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SUBSTATION FIRES, BLACKOUTS, PLANNING & TECHNICAL STANDARDS

(The 2020 Amapá – Brazil case)

English http://www.cognitor.com.br/AmapaENG.pdf Português http://www.cognitor.com.br/AmapaPOR.pdf

Author: Sergio Feitoza Costa COGNITOR – Consultancy , R&D + Training.

Email: sergiofeitoza@cognitor.com.br Site : www.cognitor.com.br

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arcs, overpressure, temperature rise, electrodynamic forces, stresses, short time currents, emc, magnetic fields, electric fields, substations,
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testing, laboratory, simulations, calculations, iec standards, busbar, busway, switchboard, internal arcs, overpressures, temperature rise,
electrodynamical stresses, short time currents, magnetic fields, electric fields, 62271, 61439, testing laboratory.

1. THE REASONS (remembering 2001 & 2009 )

In November, I read about the Amapá blackout that started on November 3 -

2020. In general, worldwide, the causes are:
a) A human or equipment failure (much less frequent)
b) Failure in the execution of the electrical system expansion planning or
inspections (usually started years before)

In cases with repercussions in the media, as in Amapá, the "guiltiest" forget what happened in previous years. The
cause varies from the non-execution of what was planned for the expansion of the electrical system, delays in bidding
under anti-corruption laws or the lack of training of the teams. In Brazil, training (after the 90s) and Education (since
1500) are always in the background.

As for the anti-corruption laws, they put an end to what remained of the efficiency of many concessionaires, state-
owned companies, and public organisms. I think they helped make Brazil one of the countries with the highest
corruption rates in the world. An exercise for journalists is to show what happened before and after the creation of
Law 8666 of 1993 in the indexes of corruption and efficiency.

As for the “official guilty” of a blackout, almost always the chosen one is a lightning discharge, a lightning arrester, a
power transformer, or a substation operator. Yesterday, December 7th, I even heard on TV a mention of not having a
fire protection system in the Amapá substation. For laypeople, these systems are useful for lowering substation
insurance premiums.

After a slightly larger fire started in the oil of the open substation transformer, nebulized water systems rarely manage
to put out the fire. They are useful to cool the region and reduce the chance that the fire will spread to neighboring
transformers. The only type of system that prevents the fire and explosion of a transformer is the type that was treated
in the NBR 8222 Brazilian technical standard. It does not have a corresponding in IEC or IEEE . CO2 systems in closed
substations are able to extinguish the fires but are not used in open substations,

In 2005, I coordinated, within ABNT - Brazilian National Standards, the review of standards on fire protection in
substations and their equipment (NBR 13231, NBR 8222, NBR 12232 and NBR 8674). The only one, which deals with a
system to prevent fires and explosions, was NBR 8222, for explosion and fire prevention systems, by depressurization.
This standard was a world-wide new thing because included a real test to prove that the explosion and fire were
prevented (I wrote it).

Numerous tests at CEPEL, the main high-power laboratories in South America, were carried out by the French company
SERGI to demonstrate the use. The NBR 8674 deals with fire protection systems, with nebulized water. After that time,
I had no contact with the topic “Fire Protection in Transformers”, except for few trainings I applied.

Cell phone. 55-21-9 88874600

E-mail: sergiofeitozacosta@gmail.com Site: http://www.cognitor.com.br
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Recently I went to the web, and I was surprised to see both the ABNT NBR8674 and NBR 8222 standards were
canceled, without replacement, in 2014. I do not believe that, after 2014, there are no ABNT technical
standards or, at least ANEEL / ONS regulations, that deal with these fire prevention systems in power
transformers. So, my question to ANEEL or those who acted in such standards cancellation is:
What was in those technical standards was transferred to another one? If this were not done it is a gross
mistake, and I would like to know what the current rules are.

Public opinion never knows the causes of a major blackout. Those involved omit the history that led to the causes,
sometimes started years before. They look for a culprit, in general, with low access to the media, to defend themselves.
Check the links below about the 2001 and 2009 blackouts.

I no longer work in the planning of the Brazilian Electric Sector, but when at Cepel / Eletrobras in the 8 years that
preceded the 2001 blackout, I was used to participate in the GCPS meetings (MME, Eletrobras, power utilities, Aneel,
etc ...). Many were in Amazonia, and we talked about the plants to be built, the costs of power plants, the use of Urucu
gas, about the Brazil - Bolivia gas pipeline, the PROINFA program (wind, biomass, and small hydroelectric plants) and
others.

We were even talking about the controversial Balbina hydroelectric plant (250 MW - 1985-1989) that flooded 2,360
km2 of the 2,360 km2 of land where Waimiri-Atroari Indians were located. Balbina, created to supply energy to
Manaus, was criticized for its high construction and maintenance costs and for being one of the least efficient Brazilian
plants in terms of Km2 / MW generated. It was said that, because the flooded area had not been deforested, it emitted
more greenhouse gases than coal-fired plants.

In those times, Eletrobras was planning the electricity sector in a very competent way. I never understood the reason
to withdraw Eletrobras' planning and create another state-owned company, in 2004, to do the same thing. In fact, I
understood well. Many management positions must have been created to do what Eletrobras performed well with a
department of some 50 people instead of 300.

2. WHAT ELSE MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO GET TO THE BLACKOUT?

Public service regulatory agencies, such as ANEEL, ANATEL and ANS, recently in focus with Covid, must inspect,
regulate, and control. They must represent the consumer in the sector's decisions, for example for energy prices
increases. As for representing the consumer, it is the same idea of how to make national and international technical
standards (ABNT, IEC). Producers, manufacturers, consumers, and neutral entities are free to participate in the
execution. However, this generates expenses and the consumer stopped participating. The consumer today is not
heard because is not there but pays the bill.

The functions of the regulatory agency are to collect market data, develop regulation, monitor compliance with
regulation, defend consumer rights, manage concession contracts, etc. ANEEL also coordinates the sector's R&D
resources.

These are many more functions than is possible to do well. The procedures for networks, regulations and other ANEEL
documents are technically well prepared. I doubt that the competent technical staff of ANEEL will be able to supervise
everything that is in its supervisory role, even with some help from ONS. In 2019 only in the Eletrobras System
(Amazonas GT, Chesf, Eletrobras Holding, Eletronorte, CGT Eletrosul) there were 71,000 km of transmission lines and
366 substations https://eletrobras.com/pt/Paginas/Transmissao-de-Energia.aspx

It is impossible to monitor this from a distance. It is not a WhatsApp thing. The size of ANEEL's teams will never be
sufficient for this. There is no point in thinking about increasing teams. Contrary to this, Brazil needs to reduce the
exaggerated size of state-owned and public companies. Decreasing the size is not making voluntary dismissal plans
(VDP) . In these plans the most experienced leave the company. Also, the best qualified leave to get the money because

Cell phone. 55-21-9 88874600

E-mail: sergiofeitozacosta@gmail.com Site: http://www.cognitor.com.br
 Consultancy, R&D and Training Ltd

they will get another good job outside. To seriously decrease the size is to privatize or close down everything possible,
without small talk. Therefore, it is necessary to have humility to transfer some assignments of ANEEL, in order to be
able to perform them.

I will give a suggestion on how to do it, for inspections. Today, due to the irresponsible VDPs, in the state-owned
companies of the electrical sector, there is a huge number of professionals doing small consultancy services, to pass
the time. These people were the cream of the electrical sector. Call these people to help with inspections by providing
services and not hiring employees. Each one could do the job in the State where he lives

3. TO CLOSE

When the official reasons for the blackout are made public, this is a good opportunity to answer the following:

(a) How many people work in ANEEL's inspection area looking the state and conditions of use of the substation’s
equipment ?

(b) If ANEEL wants to hire the services of experienced consultants to inspect, monitor and visit substations, would
this be allowed? Or is there a strange regulation that does not allow it?

(c) Under what conditions of overload did the substation transformers in Amapá operate? Was the ABNT NBR 5356-
7 standard (loading) being reasonably met?

(d) What are the current rules, ( ANEEL / ONS, ) for fire prevention and protection systems in substations? Are there
ABNT standards that cover this, as there were until 2014?

(e) When was the last time that ANEEL made a face-to-face visit to the black-out substation ? What do you do, after
identifying that one piece of equipment is at risk, without having another to put in place?

REFERENCES ( Wikipedia)

Blackout 2001:
https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crise_do_apag%C3%A3o

Blackout 2009:
https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apag%C3%A3o_no_Brasil_e_Paraguai_em_1999

Blackout Amapá 2020:

https://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apag%C3%A3o_no_Amap%C3%A1_em_2020

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The Author is Eng. Sergio Feitoza Costa. Sergio is an electrical engineer, M.Sc. in power systems and director of
COGNITOR. His C.V. is in the link https://www.cognitor.com.br/Curriculum.html

Cell phone. 55-21-9 88874600

E-mail: sergiofeitozacosta@gmail.com Site: http://www.cognitor.com.br