CENTER STATE RELATIONS LLM 2016-17 UNIT 1 FEDERALISM UNIT 2 LEGISLATIVE RELATIONSTHE STAGES OF FEDERALISM DERALIS Federalism is a political system in which power is divided and shared between the national/central government and the states. This arrangement limits the power of government, Over the years, the powers of the national government have increased tremendously atthe expense of the states, The Supreme Court has played a key role in defining the relationship and powers of ‘the national government through its broad interpretation of the supremacy and commerce clauses, ual Federalism (1789 ~ 1937 Stage is called “dual federaliswn” because the functions of the state and national government remained largely separate. + Marshall Court © Cases upheld expansive federal powers. They had a major impact on the balance of power between the national and state governments. © McCulloch v, Marytand (1819) © Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) + Taney Court © Different notion of federalism © Belief that separate and equally powerful levels of government work best © National government should not exceed its constitutionally enumerated powers © Court tended to limit the national government’s authority in areas such as slavery and eivil rights Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) Post Civil War Amendments © Plessy ». Ferguson (1896) oo Stage 2: Cooperative Federalism (193 963) Stage is called “cooperative federalism” because the new programs of the “New Deal” require cooperation across all levels of government. © Franklin Roosevelt's “New Deal” sparks a revolution in national policy making and an Increased role for the national government altering the balance of power. © Initially, the Supreme Court struck down New Deal programs, but in 1937 Supreme Court ‘changes course (court-packing plan). | | | |Stage 3 lated Federalism (1963 — 1981 Stage is called “reguiated federalism” because the national governmeat further intervened in state ‘government decision-making by threatening to withhold federal grants for specific purposes. - © Categorical Granis were given to the states for specific purposes. Discretion largely a remains in the hands of federal and officeholders. © Example: War on Poverty ~ in an effort to alleviate social ills that the states had been e unable or unwilling to remedy, Johnson Administration bypzsses conservative legislatures ‘and administrators and gives money to constituencies that will spend it on urban renewal, : ‘education, poverty programs, and job training. © Example: to regulate speed within states, the national government threatens to 7 withhold federal transportation dollars thus forcing the states to comply with federal mandates. © Unfunded mandates © From the New Deal to the 1980's, the Supreme Court exwanded national powers and - restricted state power in their rulings. Stage 4: New Federalism (1981 Stage is called “new federalism” because it reflects the return of administrative powers to the state governments. The federal-state relationship was proposed by Ronald Reagan during the 1980's, © Block Grants are given to states for general purposes and allow state officials greater discretion over how funds will be spent, eg. education, welfare. Reduced the size and power of the federal government. President Reagan used states rights as a litmus test for appoin’ments. Bush Administration: federal government expands post 9/11 Most Supreme Court decisions since 1989 have been 5-4 majorities in favor of states rights. Bush Administration: federal government expands post 9/11. oocoe Regulated Federalism ow Fodoraten gC ETE TINE ~ Jeet, BPRS tent 7 ational goverment State governments have1 Introduction Much of the literature on federalism and democracy claims it as an empirical fact that Se ofthe literature on fede (| development, especially in large and diverse societies,’ federalism is beneficial for democratic ‘As Stepan has observed,“ .. In fact, every single longstanding democracy in a territorally based multilingual and multinational polity isa federal state. Although there are many multinational polities in the world, few of them are democracies. Those multinational democracies that do exist, however (Switzerland, Canada, Belglum, Spain, and India), are all federal” (Stepan 1999; 19-20}. Where theoretical literature does make the connection between federalism and democracy, the reasoning derives from the consensus that suc sssful federalism requires well functioning democratic institutions, judicial system, integr 1ed national political parties and appropriate electoral incentives created by d 1ocratic political competition. The basic finding of the literature is that only in well func democracies can federalism be a stable and effective for of government. And conversely, outside of the democratic context, federalism is ultimately an unstable form, which logically progresses either to territorial disintegration or to becoming a ie theories show is that in the long run, in equilibrium, ddms cy must be present in order for BR ee eee eee eae federalism to be successful, This has no bearing on what adding federalism to a political regime acy and ft ble federalism isto be | 7 aie considered @ desirable democratic equilbrium, the theory is sient on how to get to thet \equilibrium. It is possible, we argue, that federalism as a constitutional form may be well compatible with successful longstanding democracy, and yet it could undermine partial democratic success in fledging regimes. This is because in the short “un the federal form with its additional cl leaders to interfere with the der process. For this reason, hypothetically speaking, it would be easier to quickly improve the quality of democracy in a unitary state than in a federal one, other taings equal. We build our argument by taking as the point of departure Kiiker’s (1964) theory of federalism, considered by many to be the best political theory of federalism avaitable, and add to it the consideration of the logic of the multi-level democratic process (Stepan 1999, Mckay 2004). In this theoretical framework, we then address the nature of the interaction between J cy and federalism as institutions for societal aggregation of preferences and corresponding political mobilization. What results is @ theoretical prediction of insttutionafot modality where, in order to pr erve territorial integrity, the quality of democracy in a federation in terms of the restrictions placed on democratic politica! competition must be either very high, or low. The reason for this bi-modality is that a low-functioning or a newly established democracy cannot generate from its midst the thing thet is needed in order to contain disruptive distributive bargaining inherent to the constituticnal federal form ~ the federally integrated party system. And since high quality of democracy in a federation requires that the party system is organized consistently with federal needs, the relationship also holds in reverse — new federations will undergo a period of inadequacy of their democratic process, and during that time will, as a strategic adjustment to the threat to their survival, lower the procedural quality of their democracy.2 Riker’s federal theory: federalism (without democracy) is not an equilibrium outcome in federal studies, there was a long tradition of viewing federalism as a balance, and in ‘hat meaning ofthe word, as an equilibrium between the opposing social forces and aspirations ~ ©, unification versus autonomy, centralization versus decentralization, and et cetera. Riker, ‘who hac! just completed at the time his analysis of coalition formation and bargaining (Riker 1962), pointed out that any federal institutional balance must depend on coalitions which were formed to support it, and that coalitions have a propensity to shift. Federal balance would change with the changes in the coalition structure, and as long as coalitions were unstable, federal institutional balance was bound to be unstable as well (Riker 1964). Furthermore, because federal bargain Is generally unstable, formal federal constitutional provisions were not a8 important as their actual implementation and “operation” (Riker 1969). After a federal Constitution is put in place, its real operation and thus the terms that are actually enforced become endogenous to the political process, more precisely, to the interaction between various government incumbents at all levels. Thus, argued Riker, federalism is a non-equilibrium political process and federal ‘agreements are bound to be unstable and will change over time to the advantage of some and the detriment of others, Since the sides to the bargain, as Riker and the prior literature saw it, ‘were states versus the center, then either the sub-national governments were to become stronger than the federal government (which Riker cal wl “peripheralized federalism) oF the federal government was gain the upper hand fntate federalism"). Neither of those were plausible candidates for Elone-sorm inetutonalequlbrum ps “peripheratized federalism” ‘would eventually so weaken the federal “center” as to become but a transitional stage on thepath toward eventual federal dissolution, while the overly strong “center” in the “centralized federalism” version would maintain territorial integrity but the union would lose its federat nature —due to “the tendency, as time passes, for the rulers of the ‘ederation to overawe the rulers of the constituent governments” (Riker 1964). Asi ilar informal argument is known in political science as Eiryce’s Law. According to 1 Edward MeWhinney (1962: 105), Bryce's Law states that *...federclism is simply a transitory step on the way to governmental unity.” An economic version of the Bryce Law was re- —————————e— discovered in the 1930s by a German economist Johannes Popitz, who argued that, though starting from rather decentralized tax systems, both unitary and feceral countries alike end up concentrating fiscal authority in the hands of national governments." Accordingly, Popitz called the federal form of government a fiction. “Popitx’s Law” asserts tha: over time there must be a centralizing trend of revenue collection, which was indeed found in a cross section of countries (see, eg, Diaz-Cayeros 2004; Blankart 1999; 2001; Vaubel 1994), Consistently with Riker’s prediction, Lake and Rothchild (2005) find that: “territorial decentralization is an extremely fragile political institution that majority groups and regions in favor of centralization and by minority groups and regions in favor of full political autonomy or secession, Most commonly, central governments quickly increase their power at the expense of regions and groups within the state. Less frequently, central governments unravel, ultimately leading to the disintegration of the state and the fracturing of the national territory into several sovereign pieces . ..” In Riker’s logic the three post-communist federations (USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) were all cases of rapid transitions from highly centralized to peripheralized federala models, producing federal governments so weak that they were unable to prevent those countries’ territorial disintegration (Bunce 1999). Meanwhile, illustrating the other theoretical Possibility a fragment of the former Soviet Union, Russia, itself a federation, has converged to a Highly centialized federal model and thus escoped territorial collapse, though federalism there 's on its way to becoming mostly @ formality (Ross and Campbell 2009) 3. Where there is no equilibrium, contract is required ‘The instability and absence of a “natural” equilibrium — an equilibrium which would be i directly setf-enforceable because it coordinates the participants to a mutually beneficial outcome — means that federal balancing via bargaining is essentially a contract, The initial ‘outcome of bargaining over the fundamental federal arrangements (constitution) is 2 contract. Ang all interim compromises in continuous federal bargaining as per Riker's conceptualization are also a string of contracts. Meanwhile, all these contracts are between and among the a Bovernments. Sovereign unit governments negotiate over alternative federal principles for the - Constitution. Sovereign federal and sub-national governments hammer out subsequent Bargains on ways of implementing federal principles and amending them. This fact makes the question of enforcement central: when dealing with governments, it is usually difficult to enforce the outcome of bargeining. Hence what we summarily label the federal form of government is a contract without a built-in mechanism for its enforcement, 7 The Incomplete contract literature extensively deals with the so called “hold-up problem,” which arises when ex ante decisions change ex post bargaining power of economic agents. A classical example is of a firm making an irreversible (sunk), “elation-specific”investment into products demanded by another firm (Klein, Cravford and Alchian 1978). A growing number of studies apply the principles of industrial organization to the design of federal constitutions {especially to their fiscal design) as incomplete contracts (Aghion and Bolton 2003; Bednar 2008; Lulfesmann 2002; Rodden 2005; Tommasi and Saiegh 2000; Seabright 1996). laryczower, Saiegh, and Tommasi (2007) argue that many welfare-Improving inter-governmental institutional arrangements have characteristics similar to investments in specific assets: they require undertaking costly and hard to revers2 actions with limited to no value in alternative uses, and they produce benefits only in the future. As long as future benefits might be threatened by the opportunistic actions of some players, this extra uncertainty will deter institutional investments, or will lead them to take less efficient forms. 4, How democracy stands in the way of credible commitment to the federal contract As distinctive from decentralization of government functions, federalism preserves the political autonomy of constituent governments. Thus, it institutionally empowers regional politicians to bargain with the federal government and challenge no: only federal policies at the stage of their implementation, but even the federal institutions thernselves that gave rise to such federal policies. Re-distributive institutional coalitions emerge from the conflict in constituent preferences when it overlaps with the federative lines of representational division. Riker thought of federal bargaining as politicians bargaining over distribution of prerogatives between the states and the center."" We put emphasis on distributive bargaining among groups such as the constituencies in federal units. Distributive bargaining gives rise to the derivative bargaining over federal institutions, as institutions for decision-making have long-termdistributive implications. indeed, crass-nationally, there is a pattern of coalitions of units clashing over the degree of centralization and prerogatives of the federal center (Bednar 2008, Cameron and Falleti 2005, Filippov, Orteshook, and Shvetsova 2004). Coalitions more likely to Control the center or to receive greater benefits from its more obvious functions support the center's institutional empowerment. tn this way, the precariousness of the center-state federal balance felt by the politicians is substantively rooted in the institutional preferences of the underlying popular coalitions that can be mobilized on each side and in support of shifting that ‘balance in either direction. Motivated by the logic of unit-level political competition, sub-national incumbents are pressured to offer their constituents the redistributive agenda for the dialogue with the federal center, Those regional politicians who are more willing to commit to hard bargaining and pose increasing demands to the center will, other things equal, be more attra for focal electorates than those who say that their unit has no claim on additional resources in the federation. This implies that electorates at least in some units will be mobilized on the issue of federal reform — federal institutional change aimed at gaining advantage (or redressing “current disadvantages”) vis-d-vis the rest of the union. Resulting territorial political polarization threatens the country's institutional and political stability, and ultimately its territorial integrity. tn the extreme, issues of federalism and federal renegotiation can become the explicit Focus in campaigns nationally as well as in the units. There Is abundant evidence that, when confronted with institutional choices of re-distributive nature, politicians are limited in their ability to support compromise and cooperation by the need to anticipate popular pressure and, most importantly, the entry of political challengers seeking to capitalize on such popular pressure ormobilize it (Horowitz 1985, Lustick 1979)" if the constituency expects distributive gains from the institutional reform, incumbents supporting stability find themselves in a vulnerable position. Therefore, federal success is impossible without the sufficiently strong central government capable to overcome resistance of any feasible coalition of constituent units. Center that strong removes any expectation of benefit from polarizing unit mobilization by making successful renegotiation of the federal terms implausible. inates at the at-large federal level in federal ‘The opposite competitive dynamics elections, where, lke in all democracies, the majority makes redistridutive decisions, generally, in its own Favor. But the majority coalition that wins federal ineumbency is limited in its poticy- making prerogative (and thus its ability to redistribute) by the constraints that the federal arrangements impose on the federal center. it therefore becomes electorally advantageous at the federal level to advocate the expansion of the powers of the center and shrink federalism. ‘The stronger the center is to begin with, the more decisive the majeritarian takeover. Thus, ‘contracts regarding institutions of federalism are routinely breached! in practice, Among the more recent examples are South Africa and Russia. In South Africa, curing the transition to majority rule, the African National Congress used the promise of decentralization as an incentive to gain cooperation from the government, Inkatha Freedom Party, and Afrikaner \Volksfront. it made concessions on the powers of the provincial authorities in order to secure ‘the minorities’ support for the 1993 draft constitution. Then, having obtained that goal, reversed the course a few years later (Lake and Rothchild 2005). In itussla, federal politicians discarded power sharing treaties with regions (and perhaps federalism altogether] as soon as a popular president came to power in 2000 (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008).FROM PLANNING TO NII TRANSFORMING INDIA’S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA FEBRUARY 8, 2918 BEES Ey ey ee) Ce) EEE ee) eee eee tecINTRODUCTION: TRANSFORMING INDIA .. CONTEXT: INDIA HAS CHANGED... RATIONALE: INSTITUTIONS MUST CHANGE .. NEW ROLE: FUNCTIONS OF NITI.. Demography Economy Private enterprise Globalisation States Technology Cooperative and Competitive Federalisin Shared National Agenda State's Best Friend at the Centre Decentralized Planning Vision & Scenario Planning Domain Strategies Sounding Board Network of Expertise Knowledge and innovation hub Harmonization Conflict Resolution Coordinating interface with World Internal Consultancy Capacity building Monitoring and EvaluationPURPOSE: GUIDING PRINCIPLES MECHANISM: STRUCTURE OF NITI .. eevee CONCLUSION: VEHICLE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE .. Antyodaya Inclusion village Demographic dividend People's Participation Governance Sustainability v7 7 Chairperson Governing Council Regional Councils, Special invitees Full-time Organisational Framework 2 Research Wing 2 Consultancy Wing 2 a ‘Team India Wing« Che cr tee re. Oo Gee Cog COPE EVO OE CHKintroduction: TRANSFORMING INDIA india has undergone a paradigm shift aver the past six decades - politically, economically, socially, technologically as well as demographically. The role of Government in national development has seen 2 parallel evolution. Keeping with these changing times, the Government of India has decided to set up NITI Aayog {Nationai Institution for Transforming india), in place of the erstwhile Planning Commission, as a means to better serve the needs and aspirations of the people of India, “The new institution will hea catalyst to the developmental process; nurturing an overall enabling environment, through a holistic approach to development going beyond the limited sphere of the Public Sector and Government of India. This will be buiit an the foundations of: < Anempowered role of States as equal partners in national development; operationalizing the principte of Cooperative Federalism. © Aknowledge hub of internal as well as external resources; serving as a repository of good governance best practices, and a Think Tank offering domain knowledge as well as strategic expertise to all levels of government. « Acollaborative platform facilitating Implementation; by monitoring progress, plugging gaps and bringing together the various Ministries at the Centre and in States, in the joint pursuit of developmental goals.INC. HAS CH. GEDContext: INDIA HAS CHANGED “The Planning Commission was constituted on 15.3.1950 through a Government of India Resolution, and has served India well, india, however, has changed dramatically over the past 65 years, While this has been at multiple levels and across varied scales, the biggest transformatory forces have been the following: 4_-Bemography: Our population has increased over three-fold to reach 121 crores. This includes an addition of aver 30 crore people to Urban India. As well as an increase of 55 crore youth {beiow the age of 35), which is mare than one anc a half times the total population of the country then, Furthermore, with increasing levels of development, literacy and communication, the aspirations of our people have soared, moving from scarcity and survival fp Gafoty and surplus We-aré therefore looking at a completely different India taday, and our ‘governance Systeme need to be transformed to keep up with the same. Economy: Our econamy has undergone a pasadigm shift. tt has expanded by over a hundred times, going from a GDP of Rs 10,000 crord’to)Rs 100 lakh crore at current prices, fo emerge fas one of the world’s largest. Agriculture's share in this has seen a dramatic drop, from more g than 50% to less than 15% of GDP. And our central government's Twelfth Five Year Plan size ? of Ré,G3 lakh crore, dwarfs the First Five Year Plan size of Rs 2,400 crore. Priorities, strategies: ‘and structures dating back to the time of the birth of the Planning Commission, must thus be revisited. The very nature of our planning processes needs to be overhauled to align with this shift in sheer scale.~~ : The nature of our economy, and the role of the Gavernment init, has Private enterpris undergone a paradigm shift as well, Driven by an increasingly open and liberalized structure, our private sector has matured into a vibrant and dynamic force, operating not just at the international cutting edge, but also with a global scale and reach. This changed economic landscape requires a new administrative pa wii ernment must fla command and control eco: 0 a far more FGirecting. calihrating, supportingand regulative a market eco-system. Nationel ‘developmént Sen beyond the limited sphere of the Public Sector. Government must thus transition from being a ‘provider of first and last resort’ and ‘malor plaver’ in the economy, to being a ‘catalyst’ nurturig an enabling environment, where the entrepreneurial spirits of all, from SS om ee Tepreneurs to large corporations, can flourish. This “Thportantiy, frees Up the Government to focus its precious resources on public welfare 7 domains such as esBential entitlemeits of f68U, nutrition, health, education and livelihood of vulnerable and marginalized groups, 7 Globalisation: The World at large has also evolved. Today, we live in a ‘global village’, connected by modern transport, communications and media, and networked international markets and institutions. As India ‘eontributes: ics, itis l50 influenced by happenings far removed from our Borders. This¢ontinuing integration yith theworld needs to be incorporated into our policy making as well as functioning of government.hie ‘The States of the Union of India have evolved from being mere appendages of the Centre, to being the actyal drivers. of national development. The development “of States must a, thus become the national goal, as the nation's progress lies in the progress of States. As 2 consequence, th one-size-fits-all approact) often inherent in cen) nniag is no y acerain nceee longer practical or eFficlane States reed fo be heard and gen te FeaDMty reauited For “effective implementation. Or. B. R. Ambedkar had said with great foresight that it is “UnfeasOnaDIe to TeAtralise powers where central control and uniformity is not clearly Essential or 1 impracticable’. Therefore, while emanating from global experiences and jational Synergy, our strategies will need to be calibrated and customized to focal needs and opportunities, réchnology: Advancements in technology and access to information hay yemssted the Treative energy that emerges from the Indian kaleidoscope. They hav ‘our varied regions and eco-systems in an interlinked national economy and society, opening up. Ht Tawar avenues OF coordination and cooperation. Technology is also playing a substantial role ‘jnemhancing (cansparsacy 3s Well SITETEMCT, holding government more accountable. Ie thus needs tobe made central to our systems of policy and governance,_ INSTITUTIONS : UST CHANGE 7Rationale: INSTITUTIONS MUST CHANGE ‘This changing reality and growing mismatch has been recognized for years now with experts, including many from within the erstwhile Planning Commission, recommending appropriate changes: «The Bt* Five Year Plan document - the very first after the liberalisation of 1991 - itself categorically stated that, as the role of Government was reviewed and restructured, the role ‘and functions of the Planning Commission too needed to be rethought. The Planning Commission needed to be reformed to keep up with changing trends; letting go of old practices and baliefs whose relevance had been lost, and adopting new ones based on the past experiences of India as well as other nations. «The Standing Committee on Finance of the 15® Lok Sabha observed in its 35% Report on Demand for Grants (2011-12) that the Planning Commission "has to come to grips with the emerging social realities to re-invent itself to make itself more relevant and effective for Signing the planning process wifh econamic reforms and its consequences, particularly fer the poor® ee © Former Prime Minister and noted economist, Dr. Manmohan Singh - in his farewell address to the Commission in April 2014 ~ also urged reflection op“what the if the Planning Commission needs to be in this new world. Are we still usin froolsjnd af hes which were designed for. titional roles should the Plannit hat Gpacitios does it need to build teensure that it continues to. process OreMahatma Gandhi had said: "Constant development isthe law of life acd aman who always tries to ‘maintain his dogmas in order to appear Consistent drives himself into « false position”. Keeping trus to this Principle our Misttations Of governance and polly must @vONe with the changing Gynamics of the new india, while remaining true to the founding principies of the Constitution of India, and rooted in our Bharatiyata or wisdom of our civilizational history and ethos. 'NIMI Rayag (National institution for Transforming india) is to be the institution to give life to these aspirations, It is being Formed based on extensive consultation across *he spectrum of stakeholders, including inter alia state governments, relevant institutions, domain exserts and the people at large.Nii;AS ae natic hood has metured anc deepened wwe have: -aribraced a greater measure pluralism and decentralization. This necessitates oper hittin how the Central jenna Cooperative Federalism; enabling States to hayé active participation \p the formulation of national policy, as well as achieving time- hart Tmaplementa'ion of quantitath _ “qualltative targets through the combined authority of the Prime eee ae and Chief Ministers. This will Bé by means of systematic and structured interacticns between the Union and State Governments, to better understand developmental issues, as well as forge a consensus on strategies and implementation mechanisms, The above wou'd mark the replacement of the one-way flow of policy from centre-te-state, with a genuine and continuing Centre-State partnership. 7 Cooperative and Competitive Federalism: Be the primary pat ager, ‘This Cooperation would be further enhanced by the vibrancy af Competitive Federalism; with the Centre competing with the States and vice versa, and the States competing with each Bler, in the joint parson aia dip ae a Yan 7 be cer iesten ene tae lop OES | a 2, Shared National Agenda: Shy sharevsen)y rational development priorities and a strategies, with the active invoWment oF States. This will provide the framework ‘national agenda’ for the Prime Minister and Chie? Ministers to implement. 3, State's Best Friend at the Centre Support States in adldressing their own challenges. as well as buliding on strengths and comparative advantages. This wil be through various means, sucha nating with Ministries, championing their ideas at the centre, providing ‘consultancy support An building capacity 4, Decentralized Planning: Restructure the planning process into bottom-up model, empowering States, and guiding them to further empower locaYSovermi TTREoping ‘mechanisms to formulate credible plans at the village level, which are progressively aggregated ~ “Upto higher TEE of govErmment. “Gp the higher Tevels of government. _ elecesig the pecan oh q jergize-the distinct strategy’ element “As a dedicated Think Tank : seally chav g the future ce = s Vision & Scenario Planning: Designiediumpnd rameworks of the big picture vision of india's future ~ across schemes, Sectors, regions and time; factoring in all possible alternative assumptions and counterfactuals, These would be the drivers of the nation a, especialy focussed or( dentifying critical gap} and harnessing (Gisopeptert same would need ic with thelr progress ‘and efficacy constantly monitored for coe mid-course recalibratiopPand the overall environment (domestic and global) continuously Scarined for incorporating evolving trends and addressing emerging challenges. ‘The above would mean a fundamental transition from merely planning for where the Nation’s money goes, to planning where we want the Nation to go. And given its unique position as the aggregator and integrator of all developmental initiatives of the Government of India and States, the NITI Aayog would be ideally suited for the same, at planning as well problem solving needs. This will especially enable the imbibing of good governance best practices, both national as well as international: especially with regards to structural reform 7. Sounding Board: Be an in-house sounding board whetting ard refining government positions, through abjective criticisms and comprehensive counter-views. 8. Network of Expertise: Main-stream external ideas and expertise into government policies and programmes through a collaborative community of naticnal and international experts, practitioners and other partners. This would entail being Gavernment's link to the outside ‘world, roping in academia (universities, think tanks and reseerch institutions) private sector Bipertise, ane the people ‘at Targé, for close involvernent in the polity making process. As is said “nthe F Riguecs CH A at: wera *y Fea: Set us welcome noble thoughts flowing in from all directions. —— 9. Knowledge and Innovation hub: Be ai Gcurulatop's well & disseminatorof research and best practices on good governance, through a state-of the-ert Resource Centie whic Hentifies, arialyses, shares and facilitates regitavon cotheSame——— An increasingly mature Indian population has steadily increased the focus on, and demand for, actua! delivery and results, To keep up with such enhanced aspirations, NITI Aayog's mandate will have to go beyond mere planning and strategizing, to facilitating Implementation of the development agenda as well. This would involve making implementation central to the planning process, through an emphasis on tangible outcomes, realistic targets, strict timelines and robust monitoring and evaluation - a transition from the isolated conceptuatisation of merely ‘planning, to‘planning for Implementatiow’. Niti Aayog will also act as a catalyst to the government machinery at large; filling gaps, enhancing capabilities and de-clogging bottlenecks, as and where required:especially when involving tross-Cutting and overlappingissues across multiple sectors; through communication, coordination, collaboration and convergence amongst all stakeholders. The ‘emphasis will be on bringing all together on an integrated and holistic approach to development. 44. Conflict Resolution: Provide a platform for miytual resolution of inter-sectoral, “Tnter-departmental, inter-state as well as centre-state issues; facilitating consensus acceptable and beneficial to all, to bring about clarity and speed in execution. 12, Coordinating interface with the World: Be the nadal point for strategically harnessing global expertise and resources coming in from across nations, multi-fateral institutions and other international organisations, in India's developmental process. 43, Internal Consultancy: Offer an internal consultancy function to central and state governments ‘on policy and program design; providing frameworks adhering to basic design principles such as decentralization, flexibility and a focus on results, This would include specialised skills such as structuring and executing Public Private Partnerships. 414, Capacity building: Enable capacity building a 7 ross government, benchmarking with latest global trends and providing managerial and technical knowhow. 15, Monitoring and Evaluation: Monitor the inn and programmes, and evaluate their impact; through rigoroug tracking of performance metrics And comprehensive program evaluations. This will not only Welp identify weaknesses and Bottlenecks for recessary Course correction, but also enable data-driven policy making; encouraging greater efficiency as wall as effectiveness,~ Purpose: GUIDING PRINCIPLES oa _ > Iarrying out the above Functions, NITI Aayog wil be guided by an overall vision of development ‘which is inclusive, equitable and sustainable. A strategy of empowerment built on human dignity “ and national self-respect, which lives up to Swami Vivekanande’s idea of our duty to encourage 7 everyone in his struggle to live up to his own highest idea . A model of development which is wafers (all round), aeFereff (all pervasive), wamnaers (ail inclusive) and wate (holistic): - «© Antyodaya: Prioritize service and uplift of the poor, marginalized and downtrodden, as enunciated in Pandit Deendayal Upadhyay/s idea of Antyodaya’ Development is incomplete o and meaningless, if it does not reach the farthest individual. In the centuries old words of ~ Tiruvalluvar, the sage-poet, nothing is more dreadfully painful than poverty = © Inclusion: Empower vulnerable and marginalized sections, redressing identity-based 7 inequalities of all kinds gender, region, religion, caste or class. As Sankar Dev wrote cecades ago: ‘to see every being as equivalent to one’s own saul is the supreme means (of attaining a deliverance)", Weaker sections must be enabled to be masters of their own fate, having equal za influence over the choices the nation makes. ot © Village: Integrate our villages into the development process, to draw on the vitality and energy of the bedrock of our ethos, culture and sustenance.