Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Doctrine of Tenure
● Doctrine of tenure: Crown holds underlying title to all land as the basis for its sovereign authority (no private absolute title to land, owner rights rest on Crown title)
● Feudalism/Doctrine of Tenure → invasion of England by William the Conqueror in 1066 (Invasion of Matilda)
○ No one physically owns land because all land someway derives back down to the Crown
○ William redivided land amongst tenants in chiefs (you have possession of this land)
■ Promised to William military service (Crown granted land in return)
● Whom do you hold your land
Doctrine of Estates
● Doctrine of estates: divide ownership into difference slices of time and distribute those slices to different people (how do you hold your land)
○ Estates: purely legal creations that enable the division of ownership into successive "slices of time" between different owners
○ Considerable degree of both flexibility and control
● Only 3 types of estates: fee entail (this is historical, curtailed women from inheriting), fee simple, life estate - Freehold Estates
○ Fee simple: largest estate known to law, closest any private owner has to absolute ownership in common law system, full ownership of land subject to allodial title of
Crown - all rights over the land forever
○ Life Estate - only hold rights over land for duration for life then reverts back to whoever granted you that land
○ Fee Tail: (don’t exist anymore) - legal limit on land - bequeath to you but have limits what you can do with land (no bearing in law today)
Tenure vs Estates
Tenure Estates
● Tenure describes how you hold land ● Estates describe how you hold land “temporally”
“spatially” ● Mediates relationship to your land
● Mediates relationship to your lord ● Estates still used
● Tenure is largely irrelevant
Basic Principles of Estates
● 2 ways you can create a new estate in land and transfer that estate to others:
○ Inter vivos transfer: grants of property rights in the land to someone else during your lifetime, normally in exchange for money or other valuable consideration
■ Court broadened statutory language by expanding the acceptable language for fee simple
○ Testamentary bequest: devise your property rights in the land to someone else after you die by making a will
■ Courts consider the intention of the testator considering the whole will, and possibly its surrounding context
RC Ellickson, “Property Land”
Class Exercise
Drawing on the readings, what are the theoretical benefits of the English doctrine of estates? Are you convinced by them? Why or why not?
- If you just want to leave something and protect it as a nature reserve → can’t protect it from development and someone else using it (if not utilizing land, then you forgo it)
- Fee simple → greater inequality, keep within family → perpetuates initial unequal distribution
- Owning more than can possibly use (on a peninsula, housing crisis, some people own more land than they can use, and some don’t have enough)
Terminology
● “Estate in land”
○ Fee simple, legal doctrine of estates
● “Deceased’s estate”
○ Referring to all property you own in your life → legal meaning
○ Legal body still around → legal ownership → transfers into estate (governed by someone, then redistributed)
● “My country estate”
○ Using estate because big house or been in family - country house → no legal meaning
● Which of the following clauses in an inter vivos grant of land do you think are sufficient to transfer the entire fee simple interest?
a) “To Y in fee simple”
○ Legislated out in some places
b) “To Y”
c) “To Y and her heirs”
○ Have to use this one under the common law
d) “To Y, their successors and assigns”
Relevant Legislation:
Property Act, RSNB 1973, c P-19 (New Brunswick)
- 12(3) In a conveyance, it is not necessary in the
limitation of an estate in fee simple to use the
words “heirs”, but it is sufficient if the words “in
fee simple” are used.
- Doesn’t help because doesn’t say fee
simple
Legislation Ontario Legislation: Nova Scotia Legislation:
Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, RSO 1980 c 90 Conveyancing Act, RSNS 1989, c 97
LIFE ESTATES
What is the Life Estate Types of Life Estate The Life Estate Today
● An interest in land carved out of Fee
Life estate Pur Sa Vie – for the life of the grantee ● Not as common but still used today
Simple
○ Marital homes
● Right of possession and ownership ● To “X for Life” ■ A spouse dies – they may have
○ Not inheritable (thus not a fee) ● TO X – no words of limitation (in common law) it is deemed to a property that their spouse
○ Subject to same limits of estate, be a life estate - (now assume fee simple if no words of lives in – they bequeath the
nuisance & legislation limitation) marital home to my partner
■ Such as waste
● Measured by lifetime Life Estate Pur Autre Vie – for the life of another person until they die and then it goes
○ Usually the lifetime of grantee to my children
(in life)/donee (in will) but can ● To X for Life of Y ○ Family run businesses
be another ■ Like farming businesses –
○ Basically, can convert a fee keeping the land in the family
simple to a life estate for the ● Presumption is creating fee simple, so must be
lifetime of the grantee explicit
● Can be created through grant or devise ● Legislation overrides Common Law
○ Most legislation – eliminates the need
for words of limitation -
Exercise
Doctrine of Repugnancy
● Operates where a testator tries to accomplish “… two things which cannot logically stand one with the other.”
● Court must determine which part of the testamentary intention predominates, and reject subordinate intention as being repugnant to dominant one
● The court will not give substance to things that cannot stand together
○ What is the primary intention – reject the subordinate one
● Relevant to wills – not really relevant to grants while you are alive
Exercise
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● Historically it played a central role in inheritances of land and control of family wealth BUT NO LONGER functionally important in modern context
● Life estate: confers a “life interest” on the recipient—meaning that the estate exists only for the duration of the recipient’s (or some other person’s) life, have use of occupation
and possession
○ Life estate is MORE LIMITED than fee simple
○ Upon the death of the person with the life estate, there is a “remainder interest”
○ Remainder interest disposes of what remains of the fee simple after the death of the life tenant, this is sometimes referred to as a “gift over”
● Contradictions:
○ A "gift over" can be repugnant if a devise (testamentary bequest) attempts to transfer land using language that suggests a fundamental contradiction between two
conflicting intentions
○ Fee simple has an infinite duration and carries with it the right of the estate’s owner to determine how to dispose of the fee interest after they die
○ It is inconsistent with this right—and indeed with the very nature of the fee simple estate—to grant or devise the fee interest first to X while also trying to ensure that X
transfers their fee simple to Z after they pass away
"To Y for life, then to W and their heirs”, transfer is doing two things:
● Owner of fee simple are transferring a life estate to Y, which will exist until the end of Y’s life
● The transferor is stipulating what should happen to the fee simple interest in the land after Y’s death. In this case, that fee simple interest will go to W.
Power to Encroach
- Access all capital available (could spend it all before end of life, nothing for next people)
- “For their use”
OR could only get income from the money have other set aside (trust can move on to heirs etc.)
R v Walker 1942 ONCA Issue: Reasoning:
*Court establishes 3 categories for life estates Can you transfer property absolutely to someone else, and also give 3 ways to interpret:
(Will) instructions on how it will be treated upon the death of that person? 1. The gift to the first person named prevails and
the gift over fails as repugnant.
Facts: ○ Wife has life estate; nephews have fee
● John Walker died on March 27, 1903.
simple as a remainder interest.
● After his widow died in 1922, there were competing claims
from beneficiaries of both John and his widow. 2. The first named takes a life-estate only, and so
● The testator gave to his wife "all of my real and personal the gift over prevails.
property", but added that "should any portion of my estate still ○ Wife has fee simple interest, nephews
remain in the hands of my said wife at the time of her decease get nothing.
undisposed of by her the remainder shall be divided as 3. The first named takes a life estate, with the
follows . . ." power to sell (trust).
○ Wife has life estate with power to
The Will: encroach
“I give and devise unto my said wife all my real and personal property ... Court choses #2: an absolute transfer of land cannot be
and also should any portion of my estate still remain in the hands of my
said wife at the time of her decease undisposed of by her, such accompanied by a gift over.
remainder shall be divided as follows ...” You can’t give a fee simple, then tell them what they can
The testator’s spouse receives: the entire estate, which therefore do with it
passes via her will when she died
Ratio:
Decision: ● An absolute transfer of land (fee simple) cannot
NO, wife has a fee simple interest be accompanied by directions on how to deal
with the land upon the death of the receiver;
however, if all that is transferred is a life estate,
then these types of gifts are valid.
● It is possible to transfer a life estate with the
power to sell the property (must be explicit), and
if this is the case then the gifts will be void if the
property is sold
● The case turned on the words "undisposed of"
which makes the gift over repugnant
- The testator gave all his property to his sister “to be used and disposed of as she wishes during her lifetime” followed by a
gift over “any that is left at her death” to X
- Here – sister took an absolute interest
How is this different? Seems like a life estate and both have the power of encroachment
- And disposed of kills the words during the lifetime – dispose is explicitly the right to inherit. Dispose gave the sister the
entire estate
Distinguished in Taylor because of the words “disposed”
Christensen v Martini Estate, 1999, ABCA Issue: What kind of interest was given to Martini? Reasoning:
*Life Estates Judgement
Facts:
- Testator gave Martini a life estate without
Notes: *Life Estate, get mortgage on it, no ● Peter Martini and his wife owned a duplex with the Christensen
power of encroachment in the half of the
mortgage from bank (listed on title doc, “life (sisters) living in one half.
● When Martini died, he made several provisions regarding the duplex
estate”
sisters.
● The will was drafted by Peter without legal counsel Language
● Will specified: "I give to my wife ... [his half of the duplex] for - It is trite law that when interpreting will’s
her use. When she no longer needs [it] that she gives said
property to [the Christensen’s]" provisions, a court should give effect to the
testator’s intentions as ascertained from the
- Appellant = Martini = widow of testator = Sharie Raby expressed language of the instrument and
- Respondents = Sandra Christensen and Sonya Nadon = the the surrounding circumstances
Christensen’s = long-time friends and neighbours of the - In this case it is apparent that the testator
testator intended to benefit both Martini and the
- Testator had a first wife – owned duplex w/ the Christensen’s – supported by the language
Christensen’s of the provision, the entire will, and
- In will – testator gave Sharie Raby his half of the duplex surrounding circumstances
“for her use. When she no longer needs it that she gives - Most likely interpretation – testator
said property to the Christensen’s” intended Martini to have life estate without
power of encroachment and a gift over to
the Christensen’s
The Will:
“I give to my wife ... 2203 31 Ave ... for her use. When she no longer - The absence of the words “during her
needs 2203 31 Ave. ... that she give said property to Sandra and lifetime” or similar magic words don’t mean
Sonya ...”
that the testator didn’t intend to grant his
The testator’s spouse receives: a right to the property until she dies,
regardless of “need” wife a life estate. Especially since testator
was a lay person writing their own will
Decision: - There is no mechanism to force Martini to
Court interpreted the will based on the entire document and determined make an inter vivos transfer of the property
bequest to be a life interest, with a gift over to the sisters. to the Christensen’s – it is up to Martini to
decide when she “no longer needs” the
property – might not make determination
during her lifetime – essentially a life estate
then.
Ratio:
UNIT VI - EQUITY
● Specific body of law developed by the English Court of Chancery (out of chancellor, second in command to king)
○ Used to remedy failing of the common law
○ Focused on fairness
○ “King’s Conscious”
○ Developed parallel to common law
○ Prevails of the common law
■ Equitable rule prevails over common law
● Relevance to Tenure and Estate:
○ Equitable Trusts
■ Beneficial Interests
Equity, Equity, and Equity
● Equity → body of law exercised by the courts of equity
● Equity → just or fairness
○ Equity seeking groups (social justice)
● Equity → value remaining in an asset
○ Equity of redemption
■ Money after debts are paid (sell house to pay debts, get difference/remainder)
○ I.e., shares of company (can trade on stock market, equities market), Interest in a house (mortgage, remaining amount you own)
Equitable Maxims
Equitable Entitlements
Equity Today
● s 41(a)-(d): If you have an equitable claim that would have been acknowledged by high court of justice or equitable chancellor then NS court will recognize it
● 43(11): equity prevails over common law
Terminology
The “Use’
(F takes a legal fee simple estate) / (A takes an equitable fee simple estate)
Avoidance by Exemption
...(to paraphrase) where a person is seized to the use or trust of another person or corporation...that in every such case the person or corporation granted the use shall
be seized… (in possession of the fee)
- If i am going to fee someone in use, they are going to be seized in the fee simple as well
● Creation
○ “to A to the use of B in trust for C”
○ “to B to the use of B, to the use of (or in trust for) C”
■ “unto and to the use of B in trust for C”
○ “to B in fee simple to the use of C for life, with the remainder to the use of D in fee simple”
■ C will get legal life estate (has to use for D - beneficial interest)
■ After C dies, remaining of fee simple goes to D (beneficial and legal)
Ex: To B limited in trust for C _________ (no limit for C) - need something in space
Trusts: Express, Resulting & Constructive
A Trust
● Property where legal ownership is held by one person or corporation and equitable ownership is held by another person or corporation
● The legal owner (trustee) must act for the benefit of the equitable owner (beneficiary)
● Can be created by deed or devise
- A piece of property, real or chattel → legal ownership is held by one person (legal title) but another person owns the equitable or beneficial ownership → one
has legal claim one has beneficial claim → two people have claim
The “Use”
“To F and her heirs to the use of A and his heirs”
(F takes a legal fee simple estate) / (A takes an equitable fee simple estate)
Express Trusts
● A trust created through the settlor’s express intent as outlined in the deed or devise
● “to A to the use of B in trust for C”
○ B gets legal interest and C would get beneficial interest
○ Would now say → “To unto the use of B in trust for C”
● “to A Ltd in trust for C”
○ Use that property to benefit C
Class Exercise:
For each of the following examples, describe all of the interests created by the transfer:
1. X grants: “to T and her heirs in trust for A for life, then in trust for B and his heirs”
- “to T and her heirs in trust for A for life, then in trust for B and his heirs”
- A gets life estate (legal interest for the life of A) for the benefit of B (beneficial/equitable interest)
- Once A dies, given full interest to B and his heirs (legal and beneficial/equitable interest) = absolute title
- X reversionary title after A’s death for B….
- B → Right to dispossess (can will away their rights)
- Becomes → “To and onto A for life in trust for B and his heirs, then to B and his heirs”
2. X grants: “to W and her heirs to the use of T and her heirs in trust for A for life, then in trust for B and his heirs”
- “to W and her heirs to the use of T and her heirs in trust for A for life, then in trust for B and his heirs”
*W = legal title / T = beneficial title → Statute of Uses takes away W
- W = nothing
- T = legal title for the benefit of A (A’s life, beneficial life interest)
- After A dies, T = legal title for benefit of B (B’s life, beneficial interest after A’s death, divisible (can dispossess))
- When T dies you look to T’s will
4. X devises: “to T and her heirs in trust for A and her heirs”
- “to T and her heirs in trust for A and her heirs”
- X gets nothing
- A gets full legal title and beneficial interest
5. X devises: “to T and her heirs in trust for A for life, then in trust for B and her heirs when she reaches the age of 25.”
- “to T and her heirs in trust for A for life, then in trust for B and her heirs when she reaches the age of 25.”
- T = nothing (use executed)
- A = life interest
- B = beneficial interest (can pass on beneficial interest, dispossess)
- After A dies, legal interest reverts back to X (if they’re dead, their heirs) B gets beneficial interest upon B turning 25
- When B is below 25 X gets legal title and beneficial interest
Resulting Trusts
Class Exercise:
Class Exercise 1:
X devises: “to T Ltd. in trust for A for life, then in trust for B and their heirs when she reaches the age of 25.”
What happens to the property after A dies and before B turns 25?
- T = legal title for A’s benefit (beneficial interest) then B when B reaches 25
- A = beneficial life interest
- B = beneficial when 25
- Beneficial interest reverts back to X
Class Exercise 2:
Suppose that one day out of the blue, your parents send you a package from their lawyer with documents that grant you title to their house and a note saying that “they
would like some more freedom to travel in their retirement.”
Would you assume that they meant to give the house to you as a gift?
- In Trust
- Still need a place to live when they come back
- Don’t need permission to fix etc. but will come back
- Could mortgage it
- Gift
- Know your parents, want to help set you up for life
Gratuitous
In the case of Gratuitous transfers, equity generally presumes a resulting trust but...
Advancement
Madsen Estate v Saylor, 2007, SCC - Father and daughter had close relationship and held joint accounts in which father retained control.
- Some evidence that father intended to make a gift of the money (financial reliance of daughter; choice of joint accounts with
right of survivorship).
Distinguishing factor:
- In Pecor, other siblings (who would take under the residue of the will) supported daughter’s argument
HERE, other siblings contested daughter’s claim
Nature of Leases
Lease
- “A contract by which a rightful possessor of real property conveys the right to use and occupy the property in exchange for consideration, usually rent. The
lease term can be for life, for a fixed period, or for a period terminable at will”
o Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)
- The lease creates the leasehold estate
- A lease is way more than a contract – a lease creates an interest in the property – thus it is an estate.
Characteristics
- Creates an estate interest in the land whereby the tenant has the right to exclusive possession of property
o Allows occupier to use and enjoy the property to the exclusion of strangers
o The tenant can declare who can and cannot enter. Subject to the lease and statute
o Heavily regulated area of law – up until WWII, tenants had no rights – generally in the common law the landlord had right to inspect for waste –
nothing really comparable for the tenant
o Statutes have addressed a lot of these old issues
- Landlord has no right to say what you do in that space (things about noise, what colours to paint the walls)
- Lease documents can include a lot of things. If you sign it, you are contractually bound
- Early in the common law
o Leases were essentially contractual in nature – as people began to sue – saw that this was inappropriate – courts began to grant the remedy of
possession – suddenly there is a land interest involved – thus a lease is a chattel real (lease is chattel (property) but real (estate attached to it))
- Obligations, and corresponding remedies, governed by both privity of contract and a privity of estate
o Must exist between ascertained persons – must be a named person.
o Payment of rent is not essential
Kinds of Leases
- Fixed term
o It will end on a set date in time
- Periodic lease
o Ongoing month-to-month at the first of the month – legislation might say that when a residential lease ends it converts to this
- Tenancy at will
o Either party can end at their will
- Tenancy at sufferance – in the textbook – if someone overstays their tenure of an estate – argument they are a leasee – kind of legal fiction – cannot fall
into tenure
Lord Denning:
Now:
Here
1) Exclusive possession that is terminable by the owner at will would be possession in name only.
a. A necessary incident of a right to exclusionary possession is a defined term (fixed or periodic).
b. Argument that tenancy at will is a weak use of the estate
2) Payment of rent is relevant to the presence of an intention to be legally bound, but is not a precondition for a tenancy, per se.
a. Lease agreement can exist with no rent payments (gifts are possible)
3) Limitations upon the purpose to which the occupier can put the land do not negate a tenancy. Exclusive possession is not synonymous with an unqualified
range of permitted uses.
a. You can have a lease where the landlord says you cannot garden in the backyard.
4) Consistent with the role of exclusive possession is the refusal to recognize a tenancy where:
a. The owner is prevented from granting a tenancy by statute;
b. Where the landlord’s right of entry is inconsistent with exclusive possession; or
i. When this happens – not recognize the tenancy – it is not tenancy without exclusive possession (statute would
override this)
c. Where right to exclusive possession can be terminated pursuant to some legal relationship extraneous to that of landlord tenant (e.g., employee
occupies employer’s premises in order to perform duties, where purchaser is in occupation pursuant to agreement of purchase and sale).
i. No tenancy
ii. You can be fired under some other legal regime like employment – the presence in the building is not due to the
tenancy
5) Terminology used to describe a tenant’s right of occupation is significant only if it indicates an intention that the occupier enjoy exclusive possession.
Conversely, a requirement that an occupier not impede an owner’s right of possession and control tends to negate exclusive possession.
Metro-Matic Services Ltd. v Reasoning: Problematic term 6(e)
Hulmann, (1973) ONCA - You must grant access to all tenants at all times
- Granting access to the space. Not exclusive access
*In notes - took Fatac test into
Canada So, what is this?
CA – wrong – they were relying on Denning’s law of looking to intent – this is no longer good law.
If it was heard today – likely wouldn’t be decided this way as there was no exclusive possession
Transfer of Lease
Both the reversionary interest (landlord) and leasehold interest can be transferred
o At end of lease – right to exclusionary possession can be transferred
- A leasehold interest can be transferred in two ways:
o 1) Through assignment
§ Assign over the tenancy of the lease – new tenant and existing landlord have no contract (cannot have a contractual agreement)
§ There is a privity of estate (between landlord and new tenant) – what terms in the lease agreement get transferred since there is no privity of
contract
§ Privity of estate, but no privity of contract
o 2) Through a sub-lease
§ No privity of estate, and no privity of contract
§ Can sublease and can resume your interest as a tenant. No privity in estate between the subtenant and landlord)
- Rule in Spencer’s Case (1583): all the ‘real covenants’ in the lease run with the assignment.
o All real covenants will bind the landlord and new tenant
o A real covenant is one that is said to touch and concern the leased property – directly impacts the landlord and a tenant
§ Example of a real covenant: rent,
o That is, it impacts the landlord as landlord or tenant as tenant
Merger Restaurants v DME Foods Issue: Decision: Mergers lease cannot be construed to allow the owner to permit DME
Ltd., (1990) CA Does mergers lease restrict the use of the parking area for parking
*Lease merger?
Reasoning:
Is the owner entitled to alter the common areas to give DME Lakeview – who took over in 1986 – said that the exclusive right to
access
parking is not covenant to the agreement
Facts: - Caselaw – similar cases where parking lots don’t run with the land.
● Merger operates a restaurant, DME operates a CA distinguishes based on the facts
restaurant on neighboring property. Both owned by - The passage of time has not affected the rule laid down in
same company. Merger is assignee of a lease. Spencer’s case that covenants which touch or concern the land run
● Construction leads to less parking for DME, owner with the land and are binding upon successors in title.
says they can use Mergers lot for parking. Merger - Touching and concerning the subject matter of the lease: to run
argues they have exclusive right to that lot. with the land, covenants must either affect the land itself, that is,
the nature, quality or value of the thing demised.
TJ: Merger has exclusive right o Our case – parking in a shopping plaza will directly affect
the nature and value of the land. No parking = no
customers
o Textbook on shopping centre leases – says that parking is
essential for business
Merger’s common area rights touch or concern the demised premises. Such
rights cannot be considered as merely collateral to the demise
Sundance Investment Corp. v Issue: Did Richfield unreasonably withhold its consent to a Reasoning:
Richfield Properties Ltd., (1983) proposed sublease by Sundance? Belzil J.A (majority):
ONCA
Facts: - Appellant:
● Richfield owns HH Plaza. 2 major tenants lease o Objection based on parking – not based on the fact that a
almost the entire thing (Sundance and Beaver). restaurant is being put in
● Sundance wanted to sublease the property to Swiss o Issue of parking is a normal incident of any use of this
Chalet but requires prior consent (permission) from premises
Richfield. - Respondent
● Beaver doesn’t want Swiss Chalet to sublease o We can rely on Beaver lumber’s objection =
because the terms of a Swiss Chalet. Require a o Sublease would jeopardize the operations of Beaver
parking setup which would interfere with Beaver’s lumber even if we can’t rely on it
business. - Beaver will likely lose customers if they are forced to park much
● Richfield rejects sublease in support of Beaver. further away. Not unreasonable to withhold consent if it could
Worth noting that Beaver’s rent paid to Richfield is a adversely affect other tenants as well as the landlord’s own
percentage of their total sales interests.
● *Get some more facts from this case* - Even if this is not the problem:
● Chamber Judge – can rely on Beaver lumber’s o the burden of proof rests on the tenant and not the
objections – referred to CA landlord to prove that consent for subletting is reasonably
withheld.
Decision: Withholding of consent is not unreasonable. o Landlords may rely on any genuine reason for withholding
consent
Ratio: The burden of proof rests on the tenant and not the
- Beaver lumber pays substantial rent – no reasonable landlord
landlord to prove that consent for subletting is reasonably
withheld. Landlords may rely on any genuine reason for would consent to the loss of 80,000 a year – and reject the
withholding consent sublease
- Not withholding because it’s a restaurant (subleased to a
restaurant before w/ no problems) but because the nature of the
business would interfere w/ other interests.
- Cites Halsbury’s: burden of proof is on tenant and not landlord to
prove consent is unreasonably withheld. Cites another case:
landlord may rely on any genuine reason for withholding consent.
Can landlord reject tenants on the basis that the tenant won’t achieve
sufficient business. Unreasonable for a landlord to reject a business based
on insufficient business. Thus, the majority decision is unjust.
General Notes
● You have privity to the estate if you hold tenancy (neighbour doesn’t unless they hold easement)
○ Do you have an interest in the land
● Tenant has privity of contract with landlord and very specific rights within the property
○ You have privity of estate with landlord
○ You have an interest in the property
Sources of Obligations
● Common law
○ Understood from property perspective
● Contract
○ Freedom of contract
● Statute
○ Remedy power imbalance
- NS: If you sign a fixed term at the end of the term a landlord can
kick you out or raise rent etc.
- ON: lease renews automatically
Remedy of Distress:
- Distress no longer available, have to go to landlord/tenant board
“The covenant for quiet enjoyment is therefore a covenant that the tenant’s
lawful possession of the land will not be substantially interfered with by the
acts of the lessor...”
- Also tried for nuisance - court dismissed this - landlord not making
the noise, it was the tenants, knew there would be other tenants
when moved in
Pellate v Monarch Investments Ltd. (1981), 23 Facts: Reasoning:
RPR 8 (Ont Co Ct) - P lived in small apartment while - Decided for plaintiff
studying for Bar exam - Landlord did all they reasonably could
- Landlord undertook extensive - But they talked about right to quiet enjoyment (not about landlord
renovation acting reasonably)
- Landlord gave option to terminate - Now broadened it to physical enjoyment
lease and kept up to date of what - Using the land as its intended to be used - did not intend that your
was happening kitchen was going to be replaced
- Offered to pay them and suggested - If landlord had told at beginning of tenancy might be
alternate study space - offered to put different
up in hotel - P said no
- P decided to stay
Sued for landlord that made apartment
unlivable
Curtis Investments Ltd v Anderson (1981), 24 Facts: Noisy upstairs neighbor Reasoning:
Man R (2d) 220 (Co Ct) - Landlord not liable because not active participation in the actions
so how can they be responsible
- To be liable the landlord has to be an active participant
Principle of Non-Derogation
● Principles states that a lessor (landlord) cannot use the property retained in a way that renders the demised premises materially less fit for the purposes for
which they were let
Petra Investments Ltd v Jeffrey Rogers plc [2000] Facts: Reasoning:
L & TR 451 (Ch D) - P tenant was a lady’s fashion retailer - Test: Did the action render the premises less fit for which it was
- Renting space in commercial mall intended to?
- Landlord said they wanted the mall - Does renting the shop across the way prevent you from carrying on
to attract a specific sophisticated and business with high end fashion
cosmopolitan stores to attract those - Nothing in principle to extend that the landlord doesn’t have a duty
clients (high end fashion store) to do anything?
- Nothing in the lease itself that the - If you can still carry on business though the landlord is not
landlord would do this (just shopping interfering
mall, rented for commercial spaces - - Nothing in lease to say the landlord had to rent out to specific
not limited to high end fashion) people
- Landlord unable to secure tenants
they wanted
- Landlord rented to a music shop and
now tenant is annoyed and sued
Legislation/Forms/Laws
NS Reg 190/1989
- Regulations tend to be about very specific issues
- More day to day procedural practical matters
Questions:
- Landlords can put rent up more than 2% if new tenant?
- If they don’t use the standard lease and someone signs a non-standard - does it default to standard?
Residential
Application of Act
3(1) Notwithstanding any agreement, declaration, waiver, or statement to the contrary, this Act applies when the relation of landlord and tenant exists
between a person and an individual in respect of residential premises.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the relation of landlord and
(a) possesses or occupies residential premises and has paid or agreed to pay rent to the person;
(b) makes an agreement with the person by which the individual is granted the right to possess or occupy residential premises in consideration of the
payment of or promise to pay rent;
(c) has possessed or occupied residential premises and has paid or agreed to pay rent to the person.
- If people are paying rent for residential tenancy, then we assume the act comes into play
- Not everyone pays rent - i.e. staying in parents house for free - not concrete if Act applies
*Right to respond
Question?
● “Where a fixed-term lease exists or where a year to year or a month to month tenancy exists or is deemed to exist and the rent payable for the residential
premises is not paid by the tenant on or before the fifteenth day after the rent is due, on or after the sixteenth day the rent is due the landlord may give to the
tenant notice to quit the residential premises effective not earlier than the fifteenth day after the date the notice to quit is given to the tenant.”
● My rent is due on the 2nd of every month. If I do not pay my March rent, when can the landlord serve me with a notice to quit? When is that notice effective?
○ Notice to quit:
○ Notice Effective:
- Are weekends and holidays included?
- Depends
- When do you start counting?
Right to Housing
(a) recognize that the right to adequate housing is a fundamental human right affirmed in international law;
(b) recognize that housing is essential to the inherent dignity and well-being of the person and to building sustainable and inclusive communities;
(c) support improved housing outcomes for the people of Canada; and
(d) further the progressive realization of the right to adequate housing as recognized in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.
Moratorium of Evictions
Attorney General (Ontario) v Person Unknown, Facts:
2020 ONSC 467 ● ACTO (Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario) is seeking to move for an order setting aside the order of a Chief Justice
*Covid which ended the moratorium on residential evictions in Ontario set on March 19, 2020. The order was made on July
6, 2020.
Reasoning:
ACTO’s concerns are not properly directed at the Chief Justice’s order re-opening court enforcement services – there could be
individual concerns which should be taken up with the government
ACTO’s concerns
● Believes that its premature to lift the moratorium on evictions and that the Chief Justice wasn’t told of the
continuing risks to individuals facing eviction
● Basically – the government went to the Chief Justice ensuring that lifting the moratorium would only lift when it was
safe – then made a new declaration of emergency legislation
● ACTO argues that the end of the declaration of emergency didn’t ensure that it was sage to evict people as the Chief
Justice was told – arguing that COVID still continues
Applicable Legal Test:
● To obtain an interlocutory injunction (or stay) the mobbing party must establish that
● (a) there is a serious issue to be tried (or in some cases, P has a strong prima facie case)
● (b) the moving party will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction isn’t granted
● (c) the balance of convenience favours the granting of the injunction
*if someone didn’t pay rent they couldn't kick them out - tried to lift it and advocacy group came and said don’t lift yet
Doctrine of Estates
Royal Proclamation, 1763
- During 7 years war (England v France mostly)
- English took over from French
- Set out guidelines for European settlement with Indigenous territory (supposed to not be west of Appalachian Mountains)
“That inference is, however, at variance with the terms of the instrument, which shew that the tenure of the Indians was a personal and usufructuary right,
dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign. The lands reserved are expressly stated to be "parts of the dominions and territories;" and it is declared to be the will
and pleasure of the sovereign that, "for the present," they shall be reserved for the use of the Indians, as their hunting grounds, under his protection and dominion.”
Aboriginal Title
“Although I think that it is clear that Indian title in British Columbia cannot owe its origin to the Proclamation of 1763, the fact is that when the settlers came, the
Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries. This is what Indian title means and it does not help one
in the solution of this problem to call it a “personal or usufructuary right”. What they are asserting in this action is that they had a right to continue to live on their
lands as their forefathers had lived and that this right has never been lawfully extinguished. There can be no question that this right was “dependent on the goodwill
of the Sovereign.”
● Where the gov didn’t have treaty with land they said
they should start making treaties
● Long and ongoing and led to Constitution Act of 1982
35 (1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed
(2) In this Act, aboriginal peoples of Canada includes the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.
(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) treaty rights includes rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements or may be so acquired.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the aboriginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.
Sui Generis
“Aboriginal title has been described as sui generis in order to distinguish it from “normal” proprietary interests, such as fee simple. However, as I will now develop, it is also sui generis
in the sense that its characteristics cannot be completely explained by reference either to the common law rules of real property or to the rules of property found in aboriginal legal
systems.
COURT:
- Archaeological evidence and Oral evidence of continuity
- Showed exclusivity
- SCC agreed with trial judge
In Class Exercise:
● Using the worksheet posted on Brightspace, compare the property rights established by ss. 20-45 the Indian Act to those of a fee simple AND of Aboriginal
title.
○ In what ways are the property rights described in the Indian Act, similar and/or different from the common law estate in fee simple and Aboriginal
title?
● Framework Agreement on First Nation Land ● Land Codes are drafted and approved by Preamble
Management signed in 1996 the community
○ Originally included 13 First Nations ○ Once ratified 44 sections of the Whereas the Musqueam Indian Band has entered into the
○ As of October 2019, 165 First nations have Indian Act no longer apply Framework Agreement on First Nation Land Management with
signed onto the Agreement ○ Does not need to be approved Canada on February 12, 1996, that was ratified on behalf of the
● Signatories opt out of the land management sections by the Minister (only needs to
of the Indian Act, and develop their own Land Codes be approved by community) Government of Canada by the First Nations Land Management
○ Agreement is not a treaty and does not ○ Government no longer involved Act, S.C. 1999 c.24.
affect existing treaty rights in decision making of First
○ As of October 2019, 91 First Nations have Nations’ Land and resources And Whereas the Musqueam Indian Band wishes to manage its
enacted their own Land Codes (does not affect title)
● Ratifying legislation Framework Agreement on First ● Title to land is not affected lands and resources, rather than having its lands and resources
Nation Land Management Act, SC 2022, c 19, s 121 ○ Still held by the Crown for use managed by the Department of Indian Affairs on its behalf under
○ Repeals First Nations Land Management Act, and benefit of First Nation the Indian Act:
SC 1999, c 24
Now Therefore, this Land Code is hereby enacted as the
fundamental Land Law of the Musqueam Indian Band
Basic Concepts
Future Interests
“An interest in property in which the right to possession or enjoyment of the property is postponed to a future time. Nevertheless, it is presently existing interest in
the property, and it is thus part of the total ownership of the property…”
Anger and Honsberger Real Property, Vol 1 (2nd ed., 1985)
Recognized Interests
● Future Interests:
○ Reversions
○ Remainders
○ Contingent Interests (condition precedent)
■ Transfers or grants of property that require conditions to be met for the grant to happen/trigger (when they turn 25 for instance)
○ Defeasible Interests (condition subsequent)
■ Some condition in future that can result in transferee losing title (want land band)
■ Can be defeated
○ Determinable Limitations (internal limitation)
■ Internal limitation built into transfer itself
■ Not a condition
■ I am giving you this transfer for this amount of time
*Determinable and Defeasible have little difference
Ex.
- To A for life → Once A dies it comes back to me as the grantor (the grantors future interest in the land returning back to them)
- To A for life then to B in fee simple → no longer reverting back to grantor (no reversionary interest) → up until A’s death B’s interest is future interest
(remainder interest)
Right of Reverter: a present interest (it exists) and know it’s going to revert back
Right of Reentry: doesn’t exist until the ___ happens, created out of thin air at that time
- Similar to a reversion but not because not automatic they have to initiate it
1) To A for life but should A predecease me then to B for _____ (bold is gift over)
Contingent Interests (Condition Precedent)
“To A for life, remainder to B when and not before B turns 25 years of age”
*in order to get the grant you have to meet a condition, if the condition is not met then it’s void.
Interpreting Contingencies
McKeen Estate v McKeen Estate, 1993 CarswellNB 35 Facts: Reasoning:
(QB) - Dylag ● Testator died in 1981 and his will directed COURT
that his entire estate be held in trust for - Could go back to grantor's estate or sisters estates
his wife for her life (dies 1992) - If contingent on sisters having to be alive to get it then
● Upon her death specific gifts of money to it goes to grantor
people and real property to people - If not contingent then goes to sisters estates
● Residue to be divided between sisters - Testators intent is of concern
equally if both alive if only one alive then - This man knew what he was doing, what to do with his
residue goes to sister absolutely money, prescribed a substitute executor instead of his
● Two sisters died in 1989 (before the wife) wife → probably didn’t want to die intestate
- Based on this the sisters interest started right away,
not contingent so it goes to sisters estates
- Vested interest with possibility of devesting
should they predecease each other
- Basically saying: where you have a transfer of property for a life estate and the remainder goes to someone else, we are going to presume that this
remainder vests immediately if there is no other condition expressly stated otherwise
● An interest that terminates upon the occurrence of a specific event (condition subsequent)
○ Operates to defeat the grant
● Event creates a right of re-entry
○ Grantor holds a possibility of reverter
○ Subject to rule against perpetuities
● Consequence of invalidity:
○ Condition severed from grant
○ Grantor’s right of re-entry is destroyed
○ Gift becomes absolute
*Looks a lot like covenant but a covenant is a contract and runs with land - this is a part of the transfer
Impossibility
“Where a Testator grants a bequest, subject to a condition which is impossible, the dominant intent must be the gift, because to intentionally draft into a will
a void condition is an absurdity.”
● Person died on May 8, 1994, left a Will - Where you have a condition that it is impossible by
● Estate of $150K the operation of law
● Will provided entire estates should be - The condition should be ignored if condition was not
held in trust for her sister then divided sole motivator for the gift
among 3 nephews provided they become - If can be determined if the testator's reason for
residents of Canada within 15 years of her imposing conditions is no longer valid
death - Grant should be void because impossible but
● Sister predeceased testator exception
● At time will was drafted, the 3 nephews - Whole intention of testator was that didn’t want
were residents of Soviet Union money going to Soviet Union (wants nephews to have
● At testators’ death they were residents of it but not go to SU)
Germany - Will made this clear
● At time of death, they were all 65+ years, - Donated a bunch of money engaged with that
none spoke English, highest level of kind of activity
education was grade 7, no money - Now in Germany, so that condition is no longer valid
○ Immigration lawyer: none
eligible to immigrate into Canada Notes:
○ Legally impossible for them to
become Canadian - it does not matter if the condition becomes
impossible before or after making the will
- Doesn’t matter if testator had knowledge of
the law (knew if legally impossible)
- Courts don’t like voiding entire grants; they like to
find a way
Uncertainty
Two standards:
1. Conditions Precedent - must be possible to say with certainty that any proposed beneficiary is or is not a member of the class
● language must be capable of some reasonable meaning.
● lower threshold of certainty
2. Conditions Subsequent / Determinable Limitations - must be able to see from the beginning, precisely and distinctly, what events would trigger the condition
● Higher threshold of certainty; more vulnerable to scrutiny
I.e., as long as it allows the family to use it → who is the family?
Facts: Reasoning:
HJ Hayes Co v Meade (1987), 208 APR 419 ● Owns a farm and dies in 1929 - James not residing on land (not vested)
*On condition that each of the children “…reside on said land ● Farmhouse to wife for life and rest for son - Can’t be vested in Harold (didn’t pay $1000 from
and cultivate the same.” Harold
James to Harold - cannot vest)
● Divided farm into 2 lots and left them to
nephews Frank and James - Land would revert back to Grandad (no residue)
● If either of two nephews did not reside on - Then would go to testate (don’t want that, not going
land, then it would go to Harold upon to interpret it that way)
payment of $1000 - Intention of testator: no question wanted sons to have
● In 1929 Frank took possession of his lot the land, each to receive something, no justice in
but James moved to USA
testate, better that James receives something
● Later James moved house on that lot and
then died and left the house to wife? - Condition was subsequent and uncertain so void
Decision: James gets the grant - So then given to James absolutely
Facts: Reasoning:
Fennel v Fennel, [2012] NJ No 63 (SC (TD)) ● Josephine Fennel died on Nov 5, 2008 - Condition subsequent
*On the condition that “..all of my family can make use of the ● Left family home to 5 of 11 children who - Void due to restrain on alienation
said house at any time without costs provided that they share didn’t live in NFL
- Void for uncertainty?
in the upkeep of the said house” ● Wanted home base for them to come
back too - Who falls within the class of family? Immediate
● all of my family can make use of the said siblings? Or their kids? or?
house at any time without costs provided - How much does one need to contribute
that they share in the upkeep of the said - What is the timing of monetary payments
house - No contextual analysis in will to help answer these
Decision: House went to the 5 children absolutely questions
no conditions attached - Therefore, condition void
- Condition subsequent, grant becomes absolute
Facts: Reasoning:
Trinity College School v Lyons, 1995 CarswellOnt 403 ● Selling parts of farm to school - Right to purchase generally is okay → where a person
(Gen Div) ● In one agreement they gave the school has a right to meet any offer made it’s generally
*Restraint on alienation the right of first refusal to purchase a
acceptable (put on market, X offers $100K, asks them
specific lot (the lot they lived on for $x
amount) if they want to match)
● Property given to daughters? - Repugnant to say they have to buy for a specific
● School suing for specific performance amount of money or to specific person (fine to say
want land or damages of value of land family to meet market price but unreasonable to say
● Sisters say problem doesn’t arise because only can sell to family)
transferred before death (says on death)
- Should’ve respected contract and allowed them to buy
it
*don’t like dead people having control, “can only use for a museum” but only for so long
“Nonetheless, there are cases where the interest of society requires the court’s intervention on the grounds of public policy.”
- Re Leonard Foundation Trust, 1990 CarswellOnt 486 (CA)
● Considerations:
○ What is public policy? Who decides?
○ Testamentary freedom v Public Policy
■ Competing interests
■ You should be able to do what you want with your property v live in society and have to do what is accepted
○ Public, Quasi-public, Private
■ Different standard for donating money as private citizen vs public organization vs quasi-public organization
Re Leonard Foundation Trust, 1990 CarswellOnt 486 Issue: Reasoning:
(CA) Do recitals need to be considered? Can those recitals be considered in deciding the issue (how to
Is this a public or private trust? deal with this trust)
Does this trust violate public policy? - They don’t have legal authority just stating contextual
belief
Facts:
● Leonard created an indenture on dec 8
1923 for a scholarship that contained
numerous abhorrent recitals Recitals
● Stating that the white race is the best - Can’t isolate recitals from trust document and
qualified to progress the world disregard them, document has to be read as a whole
● Contained various conditions for eligibility - The recitals intend to give meaning etc. and need to
○ British subject, white, protestant be viewed in entirety
● Scholarships to be given in priority (1st - Don’t contradict operative provisions
children of clergy men, children of - Throughout indenture kept making reference to
schoolteachers, children of military
recitals etc.
officers, etc.)
- Can’t ignore recitals in this context
● Mostly male
● Female scholars not to exceed ¼ female - Even if just to motive and not operative can’t ignore
students them
● In 1981 the trust began receiving
complaints from gov agencies including Public?
HR commission of Ontario, Alberta etc. - Applications from public
● 1975 several schools began to complain - Given to go to public schools
● 1972 U of T and u of A stopped processing - Scholarship’s purpose
award
● Trust brought application to court - this is
a problem but what can we do Violate public policy?
- Can only be invoked by courts in clearest of cases
Decision: (don’t want judges to impose own values instead of
Recitals need to be considered societies)
Brought trust in line with public policy - didn’t get - Although entitled to freedom of what you want to
rid of trust, used common law power to alter happen with money - Has to be limited in case of
terms of trust and use public policy to guide it (got public trust by public policy considerations
rid of the abhorrent terms) - Can look to constitution equality rights and Charter
- Not just look to legislation but widespread criticism of
the trust - demonstrates how offences the terms are
to fair minded citizens
- Not in interest of public policy
- Brought trust inline with public policy
Not all restrictions based on a class will violate public policy
- Ok to say:
- Will go to student
- To assist historically disadvantaged
community
- Charter allows these
McCorkill v McCorkill Estate, 2014 NBQB 148 Facts: Reasoning:
● Reviewing testator will on application 1. Prior to this case only conditions were invalidated but
from testator sister not entire gift (Leonard was just conditions)
● Testator gave large donation to neo-Nazi 2. They increased the instances where policy can
organization invalidate based on the character or recipient
● Court should invalidate the gift based on
public policy Through statute gov has banned donations to terrorist
organizations
Decision; - Neo Nazi organization not listed (doesn’t fall under
Stopped gift based on public policy this)
● Common Law:
○ Joint Tenancy
○ Tenancy in Common
● Statutory Regimes
○ Matrimonial
○ Condominium
○ Cooperative
Joint Tenancy
● Where two or more people own distinct interests in the same land
○ Can be 50/50, 80/20 etc. of value of land (doesn’t have to be equal)
Two features:
1. Only requires unity of possession (can be other unity ones but doesn’t have to be)
○ (Each have full right of exclusion and possession) 80/20 only becomes relevant when i.e., selling the land
2. No Right of Survivorship
○ Upon death, interest forms part of deceased’s estate
○ A = 80% and B= 20%
○ A dies then 80% value goes to heirs not to B
Class Question
In what situation would you want to hold property as a tenant in common? As a joint tenant?
Joint Tenancy
- If you’re married (don’t have to pay state tax)
- Family relationships (spouse children etc.)
- Avoid taxes, no transfer of documents
Tenancy in Common
Creation
- (grant has to satisfy the 4 unities, if it doesn't then it automatically becomes tenant in common)
*Clear, unambiguous
Interpretive Rules
“I cannot doubt, having regard to the authorities respecting the effect of such words as "amongst" and "respectively," that anything which in the slightest degree
indicates an intention to divide the property must be held to abrogate the idea of a joint tenancy and to create a tenancy in common.”
*The presumption at common law is assumed joint tenancy, if it doesn’t satisfy then tenancy in common
- Any word that suggests that there is a differing interest then tenancy in common
● Where ambiguous look at:
○ Words of severance
■ “Jointly”
■ “equally”, “equal shares”, “share and share alike” “to be divided between”
○ Presumptions
■ Parties created a joint tenancy
■ Rebuttable (can look to will, any indication that intention to create something else will rebut that presumption)
○ Intention
Class Exercise
A devises “to B and C as joint tenants, but should B become a lawyer, then B’s interest shall pass to D.”
Presumptions
Statute
5 (1) Every estate granted or devised to two or more persons in their own right shall be a tenancy in common, unless expressly declared to be in joint tenancy
but every estate vested in trustees or executors as such shall be held by them in joint tenancy.
(2) This Section shall apply as well to estates already created or vested as to estates hereafter to be granted or devised.
Robb v Robb, 1993 CarswellBC 110 (SC) Vancouver Issue: Reasoning:
*Joint tenancy or tenant in common Who is owners of shares in capital of condo tower The owner of such a suite cannot own in fee simple
and who holds leasehold interest in suite? - Building owned by company
Joint tenancy or tenant in common? - The company’s shares are owned by owners of suites of
building
Facts: - Owner pays purchase price for shares and lease
● Husband had interest in shares of a
condo and a suite - Once acquired just have to pay common taxes and
● He dies and wife has it all common operating costs
● Kids wants declaration
- March 1960 suite 501 is granted to Auto Becker with 15
Decision: years with 38 shares of capital
Shares and Lease joint tenancy - In 1965 he sold leasehold interest and shares to
Cameron’s
Ratio: - In 1986 the Cameron’s died and the Robbs purchased
Courts acknowledge that equity will presume a - When Robbs purchased the money came entirely from
tenancy in common in these situations Mrs. Robb, but the assignment was in favour of Mr. and
Mrs. Robb
Charge should include assignment of a lease - Neither assignment of lease etc. identify joint tenancy
or tenant in common
- Some external evidence for joint tenancy
COURT
- External evidence parties wanted joint tenancy
- Later Mr. Robb transferred a Cali property to Mrs. Robb
- Makes sense he would want in jointly
- Shares are joint tenancy
Class Exercise
How would Robb v Robb be decided if it took place in Nova Scotia? (based on statute)
Class Exercise
Remedies
Condominiums
Purpose
2 The purpose of this Act is to facilitate the division of land into parts that are to be owned individually, and parts that are to be owned in common, to provide for
the use and management of such properties and to expedite dealings there with, and this Act shall be construed in a manner to give the greatest effect to these
objects.
- Bylaws
- Gives boards power to create bylaws etc.
- Every province has one
Condos
Anti-Social Behaviour
● Property owners cannot be dispossessed for antisocial behaviour under common-law (anti the social behaviour)
○ Subject to legislation
■ Could call cops, bylaw officer etc. but really that’s what you’re limited to under common law
■ Under condo act there is more power
○ Other remedies exist in criminal law and tort
Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No Issue: Power of the Condo Act Reasoning:
747 v Korolekh, 2010 ONSC 448 - Court looked at S 117 of Condo Act → prohibits
Facts: conduct likely to damage property or cause harm to
*Anti-Social Behaviour - Condos ● Half units on ground floor half on upper other people
floor - Empowered board with broad remedial powers for
Notes: ● Common courtyard space - nice gathering compliance with the act
- Commentary whether or not this should be allowed space, utopia - Based on evidence (15-16 sworn affidavits) judge
- Court outside of range? ● Respondent came in and alleged in wide concluded BARD violated the act
- What’s reasonable ranging and serious conduct (physically
- What if they are mentally ill? assaulting other unit holders, acts of Remedy
- However they have bought into the mischief (through gravel at someone, - Given the unique factual context of the case they are
ownership structure and agreed to terms broke some windows, racist and going to order respondent to sell unit and vacate within
basically (don’t have to buy into it, they homophobic slurs, large music at night, 3 months
chose it - usually not cheapest option) failing to clean up after dog, using dog to - Building is small
- Still get money from sale (could be intimidate other, egging units, interfering - Units share the courtyard and respondent violated the
unfavourbale market conditions though) with television services) courtyard
- Need to weigh benefits and risks of other ● If proven much of conduct would fall - Behaviour is extreme
owners and their safety in severe cases within Criminal Code - Board ordered her to cease conduct but ignored
warning and statutory duty to take warning → didn’t
Decision: Forced the respondent to sell under the change ways or intention to change ways
Condo Act - Court said unpractical to try to court mandate her
behavior so going to make her sell it
Ratio: - Can’t do under common law but can under
Gives court ability to enforce the condo act Condo Act
(power under condo act that they don’t have in
common law)
UNIT XI - SERVITUDES
Easements
*neither a legal nor beneficial interest can barr the easement
What is an Easement?
Two types:
● Positive easement – a privilege to utilize the land of a different owner
○ Most common
○ I.e., Right of way
● Negative easement – a right to prevent an owner from utilizing their land in a specific way
○ Less common
○ I.e., Away access to light i.e., can't build a huge tower and block light
Elements of an Easement
● The easement must enhance the dominant lands (benefit the dominant tenant somehow, otherwise not an easement)
○ Sufficient nexus must exist to enhance the normal use and enjoyment of the dominant property
○ Properties need not be adjacent
■ Just needs to be a nexus between them (use and enjoyment) i.e., accessing a park
■ Not next door to each other but still gaining the benefit from that
■ The easement gives them access to what that benefits them (can’t just be right of access to someone’s property)
3)Separate Holders
Legislation
63(3) Where dominant and servient tenement parcels are registered in the name of the same person, a right of way, restrictive covenant or easement referred to in
subsection (2) is not merged by reason of the common ownership.
- In NS it doesn’t merge (still easement) because what if the next day you sell Parcel A after you bought Parcel B
4)Subject Matter
● The easement must be capable of being granted (of forming the subject matter of the grant)
Four characteristics:
1. Grant cannot confer a right inconsistent with the possession of the servient owners
2. Right granted cannot be too wide or vague
● sufficiently definite so that the owner of the dominant tenement knows what they are allowed to do, and servient owner knows what they must
allow
3. Cannot place a positive obligation on the servient tenement
○ Can’t say you have to build a road for them etc.
4. Subject of the easement must be acceptable to the courts
● E.g., No right to a view over servient lands
● Do not want to make the law uncertain (want law to be certain)
● Accepted classes of easements: easements for light, passage (right of way), solar access, and beach use
○ No right to view i.e. (can’t build a fence because I want view of your land?)
● Classes not closed
Conveyancing Act
Conveyancing Act, RSNS 1989, c 97
(d) a conveyance of any property right in land includes the buildings, easements, tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances belonging or in any
wise appertaining to that property right.
- Can close it by agreement (talk to township etc.) but can’t by sale etc. → both dominant and servient tenants need to agree
- Except where a contrary intention appears - if you buy a piece of land, it all goes with it
Creating Easements
● Express Grant: Severing land and want to create Parcel A and Parcel B and sell Parcel A. Expressly state selling Parcel A and Parcel A has easement through
Parcel B (can be implied) - “hey you can buy parcel A but dw there’s an easement so you can access it)
● Express Reservation: Severing land and want to keep Parcel A and want easement so will reserve it on Parcel B (contingent to sale basically) (cannot be
implied) “hey you can buy Parcel B but just know that there’s an easement”
*If wanted to move location of easement (i.e., to side of land vs middle) then would need both to agree to do so
Implied:
Grant
● A “quasi-easement” crystallizes into an actual easement upon transfer by implication in the grant of land
○ Fills a gap in the absence of an express grant
○ There must be a gap to be filled
○ Continuous and apparent (can see path/road)
○ Related to reasonable enjoyment
○ Owner uses them
● Rule (guideline) in Wheeldon v Burrows (1879)
1. “Quasi-easement” must have been used by the original landowner at the time when the land was severed into dominant and servient lands;
2. Use of the quasi-easement must have been continuous and apparent; and
3. The quasi-easement must be related to the reasonable enjoyment of the dominant lands.
● Can still establish implied grant, if it is necessary to give effect to common intentions of the party at the time of the grant
● Grantor cannot claim an implied reservation
○ Grantors are responsible for drafting the grants
Necessity
Requirements:
● easement must be absolutely necessary for use of the dominant lands
○ Not merely more convenient or efficient
○ I.e., A cannot access land without going through B’s property
● necessity must have existed at the time of severing title
○ Very tough to prove
Issue: Is it a public highway? Whether the TJ erred Reasoning:
Nelson v 1153696 Alberta Ltd, 2011 ABCA 203 in declaring that the Road had been dedicated to - Public highway can be created at common law by proof
*Easements (Implied, necessity) the public and dedication to by the public for use of the land
(could be footpath)
Notes: Facts:
Test:
- Right of easement to access his land includes ● 3 pieces of property
allowing public to access his land through it ● Rabbit Hill Resort leases their land from 1. Actual intention on part of owner to dedicate it as
- Maybe Nelson now has to pay money to Prosnik to Don and in 1968 they constructed a road public highway
access it or invest in another way to do it ● At time of construction the land was 2. Intention has to be carried out by the public highway
owned by Don and Dale being thrown open to the public
Result: town basically put their own road in and made an ● Dale agreed to road and when it was Dale testified that he did not intend it as a public highway
easement because of good business for town done leased back to the resort
● In 1985 Nelson purchased property north TJ said it was implied as a public highway
(bounded by land owned by Dal and Don)
and N Sask river
○ Only way to access land is via CA: overturned this - no public highway
that road 1. Have to look at totality of the evidence which includes
● Nelson obtained a dev permit to build his the negotiations of Dale not giving easement (if public
Shalom Park subject to obtaining highway they wouldn’t be negotiating easement)
approval from road owners - Dale himself he didn’t intend it
● Invested about $2M into site - No public highway
● Not a party to lease of road but he used 2. Another problem is that the “highway” is land that is
the road and contributed to the cost of subject to a lease
maintaining it - Only an owner in fee simple can dedicate a
● Tried to get a formal public highway
agreement/easement from Dale to use - That would interfere with leaseholders’
the road but Dale never signed on interest and cannot be dedicated as public
● Dale was aware of dev and use of road highway
and attended events at Shalom Park
● 2005 Prosnik bought Dale’s land and tried
to bar Nelson, his guests, public etc. to Although negotiations between parties occurred no easement
using the road was formally entered into
● Nelson sued that it was a public highway
or that Prosnik gained an implied Easement of necessity found (implied)
easement when he bought the property - Necessary access
- Land grant has to be inaccessible or useless without
Decision: easement
Appeal allowed. Found that there was not a public - Dale said he could access by water → court said no not
highway and no easement (couldn’t Est necessity in winter etc.
at time of original severance) - Only way to access is through the road and public use
Dissent: said an implied necessary easement (not determinative but helpful) otherwise public
would’ve used another way
- has to be necessary at time of severance
- 1890 Crown owned land
- Don: First severance happened in 1895 to Mr.
Lightkick
- Dale: 1897 to Mr. Street
- Even though missing piece of pie at CA level
they allowed some further evidence allowed in
- Easement by implication because of necessity
Scope of Easement
● An owner of the dominant lands cannot, without the consent of the servient owner, increase or expand the easement beyond the scope of the grant
● Excessive use of an easement is considered trespass
○ Matter of degree; type of use; foreseeability
● Issue can occur when use changes over time due to changing circumstances
○ E.g., A right of way that was once a country path is now a 4-lane highway
Issue: Decision: Right of way but just in yellow area
Laurie v Winch, [1953] 1 SCR 49
Was there a right of way or personal license
*Right of Way (Easement) through lot 33? What did right of way include? Reasoning:
Facts: - No dominant tenement so personal license → court said
no there was dominant tenement so right of way
● Laurie owns 3 lots (including lot 33) and - Ambiguous where the right of way is (just using over
trying to stop Winch from passing over yellow part)
them (applying to court) - Intent of parties to construct it
○ Every single one of the lots has - Right of way was granted not personal license
to go through her lot - The fence reinforces that yellow is the only way to enter
○ Wasn’t an easement to John land (right of way was there but limited to yellow)
Smith but a personal license? - Farm lane is the only way to get to the road
○ If found to be an easement it is - No utility to go anywhere else on lot 33
limited to what it was at time of
conveyance (farm buildings not
dev) Intent:
○ By filing plan 320 and selling all - Agriculture
the lots the change inc - Only farmland but no reason to think it’ll be farmland
circumstances amounted to an forever
extinguishment of the easement - No circumstances restricting it for just farming land
● 1910 – Sheppard owned all the lands, - Even though at time of grant it was just farmland and
and registered Plan 103 to divide the now there’s all these lots (from it being subdivided)
property into lots. Lot 33 (green line) doesn’t matter
was intended to be used as a back lane - Still only right of way in yellow area
for the other lots. There was a wire fence
running along the eastern side of lot 33
● 1917 - Sheppard sold the farmland east
of the Plan 103 to Farmer Smith. Prior to
the sale and after sale, occupants of the
farm used Lot 17 to reach lakeshore road.
Smith subsequently bought Lot 17 from a
successor of Sheppard
● 1925 – Sheppard granted a deed to Smith
with the following wording “…I hereby
given to John Smith… his heirs executers
and assigns a perpetual right of way of
Lot 33….”
● 1944 - Winch purchase the Smith Farm as
well as lot 17 together with “a perpetual
right of way over lot 33” based on the
purported grant previously given to
Smith
● 1946 - Winch registered Plan 320. Lots on
320 were sold with a right of way over
Lot 17 and Lot 33
Facts: Decision: Appellant isn’t allowed to use Malden’s land for
Malden Farms Ltd v Nicholson, [1956] OR 415 ● 1916 – Ledyard, Bulkley and Chappus camping, ROW not for anything beyond residential
owned a parcel of marshy land (which
*Easements Reasoning:
became Malden farms). They obtained an
express grant for a right of way from - Looked at language of right of way and grant
Charles Barron over a 20-foot strip of - Not only grant of N S right of way but also Malden’s
adjoining land to the east (the yellow ROW
- Based on language Nicholson’s use of right of way has
strip) gone much beyond the extent of the easement and
● 19?? – Charles Barron sold some of his needs to be estranged
land on both sides of the right of way to - The law says a grantee of the ROW is not entitled to
the predecessors of the defendant increase the burden of the ROW
- But the legal extent of ROW might allow him to
Nicholson, together with a right of way
??
over the right of way granted to Ledyard, - Motive use vs extent of use
Bulkley and Chappus - Just adding more buildings vs now using it as a
● 19??- Chappus bought out Ledyard and commercial road (can’t do this)
Bulkley and then purchased the rest of - Granted injunction
- Appellant isn’t allowed to use Malden’s land for
Barron’s land including the land subject camping, ROW not for anything beyond residential
to the right of way (the yellow strip)
● 19??- Malden farms acquired Chappus
property
● 1941 – Dayus (predecessor of defendant
Nicholson) arranged with Malden Farms
to shift a portion of the right of way north
300 feet. Malden Farms did not
relinquish its ownership of the fee simple
in land originally subject to the right of
way
● 1952 – Dayus threw open his lands as a
beach-resort and attracted large numbers
of patrons who flocked to the premises.
During picnic and camping seasons
hundreds of cars and patrons traveled up
and down the “new” right of way. They
also parked, picnicked, and camped on
the right of way as well as on Malden
Farmlands which comprised of the
original right of way
Restrictive Covenants
What is a Covenant?
● A promise, in writing, that has been signed, sealed, and delivered (no need for consideration)
○ Used to create rights enforceable by one landowner against another
Two types:
1. Positive covenants – requires party to do something or expend money in relation to the land
○ Generally, cannot “run with the land”
2. Negative covenants (restrictive covenants) – requires party to refrain from doing something
○ May “run with the land” under certain conditions
Origins
“It is said that the covenant being one which does not run with the land, this court cannot enforce it; but the question is, not whether the covenant runs with the
land, but whether a party shall be permitted to use the land in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of which he
purchased.”
● P owned square (didn’t develop) and sold - Def said didn’t sign it so not bound
to Elm (with covenant) - If we allowed, you to do that it would be possible for
● House surrounding used it (owned by P) owner to sell part of their land and the new owner to
● Covenant that the P would maintain the build something to make original owner land worthless
ground and iron railing (open state) and - Def said covenant doesn’t run with the land
at own time - Judge said not issue if run with land or not - did you get
● Would grant tenants access to it on notice of covenant with sale of land? If so, you should
payment of rent be bound by it (see quote above)
● Elm sold to def and def plans to develop - Can’t build (def has burden
it
● P brought application to court seeking Note:
injunction to restrain def from building
on it - Rule: A covenant can restrict future owners where the
future owners are given notice of said covenant
Act Amendments
An Act to Amend Chapter 385 of the Revised Statutes, 1989, the Real Property Act, to Eliminate Covenants that Restrict Access to Food or Medicine
*failed
Chapter 385 of the Revised Statutes, 1989, the Real Property Act, is amended by adding immediately after Section 10 the following heading and Sections:
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
10A (1) A restrictive covenant, however created, is void if it prohibits, whether absolutely or for a specified period, the use of land for
(a) a grocery store or supermarket;
(b) a convenience store selling fresh produce;
(c) a pharmacy or drug store; or
(d) a medical clinic.
(2) This Section applies to a restrictive covenant created before or after the coming into force of this Section.
Bill 60, An Act to Amend Chapter 385 of the Revised Statutes, 1989, the Real Property Act, to Eliminate Covenants that Restrict Access to Food or Medicine, 2nd Sess,
63rd Leg, Nova Scotia, 2018 (first reading 25 September 2018).
Building Schemes
Issue: Part of existing building scheme Reasoning:
Berry v Indian Park Association, 174 DLR (4th) 511 (CA) Facts:
- Valid building scheme that crystalizes once first lot is
*Building Schemes ● sugar bush is a rural community built in 3 sold (has to be valid before lot sold)
phases - Then vendor bound by the scheme and each of the
● Phase 1-2 built cottages (near ski hill) purchasers can enforce restriction upon each other
● Phase 3 modern residential community - Have to be derived from same owner, intend that these
● Def manage the community - maintain restrictions be imposed on all the lots, intent by the
rec centre, common areas and require common vendor that all the lots benefit from it
every resident to be a member of that - Not met
assoc. - No common vendor, phase 3 not a part of
● Bylaws that include restrictive covenants general scheme in 1974 (not even
of how they will use the land contemplated)
● Berry reps people living in phase 3 and - Did not register agreement on title (Monica,
don’t want to abide by covenants vendor
○ Phase 1-2 have different needs
○ Phase 3 modern houses,
basements, all year round, etc.
1974: incorporated Assoc
…….
● A set of agreed upon restrictions on the use and development of the property or land in question, in order to conserve or protect a valuable aspect of the
property or land
○ Typically used for environmental, historic, cultural, or heritage value
○ Generally, exist in perpetuity and “run with the land”
○ Creatures of statute
○ Why can they not exist in equity?
*Can’t exist in equity → run with statute
- Doesn’t check “Taken for the benefit of the dominant land and those lands must be sufficiently identified”
- Doesn’t benefit the land
(b) a municipality;
an easement, without a dominant tenement, for any purpose necessary for the operation and maintenance of the grantee’s undertaking, including a right to flood.
(2) To the extent necessary to give effect to subsection (1), the rule requiring an easement to have a dominant and servient tenement is abrogated.
Heritage Easements
22 (1) Any easement or covenant entered into by the Trust may be registered against the real property affected in the proper land registry office,
Idem
(2) Where an easement or covenant is registered against real property under subsection (1), such easement or covenant shall run with the real property and the
Trust may enforce such easement or covenant, whether positive or negative in nature, against the owner or any subsequent owners of the real property and the
Trust may enforce such easement or covenant even where it owns no other land which would be accommodated or benefited by such easement or covenant.
Conservation Easements
“Offered in Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario
Conservation easements are legal tools to help you protect the habitat on your land.
While maintaining ownership, you make a commitment to conserve the natural
integrity of the habitats agreed upon by you and DUC, by limiting the amount and
type of development that can occur”
https://www.ducks.ca/resources/landowners/conservation-easements/
“Conservation Agreements
Individual wetlands are legally protected with a conservation agreement. Landowners retain ownership throughout the process, and commit to conserving the land’s
natural integrity by limiting the amount and type of development. If the property changes hands, the conservation agreement stays with it.”
https://www.ducks.ca/our-work/landowners/
“You retain full ownership of your property. The Conservation Easement preserves the ecological value of your land by limiting the type and scope of development.
The specific terms of your easement are tailored to your property and to your wishes for the land.
You may keep your land, sell it, or pass the land along to the next generation. The Conservation Easement restrictions apply to all future landowners, and are upheld
by the Nature Trust in perpetuity.”
https://nsnt.ca/giving/leave-a-legacy/donate-land/
Priorities
● Speaks to issue of whose legal rights takes precedence
○ In issue where two or more persons have (i) similar rights in respect of (ii) same subject-matter, and (iii) one person is able to exercise their rights to
the exclusion of others
○ Largely governed by statute
● Relevance areas of law:
○ Property law
■ Defect of title (e.g., fraud)
● Criminal organizations sold house while you were away (innocent parties)
○ Bankruptcy law
■ Legislation sets out who gets what money is what order
● Funeral fees (if deceased)
● Costs of declaring bankruptcy
● Trustee fees
● Lawyer fees
● Wages/salaries/commissions
● etc.
○ Creditor-debtor law
*Which creditor gets the money
● Assume that A owns the legal fee simple, the only proof of which is a title deed document that A keeps in her sock drawer.
● Now imagine that this title deed is stolen by some unknown person and sold to C, who pays the thief (B) $200,000, but C has no knowledge of the theft.
○ Who should be entitled to ownership of the land?
■ A should get it
■ Not B’s to sell so C has not legal right
■ Did C do their due diligence
● Given $1M house for $200K - they should be investigating the thief
■ How much has C put into it
○ How would you justify your position?
○ What additional info might be relevant to your decision?
■ If C keeps property should they have to pay A for the value of property even if more than $200K?
■ If they knew where thief(B) was C could keep house, A gets money from B
● Most time the thief is not found
● OR A keeps house and C gets money refunded
■ Who could absorb the loss better (C first time home buyer and A is a millionaire)
■ Behaviour after the theft
● If A didn’t try to claim it for years afterward (C should keep it?)
○ Knew about theft but didn’t act immediately
● If A knew about theft and bought a new house (already dealt with loss)
○ How to fix this?
■ Electronic registration
■ Insurance (now that fraud is rising companies don’t want to insure)
■ Owner should take more steps to prevent against theft
● One cannot transfer title that is greater than that which is held
○ you can’t give what you don’t have
○ You can’t sell what you don’t have
● Issues:
○ Are competing rights equitable or legal in nature?
○ Does notice or lack of notice change priority?
○ Are there other relevant considerations that would impact priority?
Possible Combinations
(1) Legal Right vs Legal Right
● First legal right has priority and is enforceable against subsequent legal right
○ Someone has property sells to person A then to Person B
○ Both say they have right to it
○ Person A has right to it
● Notice, or lack of notice, of existing right is irrelevant (if Person B knows about person A or not)
○ Applies even if subsequent owner is innocent
○ Caveat emptor – “Buyer beware”
■ Go find thief and sue them (out of luck)
● First equitable right has priority and is enforceable against subsequent equitable interest
● Subject to “clean hands” doctrine
○ One who comes to equity must come with “clean hands”
■ Lying, misrepresenting, dirty tactics etc. (Contextual and up to courts)
● First equitable right has priority and is enforceable against subsequent legal right unless...
● …a bona fide purchaser for value is without notice of the existing equitable right
● Value - can pay money or non-money consideration
● Bona Fide – necessitates good faith
● Notice can be actual, constructive or implied
○ Actual –the legal right is in fact brought to the attention of the purchaser
■ Showed deed document for instance
■ Conversation
■ Letters
○ Constructive – Knowledge of the right is attributed to purchaser based on what a reasonable or prudent individual would have discovered while
investigating title
■ E.g. – A purchaser needs to make reasonable inquiries
● What would a reasonable purchaser have done
● Can’t just be willfully blind (i.e. failed to do any type of title searching)
○ Implied – Knowledge of the right has come to the attention of the purchaser’s agent (e.g., solicitor)
■ The purchaser can’t say they didn’t know because their solicitor knew (solicitor failed to tell them)
**Sell property but someone has a beneficial interest in it. Equity has first priority unless that legal right owner in good faith purchased the legal title for value and
was without notice of the equitable right
Title Registration
History of Conveyancing
Medieval era
● Livery of seisin
○ Most land owned by very few aristocrats (given by King William)
Modern era
Impact on Priority
Example
● Assume that the owner of Blackacre, mortgages their property to the Bank, but for some reason that mortgage isn’t registered. Next, a second mortgage for
the same property is granted to a Private Lender, who then registers that mortgage. At all times, the Private Lender was fully aware of the prior security
interest given to the Bank.
● Nova Scotia’s Registry Act, RSNS 1989, c 392, s 18: “Every instrument shall, as against any person claiming for valuable consideration and without notice
under any subsequent instrument affecting the title to the same land, be ineffective unless the instrument is registered in the manner provided by this Act
before the registering of such subsequent instrument.”
● Is the Bank’s interest effective?
○ Bank interest is not registered then not effective
○ Fact that the private lender has notice doesn’t seem to impact this provision (absent any other provision)
■ Does not have to give notice about registration to the bank
■ Bank doesn’t have an equitable estoppel argument
● Mirror Principle
○ Certificate provides accurate reflection of all interests related to title
○ Until registered, no transaction relating to property creates an interest in land
■ If own property and says will give camping rights for $5K and they sign document, still no right of interest until its registered
○ State guarantees the certificate of title
○ “Mirror” reflects existing state of title
● Curtain principle
○ Only those interest recorded on the certificate bind subsequent owners
○ Do not need to “look beyond” certificate of title
■ Only needs to look at certificate of title, don’t need to go beyond this
○ Draws a “curtain” between registry and prior transactions
Doctrine of Indefeasibility
*Title cannot pass through fraud (not compatible with registration system, because system says what is on the title is true)
1. Registration will not allow rogue to stand (steal land) → Purchased stolen land then title
2. The purchaser doesn’t possess good title, the original purchaser could come back
○ Original owner can make claim against intermediate purchaser but if the intermediate sells land to a new purchaser, then original owner doesn’t
have claim anymore
Immediate
- Did due diligence to see if it was legit
Deferred
- Didn’t do due diligence or was willfully blind
What is Fraud?
Issue: Reasoning:
Holt Renfrew & Co v Henry Singer Ltd., [1982] 4 WWR
B knew that 1978 lease was not filed and did not TJ:
481 (Alta CA) advise Dickson of this and proceeded with sale. Is
*What does fraud mean? - B knew of lease but proceeded to buy prop without it
that fraud?
- B may have suspected that Dickson’s client would not
Facts: sell property if not subject to the lease (and didn’t know
that it wasn’t registered)
● 1950 the owner of property X had a - B and Henry Singer acted within their rights and
clothing business, sold business to Holt rejected idea that they lulled them
Renfrew then leased the property the - B acted in fraudulent manner, judgment for HR
business was on to HR (HR is the tenant,
X is landlord) CA:
● Given a lease, included was an option to - Agreed fraud but gave judgment for dif reasons
renew for 10 years and enforced and - More than knowledge of unregistered instrument
registered in land titles office (lease isn’t - Knew about it and didn’t tell Dickson - TJ said Fraud
registered, option to renew is) (don’t have obligation to fix other lawyers mistakes)
● 1969: HR wanted to spend $200K on - CA said not enough for fraud
leasehold improvements (the store). In - B made a representation to Dickson saying that the
order to do that they sought a new lease lease will not be a deterrent to my client purchasing
in 1973 (when their old lease expires) prop (he further emphasized that by reviewing the
until 1990 financials)
● Lease drawn up by lawyer and sent to - B never corrected Dickson’s reliance
head office in Montreal - ….?????
● Head office failed to file new lease or
caveat with land registry office
● 1978: lawyer for Edmonton (B)
telephoned X’s (owner) lawyer named
Dickson
● B had a buyer
● Dickson said send offer and said about
lease and B said that the lease wouldn’t
be a problem
● Information of financial statements and
lease were sent (1978 lease??)
● B thought his client won’t want the 1978
lease (didn’t tell Dickson)
● B gave offer of $800K for property
(included piece of paper that said
certificate of title) and said offer of $800K
only with conditions listed (only with
1950 lease not the 1978 lease)
● Land sold and B files caveat in land reg
office
● HR thought they had their lease
protected
● HR found out that caveat was never filed
● Henry Singer (owner that B is lawyer to)
said they registered first
Remedy
35 (1) A person who objects to and is aggrieved by a registration in a parcel register may commence a proceeding before the court requesting a declaration as
to the rights of the parties, an order for correction of the registration and a determination of entitlement to compensation, if any.
***
(6) In determining whether it is just and equitable to confirm the registration objected to, the court shall consider
(a) the nature of the ownership and the use of the parcel by the parties.
(b) the circumstances of the registration;
(c) the special characteristics of the parcel and their significance to the parties;
(d) the willingness of any of the parties to receive compensation in lieu of an interest in the parcel;
(e) the ease with which the amount of compensation for a loss may be determined; and
(f) any other circumstances that, in the opinion of the court, are relevant to its determination.