Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict

Author(s): Herbert C. Kelman

Source: Harvard International Review , December 1982, Vol. 5, No. 3 (December 1982),
pp. 54-55
Published by: Harvard International Review

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/42759585

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 R
By
King Hussein - in response to U. S. insistence on association H
of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan. The PLO has not
been willing so far to acquiesce to the American condition of
A unilateral recognition of Israel's right to exist, although it has
A A.S we approach the end of 1982, the Palestinian prob- sent numerous signals of readiness to recognize Israel within
lem has come to occupy the center of attention among the a context of mutual recognition.
various actors in the Middle East conflict. With the Israeli The Israeli government has rejected the Reagan proposals
withdrawal from the Sinai at the end of April, it becameand clear reaffirmed its commitment to further settlement activity
that the Palestinian problem must be addressed if the on peace the West Bank and to Israeli sovereignty over the oc-
process is to fulfill itself - and if the process of Israeli cupied de territories. Labor party leaders, however, have re-
facto annexation of the West Bank and Gaza is to be halted sponded favorably to the American proposals and there is
before it becomes virtually irreversible. The invasion growing of indication that West Bank/Gaza policy is becoming
Lebanon has underlined the implications of an Israeli apolicy major issue for Israeli political debate. This debate is taking
that is aimed at destroying the Palestinian national movementplace in a context of widespread opposition within Israel to
and has added a sense of urgency to the search for a mutuallythe Lebanese invasion and of increasing recognition that
satisfactory solution. Each of the four actors with a there majoris no military solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
role in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - Israel, The the changes manifested by the four major actors are not
PLO, the Arab states, and the United States - has manifested yet sufficient to bring them into convergence. Further
some significant change in recent weeks. changes in any one of the actors depends on change in one or
United States policy - as expressed in President Reagan'smore of the others - which creates the very real possibility of
address on September 1 - has, for the first time, givenaprior- stalemate. An element of hope derives from the profound
ity to a solution of the Palestinian problem. The Reagan desire
pro- among major segments of both populations - Palesti-
posals moved closer to such a solution by clearly stating nians theand Israelis - to put an end to this destructive conflict.
U. S. interpretations of U. N. Resolution 242 and of Most the Palestinians seem ready for a compromise as long as it
Camp David agreements, by rejecting the option of Israeli does not mean a total defeat of their national aspirations and a
annexation or permanent control of the West Bank anddenial Gaza,of their human dignity and national identity. Many Is-
and by calling for an immediate halt to Israeli settlement raelis ac-seem ready for a compromise as long as it does not cast
tivity on the West Bank. However, in ruling out the option doubt of on the legitimacy - and hence jeopardize the secure
an independent Palestinian state and disregarding theexistence PLO, - of the Jewish state.
the U. S . policy fails to take adequate account of the nature of
Palestinian nationalism and of the PLO' s role as its organized
expression.
The Arab states, at their recent summit meeting in Fez,
took an important step by unanimously adopting a seriesÁÁm* Asolution that satisfies the fundamental needs of the
of
proposals that contemplate a peaceful settlement of the two con-
parties must be based on a formula that allows the two
flict with implicit recognition of Israel. Though the indirect,
peoples to share the land they both claim and to give political
ambiguous recognition is clearly insufficient as the text of ato their national identity within it. The endpoint of
expression
final agreement, what is significant is that, for the first successful
time,Israeli-Palestinian negotiations - and there is no
all of the Arab states, including Syria (with the exception substitute for direct negotiations between the two central par-
only of Libya, which stayed away from the summit meeting), ties - would be the mutual recognition of the right to national
indicated that there is some framework within which an self-determination for both peoples within historic Palestine.
agreement with Israel is possible. Furthermore, the Arab To have any realistic chance of success, negotiations of such
summit sent a delegation to Washington in order to explore a formula must proceed from the following presuppositions:
the possibilities of reconciling the Arab and the American (1) The Palestinian representative to the negotiations must
proposals. be the PLO or some agency authorized by the PLO. The
The PLO supported the Fez proposals. Chairman Arafat PLO, as the internationally recognized symbol of Palestinian
has also participated in the attempts to reconcile the Arab and nationhood, has a monopoly on legitimacy in Palestinian
the American proposals by discussing the question of a possi- eyes. Therefore, it is the only agency with the capacity to
ble Jordanian-Palestinian federation or confederation with make a peace with Israel to which the majority of Palestinians
will feel committed.
Herbert C. Kelman is the Richard Clarke Cabot Professor (2) The negotiations must not preclude the option of an in-
of Social Ethics in the Department of Psychology and Social dependent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza,
Relations at Harvard University. He is a member of the Exec- which is clearly the way in which Palestinians prefer to exer-
utive Committee of the Harvard Center for International Af- cise their right to national self-determination. Sovereignty
fairs and chairs the Center s Middle East Seminar. over a part of Palestine has become the irreducible condition

54 • December 1982

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 Opinion

for satisfying the Palestinians' desire to restore justice and

express their national identity. Ruling out this option in ad-
vance of negotiations would remove their incentive to enter
into the process.
(3) It must be understood that the Palestinians are prepared
to accept an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza as a
permanent solution to the conflict and that they envisage the
peaceful coexistence of such a state with its Israeli neighbor.
Such an understanding is essential to reassure the Israelis that
Palestinian objectives are not open-ended and that a Palesti-
nian state would not be a base for perpetuation and escalation Spanish - Latin - American^
of the conflict. Moreover, in the light of the Egyptian-Israeli
peace agreement, Israelis will not accept anything less than
full peace in return for withdrawal from occupied territories.
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(4) The main substance of negotiations must be the de-
velopment of a precise formula for sharing the land in a way
that reconciles Israel's legitimate security concerns with
Palestinians' national aspirations. To this end, negotiations All major cards accepted Hy D
will have to focus in detail on a number of essential issues, in-
cluding the precise borders between the two states, the future
of Jerusalem, the status of Israeli settlement on the West
Bank, the conditions of resettlement and compensation for
Palestinian refugees, mutual security arrangements,
economic and diplomatic relations between the two states,
the timing of Israeli withdrawal, and the details of the transi-
tion process.
(5) The negotiating agenda rçiust include the question of a
possible association of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan.
The nature of the relationship of the territories to Jordan is of t
central concern to all of the relevant actors. For Israel and
Jordan it may determine whether satisfactory security ar-
rangements (such as substantial demilitarization of the West A TOUCH OF THE REAL
Bank and Gaza) can be worked out. For Palestinians them-
selves, close links between a West Bank/Gaza state and Jor- MEXICO IN BOSTON'S
dan are essential for geographical, economic, cultural, and
familial reasons. However, they would prefer to establish BACK BAY
such links - perhaps in the form of a confederation or federa-
tion - by choice, from the base of a sovereign Palestinian
state.

(6) The negotiations must entertain the vision of coopera-

ÇsAf^MeftO
tive relations and open borders between Israel and a Palesti-
nian state - perhaps within the framework of a three-way
union that also includes Jordan. Geographic, demographic,
economic, military, and political realities make it very diffi-
cult to conceive of a West Bank/Gaza state that is hermeti-
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cally sealed off from Israel and of the coexistence of these
two states under conditions of perpetual hostility. Moreover, be had this side of Taxco"
some of the most difficult issues in the negotiations - includ-
Gourmet Magazine
ing the future status of Jerusalem - can probably be resolved
only within the context of an overall settlement based on
open borders and a pattern of cooperation between the two
communities that have to live together in the same land. 30 Gloucester Street
Movement toward promising Israeli-Palestinian negotia-
tions requires rethinking of the issues that underlie the six Back Bay • Boston
presuppositions outlined above. If these issues are seriously Reservations: 536-4341
addressed, both in the policy debates within each of the rele-
vant communities and in a systematic pre-negotiation pro-
Open daily from 5 p.m.
cess between Israelis and Palestinians, then there is a good
chance that the parties may converge in defining a mutually Closed Sundays
satisfactory framework for negotiations. □

International Review • 55

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