ECONOMICS (III) – THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT AND

INDIAN ECONOMY

Privatization Of Water In India: Lessons From The Global South

NAME ROLL NO.

Sonsie Khatri 2067

Sanidhya Kumar Sanhwal 2058

Submitted to:
Dr. Kranti Kapoor
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law
ABSTRACT

This study examines the privatization of water services in India, comparing it with experiences from
other countries in the Global South that share similar socio-economic conditions. Our objective is to
assess whether the approach to privatizing water supplies, a trend gaining traction globally, is a viable
and beneficial strategy for India. By scrutinizing the outcomes of water privatization in countries
within the Global South, we aim to identify lessons that could inform India's approach to managing its
water resources.

The paper begins by setting the context: the shift from state-controlled to privately managed water
supply systems, influenced by neoliberal economic policies advocating for minimal state intervention
in markets. This global trend towards privatization has been promoted by international financial
institutions, suggesting it as a solution to enhance efficiency and access to water services. However,
the transition has sparked debates on its effectiveness and equity, particularly in countries with vast
socio-economic disparities.

We delve into a detailed literature review of privatization models, focusing on the

Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, which has been prevalent in the Global South. This section
aims to dissect the academic discourse on water privatization, highlighting its purported benefits and
the challenges encountered in practice. Key issues such as tariff increases, access to water, the role of
regulatory frameworks, and the impact on community water sources are critically analyzed.

Drawing parallels with India's cautious steps towards privatizing water services, the paper examines
how similar or divergent India's experiences are compared to other countries. We explore the
implications of privatized water supply in urban, semi-urban, and rural settings in India, assessing the
potential for improved water access and quality against the backdrop of increased costs and the need
for strong regulatory oversight.

The concluding section synthesizes these insights, reflecting on the broader implications of privatizing
water supply in a socio-economic setting like India's. It contemplates the balance between achieving
efficiency and ensuring equitable access to water, a critical public resource. The paper aims to
contribute to the ongoing debate on water privatization by offering a nuanced understanding of its
impacts, guided by the experiences of the Global South and the specific challenges faced by India.
INTRODUCTION

The late 20th century marked a gradual change in the dominant voices in the sphere of economic
policy.1 With the decline of Keynesian thought (which advocated greater state intervention) due to the
stagflation that economies across the globe experienced, the 90’s saw an upsurge of economic opinion
belonging primarily to the ‘neoliberal’ ideology.2 The change was primarily due to what was
understood as excessive economic intervention of the state, and therefore a revival of the belief in free
markets with minimal state interference. This policy was not only advocated by the economic powers
of the global ‘North’3 but also aggressively pushed as reform measures for the global ‘South’ by
international development and aid agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank (WB). Neoliberal4 reforms usually came as conditionalities accompanying loans, which
required structural reforms, in line with neoliberal policy, of several sectors of the recipient country’s
economy.5 6
One of the key aspects of the reform was greater privatisation in sectors that had
traditionally been dominated by public sector units. This also included a liberalisation policy for
economies that had previously been reluctant to open their doors to foreign trade and investment. In
the more recent past, the early 21st century, there has been a greater pressure on economies of the
global South to open their public utilities sector to private players both domestic and international. It
is in this context that the debates around privatisation of public utilities have developed and taken
shape in public opinion today.

In the specific context of India, privatisation of water is being adopted in pockets across the country,
across a diverse range of settings, including urban, semi urban, and rural areas. Unlike several other
nations which had privatised regimes imposed upon them by way of conditionalities as a part of
development loans from organisations like the World Bank, India’s turn to private water supply has
been far more cautious, but steady as there has been widespread recognition of the need to improve
water systems across the country in order to provide access to better quality and sufficient quantity of
water to its citizens. In this context, this paper while recognising the need for reform in the water
sector, seeks to enquire into the experiences with water privatisation both in the limited areas that
have experienced private water supply in India, and experience of other countries of the global south

1
Jessica Budds and Gordon McGranahan, Are the debates on water privatization missing the point?
Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America, Environment & Urbanization Vol 15 No 2, 87, (2003)
[hereinafter Budds 2003]
2
Id.
3
The global North-South categorization is essentially based on socio economic indicators. Developed part of
North America, Western Europe and developed part of Eastern Asia are usually considered as the North,
whereas underdeveloped regions like Latin America, most of Africa, growing economies of Asia and the Middle
East are understood as the global South.
4
Neoliberalism can be understood as a revival of liberal economic thought, characterized by an emphasis on
lassie faire or free market economics. The Oxford English Dictionary,3rd Edition, 2010.
5
Budds 2003, page 92.
6
Ken Conca, governing water: contentious transnational politics and global
institution building 221-23 (2006)
that have had prior experience with private water systems. The core aim of the paper is to enquire into
past experiences and analyse the principled economic arguments regarding privatisation. In doing so it
aims to assess the suitability of a privatised water supply model7 in the Indian context.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Not much of the discussion in the academic domain has been centred on the core economics of
theoretical models of privatisation. Rather most of the available literature is in the form of reviews of
privatised water systems that have been put in place across the world, and to analyse the economic
benefits from the same. For the purposes of this paper most of the reviewed literature has been from
privatised schemes implemented in the global south. The rationale for this classification is the socio
political and economic similarity of the global south to the Indian socio economic setting, for the core
aim of this paper is to draw upon existing instances of privatisation to analyse its suitability to the
Indian economic setting.

The primary model of privatised water supply in the global south

A general survey of the academic research would suggest that there are primary six major models of
water privatisation. Amongst them, one particular model has been widely implemented across the
global south. The first one is known as the concession contract or the BOT model.8 BOT refers to
build own and transfer, with variations including BOOT (Build own operate transfer). Essentially
under this kind of contract, the private party, either domestic or international, invests in the building of
water systems, operates these systems for an extended period, usually 20 years or so, and then
transfers’ ownership of the same to the state. During the period of privatisation, the role of the state is
primarily that of a regulator.

Existing literature on privatisation of water systems of in the global south

Latin America has been a hotspot of water privatisation especially in the late 20th and early 21st
9
century. Studies have primarily identified privatisation as conditionality to several international
loans, particularly those from the World Bank.10 Instances of privatisation leading to escalating prices
and lockdown of community water resources has been identified as a common trend in Latin America,

7
In the context of models of privatisation models, this paper engages primarily with the BOT (Built Own
Transfer) model and its variants, in light of the fact that they have empirically been the most preferred model
of private investments in the water supply sector in economies of the global south including in India.
8
Budds 2003, page 90
9
Silva, Gisele, Nicola Tynan and Yesim Yilmaz (1998), “Private participation in the water and sanitation sector –
recent trends”, Private Sector Viewpoint Note No. 147, PPIAF, World Bank,Washington DC
10
Gleick, Peter, Gary Wolff, Elizabeth Chalecki and Rachel Reyes (2002), The New Economy of Water:
the Risks and Benefits of Globalization and Privatization of Fresh Water, Pacific Institute, Oakland,
California
most starkly seen in Bolivia. 11 Similar projects that were undertaken in Argentina, (Buenos Aires and
12
Tucuman) all highlighted as “model projects” collapsed. Available literature on privatisation has
explored the claims of the private sector and neoliberal thought of whether, privatisation implies a
better alternative to public sector managed water systems. Most reports have suggested that private
players have failed to provide wider access. The primary criticism is rooted in the increase in the
prices of water connections and supply that have typically occurred post privatisation. Studies have
identified two primary reasons for this, first private players are usually unwilling to provide water at
concessional rates due to their profit motivation and second private contracts usually come with
clauses that ensure a part of the capital investment cost is recovered from its water supply (Budds
13 14
2003). This removes the possibility of ensuring that water tariffs remain low. It has also been
15
suggested (Budds 2003) that private water supply providers have the incentive and the tendency to
engage in ‘cherry picking’ or enhancing investment and water supply systems only in those places
that have larger and more affluent populations who have the ability to pay, thus restricting its scope to
large cities only. While this may not suggest that private entities do not supply water to poorer nations
and smaller towns, it has empirically been shown that such investments happen only under low risk
16
conditions at prices that suit the profitability of the company. Studies have also highlighted the
importance of existing infrastructure as an incentive to private operators. Even in the BOT model, the
Latin American experience has shown how operators prefer to invest in improvement of existing poor
supply systems, rather than building and expansion of the entire water supply system to promote
17
greater access. Despite the view of many western economists, the global perception in both the
public eye and the view of the academia has interpreted privatisation of water systems in Latin
America as an overall failure. Despite starting with great promise, four of the major private water
supply contracts were shut down within a few years of their operations. 18

Studies on sub Saharan Africa too have findings similar to those of Latin America. However in the
case of sub Saharan Africa, one crucial difference regarding the condition of privatisation exists.
Unlike that of in the case of Latin America, water privatisation in the African economy was not rooted
as much in conditionalities alongside international loans as they were due to the weakness of their

11
Gaurav Trivedi, Rehmat, and Shripad Dharmadhikary, Water: Private Limited, 2nd Edition, 2007 [hereinafter
Water 2007]
12
Id. Page 3
13
Jessica Budds and Gordon McGranahan, Are the debates on water privatization missing the point?
Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America, Environment & Urbanization Vol 15 No 2, 87, (2003)
14
Mulreany JP, Calikoglu S, Ruiz S, Sapsin JW. Water privatization and public health in Latin America. Rev Panam
Salud Publica. 2006;19(1):23–32.
15
Supra.1 Page 103
16
Supra 12, page 7
17
Id.
18
Buenos Aires, Tucaman, Cochabamba and Trinidad & Tobago were the four iconic privatized water contracts
that were terminated primarily due to poor performance, escalating prices and denial of access to the weaker
sections of society.
own water systems. Sub Saharan Africa suffers from a lack of strong public sector water systems, and
instead relies on informal and local systems of water supply. 19 This problem of a weak public sector is
rooted in the general lack of political stability and strong government in the majority of the states in
the region. Studies have identified this as one of the key barriers to successful private water systems in
20
the region. It has been noted that often in the case of investment agreements, the bargaining power
of the respective parties, that is the state and the international private water providing organisation,
has been a crucial factor. This has often led to cases where countries have signed agreements that have
been greatly in favour of the private water providers, in terms of both investment capital benefits as
well as risk mitigation assurances. Additionally the institutional weakness of the state has often meant
that despite instances of violations of contractual norms by the private water supplier, the state
regulators have been unable to take punitive action against them, especially keeping in mind the need
21
to promote investor confidence in the international market. Studies have shown that a disparity in
the bargaining power has often led to the absence of contractual provisions regarding mandatory
provision of water supply to rural areas, or other deprived areas. The incentivisation of investment has
often occurred with profit assurances to the private firm by the govt, and in extreme cases like
Bolivia, these have been as high as 15%. 22 The academic work regarding the privatisation of water in
Africa has had results similar to those in Latin America, regarded by most as a greater failure than
success.23 The general trend has clearly been of price rise with cases like Guinea where privatised
water supply led to unaffordable levels post privatisation. 24 Several studies have found that states that
were looking to privatise, had to often hike its prices pre privatisation in order to incentivise the
private players from entering into the competitive bidding process. 25

The issue has not only been that of the rising price levels, but also that of performance. Studies have
shown that like the instance of Latin America, even sub Saharan Africa has experienced very poor
performance of the private players in the water supply systems. (Bayliss 2003)26 In many instances
privatisation has often been brought into countries with well functioning water supply systems under
the public order, which post disinvestment and privatisation began to hike tariffs and decrease in terms

19
Jessica Budds and Gordon McGranahan, Are the debates on water privatization missing the point?
Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America, Environment & Urbanization Vol 15 No 2, 105, (2003)
20
Jean-Claude Berthélemy, Céline Kauffmann, Marie-Anne Valfort, Lucia Wegner, Privatisation
in Sub-Saharan Africa :Where do we stand?, OECD, 37, 2004
21
Supra 19 page 26
22
Supra 9, page 1
23
Kate Bayliss, Utility Privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study of Water, The Journal of Modern African
Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 507-531
24
Id. Page 517
25
Supra 13 page 55
26
Supra 22, page 518
of its performance indicators.27 However despite the drop in performance indicators, private water
suppliers have continually shown high profits and increase in share prices.28

The literature from the South Asian economies has proven to be no different from the above
experience. Global privatisation studies have shown that even in countries like Indonesia and the
Philippines, in addition to price hike and low access, regulatory issues like those in sub Saharan
Africa provide a major hurdle to a sustainable model of privatisation.29 In Vietnam, in Ho Chi Min
City, water rates were set at prices higher than the minimum wages, in order to allow the private water
supplier to recover his investment costs and costs of operation that were contractually mandated.30 In
the case of Indonesia, the privatisation contract provided for a minimum percentage of profit
clause(inserted to attract investment and reduce investor risk), which the private firm was unable to
31
regain from its water supply, hence requiring the government to make good the loss in revenue.
Studies have indicated that scenarios like these have resulted in government debt higher than those
that existed pre privatisation, due to which privatisation was introduced in the first place.

Despite the general claims of poor performance by private players in water supply systems, there has
32
been a clear trend of improvement of water quality in the areas where water has been privatised.
There also exists a section of the academia, although a clear minority, which empirically suggest that
claims of price escalation and poor performance, are not a universal reality. They point to several
cases in the USA and Western Europe to suggest that privatisation has been a success in providing
sustainable water systems for both domestic and industrial users.33 However such claims are refuted
34
by other academics by citing a flaw in their analysis of performance of private water suppliers.
Studies belonging to the latter faction highlight the flaw in the indicator that private firms use to
project their performance, the indicator being collection rates. Private water systems have much
higher collection rates than public water systems that they replace, simply because the access to water
is strictly regulated; only those who pay are supplied. However in light of the common case of
widespread price hikes, most of those who were previously unable to pay and yet had connections are
now, under the private regime, deprived of it. Studies have indicated widespread increase in the rates
of disconnection, due to inability to pay for water, in situations where private parties have been able to

27
Id.
28
This includes countries like Gabon where privatization had led to high water bills and reduction in number of
connections due to the inability to pay. See Id.
29
Supra 10, page 19
30
Id.
31
Id. Page 20
32
The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 507-531
33
David Mckenzie and Dilip Mookherjee, Paradox and Perception: Evidence from Four Latin American
Countries, 2012
34
Mulreany JP, Calikoglu S, Ruiz S, Sapsin JW. Water privatization and public health in Latin America. Rev Panam
Salud Publica. 2006;19(1):23–32.
project their high rate of collection as an indicator of their promising performance when compared to
the previous public system. 35

ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Linking international experiences of the global south to the limited Indian experience

As aforementioned the core aim of this paper is to provide a subjective textual analysis of the
suitability of privatised water system in the Indian context. The scoping of the project has been
limited to the experiences of nations of the global south keeping in mind their similarities with India,
as compared to the far more developed and prosperous states of the global north. The model of
privatisation, BOT and its variants, has also been a consideration, as the BOT model has been the
preferred model for the purposes of privatisation of several public utilities in the global south, and
36
especially popular in the case of privatisation of water systems. This is in contrast to the global
north countries where other models like the divestiture model both in its partial and complete form
have been adopted by England and Wales respectively. 37 The Indian approach towards privatisation of
water has been far more cautious, and unlike the Latin American experience not based on the
imposition of conditionalities. However in this section the paper would like to explore the similarities
between the limited experience in India and that of the cases discussed in the section above. In
furtherance of this end, it is important to draw upon the primary concerns regarding the privatised
water supply model as elucidated in the mainstream academia, to enable a comparative analysis of the
same to the Indian experience.

The escalation of tariffs both before and after privatisation of the water supply systems

The escalation of prices has been a near universal phenomenon with the implementation of privatised
systems of water supply. The Indian experiences to take the case of Khandwa, people were being
made to pay an exorbitant sum of Rs 11.25 a kilolitre.38 Similarly in the case of privatised water
supply of Nagpur prices rose by 35% which imposed a heavy burden especially on those who were

35
Supra 22 page 520
36
Bayliss 2003, page 515
37
Budds 2003, page 90
38
Tapping Profit, Frontline, Volume 29 Issue 16, August 2012
slum dwellers and other marginalised sections.39 If one were to look at the experience with privatised
water systems in the remainder of the global south, a similar trend would emerge. In extreme cases
40
like Cochabamba prices rose by 200%, while even in cases like Chile which is hailed as better off
amongst the privatised regimes, prices were significantly higher than what had been the case before
privatisation.41 Price hikes are synonymous with privatisation and water supply, largely due to the
profit motives of any private firm. A private firm would seek to enter a market only if it foresaw a
potential for profit in the market. In the case of water supply, this profit comes largely at the cost of
both the state and the consumers. In most privatisation contracts there exists a clause ensuring a
certain level of profit which is guaranteed to the investor, a feature much unlike most other fields of
investment. Additionally a part of the capital cost recovery fee and a higher delivery charge is
imposed on the users of the private water supply, a culmination of which leads to escalation of prices,
whose burden is borne both by the state and the consumers. While this may not be a major cause for
concern in more developed economies with higher income levels, in a low income poverty ridden
country like India, a higher tariff will impose a heavy burden on low income consumers.

Issues related to the performance of private companies and access to private water supply

One of the core issues questions in the privatisation debate has been that of access. One of the
promises of an improved water supply system in a privatised regime is that the access of water supply
42
will be widened with new private investment and expansion of the water system. However once
again it is the profit motivations of private enterprise that provide a barrier. The profit motivations of a
private entity will ensure that investment is used to provide water primarily to places where there is a
larger demand, and more importantly a greater willingness and ability to pay. This ensures that private
entities restrict their water supply primarily to the urban areas, as over a limited territorial space, and
with a smaller investment, they are able to recover a greater chunk of their costs. The incentive to
supply to remote areas is much lower especially as it often requires the laying of new supply systems
which require a significant amount of investment. An additional disincentive is the fact that the rural
communities empirically have one of the highest rates of defaulting on the higher tariffs that are
imposed by the privatised water systems.43

The performance indicators of privatised water supply are also deeply linked to question of
accessibility under a private water regime. One of the indicators of efficiency of a privatised water
system is an indicator called Non Revenue Water or NRW. A lower NRW is usually considered an

39
Indiawaterportal.org, (2015). Nagpur Municipal Corporation in troubled waters. [online] Available at:
http://www.indiawaterportal.org/articles/nagpur-municipal-corporation-troubled-waters [Accessed 13 Oct.
2015].
40
Budds 2003, page 108
41
Id.
42
Supra 23
43
Budds 2003 page 112
indicator of a better functioning water system as the system presumes the existence of a monopoly
condition. Thus the lesser amount of water not generating revenue and yet being used, the more
efficient a privatised water system is. In a setting like India where a large portion of the population is
rural and survives on informal water sources, there is a clear case for suggesting that this may be an
inappropriate performance indicator. The other indicator is perhaps more directly linked to the
question of access. Private bodies measure the rate of their success and efficiency in terms of their
collection rates. However collection rates do not reflect the number of people who have been excluded
from the water supply due to disconnections arising from the inability of the people to pay the higher
tariffs. Again a high incidence of disconnections has been the empirical reality across the global south,
and also in India’s limited experience in cases like Khandwa.44 This gives rise to a situation where
from the perspective of the private party the water supply system is working at an efficient level,
whereas the social reality involves a large scale exclusion of the impoverished sections of society.

The absence of strong regulatory authorities of the state

The professional academia has been unanimous in its support of the claim that there is a requirement
of a strong regulatory body in the instance of privatisation of water supply systems. The ideal models
for such strict regulation can be seen in cases like the private water systems of England and Wales.45
However while analysing the potential for India, reference ought to be made to the nations of the
global south, rather than politically strong and stable states of the global north. It is in this context that
the regulation of private players in the water sector becomes a difficult task. There are several reasons
for this. First, countries of the global south, as seen from the sub Saharan African experience46 have
by and large weaker state regulatory institutions. The absence of strong regulatory institutions means
that the private party with its profit motive has a greater control on the tariffs that it charges without
fear of penalty. One of the reasons why the state in such countries is reluctant to take strict action is
because of their image and the impact on investor confidence in the international markets. In the
Indian experience, particularly in Tirupur, the private investor entered into the water supply contract
with a certain low tariff, however upon initiation of operations, increased the same to ensure
profitability, yet the state in the absence of adequate regulatory authorities was highly reluctant to curb
the same. The disparity between the bargaining power of the parties often results in weak regulation as
well as fundamentally unfavourable contracts being signed tilted towards the profits of the private
parties.

The elimination of community control and local water sources under the privatised model

44
Supra 38
45
Supra 37
46
Bayliss 517
The Latin American experience in the case of Cochabamba has highlighted this aspect of water
privatisation.47 Under the BOT model of privatisation, community water resources are handed over to
the private sector, which on most occasions have banned the withdrawal of water from the same. The
Indian experience of Khandwa, where the water supply of the town was allotted to Vishwa Utilities, a
private player, highlights the same issue. Privatisation in Khandwa too had led to the shutting down of
all alternate sources of water including public taps and community wells, as had been the case in
Cochabamba.48 A similar situation was the case in Chhattisgarh where the state govt had provided the
private entity exclusive rights over the river water, hence preventing locals to use the same for their
49
domestic purposes or the irrigation of their fields. Although this by itself may not appear to be a
grave issue, the questions of access begin to arise when privatisation imposes tariffs that many people
may be unable to afford, which has been an empirical reality across the global south. In such
circumstances the monopolisation of water resources and supply lines by the private entity proves to
have grave consequences on the lives of the ordinary people.

The economic argument for privatisation: a questionable proposition?

The core principle in the privatisation is that a privatised system will promote efficiency and ensure
50
professional management of water resources. The entire claim of efficiency lies on the assumption
of the competitive nature of private players in market conditions. Ironically however, in the instance
of water supply systems, the natural propensity is to establish a monopoly market.51 On closer
inspection there is a rational explanation for this. In water supply competitors would have to create
parallel systems of delivery of the same service which would involve a significant amount of
superfluous investment. Thus the preferred setup is one of a natural monopoly, across the world and
particularly in the global south privatised water supply contracts are award to only one entity who
then becomes a monopoly player in the market. This scenario begs the question; does this not
undermine the basic premise of competitive efficiency that a private player ought to bring into the
supply system? The creation of this scenario is what mandates the need for such tight regulatory
norms. As mentioned above in light of the weaker nature of the countries of the global south, this
becomes an even shakier proposition, and as the international experience has been there is often a
blatant disregard for regulatory norms, a phenomenon that has been seen in both, India’s limited
experience with privatisation of water systems, as well as in the international experiences of the states
of the global south.

47
Supra 42
48
Supra 38
49
Binayak Das and Ganesh Pangare, In Chhattisgarh a river becomes private property, The Economic an Political
Weekly, February 18th 2006.
50
Supra 11, page 4
51
Supra 34, page 27
CONCLUSION

The question of privatisation has seen a great deal of opposition especially in the global south, and
more so when the privatisation has occurred in the distribution of public utilities. While there is a
strong economic backing for privatising water systems, experience in the global south and the Third
world has been less than satisfactory. Experiences ranging across Latin America, sub Saharan Africa
and South Eastern Europe has elucidates the marginalising effect of private water systems on the
economically weaker sections of society who often lack the ability to pay for the high tariffs that
uniformly follow privatised water systems. The regulation of private entities in a natural monopoly
market assumes an even greater importance when the nature of the commodity at play is essential in
nature as in the case of water. In light of India’s own limited experience and that of the global south,
there emerges a clear trend of exploitation in the absence of a powerful regulatory authority. The
problems are only compounded in a socio economic setting like that of India, where incomes are low
and there is a visible absence of social security for a majority of the population. In light of these
considerations, there is a strong suggestion of a privatised system of public utility distribution having
an adverse impact on consumers, particularly weaker sections of society, hence casting doubts over
the suitability of the same in the Indian context.

REFERENCES

1. Jessica Budds and Gordon McGranahan, Are the debates on water privatization
missing the point? Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America, Environment &
Urbanization Vol 15 No 2, 87, (2003)
2. Ken Conca, governing water: contentious transnational politics and global institution
building 221-23 (2006)
3. Silva, Gisele, Nicola Tynan and Yesim Yilmaz (1998), “Private participation in the
water and sanitation sector – recent trends”, Private Sector Viewpoint Note No. 147,
PPIAF, World Bank,Washington DC
4. Gleick, Peter, Gary Wolff, Elizabeth Chalecki and Rachel Reyes (2002), The New
Economy of Water: the Risks and Benefits of Globalization and Privatization of Fresh
Water, Pacific Institute, Oakland, California
5. Gaurav Trivedi, Rehmat, and Shripad Dharmadhikary, Water: Private Limited, 2nd
Edition, 2007 [hereinafter Water 2007]
6. Mulreany JP, Calikoglu S, Ruiz S, Sapsin JW. Water privatization and public health in
Latin America. Rev Panam Salud Publica. 2006;19(1):23–32
7. Jean-Claude Berthélemy, Céline Kauffmann, Marie-Anne Valfort, Lucia Wegner,
Privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa :Where do we stand?, OECD, 37, 2004
8. Kate Bayliss, Utility Privatisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study of Water, The
Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 507-531

9. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Dec., 2003), pp. 507-531
10. David Mckenzie and Dilip Mookherjee, Paradox and Perception: Evidence from
Four Latin American Countries, 2012
11. Mulreany JP, Calikoglu S, Ruiz S, Sapsin JW. Water privatization and public health
in Latin America. Rev Panam Salud Publica. 2006;19(1):23–32.
12. Tapping Profit, Frontline, Volume 29 Issue 16, August 2012
13. Binayak Das and Ganesh Pangare, In Chhattisgarh a river becomes private property,
The Economic an Political Weekly, February 18th 2006