CAT ARTICLE DOSE – 5

In a deterministic universe, all events (including human actions) are determined by previously existing causes.
This perspective could potentially conflict with the concept of free will, because if all our actions are
predetermined by the past and laws of nature, it seems we couldn't genuinely choose our actions freely.
However, Lewis and Vihvelin suggest a different interpretation. They argue that being able to act differently—an
essential component of free will—does not mean one must be able to break natural laws or change the past. In
other words, an individual could potentially have acted differently even within the constraints of past events and
natural laws.

Consider the Consequence Argument which states that if determinism is true, then our actions are the
consequences of the laws of nature and past events. If we were to act differently, it implies that we have the
ability to break a law of nature or to change the past. However, according to Lewis and Vihvelin, this is not
necessary for free will to exist in a deterministic world. They argue that an ability to act differently doesn't
necessarily mean one has the ability to break natural laws or change the past. This is where I fundamentally
disagree with them.

To explain my viewpoint, I present my version of the Consequence Argument: Consider RP, a complete
description of the universe at a point in the remote past and L, the laws of nature. If determinism is true, then our
future actions are determined by RP and L. Consequently, to act differently, one would need to negate RP or L.
Therefore, in a deterministic world, an ability to act differently translates to the ability to break a natural law or
change the past - a capability that doesn't exist. Therefore, in a deterministic world, one can never act differently
than preordained.

Lewis's argument aims to disprove this line of reasoning by introducing an agent who performs an act, say at
time T, that is predetermined. He posits that if the agent performed a different act at T, a law would not be
broken or the remote past wouldn't change. Instead, there would have been a small violation in the past leading
up to T that would have caused the agent to perform a different act. This, according to Lewis, would not require
the agent to have an ability to break a law or change the past, contradicting the claim in my Consequence
Argument.

However, I challenge this stance by scrutinizing the assumption that if an agent would not break a law or change
the past by performing an act, then they need no ability to break a law or change the past to perform it. I propose
that this assumption is unfounded and overlooks the inherent power dynamics in free will. For freedom in a
deterministic world truly to exist, it implies that one has the capacity to defy the deterministic order, i.e., to break
a law of nature or to change the past, even if one chooses not to exercise this ability. Thus, I argue that the
power over one's actions, which is the crux of free will, is fundamentally an ability to break natural laws or change
the past in a deterministic world.

[Analysis and details of the above passage can be found on the next page]
ARTICLE INFORMATION
• Source: Brian Looper, What Freedom in a Deterministic World Must Be, Mind, Volume 130, Issue 519, July
2021, Pages 863–885, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzaa105
• Length of the Extract: 538 words
• Flesch Kincaid Grade Level: 12.5
• Genre: Philosophy, Humanities

ARTICLE ANALYSIS
Theme: The theme of this passage is the philosophical debate between determinism and free will. The author
specifically interrogates a premise proposed by David Lewis and Kadri Vihvelin that attempts to reconcile free
will within a deterministic framework.

Tone: Argumentative. The author examines the arguments of Lewis and Vihvelin in detail, providing their own
counterarguments to challenge these perspectives.

Key Ideas:

• Paragraph One: The author explains determinism and its potential conflict with free will. They present Lewis's
and Vihvelin's argument that suggests one could act differently within a deterministic universe without
breaking natural laws or changing the past.
• Paragraph Two: The author outlines the Consequence Argument, emphasizing the implication that acting
differently would necessitate the ability to change natural laws or the past. Lewis's and Vihvelin's
disagreement with this implication is highlighted, setting up the author's disagreement with their view.
• Paragraph Three: The author presents their interpretation of the Consequence Argument, arguing that the
ability to act differently in a deterministic world necessitates the power to alter natural laws or the past, a
power they assert doesn't exist.
• Paragraph Four: The author examines Lewis's counterargument, which suggests an agent can act differently
without altering natural laws or the past. This divergence of action, according to Lewis, could stem from small
changes leading up to the action.
• Paragraph Five: The author rejects Lewis's argument, stating that the capacity to act differently in a
deterministic world must imply the capacity to defy determinism, i.e., to break natural laws or change the
past. They argue that this capacity, whether exercised or not, is central to the concept of free will.

Structure:
The passage begins by presenting the general problem of free will in a deterministic universe and introduces
Lewis's and Vihvelin's argument. It then proceeds to the author's disagreement with their perspective, expressed
through a reformed Consequence Argument. Following this, the author explains and critiques Lewis's
counterargument. The passage concludes with the author's assertion that the capacity to defy determinism is
inherent in free will, even if it remains unexercised.