Individuality and Immortality in Confucian Spirituality, 2018

Individuality and Immortality in Confucian Spirituality
So-Yi Chung
Journal of Korean Religions, Volume 9, Number 2, October 2018, pp. 83-109

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/jkr.2018.0013
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Individuality and Immortality in Confucian Spirituality
So-Yi Chung
Abstract
The Christian notion of spirituality, especially the concept of human soul or anima, was a
difficult concept for Confucians. Individuality and immortality, which described the essential
feature of the Christian concept of the human soul, cannot stand together in the Neo-
Confucian framework. If something is individual, it is bound to disappear; if something is
immortal, it is never singular. In this article, I shall first discuss various translations of the
term ‘‘human soul’’ by four Christian missionaries: Juan Cobo, Matteo Ricci, Giulio Aleni,
and Francesco Sambiasi. The history of the translation of this term reveals the struggles
of missionaries as they endeavored to implant Christian worldviews in East Asia. I then
examine Confucian responses to such endeavors. Confucians who were open to new ideas
and beliefs also went through painful ordeals as they embraced the Catholic faith. In this
regard, the two brothers of eighteenth-century Chosŏn Korea—Chŏng Yakchong and
Chŏng Yakyong—represent two possibilities in Christian-Confucian dialogue. While the
former was a devoted Catholic with a Confucian background, the latter remained a Con-
fucian, albeit one who weaved Catholic ideas into his theoretical outlook. In the end, their
creative integration of ideas enriched and deepend our insights into Confucian spirituality.
Keywords: Confucian spirituality, Juan Cobo, Matteo Ricci, Giulio Aleni, Francesco
Sambiasi, Chŏng Yakchong, Tasan Chŏng Yakyong,
So-Yi Chung is an associate professor in the Department of Religious Studies, Sogang Uni-
versity. She is the co-editor of Journal of Korean Religions. Her research interests include
Confucianism, Korean intellectual history, Chinese and Korean religions, and comparative
philosophy and religion. Her recent publications are mainly on Tasan Chŏng Yakyong’s
thought, Chosŏn Confucianism, Confucianism in a comparative perspective, and Korean
Yangming Learning.
Correspondence: soyichung@sogang.ac.kr
Journal of Korean Religions Vol. 9, No. 2 (October 2018): 83–109

6 2018 Institute for the Study of Religion, Sogang University, Korea
(V9 24/11/18 19:01) Ling (154 x 224mm) TimesNM pp. 83–109 1944 JKR 9.2_05 Chung (p. 83)
84 Journal of Korean Religions 9/2 . 2018
Introduction
In the Christian tradition, the notion of a spiritual soul, among all things,
implies two things. One is individuality, or what makes a person unique
and different from all other human beings; the other is immortality, or what
remains and persists after the death of an individual. 1 Such a concept of the
eternal individual soul, however, was a rather strangely combined concept, alien
to those deeply immersed in the Confucian tradition. For Confucians, especially
Neo-Confucians, what persists in the midst of all changes is the principle (li 理),
the Infinite (Ch. wuji, K. mugŭk 無極), and the Great Ultimate (Ch. taiji,
K. t’aegŭk 太極). But this is never an individual entity; it is embedded within
every single thing in the universe, human or otherwise, so that all things are
connected with all others into a greater whole. What is singular and individual
for Neo-Confucians, on the other hand, is the individual body (Ch. ti, K. ch’e 體),
heart-mind (Ch. xin, K. sim 心) , or its vitality (Ch. hun, K. hon 魂) and
function—i.e., illumination (Ch. ming, K. myŏng 明) and knowledge (Ch. zhi,
K. chi 知). The individual body, heart-mind, and its functions, however, do
not last forever. They are classified as forms of material and ethereal body
(Ch. qi, K. ki 氣), which is bound to dissipate and fade away after death.
Hence, in Neo-Confucianism, if something is individual, it is soon to dis-
appear; if something is immortal, then it is never private. To spread and
plant the notion of something that is individual yet immortal in the East Asian
Confucian tradition, 2 therefore, was a complex and difficult task for Christian
missionaries. In like manner, to understand such a concept and embrace it
under the rubric of Confucianism was equally, if not more, daunting and
challenging for Confucian scholars.
In this article, I shall first briefly describe how Christian missionaries—
Dominicans and Jesuits—struggled with Neo-Confucian conceptions, such as
the principle li and the material force qi/ki (sometimes translated as ethereal
substance), the Great Ultimate and yin-yang (K. ŭm-yang, 陰陽), or nature
(Ch. xing, K. sŏng 性) and heart-mind. Some actively adopted these concepts
while others vehemently rejected them. Some of the early missionaries invented
new terms, only to have their successors find the terms ambiguous and unfitting.
The primary reason for such various attempts by Western missionaries to
Chung . Individuality and Immortality in Confucian Spirituality 85
translate the term ‘‘human soul’’ is that the Confucian worldview and moral
metaphysics do not allow for something individual and private to exist
eternally.
In eighteenth-century Chosŏn Korea, two brothers faced sharply different
destinies as a result of their beliefs. One deeply immersed himself in the Catholic
faith, only to later break from its core doctrine and turn against it. This was
Tasan Chŏng Yakyong 茶山丁若鏞 (1762–1836), who is widely recognized as
the great synthesizer of Chosŏn Practical Learning (sirhak 實學). The other, on
the contrary, maintained his unrelenting faith in Catholicism and eventually
became a martyr to that faith. This was Tasan’s elder brother, Chŏng Yakchong
Augustino 丁若鍾 (1760–1801), who authored the first catechistic work in
Korean (Han’gŭl). The two Chŏng brothers grew up in a family and educa-
tional milieu that was not only open to new ideas from the West, but also
extremely active in embodying and exemplifying the teachings themselves.
Many early Chosŏn Catholic devotees and martyrs emerged from this family.
If Chŏng Augustino represented how much an erstwhile Confucian could
understand the essence of Western theology without the formal guidance of
Church and priest, Tasan showed the extent to which a devoted Confucian
could embrace the key notions of Western learning (sŏhak 西學) without trans-
gressing the boundaries of Confucianism. I will compare these two brothers’
views on human spirituality—individuality, immortality, and rewards and
punishments according to one’s merits and demerits. In so doing, I hope to
delineate the distinct shape of Confucian spirituality relative to other religious
traditions. 3
Implanting the Notion of Spirituality in a Confucian Context
The first missionaries dispatched to East Asia were eager to find the equivalent
term in Chinese for immortality. In his Testimony of the True Religion (Bian
zheng jiao zhen chuan shilu 辯正敎眞傳實錄), one of the earliest books on
Christian doctrines written in Chinese, Fr. Juan Cobo (1546–1592) 4 found the
terms taiji 太極 (K. t’aegŭk) and wuji 無極 (K. mugŭk) suitable to define the
formless, loftiest, and immortal quality of the Lord of Heaven (Ch. tianzhu,
K. ch’ŏnju 天主). The term taiji/t’aegŭk (lit. ‘‘great limit’’) first appears in the
Book of Changes (I Ching 易經), 5 and is normally translated as the ‘‘Great/
Supreme Ultimate.’’ 6 Its nature was later explained by Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤
(1017–1073) by an equally enigmatic term, wuji/mugŭk (‘‘limitless’’), designat-
ing the state of undifferentiated absolute and unbounded potential. 7 Cobo
translated taiji as the ‘‘Infinite’’ (Sp. Infinito) with a capital ‘‘I,’’ and wuji as
‘‘infinite’’ as an adjective. He argued that the Lord of Heaven is exactly what
Chinese people called Infinite (taiji 太極).
Someone asks: How do you explain the nature of the ‘‘Infinite’’ (太極)?
The Father answers: (. . .) Only the reality of the Infinite God (太極之理), 8
the most infinite (無極), the most admirable, is a reality. It continues and
cannot perish. It flourishes continuously and cannot be destroyed. If it
were not grandiose, it would not be compared with the things that have
beginning. If it were not eternal, it would not be compared with the
temporal things. It neither stops nor rests. God is truly infinite (無極).
(Cobo and Villarroel 1986, 20a–b)
Cobo thought that the problem with the Chinese people was that they did
not believe in anything infinite. Just as a perfectly guided kingdom has a wise
and venerable emperor, or a peacefully sailing boat must be manned by a
perfect navigator, he argued, ‘‘if heaven and earth have a beginning and
if man is born, how is it possible to deny the existence of a great principle of
the Infinite (太始無極之理), who holds in his hands the power to create and
transform, who is the Lord of everything?’’ (Cobo and Villarroel 1986, 16b–
17b). Cobo argued that the Lord was none other than what the Book of
Changes says of the spirit (神) 9 and Infinite (太極), and which begot not only
yin and yang (陰陽) but also created and transformed everything (化生萬物).
What Cobo did not recognize was that for Confucians, taiji, the Great Ultimate
or Supreme Principle from which everything originates, is embedded within the
human heart-mind. Even the traditional notion of Heaven for Confucians
is not far and above from human inner thoughts and desires. This is well-
captured in the question of one scholar who cited the Ming xin bao jian 明心
寶鑑 (Bright heart-mind precious mirror) 10 as follows:
Although heaven is high, it can hear; it is really low, not high. Although
heaven is far, it can see at close range; it is not really far. The T’ai Shih
太誓 [Taishi ] 11 said: Heaven looks at me, it looks at all; heaven listens to
me, it listens to all; 12 the seeing and hearing of heaven consists in seeing
and hearing all. Thus heaven is neither high nor distant, but it governs every
inch of the interior of man. (Cobo and Villarroel 1986, 21b)
Cobo opposed the Confucian doctrine that Heaven is within the human
heart-mind, arguing that ‘‘if the heavenly bodies are the most admirable, there
is no other above them; the celestial being is the highest, no other can exceed
him. (. . .) how can the human heart contain a limitless heaven?’’(Cobo and
Villarroel 1986, 21b). In other words, he did not recognize that taiji, or the
Infinite, was within the human heart-mind. In Confucian thought, through
self-cultivation all humans are able to become one with the Infinite reality,
which they need not seek outside or postulate through reasoning; the ultimate
principle that created the universe, including humans themselves, and that
controlled every transformation and change, already resided within the human
heart-mind. Although the function and power of mind might be limited and
mired, in its original state it was already one with the supreme, the ultimate,
the Infinite.
While Cobo employed the terms taiji and wuji to describe the infinite,
powerful nature of God, he picked up shenhun 神魂 (‘‘mysterious soul’’) to
explain the human spirit. Although he did not go into detailed depth on the
human soul,13 he nevertheless briefly portrayed the human soul when comparing
humans to other animals as follows:
If the spiritual souls (神魂) 14 of men are the completion of all other things,
they have to be differentiated from them. There is a big difference. When
the soul is born, it is united to the body. After being born, its nature is
nourished by knowledge. It understands the righteousness of the principles
of truth (義理之正), it exercises itself in God’s good; and thus, the soul
invigorates the corporal nature. Thus can it look down without feeling
shame before man. After dying the soul will ascend to heaven; it can look
up without feeling shame before God. (Cobo and Villarroel 1986, 47b)
Again, we may discern how Cobo explains the human soul in terms Confu-
cians could easily identify with. First, a human soul is to be nurtured through
learning (學問), and then must understand the notion of right principles (義理);
one must exercise good deeds so that that one might be without ‘‘shame’’
among one’s fellow humans and before God. These are phrases that Cobo
quoted directly from works of the Confucian canon, such as the Mencius. 15
When Cobo described the human soul as shenhun (translated as ‘‘spiritual
soul’’), he was not introducing any new, alien elements, such as immortality,
the last judgment, or heaven and hell. Perhaps he did not realize that in the
Chinese Neo-Confucian framework, shenhun belonged to the realm of qi 氣
(K. ki), just as did the animal hun. In the Confucian understanding, shenhun
was not immortal; it eventually dissipates, no matter how many good deeds
one has done, or how well one has cultivated one’s mind.
Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), one of the founding figures of the Jesuit mission
in China, took a different approach from Cobo. Ricci was well-versed in
the Confucian canon and the Neo-Confucian framework of the universe. He
recognized the fact that with the concept of taiji Confucians could never realize
the Western theological notion of God or the human soul. In his masterpiece,
True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (Tianzhu shiyi 天主實義), 16 Ricci realized
that taiji represented the Confucian religiosity, i.e., transcendence within the
immanent, the infinite principle within the finite heart-mind. In this scheme,
there was no place for God the Creator or for the immortal human soul. Ricci,
therefore, put much effort into reducing taiji and the principle li to ‘‘empty
symbols,’’ or qualities that depend on self-sustaining substances (自立者). In
the chapter, ‘‘Mistaken Views about the Lord of Heaven,’’ Ricci states:
Although I arrived in China late in life, I have assiduously studied the

ancient records of China and discovered that the superior men of ancient
times worshipped and revered the Sovereign on High (上帝), the Supreme
Lord of Heaven and earth, but I have never heard of them paying respect
to the Supreme Ultimate (太極). (. . .) These empty symbols, however, are
not based on any real principles. (. . .) the way the Supreme Ultimate is
described precludes it from being the source of all things. (Ricci 1985, 107–
108)
According to Ricci, neither wuji (‘‘limitless’) nor taiji (‘‘Supreme Ultimate’’)

represent reality, which produced heaven and earth (Ricci 1985, 107). Wuji/
taiji are equivalent to a principle or a pattern, as Confucian scholars argued,
but they nevertheless are a principle of, or pattern of, something; in other words,
they cannot stand on their own and can only be established subject to other
things. In order to show this, Ricci took the example of a white horse. ‘‘Here
there are two things: whiteness and horse. Horse is substance. Whiteness is an
accident [i.e., the mere quality of a substance], since even without its whiteness
the horse could continue to exist. If there were no horse, however, the whiteness
of the horse would be totally incapable of continued existence. We therefore
say that it is an accident’’ (Ricci 1985, 109). Moreover, because a principle is
devoid of any will, its manifestation is just spontaneous and unrestrained; it
is also without intelligence or consciousness, so it cannot produce anything
intelligent or conscious (Ricci 1985, 115–116). By diminishing the importance
and symbolic status of the Supreme Ultimate, Ricci tried to turn the attention
of Confucians to the pursuit of something else eternal yet self-subsisting,
willful, omnipotent, and omniscient; that is, he was preparing the ‘‘proper’’
ground to introduce the Christian notion of God and the human soul.
Ricci not only separated the infinite nature of the Lord of Heaven from the
traditional Confucian notions of li and taiji, he tried to dissociate the concept
of the human soul (hun) from qi, which dicatated that soul would sooner or
later be extinguished. Ricci understood that Confucians saw the human as
composed of a hun 魂 and po 魄 (‘‘baser spirit’’). 17 He argued, ‘‘When these
are united, a man has a life. When a man dies his baser spirit is transformed
and dispersed and returns to earth, whereas his soul continues to exist and is
not extinguished’’ (Ricci 1985, 145). Confucian scholars, however, pointed out
that even the human soul (hun) is not immortal: ‘‘Those who assert that the
soul is extinguished and scattered after death simply regard the soul as material
force (qi 氣). The dispersal of material energy continues to hold together and
does not disperse immediately. Only after a long period of time has passed is
it gradually dissolved’’ (Ricci 1985, 187). In counter to this, Ricci argued that
the human soul, or spiritual beings, are not to be equated with material energy:
People who hold that material energy is to be equated with spiritual beings
and the human soul are confusing the names by which categories of things
are known. (. . .) I have heard of sacrifices being offered to ghosts and
spirits, but never to material energy. Why do people today confuse these
terms with one another? (. . .) If material energy is regarded as spirit and
the basis of life, they continue to be imbued with and surrounded by
material energy, where can they go to escape from material energy? How
can one die from any disaster that is not material in character? Therefore,
material energy is not the basis of life. (. . .) Men are not aware that material
energy is one of the four elements, 18 and that it does not merit being
equated with spiritual beings or with the soul. (Ricci 1985, 145, 201)
By re-defining the status of qi as one of four elements, Ricci again reduced

the fundamental importance of qi and reframed hun into something distinct
from material forms, thereby leaving open the possibility for it to not only
survive after death, but to continue its existence for all eternity.
While disintegrating the basic Neo-Confucian structure of the universe, li
and qi, into one of many qualities and one of four basic elements, Ricci intro-
duced the notion of the human spirit as something the Lord of Heaven bestows
upon birth; it is the essence of a human being, working independently from
physical limitations or bodily temperaments. Ricci used the term linghun 靈魂
(‘‘spiritual soul’’)19 to designate the human spirit and its individual and immortal
qualities. He explicated that it differed from the notion of ghost (guishen 鬼神)
and other spirits of plants and animals. 20 The human spirit is one of the most
superior of souls and called the ‘‘intellectual soul,’’ which enables a human not
only to grow and mature (the vegetative soul) and use their five senses (the
sentient soul), but also to ‘‘make inferences as to the nature of things and to
distinguish between one principle and another’’ (Ricci 1985, 145). The linghun
is eternal and inextinguishable since it does not depend on bodily activities.
While all sensible awareness depends on bodily senses, inference and distinc-
tion do not depend on one’s body, so such a soul can, therefore, exist on its
own (Ricci 1985, 146). Besides its intellectual ability, the human spirit has
another unique and crucial feature: it is free to use its intellectual capacities in
choosing and determining one’s course of action. Because of free will, humans
are fully responsible for their intentions and actions, which in turn indicates
that they will be rewarded and punished according to the merits and demerits
of those actions. The immortality of the human spirit will enable humans to
enjoy rewards or suffer eternal punishment, even after death. The concept of
the immortality of the soul, the last judgment, and Heaven and Hell are all
closely related yet foreign concepts for East Asians, and concepts which are
most often subjected to denouncement. 21
Nevertheless, Ricci’s term linghun, spiritual soul, became a widely used
term in East Asian Confucian intellectual communities. However, it retained
its connection to the idea of qi that changes in form. Furthermore, linghun
more often than not refers to specifically what remains after the death of a
body, rather than the core human essence. For this reason, Giulio Aleni
(1582–1649), in his Rough Introduction to the Study of Human Nature (Xingxue
cushu 性學觕述), adopted the term lingxing 靈性 (K. yŏngsŏng; ‘‘spiritual
nature’’). 22 At the outset of his book, Aleni actively employs the term xing 性
(nature). He narrates how there are two valuable forms of study: one is the
study of human nature (xingxue ), and the other is the study of super-nature
(chaoxing zhi xue 超性之學). The former includes the nature of everything,
including inanimate beings, while the latter denotes the nature of God the
Creator (造物主). He methodically uses the term ‘‘nature’’ in the following
sense:
That which has the animate form, what Western scholars refer to as
‘‘anima,’’ or ‘‘spirit,’’ belongs to the nature of animate beings. (. . .) Only we
humans have the spiritual nature (靈性) that illuminates ten-thousand
principles just like the spirits of Heavenly angels. That is why humans are
described as in control of ten-thousand beings, as one small universe, and
as ‘‘everything is equipped within me.’’ 23 (Aleni 1873, 1-1)
When Aleni introduced the ‘‘spiritual nature’’ (lingxing) of humans, Confu-

cian scholars naturally questioned how and whether it differed from Ricci’s
concept of ‘‘spiritual soul’’ (linghun). Confucians asked, ‘‘Spirit and nature
have different implications. Spirit (hun) belongs to the realm of qi, while human
nature (xing) belongs to li. Today, their usage must be different accordingly’’
(Aleni 1873, 1). Aleni answered that whether spirit or nature, its usage and
meaning depended on the prefix, which qualifies and designates what sort
of spirit or nature it is. Thus, to Aleni, ‘‘spiritual nature,’’ was the Heavenly
nature, which was none other than that moral nature (義理之性) with which
the Creator had endowed us. Aleni found many terms in various traditional
Chinese sources that all referred to the immortal human spirit:
Speaking of the human’s great inner spiritual substance, someone names

it as ‘‘spiritual nature’’ (靈性) to describe how its spiritual illumination is
originally endowed in human nature. Someone names it as ‘‘spiritual soul’’
(靈魂) to differentiate it from the vegetative soul and sentient soul. Someone
names it as ‘‘spiritual mind’’ (靈心) to distinguish it from flesh-heart. Some-
one names it ‘‘spiritual mystery’’ (靈神) to point at its spiritual illumination
that does not belong to material form. Someone names it ‘‘innate knowing’’
(良知) and ‘‘spiritual ability’’ (靈才) to emphasize the original innateness of
the spirit. Someone names it ‘‘spiritual foundation’’ (靈臺) or ‘‘heart of
hearts’’ (方寸) to describe how the human heart provides the foundation
for the spiritual soul. Someone names it ‘‘real me’’ (眞我) to illustrate how
the physical body is only a temporary place while inner spirit is the real
self. Someone names it ‘‘Heavenly governor’’ (天君) to denote how the
Lord of Heaven endowed us with a governor that can control and guide
our entire body. Someone names it ‘‘original mystery’’ (元神) to distinguish
it from ‘‘original qi’’ (元氣) together with which a human comes into being.
The Great Learning terms it ‘‘bright virtue’’ (明德) to note how the original
body is bright in itself, able to illuminate ten-thousand principles. Doctrine
of the Mean names it ‘‘centrality before manifestation’’ (未發之中) to signify
the original body from which various feelings emerge. Mencius names it
‘‘Great body’’ (大體) to refer to its high and noble nature. In sum, although
the names are not one, what they designate is the same. (Aleni 1873, 1-2)
Among many terms from the Confucian canon, 24 it was clear that Aleni
preferred the term ‘‘spiritual nature’’ (lingxing). 25 By equating the human soul
with the original moral nature Heaven bestowed upon humans, Aleni could
avoid the connotation of dissipating qi that was implicit in Ricci’s ‘‘spiritual
soul’’ (linghun); 26 at the same time, he could secure the implication of

innateness and immortality. A reality Aleni had to face, however, was that
in the Chinese Neo-Confucian context, as soon as one mentioned the term
‘‘nature’’ (Ch. xing, K. sŏng 性), one was no longer talking about a quality
unique to any one individual, but something all humans shared in common.
When the Confucian scholar asked whether all humans shared one common
nature and one common spiritual soul, Aleni strongly rebutted that although
humans could be said to share the same kind of nature, it would be completely
wrong to speak of them as having the same nature and spirit. One’s good
efforts and knowledge are one’s own, merit that cannot be shared with others;
likewise, one is fully responsible for one’s sin and ignorance. Aleni argued, ‘‘If
one’s good effort becomes the other’s good effort, and if the other’s sin becomes
my sin, how can such a principle hold! Good and evil are not distinguished,
rewards and punishment do not have basis: it is far from justice!’’ (Aleni 1873,
ch. 4) In other words, there was this problem with ‘‘spiritual nature’’ (lingxing
靈性), in that although it might secure innateness and immortality, it could
never quite capture individuality. In the Confucian tradition, a human nature
that could not be shared even with one’s parents and children was as alien and
bizarre as a spiritual soul that could live on forever after one’s death.
In sum, the term linghun (spiritual soul) could not procure immortality,
while the term lingxing (spiritual nature) could not hold individuality. Because
of such difficulties, some later Jesuit missionaries, such as Francesco Sambiasi
(1582–1649), decided to proceed without taking on Confucian terminologies,
opting to transliterate ‘‘human spirit’’ as anima (亞尼瑪). 27 Sambiasi defined
anima as a more precise term for both linghun (spiritual soul) and lingxing
(spiritual nature). He seemed to understand that in Confucianism, hun is not
eternal and xing (nature) is not individual. He explicated anima as follows:
Anima is a substance, and self-sustaining. It belongs to the category of spirit

(神) and immortal. It is what the Lord of Heaven 28 created out of nothing.
It is bestowed upon us when and where we were born, and it is our formal
substance. It ultimately depends on God’s grace and the good deeds of
humans in order for it is to be blessed with real fortune (眞福). (Sambiasi
1965, ch.1)
Sambiasi thought that the characteristics of anima—a self-sustaining

spiritual substance that is both immortal yet individual—could not be encapsu-
lated by terms like linghun or lingxing. The more precise transliteral term
‘‘anima,’’ however, did not possess the same appeal as other terms to East
Asian people. Those who were deeply touched and greatly influenced by
so-called ‘‘Western learning,’’ opted to use the term linghun, or attempted to
create other terminologies. To exemplify and analyze such attempts, we shall
turn to two brothers of Chosŏn dynasty Korea, Chŏng Yakchong and Chŏng
Yakyong, both of whom painfully embraced and struggled with the Christian
faith and the concept of a spiritual soul.
Embracing the Notion of Spirituality in a Confucian Context
As briefly introduced earlier, Chŏng Yakchong Augustino (hereafter, Chŏng A.)

was born into a well-known family of Southerners who were open to new
ideas from the West and attempted to intellectually explore beyond the fixed
doctrines of Neo-Confucianism. Chŏng A. was introduced to Catholicism by
his brothers Chŏng Yakchŏn 丁若銓 (1758–1816) and Tasan Chŏng Yakyong
茶山丁若鏞 (1762–1836; hereafter, Tasan), who were among the first to join a
study group reading new texts on Western thought imported from Beijing.
Unlike his brothers, who distanced themselves from the Catholic Church and
openly became apostates under governmental oppression, Chŏng A. remained
faithful to the Catholic doctrine and readily suffered martyrdom. Before being
persecuted during the trials of 1801, he composed Chugyo yoji 主敎要旨 (Essen-
tials of the Lord’s teachings), the first catechistic work in vernacular Korean
for large audiences who were illiterate in Chinese. 29
In this book, Chŏng A. consistently employed the term yŏnghon 靈魂 (Ch.
linghun; ‘‘spiritual soul’’) from Matteo Ricci. 30 He first introduced the immor-
tality of the human soul through its mechanism independent from the physical,
decaying body. As Chŏng A. described it:
After death, a person’s body decays, but the soul (靈魂) does not die. (. . .)
The human soul is not formed from the body. Rather, when the human
body is born, the Lord of Heaven attaches to it a supernatural (mysterious-
spiritual 神靈) soul. A human being, therefore, takes pleasure and displeasure
even in things that lie outside the body. (. . .) a person has a desire to live
forever because he has an immortal soul. Therefore, we can know well that
the soul has eternal life and receives eternal reward or punishment. (Chŏng
A. 2012, 69–70)
Chŏng A. argued that because the human soul was not attached to the
body, it could take pleasure or displeasure in things that brought neither good-
ness nor harm to the body. He illustrated, ‘‘When someone praises me, even
though this does not fill my stomach, I feel needless pleasure, and when some-
one insults me, even though this causes no pain to my body, I feel needless
displeasure. This mind that takes pleasure and displeasure surely does not
originate from the body but from the soul’’ (Chŏng A. 2012, 69). This human
soul cannot be burned in a fire, cut with a blade, or suffer from disease: it has
no way to die, since it has no physical form (Chŏng A. 2012, 69).
In the time of the Chŏng brothers, the notion of the immortality of the
soul resonated strongly since in the real world, reward and punishment were
not distributed fairly. Good people seemed to suffer from poverty while the
wicked enjoyed riches and prosperity (Chung 2011). Chŏng A. clarified that it
was impossible to repay the goodness or the wickedness of a person through
worldly prosperity or adversity (Chŏng A. 2012, 66). The Lord of Heaven,
therefore, had set heaven and hell to test and repay the goodness and the
wickedness of the people of the world. The immortal souls of individuals, based
on whether or not they led a good life and obeyed the commandments, could
enjoy the boundless blessings up in heaven or suffer boundless pains down in
the hell.
Scholars regard Chŏng A. as not only a devout follower but also an inter-
preter of Catholic theology in a Confucian framework. 31 Regarding the
spiritual soul, he emphasized the spiritual pleasures beyond the bodily desires,
and stressed the importance of giving the proper reward and punishment
according to a person’s merits or demerits. Such an idea could be reconciled
with Confucian moral doctrines, which extol people who ‘‘sacrifice their life to
accomplish benevolence’’ (殺身成仁), or ‘‘choose righteousness over one’s own
life’’ (捨生取義). Spiritual pleasures and high, noble desires are something
that Confucians could understand easily. Moreover, the concept of heaven
and hell was especially persuasive when it was connected with the Confucian
moral doctrine that promoted goodness and punished evil (勸善懲惡) in the
midst of turbulent times. 32
If Chŏng A. represented a Catholic deeply immersed in a Confucian back-
ground, his brother Tasan Chŏng Yakyong, on the other hand, symbolized a
Confucian who embraced Catholic theological ideas wholeheartedly, as long
as they did not violate his Confucian identity. 33 As far as the spiritual soul
is concerned, Tasan departed from his brother on a number of points. First,
the so-called subject 34, or real essence of moral agency, was nothing other
than heart-mind (sim 心), which he carefully named by various terms, such as
‘‘spiritual illumination’’ ( yŏngmyŏng 靈明), ‘‘spiritual knowledge’’ ( yŏngji 靈知),
or ‘‘spiritual substance’’ ( yŏngch’e 靈體). 35 This implies two main points. First,
it was revolutionary, even for Tasan, 36 to speak of the individual human heart-
mind as the primary foundation of moral action. In the Neo-Confucian frame-
work, it was human nature (K. sŏng, Ch. xing 性) embedded within heart-mind
that manifested itself in human practices. Human heart-minds were highly
intelligent and efficient instruments or vehicles that helped to realize its real
contents—the Four Virtues (benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom)
which is the principle of the universe (li) and the Great Ultimate (t’aegŭk). To
put it differently, Neo-Confucian scholars questioned whether it was nature
that manifested itself with the help of heart-mind, or heart-mind that worked
itself into revealing its core essence, i.e., its nature and the Four Virtues. 37 In
either case, individual human heart-minds were only helpful tools in realizing
and manifesting the great moral principles that resided within. Tasan pro-
claimed that it was individual human heart-mind, not human nature, that was
the proper name for what Mencius termed the ‘‘great body’’ (大體):
Today, scholars hotly debate over two words—heart-mind and nature:

some speak of heart-mind as great and the nature small; some speak of
nature as great and heart-mind small. Considering the doctrine of ‘‘heart-
mind unites and controls nature and feeling’’ (心統性情), then the heart-mind
seems great; referring to the doctrine that nature is principle while heart-
mind is material force (ki), then nature seems great. Those regarding heart-
mind as great, emphasize the mysterious union of spirit and form and hold
that there is only one heart-mind. Those regarding nature as great are
upholding the word ‘‘nature’’ as the proper name for the ‘‘great body’’ or
‘‘Dharma body’’ (法身). If one must borrow one word to call the great
body, then ‘‘heart-mind’’ would be closer, while ‘‘nature’’ would not fit. If
we examine how the word ‘‘nature’’ is constructed, then we must read it
like the appetite of a pheasant, inclination of a deer, quality of grass, and
properties of trees, etc. The term ‘‘nature’’ refers to dispositions and tendencies
(嗜好), not something remote and grandiose. (Tasan 2012, 6:195–200) 38
What Tasan was claiming here when speaking of heart-mind as the founda-
tion and basis of all human practice, was the place of individuality—one’s own
decisions and the resulting actions—at the center. Individuals are not revealing
their inner moral content—humans are not born with the virtues—but only
their potential and propensities toward virtue. It is well known that Tasan
innovatively interpreted human nature as kiho 嗜好—inclination, predisposition,
and preference toward goodness. 39 Goodness or virtue are not given within the
human heart-mind, thus individuals are not originally connected with one
another in a great moral universe. In order to be in touch with the greater
whole, the individual human heart-mind must decide on its own to acquire those
virtues through constant practice. According to Tasan, the human heart-mind
comprised three elements: nature as humans’ common propensity toward
moral goodness, free will that enables individuals to choose and decide
their course of action, and finally, the actual work or practice that actualizes
the intention of the heart-mind (Tasan 2012, 7:90–92). Here, general and
universal ‘‘human nature,’’ which was deemed a self-subsisting subject in the
Neo-Confucian construction, is creatively transformed into a general quality
and character of the individual human heart-mind. All that humans are left
with are personal choice and decision, and the actual actions that will entitle
them as virtuous or not.
Relating to the above context, Tasan named the individual heart-mind
as ‘‘spiritual illumination’’ (靈明), ‘‘spiritual knowledge’’ (靈知), and ‘‘spiritual
substance’’ (靈體). It is notable that within Tasan’s work, which comprises
more than five hundred volumes, not a single usage of ‘‘spiritual soul’’ (靈魂),
‘‘soul-spirit’’ (魂靈), or ‘‘mysterious spirit’’ (神靈) is to be found. This is perhaps
because the wording ‘‘spiritual soul’’ already connoted the specific anima or the
immortal human soul of Western theology; as soon as one starts to use the
vocabulary of Catholicism, one might be considered as professing it as one’s
religious orientation. More importantly, Tasan did not believe that human
heart-mind was essentially the material force ki. In fact, throughout his life
Tasan constantly attempted to unfetter Confucianism from the Neo-Confucian
li-ki dichotomy (Chung 2016). He borrowed from Ricci that t’aegŭk and li
were not the all-encompassing principle and original source from which every
entity in the world emerged and connected itself with every other entity. Li is
merely the accidental quality of a substance (Cawley 2014). He also agreed with
his other brother Chŏng Yakchŏn 丁若銓, who along with Tasan renounced
Catholicism and maintained his Confucian identity, that ki was only one of
four elements of the world, like air (ether), not a vital and material force
embodied within all animate and inanimate things. 40 Furthermore, hon,
according to Tasan, commonly refers to what is left after one’s death (Tasan
2012, 7:89). The intelligent subject that comprehends the situation, makes
choices, and decides to act upon them cannot be called hon the spirit or sin the
mysterious.
Tasan was also dissatisfied with the term spiritual nature (靈性). In his
commentary on the phrase ‘‘descend-heart’’ (降衷) from the Book of Documents,
he noted that ‘‘it means that the Heaven sends down its benevolent heart in
order to protect the Wu state. It does not mean that when a human is
conceived in a womb, Heaven bestows the spiritual nature composed of
benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom’’ (Tasan 2012, 13:189). In
other words, Tasan believed that the term ‘‘spiritual nature’’ implied the four
moral virtues mysteriously implanted within the human heart-mind.
In sum, by carefully choosing terms like ‘‘spiritual illumination’’ as the
central agency of moral action, Tasan stressed individuality and wiped out the
eternal universality within humans. Some have analyzed that Tasan brought
forth the idea of individual responsibility by urging people to motivate them-
selves to take actual action rather than merely sitting in a quiet place searching
for the perfect original virtues within (Baker 2002; Kim 2009). Although Tasan
did not use the term ‘‘spiritual soul’’ that Chŏng A. spoke of, his new interpre-
tation of heart-mind sufficiently emphasized the individuality and responsibility
that led to virtuous deeds.
The heart-mind or ‘‘spiritual illumination’’ of Tasan does not belong to li or

ki, since he disintegrated them into mere qualities and one of the four primary
elements. It is, like Dao-mind (道心), bestowed by Heaven upon birth: it has
a propensity for liking goodness and hating evil, which is the mandate of
Heaven. As such, it is very similar to Chŏng A.’s spiritual soul; however,
nowhere did he mention the immortality of one’s spiritual illumination. Then
from the perspective of Western theology, one question arises: can our heart-
mind be eternal? If it dies with the body, where would individuals obtain
reward and punishment? If they are not to be judged for their deeds, then why
should they be responsible for actions for which they will not be caught? What
is the reward for responsible and conscientious action and the punishment for
evil and treacherous conduct?
From a Confucian point of view—or any ethical point of view—a virtuous
action must be for its own sake. One should not have any ulterior motive in
practicing it. One should do the right thing for the pleasure of doing the right
thing. One saves the child in danger only for the sake of the welfare of the
child, not as a means to bring any worldly benefits to oneself. Although Con-
fucianism does have the concept of Heavenly reward and punishment, 41 a
morally superior person would not choose a course of action based on rewards
and punishment. It is simply part of our propensity or nature that we should
decide on the good action and put it to work. Tasan elaborated on this point
as follows:
If a person does one good thing, then his mind will be filled with pleasure. If
he does one bad thing, then his mind will become stained with guilt. Even if
he has not done anything good, if others praise him as good, then he will
feel good and happy. Even if he has not done anything bad, if others
condemn him, then he will feel bad and angry. As such, [the spiritual illumi-
nation] naturally knows good acts are praiseworthy and bad deeds are
blameworthy. (Tasan 2012, 6:195–200)
This passage reminds one of Chŏng A.’s proof that the workings of the
spiritual soul are independent of bodily pleasure. The same concept is used
in Tasan’s argument that we are immediately rewarded for our actions with
feelings of fulfillment, confidence, and an elevated sense of oneself when the
actions follow our natural inclination toward goodness. The opposite is also
true, for we feel shame and guilt whenever we ignore our good conscience
and indulge in haughty desires. 42 Tasan argued that since our heart-mind and
physical body are united in a whole, the decisions we make and actions we take
will eventually bring consequences to our physical self as well.
Let us speak of a person who accumulates righteous deeds. In the beginning,

he does not feel shame confronting others, and does not feel guilty confront-
ing himself. As he accumulates more, his heart-mind opens and his body
grows large, his face brightens and his back straightens.43 As he accumulates
even more, then the ‘‘vast, flood-like ki’’ 44 will flare out; it will be extremely
large and strong, as to fill all the spaces between heaven and earth. Then
no wealth and honor can taint him, poverty and lowliness cannot change
him, and threats and weapons cannot defeat him. Thus, he will mysteriously
transform himself, as to be one with heaven and earth in virtue, and be one
with the sun and moon in illumination; finally, he becomes a fully virtuous
man. (Tasan 2012, 6:195–200)
Tasan gives a detailed account of the best possible outcomes of choosing

goodness over evil, acting on righteousness over profit—to become a fully
virtuous human being, actualizing one’s own potential. One becomes on par
with heaven and earth, sun and moon, and obtains a glimpse of eternity. It is
comparable to Chŏng A.’s description of Heaven; when individuals accumulate
good deeds, they will be rewarded with all kinds of riches and honors that
they can take pleasure in without satiation (Chŏng A. 2012, 66–68). Even con-
sidering the fact that Chŏng A.’s catechistic work was written for laypeople
while Tasan’s writings were for intellectuals whose end goal was self-
actualization rather than worldly fortune, still, Tasan’s Confucian stance is
this-worldly, whereas Chŏng A.’s is beyond this world. Tasan’s description of
‘‘hell-in-this-world’’ is also noteworthy:
Suppose another person who does one thing against his own conscience
today. Tomorrow, he repeats doing the same thing. He will be dispirited
and dejected, fearful and guilty. He gives up and tells himself ‘‘I am
already doomed’’; he goes to pieces and tells himself ‘‘it is over.’’ Thereby
his willpower fades and withers, his energy dissipates and he feels crushed.
Then when someone tempts him with small profits, he will yield to it
like dogs and pigs; when someone threatens him with authority, he will
succumb to it like foxes and rabbits. He will grow haggard and flagged,
and eventually die in tears. (Tasan 2012, 6:195–200)
In many writings, Tasan comprehensively illustrates what kind of dis-

honorable state a man can fall into, regardless of his possession and position
(Tasan 2012, 4:163–167). When doing something against his own moral inclina-
tion, he is no longer a human, but more like a cunning animal or wilting plant.
To become a human in the fullest sense, through acting humanely and justly in
spite of all outer hardships and inner temptations, is the ultimate reward for
true Confucians. In the same context, to lead a life of an animal, indulging
in bodily desires and satisfying one’s haughtiness while ignoring the natural
signals from one’s conscience, is the final punishment, living in one’s own
personal hell.
When Tasan renounced the Catholic faith, it meant he ceased outward
mention of the major doctrines of Christianity, namely, immortality of the
soul, the last judgment, heaven and hell, or the resurrection of the dead. From
the Confucian point of view, however, Tasan adopted many contents of
Western theology and carefully analyzed the use of phrases and wording from
the traditional Confucian canon. He rejected the Neo-Confucian worldview
that stressed the universality of the moral nature embedded in the individual
human heart-mind and argued that the original Confucianism focused on
the individual human mind realizing its potential through following one’s
moral inclination and accumulating good deeds. He named the moral agency
‘‘spiritual illumination’’ instead of Ricci’s ‘‘spiritual soul’’ or Aleni’s ‘‘spiritual
nature.’’ The notion of heaven and hell for Tasan also became something
uniquely Confucian. Realizing one’s potential and becoming a fully virtuous
person was to make a heaven out of this world, while failing to realize one’s
potential and becoming a mere animal was like living in a personal hell. Tasan
also had his own Confucian vision of the immortal soul. The ‘‘spiritual illumina-
tion’’ of Tasan himself incessantly worked itself in studying Classics and
writing commentaries, especially during his time of exile. For Tasan, like any
other Confucian, leaving a piece of work behind meant the continuance of
one’s intellectual and spiritual individuality even after one’s death. It meant
that one was waiting for some other, future spirits to recognize the illumination
within one’s work, and resurrect it in their re-interpretation of it. In fact, Tasan
never called himself by the penname ‘‘Tasan’’; this was a name that others,
probably from opposing factions, called him in reference to his place of exile.
He always referred to himself as Saam 俟菴, meaning ‘‘waiting-in-hermitage.’’
Tasan was a thorough Confucian who believed in individual responsibility,
spiritual continuance, the heaven and hell of this world, and scholarly resurrection.
There is no need to identify him as a hidden Catholic. His notion of yŏngmyŏng
represents a paragon of Confucian spirituality.
Conclusion
Individuality and immortality of the human soul, as we have so far discussed,

was an alien notion for traditional Confucians, especially those who were
deeply immersed in the Neo-Confucian li-qi (K. li-ki) framework. Li is eternal
but not individual, while qi is individual but not perennial. This was why
Christian missionaries had a difficult time determining an appropriate term
for the human soul. Cobo used shenhun (K. sinhon; mysterious, spiritual soul),
while Ricci adopted linghun (K. yŏnghon), or spiritual soul. But those terms
carried the implication of after death, as well as the dispersal of qi. Aleni then
introduced a new terminology, lingxing (K. yŏngsŏng; or spiritual nature), that
signified innateness and continuity. However, like li, it implied a generality
shared by all humankind. It never carried the meaning of individuality. Perhaps
because of such a difficulty some Jesuits like Sambiasi opted to use the trans-
literated term anima, instead of taking on Confucian terminologies. Constant
changes of the term indicate not only the difficulty of reconciling Christianity
with Confucianism, but also the unique feature of Confucian spirituality.
Such a unique feature of Confucian spirituality was exemplified in the most
dramatic way during late eighteenth-century Chosŏn. Two Chŏng brothers,
Chŏng A. and Tasan, epitomized two distinct ways of embracing the Catholic
notion of the human soul in the Confucian tradition. Chŏng A., who chose
to become a Catholic, unswervingly used Ricci’s term yŏnghon (Ch. linghun)
to denote the human soul. He made it easy for laypeople with a Confucian
background to understand the immortality of the individual human soul
through familiar concepts like moral pleasures, reward and punishment for
good and evil, and just and fair repayment for one’s deeds. Along with the
immortality of the soul, Chŏng A. dared to introduce even the most unfamiliar
concepts like the last judgment, heaven and hell, and the resurrection of the
body, all designed by God the Creator who was like the father of all fathers,
and the lord of all lords, to whom we must practice filial piety and loyalty.
Meanwhile, Tasan chose to remain a Confucian and creatively weaved Western
Catholic ideas into his theory in a way that they would not conflict with the
Confucian worldview. He rejected the Neo-Confucian theoretical scheme that
put forward human nature as the primary moral agency; in such a scheme,
human individuality was sacrificed for the general whole. As an alternative,
Tasan selected individual human heart-mind as the central agency of all moral
action. He prudently named it yŏngmyŏng (spiritual illumination) instead of
the terms yŏnghon or yŏngsŏng, loaded as they were with many conflicting
implications. Unlike his brother, however, Tasan never mentioned heaven
and hell as the final place of redemption for a person’s deeds throughout their
lifetime. Instead, he delineated in detail the dignified life of a fully virtuous
person and the wretched life of an indulgent person; what he portrayed was
nothing less than heaven and hell in this world. Although Tasan did not broach
the notion of immortality in his yŏngmyŏng, his life was immortalized in the
work he left behind, and resurrected by later generations who have discovered
with joy his intellectual spiritual energy. Tasan’s real penname Saam (waiting-
in-hermitage), in this sense, captures the very essence of that individual immor-
tality that embodies the unique feature of Confucian spirituality.
Notes
1 There are many approaches to the concept of spirit in the Christina tradition, but
I focus here on these two major characteristics for they were the primary targets
of criticism of traditional Confucian thinkers. For a comparison of Christian and
Chinese spirituality, see Shen (2015).
2 Daoism later developed the concept of an individual spirit that is immortal, but it
too differed from the Christian concept of the soul. First, in the Daoist view, the
spirit was not something given by God to humans upon birth, but something that
all individuals are naturally born with; second, immortality was the highest spiritual
level, toward which one must continually strive through discipline, not something
that was guaranteed, as in the Christian tradition.
3 This paper does not attempt to answer whether Tasan was a hidden Catholic or
Matteo Ricci a hidden Confucian. In an attempt to embrace different worldviews
of the two religious and moral traditions, however, one somehow reaches a common
ground that brings solace and consolation to a broader range of humankind.
4 Juan Cobo was a Spanish Dominican missionary, diplomat, astronomer, and
sinologist. Testimony of the True Religion (1593), the first book printed in the
Philippines, is comprised of nine chapters: 1) Discussion on the Proofs of the True
Religion; 2) On the Existence of an Infinite Being (一位無極), Principle of All things;
3) Talking about Things Infinite (無極之事情); 4) On Matters of Geography; 5)
About the Reality of the Earthly Things; 6) On the Plants of the Earth and Other
Vegetables; 7) On the Things of the Animal Kingdom; 8) On How the Animals
Know What They Should Eat and Drink; and 9) On How the Animals of the World
Know the Medicines They Must Take. It is considered as an incomplete work.
5 ‘‘In the Change, there is the Great Ultimate. This begets two forces, and two forces
four images, and the four images beget eight triagrams’’ (易有太極是生兩儀兩儀生
四象四象生八卦) (‘‘Xici chuan’’ 繫辭傳 [Appended remarks]).
6 There are various English translations of the cosmological term ‘‘Taiji’’: James
Legge translated it as the ‘‘Grand Terminus’’ (Legge 2007); Zhang (2002) as ‘‘Supreme
Ultimate’’; Robinet (2008) as ‘‘Great Ultimate.’’
7 Taijitu shuo 太極圖說 (Explanation of the diagram of the Supreme Ultimate).
8 All the translations and romanizations are Cobo’s own and appear in the original
manuscript. Some translations of the same Chinese character vary according to
context.
9 說卦傳, 第六章神也者,妙萬物而爲言者也.
10 Cobo himself translated Ming xin bao jian (K. Myŏngsim pogam), which became the
first book of the Chinese canon to be translated into a European language.
11 Also known as the Book of History or Book of Documents (Ch. Shijing 書經).
12 天視自我民視, 天聽自我民聽. This is usually translated more as, ‘‘Heaven sees from
what we people see, and Heaven hears from what we people hear.’’
13 Cobo’s Testimony of the True Religion is said to be incomplete. After describing the
nature of God, he goes on to discuss non-living things, and then living things. He
was dispatched to Japan as a political envoy and died when the ship he was travel-
ing in sank on the way back, and before he was able to expound on the nature of the
human soul.
14 I quote Cobo’s own translation. Shenhun 神魂 (K. sinhon) is normally translated as
‘‘mysterious soul,’’ to distinguish it from linghun 靈魂 (K. yŏnghon), or ‘‘spiritual
soul.’’
15 Cobo borrowed the Mencian phrase, ‘‘When looking up, he has no occasion for
shame before Heaven (仰不愧於天), and below, he has no occasion to blush before
men (俯不怍於人)’’ (Mencius 7A), slightly rephrasing it as, ‘‘While one is living, he
has no shame before his fellows (俯不怍於人間), and after one dies, he has no shame
before the Lord of Heaven (仰不愧於天主).’’
16 It was written and published in Classical Chinese. Here I cite the English translation
of the True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (Ricci 1985).
17 According to Chinese tradition, each person has two souls while alive: hun 魂
(K. hon) and po 魄 (K. paek). After death, hun, which belongs to Heaven, ascends
to Heaven and is called shen 神 (K. sin; ‘‘spirit’’), while po, which belongs to Earth,
descends into the Earth and is called gui 鬼 (K. kwi; ‘‘ghost’’) (adapted from Ricci
[1985, 144]).
18 Material energy, according to Ricci, is ‘‘air’’ or ‘‘ethereal substance,’’ which is one of
the four basic elements along with water, fire, and earth.
19 In his earlier writings, Matteo Ricci first introduced the term hunling 魂靈
(K. honnyŏng; ‘‘soul-spirit’’), which is quite a familiar term in the Confucian tradi-
tion. Perhaps because it was too familiar, and connotes an ethereal quality soon to
be dissipated, he transposed the words into a less familiar and more foreign term.
For details, see Kim Sŏnhŭi (2012, 123).
20 Ricci argued that there were three kinds of souls. The lowest is the vegetative soul,
supporting vegetation in its growth. The next is the sentient soul, possessed by non-
human animals, allowing them to grow up and make use of their five senses (Ricci
1985, 145).
21 The most famous argument against Western theological concepts during the Chosŏn
dynasty was put forth by Sin Hudam 愼後聃 (1702–1761) in his Sŏhakp’yŏn 西學辯
(Disputations on Western learning).
22 Giulio Aleni was an Italian Jesuit missionary and scholar who wrote several books
in Chinese, including the cosmography, Wanwu zhenyuan 萬物眞原 (True origin of
ten-thousand things), and the work on the spirit, Xingxue cushu 性學觕述 (Rough
introduction to the study of human nature). See Aleni (1873).
23 This is rephrased from Mencius 7A4, ‘‘萬物皆備於我矣.’’ Aleni actively wove Con-
fucian phrases into his works.
24 Here Aleni included some Daoist and Buddhist terminology, but the focus was on
the Confucian canon.
25 Lingxing 靈性 (K. yŏngsŏng) was the term Aleni most frequently employed in this
book.
26 In chapter 4, Aleni argued that spiritual nature is not qi (K. ki). His first proof was
that ‘‘nature’’ did not belong to the realm of ‘‘fine qi’’ (Ch. jingqi, K. chŏnggi 精氣).
From here we can see why he chose this specific combination of terms.
27 Francesco Sambiasi’s notable works included ‘‘Lingyan lishao’’ 靈言蠡勺 (K.
Yŏngŏn yejak; Talking about anima from a tiny ladle). He chose to use the trans-
literated term ‘‘anima’’ (亞尼瑪) to refer to what the Chinese talked about.
28 Although Sambiasi used the transliterated term ‘‘Deus’’ (陡斯) in the introduction,
he later used the Chinese term ‘‘Lord of Heaven’’ (天主). There was a debate at the
time among Jesuit missionaries as to whether ‘‘God’’ should be translated as Lord of
Heaven or Lord on High.
29 For detailed information on Chŏng Yakchong’s life and the Chugyo yoji, see Chŏng
Yakchong (2012).
30 When first introducing the term, Chŏng A. provided the Chinese in brackets, but
subsequently used the vernacular Korean throughout the book.
31 For more on Chŏng A. on this point, refer to Chŏng (2003) and Cho (2002).
32 Apart from this, Chŏng A. explained the authority of God through the Confucian
notions of filial piety (K. hyo 孝) and loyalty (K. chung 忠). For details, one may
refer to Song (2002, 115–117).
33 Some describe Tasan’s acceptance not as acceptance of theology but a creative
transformation and interpretation of Confucianism, or simply returning to the
original Confucianism as espoused by Confucius and Mencius. For details, see
Baker (2013; 2015), Kim Sŏnhŭi (2012), and Paek Minchŏng (2007).
34 This is the spiritual soul and ‘‘formal subject’’ in Matteo Ricci’s sense.
35 Tasan used the term yŏngmyŏng most often, followed by yŏngji and yŏngch’e. For a
more detailed account of Tasan’s notion of yŏng, see Yi (2012).
36 Tasan’s stance has changed: only after exile did he finally come to realize that the
primary moral agency was the human heart-mind, and human nature was only the
inclination of such a mind. See Chung (2010).
37 The T’oegye school supported the former, while the Yulgok school insisted that
since nature does not have emotion, will, movement or trace, it is heart-mind, which
belongs to ki the ethereal force, that realizes the principle embedded within itself.
For the latter, the principle is like a doctrine or standard that the heart-mind obeys.
38 For Tasan’s text, translations are my own.
39 A more classical Latin translation would be ‘‘appetites.’’ For more on this point, see
Chŏng Inchae (2012).
40 Chŏng Yakchŏn was sent into exile when he mentioned the ‘‘four elements’’ instead
of the traditional Confucian concept of ‘‘five elements’’ (五行) while taking the
government examination.
41 It was also part of the Confucian tradition that Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 emphasized.
Tasan also mentioned Heavenly reward and punishment in a number of passages,
though not in detail.
42 Tasan strongly argued that the physical body was not the source of all selfish
desires. Pride, conceit, and arrogance, for instance, were sins not specifically related
to physical sensations.
43 These are phrases mentioned in such Confucian classics as the Great Learning and
Mencius. Tasan interprets them as that innate conscience that guides and controls
human actions and shows through one’s body.
44 This particular concept of Mencius is found in Mencius 2A2. It refers to the strong
energy/aura/charisma of a human being that can accumulate through Confucian
moral self-cultivation; here, Tasan interprets it as a kind of dignity and self-
confidence following upon one’s virtuous actions.
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Individuality and Immortality in Confucian Spirituality

Journal of Korean Religions, Volume 9, Number 2, October 2018, pp. 83-109

Published by University of Hawai'i Press

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Journal of Korean Religions Vol. 9, No. 2 (October 2018): 83–109

Implanting the Notion of Spirituality in a Confucian Context

Although I arrived in China late in life, I have assiduously studied the

According to Ricci, neither wuji (‘‘limitless’) nor taiji (‘‘Supreme Ultimate’’)

By re-defining the status of qi as one of four elements, Ricci again reduced

When Aleni introduced the ‘‘spiritual nature’’ (lingxing) of humans, Confu-

Speaking of the human’s great inner spiritual substance, someone names

soul’’ (linghun); 26 at the same time, he could secure the implication of

Anima is a substance, and self-sustaining. It belongs to the category of spirit

Sambiasi thought that the characteristics of anima—a self-sustaining

Embracing the Notion of Spirituality in a Confucian Context

As briefly introduced earlier, Chŏng Yakchong Augustino (hereafter, Chŏng A.)

Today, scholars hotly debate over two words—heart-mind and nature:

The heart-mind or ‘‘spiritual illumination’’ of Tasan does not belong to li or

Let us speak of a person who accumulates righteous deeds. In the beginning,

Tasan gives a detailed account of the best possible outcomes of choosing

In many writings, Tasan comprehensively illustrates what kind of dis-

Individuality and immortality of the human soul, as we have so far discussed,

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