RASHTRASANT TUKDOJI MAHARAJ NAGPUR

UNIVERSITY’S
DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR COLLEGE OF LAW, NAGPUR.

B.A. LL.B 5 YEARS

FOURTH SEMESTER

SUBMITTED BY
URVI KEWLANI
CASE
VINOD DUA
V.
UNION OF INDIA & ORS 2021
Date of judgement :3 June 2021
Court: Supreme court of India
Case type : Writ petition (CRL) no. 154 of 2020
Bench : Uday Umesh Lalit and Vineet Saran
Referred : Section 124A,268,501,505 Indian Penal Code, Sections 52 and 54 of The Disaster
Management Act, and Section 188 with Section 195 and 511.

INTRODUCTION
The phase of lockdown has indeed been a time of appraisal of various issues varying from
mental issues to political issues that gripped everyone in one of the darkest months of
humanity. Everyone was expected to be humane and try to help each other in all ways possible
and that is when the media and their associates played a crucial role in providing crucial
information to the people and also guide the people through their problems and prevent panic
and spread of misinformation.
To provide true and fair information, it is highly necessary for journalists and media
professionals to critically review the activities of individuals or groups that could cause a large
impact on society including the government. The above case proved that the journalists do
retain the right to critically review the administration and actions of the government and due
importance would be given to every profession and opinion and journalism being the fourth
pillar of democracy and its freedom must be retained.
The court held that, a citizen has a right to criticize or comment upon the measures undertaken
by the Government and its functionaries, so long as he does not incite people to violence
against the Government established by law or to create public disorder and reminded us of our
right to criticize and to keep up the Freedom of speech and expression.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Mr. Vinod Dua, Padmashri recipient and a journalist by profession for the past many decades
had released a YouTube video on his YouTube channel named, HW News Network on 30th of
March, 2020 as an episode of his show “The Vinod Dua Show”. The petitioner Mr. Dua, in
this video spoke about the nationwide lockdown, the critical health issues caused by Covid-
19. He also added that the government did not have sufficient facilities for testing. Another
thing spoken about was the lack of sufficient information on the availability of materials like
PPE kits, N95 masks, etc. He then added about the major labor migration issue faced in our
country. It was alleged that the petitioner was spreading false and malicious news relating to
the Prime Minister of India and that is inciting violence amongst the citizens and disturbing
the tranquility of the public. The petitioner placed his stand by saying that contents in the video
are pure and simple critical analyses of the functioning of the Government and cannot by any
stretch of imagination be said to be alleged offenses.
An FIR (FIR No.0053) was registered on 6th June 2020, referring to two timestamps of the
video on the following time making the statements:
5 minutes and 9 seconds of the video – He states that Prime minister Narendra Modi has used
deaths and terror attacks to garner votes.
5 minutes and 45 seconds of the video – he claims that the government does not have enough
testing facilities and has made false statements about the availability of the Personal Protective
Kits (PPE) and has stated that there is no sufficient information on those. Further, he also went
on to state that ventilators and sanitizer exports were stopped only on 24th March 2020.
The FIR was lodged under Section 124A, 268, 501, 505 Indian Penal Code. Additionally, the
petitioner was sent a notice for an appearance at the police station in Kumarsain, Himachal
Pradesh under Section 160 Code of Criminal Procedure. The petitioner stated his various
health issues and travel restrictions in place to travel from Delhi to Himachal Pradesh and
connected through various virtual modes.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The case of Vinod Dua v. Union of India and Others, 2021, has its roots in the historical context
of freedom of speech and expression in India, along with the evolving landscape of media
regulation and the role of journalists in a democratic society.
The Indian Constitution, adopted in 1950, guarantees the fundamental right to freedom of
speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). This provision forms the bedrock of democratic
discourse in India, allowing citizens, including journalists, to express their opinions and
critique the government without fear of censorship.
Over the years, the Indian media landscape has witnessed significant growth and
diversification, with print, electronic, and digital media playing crucial roles in disseminating
information, shaping public opinion, and holding power to account. Journalists like Vinod Dua
have been instrumental in this process, often serving as watchdogs who expose corruption,
injustice, and maladministration.
While the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and expression, it also allows for
reasonable restrictions in the interest of public order, decency, and morality, among other
grounds (Article 19(2)). However, the interpretation and application of these restrictions have
been subject to debate and controversy, particularly concerning the autonomy of journalists
and media organizations.
In recent years, there have been concerns raised about the shrinking space for dissent and
criticism in India, with journalists facing threats, intimidation, and legal action for their work.
This has led to discussions about the chilling effect on free speech and the need to safeguard
the independence of the media from government interference.
In the case of Vinod Dua, the specific allegation stemmed from a YouTube video in which he
made critical remarks about the government's handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. The FIR
filed against him in Himachal Pradesh accused him of making statements that could incite
communal hatred, leading to a legal battle over the boundaries of free speech and the state's
power to regulate it.
Overall, the historical background of the case underscores broader tensions between freedom
of speech and the need for responsible journalism, as well as the challenges faced by journalists
in navigating legal and political pressures while fulfilling their roles as public watchdogs.
ISSUES
Whether the petitioner used sedition in his comments under 124A of IPC?
Whether the petitioner is guilty of a public nuisance or an illegal omission that caused injury
under 268 of IPC?
Whether the petitioner’s comments were defamatory as according to section 501 of IPC?
Whether the petitioner’s comments were conducing to public mischief under section 505 of
IPC?
Whether there is a necessity for the judiciary to establish a committee to check and clear the
FIRs issued against the persons of media with at least 10 years’ experience?
PETITIONER S ARGRUEMENTS
The petitioner’s counsel strongly argued that Section 124A, 268, 501, and 505 of IPC cannot
be charged on him because the video is a pure and critical analysis of the functioning of the
government and cannot be quoted under the above offenses and as a journalist the petitioner
was entitled to do so.
Going by the definition of Sedition under Section 124 A of IPC, it states about performing
certain acts which would bring hatred or contempt, etc. to the Government of India, established
by law which would incite violence or create a public disturbance. The petitioner’s counsel
argued that the petitioner has not performed any action against the Government of India that
would incite violence or create a public disturbance.
The petitioner sought the quashing of the FIR lodged against him in Himachal Pradesh, the
petitioner sought guidelines from the Supreme Courtin respect of lodging of FIRs against
persons belonging to the media of a particular standing as done in the case of medical
professionals vide judgment in Jacob Mathew v. the State of Punjab (2005) 6 SCC 1 para 51,
52 affirmed by the Constitution Bench judgment in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar
Pradesh and Ors. (2014) 2 SCC 1 .
The petitioner’s counsel argued that the statement is given in the FIR, “Hon’ble Prime Minister
used threats and terror acts to garner votes”; and “Prime Minister garnered votes through the
act of terrorism” was factually incorrect and such an assertion was never made by the
petitioner.
The council also argued that the elements required for the act to be defined as an offense
under Section 501 and 505 were not established anywhere.
The counsel finally raised the argument stating that initiating a criminal proceeding against the
petitioner is an abuse of the process and being violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed
under the Constitution of India and requested the FIR to be quashed.
RESPONDANTS ARGUMENTS
The counsel of the respondents argued that the petitioner had attempted to spread
misinformation or inaccurate information a create a situation of panic amongst the people.
They took the support of the statement, “ some people feared that there could be food riots
post lockdown” which was baseless and held the complete potential to destroy the peace
among the citizens. Such an action would be covered and be punishable Under Sections 52
and 54 of The Disaster Management Act.
1. Section 52 – Punishment for false claims.
2. Section 54 – Punishment for a false warning.
Regarding the second prayer, the counsel argued that if the prayer was to be granted then it
would seem like the judiciary is overstepping in the field and area of the legislature. They also
go on to say that any preliminary inquiry as suggested by the petitioner would be opposed to
the law and not sanctioned or not permitted by law.
The council added that the petitioner did not physically arrive before the Himachal Pradesh
Police and stated that the matter would come under Section 188 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure read along with Section 511 of the Indian Penal Code for disobeying the orders of
the concerned authorities. They also requested an investigation on the same matter as they
let Section 188 be brought along with Section 195 and would be relatable to the stage of
cognizance by Court and not in anterior stages and as such the matter be allowed to be
investigated.
According to the Norms of Journalist Conduct framed by the Press Council of India (2010
Edition), the petitioner was obliged to check the facts, data, and their sources thoroughly and
authenticate before publishing or making such statements in the light of the pandemic.
CONCLUSION
JUDGEMENT
The Supreme court concluded the petition with the judgment as follows:
The court quashed FIR No. 0053 dated 6.5.2020, registered at Police Station Kumarsain, Distt.
Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, against the Petitioner, The court embarked “… a citizen has a right
to criticize or comment upon the measures undertaken by the Government and its
functionaries, so long as he does not incite people to violence against the Government
established by law or to create public disorder; and that it is only when the words or
expressions have pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance
of law and order that Sections 124A and 505 of the IPC must step in.”
Thus, the court commented that it was within the right of the petitioner as a journalist that he
exercised his concern, and he held all the rights to criticize the actions of the government.
However, the court rejected the prayer that no FIR be registered against a person belonging to
the media with at least 10 years of standing unless cleared by the Committee as suggested. The
Court stated that it is the duty of the legislature and judiciary should not overstep to their area
or field of duty.
RATIONALE
The arguments were mainly based on Section 124A,268,501,505 Indian Penal Code, Sections
52 and 54 of The Disaster Management Act, and Section 188 read along with Section
195 and 511.
Section 124A (Sedition) 268 (Public Nuisance) and 505 (Statements conducing to public
mischief) –
According to the FIR, the petitioner was spreading fear and panic among the citizens and
raising hatred or contempt towards the Government of India and the respondents strongly felt
that when the video is seen in totality it held the ability to create panic and hatred towards the
government whereas the respondents told that it was a pure and simple critical analysis of the
functioning of the government and the petitioner is entitled both as a journalist and as a citizen
provided by the fundamental right promised under Article 19(1)(A), i.e., right to freedom of
speech and expression. On analysis, we can state that no charges of sedition can be put on the
petitioner from the following:
The petitioner never said that the Prime Minister used terror attacks or terrorism to garner his
votes rather he spoke about Pulwama and Pathankot attacks and Balakot airstrikes to garner
votes and these are sufficient to hold the view that no allegations were made against the Prime
Minister.
The comment made on the availability of N95 masks, PPE kits, and testing facilities not being
adequate is just an appraisal of the situation then.
The issue regarding the migration of workers was to be analyzed in the manner that the
migration had begun much before the petitioner even made such a comment and the statement
was just a concern of the petitioner as a journalist.
Thus, we can conclude by agreeing to the court stating that the statements “can at best be
termed as an expression of disapprobation of actions of the Government and its functionaries
so that prevailing situation could be addressed quickly and efficiently.
They were certainly not made with the intent to incite people or showed a tendency to create
disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence.” It can be concluded that since
these charges are removed any prosecutions on the same grounds would be a violation
of Article 19(1)(A).
This subdues the main charges imposed on the petitioner in the FIR lodged against him for
posting the video on YouTube. There were also charges on him for not following the order
seeking his physical presence for interrogation on the FIR.
Sections 52 and 54 of The Disaster Management Act (Punishment for false claim and
warning) – The court clearly stated that the petitioner had posted his concern and had only
criticized and commented on the measures taken by the government and in no way tried to
create a sense of panic among the people.
The court held that “… a citizen has a right to criticize or comment upon the measures
undertaken by the Government and its functionaries, so long as he does not incite people to
violence against the Government established by law or to create public disorder; and that it is
only when the words or expressions have pernicious tendency or intention of creating public
disorder or disturbance of law and order that Sections 124A and 505 of the IPC must step in.”
Further when we look into the previous cases dealt in the supreme court like Express
Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors on 7 October 1985 and Sakal Papers (P)
Ltd., And Others vs The Union Of India on 25 September 1961, we get the opinion of the court
on criticizing the government that the court believes that, “concept of a free press is freedom
of political opinion and at the core of that freedom lies the right to criticize the Government,
because it is only through free debate and the free exchange of ideas that Government remains
representation to the will of the people and orderly change is effected.”
Thus, we can conclude by stating that the petitioner was acting responsibly, and even during
the time of this disaster(pandemic), the petitioner just exercised his rights and nothing beyond.
• Section 188(Disobedience to order duly promulgated by the public servant) read along
with Section 195 (Prosecution for contempt of the lawful authority of public servants,
for offenses against public justice and offenses relating to documents given in evidence)
and 511 (Punishment for attempting to commit offenses punishable with imprisonment
for life or other imprisonments) –
The petitioner had sent a response to the concerned authorities after he received the notice to
appear for the interrogation and he cited the obstacles he was facing in doing so due to his
health conditions and they are:
1. Notice as per Himachal Pradesh Covid guidelines dated 11.05.2020, any person coming
from the red zone is directed to be in institutional quarantine for 14 days. Since the
petitioner resides in New Delhi which is currently a red zone, he would be forced to be
in quarantine for 14 days.
2. The petitioner is 66 plus years old, as per Ministry Of Health guidelines, all citizens of
65 plus age were asked not to travel due to health safety risks.
3. Further, the petitioner suffers from Thalassemia minor with Iron deficiency anemia,
pancytopenia (low red & white blood cell and low platelet count), chronic liver disease
with portal hypertension & splenomegaly, diabetes, and hypothyroidism. He also has
esophageal varices with a high risk of bleeding. Therefore doctors have stated that
stepping out of his house would be life endangering.
 4. He then promised to join the interrogation via online medium.
Stating all such medical problems supported by a medical certificate and guidelines issued by
the Ministry of Health. The court let go of the charges on him and ordered the concerned
authorities to either go to his residence to interrogate or else conduct it through an online
medium. This order does seem reasonable to look after the health conditions of the petitioner
as a citizen of the country.
Prayer II of the petitioner (creation of a committee) – The Court ruled out the prayer stating
that it is the duty of the legislature and judiciary should not overstep to their area or field of
duty. The court considered Kedar Nath Singh vs. the State of Bihar (20.01.1962 – SC) and
stated that the journalists are entitled to protection as every prosecution Under Sections
124A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code must be in strict conformity with the scope and ambit
of said Sections as explained in, and completely in tune with the law laid down in Kedar Nath
Singh.
This does seem fair to let the legislature decide whether to take the initiative to establish such
a committee consisting of various dignified individuals.
OPERATING PART
The court grants Vinod Dua protection from coercive action related to the FIR filed against
him in Himachal Pradesh.
Any pending legal proceedings against Dua are stayed until further notice.The court affirms
the importance of freedom of speech and expression, particularly for journalists, while also
emphasizing the responsibility to adhere to ethical standards and avoid incitement to violence
or communal disharmony.
The state authorities are directed to refrain from harassing or intimidating journalists for
expressing their opinions or critiquing the government, in accordance with the principles of
democracy and the rule of law.
IN CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the judgment in the case of Vinod Dua v. Union of India and Others reaffirms
the fundamental importance of freedom of speech and expression in a democratic society.
While recognizing the need for reasonable restrictions to prevent harm or disruption, the court
upholds the rights of journalists to engage in robust public discourse without fear of reprisal.
This decision underscores the essential role of the media as a watchdog and guardian of
democratic values, ensuring transparency, accountability, and the protection of individual
liberties.
OPINION
In my opinion, the judgment in the Vinod Dua case represents a significant victory for press
freedom and democratic principles in India. It highlights the crucial role of journalists in
holding power to account and fostering informed public debate. By affirming Dua's right to
express his views without facing harassment or intimidation, the court sends a powerful
message about the importance of protecting dissenting voices and upholding the rule of law.
However, it's essential for journalists to exercise their freedom responsibly, adhering to ethical
standards and avoiding speech that could incite violence or division within society. Overall,
this decision is a positive step towards strengthening democracy and ensuring that the voices
of all citizens, including journalists, are heard and respected.
REFERENCES
Cases related to 124A
Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code deals with the offense of sedition, which broadly covers
acts or speech intended to incite disaffection against the government. In the context of the case
of Vinod Dua v. Union of India and Others, which revolves around freedom of speech and
expression, several other cases related to Section 124A have been significant in shaping the
legal landscape:
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962): This landmark case before the Supreme Court of
India upheld the constitutionality of Section 124A but clarified that mere criticism of the
government or comments on its policies did not constitute sedition unless it incited violence
or public disorder. The court held that the section must be applied narrowly to avoid infringing
on the right to free speech.
Balwant Singh and Another v. State of Punjab (1995): In this case, the Supreme Court
reiterated that for an act to constitute sedition, it must involve incitement to violence or public
disorder. Mere strong words or criticism of the government, however harsh, do not amount to
sedition.
S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram (1989): While not directly related to sedition, this case is
significant for its affirmation of the importance of freedom of speech and expression in a
democratic society. The court held that restrictions on speech must be narrowly construed and
applied only in cases of imminent harm.
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015): This case, which dealt with the constitutionality of
certain provisions of the Information Technology Act, reaffirmed the principle that restrictions
on freedom of speech and expression must be narrowly tailored and cannot be used to suppress
legitimate dissent or criticism.
Arundhati Roy Contempt Case (2002): While not a sedition case, this case involving the author
Arundhati Roy is often cited in discussions about free speech. The Supreme Court emphasized
that criticism of the government, however sharp, is not contempt of court as long as it does not
impair the administration of justice.
Cases related to section 501
Section 501 of the Indian Penal Code deals with printing or engraving matter known to be
defamatory. It states that whoever prints or engraves any matter, knowing or having good
reason to believe that such matter is defamatory of any person, shall be punished with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
R. Rajagopal alias R.R. Gopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994): In this case, the Supreme Court
of India recognized the right to privacy as a part of the right to life and personal liberty under
Article 21 of the Constitution. The court also discussed the importance of balancing this right
with the freedom of the press, particularly in cases involving the publication of private or
defamatory information.
Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016): In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutional validity of criminal defamation laws in India, stating that they serve a legitimate
aim in protecting individual reputation. However, the court also emphasized that such laws
should be applied judiciously and not be used as a tool to stifle criticism or dissent.
Cases related to 505
Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 620: In this case, the Supreme Court of India
held that for an offense under Section 505 IPC to be made out, it is necessary that the accused
must have intended to incite or should have known that his words were likely to incite one
class or community against another. Mere insult to a particular community or promoting
enmity between different groups without the intent to incite violence may not be sufficient to
attract Section 505.
Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 7 SCC 431: In this case, the Supreme
Court reiterated that for an offense under Section 505 IPC to be established, there must be a
direct causal connection between the statement made and the likelihood of public disorder.
Mere possibility of public disorder is not sufficient; there must be a real and imminent danger
of public disorder.