Every individual living in a society understands the value of law.

Law may be
understood as a tool to keep the society peaceful and problem free and to
prevent conflicts between people by regulating their behaviour. The laws
enacted to regulate the society are drafted by legal experts and it can very well
be anticipated that many of the laws enacted will not be specific and will
contain ambiguous words and expressions.

Quite often we find that the Courts and lawyers are busy in unfolding the
meaning of such words and expressions and in resolving inconsistencies. All
this has led to the formulation of certain Rules of Interpretation of Statutes.

We are all aware that the Government has three wings, namely, the Legislature,
the Executive and the Judiciary. The Role of Interpretation of Statutes comes
into play and is of utmost importance for the Judiciary to render Justice
correctly by interpreting the Statutes in the way the situation demands.

Doctrine of Harmonious Construction

The Parliament makes a separate set of Statutes, Rules and Legislation as well
as constitutional provisions under their well-defined powers. While the framing
of these provisions has to be done very carefully, conflict still occurs sometimes
due to overlapping in their enforcement. This is because there are chances of
certain gaps being left while framing of these provisions, which could not have
been forseen by Legislators. To deal with such conflicts, certain Doctrines and
Rules are propounded by Courts that are used in the Interpretation of Statutes.
One such Rule of Interpretation is the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction.

When there is a conflict between two or more Statues or two or more parts
of a Statute then the Rule of Harmonious Construction needs to be
adopted. Every Statute has a purpose and intent as per Law and should be read
as a whole. While using the Harmonious Rule the Interpretation should be
consistent with all the provisions of the Statute. In the case in which it shall
be impossible to harmonize both the provions, the Court's decision regarding the
provision shall prevail.

The basis of Principle of Harmonious Construction probably is that the

Legislature must not have intended to contradict itself. The intention of
Legislature is that every provision should remain operative. But when two
provisions are contradictory, it may not possible to effectuate both of them and
in result, one will be rendered futile as against the settled basic principle of ut
res magis valeat qauam pereat. Therefore, such a construction should be
allowed to prevail by which existing inconsistency is removed and both the
provisions remain in force, in harmony with each other.

Meaning of the Doctrine of Harmonious Construction

The Doctrine of Harmonious Construction is considered as the thumb Tule to
the Rule of Interpretation of Statutes.

The Doctrine states:

"Whenever there is a case of conflict between two or more Statutes or between
two or more parts or provisions of a Statute, then the Statute has to be
interpreted upon harmonious construction. It signifies that in case of
inconsistencies, proper harmonization is to be done between the conflicting
parts so that one part does not defeat the purpose of another."

The Doctrine of Harmonious Construction is based on a cardinal principle in

law that every statute has been formulated with a specific purpose and intention
and thereby should be read as a whole. The normal presumption is that what the
Parliament has given by one hand is not sought to be taken away from another.
The essence is to give effect to both the provisions. To avoid conflict, the
adopted Interpretation of the Statute should be consistent with all its provisions.

If there seems an impossibility to harmoniously construe or reconcile the

parts/provision, then the matter rests with the Judiciary to decide and give its
final Judgment. The aim of the Courts is to do interpretation in a manner that it
resolves the repugnancy between the provisions and enables the Statute to
become consistent as a whole and read accordingly.

Origin Of Doctrine Of Harmonious Construction

The Doctrine of Harmonious Construction was established as a result of Court
Interpretations of a variety of cases. The Doctrine's creation can be traced all the
way back to the first amendment to the Constitution of India, with the landmark
Judgment of [Sri Shankari Prasad Singhh Deo Vs Union of India, AIR 1951
SC 458]. The disagreement between Part III (Fundamental Rights) and Part IV
(Directive Principles of State Policy) of the Constitution of India was the
subject of the case.

The Court used the Harmonious Construction Rule to hold that Fundamental
Rights, which are rights granted against the State, may be revoked under certain
circumstances and modified by Parliament to bring them into compliance with
constitutional provisions. Both were given preference, and it was determined
that Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy are just two
sides of the same coin that must be worked together for the greater good.

This theory was developed historically through the law of conciliation, which
was first proposed in the case of C. P and Berar General Clauses Act, 1914. The
Court used this Rule of Interpretation to prevent any overlap or confusion
between entries 24 & 25 of the State List, and to read them in a logical order by
deciding the scope of the subjects in question.

The Principles Of Doctrine Of Harmonious Construction

According to the Doctrine Of Harmonious Construction, a Statute should be
read as a whole and one provision of the Act should be construed with reference
to other provisions in the same Act so as to make a consistent enactment of the
whole statute. Such an interpretation is beneficial in avoiding any inconsistency
or repugnancy either within a section or between a section and other parts of the
statute.

The Five main Principles of this Rule are:

1. The Courts must avoid a head on clash of seemingly contradicting

provisions and they must construe the contradictory provisions so as to
harmonize them. ["Commissioner of Income Tax Vs Hindustan Bulk
Carriers", (2003) 3 SCC 57, P. 74].

2. The provision of one section cannot be used to defeat the provision

contained in another unless the Court, despite all its effort, is unable to
find a way to reconcile their differences.

3. When it is impossible to completely reconcile the differences in

contradictory provisions, the Courts must interpret them in such as way
so that effect is given to both the provisions as much as possible.
["Sultana Begum Vs Premchand Jain", AIR 1997 SC 1006, Pages 1009,
1010].

4. Courts must also keep in mind that interpretation that reduces one
provision to a useless number or dead is not harmonious construction.
 5. To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision or to render it
fruitless.

A familiar approach in all such cases is to find out which of the two apparently
conflicting provisions is more general and which is more specific and to
construe the more general one so as to exclude the more specific. The question
as to the relative nature of the provisions, general or special, has to be
determined with reference to the area and extent of their application either
generally or specially in particular situations. This principle is expressed in the
maxims Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant, and Generalia Specialibus
Derogant.

The former means that general things do not derogate from special things and
the latter means that special things derogate from general things. The Rule of
harmonious construction can also be used for resolving a conflict between a
provision in the Act and a Rule made under the Act. Further this principle is
also used to resolve a conflict between two different Acts and in the making of
statutory Rules Orders.

But in case there are two remedies for a situation, one general and one specific,
and both are inconsistent with each other, they continue to hold good for the
concerned person to choose from, until he elects one of them.

Applicability Of Harmonious Construction

The Courts have formulated some measures for the improved applicability of
the said Doctrine Of Harmonious Construction after reviewing numerous case
laws:
 1. Giving maximum force to both clauses thus reducing their inconsistency
and/or dispute.

2. Both clauses that are inherently contradictory or repugnant to one another

must be read as a whole, and the entire enactment must be considered.

3. Choose the one with the broader reach of the two contrasting clauses.

4. Compare the broad and narrow provisions, and then try to analyze the
broad law to see if there are any other consequences. No further
investigation is needed if the result is as fair as harmonizing both clauses
and giving them full force separately. One thing to keep in mind is that
the legislature, when enacting the provisions, was well aware of the
situation that they were attempting to address, and thus all provisions
adopted must be given full effect on scope.

5. A non-obstante clause must be used when one provision of an Act strips

away powers conferred by another Act.

6. It is critical that the Court determine the degree to which the legislature
wanted to grant one clause overriding authority over another. In
[Eastbourne Corporation Vs Fortes Ltd., (1959) 2 All ER 102 CA], it
was decided that if two opposing sections could not be reconciled, the last
section would take precedence. This isn't a universal law, though.

Landmark Judgments on Doctrine Of Harmonious Construction

In [ Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. Vs State of Mysore & Ors., AIR 1958
SC 255], the Supreme Court applied the Rule of harmonious construction in
resolving a conflict between Articles 25 (2)(b) and 26 (b) of the Constitution of
India and it was held that the right of every religious denomination or any
section thereof to manage its own affairs in matters of religion [Article 26 (b)] is
subject to a law made by a State providing for social welfare and reform or
throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes
and sections of Hindus [Article 25 (2)(b)].

In [M. S. M. Sharma Vs Krishna Sinha & Ors, AIR 1959 SC 395, Page 410],
the same Rule was applied to resolve the conflict between Articles 19 (1)(a) and
194 (3) of the Constitution of India and it was held that the right of freedom of
speech guaranteed under Article 19 (1)(a) is the read as subject to powers,
privileges and immunities of a House of the Legislature which are those of the
House of Commons of the United Kingdom as declared by the latter part of
Article 194 (3).

But, with regard to the above Judgment, in Special Reference No. 1 of 1964
[AIR 1965 SC 745, Page 761 (Para 36)], it was decided that Article 194 (3) is
subordinate to Articles 21, 32, 211 and 226 of the Constitution of India. This
conclusion was also reached by recourse to the Rule of Harmonious
Construction, more particularly as under:

"All the four clauses of Art. 194 are not in terms made subject to the provisions
contained in Part III. In fact, cl. (2) is couched in such wide terms that in
exercising the rights conferred on them by cl. (1), if the legislators by their
speeches contravene any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III, they
would not be liable for any action in any Court.

Nevertheless, if for other valid considerations, it appears that the contents of cl.
(3) may not exclude the applicability of certain relevant provisions of the
Constitution, it would not be reasonable to suggest that those provisions must be
ignored just because the said clause does not open with the words subject to the
other provisions of the Constitution. In dealing with the effect of the
provisions contained in cl. (3) of Art.194, wherever it appears that there is a
conflict between the said provisions and the provisions pertaining to
fundamental rights, an attempt will have to be made to resolve the said conflict
by the adoption of the rule of harmonous construction."

[Calcutta Gas Company Private Limited Vs State of West Bengal & Ors.,
AIR 1962 AIR 1044]
The Oriental Gas Company Act was passed by the West Bengal Legislative
Assembly in 1960. Under this Act, the Respondent attempted to take over the
control of the Gas Company. The Appellant argued that the State Legislative
Assembly lacked the authority to pass such legislation under Entries 24 & 25 of
the State List since the Parliament had already passed the Industries
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, which dealt with industries under
Entry 52 of the Central List.

The Supreme Court noted that with so many subjects in three lists in the
Constitution of India, there is bound to be some overlap, and it is the
responsibility of the Courts in such situations to harmonise them, if possible, so
that each of them can have effect. The State List's Entry 24 includes all of the
State's Industries.

Only the Gas Industry is qualified for Entry 25. As a result, Entry 24
encompasses all industries except the gas industry, which is explicitly protected
under Entry 25. Entry 52 in the Union List corresponds to Entry 24 in the State
List. As a result, it became apparent that the Gas Industry was solely protected
by Entry 25 of the State List, over which the State has complete influence. As a
result, the State had complete authority to enact legislation in this region.
["Gujarat University Vs Krishna Ranganath Mudholka & Ors.", AIR 1963
SC 703]
According to the Supreme Court separating Education in two Lists under the
Head Of Medium Of Instruction to Parliament and Education dehors to State, is
not reasonable. The Medium Of Instruction related to specific Universities is
also provided under the Union List, Entry 66 and that Entry has enabled
Parliament to make Laws to improve standards of Education and provide
financial assistance to Backward Universities but under Entry 11 of State Law,
State can make Law for imparting Education.

Therefore, the Harmonious Construction was invoked and it was found that
Parliament has specific competence over the subject and State has the general
competence. Therefore, it was held that Parliamentary Law should prevail and
the University did not confer the power to impose any language as Medium Of
Instruction and examination.

[Sirsilk Ltd. & Ors Vs Govt. Of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., AIR 1964 SC 160]
An intriguing question involving a conflict between two equally mandatory
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, namely Sections 17 (1) and 18
(1), is a good example of the significance of the concept that any attempt should
be made to give effect to all of an Act's provisions by harmonizing every
apparent conflict between two or more of them. Section 17 (1) of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 requires the Government to publish any award of a Labour
Tribunal within thirty days of receipt, and Section 17 (2) of the Act states that
the award becomes final upon publication.

A contract between an employer and employees is binding on the parties to the

arrangement, according to Section 18 (1) of the Act. In a situation where a
settlement was reached after the Government received a Labour Tribunal Award
but before it was released, the issue was whether the Government was indeed
obliged to report the Award under Section 17 (1). The Supreme Court held that
the only way to address the conflict was to hold that the Industrial Dispute ends
with the settlement, which becomes valid from the date of signing, and the
Award becomes infructuous, and the Government cannot publish it.

[Commissioner Of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, Indore & Ors. Vs Radha

Krishna & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1588]
The Commissioner sanctioned criminal prosecution of the Respondent partners
in this case under Section 46 (1) (c) of the Madhya Pradesh General Sales Tax
Act, 1958, after the assessee failed to pay the Sales Tax despite repeated
demands. The Respondent argued that the Act had two separate Sections,
namely Section 22 (4–A) and Section 46 (1)(c), in which two different
procedures for realizing the amount due were prescribed, but that there was no
provision of law that could say which provision should be enforced in which
case. The provision prescribed under Section 46 (1)(c), according to the
Supreme Court, was more serious.

The inference drawn from the harmonious construction of these two clauses was
that the Commissioner had Judicial discretion in deciding which procedure to
follow in which case. The Court has the authority to interfere if the
Commissioner fails to act Judicially. However, in this situation, the
Commissioner was right in deciding that the more severe procedure under
Section 46 (1)(c) needed to be used because the assesse company had failed to
pay Sales Tax despite the Sales Tax Officer's repeated demands.

[Jagdish Singh Vs Lt. Governor, Delhi & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2239]
The Supreme Court decided that where there is a conflict between two
provisions, their harmony should be tried to establish between them. It requires:

a. Read the complete Statute or Rules as a whole, and

b. Read the complete statute or rules as a whole, and

c. Any Rule should not be construed to make the other Rule ineffective.

"It is a cardinal principal of construction of a Statute or the Statutory Rule that

efforts should be made in construing the different provisions, so that, each
provision will have its play and in the event of any conflict a Harmonious
Construction should be given, Further a Statute or a Rule made thereunder
should be read as a whole and one provision should be construed with reference
to the other provision so as to make the Rule consistent and any construction
which would bring any inconsistency or repugnancy between one provision and
the other should be avoided. One Rule cannot be used to defeat another Rule in
the same Rules unless it is impossible to effect harmonisation between them.

The well-known Principle of Harmonious Construction is that effect should be

given to all the provisions, and therefore, this Court had held in several cases
that a construction that reduces one of the provisions to a 'dead letter' is not a
harmonious construction as one part is being destroyed and consequently court
should avoid such a construction."

In [S. Nagraj (Dead) by LRs & Ors. Vs B. R. Vasudeva Murthy & Ors.,
(2010) 3 SCC 353], the Supreme Court held that Statutes opposing provisions
but with same subject matter have to be read together.

[SBEC Sugar Ltd & Anr. Vs Union of India & Ors., (2011) 4 SCC 668]
It was held that a cardinal principle of construction is that the provisions of the
notification have to be harmoniously construed as to prevent any conflict with
the provisions of the Statute.

In [Union of India & Ors. Vs Dileep Kumar Singh, Civil Appeal Nos. 2466-
2467 OF 2015], the Apex Court held that the provisions of Statute must be read
harmoniously together. Where this is not possible and there is irreconcilable
conflict between two Sections, it must be determined which provision is leading
provision and which provision is subordinate provision and that which one must
give way to the other.

Conclusion
Legislation is written by Legislators, and there is always the risk of uncertainty,
contradictions, inconsistencies, absurdities, hardships, repugnancy, duplication,
and other issues. In such cases, the Laws of Statute Interpretation apply, and the
provisions are construed to give them the most effect and to make Justice to the
situation at hand. In reading laws, the concept of Harmonious Construction is
very important and is used in a lot of situations.

It aids in the clarification of complex problems and facilitates the delivery of

decisions. As a result, the value of the law of Harmonious Construction is
recognized and felt by the Judiciary, just as it is by many other laws of
application of Statutes. 'The administration of Justice is the firmest foundation
of the Nation,' George Washington rightly said. As a result, in accordance with
this philosophy, the Judiciary should correctly interpret Statutes and
intelligently enforce the Rules for Interpreting Statutes in order to provide
prompt Justice to the people of the country.

The Judiciary is held to be an independent body, which acts as the Supreme

source of Justice to the people. Therefore, it is expected that the task of statutory
interpretation is performed with utmost care and caution. The Courts are under a
sole discretion to Interpret the Statutes in its own and appropriate way to render
Justice to the people so that the Legislature's real intention behind making the
law could be established accordingly.

The Interpretation of every provision is always not under the words and
expressions that it includes and differs in nature as well due to which it depends
on the Courts to adopt the appropriate meaning of the provision in question to
avoid ambiguity.

There is no need to interpret laws when the literal meaning of specific

provisions is clear and unambiguous. Still, the necessity arises when the
circumstances are otherwise, and the Courts need to apply the Rule of
Interpretation in the most effective way. Therefore, the Doctrines help the
Court to interpret specific provisions according to its requirement. Among
which, the Principle of Harmonious Construction has been dealt with in the
following article in an elaborate manner, highlighting the fact that it reduces
conflicts between two or more provisions and helps to adopt the provision of
broader scope rendering Justice to the people.

Introduction

A legal doctrine is a principle, a theory, or a position that is commonly applied

and upheld by the courts. Different judicial doctrines have developed over time
in the Indian constitutional law based on different judicial interpretations by the
judiciary. These legal concepts did not form or take place at once but they are a
result of disagreements, unrest, debates, and legislative solutions, and require
improvement. These situations arise when the statutes and their provisions have
more than one interpretation because of an ambiguity in the law. After the
statute has been enacted, the legislature becomes functus officio (no longer has
jurisdiction). The interpreters of the law are then unable to question or get back
to the legislature to request the exact interpretation of the legislation while they
were making it. Sometimes the lawmakers may not have considered such a
broad range of circumstances when drafting any given statute. The thumb rule
for interpreting any statute is then the rule of harmonious construction.

The doctrine of harmonious construction is followed when there arises an

inconsistency between two or more statutes or sections of a particular statute.
The fundamental principle behind this doctrine is, a statute has a legal purpose
and should be read in its totality and after that, the interpretation that is
consistent with all the provisions of that statute should be used. In a situation
where harmonizing all clauses is unlikely the court’s decision on the provision
then takes precedence.

The history behind the doctrine of Harmonious Construction

The doctrine of harmonious construction came into existence as a result of

many varied court interpretations of different statutes in a variety of cases. From
time to time, the judiciary decided matters that involved opposition between two
distinct provisions. This doctrine came cloaked as the rule of conciliation first in
the case of C. P. and Berar Act (1939), where the involved court resolved the
inconsistency between an entry of List I, and an entry of List II in the Indian
Constitution and interpreted them harmoniously.

In the aforesaid case, the question was whether a tax imposed by a provincial
legislature on the sale of oil by a person who manufactured it, based on the
ground that it was actually an excise duty. Then, a sales tax could be imposed
by a provincial legislature, and excise duty could be imposed only by the union
legislature. The Apex Court, in this case, remarked that it would be peculiar if
the Union had exclusive power to tax retail sales when the province had
executive power to make laws with respect to trade and commerce, its
production and supply, and the distribution of goods within its boundaries.
Hence, it was a sales tax and the Act was not ultra vires. The Court added that
there was no overlapping or conflict of two entries, so as to apply a non-
obstante clause.

The doctrine’s conception can be tracked all the way back to the first
amendment to the Constitution of India, 1951, in the landmark judgement of Sri
Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India (1951). The disagreement
between the Fundamental Rights (Part III) and the Directive Principles (Part IV)
of the Constitution of India was the subject of the case. Constitutional law is
mainly concerned with the creation of the three great organs and the distribution
of governmental powers among them, that is the executive, the legislature and
the judiciary.

The Apex Court, in this case, made use of the rule of harmonious construction
and held that Fundamental Rights are granted against the State and they may be
revoked only under certain circumstances and even modified by the Parliament
to comply with the constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court gave
preference to both and said that the Fundamental Rights and Directive
Principles of State Policy are two sides of the same coin, and it is beneficial that
they must work together. The Supreme Court further held that the Fundamental
Rights enforce limitation over both the legislature and executive power. They
are not sacrosanct and the Parliament can amend them to bring them in
conformity with the Directive Principles.

The Supreme Court articulated the doctrine of harmonious construction in the

case, Re Kerala Education Bill Case (1957). The court added that there was no
inherent conflict between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles
of the State Policy and they together constitute an integrated scheme and a
comprehensive administrative and social programme for a modern democratic
state. The court called them supplementary and complementary to each other.
Therefore, effort should be put to construe them harmoniously, so that the
courts avoid any conflict among the Fundamental Rights and Directive
Principles. They basically run parallel to each other and neither one is
subordinate to the other.

Scope and objective of the doctrine of Harmonious Construction

The aim of the judiciary and the courts should be to view the law as a whole.
The interpretation of the law should be such that it prevents confusion or
incompatibility between the different sections or parts of the statute being used.
Whenever a discrepancy arises between two or more statutes or different
clauses or sections of a statute, the doctrine of harmonious construction must be
followed. The doctrine is based on the straightforward principle that every
statute has a legal purpose and should be read in totality. The interpretation
should be such that it is unswerving and all of the statute’s provisions should be
used. In the event that harmonizing two or more statutes or different clauses or
sections of a statute is unlikely, the court’s decision on the provision would take
precedence.

Latin maxims related to the doctrine of Harmonious Construction

Generalia specialibus non derogant

The Latin maxim means that the courts prefer specific provisions to provisions
of general application whenever the provisions are in conflict. In other words,
the general rule to be followed in case of a conflict between two statutes is that
the latter retracts the previous one. One cannot hold that previous or special
legislation indirectly repealed, altered or consider it in derogated from, simply
by force of such general words, without any suggestion of that particular
intention to do so. This means that a prior special law would yield to a later
general law if two of the following conditions are satisfied, the later law, even
though general, would prevail if:

 The two provisions are conflicting with each other.

 There is some express reference in the later legislation of the previous

enactment.

Generalibus specialia derogant

Generalibus specialia derogant is another legal maxim used in connection with

the harmonious construction rule in India. It basically means that special things
detract from general things. In other words, if a special provision is made on a
certain matter, then that matter is excluded from the general provisions.
Applying this rule, the Patna High Court held in its judgement, Vinay Kumar
Singh v. Bihar State Electricity Board (2003) that Article 351 of the
Constitution of India is a general provision regarding the development of Hindi
in India. Article 348 on the other hand, is a specific provision with respect to the
language to be used in the Supreme Court and the high courts. Therefore, the
applicability of Article 351 of the Constitution is entirely precluded.

Principles that govern the doctrine of Harmonious Construction

Commissioner of Income Tax v. M/S Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2000) is a

landmark case where the Supreme Court laid down five main principles that
govern the rule of harmonious construction that are as follows:

The courts should try and avoid a conflict of seemingly disputing provisions and
effort must be made to construe the disputing provisions so as to harmonize
them.

 The provision of one section cannot be used to overthrow the provision

covered in another section unless the court is unable to find a way to
settle their differences despite all its effort.
  In the situation when the court finds it impossible to entirely reconcile the
differences in inconsistent provisions, the courts must interpret them such
that effect is given to both the provisions as far as possible.

 Courts must also take into account that the interpretation that makes one
provision redundant and useless is against the essence of harmonious
construction.

 Harmonizing two contradicting provisions means not to destroy any

statutory provision or to render it ineffective.

Application of the doctrine of Harmonious Construction

The Courts have articulated some procedures for the proper applicability of the
aforesaid doctrine after reviewing numerous case laws. They are as follows:

 Giving equal importance to both the conflicting provisions, thus reducing

their inconsistency.

 The provisions that are fundamentally inconsistent or repugnant to each

other must be read in their entirety, and the complete enactment must be
taken into account.

 The provision with a broader reach of the two contradicting provisions

should be considered.

 Comparing the broad and narrow provisions, the courts should analyse
the broad law to see if there are any other concerns. No further thought
needs to be given if the result is fair and harmonizing both clauses can be
done by giving them full weight separately. This is because the legislature
was well aware of the situation they were attempting to address when
enacting the provisions, and hence all provisions adopted must be given
full effect.
  When one provision of the Act slivers, the powers conferred by another
Act then a non-obstante clause must be used.

 It is significant that the court establishes the degree that the legislature
wanted to grant one provision overriding authority over another.

Case laws explaining the application of the doctrine of Harmonious

Construction

Following are some famous Indian case laws where the courts have tried to
interpret certain statutes with the help of applying the rule of harmonious
construction.

Sri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee v. Siddha Math and Others

(2015)

In this case, provisions of the Sri Jagannath Temple Act,1955 and the Orissa
Estate Abolition Act, (OEA) 1951 came into scrutiny. The Supreme Court said
that a clear conflict arose between Section 2(oo) of the Orissa Estates Abolition
Act,1951 and Sections 5 and 30 of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955. The
Court added that it was also clear that both the given statutory provisions of the
aforementioned Acts cannot survive together. The Court said that while using
the rule of harmonious construction it should be taken into account that when
the provisions of two statutes are irreconcilable, one must decide which
provision must be given effect to.

In this case, Section 2(oo) of the OEA Act in its entirety was not violating the
provisions of Sri Jagannath Temple Act. It was only the first part of the proviso
which was contradicting the Jagannath Temple Act. If that part of the proviso
continued to be given effect then Sections 5 and 30 of the Jagannath Temple
Act, by which the estates of the Jagannath temple at Puri are entrusted in the
temple committee, would then lose their meaning. The Court further explained
that by striking down Section 2(oo) proviso of the OEA Act, both the provisions
would be operable. Whenever a question comes up about the application of
specific and general laws in the same case then the nature of the case and the
issues must be scrutinised by the court concerned. If, however, the two laws are
in absolute conflict, then there must be a check on the limitations placed and
exceptions foisted by the Legislature.

The Apex Court held that the special provisions of the Jagannath Temple Act
would prevail in this case, and thus, the principle of generalia specialibus non
derogant was applied.

Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore (1957)

In this case, the trustees of an ancient, renowned temple of Sri Venkataramana

filed a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) against
the exclusion of Harijans from entering into Hindu temples after the passing of
the Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act (Madras V of 1947). The trustees
made a representation to the Government that the temple was a private one and
founded exclusively for the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins, and, therefore, outside
the operation of the Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act. However, the
Government did not accept that position and held that the said Act applied to the
temple.

The trustees argued that the temple was not defined under Section 2(2) of the
Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act and Section 3 of the Act was void
because it was offensive to Article 26(b) of the Constitution of India. Thus, an
appeal was made to the Trial Court which gave a decision against the
appellants. But the High Court of Madras passed a limited decree in the favour
of the appellants stating that although the public, in general, were entitled to
worship in a temple, the appellants had a right to exclude the general public
during certain ceremonies in which only the members of the Gowda Saraswath
Brahmins alone were entitled to participate. Dealing with the controversy that
Section 3 of the Madras Temple Entry Authorization Act was in violation of
Article 26(b) of the Indian Constitution, the High Court held that a
denominational institution is also a public institution, Article 25(2)(b) of the
Constitution would apply, and therefore, all classes of Hindus were entitled to
enter into the temple for worship.

The Court further added that Article 25(1) of the Constitution deals with the
rights of individuals and Article 26(b) with the rights of religious
denominations. However, Article 25(2) covers a much wider ground and
controls both the Articles. Article 26(b) must, therefore, be read keeping in
mind Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution.

The decision by the Supreme Court clarified the challenge in the interpretation
of Section 2(2) and Section 3 of the Madras Temple Entry Authorisation Act (V
of 1947) while also laying clearly the concepts pertaining to the matter of
religion and harmonisation of irregularities arising at the time of interpretation
of Article 25(2)(b) and Article 26(b) of the Indian Constitution. The Apex Court
dismissed both the appeal and the application for special leave to appeal.

State of Rajasthan v. Gopi Kishan Sen (1992)

The respondent, in this case, was appointed as an untrained teacher in Rajasthan

in 1972. The State of Rajasthan, who is the appellant, in this case, refused him
his claim of salary on the pay scale of Rs. 160-360/- per month. The respondent
then made an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the
High Court of Rajasthan which was allowed by the impugned judgement.
However, the pay scale of Rs. 160-360/- per month was given only to trained
teachers. The respondent was not a trained teacher and hence, he was appointed
at a fixed salary of Rs. 130/- per month until he became trained which comes
under the provisions of the Rajasthan Civil Services (New Pay Scales) Rules,
1969 that is read with Rajasthan Education Subordinate Service Rules, 1971.

The pay scales, however, have been revised subsequently. The amount of Rs.
130/- per month was fixed as the salary of the untrained teacher and this
provision was struck down by the High Court in part, considering it to be illegal
discrimination. Accordingly, the appellant was asked to pay the respondent his
salary at the higher rate for the period of 1972 to 1982 and this was challenged
on behalf of the appellant as flawed.

When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court observed that the rule of
harmonious construction of seemingly contradictory statutory provisions is well
recognized for as far as it may be possible to uphold and give effect to all the
provisions and avoid the interpretation which may render any of them
powerless.

Rule 29 of the Rajasthan Services Rules, 1951 dealing with the increment in pay
scale is in general terms, while the schedule in the Rajasthan Civil Services
(New Pay Scales) Rules, 1969 has a special provision overseeing the untrained
teachers. This case thus attracts the maxim ‘generalibus specialia derogant’
because when a special provision is made on a certain subject then that subject
is excluded from the general provision.

Unni Krishnan, J.P., etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others (1993)

The case of Unni Krishnan was momentous with respect to the Right to
education in India as it contested the question of the ‘Right to life’ as provided
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 21 guarantees every citizen
a right to education. The issues which came before the Apex Court were,
whether a citizen has a Fundamental Right to education for professional degrees
like medicine, engineering etc. and whether our Constitution guarantees the
right to education to all its citizens.

A writ petition was filed challenging whether the ‘Right to life’ under Article 21
also covers and guarantees the right to education to all the citizens of India, and
the right to education here also includes professional education or degree.

The Supreme Court held that the right to basic education was inferred by the:
Right to life under Article 21 when read with Article 41 of the directive
principle on education. The Court also referred to Article 45 and inferred that
there is no fundamental right to education for a professional degree that
emanates from Article 21. On the issue of the prevalence of Fundamental Rights
over Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP), the Court commented that the
provisions of Part Three and Part Four are supplementary and complementary to
each other and that the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles should be
interpreted harmoniously as they form the social conscience of the Indian
Constitution.

Sirsilk v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1963)

In this case, the Sirsilk Company entered into a dispute with the Government of
Andhra Pradesh and their employees. The dispute was also taken to an
Industrial Tribunal. After deciding on it, the authority delivered its award in
September 1957 after which it was to be published in the Official Gazette of the
Government of Andhra Pradesh. But the corporation and the employees jointly
asked not to publish the award because they had already resolved their
disagreement amicably. The Government declined to acknowledge the appeal of
the parties after which the parties lodged a writ application with the High Court,
for issuance of an order to the government for stopping them from publishing
the issue of the award in a publication. The High Court rejected the writ
application and said that it was mandatory under Section 17 in the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and the government should not withhold the publication of
an award submitted to it by the Industrial Tribunal. The appeal by the Sirsilk
Company was then filed in the Supreme Court by the parties.

The corporation and the employees submitted that since both the parties signed
a resolution that is binding to them under Section 18(1) of the Industrial Dispute
Act, the government’s award under Section 17(1), is daunting on the group and
it should not be released. The resolution agreed by the parties should be
observed and the industrial peace preserved. The Government on the other hand
quoting the mandatory nature of Section 17(1) of the Industrial Dispute Act said
that the award had to be issued within 30 days of receipt of the same. The
objective of the reference to the Tribunal is to settle disputes and when a
resolution is reached between the parties then the question of the award for
publication, issued by the Tribunal appears to be illogical and has no essence
since there is no conflict left to be resolved by publication of the award.

The Supreme Court observed that there is a difference of opinion between

Section 17 and Section 18 of the Act and it is important to find a remedy that
preserves the primary spectrum of the Industrial Dispute Act. The Supreme
Court held that the only way to resolve the two contradictory clauses of such a
case is to allow the Government to withdraw the publication of the award and to
permit the parties to continue with their resolution. The Supreme Court said that
while Section 17 and Section 18 of the Act were mandatory, in spite of the fact
that the parties have already settled their dispute amicably by agreement, in the
present case, no dispute remained to be resolved by the publication of the
award, and hence, the Apex Court directed the Government not to publish the
award in compliance with Act 17(1) and the appeal was approved.

This decision of the Supreme Court is a perfect example of how one provisions’
rules can be applied without rendering meaningless or obsolete another
provision of the law.
K.M. Nanavati v. The State of Maharashtra, (1961)

This is one of the most famous cases in Indian legal history and the jury trials
were abolished after this case in India. A Navy Commander KM Nanavati was
accused of murdering his wife’s secret lover, Prem Ahuja, and as a result, was
held guilty under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

He was charged under Section 302 and Section 304 of the IPC and the trial was
held by a Sessions Judge, Bombay and the special jury held him not guilty
under both the sections involved under IPC. However, the Sessions Judge was
dissatisfied with the jury’s decision as he felt that it was not a logical decision
taking into view the evidence of the case. So, he took the case to the High Court
of Bombay under Section 307 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 giving
reasons for his views. The High Court approved the reasoning of the Sessions
Judge. The High Court said that taking into account the circumstances of the
case, the offence could not be reduced from murder to culpable homicide not
amounting to murder. The High Court held Nanavati guilty of the offence of
murder and this decision was further challenged in the Supreme Court. In the
meantime, the Governor of Bombay by the use of power vested in him
under Article 161 of the Constitution of India passed an order for the suspension
of Nanavati.

The decision of the Governor was questioned because when the suspension was
ordered the case was sub-judice under the Supreme Court. Applying the
principle of harmonious construction to settle the conflict that arose between the
executive and the judiciary, the Supreme Court held that Article 161 and the
suspension by the Governor was not applicable when the case was sub-judice.

Calcutta Gas Company Private Limited v. State of West Bengal (1962)

Oriental Gas Company Act,1960 was passed by the State Legislative Assembly
of West Bengal. The appellant, in this case, challenged the validity of this Act
on the grounds that the State Legislative Assembly had no power to pass such
an Act under Entry 24 and Entry 25 (Constitution of India, List II) of the State
since the Government wanted to take over the management of the company.
The appellant reasoned that the Parliament had already enacted the Industries
Development and Regulation Act, 1951 under Entry 52 of the Union list/List I,
which dealt with industries.

Entire industries in the State List are covered under Entry 24, and Entry 25 is
only limited to the gas industry. The Supreme Court in this case used the rule of
harmonious construction and held that it was clear that the gas industry was
covered completely by Entry 25 of the State List over which the State had full
control. Therefore, the state had the power to make laws in this regard.
Therefore, with the help of the rule of harmonious construction, the Supreme
Court expressed that the gas industry came under Entry 25 which is a part of the
State List, and this gives the State full control over it.

Conclusion

The judiciary and the courts in India are making all efforts to protect and
maintain the object of every provision of the Indian Constitution by using the
doctrine of harmonious construction as one of the tools. Using the principle of
harmonious construction, the Indian Judiciary has tried to explain the intention
or objective of the framers of the Constitution for framing the different statutes.
The rule of harmonious construction brings consistency between different
conflicting provisions so that none of them is rendered powerless or dead-letter
as there has been considerable thought by the legislature in making them.
Through the analysis of the different cases in this article, it can be concluded
that the principle of harmonious construction or interpretation is an effective
tool of interpretation used by the Indian courts to not only resolve conflicts but
also to make important decisions on subject matters of different lists.

Editor’s Note: A beneficial statute is a class of statute which seeks to confer

benefit on individuals or class of persons by relieving them of onerous
obligation under contracts entered into by them or which tend to protect
persons against oppressive act from individuals with whom they stand in
certain relations. The established principle in the construction of such statutes
is there should not be any narrow interpretation[1]. The court should attempt to
be generous towards the persons on whom benefit should be conferred. When a
statute is interpreted liberally to give the widest possible meaning to it, it is
called beneficent construction. Beneficial construction is an interpretation to
secure remedy to the victim who is unjustly denied of relief. The interpretation
of a statue should be done in such a way that mischief is suppressed and remedy
is advanced.[2]

PRINCIPLES OF BENEFICIENT CONSTRUCTION

Beneficent construction involves giving the widest meaning possible to the

statutes. When there are two or more possible ways of interpreting a section or a
word, the meaning which gives relief and protects the benefits which are
purported to be given by the legislation, should be chosen.[3] A beneficial
statute has to be construed in its correct perspective so as to fructify the
legislative intent. Although beneficial legislation do receive liberal
interpretation, the courts try to remain within the scheme and not extend the
benefit to those not covered by the scheme.[4] It is also true that once the
provision envisages the conferment of benefit limited in point of time and
subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions, their non-compliance will have
the effect of nullifying the benefit.[5] There should be due stress and emphasis
to Directive Principles of State Policy and any international convention on the
subject.[6]

There is no set principle of construction that a beneficial legislation should

always be retrospectively operated although such legislation such legislation is
either expressly or by necessary intendment not made retrospective.[7] Further,
the rule of interpretation can only be resorted to without doing any violence to
the language of the statute.[8] In case of any exception when the
implementation of the beneficent act is restricted the Court would construe it
narrowly so as not to unduly expand the area or scope of exception.[9] The
liberal construction can only flow from the language of the act and there cannot
be placing of unnatural interpretation on the words contained in the enactment.
Also, beneficial construction does not permit raising of any presumption that
protection of widest amplitude must be deemed to have been conferred on those
for whose benefit the legislation may have been enacted.[10]

ILLUSTRATIONS ON BENEFICIENT LEGISLATIONS AND

INTERPRETATION

There are different kind of legislations which receive beneficent construction.

Laws which are enacted with the object of promoting general welfare and facing
urgent social demands receive beneficial legislations. Examples of statutes
include The Factories Act, Industrial Disputes Act etc. In case of legislations
which have may two different interpretations, the legislation which favours the
class of persons for which it is purported should be preferred. In the case
of Hindustan Level Ltd v Ashok Vishnu Kate[11], the court held that in a case
related to prevention of unfair labor practice, during interpreting social welfare
legislation, a construction should be placed on the relevant provisions which
furthers the purpose for which such legislation was enacted.
Socio-economic legislation which are aimed at social or economic policy
changes, the interpretation should not be narrow. Justice Krishna Iyer in a case
relating to agrarian reforms observed that “the judiciary is not a mere umpire
but also an active catalyst in the constitutional scheme”. In the case of Sant Ram
v Rajinderlal[12], the Supreme Court said that a welfare legislation must be
interpreted in a third World perspective favouring the weaker and poor class. It
has also been laid down in the case of labour legislation that courts should not
stick to grammatical constructions but also have regard to ‘teleological purpose
and protective intendment’ of the legislation.[13] Interpretation of labour
legislations should be done by the courts with more concern with the colour, the
context and the content of the statute rather than its literal import.[14]

In case of a social benefit oriented legislation like the Consumer Protection Act,
1986 the provisions are construed as broadly as possible.[15] Interpreting a
section of the Act, it was held that parents who hire the services of a hospital
and their child for whom the service are hired are both consumers and can
independently claim damage.[16] The clause regarding jurisdiction has been
liberally interpreted to empower the consumer fora to entertain claims
irrespective of whether other courts or for a have jurisdiction to entertain claims
unless jurisdiction is expressly barred .[17] Further, the liberal interpretation has
been taken in holding that although the forum is a judicial authority, they are
not hampered by section 34 of Arbitration Act and are not obliged to stay
proceedings before them because the Act provides a cheap and speedy remedy
to the consumer.[18]

Industrial Disputes Act 1947 is one of welfare statute which intends to bring
about peace and harmony between management and labour in an industry and
improve the service conditions of industrial workers which in will turn
accelerate productive activity of the country resulting in its prosperity. As a
result the prosperity of the country in turn will help to improve the conditions of
the workmen. Therefore this statute should be interpreted in such a way that it
advances the object and the purpose of the legislation and gives it a full
meaning and effect so that the ultimate social objective is achieved.[19] The
courts while interpreting labour laws have always stressed on the doctrine of
social justice as enshrined in the Preamble of Constitution.[20]

Another example of beneficial construction of a statute is the Juvenile Justice

Act. The earlier act of 1986 was replaced with a new act in 2000. Whereas the
1986 act defined the term ‘juvenile’ as a boy not having attained sixteen years
of age or a girl not having attained the age of eighteen years, the 2000 act
defined juvenile to mean a person who has not completed eighteen years of age.
This issue came up for a consideration before the Constitution Bench in the case
of Pratap Singh v State of Jharkhand[21]. The Court looked into the object of
the act, which is to provide for the care, protection treatment, development and
rehabilitation of neglected and delinquent juveniles. Further the acts were
passed in discharge of obligation to follow the United Nations Minimum Rules
for the Administration of Juvenile justice. Since the acts were remedial in
nature, beneficial construction was given to promote the beneficent object
behind them.

In the landmark case of B Shah v Presiding Officer, Labour Court[22], court

applied beneficent rule of construction in construing section 5 of the Maternity
Benefit Act, 1961, which makes the employer liable to pay maternity benefit to
woman worker at the rate of average daily wage for the period of her actual
absence immediately preceding and including the day of her delivery and for six
weeks immediately following that day. The court held that Sundays must also
be included and held that the Act was intended not only to subsist but also make
up for her dissipated energy and take care of child. The Act was read in the light
of Article 42
One of the leading examples of liberal construction is in the interpretation of
Section 123 © of Railways Act 1989 which defined ‘untoward accident’ to
include ‘accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers’. The
question in contention before the court was whether ‘untoward accident’ will
cover the instance of a passenger who fell down and died while trying to board
the train. In deciding the case, the court said that there are couple of
interpretations of ‘accidental falling’; first one being that it only applies when a
person is inside the train while second includes a situation where person is
trying to board a train and falls down. The relevant provision was deemed as a
beneficial piece of legislation and hence received liberal and wide interpretation
and hence the definition was expanded to include a passenger who fell off the
train in the process of boarding it.[23]

Justice Krishna Iyer exhorted Mahatma Gandhi’s talisman in interpreting

legislation which dealt with the relation between weaker and stronger
contracting parties. His advice was “Recall the face of the poorest and the
weakest man whom you may have seen, and ask yourself, if the step you
contemplate is going to be of any use to him.”[24] Due regard to Article 16(4)
and Article 46 is advocated in interpreting directives aims at making
reservations and relations in favour of members of the scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes.[25]

The effect of a beneficial legislation should not be construed to be defeated by

subsequent legislation except through a clear provision.[26] The rights of minor
children to get maintenance from their father as provided in Section 127 of
CrPC was construed not to have been taken away in respect of Muslims by the
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 section 3(b) which
enabled a Muslim woman to claim maintenance for the minor children upto the
age of two years only from her former husband. It was held by the court that the
right of children to claim maintenance under CrPC was independent of right of
divorced mother to claim maintenance for the infant children and former is not
affected by 1986 Act.

The principle of liberal construction can be taken to extreme limits at some

times in order to achieve the object of the legislation. In the case of National
Insurance Co Ltd v Swarn Singh[27]

In the case relating to insurance aspect of motor vehicles, the Supreme court
held that to prove its defence the insurer has to prove: (i)breach of
condition by the insured was done knowingly or resulted due to his
negligence and (ii)breach was fundamental and had contributed to cause of
accident. It was also held that even in cases where the insurer is able to prove
the defence of breach of condition, it will have to satisfy the award against the
insured but it can recover the amount paid to the claimant from the insured in
the same proceedings before the tribunal.

In a recent judgment in the case of The Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. Vs. Regional
Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation[28], the Supreme Court
judged the ESIC act on beneficial grounds and emphasized that the beneficient
construction is being preferred to help the intended beneficiaries.

Illustrations on the limitations of beneficial legislations

It is important to note that the principle of beneficial construction has to be

applied with a few safeguards. It can only be applied without “rewriting or
doing violence to the enactment”. When the language is clear and explicit, it
leaves little scope for any bending of interpretation.[29] Sympathy cannot be a
sole principle guiding interpretation.[30] In the Maruti Udyog case[31], the
Constitution Bench held that no provisions of act provided for absorption of
contract labour on issuance of a notification under Section 10 prohibiting
employment of contract labour. In the Employess State Insurance Act 1948,
Section 53 provided that an insured person or his dependents will not be entitled
to ‘any compensation or damages’ under the Workmen’s Compensation Act
1923 or any other law for the time being in force or otherwise in respect of an
employment injury. This was held to bar even claim for compensation of
damages in Torts although the Act is a beneficial legislation.[32]

In the Umadevi[33] case, the Supreme Court held that those employed on daily
wages temporarily or on contractual basis by State or its instrumentalities
cannot be said to be holders of a post and have no right to regularization simply
because they have worked for a number of years. This decision shows that
sympathy or sentiment cannot be the sole ground for passing a favourable order
when there is no legal right to support such an order.

The Control of Rent and Eviction Acts seek to protect tenants from unjust
evictions and it is a principle that in case of doubt, such Acts should be
interpreted to lean in favour of tenants. However, it is a restriction that the
benefit conferred on the tenants under these Acts can only be enjoyed on strict
compliance of statutory provisions contained in them.[34]

The beneficial legislation should not be construed such that it brings within its
ambit a benefit which was not contemplated by legislature.[35] Hence where the
insurance company had rescinded the contract of insurance and informed all
parties before the accident after the cheque issued to satisfy the premium due is
dishonoured.

Illustrations from foreign jurisdictions

In Australia, the Aboriginal Land Rights Act, 1983 was enacted to give
important rights to the representatives of the Aboriginal people. Justice Kirby
reiterated the principle that the act should be given the most beneficial operation
compatible with the language. Further, he stated that any ambiguity should be
resolved in favour of Aboriginal people and any attempt by Parliament to
restrict those rights must be plain and clear.[36]
In a similar case of anti-discrimination legislation, Grescher and Norman have
held that the way in which a judge should read a human rights statute should
‘stand apart from and on higher ground’ than other canons and principles.
[37] In the case of British Coal Corporation v King[38], Lord Sankey
approached the act to beneficially construct it. He held that, “In interpreting a
constituent or organic statue such as the Act, construction most beneficial to the
widest amplitude possible amplitude of its powers must be adopted.”

In the United States, in the case of Huntington v Attrill[39], the Supreme Court
said that whether a statute is remedial or penal ‘depends upon the question
whether its purpose is to punish the offense against the public justice of the
state, or to afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act’.
Liberal construction has been allowed in cases relating to providing, regulating
worker benefits[40], antitrust[41], securities[42], and unfair competition
legislation[43]. The remedial purpose canon is also found in cases interpreting
legislation designed to protect and promote public health and safety[44]. The
canon has also been used to further social well-being of general public by
protecting individuals against race, gender, age and disability discrimination.
[45]

CONCLUSION

The courts must be vigilant to ensure that benefits conferred by welfare

legislation must not be defeated by subtle devices. It is duty of the court to get
behind the smoke screen and discover the true state of affairs. It can go behind
the form and see the substance of the transaction.[46]

The strict and narrow jacket concept of law is no longer available for the
purpose of interpreting a social welfare piece of legislation especially after the
new millennium. The policy of a democratic Government should run in
conjunction with the dynamic interpretation offered by the courts. The courts
exist for the society and in the event the courts feel the requirement in
accordance with principles of justice, equity and good conscience, courts must
rise up to the occasion to do complete justice and meet expectation of the
people.

The way the US and Australian courts have strived to protect the rights of the
marginalized and vulnerable, the Indian courts have also started emulating them
as is seen through various judgments like Olga Tellis.[47] It must be
recognised that the principle of beneficent construction cannot be a rule
but only a principle. The Indian courts should look into more principles of
natural law, a movement which was started by Justice Krishna Iyer during his
time at the Supreme Court. This approach has led to several landmark and
timely judgments which have been extremely progressive and far-reaching.