TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS......................................................................................3

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED...................................................................................................5

COUNT 3 WITH RESPECT TO THE ATTACK OF THE CHAMELEON ON 6 JANUARY

2020: ON THE BASIS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDERS AND OTHER
SUPERIORS AS PER ARTICLE 28 OF THE ROME STATUTE, INTENTIONALLY
DIRECTING ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIAN OBJECTS, THAT IS, OBJECTS WHICH
ARE NOT MILITARY OBJECTIVES AS A WAR CRIME PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 8(2)
(B)(II) OF THE ROME STATUTE...........................................................................................5

1. NO LOCUS OF MONSTERA AND DRL.........................................................................5

2. THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY WITH

RESPECT TO THE ALLEGED WAR CRIME........................................................................5

I. THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE AN EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND

CONTROL OVER THE PERPETRATORS INVOLVED IN THE CRIMES.....................6

II. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOW THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME
WHEN HE SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT THE FORCES WERE COMMITTING
OR ABOUT TO COMMIT SUCH CRIMES........................................................................6

III. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE POWER TO PREVENT OR REPRESS

THEIR COMMISSION.........................................................................................................6

3. THERE WAS NO COMMISSION OF CRIME UNDER ARTICLE 8(2)(b)(ii) OF THE

ROME STATUTE.....................................................................................................................7

1. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT DIRECT ANY ATTACK............................................7

2. THE OBJECT OF THE ATTACK WAS NOT CIVILIAN OBJECT BUT A

MILITARY OBJECT.............................................................................................................8

3. THE PERPETRATOR INTENDED SUCH CIVILIAN OBJECTS TO BE THE

OBJECT OF THE ATTACK.................................................................................................9

4. THE CONDUCT TOOK PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF AND WAS ASSOCIATED

WITH AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT.........................................................9
 5. THE DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT
ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF AN ARMED CONFLICT..................................10

COUNT 4 WITH RESPECT TO THE DEATHS OF 25 DETAINEES HELD ON

THDEATHSTAR AND AT THE TRANSIT CAMP IN CANCIFEROUS BETWEEN
JANUARY AND MARCH 2020: WILFUL KILLING AS A WAR CRIME PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 8(2)(A)(I) OF THE ROME STATUTE.................................................................11

1. THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY WITH

RESPECT TO THE ALLEGED WAR CRIME......................................................................11

1. THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE AN EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND

CONTROL OVER THE PERPETRATORS INVOLVED IN THE CRIMES...................11

2. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOW THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME

WHEN HE SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT THE FORCES WERE COMMITTING
OR ABOUT TO COMMIT SUCH CRIMES......................................................................11

3. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE POWER TO PREVENT OR REPRESS

THEIR COMMISSION.......................................................................................................12

4. THE PROSECUTION LACKS THE CONTENTIVE EVIDENCE TO FRAME THE

DEFENDANT FOR THE CAPTIONED VIOLATION......................................................12

2. THERE WAS NO COMMISSION OF CRIME UNDER ARTICLE 8(2)(a)(i) OF THE

ROME STATUTE...................................................................................................................13

1. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT KILL ANY PERSON.................................................13

2. SUCH PERSON OR PERSONS WERE PROTECTED UNDER ONE OR MORE OF

THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949........................................................................14

3. THE CONDUCT TOOK PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF AND WAS ASSOCIATED

WITH AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT.......................................................15

4. THE PERPETRATOR WAS AWARE OF FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT

ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF AN ARMED CONFLICT..................................15
 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

COUNT 3 WITH RESPECT TO THE ATTACK OF THE CHAMELEON ON 6

JANUARY 2020: ON THE BASIS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDERS
AND OTHER SUPERIORS AS PER ARTICLE 28 OF THE ROME STATUTE,
INTENTIONALLY DIRECTING ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIAN OBJECTS, THAT
IS, OBJECTS WHICH ARE NOT MILITARY OBJECTIVES AS A WAR CRIME
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 8(2)(B)(II) OF THE ROME STATUTE.
It is worthwhile to mention that the hon’ble court lacks the jurisdiction to adjudicate the
present attack due to lack of authority to analyse since the flag nation of the vessel does not
intend to bring the defendant under the scrutinization of the present Article for the destruction
of the Chameleon. Even if the court considers the elements of crime, in that case too the
defendant stands not guilty. The Defendant is not criminally liable on the basis of commander
responsibility under Art. 28 of Rome statute under this provision, military commanders are
held criminally responsible for the crimes committed by their armed forces or subordinates
under their effective control or effective Authority or control as a result of his or her failure to
exercise his control properly. Since the essentials of the superior responsibility are not
fulfilled therefore the defendant is not criminally liable for the captioned attack. The
defendant is not liable for the war crimes of intentionally directing attacks against civilian
objects under Art. 8(2)(b)(ii) in respect to the destruction of the chameleon on grounds that;
firstly, chameleon was not a civilian object; secondly the defendant did not intend to attack a
civilian vessel; thirdly, the defendant was not in the position to effectively control the forces
since he was not aware of the attacks directed towards chameleon.

COUNT 4 WITH RESPECT TO THE DEATHS OF 25 DETAINEES HELD ON

THDEATHSTAR AND AT THE TRANSIT CAMP IN CANCIFEROUS BETWEEN
JANUARY AND MARCH 2020: WILFUL KILLING AS A WAR CRIME PURSUANT
TO ARTICLE 8(2)(A)(I) OF THE ROME STATUTE.
The Defendant is not criminally liable on the basis of commander responsibility under Art. 28
of Rome statute under this provision, military commanders are held criminally responsible
for the crimes committed by their armed forces or subordinates under their effective control
or effective Authority or control as a result of his or her failure to exercise his control
properly. Since the essentials of the superior responsibility are not fulfilled therefore the
defendant is not criminally liable for the captioned war crime. The Defendant is not liable for
the war crimes of wilful killing under Art. 8(2)(a)(i) with respect to the killing of 25
detainees, out of which 5 died on board and 20 died in the transit camp at Canciferous, on the
grounds that the death of the detainees is caused due to the unavoidable circumstances like
Deathicron and Weather conditions at Canciferous Coast; not due to the treatment inflicted
upon them by the forces of the defendant under his effective control. The resource deficit and
hostilities made the work of CAF and the treatment inevitably disturbed but it does not in any
case establishes the case that the death was inflicted upon them by the defendant. Further, the
defendant was not factually aware of the situation cropped up before the CAF due to attack
on the chameleon which itself does not have any causal link with the defendant and the
attack.
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

COUNT 3 WITH RESPECT TO THE ATTACK OF THE CHAMELEON ON 6

JANUARY 2020: ON THE BASIS OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF COMMANDERS
AND OTHER SUPERIORS AS PER ARTICLE 28 OF THE ROME STATUTE,
INTENTIONALLY DIRECTING ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIAN OBJECTS, THAT
IS, OBJECTS WHICH ARE NOT MILITARY OBJECTIVES AS A WAR CRIME
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 8(2)(B)(II) OF THE ROME STATUTE.
It is humbly submitted that the defendant does not have command responsible under Art. 28
of the Rome Statute for the war crimes of intentionally directing attacks against personnel
involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission under Art. 8(2)(b)(iii) with
respect to the killing of the five UN personnel, since, Art. 8(2)(b)(iii) of the Rome Statute
was not violated and secondly, the Defendant does not have command responsibility with
respect to the alleged war crime.

1. NO LOCUS OF MONSTERA AND DRL

It is worthwhile to mention that the vessel in the captioned transaction is privately owned and
registered in Chiobar1, therefore the right to invoke any sort of legal action is very well and
only and only vested to the flag nation 23 which is Chiobar in the present case 4. Further it is
submitted that the present allegation is with reference to the attack in the vessel and not on
the incidental casualties, therefore the safety obligations and the invoking rights related to the
ships are attributed only to the Flag Nation 5. Lastly the prosecution that is initiated against the
defendant is by DRL & Monstera6 and not by Chiobar therefore the veracity of the present
count in the initial stage seizes to exist.

2. THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY WITH

RESPECT TO THE ALLEGED WAR CRIME.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Defendant is not criminally
liable regardless of his superior position 7. In order to establish the liability of the

1
Statement of Agreed Facts. [3].
2
Barcelona Traction Case.
3
Vol. 94, The Hon Justice Winston Anderson, The Law of the Sea in the Caribbean, 226-227, Brill and Nijhoff
Jan 2022.
4
The legal action quoted in the section is explicitly related to the destruction of the ship.
5
Supra Note 3.
6
Statement of Agreed Facts. [47].
7
Art. 28(b), Rome Statute.
 Defendant on the basis of the responsibility of superiors as per Art. 28 to the Rome
statute, the following conditions must be fully established8.

i. Crimes were committed within the effective responsibility and control of the
superior.
ii. Either knew or owing to the circumstances at the time should have known that the
forces were committing or about to commit such crime and
iii. Failed to take necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to
prevent their commission.

I. THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE AN EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND

CONTROL OVER THE PERPETRATORS INVOLVED IN THE CRIMES.
It is contended by the defence that formal designation as the Defendant should
not be considered as a prerequisite for command responsibility to attach 9. The
Defendant being the president, does not make him a de facto a ‘superior’ with the
effective command and control over the Canciferous military especially during the
transition period.

II. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOW THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE

TIME WHEN HE SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT THE FORCES WERE
COMMITTING OR ABOUT TO COMMIT SUCH CRIMES.
It is contended by the defence did not know of the commission of the crime as no
report or news got to him about the same not until he received the report of the
same from ICC on 20th of June, 202010.

III. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE POWER TO PREVENT OR REPRESS 11

THEIR COMMISSION.
For the purpose of Art. 28, the defence humbly submits that “effective control”
requires that the commander have the material ability to prevent or repress the
commission of the crimes or to submit the matter to the competent authorities.
Any lower degree of control, such as the ability to exercise influence ‘even
substantial influence’ over the forces who committed the crimes, would be
insufficient to establish a superior responsibility.

8
Ibid.
9
Prosecutor v. Mucic et. Al, ICTY T. Ch., 16 November 1998, At [370].
10
Statement of Agreed Facts. [48].
11
Art. 86, Additional Protocol I.
 It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that it was held that the disregard or non-
compliance with orders or instructions of the accused indicates lack of effective
control12.
The indicators of effective control are a matter of evidence 13. In order to evaluate
the effectiveness of the commander’s control, it hence necessary to look to the
evidence provided on a case-by-case basis14. It is provided that the Defendant’s
orders were to assess the character and check each and every vessel pursuant to
the and further use any lawful means necessary to secure the weapon15.

It is thus established that the Defendants does not have superior responsibility with
respect to the alleged war crime on grounds that he did not have effective responsibility to
the commission, he did not know about the commission of the crime and he did have
power to repress or prevent the commission of the crimes.

3. THERE WAS NO COMMISSION OF CRIME UNDER ARTICLE 8(2)(b)(ii)

OF THE ROME STATUTE.
It is worthwhile to mention that the Hon’ble Court lacks the jurisdiction to scrutinize the
captioned charge, even if the elements of the crime are to be examined; it is contended by the
defendant that the prosecution lacks in evidence and content to establish the obligation of
defendant towards the same. Furthermore, the elements of the present crime are examined in
the following manner:

1. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT DIRECT ANY ATTACK.

It is humbly submitted that the directions with reference to the treatment of the ships and
vessels in that dip were clear from the side of the defendant. The defendant chose the way of
immense heedfulness towards the upcoming ships and interception and not to aggressively
attack on the same in order to neutralise the defence of the MDF16.

12
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber III, Judgment pursuant
to Art. 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08, 21 March 2016, At [190].
13
Prosecutor v. Blaskic (2004), ICTY, IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment (“Blaskic”), At [69].
14
Prosecutor v. Mucic et al., ICTY A. Ch., Judgement, 20 February 2001, At [197].
15
Statement of Agreed Facts. [29].
16
Statement of Agreed Facts. [29].
The attack that was done was impulsive and quick 17, done without the consideration of the
president. Therefore, an important element of directing an attack which is the causal link 18
between the defendant and the attack remains unsatisfied and isolated.

2. THE OBJECT OF THE ATTACK WAS NOT CIVILIAN OBJECT BUT A

MILITARY OBJECT.

The second element demands that the object must be a civilian object, the definition of the
civilian object and the additional phrase added to the element shows the intent of the
principal i.e., when it is categorically mentioned that object should be something which is are
not of military objectives it is intended of them to envelop the civilian objects under military
objects19 which are used for the military objects. Therefore, the nature and the attack on the
civilian object must be analysed as behaviour20.

The behaviour of the vessel was of the military object, it was carrying the Radish21 System
which was a defensive system22 which; by the way of its location near the port of Milkeno; by
its nature of carrying that particular weapon; by its way of purpose and use in the battlefield
against the CAF would have offered a definite military advantage. Moreover, the presence of
the MDF personnels were also present on the vessel that is claiming to be a civilian ship23.

Therefore, even if the court engages in the examination of the crime against defendant, the
element of it being a civilian object is infertile to a extent that the charge on this sole basis
should be quashed.

3. THE PERPETRATOR INTENDED SUCH CIVILIAN OBJECTS TO BE THE

OBJECT OF THE ATTACK.
It is contended by the defendants never had the intention to attack the civilian objects
therefore he resorted to the checking and strict surveillance, the attacks that were done while
17
Statement of Agreed Facts. [34].
18
Werle, G., ‘Principles of International Criminal Law.’, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague, 98. (2005). See also;
Ibid At [66]. See also; International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, [Hereinafter Additional Protocol I], Art. 49. See also; Prosecutor v
Ntaganda (Decision) ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II ICC-01/04-02/06, 9 June 2014 at [10].
19
Military objects are those which are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use
make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization,
in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. See Art. 52(2) Additional Protocol I.
20
Prosecutor v. Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, Sous scellés Décision concernant les éléments de preuve et les
renseignements fournis par l’Accusation aux fins de délivrance d’un mandat d’arrêt à l’encontre de Germain
Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-4-tFRA, 6 July 2007, para. 41.
21
The Rapidly Detect Identify & Shoot System.
22
Statement of Agreed Facts. [26] [27].
23
Statement of Agreed Facts. [38].
the hostilities were ongoing were all directed towards the military objects and even the
weapons that were used for the attacks were precision guided missiles 24. Therefore, the
argument based on the pattern of indifference and recklessness with respects towards civilian
life and objects is not made out which is sufficient to satisfy the intent is not present at the
part of element25.

It is humbly submitted to the Hon’ble Court that there is not causal link between the action of
the defendant in that particular time frame and the captioned attack that establishes the
specific intent. The court has previously specified that this intention is in addition to the
standard mens rea requirement provided in Article 30 ICC Statute, that is, there must be a
“Dolus Directus” of first degree, that is, a concrete intent26. The concrete intention is to
acquire the Radish system by peaceful means and not to attack any sort of civilian object.
Therefore, the defendant is not liable for the attack on, destruction of Chameleon.

4. THE CONDUCT TOOK PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF AND WAS

ASSOCIATED WITH AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that there is no requirement for a legal
evaluation by the perpetrator as to the existence of an armed conflict or its character as
international or non-international; In that context there is no requirement for awareness by the
perpetrator of the facts that established the character of the conflict as international or non-
international; There is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances that
established the existence of an armed conflict that is implicit in the terms “took place in the
context of and was associated with”.

5. THE DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT

ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF AN ARMED CONFLICT.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that there is no requirement for a legal
evaluation by the perpetrator as to the existence of an armed conflict or its character as
international or non-international; In that context there is no requirement for awareness by the
perpetrator of the facts that established the character of the conflict as international or non-
international; There is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances that
24
Statement of Agreed Facts. [22].
25
Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in the Republic of Korea, Article 5 Report, June 2014, para. 65.
26
Abu Garda, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-02/05-02/09-243-red, 8 February
2010, para. 93; Katanga and Chui, ICC PT. Ch. I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/07-
717, 30 September 2008, para. 271.
established the existence of an armed conflict that is implicit in the terms “took place in the
context of and was associated with”.

COUNT 4 WITH RESPECT TO THE DEATHS OF 25 DETAINEES HELD ON

THDEATHSTAR AND AT THE TRANSIT CAMP IN CANCIFEROUS BETWEEN
JANUARY AND MARCH 2020: WILFUL KILLING AS A WAR CRIME PURSUANT
TO ARTICLE 8(2)(A)(I) OF THE ROME STATUTE.

1. THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY WITH

RESPECT TO THE ALLEGED WAR CRIME.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Defendant is not criminally liable
regardless of his superior position27. In order to establish the liability of the Defendant on the
basis of the responsibility of superiors as per Art. 28 to the Rome statute, the following
conditions must be fully established28.

i. Crimes were committed within the effective responsibility and control of the
superior.
ii. Either knew or owing to the circumstances at the time should have known that the
forces were committing or about to commit such crime and

27
Art. 28(b), Rome Statute.
28
Ibid.
 iii. Failed to take necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to
prevent their commission.

1. THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE AN EFFECTIVE COMMAND

AND CONTROL OVER THE PERPETRATORS INVOLVED IN THE
CRIMES.
It is contended by the defence that formal designation as the Defendant should not be
considered as a prerequisite for command responsibility to attach 29. The Defendant being the
president, does not make him a de facto a ‘superior’ with the effective command and control
over the Canciferous military especially during the transition period.

2. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT KNOW THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE

TIME WHEN HE SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT THE FORCES WERE
COMMITTING OR ABOUT TO COMMIT SUCH CRIMES.
It is contended by the defence did not know of the commission of the crime as no report or
news got to him about the same not until he received the report of the same from ICC on 20 th
of June, 202030.

3. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE POWER TO PREVENT OR

REPRESS31 THEIR COMMISSION.
For the purpose of Art. 28, the defence humbly submits that “effective control” requires that
the commander have the material ability to prevent or repress the commission of the crimes
or to submit the matter to the competent authorities. Any lower degree of control, such as the
ability to exercise influence ‘even substantial influence’ over the forces who committed the
crimes, would be insufficient to establish a superior responsibility.

It is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that it was held that the disregard or non-compliance
with orders or instructions of the accused indicates lack of effective control32.

The indicators of effective control are a matter of evidence 33. In order to evaluate the
effectiveness of the commander’s control, it hence necessary to look to the evidence provided
on a case-by-case basis34. It is provided that the Defendant didn’t even knew about the attack

29
Prosecutor v. Mucic et. Al, ICTY T. Ch., 16 November 1998, At [370].
30
Statement of Agreed Facts. [48].
31
Art. 86, Additional Protocol I.
32
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, International Criminal Court, Trial Chamber III, Judgment pursuant
to Art. 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/05-01/08, 21 March 2016, At [190].
33
Prosecutor v. Blaskic (2004), ICTY, IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment (“Blaskic”), At [69].
34
Prosecutor v. Mucic et al., ICTY A. Ch., Judgement, 20 February 2001, At [197].
therefore it was far from ascertainment that the attack would result in detainment of MDF
personnels.

It is thus established that the Defendants does not have superior responsibility with respect to
the alleged war crime on grounds that he did not have effective responsibility to the
commission, he did not know about the commission of the crime and he did have power to
repress or prevent the commission of the crimes.

4. THE PROSECUTION LACKS THE CONTENTIVE EVIDENCE TO

FRAME THE DEFENDANT FOR THE CAPTIONED VIOLATION.
It is most humbly submitted to the Hon’ble court that the present count is directed towards
the defendant without any substance by the prosecution. There is no denying in the death of
25 detainees, neither it is denied that they died meanwhile the hostilities were going on, and
they died under the custody of the CAF. But it is not justiciable to accuse the defendant for
the same due to the following reasons; firstly, the count is with respect to the death of
detainees and related to their treatment; secondly, there is no causal link between the actions
of the defendant and the principal crime; thirdly, the intent of the defendant was clear by the
fact that, a search and rescue operation was conducted to save the MDF personnels and the
crew members; fourthly; the detainees died a natural death as there was outbreak of
Deathicron which led to their death despite many attempts made by the CAF to save them.

2. THERE WAS NO COMMISSION OF CRIME UNDER ARTICLE 8(2)(a)(i) OF

THE ROME STATUTE

Act of God: it is respectfully submitted that the detainees died a natural death was as a result
of uncontrollable situations from the torrential rains, sporadic weather of which amounted to
pneumonia and boils. The similarity of the symptoms compared to that of Deathicron was
such that a man of ordinary prudence could believe that they have contracted the deadly
disease. Going to the hospital was not visible since hostilities were still on and the safety of
the detainees had to be guaranteed, the difficulties in transferring them to a convenient place
clearly shows how impossible it became to convey them to the hospital. Majority of the
military personnel and doctors ran aware during the outbreak of diseases due to the
unfavourable weather condition; they were not wilfully left without care or assistance; proper
steps were taken by Admiral Neptune who provided them an area to cultivate their own food
suitable for their religion and capable to build their mental health. There was also the
delegation of Ms. Flexi to take care of them and contact medical doctor if necessary; the fact
that the doctors were not contacted indicates that the necessity did not arise, no intentions has
been made out as the motive to kill them. Deathricon was so high and had tendency of
causing death in a short span of time, no attempt was made by Monstera to evacuate its
citizens.

All these factors point toward the irresistible conclusion that President Moscow did not
willfully kill the detainees and cannot be held liable for the alleged war crime.

1. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT KILL ANY PERSON.

It is worthwhile to mention that the deaths of the detainees occurred in a peculiar situation
and the reason for the death of the detainees is still unknown 35, even if an inference were to
be made of the death reason the most factually logical path that the court can take is of
Deathicron and it is needless to say that it was not induced by the defendant.

It is imperative to note that, firstly if we look at the factual instances to ascertain what was
the intent of the forces that the CAF first rescued the detainees and then medically treated
them, following the proper regulations of medical treatment of the prisoners of war 36. The
forces did the best they could in that situation. The soldiers converted unused cabins so as to
ensure there was a place to sleep, they made available toilet, bar soaps, food and water
equivalent to what were given to the CAF soldiers37. There is no mention of suffering or
serious shortage injury done to the body, no torture, biological experiments or inhumane
treatment but only shortage of resources, they were not forced to serve the military of by any
means, and no fair trial was being denied. It has been seen that hostilities were still on, there
was no possibility of going beyond the basics in protecting the prisoners.

Secondly, it is respectfully submitted that the detainees died a natural death was as a result of
uncontrollable situations from the torrential rains, sporadic weather of which amounted to
pneumonia and boils. The symptoms were such that any man of ordinary prudence could

35
Statement of Agreed Facts. [43], [46].
36
Art. 15, Geneva Convention III.
37
Statement of Agreed Facts. [44].
believe that they have contracted the deadly disease. Going to the hospital was not feasible
since hostilities were still on and the safety of the detainees had to be guaranteed.

Thirdly; Majority of the military personnel and doctors ran away due to the outbreak of war.
The detainees were not wilfully left without care or assistance; proper steps were taken by
Admiral who provided them an area to cultivate their own food suitable for their religion and
capable to build their mental health. There was also the delegation of Ms. Flexi to take care
of them and contact medical doctor if necessary; the fact that the doctors were not contacted
indicates that the necessity did not arise, no intentions has been made out as the motive to kill
them.

All this put together to a trail proves that the intent of the defendant was not kill anyone but
rather to save the detainees, in which he failed due to unavoidable circumstances and for that
the present article does not make him criminally liable.

2. SUCH PERSON OR PERSONS WERE PROTECTED UNDER ONE OR MORE

OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949.
It is humbly submitted that the detainees were protected under the Geneva Convention III and
the conduct of the forces towards them was according to the convention. The conduct weas
the best that the CAF could offer at that time, since CAF was suffering from resource deficit
due to the war.

3. THE CONDUCT TOOK PLACE IN THE CONTEXT OF AND WAS

ASSOCIATED WITH AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that there is no requirement for a legal
evaluation by the perpetrator as to the existence of an armed conflict or its character as
international or non-international; In that context there is no requirement for awareness by the
perpetrator of the facts that established the character of the conflict as international or non-
international; There is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances that
established the existence of an armed conflict that is implicit in the terms “took place in the
context of and was associated with”.

4. THE PERPETRATOR WAS AWARE OF FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES THAT

ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF AN ARMED CONFLICT.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that there is no requirement for a legal
evaluation by the perpetrator as to the existence of an armed conflict or its character as
international or non-international; In that context there is no requirement for awareness by the
perpetrator of the facts that established the character of the conflict as international or non-
international; There is only a requirement for the awareness of the factual circumstances that
established the existence of an armed conflict that is implicit in the terms “took place in the
context of and was associated with”.

PRAYER

The Defendant respectfully prays that this Hon’ble Court declares that the Defendant is not
criminally liable for the;

1. War crime under Art. 8(2)(b)(xi) of the Rome statute in respect to the attack killing 8 MDF
soldiers, 43 fishermen and 26 Monsteran coast guards on 4 to 5 October 2019.

2. War crime under Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome statute in respect with respect to the cutting
of the undersea cable on 29 October 2019.

3. War crime under Art. 8(2)(b)(iii) of the Rome statute in respect to the attack of the
Chameleon on 6 January 2020.

4. War crime under Art. 8(2)(a)(i) of the Rome statute in respect to the deaths of 25 detainees
held on the Deathstar and at the transit camp in Canciferous between January and March
2020.
 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

AGENTS FOR THE DEFENDANT