Unmanned Aerial

Vehicles:
Implications for Military
Operations

David Glade, Lt Col, USAF

July 2000

16 Occasional Paper No. 16

Center for Strategy and Technology
Air War College

Air University
Maxwell Air Force Base
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 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:
Implications for Military Operations

by
David Glade, Lt Col, USAF

July 2000
Occasional Paper No. 16
Center for Strategy and Technology
Air War College

Air University
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:
Implications for Military Operations

David Glade, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

July 2000

The Occasional Papers series was established by the Center for

Strategy and Technology as a forum for research on topics that reflect
long-term strategic thinking about technology and its implications for U.S.
national security. Copies of No. 16 in this series are available from the
Center for Strategy and Technology, Air War College, 325 Chennault
Circle, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama 36112. The fax number is
(334) 953-1988; phone (334) 953-2985

Occasional Paper No. 16

Center for Strategy and Technology
Air War College

Air University
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112
Contents Page

Disclaimer i

Acknowledgments ii

Abstract iii

Author iv

I. Introduction 1

II. Defining Aerial Vehicles 3

III. Evaluating Aerial Vehicles 9

IV. Military Roles for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 17

V. Conclusions 21

Notes 25
Disclaimer

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and
do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense,
the United States Government, or of the Air War College Center for
Strategy and Technology.
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my appreciation to my Air War College
faculty advisors Dr. William C. Martel and Col (Ret) Theodore C. Hailes
for their invaluable encouragement and editorial assistance. I would also
like to express my thanks to my wife for her constant support and
encouragement.
Abstract
The development of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) could
potentially revolutionize how military force is used in the future. While
the early operational experiences with UAVs show great promise, their
full range of capabilities is largely unknown. However, it is clear that
these technologies will enable military forces to use aerospace power more
efficiently, which means at lower cost and with less risk to the humans
who pilot aircraft.
The broader question is the wisdom of using unmanned aerial
vehicles for employing lethal force, and in particular which air power
missions are best accomplished by uninhabited, piloted, and autonomous
vehicles. The corollary is to examine the essential roles of human pilots or
operators in aerospace operations in the twenty-first century. Since it is
common to draw distinctions between vehicles with an on-board pilot,
vehicles with off-board operators, and autonomous vehicles, this study
explores the essential role of pilots and contrasts it with the roles of
remotely piloted and autonomous vehicles.
The assumption is that piloted, remotely piloted, and autonomous
vehicles have advantages and disadvantages in military operations, and
that these vary in strategic significance for different levels of conflict.
Since it is essential for the U.S. defense establishment to consider the
strategic and technological implications of these types of aerial vehicles,
this study is devoted to addressing the issues raised by the new generation
of aerial vehicles.
The Author

David B. Glade, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, is the Acting Chief of

the Air Force Superiority Mission Area Team in the Requirements
Directorate of the Headquarters of the Air Combat Command at Langley
Air Force Base in Virginia. A flight test pilot, he was the deputy chief of
test and evaluation for the F-22 System Program Office at Wright
Patterson AFB in Dayton, Ohio, where he was responsible for planning
the ground and flight test program for the Air Forces F-22 fighter. He
served as an experimental test pilot at Edwards AFB, where he flight
tested all models of the F-15, including certifying the F-15E for terrain
following operation in weather, testing a ground collision warning system,
and numerous radar, flight control, weapons, and engine tests. He also
served as the chief F-15 instructor at the USAF Test Pilot School. His
operational assignments include a tour at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, as
a flight examiner in the EF-111A, and a tour at RAF Lakenheath, United
Kingdom, as chief of aircrew training in the F-111F. Lieutenant Colonel
Glade is a member of the Society of Test Pilots and a member of the Air
Force’s acquisition corps. A distinguished graduate of the U.S. Air Force
Academy, Undergraduate Pilot Training, and the USAF Test Pilot School;
he graduated with distinction from the College of Naval Command and
Staff, and earned a Bachelor of Science Degree from the U.S. Air Force
Academy, a Master of Science Degree from the department of Mechanical
and Aerospace Engineering at Princeton University, and a Master of Arts
Degree from the U.S. Naval War College. He co-authored a published
paper that assesses flying criteria for fighter aircraft.
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles…1

I. Introduction

The development of uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) raises the

possibility that states will be able to conduct military operations in a more
efficient and less risky fashion than was the case when aircraft were
piloted by humans. While the United States has gained experience in
recent military operations with UAVs, notably in Kosovo in 1999, the
U.S. defense establishment has not fully explored how this technology will
influence the nature and conduct of future military operations. As a result
of numerous technological developments, it is possible that the United
States will be able to build military systems, including UAVs, which can
conduct military operations without human intervention. This prospect
raises significant questions about the nature of military operations in the
future and how these technologies will influence international security.
When the United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (SAB)
conducted a study in 1996 on the role of UAV technologies in military
operations, its principal conclusion was that UAVs would enhance the
ability of the United States to project military power.1 The equally
important conclusion was that these vehicles could perform the tasks that
pose increasing difficulties for manned aircraft, of which attacking
chemical warfare/biological warfare (CW/BW) facilities and suppressing
enemy air defenses are the most important examples. The SAB study
concluded that because UAVs are more survivable than manned aircraft,
this technological development has profound implications for the military
forces that the United States will design and deploy in the future.
The prospect of building unmanned air vehicles is not new by any
standard. For most of the twentieth century, states have investigated the
feasibility of building unmanned aerial vehicles and their potential value
in military operations. A principal reason for the interest in UAVs was the
desire to reduce the risk to humans in combat, but it also was to perform
military missions in a more efficient and less costly fashion than has
historically been the case with manned vehicles. A related reason was that
freeing machines from the limitations imposed by humans would increase
their performance. From the beginning, the hope has been that unmanned
air vehicles would be less expensive to develop and manufacture than
manned aircraft, and that UAVs will reduce the demand for the supporting
2… Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

facilities and manpower that modern aircraft require. As a result of

technological advances in flight control, data and signal processing, off-
board sensors, communications links, and integrated avionics, unmanned
aerial vehicles are now a serious option. The hope, as yet unconfirmed, is
that uninhabited aerial vehicles may be able to perform the most
dangerous military missions, including attacking chemical or biological
facilities, fixed and mobile targets, and other aircraft, which would
represent a revolution in military capabilities.
There are far more than technological advances that are accelerating
the development of UAVs. With the end of the Cold War, the United
States spends less on defense, but is more likely to be involved in
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations than in major theater wars. In
addition, U.S. security will depend on rapidly deploying mobile forces
rather than relying on large forces that are based overseas. In all of these
operations, the political climate in the United States places great emphasis
on minimizing casualties, specifically when U.S. vital interests are not at
stake. If the United States can employ technology to minimize the
exposure of American military personnel in the lesser contingencies that
will dominate American military operations for the foreseeable future,
U.S. policymakers will have much more flexibility in responding to crises
and challenges.
A number of technological factors suggest that unmanned weapon
systems will be important in future military operations. To understand
how the technology behind the development of UAVs is changing the
nature and conduct of military operations, this paper examines the role of
three categories of air vehicles in military operations: aircraft that rely on
traditional pilots, vehicles that are operated by pilots at remote locations,
and vehicles that operate autonomously. After considering the advantages
and disadvantages of these categories of aircraft, the technological
implications of using UAVs in military operations will be considered.
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles…3

II. Defining Aerial Vehicles

As there are several different types of air vehicles, the first step is to
define these terms with precision. According to the U.S. Department of
Defense, an unmanned aerial vehicle is “a powered, aerial vehicle that
does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide
vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be
expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload.”2
This definition also includes aerodynamic drones and remotely piloted
vehicles (RPVs), although RPVs are designed to be recoverable.3
However, this definition excludes ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles,
artillery, and cruise missiles, the latter of which is viewed as nuclear
delivery systems in accordance with various arms control treaties.
Using these terms, UAVs may be manned or unmanned, remotely
piloted or operate in an autonomous fashion, and in the case when control
is exercised by a remote pilot, control may be continuous or episodic. In
some cases, autonomous vehicles follow preprogrammed courses and lack
the capacity for re-targeting, while in other cases autonomous UAVs will
follow preprogrammed courses and can be rerouted or re-targeted.4 In
military terminology, vehicles are reusable, while weapons are
expendable. In addition, UAVs have shorter life spans than manned
aircraft, and can suffer attrition in military operations,5 which means that
they will survive for a relatively small number of sorties until failures,
accidents, or hostile action destroy them. The loss rate for aircraft and
UAVs is an important concept that influences the cost-effectiveness of
UAVs and manned vehicles.6

Categorizing Air Vehicles

One way to understand the nature of unmanned vehicles, as a military

instrument is to develop a framework that traces the development of
manned and unmanned air vehicles, assesses the technological state-of-
the-art in aircraft and computer technologies, and extrapolates how these
developments may influence their use in military operations.
4… Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

The simplest approach is to divide aircraft into manned and

unmanned vehicles, and then to further sub-divide unmanned vehicles into
those that are remotely operated and autonomous. This framework rests
explicitly on the human role in perceiving and influencing events during
the operation of air vehicles. If manned aircraft use direct human presence
to directly perceive events and conditions around the vehicle, remotely
operated vehicles keep the human presence at a distance. The critical
factor that distinguishes between aircraft and UAVs is the amount of
information that is available to the human flying a UAV. The
technological and operational communities have invested considerable
resources in using visual and data displays to provide information to the
human about conditions in and around the vehicle. The problem is that
these technologies have been inadequate because the human operator is
deprived of significant information about the vehicle’s performance,
which includes attitude, vibration, and sound, among others. In the case of
vehicles that are operated only periodically by a human, such as the
Global Hawk UAV, the operator must make decisions with significantly
less information about the vehicle than an on-board pilot. The concept of
the information that is provided to a remote operator has significant
implications for UAVs, principally because it directly increases the
combat effectiveness, cost, and complexity of these vehicles.7
If we turn to the case of autonomous vehicles, the human presence
exists at a distance, is confined to receiving information about the vehicle,
and does not exercise direct control over the vehicle. By their nature,
humans lose control of autonomous vehicles once it is launched, which
implies that human operators do not control the operation of autonomous
vehicles, and that available information about the status of the vehicles is
quite limited. Once these limitations are understood, autonomous vehicles
may be well suited to attacking targets whose location is precisely and
accurately known. The value of this assumption diminishes, however, in
the case of searching for mobile targets, of which SCUD missiles and
command and control centers are prominent examples. One fundamental
reason for the development of these vehicles is the desire of the U.S.
military to destroy what is known as time critical targets, especially when
these vehicles are missiles that may be armed with weapons of mass
destruction.
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles…5

Perhaps the best way to differentiate between aerial vehicles is to

consider the role of human presence, which can be immediate or distant,
and can involve large or small amounts of information about the vehicle’s
operation. However, the information provided to the human operator is not
the same for all types of piloted aircraft, For example, while the MiG-23
and F-15 are both manned fighter aircraft, F-15 pilots have greater visual
perception than MiG-23 pilots as a result of the larger and less restrictive
canopy. To cite another example, the F-15 pilot has vastly more tactical
information than the pilot of the World War II era P-51 Mustang fighter,
principally because the F-15’s radar greatly extends the pilot’s ability to
perceive events in the air and on the ground.
In principle, all unmanned vehicles possess some degree of
automation. An interesting problem, however, is that completely
autonomous operations create unexpected situations, which was
reaffirmed during tests of the Global Hawk UAV.8 Not surprisingly, the
price of automation is to significantly increase the cost of engines,
hydraulics and electrical systems, and avionics systems to the point where
these are more expensive than the less automated counterparts that are
controlled by humans.

Categorizing Military Operations

The roles of UAVs can vary widely based on the difficulty of the
military operation that is to be conducted. The simplest military operations
involve attacks against fixed ground targets, while the more challenging
operations involve attacks against mobile ground targets and other air
vehicles. As one would expect, an attack against fixed targets is the
simplest because it is relatively easy to find targets whose location does
not vary and which can be assessed with great accuracy. However, an
attack against air targets is more difficult because the target’s mobility
makes it more difficult to find and destroy the target, and further because
the target’s ability to maneuver makes it more difficult to prosecute an
attack. Even when an air target has been located, the simplest form of
attack is the unobserved attack in which the target is not aware that it is
under attack. By contrast, an observed attack against a highly
maneuverable target with an experienced pilot is most difficult. Consider,
for instance, the case of an unobserved attack from behind a large bomber,
6… Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

which would be simpler to conduct than an attack against an opposing

fighter whose experienced and well-trained pilot is aware that an attack is
underway and will take active measures to defeat the attack.
Another type of attack are those against enemy targets that are out of
contact with friendly forces, which are simpler than attacks in which
enemy targets are relatively near friendly forces. The principal reason for
the difficulty of conducting this type of attack is the high-level of
coordination that is necessary if vehicles are to avoid destroying one
another, which is known as fratricide. A basic rule of military operations is
that the difficulty of combat situations increases as the number of enemy
threats increases, and that this rule has important implications in air-to-air
and air-to-ground operations when friendly and enemy targets are
interspersed throughout the battlespace. Ideally, all of the aircraft in one
area belong to the enemy, while the aircraft in other areas belong to
friendly forces, but the reality is that in modern military operations enemy
and friendly aircraft will be mixed in the same area. The problem becomes
even more complex in operations other than war when friendly, enemy,
and neutral combatants are scattered throughout the battlespace.
These concepts have several important implications for UAVs. First,
human pilots have a vastly greater ability to understand and respond to the
conditions in combat around the vehicle than the human who operates the
vehicle from a distance. Second, the number and type of threats, degree of
mobility of targets and threats, and the degree of sorting that is necessary
to separate arid classify threats directly influences the success with which
UAVs can be used in military operations. Third, despite these limitations,
technology has matured to the point where it will be possible to gradually
shift combat functions from piloted to remotely piloted vehicles and
eventually to autonomous vehicles in a migration that may transform the
nature of war.

Automation. However, the success of this shift will depend in large

measure on the ability to develop technologies that will automate many of
the functions that humans perform in military operations. In essence, a
vehicle is said to be autonomous when it can conduct operations without
human intervention. To cite an example from the current generation of
automated fighters, the F-117 can “complete an entire mission, from
wheels-up to wheels-down, with no intervention by the pilot except
consent to weapons release.”9 The vehicles that are being conceived by
industry will include varying degrees of control, in which the remote
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles…7

operator identifies the target and the UAV plans and executes a
coordinated attack. A truly autonomous vehicle would not require any
form of human intervention.
The military value of UAVs will depend on the ability to automate
many of the functions that have historically been performed by humans,
which ranges from guiding a vehicle to delivering ordnance against
military targets.10 The simplest form of automation is the radio-controlled
model airplane, while a more complicated autonomous aerial vehicle is the
World War II V-1 “Buzz Bomb,” which performed tasks in a fixed
sequence—as does a modem cruise missile that is guided by GPS. The
most complex example of automation is a UAV that relies on a rule-based
or expert system to detect, identify, and attack mobile targets.
Fundamentally, the essence of automation is to use rules to guide
decision-making, but this is a highly complex problem in war. This
complexity is illustrated by the air campaign during the Persian Gulf War,
which involved roughly 2,600 allied aircraft of at least 41 different types
and 950 opposing enemy aircraft of 17 types, of which at least 6 types of
aircraft shared common features with allied aircraft. All of these aircraft
could be attacked by various air-to-air weapons, 16,000 surface-to-air
missiles in 10 types, and 7,000 anti-aircraft guns.11 For automation to
succeed in military operations, a computer must be able to sort though
large numbers of choices and make good decisions about the use of lethal
force in a reliable and timely fashion.12 At present, the problem is that
rule-based decision-making has not reached a sufficient level of reliability
to permit autonomous vehicles to make the kinds of decisions in war in
which humans could have high confidence, especially when failure can
result in the deaths of hundreds or thousands of innocent civilians.
8… Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles…9

III. Evaluating Aerial Vehicles

This paper thus far has focused on understanding the differences

between piloted, unmanned, remotely piloted, and autonomous vehicles.
This discussion now turns to a consideration of the advantages and
disadvantages of these vehicles in the context of how technological
advances are altering the role of air vehicles in military operations.

Characteristics of Piloted Vehicles

While there are many ways to characterize modem piloted aircraft,
speed, range, altitude, and payload are among the more important when
examining the differences between piloted and unpiloted vehicles. Beyond
that, however, the most fundamental characteristic is that piloted vehicles
rely on the presence of humans to detect and respond to changes in the
vehicle’s operation. While human sensors have their own limitations and
shortcomings, it is still true that the current state of non-human sensors is
not sufficiently developed to replace their human counterparts. Aircraft
have historically relied on pilots because technology has not been able to
assess the operation of the aircraft without the presence of a human. The
human can deal with the condition of the aircraft, including unusual
vibration that may indicate structural damage or impending engine failure.
The value of humans, which technology has not yet replaced, is the ability
to absorb and analyze larger volumes of more diverse and ambiguous
information than any machine. A related characteristic is that piloted
aircraft are designed for longer lifetimes than their unpiloted counterparts,
principally because the human payload is considered to be intrinsically
valuable.

Perhaps the most important characteristic of piloted aircraft is their ability

to deliver weapons that can be used to attack a wide array of targets. In
terms of targeting, modern tactical aircraft can carry a number of
munitions that can produce wide-area as well as precise effects, and do so
at standoff distances that range from thousands of meters to thousands of
kilometers. The trend in recent years has been to increase the accuracy of
munitions, which permits designers to reduce the size of the warhead.
10… Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Finally, while conventional aircraft require long runways and large

numbers of supporting personnel, facilities, and supplies, the shift toward
weapon systems that employ some degree of automation will reduce our
reliance on the infrastructure that is commonly associated with military
organizations.

Advantages. The most significant advantage of piloted vehicles is

their ability to use humans to sense events within and outside the vehicle,
which is known in military jargon as “situational awareness.” A related
advantage of the reliance of humans is that no two pilots react the same in
every situation, which in military operations involves how humans
identify threats and targets, make decisions in unfamiliar and ambiguous
situations, and function in an analytic and creative fashion. The advantage
of human pilots is that they are able to adapt to new and different
circumstances, make decisions on the basis of incomplete or ambiguous
information, and deal with unexpected situations, such as damage or
malfunction. One condition that distinguishes piloted vehicles from their
automated counterparts is that the latter cannot possess these human
qualities. While piloted vehicles use electronic devices, such as radio,
radar, radar warning, and electronic countermeasures, to supplement the
pilot’s senses, the most fundamental characteristic of piloted vehicles is
that the human makes critical decisions about the use of lethal force.
The principal advantage of piloted vehicles is that people are able to
solve problems that machines cannot, and further humans can tolerate
greater confusion than machines and make decisions that computers
cannot. Even in the first decade of the twenty-first century, we have not
reached the stage where humans are freed from the responsibilities of
supervising machines in war.13
For the U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, the concept of
human control over the critical functions that are executed during combat
operations is the most important of piloted vehicles. The SAB argues that
human controllers have unique abilities that we have yet to replicate in
machines, and which will represent a decisive advantage in combat as long
as humans can think, synthesize, and comprehend faster than machines.14
While unmanned vehicles can conduct military operations with minimal
risk to humans, the tradeoff is a reduction in the ability of such vehicles to
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles…11

make decisions in military operations. Until UAVs can perform this

function, their role in military operations will remain quite limited.

Disadvantages. The principal disadvantage with piloted aircraft is that

the human physiology imposes fundamental limits on the performance of
the aircraft. At the same time, the presence of humans in aircraft increases
their complexity and cost, and piloted vehicles are more vulnerable
because they are larger than most UAVs, and hence more susceptible to
attack than the smaller UAVs. A final disadvantage is that piloted aircraft
are vulnerable to political exploitation. There are several recent cases in
which the loss of an aircraft created political difficulties for the United
States, including the loss of aircraft in the raid against Libya in 1986
(Operation Eldorado Canyon), Bosnia in 1995, and the loss of an F-117
over Serbia in March l999.

Characteristics of Unmanned Vehicles

UAVs fall into two distinct groups of remotely piloted and

autonomous vehicles. This section examines the general characteristics of
UAVs, while the subsequent discussion focuses on the unique
characteristics of autonomous vehicles. A useful concept for
distinguishing between these types of vehicles is to remember that
remotely operated vehicles remove the operator from the vehicle, while
autonomous vehicles remove the operation of the vehicle from the control
of the human operator.
By virtue of their range, persistence, and altitude capabilities, UAVs
enhance the ability to project military power, as demonstrated by the
Predator and Global Hawk UAVs, whose endurance is far greater than that
of piloted vehicles. For these reasons, UAVs can accomplish tasks that are
increasingly difficult for manned aircraft, of which attacking chemical and
biological warfare facilities and suppressing enemy air defenses are
emerging as critical problems. At the same time, UAV technologies are
Teaching the level of technological maturity where they are able to inflict
devastating damage on many targets.
In historical terms, extending the range or distance between the target
and the person who is responsible for using the weapon were significant
factors in the development of UAVs. The use of UAVs began with
12… Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

German experiments with guided weapons in WWII including the V-1

Buzz Bomb. This approach parallels the modern tactic of using high-
altitude piloted aircraft or low-altitude cruise missiles to deliver ordnance.
The development of UAVs for photo reconnaissance was spurred in the
early 1960s by the downing of the U-2 aircraft that was piloted by Francis
Gary Powers in May 1960 and the downing of a U-2 during the Cuban
Missile Crisis. Furthermore, UAVs were used for photographic,
communications, and electronics reconnaissance, surveillance, and
electronic combat in the Vietnam War, and by Israel for photographic and
electronic reconnaissance as well as decoys during the 1973 Yom Kippur
War and 1982 Lebanon operation.15 More recently, the U.S. Army, Navy,
and Marine Corps used the Pioneer UAV for tactical reconnaissance,
surveillance, and target acquisition during the Persian Gulf War.16
In operational terms, UAVs can operate at altitudes that exceed
70,000 feet and can carry optical sensors and radar.17 The development of
new warhead technologies allows UAVs to deliver compact weapons that
can inflict significant damage against fixed and moving targets. While
these technologies can be used with manned aircraft, the interesting
possibility is that UAVs could be used to locate and destroy mobile
targets, in particular because of recent successes with the development of
automatic target recognition software.18

Advantages. The principal advantage of UAVs is their ability to

reduce the risk to humans, and thus to provide cost-effective military
options that can be used when political or environmental conditions
prohibit the use of manned systems. The other advantages of UAVs are
the ability to free the aircraft from the human’s inability to withstand
acceleration, (g) forces, and fatigue, and to eliminate the myriad systems
that sustain human life in the cockpit, and that increase the weight,
complexity, and cost of piloted aircraft. Once freed from these limitations,
UAVs can be more maneuverable, enjoy longer endurance or loiter times,
and be less observable than their piloted counterparts. The principal
operational advantage of UAVs is their ability to fly close to highly
defended targets, which in the case of nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) targets, creates significant risk for pilots.
Disadvantages. The primary disadvantages of UAVs are their need
for large bandwidth communications, vulnerability to jamming, and low
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles…13

survivability in military operations. While it is commonly assumed that

UAVs are relatively inexpensive in comparison with manned aircraft, the
current generation of UAVs is relatively expensive to develop and build.
However, this cost advantage may be overstated if the expected operating
costs of the Global Hawk UAV are roughly half the operating cost of U-2
aircraft. While the Global Hawk cannot perform all of the U-2’s missions,
it is interesting if UAVs are less expensive to operate.19 For now, the
production costs for UAVs are relatively high because these systems
typically involve small production runs, and the avionics and weapons
used by UAVs are quite sophisticated and expensive. An important
concern is that the losses of UAVs could be prohibitively expensive if
large numbers were lost in military operations. A second problem with
UAVs is their need for sufficient bandwidth to permit the remote operator
to maintain an adequate data link with the vehicle. And the need for large
bandwidth increases their vulnerability to jamming.
A third problem is that UAVs have unique survivability problems.
The most notable are that UAVs are not technologically sophisticated
enough to warn the operator that the vehicle is under attack, cannot
operate in adverse weather, and have a low level of reliability, which
reduces the role of UAVs in military operations.20

Characteristics of Remotely Operated Vehicles

Since RPVs have a remote operator, these vehicles are smaller, have
greater operational endurance, are less expensive than piloted vehicles
with comparable capabilities, and rely on sensors and communication
links to inform the operator of the condition of the vehicle. The current
approach is to use RPVs for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions, and some thought has been given to using RPVs in air combat
missions to protect other fighter aircraft or high-value assets, such as the
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). However, the ability of
RPVs to perform these missions will require these vehicles to have the
autonomous functions that typically increase their development and
acquisition costs.

Advantages. The principal advantage of remotely operated vehicles is

their ability to use human reasoning, and that the vehicle is less expensive
14… Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

than its piloted counterpart. RPVs can be smaller, lighter, have greater
endurance than piloted vehicles, and can be stealthy depending on the
design of the aircraft and its communication system. However, while
RPVs enjoy many of the advantages that are associated with human
decision-making, these vehicles are limited by the fact that aircraft must
rely on the sensors and time delays that exist when the aircraft and the
operator are in different locations.
The operational advantage of RPVs is their ability to maneuver more
adeptly than piloted vehicles. In addition, the rule is that RPVs are less
detectable than aircraft because their smaller size makes them less
observable. The roles of the remote operator are similar to the ability of
the pilot, which is to make decisions in the presence of incomplete or
unambiguous information, deal with unexpected circumstances, and take
measures to protect the vehicle. To be successful, however, the operator
must have access to timely information about threats to the vehicle, be
able to identify that an attack is contemplated or in progress, and take
measures to protect the vehicle. The problem is that the current generation
of RPVs, as exemplified by the Predator UAV, does not have the
technological sophistication to perform these measures.
Disadvantages. The principal disadvantage is that the operator is
fundamentally unaware of the tactical situation around the vehicle, which
translates into a greater probability that the mission will fail or the vehicle
will be lost. At present, RPVs are susceptible to the loss of the electronic
link with the human operator, which has catastrophic implications for
failure of the mission or the loss of the vehicle. A general rule is that
military systems that rely on distributed sensors are quite vulnerable to
failures of the communication links. Another important disadvantage with
RPVs, which tends to be ignored or diminished, is that the distance
between the vehicle and the operator causes a time delay, which makes
RPVS less responsive in combat. Finally, the RPV operator often does not
have the same degree of situational awareness as the pilots in manned
vehicles.
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles…15

Characteristics of Autonomous Vehicles

As noted earlier, autonomous vehicles can perform their functions

without a human operator, and as a result tend to be smaller and less costly
than piloted vehicles. The fact that autonomous vehicles are smaller than
remotely operated vehicles reflects the absence of communications
systems and their relatively simple guidance systems, and gives
autonomous vehicles significantly greater operational endurance. While
the current generation of autonomous vehicles is limited to performing
intelligence and surveillance missions and attacking fixed targets, the
expectation is that technological advances will reach the point where
autonomous vehicles will be able to attack mobile targets, such as missile
launchers or command and control vehicles.

Advantages. The primary advantage of autonomous vehicles is their

ability to work faster, more precisely, and more reliably than human
operators. While the value of autonomous vehicles increases as the
complexity of the task increases, the performance of autonomous vehicles
depends fundamentally on artificial intelligence. However, the present
generation of computers does not have sufficient reasoning power to make
the right targeting decisions in military operations.21
The cost of autonomous vehicles relates directly to their capabilities.
For now, autonomous vehicles with simple guidance systems cannot adapt
to changing conditions on the battlefield as it flies toward the target.
Military commanders, however, will want relatively inexpensive vehicles
in the arsenal that are equipped with complex sensors, can interact with
other systems, and are able to react to rapidly changing situations. At
present, the United States does not have the technological capability to
build autonomous vehicles that can perform even relatively simple
missions.
Autonomous vehicles have an advantage in terms of their endurance
or when they are operating in the presence of nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons.22 Mother advantage with autonomous vehicles is
derived from the fact that these vehicles are freed from the constraints that
we imposed by the need for long runways or large fuel supplies, and thus
can be dispersed to a large number of small airfields. Finally, autonomous
16… Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

vehicles can be sufficiently small that they are difficult to observe and
destroy.

Disadvantages. The primary disadvantage with autonomous vehicle is

that human controllers have very little information about how the mission
is succeeding or how the vehicle is performing. While autonomous
vehicles could be used to provide bomb damage assessment in much the
same fashion as weapons that are guided with electro-optical sensors, the
current state of the technology does not permit the present generation of
autonomous vehicle to provide this information.
A significant disadvantage with autonomous vehicles is that the
system may be susceptible to ambiguities or simple programming errors
that cause it to attack friendly forces and cause collateral damage in areas
that contain civilian non-combatants. The broader disadvantage with
purely autonomous systems is that computers cannot make decisions
without humans to supervise their behavior.23 In terms of cost,
autonomous vehicles that possess sophisticated artificial intelligence or
expert systems will be expensive, complex, and prone to behave in ways
that an adversary could recognize and exploit. In general, these machines
cannot adapt to or exploit the factors that are essential to success in
combat.
A reasonable assumption is that autonomous vehicles are not able to
analyze the events or display the freedom of action that is essential for
success in military operations. Autonomous vehicles cannot replicate the
human ability to understand the nuances that make the difference between
success and failure in war.24 Autonomous vehicles cannot demonstrate
initiative, but must rely on the expert systems or artificial intelligence that
in itself is a product of lists of explicit rules and contingencies. These
systems will lack the human ability to adapt and behave in unpredictable
ways, which will increase their vulnerability to enemy actions. One reason
for this limitation is that expert systems do not react well to information
that operates at the edge of their “knowledge,” known as “brittleness,”
which increases their vulnerability to enemies who can use deception or
ambiguity to confuse the autonomous vehicle.25 Given the sheer number of
objects that highly automated systems may encounter and number of
decisions that must be made correctly and rapidly, the problem is the
relative ease with which an adversary could exploit autonomous vehicles
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles…17

IV. Military Roles for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

Manned aircraft has dominated the twentieth century, but

technological advances are leading to the development of UAVs that will
be able to perform military missions that once were reserved for piloted
aircraft. There are a number of roles that UAVS could perform in future
military operations.

Transportation. While it is very unlikely that UAVs will transport

passengers in the near future, a more realistic possibility is that UAVs
could transport cargo, especially in the relatively small quantities that
would apply in tactical situations. The current state of technology may be
sufficient to create remotely piloted or autonomous helicopters that are
capable of delivering supplies and ammunition to troops in the field, as
long as specific instructions and restrictions guide these UAVs.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. A more practical is to

use UAVs for intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance option
missions, which would take advantage of the fact that UAVs have long
loiter times, can be positioned flexibly near potential targets, and are small
and relatively difficult to detect. The long endurance of UAVs is
particularly important for surveillance when these operations could be
conducted over days. In this sense, UAVs could relieve manned platforms
of the need to maintain the high operational tempo for the extended
periods that are the norm in modern military contingencies.
The U.S. military in surveillance missions uses a number of UAVs.
The U.S. Air Force has used the Global Hawk for surveillance missions,
and the U.S. Army and Navy developed the Outrider UAV for tactical
reconnaissance.26 The Congressional Budget Office recommended that
UAVs should be bought in order to reduce the Army’s purchase of
Comanche reconnaissance helicopters, which would save several billion
dollars.27 Meanwhile, the U.S. military is developing UAVs that can fly
autonomously and broadcast real-time information, which the U.S. Army
will use for reconnaissance, jamming, chemical or biological detection,
and placing remote sensors on the battlefield.28
Attack Fixed Targets. The U.S. military has developed UAVs that
demonstrated the ability to launch weapons against air defense sites. As
18… Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

early as 1972 a Ryan Lightning Bug drone successfully launched an

AGM-65 Maverick electro-optical missile against a radar control van.29 It
is conceivable that UAVs could detect whether states are involved in
manufacturing or storing weapons of mass destruction, and attack those
facilities. The U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board suggested that to
attack these facilities, the United States should develop “dual-equipped”
UAVs with multi-spectral sensors and weapons. This surveillance UAV
would fly in concert with UAVs that are armed with precision, guided
penetrating weapons or weapons, which employ kill mechanisms that
prevent the spread of these materials. UAVs can be used to attack high-
value, fixed ground targets in military operations. Once military
commanders give the location, type of target, and desired weapons effects
to the UAV, it would determine the proper way to attack the targets with a
remote operator or some form of automation.

Attack Mobile Targets. The concept of attacking mobile targets with

UAVs is quite popular, and involves using sensors on high-altitude, long-
endurance UAVs in conjunction with aircraft. The fundamental problem
with using UAVs is the difficulties of detecting and identifying targets in
modem combat operations. For now, the problems of finding and
destroying the right targets in combat operations mitigate against using
UAVs for attacking mobile targets. If equipped with surveillance and
reconnaissance sensors as well as munitions, low observable UAVs that
operate at high-altitudes for long periods could be used to detect theater
and cruise missiles. The relatively long endurance of these vehicles, when
coupled with the ability to detect and identify targets, could make
remotely operated UAVs a viable option for this mission.
Air-to-Air Combat. In the foreseeable future, technology will permit
UAVs to conduct offensive and defensive combat operations against
aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. If military commanders
could use advanced UAVs to intercept aircraft, they would be able to shift
manned aircraft to other combat missions. If we look to the longer term, it
may be technologically feasible to develop UAVs that can replace the
current generation of combat aircraft with vehicles whose performance
and survivability exceeds that of piloted vehicles. Furthermore, UAVs
could be used to attack facilities that produce or store weapons of mass
destruction as well as attack critical fixed and moving targets.30 While
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles…19

some form of remotely piloted vehicle may be valuable in air combat,

many concepts that rely on degrees of automation, exceed current
technological capabilities.

Combat Support Missions. A related idea is to use UAVs for the

electronic support operations that are performed by strike aircraft and
bombers, which involves using UAVs in conjunction with aircraft to target
and jam fire-control radars. This category of UAV could function as a
decoy that duplicates the radar, infrared, and radio signatures of fighter
aircraft to increase their survivability. Once UAVs detect the location of
enemy air defenses and transmit that data to manned attack aircraft, these
or other UAVs could deliver weapons to destroy enemy air defenses, as
noted earlier.

Summary. It is inevitable that technological developments will permit

UAVs to assume many military roles. For this reason, it is essential for the
United States to use the investment in UAV technology to increase the
cost effectiveness of weapon systems while reducing the risk to humans in
combat. However, the prudent option for the United States is to maintain
significant capabilities in manned aircraft until computers and sensors
have reached the point where they are capable of making the decisions in
war that historically were controlled by humans.
20… Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles…21

V. Conclusions

The U.S. military faces numerous concepts for how UAVs should be
used in military operations, but the fact is that many of these concepts rest
on speculation about how UAV technologies might work. Given the
present state of technology, there are significant problems that limit our
ability to use unmanned vehicles, especially those that rely on automation
to make decisions in combat. By most standards, automation is the critical
technology that will determine whether UAVs will be able to function
effectively in military operations. It is not enough to say that because the
current generation of cruise missiles use inertial navigation systems,
automated terrain-comparison, or Global Positioning System (GPS)
technologies, that the U.S. military has reached the point where UAVs can
assume a dominant role in military operations?31 The reality is that the
development of UAVs has been slowed by the problems associated with
building autonomous machines that can perform human functions, of
which making decisions in combat about the use of lethal force are
probably the most difficult.
There is no doubt that recent technological advances have increased
the military value of UAVs. For example, control systems have been
perfected to the point where the operator needs far less experience with
operating vehicles, and can focus on delivering weapons. Nor is it clear
that UAVs will be less expensive to operate than their manned
counterparts. While one study suggested that the Global Hawk UAV may
be less expensive to operate than the U-2 aircraft, there are considerable
uncertainties about how much it will cost to operate UAVs. For example,
the U.S. Air Force discovered during the 1999 Balkans campaign that it
was more expensive to operate the Predator UAV than it had anticipated.32
Finally, the military must understand that there will always be cases
in which unmanned vehicles cannot fulfill the missions performed by
manned aircraf.33 The fundamental technological problem with UAVs is
their limited ability to deal with ambiguity in military operations. Whether
in major wars or peace enforcement operations, military commanders
routinely make mistakes when identifying friendly and enemy forces as
well as civilians. A notable example was the failure to
22… Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

realize that civilians were crossing a bridge in Kosovo at the same time as
military forces, which were attacked by NATO aircraft.34 The problem is
that command and control bunkers may shelter civilians or surface-to-air
missile systems may be located in urban areas, which if attacked by
mistake will kill innocent civilians. To pass the threshold where UAVs can
be used extensively in military operations, UAVs must demonstrate a level
of automation that can deal with this ambiguity, but this standard still
exceeds our technological capabilities. Until remotely operated UAVs
have the sensors and computers that can resolve the ambiguities that exist
in combat, the U.S. military will not be able to rely on automated systems.
This is not to say that technology will never create automated systems that
can guide UAVs on military missions. But the danger is that as the volume
of information grows which increases the pressure to make decisions more
quickly, human operators may become so overloaded that they willingly
abdicate control to automated systems.
A related question is whether the development of UAVs will lead the
technological obsolescence or extinction of piloted aircraft, and hence of
the U.S. Air Force. The counter argument however, is that if the U.S. Air
Force fails to adapt to rapid technological change, its role will diminish in
any case.35 Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the reliance on machines
could accelerate the demise of an era in which humans play a decisive role
in the use of air power.
These technological developments should not obscure the fact that
piloted, remotely piloted, and autonomous aerospace vehicles can make
significant contributions to military operations, and that military
organizations must consider how these technologies will change the
doctrinal foundations of military power. The U.S. military must adapt to
technological change if it is to preserve its ability to prevail in military
operations. And this, rather than the presence of human operators, is the
ultimate military and technological test of success.
As technological advances increase the lethality of weapons on the
modern battlefield, it is inevitable that UAVs will reduce the risks to
humans in combat. It is illusory, however, to believe that technological
progress will completely erase the need for placing humans in harm’s way.
If there is a fundamental constraint on the development of UAVs, it is that
technology promises to find purely unmanned solutions to combat but
cannot deliver on that promise. Political and military authorities should
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles…23

approach with caution the prospect of a world in which automated systems

select military targets and employ lethal ordnance. Let us imagine the
dangers of a situation in which an autonomous vehicle that is armed with
missiles mistakenly attacks a school bus, which is filled with children
because the automatic target recognition software concluded that the
“target” was the transported-erector launcher that carried a SCUD missile.
This problem can be compounded if one considers that the automatic
target recognition system might fail to “realize” that the mobile missile is
parked in a schoolyard.
While automation can assist humans, we have not reached the point
where technology will allow automated systems to make decisions about
the use of lethal military force. If the objective behind the development of
UAVs is find technological solutions for saving human lives in combat, it
should not divert the technological community from finding better ways to
integrate humans and machines into the most effective system for making
the best possible decisions in war
24… Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles…25

Notes

1. United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report on

UAV Technologies and Combat Operations (Volume 1: Summary), SAB-
TR-96-01. November 1996.
2. Joint Publication 1-20, Department of Defense Dictionary of
Military and Associated Terms, March 23, 1994, as amended through
April 15, 1998, pp. 138, 369, and 459.
3. Author interview with Edward E. Huling, III, and Major James
D. McCormick, Reconnaissance Systems Program Office, Aeronautical
Systems Center, November 24, 1998.
4. Brian T. Kehl and Michael D. Wilson, Manned Versus
Unmanned Reconnaissance Air Vehicles: A Quantitative Comparison of
the U-2 and Global Hawk Operating and Support Costs,
AFIT/GCA/LAS/98S-7 (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Air Force
Institute of Technology Thesis, 1998).
5. United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report on
UAV Technologies and Combat Operations (Volume 1: Summary), SAB-
TR-96-01, November 1996, pp. 4-6.
6. See William Wagner, Lightning Bugs and Other Reconnaissance
Drones (Fallbrook, CA: Aero Publishers, 1982). See also Christopher A.
Jones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): An Assessment of Historical
Operations and Future Possibilities (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command
and Staff College, March 1997), p. 11,
7. In terms of cost, the least expensive weapon is a dumb bomb, the
next more expensive option is an expendable cruise missile or a precision
standoff weapon that is delivered from manned platform, and the most
expensive option is a precision weapon that is delivered by a reusable
vehicle that is remotely piloted or autonomous.
8. “Global Hawk 2 Flight Sets Stage For Airborne Sensor Tests,”
Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 30, 1998, p. 32.
“Operators had one unexpected event. While on approach, the Global
Hawk was told by the Edwards [Air Force Base] tower that heavy traffic
required it to hold. The aircraft’s flight plan was suspended, and the UAV

25
26… Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

was put into a holding pattern [by the remote operator] at 5,000 ft. until it
was permitted to land. It then conducted an autonomous landing.”
9. Bill Sweetman, “Pilotless Fighters: Has Their Time Come?”
Jane’s International Defense Review, June 1997, pp. 57-61.
10. Stan Gibilisco, ed., The McGraw-Hill Illustrated Encyclopedia of
Robotics & Artificial Intelligence (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
1994), p. 406. For reference, there are at least eight levels of automation,
ranging from manually operated tools and manipulators, machines that
perform a series of tasks in a fixed sequence, programmable manipulators,
numerically controlled robots, sensate robots or robots that incorporate
any type of sensor, adaptive robots that compensate for changes in their
environment, smart robots with artificial intelligence, and smart
“mechatronic” or mechanical-electronic systems that can control a fleet of
robots or robotic devices.
11. James P. Coyne, Airpower in the Gulf (Arlington, VA: Air Force
Association, 1992), pp. 19-35.
12. Gibilisco, p. 62.
13. Ibid., p.23.
14. See United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report
on UAV Technologies and Combat Operations (Volume 1: Summary),
SAB-TR-96-01, November 1996, pp. 4-3, which noted that, “Humans can
learn to perform control functions and can thus adapt to unexpected inputs
and demands. Humans can also reason effectively under conditions of
uncertainty and perform higher order integration tasks.” See John R.
Boyd, Patterns of Conflict, December 1986 briefing, who argued that “to
win, we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries—
or, better yet, get inside adversary’s Observation-Orientation-Decision-
Action time cycle or loop.”
15. Dana Longino, Role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Future
Armed Conflict Scenarios (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University
Press, 1994), pp. 1-6.
16. Christopher A. Jones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): An
Assessment of Historical Operations and Future Possibilities,
AU/ACSC/0230D/97-03 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff
College, March 1997), p. 5.
17. Report on UAV Technologies and Combat Operations, op. cit.,
pp. 4-1, 4-2.
18. Ibid., pp. 2, 3-2 to 3-4.
19. See Kehl and Wilson, pp. 51, 81, 88.
 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles…27

20. Report on UAV Technologies and Combat Operations, p. 4-2.

21. Gibilisco, pp. 23, 25, 81.
22. Report on (UAV Technologies and Combat Operations, pp. 3-2,
4-2.
23. Gibilisco, p. 23.
24. Boyd, Patterns of Conflict
25. Daniel Crevier, AI: The Tumultuous History of the Search for
Artificial Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1993), p. 207.
26. Author interview with Lieutenant Colonel Paul Geier, U.S. Air
Force UAV Battlelab, November 17, 1998.
27. David A. Fulghum, “U.S. Army Debates Tactical UAV
Requirements,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 23, 1998,
p. 50.
28. David A. Fulghum, “Miniature Air Vehicles Fly Into Army’s
Future,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 9, 1998, p. 37
29. Jones, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, p. 13.
30. Report on UAV Technologies and Combat Operations, p. 4-3
31. See “Gallery of USAF Weapons,” Air Force Magazine Vol. 81,
No. 5 (May l998), p. 155.
32. David A. Fulghum and Robert Wall, “Pentagon Budget Up, But
Research Withers,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 8,
1999, p. 28,
33. See Kehl and Wilson, pp. 51, 81-88.
34. ABC News, June 1, 1999.
35. See Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military
Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1989); Carl H. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome: The Role
of Air Power Theory in the Evolution and Fate of the U.S. Air Force (New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994).

27
 Center for Strategy and Technology

The Center for Strategy and Technology was established at the Air
War College in 1996. Its purpose is to engage in long-term strategic
thinking about technology and its implications for U.S. national security.
The Center focuses on education, research, and publications that
support the integration of technology into national strategy and policy. Its
charter is to support faculty and student research, publish research through
books, articles, and occasional papers, fund a regular program fo guest
speakers, host conferences and symposia on these issues, and engage in
collaborative research with U.S. and international academic institutions.
As an outside funded activity, the Center enjoys the support of institutions
in the strategic, scientific, and technological worlds.
An essential part of this program is to establish relationships with
organizations in the Air Force as well as other Department of Defense
agencies, and identify potential topics for research projects. Research
conducted under the auspices of the Center is published as Occasional
papers and disseminated to senior military and political officials, think
tanks, educational institutions, and other interested parties. Through these
publications, the Center hopes to promote the integration of technology
and strategy in support of U.S. national security objectives.
For further information on the Center for Strategy and Technology,
please contact:

Grant T. Hammond, Director

Theodore C. Hailes, Deputy Director
John P. Geis II, Director of Operations

Air War College

325 Chennault Circle
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112
(334) 953-6996/2985/5579
(DSN 493-6996/2985/5579)

Email: Grant.Hammond@maxwell.af.mil
Ted.Hailes@maxwell.af.mil
John.Geis@maxwell.af.mil
 Titles in the Occasional Papers Series

1
Reachback Operations for Air Campaign Planning and Execution
Scott M. Britten, September 1997

2
Lasers in Space: Technological Options for Enhancing U.S. Military
Capabilities
Mark E. Rogers, November 1997

3
Non-Lethal Technologies: Implications for Military Strategy
Joseph Siniscalchi, March 1998

4
Perils of Reasoning by Historical Analogy: Munich, Vietnam, and the
American Use of Force Since 1945
Jeffrey Record, March 1998

5
Lasers and Missile Defense: New Concepts for Space-Based and Ground-
Based Laser Weapons
William H. Possel, July 1998

6
Weaponization of Space: Understanding Strategic and Technological
Inevitables
Thomas D. Bell, January 1999

7
Legal Constraints or Information Warfare
Mark Russell Shulmann, March 1999

8
Serbia and Vietnam: A Preliminary Comparison of U.S. Decisions to Use
Force
Jeffrey Record, May 1999
9
Airborne and Space-Based Lasers: An Analysis of Technological and
Operational Compatibility
Kenneth W. Barker, June 1999

10
Directed Energy and Fleet Defense: Implications for Naval Warfare
William J. McCarthy, February 2000

11
High Power Microwaves: Strategic and Operational Implications for
Warfare
Eileen M. Walling, March 2000

12
Reusable Launch Vehicles and Space Operations
John E. Ward, Jr., March 2000

13
Cruise Missiles and Modern War: Strategic and Technological
Implications
David J. Nicholls, March 2000

14
Deeply Buried Facilities: Implications for Military Operations
Eric M. Sepp, March 2000

15
Technology and Command: Implications for Military Operations in the
Twenty-First Century
William B. McClure, July 2000