A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian

Self-Knowledge: According to Tu Weiming's

Explanation

CHI Chienchih*

I. Introduction

Modern science and democracy, which have dramatically changed human life-
styles, have both developed from the Western philosophical approach. Based on
the new developments of cognitive science, however, we can now consider what
we can learn from the Chinese philosophical approach. We can see that there are
at least two different ways to obtain knowledge. The first is theoretical: we learn
through factual statements and rules, such as "the Earth is round." We learn this
by being told. This type of knowledge is easily organized into a logical system.
Scientific (also called factual or theoretical) knowledge is based on these logical
systems. The second is practical: we learn through practice. Through practice, we
may acquire new experiences, and based on these new experiences, we know
something new. 1 These two approaches involve different cognitive processes;
neither of them can be used to obtain both types of knowledge. However, we
can still use a scientific view to analyze both cognitive processes. 2
Unlike W e s t e r n philosophy, Chinese p h i l o s o p h y mainly a d o p t s the s e c o n d
a p p r o a c h to o b t a i n i n g knowledge. O n e o f the m a i n c o n c e r n s in Chinese phi-
l o s o p h y is a b o u t the self: h o w to develop oneself, h o w to k n o w oneself, and even
h o w to perfect oneself. Practice, n o t logical reasoning, is the p r i m a r y route for
achieving these goals. In one respect, C o n f u c i a n i s m is c o n s i d e r e d to be a t h e o r y

* Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Kao Yuan Institute of Technology, 1821 Chung Shun Road,
Luchu, Kaohsiung County 821, Taiwan; e-mail: chi@cc.kyit.edu.tw.

Dao: A Journal of Comparative PhilosophyJune 2005, Vol. IV, No. 2, pp. 267-282.
9 2005 by Global Scholarly Publications. All rights reserved.

1 New experiences are not necessary for learning through practice. New connections between
experiences may also make us learn something new. For example, a dog can learn a new thing by
connecting the experience of seeing a red light and the experience of smelling food. However, in
some sense, this kind of new connection can also be viewed as new experience. In this article, the
t e r m new experienceis used to include this kind of new connection.
2 This distinction is known in computer science as the distinction between different ways to obtain
declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge (see Miles and Moore) and in psychology as the
distinction between explicit learning and implicit learning (see Reber).
268 Dao: A Journal of ComparativePhilosop~ IV. 2

o f self-perfection. For TU Weiming, self-knowledge is the Confucian way to

make oneself perfect. 3 He says, "To know oneself is simultaneously to perfect
oneself" (Tu 1985: 20). Without self-knowledge, one cannot perfect himself or
herself. Tu says, "The possibility o f perfecting oneself through the enlighten-
ment o f the mind without the mediating o f carefully internalized methods o f
acquiring self-knowledge is limited" (Tu 1993: 105). According to this view,
self-knowledge, or the process o f coming to know oneself, can make one be-
come a perfect or a profound person in the Confucian sense. H o w is this possible?
From Tu's point o f view, to learn about the self is not only self-realization but
also self-development: "Moral and spiritual self-development can be understood
as a process toward an ever-deepening subjectivity" (Tu 1985: 27). This idea
corresponds to an important paragraph in the first chapter o f the Zhongyong~ the
Doctrine of theMean: "What Heaven [Tian]) imparts to man is called human nature.
To follow our nature is called the Way [Dao]. Cultivating the Way is called edu-
cation" (Chan: 98). This passage is believed to describe a central Confucian
thought. One o f the main goals o f Confucianism is to discover our nature. The
learning process cultivates the Way that follows nature. As one discovers his or
her nature, he or she becomes a profound (or a perfect) person. 4
I f we believe that there is this kind o f self-knowledge that enables a person to
become perfect, it is reasonable to believe that self-knowledge is not to be
learned simply by being told. One o f the main reasons is that a profound person,
according to Confucianism, should be wise and virtuous; such a person knows
h o w to do things properly in a certain situation. This ability can only be learned
through (social) practice rather than through being told a set o f facts and rules
(see Dreyfus; Seade). Tu also claims that "one cannot simply convert to Confu-
cianism and identify oneself as Confucian; one must become Confucian through
self-transformation" (Tu, Hejtmanek, and Wachman: 10). The process o f ac-
quiring self-knowledge is thus also the process o f self-development (or

3 Tu also uses personalknowledgeto discuss Confucian teachings. For Tu, personal knowledge is
different from self-knowledge. Personal knowledgeis knowledge about a person not only about the
self. Tu writes, "If I express the view that I know the person, I mean to suggest that I have some
personal knowledge of what the person is" (Tu 1986: 19). Personal knowledge involves
self-knowledge. To know a person requires some "know-how,"not just the art of human interaction,
but also analogical thinking, empathetic appreciation, self-knowledge, and a host of other inter-
nalized skills (Tu 1986: 19). Self-knowledgeis thus necessary to acquire personal knowledge and
personal knowledge has more contents than self-knowledge. However, personal knowledge does
not have to be knowledgeabout other people. We also possess our own personal knowledge. In this
sense, personal knowledgeis close to self-knowledge.However,in Confucianism, our own personal
knowledge cannot be separated from our knowledge of others: "the quest for one's own personal
knowledge must be understood as an act of service to the community as well" (Tu 1993: 41). In
addition, he says, "self-knowledgereveals not one's own private desires, feelings, and thoughts but
the uniqueness of being human, which is shared by all members of the human community" (ru
1993: 93). In this sense, self-knowledgeis much closer to personal knowledge. It is interesting to
discuss the differences and similarities between self-knowledgeand Confucian personal knowledge,
but in order to avoid confusion I will only focus my discussion in this paper on self-knowledge,
although some of Tu's explanations of personal knowledge are helpful for the discussion of
self-knowledge.
4 Like Buddha in Buddhism, a profound person is the highest status in Confucianism. A profound
person is supposed to possess self-knowledgeand bring people peaceful life.
 Chi: A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian Self-Knowledge 269

self-transformation) which is learned through practice rather than simply

through reading or hearing. In addition, since only the perfect person really
knows himself or herself, self-knowledge is hidden from normal people. When
we say that self-development or self-transformation is to acquire self-knowledge,
the process of self-development or self-transformation is not a process of
changing oneself, but a process of revealing one's true self, which is supposed to
be the deepest human nature. The goal of this article is to ask what kind of
knowledge this is and how it possibly works. According to Tu's explanation, I will
analyze Confucian self-knowledge in its cognitive respect. Based on this analysis,
I will discuss whether self-knowledge accurately describes our true self, as Tu
suggests.

II. TO Weiming on Confucian Self-knowledge

Tu claims that the primary focus of Confucianism is self-knowledge, which is a

way to make oneself a profound person. In his view, self-knowledge "is basically an
understanding of one's mental state and an appreciation of one's inner feeling" (Tu
1985: 19). Because a profound person possesses wisdom and virtues that can be
learned not simply by being told, but by a process of self-development through
practice, we can say that self-knowledge is knowledge about one's own mental
states that is learned through practice. However, not all mental states are the
self-knowledge that Tu indicates, because he emphasizes the true self that is
hidden to most people. Only the knowledge of those mental states that reveal the
true self can be properly caled self-knowledge. We can thus say that Confu-
cianism is a theory that can only be learned through a certain type of practice, by
which we discover our true selves. Here, we find a fundamental difference be-
tween Confucianism and Western philosophy. The most important philosophical
knowledge in Confucianism can only be learned through practice, rather than
through arguments or theories. Although virtue ethics in Western philosophy,
especialy in Aristotle, also mentions practice (through practice to develop vir-
tues), the knowledge that can only be learned through practice does not play a
fundamental role in his theories and arguments. However, if we ignore
self-knowledge in Confucianism, we lose sight of one of its essential element.
What kind of knowledge could Confucian self-knowledge be? Why can it
only be learned through practice? Tu suggests, "self-knowledge is neither know-
ing-that nor knowing-ho~, it is, in essence, an objectless awareness, a realization of
the human possibility of intellectualintuition" (Tu 1985: 20). According to Tu,
self-knowledge is a third kind of knowledge, which can be obtained through
intellectual intuition. In order to understand the process of gaining
self-knowledge, we must connect the concept intellectual intuition to the concept
self-knowledge. In doing so, we need another concept, inner experience. Tu says,
"self-knowledge is a form of inner experience" (Tu 1985: 23). Self-knowledge is
thus knowledge about a sort of inner experience, which can be known through
intellectual intuition that is developed through practice. According to Tu, this
process of acquiring self-knowledge is also self-cultivation and when a person
270 Dao: A Journal of ComparalivePhilosophy IV. 2

achieves total self-knowledge, he or she becomes a profound person. 5 WANG

Yangming thus states: "Knowledge is the beginning of action and action is the
completion of knowledge. Learning to be a sage involves only one effort.
Knowledge and action should not be separated" (Chan: 674).
Since the knowledge Wang emphasizes is the awareness or introspection of our
conscience, this knowledge tells us how to act. If one can focus one's attention on
one's conscience, one will grow sensitive to it. Since this sensitivity will offer more
information about one's mental states, one will obtain more knowledge about one's
conscience and gradually combine one's mind with one's conscience. In so doing,
one also develops himself/herself into a profound person. The whole cognitive
process can be simply summarized as follows: Through a process of practice we
obtain a kind of intellectual intuition and through this intellectual intuition we may
obtain (or notice) some sort of inner experience, which reveals something about
our true and hidden selves. The true self can be understood as the common and
deepest nature of human beings. It is hidden because people normally do not
know it. The understanding of our true selves is also self-development into a
profound person. I agree with Tu that this is the proper description of the process
of how we acquire self-knowledge. There are two main issues in analyzing
self-knowledge: The first is to ask what sort of knowledge self-knowledge is if it is
neither knowing-that nor knowing-how, as Tu claims; the second is to explain the
cognitive process involved in acquiring self-knowledge.

III. Self-knowledge as Neither Knowing-that Nor Knowing-how

Tu claims that self-knowledge is neither knowing-that nor knowing-how; it is

another kind of knowledge. Knowing-that (also called factual knowledge) always
refers to knowledge that expresses facts (or fact-like statements) and rules, such
as "Earth is round." We learn this type of knowledge by being told. Know-
ing-how (also called practical knowledge) often refers to knowledge of skills,
such as knowing how to ride a bicycle. This type of knowledge is hardly de-
scribable in language, so that we cannot learn this type of knowledge by being
told. We learn it only through practice.
So, what is self-knowledge? Tu explains, "It is basically an understanding of
one's mental state and an appreciation of one's inner feeling" (Tu 1985: 19). In
one respect self-knowledge should be like a kind of factual knowledge because
the knowledge that is used to express a mental state can be described as a factual
statement, for example, "I know I feel guilty now" or "If I do a certain thing I
will feel guilty" or even "I have a conscience." There are also examples in
Zhongyonff.. '~l profound person knows that human nature is imparted from
Heaven and the Way is to follow that nature; the goal of education is to cultivate
the Way" (Chan: 98). This kind of knowledge looks like factual knowledge. In
addition to describing our mental feelings, Tu also believes that knowing oneself

5Tu says,"althoughexistentiallyhumanbeingsare not what theyoughtto be, theycan be perfected

through self-cultivation;and the reason that theycan become fullyrealizedis inherentin whatthey
are" (Tu 1985:25).
 Chi: A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian Self-Knowledge 271

involves realizing the deeper principle inherent in one's nature (Tu 1985: 32-33).
Principles can also be expressed as factual knowledge, and so self-knowledge is
similar to factual knowledge in this respect.
However, we cannot categorize self-knowledge into factual knowledge be-
cause, unlike factual knowledge, self-knowledge cannot be learned or understood
by being told. We must engage in a certain practice and then experience it in
order to know what it is. From this point of view, self-knowledge is closer to
practical knowledge because we can acquire the knowledge only through practice.
For example, the only way to understand guilt is to do something wrong and then
to experience the mental feeling that emerges after doing the wrong thing.
Through practice, we learn whence guilt originates and how to avoid it. Although
we can express self-knowledge in factual (or sentential) statements, we must ac-
quire it through practice. This kind of knowledge is based on inner experiences,
which can be learned only through practice. Through such experiences, one un-
derstands what expressions of self-knowledge really indicate and then believes
them. This means that if we learn this kind of knowledge only through language,
we do not understand what it really means and then we do not really believe it,
because we lack the fundamental practice-based inner experiences.
Because self-knowledge has features of both sorts of knowledge, it cannot
belong to either category. We may consider it as a third kind of knowledge, which
is like factual knowledge that can be expressed by language, but can be learned
only through practice. 6 This kind of practice is not limited solely to bodily
movement. We may learn practical knowledge only through repeated bodily
practice. For example, in order to learn how to ride a bike or drive a car, one must
perform this activity over and over. However, according to Tu, this method fails
to give us sdf-knowledge. He argues that one cannot become a profound person
by bodily model learning because the Way cannot be determined by a limited set
of rules or divided into discrete stages in a unilinear fashion (Tu 1989: 31). Since
Tu also argues that self-knowledge is about our own mental states, there is no way
to understand our own mental states through bodily movements. In this case,
what we can learn about our selves from bodily practice is not as important as
what we can learn through mental practices.
However, there is another type of knowing-how we need to consider. Fol-
lowing Gilbert Ryle's definition, knowing-howis not merely a type of knowledge
about bodily skills, but also about intellectual skills. For example, Ryle says, "the
chess-player must run over in his head all the relevant rules and tactical maxims
of the game before he can make correct and skilful moves" (Ryle: 29). He adds
that, to do something, thinking what one is doing is always to do two things: (1)
to consider certain appropriate propositions, and (2) to put into practice what
these propositions enjoin (Ryle: 29). Here, we see that Ryle also emphasizes the
importance of mental practice. Knowing-how is also about knowing how to
behave intellectually, so that the practice for learning how to behave intellectually

6When discussingpersonalknowledge,Tu indicatesthat it is a combinationof "knowingthaCand

"knowingbow," for it involvesboth verifiableinformationand acquired skill (Tu 1986: 19). Since
self-knowledgecan be consideredas one typeof personalknowledge,Tu's explanationof personal
knowledgecan supportthis conclusionabout self-knowledge.
272 Dao: A Journal of ComparativePhilosophy IV. 2

demands mental practice. This type of knowing-how is often discussed in moral

philosophy, especially in virtue ethics, as praclicalknowledge (see Simon; Wallace).
Aristotle called itpraclicalwisdom and explained that a man with practical wisdom
knows how to properly do things in different situations and what he does are
really virtuous actions (see Yu: 329-330). Because Confucianism can also be
considered as a type of virtue ethics, can we use this practical wisdom to under-
stand self-knowledge? There are two reasons that self-knowledge is not a type of
practical wisdom. The first reason is, as YU Jiyuan indicates, that there is no Ar-
istotelian notion of practical wisdom in Confucius's thinking:
Confucius insists on the continuity and authenticity of tradition. It is out o f this belief that
Confucius devotes much o f his life to the transmission o f the ancient classics, which record
the li or civilization of Zhou.... Confucius's notion ofyi seems to open the door for an
Aristotelian practical wisdom, but he fails to work it out. He has a major virtue called
"wisdom" (Zhl), but it must also be based on conformity to k'. (Yu: 330-331)

Although Confucius' thinking lacks the Aristotelian notion of practical wis-

dom, we can still fred the idea in his words, even though he does not express it in
a philosophical manner. For example, in the Analects 2:17, Confucius says, "Yu,
shall I teach you [the way to acquire] knowledge? To say that you know when you
do know and say that you do not know when you do not know that is [the way
to acquire] knowledge" (Chan: 24); in the Analects 2:15, Confucius says, "he who
learns but does not think is lost; he who thinks but does not learn is in danger"
(Chan: 24). These paragraphs warrant the belief that Confucius may have had the
idea of wisdom without having developed it, since self-reflecting and thinking
are probably the most important ways of gaining wisdom. In addition, mere
bodily modeling cannot change one into a profound person. If one can become
a profound person merely through bodily modeling, then Confucianism is
nothing but ritualism, while Tu makes it clear that "it is misleading to characterize
Confucianism as a kind of ritualism" (Tu 1985: 22). Thus, merely following li
cannot change one into a profound person. Tu claims that self-knowledge is the
primary focus of Confucianism (Tu 1985: 19), and so this undeveloped idea of
practical wisdom could not be the core foundation of Confucius' thought.
Hence, self-knowledge is neither Aristotelian practical wisdom nor a type of
practical knowledge.
The other reason to claim that self-knowledge is not practical wisdom is that
Tu indicates that self-knowledge is knowledge about our inner feelings or mental
states. We can describe our inner experiences by using factual statements, unlike
Aristotelian practical wisdom, which cannot be clearly expressed through factual
statements. Tu also emphasizes that self-knowledge is about the true self and the
hidden self. The term bidden suggests that we are not aware of the inner ex-
periences of our self, although we can experience them in our daily lives.7 Here,
we must understand the term hidden in another way. It is possible that in our daily
lives we experience self-knowledge without noticing it. Thus, we can only notice

7 Referring to the statement in Zhongyongthat "to follow human nature is called the Way," Tu argues
that since Confucian self-knowledge reveals the Way and the Way is inseparable from our ordinary
existence, Confucian self-knowledge should be found in our daily lives (Tu 1989: 6-7).
 Chi: A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian Self-Knowledge 273

it through a certain process of practice. In other words, for most people, the
experience of self-knowledge could be considered as a new experience, but it is
possible that we have already experienced self-knowledge without noticing it. In
the subsequent sections of this article, I will argue that there are several reasons
to accept this explanation. However, if we do not experience self-knowledge in
our daily life, it is not proper to call it self-knowledge,because it does not necessarily
describe ourselves. A related question is whether self-knowledge shows the true
self, as Tu suggests, or only a possible self. I will discuss these questions in detail.

IV. From InteUectual Intuition to Serf-knowledge

Tu says, "Self-knowledge is nothing more than the manifestation of one's real

nature" (Tu 1985: 20). He also indicates that self-knowledge is, in essence, a
realization of the human possibility of intellectual intuition and explains the idea
of intellectual intuition as direct knowledge of reality without logical reasoning
or inference (Tu 1985: 20). Thus, according to Tu, we can learn our real nature
through self-knowledge and learn self-knowledge, which is a direct knowledge of
reality, through intellectual intuition. What is intellectual intuition? At first, in-
tellectual intuition in Tu seems a mystical capacity. However, he emphasizes that
"it has very little to do with revelation" (Tu 1985: 20). Tu does not intend to make
a mystical explanation of the process of acquiring self-knowledge. He suggests
that "self-knowledge is a form of inner experience" (Tu 1985: 23). We can thus
connect these important concepts, self-knowledge, inner experience, and intellectual
intuition, in an explanation of a cognitive process as follows: through a series of
practice, one obtains an ability that is intellectual intuition, which allows us to
directly perceive an inner experience and this inner experience reveals the true
self (self-knowledge).
We can express this inner experience (a kind of mental state) through factual
statements as self-knowledge. Based on this cognitive process, we find that this
knowledge is only about the self, and not about other people, because all
knowledge comes from personal inner experience. Tu agrees that all knowledge
comes from personal inner experience, but he does not agree that all knowledge
is only about the self. He says, "the experience that is considered truly personal is
not at all private to the individual; self-knowledge is a form of inner experience
precisely because it resonates with the inner experience of the others" (Tu 1985:
23). In addition, Tu indicates,
The quest for self-knowledgeas a way of learningto be human cannotbe a lonelysearch
for privatetruths. Rather,it is a deepenedappreciationof commonhumanity.Since,unlike
mere intellectualreflectionon abstract concepts,knowledgeof this kind must manifest
itself in concreteaffairs,its usefulnessis demonstrableeitherin the rectificationof politics
or in the transformationof society.(Tu 1993: 126)

This explanation points out a difference between Confucianism and other

practice-based philosophies like Daoism and Buddhism. In order to make one's
own inner experiences resonate with the inner experiences of others in society,
the practice of learning self-knowledge necessitates the inclusion of other people.
274 Dao: A Journal of ComparalivePhilosop~ IV. 2

This means that social practice is a required feature o f Confucianism, but not o f
Daoism or Buddhism. Tu says, "Only Confucianism among the Three Teachings
unequivocally asserts that society is both necessary and intrinsically valuable for
self-realization" (Tu 1985: 26). Therefore, we may explain Tu's view as follows:

One of the main goals of Confucianismis to acquire self-knowledge,which is the same as

becoming a profound person. In order to reach this goal, a type of social practice is nec-
essary, through which we can develop an intellectualintuition, which is the key to obtaining
the inner experience of our true selves. Thus, social practice or intellectual intuition can
help us directly obtain self-knowledgewithout logical reasoning.

There are two main issues in this cognitive process. The first is about inner
experience. H o w can inner experiences reveal a real self or the real nature o f
human beings, and why can this only be found through a series o f social practices?
The second is about intellectual intuition. Does intellectual intuition really exist,
and can it work as Tu expects? Through a cognitive analysis, I will discuss these
issues in the following sections.

V. The New Inner Experience

After a series o f practices, a new experience may occur. Having a new experience
is not rare in our daily life. We often obtain new experiences through practice. For
example, a person who cannot swim does not know what it feels like to swim in
a river. After some practice, when he learns how to swim, he will have a new
experience and know what it is like to swim in a river. It is no problem to claim
that practice is helpful for learning and for acquiring new experiences. Based on
the new experiences, we know something new. However, self-knowledge is
knowledge about the self, not about skills. The achievement o f this knowledge
cannot only be done through bodily movements, but must be learned through
introspection. Fortunately, we can improve our ability o f introspection. Nagel
agrees, stating that, "with suitable training, the range o f our non-observational,
introspective awareness can be extended" (Nagel: 452). Through the extension
o f the range o f introspection, we obtain new experiences, which may enable us
to know more about our (hidden and true) self. In addition, this new experience
may also be the foundation for us to understand and believe something that is
considered self-knowledge. Based on some psychological experiments, Pierre
Vermersch argues that introspection is an act that can be improved through
practice. He adds that we can at least practice the ability o f describing our inner
experiences and this ability is helpful for us to understand our inner experiences.
Furthermore, this understanding can improve our next introspection (Vermersch:
22-23). Thus, we may also get new experiences about the self through an im-
proved introspection by practice.
However, the problem is how we can say that the new experience we obtain
through improved introspection is a "hidden self," not a "created self" or a
"possible self." Even if we suppose that all our experiences are part o f the self,
we can only say that the new inner experience is a possible self or a created self,
not a hidden self. When we say that an inner experience shows a hidden self, it
 Chi: A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian Sdf-Knowledge 275

implies that the inner experience shows human nature, which is already in our
minds from the beginning but hidden. Tu does not give an adequate explanation
at this point. However, we can fred some possible reasons to support that a new
inner experience would be part of the hidden self: (1) The new inner experience
is in fact not new, but since we previously ignored it, from the m o m e n t we clearly
experience it, we experience it as a new one. However, because we are also aware
o f its already being there, we consider it as part o f the hidden self; (2) the new
inner experience is really a new one, but when we experience it, we intuitively
believe that it is a hidden self; and (3) the method we used to get the inner ex-
perience makes us believe that it is a hidden self.
O f course, there exist other possibilities. For example, we may say that this
inner experience is a new one, but because we are taught to consider it as a true
self, we then believe it to be a true self. I do not think that this kind of possibility
is worth discussing, and so I would like to focus only on the three possibilities
above. The first explanation seems to contradict itself. H o w is it possible that we
know we always have the experience and still think that the experience is a new
one? In order to explain this possibility, a good example to introduce is Hei-
degger's Dasein. Heidegger suggests that the essence o f a human being is exis-
tence and he uses the term DaMn to describe this existential status and indicates
that Dasein is "always already" situated in a world (Heidegger: 147). If we do not
use Heidegger's phenomenology to investigate our existential status, we may not
fred that Dasein is inseparable from the world. As a result, we may not figure out
the fact that we are always already situated in the world. In other words, the
experience o f being-in-the-world is always there, but we ignore it. Through a
series o f practices, we begin to be aware o f the experience. Although we know
that we always have the experience with us, we still consider the experience a new
one. Can we really call this kind o f experience new experience? When we use the
term new in this way to understand what a new experiences is, we do not need to
emphasize that it is new in the second possible reason. We can rewrite these
possible reasons as follows: (1) The new inner experience makes us understand
that we always ignore it. From the m o m e n t we clearly experience it, because we
are aware o f its always already being there, we consider it as a hidden self; (2)
When we experience the new inner experience, we intuitively believe that it is a
hidden self; (3) The practical method we use to obtain the inner experience
makes us believe that it is a hidden self.
There are some documents that support the first possible reason. According
to Zhongyong ( ~ ) , "it is due to our nature that enlightenment results from
sincerity" (Chan: 107). The new experience comes from the enlightenment,
which results from sincerity. The Chinese character cheng ~ (sincerity) here
normally refers to being sincere with oneself. Since the enlightenment brings us
to see ourselves more clearly, and we also find that the experience of ourselves is
in fact always there, we believe that we find our hidden self. In addition, because
we get the new experience through sincerity, we may also infer that it is a hidden
self. It also supports the third possibility. In addition, there are other reasons that
support the third possibility as follows: (a) The process o f practice does not try
to change one's nature; (b) The process o f practice is letting inner experience
show itself in itself.
276 Dao: A Journal of ComparativePhilosophy IV. 2

In Zhongyong, equilibrium and harmony are both emphasized. Equilibrium is

the mental state before the feelings o f pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are
aroused, and harmony is a situation that, when those feeling are aroused, each
and all attain due measure and degree. The way to reach this goal is to be watchful
over ourselves when we are alone. The reason for this is that there is nothing
more visible than what is hidden and nothing more manifest than what is subtle
(Chan: 98). Based on this description, we can say that when one is alone, it is the
time for the person to go into his or her true self. Confudans do not suggest any
special practice to change oneself. However, they emphasize that we should let
inner experience show itself in itself. Therefore, the man who experiences his
inner experience through this method will tend to believe that what he experi-
ences is his hidden self.
Thus the first and the third possibilities can support each other. Since the
method leads us to see deeper into ourselves, the processes can raise the feeling
that what we experience is our own selves. However, these reasons can only make
us tend to believe that the new inner experience shows our hidden selves, but it is
still possible to be wrong. The new experience could be totally new but when we
experience it we mistakenly believe that we had already possessed it. The way we
intuitively believe that the new inner experience shows our hidden selves (the
second possible reason) is the key to discover whether it really shows a hidden
self. The first and third possibilities do not contradict the second one and there is
no reason to think that Tu may disagree with the first and the third ones. Al-
though Tu does not give an explanation of why the self we discover through
self-knowledge is a true self rather than a created self, with his emphasis on
intellectual intuition, it seems clear that Tu emphasizes the second reason.
However, we may still accept all three of them as reasons to believe that inner
experiences show hidden and true selves.
Tu believes that the intellectual intuition he emphasizes is similar to the
Buddhist idea of intuilive wisdom or nondualknowledge, which refers to an inalienable
quality of the mind that manifests itself as the true Buddha nature in each person
(Tu 1985: 25). In addition, Tu also believes that this intellectual intuition makes
us believe not only that the inner experience is our hidden or true self, but also
that our hidden or true selves are our human nature that is imparted from
Heaven as indicated in Zhongyong (Chan: 98). In this situation, how are Buddhist
and Confucianist self-knowledge different, if both of them refer to the true self?
Since Confucianism emphasizes social practice but Buddhism does not, their
different methods o f practice may result in different intellectual intuitions.
Therefore, through different intuitions, they may produce different
self-knowledge. If this is true, we cannot consider self-knowledge as a descrip-
tion of our hidden and true self, but only a possible self. In order to clarify this, it
is necessary to discuss the mechanism of intellectual intuition that is acquired
through practice. As we have seen, Tu does not want to ascribe to the concept of
intellectual intuition any mystical meaning. So, we supposedly can find out the
mechanism o f this intuition from a cognitive view, which I will discuss in the next
section. Then, we will be in a better position to examine whether intellectual
intuition can reveal a hidden or true self rather than a possible self.
 Chi: A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian Self-Knowledge 277

VI. The Mechanism of Intellectual Intuition

In the Western philosophical tradition, especially from Plato to Kant, philoso-

phers tried to find the ground of knowledge that is self-justifying or apriori. This
tradition has received much critique, from a holistic point of view, which sug-
gests that there is no fundamental ground of knowledge (see Quine; Blanshard).
Thus, the grounded knowledge thought to be true through intuition is still
problematic. Some other critiques are from a psychological point of view, which
suggests that the mechanism of intuition is not a trustworthy means to obtain
knowledge. However, the word intuiiion is not always used in the same sense. It is
helpful to have a rough definition of it before discussing the mechanism of
intellectual intuition. Since Tu does not offer a clear definition of the term intd-
kctualintuilion, I ~ follow a general definition that does not conflict with any of
Tu's explanations. Based on Gopnik and Schwitzgebel, we may call any judgment
an intMlivejudgraent, or more briefly, an intMtion, just in case that judgment is not
made on the basis of some kind of explicit reasoning process that a person can
consciously observe (see Gopnik & Schwitzgebel: 77). According to this defini-
tion, intuition is simply an emerging judgment or belief that does not have a
conscious reasoning process. There are many critiques about this kind of cog-
nitive process. Edward Wisniewski indicates that many of the judgments made
through this process are not trustworthy. He says,

Based on researchfrom cognitiveand socialpsychologyand observationsabout evolution,

I describe the dangers of appealingto intuition as the sole methodologyfor obtaining
knowledge. I begin by describing several salient examples of fairlybasic intuitions that
seem obviouslytrue, but that are contradictedby the results of psychologicalstudies. Such
examples are not rare and the fact that strong intuitions sometimesturn out to be wrong
should make one very cautious about trusting any intuition. (Wisniewski:45)

There are examples that can support Wisniewski's view. For example, some
vision-trick pictures always delude people into making wrong intuitive judgments.
However, we should ignore this kind of intuition in our discussion because not
all types of intuition are the same and what Tu wants to emphasize is the intui-
tion about the self or inner experience, not about the external world. George
Bealer divides intuition into two categories, rational intuition and physical intui-
tion. He explains what physical intuition is with this example: when we see that a
house is undermined, we intuitively believe that it will fall. This belief may be
wrong because the mechanism for us to believe that the house will fall is probably
that we get used to seeing that things undermined will fall. However, there is no
guarantee that this expectation must be right. The rational intuition is such that
we intuitively believe if P then not not-P (see Bealer: 207). Following this dis-
tinction, intellectual intuition should belong to or be closer to rational intuition,
rather than to physical intuition. Since they occur from different cognitive
mechanisms, critiques about physical intuition do not necessarily apply to intel-
lectual intuition.
The main reason Wisniewski argues that many intuitive judgments are not
trustworthy is that people do not always have conscious access to their thought
processes, and they are sometimes unaware of factors that influence their
278 Dao:A Journalof ComparalivePhilosop&IV. 2

thoughts and behavior (Wisniewski: 45). His argument can be used to defeat
some philosophical theories that use a type of intuition. For example, Frederick
Anderson defines intuition as the talent of judging right upon imperfect mate-
rials, of making a wise choice between several possible views (Anderson: 365).
Since this kind of intuition requires an unconscious thinking process, it will
encounter the problem Wisniewski proposes. Obviously, Wisniewski's argument
about intuition is not suitable to Tu's intellectual intuition. Wisniewski believes
that some intuitive judgments come from an unconscious thinking process,
which may result in mistakes. However, Tu would not agree that there is an
unconscious thinking process in intellectual intuition because he believes that
intellectual intuition is the process of letting the inner experience show itself in
itself. It is just as I know I am in pain or I know I am experiencing something
interesting.
Intellectual intuition is probably closer to Heidegger's phenomenology.
Heidegger said, "the expression phenomenon signifies that which shows itself in
itself, the manifest"; he added, the meaning of ~alVOlatVaor phenomena is the
totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light (Heidegger:
28). The similar description in Zhongyongemphasizes that we should be sincere
with ourselves: "Given sincerity, there will be enlightenment, and given
enlightenment, there will be sincerity" (Chan: 107). The true self may show itself
in itself through the process of being sincere with oneself. However, their
similarity is only in the cognitive process, not in the content. Tu's intellectual
intuition is into the true and hidden self. He believes that through a series of
practices, our hidden self may show itself in itself to us and then we will obtain
self-knowledge, which is the foundation of Confucianism. Without a doubt,
through the practice of sincerity, we may clearly observe our own selves and the
process of observation may bring us new inner experience, as Tu indicates.
Therefore, the new experience will reveal self-knowledge to us. However, since
the fundamental method is similar to Heidegger's phenomenology--let a phe-
nomenon show itself in itself--and Heidegger's philosophy can never go outside
phenomena, self-knowledge should never go outside inner experiences. If we
have a belief that does not purely belong to inner experiences, then the belief is
not learned purely through intellectual intuition. Unfortunately, some of the
most important beliefs about self-knowledge in Confucianism are not purely
descriptions of inner experiences, but statements about the external world and
other minds as these examples show: (1) Human nature is imparted from Heaven;
and (2) Everyone's nature is similar.
How can we learn these from our hidden selves through purely inner ex-
periences? Tu points out that the practice for learning our own nature should
include social practice. This means that interaction with other people is one of
the main parts in the process of practice. From practice, we can even understand
other people's emotions as we experience them. Based on this kind of experience,
we automatically form the intuition that all human beings have a similar nature.
From the similar process of learning this self-knowledge, the other
self-knowledge is also obtained. The Zhongyongstates,

Onlythosewho are absolutelysincerecan fullydeveloptheirnature.If theycan fullydevelop

 Chi: A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian Self-Knowledge 279

their nature, they can then fully develop the nature of others. If they can fully develop the
nature of others, they can then fullydevelop the nature of things. If they can fullydevelop the
nature of things, they can then assist in the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven
and Earth. If they can assistin the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth,
they can thus form a trinity with Heaven and Earth. (Chan: 107-108).

This means that if the practice for learning self-knowledge is only about our-
selves, then we can find the true nature about ourselves, but if it includes other
people, we can also find the true self or true nature o f ourselves and o f others. I f
the practice also includes things or objects, then we can even fred a more broad
hidden self that includes things or objects. Furthermore, it can also include the
transforming and nourishing process o f Heaven and Earth. When our observa-
tion o f our hidden self reaches this realm, we can form a trinity with Heaven and
Earth and then fred that our nature is in fact inseparable from Heaven. Thus, we
will find that our nature is imparted from Heaven.
This explanation may encounter a problem regarding whether this process o f
intellectual intuition is purely letting the hidden self show itself in itself. It seems
strange that our hidden selves can tell us that all human nature is similar. Since
this statement is not merely an expression about inner experiences but also a
belief about the world and other people, it is hard to believe that this statement
comes entirely from the hidden self or inner experiences. Except for an obser-
vation o f our inner experiences, self-knowiedge must also have a property o f
Anderson's definition of making a wise choice between several possible views.
Based on long-term interaction with other people, we may reasonably believe
that others have similar hidden natures as ours. However, this belief can turn out
to be wrong. We may simply use our own hidden selves as a model to understand
and explain other people's behavior, but it is not necessarily true. T h e belief
comes from an unconscious reasoning process. While there is an unconscious
thinking process, we must face Wisniewski's critique that it may turn out to be
wrong. An unconscious thinking process may still offer wise judgment, but there
is no guarantee that it must be true. Therefore, the whole approach used for
finding Confucian self-knowledge is in fact not as trustworthy as Tu may expect.
Self-knowledge is not only a description about an inner experience, but also a
judgment about the world. However, it does not imply that we must abandon this
methodology to obtain beliefs. Wisniewski only suggests that we must be very
careful when using it. I f we find a kind o f intuition whose mechanism is
trustworthy, although not necessarily creating true belief, we can still use it to
obtain reasonable knowledge.
In discussing this sort o f intuition, Petitmengin-Peugeot indicates that the
history o f the science is full o f testimonies from scientists about how a new idea
came to them in a sudden, unexpected manner, without any discursive activity
(Petitmengin-Peugeot: 43). This kind o f intuition is absolutely not only about
inner experience, but about the world. In addition, we can reasonably believe that
those scientific discoveries are correct. T h e mechanism that leads this kind o f
intuition to make a true statement should exist. T h e important thing we must do
is to dig out the different unconscious thinking processes o f intuition, and then
to determine the degrees to which it is trustworthy. Petitmengin-Peugeot pre-
sents a mechanism in detail to explain this kind o f intuition. Through practice,
280 Dao: A Journal of ComparalivePhilosophyIV. 2

we create practical knowledge and this knowledge may bring us a new ex-
perience, and then when we represent this experience into words, we suddenly
(intuitively) get the idea. There are two major stages in this process. One is the
process of practice to gain new experiences; the other is the process from
experiences to language. This process is very similar to our discussion about
obtaining self-knowledge. In fact, we can find a lot of examples in both proc-
esses in our daily life. We always learn new experiences through different prac-
tices, no matter whether it is physical, mental, social, or otherwise. Sometimes we
have a feeling that something is wrong but cannot explain why. We might gain
some abilities only on an experiential level, but not represent them in words. A
famous example is the other mind problem. We may agree that we cannot make
sure that others have a mind, but in fact, in our daily life, nobody really doubts it.
The same case is the problem of the external world. The knowledge of other
minds and the external world is neither from conscious reasoning nor from any a
priori knowledge, but from practice. Through practice with other people and
interactions with the external world, we obtain experiences about other minds
and the external world. Before we think about the question of whether others
have a mind, we have built an experience about others' existence with a mind
through social practice and then used the experience in our daily life to
strengthen the experience or belies
Here, we can come back to our previous question o f whether this process of
getting self-knowledge is to fred out a hidden self or to build a possible self. Tu
states that "learning for the sake of others as a demonstration of altruism cannot
be truly altruistic, unless it is built on the foundation of self-knowledge" (Tu
1985: 56). Through the practice o f altruism, we may build an experience where
altruistic virtue is our hidden nature, and then we will become altruistic. From
this expression, we also find another explanation about our hidden nature. It
means that we may also build our hidden nature through practice. If we can build
something into our nature, can we still say that it is our hidden nature? If
something is our hidden nature, should we need to build it? Tu does not seem to
clearly distinguish between hidden nature and possible nature because he thinks
that to understand self-knowledge is not only a process of self-realization, but
also self-cultivation (Tu 1985: 7-8). For him self-knowledge is a realization o f the
human "possibility" of intellectual intuition (Tu 1985: 20). Thus, it seems that Tu
does not want to distinguish them. Or, we might explain it by saying that the best
possible self is also our true and hidden self. However, since we have no argu-
ment to support this point of view, it is only a possible explanation of Tu's
unclear ideas of/rue self and hidden self.
Although practical knowledge about our daily life can be trained through
practice to be more and more accurate, it still has its limitations. There is no
guarantee that the way to obtain Confucian self-knowledge can lead us to the
truth. We may consider both statements of the Confucian self-knowledge dis-
cussed above as not proper self-knowledge but reasonable presuppositions. In
addition, if we consider that self-knowledge is about a possible self and we build
it through practice, then we should consider it as built beliefs rather than a hidden
self. The beliefs may not be true ontologically, but they are held as true for
profound persons. In addition to the Confucian self-knowledge, there is still
 Chi: A Cognitive Analysis of Confucian Self-Knowledge 281

other self-knowledge that purely describes our own inner experience and reveals
our hidden nature or hidden self. However, at least two of the most important
statements in Confucian self-knowledge, which is not purely a description about
self but also about others or the world, cannot totally be built from an approach
that can guarantee their truth. We can still consider them as reasonable pre-
suppositions in Confucianism.

VII. Conclusion

The main goal of this essay is to discuss what Confucian self-knowledge is ac-
cording to Tu's explanation and give it a cognitive analysis, in order to see how
much we can trust Confucian self-knowledge. Following Tu, I argue that
self-knowledge can be expressed by using language, but can only be acquired
through practice. As Tu indicates, self-knowledge is neither factual knowledge
nor practical knowledge. It is a third kind of knowledge. The difference between
self-knowledge and factual knowledge is that we can understand or believe
self-knowledge only through practice. The difference between self-knowledge
and practical knowledge is that self-knowledge is not only about skills, but also
about beliefs that can be expressed through language.
The process of attaining self-knowledge is a two-stage steps. Through a se-
ries of practices, we obtain a new inner experience and then turn the experience
into words. I suggest that we can understand Tu's intellectualintuilion through this
cognitive process. The reason to consider the process as a type of intuition is that
during the practice we cannot be clearly aware of the change of our own mental
states, but we gradually experience our deeper mental states. Then, when we
suddenly turn the experience into words, we consciously find our own hidden
self and obtain self-knowledge. This process corresponds to our general defini-
tion of intuition, as Gopnik and Schwitzgebel propose. This process of getting
knowledge is different from the Western philosophical tradition, and as Tu in-
dicates, this methodology is probably the main method in most of the Chinese
philosophical traditions, especially in Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. For
their distinct methodologies, it is not proper to compare these two types of
knowledge. However, we can still analyze them from a cognitive perspective to
see whether they are trustworthy. There is no problem with this methodology for
acquiring self-knowledge as discussed above when we adopt it to acquire
knowledge about the self and it can only be reasonable (but cannot be certain)
when we adopt it to acquire knowledge from inner experiences about other people
and the world.

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