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    The Emergence of The Global and Social City - Golden Mile and The Politics of Urban Renewal

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    VALECIA
    The Emergence of the global and social city

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    tas renspecnves Stan VOL. 8 NO. 4699-718 R Routledge ‘nttpsfidoiorg/10.1080/02665433.2019 1581835 ER tapers FancisGroup [Seeman The Emergence of the global and social city: Golden Mile and the politics of urban renewal H. Koon Wee © Department of Architecture, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong [ABSTRACT Kerworos This study discusses the conflicted ideas of urban renewal under the economically Urban renewat lab ty progressive but inexperienced leadership of a young Singapore government, As vata tile ownership: ‘the site of this study, the Golden Mile shares its aspirational name with the first alc modernization building built on it- the Golden Mile Complex. This district was planned to carry "9290" Singapore into the era of the global city. During the period of modernization in ‘the 1960s, influential ideas were propagated through different United Nations experts. Singapore used these recommendations to legitimize an aggressive form of urban renewal, but it also encouraged greater participation By think tanks with greater intellectual and reseatch sophistication, This marked Singapore's most democratic period of public debate and participation in urban policy-making. The advancements made by the Singapore Planning and Urban Research group, and Lim's built megastructure and unbuilt linear city came about under these liberal conditions. Consumerist functions and civic minded forms were combined to produce unprecedented but ultimately incomplete socio-urban effects, This episode revealed that Singapore's successful legacy of modemization was always exclusively narrated by the state, but there was an tunder-documented tussle was between the sociopolitical capital of Singapore's public housing programme, and the economic acceleration of private and slobal consumerist functions. Introduction ‘The Golden Mile is the name of a high-profile district of new skyscrapers built with global money. A series of politically charged events occurred between 1962 and 1969, leading to five different schemes proposed in association with the district undergoing urban renewal. United Nations (UN) inter~ national experts, the local government, local students, and architects in private practice were involved at various stages in envisioning a high-density Asian city before the Golden Mile Complex (GMC) was eventually realized by William S.W. Lim and Design Partnership (DP) in 1973. The Golden Mile District (GMD) paved the way for the state's use of modern architecture as symbols of progress. As a newly expanded section of the city, GMD was always associated with a new mod- cemity of Singapore. It was formed by land reclaimed since the 1880s, from a time when Beach Road ‘was part of the waterfront of the European Town anda district for Malay, Bugis and Javanese traders who have been active for centuries. As early as 1955, Nicoll Highway would connect to the newly built Merdeka ‘Independence’ Bridge, marked by a Merdeka Lion and monument, to symbolize the gaining of partial internal self-governance, as a first step to decolonize. ‘CONTACT H. Koon Wee @ hoonweeshkuk 1 2019 errs UK nies, ang 3 Tay & Franc Grup «0 © wewee The ambition of GMD was to attract private developers, and to turn the city into the ‘New York’ of Malaysia. Upon receiving the UN advisory plans, the state-controlled Straits Times newspaper declared that Singapore would be ‘the first in Asia to redevelop whole city centres,” citing that urban renewal would not only double the density of the area, but also remove slums and unsanitary conditions, uneconomic use of land, and extreme traffic congestion. Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew described GMD as part of a ‘new look’ city with the ‘most expensive buildings.”” This national announcement set the tone for an aggressive form of urban renewal. As part of the first gen- eration of private land sales in 1967, GMD serves as an analytical lens to shed light on the tension between the national housing improvement programme, and the making of a global city. In other words, GMD sets up an ideological battleground between the social city and the global city. The for- mer sought sociopolitical legitimacy that could cement the position of the young government because land in the Central Area of Singapore was carved out for affordable resettlement housing. ‘The latter would conjure GMD as a boulevard of consumerist functions of hotels, theatres, entertain ‘ment venues, shopping centres and luxury housing that were capable of capturing the imagination of global capital. This paper will document as many as five iterations and urban actors in discussing the politics of modernization, urban renewal and political control during the embryonic stage of global city thinking, These five uncoordinated and sometimes conflicted schemes gave full expression to the potential of democratic design experimentation, liberal urban and economic development, and tightly controlled social planning, Despite the fullest attention given to it, GMD did not become the frontier of the global city image that Singapore had originally planned. It is an important time to reflect and learn from this past, because as GMD ages in the past five decades, GMC has become one of the prime targets for demolition and urban redevelopment today. Research methods ‘There is a need to carefully reconstruct the political challenges and turmoil during this period of nation-building and aggressive urban renewal, because the available accounts are mostly narrated by the state. As far as mainstream narratives go, the modernization of the city was portrayed as a seamless process with no adverse relationships to race conflicts, social upheavals, inequality or pol- itical motives. Therefore, this research has to approach the topic from sources outside of the nation state apparatus, namely the UN Archives, the Charles Abrams Papers and Files at Cornell University Library, the Otto Koenigsberger Archive atthe AA. the Jaqueline Tyrwhitt Papers at RIBA, and other participants of this urban renewal process. Because this period was marked by uncertainty, with a lack of experience in urban planning and policy-making in the public sector, the participation of, local think tanks, university research and intelligentsia from the private sector flourished. ‘This rescarch benefitted from interviews with key protagonists from that period, including the former President of the Singapore Institute of Architects (SIA) Lim Chong Keat, former student of William Lim and later partner of DP Architects, Chan Sui Him, architect William Lim himself, and his daughter CW Lim, who was nine when they first moved into GMC as its first residents. These oral accounts, and public debates documented in the National Archives of Singapore and the local presses showed that participation in issues of urban planning and policy-making was at its most democratic. They thrived for a short period, before research think tanks like the Singapore Planning and Urban Research (SPUR) group were disbanded, and university research like that of political scientist Robert Gamer’s was excluded in state narratives, even though they were originally 12 for ey 34835" 18 Lee exhins big plans for new lok cty* endorsed by the government. In this paper, these accounts would be compared with official accounts from state agencies such as the Urban Redevelopment Agency (URA), Housing Development Board (HDB), Centre for Liveable Cities (CLC), and others. Though short-lived, this period of openness showed there were small but optimistic deviations from the common belief that Singapore has stunted political development? It was a time when senior ministerial level personnel would actively ‘meet with think tanks and the general public for debates and discussions * The politics of urban renewal would also be juxtaposed against the broader geopolitical events of the Cold War, and Sin- gapore was a direct beneliciary of the paranoia of socialism and communism, and the Truman Doc- tine, This paper reasticulates the modernization of the city as a major accomplice in how the government legitimized itself at the cusp of becoming a nation. The city state and United Nations: imperfect bureaucracy and affinities ‘When the Singapore government embarked on its modernization project after gaining full internal self-government from the British, the 1958 Master Plan was deemed insufficient to handle the necessary economic and population growth. UN experts were invited to provide technical aid in urban planning and industrialization at the beginning of the short-lived merger of Singapore with Malaysia between 1963 and 1965, and racial tension was at an all-time high. Formed in 1960, HDB had built a remarkable 54,000 dwelling units by the First Five-Year Programme in alleviating housing shortages > The State and City Planning Department (SCP) was formed in 1967 to follow through with the UN report that Charles Abrams, Susumu Kobe and Otto Koenigsberger submitted to the government in 1963. The work of SCP and UN culminated in the 1971 Master Plan, with UN contributions of five million Singapore dollars to the master planning project under the newly formed United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).’ The 1963 UN Report set out new kinds of acupuncture improvement for the city, contrary to the carte blanche approach eventually preferred by the Singapore authorities around GMD and elsewhere in the city areas, cautioning against the ‘bulldozer addicts.” In a 2013 interview, UNDP Project Director Henry Wardlaw recalled that very few historic buildings were conserved by the Singapore government as advocated by UNDP due to economic constraints.* The UN team made unique requests of the local government to embrace ‘applied research,’ and enlist local experts and intelligentsia to form think tanks. There was a specifi reference of the ‘Devel ‘opment Group’ model” from Britain, presumably a recommendation from Koenigsberger, who was leading the Architectural Association (AA) Department of Tropical Studies. Shortly after this Singa- pore stint, Koenigsberger published the AA Paper Number 1: Roofs in the Warm Humid Tropics, with climatic data on Singapore, and a preface from Ernest Weissmann, who was the UN director in charge of the request for technical aid from Singapore."° The goal was to save ‘staff time and provide a valuable aid in keeping busy officials abreast with recent advances of scientific and technical know!- edge.” Arguably, this also led to the formation of the SPUR group in 1965, with government officials Seach Singapore: Wealth, Power and the Culture of Contra See aso, Richardson, Singopare to 2003: Asping fo the Fst Word “tiowe, Lim and Si Member, “Dialogue between the Ministry andthe SIA" 115. wong and Yeh Housing a Navon: 25 Years of Publ Housing a Singepore. 1 ‘57, "Unique Nation Stat’ plan” ‘nas el Growth ad Urban Renenal in Singopore, 82 CLC Hemy Wardlaw Interview wth CLC nora, eal, Growth and Utan Rene in Singapore, 11 xoenigsbergr and Lynn, 4A Paper Number I "Abrams, ea, Growth and Uban Renewal m Singapore, 1 or © wewee such as Chief Planner Tan Jake Hooi as early members. SPUR grew out of the editorial committee of SIA,” in part because they were grappling with and arguing against the intrusion of foreign experts invited by the government, and wanted to stay involved in urban-scae alterations of their city, and continue to gain professional work and credibility. SPUR did not claim its genealogy to UN rec ‘ommendations, but there was no way it could, because members were actively debating against some of the UN recommendations, while proposing new ones. SPUR was initially chaired by Lim, strategically coupled with his experimental private practice. Lim was an accomplished architect with an AA and Harvard education, and indirect ties to UN, He was frequently lecturing to a regional audience, expanding on his research and visions in design and policy-making. Iti important to trace ‘many of these ideas executed in Singapore to Lim’s time at the ninth meeting of the International ‘Congress of Modern Architecture (CIAM) at Aix-en-Provence in 1953, and the first two Urban Design Conferences Lim attended at Harvard in 1956 and 1957. ‘The pedagogical lineage of Lim's work has to be left to another longer paper."* but itis important to note the enlarged scope of an architect’s responsibility towards the urban realm during the 1960s — from ‘environmental’ planning scale to alternative strategies of urban renewal in old downtown cores. GMC has to be situated alongside the global experiments of pedestrianized urbanism and post-war shopping. These discourses are evident in Lim’s writings from the same period, where he updated the emergent ideas for high-density Asia, based on lessons from his Harvard teachers Jaqueline Tyrwhitt, Lloyd Rodwin, Charles Haar, and lectures given by Victor Gruen, Jane Jacobs, and others at the Urban Design Conferences, Gruen’s 1964 The Heart of Our Cities book was excerpted in a 1967 issue of the SIA Journal when Singapore was undergoing urban renewal, aimed at cautioning the government and practicing professionals against the “Traffickist, ‘Bulldozer ite” ‘Segregator’ ‘Projectite’ and ‘Economizer’ as false friends of the city."* GMC had a particular role in the popularizing of a strata-title shopping typology that matched the rise of the consumerist ‘middle-class of Singapore, who had access to affordable shopping and the possibilty of gaining own- ership of small commercial properties. Lim referred to the heightened roles of modern technology in popular culture and mass appeal during that period,"* which explained why he could take to the shopping function generally shunned by modernist architects Lim returned from Harvard to British Singapore in 1957. As soon as the British departed in the carly 1960s, the Singapore government intensified its request for assistance from UN, GMD would come into the picture as part of the urban renewal area of Precinct NI, bounded by Nicoll High- ‘way, Jalan Sultan, Victoria Street and Crawford Street. Precinct NI was one of the many districts ~ N1 to N9 and SI to $8 ~ zoned for incremental improvements by the UN advisor Erik E. Lorange. (Figures 1 and 2) The Lorange Report was under the purview of Ernest Weissmann at the UN Headquarters.” Lorange was able to devote so much time to Singapore because he was on leave from his role as the Chief Planner of Kristiansand in Norway. His work demonstrated a strong emphasis on tackling the housing shortage after the war, which made him the ideal advisor for housing problems in Singapore. The preservation of Posebyen, a district of historic wooden houses in Kristiansand, was largely attributed to Lorange. Yet he was also an advocate for high-rise mod- em housing, evident in his work in developing Tinnheia on the outskirts of Kristiansand, While the overcrowding and unsanitary conditions of downtown Singapore were well-documented in the sia, “Singapore Panning and Urban Research Group 110. Se, “An Incomplete Megastructure in Singapore” ‘Lim, “Envtonmental Panning i 2 Cy State” Serve, “The Heart of Our Ces 4 ‘ti, incre oth thor, 207, "Lorange “Letter to Weissmann” PLANNING Perspectives ©) 693 AREANORTH OF SINGAPORE RIVER + BENDED BOUNDARY ey UR even fa 4 Conan PLN) UN LORANGE POND Figure 1. 1962 Lorange Plan with 1969 URD Updates ~ the basis ofthe 1963 UN Technical Assistance Team urban redevelopment recommendations (Source: United Nations Archives and Urban Redevelopment Authority, redrawn by Matthew Chan) on © wewee Figure 2. The entire NI was erased by an aggressive form of urban renewal favoured by the planning authorities. The first three blocks ofthe Crawford Public (Resettlement) Housing Estate were erected by 1967, with Nicoll igh- way and the Merdeka Bridge in the foreground. Image Source: Tay Kheng Soon / Robert Gamer) 1962 Lorange Report, his preference for remediation and preservation, and his regard for a com- binatory space between the city and countryside were not adequately understood by Singapore. ‘This meant that the young, said to be the only trained architect and town planner on staff, and tasked by the government to ‘study, shadow and assist’ Lorange in 1962," may have focused on his physical zoning plans that supported urban renewal, while missing the subtle possibility of incremental change, especially in the N1 Precinct. This theme of incremental change would be further developed by Abrams in subsequent UN advisory plans, but would repeatedly be ignored by the Singapore government. Similarly, Weissmann championed social equality through affordable housing for over a decade through his participation at the eighth CIAM meeting"? and from his position as the Assistant Director of the Housing, Building and Planning Branch of the UN Bureau of Social Affairs. Arguably, the importance of a strong public housing programme and the aesthetics of European modernism in Singapore was established through such a period of international engagement. The influence of ‘Weissmann is also evident vis-a-vis the pedagogical influence of the Harvard urban design curricu lum through Tyrwhitt, who was highly influential in Lim's work. Her UN work that began back in 1950 with Weissmann would bring her to Asia, and ater to Bandung to set up a new urban planning programme in 1959, as a joint effort between the UN-Harvard team of Tyrwhitt and Weissmann, and the Indonesian government” hoe “The Early Years of Nation Buling” 12 Sweissmann, “Uroanzation and Regional Planning” 33-36, Se als, Welssman, "Mutual Adin Low-Cost Housing” 107-114 *Shoshkes, Jaqueline Iywhit A Tansntiona ie, 98 The Lorange Report was followed up in 1963 by a fuller urban renewal agenda urgently pursued by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Development (MND) Howe Yoon Chong. In fac, it was clear in the UN letter from Howe,”* even before the findings were made, that he was dis- appointed that the UN experts were under-prepared for ‘the seriousness with which my [Howe's] Government intends to go about implementing its plans for urban renewal. ‘The decidedly inter- national outlook of these recommendations was used by the Singapore government to legitimize the speed and extent of urban renewal,”* but upon close scrutiny, the contents of the UN reports Aiffered markedly from the altitudes of the government, and their eventual decisions. The UN Report cautioned the government against the ‘bulldozer addicts’ in city with ‘a fast-growing population and limited land resources’ Given Singapore's successful legacy of modernization, itis no surprise that most of the discourse around urban development has been exclusively narrated by the state, disso- Rbrams etal Giowth and Urban Renewal m Singapore, 62 2c, "We Have Only Been Modern’ 11 Dale, Urban Planing Singapore “cue, Uban Systems Stae, 1, Koenigsberg, "Low Cost Housing in South’ 17, oouda, “Singapore's United Nations” 5. orange, “Outne of Final Repor,” 3 Truman, “Address ofthe Present of the United States” 6 © wewee oY ib) 7) i bad of 7 P 7 al 7 = soon -) i = of = : val = “ re 3. (A) A close-up view of the 1963 Public Improvement District (PID) along GMD, showing mixed-use com- mercial and office functions with public housing as the predominant function (Image Source: United Nations ‘Archives, redrawn by Natalie Khoo}. (8) An overview of the 1963 Public Improvernent District (PID) along GMD with three sets of public housing cluster, each with a pedestrianized bridge with shops linking back to the historic urban fabric (Image Source: United Nations Archives, redrawn by Natalie Khoo) form of soft power through the delivery of economic and urban planning expertise, but also a way to invent the Third World. Singapore was very much part of this transnational discourse of the Global South, where its leaders genuinely believed in the project of modernization. They actively sought technical assistance that would eventually produce a new form of technopolitics in Singapore.” Sin- gapore welcomed proposals from international experts and staff training ‘which will teach people at a low level of technical culture some of the elements which have to be mastered if great economic pro- blems are to be solved’, and in so doing, it reproduced foreign-trained elitist technocrats to control Singapore's urban development for the generations to come. Singapore began as a socialist democracy with strong left-wing leaders within its government. In fact, the original politcal party that won the elections in 1959 was successful largely due to the social- ist ideals espoused by Lim Chin Siong and Dr Lee Siew Choh, winning over voters from Chinese language speakers, trade unions and rural dwellers. Lim Chin Siong and Dr Lee would split from Lee Yuan Yew’s People’s Action Party to form Barisan Sosialis in 1961 to challenge Lee for 2 itchel Rule of Expert: Egypt, Techno Potts, Modemiy. owen, “The United Nations Programme of Techni Asta Figure 4. Typical rent control shophouses along Clyde Street in 1963, Ths was a Public Works Department photo of 2 worker from the sewerage works holding up a chalk board marking the address. The photo unintentionally reveals the active presence of politcal opposition party Barisan Socialis in this urban renewal neighbourhood. ‘Other photos in this series showed political recruitment notices pasted around the city. (Image Source: Ministry of Information and the Arts Collection, courtesy of National Archives of Singapore) power. The controversial 1963 national security operation, code name Operation Coldstore, was car- ried out to quash all underground communist organizations, and many socially-minded politicians ‘were also arrested without trial, based on the threat of a communist uprising. In an extensive study of land-use policies and urban renewal between 1964 and 1968, University of Singapore Lecturer ‘Gamer observed that ‘the government can rearrange the populace (especially in areas with high con- centration of political opponents) and give tangible evidence that itis benefiting the public’. There ‘was distinct evidence that such political oppositions were strong in many neighborhoods fit for demolition around GMD. (Figure 4) On the city planning front, Permanent Secretary Howe attested to the work of his civil service architects, such as those working in HDB and URA, by describing the state asa ‘socialist government’ that would not tolerate greed through a Master Plan that gave too ‘much rights to private land owners.** Despite his disdain for the affiuent private sector architects, the urban mandate was to attract private global capital to build Singapore into a global city, and Howe had no choice but to appeal to the private architects to support Singapore Four months after this security operation, UN advisors Koenigsberger and Kobe set foot in Sin gapore on June 15, 1963, followed by Abrams, for a duration of three months.*> ‘The UN Report sub- mitted by these advisors carefully avoided any reference to the relationship between urban renewal camer, The Pls of Urban Redevelopment, 32. >on, Li & SI, “Howe's Letter to the UN," 4 “Rado Singapura, “Being by United Nations Experts” on © wewee and expansion, and the concomitant issues of urban governance, politics, social inequality and racial tensions, Following that eventful year, amidst a strong inward-looking interest of national develop- ment, and an outward engagement of international expertise, the Urban Renewal Unit was set up in 1964 within HDB. This unit would become URD in 1966, before growing into the more autonomous Urban Renewal Authority (URA). In 1974, this agency was renamed Urban Redevelopment Auth- ority (still URA) for a more benign image. Since the beginning, with housing as the priority, the pol- itical clout of HDB was second to none within the pecking order of the civil service. HDB was admired for tackling the severe housing shortage during the early independence period, and cemen- ted Singapore's reputation as one of very few countries that successfully developed affordable hous- ing within a state capitalist framework“ With the increased autonomy of URA, the planning of Singapore would become polarized into a schizophrenic state, ‘The central areas tend to be privately ‘owned and controlled by URA, because the 1967 Land Acquisition Act promoted urban renewal as a ‘way to facilitate the state's reconsolidation of land for private sales and national development,” with the goal of attracting global capital. URA had an unwritten requirement that high-profile sale tender sites came with the participation of globally established architects.** On the other hand, satellite new towns were planned and built by HDB for maximizing political legitimacy and social harmony.” The United Nations plans: put first iteration) ic improvements versus private investments (1963: ‘The 1963 UN Report recommended Public Improvement Districts (PID) for the reclaimed land to the southeast of Precinct N1 to be primarily led by public funding (Figure 3), whereas the Mixed Improvement Districts (MID) to be surgically stitched into the historic fabric with a combination of public and private initiatives. (Figure 5) As the urban renewal expert, Abrams saw the relatively ‘under-built reclaimed land southeast of the Central Area as the perfect ‘receiving area for families and business establishments displaced from precincts NI to N5, because it would minimize any destruction of the historic urban fabric."° In other words, the seafront edge of GMD was zoned by Abrams as a PID with high-rise public housing, small-scale commerce, and even a school. Twelve 20-storey slab blocks and integrated 2-storey new shops were proposed by UN, with no recommen- dations of large-scale demolition of Precinct NI. There were three dominant pedestrianized shop- ping bridges stitching the new PID to the historic fabric, in an effort to create continuity with the historic shop house fabric. This UN proposal can be seen in relation to GMCs the primitive version of a mixed-use slab and podium typology in Singapore, even if these shops on the first two floors were not fully refined forms of podium shopping, Abrams global advocacy for affordable housing and urban renewal was most visible in his book ‘entitled Housing in the Modern World." This was a culmination of decades of UN advisory work, and the breadth of his knowledge and influence included Singapore, Photographs taken in Singapore by Abrams included a ‘play space’ with children in a back alley which could easily be misconstrued as the ‘slums’ of the old shop house fabric worthy of nothing but demolition. (Figure 6) Abrams's view of urban slums showed a deeper understanding of dense urban life full of vitality, even if they are unspectacular. These ideas were very similar to the Smithsons’ analysis of children and family life in > chua, bra Dkaroned, Cmmuntaranim and State Capitals in Singapore. EAC Unban Stes Studies Land Acquiton and Resederen 17 >'Lam lnerew with autor, Hong Keng 2elayatham, Responding to Glebeluation: Nation Cute, and Identity Singapore, 108. ’abrams et al, rowth and Urban Renewal in Singapore, 168. “Noam, Housing n the Moder Worl, 170-173 muanuine renspectves ©) 699 [nooo | mt Wnt © Figure 5. Example of an acupuncture improvement approach described as Mixed Improvement District (MID) {Image Source: United Nations Archives, 1963, redrawn by Natalie Khoo) 70 © wewee igure 6. Typical rent control shophouses along Beach Road and Clyde Street in 1963. This area was marked in Lorange Plan's as Distict NB, and it was one ofthe last to be demalished, These shophouses resemble one of the scenes UN Technical Advisor Charles Abrams photographed during his 1963 visit to Singapore, showing chil- dren playing in a back alley captioned as ‘A play space in Singapore’ Abrams did not treat these areas as slums’ (Image Source: Courtesy of National Archives of Singapore] London, and Herbert Gans’ enduring work on the West End of Boston. ‘Slums’ were no longer just visually incompatible aspects in modern and progressive views of the city, but there was a real possi- bility of rehabilitation. Abrams did not preclude the necessity for modern housing, which was why he also included an exemplary public housing project from Singapore in his study. In the 1963 UN Report, Abrams's recommendations for adding higher density modern housing was substantially less invasive, with the assumption that the old city can coexist with the modern city. URD's luxury flats: rush to attract global capital (1967: second iteration) All eight historic urban blocks within Precinct NI were erased by URD, including demolition of all the streets to accommodate resettlement public housing, (Figure 2) Even the nearby well-frequented and well-liked Clyde Terrace Market on Beach Road, affectionately known as thih pa sat Khaw, was not spared. The entire N1 would be reconstituted to form the Crawford Public Housing Estate, except for the seafront plot kept for the future GMC. This followed Lorange’s recommendation to start at the northern and southern ends of the city, hence the numbering system of NI and SI URD followed the recommended sequence of the UN proposals, but not its spirit. The first three public housing slab blocks were erected as early as 1967, with splendid views to the coast. Unfortu nately, this sea view proved to be short-lived, as GMD was always intended to be sold as private land for future luxury housing. The extreme segregation between the working-class resettlement housing (Figure 7), and the private luxury housing could not be more stark. An interview with an original re 7. Study models of Crawford Public Housing in 1964, There appears to be two different black designs being tested here, and were not constructed in the forms shown here. The Z-Block to the left bears a resemblance to the public housing (PID) plans proposed by the UN Technical Advisors in 1963 (Figure 3), while the straight slab block to the right is vey similar to what was eventually constructed in 1967 (Figure 2) Image Source: Ministry of Infor- mation and the Arts Collection, courtesy of National Archives of Singapore) resident ofa GMC penthouse unit revealed that a couple of suicides were witnessed each month from. the windows of her grandmother's bedroom facing the relatively new public housing blocks at Craw: ford in the 1970s, The interviewed resident was nine at that time, and she also recalled frequent sight- ings of dead bodies washed ashore the coastline from her own bedroom facing the coast."? The poverty and lack of connection to modern housing in the city was patently obvious. This was the reality of the city when Choe proposed a four-tower private housing scheme for the GMC site in 1967." (Figure 8) Choe suggested that the potential of these sites makes them an ideal locality for the building of tourist amenities and high class apartments for the new executive class who would like to live within easy reach of the city and yet enjoy an exclusive environment and view of Singapore.** Choe's unbuilt proposal can be considered an incongruent outcome during this period of aggressive urban renewal. URD reported a designation of two-percent of the construction budget for a luxurious park landscape, fountains, sculptures, children’s playground and street furniture. No commercial or mixed-use functions were included because of the need for security and Lm, Goden Mle Memories’ Ema nervew wth the author, Singapore. “SiN "14 Urban Renewal Stes” p. “chi, “Gleaming Golden Mle” 7 id 7. yar © wewee Luxury Flats Golden Mile Figure 8. Scaled Model, Site Layout Plan and Typical Floor Plan of Unbuilt Golden Mile Luxury Flats ‘Towers in a Park’ in a gated luxury garden compound proposed by URD in 1967, two years before the GMC site was up for tender. (Image Source: Urban Redevelopment Authority and Singapore institute of Architects, redrawn and temo- delled by Natalie Khoo} privacy, assuming that the downtown district of ‘slums’ was not the safest places for the ‘new executive class. There was no clear idea about how the wealthy residents of Choe's private apart- ments would coexist next to the disenfranchized public housing residents. The mixed ideas of Pre- cinct NI revealed markedly opposing sensibilities towards the conflicted public and private goals. ‘The biggest victim would be the working class tenants and subtenants from the demolished NI fabric. Abrams warned that the landlords of the old shop house buildings would often be complicit with the public authorities by allowing their buildings to fall into disrepair and become ‘slums,’ as. landlords could receive compensation but not the tenants. There was little incentive to upkeep their property, apart from doing the bare minimum to ensure the tenants continued to pay rent. Rehabilitation of the old city fabric was predestined to fail. But to HDB's credit, it had gradually developed a stringent resettlement and compensation policy since 1963, even though by its own admission, it was incredibly difficult to ascertain equity. It took yeats to refine the mechanism. for compensation.” [As the public housing blocks were being completed, and as the remaining demolition continued in preparation for the inaugural land sales sites in 1967, the empty site of GMC ‘emerged. Choe's proposed luxury apartment towers were perhaps only a quick visualization by the authorities to give an idea of what could be proposed for the site, as the GMC site went out for tender. It was designated as the ninth plot of the inaugural URD land sales sites, composing thirteen plots in total. A combined area of 125,295m? of shopping, 56,723m° of office, 3,896m" of cinema, 1,320 hotel rooms, 564 residential units and 33,492m°* of others (carparks and recreational).“* It was clear that the new architecture along GMD was charged with a role to establish the young nation’s consumerist functions, and attract private investments from Singa- pore and the region. The unbuilt single luxury residential function by URD and Choe did not match the sheer quantity of shopping required for the district. Singapore was keen to compete with top cities around the region, such as Hong Kong, and keen to attract regional and global capi- tal that might otherwise be gravitating towards Hong Kong." In fact, the development parameters for these first private land sale sites were relatively lax and favourable in order to attract private investments. Developers will have to pay down only 20 per cent of the cost of the land and will have ten years in ‘which to pay off the remainder, No interest will be charged. There will be exemption from property tax for six months, plus an extra month for each storey of the building. Development charges will be waived” ‘This was a period that saw vast amount of foreign capital invested and massive infrastructure building. University of Singapore political scientist Robert Gamer observed that in order to encou- rage urban development, the government rarely turned down private proposals and bids for devel- opment." In 1966, it turned down only six out of seventy proposals, and in 1967, only eight out of sixty. This period of exuberant growth relied strongly on the private sector as there was a lack of, expertise from within the government? “Roem, eta, Gowth and Urban Renewal in Singapore, 125 ‘ong ae Yet, Housing @ Nation, 308, “Una Paci Chronology of Soe of Stes, 1 “Sr, "The Golden Mile” 8. Si camer, The Pits of Urban Development xvi, 41-22. 2. che, “The Early Yeas of Nation Building” 2. ma © wewee SPUR's iteration) of tomorrow: democrs ation by Think Tanks (1966: third Under the leadership of Lim, SPUR brought together a multidisciplinary group of sociologists, pol- itical scientists, scholars and architects. The avant garde imagery that is synonymous with SPUR's manifesto for Asian cities shared the same seeds of ideas for GMC,™* and they were being tested within the safe confines of academia. Despite Singapore sometimes being described as the most repressive during the 1960s and 1970s." this openness was not so short-lived, as SPUR was only deregistered as a civil society group in 1975. Participation by professional think tanks was critical not only because the government followed a particular ‘developmental group’ recommendation put forth by Koenigbersger in the 1963 UN Report, but also because Singapore genuinely needed expertise from the private professionals. As Lim, his younger partner Tay Kheng Soon, and their practice DP struggled with experiments of strata-title ownership policy by URD, it was their protégé ‘Chan who confessed that these formal experiments were taking place under Lim and Tay’s tutelage at a Singapore Polytechnic design studio in 1966.** Many high-density proposals bearing the same stepped megastructure aesthetics were carried out by students working in groups. Chan’s excellent performance in one of these groups led Lim to hire him after his graduation. Chan was directly involved in GMD unbuilt master plan in 1969, prior to the commission of GMC later that year ‘The formal studies of the stepped megastructure conducted in 1968 and the feasibility urban study in 1969 (Figure 11) would represent yet another idealized version of GMD, encouraging ‘free movement of commuters from one end of the site to the other.” These studies explored the relevance of a megastructure deployed in the rise of consumerism and wealth in Singapore. IC was ‘unmistakable that this strong linear city form marked the first grand formal expression of urban design in Singapore, and it was possibly the last, as the city was overtaken by highly fragmented and predictable forms based on more pragmatic and economic decisions The most provocative set of imagery produced by SPUR demonstrated that a super-dense stepped -megastructure can coexist with the historic fabric of the city. (Figure 9) Published as early as 1966 in the Asia Magazine in Hong Kong as a manifesto entitled "Our Cities Tomorrow: Sky-high structures may solve population problems,’ the linear city of megastructures was apparent. Its imagined site next to the historic shop houses revealed that the contentious issues of urban renewal and historic preservation were close at hand, These conditions were in fact very similar to GMD along Beach Road, where GMC was eventually built. This suggests that SPUR was not prepared to demolish any of the historic shop houses, and the transitional scales between the older low-rise fabric and the future high-rise fabric were no longer relevant when Asia was confronting a population explosion. Good and conventional urban design of sensitive human scale did not apply. The enor mous density and super high-rise nature of this SPUR proposal would be the most daunting aspect. for any city to accept, as verticality was embraced by Lim as the future as much as linearity and hor izontality, as the megastructure was also envisioned to crawl across large urban territories. There ‘would be no apology for the density required in an Asian metropolis. ‘Anyone with any appreciation for the sense of a city will agree that a true city is a congested city - congested not of cars but of people drawn close together by a multitude of related activities’** The context of an Asian form Koolhaas, “Singapore Songlines: Porat ofa Potemkin Metropolis” chen and Goby "What's ke to be a Singaporean” 260 “chan, inten ant the author and E Seng Singapore Barnet, “Golden Mle Shopeing Centre” 18 5PUR, “Our Giles Temorew:Sky-gh structures may seve population problems” PLANNING Perspectives @)_ 705 a | SPECIAL REPORT 'SKY-HIGH STRUCTURES MAY SOLVE POPULATION PROBLEMS By the Singapore Planning & Urban Research Group Figure 9. Concept Sketch of ‘Our Cities Tomorrow’ showing coexistence of a megastructure adjacent to historic downtown fabric in Singapore, fst published in 1966 in Asia Magazine, (Image Source: SPUR Archives) 706 © wewee of urbanization was perhaps the unwitting accomplice in the evolution of the megastructure. Lim. professed, ‘The idea ofa lineal city is coming into favour. It is free ofthe traffic confusion of a radial city which by extension and improvement of roads bring more confusion to the centre, Because the lined city can be controlled along certain lines of grovith, it would permit frictionless expansion and renewal when the cydle of regeneration occurs.”* ‘The Singapore Polytechnic students from the 1966 SPUR studio were never acknowledged as part of SPUR's ‘Our Cities Tomorrow’ manifesto, But the symbiotic links between academia, advocacy and city planning practice would bear an uncanny symmetry in relation to the work of Lim’s most influential teacher Tyrwhitt. In trying to ensure her students continue to engage city planning in newly independent nations in Asia, Tyrwhitt attempted to bring together a number of her Asian students from Harvard, such as Fumihiko Maki, Tao Ho, Kochi Nagashima and Lim, with the hope that they could become the Team 10 of Asia.” Within a short span of two years from Lim’s fist teaching engagement, he would invite her to Singapore Polytechnic to present a proposal for an ‘urban design course in December.“' Tyrwhitt’s interest in Singapore and the region started as carly as July 25, 1960, when she met up with Lim for the first time since his departure from Har- vard in 1957 Lim set her up for high-level meetings with various Singapore leadership in the public sector, including Howe, who was at that time the CEO of HDB, HDB Chairman Lim Kim San, HDB Chief Architect Teh Cheang Wan, Chief Planner Tan Jake Hooi, and Ministry of Finance Assistant Secretary Sim Kee Boon. Tyrwhitt’s reputation as UN advisor was well estab- lished by the time she was invited to Singapore. Her academic reputation as founding editor of the Bkistics Journal for C.A. Doxiadis began as the Tropical Housing and Planning Monthly Bulletin in 1955, on the condition that this bulletin was also used to keep UN housing and planning experts ‘working in developing countries up to date with relevant professional expertise. Lim’s budding pri vate practice in Singapore in the early 1960s would also become entangled in the web of UN advi- sory work and local academia in Singapore. His association with Tyrwhitt’s reputation through her UN and academic work, and her role as Lim's teacher at Harvard would have been seen by the state bureaucracy in a good light. University research: o1 al conflict in urban renewal sion of race or pol ‘The university was also very involved in studying the volatility of evolving urban policies and their effects on society. Racial tensions and inequality were reported by Gamer in his extensive study of Precinct N1 between 1964 and 1968. As a member of SPUR, Gamer’s ideas propagated within the professional circles of architects and planners. Because of the strong reactions to the urban renewal process, Prime Minister Lee had to step forward in June 1964 to publicly address the suspicion of racial discrimination in the removal of predominantly Malay families in the precinct Deliberate and high-profile meetings between the Minister for Culture and Social Affairs Othman Bin Wok and Malay representatives from the Crawford area were recorded in late 1965. (Figure 10) Ironically, permission for Gamer's social survey of a rundown section of the central city was granted by the Minister of Social Affairs S. Rajaratnam, who was the first political leader to formally articulate Si Mal, ntervew with cuthor, Sngopore. SIA "Meeting with Profesor Jaqueline Tyrwhit” 7 ‘Tyrie “Letter to CA. Donal om J. Tywhit,l26: Report on Vist to Singapre in Response to CDA” ST, “Le explains big plans for ‘new look cy” Figure 10, Meeting on Nov 4, 1965 between Malay representatives from the Crawford area, and the Minister for Culture and Social Affairs Othrman Bin Wok (not pictured in the photograph). The presence ofthe camera or video crew, and the gentleman in dark sunglasses (common dress feature of undercover government observers or agents) suggests that this was a high-profile public session. (Image Source: Ministry of Information and the Arts Collection, courtesy of National Archives of Singapore) Singapore's global city agenda. A direct link can be established between urban renewal and a form of racialized nationalism. ‘To those who hold political power this appears to be an ideal way to reduce tensions stemming from race, language, and class. Areas where single races lived in isolation can be cleared and replaced with new multiracial housing’® The seeds of a global city were sown as early as the 1960s in urban renewal sites such as GMD, in direct antagonism against the local patterns of settlement in the central area of Singapore. The 1828 Jackson Plan and 1846 Thomson Plan from the colonial era showed the presence of a thriving and diverse Islamic community highlighted as the Arab Campong and Bugis Campong, no different from the Chinese settlements in other sections of the central district. Historian Imran Bin Tajudeen argues that the first settlers of Malay, Bugis and Javanese origins have been active for centuries around GMD, centred around the Kampung Gelam Royal Citadel and Sultan Mosque. Itwas unfortunate that part of their historic urban fabric was systematically demolished, and their histories actively omitted in ‘mainstream histories that focused on the dominance of the British and Chinese in Singapore. 11 was the government themselves who had to call out the racial issues, and to justify that there was no discrimination. Understudying Lorange and other UN experts, Choe was in fact exposed to the racial problems that urban renewal brought to cities in the United States, and he vowed to do it ST, "Global iy’ succes for pre Raj. ‘camer, The Pls of Urban Development in Singapore, 133. “Tajudeen From Ria t Singapore, 1700-1870 Trade Por and Urban Miso,” 12. 7a © wewee differentty in Singapore.” However earlier accounts by Choe omitted the racial problems, and they ‘were much more decisive and unapologetic about urban renewal policy makers need no longer feel morally or politically jeopardized in an exercise which is designed to relocate the poor in an unhealthy and dangerous slum area to a public housing area; and in so doing make available strategic and valuable land for public and private development designed to benefit the whole country. In contrast, Gamer attributed the July 1964 racial riots, the worst in Singapore, to racial ‘unrest brought about by urban renewal? He cited accounts of the earliest scenes of fights taking place literally at edge of Precinct NI, slated for urban renewal demolition, Practically all accounts of the 1964 racial riots attributed them to the political instability of the period when Chinese- dominant Singapore was on the brink of leaving the Federation of Malaysia. They failed to fully account for the effects urban renewal had on racial unrest. Government accounts took pain to suggest that the Lorange Plan relied only on visual surveys of the physically dilapidated con- ditions of the buildings, rather than any knowledge of the ethnic enclaves associated with them.” This is highly unlikely, especially when Choe readily admitted that, from understudying UN experts and the study trips to the United States, he learned to pay attention to the class and race problems associated with urban renewal.”! By separating further controversy from urban renewal, the government managed to build a highly positive image of urban renewal in Singa- pore, arguing for its contribution to the modernization and globalization of Singapore, The sen- sitivity of the race issue can be seen in Gamer's first-hand observations of the process of urban renewal. Without Minister Rajaratnam and Permanent Secretary Howe's authorized access to government data and permission to study the residents’ livelihood, Gamer would not have been able to carry out his research, let alone draw the link between race and the politics of urban development. In seeming gratitude, Gamer deescalated the severity by the issue by electing to use the phrase ‘ethnic diversity” instead of ‘racial tension’ throughout his account of urban. renewal Megastructure linear city: experimentations in mixed use and strata title forms (1969: fourth iteration, 1973: fifth and built iteration) Lim's newly reorganized private practice DP was able to flourish under such boom conditions. Despite the break-up of the Malayan Architects Co-Partnership in 1967, with the loss of influential partner Lim Chong Keat, Lim was able to retain younger partner Tay, even though he was Lim Chong Keat's former student. Commissioned to first develop the economic feasibility of the project by the inexperienced developer Singapura Developments in 1969, Lim and Tay were able to develop a GMD feasibility master plan study (Figure 11), and they eventually won the commission to design the building. In preparing for complex projects such as GMC, Lim embraced the role of architect-plan- ner-administrator advocated at the Harvard Urban Design Conference. Lim would provide socioeco- nomic, environmental and planning assessments for the client. His junior partner Chan Sui Him recalled his participation in this extensive GMD feasibility study, describing Lim as the philosopher hoe, “The Early Years of Nation Buldng: Reflections on Singapore's Urban Histon,” 12. “cha, “Urban Renewal” 170, ‘Gamer, The Plies of Urban Development n Singapore, 76 "Go, Urban Systems Suis: Urban Redeelgpment Fem Urban Squaleto Global Cty 28 chee, “The Early Yeas of Nation Bulding” 12 Gamer, The Poti of Ubon Development in Singapore, 262. PLANNING PERSPECTIVES @)_708 no © wewee Pot ee Figure 12. Unbuilt GMD Typical Sectional Studies showing structural elements and circulation in ealy experiments forthe stvata-title megastructure in 1968. (Image Source: William S.W. Lim Archives) and development economist.”* The pedestrianized corridor along GMD was marked as ‘continuous shopping, that moved gradually from the ‘global’ functions in the southwestern end of hotels, offices, shops, convention halls, to the ‘local’ functions of las, ‘local hotels,’ and even a flatted factory towards the northeastern end of GMD adjacent to public housing, This factory would be a source of ‘employment forlocal residents, connecting to the Kallang industrial zones to the north, Most critically, Lim and DP envisioned these global and local functions to coexist, and share the same stepped mega structure form. An annotation on the drawing read ‘policy decision is necessary for the use ofthis and because it afects the type of development possible on Golden Mil,’ as a prompt to the planning auth- tities to ensure that good policies were in place to aid good design. ‘Accompanying this master plan were typical sectional studies of how the megastructures could work, (Figure 12) These drawings reveal that Lim was experimenting with strata title and mixed ‘use functions for GMD as a whole, as early as in 1968, as i was one of the first test cases in Singapore since the passing of the Land Titles (Strata) Act in 1967.” Under this strata title act, developers were allowed to sell the commercial and shop units to recover their cost relatively quickly. However, the ultimate beneficiaries were the shop unit owners, because there was the possibility of a more equi- table distribution of ownership and wealth across the city. The experimental nature of these tah, “An ntervew with Chan Su Hi 27. BCA, Sata Lving in Singopore explorations revealed that Lim and DP did not get it right in the firs iterations. Lim was testing two and three-storey low-rise housing facing the Nicoll Highway, and a second row of stepped mega- structure with a hotel component, but these experiments were not eventually adopted. These strata title experiments for GMD were in fact closely aligned with UN recommendations, as the built GMC can be closely compared to the MID proposals by Abrams and the UN team in terms of their mixed ‘use intentions. (Figure 5) UN recommended that these ‘mixed’ redevelopment forms should be led by private investments, with new models of private ownership and architectural typologies. The vola- Uility of the policies of that period was conducive for architectural experimentation and innovation, as Lim could develop novel architectural forms across a complex spectrum of scales, from broad urban ideals of a linear city to experimental construction details that required a close working relationship with the contracting profession, The eventual iteration was completed in 1973 on the ninth plot furthest east of GMD. (Figure 13) Lim recalled the use of recycled and surplus steel railway tracks as foundation piles for GMC, which required special engineering calculations by Arup Engineers, and special waivers were needed.” Responding to the belief that Singapore's economy would benefit from a higher level of consumer- ism, GMD was faced with the requirement to bring about new forms of shopping experiences to Sin- gapore, Lim's unbuilt urban design master plan ought to be discussed alongside other typologies of linear ‘social’ megastructures, as well as extra-large shopping malls. The horizontality and mixed-use functions of GMC contrasted strongly against Choe and URD's preferred verticality and mono-func- tional form. Despite the fact that only one of the twin-row of the fifteen stepped megastructures depicted in Lim's master plan was built, the GMC experiment would have a very direct influence ‘over this emerging mixed-use typology in Singapore, closer to the proposal Conclusion: the conflicted city: modernization and the third world ‘The city and its architecture were in conflict. There is a deeply rooted chasm between the global city of private capital and luxury housing, and a social city of politically legitimized housing projects and affordable consumption. Singapore's public housing programme is second to none, so is its image of a green and well-planned global city. These accolades help to paper over the cracks in the system, and the state would not risk disruptions to its embryonic global city and modernization plans with dama- ging narratives of racial unrest. It stands to reason that sociologist Adeline Cheng’s study of collective ‘memory in Singapore would reveal that all state accounts around the racial riots of 1964 had been dominated by a hegemonic form that used the riot as a tool to declare Singapore as a tolerant, multi- cultural and multiracial society.” Alternative accounts by any particular race group would be con- sidered unacceptable because they would destabilize this narrative of multiculturalism. The dominant race group within the government remains Chinese, There is a schizophrenia that can account for Singapore having one of the worst inequality in its income distribution amongst the developed nations.” Singapore may be a First World city with a Third World income inequality, even if there are statistics that may give Singapore the benefit of the doubt.”* There were numerous unexpected actors and outcomes of the global narrative of modernization, which perhaps did not yield the desired results. The linear district of GMD and Precinct N1 was planned in such @ way Pim, intr ith autor, 2011 cheng, “The Pat n the Present Memories af the 1964 Racal Rain Singapore” cn) 2017} Ditbution of Family Income ~ Gini Index, DF and Oxfam Research, The cmmatment to reducing inequality inde: o new global ranking of governments based an what they are doing totale the gap between ich and por “UNDP Haman Dewgpment Reports amon Development Inca hess m © wewee Figure 13. Contemporary aerial view, with lobal architects (except a couple of exceptions) neatly aligned along ‘GMO, (LtoR) Norman Foster's South Beach Towers, lersen Van Sitteren's Shaw Tower and Cinema, LM. Pe’ Gate- way Towers, Ole Scheeren’s Duo Towers (behind), Prilip Cox's Concourse Skyline Apartments, Paul Rudoip’s Con- course, Ec Taylor's Hotel Plaza, Goh Hock Guan’ Golden Mile Tower ané Cinema, and DP's Golden Mile Complex. Forreference, the conservation areas are visible asthe remainder tera cotta roofs ofthe shophouses, limited to N4, [NB and part of N7 totalling less than 20% of the entie North District as marked out by Lorange. (Image Source: Google Earth image, 2019 DigitalGlobe) as to serve the global city economy of the nation, while partially meeting the demand for social legiti- macy by its expectant new citizens. (Figure 14) Designed in the context of GMD between 1963 and 1973, the five iterations of GMC not only showed the nature of urban renewal in Singapore, it also positioned a narrative of global tecinical assistance, urban design pedagogy and an evolutionary position of the experimental megastructure. ‘These transformations took place in an emerging global city in the midst of extensive urban research and advocacy for the Third World in Asia. A large part of this can be attributed to the resituating of the debates at Harvard to a developing Singapore city in search for expertise and national identity. Lim’s ‘writings gave clues about the complexity facing architectural and urban design professionals. Yet it was against this backdrop of a powerful planning machinery that Lim Chong Keat cautioned against pla- «ing too much burden on urban design as a discipline to solve all the problems.” The unforgiving zname of ‘golden,’ like Singapore's Golden Shoe, or Kuala Lumpur’s Golden Triangle, set lofty expec- tations that these districts will definitely bring wealth to the nation. It suffices to say that GMD was not spared from these demands, as it revealed deeply seated tensions and inequalities in the context of a newly established government seeking social legitimacy and global relevance at the same instance. Situating within the broader mid-twentieth century history of modernism, GMC was a project of its time — a period of greater tolerance and liberalization, a rapidly decolonizing world, the rise of the Lim, “roan Design and Content in Singapore and Malaysia” 58 Figure 14, Crawford Public Housing served as a socially legitimizing backdrop to the 1985 National Day Parade — contingents of soldiers and community groups were marching past spectators along Crawford Street and turning to North Bridge Road. There would be no view of GMD during this parade, as it would have been blocked by these housing slab blocks. mage Source: Ministry of Information and the Arts Collection, courtesy of National Archives of Singapore) ‘Third World and the emergent globalized world, The Civil Rights Movement came about during the same climate of social change. Towards the end of his Fulbright fellowship at Harvard in 1957,"° Lim toured the United States, and hitchhiked from Boston to the Deep South and Midwest of America. He recalled being on long interstate coach rides, where he sat towards the rear of the coaches with fellow passengers of colour, He felt connected to African Americans and the Civil Rights Movement, and understood what it meant to be an outsider. This racial and class distinction in the American city resonated with Lim as he worked out what needed to be done for Singapore and other Third World

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