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Wartime Command & Control Proceedings January 2024 Vol 15011
Wartime Command & Control Proceedings January 2024 Vol 15011
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To prevail in this scenario, senior commanders will need to delegate to the maximum extent possible, rely on mission command, and update their
commander’s intent often.
U.S. NAVY (MARCUS STANLEY)
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Initial Thoughts
It is important to explain command and control and its application, structure,
execution, and management. The military mind tends to align things in vertical
priorities, authorities, and responsibilities, so breaking C2 into a vertical, hierarchical
context is the norm. That structuring takes the form of echelons of commands and
formations and phases of competition and war.
The military does not do well with horizontal constraints and variables other than,
perhaps, time. Even regarding time, services and commands focus on the near
term—what needs to be done today, inclined toward crisis planning and crisis
response rehearsals. When a longer view is taken, too often it does not inform near-
term planning and actions. It expresses a desired end-state rather than a horizon
for a long-term sequence of events; it remains, in other words, a variable that
affects operational and tactical concerns, not strategic ones. Or, at the very least, it
does not connect the operational and tactical considerations closely and
sequentially with the strategic ones.
Command and control is not a unified concept. Command is related to, but
distinctly different from, control. They are characterized as a single construct—C2—
but this can cause confusion, even more so when they are combined with
“communications” and “computers” in the “C4” construct. In 2002, then Seventh
Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Robert Willard defined the terms this way:
“Command is the doctrinal assignment of authority. Possessing a measure of
command is a prerequisite to exerting control. Control is defined as guiding the
operation.” He noted:
A context for determining the scenario centers of gravity is found in the following
statements. The U.S. and allied strategic goals are to (1) defend Taiwan by ensuring;
(2) Taiwan remains autonomous; (3) China is defeated militarily; and (4) China is
isolated politically and economically.
The first objective (defending Taiwan) is an outcome of achieving the second and
third objectives (Taiwan remains autonomous and China is militarily defeated). The
second and third objectives should be assigned to DoD as the supported authority.
The fourth should be retained by the State Department as the supported authority.
Objective two should be clarified in the context of China’s stated military operation
“to restore the integrity of Greater China.” This People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
operation to reunify Taiwan with China is broadly referred to as the Joint Island
Landing Campaign (JILC).3 Defeating this campaign is a more appropriate military
mission than defeating the PLA. DoD would assign this clarified objective (mission)
to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (Indo-PaCom).
C2
Command is the structure operational commanders use to exercise their
authorities to pursue assigned missions. Higher authority assigns and delegates
missions to subordinates. The functions that enable mission success include:
movement, maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. Tasks within
the functions are actions that create the necessary effects to achieve the assigned
mission.
According to the 2020 Joint Staff paper “Mission Command,” the subject is
philosophically focused on the art of war and is defined as “the conduct of military
operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders.” The
paper goes on to say mission command “exploits the human elements of trust,
force of will, intuition, judgement, and creativity, exercised through disciplined
initiative.”4 This is why delegating authority must be a commander’s routine
practice. If not practiced in times of stability and clarity, it will not happen in the
chaos and fog of war.
The underpinning document that provides order and clarity to mission command
is commander’s intent. Mission command is a concept, and commander’s intent
provides its structure. Often described as what constitutes success for the
operation, commander’s intent highlights the purpose, key tasks, and conditions
that define the end-state. This view, however, lacks an essential understanding of
the different time horizons required to deal with peer competition, crisis, and
conflict. Commander’s intent should be conditions-based on a horizon of interest
relevant to the engaged forces. These changing conditions extend from the
strategic to tactical levels, include risk/advantage to force and mission, and cross all
functions of warfare, including movement, maneuver, intelligence, fires,
sustainment, and protection. For the past 30 years, U.S. commanders have had the
luxury of time continuums that are too long for this scenario at the tactical level.
Success requires breaking down tactical operations into shorter time frames,
aligning the focus of engaged forces to the battle conditions they will experience.
At the operational and strategic levels, where the echelon I and II commanders and
staffs function, longer time horizons will be the norm. The days of Operations Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF), where all echelons often functioned
at the tactical edge, are informative but not instructive. Those who do not
command at the echelon they are assigned will not succeed.
Command Relationships
Unique and shared command responsibilities will have to be negotiated with the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs across combatant and
functional commanders. With global authorities and responsibilities, U.S. Strategic
Command, Space Command, Special Operations Command, Transportation
Command, and Cyber Command all will be operating in the theater. Adjacent
combatant commands—Central Command, Africa Command, European
Command, Southern Command, and Northern Command—all have coordinating
equities. With every combatant and functional command engaged, command
authorities must be as simple as possible.
Because the outcomes of this conflict are critical, combatant, operational, and
tactical control of forces must be the rule. Joint Publication 1 notes that all three
have unique attributes, but all have a common critical element—assigned
authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the commander
considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.5 These authorities,
centralized in theater commanders, are critical to sustaining the clarity,
accountability, and responsibility for success of the missions assigned to counter
the PLA. Specifically, authorities include those to “plan for, deploy, direct, control,
and coordinate the actions of subordinate forces.”6 Power delegated is power
applied.
Supported/Supporting
CJTFs have the authority to establish and assign missions and authorities to
subordinate task force (TF) commanders. These can be domain-based, such as joint
force maritime component commander, joint force land component commander,
etc. In this scenario, the CJTF should establish them based on mission or function.
An example of a mission-based TF would be to establish freedom of maneuver to
conduct fires in support of CJTF mission objectives. A function-based TF would be
ordered to provide logistical support to other TFs.
Success in this scenario requires exploring options before such a war breaks out to
develop the highest level of integration possible between the United States and
Taiwan. Cooperation with Taiwan may be the best that can be achieved, but this is
just the first for four critical levels of integration. Cooperative organizations remain
separate, conducting independent operations but cooperating to be aware of the
timing, tempo, and intention of each other’s independent operations.
The next higher level is collaboration. While command functions are not integrated
in the U.S. joint context, U.S. and allied command staffs could be collocated to
collaborate during operational planning and execution.
Delegating the latitude to plan how to accomplish missions with the resources
assigned will ensure unity of command and effort and optimize resources. No one
warfare area or capability should be the primary focus of any commander.
Rules of Engagement
Rules of engagement are defined as “directives issued by competent military
authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United
States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces
encountered.”10 The key words are circumstances and limitations. ROE can
diminish the efficiency and effectiveness of military operations. When this occurs, it
is incumbent on military commanders to inform civilian leaders of the effects on
risk to mission and force. Discussions of ROE ensure all the implications—both
intended and otherwise—are fully understood. This requirement underscores the
importance of ROE so that law-of-war (justice in war) principles such as military
necessity, discrimination, and proportionality are fully adhered to.11 When a
commander assesses that the ROE provides insufficient latitude for success, he or
she must inform civilian leaders—who determine the rules—of the risk.
Complying with ROE also emphasizes the centrality of civil authority over military
operations. Core to ROE is ensuring all military operations are fully compliant with
international law; and guided by restraints (must not do) and constraints (must do)
of U.S. civil government authorities. Multinational operations require a clear
understanding of the application and implications of every participating nation’s
ROE caveats.
Control Considerations
With a clear delineation between command and control, control considerations
become more distinct—as Admiral Willard put it, the ability to guide combat
operations and forces. This is the amalgamation of software, hardware, and people
to deploy, employ, and optimize C5ISR. These are the enabling capabilities and
tools of command.
In OEF and OIF, the control environment was much less contested than the one
envisioned in this scenario. The implications of control mechanisms in this scenario
are just as critical as the command structures. Control capabilities and tools should
be built to support the worst-case environment for exercising command over
fielded forces in denied areas. Project Overmatch is an example of an effort
designed to provide hardened battle networks to operate in contested
environments.
Summary
Joint power, capacity, and capabilities must be centralized under joint command
authorities. Mission, function, and task authorities must be assigned with the
clarity and certainty provided by operational and tactical control constructs.
Devolving to supported/supporting constructs is a leading indicator of insufficient
resources for the missions assigned. Mission command, with its supporting
commander’s intent, ensures unity of command and effort when control
mechanisms are interdicted or overwhelmed. Control is separate and distinct but
related to command. And judicious delegation of authority helps sustain the
velocity of action, protecting decision superiority.
A war such as the one in this scenario would be demanding, lethal, and risk-filled.
To prevail, commanders must remember these historical tenets of command and
control, applying them with the knowledge that war complicates everything. As
Albert Einstein might have advised, C2 must be as simple as possible, and no
simpler.
1. VADM Robert F. Willard, USN, “Rediscover the Art of Command and Control,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 128, no. 10 (October 2002), 52.
3. Cristina L. Garafola, “China Maritime Report No. 19: The PLA Airborne Corps in a Joint Island
Landing Campaign,” China Maritime Studies Institute, 5.
4. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Mission Command, 2nd
edition (January 2020), 1.
5. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,
25 March 2013 Incorporating Ch. 1, 12 July 2017, V-6, 7.
6. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,
V-7, 3. c. (7).
7. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,
V-8, 5. a.
8. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,
V-8, 5. a.
9. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,
II-21, II-13.
10. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-04: Legal Support to Military Operations, 2 August 2016, GL-3
11. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-04: Legal Support to Military Operations, 2 August 2016, II-2.
By Admiral Scott Swift, U.S. Navy
(Retired)
Admiral Swift commanded the U.S. Pacific Fleet from
2015 to 2018. In 2023, he served as a senior mentor for the
Navy’s Large Scale Exercise and the global war game at
the Naval War College.
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Jeff Heier − ⚑
10 days ago
more important than the cuban missile crisis? please! what is it with dead krauts that we americans love so much???
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