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Econometrica
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE MODEL
7 Indeed, in all cases, the quantitative changes which would have been required
lay within the standard errors of the constants to be altered.
8 Cf. Klein-Goldberger, op. cit., p. 95 and Figure 29, p. 102.
to be applicable for more than a few years,9 we had to re-estimate all the
tax relationships. Therefore, at the suggestion of A. Goldberger,10 we
adopted a new set of tax functions, which assumed that the tax policies of
1952, interpreted as relationships between real variables, would continue
indefinitely into the future. These are incorporated into the tax equations
which appear in Appendix B. 1.
We were also forced to alter the interest rate equations. Since the excess
bank reserves, Rt, are taken as exogenous, the short term interest rate (is
and the long term rate (iL)t can both be computed without reference to
the rest of the system. With the small values of Rt typical of the postwar
period, it is evident from the short-term interest rate equation [Eq. (15)]
that (is)t will double (roughly) every decade. And yet there is no restoring
force within the system to keep this quantity at a reasonable value! Simi-
larly, (iL)t will, ultimately, become equal to about 0.7(is)t. In view of the
fact that such a projection would eventually result in economic nonsense,
we decided to suppress the interest rate equations and to fix (arbitrarily)
the short term rate at 2.5 % and the long term rate at 3.5 %.
Lastly, the agricultural price equation was re-evaluated, using only the
postwar data. The reason for this alteration was the admittedly unsatis-
factory behavior of the form used by Klein and Goldberger."
We were still not in a position to follow the long-term development of
this system, however, as it was necessary to extrapolate the exogenous
variables far into the future. This was done, in some instances, by fitting
a least-squares straight line to the postwar data. But, in the case of govern-
mental expenditures, the discontinuity because of the Korean War and the
subsequent intensification of military preparedness, imparted a trend to
the postwar data much steeper than could reasonably be expected to
continue. Therefore, we estimated the rate of increase of government ex-
penditures by fitting a straight line to both the prewar and the postwar
points, omitting only those of 1951 and 1952. The level was chosen to coin-
cide, more or less, with that of those latter two years. With this procedure
we found that our extrapolation leads to numbers which appear to be consis-
tent with current experience.
On the other hand, agricultural subsidy income and the number of farm
operators have a declining trend. For these quantities it seemed more
appropriate to use a fit of the form
X-~ a + t-a
b
in order that they never become negative. Finally, since there was no obvious
trend, during the postwar period, for the index of hours worked and the
index of farm exports, both were taken as constant. The extrapolations
of all the exogenous quantities appear in Appendix B. 2. The initial values
of the lagged variables are listed in Appendix B. 3.
3. CALCULATIONAL PROCEDURE
After all the preceding considerations were taken into account, it turned
out that neither memory space nor running time was a serious limitation on
the use of the IBM 650. Therefore, the problem was coded for the machine
in a straightforward manner. As a matter of interest, the computations for
one year could be made during an operating time of about one minute.13
900 90
700 - _ 70
600 - - 60
GC GSS INVESTMENT (DEFLATED)D LT
(BI) (BILLIONS OF 1939 DOLLARS)
SCALE-SCALEX
500 - b OX-<t
4 00 - 4 0
300 - c30
100
100 ~-
~~~~~~~(BILLIONS
SCALE
OF 1939 DOLLARS) 1
O . , ,. ~~~~~~I I I i l I O0
O 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
13 The actual time depends on the number of iterations required for convergence;
in the linear part of the time path, the first guess is adequate.
Our first machine data decided the issue unequivocally. After a brief
"settling-down" period, the system is quite monotonic and essentially linear.
These is no hint whatever of any internally generated business cycle, and,
indeed, even in the first few years, the shock of start-up is not sufficient
to induce more than a single turning point in any variable. Of course, since
most of the exogenous trends are fitted by straight lines, it is not surprising
that the overall character of the solution is linear, rather than, say, quadra-
tic, but the absence of oscillations is less obvious (a priori) and more signi-
ficant.
The time paths of several of the more important quantities are depicted
in Figure 1. The several curves in Figure 1 represent the projections of the
price index and of the real values of GNP, consumer expenditures, and
gross private investment, respectively. The approximate behavior of the
rest of the variables may be inferred from the information in Table j.14
In an attempt to see whether the qualitative properties of the solution
are at all sensitive to the starting conditions, we reduced the magnitudes
of all but seven15 of the initial values of the real quantities by 10 per cent.
The results of this calculation possessed the same general character as had
been observed previously. As might have been anticipated, the new ordinates
were invariably lower, and, except for corporate savings, the slopes of the
curves tended to be the same or smaller. The linearity was even more
marked with the reduced inputs; indeed, only two variables showed any
turning points at all. These were corporate savings and corporate surplus,
both of which were actually negative for several periods. Since, in view of
these results, it was felt that small variations in our input would not lead
to significant differences in the natuye of our solution, a more detailed in-
vestigation of the influence of initial values upon the operation of the
model was postponed to a future date.
The implications of these results are quite clear. Since the economic
variables in the Klein-Goldberger model grow almost linearly with time,
it is apparent that this scheme does not contain an intrinsic explanation
of a persistent oscillatory process. That is, the complete lack of even a
broad hint of cyclical behavior in the absence of shocks precludes the appli-
cation of the Klein-Goldberger analysis to economies in which oscillations
are presumed to develop spontaneously. The conclusions one may draw
from this observation lie anywhere between the two extreme positions which
follow. On the one hand, if one wishes to retain the hypothesis that periodic
cumulative movements are self-generated in the course of the growth
14 The authors will be happy to furnish, upon request, the detailed results of their
computations.
15 The ones excluded were N w, h, NE, NF, NG, N, NP (for explanation of symbols,
see Appendix A).
TABLE I
t (years)
24 3060 90 120
Variable* (first year) 30
next period saw the return of national income, farm receipts, and total
employment to their pre-shock trends. However, it was not until the
fourth year after the disturbance that real private employee compensation
achieved its unperturbed level, as the price index rose more rapidly than
the wage rate. Meanwhile, possibly as a result of the fact that consumer
expenditures lagged yet another period, there was a mild business recession
+5 . I l25
-35s F ~~~~FIGURE 2
40I 1 I 1 I I
0 5 l0 5 20 25 30 35
YEARS AFTER SHOCK
this
in the SHOKE
fourth TIME
year, the PAl,teeonm a setialH
effects of which were euneSoisbai qii the rest of the
felt throughout
economy for the next two periods. The subsequent boom reached its peak
(with respect to its unperturbed trend) about eight years later, and then
tapered off extremely slowly over an additional 22 years or so. While
calculations were not continued beyond this point, it appears that, after
brium path, except for the price and wage indices18 and for the cumulative
corporate surplus (all of which remained lower).
While the details of the response of a Klein-Goldberger economy to a
strong shock will depend on the nature of the perturbation, it would appear
likely from this calculation that even a very strong shock will not permanent-
ly distort the long-run path of the economy. In other words, the Klein-
Goldberger system is stable. Nevertheless, a sharp disturbance does suffice
to create a business cycle of depth comparable to that which one would
expect in an actual economy under a corresponding inpulse. And, while
the duration of the cyclical movement is much longer than that normally
observed in practice, it is probable that the later stages of such a cycle,
if it really existed, would be obscured by the intervention of new exogenous
shocks.
18 The real wage rate, however, does return to its equilibrium trend by the end of
the cycle.
19 The idea that economic fluctuations may be due to random shocks was first
suggested in 1927 by E. Slutzky, "The Summation of Random Causes as the Source
of Cyclical Processes," translated into English in Econometrica, Vol. 5 (1937), pp. 105
ff. It was also suggested independently by R. Frisch, op. cit.
20 T. Haavelmo, "The Inadequacy of Testing Dynamic Theory by Comparing
Theoretical Solutions and Observed Cycles," Econometrica, Vol. 8 (1940), p. 312.
7. SHOCKS OF TYPE I
600 I i 60
24 30 4 5 0 0 80 9400lI S
0; 4 30 40 50 60 ~~~~ACTUAL U.S. lo l 2
(FIRST YEAR)
procedure for each of the exogenous variables and adding the calculated
shocks to the appropriate trend values, we arrived at a set of shocked exo-
genous quantities to use as inputs for the tth period. The values of the
endogenous variables for this period were then found, of course, as before.
Some of the results obtained with shocks of type I are summarized in
Figure 3. The solid lines in this graph portray the computed time paths
of GNP, consumption, and corporate profits, while the dotted lines repre-
sent actual time paths of these variables for the postwar portion of the
sample period.26 From this figure, it would seem that the introduction of
forces of type I into the model generates 3 to 4 year swings in the variables
of the system. However, the same graph also reveals that the average am-
plitude of the "cycles" induced by random shock on exogenous quantities
is unrealistically small. It would appear, then, that type I perturbations
of reasonable magnitude superimposed upon the Klein-Goldberger model will
not produce the sort of cyclical behavior observed in the actual economy.
We shall therefore proceed to see whether shocks of type II will prove more
promising.
8. SHOCKS.OF TYPE II
To understand the origin of shocks of type II, one should recall that, in
the process of fitting their empirical data, Klein and Goldberger endowed
each of their behavioral equations with a random error term.27 At least
three sources of irregularity could produce this term. In the first place,
simplifying assumptions are inevitable whenever one wishes to construct
a concrete model of a realistic economy. Some of these abstractions are
made for convenience, others because the precise equations of motion
of an economic system are not yet known. Variables which in practice exert
a direct influence upon the solution may be suppressed from several of the
equations, made exogenous, or omitted entirely; similarly, relationships
which are an integral part of the description may be lost in the process
of approximation. Moreover, in predictive models, inherently nonlinear
relationships are often treated in a linear approximation for the sake of
expediency. In view of these considerations, it is reasonable to expect
that the inexactness of the functional form of the Klein-Goldberger equations
as a representation of the economic behavior of our society contributes
to the size of the random error term.
Secondly, even if the Klein-Goldberger relationships did have a functional
form derived from indisputable theory, the fact that the coefficients are
based upon empirical data would imply a random error term, as a result
of the usual sampling fluctuations. These include, for example, the uncer-
tainty of the degree to which the sample is representative of the universe,
as well as the changes in accounting practices, coverage, and reporting
techniques which generally occur in the collection of data over a long period
of time.
26 The data for the actual time paths are taken from Klein-Goldberger, op. cit., pp.
131-133.
27 This is standard econometric procedure; cf. Klein-Goldberger, op. cit., pp. 42-46.
28 The equations involved are (1) - (8) and (10) - (13) of Appendix A.
60 l l 1 1 60
300
19 4 5- 19 52
Since the effects of shocks of type II are much larger than those of type I
disturbances, the same statement can be made for a system in which both
kinds of perturbations are present. And, in view of the fact that, on a
priori grounds, either type of shock may be present in an actual economy,
it would seem appropriate to carry out our more detailed analysis for the
case in which both forces are present.
several economic series? Do the time paths of the individual variables of the
model correspond to those observed in the United States economy? In other
words, if a business cycle analyst were asked whether or not the results of
a shocked Klein-Goldberger computation could reasonably represent a
United States-type economy, how would he respond?
To answer these questions we shall apply to the data techniques developed
by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)30 for the analysis
of business cycles.
One property of cyclical fluctuations in an industrial economy is a
marked tendency for a clustering of peaks and troughs of individual econom-
ic time series about particular reference dates. It is, in fact, precisely this
characteristic of business cycles that Burns and Mitchell use as their criterion
for the dating of turning points in the United States economy.3' And,
inasmuch as the oscillations in the Klein-Goldberger model occur in response
to random (i.e., noncorrelated) perturbations, a study of the simultaneity
of occurrence of peaks (and troughs) will provide us with quite a stringent
test of the validity of the model.
As in the normal NBER procedure,32 we first date the specific cycles;33
i.e., we determine all the turning points of each of the several time series.
Then, to establish the reference dates33 for the turning points of the overall
business cycle, we examine the data for bunching (in time) of specific cycle
peaks and troughs.34
Table II is a summary of some of the relevant characteristics of the
business cycles observed in our shocked Klein-Goldberger economy. In
examining this table, one should recall that intervals and dates can have
30 The methods and results of the NBER work are summarized in A. F. Burns
and W. C. Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles (National Bureau, 1946) and in W. C.
Mitchell, What Happens During Business Cycles (National Bureau, 1951).
31 Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 10-1 1.
32 See Burns and Mitchell, op. cit., Ch. 2.
33 In the rest of this paper we will need the definitions of several quantities prevalent
in the literature of business cycles. See, for example, Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 9-11, or
Gordon, op. cit., p. 232.
(1) Reference dates are those dates which mark the turning points of overall business
activity in the economy.
(2) A reference cycle of an economic variable V represents the behavior of V between
the reference dates marking two consecutive minima of overall business activity.
(3) A specific cycle of V represents the behavior of V between the dates marking
two consecutive minima of V itself.
34 Our procedure corresponds to that of the NBER (cf. Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 10-12).
As a basis for establishing the reference dates we used all the Klein-Goldberger endoge-
nous quantities except the 5 tax variables. A reference peak (trough) was said to occur
(in our data) during any year in which the modal number of specific cycle peaks occurs,
provided that at least 10 peaks (troughs) are found in a two-year period which in-
cludes the model year.
TABLE II
REFERENCE DATING FOR SHOCKED KLEIN-GOLDBERGER MODEL
- 27 - 2 - - - - - -
29 31 2 1 2 8 6 1 6 4
32 37 5 1 1 8 5 4 7 4
38 42 4 1 1 10 0 1 13 1
43 45 2 1 2 7 4 0 10 0
46 51 5 2 2 11 1 3 8 3
53 54 1 2 4 12 1 2 10 4
56 59 3 1 1 10 1 1 11 4
60 63 3 1 2 7 6 4 6 2
64 68 4 2 6 6 3 5 7 1
70 72 2 1 2 7 3 1 13 1
73 74 1 1 2 9 1 2 8 2
75 77 2 1 2 8 4 0 10 2
78 79 1 1 2 8 2 3 9 3
80 83 3 2 2 12 1 1 7 3
85 86 1 2 4 12 2 2 11 2
88 90 2 1 2 12 2 1 11 4
91 94 3 2 3 10 1 3 1 1 3
96 98 2 4 5 8 3 1 9 3
102 106 4 1 3 12 2 3 10 2
107 109 2 1 4 9 1 5 11 2
110 113 3 1 2 11 4 5 7 1
114 116 2 1 5 7 4 3 13 0
117 119 2 1 1 8 8 4 9 3
120 - - - - - - - -
Average per
cycle 2.56 1.48 2.61 9.22 2.82 2.39 9.43 2.34
Percent of
Specific Cycles
Represented _ - 14.5 51.2 15.7 13.3 52.4 13.0
35 Computed from the NBER dating for the period 1854-1949, reproduced in
Gordon, op. cit., p. 216. We omitted from our averages the Civil War cycle and those
corresponding to the two World Wars.
36 These percentages were estimated from Chart 3 (pp. 16-17) of G. H. Moore,
Statistical Indicators of Cyclical Revivals and Recessions (National Bureau Occasional
Paper 31, 1950). Moore's graph was presented on a monthly basis and included the
years 1885-1940.
37 Mitchell, op. cit., Table 15, pp. 154-155, Table 16, pp. 159-167, and Table 42,
pp. 312-325.
0u1 Z o
I~regula
ICoincdet lI)aCicdn Ii>e_,~
COMPARISNFKLE-GDBY
quantitative, in the sense that the duration of the cycle, the relative length
of the expansion and contraction phases, and the degree of clustering of
peaks and troughs are all in numerical agreement (within the accuracy of
measurement) with empirical evidence. Therefore, we shall study the
Klein-Goldberger cycles in more detail.
Table III summarizes, for the shocked Klein-Goldberger model, some of
the significant features of the specific cycle patterns observed in the endo-
genous variables. As can be seen from columns 6, 7, 14, and 15, the segre-
gation of the Klein-Goldberger economic variables into leading, coincident,
and lagging series is quite similar to the division of the analogous quantities
in the United States economy by the NBER. (Columns 2 - 5 and 10 - 13
give the data which lead to our grouping; the NBER separation into
categories is taken from Mitchell.37) Of the 20 series listed, 12 are classified
as coincident series at both peaks and troughs. These are gross national
product (Y + T + D), national income Y, gross investment I, private
employee compensation WI, non-wage non-farm income P, employment
Nw, corporate profits Pc, corporate savings Sp, corporate surplus B,
capital stock K, the general price index p, and the index of agricultural
prices PA. In addition, consumption C coincides at peaks, but has a tendency
to lead at troughs. All of these results are in accord with NBER experience
(when available), except that the United States specific cycles for consump-
tion coincide, rather than lead at the troughs.
Three additional variables (corporate liquid assets L2, real wages wI/,
and the capital-output ratio K/Y) are in inverse coincidence with the business
cycle, in the sense that their troughs tend to occur at reference peaks and vice
versa. Unfortunately, we were unable to find the identical items among
the NBER data; however, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, these
inverse relationships are eminently reasonable. As far as L2 is concerned,
for example, both transactions demand and investment opportunities are
reduced as business activity falls and therefore liquid surpluses should
begin to accumulate.38 Indeed, the NBER has some experimental data to
support the proposition that the cash component of L2, at least, tends to
rise as the downturn develops (and vice versa).39
With respect to the capital-output ratio, it too should fall in times of
expansion and climb during a contraction. From a theoretical point of
view, as shown by Duesenberry,40 a non-decreasing capital-output ratio
during a business expansion would imply a rising marginal efficiency of
investment. But the marginal efficiency of investment cannot increase unless
38 An excellent description of this process can be found in Gordon, op. cit., p. 270-271.
39 Mitchell, op. cit., p. 148.
40 J. S. Duesenberry, Business Cycles and Economic Growth (McGraw-Hill, 1958),
p. 112.
the capital-output ratio drops. Therefore, the capital-output ratio must fall
during the boom phase. Furthermore, the time required for the formation
and depletion of the capital stock exceeds the time lag inherent in the pro-
duction of consumer goods; this too implies that the capital-output ratio will
move in a direction opposite to that of the general level of economic activity.
With regard to w/p, both Marshall4l and Keynes42 suggested that real
wages tend to vary inversely with the level of output and employment.
This theorem, which has been thoroughly discussed in the literature,43 is
consistent with our observations. In addition, experimental data concerning
the movement of real wages in industrial economies,44 while somewhat in-
conclusive, tend to confirm the calculated inverse behavior of this variable.
Of the remaining four quantities, the NBER considers farm income
to concur with the general business cycle and money wage rates w to
coincide at troughs and to lag at peaks. We, on the other hand, find the
former series to be irregular and the latter to lag everywhere. But, as is
evident from Table III, the NBER data for agricultural incomes do not
show a very high degree of conformity to the overall business cycle (especially
at the troughs), and farm output itself (in real terms) tends to have a
higher correlation with metereological cycles than with business cycles.45
For wages, the disagreement between the behavior of the shocked Klein-
Goldberger model at the troughs and the NBER analysis may simply
be a reflection of the fact that the Klein-Goldberger equations do not
appear to allow enough interaction between unemployment and wage rates.46
In our study personal liquid assets L1 tend to lead at peaks and to lag
somewhat irregularly at troughs. We have not encountered comparable
NBER series. However, one might attribute a lead in personal liquidity
at a peak to the de facto financing of the last stages of the boom by dis-
hoarding on the part of overoptimistic consumers, and the lag at a trough
to the satisfaction of pent-up demand in the light of renewed income pros-
pects.
Finally, depreciation D leads, in our calculations, at both troughs and
peaks. While Fabricant47 has found that depreciation charges tend to
show much less cyclical fluctuation than corporate gross income or physical
output, our computations do not exhibit this behavior. But, it should be
noted that, first of all, the Klein-Goldberger depreciation is deflated and
more complicated than that of Fabricant, and, secondly, that Fabricant's
data cover only the first fourteen years immediately following World War I.
We feel, therefore, that existing empirical work is inconclusive on this point,
especially in view of the complex nature of any realistic measure of depre-
ciation.
Columns 8 - 9 and 16 - 17 of Table III present the indices of conformity48
of the specific cycles to the expansions and contractions of the business
cycles of both the Klein-Goldberger data and the NBER statistics.49
These indices measure the correlation between the direction of movements
in the individual series which comprise the business cycle and that of the
overall economic fluctuations which result. In evaluating the data, one
should note that those NBER indices which are preceded by an asterisk in
the table are based upon only four complete cycles and therefore that they
can assume no numerical values other than 0, ? 50, and ? 100. While, by
definition, an index of + 100 denotes perfect concurrence in direction of
specific cycles with the general business cycle for all four cycles, an index
of + 50 for these data states merely that, in exactly three out of the four
cases examined, the series expanded during the reference expansion (or
contracted during the reference contraction).
As can be seen from this table, there is reasonably good agreement
1 0. CONCLUSIONS
the solution resumes its unperturbed equilibrium growth trend even after
a strong exogenous disturbance.
On the other hand, when random shocks of a realistic order of magnitude
are superimposed upon the original form of the Klein-Goldberger equations,
the cyclical fluctuations which result are remarkably similar to those de-
scribed by the NBER as characterizing the United States economy. The
average duration of a cycle, the mean length of the expansion and contrac-
tion phases, and the degree of clustering of individual peaks and troughs
around reference dates all agree with the corresponding data for the United
States economy. Furthermore, the lead-lag relationships of the endogenous
variables included in the model and the indices of conformity of the specific
series to the overall business cycle also resemble closely the analogous
features of our society. All in all, it would appear that the shocked Klein-
Goldberger model approximates the behavior of the United States economy
rather well.
In view of these results, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the gross
characteristics of the interactions among the real variables described in
the Klein-Goldberger equations may represent good approximations to
the behavioral relationships in a practical economy. There are, of course,
a number of significant defects in the detailed workings of the Klein-
Goldberger system. For example, the treatment of the monetary quantities
and the interconnections between them and the real sector both need
improvement. Nevertheless, the representation would seem to offer a
good working basis for the investigation of cyclical fluctuations, especially
if the deficiencies mentioned above are corrected.
But, the behavior of the Klein-Goldberger system under random pertur-
bations is also suggestive from another point of view. Ever since the path-
breaking article of Frisch on the propagation of business cycles, the possi-
bility that the cyclical movements observed in a capitalistic society are
actually due to random shocks has been seriously considered by business
cycle theorists. The results we have found in this study tend to support
this possibility. For, the agreement between the data obtained by imposing
uncorrelated perturbations upon a model which is otherwise non-oscillatory
in character is certainly consistent with the hypothesis that the economic
fluctuations experienced in modern, highly developed societies are indeed
due to random impulses.
Of course, these random impulses are not necessarily synonymous with
an exogenous theory of the business cycle. For, as we saw in Section 8
above, it was primarily shocks of type II which led to agreement between
the cyclical behavior of the model and that of the United States economy.
And, the reader will recall, these shocks may reflect inexactness in the
model, statistical inaccuracies in the fits, or inherent randomness in the
1. Explanation of Symbols
(3) * (SP)t =- 3.53 + 0.72 (Pc - Tc)t + 0.076 (Pc - Tc - SP) t-1 - 0.028 Bt1
(4)* (Pc)t = -7.60 + 0.68Pt
(8)* wt -wt- = 4.11 -0.74(N -Nw -NE- NF) + 0.52(pt-l pt-2) + 0.54t
(9)* (Fs)t=0.32+0.0060(W +W2-Tw+P-TP+A +A2-TA)t
+ 0. 81(F.,)t
275.4
(21) Tt = 0.0924(Y + T + D)t-
1398.1
(22) (Tw)t 0.1549(W1)t + 0.1310(W2)t Pt
548.2
(23) (Tc)t = 0.4497(Pc)t + Pt
pt-
APPENDIX B
1. The equations that, for the actual calculations, replaced their counterparts of
Appendix A
2. Extrapolations
Nt 44.53 + .964t
ht= 1.062
Gt = 19.892 + .567t
.0746
(A2)1t .108 + t-16
(FA)t 171.86
Y +T +D 172.0 h 1.062
C - 111.4 W2 15.12 15.70
W, - 78.65 G - 33.5
A, - 7.3 A2 0.1187 0.1173
I - 24.3 FA 171.86
K - 41.5 NP- 159.6
D - 19.35 N - 67.63
Pc - 16.51 NE - 6.53
P - 35.17 NF - 4.25
SP - 1.9 NG - 9.71
B - .19 is 2.5 2.5
Nw ~~- 56.0 i r. 3.5 3.5
Li ~- 95.2
L2 - 38.1
w - 326.2
P 197.5 202.4
P A - 303.0
T - 14.51
Tw -8.63
TA - 838
TC 10.14
TP 13.72
is .512 .20
iz L.146 .0423
h .0185 .018
W2 1.77 .123
G .88 .026
A2 .0192 .16
FA 12.2 .071
NP .086 .00054
N .125 .0018
NE .114 .017
NF .234 .055
NG .975 .10
t Based on residuals from our re-estimated equation for PA for the years
1946-52.