Marine Pollution Bulletin 127 (2018) 310–319

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Marine Pollution Bulletin

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpolbul

Corporate social responsibility in marine plastic debris governance T

Micah Landon-Lane
Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies, University of Tasmania, 20 Castray Esplanade, Battery Point, Tasmania, Australia

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: This paper explores the governance characteristics of marine plastic debris, some of the factors underpinning its
Corporate social responsibility severity, and examines the possibility of harnessing corporate social responsibility (CSR) to manage plastic use
Marine plastic debris within the contextual attitudes of a contemporary global society. It argues that international and domestic law
Oceans governance alone are insufficient to resolve the “wicked problem” of marine plastic debris, and investigates the potential of
the private sector, through the philosophy of CSR, to assist in reducing the amount and impacts of marine plastic
debris. To illustrate how CSR could minimise marine plastic pollution, an industry-targeted code of conduct was
developed. Applying CSR would be most effective if implemented in conjunction with facilitating governance
frameworks, such as supportive governmental regulation and non-governmental partnerships. This study
maintains that management policies must be inclusive of all stakeholders if they are to match the scale and
severity of the marine plastic debris issue.

1. Introduction nondegradable. Nondegradable is currently defined as “the lack of

Marine debris threatens the integrity of the oceans, which are in-
creasingly being described as in ‘crisis’ (Vince, 2015, Gold et al., 2014).
Marine debris is composed of plastic, glass, metal and rubber, but
plastic makes up 80% of anthropogenic debris found in the oceans,
explaining the particular focus of this paper on marine plastic debris
(UNEP, p.17, 2014). While 322 million tonnes of plastic was produced
in 2015, estimations in the literature of how much goes on to enter the
oceans range widely from 6 to 20 million tons, but generally favour the
higher estimations; one of many examples of dissensus in published
marine plastic literature (World Economic Forum, 2016, UNEP, 2014,
Vince and Hardesty, 2016, Gold et al., 2014). Similarly, while the
academic consensus rests at 80% of marine plastic debris being ter-
restrially sourced, estimations vary from 60 to 95% (Gold et al., 2014,
UNEP, 2014). This has obvious implications for policies for marine
plastic pollution prevention. Within the ocean, plastic has achieved a
ubiquitous presence; it can be found on shorelines, in ocean waters, and
seafloor sediments worldwide (Gall and Thompson, 2015, Secretariat of
the CBD and STAP, 2012, Thompson et al., 2009, OSPAR Commission,
2007). With global plastic production increasing by 5% annually
(UNEP, 2014), models agree the amount of marine plastic debris will
increase (van Sebille et al., 2015). Indeed, plastic production is ex-
pected to double in the next two decades, meaning that by 2050, at
current pollution rates, the mass of plastic in the oceans will be greater
than the mass of fish (Simon and Schulte, 2017).
Plastics are traditionally petroleum-based, and therefore
ability of the material to decompose or mineralize at measurable rates”
(Leslie, 2015). Curiously, this offers some degree of interpretation re-
garding what constitutes a “measurable rate”, providing challenges for
consistent classification of plastic types. Additionally, there is no in-
ternational standard for the degradation of plastic; this causes confu-
sion regarding which plastic types are most persistent, or even what
results from the disintegration of the various types of degradability:
degradable, biodegradable, oxodegradable, and compostable
(Australian Senate, 2016, Gold et al., 2014). Furthermore, there is
prolific confusion surrounding the terms “biodegradable” and “de-
gradable”, as they are often used interchangeably for plastics
(Australian Senate, p.126, 2016). Compostable and biodegradable
usually refers to plastics created from plant-based oils or methane,
which, along with other plastics made from organic compounds, can
fully degrade into environmentally safe particles (Simon and Schulte,
2017, Kuruppalil, 2015). Compostable plastic's title is similarly mis-
leading; it is generally designed to decompose in industrial composting
facilities; in the environment it has a similar degradation time to tra-
ditional plastic. During this time, it remains equally harmful to wildlife
from ingestion or entanglement. As such, the emphasis of innovations to
plastics should be directed at improving plastic recyclability and reu-
sability. Petroleum-based plastics also reduce the finite global stock of
fossil fuels, with 5–8% of global oil extraction going to plastic manu-
facturing (Kuruppalil, 2015, UNEP, 2014). Petroleum-based plastics
must therefore one day be replaced with renewable materials, parti-
cularly as the world begins to move away from fossil fuels.

E-mail address: micah.landonlane@utas.edu.au.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2017.11.054
Received 2 November 2017; Accepted 22 November 2017
0025-326X/ © 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
M. Landon-Lane
Despite the economic costs of marine plastic debris being re-
markably unknown (Newman et al., 2015, McIlgorm et al., 2011),
studies that attempt to enumerate the costs of marine debris provide
compelling evidence that policy development targeting marine plastic
debris can be cost effective; globally, plastic debris devalues specifically
marine ecosystems by $13 billion per year (UNEP, p.12, 2014). Goods
packaging accounts for 26% of annual plastic production, which, due to
the current emphasis on single use, almost invariably loses $80–120
billion from the global economy (World Economic Forum, p.6, 2016).
Additionally, single use packaging has been estimated to create $40
billion in externalities, which likely exceeds the total profits of the
packaging industry. Conversely, recycling accounts for only 14% of
plastic packaging, which decreases to approximately 5% after wastage
and inefficiencies in the recycling process. In contrast, recycling rates
for paper and iron/steel are 58% and 70–90% respectively.
2. Qualifying the marine plastic debris problem
2.1. Marine plastic debris as a wicked problem
The term “wicked problem” was coined by Rittel and Webber
(1973), in their seminal paper Dilemmas in a general theory of planning,
wherein they described some social policy problems as “wicked”. This
created a distinction from classical problems that they considered to be
“tame”, which otherwise have a clear and objective optimal solution.
They outlined ten properties of wicked problems, which are condensed
into seven points pertinent to marine plastic pollution:
1. They require management that constantly adapts to changing fac-
tors, meaning that the problem may not ever disappear;
2. Management is at best optimal, not “right” or “wrong”, subject to
managerial and external limitations;
3. The full effects of a chosen management pathway are only known
post implementation, and may serve to irreversibly worsen the
problem;
4. Wicked problems do not have an exhaustible set of potential solu-
tions;
5. Every wicked problem is unique, and continues to change into the
future;
6. They can be considered the symptoms of other problems; and,
7. Decision makers carry a heavy moral burden, as their decisions are
not allowed to be wrong.
In extrapolating these properties to marine plastic debris, it is pos-
sible to see that the problem is wicked; understanding the heart of the
problem is one of the central difficulties pertaining to wicked problems
(Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2009). At first glance, it may seem simple to
pinpoint the problem of marine plastic debris: “too much plastic is
washing into the sea.” Whilst this is wholly true, it needs greater spe-
cificity. Yet narrowing the problem from here immediately encounters
issues; precisely how much plastic entering the oceans is “too much”?
Unavoidable spillages of all forms of marine debris make it utterly
unrealistic to have a target of zero plastic entering the oceans. As yet,
no robust estimate of acceptable marine plastic pollution has been set,
and even if there had been, it would not be free of the uncertainty that
characterises wicked problems. Furthermore, does the plastic problem
lie in society's entrenched global culture of consumerism, driving the
swelling production of petroleum-based plastics? Or is it rather that the
dilemma lies in the use of fossil fuels to create plastic, which remain as
inorganic molecules for decades, even centuries? Or simply that waste
treatment systems need to be upgraded to retain our wastes more ef-
fectively? Certainly all of these issues contribute to the scale of marine
plastic debris, along with a plethora of others, which serves to de-
monstrate the interconnectedness of marine plastic debris with other
similarly intractable social and environmental issues.
Fisheries management has been qualified as a wicked problem
311
Marine Pollution Bulletin 127 (2018) 310–319
(Jentoft and Chuenpagdee, 2009), and has parallels with marine plastic
debris. A prominent likeness is in their spatial characteristics; the mi-
gratory nature of open ocean fish stocks, against the pervasive presence
of plastic debris. The difficulty in managing fisheries or plastic debris
lies in international governance, which has a history of obtaining mixed
results when handling international environmental issues; successful
international governance is represented in the responses of states in
cutting emissions of chlorofluorocarbons – the gas linked to exacer-
bating the hole in the ozone layer – and in the designation and man-
agement of Antarctica as an international scientific haven. Yet for every
success story, many failures of international governance exist. A co-
ordinated, comprehensive effort to mitigate the effects of climate
change is yet to be enacted, and many migratory fish stocks are har-
vested as a common pool resource, which has led to their over-
exploitation via a tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). In extending
beyond specifically fish stocks, the oceans are a global common, ab-
sorbing anthropogenic wastes like carbon dioxide and plastic debris.
However, poor governance cannot be solely attributed to the cur-
rent state of the marine plastic debris problem. Finding solutions to the
intricately complex issue of marine plastic debris may well be beyond
the means of government institutions alone, both national and inter-
national. The complexity of the situation lies in a multitude of areas.
Firstly, marine plastic debris is a temporally exacting issue, as it is
damaging at present, and will continue to be damaging for decades into
the future. This will occur even if plastic stops entering the oceans
today, meaning that immediate actions have intergenerational con-
sequences. This only serves to add to the moral burden decision makers
must bear, as effective management solutions to the problem must be
realised as soon as possible.
2.2. Marine plastic debris in the global oceans common
In associating marine plastic debris as a tragedy of the commons,
some clarifications must be made. Seeing the ocean as a dumping
ground for anthropogenic waste, common to all, can be considered the
reverse position of a traditional common, being an openly available
resource. Yet looking deeper, striking similarities emerge between tra-
ditional commons and the idea of marine plastic debris as a reverse
common, as outlined by Hardin, 1968. Absenting a governance system
to impose rules for behaviour, the rational individual sees that the
shared cost of polluting, shared by the global community, is often
smaller than personally paying for the processing of their waste. This is
perfectly reciprocal to an extractive common, and can be applied to
groups on many organisational levels. Continuing with the idea of
acting within a global community, nation states can be seen as in-
dividuals. For example, China is estimated to be the greatest con-
tributor of marine plastic debris (Jambeck et al., 2015); to internalise
the cost of this pollution, China would have to pay a significantly more
than at present, as other members of the region, particularly neigh-
bouring states, currently share in the cost of this pollution (Chow,
2016). These costs are embodied in reduced aesthetic value of recrea-
tional spaces, impaired ecosystem services resulting in poorer fisheries
and debris entanglement with ship propellers. Additionally, if China
were to entirely internalise the cost of its plastic pollution, it would still
share in the cost of its neighbours' pollution, creating a double disin-
centive for states to independently reduce their plastic pollution. Thus
the problem of marine plastic pollution can be described as a wicked
problem within a common; multiple user groups have multiple objec-
tives for the ocean commons, some of which may be conflicting.
Introducing property rights has been effective in managing some
environmental resource problems, but has limitations; it is particularly
weak when applied to dynamic settings, and has the disadvantage of
increasing pressure on any remaining common resources (Jentoft and
Chuenpagdee, 2009). Migratory fish stocks have proven difficult to
manage, as their movements between international jurisdictions mean
that allocating equitable quotas are challenging to decide upon,
M. Landon-Lane
let alone to enforce (Mulder and Coppolillo, 2005). Attempting to
manage plastic pollution with “reverse quotas” that allocate fair and
safe levels of pollution for states would be similarly troubled; marine
plastic debris rarely stays nearby its source, meaning that the actions of
one state will affect adjacent states. It is, therefore, reasonable to say
that marine plastic debris will not be solved by privatising the oceans.
In consequence of now treating marine plastic debris as a tragedy of
a reverse common, it is impossible to assign meaningful responsibility
to the inestimable number of individual actors – both state and non-
state. Whilst it is sometimes possible to trace marine plastic debris back
to its source (Chow, 2016), attempting to differentiate levels of ac-
countability for future cleanup efforts would be fraught with the danger
of marginalising low income, poor infrastructure states, which are less
able to deal with their pollution than developed countries. It would,
therefore, be far less meaningful to analyse the unintentional, unin-
formed source history of marine plastic debris, than it would be to focus
on accepting shared past responsibility for the current state of the
oceans, and to begin building collaborative efforts to reduce marine
plastic pollution.
2.3. Marine plastic debris as a governance problem
This paper defines the term “governance”, set out by Young, 2013,
as; “a social function centred on steering human groups toward desired
outcomes and away from undesirable outcomes”. This allows for the ac-
knowledgement of the potential for non-state actors to positively in-
fluence human groups through their actions. Furthermore, it becomes
clear that the presence of a governmental institution is not a pre-
requisite for the existence of governance; there are many cases where
governments are involved in the opposite of governance, e.g. corrup-
tion. More often than not, governance can be effectively realised
through the actions of communities, NGOs and market-based govern-
ance (Vince and Hardesty, 2016, Young, 2013), in cooperation with
institutional regulation (Haward and Vince, 2008). In further defining
governance, ‘traditional governance’ refers to the exclusive use of
formal governmental institutions for the purpose of governance. It is
typically effected by laws developed and implemented by government
institutions (Haward and Vince, 2008); traditional international gov-
ernance's only distinction being the laws and governmental frameworks
are cooperative: multi- or binational. Modern governance, importantly,
is increasingly recognising the role of non-state actors (Levy and
Prakash, 2003).
When taken with all its complexities, it is unsurprising that, as a
wicked problem within a global oceans common, marine plastic debris
has become so challenging for international governance. Indeed, it is
because of intricate international problems such as marine plastic
debris and overfishing, that international governance began to seek
alternative approaches to traditional governance for management so-
lutions (Haward and Vince, 2008). Consideration of the numerous,
often dissimilar, goals and desires of stakeholders presents a major
obstacle in oceans governance. Resolving such conflicts in any setting,
particularly in an international setting, often requires the involvement
of large numbers of stakeholders, which can further distance a con-
sensus on what is even the source of the problem (Duckett et al., 2016).
As such, intensely collaborative approaches involving numerous actors
are resource intensive, and should be questioned as to whether they
would be the most effective method of issue resolution. An example of a
collaborative governance approach is climate change resolution, which
has been time consuming, but necessary due to the profound require-
ment of international cooperation.
In building collaborative governance structures between states, the
ability to attribute liability for actions regarding plastic mismanage-
ment would, naturally, deter plastic pollution. While attributing legal
liability for trans-boundary environmental damages is far from simple,
it has precedent in landmark cases such as the Trail Smelter case, in
which Canada was held accountable for environmental damages to the
312
Marine Pollution Bulletin 127 (2018) 310–319
USA. The most significant rulings of the arbitration to marine plastic
pollution were “that states have a duty to prevent transboundary en-
vironmental harm”, and that they also have “an obligation to pay
compensation for the harm they cause”, otherwise known as the pol-
luter pays principle (Wood, 2007). In applying these rulings to marine
plastic pollution, proving that significant “transboundary environ-
mental harm” has occurred presents perhaps the most significant ob-
stacle in attributing liability to the polluting state. With marine plastic
pollution being a relatively newly discovered form of environmental
harm, uncertainties over its exact damages and the difficulties of
quantifying them mean that for the near future, it is unlikely that
widespread cases for marine plastic debris liability will be brought
forward. Nevertheless, international law has developed in the areas of
state responsibility and liability for environmentally injurious acts
which are not currently prohibited under international law (Xue, 2003);
as such, select instances where amounts of plastic exceeding a threshold
migrate from one state's boundaries to another's, the injured state could
seek reparation, even without legal precedent (Gold et al., 2014). Re-
paration could be provided by the International Court of Justice, given
the appropriate supporting international law. Real world examples such
as the movement of plastic from China to Hong Kong (Chow, 2016)
present delicate opportunities for liability attribution.
Attributing liability may be possible in a bilateral situation, but as
the scope of marine plastic debris is unquestionably in the realm of the
global oceans commons, besides being caused in varying degrees by
every state, it rapidly becomes impractical to determine who is at fault.
Moreover, it has only recently been thought that states can claim
compensations on behalf of the international community for damages
to global commons (Xue, 2003). In dealing with plastic pollution lia-
bility, it must be remembered that the societal source of plastic pollu-
tion originates from a combination of state and corporate actors. As a
result, state-based governance would be restricted if it excluded the
greater proportion of actors involved in marine plastic pollution
(community, corporate, research, and education NGOs). Indeed, many
governance frameworks exist whereby NGOs are central to their op-
eration, and states are yet to be involved.
3. Limitations in international law
A major limitation within the frameworks of international binding
agreements is their poor acknowledgement of the approximately 80%
of marine plastic debris that originates terrestrially (Simon and Schulte,
2017, Vince and Hardesty, 2016). For example, UNCLOS (1982) only
goes as far as requesting that states control terrestrial pollution through
domestic governance (Gold et al., 2014, UNEP, 2014). Additionally,
regional agreements that do control for terrestrially sourced plastic,
such as the Helsinki Convention (1992), are threatened by migrating
marine plastic debris from beyond their area of control. The GPA and
the Honolulu Strategy are promising new non-binding developments, as
they do incorporate land-sourced plastic into their frameworks (UNEP,
2017, UNEP, 2012). Furthermore, the GPA approaches marine plastic
debris management from a collaborative, integrated perspective; it
brings together multiple stakeholders; states, NGOs, and corporate
sector. This is distinctive from other examples of international law,
which fail to acknowledge the governance potential of corporate sector
involvement. Indeed, soft law approaches to managing marine debris
are currently far more extensive and better developed than their hard
law equivalents (Vince and Hardesty, 2016). However, soft law ap-
proaches alone will struggle to bring about the level of change required
to overcome marine plastic pollution, because of their voluntary nature.
In its current state, international law will not solve the marine
plastic debris problem (Simon and Schulte, 2017, Gold et al., 2014).
There is substantial debate on whether the problems of the world's
oceans need more regulatory framework, or need more effective im-
plementation of existing regulations (Houghton, 2014, Gold et al.,
2014). As marine plastic debris has become a global priority, the
M. Landon-Lane
answer may be a combination of the two. A new binding treaty focusing
on marine plastic debris may be required to match the scale of the risk
posed (Simon and Schulte, 2017, Vince and Hardesty, 2016); such a
treaty would combine the various aspects of marine plastic debris
currently covered in international agreements into a comprehensive,
integrated instrument. Furthermore, a new treaty should take this ripe
opportunity to include non-state actors into its functioning, especially
the often ignored corporate sector, which has the direct ability to
produce more sustainable products.
However, the creation of such comprehensive international agree-
ments can take decades; further efforts for the implementation and
enforcement of existing international agreements will aid somewhat in
managing marine plastic debris in the near term. This would be fa-
cilitated by the removal of ambiguity from existing international
agreements (Gold et al., 2014). Furthermore, the operation of multiple,
independent instruments that manage marine plastic debris does not
serve as a hindrance (Simon and Schulte, 2017, Houghton, 2014). Ra-
ther, these assist by overlapping and supporting each other's goals. This
supports the implementation of the PSC, as although its goals would
overlap those of the GPA, its difference in approach would strengthen
marine plastic debris management efforts. The GPA could, as an ex-
ample, recommend the PSC as a method for its corporate members to
begin making practical changes to marine plastic debris.
As with the formation of integrated, nationwide plastic policies
within Australia, the creation of an integrated marine plastic debris
policy for the world's oceans entire would be still more susceptible to
failure, if not prepared with great care. This is due to the increased
numbers of participants in the process, namely, the members of the
international community. However, Vince (2015) and Vince and
Hardesty (2016) maintain that holistic policy integration remains the
best path to ocean restoration, as the isolated management of a sector of
marine use will be consistently overcome by external influences. Fur-
thermore, marine plastic debris policy development should not be
limited to the international level – on the contrary, its relationship to
national policy should be to provide consistent guidelines for domestic
marine plastic debris policy development. Additionally, integrated,
holistic policy includes as many actors as possible, both state and non-
state. Therefore, with careful designing, such policy is more likely to
succeed (Vince and Hardesty, 2016). Policy integration can be achieved
using governance institutions, that is, organisations that are created
with the explicit purpose effecting governance, but, importantly, re-
quires the near total support of all participants (Vince, 2015). There-
fore, to implement effective, integrated marine plastic debris policies on
an ocean commons scale, almost every state must be supportive of the
proposed policies – a formidable goal.
4. Applying corporate social responsibility to marine plastic
debris governance
4.1. Defining corporate social responsibility and its influence
CSR can be defined as the voluntary actions of corporations to in-
tegrate social or environmental concerns into their business principles
(Crane et al., 2008). They propose six essential pillars of CSR: its vo-
luntary nature; internalisation of externalities; incorporation of mul-
tiple stakeholder groups; alignment of social or environmental re-
sponsibilities with economic responsibilities; definition of company
practices and values, and; extension beyond philanthropy. These cul-
minate in corporation operations gaining social legitimacy, referred to
as a ‘social license’ (Vince and Hardesty, 2016, Porter and Kramer,
2006). This term illustrates the idea that CSR is a form of corporate
behaviour beyond government regulation.
Thirdly are stakeholder theories, which integrates both instrumental
and political CSR theories (Garriga and Melé, 2004). It suggests that
guidance for suitable corporate behaviour can be found in relevant
public policy, as well as in other indicators of the general direction of
313
Marine Pollution Bulletin 127 (2018) 310–319
societal values. Regarding marine plastic debris, relevant public policy
can be found in organisations such as the APC, and in international
frameworks, such as the GPA. Subscribing to this group of theories
leads corporations to not simply support social demands, but to in-
tegrate those demands into the core functioning of the business,
through the central use of stakeholder direction. This involves the use
of stakeholder contributions to direct managerial decisions towards
positive stakeholder returns. Stakeholder theory includes primary
company stakeholders and those who have an interest in the resources
being exploited, such as adjacent communities. The Sustainable Plastics
Industry Principles relate best with this form of CSR, as the PSC utilises
the input from a wide range of stakeholders – industry, NGO and state.
It is now possible to see plastic shopping bags that claim to be
‘degradable’ or ‘biodegradable’, along with ‘oxodegradable’ and ‘com-
postable’; these are potentially deceptive examples of CSR by retailers,
which address the growing consumer concern for plastic waste.
Oxodegradable and compostable plastics aside, currently no inter-
nationally accepted definition exists pertaining to the differences be-
tween biodegradable and degradable plastic (Gold et al., 2014). This
means that many plastics touting degradability in fact only refer to the
products' breakup and subsequent formation of secondary micro-
plastics, which are equally as inorganic as when whole. Essentially,
‘degradable’ plastic should refer to plastic that will disintegrate in the
environment to form secondary microplastic, whereas ‘biodegradable’
plastic should refer to plastic that will disintegrate in the environment
to form organic compounds, which are not harmful to ecosystems
(Greene, 2014). However, because there is no internationally accepted
definition, these definitions are frequently interchangeable, as in the
Australian Senate inquiry into Australia's marine plastic debris (p.126,
2016). Consequently, plastic manufacturers are able to label products
as (bio)degradable, thereby using the widespread consumer confusion
regarding these terms to ostensibly increase their CSR (Australian
Senate, 2016). This false act of CSR harbours no positives for marine
plastic debris.
Although instrumental, or profit-driven, CSR is the most prevalent
and weakest form of CSR, its faults do not preclude it from being an
effective tool to manage marine plastic debris; its limitations can be
alleviated by an integrated (state and non-state) market-based approach
(Vince and Hardesty, 2016). For instance, the confusion over differ-
ences of plastic degradability could be resolved by the adoption of
appropriate regulation and standards. However, with increasing gov-
ernment involvement often comes a fading of CSR; one of the pillars of
CSR is its voluntary nature; that is, operation beyond state regulation.
Nevertheless, this is not a significantly encumbering issue, as low in-
terventionist policies are preferred by governments; corporations gen-
erally do not desire stricter regulations, and governments do not want
to have to impose, fund and enforce stricter regulations (Gale and
Haward, 2011, Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998). Yet, where healthy
market competition is promoted, appropriate regulation can gain in-
dustry support. Proper regulation, although difficult to design, can spur
innovation into least cost solutions and avoid tragedy of the commons
situations (Porter and van der Linde, 1995).
4.2. Corporate social responsibility methods
Market certification systems and voluntary codes of conduct are
widespread forms of CSR, designed to verify a corporation's higher
environmental, social or economic standards to consumers (Gale and
Haward, 2011). These systems' certification labels are seen as an in-
dependent guarantee of product quality, which is useful in overcoming
consumer doubt if a responsible product comes with a premium. The
rise of these forms of CSR has largely been due to the failure of inter-
national and domestic traditional governance to effectively manage
natural and social resources (Ponte, 2012, Gale and Haward, 2011).
From this failure, corporate and civil society actors developed these
alternative, market-based forms of governance as a means of
M. Landon-Lane
circumventing slow government and corporate responses to reputation-
damaging environmental issues (Bush et al., 2013). Additionally, cor-
porations already operating in a responsible manner wished to distin-
guish themselves from their less responsible rivals. Bush et al., 2013 go
on to outline four characteristics of certification systems in particular:
standards for social and ecological interactions; assessment of standards
compliance; product labelling for consumer distinction, and; institu-
tions to undertake these processes.
Although driven by non-state actors, certification systems and vo-
luntary codes of conduct benefit from governmental participation.
Governments wish to ensure that certification systems are driving the
desired changes in the market by being transparent and inclusive of
small businesses (Gale and Haward, 2011). For this to occur, there must
be some governmental involvement, else the certification system may
conflict with existing state policies, endangering its efficacy. Further-
more, the relationship between industry self-regulation and govern-
mental policy implementation is complementary, as success for one
relies on the acknowledgement and adoption of the other (Vince, 2015).
Fortunately, the issue of small business exclusion does not apply to
small plastic manufacturers, as the industry is dominated by large firms.
Nevertheless, government involvement can only aid in achieving both
industry's desires and states' governance goals, by avoiding potential
non-state versus state conflicts.
The APC's performance goals for signatories is an example of a vo-
luntary code of conduct concerning sustainable packaging design and
use (APC, 2013). This organisation combines government and industry
actors where each can provide input into the direction the APC takes.
This partnership approach is a relatively recent governance develop-
ment (Gale and Haward, 2011), so there are some holes in this rela-
tively integrated instrument. Under the guidelines of the APC, “signa-
tories become non-compliant when they don't meet their APC obligations”,
resulting in their being “referred to the relevant government jurisdiction”
(APC, 2017). Yet there are currently no “relevant government jurisdic-
tions” that penalise non-compliance, meaning that choosing to ignore
obligations is inconsequential, excepting reputation damages. Improved
outcomes would be realised if there was a clarification of the APC's
position regarding non-compliance, or the creation of such government
jurisdictions to regulate non-compliance.
4.3. Corporate social responsibility and marine plastic debris: adapting the
marine stewardship council model
The MSC is a sustainability-centred certification system that was
initiated in 1996 (MSC, 2017). The idea for the MSC originated from an
increasing concern for the state of global wild capture fisheries by two
international organisations; the environmental civil society organisa-
tion World Wide Fund for Nature International (WWF) and the multi-
national corporation Unilever (Gale and Haward, 2011). Such part-
nerships between corporate and non-profit organisations are formed on
the broader CSR principle of sustainable development; in this instance,
Unilever moved beyond its economic responsibilities to incorporate
environmental responsibilities also, by moving to source all its seafood
from MSC certified fisheries (Gale and Haward, 2011). The MSC's
subsequent rise to eminence has been founded on the growing global
demand for sustainably harvested seafood; the MSC harnesses this de-
mand to provide an opportunity for corporations to be rewarded for
harvesting fish in an environmentally responsible manner, by main-
taining or increasing profits through product labelling.
Although the MSC was designed and implemented by a corporate
and non-profit NGO, the resultant organisation operates independently.
This means that it becomes a third party certifier, which increases its
credibility among consumers (Gale and Haward, 2011). Third party, as
opposed to first party, certification is certification undertaken by the
corporation itself, where there may be tempting incentives to conduct
lenient audits. The MSC's structure consists of a self-appointed, deci-
sion-making Board of Trustees; the Technical Advisory Board,
314
Marine Pollution Bulletin 127 (2018) 310–319
responsible for MSC standards and accreditation, and; the Stakeholder
Council, which supposedly fulfils the purpose of stakeholder involve-
ment. The method by which fisheries become certified is by in-
corporating the Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fishing into fishery
management (MSC, 2010). Each of the three principles have an intent,
which equate to the notions of intergenerational equality, sustainable
development and the precautionary principle. These principles con-
stitute the first characteristic of certification systems outlined by Bush
et al. (2013); the standards for ecological and social interactions. No-
tably, the MSC has been criticised for its lack of social emphasis within
its standards, as its primary focus is for environmental considerations,
ignoring social aspects such as labour conditions (Ponte, 2012).
Just as the MSC arose from the failure of international fisheries
governance, so too could an equivalent “Plastics Stewardship Council”
bloom from the comparable governance failure surrounding marine
plastic debris. Furthermore, the MSC could be used as an adaptable
model for the creation of such a certification system, similar to how the
MSC was adapted from the Forestry Stewardship Council (Gale and
Haward, 2011). With international and regional governments failing to
effectively manage marine plastic debris in isolation, an international
market-based governance instrument would augment existing and fu-
ture regulatory management actions (Gold et al., 2014). There are some
certification systems and voluntary codes of conduct related to plastic
manufacturing in place today, but these are not appropriate to the scale
of the marine plastic debris issue. There is, as yet, no international,
integrated certification system for sustainable plastic manufacturing.
However, there are differences in the circumstances that brought
the MSC into existence and those justifying the creation of a PSC. Of
primary concern is the contrasting nature of fisheries management,
being extraction-based, and plastic design and production, being in-
sertion-based. To rephrase, the MSC governs the extraction (output) of
fish, whereas the PSC would govern the creation (input) of plastic. This
fundamental distinction may require the input of models other than the
MSC if the PSC is to be a successful organisation. To this end, the use of
existing sustainable plastic initiatives will contribute to the formation
of an appropriate input-based certification system. Foremost relevant
contributors are the GPA and the APC, whose objectives and principles
inform suitable guidelines for the functioning of the PSC.
The proposed plastic certification system must be founded on sev-
eral essential features. In acknowledging the ubiquitous nature of
marine plastic debris, it must involve a wide range of actors associated
with the issue. Firstly, corporate NGOs must form the industry support
for such a system (Monroe, 2014). Their involvement will result in the
goals of the certification system being in harmony with industry goals
and limitations, so that industry support for the system will be more
extensive. Civil society NGOs, that already work to solve marine plastic
debris, need to be included in the formation and operation of the cer-
tification system. This will provide balance for the goals of the system
and transparency of the process, thereby creating consumer confidence
in the resultant certification organisation (Gale and Haward, 2011). In
addition, research NGOs and other scientific organisations are indis-
pensable to the creation of goals founded on meaningful research.
Lastly, states and intergovernmental bodies must be part of the process,
so that amendments to existing and the creation of future legal struc-
tures are designed to be in synergy with the certification system. In-
tegrating these sometimes disparate sectors would offer the greatest
chance of success, as efforts to manage ocean areas in isolation often
suffer from external factors (Vince, 2015).
This need for the wide involvement of stakeholders suggests that the
stakeholder theory of CSR is most suitable for the guiding the creation
of the PSC. Appropriate guiding public policy can be taken primarily
from the GPA and Honolulu Strategy, as these instruments specifically
target marine plastic debris and have an international scope.
Furthermore, the GPA follows a multi-partnership stakeholder ap-
proach to marine plastic debris, by linking international agencies,
governments, academia and research NGOs, the private sector, civil
M. Landon-Lane
society, and individuals, which is precisely what is required of any in-
ternational effort, such as the PSC, attempting to manage marine plastic
debris.
The primary incentive for corporations to become certified would be
the opportunity of improved economic performance stemming from
preferential retailer and consumer purchasing of PSC certified plastic
products. The extent of this benefit would vary depending on market
demand for sustainable plastics (OECD, 2001), which is likely to be
driven primarily by higher income earners with more disposable in-
come. Further incentives may include support from governments to
transition into solely manufacturing sustainable plastic, or in the form
of lessened governmental regulation, as the PSC adopts a governance
role within the industry. Moreover, positive partnerships between sig-
natories and civil society and environmental NGOs may develop,
whereby partnered NGOs support sustainable plastic corporations by
promoting their corporate partner's responsible business decisions to
their respective audience.
4.4. Discussion: sustainable plastics industry principles
The Sustainable Plastics Industry Principles forms the foundation of
the PSC's operating guidelines. The Principles provide the reference
point to clarify the direction and purpose of the PSC, in addition to
being the standards by which signatory corporations are assessed
against. They were developed in close reference with the framework of
the MSC's Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fishing (MSC, 2010), but
the body of the Sustainable Plastics Industry Principles has been
adapted to the PSC's focus on plastic design and manufacturing. This
transformation to emphasise sustainable plastic was informed primarily
by the APC's Performance goals and KPIs [Key Performance Indicators]:
An explanation of the KPIs into signatory-specific terms and requirements
(APC, 2013), and the GPA's fourth objective, “to promote resource effi-
ciency and economic development through waste prevention (reduce, re-use,
recycle and re-design) and by recovering valuable material and/or energy
from waste” (UNEP, 2017).
The sustainable plastic certification system would be guided by the
long term goal of creating a plastic manufacturing industry that is, as
near as possible, a closed loop system. A closed loop system, in this
instance, refers to the closing of the input and output streams, respec-
tively being petroleum oil and discarded plastic wastes. The objectives
for achieving this, referred to as Principles, are fourfold: eradicating
plastics of single use design, in their place making all forms of plastic
recyclable; increasing the percentage of recycled material in plastic
manufacturing; eradicating the production of non-renewable, petro-
leum-based plastics, instead creating biodegradable plastics, and; de-
signing plastic products that use resources as efficiently, and with as
little harm to the environment, as possible. Some of these Principles
would be more difficult to achieve than others, yet all are required for
the operation of a fully sustainable plastics industry within a circular
economy.
Principle I of the Sustainable Plastics Industry Principles targets the
pervasive use of single use plastic products, many of which are non-
recyclable. This design is highly inefficient, shown in the current use of
plastic packaging, where 95% of the material value is lost from the
economy. This results in the total externalities of plastic packaging
being estimated as greater than the total profits of plastic packaging
(World Economic Forum, p.6, 2016). While not all plastic products can
be reused, most plastic products would be recyclable, if properly de-
signed.
Principle I combines with Principle II, which increases use of re-
cycled material in plastic production, to form, as close as practicable, a
closed loop plastics industry. Minimising inputs, and especially outputs,
will reduce the amount of plastic waste that enters the environment to
become debris. However, as there will always be inefficiencies in plastic
waste collection and recycling, it is acknowledged that new resources
will be required. In order to maintain indefinite production, these virgin
315
Marine Pollution Bulletin 127 (2018) 310–319
resources must be from a renewable source, such as vegetable oils or
from the conversion of methane gas (World Economic Forum, 2016).
Caution should be used here, as this should not undermine emphasis on
utilising recycled materials, as the use of vegetable oils reduces the
amount of land available for growing food, thereby further straining
global food production.
In addition to some plastic products being destined for single use
only, other types of plastic may never be practically or safely recycl-
able, such as aseptic plastics (Monroe, 2014). This issue is covered by
Principle III, which states that all plastic products must be biodegrad-
able post-use (i.e. degrade quickly into organic compounds, such as
carbon dioxide and water), to avoid dangerous residues remaining in
the environment. The PSC acknowledges that there will always be a
certain amount of plastic waste leakage into the environment; Principle
IV, requiring that plastic products use resources as efficiently as pos-
sible, in addition to having the design of products be as en-
vironmentally friendly as possible, combines with Principle III to ad-
dress the accidental leakage of plastics into the environment. For some
plastics, this leakage has been estimated to be relatively high; for plastic
packaging, it is estimated to be at 32% (World Economic Forum, p.6,
2016).
The primary theory compelling these positive changes to the plastics
industry is a specific form of CSR known as product stewardship. This
theory is closely related to that of extended producer responsibility,
which is described as a mandatory, government driven form of product
stewardship (Monroe, 2014); as the PSC is an organisation for voluntary
certification, extended producer responsibility is included within the
discussion under the all-inclusive theory of product stewardship. Pro-
duct stewardship is a term that encompasses efforts by producers to
reduce the negative environmental and social effects of their products
throughout their life cycles (Monroe, 2014). These efforts shift the re-
sponsibility for the product away from communities and instead to the
producer, by having the producer adapt to social or environmental
concerns in the design and manufacturing stages of their products
(OECD, 2001).
Of particular importance in a corporation's transition to becoming a
steward of their products is the design phase. Monroe, 2014 states that
changing the design of plastic packaging production is the most effi-
cient way to reduce the plastic packaging's negative impacts, as 70% of
the production and end-of-life processing cost of the plastic packaging
is determined in its design phase. Such end-of-life processing costs are
typically incurred by local municipalities. Improving plastic product
design can therefore promote a reduction in costs associated with
landfilling or incinerating waste, improve recyclability, and encourage
more efficient use of resources in plastic product manufacturing (OECD,
2001). Furthermore, the cost of a plastic product may extend to become
an environmental cost, which is mostly in the form of the natural ca-
pital cost of marine plastic debris (UNEP, 2014). Whether or not the
plastic product has been designed to have minimal impacts on ecosys-
tems, especially marine life, in addition to whether or not it is biode-
gradable, will all influence the environmental cost of the plastic pro-
duct. These costs accumulate to become externalities, and hinder efforts
to achieve sustainable economic development (OECD, p.17, 2001).
The eventual transition of the plastics industry to minimising both
inputs and outputs has been termed by the World Economic Forum
(2016) as ‘the new plastics economy’. For this transition to occur,
corporate product stewardship is an obvious means of progression. The
PSC incentivises an avenue for corporations to become better stewards
of their plastic products, by adjusting their plastic design and manu-
facturing to conform to the Sustainable Plastics Industry Principles, and
thereby reducing their contribution to marine plastic debris. By be-
coming better product stewards, corporations are also beginning to
account for the full costs of plastic products, by starting to internalise
product externalities. Furthermore, integrating the full life cycle of
plastic with state and municipal systems, from design to disposal, in-
creases efficiency and reduces unnecessary waste.
M. Landon-Lane
The extent to which the PSC is adopted by members of the plastic
industry is difficult to predict. Leaving aside external factors such as
government and NGO facilitation of corporate certification, the ulti-
mate goal of the PSC of creating a near closed loop plastics industry is
possibly over-optimistic, at least for the short and medium term future.
For example, in the creation of a closed loop system, Monroe (2014)
states that 75–80% recovery of plastic for recycling is the maximum
rate that is feasible; this leaves a > 20% gap in recycled inputs that
must be filled by virgin resources. The degree of redesigning which
certain products may need in order to be recyclable may also be un-
feasible, meaning that Principle I could be prohibitively stringent for
otherwise responsible corporations. However, the purpose of the PSC –
to shrink the environmental impacts of the plastics industry, which are
particularly marine-based, by minimising its wastes – is vital for ocean
health, and its objectives must be strong in order to match the severity
of marine plastic debris.
5. Conclusion: marine plastic debris governance and the role of
the plastics stewardship council
The degree to which the PSC achieves a reduction in the amount and
impacts of marine plastic debris rests in its endorsement by plastic
manufacturers. This is in turn dependent upon retailer and consumer
willingness to preferentially purchase PSC certified packaging.
However, with actions by civil society NGOs and states to encourage
adoption and increase consumer awareness of the goal of the PSC, to
promote sustainable plastic production, the continually growing global
awareness of marine plastic debris will translate into an increasing
demand for sustainable plastic products. An example of government
promotion of sustainable plastic may be in the development of man-
datory labelling of non-sustainable plastic, which clearly shows to
consumers that such plastic packaging is not sustainable. This would
consequently boost consumer uptake of sustainable plastic packaging,
similar to how anti-cigarette packaging laws are designed to reduce
rates of smoking.
In light of this evidence of facilitating, overlapping governance
frameworks for PSC implementation, CSR acting independently, in the
form of the PSC, is unlikely to substantially improve business practices
regarding marine plastic debris. CSR, being voluntary, shares simila-
rities with other voluntary forms of governance, such as soft law in-
struments like the GPA. While voluntary marine plastic debris gov-
ernance arrangements are generally more developed than compulsory
arrangements (Vince and Hardesty, 2016), their voluntary foundation
limits the extent of plastic pollution reform they can achieve. Indeed,
the extent and complexity of this wicked problem, coupled with the
limitations of CSR, mean that for CSR to have any significant positive
effect, it should be coupled with governmental regulatory structures
and NGO partnerships.
With many academics (e.g. Simon and Schulte, 2017, Gold et al.,
2014) calling for the creation of a binding international treaty targeting
plastic debris, the PSC could be utilised as one of the treaty's tools to
reduce the amount and impacts of marine plastic debris. Such a re-
lationship between industry and international state-based governance,
as has been lacking previously, is undeniably required to begin resol-
ving marine plastic debris. A further potential development to work in
partnership with the PSC and a new international plastic debris
agreement is the concept of a ‘Marine Responsibility Fund’ (Simon and
Schulte, 2017). This organisation, funded by the plastic industry, states
party to the plastic debris agreement, and NGOs, would administer
practical solutions to eliminate marine plastic debris. As the PSC ex-
clusively regulates the manufacturing of new plastic, and ignores plastic
currently in the ocean, solutions in the form of the Marine Responsi-
bility Fund are equally required. Moreover, donating to such a fund is a
significant act of CSR for plastic industry members, showing strong
support for marine plastic debris management, and acceptance of re-
sponsibility for being partly to blame in the creation of the problem.
316
Marine Pollution Bulletin 127 (2018) 310–319
With these facilitating, cooperative instruments in place, an in-
dustry-based sustainability code of conduct could enhance, and be en-
hanced by, such marine plastic debris management efforts. These
overlapping, integrated management tools would accomplish more
than their isolated efforts. As such, the proposed PSC may only become
successful on the condition that these supportive frameworks and
partnerships are simultaneously implemented. The drafted Sustainable
Plastics Industry Principles has been created within a policy integration
framework, as integrated policy has been found to be the most effective,
if not only, method of achieving ocean restoration (Vince, 2015).
Without such facilitations, an international sustainable plastic certifi-
cation scheme would struggle to gain signatories, and consequently
would do little to reduce the extent and impact of marine plastic debris.
Further research into the governance failure surrounding marine
plastic debris should revolve around greater inclusion of the corporate
sector in marine plastic debris governance, as this sector is too often
neglected. The corporate sector must continue to be included in the
contemporary rise of alternative governance (Gale and Haward, 2011,
Haward and Vince, 2008), as it is a strongly influential stakeholder, and
therefore has the potential to significantly impact international oceans
governance. Furthermore, it is doubtful that CSR would effectively re-
duce marine plastic debris operating in isolation – multi-sector co-
operation is the broad path towards meaningful marine plastic debris
management.
6. Sustainable plastics industry principles
The Principles contained herein form the foundation of the PSC's
operating guidelines. They are used as reference values for third party,
independent, voluntary certification of corporations that design or
manufacture plastic products. Wholesalers, retailers and consumers are
encouraged to make public commitments to only purchase products
from certified sources. The code represents a visualisation of what
guidelines would be effective in producing meaningful changes to the
way plastic products are viewed by manufacturers and broader society.
6.1. Definitions
Plastic product – any consumer good that contains plastic compo-
nents and is used in packaging, clothing, cosmetics, household items
and toys. It excludes plastics used in construction, scientific research,
and primary industry.
Biodegradable – plastic that forms organic, non-toxic compounds
post-disintegration.
Recycling – disassembling a plastic product into its base materials to
be reused in the manufacturing process.
Single use plastic products – plastic products designed to be used once
and subsequently discarded.
Sustainable Plastic – plastic that is fit for purpose, consumes minimal
resources, generates minimal waste, and involves minimal risks to so-
cial and environmental systems (from Lewis et al., 2010, definition for
“sustainable packaging”).
Resource recovery – the harvesting of resources from waste products.
Renewable source – the origin of the resource is not finite, e.g. plant-
based oils for plastic manufacturing.
Plastic industry – the collective term for all designers and manu-
facturers of plastic products. Any corporation involved in the design
and manufacture of plastic products will be able to become signatory to
the PSC and label their products accordingly, provided that their pro-
ducts and business operations meet certification requirements outlined
in the Sustainable Plastics Industry Principles. Subsequent actors in the
plastics supply chain, i.e. plastic wholesalers and retailers, can choose
to enhance their public image of being socially and environmentally
responsible, and preferentially stock products certified under the pro-
posed system. Notable non-target actors include resource suppliers
(predominantly petroleum oil) for plastic production; this sector is
M. Landon-Lane
made up of a complex array of multinational corporations, and only
indirectly related to plastic manufacturing.
6.2. Section 1: the plastics stewardship council ethos
6.2.1. Article 1.1: working towards a closed loop plastics industry
The Principles directing the PSC reflect a recognition of the scien-
tific evidence that plastic products negatively affect the world's en-
vironment, particularly the oceans, in the form of plastic debris. Also,
the Principles reflect the recognition that the current reliance on single
use plastic products is directly opposed to the development of sus-
tainability within the plastic manufacturing sector; with plastic now
being an essential component for society's functioning, the plastic in-
dustry will need to transition to a closed loop system to allow for a
continuance of humanity's current and future requirements. With re-
spect to the plastic industry, a closed loop system would involve the
strict minimisation of input resources and output waste, such that
plastic waste (output) becomes the manufacturing resource (input). The
underlying reasoning for a closed loop system is based doubly on the
fact that the use of a non-renewable, finite resource (petroleum oil)
cannot continue indefinitely; and that, secondly, the continued disposal
of durable products will compound the negative effects of plastic debris
for future generations.
6.3. Section 2: plastics stewardship council principles
The following Principles are intended to guide the efforts of the PSC
towards sustainable plastic production on a global scale. They have
been developed assuming that a sustainable plastic industry is defined,
for the purposes of PSC certification, as one that is conducted in such a
way that the industry can continue indefinitely, and the industry's im-
pact on social and environmental systems is insignificant.
6.3.1. Article 2.1: Principle I
Plastic products must be designed for multiple use; multiple use in
its original form, and recycling of the base resources.
6.3.1.1. Intent. Single use plastic products are used pervasively and are
incompatible with sustainable practices. Plastic products designed for
single use and then discarded are unacceptable. It is acknowledged that
some forms of plastic, such as food packaging, are not able to be used
again in their current form. However, these types of plastics are
commonly non-recyclable, and are therefore disposed into landfill,
where it takes decades to degrade and may escape to become marine
plastic debris. Non-recyclable plastic is, in addition, an inefficient use of
resources. The intent of this Principle is to ensure that plastic products,
such as shopping bags, are designed to be used repeatedly without
disintegrating, and that, furthermore, all plastic products are
recyclable, to maximise resource recovery and minimise plastic in
waste management systems. Reducing the amount of plastic in waste
management systems will reduce plastic escaping to the environment,
including the ocean, where it becomes litter.
6.3.1.1.1. Illustrative actions. Actions taken in order to meet
Principle I may include:
• Designing and manufacturing recyclable single use plastic food
packaging
• Designing and manufacturing plastic shopping bags to be strong
enough for multiple use, in addition to being recyclable
• Designing and manufacturing recyclable plastic packaging for elec-
tronic and other household goods
6.3.2. Article 2.2: Principle II
The manufacturing of plastic must use 100%, or as near as prac-
ticable, recycled materials. If virgin resources are required in plastic
design and manufacturing, they must be from a renewable source.
317
Marine Pollution Bulletin 127 (2018) 310–319
6.3.2.1. Intent. Traditionally, plastics are created from non-renewable,
petroleum-based oils. This use of a finite and dwindling resource will
not be possible indefinitely. As such, the intent of this Principle is to
minimise the reliance of plastic manufacturing on a non-renewable
resource, instead to substitute recycled materials. To compensate for
plastic recycling inefficiencies, virgin resources may be required; these
must be renewable materials. This Principle couples with Principle I in
attempting to create a self-reliant, closed loop plastics industry.
6.3.2.1.1. Illustrative actions. Actions taken in order to meet
Principle II may include manufacturing plastic products from > 80%
recycled materials, with the remaining manufacturing materials being
sourced from a mixture of:
• Plant-based oils
• Algae-based oils
• Methane gas
• New technology allowing for other renewable resources to be used
in plastic manufacturing
6.3.3. Article 2.3: Principle III
Plastic products must be designed to be biodegradable.
6.3.3.1. Intent. It is inevitable that plastic will escape into the
environment and proceed to damage ecosystems. Plastic causes harm
when it is whole, but once disintegrated into “microplastic”, traditional
plastic remains inorganic and can move toxins throughout ecosystems.
Furthermore, plastics involved in certain uses, such as medical uses,
may not be safely recycled. The intent of this Principle is to address this
unavoidable consequence of using plastic, by minimising plastic debris'
impacts on ecological systems. This can be done by designing the base
compounds of plastic products to be organic post-disintegration. This
will allow for their natural and harmless assimilation into the
environment.
6.3.3.1.1. Illustrative actions. Actions taken in order to meet
Principle III may include:
• Designing and manufacturing plastic products to disintegrate into
harmless organic compounds, such as carbon dioxide and water
6.3.4. Article 2.4: Principle IV
Plastic products must use resources as efficiently, and be as en-
vironmentally harmless, as possible.
6.3.4.1. Intent. The intent of this Principle is to encourage plastic
design that uses less resource for an equal or greater amount of
product. This will result in less plastic in waste management systems
and the environment. Furthermore, plastic products that escape into the
environment will cause harm while whole, by entangling or being
ingested by wildlife. Designing plastic products so that wildlife does not
mistake them for food, in addition to designing plastic products to
minimise the possibility of wildlife entanglement, will reduce the
impact that plastic debris has on the environment.
6.3.4.1.1. Illustrative actions. Actions taken in order to meet
Principle IV may include:
• Designing plastic products to disintegrate as quickly as possible after
the discarding of the product
• Minimising the number of individual pieces in a plastic product, in
order to reduce the possibility of pieces escaping into the environ-
ment
• Avoiding the design of loops and holes in a plastic product that
increase the probability of entangling wildlife
M. Landon-Lane
6.4. Section 3: signatory conditions
6.4.1. Article 3.1: becoming a signatory
To become a signatory, corporations must apply to the PSC for an
independent preliminary assessment of operations, to determine whe-
ther the applicant is functioning in a manner concurrent to the PSC
Principles. Following a successful assessment, applicant corporations
become PSC members and will be authorised to use the PSC sustainable
plastic logo on their products. A two-year grace period will be given to
applicant corporations to allow for the necessary transitions to occur for
sustainable plastic manufacturing to begin. A quarterly report on the
progression of the transition must be submitted to the PSC to ensure
that relevant changes will be achieved within the two-year timeframe.
The PSC will in return provide technical advice to aid in the transition
to sustainable plastic manufacturing.
6.4.2. Article 3.2: financial responsibilities of plastics stewardship council
signatories
The PSC is a non-profit organisation and is funded by donations.
While it is free to become and stay a signatory member of the PSC,
applicant corporations are obliged to pay the PSC for the independent
third party audits. This reduces the costs of the PSC, allowing the or-
ganisation to operate without requiring signatory levies. Furthermore,
in order to fulfil industry obligations of plastic product stewardship,
signatories are required to contribute a minimum of 0.05% of annual
profits to the Global Marine Responsibility Fund.
6.4.3. Article 3.3: plastics stewardship council governance
All operational decisions are made by the PSC Board of Trustees.
Positions on the Board of Trustees are held by an equal combination of
industry, NGO and governmental representatives, which ensures ba-
lanced decisions are made that accommodate all stakeholder interests.
Board of Trustees is limited to 45 members, and election is awarded to
members from the top financial contributors to the Global Marine
Responsibility Fund; that is, the top 15 contributors from industry, NGO
and government. Science and industry representatives make up the
Technical Advisory Board, which provides technical advice to the Board
of Trustees. Members of the Technical Advisory Board are determined
by the Board of Trustees.
6.4.4. Article 3.4: plastics stewardship council integrity mechanisms
The overarching philosophical basis for the PSC is that of steward-
ship of the materials and design of plastics, in a manner that harnesses
market forces to promote environmental sustainability within the
plastic industry. The successful implementation of the Principles relies
upon the certification system being transparent, objective, and founded
on the best available research and technology. Furthermore, the suc-
cessful functioning of the certification system must be supported by
effective integrity mechanisms. These will be in the form of periodical
independent audits of signatories, commissioned by the PSC.
Signatories to the PSC Principles who are found to be operating outside
of these values, risk having their reputation, and thus their social li-
cense to operate, sullied. Resulting sanctions from business partners and
civil society NGOs are likely to be significant economic deterrents to
signatory misbehaviour. Moreover, non-complying signatories will
have their right to use the PSC sustainable plastic logo suspended until
they are independently reaudited, at the offending signatory's cost.
Non-compliance will not result in a termination of PSC membership,
and other financial responsibilities will remain.
Acknowledgements
Deep thanks go to my thesis supervisor Professor Ben Richardson,
who always provided sound advice and comments on the shape and
direction of my work. Further recognitions go to my extended family
who gave me a home and helped me survive a year of thesis writing.
318
Marine Pollution Bulletin 127 (2018) 310–319
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding
agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
References
APC, 2013. Performance goals and KPIs: an explanation of the KPIs into signatory-specific
terms and requirements.
APC, 2017. Australian Packaging Covenant. (Available: http://www.packagingcovenant.
org.au/ [Accessed 13 February 2017]).
Australian Senate, 2016. Toxic tide: the threat of marine plastic pollution in Australia. In:
Environment and Communications References Committee. Parliament House,
Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
Bush, S.R., Belton, B., Hall, D., Vandergeest, P., Murray, F.J., PONTE, S., Oosterveer, P.,
Islam, M.S., Mol, A.P., Hatanaka, M., 2013. Certify sustainable aquaculture? Science
341, 1067–1068.
Chow, L., 2016. Hong Kong's Beaches Teeming with Plastic Trash. In: Can Even Be Seen
From Space, (Available: http://www.ecowatch.com/hong-kongs-beaches-teeming-
with-plastic-trash-1917515523.html [Accessed 29 September 2016]).
Crane, A., Matten, D., Spence, L.J., 2008. Corporate Social Responsibility: Readings and
Cases in a Global Context. Routledge, London.
Duckett, D., Feliciano, D., Martin-Ortega, J., Munoz-Rojas, J., 2016. Tackling wicked
environmental problems: the discourse and its influence on praxis in Scotland.
Landsc. Urban Plan. 154, 44–56.
Gale, F., Haward, M., 2011. Global Commodity Governance: State Responses to
Sustainable Forest and Fisheries Certification, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire.
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 2011.
Gall, S.C., Thompson, R.C., 2015. The impact of debris on marine life. Mar. Pollut. Bull.
92, 170–179.
Garriga, E., Melé, D., 2004. Corporate social responsibility theories: mapping the terri-
tory. J. Bus. Ethics 53, 51–71.
Gold, M., Mika, K., Horowitz, C., Herzog, M., Leitner, L., 2014. Stemming the tide of
plastic marine litter: a global action agenda. Tulane Environ. Law J. 27 (2), 165–204.
Greene, J.P., 2014. Sustainable Plastics: Environmental Assessments of Biobased,
Biodegradable, and Recycled Plastics. Wiley, Hoboken, pp. 2014.
Gunningham, N., Grabosky, P., 1998. Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
Hardin, G., 1968. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162, 1243–1248.
Haward, M.G., Vince, J., 2008. Oceans Governance in the twenty-First Century: Managing
the Blue Planet. Edward Elgar Publishing.
HELCOM, 1992. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic
Sea Area. (Available: http://helcom.fi/about-us/convention [Accessed 26 January
2017]).
Houghton, K., 2014. Identifying new pathways for ocean governance: the role of legal
principles in areas beyond national jurisdiction. Mar. Policy 49, 118–126.
Jambeck, J.R., Geyer, R., Wilcox, C., Siegler, T.R., Perryman, M., Andrady, A., Narayan,
R., Law, K.L., 2015. Plastic waste inputs from land into the ocean. Science 347,
768–771.
Jentoft, S., Chuenpagdee, R., 2009. Fisheries and coastal governance as a wicked pro-
blem. Mar. Policy 33, 553–560.
Kuruppalil, Z., 2015. Green plastics: an emerging alternative for petroleum based plas-
tics? Pop. Plast. Packag. 60, 23–28.
Leslie, H.A., 2015. Plastic in Cosmetics: Are we Polluting the Environment through our
Personal Care: Plastic Ingredients that Contribute to Marine Microplastic Litter.
(UNEP).
Levy, D.L., Prakash, A., 2003. Bargains old and new: multinational corporations in global
governance. Bus. Polit. 5, 131–150.
Lewis, H., Verghese, K., Fitzpatrick, L., 2010. Evaluating the sustainability impacts of
packaging: the plastic carry bag dilemma. Packag. Technol. Sci. 23, 145–160.
Mcilgorm, A., Campbell, H.F., Rule, M.J., 2011. The economic cost and control of marine
debris damage in the Asia-Pacific region. Ocean Coast. Manag. 54, 643–651.
Monroe, L., 2014. Tailoring product stewardship and extended producer responsibility to
prevent marine plastic pollution. Tulane Environ. Law J. 27, 219–236.
MSC, 2010. MSC Fishery Standard: Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Fishing. MSC.
(Available: https://www.msc.org/documents/scheme-documents/msc-standards/
MSC_environmental_standard_for_sustainable_fishing.pdf [Accessed 01 February
2017]).
MSC, 2017. Marine Stewardship Council: Certified Sustainable Seafood. (Available:
https://www.msc.org/ [Accessed 1 February 2017]).
Mulder, M.B., Coppolillo, P., 2005. Conservation: Linking Ecology, Economics, and
Culture. Princeton University Press.
Newman, S., Watkins, E., Farmer, A., Brink, P.T., Schweitzer, J.-P., Bergmann, M., Gutow,
L., Klages, M., 2015. The economics of marine litter. In: Marine Anthropogenic Litter.
Springer International Publishing.
OECD, 2001. Extended Producer Responsibility: A Guidance Manual for Governments.
OECD Publishing.
OSPAR COMMISSION, 2007. Monitoring of Marine Litter on Beaches in the OSPAR
Region. OSPAR Commission.
Ponte, S., 2012. The marine stewardship council (MSC) and the making of a market for
'Sustainable fish. J. Agrar. Chang. 12, 300–315.
Porter, M.E., Kramer, M.R., 2006. Strategy and society: the link between competitive
advantage and corporate social responsibility. Harv. Bus. Rev. 1–15.
Porter, M.E., van der Linde, C., 1995. Green and competitive: ending the stalemate. Harv.
Bus. Rev. 73, 120.
Rittel, H., Webber, M., 1973. Wicked problems. Man-made Futures. 26. pp. 272–280.
M. Landon-Lane
van Sebille, E., Wilcox, C., Lebreton, L., Maximenko, N., Hardesty, B.D., van Franeker,
J.A., Eriksen, M., Siegel, D., Galgani, F., Law, K.L., 2015. A global inventory of small
floating plastic debris. Environ. Res. Lett. 10, 124006.
Secretariat of the CBD & STAP, 2012. Impacts of Marine Debris on Biodiversity: Current
Status and Potential Solutions. Technical Series No. 67. Secretariat of the Convention
on Biological Diversity, Montreal.
Simon, N., Schulte, M.L., 2017. Stopping Global Plastic Pollution: The Case for an
International Convention. Publication Series Ecology, Heinrich Böll Foundation.
Thompson, R.C., Moore, C.J., von Saal, F.S., Swan, S.H., 2009. Plastics, the environment
and human health: current consensus and future trends. Philos. Trans.: Biol. Sci. 364,
2153–2166.
UNCLOS, 1982. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. United Nations.
UNEP, 2012. The Honolulu Strategy: A Global Framework for Prevention and
Management of Marine Debris. UNEP.
UNEP, 2014. Valuing Plastic: The Business Case for Measuring, Managing and Disclosing
Plastic Use in the Consumer Goods Industry. UNEP.
319
Marine Pollution Bulletin 127 (2018) 310–319
UNEP, 2017. Global Program of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from
Land-based Activities. (Available: http://www.unep.org/gpa/GPA/ [Accessed 10
March 2017]).
Vince, J., 2015. Integrated policy approaches and policy failure: the case of Australia's
oceans policy. Policy. Sci. 48, 159–180.
Vince, J., Hardesty, B.D., 2016. Plastic Pollution Challenges in Marine and Coastal
Environments: From Local to Global Governance. Society for Ecological Restoration.
Wood, S., 2007. Transboundary harm in international law: lessons from the trail smelter
arbitration. Osgoode Hall Law J. 45, 637.
World Economic Forum, 2016. The New Plastics Economy: Rethinking the Future of
Plastics. World Economic Forum.
Xue, H., 2003. Transboundary Damage in International Law. Cambridge University Press.
Young, O.R., 2013. Sugaring off: enduring insights from long-term research on environ-
mental governance. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and
Economics 13, 87–105.