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Currency
Internationalization
and Macro Financial
Risk Control
Editor
International Monetary Institute
Renmin University of China
Beijing, China
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Preface
The year 2015 was an eventful year. After the Federal Reserve officially
started the interest rate increase, the dollar index continued to rise, dollar
assets were sought after by many, international capital flow experienced
large-scale adjustment, and China faced an increasingly sharp pressure of
capital outflow. Refugee crisis slowed down the economic recovery in
Europe, the risk of “British Exit” further increased the uncertainty of its
prospects, and the European Central Bank announced to implement the
negative interest rate policy. Since the EU is China’s largest trading part-
ner, a substantial depreciation of the euro hit heavily the export trade of
China. Such international circumstances worsened the Chinese economy
which was itself in a difficult transformation. For one thing, issues includ-
ing over-capacity, decline in private investment, and non-performing bank
assets have become increasingly prominent. For another, the domestic
financial market was in turmoil: the first half of the year witnessed the
stock market disaster propelled by high leverage and private funding, end-
ing up with an market value evaporation of over 20 trillion yuan; and the
second half experienced a panic exchange rate overshoot in the foreign
exchange market, and a cliff-like liquidity crunch of the offshore renminbi
market. Domestic and international confidence in China’s economic
growth and financial stability has been shaken.
RMB internationalization still maintained a good momentum. By the
end of 2015, the international use of RMB index marked by the RII
reached 3.6, an increase of over ten times over the past five years. The ratio
of RMB settlement in China’s foreign trade was nearly 30%, and that in
global trade was pushed up to 3.38%. RMB foreign direct investment
v
vi PREFACE
crisis and provide a fundamental guarantee for the steady growth of the
real economy and the ultimate realization of RMB internationalization.
The international financial classic theories hold that the monetary
authorities of an open economy can only choose two out of the three
macro-financial policy objectives, namely, the independence of monetary
policy, the fixed exchange rate system, and the complete free flow of capi-
tal. The history of Germany and Japan shows that in the process of the
climbing level of currency internationalization, the monetary authority
must adjust policy objectives to major changes in cross-border capital
flows and exchange rate regimes. Germany and Japan launched interna-
tionalization of their currencies from similar starting points, but the differ-
ent decisions on policy adjustment have had profound but distinct impact
on the domestic economy and finance, resulting in the opposite results of
currency internationalization of the two countries.
At the initial stage of currency internationalization, Germany regarded
exchange rate stabilization as its primary target. It even resorted to the
measures including capital controls, the suspension of financial market
development, and the use of foreign exchange reserves for market inter-
vention. As a result, it created favorable external conditions for maintain-
ing the advantages in trade, enhancing industrial production
competitiveness, and consolidating the domestic development of the real
economy, and provided a strong support for the long-term stability of the
mark exchange rates. Japan was too radical because it over-estimated the
ability of its real economy in coping with the impact of the appreciation of
the exchange rate, thus failing to keep the yen exchange rates stable.
Coupled with the mistakes made in internal macro-economic policies,
Japan has fundamentally undermined its real economy, making the inter-
national level of yen temporarily rise before the sharp decline.
The level of RMB internationalization has improved steadily in recent
years, and will embark on a new stage of development after joining the
currency basket. This marks that China has entered a sensitive period of
policy adjustments in the area of macro-management. The difference in
the policy adjustment that Germany and Japan made and the distinct
impact on the currency internationalization provide us with an important
historical lesson. The experience of the two countries reminds us that
China should not implement policy adjustment too speedily; rather, the
exchange rates and capital account can be liberalized only after the real
economy, financial market, and management departments are fully
prepared.
viii PREFACE
xiii
xiv CONTENTS
Fig. 1.1 The RII. Note: RII has been subject to the following
adjustments. (1) Offshore market has developed rapidly, and
the statistics system about renminbi assets improved. Our
indicators of RMB international credit include not only the
former statistics about the mainland and Hong Kong, but
also statistics about Macau, Taiwan, Singapore, and London.
(2) Chinese International Balance of Payments Statistics
shifted to BPM6 standard in 2015; as a result, the caliber
about direct investment included in RII shifted from BPM5
standard to BPM6 standard. (3) RII is modified along with
the statistical adjustment of the raw statistics 3
Fig. 1.2 RII quarter annual growth 3
Fig. 1.3 Cross-border trades settled in RMB 11
Fig. 1.4 Comprehensive index for RMB-denominated international
financial settlement. Note: The comprehensive index for
RMB-denominated international financial settlement consists
of the proportion of RMB overseas credit in international
credit, the proportion of RMB security in announced
issuance of international bonds and notes, the proportion of
RMB security in amounts outstanding international bonds
and notes, and the proportion of RMB direct investment in
international direct investment 13
Fig. 1.5 RMB’s proportion in international credit 13
Fig. 1.6 Global RMB direct investment 14
Fig. 1.7 The comprehensive index of RMB international bonds and
notes16
xv
xvi List of Figures
Fig. 2.18 Exchange rate and price difference of onshore and offshore
RMB. (Source: Wind) 61
Fig. 2.19 Daily closing prices of RMB NDF in the 2014–2015 period.
(Source: Wind) 63
Fig. 3.1 The trend of China’s de facto capital account liberalization.
(Source: IMF) 97
Chart 3.3 The 1997 non-resident holdings of government bonds in
G10 (10%). (Source: Bank of Japan, Murase, Tetsuji (2000)
“The Internationalization of the Yen: Essential Issues
Overlook”, Pacific Economic Papers, No. 307) 104
Chart 3.4 Dependence on the trade with the United States. (Data
source: Calculation based on statistics of UN Comtrade) 107
Fig. 3.2 Export price elasticity and the selection of settlement
currency in export trade. (Data source: Bekx (1998), Oi et al.
(2003), CEIC database) 112
Fig. 3.3 The proportion of RMB settlement in total trade. (Data
source: People’s Bank of China, the Ministry of Commerce) 114
Fig. 3.4 Comparison of China’s and Japan’s dependence on trade
with the United States. (Data source: Calculation according
to statistics on UN Comtrade) 115
Chart 4.1 “Trilemma” triangle 132
Chart 4.2 Currency internationalization and changes in economic
indicators: the experience of Germany and Japan. (Data
source: CEIC) 139
Chart 4.3 Unilateral appreciation’s impact on economy: Japan and
China. (Source: CEIC) 142
Graph 5.1 Trend of the exchange rate against USD and EUR 157
Graph 5.2 Trend of stock market and bond market 158
Graph 5.3 RMB exchange rate index 166
Graph 5.4 The effective exchange rate and total value of retail sales of
social consumption goods 167
Graph 5.5 The real exchange rate and investment 168
Graph 5.6 Capital flow in international balance account 176
Graph 5.7 The real and nominal exchange rate 176
Fig. 6.1 Four stages of Chinese capital account opening (1979–2015) 201
Fig. 6.2 Dynamic correlation coefficients between capital flow and
capital market yield volatility. (Before the August 11th
reform)209
Fig. 6.3 Dynamic correlation coefficients between capital flow and
capital market yield volatility. (After the August 11th reform) 210
Fig. 7.1 Proportion of overseas assets of commercial banks 213
Fig. 7.2 Proportion of overseas profits of commercial banks. (Data
Source: Annual Reports of Banks) 213
xviii List of Figures
xxi
xxii List of Tables
3.87
4 3.60
2.76
3 2.52 2.48
2.30 2.36
2.10
2 1.64
1.14
0.95 1.11
1
0
2013 2014 2015
Fig. 1.1 The RII. Note: RII has been subject to the following adjustments. (1)
Offshore market has developed rapidly, and the statistics system about renminbi
assets improved. Our indicators of RMB international credit include not only the
former statistics about the mainland and Hong Kong, but also statistics about
Macau, Taiwan, Singapore, and London. (2) Chinese International Balance of
Payments Statistics shifted to BPM6 standard in 2015; as a result, the caliber about
direct investment included in RII shifted from BPM5 standard to BPM6 standard.
(3) RII is modified along with the statistical adjustment of the raw statistics
160%
140%
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
2013 2014 2015
Firstly, Chinese economy remained stable on the whole and financial reform
was advanced smoothly. In 2015, although faced with downward pressure,
China remained one of the most stable economies, which laid a solid devel-
opment foundation for RMB’s internationalization. As a flagship of emerg-
ing markets, China boasted a GDP growth rate of 6.9%, one of the fastest
in the world; China reinforced structural reforms, kept its monetary poli-
cies robust, and its economic and financial system remained resilient against
risks, all of which provided RMB’s internationalization with sustaining
momentum; the current account realized a surplus of $293.2 billion with a
year-on-year growth rate of 33.5%, overseas direct investment (ODI)
increased by 14.7% year-on-year, the international payments account stayed
balanced basically, and cross-border capital outflow converged to the fun-
damentals. As for the financial reforms, China seized the opportunity to lift
the ceiling of floating interest rate of commercial bank and rural coopera-
tive financial institutions and canceled the interest rate control; improved
the regime of central parity rate of RMB; increased the liberalization level
of exchange rate; and narrowed the difference between central parity rate
and market exchange rate and between onshore and offshore exchange
rate. Meanwhile, the publishing of China Foreign Exchange Trade System
(CFETS), the improvement of People’s Bank of China (PBOC) exchange
rate market management, and the maneuver against the short-selling of
RMB abroad helped the market expectations to return to a rational level.
By encouraging innovation and following successful patterns nationwide,
the RMB convertibility under the capital account was advanced smoothly.
The RMB’s admission to the SDR basket represented the acknowledgment
to China’s monetary financial reform by the international community.
Secondly, the policies of RMB cross-border business under capital account
improved. Although the volatility of financial market both at home and
abroad was heightened and the stress of capital outflow increased, China
still made outstanding progress on the policies of the RMB cross-border
under capital account, which broadened the backflow channels of RMB,
optimized the capital allocation, and supported the real economy. In
2015, China relaxed external debt regulations of enterprises and the
two-way cross-border RMB cash pooling, which improved the
independence and convenience of cross-border financing; China permit-
ted foreign currency authorities, official reserve managers, global finan-
cial organizations, and sovereign wealth funds to enter China’s interbank
market and conduct foreign exchange business including spot, forward,
swap and options transactions, which improved the representative of
RMB exchange rate and enhanced the function of international reserve;
INTERNATIONALIZATION INDEX OF RENMINBI 5
Armenia, South Africa, Chile, and Tajikistan separately. The domestic free
trade area and financial experimental zone were constructed at high speed,
which helped to further consolidate the RMB function of payment, settle-
ment, investment, and financing. In addition, on the 40th anniversary of
establishment of diplomatic ties between China and EU, their financial
cooperation continued its positive momentum: European Union became
the largest trade partner, the most important source of imported technol-
ogy, and a great investment cooperation partner for China; the business
cooperation scale between China and EU in 2015 reached $169.2 billion;
the top leaders of both sides made frequent visits to each other, which
helped to enhance the dialogues on economy and finance, supported the
development of offshore RMB market, and deepened the cooperation on
market access, cross-border securities regulation, investment platform, and
supporting facilities. At the same time, RMB opened the gate of Sino-
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) cooperation: the fourth
China-CEEC Leaders Meeting was held in November; the participants
advocated the establishment of 16+1 Financial Company, discussed the
possibility of building up the China-CEEC cooperation fund, and agreed
to support the setup of RMB clearing regime, offering good external envi-
ronment for the CEEC offshore RMB market.
Fifthly, under the circumstances of the fluctuating financial market and a
stronger dollar, the use of RMB in denominating commodities became
more frequent. With the international oil price low and petrodollar tight-
ened, the level of RMB use in Middle East increased. In 2015, RMB clear-
ing center in Qatar was set up, and MOU was signed between China and
UAE, making RMB the common currency used in the payment from UAE
and Qatar to Chinese Mainland and Hong Kong, with proportions of 74%
and 60%, respectively, an annual growth rate of 52% and 247%. Serbia
started its RMB projects. The Russian acceptance of RMB constantly
improved, making RMB its third popular currency after USD and euro, and
the Moscow bourse launched ruble-denominated RMB futures trading.
London Metal Exchange accepted RMB as a pledge currency. China
(Shanghai) free trade area started cross-border RMB spot commodity trans-
action in July. The use of RMB in commodity denomination was enhanced.
Billion RMB
2500 5%
Cross-border RMB settlement amount
The proportion of RMB settlement in the international trade
2000 4%
1500 3%
1000 2%
500 1%
0 0%
2013 2014 2015
7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
2013 2014 2015
0.7%
0.6%
0.5%
0.4%
0.3%
0.2%
0.1%
0.0%
2013 14 15
products and market became diversified. In addition, the scope of the trial
for RMB cross-border credit expanded: the trials of cross-border RMB
debt in Hengqin Nansha free trade zone made the investment and financ-
ing between the mainland and the Hong Kong-Macau more convenient;
the trials in Quanzhou financial reform experimental area and Xiamen
developed the RMB debt business between the mainland and Taiwan,
broadened the investment and backflow channels of RMB in Taiwan, and
accelerated the development of RMB offshore market.
RMB direct investment can be divided into RMB foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) and RMB ODI. With the development of “going out” of
Chinese enterprises and international cooperation on production capacity,
the scale of RMB direct investment kept expanding rapidly. RMB FDI in
2015 was 2.32 trillion yuan with a growth of 121.6%. At the end of 2015,
the proportion of RMB direct investment in global FDI was 16.56%
(Fig. 1.6).
Although the risk of economic downturn rose, Chinese GDP growth
rate and return on assets still took the lead around the world, attracting
even more foreign investment. Due to the relaxation of the FDI limitations,
Billion RMB
1000 RMB direct investment scale 18%
Proportion of RMB direct investment in international investment
900 16%
800 14%
700
12%
600
10%
500
8%
400
6%
300
200 4%
100 2%
0 0%
2013 2014 2015
Firstly, the spread variations between the domestic and foreign impelled
market entities to choose autonomously and onshore, offshore RMB
16 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY INSTITUTE
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
2013 2014 2015
Proportion of RMB security in global remaining sum of international bonds and bills
Proportion of RMB security in global issuance of international bonds and bills
Proportion of RMB comprehensive international security
Fig. 1.7 The comprehensive index of RMB international bonds and notes
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2013 2014 2015
Fig. 1.8 The internationalization indexes’ changing trend of the world’s major
currencies
22 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY INSTITUTE
Column 1.3 USD Interest Rate Hike Stirred the Global Capital
Markets
Since the Fed proposed to exit from QE in 2013, the expectation of
rising dollar interest rate was increasingly stronger, especially after
October 30, 2014 when the US Federal Reserve announced its exit
from QE and constantly implied to raise interest rates to stimulate
the international capital inflow to the United States and enhance the
vitality of the US market investment and attractiveness. In 2015,
with the recovery of the US economy and the expectation of dollar
interest rates rising, the dollar index surged and hit the highest point
in the past 12 years of 100.412 on December 2, 2015. All parties
gave a high degree of concern about the Fed’s monetary policy, and
different opinions about the tendency of dollar interest rates resulted
in a large range of market volatility. Global commodity markets and
financial markets fluctuated. Commodity prices, stock markets of
major countries, and the international currency exchange rates suf-
fered different degrees of shock.
Finally, the Federal Reserve announced to raise the federal funds
rate by 0.25% on December 16, 2015, and declared the low inter-
est rates would remain for long. In the future the Fed would adjust
the process of interest rate hike according to future economic data
INTERNATIONALIZATION INDEX OF RENMINBI 23
performance. It was the first time in nearly ten years to raise the
federal benchmark interest rate, terminating the situation where
official interest rate wandered around zero for 84 months. After
the announcement, the dollar index rose to 99.2898 in short term.
Although the global financial market had long expected this event
and braced itself for the interest rate rises, and the stock market,
bond, and foreign exchange markets of the main developed coun-
tries were without drastic fluctuations, emerging markets reflected
intensively: Argentine Peso plummeted by 30%; the Russian ruble,
the Brazilian real, and South African rand declined to different
extents; even the RMB exchange rate also depreciated for ten con-
secutive days.
In the short term, a stronger dollar would attract back overseas
capital that out-flowed due to QE, exerted pressure on the global
monetary policy, and imposed a negative effect on the world’s major
economies through three channels: capital flow, exchange rate, and
trade. First, economies with their currencies pegged to the dollar
would adjust interest rate automatically, such as Hong Kong. Second,
the economies affected by the fall in commodity prices, such as
Argentina, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa, as well as economies suf-
fering from high debt rate and international trade deficit, such as
some of the southern European countries, had to raise interest rates,
depreciate their currencies, impose capital controls, or take other
measures to deal with the situation, which suppressed real econo-
mies’ confidence and vitality. Finally, some developed economies
such as the EU and Japan were still in economic downturn and their
monetary easing space would be restricted. Easing policies would
likely make more capital flow to the United States for relatively
higher returns, thus weakening the effect of easing policies.
The impact of the dollar rate rising would gradually fade out. In a
long-term view, if the US economy further recovered in the process
of raising interest rates, it would produce positive effect through the
trade to economic situation of major US trading partners including
China, European Union, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, and ASEAN
countries; support commodity prices; and further boost the econ-
omy of Russia, South America, Middle East, Africa, and other
regions. If the US economy was impeded by raising interest rates,
the process of interest rate rising would slow down and even reverse.
24 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY INSTITUTE
Przyjemski luki:
Mutta tuota kesti vain lyhyen ajan. Hän pian taas voitti itsensä, ja
uudestaan pani hän kätensä hänen kädelleen, mutta tällä kertaa
miltei käskevästi.
— Klaara! Klaara!
Ilta oli tyyni, mutta pilvinen eikä yhtään tähteä tuikkinut. Sitä
kirkkaammin säteilivät palatsin valaistut akkunat. Väliin kiiti ankara
tuulenpuuska ilman halki, väliin taas vallitsi täydellinen tyven. Silloin,
äkkiä, aaltoili leveä sävelvirta puiston ja puutarhan läpi.
— Ei, elä tule: Kiitos, ettet tahdo tulla. Aita kernaasti erottakoon
meidät. Mutta elä käännä pois päätäsi, nojaa minua vastaan… kas
noin, rakkaani.
— Rakastatko minua?
— Oi, rakkaani!
Nyt vasta näytti mies, jolle nämä sanat lausuttiin, tointuvan, ja raju
viha valtasi hänet.
— Mene tiehesi!
Elä suutu, minä tein sen vaan peljäten, että karkaisit luotani…
— Te… ruhtinas?
Noin tunti sitten, heti palattuaan hän oli lyhyeen kysynyt: »No,
mitäs kuuluu? kamaripalvelijaltaan Benediktiltä, joka silloin sattui
yksin olemaan herransa luona.
— Wygrycz.
— Milloinka?
— Tänä aamuna.
— Minnekkä?
Hän oli aikonut sanoa: »Niin otan minä asiasta selvän» — mutta
tarkemmin harkittuaan hän havaitsi viisaammaksi olla lausetta
loppuun jatkamatta. Hän odotti. Ruhtinas ei lausunut mitään. Tämä
vaan katseli ulos ikkunasta ja kääntymättä hän teki vielä yhden
kysymyksen:
Kyllä Benedikt oli hänet nähnyt. Kun hän alituisesti tahtoi pitää
pientä taloa silmällä, oli hän eilen illalla heti kymmenen lyötyä tehnyt
kierroksen puutarhan viereisessä puistossa. Silloin hän äkkiä sai
kuulla nyyhkytyksiä. Hän lähestyi varovasti varpaillaan ja huomasi
puurunkojen välissä olennon, joka lepäsi polvillaan aidan vieressä,
käsivarret ja otsa siihen nojaten.