders and Reminders of
the Divine,” 530–31.
29 Duns Scotus, Ord. III, dist. 9, q. un., n. 24 (ed. Vat. IX), 327.
30 Petrus Aureoli, Commentaria in tertium librum Sententiarum, dist. 9, q. un., art. 1,
400bB: “Dices, quod sunt distincta solum secundum magis, et minus, ut maior albedo, et mi-
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Emphasizing thus the unbridgeable difference between the creator and creation,
Auriol goes on and argues by distinguishing formally between the appropriate
adoration for them:
A formal distinction of an object into diverse species claims for a distinction of the [re-
spective] acts [of the will] into diverse species. But the dependency on God and on a
creature, which is the formal object of adoration, is of different species, therefore [the
same is true] for the acts [of the will] corresponding to them. Yet, the adoration due
with regard to God is called latria.31
The unspoken corollary of this is that, as a consequence, any reverence shown to

something that formally is not God cannot be latria.32
However, many other Franciscans writing in the wake of Scotus either did
not tackle distinction 9 of Book III at all, such as William of Alnwick, Francis of
Marchia or Francis of Meyronnes,33 or they dealt with a different topic at this
place, such as Hugh of Newcastle.34 Among the remaining few that took up the
problem it is interesting to note that they mostly tried to read Scotus as tradi-
tionally as possible: John of Bassolis only reports Scotus’s two ways of under-
standing the syncategorematic term ‘solum’ (S2a and S2b), thus omitting half of
what would have been in support of hyperdulia.35 And while he agrees that, ac-
cording to (S2b) in Scotus, Christ’s human nature should only be adored with
nor. Dico, quod non, imo dico, quod sunt omnino alterius rationis, quia quantumcumque ad-
dens ad dependentiam creaturae, numquam attingeret ad illam, quae est ad Deum, et ideo ac-
tus, qui necessario sequitur in voluntate ex illa, est alterius rationis ab eo actu, qui sequitur ex
illa.”
31 Ibid., 400bC: “Distinctio formalis obiecti in diversas species arguit distinctionem actuum
in diversas species: sed dependentia ad Deum et creaturam, quae est formale obiectum adora-
tionis, sunt diversae species: ergo actus adorationis eis correspondentes. Illa autem adoratio
quae est respectu Dei, vocatur latria.”
32 Cf. Petrus Aureoli, Commentaria, III, dist. 9, q. un., art. 3, 401bA: “Latria debetur Trini-
tati, et unica, quia unica est dependentia omnis creaturae ad totam Trinitatem, et unum formal
obiectum est ibi. […] Hiperdulia vero debetur humanitati Christi, quia omnis creatura depen-
det ab eo nobiliori modo […]. Dulia vero secundum diversas species diversis attribuitur.”
33 At least in those versions I could check. See William of Alnwick, Quaestiones in Senten-
tias (Assisi, Fondo Antico presso la Biblioteca del Sacro Convento, Ms. 172), 78r; Francis of
Marchia, Super tertium Sententiarum (Paris, BNF Lat 15805), 99va; Franciscus de Mayronis,
Scriptum luculentissimum in tertium Sententiarum, dist. 9, 10va.
34 Hugo de Novocastris, Lectura in librum III Sententiarum (Vienna, ÖNB, Ms. 1423),
254vb: “Circa distinctionem nonam quaeritur utrum latria sit virtus.”
35 John of Bassolis, In tertium Sententiarum Opus, dist. 9, q. un., 43va–b: “Sed hoc potest
intelligi uno modo sic quod illa dictio exclusiva ‘soli’ excludat omne aliud a deo ab ipso termi-
no adorationis. […] Alio modo potest intelligi sic quod ly ‘soli’ excludat omne aliud a deo
tanquam rationem adorationis.”
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376 Ueli Zahnd
hyperdulia, he presents the first interpretation of the syncategorematic term

(S2a) so broadly that it allows him to conclude:
Not only the humanity or the flesh of Christ can be adored with latria when taken this
way, but also images of Christ, crosses and the cross of Christ itself, inasmuch as they
represent Christ.36
Antonius Andreae even exclusively builds on (S2a), concluding in line with

Bonaventure that Christ’s humanity should not be excluded from adoration with
latria.37 Peter of Aquila replaces Scotus’s different interpretations of ‘solum’ with
a threefold acceptation of the notion of adoration that he finds in William of
Ware:38 one per accidens (A1) and another per se (A2), the latter being further
divided into per se et propter se (A2a), and per se sed non propter se (A2b).39 But
while he admits that per se et propter se adoration (A2a) is only due to God and
the Trinity, he can conclude that, when taken as per se sed non propter se adora-
tion (A2b), Christ’s humanity is to be adored with latria.40
36 Ibid.: “Et dico etiam quod non solum humanitas vel caro Christi modo praedicto potest
adorari latria, sed etiam imagines Christi et cruces et crux Christi inquantum repraesentant
Christum. Et tunc non est distincta adoratio Christi et praedictorum, sed eadem principaliter
Christi et consequenter aliorum vel secundario.”
37 Antonius Andreae, In quatuor Sententiarum libros opus longe absolutissimum, III, dist. 9,
q. un., 97ra: “Ad propositum de Christo dico, quod sola divinitas, quae est in Christo, est suffi-
ciens terminus, cui exhibeatur honor latriae, non tamen sola humanitas. Item divinitas in
Christo est ratio, quare detur sibi honor latriae, et non humanitas. Secundo dico, quod human-
itas non est excludenda a Christo, quando ei exhibetur honor talis, immo toti Christo, pro ut
includit divinitatem et humanitatem, talis honor est exhibendus, licet ratio huius non sit hu-
manitas, sed divinitas.”
38 The distinction is treated both in the shorter and in the longer version of William’s Sen-
tences commentary (respectively called Dicta and Commentaria): William of Ware, Dicta super
quatuor libros Sententiarum (Vienna, ÖNB, Ms. 1438), 139vb–40ra: “Sed advertendum est
quod aliquid potest adorari dupliciter: vel per se, vel per accidens. Per se dupliciter: vel per se
et propter se, vel per se et propter aliud”; and id., Commentaria in libros quatuor Sententiarum
(Vienna, ÖNB, Ms. 1424), 121va: “Distinguendo est in principio de adoratione, quia est adora-
tio per se et adoratio per acciens. Iterum adoratio per se distinguitur, quia est adoratio per se et
propter se, et est adoratio per se et non propter se sed propter aliud.” A similar distinction can
also be found in Henry of Ghent, Quaestiones quodlibeticae, X, q. 6, 413v; cf. Wirth, “La cri-
tique scolastique,” 102–4.
39 Peter of Aquila, In Sententiarum libros, III, dist. 9, q. un. (unpaginated, 3ra of quire o):
“Dico quod adoratio est duplex, scilicet adoratio per se et adoratio per accidens. Item adoratio
per se distinguitur, quia est adoartio per se et propter se, et est adoratio per se et non propter se
sed propter aliud, puta quando adoratum est alteri unitum.”
40 Ibid.: “Ista distinctione praemissa dico ad quaestionem quod adoratio per se et propter se
quae dicitur latria competit soli Deo et Trinitati, quia solus Deus est ultimus finis per se et
propter se adorandus. Si autem loquamur de adoratione per se et non propter se sed propter
aliud, tunc ista competit naturae humanae in Christo quae est unita Deo.”
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All these Franciscan authors, therefore, sought to re-establish latria more

firmly as the appropriate form of worship of Christ’s humanity. As a conse-
quence, in the second half of the fourteenth century, the Scotist Francis of Peru-
gia argues again for an exclusive adoration of Christ’s humanity with latria; and
he does so by giving Christ’s humanity a particular place on the scale of created
and uncreated beings:
A rational creature unified with the divine word exceeds in its being-unified the perfec-
tion of any other created being. Therefore, this creature that is unified with the Word in
this way must be adored with latria. The antecedent is obvious, for [this creature] is
above all of that which is formally not God. The consequence is proven. For, if it was
according to degree [that this creature exceeds the other creatures] then every creature
would have to be adored. Therefore, if this unified nature exceeds the perfection of any
created being, then it has to be honored above any grade of honor of any created being.
But if the other creatures are not honored with the adoration of latria, then this honor is
due to this nature.41
From a systematical point of view, this solution seems problematic in two re-
gards. First, the proof of the consequence brought forward by Francis of Perugia
seems to be a petitio principii: if the excellence of this nature is gradual with
regard to other creatures, then other creatures would only have to be adored
with latria, if it were already settled that this excellent nature is so to be adored.
But that is exactly what the argument is meant to prove. Second, Francis passed
over the fact that the scholastic tradition, and Scotus in particular, does know of
a kind of reverence reserved for created beings that excelled every other created
being, namely hyperdulia, a concept that Francis even introduces a few lines later
in his commentary as “the honor that is due to the most excellent creature,”
without revising however his former account.42 But be that as it may, from a
historical point of view it is interesting to note that these inconsistencies fit into
a general tendency among Franciscan authors, that is, to implicitly oppose Sco-
tus’s solution of the question and to return to the traditional, prevailing opinion
that Christ’s humanity and other created entities linked to it should be adored
41 Francis Totti of Perugia, In Sententias, III, dist. 9, q. un. (Munich, BSB, Ms. clm 8718),
145rb–va: “Creatura rationabilis unita Verbo in esse unionis excedit perfectionem cuius-
cumque enti creati. Ergo ista creatura sic Verbo unita est adoranda cultu latriae. Antecedens
patet quia est super omne illud quod non est Deus formaliter. Consequentia probatur. Nam si
secundum gradum, ergo quaelibet creatura est adoranda. Ergo si ista natura unita excedit per-
fectionem cuiuscumque entis creati, ergo debet honorari secundum [read: super] omnem
gradum honoris cuiuscumque creaturae. Ergo si aliae creature non honorant latriae adoratione,
ergo istae naturae debetur iste honor.”
42 Ibid., 145va: “Humanitas Christi non unita Verbo esset adoratione yperduliae adoranda,
quia yperdulia est honor excellentissimus debitus creaturae.”
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378 Ueli Zahnd
with latria. Unsurprisingly, Francis of Perugia also explains that the appropriate
reverence for images of Christ is latria.43
In other milieus than the Franciscan ones, however, Scotus’s approach was
more openly received. This is already evident with the Dominican Durandus of
Saint Pourçain in the early 14th century who studied in Paris in 1303 and possi-
bly attended Scotus’s lecture.44 His treatment of Sentences III, dist. 9, reflects sev-
eral elements of the Franciscan master’s account. First, while it is true that Du-
randus too does not explicitly rely on Scotus’s different interpretations of the
term ‘solum,’ he introduces a differentiation similar to the later one of Peter of
Aquila, a differentiation that reflects more closely, however, Scotus’s conception:
One must know that the honor of latria or of any other reverence can be shown to some-
body in a twofold way, that is per se and per accidens. It is shown per se to the one in
whom the cause of such an honor is, and it is shown per accidens to the one in whom
there is no cause of such an honor but who has a certain habitudo to the one in whom
the cause is.
For Durandus, there is a twofold understanding of showing reverence to some-

body, one per se (Db) and one per accidens (Da), and while per se reverence
(Db) fits closely with (S2b), that is, a reverence where the cause of the adorabili-
ty is in the adored object itself, per accidens reverence (Da) is – just as in (S2a)
– only accidentally presented to an object with, as Durandus said, a certain habi-
tudo with the real cause of adoration (recall the purple robe of the king).45 Ac-
cordingly, just as Scotus, Durandus reserves per se adoration – that is, latria46 –
for God alone, while Christ’s humanity is only incidentally to be adored that
way:
I say per accidens, for neither is his humanity properly that which is adored […], nor is it
the cause or reason of such an adoration. It is, though, the cause of some other adoration,
namely hyperdulia, which is due to Christ because of his human nature.47
43 See ibid., 145vb, at the end of the question.

44 For Durandus’s biography, see the literature collected by Jeschke, Deus ut tentus vel visus,
376. For Scotus’s acquaintance (at the time of his quodlibetal disputation at Paris in 1306 or
1307) with a position held by Durandus, see Cross, Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 111.
45 Durandus of St. Pourçain, Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum libri
IIII, III, dist. 9, q. 2, 229vb: “Sciendum quod honor latriae vel cuiuscunque alterius reverentiae
potest exhiberi alicui dupliciter, scilicet per se et per accidens. Per se exhibetur illi in quo est
causa talis honoris, per accidens autem exhibitur in quo non est causa talis honoris, sed habet
aliquam habitudinem ad illud in quo est causa.”
46 Ibid.: “Honor latriae debetur per soli deo ratione divinitatis.”
47 Ibid.: “Adoratur humanitas Christi per accidens adoratione latriae, quia quando supposi-
tum per se honoratur, honoratur per accidens quicquid est in supposito. Sed Filius Dei ado-
ratur adoratione latriae per se, ergo humanitas Christi per accidens honoratur eadem ratione.
Dico autem per accidens, quia nec ipsa humanitas est proprie illud quod adoratur cum non sit
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Yet, Durandus not only acts on Scotus’s account in a sometimes different word-
ing, but he also applies it to the problem of images, being probably the first to do
so and to take, from this perspective, a rather critical stance on religious im-
ages.48 First of all, Durandus notes that images, crosses, and other objects when
taken for themselves are not worthy of any kind of reverence, since they are
inanimate beings.49 The idea behind this argument can already be found in Tho-
mas Aquinas who held that, in order to receive honors, a thing needs to possess
reason.50 But Durandus also rejected the idea – defended by Thomas, and also
by Bonaventure and others – that the honor shown to an image is actually
shown to the thing represented by the image:
To whatever degree it may be one and the same movement of the soul with which it is
carried to the image as image and to the thing [represented], the soul never says that the
image as image is identical with the exemplar [that is, the represented thing], nor that
the sign as a sign is identical with the thing signified, for there is always a distinction
between them both in the thing and in the conception of the soul. […] Therefore, what
is given to the exemplar or the thing signified is never to be attributed to the image or the
sign, no matter how much it is considered with regard to the image or the sign. Because
of this, speaking properly, the reverence of the exemplar or the signified thing is never
due to the sign or the image.51
Durandus thus opposes, in the perspective of Scotus’s account, the prevalent

doctrine of the veneration of images. It is true that, faced with the huge majority
of defenders of an actual worship of images, Durandus is ready to concede that,
suppositum subsistens, nec est causa seu ratio talis adorationis, quamvis sit causa cuiusdam
alterius adorationis, scilicet hyperdulia quae debetur Christo ratione humanae naturae.”
48 For similarities with Henry of Ghent’s account, see Wirth, “Theorien zum Bilderkult,”
34, and id., “La critique scolastique,” 104–6,.
49 Durandus of St. Pourçain, Commentariorum libri, III, dist. 9, q. 2, 229vb: “Hoc gener-
aliter tenendum est, quod si considerentur secundum se, sic aut eis non debetur aliquis honor,
puta cruci vel imagini et caeteribus rebus inanimatis, aut si debetur (sicut beatae virgini) nun-
quam tamen debetur eis honor latriae, cuius ratio est, quia honor latriae debetur solum excel-
lentiae divinae, sed talia secundum se considerata aut nullam excellentiam habent ut inanima-
ta, aut si habent, illa tamen est infra excellentiam divinam.”
50 Thomas Aquinas, STh III, q. 25, art. 4, 172b.
51 Durandus of St. Pourçain, Commentariorum libri, III, dist. 9, q. 2, 230ra: “Sed istud non
videtur proprie dictum, quia quantumcumque sit unus et idem motus animae quo fertur in
imaginem ut imago est, et in rem, numquam tamen anima dicit imaginem inquantum est ima-
go esse idem cum exemplari, neque signum inquantum signum esse idem cum signato, sed
semper inter ista est distinctio in re et in conceptione animae. Habitudo enim eorum ad in-
vicem est relativa, relativi autem esse est ad aliud esse. Et ideo quod attribuitur exemplari vel
signato nunquam est attribuendum imagini vel signo, quantumcumque consideretur sub ra-
tione imaginis vel signi. Propter quod proprie loquendo nunquam reverentia exemplaris vel
signati debetur signo vel imagini.”
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380 Ueli Zahnd
in order to save the common opinion, one could say, when giving honors in
front of an image, that even if we do not adore the image or the represented
thing in the image, we honor the represented thing according to its concept in
our mind, i. e., as it is made present to us by the image.52 Even this concession,
however, did not re-open the door for adoring images with latria. For one thing
was sure for Durandus:
An image [of Christ] either represents the Christ as a human being, or it is made to
represent the Father or the Holy Spirit as regards the divinity, just as some images are
painted such that one represents God the Father, another the crucified Son, and a third
the Holy Spirit proceeding like a dove from the Father to the Christ. To images of the
first type, the same honor is due as to Christ according to the understanding presented
above.53 But it is foolish to create images of the second type and to adore them, which is
why John Damascene says that it is of the highest foolishness and an impiety to shape
images of what is divine.54
Durandus does not argue any further why one should not depict anything di-
vine. But in these few words, it is worth noting that he does not say that depict-
ing the divinity is erroneous or idolatrous – which would have been the appro-
priate terminology, if he were concerned with the biblical prohibition of images.
Rather, the semantics of ‘foolishness’ seems to build on the metaphysical
grounds that we already had in Scotus: it would be a contradiction to represent
an infinite, extracategorical being by means of a finite, categorical thing.
With this critical stance, Durandus not only opposes the prevailing opinion
before him, but – as we have seen with the Franciscan tradition – also chooses a
different direction than most of those who came after him. Nevertheless, this
way of approaching the problem of Christ’s humanity and of images would pop
up every now and then throughout the 14th century. This was most prominently
the case in another Dominican friar, Robert Holcot, who, in his commentary on
52 Ibid.: “Concedi potest quod signa et imagines adoeantur eadem adoratione cum rebus
signatis, et imaginatis, quia res ut cognitae per signa, et imagines simili modo adorantur ac si
essent praesentes secundum se.”
53 That is, the honor due to these images can only be the one reserved for Christ’s human
nature, namely: hyperdulia.
54 Durandus of St. Pourçain, Commentariorum libri, III, dist. 9, q. 2, 230rb: “Imago aut
repraesentat Christum secundum quod homo est, aut est facta ad repraesentandum Patrem vel
Spiritum Sanctum quoad deitatem, sicut pinguntur quaedam imagines quarum una repraesen-
tat Deum Patrem, et alia Filium crucifixum, et tertia Spiritum Sanctum quasi columbam proce-
dentem a Patre in Christum. Primo modo debetur idem honor imagini, qui et Christo, secun-
dum intellectum tamen prius positum. Secundo autem modo fatuum est imagines facere vel
eas venerari, unde Damascenus dicit […] quod insipientiae summae est et impietas figurare
quod est divinum.”
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Wisdom, also rejects the adoration of images.55 In the second half of the 14th
century, the secular cleric Albertus Engelschalk even uses Scotus as the authority
in oppositum in Book III, dist. 9, of his Sentences commentary.56 Another secular
master, Conrad of Soltau, who, just as Engelschalk, was active, in the late 14th
century, among other places at the university of Prague, further narrows Duran-
dus’ approach, restricting images not only to those of Christ as a human being
in general, but for fear of excess he limits them to being images of only those
scenes that were biblically attested.57 Since John Wyclif, on the other hand, had
transmitted Robert Holcot’s accounts,58 we have, at the turn of the 15th century,
a set of systematical elements in Prague that allowed Jan Hus not only to defend,
in Book III, dist. 9, of his commentary on the Sentences that Christ’s human
nature should be honored only with hyperdulia, but also to reject all and any
adoration of images.59 As a consequence, the critique of religious images became
an essential part of the Hussite revolution with several tracts being written
against the veneration of images as it prevailed in other parts of Europe. Even
without going into the details of the arguments brought forward in Hussite cir-
cles,60 we may note that, from a perspective of the transmission of ideas, the
Hussite critique did not simply emerge from a renewed biblicism and was not
only due to Wyclif and his ecclesiological ideas, but seems to have had at least
parts of its theological roots in a mode of thinking that was owed to Scotus.
Hence, for the present purpose, it seems more interesting to see what happened
within the traditional Scotist milieus of Western Europe in reaction to these
Hussite challenges.
55 Robert Holcot, In librum Sapientiae regis Salomonis praelectiones CCXIII, lect. CLVIII,
525: “Nulla adoratio debetur imagini, nec licet aliquam imaginem adorare.” See Aston, “Lol-
lards and the Cross”, 104 f., Wirth, “La critique scolastique,” For another English theologian
active in the mid-fourteenth century, Richard FitzRalph, see Balzamo, Les êtres artificiels, 98.
56 Albertus Engelschalk, Quaestiones super I–III libros Sententiarum, III, dist. 9, q. un. (Pra-
gue, NKCR, Ms. IV.B.14), 80ra.
57 Conrad of Soltau, Quaestiones super quatuor libros Sententiarum, III, dist. 8 ad 10, q. un.
(Munich, BSB, Ms. clm 14259), 113rb: “Et ideo credo quod non deberetur fieri imagines maxi-
me Christi nisi de quibus haberetur testimonium ex scripturis quia bene debet nobis sufficere
veritas scripturae pro devotione et non oportet nos confingere novas imagines, sicut hodie qui-
dam faciunt imagines Christi passi iacentem in sinu beatae virginis – et ubi habetur hoc in
scriptura?”
58 Wyclif himself, however, had a rather traditional stance on images, see Gayk, Image,
Text, and Religious Reform, 9–11, and now Balzamo, Les êtres artificiels, 101.
59 Jan Hus, Super IV. Sententiarum, III, dist. 9, 414–23.
60 See Bartlová, “Hussite Iconoclasm,” Dobicki, “Ein Beitrag zur Bildertheologie,” and Bal-
zamo, Les êtres artificiels, 101–3.
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382 Ueli Zahnd
3. 15th-Century Scotism
In 15th-century Scotism, the Hussite critique of religious images has an unexpect-
ed effect. Even if – from the perspective of those who understood themselves as
the defenders of Catholic orthodoxy – the Hussite position on images simply
belonged to a larger set of heterodox and heretical theological tenets, in con-
frontation with the Hussite position representatives of Scotism became more
aware of the specificity of Scotus’s approach. This is already apparent in a small
tract on images drawn from a commentary on the Sentences that was most prob-
ably produced at the university of Vienna and was slightly revised to circulate at
the council of Basel in 1432.61 Although its author is unknown, the sources he
uses in this treatise make it clear that he was very well acquainted with the Fran-
ciscan tradition.62 Set up in the usual context of material from Book III, dist. 9,
the treatise was written, of course, to defend the traditional veneration of images,
but it did so by adopting the distinction between per se et propter se (A2a), and
per se sed non propter se adoration (A2b) that Peter of Aquila had taken over
from William of Ware (as seen above). In contrast to Peter of Aquila, however,
who had used the distinction to re-open a door for latria, in this treatise it was
used to re-open a door for hyperdulia. For, per se sed non propter se adoration of
Christ’s humanity (A2b) could only be called latria, the treatise affirmed, if the
adoration was given on account of the divine person that Christ’s human nature
was united with. On account of itself – even when united with the divine nature
– the adoration due to Christ’s humanity was hyperdulia.63 In the context of the
Hussite debate, but also compared to late 14th-century Franciscan positions, this
was already a strong limitation.
61 The treatise is sometimes attributed to Nicolas of Dinkelsbühl. Since it obviously stems

from a Sentences lecture which is not the one of Dinkelsbühl, and since the doctrines defended
there are different from the ones defended by Dinkelsbühl in his own Sentences lecture, this
attribution is more than dubious, see Dinkelsbühl, Lectura super Sententias (Vienna, Schotten,
Ms. 269), 188r–200v. For manuscripts of the treatise, see Madre, Nikolaus von Dinkelsbühl,
266 f. The following relies on the version found in Vienna, ÖNB, Ms. 4131, 72r–81r.
62 And with the older Franciscan tradition in particular, since he refers, among others, to
Bartholomaeus Anglicus, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and William of Ware. Besides,
while opposing Thomas Aquinas, he also cites assertively long passages of Holcot and of Du-
randus. Finally, he also refers to a certain “Franciscus” with a position very close to the one of
Scotus (Vienna, ÖNB, Ms. 4131, 73r), but I was not able to identify whom he meant (as men-
tioned above, neither Francis of Marchia nor Francis of Meyronnes seems to have treated the
topic, and Francis Totti of Perugia defended a different position).
63 Anonymous, De imaginibus lectura scolastica (Vienna, ÖNB, Ms. 4131), 73r: “Alio modo
potest considerari ratione sui ut tamen unita est. Sic non est adoranda latria quia est infra
Deum nec simplici dulia quia est super omnem creaturam, sed hyperdulia quae est summa
dulia.”
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But this is not all. When it comes to discussing the question of images, the
treatise advocates a corresponding restriction regarding images of Christ, intro-
ducing also per accidens adoration (A1), and stating as one of several conclu-
sions at the end of the treatise:
Just as Christ’s humanity inasmuch as it is united with the divine nature must be adored
per accidens with the veneration of latria, this kind of adoration, relatively to God, must
also be incidentally shown to his image by the faithful.64
The several restrictions in this passage are important, and as if this was not
enough, the treatise proposes also a set of corollaries to its conclusions, one of
them stating that “to paint images of God the Father or of the Holy Spirit is not
only foolish, but it must be rejected as something close to an error.”65 A few lines
later it adds: “No sensible veneration may be shown to a fictitious image of God
the Father or of the Holy Spirit.”66 Hence, in reaction to the Hussite controver-
sy,67 the unknown author of this treatise is led to defend a moderately critical
position of per accidens adoration that reflects more clearly than any fellow
scholastic in the century before him a set of doctrinal tenets that had been devel-
oped in the immediate wake of Scotus.
Subsequently, other Scotists of the 15th century returned to Scotus’s ac-
count.68 William of Vorillon, a Franciscan master who proudly announced that
throughout his Sentences commentary he only deviated in three points from Sco-
tus, concludes regarding Book III, dist. 9, in a somewhat convoluted manner:
“To the Deity is owed reverence in such a way that the same reverence must be
paid to the humanity united with it”69 – which was nothing else than (S2a).
Later on, Vorillon accordingly confirmed that Christ’s humanity, taken in itself,
64 Ibid., 80v: “Sicut Christi humanitas inquantum natura Verbi latriae cultu per accidens est
adoranda, ita et eius imagini accidentaliter relative ad Deum huiusmodi adoratio a fidelibus est
exhibenda.”
65 Ibid.: “Depingere Dei Patris aut Spiritus Sancti imaginem non solum est fatuum, sed eti-
am tamquam errori propinquum abiciendum.”
66 Anonymous, De imaginibus lectura scolastica (Vienna, ÖNB, Ms. 4131), 80v: “Ficte
imagini Dei patris aut Spiritu Sancto non est aliquis sensibilis cultus exhibendus.”
67 That the controversy has led to a sharpening of theological positions is commonly
known. See, e. g., with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, Shank, Unless you Believe, 186–95,
and more generally for the intellectual climate of the 15th century Hoenen, “Philosophisches
Wissen und seine Gefahr.”
68 On the general climate of returning to Scotus among 15th century Franciscans see Zahnd,
“Easy-Going Scholars.”
69 William of Vorillon, Quatuor librorum Sententiarum compendium, III, dist. 9, 265vb:
“Deitati sic debetur latria, ut humanitati unite idem sit cultus tribuendus.”
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384 Ueli Zahnd
should be adored with hyperdulia.70 Nicholas de Orbellis, another famous Fran-

ciscan commentator on the Sentences in the 15th century, even returned to Sco-
tus’s initial distinction between a categorematic (S1) and a syncategorematic
(S2) use of the word ‘solum.’ He defends the corresponding assumptions re-
garding the adoration of Christ’s humanity due to these various uses of ‘sol-
um.’71
There was thus a clear tendency to stick more closely with Scotus’s initial
account. As regards images, however, while Vorillon stated that it would be
idolatrous to believe that something divine is in an image,72 he as well as Orbellis
benefited, as it were, from Scotus’s leaving a blank with regard to images. They
felt free to resort to other positions: while Vorillon accepts Durandus’s solution
that, inasmuch as an image leads back to the Christ – that is, on an internal,
mental level – latria is due,73 Orbellis defends the traditional view in the shape
of Bonaventure’s account, using Bonaventure even to counter the epistemologi-
cal argument that images of the divine could be a cause of error:
If you object that images give reason to err, I say that the Holy Scripture was and still is
to this day a cause of error, and so are the creatures, too. Yet, because of that, the Holy
Scripture should not be deleted, and the creatures should not be destroyed.74
And now we have arrived in the very late 15th century, the time of Stephan
Brulefer. Besides the already mentioned treatise on images, Brulefer also pro-
duced a huge Sentences commentary. Yet, his approach was not to comment
upon the Sentences as such, but rather upon the Sentences commentary of
70 Ibid.: “Notandum tamen quod humanitas Christi potest considerari vel ut unita est di-
vinitati, et hoc modo adoranda est latria, sicut divinitas. Eodem quippe honore rext honoratur
et purpura eius. Si vero consideretur absolute, vel ut esset a Verbo dimissa, tunc non debetur
sibi latria cum non sit summum bonum; sed nobilior species duliae scilicet yperdulia.”
71 Nicholas de Orbellis, Compendium super Sententias, III, dist. 9, q. 1 (unpaginated, 1rb–
va of quire t, here in particular t1va): “Sicut latria est cultus soli Deo debitus, sic dulia est cultus
debitus creaturae rationali, et dividitur in duliam maiorem et minorem. Dulia maior dicitur
hyperdulia quae est reverentia debita excellentissimae creaturae cuiusmodi est humanitas Chri-
sti.”
72 William of Vorillon, Quatuor librorum Sententiarum compendium, III, dist. 9, 266ra:
“Sed quid de imagine Christi, quali honore veneranda est? Dicendum quod si capiatur absolute
illa pictura nullo honore, quia esset idolatria credendo numen in pictura esse.”
73 Ibid.: “Si autem inquantum reducit in Christum, sic debetur cultus latriae, quia totus
honor venit ad Christum.”
74 Nicholas de Orbellis, Compendium super Sententias, III, dist. 9, q. 2 (unpaginated, 2rb–
va of quire t): “Si obiicias quod sunt occasio errorum, dico: litterae sacrae fuerunt et sunt usque
ad hodiernum diem occasio errorum et etiam illae creaturae. Non tamen propter hoc sunt lit-
terae delendae et creaturae destruendae, quia hoc divini iudicii est ut bonis sint in bonum,
malis autem in malum convertantur.” See Bonaventura, Commentaria, III, dist. 9, art. 1, q. 2,
204b.
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Bonaventure, who had been canonized in 1482.75 Curiously, though, he used this
commentary to present positions that, in many regards, deviated from the doctor
seraphicus and in fact were much closer to Scotus. As regards the problem of
adoring Christ’s humanity, Brulefer even gives the discussion a cunning twist by
presenting the problem as if there had been, historically speaking, only two posi-
tions on the question: one which in every regard rejects any adoration of
Christ’s humanity with latria, and another which rather confirms the possibility
of such adoration, though only in that special case when Christ’s human nature
is considered as united with the divine nature.76 His presentation of course, is
historically inaccurate, since the second opinion obviously is the one defended
by Scotus, while the first, more radical one, closely resembles the position of Pe-
ter Auriol.77 By this maneuver, however, Brulefer manages to present the Subtle
Doctor as the more moderate thinker on the present issue. This appearance of
moderation seems to have been necessary, since, as we know, Brulefer was even
more radical regarding the problem of images. Already when presenting the first
of the two ‘historical’ positions on the adoration of Christ’s humanity, Brulefer
voiced his concern for a clear-cut distinction between the divine and the realm
of creation:
The flesh of Christ, whether taken in itself or as united with the divine Word should not
be adored with latria, for, in whatsoever way it is considered, it always remains within
the limits of nature [i. e. creation], since neither the human nature, nor this union is
God, but a mere creature.78
This same concern for a fundamental distinction between the created and the
divine order is even more apparent at places where Brulefer discusses the ques-
tion of images. In his Sentences commentary (based, let me emphasize again, on
Bonaventure who was the longtime model of a defense of the veneration of im-
75 See Zahnd, “Easy-Going Scholars,” 302.

76 Brulefer, Reportata in quatuor libros Sententiarum S. Bonaventurae, III, dist. 9, q. 1,
295ra–b.
77 Auriol is not mentioned in the passage, and generally speaking, Book III of his Sentences
commentary seems to have been hardly known in the 15th century. However, the wording
Brulefer chooses (as cited in the next footnote) is telling when compared with Petrus Aureoli,
Commentaria in tertium librum Sententiarum, dist. 9, q. un., art. 3, 402b: “Si quaestio fiat de
adoratione per se, planum est quod per hiperduliam debet adorari […] sed secundo modo,
non, quia quantumcumque sit unita, non habet quod sit formale obiectum adorationis, quod
semper manet intra limites creaturae.” In addition, besides Auriol, I have not found any other
author defending this precise position.
78 Brulefer, Reportata clarissima, III, dist. 9, q. 1, 295ra: “Caro Christi neque secundum se
neque ut unita verbo divino est adoranda adoratione latriae, quia sive consideretur sic sive sic
semper est infra limites naturae, quia nec natura humana, nec illa unio est Deus, sed pura
creatura.”
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386 Ueli Zahnd
ages), Brulefer even enters the main discussion of Book III, dist. 9, by immedi-
ately addressing the question of images:
First proposition: no creature taken for itself and considered absolutely is to be blessed or
adored with latria. Corollary: no image of whichever saint, or even of Christ himself
should be adored with latria. And this corollary about images is proven against the an-
cient doctors who say that the cross, inasmuch as it is a sign of Christ crucified must be
adored with the same adoration with which Christ is adored in himself, so that there is
only one and the same movement toward the image and the one imagined. Against this
is argued as follows: the habitudo that a sign has to the signified is a true creature, be-
cause it is nothing else than a relation – be it a real one or one in the mind –, a relation
which is in the cross itself. It follows that it is a creature, and thus it should not be adored
with latria.79
The main reason not to adore any image whatsoever is thus, for Brulefer, that
one cannot, by means of an image, pass over the limits of the created order, for
even the image’s being a sign, its standing for something else, belongs as such
within the realm of creation. If, however, an image is intended to signify some-
thing truly beyond these limits, that is, the divine itself, it is even worse accord-
ing to Brulefer:
Second corollary: sacred images made to represent Godfather or the Holy Spirit, as re-
gards the deity, should not be honored with any reverence or be adored with latria. Rath-
er, they must be destroyed. For, whatsoever is impious must be destroyed in the Church;
but these images made to represent the Father or the Holy Spirit as regards the Deity are
of maximal impiety. Therefore, they must be completely destroyed.80
Compared with Durandus’ reproach of foolishness or with the anonymous trea-

tise from Vienna stating that images of the divine are “to be rejected as some-
thing close to an error,” Brulefer is much more radical with his request to abolish
these images. And he is also clearer about why these images should be destroyed:
79 Ibid., 294rb: “Et pro istis ponitur talis propositio prima: Nulla creatura secundum se et
absolute considerata est beatificanda seu adoranda adoratione latriae. Patet ex praedictis in
diffinitione latriae. Correlarium: Nulla imago cuiuscunque sancti, etiam ipsius Christi est ado-
randa adoratione latriae. Et probatur de imagine contra antiquos doctores qui dicunt quod
crux inquantum est signum Christi crucifixi adoratur eadem adoratione qua ipse Christus in se
adoratur, ita quod non est nisi unus et idem motus ad imaginem et imaginatum. Contra hoc
arguitur sic: quia illa habitudo quae est signi ad signatum est vera creatura. Non enim est aliud
quam relatio – vel realis vel rationis – quae est in ipsa cruce, et per consequens est creatura et
sic non est adoranda adoratione latriae.”
80 Ibid., 294rb–va: “Secundum correlarium: Imagines factae ad repraesentandum Patrem in
divinis vel Spiritum Sanctum quo ad Deitatem nullo honore sunt venerandae nec adorandae
adoratione latriae, sed potius sunt destruendae. Quia quicquid est impium debet destrui in ec-
clesia. Sed istae imagines factae ad repraesentandum Patrem vel Spiritum Sanctum in divinis
sunt maximae impietais, ergo sunt penitus destruendae.”
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Any false and erroneously shaped sign whatsoever must be repelled and destroyed under
the Law of truth. But these images mentioned before are false signs, therefore etc. The
minor is proven: A false sign is that which represents something differently from how it
is in truth. Yet, the aforementioned images do falsely and erroneously represent the Fa-
ther and the Holy Spirit differently from how they are in truth, for they represent the
Father himself as an old, bearded man and the Holy Spirit as a dove, which is false and
impious to believe.81
This notion of a false sign is interesting, of course, for it seems not only to lead
directly to the Reformed conception of mendacious signs, but also evokes more
clearly than Durandus’s account the epistemological side of the whole discus-
sion: as false signs bound to the limits of finite beings, these images are not able
to evoke a true conception of the infinite God.82
All that which incites idolatry is to be destroyed and abolished. But this kind of images
do incite idolatry, therefore etc. The major premise is evident, and the minor is proven,
for it is clear that the images that are painted in the churches are only made for the
simple folk, but the simple who see the kind of aforementioned images, reason and be-
lieve that the Father and the Holy Spirit are in themselves such as depicted. Therefore
etc.83
As seen at the outset, this combination of epistemological and pastoral concerns

is also present in Brulefer’s earlier treatise on the depictability of the Trinity,
where he said that uncreated paternity has no similarity with created paternity,
and that, therefore, simple and unlettered folks would be induced into maintain-
ing wrong ideas of the divine.84 As was later to become common in Reformed
circles, Brulefer, our Scotist Franciscan who believed in the incommensurability
of the divine and the created spheres, for fear of mis-leading unlearned people in
their conceptions of the infinite, per se un-imaginable being that is God, advo-
cates the destruction of religious images.
81 Ibid., 294va: “Item quicquid est signum falsum et erronee figuratum debet repelli et de-
strui in lege veritatis. Sed istae imagines praedictae sunt signa falsa, ergo etc. Minor patet: illud
est signum falsum quod aliter repraesentat signatum quam sit in rei veritate. Sed praedictae
imagines false et erronee repraesentant Patrem et Spiritum Sanctum aliter quam sunt in veri-
tate, quia repraesentant ipsum Patrem ut antiquum barbatum, et Spiritum Sanctum ut colum-
ba, quod est falsum et impium credere.”
82 See again Duns Scotus, Ord. I, dist. 3, p. 2, q. 2, n. 35 (ed. Vat. III), 24, as quoted above,
note 28.
83 Ibid., 294va: “Item omne quod est provocativum ad idolatriam est destruendum et
abolendum, sed huiusmodi imagines sunt provocativae ad idolatriam, ergo etc. Maior est nota,
et minor probatur, quia clarum est quod haec imagines quae in ecclesia depinguntur fiunt pro-
pter laicos simplices tantummodo, sed videntes simplices huiusmodi imagines praedictas, iudi-
cant et credunt Patrem et Spiritum Sanctum esse tales in se. Ergo etc.”
84 See above, note 8.
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388 Ueli Zahnd
Conclusion
This chapter addressed the late medieval – mainly Scotist – discussions of the
adoration of objects belonging to the realm of creation, and of religious images
in particular. We have seen that while, as it seems, Scotus did not pronounce
himself on the question of images, with his metaphysics of the infinite and its
distinction from categorical being, he laid the grounds for a critical stance on
these topics – a critical stance that indeed is manifest in his own discussion of
the adoration of Christ’s humanity. It is interesting, however, that Durandus and
Auriol were the only ones in the immediate wake of Scotus to continue this di-
rection and even to radicalize it. By contrast, the further we go into the 14th cen-
tury, the more widespread, at least among Franciscan authors, a re-reading of
Scotus in traditional terms becomes, accompanied by a standard defense of the
veneration of images. It was only with the Hussite revolution at the beginning of
the 15th century that the arguments for a critique of religious images reappeared
in the broader discussion. Strikingly enough, this did not reinforce an interpreta-
tion of Scotus in even more traditional terms. Rather, from Vorillon over Orbel-
lis to Brulefer, the original account of Scotus on the adoration of Christ’s hu-
manity was laid bare, having the effect in Brulefer that he took a radical stance
on religious images and advocated, for epistemological reasons, their destruc-
tion. In Brulefer’s view, which also came to be the one of the Reformed branch
of the Reformation, the distinction between God and all that which is formally
not God is so fundamental that images with their rootedness in finite being are
not able to lead to any true cognition of God. In this regard, it does not seem to
be an exaggeration to understand Brulefer’s position on the adoration of images
– and, accordingly, the Reformed theologians with their epistemological con-
cerns – as belonging to the Scotist tradition, even if, in medieval times, Brulefer
seems to have been the most explicit and also the most radical author on this
issue.
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Melanchthon and the Will
An Early Protestant Reception of Scotist Psychology?
Arthur Huiban
Introduction
The title of my paper suggests an obviously excessive, and even provocative hy-
pothesis. It would certainly be an exaggeration to call Philip Melanchthon
(1497–1560), the main architect of Lutheranism’s institutionalization in the
Holy Empire, a secret disciple of John Duns Scotus. Such a hypothesis would be
excessive, first, because Melanchthon’s knowledge of the Subtle Doctor re-
mained incomplete and superficial throughout his career: in the 1510’s Me-
lanchthon was first trained as a philosopher, and even if he greatly contributed
later to the systematization of Lutheran theology, through the various editions of
his Loci communes, the Augsburg Confession and his numerous biblical com-
mentaries, it is a fact that he studied classical theology late, without ever attain-
ing any deeper knowledge of the medieval theological tradition.1 But the hypoth-
esis of a manifest Scotist influence would be excessive also because the few times
Melanchthon explicitly mentions Scotus’s name, it is in a negative and critical
fashion, and Scotus’s theology is usually regarded, by both humanists and Re-
formers, as the very prototype of that kind of ‘theologia scholastica’ with which
anyone seeking the ‘pure Word of God’ should break.2 Finally, this hypothesis
would be excessive above all because, even in their late development, the Prae-
This article is published as a part of the project “A Disregarded Past. Medieval Scholasticism
and Reformed Thought”, funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant number
192703). I would like to thank Claus A. Andersen, Daniel Heider, and Ueli Zahnd for patient
proofreading. Any remaining errors or inaccuracies are of course my sole responsibility.
1 There is still no systematic study devoted to Melanchthon’s relationship to medieval the-
ology. For biographical aspects and a general survey of Melanchthon’s life and thought, see in
particular: Sperl, Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Reformation; Greschat, Philipp Me-
lanchthon: Theologe, Pädagoge und Humanist; Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon zwischen Hu-
manismus und Reformation, especially vol. 2: Der Theologe; Scheible, Melanchthon.
2 See, for Melanchthon’s late judgement on Scotus, the praefatio to the Initia: CR 7, 475:
“Studeamus et genere sermonis proprio uti, et non alieno a linguae latinae consuetudine. Nam
qui recte loqui student, res intuentur, quibus nomina attributa sunt: e contra, cum sermo
novus fingitur, plerunque et res mutantur, ut in Scoti et similium scriptis non sermo tantum
corruptus est, sed umbrae rerum seu somnia excogitata sunt, quibus novae appellationes at-
tributae sunt.” Regarding the polemical notion of ‘scholasticism’ in both Humanism and Re-
formation thought, see Quinto, Scholastica, especially 205–37.
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394 Arthur Huiban
ceptor Germaniae’s theology and philosophy remain too little speculative to pro-
vide solid points of comparison with the doctrines of the Doctor Subtilis.3
Notwithstanding these obstacles, I was struck to find in the Praeceptor Ger-
maniae’s early writings, some clear indications of a certain Scotist imprint,
which testifies to the broad and diffuse reception of the Doctor Subtilis’s thought
in early sixteenth-century Germany.4 By discussing in particular the questions of
free will and the relationship between the will and the practical intellect, I would
like to offer here a brief journey through the psychology of Melanchthon’s early
Loci communes.5 In its initial edition of 1521, this work pretends to be nothing
more than a brief summary to the main topics of the Epistle to the Romans: free
will, sin, Law, faith, Gospel and, beyond Paul himself, the doctrine of the sacra-
ments and the church.6 However, the treatise also assumes to be in the full sense
a summa theologiae: the sum of the truths that every Christian must know for
his salvation.7 And in fact, for more than two centuries, it was under the title of
‘Commonplaces’ (Loci communes) that the main Protestant – Reformed and
Lutheran – theologians published their own theological systems.8
Scotus and the Scotists are the subject of a significant criticism in this first
edition of the Loci. This criticism focuses notably in the first chapter on free will
and predestination, where Melanchthon explicitly mentions “Scotus et scotistae,”
and then in the second chapter on original sin and the degree of human nature’s
corruption after the Fall.9 Although quite imprecise, this criticism is relatively
3 For Melanchthon’s statements on the medieval theology and their evolutions between
the early 1520’s and the 1530’s, see in particular Wengert, Human Freedom, Christian Right-
eousness, 41–64; Schwarzenau, Der Wandel im theologischen Ansatz bei Melanchthon von
1525–1535, 9–84; Meijering, Melanchthon and Patristic Thought, 109–37.
4 On the diffusion of Scotism from the late fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, see
Schmutz, “L’héritage des subtils”; Zahnd, Wirksame Zeichen?, especially 449–90; Zahnd,
“Easy-Going Scholars.”
5 I will stick here to the first version of 1521 and follow the bilingual Latin-German refer-
ence edition by Pöhlmann: Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521.
6 For a systematic interpretation of the free will issue in the first edition of the Loci com-
munes, see Maurer, Melanchthons Loci communes von 1521, 15–28; Bizer, Theologie der Ver-
heißung, 50–85; Matz, Der befreite Mensch, 39–78; Graybill, Evangelical Free Will, 81–131; zur
Mühlen, “Melanchthons Auffassung vom Affekt in den Loci communes von 1521,” 327–36.
7 On the notion of a summa as both a concise statement and a comprehensive summary of
the articles of faith, around the notion of ‘commonplace,’ see Huiban, “Melanchthon und die
Philosophie,” 145–64.
8 On the status of Melanchthon’s Loci communes in sixteenth-century Lutheranism, see
Kaufmann, “Martin Chemnitz (1522–1586),” 183–253. For a general overview of Lutheran
loci, see Preus, The Theology of Post-Reformation Lutheranism. Cf. for the Reformed loci, Mul-
ler, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, especially vol. 1: The Prolegomena to Theology.
9 Scotus is explicitly mentioned in the first chapter on free will, cf. Melanchthon, Loci com-
munes 1521, 40–42: “Sed quid ad christianam disciplinam externa opera, si cor sit insincerum?
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Melanchthon and the Will 395
surprising in its scope. It is surprising, first because, in 1521, Melanchthon usu-

ally pays very little attention to the doctrine of any particular medieval theolo-
gian: following Luther, his goal is rather to propose a generic concept of ‘scho-
lastic theology,’ where Thomas, Scotus, Ockham and the others can be mixed up
all together and opposed to the ‘purity of the Word of God.’10 But this criticism
is also surprising because the other eminent figures of Lutheranism, starting with
Luther himself, very rarely cite the Subtle Doctor in the same period. It is in fact
only four years after the first publication of the Loci communes, in 1525, that
Luther approaches in more detail the medieval theories on free will, especially in
his controversy with Erasmus.11 Starting from the criticism of the so-called ‘Sco-
tist’ doctrine of free will in the first chapter of the Loci, I would like to raise here
a question, partly historical and partly analytical: for what reasons does Me-
lanchthon criticize the Scotist doctrine on liberum arbitrium, and what idea of
human freedom does he oppose to the concept of an indeterminate will? This
question is all the more interesting since, as we shall see, Melanchthon criticizes
Scotist voluntarism – or the idea of an indeterminacy of the will, and its inde-
pendence from the intellect – in the name of an even more radical kind of vol-
untarism, as if Melanchthon were, in this precise question, more Scotist than
Scotus.12 My presentation will consist of four parts: first, I will briefly present the
psychology exposed in the Loci and the free will’s definition that it formulates
around the problem of intellectualism and voluntarism; secondly, I will discuss
the hypothesis of an affective determinism of human intellect; thirdly, I will at-
tempt to briefly explain the theological motivations which justify this emphasis
on the intellect’s dependence on the affections; and finally, I will try to show
Praeterae ipse etiam Aristoteles non prodidit actus illos elicitos, quod Scotus confinxit.” In the
second chapter, the “Scotists” designate the partisans of the doctrine according to which the
sinful man could, by his natural will alone, observe all the commandments of the justitia Dei.
Here again, it is the doctrine of free will which is targeted, cf. Melanchthon, Loci communes
1521, 76: “Et hic ruit illa philosophiae moralis et liberi arbitrii theologorum sententia impia et
stulta, quam plenis buccis nunquam non intonant Scotistae voluntatem posse se conformare
omni dictamini rectae rationis, id est, voluntatem posse velle, quidquid recta ratio, rectum con-
silium intellectus praescribit.”
10 See Büttgen, “Histoire et critique de la scolastique.”
11 Scotus’s doctrine on predestination is discussed in Luther, De servo arbitrio, 662–66. The
citation of Scotus is there polemical and aims at refuting a typology of the doctores scholastici
first established by Erasmus. See Erasmus, De libero arbitrio diatribe, 1223a: “Qui Scoti placitis
addicti sunt, proniores sunt in favorem liberi arbitrii, cujus tantam vim esse credunt, ut homo
nondum accepta gratia, quae peccatum abolet, naturae viribus exercere posset opera moraliter,
ut vocant, bona, quibus non de condigno, sed de congruo promereantur gratiam gratum fa-
cientem […].”
12 For Scotus’s voluntarism see also my concluding remarks below.
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396 Arthur Huiban
more precisely on what points this psychology is opposed to the psychology of

the Scotist tradition, and on what points it approaches it.
1. The Definition of the Will

How does Melanchthon define human will? At the opening of the first chapter,
he begins by setting out very briefly the main principles of his anthropology:
In the first place, we do not need the numerous divisions of the philosophers to describe
human nature, but we simply divide man into two parts. For there is in him a power to
know and also a power by which he follows or rejects the things known. The power of
knowing is that by which we feel or understand, calculate, compare things with one an-
other or deduce one thing from another. The power from which our affections arise is
that by which we turn away or, on the contrary, pursue what is known. This power is
sometimes called will, sometimes affection, and sometimes appetite.13
Human nature can thus be reduced to the interplay between two elementary
powers, the vis cognoscendi and the vis affectuum. The cognitive power is the
power of knowing, feeling, understanding, calculating and comparing (it is
worth noting that the sensitive and intellectual powers are not clearly distin-
guished here, and Melanchthon explicitly refuses the use of this distinction later
on);14 the affective power is the power of approving or rejecting the things
known. Despite his warnings against the “divisions of the philosophers,” Me-
lanchthon follows here the traditional distinctions of the Sentences and their
commentaries, the very ones that shape the discussion on free will in the com-
mentaries to Book II, distinctions 24 and 25. The influence of John Gerson’s De
theologia mystica tractatus has been noted by several commentators, especially in
regard to the choice of this bipartition of human being’s spiritual nature as well
as the very use of the terms ‘vis cognoscendi’ and ‘vis affectuum.’15 This influ-
13 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 26: “Ac primum quidem in describenda hominis
natura non habemus opus multiplicibus philosophorum partitionibus, sed paucis in duo par-
timur hominem. Est enim in eo vis cognoscendi, est et vis, qua vel persequitur vel refugit, quae
cognovit. Vis cognoscendi est, qua sentimus aut intellegimus, ratiocinamur, alia cum aliis com-
paramus, aliud ex alio colligimus. Vis, e qua affectus oriuntur, est, qua aut adversamur aut
persequimur cognita. Hanc vim alias voluntatem alias affectum, alias appetitum nominant.”
14 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 26–28: “Non puto magnopere referre hoc loco sepa-
rare sensus ab intellectu, quem vocant, et appetitum sensuum ab appetitu superiore. Nos enim
de superiore loquimur, hoc est, non modo de eo, in quo fames, sitis et similes brutorum affec-
tus sunt, sed de eo, in quo amor, odium, spes, metus, tristitia, ira et qui ex his nacuntur affec-
tus, insunt: ipsi voluntatem vocant.”
15 Maurer, Der Junge Melanchthon, vol. 2: Der Theologe, 257; zur Mühlen, “Melanchthons
Auffassung vom Affekt in den Loci communes von 1521,” 329. In his De mystica theologia,
Gerson distinguishes in human nature between a “potentia cognitiva” and a “potentia affecti-
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ence also seems to be confirmed by the early reception of the Loci in the confes-
sional controversy. Four years after the publication of the editio princeps, Jo-
hannes Cochlaeus, one of the great figures of the anti-Lutheran polemic in the
1520s, published a treatise De libero arbitrio homines adversus locos communes,
in which he accused Melanchthon of having taken over from Gerson this bipar-
tition of human nature, without understanding the intention behind it.16 Howev-
er, and even if it is true that Melanchthon read Gerson’s De theologia mystica
and that he drew largely on it for other aspects of the Loci,17 this influence does
not seem to me to be decisive on this point: in fact, the distinction of the power
to know and the power to will, and the use of the terms vis cognitiva and vis
affectuum can equally be found in Lombard’s Sentences, and in many of its com-
mentaries, including the one by Thomas Aquinas.18
It is true, at the same time, that the insistence on the relatively poorly con-
ceptualized vocabulary of the vis – ‘power’ or ‘force’ – allows Melanchthon to
circumvent subsequent distinctions, and especially those of habitus, facultas (or
potentia) and actus; in medieval commentaries, the characterization of liberum
arbitrium as a faculty of choice evolved around these terms.19 Here, the term
‘vis,’ indeed, evokes both more and less than a faculty, in the sense of an au-
tonomous power which could be freely actualized by a habitus or by a volitional
act. More, because the forces in question are not some kind of separate powers,
that one would choose to activate at his will and sporadically, but a driving ten-
dency, permanently active in the individual’s psychic life. Less than a faculty,
however, because the individual’s passivity towards this power seems, for Me-
va.” This distinction is inserted in a development which aims precisely at defining the type of
distinction in the soul, and Gerson obviously opts for the thesis of an only nominal distinction
between the will and the intellect: Gerson, De mystica theologia, 74–76: “Dicamus ergo de
anima rationali, quod ipsa pro diversitate officiorum et agibilium distinctas vires habet, distinc-
tas inquam non re, sed nomine. […] Attamen sic utamur in proposito quasi vires anime essent
penitus in natura distincte, dividentes primo animam rationalem in intellegentiam simplicem,
in rationem, in sensualitatem vel animalitatem vel potentiam cognitivam sensualem, et hoc
vires cognitivas; sed quod affectivas proportionaliter dividitur, primo in synderesim, mentis
apicem, in voluntatem vel appetitum rationalem, in appetitum animalem, quarum virium mox
docebimus proprias rationes.”
16 Cochlaeus, De libero arbitrio homines adversus locos communes, H4r. Cf. Wengert, Hu-
man Freedom, Christian Righteousness, 81.
17 Cf. zur Mühlen, “Melanchthons Auffassung vom Affekt in den Loci communes von
1521,” 329.
18 Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. II, dist. 24, q. 1, art. 3: “Sed contra, per virtutes affectivas et
apprehensivas sufficienter dividuntur vires intellectivae partis. Sed voluntas et ratio compre-
hendunt sufficienter apprehensionem intellectivam, et affectionem.”
19 See e. g.: Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent. II, dist. 24, q. 1, art. 1: “Utrum liberum arbitrium
sit habitus,” art. 2: “Utrum liberum arbitrium dicat plures potentias vel unam,” art. 3: “Utrum
liberum arbitrium sit potentia distincta a voluntate et ratione.”
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398 Arthur Huiban
lancthon, to be an essential feature of it; the vis designates first of all a deaf and
spontaneous impulse, a blind potentiality, on which one has only a limited con-
trol. To characterize further the affective state of sin, going back beyond the dis-
tinction of original and actual peccatum, Melanchthon uses the terms impetus
and energeia.20 It should be noted too that the overcoming of “Aristotle’s argu-
tias”21 operates by a return to a conceptuality that is certainly neo-testamentary,
though in a certain way even more Aristotelian: sin is in us an always living and
effective affect; always alive, always latent and at the same time always actual-
ized.22
However, these remarks remain purely conjectural. Indeed, Melanchthon
does not question here the exact nature of affective or cognitive powers, nor the
type of activities that fall to them. The decisive point lies above all in the rigor-
ous identification that is made between affection, appetite and the will. This
identification is characteristic of the refusal, later expressed more clearly, to dis-
tinguish a higher power and a lower power, such as for example a rational ap-
petite and a sensitive appetite.23 The will, for Melanchthon, is not only a power
of choice, determined or inclined by an affectus – it is rather itself an affectus.24
Almost immediately after this, Melanchthon sets out to discuss the traditional
question of the order of the two potentiae, and their respective hierarchy in the
process of choice:
Knowledge serves the will, so they [the ‘Sophistae’] employ the new term of ‘free will’ for
the will as it is united with knowledge or intellectual judgment. Indeed, the will is in man
like a tyrant in a republic, and just like the Senate is subject to the tyrant, thus the knowl-
edge is subject to the will. So even if one’s knowledge exhorts judiciously, the will rejects
it and defers to its affections, as I will soon explain more clearly. On the other hand, they
20 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 46–48: “Peccatum originale est nativa propensio et
quidam genialis impetus et energeia, qua ad peccandum trahimur, propagata ab Adam in om-
nem posteritatem. Sicut in igni est genuina vis, qua sursum fertur, sicut in magnete est genuina
vis, qua ad se ferrum trahit, ita est in homine nativa vis ad peccandum. Scriptura non vocat hoc
originale, illud actuale peccatum. Est enim et originale peccatum plane actualis quaedam prava
cupiditas. Sed tam actuale quam originale vitium peccatum simpliciter vocat, quamquam non-
nunquam ea, quae nos actualia peccata, vocet fructus peccati, ut ad Romanos Paulus solet, et
David quod originale nos, alias curvitatem alias iniquitatem appelat.”
21 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 12: “[…] foede hallucinati sint ubique in re theolog-
ica, qui nobis pro Christi doctrina Aristotelicas argutias prodidere.”
22 In the NT, energeia designates more the “force” or “efficacy” of God’s power than that of
sin; cf. Eph 1:19; Eph 3:7; Eph 4:16; Phil 3:21; Col 1:29, Col 2:12, 2 Th 2:9; 2 Th 2:21. For
energeia, in Aristotle, see Jaulin, “L’acte (energeia) comme fondement chez Aristote.”
23 See supra footnote 14.
24 Melanchthon always uses the term ‘affectus’ as an equivalent to the Greek ‘πάθος.’ Re-
garding the use of the term ‘affectus’ (not ‘affectio’ or ‘passio’) in the early sixteenth century,
and especially in Erasmus, see, e. g., Essary, “Passions, Affections, or Emotions?”
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call the intellect as united with the will ‘reason.’ We will never use the term ‘free will,’
nor that of ‘reason’; we will rather only call the two parts of man the power of knowing
and the power subject to affections, i. e., love, hatred, hope, fear and others.25
In itself, the definition of free will as “voluntas cum cognitione coniuncta” ech-
oes the definition of Lombard’s Sentences,26 and fails to indicate an order of pri-
ority between knowledge and the will in the practical decision-making process.
What follows, however, stands in favor of a resolute voluntarism: “ut senatus
tyranno obnoxius est, ita voluntati cognitio.” In human decision, the actualiza-
tion of the will in its choice is thus not only independent of the conclusions of
the practical intellect, but this intellect is itself almost entirely subordinate to the
will. In the second version of the Loci communes, published in 1522 only one
year after the editio princeps, the opposition of intellectualism and voluntarism is
explicitly assigned to the legacy of Plato and Aristotle.27 However, in the context
of the discussion, this opposition obviously also refers to the medieval discus-
sions of distinction 25 of Book II of the Sentences – and although it does not
always explicitly mention the Thomists and the Scotists, several clues in the text
show that Melanchthon has them in mind when he discusses this question.28
The idea of the subordination of knowledge to the will includes two distinct
theses, which Melanchthon defends simultaneously. The first thesis refers to a
relatively common form of voluntarism, which could be attributed to Scotus: no
intellectual judgment about a practical choice, however strong and rational it
25 Melanchhton, Loci communes 1521, 28: “Cognitio servit voluntati, ita liberum arbitrium
novo vocabulo vocant coniunctam voluntatem cum cognitione seu consilio intellectus. Nam
perinde, ut in republica tyrannus, ita in homine voluntas est, et ut senatus tyranno obnoxius
est, ita voluntati cognitio, ita ut quanquam bona moneat cognitio, respuat tamen eam voluntas
feraturque affectu suo, ut posthac clarius explicabimus. Rursum intellectum cum voluntate co-
niunctum vocant rationem. Nos neque rationis neque liberi arbitrii voce utemur, sed hominis
partes nominabimus vim cognoscendi et vim obnoxiam affectibus, hoc est amori, odio, spei,
metui et similibus.”
26 Petrus Lombardus, Sent. II, dist. 24, cap. 3: “Liberum verum arbitrium est facultas ration-
is et voluntatis, qua bonum eligitur grati assistente, vel malum eadem desistente. Et dicitur
‘liberum’ quantum ad voluntatem, quae ad utrumlibet flecti potest; ‘arbitrium’ vero quantum
ad rationem, cuius est facultas vel potentia illa, cuius etiam est discernere inter bonum et
malum. Et aliquando quidem, discretionem habens boni et mali, quod malum est eligit; ali-
quando vero quod bonum est.”
27 Melanchthon, Loci theologici: B. Prima eorum aetas, 93, n. 23: “Sic mihi pinguissime dis-
cerni partes hominis posse videntur. Caeterum nomenclatura partium variat, Aristotelicum
vulgus intellectum et voluntatem vocat. Theologi quidam veteres, voluntatem, cum consilio in-
tellectus coniunctam, liberum arbitrium nuncupavere, petito et hoc ab Aristotelicis vocabulo,
volueruntque penes voluntatem regnum esse, Intellectum prospicere, consuluere, monere, quae
videtur, adeoque servire voluntati. Rursum Platonici vocarunt Rationem intellectum coniunc-
tum cum voluntate, ita ut priores tribuantur intellectui, qui voluntatem in officio contineat.”
28 See, in particular: Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 28–30.
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400 Arthur Huiban
may be, can possess per se a power of influence sufficient to determine the will.29
The cognitive power, understood as the faculty of judging, is, from a practical
point of view, rigorously inefficient; a mere judgment concerning the ‘good’ or
the ‘best’ thing to do cannot, by itself, cause the choice of the will: the latter
remains free from any intellectual and cognitive determinism.30 Subsequently,
the second thesis radicalizes this voluntarism by stating that there is a relation-
ship between voluntas and intellectus, and not only one of mutual independence,
but rather of subordination. Aside from being unable to determine the will, the
intellect has also itself a reactive dimension, for its judgment is distorted by hu-
man affections and appetites.31 The conception of the will as a mere reactive
power, whose role is to approve or reject the res judicata, is here purely and
simply reversed. Practical judgments are themselves invested with latent affec-
tions. Their content is twisted by the affective dispositions that shape them. In
short, we believe and judge first what we desire to judge. Our beliefs and our
judgments react to our desires, confirm and crystallize them.32 Not only is the
will independent of the intellect, but the intellect appears itself as a mere ‘record-
ing chamber’ of human affections. Just as the Roman Senate passively records
and transcribes the arbitrary will of the tyrant, conferring on it a retrospective
appearance of legality, the practical judgment appears to be a mere judicial re-
flection of affectus. The practical intellect is, so to speak, the faculty of justifying
a posteriori a desire.
2. The Affective Determination of the Will

Upon these first definitions, Melanchthon moves to the key-issue of liberum ar-
bitrium, that is the question of the freedom of the will.33 Here, Melanchthon first
reminds us that the question of human freedom does not arise with regard to the
cognitive faculty, since it obeys the will, but with regard to the affective power,
which is the only principle of self-determination in human nature:
We cannot properly say that freedom belongs to the cognitive part of man, since [this
part] is dragged hither and thither while obeying the will. Freedom rather is the ability to
29 Scotus, Ord. II, dist. 25, q. 1: “Utrum aliquid aliud a voluntate causet effective actum
volendi in voluntate.” Regarding the question of the relationship between intellect and will, see
Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 84–89, and Hoffmann, “Freedom Beyond Practi-
cal Reason”; cf. also my concluding remarks below.
30 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 28–32.
31 See also Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 48–50.
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act or not to act, and the ability to act one way or another. This is why the question arises
as to whether the will is free, and to what extent it is free.34
Against the background of the definition of the will previously given, the way
Melanchthon here formulates the issue of liberum arbitrium is somewhat sur-
prising. For if the will is reduced to the affective power, itself understood not as a
power of choice but as a mere affective impulse, how can there then be any ques-
tion about its freedom? Or to put it another way: how can the will, if it is noth-
ing more than the spontaneity of an affection, be deemed free to determine it-
self? Subsequently, the difficulty is amplified by the differentiation of three lines
of questioning, which relate the problem of the freedom of the will, first to the
predestination of God – this is the cosmological problem of causal indetermina-
cy in general35 –, then to the interior freedom of a human being towards his
affections – this is the problem of human self-control over passions36 –, and
finally to the external freedom of a human being towards his acts – this is the
problem, so to speak, of the imputation of external actions.37
The question of divine predestination authorizes a first clear answer. From
God’s point of view, indeed, human free will is just a fiction: “Since everything
that happens, necessarily happens according to divine predestination, the free-
dom of our will is null.”38 Here, the decisive influence is that of Lorenzo Valla,
who, in his De libero arbitrio, had defended a strictly determinist doctrine. Valla
deliberately combined the theses of the divine prescience of future contingents
and of the effective determination of all events within Creation by God’s will.39
In later editions of the Loci, Melanchthon shall distance himself from this strict
form of determinism, but this is not something I will dwell on here.40
The second perspective – the one regarding the freedom of the will towards
affections – constitutes the culmination of the paradox. Melanchthon first re-
futes the possibility of an interior freedom with a mere lexical argument: since
‘will’ designates the “source of affections”, in Scripture aptly called the ‘heart,’
34 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 28: “Libertas non dicitur proprie cadere in partem
cognoscentem, verum ea voluntati obtemperans huc aut illuc rapitur. Est autem libertas posse
agere aut non agere, posse sic aut aliter agere. Itaque in quaestionem vocatur, sitne libera vol-
untas et quatenus libera sit.”
38 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 28: “Quandoquidem omnia quae eveniunt, neces-
sario iuxta divinam praedestinationem eveniunt, nulla est voluntatis nostrae libertas.”
39 Valla, De libero arbitrio. Cf. Monfasani, “The Theology of Lorenzo Valla”; Camporeale,
Lorenzo Valla, 200–5.
40 See Melanchthon, Loci communes theologici recens collecti et recogniti (1535), 371–78.
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402 Arthur Huiban
i. e., “this part of man from which the affections arise,”41 the idea of an interior
indeterminacy of the will – that is, of a will which would not be subject to any
affection – immediately involves a conceptual contradiction. How can the will,
which is nothing other than the vis affectuum, oppose its affections? It does in-
deed happen that a human being may not choose an action suggested to him by
his desire, especially when antagonistic affections pull him in opposite direc-
tions, or when a stronger affection prevails over a lower one.42 But in this case,
the will remains affectively determined. It sacrifices an affection for a stronger
affection. The classic example of Alexander the Great serves to illustrate this
point, showing as it does how the desire for glory led the Emperor of the Greeks
to choose actions which contradict his natural love for sensual pleasures.43 The
examples relating to the philosophical problem of acrasia or the weakness of the
will also belong to this order of consideration.44 The will is indeed weak, not
when it is determined in its choice by any affective inclination contrary to the
recommendations of the practical intellect, but rather only when it is determined
by an affective inclination directed to an object referring to some immediate
good that is weaker or less interesting than some greater good, which the indi-
vidual could obtain if he renounces the present one.
However, Melanchthon at the same time maintains all the force of the para-
dox. He thus foresees, alongside the competition of antagonistic desires, the case
of a will which would be entirely undetermined by any affection:
Then, it may well happen that something is chosen which is quite contrary to all affec-
tions. But when this happens, it is a mere simulacrum, like when someone, perhaps with-
out any particular cause, treats with kindness, friendliness and gentleness a man whom
he loathes in his soul and for whom he wishes evil. Even if this person does not feel that
he has been pushed by another affection […], I maintain that this man is only simulating
the friendship in the external works, in which there seems to be a certain freedom, ac-
cording to nature. And this is the will that our stupid Scholastics have invented, namely
41 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 36: “Quid enim est voluntas, si non affectuum fons
est? Et cur non pro voluntatis vocabulo cordis nomen usurpamus? Siquidem scriptura potissi-
mam hominis partem cor vocat adeoque eam, in qua nascuntur affectus.”
43 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 36–38: “Qui fit igitur, cur saepe diversum ab affectu
homines eligamus? Principio, quod nonnunquam aliud in opere externo eligimus, quam quod
cupit cor seu voluntas, fieri potest, ut affectu vincatur affectus, ut negari non potest, quin
voluptatum amans sit Alexander Macedo, tamen quia gloriam magis ardet, deligit laborem,
voluptates aspernatur, non quod eas non amet, sed quod vehementius amet gloriam.”
44 Cf. Saarinen, Weakness of Will in Renaissance and Reformation Thought, 132–35; Saari-
nen, “Weakness of Will.”
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such a power which, whatever be the affections under which influence you find yourself,
can always moderate and temper them […].45
Which ‘Scholastics’ are we talking about? One cannot fail to notice that the
(critical) definition of the will as a faculty to moderate and temper affections
echoes here the way Scotus himself characterizes the affectio justitiae – precisely
the affection at the source of human freedom – as a capacity to moderate the
affectiones commodi.46 And what immediately follows makes it possible to ex-
plicitly specify the target that Melanchthon has in mind:
The schools do not deny that the affections exist, but they call them an infirmity of na-
ture and think it is enough if the will possesses the ability to elicit various acts. But I deny
that there is any power in man that can seriously oppose his affections, and I think that
these elicited acts are nothing but a fictitious mental exercise. For since God judges
hearts, the heart along with its affections must be the highest and most powerful part of
man. Otherwise, why would God consider man according to his weaker part and not
rather according to his better part, if the will is somehow different from the heart and
better and stronger than the part that contains the affections? […] But what do external
works have to do with Christian discipline, if the heart is insincere? And besides, Aristo-
tle himself did not teach these ‘elicited acts,’ which have rather been invented by Scotus.47
If the example of hypocrisy can help us to interpret the presumed indeterminacy

of the will as a mere exception and simulacrum of civility, however, the anthro-
pological possibility of this indeterminacy still poses a logical problem. How, af-
ter having explicitly identified the will with appetite and affections (by calling
the voluntas the fons affectuum), can Melanchthon now suppose a kind of re-
treat of the will from affections? How, after having defined the will as an affec-
45 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 38: “Deinde fieri fortasse potest, ut prorsus contra
omnes affectus deligatur aliquid, quod cum fit, per simulationem fit, ut cum quispiam eum,
quem ex animo odit, cui ex animo male vult, benigne, comiter, blande tractat, nulla fortasse
certa causa. Is etiamsi non sentiat aliquo alio se affectu vinci […] is, inquam simulat comi-
tatem in externo opere, in quo secundum naturam videtur esse quaedam libertas. Atque haec
est illa voluntas, quam nobis stulti scholastici finxerunt, scilicet vim talem, quae, utcunque sis
affectus, possit tamen affectum moderari temperareque […].”
46 Cross, Duns Scotus, 85–89; cf. also my concluding remarks below.
47 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 40–42: “Non negant affectus scholae, sed vocant in-
firmitatem naturae, satis esse, si actus elicitos diversos habeat voluntas. At ego nego vim esse
ullam in homine, quae serio affectibus adversari possit, censeoque actus illos elicitos non nisi
fictitiam cogitationem intellectus esse. Nam cum corda deus iudicet, necesse est cor cum suis
affectibus summam ac potissimam hominis partem esse. Alioqui, cur hominem ab imbecilliore
parte deus aestimaret et non potius a meliorem si qua voluntas est alia a corde et affectuum
parte melior ac fortior? […] Sed quid ad christianam disciplinam externa operam si cor sit
insincerum? Praeterea ipse etiam Aristoteles non prodidit actus illos elicitos, quos Scotus con-
finxit.”
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404 Arthur Huiban
tive impulse, can the Reformer return to an approach which rather tends to in-
terpret the will as a faculty of choice between opposites, a power to arbitrate
between contrary motivations?
One part of the answer lies in the distinction between the viewpoints of
interiority and exteriority. Regarding external acts, the ‘Scotists’ can legitimately
state that there is, in human beings, an absolutely free and indeterminate power
of choice, and therefore that human beings correspondingly are, in regard to
their external works, capable of acting or not acting, of accepting or refusing a
practical suggestion, of appearing amiable to hated persons, or of flattering
tyrants.48 But this kind of freedom and indeterminacy only states the possibility
of a free will with regard to external acts. It does not imply the reality of any
power which would also be indeterminate towards the empire of the affections,
and therefore of sin.49 This freedom of action is illustrated by such trivial and
non-controversial examples as greeting, clothing – and Lent:
But if you consider the power of the human will as a natural capacity, it cannot be denied
that there is in it, according to human reason, a certain freedom in external works. One
experiences for himself that it is within his own power to greet a man or not to greet him,
to put on such a garment or not to put it on, to eat meat or not to eat it. And the pseudo-
philosophers, who attribute freedom to the will, have fixed their eyes on this contingency
of external works. But because God does not consider these outer works but the inner
motion of the heart, Scripture remains silent concerning this freedom.50
A human being is therefore quite capable, by virtue of his volitional faculty, to

determine himself freely in his choices concerning external acts. In his own or-
der, and notwithstanding the global predestination by God, the individual is ab-
48 See also Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 36: “Contra interni affectus non sunt in
potestate nostra. Experientia enim usuque comperimus non posse voluntatem sua sponte
ponere amorem, odium aut similes affectus, sed affectus affectu vincitur, ut, quam quemvis
alium amas. Nec audiam sophistas, si negent pertinere ad voluntatem affectus humanos, amo-
rem, odium, gaudium, moerem, invidentiam, ambitionem et similes; nihil enim nunc de fame
aut siti dicitur.”
49 Melanchthon, Loci communes, 42: “Praeterea, quid attenet iactare externorum operum
libertatem cum cordis puritatem deus requirat? Pharisaica prorsus traditio est, quidquid de
libero arbitrio, de iustitia operum stulti homines et impii conscripserunt. Iam ubi affectus pau-
lo vehementior fuerit, fieri non potest, quin erumpat id quod dici solet : Naturam licet expellas
furca, tamen usque recurret.”
50 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 34–36: “Quod si voluntatis humanae vim pro natu-
rae captu aestimes, negari non potest iuxta rationem humanam, quin sit in ea libertas quaedam
externorum operum, ut ipse experiris in potestate tua esse, salutare hominem aut non salutare,
indui hac veste vel non indui, vesci carnibus aut non vesci. Et in hanc externorum operum
contingentiam defixerunt oculos philosophastri, qui libertatem voluntati tribuere. Verum quia
deus non respicit opera externa, sed internos cordis motus, ideo scriptura nihil prodidit de ista
libertate.”
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solutely free, according to his natural strengths, to greet or not to greet, to dress
or not to dress, to flatter or not to flatter. Understood in this minimal sense of a
faculty of resolution between contrary actions, the freedom of the will is here
absolutely preserved. However, this freedom of works never extends to control-
ling inner affections. Man has quite precisely no control over this interiority,
which is described less in terms of an act than of a tendency or, in the words of
the apostle, of an “inner motion of the heart.”51 The error of the philosophers –
or pseudo-philosophers – is therefore to have built a global paradigm of human
action around the extremely specific model of hypocritical action. This concep-
tion may certainly appear justified regarding the thematic interests of the ancient
philosophers, whose ethics simply aims at defining the conditions for the civil
reputation of the individuals. But it is entirely illegitimate, on the other hand, in
theology, because Scripture teaches us that God does not judge deeds but
‘hearts.’52
In sum, the ‘doctrine of free will’ is therefore not so much false as indiffer-
ent to Christian truth. The ‘sophists’ did not err so much in recognizing a free-
dom of the will regarding external works as rather in thinking they could draw,
from this freedom, a theological conclusion. In the following chapter on sin, Me-
lanchthon reaffirms this observation by discussing the problem of pagan virtues:
I grant that there was in Socrates constancy, chastity in Xenocrates and temperance in
Zeno. However, since these resided in impure souls, and much more, because these shad-
ows of virtues had their source in self-love and philautia, they should not be taken as true
virtues, but rather as vices. Socrates was perseverant but he loved glory, or at least was
self-satisfied with his virtue. Cato was brave, but because of his love of praise. In fact,
God lavishes these shadows of virtue among the nations, among the ungodly, or among
whomever, in the same way that He confers beauty, wealth, and the like. And as human
reason marvels at these phantoms which parade under the mask of virtue, our pseudo-
theologians, deceived by a blind natural judgment, have urged us to study philosophy, in
search of philosophical virtues, and the merits of external works. But what, then, are
these philosophers teaching, including the best of them, if not self-confidence and love
for ourselves? Cicero, in his De finibus bonorum et malorum, believed that all interest in
virtue stems from self-love and philautia.53

52 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 36.
53 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 58: “Esto, fuerit quaedam in Socrate constantia, in
Xenocrate castitas, in Zenone temperantia, tamen quia in animis impuris fuerunt, immo, quod
amore sui ex pilautia oriebantur istae virtutum umbrae, non debent pro veris virtutibus, sed
pro vitiis haberi. Tolerans fuit Socrates, sed amans gloriae aut certe placens sibi de virtute.
Fortis fuit Cato, sed amore laudis. Effundit autem huiusmodi virtutum umbras deus in gentes,
in impios, in quosvis non aliter atque formam, opes et similia dona largitur. Et cum hanc exter-
nam virtutis personam ac larvam miretur tota humana ratio, pseudotheologi nostri, falsi caeco
naturae iudicio, commendarunt nobis philosophica studia philosophicasque virtutes et operum
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406 Arthur Huiban
The distinction between interiority and exteriority serves here to radically sep-
arate the logic of the philosophical virtues (temperance, justice etc.), which by
their nature agree with the hypocrisy of works, from the logic of the theological
virtues (faith, hope and charity), which can only arise from a regenerate heart.54
According to Melanchthon, the incompatibility between philosophy and theolo-
gy stems more, therefore, from a difference in perspectives than from an intellec-
tual contradiction. Those theologians who imported philosophy into Christian
theology did not pay enough attention to the fact that the virtues of Aristotle or
Cicero were only external virtues, indifferent in themselves to the true justitia
christiana. Their error is not, therefore, to have proclaimed the reality of free
will, by fixing their myopic eyes on the particular case of external freedom and
then generalizing the model of hypocritical actions to the reign of interiority.
Their error rather is to have believed that this external freedom could be used as
an argument in the locus de justificatione, namely in the question of man’s abili-
ty to prepare himself for grace.55
3. The Theological Motivations

of Melanchthon’s Psychology
We should therefore move briefly to the field of theology, in order to understand
the heart of Melanchthon’s criticism of the ‘Scotists.’ In the second chapter on
sin, Melanchthon utilizes the distinction between interiority and exteriority in
order to criticize some authors identified by Melanchthon as ‘neo-Pelagians.’56
In the Loci, this term always refers to the ‘Scotists.’ Scotus himself is explicitly
referenced, as we saw above, for the concept of an actus elicitus,57 which desig-
nates an act that the will can choose by itself and without the auxilium of an-
other power. In contrast to the ancient Pelagians, who denied the very reality of
original sin, the neo-Pelagians are characterized, according to Melanchthon, by
their denial of the fact that “the power of original sin is such that all human
actions and all human behavior are sins.”58 This statement obviously echoes the
externorum merita. At quid in universum docent philosophi, si qui optime docent, nisi fiduci-
am et amorem nostri? M. Cicero in finibus bonorum et malorum omnem rationem virtutis ab
amore nostri et philautia aestimat.”
54 Regarding this question, see Huiban, “La ‘philautie’ des premiers Loci Communes de Me-
lanchthon (1521).”
57 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 76.
58 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 56: “Minore negotio Pelagiani veteres revelli possunt
quam nostrorum temporum novi Pelagiani, qui, etsi non negent esse peccatum originale, ne-
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thesis defended by Luther and Karlstadt against Johannes Eck at the Leipzig dis-
putation in 1519.59 The latter was an eclectic theologian of Ingolstadt, who was
significantly influenced by the theology of Scotus, Ockham and Biel.60
In the second chapter of the Loci, the references to Scotus and the Scotists
always concern this particular controversy over the preparation for grace that
centered on man’s ability to make himself worthy, “ex ipsis viribus” of the gratia
gratum faciens, before any gracious antecedent grace.61 Obviously, the summary
that Melanchthon gives here of the ‘Scotist’ theses on grace does not go without
a certain caricature; we can assume that Melanchthon always has Johannes Eck
in mind when he mentions Scotus.62 However, if Melanchthon undoubtedly
drew from the Chrysopassus the standard theses of the late medieval theologians
on the question of grace and predestination, he also had common sources with
Eck, in particular through their academic milieu.63 From 1514 to 1517, while
already a master of arts at the University of Tübingen and teaching for two years
the disciplines of the trivium, the praeceptor Germaniae also attended classes at
the faculty of theology, the content of which he sometimes relates in his corre-
spondence and biographical writings.64 In the 1541 preface to the edition of his
early works, Melanchthon thus mocks the demonstration of the doctrine of tran-
substantiation taught in the 1510s in Tübingen by one of Eck’s teachers, Jacob
Lemp, who was then Master of the Sentences, and who was largely influenced by
Scotus’s theology.65 But Melanchthon also praises a theologian more hostile to
the doctrines of the Subtle Doctor, Wendelin Steinbach, also professor of theolo-
gy in Tübingen, and from whom Melanchthon may have learnt to identify cer-
tain commonplaces of contemporary Scotism, such as the thesis of the power of
gant tamen eam esse vim peccati originalis, ut omnia hominum opera, omnes hominum cona-
tus sint peccata.”
59 On the Leipzig Disputation, see notably: Selge, “Die Leipziger Disputation zwischen Lut-
her und Eck”; Selge, “Der Weg zur Leipziger Disputation zwischen Luther und Eck”; Schulze,
“Johannes Eck im Kampf gegen Martin Luther”; Sider, Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt, 70–
85; Evans, “Defending Wittenberg.”
60 On this figure, see Seifert, Logik zwischen Scholastik und Humanismus. Notably, Eck’s
Chrysopassus from 1514 is a synthesis of medieval theological sententiae on the question of
predestination. Regarding the Chrysopassus, see the older work of Greving, Johann Eck als jun-
ger Gelehrter. Regarding the ratio praedestinationis and Eck’s evolution between 1514 and the
Leipzig disputation, see Oberman, “Wittenberg’s War on Two Fronts.”
62 Regarding the discussion of the Scotist doctrine of predestination, see in particular Eck,
Chrysopassus, [unpaginated] D1r–E4v.
63 On this academic background, see Scheible, Melanchthon, 20–27.
64 Scheible, Melanchthon, 21–22.
65 Melanchthon, Epistola Philippi Melanchthonis de seipso et de editione prima suorum
scriptorum (1541), CR 4, 718.
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408 Arthur Huiban
the will on the affects, defended by Scotus himself, but especially formalized by
his disciples of the 15th and 16th centuries.66
At the outset of the Loci’s second chapter, the discussion would seem to be
a strictly philosophical consideration of the question of the will’s ability to con-
form to the “commandments of right reason”: can a human being fulfill, by his
own strength, the requirements of what his understanding presents to him as the
“laws of nature”?67 Immediately under this classical formulation, however, lurks
the theological problem. Throughout the Loci communes, the “commandments
of reason” rather refer to the natural knowledge of the Law, and therefore to the
problem of the conditions of justification, than to the philosophical question of
acrasia or the weakness of the will.68 Subsequently, the controversy is thus
brought more directly on the doctrine of the facere quod in se est. In its Ockha-
mist version, this doctrine states that man can, in the sacrament of penance,
strive to love God super omnia, by his own natural power, without being helped
by the special assistance of any antecedent grace (“gratia gratis data”).69
Although I shall later extensively discuss the power of the Law, I cannot help here but
show the Christian reader the stupid, absurd, and ungodly nonsense by which the
Sophists prove that we can love God by our natural powers. They gossip like this: a lesser
good, namely any creature, can be loved; therefore, a higher good can be loved too. Is
this a discourse of Christians, seasoned with salt as Paul wants it? No, it is an entertain-
ing enthymeme, purely Aristotelian, and worthy of Aristotelian theologians. First of all, it
is in the nature of love that we love nothing except what looks good, both pleasant and
beneficial, to us, so that we love everything for our benefit. You love power or money, not
because they are good things in themselves, but because you believe they serve the best
interests for your life. So, you don’t love God, however good he is, until you realize that
he is useful for you and your calculations. And indeed, if you would love [God] in this
way, with regard to your benefit, then you would love [Him] in a servile way, and with
your perverse and corrupt natural affection you would plainly sin. And in this way, you
will never love God, nor do we feel the benefits from God without our hearts having
already been purified by the Holy Spirit and the love of God having been engraved into
such a pure and godly heart.70
66 Scheible, Melanchthon, 21–22. On the influence of Jacob Lemp on Johannes Eck, see also
Wiedemann, Dr. Johann Eck, 8.
67 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 76: “Et hic ruit illa philosophiae moralis et liberi
arbitrii theologorum sententia impia et stulta, quam plenis buccis nunquam non intonant Sco-
tistae voluntatem posse se conformare omni dictamini rectae rationis, id est, voluntatem posse
velle, quidquid recta ratio, rectum consilium intellectus praescribit.” These dictamini rectae ra-
tionis are associated later with the laws of nature, discussed in the third chapter; see especially
Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 100–6.
69 See notably Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 120–84.
70 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 78: “Non possum hic mihi temperare, quamquam de
vi legis postea sim dicturus abunde, quin obiter indicem christiano lectori fatuas, insulsas et
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The two sub-categories ‘good things,’ ‘good’ (bona), namely ‘pleasant’ (iucunda)
and ‘advantageous’ (commoda) things are basically equivalent. Indeed, it belongs
to the deepest affective tendency of human nature that the evaluation of the
good be reduced to the consideration of what is useful to us. If man cannot want
anything except what appears to him useful, and if this very will is identified
with affection, then neither can man love or hate anything except what seems to
be good or useful to him. Love can only love its advantage, hate can only flee
from what appears harmful to it.
We can thus understand why the theological argument of the gradation of
love, no doubt inspired by Gabriel Biel’s commentary on the Sentences and its
quotations in Eck’s Chrysopassus,71 is untenable. It is because the term ‘love’ is
purely equivocal, depending on whether it applies to love ad nos, which falls
under the natural consideration of my advantages, or to love in se, which is
purely inaccessible to the sinful intellect. However, the issue here is not to point
to a cognitive corruption of sin by the Fall, or to emphasize the noetic effects of
original sin. In second chapter of the Loci Melanchthon has nothing to say in
regard to this corruption, although the 1522 edition has a brief supplement to
recall that, just like the will, the human intellect too has been corrupted by the
Fall.72 The reason for this silence is to be found in the thesis of the intellect’s
dependence on the affections. After the Fall, the practical intellect is not so inca-
pable of perceiving what is good, right or just in itself, as unable to appreciate,
and therefore only subsequently to consider, anything other than what seems
good, pleasant or useful to a person. This presupposition explains the subse-
quent rejection of the doctrine of the meritum de congruo, which states that a
first merit, rewarded by the gift of sanctifying grace, can be obtained by human
beings merely by the natural means of his will.73 Now, for Melanchthon, the ego-
impias sophistarum argutias, quibus probant posse nos per vires naturae diligere deum. Sic
enim argutantur: Diligi potest minus bonum, nempe creatura quaepiam, posse igitur et maius
bonum diligi. Scilicet hic est sermo christianorum, quem Paulus vult esse sale conditum? Adeo
hoc est et festivum et mere Aristotelicum et Aristotelicis dignum theologis commentum. Pri-
mum ea est amoris natura, ut non amemus nisi quae nobis bona, tum iucunda, tum commoda
videntur, adeoque quidquid amamus, nostri commodi respectu amamus. Amas opes, amas pe-
cuniam, non quod ipsa per sese bona res sit, sed quod usibus vitae tuae servitura videtur. Sic
deum non amas, quantumvis bonum, nisi tuis rationibus tibique utilem esse sentias. Iam etiam,
si hac ratione respectu tui commodi amares, serviliter amares et pravo perversoque affectu nat-
urae planeque peccares. At ne sic quidem unquam amas; neque enim ex deo ulla commoda
sentiuntur, nisi per spiritum sanctum iam cor sit purificatum et insculpta si puro pioque cordi
dei beneficentia.”
71 Cf. Pöhlmann’s comment in Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 77, note 190.
72 Melanchthon, Loci theologici: B. Prima eorum aetas, 93–94, n. 23.
73 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 82: “Iam quae prodidere sophistae de merito con-
grui, scilicet quod ex operibus moralibus, id est, quae viribus naturae nostrae facimus de con-
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410 Arthur Huiban
istic inertia of human nature makes any type of affection, and its corresponding
type of knowledge, beyond the logic of benefit calculation strictly inconceivable.
The idea of a natural love of God super omnia, and in particular beyond oneself,
thus appears as a contradiction in terms. Theologically speaking it all comes
down to the following argument: the sinner can care about nothing other than
what benefits or what harms his personal utility; but the justice of the Law is a
justice which condemns, saddens and distresses; ergo, sinful human beings can’t
help hating the justice of God.74
Conclusion: Scotist Imprints and Criticism of Scotus

To conclude, if one compares Melanchthon’s anthropology with Scotist psychol-
ogy, then one can say that the crucial difference lies entirely in the rejection of
the thesis of a natural affection for loving God.75 As radical as it may be in its
theological consequences, the opposition to Scotism ultimately evolves around
this extremely minimal anthropological motive: the rejection of affectio justitiae,
that is, of the idea that there would be in a human being a natural tendency to
love the good and indeed God for themselves, unconditionally, and so to speak
outside of the consideration of the advantage which that good provides or seems
to provide to a human person in view of his self-interest. According to Scotus,
this affectio justitiae constitutes the natural counterpoint to the affectio commo-
di: the existence of this affectio justifies the hypothesis of human freedom by
locating the place of indeterminacy in the absolute independence of the will
from, not only the practical intellect, but also from a specific affective determina-
tion.76 This affective dualism explains how Scotus can posit, beyond the com-
gruo, sic loquuntur, mereamur gratiam, ipse, lector, intelligis blasphemias esse in iniuriam gra-
tiae dei ementitas. Etiam cum naturae humanae vires citra spiritus sancti afflatum non possint
nisi peccare, quid Merebimur nostris conatibus nisi iram?” Cf. Oberman, The Harvest of Me-
dieval Theology, 42–47.
75 On the question of the two affections and on the double meaning, metaphysical and
moral of freedom in Scotus, see Cross, Duns Scotus, 88–89; Boler, “Transcending the Natural”
and the discussion of Lee, “Scotus on the Will.” Cf. also, on the same point, Hare, “Scotus on
Morality and Nature”; King, “Scotus’s Rejection of Anselm”; Wolter, “Duns Scotus on the Will
as a Rational Potency.” For the broader question of the relationship between passions and will
in Scotus, see also Drummond, “John Duns Scotus on the Passions of the Will”; Perreiah, “Sco-
tus on Human Emotions”; Boulnois, “Duns Scot: existe-t-il des passions de la volonté?”; Loiret,
Volonté et infini chez Duns Scot, 87–93.
76 Regarding Scotus’s teaching on free will, see Boler, “The Moral Psychology of Duns Sco-
tus”; Frank, “Duns Scotus’ Concept of Willing Freely,” 68–89; and more broadly Wolter, Sco-
tus on the Will and Morality. For the later Scotist tradition, see further the article by Claus A.
Andersen in this present volume.
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mon definition of the voluntas as the faculty of inclination toward the good, an
absolutely free sense of the will as the potentia indeterminata.77 It is indeed the
existence of two affective tendencies – affectio justitiae and affectio commodi –,
both innate and contradictory, which allows the subtle Doctor to reject the idea
of an affective determination of the will and to posit, as a third term, a power of
retreat and of arbitration.
By transposing the actuality of this affection of justice entirely into the or-
der of grace, Melanchthon thus does much more than break with the Scotist
balance of natural affections. Since there is no other volitional determination in
human beings than that of amor sui, the very principle of freedom disappears;
due to ‘selfish inertia’ a human being cannot desire or want anything other than
what he finds pleasant, agreeable, or useful.78 According to Scotus, freedom and
merit mutually imply one another. It is because the will is free towards affectio
commodi that it is also capable of orienting itself in accordance with the affectio
justitiae and thus love God super omnia – and consequently achieve congruent
merit. Conversely, however, it is because the will is free towards this very affectio
justitiae that it may at any time fall back into the sinful affectio commodi and
thereby fully deserve reprobation.79 For Scotus, human freedom therefore pre-
supposes the affection of justice in a twofold way. First of all, it does so in a
negative way, namely owing to the fact that the affective dualism enables the
independence of the will from any one specific affection; this indeterminacy of
the will is metaphysical freedom. As for the positive side, any free will that is
determined by virtue of affectio justitiae is said to act ‘freely’ and by itself, not
according to any necessity of nature, as it would when determined by the affectio
commodi alone. The contrast is clear: whereas the metaphysical definition of
freedom concerns the contingency of choice, the will as determined by the affec-
tion of justice defines moral freedom.80
By making the affectio justitiae an effect of the free gift of the Holy Spirit,
and no longer a natural affection capable of freely inclinating the will, Me-
lanchthon ruins, by the suppression of a single premise, Scotus’s whole doctrine
of free will and justification. In doing so, the Reformer does not contradict the
77 Duns Scotus, Ord. II, dist. 25 (I refer to the entire distinction); Duns Scotus, Quaestiones
super libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis, q. 15, n. 4.
78 Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 52: “Primus itaque affectus et summus naturae ho-
minis est amor sui, a quo rapitur, ut velit desideretque ea tantum, quae suae naturae bona,
iucunda, dulcia, gloriosa videntur, odio habeat et formidet ea, quae naturae adversa videntur,
adverseturque eum, qui arcet ab iis, que cupit, aut qui praecipit ea sectari, ea quaeri, quae disci-
plicent.”
79 Hoffmann, “Freedom Beyond Practical Reason,” 1079–83; Lee, “Scotus on the Will,” 43–
50.
80 Boler, “Transcending the Natural,” 125; Cross, Duns Scotus, 88–89. See also, for a discus-
sion, Lee, “Scotus on the Will,” 45–50.
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412 Arthur Huiban
metaphysical idea of free will, understood as a power of choice between oppo-

sites; in the Loci communes, Melanchthon accepts the existence of this so-called
‘external’ freedom.81 However, in natural man, and beyond that mysterious case
of hypocritical action (cf. chapter 2 above), this power of determination has no
other source than the affectio commodi. The will is just a spontaneous arbitration
among several selfish desires. If Melanchthon’s anthropology, in its deep logic
(and even in the tacit distinction of the two senses of liberty, the metaphysical
and the moral one), may have a scent of Scotism, his anthropology, on the other
hand, no longer works with the moral ideal of freedom, nor the theological idea
of a meritum de congruo as the human condition for sanctifying grace. The radi-
cal rupture with the Scotist tradition operates by a peculiar and subtle transfor-
mation, even radicalization, of the presuppositions of this very tradition. And
even if Melanchthon stands in opposition to the Scotist theology on the doctrine
of sin and grace, a Scotist pattern can be found, in the first edition of the Loci
communes, on at least four points which concern more directly philosophical
and anthropological issues:
1) The very definition of the will as potentia indeterminata: if Me-
lanchthon rejects as a theologian the idea that this power is sufficient to
fight against self-love and to pull man out of the empire of sin, he rec-
ognizes, as a philosopher, the full reality of this self-determining power
for opposites with regard to the reality of our external acts.
2) Therefore, the very definition of freedom as the capacity to will or not
to will: it is the indeterminacy of the will which, in Melanchthon’s early
Loci communes, defines the reality of free will, and not the idea of ratio-
nal appetite, as in a Thomistic conception of freedom.
3) Consequently, also, a strictly voluntarist conception of the relation be-
tween will and understanding: Melanchthon rejects the idea that the
practical intellect and the mere knowledge of the good can determine
the will in its choices.
4) Finally, the tendency to define the affectio commodi as a proper tenden-
cy of the will, and not as a “lower” appetite. For Melanchthon, self-love
is not a sensitive appetite, it is not the effect of the body on the soul; but
self-love belongs to the intrinsic determination of the will.82

82 On the importance of this idea according to which the affectiones commodi are, for Sco-
tus, intrinsic determinations of the will, which tends by itself to the perfection of its nature, and
not effects of a pressure of the body and sensible appetites on the volitional faculty, see Cross,
Duns Scotus, 88–89, and Boulnois, “Duns Scot: existe-t-il des passions de la volonté?” Similar-
ly, in Melanchthon, amor sui appears as an entirely spiritual affection, and not as a weakness
induced by the relation to the body. See here again Melanchthon, Loci communes 1521, 52.
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Univocity of Being, the Cogito and Idealism
in Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665)
Giovanni Gellera
Introduction
The common narrative has long regarded Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665) as a
Cartesian-scholastic eclectic philosopher, or as a ‘minor’ Cartesian who ulti-
mately failed to understand Descartes.1 The consensus now is, however, that
“Clauberg’s system lies at the intersection of various philosophical paradigms”
and that Clauberg is “an original interpreter of many strains of modern philoso-
phy.”2 In this paper I wish to contribute to this renewed interest in Clauberg by
shedding more light on a so far underexplored aspect of his metaphysics: the
relation with Scotism. To be sure, while he professed to be following Descartes,
Clauberg never declared to be a Scotist, nor to be consciously contributing to the
long Scotist tradition. Nevertheless, I will show that Clauberg makes use of some
concepts and views in his metaphysics which are usually associated with Scot-
ism, and that he did so in an original dialogue with Descartes’s philosophy.
Clauberg’s metaphysics is therefore suggestive of the relevance of Scotism, even
in some milieus not traditionally associated with it. As a consequence, it raises
the question of how to understand a conceptual relation which is implicit and
indirect. Finally, I will argue that Clauberg deserves a more pronounced place in
the history of early modern idealism precisely because of the original way in
which he synthesized views from the Schulmetaphysik, Scotism and Cartesian-
ism.
In this paper I will primarily focus on the final edition of the Ontosophia,
the Metaphysica de ente, quae rectius ontosophia (1664, hereafter MdE).3 MdE is
This article is a part of the project “A Disregarded Past. Medieval Scholasticism and Reformed
Thought” (2020–2024), funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant number
192703). I would like to express my gratitude to the Swiss National Science Foundation. I
would also like to thank, among others, Laurent Cesalli, Dominik Perler and Claus A. Ander-
sen.
1 Carraud, “L’ontologie peut-elle être cartésienne?,” 27-28. See Ragni, “Bibliographia
Claubergiana,” for bio-bibliographical information.
2 Ragni, “Bibliographia Claubergiana,” 732 and 734. If not otherwise specified, emphasis in
quotes is original.
3 In MdE, paragraphs are numbered continuously and divided into sections; for instance,
MdE I.5 is followed by II.6. In all references to this work, both in the main text and in the
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418 Giovanni Gellera
the end-point of Clauberg’s career-long project, which started with the Elementa
philosophiae seu Ontosophia of 1647 and his ‘conversion’ to Cartesianism in
1648: the project to integrate the ontology of the Schulmetaphysik and Carte-
sianism. Only recently have commentators seen this project in a more successful
light. The most accomplished result is Massimiliano Savini, Johannes Clauberg.
Methodus cartesiana et ontologie (2011). Savini argues Clauberg took from Des-
cartes’s Meditations a first philosophy, that is, the acquisition of the first princi-
ples, and from the Schulmetaphysik a universal concept of being as intelligible.
For Clauberg, this solved the difficulty of regarding scholastic metaphysics as
both a science and a method, as well as the competing logical and metaphysical
interpretations of Aristotle’s Categories. Clauberg’s originality, Savini concludes,
lies in complementing Cartesian philosophy with a “methodus,” and in inserting
Cartesianism in an ontological perspective.4 My contribution to this interpreta-
tion will be to show that from Scotism Clauberg took the univocal sense of being
as the universal object of the Cartesian Cogito.
The paper is divided into two parts. Part 1 presents some affinities between
MdE and Scotism, in particular on the definition of metaphysics, and of being as
intelligibile and as aliquid. Three views traditionally associated with Scotism will
be particularly relevant: univocity of being, the intellect’s activism, and the onto-
logical status of mental content as ens deminutum. Part 2 discusses the relation
of Scotist and Cartesian views in Clauberg from the perspective of early modern
idealism, and suggests that a version of epistemological idealism can be a helpful
interpretative framework for Clauberg’s ontology and his unique blend of Carte-
sianism and Scotism.
1. MdE and Scotism: Univocity of Being and

the Ontological Status of Ideas
Commentators disagree on the relation of Clauberg and Scotism. On the one
hand, there is a “discrepancy,” or a “shift,” between Clauberg and Scotus even
though the connection with the Scotist tradition is maintained,5 especially in re-
spect of the realitas obiectiva.6 Likewise, Clauberg’s understanding of the univoc-
footnotes, I additionally supply the page number. All texts by Clauberg referred to in this arti-
cle are also conveniently accessible in the Opera omnia philosophica from 1691 (cf. the 1968
reprint edition).
4 Cf. Savini, Methodus cartesiana, 7-8, 13 and 19.
5 Savini, Methodus cartesiana, 255 (regarding the theory of signum): “Le décalage par rap-
port à Scot apparaît ici clairement, tout comme le lien que Clauberg entretient avec la tradition
scotiste.”
6 Savini, Methodus cartesiana, 245: “Ce parcours se déroule essentiellement à l’intérieur de
la tradition scotiste.”
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Univocity of Being, the Cogito and Idealism in Johannes Clauberg 419
ity of being bespeaks a “faithful, however imprecise, Scotistic framework.”7 On

the other hand, Richard A. Muller has denied that there is anything especially
Scotist in Clauberg, and concluded that his Scotism might amount to “potential-
ly opening a door to the concept [of univocity of being], but not very widely.”8
These opposite conclusions suggest that the connection between Clauberg and
Scotus is as tantalizing as it is indirect and mediated, and that a sort of ‘latitude’
is necessary in applying the category of Scotism to Clauberg. Clauberg’s ‘Sco-
tism’ is of a very different nature from that of coeval declared Scotists such as
Bartolomeo Mastri and John Punch.9 In MdE, Scotus is mentioned only once.
After approving of the primacy attributed by Aristotle to individual substances,
Clauberg writes that “Scotus called the individual essence itself ecceitas or haec-
ceitas.”10 In other works Clauberg discusses his sources explicitly. In Differentia
inter Cartesianam et aliam in scholis usitatam philosophiam (1657, published in
1680) Scotus is mentioned with Thomas Aquinas and Francisco Suárez as the
“Monachi & Jesuiti” representative of the philosophy of the schools (Introitus,
IV, 3). This suggests that Clauberg regarded Scotus as key among the scholastics.
In De cognitione Dei et nostri, Exercitatio XV.15–16, 75–76 (published posthu-
mously in 1685) Clauberg praises Giacomo Zabarella’s endorsement of the view,
attributed to Scotus, that things in the mind are res. In Exercitatio VI.9, 42, an-
other possible source of knowledge about Scotus is Christoph Scheibler. We now
turn to how Clauberg weighs in the traditional debate on the definition of meta-
physics.
1.1 Section I: On the Definition of Metaphysics and Being
Clauberg defines metaphysics as follows (the three ‘†’ are explained below):
I.1. There is a science which contemplates being as such, that is, insofar as it is under-
stood as to have some common nature or some degrees of nature, † which is in corporeal
and incorporeal things, in God and creatures, and in all and each individual beings, in its
own proper way.†
7 Carraud, “L’ontologie peut-elle être cartésienne?,” 16: “un cadre scotiste imprécis mais
fidèle.”
8 Muller, “Not Scotist,” 145. Muller criticizes the view that univocity of being is a mark of
Protestant thought, while maintaining that this does not demonstrate the absence of other Sco-
tisms (146).
9 Cf. Forlivesi, Scotistarum princeps, 208-18; Heider, “Mastrius and Punch on the Com-
mon Nature and Universal Unity.”
10 Clauberg, MdE VIII.140, 32: “Scotus ipsam essentiam singularem Ecceitatem vel Haeccei-
tatem appellavit.”
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I.2. This science is commonly called Metaphysics, but it is called more correctly Ontology
† or catholic science […] and universal Philosophy.11
Clauberg here echoes Aristotle’s traditional definition in Metaphysics, Book Γ,12

and distances himself from his own ealier definition in the Ontosophia (1647)
which was closer to Clemens Timpler’s in Metaphysicae systema methodicum
(1604):
[Metaphysics is] the speculative art which is concerned with everything intelligible, inso-
far as it is intelligible by human beings through the natural light of reason without any
concept of matter.13
Unlike in Timpler and in 1647, there is no reference to ‘being as intelligible’ and

to abstraction from matter. Different is also the way in which the object of meta-
physics is made available to the human mind. In Rudolph Goclenius’s Lexicon
philosophicum (1613), the term ‘ontology’ (ὀντολογία) occurs in the entry ‘Ab-
stractio,’ specifically under the heading ‘Abstractio materiae in scientiis contem-
platricibus.’ Mathematical abstraction is said to be ‘ontological,’ that is, adequate
to philosophy when it discusses being or transcendent things.14 From Aquinas
and Scotus to Suárez, Timpler and Goclenius, there was an agreement that the
concept of being investigated by metaphysics is acquired, in some way, by abs-
traction from non-essential features and, especially, from matter. Bartolomeo
Mastri, the Princeps Scotistarum, argues for a “twofold abstraction”: of intelli-
gence from things’ materiality, and of being qua being and the transcendentals
from materiality in terms of indifference.15
Clauberg, on the other hand, does not use the concept of abstraction in the
definition of metaphysics.16 Clauberg contends that metaphysics is about being
11 Clauberg, MdE, I.1, 1: “Est quaedam scientia, quae contemplatur ens quatenus ens est,
hoc est, in quantum communem quandam intelligitur habere naturam vel naturae gradum, †
qui rebus corporeis & incorporeis, Deo & Creaturis, omnibusque adeo & singulis entibus suo
modo inest”; and I.2, 1: “Ea vulgo Metaphysica, sed aptius Ontologia † vel scientia Catholica,
eine allgemeine Wissenschaft / & Philosophia universalis nominatur.”
12 Savini, Methodus Cartesiana, 189.
13 Timpler, Metaphysicae Systema, bk. I. ch. I., 1: “Metaphysica est ars contemplativa, quae
tractat de omni intelligibili, quatenus ab homine naturali rationis lumine sine ullo materiae
conceptu est intelligibile.” The definition is reprised in bk. I, ch. I, q. V, 8, where the end of
metaphysics is “naturalem contemplationem eorum omnium quae in suo conceptu materiam
non includunt.”
14 Goclenius, Lexicon Philosophicum, 16: “Mathematica haec est & ὀντολογιϰὴ, id est,
Philosophiae de ente seu Transcendentibus.”
15 Cf. Andersen, Metaphysik im Barockscotismus, 93-102; Andersen, “What is Metaphysics
in Baroque Scotism?,” 57.
16 Clauberg uses the term abstraction only to indicate the operation by which a mind sep-
arates essence and existence (MdE VI.80, 19). Perhaps, this single occurrence has convinced
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with a common nature, or degrees of nature, in God and creatures and in corpo-
real and incorporeal things.17 Clauberg’s more immediate background seems to
be the ‘perception of the mind’ and cogitatio, in the language of Descartes’s
Meditations: being is “thought of by a mind, is perceived by a mind” when “the
mind doubts about it, when it affirms or negates it, and when it demonstrates
something.”18 Perceptio becomes synonymical with cognitive activity, and seems
to indicate some sort of intuitive cognition or an immediate, epistemically rich
perception. The concept of being is obtained by a different cognitive process
than the intellect’s abstraction, as in Timpler and Goclenius, as it is perceived in
things, rather than abstracted from things. Arguably, this constitutes a central
metaphysical and epistemological difference between (Cartesian) mens and
(scholastic) intellectus.19 Abstraction from matter does not serve ontology’s pur-
pose, for its “universal calling” and “unity are grounded in the univocity and
universality of the concept of being.”20
The three ‘†’ symbols in MdE I.1-2, 1, indicate footnotes to the terms natu-
rae gradum, suo modo, and aptius. The first footnote refers to MdE XI.200, 50,
which explains that “the degrees of nature are distinct only by reason, in the way
one says that a species is composed of degrees of generic nature and specific
difference.”21 The third footnote refers to MdE V.64, 15, which explains that a
word should express the essence of the thing it signifies and that, on this ac-
count, the terms ‘ontology’ or ‘ontosophia’ are preferable to ‘metaphysics.’ The
second footnote is important for our analysis. It reads: “si non univoce, saltem
analogice.” The wording has been called into question, for different reasons, by
Muller and Carraud. Muller translates it as “if not univocal, failing an alterna-
tive, analogical,” and comments that Clauberg is “perhaps indicating an affinity
with Cartesian understandings of univocity, but not arguing any position as
Carraud that Goclenius, Timpler and Suárez operate with a similar (scholastic) concept of abs-
traction: Carraud, “L’ontologie peut-elle être cartésienne?,” 18.
17 Clauberg, MdE, I.1, 1. The remark recurs in the footnote to MdE I.3, 1 (which refers to
MdE IV.49, 11) where Cartesian substance dualism comprising two “classes” of material and
immaterial things is said to be subsumed under the transcendentals.
18 Clauberg, MdE II.9, 2: “Cogitatur autem Ens, cum animo percipitur, cum de eo dubi-
tatur, vel affirmatur, vel negatur, vel probatur aliquid.”
19 Carraud, “L’ontologie peut-elle être cartésienne?,” 25.
20 Savini, Methodus cartesiana, 192. Savini emphasizes the role of inductio metaphysica, a
concept arguably derived from Johann Comenius. On the model of Descartes’s Meditations,
for Clauberg the mind’s principles and first concepts are acessed inductively, by experience,
because of the mind’s “permeability” (50, 65-66).
21 Clauberg, MdE XI.200, 50: “Etiam naturae gradus sola ratione distinguuntur, ut cum spe-
cies componi dicitur ex gradibus naturae genericae & differentiae specificae.”
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definitive.”22 Carraud draws the opposite conclusion that the wording is “casual,
to say the least” but that it betrays Claubergs’s rejection of all analogy of being,
even his inability to grasp the importance of analogy of attribution.23 Carraud
believes, again unlike Muller, that the concept of being in Clauberg and the
Schulmetaphysik develops squarely within the Scotist question of the univocal
sense of being.24
For Scotus, the implication of abstraction, univocity and analogy are all too
evident. By abstracting from the features of finite creatures, one arrives at a
“neutral” or “pure” concept of being which is indifferent to God and creatures
and exists only in the human mind. This concept can then be “contracted” to
God or creatures by adding features specific to them. Unlike what many com-
mentators erroneously thought, Scotus did not contrast univocity and analogy.25
Since there is nothing univocal between God and creatures outside of the human
mind, only “analogy, or as Scotus calls it, ‘attribution,’ is a feature of real things
in the world and consists of relations of dependence and participation among
real things, whereas univocity is a feature of concepts.”26 So, “we can give an
account of analogy only if we accept that some concepts we apply to God and
creatures are univocal. These concepts correspond to attributes common in
some sense to God and creatures,”27 and the difference between God and crea-
tures is ultimately one of degree.28 Now, MdE seems to indicate, as suggested by
Muller, that, perhaps like Descartes, Clauberg was uninterested in working out
clear distinctions of ‘univocity,’ ‘analogy’ and ‘equivocation.’ The “si non uni-
voce, tamen analogice” footnote does not bespeak a contrast of univocity and
analogy, unlike in Francisco Suárez’s view that what God and creatures have
substantially in common is “non tamen univoce, sed analogice.”29 That Clauberg
believes that the unity of being in metaphysics is such on account of a “common
nature” or of “degrees of nature” between God and creatures is suggestive, but
22 Muller, “Not Scotist,” 136. But Descartes’s own understandings of univocity are not as
straightforward as Muller seems to suggest. In Principia philosophiae I.51 Descartes denies that
the term ‘substance’ is predicated univocally of God and creatures (and he is generally uninter-
ested in the concept of being). Jean-Luc Marion (Théologie blanche, 23) and Tad Schmaltz
(Disappearance of Analogy, 86 and 95) have argued that Descartes’s rejection of univocity is
suggestive of his acceptance of equivocation, rather than analogy, between God and creatures.
23 Carraud, “L’ontologie peut-elle être cartésienne?,” 17: “pour le moins désinvolte.”
24 Carraud, “L’ontologie peut-elle être cartésienne?,” 13.
25 See Smith, “Analogy of Being,” 637-38: for Scotus on univocity, see Ord. I, dist. 3, pars 1,
qq. 1-3 (ed. Vat. III), 1-123; and Ord. I, dist. 8, pars 1, q. 3 (ed. Vat. IV), 169-229.
26 Smith, “Analogy of Being,” 645.
27 Cross, Duns Scotus, 37-38.
28 Cross, Duns Scotus, 39.
29 Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae, disp. 32, sect. 1, n. 9 (Opera omnia XXVI), 314; cf.
Schmaltz, “Disappearance of Analogy,” 91.
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not conclusive, of univocity. However, the expressions ‘commonality in some

sense’ and ‘difference of degree’ used by Cross to describe Scotus’s view are ech-
oed in Clauberg’s “suo modo” and “naturae gradum.”
The term ‘univoce’ occurs only twice in MdE.30 In De cognitione Dei et nos-
tri, which is an exposition of special metaphysics on immaterial substances in
the form of a commentary to Descartes, Clauberg discusses univocity of being in
more details. Exercitatio LXIII is entitled: “God and creature can be apprehend-
ed under a common concept, or on the grounds of their common names”
(Deum et creaturam posse communi conceptu apprehendi, vel occasione ipsorum
communium nominum). These common names are ens, aliquid, res, substantia,
causa, efficiens, and perfectum.31 Rodrigo de Arriaga is mentioned several times
for his attribution of the concept of ‘being’ to God, and on the common predica-
bility of concepts between God and creatures:32 both views imply a univocal con-
cept of being, instrumental to Clauberg’s ontology. Clauberg echoes Scotus’s re-
jection of the view that only categorial terms can be properly called ‘universal’
insofar as he understands being as a transcendental, on a par with unum, verum,
bonum: “Not only are these transcendentals predicated of God and of all created
things, but truly also of one another, as when truth is said to be one, and unity is
said to be true.”33 These “permeate and embrace all things” (“omnia permeent et
ambiant”), and the stress is on the common predicability of concepts between
material and immaterial substances, and between God and creatures. The con-
cept of being in MdE seems, therefore, indebted in some ways to the Scotist tra-
dition of univocity of being, as argued by Carraud and Savini. However, that
Clauberg made no room for analogy of being (as argued by Carraud, probably as
further evidence of Clauberg’s ‘Scotism’) seems incorrect. The “si non univoce,
saltem analogice” footnote might well be worded “casually” after all, but it occurs
in a Scotist context, and is Scotist in spirit.
In MdE I.4, 1, Clauberg introduces a tripartition of the senses (significa-
tiones) of being. Here his debt to Clemens Timpler is most evident, and the fa-
miliar Aristotelian definition of metaphysics takes on an original sense. In its
first sense, being is intelligible, and it evokes the Timplerian definition of being
as “omne quod cogitari potest.” In its second sense, being is ‘something’ (ali-
quid). In its third sense, being indicates that which exists on its own (res), such
30 The second occurrence is in MdE IX.165, 39: “Manus mortua vel picta non univoce […]
sed aequivoce […] manus dicitur.”
31 Savini, Methodus cartesiana, 187. Savini situates Clauberg also in the Scotist tradition’s of
realitas objectiva, as we will see below.
32 Clauberg, De cognitione Dei et nostri, Exercitatio LXII, 9, 291; LXIV, 9, 300 and 13, 302,
where Clauberg refers to Arriaga, Cursus philosophicus, Disputatio metaphysica. I, num. 42.
and Disputatio logica XI, num. 9.
33 Clauberg, MdE I.3, 1: “Haec enim non modo de Deo rebusque creatis omnibus, verum
etiam de se invicem praedicantur, ut, cum veritas una & unitas vera dicitur.”
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as a substance.34 Being as intelligible has no opposite, being as ‘something’ has

‘nothing’ (nihil) as its opposite, and being as ‘substance’ has ‘accident’ as its
opposite. As in Descartes, the latter opposition is predicated on the fact that sub-
stances can exist on their own, unlike accidents, and it abstracts from the univer-
sal dependence of all created substances from God in respect of esse and fieri.
Properly speaking, ‘ontology’ refers only to the investigation of being in its third
meaning, that is, in its divisions and attributes. Most of the content of MdE is
about this third sense of being. However, the focus of this paper is on the intro-
duction to ontology, for Clauberg says that:
in order for us to better understand [this third sense of being] we shall present first some
considerations about being in its first and second senses, and shall begin universal philos-
ophy from the intelligible being, just as first philosophy †, taking its beginning from the
singular, does not consider anything else prior to the thinking mind.35
In this passage Clauberg openly acknowledges his debt to Descartes, who re-
mains in the background for the remainder of MdE. The footnote, marked with
a cross (†), explains that:
first philosophy is not called in this way because of the universality of its object; but
because of the fact that whoever wishes to philosophize in a correct manner has to begin
with it. Namely, [to begin] from the awareness of one’s own mind and of God, and so
on. Such a first philosophy is found in Descartes’s six Meditations.36
Commentators have discussed the tension between scholastic metaphysics and

Cartesian protology. In what might be called the ‘Cartesian’ interpretation, Car-
raud argues that Cartesian mathesis universalis and ontology are incompatible.37
Clauberg ultimately “failed” because he did not understand that (being as) cog-
itabile without mathesis universalis cannot ground the universality of protology.
34 Note, again, the difference between Clauberg and Mastri. Mastri “operates with no less
than three common concepts of being”: the ens transcendentissime captum, the ens transcen-
denter sumptum, and the ens finitum. Andersen, “What is Metaphsics in Baroque Scotism?,”
62-63.
35 Clauberg, MdE I.5, 1: “tamen ad meliorem hujus notitiam comparandam nonnulla de
Ente in prima & secunda acceptione praemittemus, inchoaturi universalem philosophiam ab
Ente cogitabili, quemadmodum a singulari incipiens prima philosophia † nihil prius considerat
Mente cogitante.”
36 Clauberg, MdE, Annotatio 5, 88: “Prima philosophia] sic dicta non propter universali-
tatem objecti, de quo agit; sed quod serio philosophaturus ab ea debeat incipere. Nempe a
cognitione suae mentis & Dei &c. Haec prima philosophia sex Meditationibus Cartesii contine-
tur.”
37 Carraud, “L’ontologie peut-elle être cartésienne?,” 13, where he endorses the views ex-
pressed in Jean-François Courtine, Suarez et le système de la métaphysique, and Jean-Luc Mari-
on, Sur le prisme métaphysique de Descartes.
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Clauberg failed to realize that “the universality of first philosophy, acquired

through order, made the question about being qua being hollow.”38 On this view,
the ontology of the Schulmetaphysik is rendered meaningless solely because it
has no place in Cartesian thought, and against all evidence that Clauberg saw it
as important. Savini agrees that Cartesian philosophy and ontology “cannot be
assimilated,” but also contends that they share a common aim in the foundation
of science,39 and that Clauberg proposes a “twofold metaphysics”: Cartesian first
philosophy serves to amend the mind and to acquire the first concepts and prin-
ciples, while ontology investigates reality from the universal perspective of ens
qua ens. First philosophy has priority but not primacy, while metaphysics is a
universal philosophy but not a ‘first’ philosophy.40 We will return to Clauberg’s
Cartesianism below in Section 2.1.
1.2. Section II: Being as “Intelligibile”
Section II of MdE defines being as intelligible as:
the first, most general and highest, because we cannot apprehend anything above this
genus. Now, for the very reason that we apprehend something, this is already intelligible,
and consequently, [it is] being in its first sense. But if one does not descend from the
universals and, on the contrary, follows the logical order and ascends gradually from the
singulars and begins to count, the concept of being will be the last.41
Thinking about something always “adds something” to the most simple concept
of being.42 All mental content is, therefore, a qualification or a determination of
the concept of being as intelligible. With a little poetry, being is “almost like the
first and thinnest thread onto which more things, less refined, are added little by
little, so that we weave the whole philosophical fabric.”43 Since the concept of
being is also most known, “nothing unknown can occur in our mind, or be
brought up in a question, of which we do not already establish as known that
38 Carraud, “L’ontologie peut-elle être cartésienne?,” 27: “Clauberg n’a pas vu que l’univer-
salité de la prima philosophia, conquise par l’ordre, disqualifiait la question de l’ens in quan-
tum ens.”
39 Savini, Methodus cartesiana, 294-95.
40 Savini, Methodus cartesiana, 184.
41 Clauberg, MdE II.10, 2: “Entis ita spectati conceptus primus est seu generalissimus &
summus, quoniam supra illud genus nullum possumus apprehendere. Nam eo ipso quo quid
apprehendimus, jam est intelligibile, & per consequens Ens in prima sua significatione. At si
non ab universalibus descendendo, verum a singularibus ordine Logico gradatim ascendendo
incipias numerare, Entis conceptus erit ultimus.”
42 Clauberg, MdE II.11, 2: “aliquid superadditur.”
43 Clauberg, MdE II.11, 2: “Ens est quasi primum & subtilissimum filum, cui paulatim alia
atque crassiora addenda sunt, ut integram telam philosophicam pertexamus.”
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‘this is a being, this is a thing’.”44 “By the very fact of presenting ‘non-being’ or
‘non-intelligible’ as the opposite [of intelligible],” Clauberg continues, “we un-
derstand it, because this opposition takes place in reason. Therefore, what is said
to be ‘non intelligible’ in speech, becomes intelligible in reason, hence it is called
Ens rationis.”45 To be sure, Clauberg is not arguing for the untenable view that
material ignorance is impossible, but rather that, in order to be apprehended
(and be apprehendable) by a mind, being has to be, in some respect at least,
intelligible or proportionate to the knowing mind.46 In this sense alone, igno-
rance is impossible. What applies to non-being also applies to a contradiction:
while ‘P and ØP’ “does not exist outside of our reason in the world, it exists at
least in speech, when it is pronounced, and exists firstly in the intellect, when it
is thought of.”47 Therefore, “being is whatever can be thought of and said, in
whatever way it is. […] So I say ‘nothing’ and as I speak I think also, and as I
think, that is in my intellect.”48 What kind of existence is this?
Ens rationis was such a prominent topic among early modern scholastics
that it elicits the question of why early modern non-scholastics seemingly disre-
garded it.49 Clauberg’s account of the existence of mental content is somewhat
lacking in details as compared to scholastic ones, arguably following the model
of Descartes. Suárez’s definition was accepted by the majority of the scholastics:
being of reason is “that which has only an objective being in the intellect.”50 The
44 Clauberg, MdE II.12, 3: “Nec potest quid adeo ignotum animo nostro occurrere vel in
quaestionem venire, de quo non prius ponatur ut notum, quod ens sive res sit.”
45 Clauberg, MdE II.9, 2: “At eo ipso quo Non ens sive Non intelligibile opponimus, hoc
intelligimus, quia per intellectum ista fit oppositio. Ergo quod Non intelligibile tunc dicitur in
oratione, fit intelligibile in ratione, unde Rationis ens nominatur.”
46 Cf. Tropia, “Suárez as a Scotist,” 92: Suárez and Scotus hold that “everything that exists
belongs to the intellect’s domain” but also that “not every object is proportioned to the human
intellect.”
47 Clauberg, MdE, II.15, 4: “si non existit extra rationem et rationem nostram in mundo,
saltem est in sermone, cum dicitur, atque imprimis est in intellectu, dum cogitatur.”
48 Clauberg, MdE II.6, 2: “Ens est quicquid quovis modo est, cogitari ac dici potest. Alles
was nur gedacht und gesagt werden kan. Ita dico Nihil, & cum dico cogito, & cum cogito, est
illud in intellectu meo.” Carraud, “L’ontologie peut-elle être cartésienne?,” 21, notes the simi-
larity with Descartes’s “Ego sum, ego existo, quoties a me profertur, vel mente concipitur.” In
MdE II.7, 2, Clauberg produces one of his imaginary etymologies: “sache res a sagen dicere.
[…] Ipsum Res, si non a reor, est a ῥέω loquor.” Regarding Clauberg’s profound attention to
natural language, see Savini, Methodus cartesiana, 300, and chapter V, and Gellera, “Clauberg
and the Philosophy of German Language,” e. g., 133, 137–39, for an analysis of Clauberg and
MdE from a distinct but complementary perspective.
49 Novotný, “Arriaga (and Hurtado),” 121.
50 Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae, disp. 54, sect. 1, n. 6 (Opera omnia XXVI), 1016:
“ens rationis esse illud, quod habet esse objective tantum in intellectu,” and which does not
really exist. Cf. Novotný, “Arriaga (and Hurtado),” 122, and the remark in Courtine, “La doc-
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qualification ‘only’ suggests that real being (that is, being which exists outside of
the mind) is (onto)logically prior to being of reason (that is, the mental repre-
sentation of it). For our purpose, this definition raises two questions. The first
concerns the inclusion of ens rationis in metaphysics, the second, which we will
see in Section 1.3, concerns the ontological status of ens rationis.
Scotus held, with the majority of the scholastics, that beings of reason are
the subject of logic, not of metaphysics, because metaphysics is a ‘real’ science.
As the existence of beings of reason consists of being thought of, they might be
said to exist “outside of the realm of real being.”51 It appears that Clauberg un-
derstands the distinction between ens rationis and ens reale as a distinction be-
tween qualifications of the same univocal concept of ‘being as intelligible’ and
that, since the latter is the subject matter of metaphysics, the former is also. Sim-
ilar views to Clauberg’s are held by Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, who included
ens rationis in the subject of metaphysics because it has objective being in the
intellect and because it is intelligible.52 However, it cannot be the foundation of
the unity of metaphysics, precisely because of its mental status, which is incom-
patible with metaphysics understood as a real science in the Aristotelian sense,
that is, a science about extra-mental reality. Therefore, the foundational role is
reserved for God.53 For Punch and Mastri, who were otherwise quite happy to
disagree on many issues, the subject of metaphysics cannot be a concept univo-
cally predicable of being of reason and real being, and being of reason should
always be understood in relation to real being. So much so, Mandrella concludes,
that Mastri is ready to abandon the view, a minority position among the Scotists
anyway, of the univocity of mental and real being rather than to abandon the
conception of metaphysics as a ‘real’ science.54 However, Mastri also “insists,”
against Peter Auriol, that “this concept [of being] does correspond with some
real ratio that all entities have in common.”55
For Hurtado, ens rationis cannot ground the unity of metaphysics because
it is produced by the intellect, which makes it esse secundum quid, not esse reale.
This argument raises a problem for the status of the ens communissime sump-
trine cartésienne,” 261: “La position commune de Thomas et de l’École thomiste était que l’être
objectif, bien loin d’être un être réel, n’est qu’un ens rationis.”
51 Novotný, “Prolegomena to a Study of Being of Reason,” 126.
52 Hurtado, Universa philosophia, Disputationes metaphysicae disp. I, sectio 2, subs. I, n. 52,
701: “hic actus, ens rationis habet esse obiective tantum in intellectu, est metaphysicus”; and
ibid., n. 53, 701: “quia ens rationis non solum secundum extrema realia quae connotat, sed
etiam secundum rationem chymaericam quam essentialiter includit, est cognoscibile.” Cf. also
footnote 53.
53 Mandrella, “Le sujet de la métaphysique,” 128, 133-34.
54 Mandrella, “Le sujet de la métaphysique,” 136, 138.
55 Andersen, “What is Metaphysics in Baroque Scotism?,” 53.
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tum, which includes both the mental and the real.56 Discussing Mastri, Marco
Forlivesi wrote that “the nature of being common to God and creatures […] is
not a true genus; it is merely an inadequate concept […] which is only con-
ceived of as something common by way of the work of the intellect.”57 Forlivesi
also noted that “Mastri rejects the doctrine of the Jesuit Nominalists, in particu-
lar that of Arriaga, for whom the transcendental being is a true genus, perfectly
univocal and produced substantially by the activity of the mind.”58 A related
problem lies in the fact that the latitude of ens rationis seems to be broader than
that of ens reale,59 because the scholastics usually attributed priority to real be-
ing. Savini argued that Clauberg saw no problem in prioritizing mental being,
and that this grounds the view that “every real being has, in principle, an objec-
tive being, that is, it can be thought of or said.”60
At the close of Section II Clauberg introduces the concept of ‘objective be-
ing’ (esse objectivum): all being has some esse, which is grounded in the princi-
ple that existence follows from essence.61 The ‘objective being’ of being is the
same as ‘being known’ (esse cognitum) of being: the kind of being attributed to
something in the mind “is attributed to it insofar as [something] is made an
object by and for the intellect.”62 This brings us to the discussion of being as
‘aliquid.’
1.3 Section III: Being as “Aliquid” (or ens positivum)
Everything in the mind has esse objectivum. If the concept which exists in the
mind “does not imply any contradiction in our thoughts,” then esse reale is also
attributed to it.63 At this point one would expect the argument that mental be-
ings and real beings are different in virtue of the attribution of external or mind-
independent existence to the latter. But Clauberg takes an unexpected direction.
Aliquid is “that which exists not only if it is thought of by a mind, or if it can be
56 Mandrella, “Le sujet de la métaphysique,” 124-25.

57 Forlivesi, “The Nature of Transcendental Being,” 263.
58 Forlivesi, “The Nature of Transcendental Beings,” 337. Notice, perhaps, a similarity with
Clauberg here.
59 Mandrella, “Le sujet de la métaphysique,” 139.
61 Clauberg, MdE II.15, 3: “omne ens habet aliquod esse,” and MdE VI.79, 18: “essentiam
involvi in conceptu existentiae.”
62 Clauberg, MdE II.16, 4: “Hoc esse quod ei tribuitur, quatenus intellectui objicitur & ab eo
cognoscitur, vocatur Esse objectivum seu esse cognitum Entis.”
63 Clauberg, MdE III.18, 4: “Si illud, de quo cogitamus, nullam involvit in cogitatione nostra
repugnantiam […] tunc ei non modo esse objectivum, verum etiam esse reale attribuimus, nec
solum νοητὸν, intelligibile, sed etiam ἐτὸν, reale quid & proprie Aliquid, τί, ichts / etwas appel-
lamus.”
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thought of by a mind, but also if it exists especially in another way,” and “our
thoughts are indeed something.” The reason adduced is that some thoughts exist
only if we think of them but some other thoughts exist even if we do not think of
them. Therefore, “they have real being, even if they do not have objective be-
ing.”64 The internalist axiom is introduced that:
for [the definition of] reality, it suffices that something could be, even if it does not actu-
ally exist. […] We always claim that a rose and snow are something when we attend [in
our minds] to their respective nature, properties, and operations, even if we would deny
that a rose exists in winter, and snow in summer.65
Clauberg underlines his position that potential, not actual, existence is the crite-
rion for reality with a reference to Ecclesiastes: “To every thing there is a sea-
son.”66 Next, Clauberg discusses the relation between objective being in the mind
and the knowing mind. The reference to the workings of the mind is always in
active terms: the mind “efficit” (“brings about, effects, produces”) an idea and
thus places something (aliquid), some positive being in the mind.67 The mind
does not merely receive the species of the known object, nor does it merely ab-
stract the concept of the known thing from sense data. Rather, the mind makes
the known thing into an object (“objicitur”) and produces (“efficit”) some posi-
tive being in the mind: “Thinking clearly places something in the thinking mind.
There is something positive in the mind.”68
As we have seen above, Scotus is mentioned only once in MdE, approving-
ly, on haecceitas along with Aristotle, who is praised for attributing primacy to
individual substances.69 This passing reference reminds us of the importance of
inductio metaphysica and perceptio mentis in Clauberg, for both have individual
substances as their first objects. However, the reference to Scotus in De cogni-
64 Clauberg, MdE III.19, 4: “Aliquid igitur est, quod non tantum mente cogitatur vel cogi-
tari potest, sed alio praeterea modo est aut certe esse potest […] Nempe cogitationes nostrae
sunt revera aliquid. […] habent esse reale, etiamsi non habent esse objectivum.”
65 Clauberg, MdE III.21, 5: “Axioma: ad realitatem sufficit, ut quid esse possit, licet revera
non existat. […] Sic rosam et nivem semper aliquid esse affirmamus, dum utriusque rei natu-
ram, proprietates & operationes attendimus, licet illam hiberno, hanc aestivo tempore existere
negemus.”
66 Clauberg, MdE, III.21, 5: “Nam omnia tempus habent.” Cf. Ecclesiastes 3:1, King James
Version: “To every thing there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven.”
67 Clauberg, MdE III.23, 5.
68 Clauberg, MdE, III.23, 5: “At cogitatio utique ponit aliquid in mente cogitante. Est enim
positivum quid in mente.”
69 Cf. footnote 10 and Tropia, “Suárez as a Scotist,” 96: Scotus and Suárez disagree with
Aristotle that the intellect is concerned with universals, not individuals; according to Scotus,
“the intellect, owing to its nobility, is indeed able to know what the senses are able to know,
and in a superior way.”
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tione Dei et nostri is more important to our analysis, as Clauberg ascribes, albeit
indirectly, the view that mental content is a real being to Scotus himself:
Hence, Zabarella proceeds in this way: I entirely subscribe to this opinion of Scotus, that
I believe that not only those [first] intentions which are outside of the soul in the medi-
um of the senses, but also that those which are in the soul [second intentions], are some-
thing, and that they are things.70
The attribution to esse objectivum of the ontological status of a real being, or at

least some sort of ‘thin’ existence, is traditionally associated with Scotism. Cross
has recently argued that while Scotus first endorsed the view that esse intelligibile
is a kind of (thin) existence, he later rejected the view and reduced all mental
content to real representational object.71 Scotus maintained, though, a “tendency
to speak as though he wants to reify esse intelligibile.”72 This tendency might help
explain why this view has been associated with the long Scotist tradition, by
friends and adversaries alike. One such adversary was Tommaso de Vio Cajetan,
who ascribes to Scotus the view that being known or represented is a certain
being, a being secundum quid, and that such a being is enough to be the termi-
nus of a relation.73 Famously, Descartes would apply the principle of causality to
ideas in the mind. According to Courtine, this application by Descartes was pos-
sible also thanks to the attribution of quasi-reality to objective being in the Sco-
tist school.74 The scholarly consensus is that the Scotist tradition influenced sev-
eral important aspects of Descartes’s thought,75 and realitas objectiva was
discussed well before Descartes used the term in the Meditations.76 While the
scholastic background of Descartes is fairly well know, more research on the ear-
ly modern scholastic sources of Clauberg’s ontology is desirable. An intriguing
direction of research is suggested by Isabelle Mandrella who reports that Pedro
70 Clauberg, De cognitione Dei et nostri, Exercitatio XV.16, 75: “Unde sic pergit Zabarella:
Huic sententiae Scoti ego omnino subscribo, non solum enim illas intentiones, quae extra ani-
mam sunt in medio sensus, sed etiam eas quae sunt in anima, puto esse aliquid, et esse res.”
71 Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 151, making the point that the real structure of
the act explains its semantic features.
73 Cajetan, Commentaria in pars prima Summae theologiae, q. 14, art. 5, 175a: “Scotus […]
putat quod esse cognitum, repraesentatum […] est esse quoddam distinctum contra esse in
rerum natura. Non tamen est, apud eum, esse essentiae, sed potius esse secundum quid et
essentiae et existentiae rerum. Nec putat tale esse esse relativum, sed absolutum: secundum
quid tamen, et fundans relationem.” Cf. Courtine, “La doctrine cartésienne de l’idée,” 261-62.
74 Courtine, “La doctrine cartésienne de l’idée,” 264.
75 On Clauberg, Savini, Methodus cartesiana, 245.
76 Marrone, “Descartes e la tradizione scotista.” Especially by the fourteenth-century Scotist
Johannes Canonicus (alias for Francesc Marbres), in Quaestiones super octo libros Physicorum
(printed several times during the Renaissance). Cf. Schabel, “Francesc Marbres.”
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da Fonseca rejects the position of some, unnamed, “recentiores” who believe that
such supertranscendental concepts (“supertranscendentia”) as “cogitabile, opin-
abile, apprehensibile” should be assumed in addition to the traditional list of
transcendentals.77 Chronological reasons alone make it impossible that Fonseca
was referring to the Schulmetaphysik, when he wrote the Institutionum dialecti-
carum (editio princeps 1564). The similarity between the views defended by
these unnamed authors and the Schulmetaphysik suggests, however, that the au-
thors that Fonseca had in mind might be part of the wider background of the
Schulmetaphysik.
1.4 Concerning ens reale
As a conclusion to this Section. In MdE, the most general, immediate and proper
concept of being is ‘intelligible.’ When apprehended by a mind, being is ens ra-
tionis, and has esse objectivum, which is the same as esse cognitum. This is fur-
ther qualified as aliquid, or ens reale, when the mind perceives no contradiction
in the concept of a known thing. Interestingly though, ens reale seems to be a
qualification of ens rationis and not only indicate extra-mental things. Therefore,
ideas (when a mind is not thinking of them) and substances are equally entia
realia because non-contradiction suffices for realitas. Clauberg is committed to
the realitas of mental content. The scholastics would distinguish between the
mental act as a quality or accident of the thinking mind (its ‘subjective’ being)
and the mental content as referential (its ‘objective’ being). Descartes would
speak of the formal and material aspects of an idea. Interestingly, Clauberg does
not invoke this distinction here, as he does elsewhere.78 Insofar as a mind thinks
of it, mental content which does not exist extra-mentally, such as a contradic-
tion, also exists in the mind as ens reale, ‘is’ something in the mind, and does
not just exist as a quality or an accident of the mind. How does Clauberg differ-
entiate between mental content which has an extra-mental correspondence, and
that which does not? In Section 2.2. I will discuss how this problem relates to
Clauberg’s Scotism and Cartesianism from the perspective of epistemological
idealism as an interpretative framework.
77 Mandrella, “Le sujet de la métaphysique,” 136.

78 Clauberg, De cognitione Dei et nostri, Exercitatio VI.6, 41–42. More on this passage be-
low in Section 2.2.
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2. MdE and Early Modern Idealism

Commentators have highlighted some tensions in Clauberg’s thought which are
usually regarded as either failures to integrate Cartesian insights into the ontolo-
gy of the Schulmetaphysik, or a fundamental incompatibility between the two. In
Section 2.1. I suggest that a reference to Scotist views sheds new, more positive
light on these supposed tensions, and that Clauberg received Scotist views differ-
ently from Descartes. In Section 2.2. I argue that a version of early modern epis-
temological idealism constitutes a helpful interpretative framework for MdE,
especially because of the way in which Clauberg inserted some Scotist views into
the interplay of Schulmetaphysik and Cartesianism.
2.1 An un-Cartesian Clauberg? Some Views

from Recent Literature
Carraud dismisses the ens ut intelligibile of the Schulmetaphysik as a “regression

in terms of inquiry, which always tends towards a greater simplification.”79 On
his view, Clauberg fails to appreciate what was a real problem for Suárez, namely
to demonstrate that the ratio entis is the same in the thing and in the mental
object,80 in order to fend off the threat of scepticism. To be sure, Clauberg’s fail-
ure is presented as even more regrettable because Descartes’s Meditations are
structured precisely around solving this very question: how my mental represen-
tation can be epistemically reliable. Savini similarly argues that Clauberg “cannot
bring [him]self to grasp the difference (which is paramount for Descartes’s epis-
temology) between considering things qua existing and considering things qua
subjected to the regard of the mind,” therefore hollowing out the radicality of
metaphysical doubt.81 Savini ascribes this failure to the fact that for Clauberg
beingness is a constant reference, and arguably a conceptual limit vis-à-vis Des-
79 Carraud, “L’ontologie peut-elle être cartésienne?,” 19: “une régression problématique,

tendant toujours vers la plus grand facilité.”
80 Carraud, “L’ontologie peut-elle être cartésienne?,” 19: “Mais ce qui constituait encore
cependant un véritable problème pour Suarez, à savoir la nécessité de montrer que la ratio entis
est la même dans la chose et dans l’ôbjet, Clauberg n’en voit même plus la difficulté.” Perhaps
Carraud is referring to Suárez, Disputationes metaphysicae, disp. 2, sect. 4, on the ratio entis,
and to disp. 54 on ens rationis.
81 Savini, Methodus cartesiana, 298: “la philosophie claubergienne est toujours mesurée par
la référence à l’étantité et ainsi elle n’arrive pas à saisir la différence, capitale pour l’épistemolo-
gie cartésienne, entre la considération des choses en tant qu’existantes et la considération des
choses en tant que soumises au regard de la mens. Ainsi, chez Clauberg, la question du rapport
entre évidence et vérité n’est jamais vraiment abordée, et le doute métaphysique perd toute sa
radicalité.”
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cartes.82 If these interpretations are correct and the ontology of the Schulmeta-
physik is somehow residual in Clauberg’s thought, or is even an obstacle for his
Cartesianism, they do not explain, however, why Clauberg always maintained
ontology at the center of his philosophy. Perhaps Clauberg should not be read
mainly through the prism of his Cartesian credentials.
Critical remarks have been raised also about the epistemological role of re-
alitas objectiva and esse objectivum, two notions which originated in the Scotist
tradition. Betraying a preference for a Thomist position, Courtine argues that
these concepts produce in Descartes what he calls a “skeptical de-realization” of
the known thing.83 The ens cognitum is now, says Courtine, “a real thing, a men-
tal thing first” and “not anymore a medium which gives access to the world (and
one has to clarify from now on, quite surprinsingly to be honest, ‘external
world’).”84 This view is deemed skeptical because if esse cognitum is a mental
thing, and not just a mode of being of the known thing, then a third entity slides
in between knower and known object. For Aristotle, as Courtine contends,
“there is no room for the reality of my representation which would slide in be-
tween the form of the object and the form of the act by which I think of [the
form of the object].”85 So, the esse objectivum of the Scotist tradition adopted by
Descartes and Clauberg would be a threat to (scholastic) realism. Expressions
such as the ‘veil of ideas’ or ‘veil of perception’ used to describe John Locke’s
ideal theory make sense only if one accepts the view, quite characteristic of early
modern epistemology, that an idea is different from the thing it represents. An-
other consequence of such a “de-realization” is that the realitas of the object
could be defined in terms of mental-dependent existence rather than extra-men-
tal existence.
Specific early modern views can be regarded as developments of some Sco-
tist views, even as they indicate a departure from the scholastic epistemological
framework. There is evidence that for Clauberg the rejection of the scholastic
epistemological framework in favour of Cartesianism did not necessarily lead to
the rejection of all Scotist concepts. A possible affinity with Scotus is raised by
82 For Clauberg’s “misunderstandings” of Descartes, see Courtine, “La doctrine cartésienne

de l’idée,” 263, on the application of principle of causality to esse objectivum; and Carraud,
“L’ontologie peut-elle être cartésienne?,” 27, on God as causa sui, causality as a universal prin-
ciple of intelligibility, the incompatibility of mathesis universalis and ens in quantum ens, and
the presumption to build a universal science without the Cogito.
83 Courtine, “La doctrine cartésienne de l’idée,” 264.
84 Ibid.: “une telle déréalisation sceptique aboutit à faire de l’esse cognitum non plus un
medium donnat accès au monde (et il faut préciser désormais, de manière à vrai dire sur-
prenante, au ‘monde extérieur’), mais une véritable chose, chose mentale d’abord.”
85 Courtine, “La doctrine cartésienne de l’idée,” 252: dans “la phénoménologie aristotélici-
enne […] Il n’y a donc aucune place pour la réalité de ma représentation qui viendrait se
glisser entre la forme de l’objet et celle de l’acte par lequel je la pense.”
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Cross’s argument that Scotus himself was in some cases at a distance from main-
stream scholasticism. The “Aristotelian” position is captured as follows:
Aristotelians think of the form that is received [in the intellect] as in some sense the
same as the form of the extramental object. […] The appeal of the Aristotelian view is
that it provides an obvious way for explaining how it is that a cognitive act is about an
object: intentionality is grounded in the sameness of the real form and the intentional
form.86
Cross contends that “Scotus […] argues rather differently. Basically, he claims
that thoughts are wholly distinct from their objects, and are such that they are
measured by them.”87 This also applies to cognitive acts which lack an object.
Scotus, therefore, did not believe in the “scholastic notion of animal reception of
a form, or ‘formal sameness’ of knower and known.”88 Finally, “whatever inten-
tionality is [for Scotus], it cannot depend on a real causal connection with an
extramental object.”89 Spruit has noted Clauberg’s similarity to the medieval
scholastics who “opposed the naturalistic strand of Aristotelian philosophy” and
“were critical of the species doctrine.”90 We should notice, of course, that Scotus
was not among those who rejected the doctrine of intelligible species.91
This brief literature survey has shown that Carraud, Courtine and Savini
offer the image of a rather un-Cartesian Clauberg, who does not discuss the cor-
respondence theory of ideas, skepticism, the application of causality to ideas,
God’s veracity and the intentionality of ideas. There is also the possibility that
when Clauberg distanced himself from Descartes he was – in some cases, and
perhaps unknowingly – drawing closer to some aspects of Scotus’s theory of
cognition. My suggestion is, therefore, that Clauberg could have found concep-
tual resources in Scotism even as he rejected some central scholastic tenets. This
survey has raised the question of why Clauberg interpreted Descartes the way he
did, and of a better sense of the place of ontology in his thought. And also, as
Carraud complained, of why Clauberg did not understand any longer why estab-
lishing the identiy of thing and object was a real philosophical problem for
Suárez and Descartes.

87 Ibid.
90 Spruit, “Perceptual Knowledge,” 82.
91 Cf., e. g., Marina Fedeli’s contribution to this present volume.
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2.2 Epistemological Idealism as an Interpretative Framework
In the eighteenth century, the Scottish Common Sense philosophers took on the
skeptical challenge to realism which, in their opinion, was inseparable from the
theory of ideas inherited from Descartes and John Locke. This was, in turn,
pushed to idealist consequences by George Berkeley, and reproposed in a New-
tonian framework by David Hume. Hence, the programmatic defense of ‘com-
mon sense’ argued for the direct realist view that we know external objects di-
rectly. The Common Sense school became the hallmark of Enlightenment
Scottish philosophy - and almost a synonym of Scottish philosophy tout court.
Initiated in its own right as a reaction to a perceived skeptical challenge, it was
not before long that the Common Sense school met its own counter-reaction.
The nineteenth-century Scottish idealist James Frederik Ferrier argued that the
same skeptical challenge inherent in Lockean and Humean versions of the theo-
ry of ideas is still present in Common Sense philosophy. It has simply shifted
position: while for Thomas Reid the aim was to demonstrate that ideas put us
directly in touch with the external object (an eighteenth-century formulation of
the scholastic realism), Ferrier retorted that, by positing a thing external to the
mind, and by speaking of ‘ideas in the mind’ realism ipso facto also posited an
epistemic gap between mind and object. The gaps between mind, idea and object
could be narrowed down only by assuming further intermediate entities, thus
compounding the same problem ad infinitum. So, Ferrier contends, “Idealism is
true Realism” because idealism as perception “steers clear of all the perplexities
of representationism; for it gives us in perception only one, that is, only a proxi-
mate object.”92
The association of Clauberg with idealism has been suggested before. In his
article “Berkeley et les métaphysiques de son temps,” Jean-Christophe Bardout
does not argue for an idealist interpretation of Clauberg, but makes the case for
his importance in the metaphysical tradition “from Descartes to Malebranche,”
which influenced Berkeley’s famous view that esse est percipi.93 Berkeley criti-
cized traditional (scholastic) metaphysics as an abstract exercise resulting in an
abuse of language and disregard for experience. He rejected a general concept of
being as the starting point of metaphysics, as well as the Aristotelian concept of
substance and Descartes’s ideas of God and the self.94 For Berkeley, a general
concept of being obtained by abstraction is, in Bardout’s words, “incompatible
with sensible knowledge,” makes matter unknowable and is ultimately “inca-
92 McDermid, “Ferrier and the Myth of Scottish Common Sense Realism,” 104. Hence, the
“myth” that the Scottish Common Sense school answered the skeptical challenge.
93 Bardout, “Berkeley et les métaphysiques de son temps,” 123.
94 Bardout, “Berkeley et les métaphysiques de son temps,” 119, 121.
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pable of providing us with any real knowledge of the object.”95 Finally, the view
that matter exists only as the concept we have of it characterizes Berkeley’s ide-
alism as ‘ontological.’ What is the role of Clauberg? The “strict equivalence of
being and [being] perceived” proposed by Clauberg is fundamental, for it indi-
cates that what exists is such insofar as it is, or can be, perceived.96 This notion
of perception is indebted to Descartes, and equivalent to cogitatio. Like Carraud,
Bardout ascribes to Clauberg the traditional view that the univocal concept of
being is obtained by abstraction. The supporting text is MdE II.10, 2, where,
however, Clauberg makes no reference to ‘abstraction.’ The first and most gen-
eral concept of being is said to be “apprehended” by the mind.97
The reader will forgive this detour ahead in time, since it helps us draw
attention to what modern idealists regarded as their strengths as well as the
weaknesses of their opponents. Berkeley and Ferrier believe that the content of
‘perception’ is all that the mind knows, and can know. Idealism alone avoids
skeptical consequences and, in Ferrier’s words, is ‘true’ realism. Against a “real-
ist definition of a thing as existing outside a mind,” Berkeley seeks to “define a
thing in terms of its perceptibility.”98 Berkeley and Ferrier are ontological ideal-
ists for they reduce all existence to the existence of minds and of their mental
content. Berkeley famously denied the mind-independent existence of matter.
Epistemological idealism is the view that, while mind-independent reality is ac-
cepted, all that can be known about it is a product of the creative and construc-
tive power of the mind.99 In the remainder of this paper, I show how a version of
epistemological idealism can be a helpful interpretative framework for Clau-
berg’s ontology, and how it can help situate Clauberg at once within and beyond
scholasticism and Cartesianism. The discussion will center on Clauberg’s theory
95 Bardout, “Berkeley et les métaphysiques de son temps,” 124: “Une telle abstraction exclut
donc la connaissance sensible, mais bannit aussi (ce qu’il nous faudra garder à l’esprit) la con-
sidération de la matière.” Abstraction is “incapable de nous procurer aucune véritable connais-
sance d’objet.”
96 Bardout, “Berkeley et les métaphysiques de son temps,” 127: “l’étant reste en premier lieu
objet d’un concept général, obtenu par abstraction de toute détermination particulière; mais
un pas essentiel ne s’en trouve pas moins franchi, avec cette mise en équivalence de l’étant et
du perçu. Il ne s’agit plus simplement de dire que l’étant peut être perçu, mais que ce qui est est
tel en tant qu’il est perçu, ou peut l’être.”
97 Clauberg, MdE, II.10, 2: “Entis ita spectati conceptus primus est seu generalissimus &
summus, quoniam supra illud genus nullum possumus apprehendere. Nam eo ipso quo quid
apprehendimus, jam est intelligibile.”
98 Bardout, “Berkeley et les métaphysiques de son temps,” 129: “La réalité (realitas), enten-
dons le fait d’avoir le statut de chose, se décide et se mesure donc au fait de pouvoir être pensé,
de se faire l’objet d’un entendement quelconque. […] La démarche berkeleyenne, par sa logi-
que propre, aboutit à définir la chose par sa perceptibilité, à l’encontre de ce que nous pour-
rions nommer une définition réaliste de la chose existant hors d’un esprit.”
99 See Guyer and Horstmann, art. “Idealism” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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of ideas, especially the status of mental content and the assumption that the
mind produces its content in some relevant sense.
The discussion can resume from where we left it in Section 1.4 with the
question of how Clauberg could differentiate between mental content which cor-
responds to an extra-mental object, and that which does not. In MdE II.16, 4, a
being which is cognitum by a mind has esse objectivum. Further, esse reale is
attributed to it if the mind finds no contradiction in it, and thus it is an aliquid, a
ἐτὸν, not only a νοητὸν (MdE, III.18, 4). The definition of Aliquid in MdE
III.19, 4, is not restricted to mental dependence: “that which exists not only if it
is thought of by a mind, or if it can be thought of by a mind, but also if it exists
especially in another way or it can exist in a certain way.” As we have seen
above, aliquid can exist in the mind as well as outside of the mind.100 This in-
cludes our thoughts because we can, at any other moment, think of them again,
even if we are not presently thinking that we are thinking of them. When we do
not think of them, our thoughts have real being but not objective being.101 In a
Cartesian fashion, Clauberg gives an internalist account of mental content and
has yet to discuss mind-independent reality, the existence of which, to be sure,
he does not deny. Extra-mental reality is either material and immaterial sub-
stances, or thoughts presently not thought by any mind. Regarding the latter,
Savini has argued that Clauberg’s theory of ideas bears the influence of the “ex-
emplarism” of his teacher Konrad Berg, and the belief that ideas have a greater
perfection than the things they represent because of their divinity and immateri-
ality. In light of these neoplatonic tendencies Clauberg reinforced Descartes’s
concept of objective reality and included objective being into ontology.102 To be
sure, Clauberg does not claim that such exemplars are in the divine mind, nor
that the finite mind thinks in the divine mind or by means of ideas supplied by
the divine mind,103 especially because of the active power of the mind. Perhaps
such ideas are best regarded as the truth-makers of both divine and human
ideas, some sort of a third exemplary entity.
100 Clauberg, MdE III.19, 4: “Aliquid igitur est, quod non tantum mente cogitatur vel cogi-
tari potest, sed alio praeterea modo est aut certe esse potest: sive in mundo, ut omnes res cor-
poreae, adeoque ipsa mens & mundus universus.”
101 Ibid.: “Nempe cogitationes nostrae sunt revera aliquid, quia etiamsi non cogitemus nos
cogitare, certum tamen est, nos interim posse cogitare.”
102 Savini, Methodus cartesiana, 243-44.
103 See Clauberg, MdE XXIII, 84-86. Cf. Bardout, “Clauberg et Malebranche,” on possible
conceptual affinities between Clauberg and Malebranche concerning the vision in God and
ideas as the object of metaphysics.
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Aliquid is a real being in nature and is “capable of being apprehended by a

positive or affirmative concept of a mind” but is not (the same as) substance.104
Because of the attribution of realitas to both thoughts (aliquid in the mind) and
things (extra-mental aliquid), the formulation of a clear distinction between
them - which is arguably a starting assumption among the scholastics and Des-
cartes - arrives somewhat late in MdE. As the third significatio of being, sub-
stance participates in the essence of the previous two as an aliquid intelligibile.
But since not every aliquid intelligibile is a substance, further qualifications are
needed to get to ‘substance.’ Substantia is finally introduced in MdE IV.44, 10, as
“that which exists in such a way that is fitting of a subject which would lack
nothing for its existence.”105 Now, what is the difference between (our percep-
tion of) aliquid and substantia? In MdE, Clauberg simply appeals to ordinary
language uses: “when we want to speak about the existence of a thing, we say:
est, deest, invenitur, datur, ponitur in rerum natura, occurrit, reperitur, exstat.”106
It is a matter of fact, so to speak, that something exists empirically outside of the
mind. Presumably, some Cartesian-like clear and distinct feature of mental con-
tent would qualify a given mental content as representational, and a perceived
thing as existing extra-mentally. Consequently, and as if answering a predictable
objection, Clauberg makes it also clear that:
to think about something, and to represent it in our mind, does not change anything in
things, that is, to speak in a barbaric way with the scholastics, the objective being of a
thing does not add anything to or subtract anything from the reality of that thing.107
The mental perception does not change anything in things because it is an im-
manent operation. By ‘change’ (mutat) Clauberg simply means that perception
does not ‘place’ (ponit) anything in things,108 not that the mind is a mere passive
receiver of external stimuli. Concepts or ideas are also discussed in De cognitione
Dei et nostri, Exercitatio VI. There, Clauberg introduces a twofold dependence:
from the intellect which does the thinking, insofar as the concepts are its opera-
tion; and from the thing thought, insofar as concepts are representations or im-
ages of things.109 Clauberg dismisses both the Thomists’s formal likeness and the
104 Clauberg, MdE III.20, 5: “Et quoniam sic omne illud, quod Aliquid est, aut revera aut
saltem virtute ponitur extra nihilum in natura, […] sua natura aptum est positivo seu affirma-
tivo mentis conceptu apprehendi.”
105 Clauberg, MdE IV.44, 10: “Re[s] quae ita existit, ut aliquo ad existendum subjecto non
indigeat.” Notice also the definition in MdE I.4, 1: “quod per se existit.”
106 Clauberg, MdE VI.77, 18. My emphasis. I have chosen not to translate Latin terms.
107 Clauberg, MdE III.22, 5: “Cogitatio in rebus nihil mutat, quod scholastice, hoc est, bar-
bare sic diceret alius: esse rei objectivum neque dat neque adimit ullam ipsi realitatem.”
108 Cf. footnote 68.
109 Clauberg, De cognitione Dei et nostri, Exercitatio VI.9, 42: “conceptum seu ideam omnem
habere duplicem dependentiam, unam a concipiente sive cogitante intellectu, quatenus eius
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Scotists’s virtual likeness in favour of a version of representationalism. While the

representational content of ideas depends on external things, this depencence
should not be understood in causal terms for Clauberg “endorsed neither a
strictly Cartesian innatism of ideas, nor did he claim that ideas [of material sub-
stances] come from perception.”110 If ideas are neither innate to a mind, nor
(entirely) derived from perceptual experience, a middle way seems to present
itself: ideas are derived representatively as well as modified in relevant ways by
the fact of being known. In Exercitatio VI we are told that the known thing is
“reduced” to its efficient cause, the intellect.111 In MdE II.16, 4, we are told that
the mind objicit and efficit, that it attributes esse to a being insofar as it is known
by a mind, and that the process of knowing is one of “objectification,” of “mak-
ing a being into an object” by the activity of a mind. Here, esse objectivum does
not only indicate representational content but also, crucially, the fact of being
known by a mind: “esse objectivum seu esse cognitum Entis.” Clauberg conflates,
in a Cartesian fashion, representation and content in the activity of the mind.112
In Clauberg, as in Descartes, “the last remaining thread uniting signification to
causality through the species is now broken,” thus rebalancing signification en-
tirely on the side of esse objectivum.113 Extra-mental things exist also “when no
one thinks of [them],”114 but through the act of perception, the mind places
something in itself through which alone extra-mental things are known.
This mental activism brings us to the fate of some concepts of Scotist legacy
in Clauberg. The first is ens deminutum. Perler has described the Scotist view as
follows: “one does not establish a cognitive relationship with an existing thing,
but rather with something produced by the intellect which, in contrast to a real
being, is an intelligible being (esse intelligibile).”115 Ens deminutum is meant to
indicate the entire thing, which exists externally, as it is considered as existing
“in a certain respect” (secundum quid).116 This view is also reflected in Des-
cartes’s idea objectively in the mind, but Clauberg, as we have seen, does not
operatio est; alteram a re concepta aut simili, cujus scilicet repraesentatio sive imago est.” Clau-
berg cites an answer to Scotus by the Scotist Franciscus Lichetus (1450/75-1520) on mental
images as reported in Scheibler, Metaphysica I, cap. 24, n. 89, 378.
110 Spruit, “Perceptual Knowledge,” 82.
111 Clauberg, De cognitione Dei et nostri, Exercitatio VI.10, 42: “intellectum esse causam
conceptus efficientem, uti operans suae operationis causa est; rem vero conceptam […] esse
causam conceptus exemplarem (quae quidem etiam ad efficientem reducitur).”
112 Spruit, “Perceptual Knowledge,” 77: “ideas are mental items with representational con-
tent.”
113 Ibid.; cf. also Savini, Methodus cartesiana, 255-56: “avec Clauberg (à la suite de Des-
cartes) le dernier fil qui unissait la signification à la causalité en vertu de l’espèce est rompu.”
114 Clauberg, MdE I.4, 1: “nemine etiam cogitante.”
115 Perler, “What Am I Thinking About?,” 74.
116 Perler, “What Am I Thinking About?,” 75.
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think in terms of the distinction between ens rationis and ens reale, and of an-
swering the skeptical challenge. Clauberg develops the notion of ens deminutum
into an ontologically ‘thick’ entity in the mind. Inasmuch as the Scotist ens
deminutum is a kind of existence secundum quid, then all substances in MdE
could be regarded as having, in some sense, existence secundum quid. If my in-
terpretation is correct, Clauberg holds the representationalist view that the mind
is in a cognitive relation with a mental product, rather than directly with an ex-
ternal thing.117
The second is the univocal concept of being. Being is defined relationally in
terms of intelligibility to a mind, and knowing is presented as an activity of ob-
jectification by a mind. Everything which is known appears to be a qualification
of the univocal concept of being presented in MdE I. That the univocal concept
of being is obtained by perception on the model of Descartes, and not by abs-
traction, might at first suggest passivity on the mind’s side. But we have seen
that this is not the case, because perception is understood as an activity of the
mind and not as a reception of some external content.118 My first suggestion is
that univocity of being constitutes an important, and overlooked, conceptual re-
source in Clauberg’s version of Cartesian philosophy. The univocal concept of
being is perceived immediately in things, so, in this sense, all known things share
in at least one essential feature: being. In all things such a univocal concept of
being has the two principal meanings as intelligible and something (substance
being the third meaning, but not all things are substances as well). Thus, this
concept supplies Clauberg with an object of knowledge which is formally and
materially one, neutral and universal, essential to all things which are known and
knowable. The second suggestion is that, in keeping with Clauberg’s cognitive
theory, the univocal concept of being too is a product of the activity of the mind.
This concept of being arguably complements the two main achievements of Des-
cartes’s philosophy: the acquisition of an individual knowing principle and epis-
temological starting point, the Cogito, and the method of ordering the known
substances, the mathesis universalis. Clauberg’s understanding of being qua uni-
vocal would provide ontological rooting to the perceptions of a Cartesian mind.
What sort of ‘ontological rooting’ is still available to Clauberg? Quite
tellingly Carraud has spoken of the “destruction of ousia” and of the “un-doing
of things” because of, jointly, the attribution of realitas objectiva to substance,
117 Cf. Spruit, “Perceptual Knowledge,” 85: for Clauberg ideas are not a “tertium quid” and
he “does not subscribe to a representational view of cognition in the strict sense in which ideas
are seen as cognitive objects.” However, Spruit, 93, notes that Clauberg “seem[s] to endorse a
representational view of perception” when discussing Descartes.
118 See also Clauberg, Ars etymologica Teutonum, 6 and 9, where perceptio is equated with
the active essence of the human mind. Cf. Gellera, “Clauberg and the Philosophy of German
Language,” 135.
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and possibility as the condition for realitas.119 For one thing, Clauberg holds that
truth consists in a correspondence between an object and its idea, but that the
idea is “formed” by the intellect.120 Unlike in adaequatio rei et intellectus, with an
internalist emphasis it is the object which conforms to our idea, not the other
way around. Nominally, Clauberg also maintains the traditional definition of
substance, so basic as to be unproblematic for Aristotelians and Cartesians alike,
which is based on (capacity for) independent existence. But there seems to be
little or no room in MdE for substance as ‘something which exists by itself’ -
with the exception, of course, of God and, perhaps, of immaterial substances.
After the definition of substance in MdE IV.44, 10, Clauberg covers more tradi-
tional metaphysical topics such as essence and existence, transcendentals, cause,
and disjunctive attributes. If looked from this perspective, this taxonomy could
be regarded as structured also by the acts of the knowing mind and not only by
the essential or absolute (that is, mind-independent) features of substances.
Whereas Timpler is credited with the “intellectualization” of ens ut cognitum by
an intellect, Clauberg operated a universal “semiotization” of ens ut cogitatum by
a mind: all being is potentially signified by a mind and, with a different empha-
sis, there is no perception which is not also endowed with signification.121
My suggestion is, therefore, that from the perspective of early modern epis-
temological idealism some first steps in the direction of a change of paradigm
might be detected in Clauberg’s ontology. Clauberg does not pursue a version of
idealism in any conscious way. He believes that the mind stands in a non-causal
relation of content-dependence with the external world, and ideas are sponta-
neously generated; that ideas are the proper object of cognition of the mind and
external things are known though the ideas; that ideas are real beings which the
mind produces; that all reality available to the mind is already intelligible and a
qualification of the univocal concept of being. These views, combined with a
marked “cognitive rooting” for ontology,122 internalism, and strong exemplarism
about ideas seem to suggest a tendency towards a version of epistemological ide-
alism. Whereas without extra-mental entities there are no ideas in a mind, with-
out a perceiving mind there are no ‘objects.’ Were finite minds to disappear, the
question arises of what would happen to the three senses of being as intelligibile,
aliquid and res - the three ways in which a finite mind perceives being and efficit
objective being. God needs not perceive being in the same way. My interpreta-
119 Carraud, “L’ontologie peut-elle être cartésienne?,” 24: “l’ontologie […] déchosifie la cho-
se en posant la réalité objective […] la destruction radicale de la doctrine de l’être de l’étant
comprise comme ousia.”
120 Clauberg, MdE IX.153, 35: “veritas cujusque in eo consistit, quod cum sua convenit idea,
quam de ea format intellectus.”
122 Bardout, “Berkeley et les métaphysiques,” 129: “enracinement cognitif.”
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tion might also go in the direction of explaining some of the tensions discussed
in Section 2.1. The epistemic structure of Descartes’ Meditations, which matches
out evidence and truth, mental and external reality, finds no place in MdE. Clau-
berg was not concerned with the potential skeptical consequences of under-
standing ens rationis as aliquid: if understood as anything more than emenda-
tion of the mind from error, skepticism seems to have no place in Clauberg’s
ontology. Arguably then, he was in no urgency, unlike Suárez and Descartes, to
demonstrate that the thing in the mind and the external thing are the same thing
because he understood truth as evidence to the mind.123
Conclusion: Latitudo Scotistarum

In this paper I have argued that some Scotist views play an important role in
Johannes Clauberg’s Metaphysica de Ente (1664). Scotism constitutes an impor-
tant, though indirect, conceptual background of Clauberg’s ontology, and is de-
rived from both the Schulmetaphysik and Cartesianism. Clauberg never declared
to be a Scotist and, in all probability, he was acquainted with Duns Scotus only
indirectly via other thinkers, in particular Scheibler and Zabarella. In MdE Clau-
berg only refers to haecceitas in passing, while in De cognitione Dei et nostri he
reports second-hand opinions about Scotus. However, in specific cases some
affinity with Scotist views can be established on a conceptual basis, as regards
univocity of being, univocity and analogy, univocity expressed post opus intellec-
tus, the objective reality of ideas, ens deminutum, common nature and degrees of
nature, the primacy of the individual, haecceitas, internalism, the implication of
essence and existence. That Clauberg never saw himself as actively contributing
to coeval Scotism might indicate why he did not regard as Scotist some Scotist
concepts he was clearly using to his own ends. In this sense, MdE bespeaks the
enduring, and often indirect, influence of Scotism, also beyond those Catholic
scholastic milieus which drove a Scotus renaissance in the seventeenth century,
as well as the latitude of Scotism, which could take on diverse and even conflict-
ing forms.
I have also made the separate claim that epistemological idealism provide a
helpful interpretative framework for some aspects of Clauberg’s metaphysics,
especially at the interplay of Scotist and Cartesian views. Rather than being a
‘minor’ Cartesian who misunderstood Descartes and who was limited by his on-
tological commitments, I have suggested that the use which Clauberg makes of
some Scotist concepts brings in important contributions to his synthesis of
Schulmetaphysik and Cartesianism. Clauberg’s metaphysics can be read from the
123 Knebel, “Scotists vs. Thomists,” 225, has spoken of “phenomenalism” as a consequence
of the act’s reification in theories of cognition, a process stimulated by the Scotist tradition.
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different perspectives of Schulmetaphysik, Cartesianism and Scotism, and does

not seem to entirely belong in any of them. Clauberg innovates the Schulmeta-
physik thanks to Cartesianism: Timpler’s being as ‘cognitum by an intellect’ be-
comes being as ‘cogitatum by a mind.’ But also, he complements Cartesian pro-
tology with a univocal concept of being. Whereas Descartes started from
particular, and not universal, beings such as minds, God, and external things,
Clauberg started with a logically and ontologically prior universal and univocal
concept of being. In so doing, he proposed a twofold beginning for philosophy:
the individual mind as cogitans and a univocal concept of being as cogitabile.
In the above, I have tried to take the recently renewed interest in Clauberg
one step further by showing that Clauberg’s original philosophy was far from
being just an attempt to introduce Cartesianism into scholasticism, and that his
use of some Scotist concepts is a testament to the importance, often unac-
knowledged, of the long Scotist tradition. A history of Clauberg’s legacy still has
to be written too.124 Clauberg should be regarded as a pivotal moment in the
conceptual developments which led to Ferrier’s provocative claim that ‘idealism
is true realism’ and to the shift from the opposition between realism/nominalism
of medieval thought to the opposition between realism/idealism of modern
thought.
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List of Contributors
Andersen, Claus A. (Catholic University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve)
Cross, Richard (Notre Dame University, South Bend)
Fedeli, Marina (University of Macerata)
Fiorentino, Francesco (Q. Orazio Flacco High School, Bari)
Gellera, Giovanni (University of Geneva)
Ginocchio, David González (International University of La Rioja, Logroño)
Heider, Daniel (University of South Bohemia, Budweis)
Huiban, Arthur (University of Geneva)
Novák, Lukáš (Charles University, Prague)
Park, Damian, O. F. M. (Boston College, Chestnut Hill)
Pich, Roberto Hofmeister (Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul,

Porto Alegre)
Pini, Giorgio (Fordham University, New York)
Tropia, Anna (Charles University, Prague)
Zahnd, Ueli (University of Geneva)
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Index of Names
Aho, Tuomo 194 Autrecourt, Nicholas of 245

Ailly, Peter of 245 Averroes 58, 67, 74
Alarcón, Diego de 281 Avicenna 19, 42 f., 51, 68, 71–74, 85, 244 f.,
Alejandro, José Maria 194 259, 304
Alliney, Guido 119, 122, 136, 231 f.
Alnwick, William of 12, 20, 22 f., 114–116, Baconthorpe, John 122
119, 122–139, 215–221, 227, 234 f., Bą k, Felix 14
237, 244, 256 f., 259, 375 Ballor, Jordan J. 333
Amerini, Fabrizio 231, 308 Balzamo, Nicolas 370, 381
Andersen, Claus A. 9, 12–15, 17 f., 21 f., 24, Báñez, Domingo 269, 338, 356
33, 41, 60, 65, 85, 143, 181, 229, 231, Bardout, Jean-Christophe 435–437, 441
234, 267, 271, 281, 289, 299–301, 318, Barker, Mark J. 34, 75
328, 334, 337 f., 345–348, 360, 393, 410, Bartlová, Milena 381
417, 420, 424, 427, 443 Bassol, John of 290, 336, 375
Andrews, Robert 9, 333 Baù, Antonio 178
Anfray, Jean-Pascal 334, 336, 349, 354, 357 Bayle, Pierre 178
Aquila, Peter of 122, 231, 248 f., 257, 259 f., Bazán, Carlos B. 186
376, 378, 382 Becker, Othmar 334–336
Aquinas, Thomas 19, 21, 34, 42 f., 47, 51, Belluto, Bonaventura 13, 15, 18 f., 33–37,
54, 68, 71, 74 f., 90, 92, 98, 101, 108, 43, 47–61, 67, 84–89, 143, 178, 271,
113 f., 146, 148, 178–181, 184, 186, 192, 299–301, 315, 329, 334–336, 339, 343,
206 f., 307, 320 f., 370–372, 379, 382, 349, 358
397, 419 f. Berkeley, George 435 f., 441
Aristotle 13, 16, 33, 35, 56 f., 69–71, 73, Bérubé, Camille 186, 232, 249
76 f., 106, 119, 145, 147 f., 152, 194, 197, Bianchi, Luca 178, 244
216, 220, 225, 229, 231, 233 f., 244, 246, Biel, Gabriel 11, 407, 409
248, 257, 287, 339, 350, 398 f., 403, 406, Bizer, Ernst 394
418–420, 429, 433 Black, Deborah 72–74
Arriaga, Rodrigo de 52 f., 85, 87, 90, 423, Boehner, Philotheus 153
426, 428 Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus 247,
Ascoli, James of 22 f., 211–215, 223, 227, 259, 353
233–235, 241, 256 f. Boland, Vivian 108
Ashworth, Elisabeth J. 18 Boler, John 410 f.
Aston, Margaret 381 Bolliger, Daniel 15, 25, 369 f.
Augustine of Hippo 76, 133, 233, 243, 245– Bonaventure of Bagnoregio 99, 370 f., 384 f.
248, 250, 256 f., 259, 373 Bonetus, Nicholas 12, 205
Aureol, Peter 143, 153, 230, 237 f., 257 f., Bos, Egbert P. 152, 156, 242 f.
260, 290, 299, 308, 374 f., 385, 388, 427 Boulnois, Olivier 127, 410, 412
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450 Index of Names
Brenet, Jean-Baptiste 58 Dinkelsbühl, Nicolas of 382

Briceño, Alfonso 23 f., 267–294 Dobicki, Jacek 381
Brower, Jeffrey E. 101, 113 d’Onofrio, Giulio 233
Brower-Toland, Susan 101, 113 Doyle, John P. 22, 272
Brown, Stephen F. 122, 143, 283 Drayton, Richard of 136
Brulefer, Stephan 25, 368–370, 384–388 Drummond, Ian 79, 410
Büttgen, Philippe 395 Duba, William O. 10, 205, 222, 226, 238,
349
Cabré Duran, Maria 13 Dumont, Richard 120
Cajetan, Thomas de Vio 57, 180, 356, 430 Dumont, Robert E. 181
Calcidius 245 Dumont, Stephen D. 119, 123, 134, 144,
Calvin, John 368 177, 283
Camporeale, Salvatore I. 401 Dunne, Michael 60
Candia, Peter of 231, 251–255, 257–260 Duns Scotus, John passim
Caramuel Lobkowitz, Juan 14 Dupasquier, Sebastian 337 f., 359
Carraud, Vincent 417, 419, 421–426, 432– Durand of St. Pourçain 122, 378–382, 384,
434, 436, 440 f. 386–388
Casalini, Cristiano 192 Dvořák, Petr 337, 359
Cenci, Márcio Paulo 267 f.
Cesalli, Laurent 143, 152, 155, 157 f., 160, Eberstein, Wilhelm Ludwig Gottlob Freiherr
162, 417 von 11
Céspedes Agüero, Víctor Santiago 267 Eck, Johannes 25, 349, 407–409
Chatton, Walter 237 Edwards, Michael 197
Chiappini, Aniceto 231 Engelschalk, Albertus 381
Cicero, Marcus Tullius 69, 405 f. Erasmus, Desiderius 395, 398
Clauberg, Johannes 25 f., 417–443 Essary, Kirk 398
Cochlaeus, Johannes 397 Etzi, Priamo 14
Coleman, Janet 249 Etzkorn, Girard J. 70–72, 128, 143
Cory Scarpelli, Therese 55 Eusterschulte, Anne 368
Courtenay, William 10, 12 Evans, Alyssa Lehr 407
Courtine, Jean-François 424, 426, 430,
433 f. Fabri, Filippo 13, 61 f., 336 f., 346 f., 359
Cross, Richard 12, 15–17, 22, 59, 66, 103, Falà, Jacopo Francesco 233
105, 111, 119–121, 128, 146, 149, 152, Farago, Cintia 333
234, 237, 268, 276, 347, 369, 378, 381, Fasolo, Girolamo 357–359
400, 403, 410–412, 422 f., 430, 434 Fedeli, Marina 12, 20, 233, 434
Ferrier, James Frederik 435 f., 443
Daguí, Pere 22 Fiorentino, Francesco 12 f., 22 f., 119, 123,
Dandini, Girolamo 21, 197 f. 134, 136 f., 230–238, 243, 245, 341, 347,
Darge, Rolf 24 349
Day, Sebastian J. 177 Folger-Fonfara, Sabine 205
De Libera, Alain 126 Fonseca, Pedro da 34, 356, 431
de Rijk, Lambertus M. 130 Fontaines, Godfrey of 120, 130
De Vries, Joseph 194 Forlivesi, Marco 10, 13 f., 18, 33, 84 f., 317 f.,
Des Chene, Dennis 38 333–337, 354 f., 419, 428
Descartes, René 11, 26, 177 f., 192, 236, Foxholes (Foxal), John 244
417 f., 421–424, 426, 430–440, 442 f. Frank, William A. 410
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Index of Names 451
Frassen, Claude 13, 359 Hurtado de Mendoza, Pedro 86, 273, 280 f.,
Friedman, Russell L. 230, 308 286, 427
Frost, Gloria 105, 335 f., 356 Hus, Jan 381
Gaetano, Matthew 333 Iserloh, Erwin 367

Gayk, Shannon 381
Gellera, Giovanni 15, 25 f., 426, 440 Jaulin, Annick 398
George, Marie I. 146 Jeschke, Thomas 378
Gerson, Jean 245, 396 f. Jones, W.R. 367
Ghent, Henry of 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 68, 76,
99, 120, 123, 129 f., 132, 137–139, Kant, Immanuel 11
229 f., 232–234, 241, 243–245, 254, Kaufmann, Thomas 394
256, 259, 283, 303, 341, 376, 379 Kaukua, Jari 73
Ghisalberti, Alessandro 231 Kazenberger, Kilian 337
Giblin, Cathaldus 60 King, Peter 16–18, 105, 111, 120, 127 f.,
Gilson, Étienne 9, 143, 171 179, 284, 410, 429
Ginocchio, David González 14, 16, 19, 33 Knebel, Sven K. 10, 44, 299, 308, 356 f., 359,
Goclenius, Rodolphus 420 f. 442
Gomes of Lisbon 13 Knuuttila, Simo 51
Gonteri, Alanus 235 Kobayashi, Michio 236
Goris, Wouter 12 Krause, Katja 184
Granado, Diego 281 Kriegel, Uriah 44
Graybill, Gregory 394 Krisper, Crescentius 328, 337 f., 359
Greschat, Martin 393
Greving, Joseph 407 Lamanna, Marco 15
Guyer, Paul 436 Lambertini, Roberto 135
LaZella, Andrew Thomas 367, 374
Hales, Alexander of 14, 382 Ledoux, Athanasius 119, 122, 136
Hanisch Espínola, Walter 267 Lee, Skjae 410 f.
Harclay, Henry of 12, 237 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 11, 336 f.
Hare, John E. 410 Leijenhorst, Cees 57
Heider, Daniel 9, 14 f., 17–19, 32, 37, 43, Leinsle, Ulrich G. 333 f., 352, 356, 358
45, 47 f., 53, 57–59, 61, 65, 85 f., 126, Lentes, Thomas 368
143, 146, 153, 190, 229, 273, 290 f., 299, Leu, Urs B. 370
333, 349, 393, 419 Lička, Lukáš 308
Henninger, Mark G. 106, 112, 147, 229 Locherer, Alipius 338
Herice, Valentín de 285 f., 288 Locke, John 11, 433, 435
Hoenen, Maarten J.F.M. 13, 138 f., 245, 383 Loiret, François 410
Hoffmann, Tobias 12, 400, 411 Lombard, Peter 14, 179, 333, 367, 370, 373,
Holcot, Robert 380–382 397, 399
Honnefelder, Ludger 11, 15, 231, 249, 268, Lonergan, Bernard 146
278, 284 Lorca, Pedro de 280
Horstmann, Rolf-Peter 436 Lovejoy, Arthur O. 10
Houtepen, Anton 367 Luther, Martin 25, 361, 368, 395, 407
Huiban, Arthur 15, 25, 349, 361, 394, 406
Hume, David 215, 435 Macedo, Francisco 13, 21, 177–196, 198,
338,
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452 Index of Names
Machin de Aquena, Ambrosio 281, 283 f. Netter, Thomas 245

Madre, Alois 382 Newcastle, Hugh of 375
Mahoney, Edward P. 57, 258 Noone, Timothy 127, 232
Maldonado, Juan 21, 195–197 Noreña, Carlos P. 194
Mandrella, Isabelle 205, 427 f., 430 f. Novák, Lukáš 14, 16, 23 f., 299 f., 307 f., 314,
Manzano, Isidoro 267 317
Marchal, Guy P. 367 Novotný, Daniel D. 10, 271, 273, 426 f.
Marchia (Ascoli), Francis of 12 f., 22, 222–
227, 230, 238–240, 256–260, 349–352, Oberman, Heiko Augustinus 11, 407 f., 410
375, 382 Ockham, William of 18 f., 21 f., 122, 136,
Marion, Jean-Luc 422, 424 143–145, 153, 162, 164–167, 170 f.,
Maritain, Jacques 192 173 f., 178, 194, 220 f., 227, 237, 251,
Marrone, Francesco 430 254–259, 282, 395, 407
Marschler, Thomas 333, 356 Olivi, Peter John 75 f., 100, 120, 232
Martínez Rius, Antonio 236 Orbellis, Nicholas of 25, 231, 255–258, 369,
Mastri, Bartolomeo 13, 15, 18 f., 21, 23 f., 384, 388
33–37, 43, 47–61, 67, 84–89, 92, 143,
178, 234, 237, 245, 271, 299–303, 305– Paladini, Chiara 238
331, 333–360, 419 f., 424, 427 f. Park, Damian 12, 21, 243, 277
Matava, Robert Joseph 356 Pasnau, Robert 11, 16, 18, 43, 134, 148,
Matz, Wolfgang 394 181, 216–219, 278
Maurer, Armand 143, 153, 168, 171 f., Pasqualigo, Zaccaria 308
Maurer, Wilhelm 393 f., 396 Paul V 333
McCaghwell (Cavellus), Hugh 13, 19, 35, Pennotti, Gabriele 355
59–61, 86, 191, 194 f., 268, 336–338 Pépin, Jean 233
McCord Adams, Marilyn 54, 67, 69, 81, 83 Pérez de Quiroga, Manuel 337
McDermid, Douglas 435 Perler, Dominik 41, 45, 48, 51, 53 f., 59, 67,
Mediavilla, Richard of 14 120 f., 130, 132, 153, 190, 211, 215, 234,
Meijering, Eginhard P. 394 417, 439
Melanchthon, Philipp 25, 393–412 Perreiah, Alan R. 410
Menn, Stephen 43 Petagine, Antonio 133
Mensa i Valls, Jaume 13 Pich, Roberto Hofmeister 14, 23, 143, 153,
Meyronnes, Francis of 12, 14, 21, 23, 122, 157–163, 165–169, 172 f., 267–269,
143–145, 147, 152–174, 231, 233, 237, 271, 276, 278, 282, 289 f.
242–245, 257, 259 f., 290, 342, 349, 369, Pickavé, Martin 143, 158
375, 382 Pini, Giorgio 12 f., 16, 20, 26, 102 f., 105,
Möhle, Hannes 143, 153, 157–163, 165– 111, 115 f., 122, 126–128, 144–146,
169, 172 f., 243 f. 150, 153, 181, 184, 341, 371
Molina, Luis de 269, 336, 338, 356 f. Plato 236, 245 f., 248, 256 f., 259, 399
Monfasani, John 401 Poinsot, John 36, 146
Mühlen, Karl-Heinz 394, 396 f. Pomplun, R. Trent 9
Muller, Richard A. 394, 419, 421 f. Popper, Karl R. 243
Muñoz García, Ángel 267 Porro, Pasquale 245
Preus, Robert D. 394
Natalis, Hervaeus 122, 222, 237, 308 Proclus 45
Navarre (Atarrabia), Peter of 231, 245–247 Pseudo-Dionysius 172, 255, 260 f.
Nazario, Giovanni Paolo 357
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Index of Names 453
Punch, John 13, 15, 17, 19, 59, 84 f., 89–92, Smith, Garrett R. 12 f., 20, 114 f., 206, 215,
234, 237, 245, 325–327, 334, 336 f., 347, 217, 230, 241, 422
359, 419, 427 Soltau, Conradus de 381
Sondag, Gérard 268, 278
Quinto, Riccardo 393 Sorabji, Richard 70
Sotomayor, Pedro de Ortega 268
Ragni, Alice 417 Sousa Ribeiro, Ilídio de 178
Ramis Barceló, Rafael 9, 13 f. South, James B. 9, 34, 190, 194, 267, 299
Rapp, Christof 70, 77 Spade, Paul Vincent 220 f.
Reading, John of 12, 20, 122, 136–139 Specht, Rainer 11
Redmond, Walter Bernard 267 Sperl, Adolf 393
Renemann, Michael 300, 308 Spinoza, Baruch de 11, 192
Rimini, Gregory of 242 f., Spruit, Leen 19, 120, 122, 177, 190, 193,
Ripa, John of 231, 245, 249–255, 257, 259– 434, 439 f.
260 Stella, Prospero T. 133–135
Riserbato, Davide 130 Steneck, Nicholas H. 59, 61
Rubio, Antonio 87 Suárez, Francisco 10 f., 15, 17–19, 21, 24,
Rubione, William of 230, 290, 349 33–55, 57–61, 67, 75, 85 f., 178 f., 190–
197, 269, 271, 273, 419–422, 426, 429,
Saarinen, Risto 402 432, 442
Sagües Azcona, Pío 231 Sutton, Thomas 122
Salas, Juan de 280 Sytsma, David 333
Sallmann, Martin 369
Sannig, Bernardus 316, 337 Tachau, Katherine H. 120, 137, 143, 153,
Savini, Massimiliano 418, 420 f., 423, 425 f., 177, 230
428, 430, 432, 434, 437, 439, 441, 443 Tartaret, Pierre 14, 349
Schabel, Christopher D. 10, 230 f., 238– Tellkamp, Jörg A. 74
240, 251 f., 341, 349, 430 Thomae, Peter 12, 14, 20, 114–116, 215,
Scheible, Heinz 393, 407 f. 230 f., 241–243, 257–260, 287
Scheibler, Christoph 26, 419, 439, 442 Timpler, Clemens 420 f., 423, 441, 443
Schindler, Alfred 369 Toivanen, Juhana 34, 75
Schmaltz, Tad M. 11, 422 Trabibus, Petrus de 232
Schmutz, Jacob 14 f., 281, 286 Trapani, Giuseppe Napoli da 335–338
Schulze, Manfred 407 Troilo, Erminio 178
Schwarzenau, Paul 394 Trombetta, Antonio 171, 258, 341, 349
Scribano, Emanuela 184, 192 Tropia, Anna 14, 21, 60, 67, 75, 178, 190 f.,
Scribner, Bob 367 194–196, 338, 426, 429
Seifert, Arno 407 Trottmann, Christian 184
Selge, Kurt-Victor 407 Tweedale, Martin M. 130
Seneca, Lucius Annaeus 233, 250, 259
Sghemma, Gaspare 334, 336, 359 Urdaneta, Ramón 267
Shank, Michael H. 383
Sider, Ronald J. 407 Valera, Jerónimo 267
Silva, José F. 37 Valla, Lorenzo 401
Skariča, Mirko 267, 269 Vater, Carl A. 232
Smeets, Uriël 268 Vázquez, Gabriel 272, 341 f., 344
Veliath, Dominic 122
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454 Index of Names
Venice, Paul of 249–251 Wimpina, Konrad 349

Ventosa, Enrique Rivera de 178 Wirth, Jean 367, 376, 379, 381
Vigerio, Giovanni 335 f. Wolter, Allan B. 54, 67, 69–72, 81, 83, 99–
Volpe, Angelo 335–337, 342, 346 f., 359 103, 105 f., 109 f., 114 f., 128, 131, 148 f.,
Vorillon, William of 25, 383 f., 388 168, 177, 205, 207 f., 211, 232, 234, 236,
Vos, Antonie 268, 278 284, 339, 341, 350, 410
Wyclif, John 23, 245, 259, 381
Wadding, Luke 14, 60, 186, 209, 336, 339,
350 Yokoyama, Tetsuo 212, 235
Ware, William of 376, 382
Weidmann, Sandra 370 Zabarella, Jacopo 26, 419, 430, 442
Wengert, Timothy J. 394, 397 Zahnd, Ueli 13, 15, 25, 231, 361, 368, 383,
Whitworth, Amy F. 66 385, 393
Wiedemann, Theodor 408 Zwingli, Huldrych 15, 25, 367–370
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Schwabe Verlag’s signet was
Johannes Petri’s printer’s mark.
His printing workshop was
established in Basel in 1488 and
was the origin of today’s Schwabe
Verlag. The signet refers back to
the beginnings of the printing press,
and originated in the entourage of
Hans Holbein. It illustrates a verse of
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https://doi.org/10.24894/978-3-7965-4767-6
.
Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy
Julia Jorati /Dominik Perler/Stephan Schmid (eds.)
COGNITIVE ISSUES IN THE LONG SCOTIST TRADITION

The late-scholastic school of Scotism (after John Duns Scotus, †1308)
had considerable room for disagreement. This volume innovatively
demonstrates just how vividly Scotist philosophers and theologians
discussed cognitive matters from the 14th until the 17th century. It
further shows how the Scotist ideas were received in Protestant and
Reformed milieus.
Editors
Daniel Heider is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University
of South Bohemia. Among his many publications on metaphysics and
epistemology in Post-Medieval / Early Modern scholasticism are his
monographs Universals in Second Scholasticism (2014) and Aristotelian
Subjectivism: Francisco Suárez’s Philosophy of Perception (2021).
Claus A. Andersen is currently Postdoc at the Université catholique de

Louvain; from 2019 to 2022, he was Postdoc at the University of South
Bohemia. He specializes in Late Scholastic thought and is author of the
monograph Metaphysik im Barockscotismus (2016) and co-editor of
Pere Daguí, Tractatus formalitatum brevis, Tractatus de differentia (2018).
www.schwabe.ch
I S B N 978-3-7965-4766-9
https://doi.org/10.24894/978-3-7965-4767-6

Cognitive Issues in The Long Scotist Tradition: Daniel Heider Claus A. Andersen (Eds.)

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Cognitive Issues in The Long Scotist Tradition: Daniel Heider Claus A. Andersen (Eds.)

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Medieval

and Early Modern

Julia Jorati / Dominik Perler / Stephan Schmid (eds.)

Cognitive Issues in the

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

© 2023 Schwabe Verlag, Schwabe Verlagsgruppe AG, Basel, Schweiz

II. Intellectual Cognition

III. Metaphysical and Theological Implications

IV. The Influence of Scotism

List of Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447

1. The Long Scotist Tradition:

2 Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being, 22.

resembles the situation in the early fourteenth century. The aforementioned

2. Cognitive Issues in the Scotist Tradition –

Only in the case of Scotus’s criticism of Henry of Ghent’s doctrine of illumina-

26 Pasnau, “Cognition,” 285.

31 Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition, 203.

2.1 Sensory Cognition

2.2 Intellectual Cognition

34 Heider, Aristotelian Subjectivism, 270–74, nevertheless maintains that Suárez’s philoso-

36 Cf. Smith, “The Origin of Intelligibility.”

A somewhat similar case is explored in the contribution by Damian Park,

2.3 Metaphysical and Theological Implications

Scotist cognitive psychology is interwoven with both metaphysics and theology.

the ones examined in the previous contribution, Fiorentino investigates how

distinction, of course, is Scotus’s key innovation in this area. It is his alternative

2.4 The influence of Scotism

An understudied aspect of the Scotist tradition’s broader impact is its influence

41 Cf., again, Bolliger, Infiniti Contemplatio, here 380.

seventeenth-century continuation of the story of Scotist influence in non-Catho-

–. Metaphysik im Barockscotismus. Untersuchungen zum Metaphysikwerk des Bartholomaeus

in the production of perceptual acts, they substantially differ in their answer to

1. Shared Assumptions Regarding the Formal, Material

the species as a co-cause in the production of a perceptual act.9 Contrary to some

2. Suárez on the Production of Interior Species

In the second question, “Whether for the Production of Sensible Species It Is

causality is to embrace a different theory, one which endorses the top-down

2.2 Composite Species

In addition to the apprehension of absent objects, the internal sense is able to

2.3 Unsensed species

31 Suárez, CDA, disp. 6, q. 2, n. 15 (vol. II), 490–92.

2.4 The Species of the Acts of the External Senses

Besides apprehending unified sensory forms representing absent objects, action-

see the apple. In contemporary philosophy, this self-awareness is called ‘same-

37 For Suárez’s theory of perceptual self-awareness, see Perler, “Suárez on Consciousness,”

42 Suárez, CDA, disp. 6, q. 4, n. 6 (vol. II), 508–10.

cording to this self-consciousness as well. Epistemologically speaking, however,

3. Mastri and Belluto on the Production

external thing, the interior species must be caused immediately by an external

52 Ibid., n. 72, 74b.

ly.55 From this point of view, it is reasonable to consider exterior species to be

3.2 Composite Species

3.3 Unsensed Species

62 Mastrius / Bellutus, In DA, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 244, 118a.

3.4 The Species of the Acts of the External Senses

71 Perler, Eine Person sein, 262.

the act will be distinct.75 Moreover, following Scotus’s Questions on De anima,76

Conclusion and Perspective

publication of Suárez’s Tractatus de anima in 1621, this Irish Observant pub-

Given the underdeveloped character of Scotus’s philosophy of perception men-

–. Metaphysik im Barockscotismus. Untersuchungen zum Metaphysikwerk des Bartholomaeus

1. The Necessity of Sense Cognition

tus’s theory of sense cognition. Richard Cross, in his comprehensive overview of