SIX BASIC METHODS

Math 1007 -10

Class 19
4/3/2023
R. Robinson
PART IV OF COURSE
Voting with 3 or more candidates
Majority vs Plurality
• In Chapter 1 (for 2 candidates) simple majority often the
method of choice.
• May’s Theorem: (from Part 1) Simple majority is the
only anonymous, neutral, monotone and almost
decisive.
• If additional candidates also run, simple majority
method reverts to the "plurality method":
• Whoever gets the most votes wins.
• Often called "first past the post" (an allusion to horse
racing).
• Voter’s expression limited to designating their first
choice
Better alternatives
• The type of voting method we study first for 3 or more
candidates is called ranked choice or preference ballot
voting.
• Ranked coice is in the news these days Maine used it (in
one form) in its last two elections.
• Also, Massachusetts held a referendum on it; which lost.
• Having more choices might be healthy; it might reduce
partisanship.
• Later we will discuss other voting methods for more than
two candidates: approval, range, and proportional
methods.
CANDIDATES & BALLOTS
Candidates
• Now we consider three (or more) candidate elections.
• m = number of candidates, m ≥ 3.
• Generic names for candidates A, B, C, …
• A, B, C if n =3,
• A, B, C, D if n = 4,
• etc.
• n = number of voters.
• If we need to name them: a, b, c,,…
Everyone required to vote!
• Candidates may or may not be voters…
Preference (ranked choice) ballot
Each voter lists their 1st, 2nd, 3rd,… choices.

1st B
1st B
Example with 2nd A
…or if m>3.
2nd A m=3 3rd D
3rd C candidates.
… …

nth F

Called “ranked choice voting” in Maine 2018, 2020 election.

Preference (Second Format)
Each voter lists their 1st, 2nd, 3rd,… choices.

A 2nd
A 2nd
Example with B 1st
…or if m>3.
B 1st m=3
C 5th
C 3rd candidates.
… …

Z 12th
The Full Profile
a b c d e f g h i j

A A A A B B B C C C

B B C C A C C B B B

C C B B C A A A A A

Example with m = 10 and n=3.

Shows the ballot that each voter submitted.

The Tabulated Profile
a b c d e f g h i j

A A A A B B B C C C

B B C C A C C B B B

C C B B C A A A A A

For this we
count number
2 2 1 2 3
of times each
column A A B B C
(preference B C A C B
order)
occurs. C B C A A
 The Tabulated Profile
For most methods the tabulated profile is sufficient to determine
the outcome. We usually don’t need to know how individual voters
voted, just how many voted each way.

Methods like this are called anonymous (such methods treat all
voters the same).

2 2 2 1 3
“Profile 1”
A A B B C

B C A C B

C B C A A
METHODS
The book also uses the term “social choice function”.
Method 1. Plurality method
• Ignore everything beyond voters’ 1st choices.
• A candidate wins if s/he gets more first place votes than
any other candidate.
• With fewer first place votes lose.
• Do not need majority.

• Ties are possible (not decisive)

• Comments:
• This method is anonymous (only depends on tabulated profile).
• This method treats all candidates the same: neutral
• Monotone more votes help
• Majority criterion Any candidate with a majority of first place votes
automatically wins (& no ties in this case).
 Plurality method (Profile #1)
2 2 1 2 3
2 2 1 2 3 4 3 3
A A B B C
A A B B C A B C
B C A C B

C B C A A Ignore all but Count.

first place.
Tabulated profile.

Candidate A is unique winner by the plurality method.

Note: A does not have a majority of first place votes, which

would require 6 votes (since n = 10).
Plurality in Scenario #9
A=Wal Mart
B=Casino!
18 15 24 8 16 18 C=Park
A A B B C C
B C A C A B
C B C A B A

18 15 24 8 16 18
A A B B C C Park wins

33 32 34
A B C
Plurality method with 4 candidates

Plurality

n=4
m = 76
q = 39

“First past the post”

Method 2. Borda count
• Suppose there are m candidates
• A candidate gets:
• m-1 points for each 1st place vote,
• m-2 points for each 2nd place vote.
• …
• 0 points for each last place vote,
• The candidate (or candidates) with the most points win.
• Comments:
• This method is anonymous (only depends on tabulated profile).
• This method treats all candidates the same: neutral
• Ties are possible (not decisive)
• This method is : monotone
• Majority criterion?
 Borda count (Profile #1)
A B C
2 2 1 2 3 A B C
1st 4 3 3 2
A A B B C 1st 4 3 3
2nd 1 5 4 1
B C A C B 2nd 1 5 4
3rd 5 2 3 0
C B C A A 3rd 5 2 3
9 11 10
Tabulated profile. Positional profile.

B is unique winner by the Borda count.

!"("$%)
Note: Total number of points is '
, which is 30 here.
Borda count in Scenario #9
A=Wal Mart
B=Casino!
18 15 24 8 16 18 C=Park
A A B B C C
B C A C A B
C B C A B A

A B C
1st 33 32 34 2
2nd 36 30 23 1
3rd 26 31 42 0
102 94 91

Wal Mart wins

Method 3. Hare method
• If m=2 then candidate with a majority (of 1st place votes)
wins.
• Else m>2. In this case, drop candidate (or candidates)
with the least 1st place votes.
• Repeat until just two candidates remain.
• Comments:
• This method is anonymous (only depends on tabulated profile).
• This method treats all candidates the same: neutral
• Ties are possible (not decisive)
 Hare method
2 2 1 2 3

A A B B C

B C A C B Drop B and C A wins!

C B C A A

B and C each have just

3 first place votes.
A has 4.
Hare in Scenario #3
A=Wal Mart
18 15 24 8 16 18 B=Casino!
A A B B C C C=Park
B C A C A B
C B C A B A
Hare in Scenario #9
A=Wal Mart
18 15 24 8 16 18 B=Casino!
A A B B C C C=Park
B C A C A B
C B C A B A

33 32 34
A B C
Hare in Scenario #3
A=Wal Mart
18 15 24 8 16 18 B=Casino!
A A B B C C C=Park
B C A C A B
C B C A B A

33 32 34
A B C
18 15 24 8 16 18
A A B B C C
B C A C A B
C B C A B A
Hare in Scenario #3
A=Wal Mart
18 15 24 8 16 18 B=Casino!
A A B B C C C=Park
B C A C A B
C B C A B A

33 32 34
A B C
18 15 24 8 16 18
A A A C C C
C C C A A A
Hare in Scenario #9
A=Wal Mart
18 15 24 8 16 18 B=Casino!
A A B B C C C=Park
B C A C A B
C B C A B A

33 32 34
A B C
18 15 24 8 16 18
A A A C C C
C C C A A A

57 42 Wal Mart wins again!

A C
C A
Method 4. Copeland’s method
"("$%)
• If there are m candidates, there are '
pairs of
"! "("$%)
candidates. Note:𝐶 𝑚, 2 = '! "$' !
= '
• For each pair, drop all other candidates, and have a
1-on-1 contest.
• The candidate/s who win the most 1-on-1 contests wins.
• Comments:
• This method is anonymous (only depends on tabulated profile).
• This method treats all candidates the same: neutral
• Ties are possible (not decisive)
 Copeland method !(!#$) '⋅&
m= 3 implies = = 3 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑠.
& &
4 6
A B C
2 2 1 2 3 A B
5 5 1 $ 1 1
B A 1+ +
A A B B C 2 & 2 2
B C 1 1
B C A C B 1 1
5 5 2 2
C B
C B C A A
A C red=corrected in V2
C A

Candidates B wins by the Copeland method.

Copeland in Scenario #9
A=Wal Mart
18 15 24 8 16 18 B=Casino!
A A B B C C C=Park
B C A C A B
C B C A B A

49 50 57 42 50 49
A B A C B C
B A C A C B

1 2 0
A B C

Casino! wins
“BAD” METHODS
Method 5. Dictator
• There is one voter
designated as the dictator.
• Whoever the dictator’s
first choice is wins.

• Comments:
• Don’t let the word “dictator” throw you here. It does not have
exactly the same meaning as the common meaning.
• Dictator need not be a candidate him/herself. “Candidates” may be
policies, not people.

• Anonymous, neutral, decisive?

Dictator
a b c d e f g h i j

A A A A B B B C C C

B B C C A C C B B B

C C B B C A A A A A

• To implement this, you need to know who the dictator is.

Here we assume the dictator is j. Then C wins.
• Method is not anonymous. Cannot use tabulated profile.
• Method is decisive (ties not possible). Why?
• Method is neutral (all candidates treated the same).
Why?
Method 6. Monarch
• One candidate is designated monarch.
• The monarch always wins.

• Comments:
• Don’t let the word “monarch” throw
you here. It does not have exactly
the same meaning as the common
meaning.
• Anonymous, neutral, decisive?
Monarch
2 2 1 2 3

A A B B C

B C A C B

C B C A A

C wins.
 2 2 1 2 3
Method 7. All ties
A A B B C

• The result is always a tie. B C A C B

• A, B and C tie as winners.
C B C A A
• Anonymous, neutral, decisive?
MORE METHODS
The book also uses the term “social choice function”.
 Antiplurality
• Whoever gets the fewest last place votes wins

18 15 24 8 16 18

A A B B C C 18 15 24 8 16 18 26 31 42
B C A C A B C B C A B A A B C
C B C A B A
Antiplurality in Scenario #9
A=Wal Mart
18 15 24 8 16 18 B=Casino!
A A B B C C C=Park
B C A C A B
C B C A B A

Wal Mart wins again!

26 31 42
A B C
 Positional methods (generalized Borda)
A B C
18 15 24 8 16 18
1st 33 37 34 1
A A B B C C
2nd 40 36 23 1
B C A C A B
3rd 26 31 42 0
C B C A B A
73 68 57
Tabulated profile.
Positional profile with points.
These are like Borda, except you change the points system:
• Borda: P(2,1,0) (also P(3,2,1) also P(20,10,))
• Plurality P(1,0,0)
• Antiplurality or “Vote for 2” P(1,1,0)
“Antiplurality” vs “Vote for 2”
• Vote for two has the “verbal” description: The winner is
the candidate with the most first and second place votes
• Vote for 2 as a positional method is P(1,1,0,0,…,0)
• Antiplurality: The winner is the candidate with the fewest
last place votes
• Antiplurality as a positional method is P(1,1,…,1,0)
• Note: Antiplurality is “least unpopular”, vs plurality is “most popular”.

Comment: With 3 candidates vote for two and antiplurality

are the same (previous slide). With more than 3
candidates, these are different:
Hare method 4 candidates
Three rounds this time, ending with simple
majority 2-candidate contest

• Anonymous, neutral
• Monotone?
• Not decisive
• How should ties be handled?
• Majority criterion
• Yes. Majority candidate never gets
eliminated.
• So you can stop once someone gets
a majority
• This method “forces a majority”
 Coombs method Like Hare except we drop candidate
with most last place votes.

18 15 24 8 16 18 18 15 24 8 16 18
49 50
A A B B C C A A B B
A B
B C A C A B B A A B
B A
C B C A B A B A B A

C has most: 42 last Drop C! B wins!

place votes

26 31 42
• Anonymous, neutral
• Not decisive
A B C
• Monotone?
• Majority criterion? No
We drop “most unpopular” vs “least popular”.
French method
• Drop all but the two candidates with the most 1st place
votes. Then hold a runoff

18 15 24 8 16 18

A A B B C C

B C A C A B

C B C A B A
Also used in Georgia NY Times at 12:10pm 11/9/2022

Total vote: 4,134,970 Warnock needs: 126,576

Majority: 2,067,486 Walker needs: 161,337
Left to count: 150,749