Journal of Pastoral Theology

ISSN: 1064-9867 (Print) 2161-4504 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ypat20

A Feminist Critique of the Concept of Harmony: A

Confucian Approach

Insook Lee

To cite this article: Insook Lee (2018) A Feminist Critique of the Concept of Harmony: A Confucian
Approach, Journal of Pastoral Theology, 28:3, 139-159, DOI: 10.1080/10649867.2018.1547958

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10649867.2018.1547958

Published online: 13 Dec 2018.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 36

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ypat20
Journal of Pastoral Theology, . , –, 

A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF

HARMONY: A CONFUCIAN APPROACH
INSOOK LEE*
New York Theological Seminary,  Riverside Drive, New York, NY
, USA

In this paper, I explore the Confucian notion of harmony, particularly the ways that
Asian women embrace it. The guiding question is “Should we de-Confucianize
Asian women in order to engage them in genuine feminist dialogue?” With this
question in mind, I explore the dynamic of Confucianism and modernization in
terms of its impact on Asian women. I challenge us to recognize how the process
of modernization has affected Asian women’s lives, producing complex
psychological reactions and consequences. I proceeded to criticize the Western
stereotypes and misinterpretations of Confucianism, which modernization has
shaped over the past century. Then, I have chosen the notion of harmony, one of
the highest Confucian values, as an example of how this long-cherished value
in Asia can be reclaimed as one of the major sources and strategies for Asian
feminism.
KEYWORDS: Asian feminism, Korean/Korean–American, Confucianism, harmony,
modernization, ambivalence, pastoral care and counseling

In this paper, I explore the dynamic between Western modernization and

Confucianism with a focus on the Confucian notion of harmony, particularly the
ways that Korean/Korean–American women embrace and apply it to their relation-
ships with self, others, family, and society. I have heard many Korean/Korean–
American women make statements along the lines of, “For the sake of the
harmony of our family (or of our church, or of our community), I say nothing. I
remain silent.” Their intentions in saying this are good, but I suggest that such an
understanding of harmony more properly reflects disharmony and an anti-
Confucian way of living. In order to preserve what they think is “harmony,” they
actually betray the very “harmony” or more exactly “harmonizing” that
Confucian traditions teach as a core value.
I would say that such incongruent behaviors originate at least partly from
women’s misunderstanding of Confucian traditions themselves and the consequent
ambivalent feelings toward Confucianism. Such misunderstanding and ambivalence

* Correspondence to: Insook Lee. Email: islee@nyts.edu

© Society for Pastoral Theology  DOI ./..

 I. LEE

I believe were fostered by the process of “the relentless modernization and

Westernization” (Dallmayr, , p. ). In my roles as a pastoral theologian
and psychotherapist, I have repeatedly observed such complex and often self-
unaware ambivalence among many Korean/Korean–American women, and have
noticed that these ambivalent feelings as a psychological conflict significantly
affect their emotional and mental health. Furthermore, this misunderstanding and
ambivalence often hinders Korean/Korean–American women’s feminist talk from
flourishing in a Confucian cultural context.
The reconstruction of the traditional Confucian value of harmony, however,
could have a backlash for Korean/Korean–American women because it has a
history of being misused, or even abused, to suppress women’s agency. As a way
of approaching this issue, therefore, I first ask, “Should we de-Confucianize Asian
women in order to engage them in genuine feminist talk meaning a discourse
about women’s well-being?” In a nutshell, it is not the destruction or revival of
the old Confucian traditions per se, but a new type of Confucianism with a potential
for reform that I suggest can respond to the needs of contemporary society in a fem-
inist context. Such a task of reimagining Confucian values is most crucial for
Korean/Korean–American women, who particularly stand to benefit from values
that can empower them in the twenty-first century.
There are some scholars who have explored a creative encounter between Western
liberal feminism and Confucianism. As early as , Chinese feminist Terry Woo
wrote an essay about the mutually critiquing relationship between Confucianism
and feminism, in which she stated, “[T]here is no single feminism, but there are
many feminisms … there is a common thread that runs through them: that is the
impetus to critique and improve the disadvantaged status of women relative to
men within a particular cultural situation” ( p. ). With the emphasis on cultural
diversity, she desires her essay to mark a beginning of a “new stage of development
toward a less racist feminism or feminisms” ( p. ).
Authors Foust and Tan () write about new directions in Confucian feminism
and are optimistic for “Confucianism to adjust to the evolving concerns of feminists,
philosophers, and feminist philosophers” ( p. ). Not satisfied that Confucianism
merely requires an adjustment to feminism, authors Chang and Kim () also
argue in Women’s Experiences and Feminist Practices in South Korea that “in
order that the meeting in our society between Confucianism and feminism be
more productive, it is not enough for feminism to be enacted with the goal of
simply continuing Confucianism; feminism needs to be used for critical reinterpreta-
tion and reconstruction” ( p. ) of the tradition. This paper continues those efforts
of exploring the creative encounter between Confucianism and feminism, but sees
the deeply ingrained idea of harmony as the starting point for fruitful progress in
positively merging these two ideologies.
The Confucian virtue of harmony has long been misused or abused as a tool to
suppress women’s agency and to marginalize their voices in decision-making pro-
cesses. Can a Confucian value of harmony be reevaluated or reframed to become
a positive rather than oppressive force for Korean/Korean–American women?
The purpose of this discussion is to clarify the inner conflict and ambiguity of
Asian women toward Confucian values under the impact of radical Western mod-
ernization; a conflict and ambiguity I often witness in my pastoral care and counsel-
ing work with Korean/Korean–American women. To this end, I begin by outlining
 A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF HARMONY 

my experience of working with Korean/Korean–American women between 

and .

MY EXPERIENCE OF WORKING FOR KOREAN/KOREAN–AMERICAN WOMEN

I began my formal education in South Korea in the s, a period of aggressive

modernization right after the Korean War. At that time, Confucianism was still
being taught in schools, but the social consensus was that Confucianism represented
an outdated mode of thinking and living, and that Koreans should embrace new
Western alternatives. As part of this trend, Korean women began to be in contact
with Western feminism and were inspired by its strong impact on their lives and
thoughts. I too became quite influenced by Western feminism, especially after I
came to the USA in the s. That influence occurred mostly through my theolo-
gical education and my counseling training. Through this education and training, I
have become a pastoral theologian and psychotherapist who has worked for
Korean/Korean–American women, as well as many other Asian racial/ethnic
groups in the USA. I have had various opportunities to lead counseling seminars
and workshops in church settings, seminaries, and local communities, and to
counsel individuals as well, and my paper draws on this experience.
After more than twenty years of being in a helping profession, with both successes
and failures under my belt, I have realized how deeply Korean and Korean–
American women are committed to Confucian values, whether consciously or
unconsciously. It turns out that religious affiliations do not matter to them nearly
as much as Confucian values, which are deeply and equally inscribed in the lives
of Buddhists and Christians. Confucianism is no longer regarded as a religion
(though there has been an effort recently to recover its religious aspect), but rather
as a culture or philosophy that has existed for over a thousand years in Korea and
some other Asian countries. To this day, Confucianism remains the most pervasive
and undeniable part of my clients’ culture and community. Indeed, one could say
that the Confucian way of living has even become a part of many Koreans’ and
Korean–Americans’ collective unconscious.
Confucianism is generally regarded as incompatible with feminism, especially the
type of feminism founded on the Western liberal approach to individual freedom
and rights. Many feminists criticize Confucian society as patriarchal, oppressive,
and authoritarian, and thus as intrinsically opposed to women’s well-being and hap-
piness. This feminist criticism raises a crucial question for Korean/Korean–
American women: Do they need to be de-Confucianized to engage seriously with
feminist concerns about women’s well-being?
My experience of working with many Korean/Korean–American women has
taught me that their reactions to feminism are typically ambivalent and uncertain.
In other words, I encounter both passion and resistance toward feminist talk as
defined above, and often experience that such ambivalent attitudes hamper the dis-
cussion of women’s well-being in general. Though many women with whom I have
worked are, to my surprise, very insightful and articulate in criticizing the Confucian
patriarchal system, I experience the same group of women often becoming reserved
and disengaged, typically manifested as “polite” but subtle silence, when they
 I. LEE

encounter the word “feminism,” all the more so when it obviously refers to the
liberal Western model of individual freedom and rights.
At first, such seemingly incongruent reactions were puzzling to me. Yet as I gained
more experience working with these women, I realized that many Asian and
especially Korean/Korean–American women are still loyal to the core values of
Confucian teaching, such as the importance of family over their individual rights,
dedication to and sacrifice for children, respect for elderly people, self-discipline,
and most of all the relational ethics of harmony. For them, the Confucian rather
than the Western liberal personality has persisted as their ideal, but not without
some ambivalence.
Aware of Korean/Korean–American women’s continued devotion to
Confucianism, I began to study Confucian traditions more thoroughly. To my sur-
prise, I learned that my knowledge of Confucianism was very superficial. In fact, I
had not been taught the deep philosophical or religious meanings of
Confucianism in any systematic way as part of the formal education that I received
during the most radical period of modernization in Korea. Instead, our school cur-
riculum was full of Western philosophers and thinkers. We learned Western tra-
ditions in a quite systematic way, from Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, to various
contemporary thinkers such as John Locke, Kant, and Hegel. In other words, I, in
reality, had continued living out Confucian values, but had done so without a
proper understanding of such values amidst the torrent of aggressive modernization.
This disparity is a costly result of modernization over the past century, and I
believe has generated uncertain attitudes in many Korean people both toward
Confucian traditions and Western modernization. As a consequence, many
Korean people may have continued practicing Confucian values in their daily lives
but, to some extent, have devalued part of them as an outmoded, irrelevant way
of thinking and living. In the same vein, they have welcomed Western values as a
new alternative, but at the same time resisted them as incompatible with their fam-
iliar, traditional ways of living and thinking. While it is often unconscious, this
ambivalent and uncertain attitude could be the source of the same odd combination
of acknowledgment and disavowal that I have experienced in the contexts in which I
have worked with Korean/Korean–American and other Asian women.
Another surprise was to find that my own knowledge of Confucianism had relied
heavily upon Western analyses and interpretations given the prevailing ethos of
modernization. When I was growing up, both Korean and Chinese Confucian clas-
sics were written in ancient languages which were no longer accessible to common
people. As a consequence, most of my understanding of Confucianism was from
secondary sources. To make matters worse, as a Korean–American, I read the sec-
ondary literature mostly in English and in the North American context. Considering
that language and cultural context significantly affect the way we perceive and
understand reality, it is no wonder that the Confucianism I learned was heavily
Eurocentric, a point I will discuss later in this paper.
To explore these complex cultural dynamics, I consider the historical background
of Confucianism with a focus on its relationship with the West background infor-
mation that is essential to understanding the role of Confucianism not only in
Korea, but also in China, the country in which Confucianism originated. But I
begin by exploring how such cultural dynamics may have affected Korean
women’s psychological health.
 A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF HARMONY 

CONFUCIAN CULTURE AND MODERNIZATION: IMPACT ON MENTAL WELL-BEING

In this section, I discuss how the aforementioned cultural dynamics may affect
Korean women’s psychological health. However, an in-depth exploration of how
to understand, categorize, and diagnose such complex psychological phenomena
awaits more detailed research. The current discussion will be limited in scope as it
simply raises awareness for the importance of this issue for Korean/Korean–
American women in the Confucian cultural context.
In the wake of modernization and the resulting globalized world, Korean women
encountered radically different approaches to women’s issues from their traditions
such as social roles, gender identities, political and economic equality, reproductive
freedom, etc. Yet Confucian values had been deeply inscribed in their minds: they
were living and embodying those values in almost every aspect of their lives, often
without even being aware of it. On the other hand, they felt the need and value of
modernization strongly, in the sense that Western values in general began to be con-
sidered a new ideal for social change.
It is little wonder that, finding themselves between these two different sets of
values, many Korean women possibly experience a culture clash, often articulated
as the difference between the East and the West. It is possible that those two see-
mingly incompatible sets of values exist side by side in Korean/Korean–American
women’s psyches. This phenomenon is similar to psychological oscillation or split-
ting: acknowledgment and disavowal coexist side by side, causing complex emotion-
al reactions, including ambivalence and inner conflict.
Freud (/) generally used the term “ambivalence” in the sense of “sim-
ultaneous existence of love and hate towards the same object” ( p. ). I would say
that this is what I have experienced with many groups of Korean/Korean–
American women. I was often impressed by their articulate and insightful critique
of the patriarchal Confucian society. But they became noticeably reserved and
subtly resistant when they were introduced to women’s individual freedoms and
rights, which are the core ideas of Western liberal feminist approaches. They
seemed to advocate more for traditional Confucian understandings about woman-
hood, such as self-sacrifice, humility, and harmony. Because their attitudes typically
change quite abruptly between these two responses, I have a mental image of these
woman vacillating between two worlds separated only by an invisible screen. By
taking just one step through the screen, the individual can enter a totally different
world. It seems to me that two different worlds exist without much interaction with
or integration into each other, and some, if not all, Korean/Korean–American
women live in these two worlds simultaneously. Some psychologists explain such
a phenomenon as a defense, and referred to it as splitting. According to the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM-) cri-
teria, splitting refers to “a pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relation-
ships characterized by alternating between extremes of idealization and
devaluation” ( p. ). Of course, not all Korean women necessarily or uniformly
experience this psychic phenomenon as a result of the conflict between
Confucianism and modernization. Instead, I am suggesting that this phenomenon,
among many, can add another insight to our understanding of Korean/Korean–
American women’s experience that is unique in a specific cultural context. A
 I. LEE

further discussion of who would belong to this psychological phenomenon is

another topic for further study.
Splitting of consciousness was first described by Pierre Janet, and his ideas were
extended by Freud. In fact, Freud () talked about three different types of split-
ting: the splitting of entire psychic groupings; the splitting of representation; and
finally the splitting of the ego. It is the last type of splitting the splitting of the ego
that I suggest could explain some of Korean/Korean–American women’s experience
of modernization in a Confucian context, and Confucian tradition in the context of
modernization. The theory of “ego-splitting” states that the ego takes up inconsist-
ent attitudes to a single thing or event. In such a case, the ego usually shows both
acknowledgment and disavowal simultaneously, and thus “[t]he two [inconsistent]
attitudes persist side by side” in the ego “without influencing each other” (Freud,
, pp. –). In other words, the ego’s disavowal is always supplemented
by an acknowledgment, and vice versa. Two contrary and independent attitudes
arise together and result in the situation of there being a splitting of the ego
(Freud, , p. ). Thus, splitting of the ego refers to contradictory ego states
in which reality is, on the one hand, acknowledged and, on the other hand, uncon-
sciously disavowed; or reality is consciously rejected but unconsciously
acknowledged.
I suspect that some Korean/Korean–American women whom I have met might be
experiencing attitudinal ego-splitting as a result of being in contact with two see-
mingly irreconcilable social demands: the thousand-year tradition of
Confucianism and the recent Western model of modernization. One of my clients,
for example, displayed this phenomenon when she spoke about two contrasting
thoughts and attitudes: “I don’t like feminism because it is a voice of those strong
women who want to become like men … we don’t need feminism.” At the same
time, she said, “I fearlessly fought against my oppressive Confucian father … I
observe worse cases happening in my church when the Bible is held hand in hand
with Confucianism. I am angry, angry against my inability to stand up to act.”
The client holds a desire not to be a “strong woman,” while harboring a contradic-
tory desire to be a strong woman; for example, like a feminist who fights and resists
gender discrimination. Two different cultural demands, with almost equal social and
psychological pressure, may create an ambivalent situation for my client. Whatever
she chooses, the outcome seems not totally satisfying. To avoid such irreconcilable
conflicts, she seems to develop a defense like ego-splitting, which Freud called a
“cleavage in the ego” (, p. ). Such ego-splitting put those individuals at
risk of mental degeneration.
The aim of an ego defense is to “protect the mind/self/ego from anxiety and
social sanctions and to provide a refuge from a situation with which one cannot cur-
rently cope” (Poddar, Sanyal, & Mukherjee, , para. ). Such a defense could
serve the complex needs of some Korean/Korean–American women very well in
dealing with “fear of rejection, intense conflict between ambivalent feelings of
loyalty and disloyalty, trust and distrust, group cohesion and separation … [and
need for] individuation” (Van Dyk & Nefale, , p. ). Such women should
experience some kind of integration of their contradictory needs. By integration, I
mean developing or recovering their sense of agency to clearly understand the
unique dynamic of the historical relationship between traditions and modernization
in general, and between the Confucian values and the Western liberal values of
 A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF HARMONY 

modernization in particular. This interest leads to the topic of the next section, in
which I will discuss the brief history of the encounter between Confucianism and
Western liberal feminism.
The purpose of such integrating work for Korean/Korean–American women is to
recover their sense of agency. American feminist Bednarowski () argues for a
positive use of women’s ambivalent experience of their traditions. In her article,
“Ambivalence as a New Religious Virtue: The Creativity of Women’s
Contradictory Experiences of Their Traditions,” she claims that women experience
themselves as both “insiders and outsiders” in their communities, developing
ambivalent feelings toward their traditions ( p. ). Women, Bednarowski continues,
can transform such a potentially harmful experience of ambivalence to become a
creative resource for feminist consciousness. This transformation, she argues,
comes along with the birth of a sense of agency in women. She calls the transform-
ation “a creative ambivalence” or “a piety of ambivalence” ( p. ). I would argue
that, by recovering a sense of agency, Confucian women can transform their poten-
tially harmful, “ambivalent” experience into “a creative ambivalence” that can con-
tribute to developing a unique Confucian feminism relevant to their own
experiences.
If we leave Freud’s ego-splitting unattended, we run the risk of pathological out-
comes. My aim for this paper is to illustrate that the deliberate transformation of this
space toward creative ambivalence will allow us to make room for new non-patho-
logical outcomes, the result being a positive Confucian feminism.
In the following section, I survey Confucian scholars, both Korean and Chinese,
who have explored the possibility of Confucian feminism. This precedes my explora-
tion of the historical influence of Western modernization on Confucian ideology.

CONFUCIAN FEMINISM

Confucianism and feminism have engaged with each other for over a hundred years.
However, the relationship has largely been a “one-sided affair” (Woo ) rather
than a “balanced one” (Li, , p. ): “feminists criticizing the status and treat-
ment of women determined by Confucianism” (Woo , p. ). Those research-
ers who focus on women’s oppression take great pains to expose how traditional
Confucian society victimized and marginalized women, and after a long-time one-
sided affair, Li () states, Confucianism has finally started to “talk back” to
its feminist critics ( p. ).
Both feminist Terry Woo and Confucian philosopher Cheyang Li do not deny that
Confucianism has elements of women’s oppression embedded in its patriarchal
system. The problem with these types of research studies, however, is that
women are constructed mostly as a homogenous, powerless group, and such a hom-
ogenous construction “robs non-Western women of their political and historical
agency and thus refers to them as objects” (Yin, , p. ). African–American
feminist bell hooks () and Indian feminist Mohanty () encourage non-
Western women to resist the Eurocentric standard that is based on liberal individu-
alism in its definition of womanhood. Korean Confucian feminism is a response to
this call to approaching feminism within the context of Korean women’s experience.
 I. LEE

Some Confucian scholars (Li ; Nylan ; Woo ) contend that, even
though there are elements of women’s oppression in Confucianism, that is not all
there is to Confucianism. There is much more in Confucian traditions, and it is non-
sense to discard all of Confucianism to resist those oppressive elements. In this vein,
some scholars attempt to separate the earlier classical Confucian teaching, such as
those of Confucius and Mencius, from the ramifications of later generations. For
example, Woo () argues that Confucian gender hierarchies began to clearly
emerge when the synthesis of yin–yang cosmically justified the subordinate status
of women as yin in contrast to men as yang in the Han dynasty ( BCE–
CE). Feminist Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee () resists this yin–yang theory of the
Han dynasty and argues for the non-gendered reciprocity and complementarity of
yin–yang ( pp. –).
Confucian historian Tu () is another scholar who differentiates the classical
teaching and the later interpretations. He differentiates between the Five
Relationships and the Three Bonds, which are the two core ideals of Confucian
relationships. Mencius (fourth century BCE) was one of the founders of
Confucianism who taught the Five Relationships, while the Three Bonds emerged
almost four centuries after him. According to Tu, the idea of the later Three
Bonds was derived from the spirit of Mencius’ Five Relations, but Mencius’ idea
of the distinction between the husband and wife is based on the principle of mutual-
ity ( p. ), whereas the husband–wife relationship in the later Three Bonds is hier-
archical ( p. ). Chinese feminist Nylan () also supports this idea. She argues
that the gender stereotypes of China do not come from ancient historiographers, but
rather from relatively recent sources, namely the neo-Confucians and the May
Fourth reformers.
Yin () is another Confucian scholar who tries to find a resource for feminism
in Confucian traditions. She has found this possibility in the principle of Confucian
“ren,” which refers to “[being] or becom[ing] humans” ( p. ). According to Yin, a
Confucian person from birth stands in a network of relations that is guided by the
principle of ren, and this principle values moral mutuality above all else. However,
the virtue of ren is not an innate trait, but the outcome of self-cultivation (Chang,
, as cited in Yin, , p. ). In ancient Confucian society, however, only
men were included in the project of achieving ideal humanness through rigorous
education (Nyitray , p. ). Women were culturally excluded from the
social and educational process of self-cultivation. Therefore, what prevents
women from engaging in the Confucian project of becoming an ideal human is
the cultural bias and custom, not the Confucian principles themselves. Those scho-
lars who argue for this kind of interpretation contend that Confucian principles can
be now extended to contemporary women without seriously compromising
Confucian core values and principles. For example, Yin () insists that the prin-
ciple of ren and self-cultivation together be used to develop “feminist consciousness”
and a sense of “agency” ( p. ) for contemporary women in the Confucian context.
She suggests that such a Confucian feminist consciousness can contribute to explor-
ing “alternative forms of feminisms” ( p. ) that counteract the pitfalls of Western
liberal feminism, such as the impact of uncritical individualism and rights-based
ethics.
Korean feminist Un-sunn Lee () goes further in her advocacy for Confucian
ren and self-cultivation as the resources of constructing Confucian feminism. She
 A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF HARMONY 

argues that Confucian self-cultivation is not “just a secular process of civilization but
also a spiritual, sanctifying process of sagehood” ( p. ). In other words, self-cultiva-
tion is not merely about personal growth or moral perfection. It is a way to overcome
narrow self-interests to transform oneself for others. With this claim, Lee elevates the
Confucian project of ren and self-cultivation to the level of religiosity. Tu (, as
cited in Yin, ) also defines self-cultivation as “a process of transforming the
private ego to the all-encompassing self which has the ability to feel the suffering
of others” ( p. ). Learning to be “a humane person” is to engage in a “transform-
ing process,” to be “sensitive to an ever-expanding network of relationships”
( p. ). Confucian feminism thus can easily include spirituality in its project of
reconstruction.
I have discussed some of the Confucian feminists’ responses to Western liberal
feminism. As demonstrated, those efforts of newly engaging Confucianism and fem-
inism with each other have begun to “balance” the previously one-sided criticism,
namely a Western liberal feminist criticism of Confucian oppression of women.
However, this new project requires much rigorous, creative work of reconstructing
Confucian traditions in accordance with contemporary feminist needs and concerns.
With this interest, I now turn to the historical development of Western moderniz-
ation and its impact on Confucian society.

HISTORICAL INFLUENCE OF MODERNIZATION ON CONFUCIAN IDEOLOGY

According to historians, before the nineteenth-century European Industrial

Revolution and the Columbus’s “discovery” of America in , the world was
basically composed of three dominant civilizations: the Islamic civilization in the
Middle East, the Confucian civilization in the Far East, and the Christian civilization
in Europe (Choi, , p. ). The Islamic civilization, especially from the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries on, had developed a superior culture to any
other area (Choi, , p. ). The Chinese civilization in the Far East,
however, is considered to be the oldest in the world. Both the Islamic civilization
and the Confucian civilization in the thirteenth century had blossomed and become
much more advanced than that of Europe, which was in the process of forming the
crusades (Choi, , p. ). Then, the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth
century and the development of capitalism and modern democracy in Europe
created “the violent market” (Choi, , p. ) of early European capitalism,
and it attempted to keep and extend its dominant position in the world via the con-
struction of colonies. The center of the world had moved to Europe, and the
immense influence of this modernization followed.
The Western model of so-called modernization refers to a model of progressive
change from a traditional to a modern society and is often identified with the
change from agrarian societies to urbanized, industrial ones. In this process,
people see traditions as obstacles to economic growth. The roots of modernization
are found in the historical contexts of the Industrial Revolution, the French
Revolution, and the Revolutions of . As a result, some theorists use the
terms “democratization,” “liberalization,” “development,” and “modernization”
interchangeably. Modernization was long considered to have attained its most
 I. LEE

advanced form in Europe, and that is why modernization is frequently identified

with Westernization. In this model, the modernization of a society requires that
the traditional culture be replaced not simply by a more modern one, but by a
more Westernized one, and modernization theory in this sense is criticized as
being Eurocentric. Likewise, a Westernized view of Eastern cultures and religions
left its mark on Confucianism.

CONFUCIANISM IN KOREA

Confucianism was received in Korea at about the same time as Buddhism in the
fourth century CE during the period of the Three Kingdoms ( BCE– CE),
with Koguryo, Baekje, and Silla being the three kingdoms. Koguryo in the
north was the first kingdom that adopted Buddhism, but at the same time built
a Confucian university. The other two kingdoms followed this pattern of embra-
cing both Buddhism and Confucianism. In  CE, Silla unified the three king-
doms and adopted Buddhism as a national religion. However, Buddhist,
Confucian, and Taoist scholars were open to each other and not concerned
with orthodoxy.
The Koryo Dynasty (– CE) followed the Unified Silla. The new kingdom
likewise encouraged the teachings of both Buddhism and Confucianism. At the end
of the kingdom, however, intellectuals began to criticize Buddhism as the main
source of social corruption that was undermining the power of the Koryo
Dynasty. This accusation came from the belief that Buddhism was transcendent
and otherworldly, given its individualistic approach to salvation. Intellectuals
regarded Confucianism as this-worldly, given its emphasis on practical guidelines
for how to live together as ethical communities.
Finally in , the Koryo Dynasty fell and the Choson Dynasty was established.
The founder of the new kingdom proclaimed Confucianism as the official state reli-
gion that would henceforth undergird social, cultural, and political reform.
Confucianism was the strongest influence on Korean society for more than five
hundred years until the establishment of the Republic of Korea in .
Considering the entire history since the initial introduction of Confucianism in the
fourth century CE, it can be said that Confucianism has guided Korean people’s
lives for about two thousand years.
After , however, the newly established Republic of Korea underwent aggres-
sive modernization by importing Western culture, capitalism, and democracy. In this
process, Confucianism was accused of being pre-modern and irrelevant and thus a
major obstacle that Korean people had to overcome. The relevance and teachings
of Confucianism began to contort itself to affirm the Western perspective in the
eyes of the populace. This trend continued throughout the twentieth century.
Only recently have many people begun to voice a desire to reclaim their rich tra-
ditions as an alternative to Western influence, which people associate with the
breakup of family and community, an unaccustomed lack of moral sensitivity, dee-
pened conflict between the rich and the poor, etc. In particular, people have begun to
cite the Confucian value of harmony as being crucial in a world in which violence,
extreme individualism, and planetary crisis are so prevalent.
 A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF HARMONY 

CONFUCIANISM IN CHINA

Confucianism began in China. Its history can be divided into three pivotal periods.
The first was the classical period, beginning with the founder, Kongzi or Confucius.
Kongzi lived in socially and politically turbulent times and tried to find the Way to
live in harmony. This classical period lasted for about three hundred years until the
Qin Dynasty unified the divided kingdoms ( BCE). The unified kingdom,
however, lasted for only fifteen years. The Qin Emperor, a ruthless tyrant, perse-
cuted Confucians and Confucianism, burned Confucian books, and killed
Confucian scholars out of fear of its critics. After the fall of the Qin Dynasty,
Confucianism revived temporarily, then lay dormant again for the next four
hundred years. It began to revive significantly again in the Tang Dynasty (–
 CE), and its social and political impact lasted for the next  years. In the
next Song Dynasty (– CE), Confucianism was reformed by Zhu Xi
(– CE) and called neo-Confucianism. Zhu Xi established a systematic
Confucian worldview by incorporating the metaphysics of the Buddhist and
Taoist approaches to cosmology. This is the neo-Confucianism that the Choson
Dynasty in Korea adopted as its official state religion in .
When the last Quing Dynasty fell, the Republic of China (–) was
formed. The May Fourth Movement in  followed, mainly for political
reasons. However, it was also a cultural revolution in the sense that young
Chinese people at that time had already been inspired in the preceding two
decades by Western thought, science, and democracy, and this new influence
made them frustrated and dissatisfied with Chinese traditions. Confucianism and
its clan system and traditional morality were viewed as the main causes of their dis-
satisfaction. In , the Communist Party formed the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) that endures to the present.
The communist government attempted to rid China of “old elements,” and so
began the Cultural Revolution in . The young people of China rose up again
in an effort to purge the nation of what were known as the “Four Olds”: old
customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas. Confucian traditions were the
most targeted in this revolution, which eventually led to the modernization of
China. As a result, Confucianism was exiled from the mainland to Hong Kong,
Taiwan, and into the Chinese diaspora (Berthrong, , p. ) until recently.
Since the s and s, however, a new cultural reconstruction has been hap-
pening with the revival of old Confucianism. This movement is called “New
Confucianism” in contrast to the neo-Confucianism of the twelfth century. As
early as the s in academic circles, the movement of New Confucianism began
as “a grand attempt at … philosophical restoration and revision” (Berthrong,
, p. ). Chinese scholars began to search their own traditions for alternatives
to Western ideas about politics and social ideologies and structures. In their search,
they did not consider Buddhism and Taoism to be good candidates for reviving tra-
ditions because of their rather metaphysical and transcendental approaches to the
world. Instead, Chinese scholars recognized possibilities in Confucianism with its
practical, ethical, and this-worldly approach to reality.
I have shown how Confucianism was exiled from the histories of both Korea and
China over the past century. The influence of radical Western modernization played
 I. LEE

a major role in this phenomenon. Now, I will turn to exploring some of the Western
understanding of Confucian ideology.

WESTERN INTERPRETATIONS OF CONFUCIANISM

Matteo Ricci, a sixteenth-century Italian Jesuit missionary to China, was one of the
first Western scholars to introduce Confucianism to the West. In his encounter
with Chinese religious traditions in his missionary work, he criticized Buddhism
and Taoism, but highly appreciated Confucianism. In fact, he considered
Confucianism to be a kind of philosophy rather than a religion and declared that
Confucian philosophy transcended Western philosophy that was based on Greek,
Roman, and Egyptian ideas. In particular, he was impressed by how
Confucianism spoke of human nature and heavenly principles. In comparing
Confucianism to Catholicism, he considered the aim of Confucianism to be the
pursuit of “inner transcendence,” and that of Catholicism the pursuit of “outer
transcendence” (Tang , p. ).
Inner transcendence refers to cultivating inner virtues, and outer transcendence to
external intervention. Ricci believed that one cannot attain transcendence simply
through cultivating one’s inner moral life; one must be pushed by an external trans-
cendent power, which for him meant God. Thus, Ricci considered the doctrines of
Catholicism to be more perfect than those of Confucianism, though he also
praised Confucian teaching highly.
German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (–) was another
scholar who developed an interest in Chinese culture (Mungello, , p. ). He
read several books written about China, including Confucius Sinarum
Philosophies, an article published in . It represents a Jesuit attempt to translate
excerpts from the Chinese Confucian classics, such as the Great Learning, the doc-
trine of the Middle Way, and the Analects. Hughes () postulated the direct
influence of these books upon Leibniz’s thought. As evidence, he showed that
some of Leibniz’s theories closely resembled some of those in Confucius Sinarum
Philosophies (Mungello, , p. ).
In , Leibniz wrote the preface to the first edition of Novissima Sinica (The
Latest News from China), which was his only public statement on China
(Mungello, , p. ). Yet he was involved in the extensive discussion of neo-
Confucianism through personal letters and correspondence. He discovered that
his theory of a binary system of progression was confirmed by that of the Chinese
hexagrams explained in the book I Ching (Mungello, , p. ), the oldest of
the Chinese classics. It depicts the universe as a progression of contradictory duali-
ties, a series of yin–yang, such as dark–light and male–female. Apparently, Leibniz
was pleased to find parallels between the West and the East that qualified his own
research efforts.
It was German sociologist Max Weber (–) in particular who inter-
preted Confucianism rather negatively and set in motion the misinterpreted notion
regarding Confucian harmony. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism, he argued that the Puritan ethic of hard work, self-discipline, and
responsibility contributed to the emergence of modern capitalism. This Puritan
 A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF HARMONY 

ethic, Weber explains, comes from the sense of duty to direct worldly affairs accord-
ing to God’s will, through challenging and transforming the existing world. Weber
claimed that such a Puritan ethic has helped precipitate the modernizing process. In
contrast, he argued, Confucianism in China has played a negative role in the process
of modernization. He argued that the main reason for this was the Confucian way
of “keep[ing] harmony between this world and the world beyond, not to dramatize
the rupture between them” (Schluchter, , p. ). For Weber, Confucianism thus
lacks the potential to change the existing world because of its fundamental emphasis
on the ideal of harmony. Rather, he understood Confucianism as a “rationalism of
adjustment to the world” in contrast to the “Puritan rationalism” of “world dom-
ination” (Schluchter, , p. ).
In short, Weber correctly understood that harmony is one of the core values of
Confucianism, but he erroneously interpreted Confucian harmony to be a static
obstacle to transforming society. Weber looked at harmony as a motionless agent
of constant concession, something that is solely reactionary. His argument rings
true when we take into account such Korean women’s declarations as, “For the
sake of the harmony of our family (or of our church or of our community), I say
nothing. I remain silent.” This is exactly what Weber is worried about when adjust-
ment, rather than transformation, is a major concern. For Weber, Confucian
harmony does not have a dynamic core; it does not challenge or confront the
world. Weber’s interpretation of Confucian harmony is misleading. Confucian
harmony rests in the assessment of opposing forces in one continuous reality that
is neither good nor bad. One neither wins nor loses; harmony is more like a
dance between forces rather than a zero-sum game. Yet, to achieve balance in
harmony requires one to oppose negative societal elements so that a homeostasis
of resting energy occurs. Harmony is neither passive nor compliant. Because this
resting border of harmony is so tenuous in human nature, one must always be on
the frontline of change rather than in the mute background of constant acceptance.

THE NOTION OF HARMONY IN THE WEST AND THE EAST

European philosopher Gawlikowski () discusses the differences between the

Korean and Western approaches to harmony. He reminds us that both West
and East have long traditions of valuing harmony. Gawlikowski argues that the
idea of “achieving a perfect order through conflict and struggle constitutes an
age-old paradigm of Western thought” ( p. ). To achieve harmony in the West,
one must fight for it by conquering an enemy. Furthermore, he argues, it is this
very theory of conflict and struggle that has been incorporated into the notion of
the contemporary free market and capitalism ( p. ). A democratic order is based
on such conflict and struggle from which social harmony emerges. The oxymoron
“struggle for peace” has become a popular motto, as have the notions of the
“struggle against the nature,” “struggle of generations,” “struggle for human
rights,” and the “appreciation of heroic deeds” ( p. ). Yet, Gawlikowski discusses
the notion of harmony in a Confucian culture in an entirely different way.
According to Gawlikowski, Confucian governance is based on virtues (and thus
the king is thought of as a sage) rather than on the model of the struggle and conflict
 I. LEE

of a hero. Although there were certainly moments of historical Confucian conflict

similar to the conquests and struggles present in the West, he conceptualizes
Eastern harmony as a virtuous force. Gawlikowski notes that it was Confucian lit-
erati with “brushes,” not warriors with swords and weapons, who governed the
Choson Dynasty in Korea. Recourse to arms both in domestic and international
affairs was generally considered a political failure (Gawlikowski, , p. ) or
an inferior way of solving a problem. Now I turn to the Greek ideas of harmony,
which have influenced the Western understanding of harmony, with a focus on
the similarities to and differences from Confucian harmony.

GREEK IDEAS OF HARMONY

Pythagoras (– BCE) saw music as the epitome of harmony. He believed that
the world is created in perfect mathematical order, which also can be realized in a
musical scale (Li, , p. ). Harmony for him, therefore, refers to “the attune-
ment of numerical ratios” of the preexisting order of the cosmos as seen in music.
We can call it “conformist harmony” (Li, , p. ) in the sense that harmony
is seen as complying with a preestablished, given mathematical order embedded in
the world. In addition, Pythagoreans’ understanding of harmony relies upon a
linear model of sounds in numerical order, not what we call harmonious chords
(Li, , p. ). This notion of harmony is radically different from Confucian
harmony, which has no fixed formula and is not so sequentially or linearly struc-
tured (Li, , p. ). I will discuss this difference in detail in the section entitled
“Confucian harmony.”
Heraclitus (– BCE) understood harmony differently from Pythagoras.
Similar to the Confucian harmony, his notion of harmony does not presuppose a
given, fixed underlying order in the world. Instead, the order is considered to
result from a continuously harmonizing process (Li, , p. ). In spite of this
similarity between Confucians and Heraclitus, there is a significant difference
between them. Heraclitus understood harmony as the “harmony of opposites and
tension.” For him, everything is made up of opposites, and harmony can be achieved
by neutralizing those opposing forces and maintaining equilibrium in a balance
between them (Li, , p. ). Confucians view the different forces not as opposing
each other, but as existing in one continuous reality in such a way as to enhance the
qualities of each other and thus to be complementary. This aspect of Confucian
harmony will be discussed more later in this paper.
Aristotle, one of the most influential Western philosophers, followed Heraclitus’
idea of achieving harmony through neutralizing opposing forces into a state of equi-
librium. He said, “The oppositions … merge and from the divergences emerges the
most beautiful harmony; all things come into being through strife” (as quoted in
Nahm, , pp. –; Gawlikowski, , p. ). For both Heraclitus and
Aristotle, those opposites are in permanent tension and struggle. Confucians, par-
ticularly neo-Confucians, understand the cosmos as being composed of the forces
of yin and yang. However, they understand these two different forces not as an
oppositional binary, but as complementing each other. Rather than the concepts
of opposition or tension, the ideas of reciprocity and complementarity prevail in
 A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF HARMONY 

the Confucian notion of harmony. Based on this basic difference, Gawlikowski

defines the Western civilization as a “civilization of struggle,” and the Confucian
civilization as having “appreciation of harmony” in general (, p. ).


CONFUCIAN HARMONY

Similar to some Greek thinkers, Confucians find the prototype of harmony (hwa in
Korean) in music. For example, the text of the “Zhongfu” hexagram in the Yijin
states, “A crane sings in the woods and its young respond (hwa) to it” (quoted in
Li, , p. ). The word hwa in this text is a verb rather than a noun, implying
that hwa is a harmonizing, ongoing process and is not a fixed, predetermined entity.
The key point here is “responsiveness” (Li, , p. ). In other words, hwa or
harmonizing describes how various sounds respond to one another. For instance,
Confucian scholars used to practice the custom of harmonizing (hwa) by composing
a poem in response (dab) to another poem by someone else. In this way, Confucian
scholars hwa-dab (respond in harmony, or harmonize in response) with each other’s
poems, meaning they show mutual responsiveness through harmony.
Mere mutual responsiveness, however, is not yet harmony. One more element
must be added. The Confucian text The Middle Way states, “Male and female phoe-
nixes fly together and their sounds harmonize with vigor” (as quoted in Li, ,
p. ). When sounds respond to and mutually bo one another, it is called hwa.
Bo has many interrelated meanings such as “protect,” “nurture,” “rely on,” “stabil-
ize,” and “assure” (Li, , p. ). In other words, hwa or harmonizing means
that various sounds respond to one another in a mutually promoting, complemen-
tary, and stabilizing way.
Thus, Confucian harmonizing presupposes the existence of “different” things, but
does not see the difference as necessarily being antagonistic or oppositional. Rather,
Confucians see the difference as existing in one continuous reality, only embodied in
our differentiating faculties of cognition and language. This notion of harmony,
however, is different from conformity or adjustment to sameness, as Max Weber
misinterpreted Confucianism. I noted earlier how Korean/Korean–American
women tend to buy into this misinterpretation when they say, “I remain silent for
the sake of harmony.” Though they do not realize it, this kind of adjustment to
the status quo actually contradicts the Confucian teaching of harmony because
Confucian texts clearly differentiate between harmony (hwa) and sameness (tong).
They say, for example, that “A sage harmonizes but does not seek sameness; a
petty person seeks sameness but does not harmonize” (Analects .).
One of my clients, an ordained minister Minee, said that she often observed many
“bad” cases of gender discrimination happening in her church where male elders
and deacons treated women, even ordained women ministers, as those who were
in an inferior position to them. In a decision-making process in a certain committee,
for example, those women ministers’ voices were often suppressed and put down. As
this tendency has been a pattern in this church, many women often became extre-
mely uncomfortable and tried to “hush” Minee when she stood up to give her
own opinions or raised a question regarding male elders’ suggestions. Without
any support from other members in the committee, she often felt “alone” in this
 I. LEE

“battle.” Minee, however, kept doing this because she had to preserve her integrity
and be true to her inner voice. Her intention was to work for the benefit of the
church. In other words, she refused to become a Confucian “petty person” who
would blindly follow the sameness of others in making important decisions for
the church. There was a constant pressure from other members for Minee to be
like them. Using Confucian terms, Minee tried to “harmonize” with the church,
or the committee, by adding different voices and refusing to conform to sameness
when that sameness would work against the interests of the church. Her way of har-
monizing was not to remain silent, as many others might think to do, but to raise her
voice in order to break the pattern of conformity to sameness.
For Confucians, conformity to sameness or uniformity means “disharmonizing.”
Rather than conforming, they seek to change the disequilibrium caused by the dis-
harmony of sameness. A sage king seeks harmony by choosing ministers who can
“harmonize” by remonstrating with the king when the king is doing wrong. True
friends “harmonize” by correcting their friends’ wrongdoings rather than being
complacent. Thus, the Confucian ideal of harmony is “harmony without mindlessly
following others” (Li, , p. ).
In this sense, the dynamic of Confucian harmony can be a rich source of social
transformation and justice, without resorting to the Western concepts of the
binary, oppositional strife and conflict. Korean/Korean–American women can
claim both their Confucian traditions and feminist positions, free from ambivalent
feelings toward both. Confucianism and feminism can be complementary. In
other words, from the perspective of Confucian concern for harmony, Confucian
women can be strong feminists who address women’s issues and effectively “critique
the disadvantaged status of women” (Woo , p. ) in order to disturb the
status quo and to recover the harmonious dynamic in society. Confucian
harmony is not a one-directional “adjustment” to a preexisting cosmic order, as
Max Weber understood it.
Another important feature of Confucian harmony is that it is a process and is con-
textual (Li, , p. ). That is why Confucians often call it “harmonizing” as a
verb, rather than “harmony” as a noun. One of the cardinal principles of Confucian
harmony is producing and reproducing without ceasing (생생불식 in Korean).
Without the principle of constant reproduction and change, Confucians believe,
the mind would be dead. Different from the Pythagorean numeric model, the
Confucian notion of harmony does not admit in a linear sequential pattern of a
fixed formula, but is open-ended and continuously self-renewing in the dynamic
of creating, reproducing, and therefore harmonizing (Li, a, p. ).
In the harmonizing process, however, the Confucian concept of “timing” (시중 in
Korean) is crucial. According to the Confucian classic The Middle Way, the Middle
Way does not refer to a middle position or indecisiveness. Rather, the Middle Way
refers to the undifferentiated or unmoving state of emotions and thoughts in equili-
brium (Zhung or the Middle). When this Middle state is “aroused” (bal) in whatever
way fits the occasion, it is called harmony (Kim, , p. ). The Confucian text
says, “The great person (or sage) keeps the Middle Way but the petty person acts
against the Middle Way. The great person practices the Middle Way according to
appropriate timing whereas the petty person practices the Middle Way without a
sense of timing or prudence” (The Middle Way : –).
 A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF HARMONY 

Thus, Confucian harmony is contextual and situational and is embodied by

human agency in accordance with each particular situation: how, what, where,
and when something is occurring. For example, a person expresses his or her
anger, but the same angry behavior can be the sign of harmonizing or of de-harmo-
nizing depending upon the situational context and timing of the event. If my client
Minee responds to an event with an angry expression or behavior that is in accord
with the appropriate level of situational response, the anger can be an act of
harmony. If the same anger is disproportionate to the situation and time, it is the be-
havior of an unaware person who does not follow the wisdom and prudence to
discern the appropriate situational response. The Middle Way occurs when both
timing and situation are just right, and we call such a process harmonizing.
Still another distinct characteristic of Confucian harmony is that Confucian
harmony is about harmony among various virtues. For Confucians, it is not just
the practice of the virtues themselves, but the practice of the virtues in harmony
that results in the highest virtue (Li, a, p. ). In Analects :, Confucius
says, “Virtue is never solitary: it always has neighbors” (as quoted in Slingerland,
, p. ). According to Confucianism, the five cardinal virtues are humanity,
righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and integrity. The harmony among these
virtues is more important than each individual virtue. Benevolence, for example,
when practiced against righteousness or wisdom, is no virtue at all (Kim, ,
p. ). Such benevolence can do more harm than good to people, interrupts the
harmony, and therefore is not considered a virtue. Applying this principle to my
client Minee, we can say that if she bursts into anger from her sense of justice and
righteousness during a committee meeting, but without harmony with wisdom
and propriety, she will end up being a “petty person” rather than a virtuous
person. She fails in practicing Confucian harmony. In summary, Confucian
harmony, with no pre–given order, is generated by human agency through a harmo-
nizing process. This notion of harmony is contextual and situational and is practiced
in an orchestrated harmony among various virtues.
Confucian harmony has no pre-established order. Instead, order is generated by
human agency through a harmonizing process, making the notion of harmony con-
textual and situational.

CONCLUSION

I began this paper with the question, “Should we de-Confucianize Korean women in
order to engage them in genuine feminist dialogue?” I answer that we do not need to
de-Confucianize Korean women. Rather, to engage these women in a feminist dia-
logue so that they may actualize their social and personal power in a way that
honors their desire to follow Confucianist principles, we need to reimagine and rein-
terpret its core principle of, for example, harmony as a dynamic ideology that can
transcend arbitrary social barriers. Because harmony is rooted in context and
requires additional virtues, namely the wisdom to respond proportionately to an agi-
tation, it cannot be a static ideal. Harmony is not an adjustment to something for the
sake of ending a conflict. Harmony is generative creativity and an adjustment with,
not to, an idea or a behavior. If not, this supposes that all conflict has a
 I. LEE

predetermined order where the proper response is quiet acceptance. Obviously, this
can be extremely harmful to women by placing them in mental and physical danger
against an abusive other. Therefore, it is urgent that we create the space for Korean/
Korean–American women to merge feminist thought with their ingrained
Confucianist beliefs.
The women in my practice are experiencing ambivalence and disharmony at the
expense of remaining true to a largely westernized and predetermined interpretation
of Confucianism. They are practicing what they believe to be Confucian harmony
but, in effect, have become advocates of disharmony because they misunderstand
Confucian harmony and because they are not using other virtues such as wisdom,
righteousness, propriety, and integrity in accessing conflict. Importantly, offering
these women the insight that they must use timing and contextual understanding
to bring about harmony is critical for their journey toward greater individual
agency and healing. Using Confucian harmony not only keeps the intellect alive,
but reinserts women back into society as powerful individuals whose duty it is to
live in the Middle Way of dynamic response to the world around them.

NOTES
 There is a certain level of generational difference in embracing Confucian traditions and the impact of
modernization among Korean women. In fact, I have heard many people say and assume that young
people are more ‘liberated’ from the traditional – particularly Confucian – culture to be tilted toward
more ‘modernized’ styles of life, modes of thinking, and value systems. To my surprise, I repeatedly
found many young people, including the second generation who were born in the USA, are being sig-
nificantly affected by the traditional Korean values predominantly impacted by Confucianism.
 For detailed discussion on this topic, see Ryu and Servero ().
 There have been many feminist critics of Confucianism from both Korean and Western scholars. For
example, Korean feminist Namsoon Kang () criticizes Confucian patriarchy as incompatible with
the ideas of gender justice. Similarly, Guisso () is critical of the Confucian Five Classics for their
accepting stereotypes of women in a patriarchal society.
 The degree of Confucian influence on their personality formation differs among the first generation
(born in Korea and came to the USA as a grown-up), . generation (born in Korea and came to
the USA before adulthood), and second generation (born in the USA from Korean–American
parents). To my surprise, I have learned that even the second generation, often under their parents’
strong influence at home, tend to keep many Confucian values as their cultural heritage, though
with some degree of resistance in the course of their development.
 This trend has begun to change. Recently, many contemporary Confucian scholars have been trans-
lating the classics into popular, contemporary languages, as well as giving lectures on them in
schools and communities and through various media.
 I use the past tense ‘was’ because there are currently many efforts to correct this situation by actively
translating many Confucian classics into modern languages and thus making them accessible to
common people. This trend is a recent reaction to the prevalent Western modernization that has con-
tinued in the last century.
 See Bokanowsk and Lewkowicz (). Splitting is regarded as pathological because split-off material
is dissociated from the formations of the mind and, as a result, the energy in them remains
undischarged and free to cause trouble.
 Freud only twice discussed the splitting of the ego by name, in ‘Splitting of the Ego in the Process of
Defense’ (early in ) and in the ‘Outline of Psychoanalysis’ (in mid-).
 Van Dyk and Nefale (), professors in South Africa, explored the defense mechanisms of split-ego
students in a psychotherapy training program in Africa. They studied the students’ split-ego experi-
ences through the cultural clash between the traditional, communal approach and the Western, indi-
vidualistic approach to problem-solving. This case shows that split-ego experiences accompany a full
range of emotional reactions.
 For example, Dong Zhong-shu (– BCE), the Han Confucian master, maintained that between
the two principles that govern the universe, the yang and yin, yang is superior and yin is inferior. Zhu
Xi (– CE), the prominent neo-Confucian, advocated the ‘Three Bonds,’ which assert the
ruler’s authority over the minister, the father over the son, and the husband over the wife. Thus,
 A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF HARMONY 

the degrading attitude toward women became extreme during the period of Song-Ming neo-
Confucianism (Li , ).
 Western liberal individualism emphasizes the rights and freedom of the autonomous individual and
has developed rights-based ethics.
 Neo-Confucianism is a form of Confucianism that was primarily developed during the Song Dynasty
(– CE). The May Fourth Movement is the intellectual revolution and sociopolitical reform
movement that occurred in China between  and .
 Choi () criticizes French historian Fernand Braudel and American sociologist Immanuel
Wallerstein and argues that European history before the nineteenth century was just one of various
centers in the world. According to Choi, therefore, world history must be described by explaining
the impacts of both the Confucian civilization in East Asia and the Islamic civilization in the
Middle East on the Christian civilization in Europe. After the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth
century, however, European imperialists attempted to present European history as the centre of world
history, but did so in misleading ways.
 Modernization theory emerged in the s as an explanation for how the industrial societies of
North America and Western Europe developed. The theory argues that societies develop in fairly pre-
dictable and increasingly complex stages. Development depends primarily on the importation of tech-
nology as well as a number of other political and social changes believed to come about as a result of
such technology.
 See Tipps ().
 For detailed information about Korean religious history, see Grayson ().
 The reason for the Qin emperor’s persecution is that Confucian scholars remonstrated with rulers
when the rulers were not governing the country well.
 Confucianism lay dormant from the fall of the Han Dynasty ( BCE– CE) to the rise of the Tang
Dynasty (– CE).
 Confucians of the Song Dynasty (– CE) studied the classical works of their faith, but were
also familiar with Buddhist and Taoist teachings. Neo-Confucians incorporated Buddhist and
Taoist ideas. At that time, Confucianism was not systemized in its beliefs and teachings compared
to Buddhism and Taoism. Zhou Xi tackled this task and tried to establish the systematic understand-
ing of the neo-Confucian worldview. In this process, he tended to incorporate the metaphysics of the
Buddhist and Taoist approach to cosmology.
 Some Confucians say that Zhu Xi’s reform has weakened the practical aspect of Confucianism and
turned it into a metaphysical theory and thus caused it to lose its vital force to influence society.
The practicality of Confucianism is regarded as one of its major differences from Buddhist and
Taoist teachings.
 See Song () for Matteo Ricci’s work in China, and Tang (), Chapter , for Matteo Ricci’s
attempt to link Chinese and Western cultures.
 In The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven, Matteo Ricci points out this shortcoming of
Confucianism and criticizes it. See Ricci and Lancashire ().
 Among the books that he read were Spizel’s De Re Litteraria Sinensium Commentarius (Leiden,
), Fr. Athanasius Kircher’s China Monuments Illustrata (), and Andreas Miller’s Key to
Chinese ().
 The full Latin title of this work is Confucius Sinarum Philosophus, Sive, Scientia Sinensis Latine
Exposita (Confucius the Philosopher of China, or the Knowledge of China Translated into Latin).
In , the Parisian printer Daniel Horthemels produced the first edition of this significant work.
It was the first substantial translation of the Confucian canon into European languages – in this
case Latin, the common language of scholarship.
 Novissima Sinica consists of contributions almost exclusively from Jesuits in China. See Lach ().
 I Ching is the oldest of the Chinese classics with origins in the Western Zhou period (– BC). It
is a divination text also known as the Book of Changes in English. In East Asia, it is a foundational
text for the Confucian and Taoist philosophical traditions, which explain Chinese cosmology. This
text includes the explanation of the hexagrams that are used for divination. Leibniz found some
sort of confirmation for his theories in the I Ching’s depiction of the universe as a progression of con-
tradictory dualities, a series of yin–yang, such as dark–light and male–female.
 See Schlechter ().
 Even though he tends to stereotype in his discussion, some of his core ideas are worth our attention.
 See Burnet (, ).
 The Confucian notion of harmony is open-ended and continuously self-renewing (Li, ). Different
from Pythagorean harmony, it is closer to contemporary jazz, which is spontaneous and extempora-
neous. The Pythagorean notion of harmony is considered more structured and fixed.
 Harmony is the highest ideal in Zhongyong, one of the four cardinal Confucian texts, which include
Analects, Great Learning, The Middle Way (Zhongyong), and Mencius.
 군자 화이부동, 소인 동이불화 in Korean.
 I. LEE

 Plato similarly advocated for harmony among three cardinal virtues (i.e., wisdom, courage, and tem-
perance). Confucian harmony, however, is fundamentally different from Plato’s harmony in that the
latter is to conform to a firm, preset, rational order imposed onto the world from outside. In contrast,
Confucian harmony is ‘generative creativity’ without pre-given order. For more information, see Li
(a, ).
 This concern is expressed as 화이불류 in Korean.

REFERENCES
American Psychiatric Association. . Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. th ed.
Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing.
Bailey, P. . “Voltaire and Confucius: French Attitudes towards China in the Early Twentieth
Century.” History of European Ideas  (): –. doi:./-()-C.
Bednarowski, M. F. . The Religious Imagination of American Women. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press.
Berthrong, J. H. . “Confucian Formulas for Peace: Harmony.” Society  (): –. doi:.
/s---.
Blum, H. P. . “Splitting of the Ego and its Relation to Parent Loss.” In Defense and Resistance, edited
by H. P. Blum. New York: International Universities Press.
Bokanowsk, S., and T. Lewkowicz, eds. . On Freud’s “Splitting of the Ego in the Process of
Defense”. London: Karnac Books.
Brook, J. A. . Freud and Splitting. Presented to the Ottawa Psychoanalytic Society. http://http-
server.carleton.ca/~abrook/SPLTTING.htm.
Chang, P. W., and E. S. Kim. . Experiences and Feminist Practices in South Korea. Seoul: Ewha
Woman’s University Press.
Choi, Y. O. . “Reflection on Eurocentric Historical Consciousness.” Korean Studies : –.
(in Korean).
Dallmayr, F. . “Tradition, Modernity, and Confucianism.” Human Studies : –.
Dragon Reader, ed. . : The Old Man Lost His Horse.  Common Chinese Idioms: English-
Chinese-Pinyin. CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
Foust, M., and Sor-Hoon Tan, eds. . Feminist Encounters with Confucius. Boston, MA: Brill
Academic.
Freud, S. . “Neurosis and Psychosis.” In Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works,
Vol. , edited by J. Strachey. London: Vintage and Hogarth.
Freud, S. . “Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense.” In T. Bokanowski and S.
Freud, S. . “Totem and Taboo.” In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of
Sigmund Freud, Vol. . Translated and edited by J. Strachey, –. London: Hogarth Press.
(Original work published .)
Gawlikowski, K. . “The ‘Civilization of Struggle’ in the West and Appreciation of Harmony in East
Asia: Philosophical and Social Implications of the Two Approaches.” Dialogues and Universalism -
: –.
Grayson, J. H. . Korea: A Religious History. New York, NY: RoutledgeCurson.
Guisso, R. . “Thunder Over the Lake: The Five Classics and the Perception of Woman in Early
China.” In Women in China: Current Directions in Historical Scholarship, edited by R. W.
Guisso and S. Johannesen, –. Youngstown, NY: Philo.
Hon, I. Ma Weber, Confucianism and Modern Capitalism. https://www.academia.edu//Max_
Weber_Confucianism_and_Modern_Capitalism.
hooks, b. . Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. nd ed. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.
Hughes, E. R. . The Great Learning and the Mean in Action. New York, NY: E.P. Dutton & Co.
Kang, N. . “Confucian Familism and Its Social/Religious Embodiment in Christianity:
Reconsidering the Family Discourses from a Feminist Perspective.” Asia Journal of Theology :
–.
Kim, Y. O. . The Middle Way: The Taste of Humanity. Seoul: Tongnamoo.
Lach, D. F. . The Preface to Leibniz’ Novissima Sinica: Commentary, Translation and Text.
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Li, C. . “Confucianism and Feminist Concerns: Overcoming the Confucian “Gender Complex.”.”
Journal of Chinese Philosophy  (): –.
Li, C. . “The Confucian Ideal of Harmony.” Philosophy East and West  (): –.
Li, C. a. “The Ideal of Harmony in Ancient Chinese and Greek Philosophy.” Dao : –. doi:.
/s---.
Li, C. b. “The Philosophy of Harmony in Classical Confucianism.” Philosophy Compass  ():
–. doi:./j.-...x.
 A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF THE CONCEPT OF HARMONY 

Li, C. . “Confucian Harmony: A Philosophical Analysis.” In Dao Companion to Classical

Confucian Philosophy, edited by V. Shen, –. New York, NY: Springer.
Marasigan, V. . “Korean Theology of Harmony?” Landas : –.
Mohanty, C. T. . “Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses.” In
Comparative Political Culture in the Age of Globalization: An Introductory Anthology, edited by
H. Y. Jung, –. Lanham, MA: Lexington Books.
Mungello, D. E. . “Leibniz’s Interpretation of Neo-Confucianism.” Philosophy East and West 
(): –. doi:./.
Nahm, Milton C. . Selections from Early Greek Philosophy. New York: F.S. Crofts.
Nyitray, V. L. . “Review Essay. Confusion, Elision, and Erasure: Feminism, Religion, and Chinese
Confucian Traditions.” JFSR  (): –.
Nylan, M. . “Feminist/Confucianism: A Search for Dignity.” Religion East & West : –.
Poddar, S., N. Sandal, and U. Mukherjee. . “Psychological Profile of Women with Infertility: A
Comparative Study.” Industrial Psychiatry Journal  (): –. doi:./-.
.
Ricci, M., and D. Lancashire. . True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (Jesuit Primary Sources in
English Translations Series : No.). Boston, MA: Institute of Jesuit Sources.
Ryu, K., and R. M. Servero. . “The Role of Confucian Cultural Values of Politics in Planning
Educational Programs for Adult in Korea.” Educational Programs for Adult in Korea  ():
–.
Schlechter, W. . “‘How Ideas Become Effective in History’ Max Weber on Confucianism and
Beyond.” Max Weber Studies  (): –.
Slingerland, E., ed. . Confucius: Analects with Selections from Traditional Commentaries.
Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
Song, Y. B. . “Reflections on the Contributions of Matteo Ricci.” Studies of Confucian Culture :
–. (In Korean).
Tang, Y. . “The Attempt of Matteo Ricci to Link Chinese and Western Cultures.” In Confucianism,
Buddhism, Christianity and Chinese Culture. New York, NY: Springer.
Tipps, D. C. . “Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of National Societies: A Critical
Perspective.” Comparative Studies in Society and History  (): –.
Tsien, J. Voltaire and China. http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/soundingchina/Tsien.html.
Tu, Wei-ming. . “Probing the “Three Bonds” and “Five Relationships”.” In Confucianism and the
Family, edited by W. H. Slote and G. A. DeVos, –. Albany: State University of New York
Press.
Van Dyk, G. A. J., and M. C. Nefale. . “The Split-Ego Experience of Africans: Ubuntu Therapy as a
Healing Alternative.” Journal of Psychotherapy Integration  (): –.
Weber, M. . Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion. Translated by Ephraim Fischoff. Boston,
MA: Beacon.
Woo, Terry. . “Confucianism and Feminism.” In Feminism and World Religions, edited by A.
Sharma and K. K. Young, –. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Yin, J. . “Toward Confucian Feminism: Critique of Eurocentric Feminist Discourse.” China Media
Research  (): –.