CUALES REVIEWER – SUMMARY [Articles 1 - 3]

[CRIMINAL LAW]

Criminal Law:
“…is that branch or division of law which defines crimes, treats of their nature, and provides for
their punishment”

Sources of Philippine Criminal Law:

1. The Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815) and its amendments.
2. Special Penal Laws
3. Presidential Decrees issued during martial law

Note: Court cases are not sources of criminal law, they merely explain the meaning of, and apply,
the law as enacted by the legislative branch.

Inherent powers of government:

1. Eminent Domain
2. Police Power
3. Taxation

Limitations on the power of Congress to enact penal legislation:

1. Due Process and Equal Protection (Art. III, Sec. 1)
2. Non-imposition of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment (Art. III, Sec. 19.1)
3. Ex Post Facto Law or Bill of Attainder (Art. III, Sec. 2)

On limitations:
• [Due Process] Comprised of two components:
o Intrinsic validity: Right to life, liberty, or property
o Procedural due process: Notice and Hearing
• [Equal Protection] No person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of
laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances (City of Manila
v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.).
• [Excessive Fines] Only applies to criminal prosecutions.
o To be considered obnoxious to the Constitution, it needs to be more than merely
being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe.
• [Cruel and Unusual Punishment] Aimed more at the form or character of the punishment
rather than at its severity (Lim v. People).

Ex Post Facto Law and Bill of Attainder

Ex Post Facto Law:

• [Definition] Retroactively changes the legal consequences or punishments for actions that
were committed before the law was enacted.
• [Background] Congress is prohibited from passing retroactive penal laws that are
prejudicial to the accused.
• [Increased Penalty] Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 (approved in 1982) may not be given
retroactive application to the crime which was committed in January 1976, for it would be
prejudicial to the accused (People v. Sandiganbayan).
o Makes person criminally liable for a crime that had already been extinguished under
the law existing when it was committed.
• [Increased Penalty] Increase of penalty to swindling by means of bouncing checks
approved in 1985 cannot be applied to estafa committed on 1974 (People v. Villaraza).

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Bill of Attainder:
• [Definition] Legislative act that pronounces a group or person guilty of a crime without
benefit of a trial.
• [Communist] A law which makes it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve
as an officer or employee of a labor union is a bill of attainder (US v. Brown).
• [Bill of Rights] Accounts for person’s rights.
• [Waiving of Rights] As a general rule, rights which are personal may be waived. Rights
which involve public interest may not be waived.
o Personal right example: Right to confrontation and cross-examination
o Right involving Public Interest example: Right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.

Characteristics of Criminal Law

1. General
2. Territorial
3. Prospective

General
Criminal law is binding on all persons who live or sojourn in Philippine territory (Art. 14, NCC).

General:
• [US Citizen’s right to bear arms] Does not apply in the Philippines. Philippines is a
sovereign state … with the general jurisdiction to punish persons for offenses committed
within its territory, regardless of the nationality of the offender (Salonga and Yap, Public
International Law).
o GR: No foreigner enjoys in this country the extra-territorial right to be exempted
from its laws.
o X: Heads of States and Diplomatic Representatives, by virtue of customary laws
• [Military Character] Jurisdiction of civil courts is not affected by the military character of
the accused (US v. Sweet).
o X: When the offense is service-connected
▪ X to the X: When the President, in the interest of justice, orders that such
crimes be tried by the proper civil courts (Sec. 1, RA 7055).
• [Court Martial] Service-connected crimes under the Articles of War are tried by the court
martial (Reyes, p. 10).
• [RA 7055] does not divest military courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of
Articles 54 to 70. The law mandates that these crimes or offenses shall be tried by the court
martial (Navales et al. v. Abaya).
• [RPC v. AOW] When the military court takes cognizance of the case involving a person
subject to military law, the Articles of War applies not the Revised Penal Code (Ruffy et al.
v. Chief of Staff et al.).
• [Double Jeopardy] Prosecution of an accused before a court-martial is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense (Marcos and Concordia v. Chief of Staff).

Exceptions to the General Application:

• [Background] Provisions of this Code shall be enforced within the Philippine Archipelago
except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application (Art. 2, RPC).
• [Treaties Definition] An agreement formally signed, ratified, or adhered to between two
countries or sovereigns; an international agreement concluded between two or more
states in written form and governed by international law (Black’s Law Dictionary).
o [Visiting Forces Agreement] Between the Philippines and the USA (Feb. 10, 1988)
▪ Philippines has jurisdiction over:
• US Personnel → Offenses within the Philippines
• US Personnel → Offenses relating to the security of the Philippines

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 o (Treason, sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating
to national defense)
▪ US has jurisdiction over:
• US Personnel → Military law of the US
• US Personnel → Offenses relating to the security of the US
• US Personnel → 1. Acts against property or security of the US or 2.
Offenses arising out of act or omission done in performance of duty.
• [Laws of Preferential Application Definition] Laws that apply to a specific group of people
or circumstances (Black’s Law Dictionary).
o [RA 75] Exempts from arrest or imprisonment ambassadors or public ministers of
any foreign State, authorized and received as such by the President, or any
domestic or domestic servant of any such ambassador or minister.
▪ X: Citizen or inhabitant of the Philippines, in the service of ambassador or
public minister who contracted debt prior to the service.
▪ X: Domestic servant of an ambassador or public minister, unless name of
servant has been registered in the DFA.
• [Vienna Convention] Exempts certain persons from the operation of our criminal laws.
o Persons exempted:
▪ Ambassadors and other heads of mission of equivalent rank who are
accredit to the host state;
▪ Envoys extraordinary, ministers plenipotentiary, and other representatives
who are accredited to the host heads of state; and other representatives
who are accredited to the host heads of state; and
▪ Charges d’affaires, who are accredited to the minister of foreign affairs.
o [Blanket Immunity] Only heads of missions and members of the diplomatic staff
have blanket immunity from civil and criminal suits.
▪ Main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to
immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of
diplomatic nature (Minucher v. CA).
▪ [Consuls] who represent their respective states in concerns of commerce
and navigation and perform certain administrative notarial duties are not
covered by the blanket immunity.
• They only have immunity for acts performed in the exercise of
consular functions, but this does not apply in respect of civil action.
• [Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity] The State may not be sued without its consent (Article
XVI, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution).
o Rationale: State embodied the law and could therefore do no wrong.
o Also applies to state officials for acts performed in discharge of their duties.
o [Drugs] is not covered under sovereign immunity. It cannot for a moment be
imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity. (US v. Guinto).
o [DEA Agent] in the performance of his duty to conduct surveillance on suspected
drug suppliers is covered under sovereign immunity (Minuncher v. CA).
o [Cases when State can be sued] Contracts, Torts and Negligence, Property Rights,
Government Liability Act, Contracts GOCC, Cases involving the Constitution.
o [Private Capacity] Sovereign immunity does not apply when State officials are
sued in their private or personal capacity or for unauthorized acts.
• [ADB Immunity] Officers and staff of the Bank, including experts and consultants
performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy immunity with respects to acts performed
by them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity (Sec. 45 of
the Agreement between ADB and the Philippines).
• [Presidential Immunity] President enjoys immunity from suit during his or her tenure of
office or actual incumbency. Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be
invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed during his or her tenure
(Lozada v. Arroyo).

Territorial
Criminal law is binding on all persons who live or sojourn in Philippine Archipelago including its
atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone (Art. 2, NCC).

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Territorial:
• [Meaning] As a rule, penal laws of the Philippines are enforceable only within its territory.
• [Extent] Within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters
and maritime zone.
• [Exceptions to the Territorial Application]
1. [Ship or Airship] Commit an offense while on Philippine ship or airship.
2. [Forge or Counterfeit] Forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the
Philippines or obligations and securities issued by the Government.
3. [Introduction] Introduction into the Philippines of the obligations and securities in
the preceding number.
4. [Public Officers or Employees] While being public officers or employees should
commit an offense in the exercise of their functions.
5. [National Security] Any of the crimes against national security and the law of
nations defined in Title One of Book Two of the RPC.
• [VAWC Case] In a case involving a foreign national father due to his unjustified failure to
support his minor child, since the respondent is currently living the Philippines, the
Territoriality Principle applies (Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem).
• [VAWC Case] …violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or
continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in
their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another …
Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed (AAA v. BBB, GR No.
212448 [2018]).
o Even if the alleged extramarital affair causing the offended wife mental and
emotional anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place ap prosecution
under RA 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.

Prospective
No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission (Art 21,
Revised Penal Code).

Prospective:
• [General Rule] Laws shall have no retroactive application, lest they acquire the character
of an ex post facto law (Mejia v. Pamaran).
o X: When favorable to the accused.
▪ X to the X:
1. Where the new law is expressly made inapplicable to pending
actions or existing causes of action (Tavera v. Valdez).
2. Where the offender is a habitual criminal under Rule 5, Art 62 of the
Revised Penal Code (Art 2, RPC).
o Different effects of repeal on penal law:
▪ Penalty in new law is lighter → New law applies.
▪ Penalty in new law is heavier → The law in force applies.
▪ Penalty in new law is no longer punishable → Crime is obliterated.
• [New and Old Law penalizing the same offense] Where an act of the Legislature which
penalizes an offense repeals a former Act which penalized the same offense, such repeal
does not have the effect of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction (US v. Cuna).
• [Self-Repealing Law] Where an act expires by its own time of its limitation, the effect is the
same as though it had been repealed at the time of its expiration (People v. Jacinto).
• [Pro Reo Principle] Penal laws are strictly construed against the Government and liberally
in favor of the accused (US v. Abad Santos).

Effectivity
This Code shall take effect on the first day of January, nineteen hundred and thirty two.

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Felonies
Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies. Felonies are committed not only by means of
deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).

Felonies:
• [Elements] The elements of felonies in general are:
1. There is an act or omission
2. Act or omission is punishable by the RPC
3. Act is performed or the omission incurred by means of dolo or culpa
• [External] Only external acts can be punished because internal acts are beyond the sphere
of penal law. Thoughts or intentions don’t constitute a felony.
• [Punishable by Law] This is another element of felony. Following the maxim ‘nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege’ – there is no crime where there is no law punishing it.
• [Classification of Felonies] Article 3 classifies felonies by means which they are committed.
o Intentional Felonies – Act or omission is malicious; with deliberate intent.
o Culpable Felonies – Act or omission is not malicious; unintentional.
• [Injury without intention] …it was held that while there was no intention to cause an evil
but to provide a remedy, the defendant was liable for physical injuries through imprudence
(US v. Divino).
• [Negligence v. Imprudence] Imprudence indicates a deficiency of action. Negligence
indicates a deficiency of perception.
o Negligence – usually involves lack of foresight.
o Imprudence – usually involves lack of skill.
• [Voluntary] In felonies committed by means of dolo or culpa, the acts or omissions are
voluntary.
o Even negligent acts are voluntary.
o [Deer] Hunter sees with his lantern the eyes of a deer about 50 meters from him
and shoots at it. It proved to be his companion. He is guilty of the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence because while he did not have the intent, he should
have exercised all the necessary diligence to avoid every undesirable accident
(People v. Ramirez).
o [Air Gun] Reodique picks up an airgun and asks the owner if it was loaded. Owner
says no. He discharges it and wounds and later kills the owner. He was convicted of
gross or reckless imprudence. He deliberately pulled the trigger and voluntarily and
intentionally caused its discharge which produced the injury.

Dolo or Malice:
• [Requisites] For act or omission to be considered as having been performed or incurred
with deliberate intent, the following requisites must occur:
1. Freedom
2. Intelligence
3. Intent
• [Freedom] When a person acts without freedom, he is no longer a human being but a tool.
o [Irresistible Force] Person who acts under a compulsion of an irresistible force is
exempt from criminal liability because he had done the act without freedom (Art 12,
Par. 5).
o [Uncontrollable Fear] Person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear
of an equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability because he had done
the act without freedom (Art 12, Par. 5).
• [Intelligence] Without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts, no
crime can exist.
o [Imbecile or Insane] Person who is an imbecile or is insane is exempt from criminal
liability because he had done the act without intelligence (Art. 12, Par. 1).
o [Age] Infant under 9 years and minor over 9 years but less than 15 and acting
without discernment is exempt from criminal liability because he had done the act
without intelligence (Art. 12, Par. 2 and 3).
• [Intent] …is a mental process and is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act.

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 o Criminal intent and the will to commit a crime are always presumed to exist on the
part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary
appears (US v. Apostol).
• [Intent] …presupposes the exercise of freedom and the use of intelligence.
o No freedom, no intent.
o No intelligence, no intent.
o But a person with intelligence and freedom may not have intent. Thus, a person
who caused an injury by mere accident is not criminally liable (Art. 12, Par. 4).
• [Intent] Existence of intent is shown by overt acts.
o For example, intent to kill is difficult to prove since it’s a mental act. But, it can be
deduced from the external acts made by the person.
• [Intent] Presumption of intent does not arise from the proof of the commission of an act
which is not unlawful.
o Where the facts proven are accompanies by other facts which show that the act
complained of was not unlawful, the presumption of criminal intent does not arise
(US v. Catolico).
• [No Felony by Dolo] …if there is no intent.
o [Marriage] Minor who married without parental consent was not criminally liable
because she proved she acted without malice (US v. Penalosa).
o [Dream] Person who suddenly got up in his sleep and wounded his wife and
attacked others is not criminally liable because his acts were not voluntary for
having acted in a dream; No criminal intent (People v. Taneo).
• [Mistake of Fact] Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance (ignorantia legis
non excusat), but ignorance or mistake of fact relieves the accused from criminal liability
(ignorantia facti excusat).
o [Requisites] Mistake of Fact as a Defense:
1. Act would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed
them to be
2. Intention of the accused performing the act should be lawful
3. Mistake must be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused
• [Mistake of Fact] Lack of intent to commit a crime may be inferred from the facts of the
case. Accused charged with theft for cutting and carrying away 33 coconut trees.
o He sought prior permission from the barangay captain to cut down the coconut
trees which was done openly and during broad daylight, effectively negating malice
and criminal intent on their part (Magsumbol v. People).
• [Mistake of Fact] Act done would have been lawful, had the facts been as the accused
believed them to be. In other words, act would not constitute a felony had the facts been
as the accused believed them to be.
o Examples:
▪ Believing that she was of proper age when contracting a marriage (US v.
Penalosa).
▪ Believing that the orders of his superior were legal (People v. Beronilla).
▪ Believing that his roommate was an intruder (US v. Ah Chong).
o Not Examples:
▪ Believing that the man sleeping was the wanted criminal, does not permit
the captor to kill him. This is not lawful (People v. Oanis).
▪ In mistake of identity where A killed B believing he was C. The principle of
mistake of fact does not apply because the act was unlawful.
▪ When the accused is negligent, mistake of fact is not a defense. A policeman
who shot at a person he believed to be an escaped convict is charged with
a culpable felony. There is no intent, but there is negligence (People v. de
Fernando).
▪ Mistake of killing one man instead of another cannot relive him from
criminal responsibility, he having acted maliciously and willfully (People v.
Gona).
o Act done would have constituted (1) a justifying circumstance, (2) an absolutory
clause, or (3) an involuntary act.
• [Mistake in Identity] Here, the principle of mistake of fact does not apply because the act
is unlawful.

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 • [Reason] Criminal intent is necessary in felonies committed by means of dolo because:
o Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea – The act itself does not make am an guilty
unless his intention were so
o Actus me invito factus non est meus actus – An act done by me against my will is
not my act (US v. Ah Chong).

Culpa or Fault:
• [Requisites] For act or omission to be considered as having been performed or incurred
with fault or culpa, the following requisites must occur:
1. Freedom
2. Intelligence
3. Imprudence, Negligence, or Lack of Foresight
• [No Intent] In culpable felonies, injury caused to another should be unintentional; It is an
act performed without malice.
o Example:
▪ The injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice (People v. Sara).
▪ Three men were out hunting. Catangay aimed at a deer but stumbled
against an embankment and accidentally discharged his gun which hit and
killed Ramos. Catangay was not criminally liable because he had no criminal
intent and he was not negligent (US v. Catangay).
o Not an Example:
▪ Throwing a grenade at the President intending to kill him but accidentally
injures the persons surrounding the President. Deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence
(People v. Nanquil).
▪ Where an unlawful act is willfully done, a mistake in the identity of the
intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People v.
Guillen).
• [Lawful] The act must be lawful.
o Lawful – Aiming a gun at a deer while hunting.
o Unlawful – Aiming a gun in a public place is unlawful; Therefore, if a person is injured
as a result of the discharge, the one discharging is criminally liable.

Special Laws:
• [The Third Class of Crime] …are those defined and penalized by special laws.
o If it is punished by a special law, intent to commit is not necessary. It is sufficient
that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited.
o Distinguishing intent to commit and intent to perpetrate:
▪ Intent to Commit – there must be criminal intent.
▪ Intent to Perpetrate – It is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and
consciously.
o Examples:
▪ The law which defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent
with which he violated is immaterial. Defendant may not have intended to
intimidate any electorate or violate the law, but when he got out of his
automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the
place, he committed the act complained of (People v. Bayona).
▪ The Intellectual Property Code is malum prohibitum and prescribes a strict
liability for copyright infringement. Good faith, lack of knowledge of the
copyright, or lack if intent to infringe is not a defense (ABS CBN v. Gozon)
• [Mala in se v. Mala prohibita] The rule is that in acts mala in se, there must be a criminal
intent. But in those mala prohibita, it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally
done.
o Mala in se – crimes that are inherently wrong.
o Mala prohibita – crimes which are prohibited.
o The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala
prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the
intent of the offender is immaterial (Tan v. Ballena).

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 o Good faith and absence of criminal intent are not valid defenses since the offense
committed is malum prohibitum, punished by a special law (People v. Neri).
• [Motive v. Intent]
o Motive – Moving power which impels one to action for a definite result.
o Intent – Purpose to use a particular means to effect such result.
o Motive is not an essential element of a crime, and need not be proved for purposes
of conviction (People v. Asposaga).
o An extreme moral perversion may lead a man to commit a crime without a real
motive but just for the sake of committing it (People v. Taneo).
• [When Motive is Necessary]
o Identity of Accused
▪ Where the identity of a person accused of having committed a crime is in
dispute, the motive that may have impelled its ocmmission is very relevant
(People v. Murray).
▪ Motive is essential only when there is doubt as to the identity of the assailant.
It is immaterial when the accused has been positively identified (People v.
Gadiana).
▪ Where the defendant admits the killing, it is no longer necessary to inquire
into his motive (People v. Arcilla).
o Antagonistic Theories
▪ Motive is important in ascertaining the truth between two antagonistic
theories or versions of the killing (People v. Boholst-Caballero).
o No Eyewitnesses
▪ Where there are no eyewitnesses to the crime, and where suspicion is likely
to fall upon a number of persons, motive is relevant and significant (People
v. Melgar).
o Circumstantial Evidence or Sufficient Evidence
▪ If the evidence is merely circumstantial, proof of motive is essential (People
v. Oquino).
• [Proving Motive] Motive is established by the testimony or witnesses on the acts or
statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense
(Barrioquinto v. Fernandez).
• [Motive Alone is Not Sufficient] Existence of a motive is not sufficient proof of guilt (People
v. Marcos). Mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not sufficient to support a
conviction (People v. Macatangay).

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 People v. Oanis
G.R. No. 47722 || 1943
Mistake of Fact

Recit:
In "People v. Oanis," the Supreme Court of the Philippines convicted Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto
Galanta of murder, not merely homicide through reckless imprudence as initially charged by the
lower court. This decision was based on their failure to reasonably ascertain the identity of Serapio
Tecson before fatally shooting him, under the mistaken belief that he was the criminal Anselmo
Balagtas. The Court held that law enforcement officers are not justified in using deadly force
without verifying the identity of their target, especially when there is no immediate threat or
resistance, and that their actions cannot be excused as an innocent mistake of fact. While
acknowledging that the defendants believed they were performing their duty, the Court found
this only partially mitigating, leading to a reduced but still significant penalty for their precipitate
and unjustified actions.

Facts:
The case revolves around the murder of Serapio Tecson, an innocent citizen, by Antonio Z. Oanis,
Chief of Police, and Alberto Galanta, Corporal of the Philippine Constabulary. The defendants were
instructed to arrest Anselmo Balagtas, a notorious criminal, and were authorized to use lethal force
if overpowered. Mistaking Tecson for Balagtas while he was asleep with his paramour, Irene, in
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, the defendants fatally shot him without verifying his identity.

Issue:
The primary issue was whether Oanis and Galanta should be held criminally liable for the death
of Tecson, given their belief that they were acting in the line of duty under the mistaken
impression that Tecson was Balagtas.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court ruled that the defendants were guilty of murder, overturning the lower court's
conviction for homicide through reckless imprudence. The Court held that the defendants' actions
were not a result of innocent mistake or honest performance of duty, as they failed to verify
Tecson's identity and acted precipitately. The Court distinguished this case from instances of
innocent mistake of fact, noting the lack of immediate danger or necessity for such a hasty action.

It was emphasized that law enforcement officers are not justified in using unnecessary force or
resorting to dangerous means when a less violent alternative is available. The Court also
recognized a mitigating circumstance in the defendants' belief that they were performing their
duty, though this did not fully justify their actions. Hence, a penalty lower than that prescribed for
murder was imposed.

US v. Ah Chong
G.R. No. 5272 || 1910
Mistake of Fact

Recit:
In "United States v. Ah Chong," the Supreme Court addressed the issue of criminal liability in the
case of a mistaken belief of self-defense. Ah Chong, believing he was defending himself against a
robber, accidentally killed his roommate. The Court acquitted him, underscoring the principle that
criminal liability requires either wrongful intent or negligence, which were absent in Ah Chong's
case. This ruling highlights the legal acknowledgment of innocent mistakes of fact, provided they
are not due to negligence or bad faith, in determining criminal responsibility.

Facts:
This case involves Ah Chong, a cook, and his roommate, a house boy named Pascual Gualberto.
Ah Chong, mistakenly believing that an intruder was breaking into their shared room at night,

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fatally wounded Gualberto. Ah Chong had taken precautions due to a spate of robberies in the
area, including keeping a knife under his pillow. On the night of the incident, Gualberto attempted
to enter their room without identifying himself, leading Ah Chong to believe he was an intruder
and to act in what he believed was self-defense.

Issue:
The central issue was whether Ah Chong could be held criminally responsible for Gualberto's
death, given his mistaken belief that he was defending himself against a robber.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court acquitted Ah Chong, holding that there was no criminal liability under the
circumstances. The Court reasoned that criminal liability requires a wrongful intent or negligence,
neither of which was present in Ah Chong's actions. The Court distinguished between cases of
genuine mistake of fact without negligence or bad faith, and those involving negligence or
criminal intent. In Ah Chong's case, his actions were based on a reasonable belief formed under
the circumstances as they appeared to him. The principle of "Ignorantia facti excusat" (ignorance
or mistake of fact is an excuse) was applied, emphasizing that an act committed under a mistaken
belief, if not due to negligence or bad faith, does not constitute criminal liability.

People v. Gervero
G.R. No. 206725 || 2018
Mistake of Fact

Recit:
In the case of People of the Philippines vs. Esmael Gervero et al., decided on July 11, 2018, the
Supreme Court upheld the murder convictions of the defendants for the 1991 killing of three
individuals in Iloilo. The Court rejected the defense of mistake of fact and fulfillment of duty,
finding that the attack was characterized by treachery as the victims were caught off guard and
had no chance to defend themselves. The ruling emphasized that the accused's actions were
deliberate and malicious, dismissing their claim of engagement in a lawful patrol operation.

Facts:
The defendants were charged with multiple murder, stemming from an incident on November
25, 1991, in Lemery, Iloilo, Philippines. The charges involved the murder of Hernando Villegas, Jose
Villegas, and Benito Basug Jr. The prosecution's case was built on eyewitness accounts, indicating
that the accused, armed with firearms, attacked the victims with treachery, evident
premeditation, and superior strength, causing their immediate deaths.

The defense claimed that the accused were conducting a patrol operation against NPA members
and engaged in a shootout under the belief that the victims were NPA members. This defense
was built on the premise of mistake of fact and fulfillment of duty.

Issue:
The central issue revolved around whether the killing of the three victims was a result of a
mistaken engagement due to the belief that the victims were NPA members or a deliberate
act of murder.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts, finding the accused guilty of murder.
The Court rejected the defense of mistake of fact, ruling that the accused had ample opportunity
to verify the identity of the victims and their actions were not those of individuals acting under a
mistaken belief but rather indicated a deliberate intention to kill. Furthermore, the defense of
fulfillment of duty was dismissed as the actions of the accused were not in line with lawful duty
and instead were driven by personal motives.

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The Court underscored the element of treachery in the attack, noting that the victims were
unsuspecting and had no opportunity to defend themselves. This sudden and unexpected attack
without any chance for the victims to retaliate or defend themselves constituted treachery.

US v. Valdez y Quiri
G.R. No. 16486 || 1921
Proximate Cause

Recit:
In the case of United States vs. Calixto Valdez y Quiri (1921), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
Valdez was criminally responsible for the homicide of Venancio Gargantel. Gargantel drowned
after jumping into the Pasig River to escape Valdez, who had threatened him with a knife. The
Court established that Valdez's threatening behavior directly led to Gargantel's death, affirming
the principle that causing someone to act in self-preservation, resulting in their death, constitutes
homicide.

Facts:
The case involves an incident that occurred on November 29, 1919, on the Pasig River, Philippines.
Calixto Valdez y Quiri, while in a small boat as part of a crew including Venancio Gargantel, was
accused of causing the death of Gargantel. Valdez, displeased with the speed of the crew's work,
threatened Gargantel with a knife, leading Gargantel to jump into the river to escape. Gargantel
subsequently drowned as he did not resurface. The event occurred in broad daylight with several
witnesses present, yet Gargantel's body was never recovered.

Issue:
The central issue was whether Valdez should be held criminally responsible for Gargantel's
death. The key question was whether Gargantel's act of jumping into the river, leading to his
drowning, could be directly attributed to Valdez's threatening actions.

Ratio:
The Supreme Court found Calixto Valdez y Quiri guilty of homicide. It ruled that Valdez was
responsible for Gargantel's death as his actions created an immediate sense of danger for
Gargantel, prompting him to jump into the river. The Court held that Valdez's act of threatening
Gargantel with a knife was the direct cause of Gargantel's decision to escape, which ultimately led
to his drowning. The Court referenced similar legal precedents, emphasizing that creating a
situation where a person feels compelled to take risky actions to preserve their life can lead to
criminal liability if those actions result in death.

Garcia v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 157171 || 2006
Mistake of Fact

Recit:
In Garcia v. Court of Appeals (2006), the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Arsenia B. Garcia
for unlawfully decreasing the votes of senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr. during the 1995
elections. This act, classified as "mala in se," demonstrated willful and malicious intent, thus
constituting a violation of Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646. The case underscores the
principle that election officers must ensure the accuracy and authenticity of election results, with
intentional manipulation of such results being inherently immoral and punishable by law.

Facts:
Arsenia B. Garcia, an election officer, was charged with violating Section 27(b) of Republic Act No.
6646, due to actions during the canvassing of votes in the 1995 senatorial elections in Alaminos,
Pangasinan. The charge involved the alleged decrease of votes received by senatorial candidate
Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., from 6,998 to 1,921 votes. Garcia's defense centered on the absence of

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motive and intent to commit the crime, arguing that the reduction of votes was not willful or
intentional.

Issue:
The case's central issue was whether Garcia's actions, leading to the significant reduction of
votes for a candidate, constituted a willful and unlawful act under Section 27(b) of Republic Act
No. 6646. The legal determination hinged on whether the act was "mala in se" (wrong in itself)
or "mala prohibita" (wrong because it is prohibited by law).

Ratio:
The Supreme Court held that Garcia's actions fell under the category of "mala in se," meaning the
act was inherently wrong and required the establishment of criminal intent. The Court found that
Garcia intentionally decreased the votes of Pimentel, which was inherently immoral and done with
malice. It emphasized the importance of accuracy and authenticity in election results and upheld
Garcia's conviction for violating the election law. The Court rejected the defense of lack of intent
and motive, ruling that the substantial decrease in votes could not be attributed to mere error or
fatigue.

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