INTERPRETATION OF STATUTUTES

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
Analysis of the Constitutional Doctrine of Colourable Legislation in the Interpretation of
Statutes
Principle of Colourable Legislation
The doctrine of colourability is the idea that when the legislature wants to do something that
it cannot do within the constraints of the Constitution, it colours the law with a substitute
purpose which will still allow it to accomplish its original goal.
Maxim: "Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliqum" which means what
cannot be done directly cannot also be done indirectly.
The rule relates to the question of legislative competency to enact a law. Colourable
Legislation does not involve the question of bonafides or malfides. A legislative transgression
may be patent, manifest or direct or may be disguised, covert, or indirect. It is also applied to
the fraud of the Constitution. In India 'the doctrine of colorable legislation' signifies only a
limitation of the law-making power of the legislature. It comes into the picture while the
legislature purports to act within its power but in reality, it has transgressed those powers. So
the doctrine becomes applicable whenever legislation seeks to do in an indirect manner what
it cannot do directly. If the impugned legislation falls within the competence of the
legislature, the question of doing something indirectly which cannot be done directly does not
arise In our Constitution, this doctrine is usually applied to Article 246 which has demarcated
the Legislative competence of the Parliament and the State Legislative Assemblies by
outlining the different subjects under list I for the Union, List II for the States and List III for
the both as mentioned in the seventh schedule.

This doctrine comes into play when a legislature does not possess the power to make law
upon a particular subject but nonetheless indirectly makes one. By applying this principle the
fate of the Impugned Legislation is decided.
Doctrine of Colourable Legislation in simple words means “What cannot be done directly
cannot also be done indirectly”. Doctrine of Colourable Legislation and Legislative
Accountability in a deliberative law-making body, unlike the Presidential systems, highlights
upon accountability. According to the plan of action of our constitution there exists
Separation of Powers which is meant to keep up and nurture an equilibrium between
individuals and constituting elements of government that is Judiciary, Executive and
Legislature. The primary purpose of the Legislature is to enact and create laws. However,
when Legislature tries to moves this equilibrium of power in its favour then the Doctrine of
Colourable Legislation is put into action to take account of the same. Though the different
constituting elements of government are supreme in itself but their actions are always liable
to proper inspection and scrutinization. By applying this principle, the destiny of disputed and
challenged legislation is pronounced. Legislative Accountability is nowhere observed in the
constitution but can be concluded from the conduct and behaviour, we are following since
years. Legislative Accountability means imprudent, secrecy, and unbolted ill treatment of the
public’s belief and confidence. There can be types of Legislative Accountability: Legal and
Moral. The legislature is given such a potentiality it is morally accountable, however, when
we say the legislature is legally accountable more than morally accountable, the Doctrine of
Colourable Legislation comes into action. While having such a long and garrulous
constitution the public has miserably flunked to check the lucidity and responsibility along
with the liability of governmental agencies. Checks and balances are of a very important
nature. This is where consequential and significant public ministrations reforms in the design
and operation of bureaucracy, and suitable judicial resolution in the manner in which it is
long-running, and justice been served. Emphasis is on citizens on one hand and legislature on
the other hand. The public/citizens accord law framing capacities to Legislature. They invest
it with authority and control for crucial verdicts to be taken about the application and
execution of public policies and public accounts in return citizens want to safeguard these
powers against the misconduct and abuse by Legislature.
Important Case Laws
Case 1: KC Gajapati v. State of Orissa
Facts: The petitioners were the owners of estates. The Orissa state Legislature enacted the
"Orissa State Estates Abolition Act, 1952" whose primarily purpose of the Act is to abolish all
zamindary and other proprietary estates and interests in the State of Orissa and after
eliminating all the intermediaries, to bring riots or the actual occupants of the lands in direct
contact with the State Government the compensation would be calculated at a certain number
of years purchase of the net annual income of the estate during the previous agricultural year,
that is to say, the year immediately preceding that in which the date of vesting falls. The other
sum payable as income tax in respect of any other kind of income derived from the estate
would also be included in the deductions.
The amount of compensation thus determined is payable in 30 annual equated installments
commencing from the date of vesting and an opinion is given to the State Government to
make full payment at any time.

Issue
Whether "Orissa State Estates Abolition Aet", 1952 is a piece of colourable legislation?
Legal Proposition
That the doctrine of colourable legislation does not involve any question of bonafides or
malafides on the part of the legislature. The whole doctrine resolves itself into the question of
competency of a particular legislature to enact a particular law. If the legislature is competent
to pass a particular law, the motives which impelled it to act are really irrelevant. On the other
hand, if the legislature lacks competency, the question of motive does not arise at all.
Whether a statute is constitutional or not is thus always a question of power "Malice or
motive is beside the point, and it is not permissible to suggest parliamentary incompetence on
the score of malafides. A distinction, however, exists between a legislature which is legally
important like the British Parliament, and the laws promulgated by which could not be
challenged on the ground of incompetency, and a legislature which enjoys only a limited or a
qualified jurisdiction.
Judgment
The validity of this provision has been challenged on the ground that it is a piece of
colourable legislation which comes within the principle enunciated by the majority of this
court in the Bihar case. It is difficult to appreciate this argument of the learned counsel. It is
not a legislation on something which is non-existent or unrelated to facts. It cannot also be
seriously contended that what section 37 provides for, is not giving of compensation but of
negativing the right to compensation as the learned counsel seems to suggest. There is no
substance in this contention and we have no hesitation in overruling it. The result is that all
the points raised by the learned counsel for the appellants fail and the appeals are dismissed.
Having regard to some important constitutional questions involved in these cases which
needed to be brought up, we direct that each party should bear his own costs in these appeals.
Appeal dismissed.