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To prevail in this scenario, senior commanders will need to delegate to the maximum extent possible, rely on mission command, and update their
commander’s intent often.
U.S. NAVY (MARCUS STANLEY)

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Wartime Command & Control

The War of 2026 scenario demands rethinking both command and control
with mission command a central tenet.

By Admiral Scott Swift, U.S. Navy (Retired)

January 2024 Proceedings Vol. 150/1/1,451

THE AMERICAN SEA POWER PROJECT VIEW ISSUE

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Analyzing command and control (C2)—whether in an academic environment, a

wargame or exercise debrief, or through a historical lens—can be an interesting but
often sterile endeavor. Which senior leader made what decision based on what
information available at which time? Which side put the right leaders in command
with the proper control mechanisms and the authorities to act to gain decision
advantage over the adversary? These are weighty but often lofty discussions.

There is nothing lofty and everything weighty

about command and control in the 2026
scenario. It will be visceral and pressurized,
with constant life-and-death decisions. As the
scenario states, the stakes “are enormous—
much greater than at any time since the Cold
War or even World War II—and carry
extraordinary implications. . . . ‘Business as
usual’ is not viable.” Commanders at all levels
will have to make the hardest decisions of
their lives, often with limited time to think
and with thousands of lives on the line.

What follows is a discussion of C2 based on

years of study and experience in exercises
and wargames focused on the western
Pacific. I cannot pretend to have lived
through—never mind led through—a war of
this intensity. But U.S. and allied commanders must stretch their imaginations now
to inform C2 relationships before such a scenario ever becomes a reality.

Initial Thoughts
It is important to explain command and control and its application, structure,
execution, and management. The military mind tends to align things in vertical
priorities, authorities, and responsibilities, so breaking C2 into a vertical, hierarchical
context is the norm. That structuring takes the form of echelons of commands and
formations and phases of competition and war.

The military does not do well with horizontal constraints and variables other than,
perhaps, time. Even regarding time, services and commands focus on the near
term—what needs to be done today, inclined toward crisis planning and crisis
response rehearsals. When a longer view is taken, too often it does not inform near-
term planning and actions. It expresses a desired end-state rather than a horizon
for a long-term sequence of events; it remains, in other words, a variable that
affects operational and tactical concerns, not strategic ones. Or, at the very least, it
does not connect the operational and tactical considerations closely and
sequentially with the strategic ones.

Increasing a commander’s planning and

action horizon is critical to moving beyond
reactive actions derived from direct, objective
observations of enemy activity. For a
commander and his or her assigned forces to
succeed, they must anticipate enemy actions,
maneuvering their forces to positions of
advantage in space, time, and
During World War II, Admiral Chester Nimitz
configuration. There are tools to achieve this
delegated authority to subordinate commanders
ideal. Cycles of planning, assessments, and to the maximum extent possible. He also
updated his commander’s intent often so that
action are intended to drive the velocity of they understood the “why” and the risk/reward
war to one’s advantage. They are designed to calculus. U.S. Naval Institute Archives

meld the science of objective planning with

the art of subjective alternatives in a structured, repeatable process. Commanders
and staffs train to use these tools but often fail to apply them in execution. Enemy
actions and own-force friction cause timelines for action to collapse; planning
timelines follow; and decision timelines become product-based rather than
process-based. Enemy effects take root in U.S. commanders’ processes.

Leadership is a critical element of command and control, but talking about

leadership is insufficient without discussing its relationship to management. When
an operation is going smoothly and according to plan, C2 activities are best
described as “managing the plan.” When an operation does not go smoothly,
however, or when the plan is flawed or planning assumptions are proven to be
false, those who would have managed the plan’s execution must now lead to
adjust it—changing or even abandoning the plan based on emergent realities. The
overall mission may remain unchanged and its functions consistent, but time
constraints will force changes, which are driven by the leaders’ experience and
subjective analysis.

Command and control is not a unified concept. Command is related to, but
distinctly different from, control. They are characterized as a single construct—C2—
but this can cause confusion, even more so when they are combined with
“communications” and “computers” in the “C4” construct. In 2002, then Seventh
Fleet Commander Vice Admiral Robert Willard defined the terms this way:
“Command is the doctrinal assignment of authority. Possessing a measure of
command is a prerequisite to exerting control. Control is defined as guiding the
operation.” He noted:

The acquisition of and training on command and control (C2) tools—computers,

radios, and software—became confused with the requirement for continuous
training in the operational art of and methods for effective control of forces.
[Emphasis added.]1

For both command and control, leader/manager authorities should be delegated

to the maximum extent possible. Decision advantage is often thought of as
something technology can deliver; this is a core tenet of Project Overmatch, but
technological solutions will have little effect if authorities remain centralized with
high-level commanders or inside individual staffs.2

Delegating authorities to lower levels increases the velocity of effects in the

operational plan. It reduces the adversary’s opportunity to degrade control of forces
by interdicting communications.

Reasons not to delegate authority can include subordinate commanders or

commands not being trained appropriately, limited or nonexistent ability to
communicate action and intent, and a lack of resources to act on delegated
authorities. Solutions to these challenges exist, but they are more easily adopted
before a fight. Waiting until a conflict has begun will increase the fog and
uncertainty. But sometimes, plans must be improvised after the shooting starts.

A War for More Than Regional Hegemony

The War of 2026 scenario describes a struggle for regional hegemony and Taiwan,
with implications for leadership of the world order. The “why,” therefore, is to defeat
China’s ability to replace or displace the current international rules-based order
through force and coercion. As the fighting begins, the lead national security
functions must shift from the State Department to the Department of Defense.
The application of military planning and effects that would have been ongoing will
take priority, but they will not replace discourse, dialogue, and diplomacy.

Centers of gravity assessment and determination are critical to formulating

relevant command, control, and rules of engagement. An ongoing risk-to-mission
assessment must determine when there are more impediments to success than
enablers. This assessment guides policy and rules of engagement (ROE) decisions
that, when timely and informed, can empower friendly objectives.

A context for determining the scenario centers of gravity is found in the following
statements. The U.S. and allied strategic goals are to (1) defend Taiwan by ensuring;
(2) Taiwan remains autonomous; (3) China is defeated militarily; and (4) China is
isolated politically and economically.

The first objective (defending Taiwan) is an outcome of achieving the second and
third objectives (Taiwan remains autonomous and China is militarily defeated). The
second and third objectives should be assigned to DoD as the supported authority.
The fourth should be retained by the State Department as the supported authority.

Objective two should be clarified in the context of China’s stated military operation
“to restore the integrity of Greater China.” This People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
operation to reunify Taiwan with China is broadly referred to as the Joint Island
Landing Campaign (JILC).3 Defeating this campaign is a more appropriate military
mission than defeating the PLA. DoD would assign this clarified objective (mission)
to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (Indo-PaCom).

C2
Command is the structure operational commanders use to exercise their
authorities to pursue assigned missions. Higher authority assigns and delegates
missions to subordinates. The functions that enable mission success include:
movement, maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. Tasks within
the functions are actions that create the necessary effects to achieve the assigned
mission.

Command is executed through control mechanisms. Broadly those mechanisms

are provided by the man, train, and equip functions of the service chiefs and
endorsed by the Secretary of Defense through the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. They are codified in law through the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

Scenario Command Considerations

Command structures, authorities, and
protocols should be built for the worst-case
environment for exercising command over
fielded forces. The command environment in
this scenario will be the most contested since
World War II. Each side takes an opposing
philosophical approach to command, one
embracing decentralization as a core
strength, the other treating it as a core
weakness. It is incumbent that U.S. command In a war with China, U.S. commanders’ ability to
structures are built on a decentralized communicate up, down, and across echelons
would be hampered significantly. Planning for
foundation of mission command. and exercising graceful degradation before the
conflict will be a key to success. U.S. Navy (Ryre
Aciaga)

Mission Command / Commander’s Intent

According to the 2020 Joint Staff paper “Mission Command,” the subject is
philosophically focused on the art of war and is defined as “the conduct of military
operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders.” The
paper goes on to say mission command “exploits the human elements of trust,
force of will, intuition, judgement, and creativity, exercised through disciplined
initiative.”4 This is why delegating authority must be a commander’s routine
practice. If not practiced in times of stability and clarity, it will not happen in the
chaos and fog of war.

The underpinning document that provides order and clarity to mission command
is commander’s intent. Mission command is a concept, and commander’s intent
provides its structure. Often described as what constitutes success for the
operation, commander’s intent highlights the purpose, key tasks, and conditions
that define the end-state. This view, however, lacks an essential understanding of
the different time horizons required to deal with peer competition, crisis, and
conflict. Commander’s intent should be conditions-based on a horizon of interest
relevant to the engaged forces. These changing conditions extend from the
strategic to tactical levels, include risk/advantage to force and mission, and cross all
functions of warfare, including movement, maneuver, intelligence, fires,
sustainment, and protection. For the past 30 years, U.S. commanders have had the
luxury of time continuums that are too long for this scenario at the tactical level.

Success requires breaking down tactical operations into shorter time frames,
aligning the focus of engaged forces to the battle conditions they will experience.
At the operational and strategic levels, where the echelon I and II commanders and
staffs function, longer time horizons will be the norm. The days of Operations Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) and Enduring Freedom (OEF), where all echelons often functioned
at the tactical edge, are informative but not instructive. Those who do not
command at the echelon they are assigned will not succeed.

Mission is an end-state—in this case defeating the Chinese JILC. Commander’s

intent, however, is conditions-based. Initially, it might be “Create the conditions to
deter the PLA’s campaign to take Taiwan.” If the PLA is not deterred, commander’s
intent must change. When to transmit the updated intent depends on available
communications.

For these reasons, commander’s intent should be part of a running assessment. It

should be a living document, changed and updated as battle conditions change
and reissued as the communications allow. It should be concise for ease of
transmission, and unambiguous to subordinate commands that may not have the
benefit of knowing the conditions that drove the changes.

Command Relationships

Unique and shared command responsibilities will have to be negotiated with the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs across combatant and
functional commanders. With global authorities and responsibilities, U.S. Strategic
Command, Space Command, Special Operations Command, Transportation
Command, and Cyber Command all will be operating in the theater. Adjacent
combatant commands—Central Command, Africa Command, European
Command, Southern Command, and Northern Command—all have coordinating
equities. With every combatant and functional command engaged, command
authorities must be as simple as possible.

Because the outcomes of this conflict are critical, combatant, operational, and
tactical control of forces must be the rule. Joint Publication 1 notes that all three
have unique attributes, but all have a common critical element—assigned
authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the commander
considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.5 These authorities,
centralized in theater commanders, are critical to sustaining the clarity,
accountability, and responsibility for success of the missions assigned to counter
the PLA. Specifically, authorities include those to “plan for, deploy, direct, control,
and coordinate the actions of subordinate forces.”6 Power delegated is power
applied.

Supported/Supporting

The supported/supporting command relationship should be avoided. It is applied

when there are more missions than forces assigned can support and more tasks
than resources available. If this was not the case, then operational or tactical
control authorities would be applied. These authorities are “by design, a somewhat
vague but very flexible arrangement.”7 Joint Publication-1 further states: “When a
supporting commander cannot fulfill the needs of the supported commander, the
establishing authority will be notified by either the supported or a supporting
commander. The establishing authority is responsible for determining a solution.”8
In this scenario, this “vague but very flexible arrangement” will increase the
workload of overtasked senior commanders.

If operational tempo is low to moderate, supporting/supported command

authorities work well to allow a supporting commander to serve under resourced
commanders. As operational tempo increases, however, the available bandwidth of
senior commanders and their staffs decreases, reducing their ability to adjudicate
supporting or supported commanders’ conflicting support. As a result, these
adjudication priorities are determined by default rather than design, with
subordinate commanders making decisions without necessary experience,
intelligence, operational insight, or authority. Without the preponderance of force
and internal logistics lines, supported/supporting command relationships are high
risk.

Joint Command Structure

Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, should be authorized as the joint force

commander (JFC), responsible for mission achievement, but no single service can
win this fight. Missions must be centralized through multiservice joint command
structures. Functions must be joint, drawing on capability distributed across all
services. Tasks must be assigned to joint formations based on the highest
probability of success with the least risk to force/mission and lowest cost in
resources required.

The JFC would establish subordinate command elements with assigned

subordinate missions in specific areas of operations. Those missions would inform
the establishment of joint operations areas providing geographic boundaries of
assigned missions, authorities, responsibilities, functions, tasks, and risks. One of
these command elements would be the commander, joint task force (CJTF),
subordinate to the JFC.

CJTFs have the authority to establish and assign missions and authorities to
subordinate task force (TF) commanders. These can be domain-based, such as joint
force maritime component commander, joint force land component commander,
etc. In this scenario, the CJTF should establish them based on mission or function.
An example of a mission-based TF would be to establish freedom of maneuver to
conduct fires in support of CJTF mission objectives. A function-based TF would be
ordered to provide logistical support to other TFs.

Multinational Operations and Interagency Coordination

Another advantage of joint command
concepts is that their design accommodates
multinational operations and interagency
coordination.9 Applied command concepts
are most likely to succeed if practiced,
exercised, and tested on a regular basis. There
is deterrent value in these actions as well, Command and control is often thought of as a
demonstrating will, commitment, capability, unified concept. But the tools of control,
including computers and datalinks, are enablers
and capacity. This is true with respect to of command—not command itself. Shutterstock
operating with key allies as well, but too often
allies are not assumed to be part of the command structure. Decisions about
command constructs are often deferred—to be determined as the conflict
develops. This is dangerous. U.S. and allied forces in the Indo-Pacific should
commit to a structure now. Test and exercise it with an eye to increasing
confidence in it. Apply an ongoing combined assessment of the structure with
recommended changes and improvements based on a rigorous assessment of
what works and what does not.

Success in this scenario requires exploring options before such a war breaks out to
develop the highest level of integration possible between the United States and
Taiwan. Cooperation with Taiwan may be the best that can be achieved, but this is
just the first for four critical levels of integration. Cooperative organizations remain
separate, conducting independent operations but cooperating to be aware of the
timing, tempo, and intention of each other’s independent operations.

Coordination is the next level of integration. Coordinated organizations may share

staff. Even liaison staff are of great value. The goal is to adjust the timing, tempo,
and intention of operations to ensure conflicts are minimized and to optimize
independent operations when possible.

The next higher level is collaboration. While command functions are not integrated
in the U.S. joint context, U.S. and allied command staffs could be collocated to
collaborate during operational planning and execution.

The ideal state is combined operations with full staff integration. On a

multinational level, NATO is a good example, while Combined Forces Command
Korea demonstrates bilateral integration.

Decentralized Control and Execution

These command structures—formed according to the tenets of mission, function,
and task—avoid the temptation of senior commanders to place priority or
preeminence on specific capabilities to be used by subordinate commanders. It
requires seniors to give subordinates the mission, commander’s intent, and broad
mission orders, reinforced with clear operational control and tactical control
authorities over forces assigned.

Delegating the latitude to plan how to accomplish missions with the resources
assigned will ensure unity of command and effort and optimize resources. No one
warfare area or capability should be the primary focus of any commander.

Rules of Engagement
Rules of engagement are defined as “directives issued by competent military
authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United
States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces
encountered.”10 The key words are circumstances and limitations. ROE can
diminish the efficiency and effectiveness of military operations. When this occurs, it
is incumbent on military commanders to inform civilian leaders of the effects on
risk to mission and force. Discussions of ROE ensure all the implications—both
intended and otherwise—are fully understood. This requirement underscores the
importance of ROE so that law-of-war (justice in war) principles such as military
necessity, discrimination, and proportionality are fully adhered to.11 When a
commander assesses that the ROE provides insufficient latitude for success, he or
she must inform civilian leaders—who determine the rules—of the risk.

Complying with ROE also emphasizes the centrality of civil authority over military
operations. Core to ROE is ensuring all military operations are fully compliant with
international law; and guided by restraints (must not do) and constraints (must do)
of U.S. civil government authorities. Multinational operations require a clear
understanding of the application and implications of every participating nation’s
ROE caveats.

Control Considerations
With a clear delineation between command and control, control considerations
become more distinct—as Admiral Willard put it, the ability to guide combat
operations and forces. This is the amalgamation of software, hardware, and people
to deploy, employ, and optimize C5ISR. These are the enabling capabilities and
tools of command.

In OEF and OIF, the control environment was much less contested than the one
envisioned in this scenario. The implications of control mechanisms in this scenario
are just as critical as the command structures. Control capabilities and tools should
be built to support the worst-case environment for exercising command over
fielded forces in denied areas. Project Overmatch is an example of an effort
designed to provide hardened battle networks to operate in contested
environments.

Understanding PLA capabilities to interdict U.S. and allied control mechanisms

allows hardware, software, and training to support best-case practices as well as
worst-case fallback protocols. Systems, plans, and training must account for the
graceful degradation of control, with the attendant implications to command.

To best hedge against the enemy’s capability to interdict control mechanisms,

commanders must habitually delegate authority, practice mission command, and
frequently update commander’s intent. Cross- or in-echelon command structures
and practices must be ready to take over when down- or up-echelon command
structures are no longer available.

Summary
Joint power, capacity, and capabilities must be centralized under joint command
authorities. Mission, function, and task authorities must be assigned with the
clarity and certainty provided by operational and tactical control constructs.
Devolving to supported/supporting constructs is a leading indicator of insufficient
resources for the missions assigned. Mission command, with its supporting
commander’s intent, ensures unity of command and effort when control
mechanisms are interdicted or overwhelmed. Control is separate and distinct but
related to command. And judicious delegation of authority helps sustain the
velocity of action, protecting decision superiority.

A war such as the one in this scenario would be demanding, lethal, and risk-filled.
To prevail, commanders must remember these historical tenets of command and
control, applying them with the knowledge that war complicates everything. As
Albert Einstein might have advised, C2 must be as simple as possible, and no
simpler.

1. VADM Robert F. Willard, USN, “Rediscover the Art of Command and Control,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings 128, no. 10 (October 2002), 52.

2. Mallory Shelbourne, “Navy’s ‘Project Overmatch’ Structure Aims to Accelerate Creating

Naval Battle Network,” USNI News, 29 October 2020.

3. Cristina L. Garafola, “China Maritime Report No. 19: The PLA Airborne Corps in a Joint Island
Landing Campaign,” China Maritime Studies Institute, 5.

4. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Insights and Best Practices Focus Paper: Mission Command, 2nd
edition (January 2020), 1.

5. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,
25 March 2013 Incorporating Ch. 1, 12 July 2017, V-6, 7.

6. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,
V-7, 3. c. (7).

7. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,
V-8, 5. a.

8. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,
V-8, 5. a.

9. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,
II-21, II-13.

10. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-04: Legal Support to Military Operations, 2 August 2016, GL-3

11. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1-04: Legal Support to Military Operations, 2 August 2016, II-2.
 By Admiral Scott Swift, U.S. Navy
(Retired)
Admiral Swift commanded the U.S. Pacific Fleet from
2015 to 2018. In 2023, he served as a senior mentor for the
Navy’s Large Scale Exercise and the global war game at
the Naval War College.

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more important than the cuban missile crisis? please! what is it with dead krauts that we americans love so much???

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