Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Hanifa School is the most popular school of thought among the other four schools of
thought. It is majorly followed in North India, out of the four schools of thought Hanifa
school of thought is much more liberal towards the non muslims, the Hanifa school of
thought gives greater importance to the rational deduction.
The Maliki school of thought is the second largest school of Islamic jurisprudence when it
comes to the percentage of its followers. This school is followed by at least 25% of the
Muslim population. This school of thought is predominantly different from other schools of
thought when it comes to sources to derive its sayings, however like other schools, the Maliki
school of thought also Quran as the major source of Islamic law.
The Hanbali school of thought does not have great followership, still, it is an important
school of Islamic jurisprudence. It is considered to be the most orthodox schools of Islamic
jurisprudence as it wants to the strict implementation of the Quran and the sayings of
Muhammad, however it is considered to be one of the most liberal schools when it comes to
trade or for commercial purposes. The current set of individuals who believe in Wahabism is
influenced by this school.
The Shafi school of thought is mostly followed in Yemen, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and
Palestine. It considers the Quran, Ijma, Sunnah, and Qiyas as the major source of Islamic law,
however, it relies less on qiyas while trying to construct its sayings. Apart from this it also
considers the sayings of Muhammad’s close companionship as a source of Islamic law.
1.2 Personal Laws and the Indian Constitution- Change in approach and view
In State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali,1952, the petitioner challenged the validity of the
Bombay Prevention of Bigamous Hindu Marriages Act, 1946, which states that bigamous
marriages void and criminalize bigamy among Hindus. The judgement was pronounced by
the rationale of the two-judge bench which stated that personal law is beyond the scope of
Part III of the Constitution. While deciding the case the court had to look into various issues
below-mention:
1. Whether personal law comes into the ambit of Article 13 of the constitution of
India?
2. Whether there is any reasonable basis for creating the Muslims as a separate class
to which the State law is not applicable?
3. Whether it is for the Legislature to decide what constitutes social reform?
While determining the fact that Muslim polygamy is valid, the court applied the principle of
‘Expressio Unius Exclusio Alterius’ which states that the expression of one excludes the
other, and its present application. The court relied on Article 112, which states that personal
laws cannot be defined as laws under Article 13, and also various State-regulated provisions
in the Constitution that relate to personal law as under Article 17 which abolishes
untouchability, Article 25 which guarantee freedom of religion to its citizen the constitution
drafters where redundant to include personal laws within the definition of under Article 13.
Further Article 44, which implements the state to build a Uniform Civil Code and Entry V of
the Concurrent list suggest that the drafter intent was to give the power to different personal
laws to the legislation and not the judiciary.
It is a historic fact that both the Muslims and Hindus’ personal laws are derived from their
respective religious texts embodied with their own distinctiveness and backgrounds.
However, Article 44 of the Constitution recognises separate and distinctive personal laws
irrespective of race or religion consequently the legislature has the power to introduce a
social reform in respect of a particular community having its own personal law, in this case,
the Hindus Bigamous Marriages Act.
The State plays an important role in considering the institution of marriage, divorce and
educational reforms of the two communities. As per Article 14, the State may rightly bring
social reform at different stages, territorial or community-wise. Hence, the Hindus Bigamous
Marriages Act does not follow any discrimination against the Hindus on the ground of
religion or race. Although the act is not uniform it is not arbitrary or capricious, there is a
reasonable basis for creating a separate class for Muslims.
Marriage is a social institution and the State of Bombay is vitally interested to compel Hindus
to become monogamists as a measure of social reform for the welfare of the state. The State
inherits this power under Article 25(2)(b) which states the right of a citizen to freedom of
religion. In a democracy, the legislature is constituted by the will of the people and
responsible for the welfare of the state and lays down the policy to achieve the objective
inherent in it. Hence, the legislation in its wisdom decides the social reform and not the court
of law.
Transformative approach towards personal laws
The ratio of Narasu Appa Mali case has never been challenged in the Supreme Court as it
extends to uncodified religious law which has not been modified by either customs or usage.
However, the previous decision by the Supreme Court in Sant Ram v. Labh Singh, where it
was held that customs are subject to fundamental rights and the decision in John Vallamottam
v. Union of India, subjecting personal laws to fundamental rights only dealt with codified
personal law.
While re-evaluating the Narasu Appa Mali case, some literature provide contrary views such
as Article 13(3)(a) does not use the word “common law” yet it is subjected to fundamental
rights. While drafting Article 17 the constituent drafter considering the pervasive nature of
caste discrimination prevailing in the society incorporate a specific article prohibiting
untouchability to leave no stone unturned. Further, the scope of Article 25 is broader than
personal laws as it protects an individual’s right to practice her religion rather than protecting
norms or rules. Article 44 comes as stated in Part IV of the Constitution casting no positive
obligation on the citizen as it is non-enforceable in the court of law.
However, it should be read as a transformative document to value constitutional morality
over societal morality. The observation on the importance of personal laws is subjected to
fundamental rights is made by Justice D.Y Chandrachud in the Sabrimala Temple Case.
“Customs, usages and personal laws have a significant impact on the civil status of
individuals. Those activities that are inherently connected with the civil status of individuals
cannot be granted constitutional immunity merely because they may have some associational
features which have a religious nature. To immunize them from constitutional scrutiny is to
deny the primacy of the Constitution.”
Subjecting personal laws to constitutional scrutiny is an important step in the direction of
constitutional vision. Hence, the decision in Narasu Appa Mali case, concerning
immunisation uncodified personal laws and distinctive customs and usage should be
reconsidered in an appropriate case in the future.
In India Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (“Sabrimala Temple case”), the
Supreme Court held the Sabarimala Temple’s custom of prohibiting women in their
menstruating years from entering to be unconstitutional and violative of female worshippers
right to equality under Article 14 of the Constitution and freedom of religion under Article 25
of the Constitution. However, the learned judges, in this case, differs from the Narasu case on
whether the expression “laws in force” in Article 13(1) read with Article 13(3)(b) includes
“custom or usages” by taking a closer look on the dissent adopted by Justice Rohinton Fazi
Nariman in the case of A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950, which dealt with the
constitutionality of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950. The fundamental rights are not
isolated, and separate but they are protected by a common thread of liberty and freedom.
Hence, Article 19,20, 21 and 20 do not overlap each other.
In the case of Shayara Bano v. Union of India, 2017, a Constitutional Bench in a 3:2 verdict
ruled that talaq-ul-biddat or triple talaq is not legally valid and the Muslim Personal Law
(Shariat) Application Act, 1937 is a law made by the legislation before the Constitution and it
falls within the expression “laws in force” in Article 13(3)(b) and would be hit by Article
13(1) as the practice of triple talaq is against the provision of Part III of the Constitution.