2023

Charts of
the year
A look back at some of the
McKinsey Global Institute’s favorite
data visualizations from the year
 P RO D U CT IV IT Y & PROSPERI T Y

What would it take to raise living standards

while also getting on a net-zero pathway?
Growth and innovation can deliver half the combined gap;
additional societal commitments could fill the rest in tandem
with market responses.
$41
trillion
$37
trillion

Sources to potentially fill

each gap, $ trillion (1 square = $1T)
Societal commitment to
address the residual gap
Potential market responses
to societal commitments
Business-led innovation
Baseline growth

Empowerment Net-zero investment

gap gap
The boost in spending The boost in low-emissions
power needed for everyone spending needed above
to reach the empowerment 2020 levels to get on a
line (the point at which they net-zero trajectory
can meet all essential (cumulative total
needs and start to save; worldwide, 2021–30)
cumulative total worldwide,
2021–30)

Note: For sources and details, see exhibit E1, “From poverty to empowerment: Raising the bar for sustainable and inclusive growth”
McKinsey Global Institute, September 2023
 P RO D U CT IV IT Y & PROSPERI T Y

GDP growth varies by 1.7 p.p and household

wealth by $48 trillion across scenarios in the US.
Inflated and unsustainable change

Change in 2030 outcomes by scenario, United States

Return to Higher for Balance Productivity

Baseline past era longer sheet reset acceleration

Real GDP growth,

(2022–30 average)
1 p.p.
1.5%1 0.2 p.p.
–0.4 p.p. –0.6 p.p. +1.7p.p.

Household wealth,
$2
$147T $44T
(2022 $17T
value)
–$8T
+$48T
–$31T

Primary channel of Asset price Inflation Asset Productive

wealth adjustment inflation, dampening correction new capital
“wealth real value of formation
illusion” wealth

Note: For sources and details, see exhibit 1, ”The future of wealth and growth hangs in the balance,” McKinsey Global Institute, May 2023
 P RO D U CT IV IT Y & PROSPERI T Y

In a moderate scenario, office and retail space

demand falls sharply between 2019 and 2030.
Change in demand for real estate before prices adjust,
2019–30, %
Change resulting from factors unrelated to the pandemic
Change resulting from pandemic-driven behavior

Residential space Retail space

Office space
in urban cores1 in urban cores
−20 −10 0 10 0 10 20 30 −20 −10 0 10

San
Francisco −20 −2 −17

London −22
−11 6

New York City

−16 6 −14

Houston
2 26 −3

Paris
−13 −4 −9

Munich
−16 8 −4

Tokyo
−9 12 −2

Beijing
2 5 −9

Shanghai
−14 3 1

Note: For sources and details, see “Empty spaces and hybrid places: The pandemic’s lasting impact on real estate,” McKinsey Global Institute,
July 2023
 P RO D U CT IV IT Y & PROSPERI T Y

Focusing on long-term productivity growth in

the US could add $10 trillion in output.
US GDP, real dollars, 2021, $ trillion
30 2.2% productivity growth
(1948–2019 average)
Two projections
1.4% productivity growth
(2005–19 average)

25 Gap between
the 2 projections
is equivalent to:

$10 trillion
20 Cumulative GDP
added over 2021–30

$15,000
Additional output
15 per household in 2030
2005 2021 2030

Fastest-growing states and cities, Fastest-growing sectors,

2007–19 2005–19
Information
Seattle

Washington
North Dakota Mining
San Francisco

San Jose
Wholesale trade

California

Note: For sources and details, “Rekindling US productivity for a new era,” McKinsey Global Institute, February 2023
 P RODU CTI VI TY & P RO SP E R IT Y

By 2050, Africa will be Africa

home to the world’s +796 million

from 2020
to 2050
largest and youngest 1.5

population, adding almost

800 million people to the
global workforce.
Population ages 15–64 India
+183 million
by region, billions
1.0

China
–180 million
Europe
–156 million

North
America
0.5 +39 million
Latin
America1
+49 million

Projected
0
1950 2020 2050
Note: For sources and details, see exhibit 9, “Reimagining economic growth in Africa: Turning diversity into opportunity,” McKinsey Global
Institute, June 2023
 T ECHNO LO GY & M ARKETS OF T HE F UT URE

Generative AI could unlock additional value

potential beyond other AI and analytics.
AI’s potential impact on the global economy, $ trillion
17.1–25.6

13.6–22.1
6.1–7.9
2.6–4.4
11.0–17.7

~15–40% ~35–70%
incremental incremental
economic impact economic impact

Advanced analytics, New generative Total use All worker productivity Total AI
traditional machine AI use cases case-driven enabled by generative economic
learning, and deep potential AI, including in use potential
learning1 cases

Note: For sources and details, see exhibit 2, “The economic potential of generative AI: The next productivity frontier,” McKinsey, June 2023
 G LO BA L C ONNECT I ONS

About 40 percent of global trade is

‘concentrated.’
Global trade value by type of concentration, 2021
Total goods trade
Proportion by type of concentration, %

Diversified trade 60

Concentrated trade
Importers depend on
three or fewer
10 30 40
nations1

Global concentration Economy-specific concentration

Few supplying Many supplying economies exist, but each
economies, on which importer relies on only a few of them
most importers rely

Natural gas
Examples Iron ore Airplanes
(pipeline)

Laptops Memory chips Diamonds

Soybeans Vaccines Maize (corn)

Note: For sources and details, see exhibit 1, ”The complication of concentration in global trade,” McKinsey Global Institute, January 2023
 G LO BA L CONNECT I ONS

Concentrated global trade can make countries

and companies vulnerable to disruption.
Global creation and exported trade flow for soybeans, 2021,
millions of tons (circle size)

Canada Russia 337

1,800
Netherlands 154
US
28,000
Germany 164

Italy 48 South
Portugal 5.1 China Korea
Türkiye 48 (Mainland) 2.4
138
Spain 4.2
Japan 1.2
Mexico Pakistan 1.0
3.9
Taiwan, China
Colombia 3.2
1.0 Paraguay
3,400 Saudi Arabia
1.0 Vietnam 1.0

Malaysia 5.4

Brazil Indonesia 1.0

45,000 Billions of tons,
(arrow thickness)
Thailand 1.0
Uruguay 30
650
20
Argentina
2,700 3
<1

Note: For sources and details, see “Global trade explorer,” McKinsey Global Institute, October 2023
 HU M A N POT ENT I AL

Companies can gain a competitive edge with a

dual focus on people and performance.
Organizational People and performance winners:
signature, by top-tier financial results and human-capital development
company type
Collaborative

Goal oriented Challenging Nurturing Caring

Top down Encouraging

Performance-driven companies: People-focused companies:

top-tier financial results top-tier human-capital development

Share of companies in each type, %

21 9 15 55

Typical performers: no clear patterns observed

People and performance winners excel across a range of business outcomes

ROIC, % Performance Revenue growth Rate of Economic
vs peers, multiples during COVID-19 crisis, % attrition, % profit, $ billion
BETTER BETTER BETTER BETTER BETTER

7.9
28 28 4.2× 8 1.1
8.5

3.0×
6

0.4

4
9 0
–1.1× 13.5 0
6 –1.5× 3 13.4 –0.1 –0.1

WORSE WORSE WORSE WORSE WORSE

Note: Analysis of 1,800 large companies across all sectors in 15 countries.

For sources and details, see ”Performance through people: Transforming human capital into competitive advantage,” McKinsey Global
Institute, February 2023
 HU M A N POT ENT I AL

We expect an additional 12 million occupational

transitions in the US through 2030.
US job growth, index (0=2016 levels) 40

Resilient and growing

occupations1 30

+17%
9.9M jobs 20

Stalled but rising

occupations² 10
+7%
2.8M jobs
0

–10%
Hit and declining –6.0M jobs
–10
occupations³

2016 2019 2022 2030

Growth • Healthcare demand increase • Investments in • Automation adoption

trajectory as the population ages infrastructure and the • Sustained e-commerce trend
driven by • The push toward digitization net-zero transition • Reduced need for
and technology • Demand for reskilling and customer-facing roles
• Demand for last-mile delivery lifelong learning

Projected 1M 1M 10M
transitions⁴ From a
to new resilient and
occupations,⁵ growing
2022–30 occupation
to any other
occupation

Occupational 36% of US workers in 2022: 25% of workers: 39% of workers:

categories • Health professionals • Builders • Production work
within each
profile • Health aides, technicians, • Creatives and arts • Food services
and wellness management • Customer service and
• STEM professionals • Property maintenance sales
Occupations • Managers • Mechanical installation and • Office support
where repair
generative AI • Transportation services
could • Business and legal • Community services
accelerate professionals • Education and workforce
automation training
significantly
• Agriculture

Note: For sources and details, see exhibit 1, ”Generative AI and the future of work in America,” McKinsey Global Institute, July 2023
 R E SO U RCES OF T HE WORLD

By 2030, relatively low-cost solutions have high

potential to reduce CO2e.

Potential contribution to net CO₂e reduction in 2030, by solution,1 Capital Current capital
metric gigatons spending spending as a share
Less expensive to reduce More expensive Abatement cost on physical of annual 2021–30
abatement cost (<$20 per (>$20)² data unavailable assets, 2020,³ spending in
metric ton of CO₂e abated)² $ billion illustrative net-zero
scenarios,³ %

Solar power⁴, ⁵ 3.4 Total: 5.0 175 40–60

CO₂ abatement
3.3 11.7 20 <20
in agriculture and land use

Wind power⁴, ⁵ 3.1 3.9 150 20–40

Transportation efficiency 2.3 2.3 70 40–60

and modal shift⁶
Non-CO₂ abatement 1.6 2.3 n/a n/a⁸
in waste and industry⁷
Methane abatement in coal, 1.4 1.7 <5 <20
oil, and gas operations
Energy efficiency 1.3 1.3 235 40–60
in buildings⁶
Energy efficiency, materials efficiency, 1.1 3.2 25 40–60
enhanced recycling in industry⁹
Other low-emissions power capacity 0.7 2.8 120 40–60
(such as nuclear and geothermal)⁴
Nitrous oxide and methane abatement 0.4 2.8 10 <20
in agriculture and land use¹⁰, ¹¹

Biofuels 0.2 0.7 n/a n/a⁸

Building electrification and other 0.2 1.8 310 40–60

decarbonization measures¹⁰, ¹², ¹³

Industrial electrification 0.0 2.1 20 <20

Carbon capture in power 0.0 1.0 <5 <20

and industry

Electric vehicles¹⁰, ¹² 0.0 0.8 125 <20

Note: For sources and details, see exhibit 6, “An affordable, reliable, competitive path to net zero,” McKinsey, November 2023
 G LO BAL T RENDS

Asia is becoming the world’s new ‘majority.’

Asia’s share of global total, %
Domain Indicator 0 MAJORITY 100
World order GDP growth
1990–95 2015–21
Value of world trade1 involving Asia
1992 2021
Manufacturing sector value added
1992 2021
Technology R&D spend
platforms 1990 2021
Patents granted
1997 2021
Top tech company2 global revenue growth
1995–2000 2016–21
Demographic Urban population
forces 1990 2022
Population aged 65+
1990 2022
Middle-class households3 PPP4
1990 2021
Resource Primary energy consumption
and energy 1990 2022
systems
New investments in clean energy
1990 2019
Renewable energy capacity
2000 2022
Capitalization Gross domestic savings
1990 2021
Foreign direct investment inflows
1990 2020
Fixed investment
1990 2022
0 MAJORITY 100

Note: For sources and details, see exhibit 1, “Asia on the cusp of a new era,” McKinsey Global Institute, September 2023
 G LO BAL T RENDS

Latin America’s productivity continues to lag

behind that of other emerging markets.
Productivity across India
regions, Change in 150
China
real GDP per hour
worked relative to 100
US baseline, %
CESEE ²,³
50 ASEAN³

0 Latin America and the

Caribbean³

-50
1995 2020

Productivity within Chile Peru

Latin America, % 50

Latin America and the Caribbean³

Highlighted country
0
Other countries

-50
1995 2020 1995 2020

Brazil Colombia Mexico

50

-50
1995 2020 1995 2020 1995 2020

Note: For sources and details, see exhibit 7, “What could a new era mean for Latin America?” McKinsey Global Institute, July 2023