RUSHBROOK - Fire Aboard Ship-3rdEd-1998

Chapter One
Fire-Fighting Through the Ages
Millions of years ago, when early Man roamed the surface of the earth, there was little to
distinguish him from the other wild animals. Both hunter and hunted, he killed and was killed in
turn. Clothed in the skin of animals, he retired at night to a cave, across the mouth of which he
rolled stones to keep his enemies at bay. Puny indeed beside gigantic reptiles like the dinosaurs, he
survived only by using his superior intelligence to outwit them.
Then came a remarkable change. Man learnt how to make fire—and so changed the whole
balance of power in the world's history.
The theory has often been advanced that the wheel was early Man's greatest invention; but a little
reflection will show that the discovery of fire-making was much more important. It is thought that
man learnt how to make fire by rubbing two pieces of wood together through watching the boughs
of trees rubbing together in the wind, so engendering heat through friction which would in turn set
fire to the moss-covered bark. It does not require a particularly vivid imagination to visualise him
creeping forward to see this new phenomenon, stretching out his hand—and probably getting well
burnt for his pains! But since he had a brain, he would soon see that it was possible for him also to
imitate the action of the boughs; and we can imagine him demonstrating to his fellows the method
of making this new magic by rubbing two pieces of stick together. Quickly they would discover
that fire would make them warm in winter, keep their enemies at bay, and make their food much
more palatable to eat.
Having once learnt how to make fire, Man would soon find however, that he must also learn how
to control it. Serious fires would have started in undergrowth and in the forests, and in the cave
dwellings themselves; and many of these uncontrolled fires would kill and maim, not only the
family of Man but also the animals which formed his basic diet. Soon he would discover that water,
bountifully available in nature, was a most effective medium for extinguishing fire.
It is a surprising fact that even today, millions of years after the discovery of fire-making, water
is still the most effective medium for fighting fire. There are, of course, new extinguishing agents
available for specialised risks (although, as will be seen, no new chemical panacea for combating
fire appears to be on the immediate horizon). But, basically, water still reigns supreme.
Fire fascinated the ancient peoples of recorded history, and was the subject of worship by many
races. The following account of the Vestal Virgins, and of Vesta the Roman Hearth Goddess, is
taken by permission from the Encyclopaedia Britannica:
VESTA, the Roman hearth goddess. The name is etymologically identical with Hestia, but the Roman
cult is nearer the primitive conditions. In an early community, fire was hard to make; and therefore it was
desirable that at least one fire should always be kept burning. This duty would naturally devolve upon the
chief or king, and the actual maintenance of the fire would usually fall to his young daughters; since slaves
if he had any, would hardly be trusted with a duty considered holy, he and his sons would be out most of
the day, and his wife would be busy with housework. Much of the actual preparation of food would also
fall upon the daughters, as soon as they were old enough; for a Roman housewife in early days might not
grind corn or cook food for her husband. Hence we get, in early historical times, besides the private cult
of Vesta and the di penates in every household, a public cult of a sacred royal hearth, never allowed to go
out, tended by girls (Virgines Vestales) whose service begins when they are from six to ten years old and
lasts originally for five years, i.e. till they are old enough for marriage, or at least betrothal. The earliest
cult of this kind was supposed to be that at Lavinium; the most famous was at Rome.
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2 Rushbrook's Fire Aboard
In Republican times, the Pontifex Maximus took the place of the king for many sacred purposes. The
Vestals, whose number was six, and whose term of service had now been lengthened to 30 years, were in
his charge, being freed from the potestas of their own fathers. They must, when chosen, be of the required
age, free-born of free-born and respectable parents (although later daughters of freedmen were eligible),
having both parents alive (patrimae et matrimae) and free from physical and mental defects. The Pontifex
took the candidate by the hand, pronouncing a formula of admission to the sacred office; her hair was cut,
and the cuttings hung on a certain tree; she was dressed in an ancient costume, identical with that of a
bride. From this it does not follow that she was the wife of either fire-god or king (Klausen, Frazer and
Wissowa), but rather that the bride's dress was that of a virgin. If a vestal let the fire go out, she was
beaten. On such occasions, and also apparently once a year, when it was solemnly extinguished and
re-lighted at the New Year (March 1), the fire was rekindled by friction of wood. If found guilty of
unchastity, she was subjected to an ordeal which amounted to a horrible form of capital punishment; she
was shut up with a little food in an underground cell, which was covered over with earth.
The Vestals' duties, besides the tending of the fire, comprised the fetching of water from a sacred spring
(Vesta would have no water from the city mains), the preparation of sacred foodstuffs (muries, or brine,
and mola salsa, coarse meal mixed with salt) for ritual purposes; also the custody of various holy objects,
said to include the Palladium in the penus Vestae, or store-chamber of the shrine of Vesta, which was so
holy that no one but a Vestal might enter it. They took part in ceremonies of various kinds, besides Vesta's
own elaborate daily ritual. Further, the privileges accorded to the Vestals, and especially those which
were extended to their senior, the Virga Maxima, were those of princesses.
The shrine of Vesta stood in the Forum, near the Regia, or palace of the kings. It was not technically a
templum, but a round structure, a stone imitation of the primitive "bee-hive" hut. When Augustus became
Pontifex Maximus, he built a second shrine of Vesta on the Palatine, and handed over the Regia to the
Vestals. They also had for their quarters the splendid Atrium Vestae, between the shrine and the Velia.
Their cult continued in great honour throughout the Empire until the abolition of pagan worship by the
Christian emperors. Gratian confiscated the Atrium Vestae in 382. Considerable ruins of both it and the
shrine are still to be seen; the former contains numerous statues (all late) of Vestals. The shrine contained
no statue, the eternal fire serving instead.
Images of Vesta of any kind are rare; when shown in art she is represented as a woman fully draped;
sometimes accompanied by an ass. Her festival, the Vestalia, was on June 9th; thereafter, until June 15th,
the shrine was closed for the annual ceremonial cleansings. This period was deemed highly unlucky.
Allied deities were the very old pair of fire-gods, Cacus and Caca, probably belonging to the Palatine
settlement; and the later Fomax, spirit of the baker's oven (hence Vesta's association with the ass, which
turns the mill; bakers in early Rome were also millers).
Throughout the centuries there have been a vast number of inventions dealing with artificial
fire-making. These ranged from fire-pistons to instantaneous light contrivances. Fire-pistons were
invented and used centuries ago in China, and worked rather like a bicycle pump. They consisted of
a piston holding, in a small cavity in its face, a tiny fragment of tinder, which fitted tightly into a
small tube or cylinder of either metal, bone, wood or horn, having a closed end. The apparatus
worked by compressing a small quantity of air so suddenly and so forcibly as to compel it to yield
up enough of its latent heat to ignite the tinder.
In Italy in 1786 a "Portable Fire-box" was invented, consisting of a small bottle of compound of
phosphorus and of some tiny sulphur-tipped matches. In theory, a match dipped into the bottle and
withdrawn quickly would burst into flame; but in practice the device proved to be both unreliable
and dangerous. Another form of instantaneous light consisted of a well-stoppered bottle containing
sulphuric acid and small matches tipped with a compound consisting of chlorate of potash which
bursts into flame on coming into contact with the acid.
The Bryant and May Museum in London contains an astonishing number of these early means of
making fire, ranging from the wood-friction and the flint-and-steel method to the early form of
friction match. The Museum is well worth a visit by anyone interested in the subject.
It is not generally realised that the friction match in use today is comparatively modern, having
been invented in 1826 by John Walker, a chemist of Stockton-on-Tees, in County Durham. This
man, who gave such a wonderful boon to mankind, was unfortunately a better chemist than he was a
businessman; with the result that he failed to take out patents to protect his interests. A vast new
industry was created, particularly in Sweden and in Britain; and Walker reaped no financial benefit
at all from his invention.
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Fire-Fighting Through the Ages 3
Although fire-fighting must be nearly as old a science as is the making of fire, it is not until
Roman times that records are found depicting the work of organised fire-fighting units. The Roman
fire-fighters were called the Matriculoeii, and were in fact Legionaries who were given the task of
protecting from fire the buildings in the towns and cities under their control. Early London certainly
saw these fire-fighters with their fire pumps, which were called "Siphos" or "Syringes", were made
of metal, and were constructed like a modern garden syringe.
No doubt the great galleys in which the Romans sailed up the Thames Estuary would also be
fitted with pumps for fire-fighting and for other purposes. After the Romans finally left the shores
of Britain in A.D. 410, the design of fire pumps as of so many of the other inventions of this great
people, remained unaltered for at least a thousand years. In fact during the Great Fire of London in
1666, many hundreds of these "hand squirts", as they were then called, were used to fight the
flames.
During the years before 1666, the regulations required that "a barrelful of water for quenching
fires should be placed before the doors of a building"; and the "bellman ring their bells at night, and
call out: 'Take care of your fire and candle, be charitable to the poor, and pray for the dead'."
After the Great Fire of London, a great deal of thought was given to the problem of protecting the
towns and cities of Britain against the ravages of fire. Progress was made in the design of fire
pumps; and the first of the Fire Insurance Companies opened for business in the year 1684. It is
worth noting, by the way, that something which was in essence insurance or underwriting — though
it was not called by that name — had been carried on in Britain long before 1684. When British
seamen were making their adventurous ways over the great oceans in the early sixteenth century,
they were generally financed by the merchants and businessmen of the day. From the point of view
of these "financiers", these enterprises were not unlike a form of underwriting, with rich reward or a
total constructive loss the stark alternatives.
The fire-fighting units of these early Fire Insurance Companies in London were manned largely
by personnel who performed their daily tasks mainly as watermen on the Thames, and who manned
the fire engines in a part-time capacity. These watermen/firemen were by law immune from the
attentions of the press-gangs who impressed all able-bodied men they could lay their hands on for
service in the Navy. To preserve their immunity, they had to carry identity certificates issued by the
Insurance Companies. If they forgot their immunity certificates, they were sometimes caught by the
press-gangs.
G.V. Blackstone, in his book A History of the British Fire Service, records: "It would appear that
the uniform was not sufficient protection if the certificate was lacking; for when the crew of the
Bounty mutinied in 1789 and settled on Pitcairn Island, there was a fireman on board complete with
uniform, probably indicating that he had been pressed while wearing it. It was used as a ceremonial
dress by the island's chief inhabitant many years later — as might well have been, for these
uniforms were very resplendent."
During the eighteenth-century wars with France, the Admiralty itself issued firemen with vellum
certificates of exemption from "imprisonment". This was because the firemen joined, en masse, a
corps of Home Guard runners organised to defend London in the event of invasion.
It was the custom of the Fire Insurance Companies, on payment of an annual premium, to affix a
metal plate, called a "fire mark", to the outside of an insured building. These fire marks were made
of copper or lead, and usually showed the Company's motif embossed on the plate, and the number
of the policy beneath. As these Companies, being run for profit, were to some extent interested in
extinguishing fires only in buildings which they had themselves insured, it is not surprising that
many unfortunate incidents occurred, resulting in large fires which under another system might well
have remained small. By and large, however, it is true to say that these Fire Companies performed a
useful public service certainly better than any that had been previously available. The City of
Edinburgh was, in 1824, the first local authority in Britain to form a whole-time professional fire
brigade. It was under the leadership of James Braidwood, a surveyor then in the Corporation's
employment. It was the result of a series of disastrous fires earlier that year, in which a large area of

the City had been destroyed and over 400

persons had been rendered homeless.
In 1832, the Insurance Companies in London
who maintained the Fire Companies decided to
amalgamate their forces under the leadership of
James Braidwood, and formed the London Fire
Engine Establishment. (Braidwood himself was
later killed by a falling wall in the great Tooley
Street fire in 1861.) It was not until January 1st,
1866, that the Metropolitan Fire Brigade took
over the responsibility of providing fire
protection for the capital, and that the London
Fire Brigade was thus born.
Soon all the main cities followed Edinburgh's
lead; and by the turn of the century the Insurance
Fire Brigades had passed into history.
The problems associated with fighting fires on
land must have applied equally to fighting fires
at sea. When man learnt to build ships capable
of journeying far and wide over the oceans, he FIGURE 1.1 A Roman Screw Pump
would have ever-present in his mind the danger
of fire; and by reason of the very limited fire-fighting equipment available, he would have to pay
strict attention to fire prevention. Even today, in this age of wireless and radar, fire at sea is still an
occurrence to strike fear into the hearts of seamen. How much more terrifying must have been a fire
at sea in the days when ships were built of wood. Not only would everything in the ship burn,
including the hull; but once the crew had taken to boats, if any, their chances of being picked up by
another ship were poor indeed; and a landfall could only be made with the aid of very rough
navigational aids and the help of God.
It must not be imagined that the vessels used in ancient times were all tiny and unseaworthy. The
Egyptian, Diodorus, mentions one built by Caligula in Egypt to transport one of the obelisks to
Rome, which carried no less than 120,000 pecks of lentils as ballast. A peck is a dry measure
equalling 14 lb., so that the ballast alone carried by this ship amounted to 750 tons.
Julius Caesar gives a fascinating account of ships of the day in Book III of his War
Commentaries. He describes the ships used by the Veneti of South Brittany:
These vessels were relatively flat-bottomed, and could therefore ride the shallows or on an ebb tide. With
their unusually tall prows and sterns they could weather high seas in a gale of wind; and the hulls, made
entirely of oak, were capable of standing up to any amount of rough handling. The crosstimbers consisted
of beams a foot thick, fastened with iron bolts as thick as a man's thumb, and iron chains instead of ropes
were used to secure the anchors.
Their sails were made of raw hides or thinly-dressed leather ... probably due to mistaken belief that canvas
was unequal to the violence of Atlantic gales and unsuitable for manoeuvring vessels of their burden. In
an encounter with these ships our sole advantage was speed derived from the use of oars. Their bulk
rendered them safe against ramming, while their height placed them virtually beyond reach of our missiles
and grappling-irons. Besides, when it began to blow hard and they were running before the wind, they
were not only more seaworthy, but could heave-to in shallow water without fear of damage from reefs and
jagged rocks; whereas all these factors constituted a serious danger to our shipping.
There is no evidence about the size of these ships; but it is known that Julius Caesar needed 80
ships to transport 10,000 troops to Britain in 55 B.C.
It is also recorded that Ptolemy Philopator built a ship of 40 tiers of oars, which was 420 ft. long
and 72 ft. from the keel to the top of the poop. This was a man-o'-war; it carried 400 sailors and
3,000 soldiers, and was rowed by no fewer than 4,000 slave rowers. Quite a formidable vessel,

even by today's standards! Its effect on the

unfortunate people being attacked can only be
imagined.
Since ancient times, Man has striven to find
means to raise water from a lower to a higher
level. The most fabulous city of all times is
reputed to have been Babylon, capital of the
Chaldaean empire. This wonderful city, built on
a barren desert plain with 15 miles of streets, had
buildings of three and four storeys high. The heat
and dryness of the climate makes it certain that
some form of pump must have been employed to
raise water from wells to the famous Hanging
Gardens—one of the Seven Wonders of the
Ancient World—and for normal domestic
purposes.
What is considered to be the most remarkable
FIGURE 1.2 A machine of Ctesibius (220 B.C.).
well ever made by man is Joseph's Well in Cairo.
This stupendous construction is an oblong 24 ft.
by 18 ft., and is excavated through solid rock to a depth of 297 ft. It is built in two stages, the first
being at 165 ft. where it is enlarged into a capacious chamber, in the bottom of which is formed a
reservoir. The water is brought by a chain of pots to the first stage where a second chain takes it to
the surface. The builder's name is lost in antiquity, though some authorities attribute it to the
Crusaders' great adversary, the Emir Saladin. It is generally believed, however, to be at least 1,000
years old.
Force pumps have been in existence for over 2,000 years. Ctesibius (287-212 B.C.), an engineer
of Alexandria, is credited with having invented the first of them. This was a two cylinder
reciprocating pump worked by levers.
Archimedes' screw pumps have been in use in
Egypt for over 2,000 years, mainly for purposes of
irrigation.
While no doubt pumps of this type would be
used on board the rear galleys of the day,
unfortunately all records of them have been lost.
One of the very earliest pumps used on board
ships consisted simply of an endless rope. These
rope pumps were formed of loosely spun wool or
horsehair, and stretched on two pulleys like an
endless chain of pots. The pulleys had grooves
formed on their surfaces for the reception of the
ropes. The rope was turned by a multiplying
wheel; and as it came up out of the water in the
bilge of the ship, it carried with it the water it had
absorbed. As the rope passed over the top pulley
wheel, the water was flung off by centrifugal force
into a tank. Separate rope pumps were provided
for each deck below the main deck. Thereafter,
hand pumps would be used for purposes of actual
FIGURE 1.3 The Rope Pump, one of the very earliest fire-fighting.
forms of ship's pumps.
Chain pumps have certainly been used on ships
for 1,000 years, and were in regular use up to the

beginning of the eighteenth century. A typical design consisted of two square-sectioned wooden
casings in the form of a "V", with a free-running bearing at the base of the "V". A pulley wheel was
positioned at the top, over which ran an endless chain to which were attached at regular intervals
small cups or pots. The base of the pump was set into the bilge, into which water could be admitted
by means of a simple valve. When the windlass was turned, the cups or pots would pass through
the water, each picking up its quota of liquid which was then discharged into a trough at the top of
the pump. The water would then be picked up by hand or by manual pumps, and directed on to the
fire.
As engineering limits became finer, so these chain pumps were formed with circular washers
which operated within a tube and carried the water to the upper decks. The earlier forms were
certainly fitted with pots.
Chain pumps were used in British ships in the latter part of the seventeenth century. Dampier
mentions one in his voyage to New Holland in the Roebuck. "This ship on returning home sprung a
leak near the island of Ascension, and the water flowed in so fast that the chain could not keep her
free. I set in the hand pump to work also, and by ten o'clock, sucked her." The hand pump
mentioned would no doubt serve normally for washdown and similar purposes. Most authentic
models of the old wooden-walled ships of the seventeenth century include a portable hand-operated
reciprocating pump on the upper deck; so it is obvious that such equipment was carried as standard.
In 1760, a Mr Abbot invented a ship's pump which was represented as being of very simple
design, and which threw "five hundred hogsheads of water in an hour". A hogshead is a liquid
measure of 521 imperial gallons, so that the output of the pump purported to be 4,371 gallons per
minute — a ridiculously high figure quite unobtainable in those days. Eight years later, Mr Cole
introduced an improved chain pump which was tried on board H.M.S. Seaford, in Block House
Hole in the presence of Admiral Sir John Moore. The results of the trial are reported as follows:
New Pump, Mr Coles Old Chain Pump

4 men pumped out one ton 7 men pumped out one ton
of water in 431/2 seconds of water in 76 seconds
2 men pumped out one ton 4 men pumped out one ton
in 55 seconds of water in 55 seconds
NOTE: 1 ton of water = 224 gallons.
TABLE 1.1
FIGURE 1.4 Plans and Profile of Mr. Cole's Pump fitted on board the Grafton on September 7th, 1772, showing
the pump, and the fore-and-aft and thwart-ship view of the main case with the scuttles fitted. A diagonal and
fore-and-aft view of part of the chamber and main case, with nature of the chains jamming in the tube.

A plan of Cole's pump fitted on the Grafton is

shown in Figure 1.4. Just how far we have moved
since those days in terms of pump output is
evident from the fact that today pumps are
available with an output in excess of 10,000
gallons per minute.
A description of the pumps on board the North
Carolina, an American ship-of-the-line in the
days of Paul Jones, the Scottish/American
privateersman, is of interest. The vessel was
fitted with six pumps. The pipes consisted of
large trees bored out, and lined with lead. They
reached from the surface of the main gun deck to
the well, a distance of 23 ft. A brass cylinder, two
feet nine inches long and of nine-inch bore, in
which the piston worked, was let into the upper
part of each. The piston rods, made of iron,
passed through the centre of a guide piece secured
over the pump, which thus kept the rods from
deviating from a perpendicular position. They FIGURE 1.5 Chain Pump in the U.S.S.
were connected to the levers by slings, as in the Independence, built at Boston in 1799.
common brass lifting pump. The levers were
double, and were shaped like those of fire engines, staves of wood being slipped through the rings
whenever the pumps were worked. Each lever worked two pumps, and the length of stroke in the
cylinders was 14 in. The pistons or upper boxes were of brass, with butterfly valves; the band of
leather round each was secured by screws.
A ship's pump invented by Mr Taylor, of Southampton, in 1780 introduced two suckers or
pistons into one cylinder, each united to a separate rod so that one might ascend as the other
descended and thus discharge double the quantity of water. This pump was worked by means of a
drum fixed to one end of the shaft of a cog-wheel; over this a rope was passed, and crossed below,
to which any number of men on each side could apply their strength. (See Figure 1.6)
In 1785, a revolution in ship's pump design took place in the form of a new pump designed by
Joseph Bramah, of Piccadilly, London. Bramah was an engineer of high repute, and obtained a
patent for a "hydrostatical machine upon a new construction", in which the advantages arose
principally from the pistons having their motion round a centre, in a rotary direction, instead of
reciprocating in a straight cylinder. A reproduction of Bramah's original drawing is shown in Figure
1.7. Bramah's pump was to prove the most efficient yet designed for ship work; and they were
installed on practically every new ship for the next 100 years.
FIGURE 1.6 Taylor's rope-operated pump, 1780.

In 1802 the first practical steamship, the Charlotte Dundas, was built for use on the Forth and
Clyde Canal. Some five years later, the steamship Clermont sailed from New York to Albany, a
distance of 130 miles in 32 hours. The first crossing of the Atlantic was made in 1817 by the
American sail-and-steamship Savannah, but she used her engines only when becalmed. Nearly 20
years later, the Sirius and the Great Western crossed from England to the United States under steam
in just over 14 days. The age of the steamship had arrived, but some conservative ship owners were
to continue to build sailing ships almost up to the end of century.
Although the Charlotte Dundas was the first practical steamship, it is recorded that in 1543 a
naval officer, Blasco de Garay, propelled a ship of 200 tons by steam in the harbour of Barcelona.
No account of his machinery is available, except that he had a large copper boiler, and that
paddle-wheels were suspended over the sides of the vessel. Like so many of the old inventors he
refused to explain how the mechanism worked. There were no such things as patents in those days,
and inventors had to be evasive about ways and means if they did not want to risk losing the fruits
of their labours.
The experiment was tried in a vessel called the Trinity, which came from Calibre to discharge a
cargo of corn at Barcelona. The Captain was Peter de Scarza. By order of the Emperor Charles V,
Don Henrique de Toledo, the Governor Don Pedro de Cordova, the Treasurer Ravago, and the
Vice-Chancellor and Intendant of Catalonia all witnessed the experiment. In the reports made to the
Emperor, the invention was generally approved particularly on account of the promptness and
facility with which the ship was made to go about. The Treasurer Ravago, an enemy of the project,
said that the vessel could be propelled two leagues in three hours, that the machinery was
complicated and expensive, and that there would be danger in case the boiler should burst. This
seemed to have discouraged the inventor, and he removed his machinery, of which all trace was
lost.
If the above account be true (and it is reputed to have been derived from the Royal Archives of
Simuncas), then Blasco de Garay must be regarded as the inventor of the first steam engine.
The advent of the steam engine was the signal for the development also of auxiliary machinery,
among the first of which was the fire pump. E. C. Smith in A Short History of Marine Engineering
mentions the adoption of separate steam fire pumps by the Admiralty.
FIGURE 1.7 Joseph Bramah's rotary fire pump.

For fire purposes, when steam was not up, ships had to rely on the hand pumps. The inadequacy of these
led the Admiralty, about 1880, to supply one or two capital ships, among them the Sultan, with fire pumps
made by the well known fire-engine makers, Shand Mason and Company. In the Sultan the boiler was
placed on the lower deck, and close beside it was a horizontal fire-engine discharging into the fire main,
and also a three-throw pumping engine for drawing from the main drain. At a trial of the plant on January
6, 1880, steam was raised in ten minutes to 100 lbs. per square inch, and a stream of water discharged
over the mast 200 ft. above the level of the engine. The capacity of the fire-pump was 1,120 gallons per
minute, and that of the pumping engine 720 tons per hour, or about eight times the capacity of all the hand
pumps together. Another innovation of the time was the fitting of several large Friedmann steam ejectors
for dealing with large quantities of water in case of emergency.
About this time several engineering companies, among them the Drysdale Company in 1880,
were designing fire pumps of the centrifugal and rotary type for use on board ship.
The centrifugal pump is surprisingly old, having been invented by a M. le Démor in 1732. Le
Démor's pump was merely a straight tube attached in an inclined position to a vertical axis, and
whirled round by the handle. The tube was fastened by ligatures to three strips of wood projecting
from the axis. The operator must have got awfully wet as the tube rotated!
Rotary pumps are known to have existed in the sixteenth century. A water pump consisting of
two cog-wheels fitted to work accurately into each other, and enclosed in an elliptical case, was
described by a Frenchman, M. Servière, in 1625. He gives no hint of its inventor, but states that it is
of the middle sixteenth century.
Fire floats designed to help fight fires in ships
in port, or in harbour installations, have been in
use for well over 100 years. Messrs.
Merryweather made their first fire float in 1841
for the Kronstadt Harbour Board. The pump was
hand operated, and was simply a land appliance
placed on a barge. In 1852, the only fire floats for
the protection of all London's riverside areas were
two hand-worked pumps on floats propelled by
oars. The lack of adequate fire protection for the
riverside brought a constant stream of criticism;
and one critic, after carefully timing a "turnout",
announced that it took twenty minutes to get the
float away from her moorings. A year later
London took the first step towards a steam fire
float by converting one of the hand-worked floats.
In 1854, a floating steam fire engine was
commissioned. She was 130 ft. in length, cost
£3,000, and was propelled by a large centrifugal
pump. This fire float was immediately criticised
as being hopelessly inadequate as to speed; she
could, however, pump water at the rate of 2,000 FIGURE 1.8 A sixteenth-century Reciprocating
gallons per minute. Rotary Pump. The Bramah pump works on the same
Merryweather's made a number of other very principle, but with two pistons instead of one. The
efficient and properly designed fire floats about pump illustrated consists of a close case, in the form
of a sector of a circle, having one opening at the
this time; but they were destined for service in bottom for the admission of water and another to
ports overseas — Calcutta, Shanghai and Venice which a forcing pipe with its valve is attached. A
among them. Today this famous fire-engineering movable radius or piston is turned on a centre by the
firm is producing fire-boats with an output which lever. When the lever is pulled down towards the
left, the piston drives the contents of the case through
would have staggered the men who pioneered this the valve in the ascending pipe.
form of nautical fire-fighting.

FIGURE 1.9 The fire-ship Firebrand which was FIGURE 1.10 A red-hot-shot
accidentally destroyed by fire near Falmouth carrier much used in the 18th
on October 10, 1781
FIGURE 1.11 The twisted deck of the Noronic after the fire,
indicative of the terrific heat generated.

Chapter Two
The Fighting of Fire in Ships
Fire is today, and has been for thousands of years, one of the main destructive weapons used at
sea. During the last war and right up to The Falkland's episode, many fine ships were lost through
fire (although this was admittedly but the secondary effect of high explosive shells or torpedoes);
and one of the main effects of a nuclear bomb is to start fires which can soon finish off the work
started by the explosion.
FIGURE 2.1 Greek Fire as it might have been used in an early sea-fight.
In ancient times the mere mention of Greek Fire was enough to strike fear into the hearts of the
seafarers of the day. This terrible weapon, it is said, was invented by one Callinicus, a mechanic of
Heliopolis, about the seventh century A.D., but it is quite possible that its use was known earlier
still.
Several ingredients enumerated in Greek Fire are mentioned by Vincentius: "An equal quantity
of pulverised rosin, sulphur and pitch, one-fourth of opopanax and of pigeons' dung well dried were
dissolved in turpentine water or oil of sulphur, then put into a close and strong glass vessel and
heated for fifteen days in an oven, after which the whole was distilled in the manner of spirit of
wine, and kept for use."
Another account makes it out to consist chiefly of turpentine water (spirits of turpentine) slowly
distilled with turpentine gum. It was said to ignite by coming into contact with water. Yet another
account maintains that it was composed of naphtha, pitch and sulphur.
Whatever its composition, it is certain that Greek Fire was used for hundreds of years by the
navies of the world right up to the invention of gunpowder. (Naval ordnance was first introduced
into the British and French Navies in the year 1350.)
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Greek Fire was propelled in a fluid state through brazen tubes from the bows of a ship, probably
by means of bellows or of a simple pump in much the same way as water is directed on to a fire
today. The prows of the ships and galleys were usually fancifully shaped like dragons' heads, from
the mouths of which seemed to vomit streams of liquid fire.
Pumps were, of course, known long before the seventh century, and there was nothing to prevent
their being used to project Greek Fire, since it was in liquid form. It does seem obvious, though,
that the weapon could only be used at very close quarters, the range of the pumps being only a few
feet.
As the liquid became exposed to the air, it ignited; thus a continuous stream of fire was directed
on to the attacked vessel. To add to its horror as a weapon, the fire was accompanied by thick
smoke, a loud noise and a disgusting stench. Water could not be used to extinguish the fire — in
fact it only increased its rate of burning. One ancient authority records that it could only be
extinguished by smothering with dry sand, vinegar or urine. The liquid was stored in earthenware
jars, which were sometimes hurled by hand on to the deck of an enemy ship where they immediately
burst into flame.
Naturally, means of defence against Greek Fire exercised the minds of the naval strategists of the
day; and various methods of protection were tried. Timbers were covered with raw hides, or with
cloth made from hair, which were thoroughly soaked with water before going into action; or
sometimes, though seldom, covered by metal sheets.
A remarkable thing is that the use of alum to render timber fire-resistant was known to the
ancients. It is recorded that Archelaus, one of the generals of Mithridates, in a war with the
Romans, washed over a wooden tower with a solution of it, and thereby defeated all attempts by
Sulla to set the structure on fire. There is, however, no record of alum being used to protect ships'
timber against fire, either of accidental origin or from enemy action; but it is probable that it would
be tried as a defence against fire at sea.
Greek Fire was not only a weapon of the sea. There is much evidence to show that it was
commonly used as an offensive land weapon. The dragons slain by St. George and other mythical
figures were no doubt simply man-made Aeolipylic War-Dragons, or Brazen Horses on wheels
which vomited fire from their hideous mouths. These monsters were propelled by men towards
their enemies; and when they were within range, bellows were operated to direct the burning fluid
— as in modern flame-throwers. The effect of these monsters on the superstitious minds of simple
people can well be imagined; and it is not surprising that tales of "dragons erupting fire" were
passed down from father to son, gathering suitable embellishment in the telling.
The fifth chapter of Book IX of Olaus Magnus, contains an interesting account of the use of
Greek Fire.
Vincentius in Spec. Histo. L. xxxi. Chap. 10, asserts that the king of the Indians, commonly called
Prester John, being attacked by a powerful army of Ethiopian Saracens, enemies of the Christian faith,
delivered himself by a stratagem not unlike that of Regnerus, for he made copper images of men and
mounted each upon a horse. Behind every image was a man to govern it, and to blow with a bellows
through holes made for the purpose on fumid materials inserted beforehand into the body of the image,
Provided with a large number of these, he proceeded vigorously against his enemies, whom Vincentius
calls Mongols or Tartars. The mounted images being ranged side by side in front of the hostile army, their
managers were directed to advance, and when arrived within a short distance of the foe to commence
blowing with their bellows the smoking fire within, and with a continual blast to fill the air with
darkness—the consequences of which were that many of the invaders were slain and others took to sudden
flight. Large numbers of horsemen and horses were burnt to death and some reduced to ashes by Greek
Fire, composed of the following ingredients by the artificers of Prester John:
Aspaltum, nepta, dragantum, pix quoque Greca;

Sulphur, vernicis, de petrolio quoque vitro
Mercurii, sal gemmae Graeci dicitur ignis.
Item: Sulphur, petroleum, colopho, resi, terebinthi,

Aspaltum, camphora, nepta, armo, benedictum.

The Fighting of Fire in Ships 13
Magnus could make nothing out of these old

poetic recipes. He thought it would be a vain task
to attempt their explanation, and wicked to revive
the invention. He seems to have been of the
opinion, once widely held, that the souls of the
authors of Greek Fire and of Gunpowder were
reaping their appropriate rewards in hell, doomed
for ever to taste of the torments which their
"devilish devices" inflicted on others. (What
Magnus would have thought about the inventors
of the hydrogen bomb hardly bears thinking FIGURE 2.2 The Aeolipylic War-Dragon.
about!)
The earliest recorded sea fight in which fire was used as a weapon was the Battle of Salamis,
fought in 480 B.C. between the Persians and the Greeks. (It has been said that it was fought "to
decide whether Persian barbarism should curse, or Grecian civilisation bless, the world".) The
Persians had a fleet of 1,200 vessels, whilst the Greeks could only muster 380 triremes (ships
having three tiers of rowers) for the battle. Apart from the usual method of ramming and boarding,
the Greeks employed red-hot coals placed in kettles hanging from long spars. The manoeuvre was
to close with the enemy ship and snap off its oars; and in passing to tip the coals into the ship and
set it on fire. The Greeks won the battle.
A fascinating account of the Battle of Actium, fought in 31 B.C. in the Embracian Gulf, is given
in Twenty Famous Naval Battles by Rawson:
Antony's fleet had constructed wooden towers from which were thrown heavy weights and "balls of fire"
on to the enemy ships. It is recorded that in the middle of the battle, when Cleopatra, the Egyptian Queen,
ordered her fleet of sixty ships to sail away to the south through Antony's fleet, he followed his lover,
leaving his brave men to their fate. Plutarch writing of the battle said, "The defection of their leader, fire,
and the winds of heaven had brought disaster". Antony and Cleopatra escaped to Alexandria, where
"every wild revelry was indulged in and sensuous pleasure, rare delights, were rife on a scale unparalleled
since the world began". Octavian soon caught up with them and Antony slew himself.
Vinesauf's description of a naval battle in 1190 also makes interesting reading:
A battle took place between the Pisans and Turks, and victory went to the Pisans because of their superior
use of Greek Fire, by which means they set fire to the Turks' galleys and so terrified the crews that they
leaped into the water to escape the flames. The Turks who were captured were seized by the women, who
treated them to every indignity and savagely stabbed them, and then cut off their heads — not with swords
but with knives.
Among other interesting weapons of this period were three-pronged pieces of iron known as
triboli (the Germans used similar weapons on our airfields during the last war to puncture the tyres
of our aircraft as they took off or landed). These were thrown, in conjunction with a slippery
substance, on to the enemy's deck. The vessel was then sprayed with a caustic solution which
caused temporary blindness. The theory was that the crew would then rush blindly about, slip on
the deck and impale themselves on the triboli—a sequence of mishaps well calculated, to say the
least, to weaken their resistance! Another ingenious method of attack was to throw baskets full of
poisonous snakes into the other man's galley. This was supposed to have the effect of throwing his
rowers into such a state of confusion that the ship would fall an easy prey to the attackers!
The Greek scientist Archimedes (287-212 B.C.), inventor of the screw pump, made a metal
mirror of such great size that by using it to focus the sun's rays on to the Roman ships which were
invading Syracuse in 212 B.C., he managed to set fire to some of them. The Roman soldiers, when
they landed, captured and immediately killed Archimedes as being a "dangerous wizard".
In their Memoirs of the Crusades, Villehardouin and de Joinville give an interesting account of a
voyage of Louis IX of France to the Levant for the Seventh Crusade in 1248. The chronicler, the

Sieur de Joinville, tells how they reached Marseilles to join their chartered ship. The expedition
was a large one, and it is recorded that "they opened the door of the ship, and therein all the horses
we were to take oversea; and then they re-closed the door and caulked it well, as when a cask is
sunk in water, because when the ship is on the high seas, all the said door is underwater". There
survives, alas! no record of the fire precautions governing the straw on which these unfortunate
animals must have been bedded down!
One of the earliest records of an accidental ship fire is also related by de Joinville:
"The fire occurred at night from one of the Queen's bedwomen leaving the Queen's head-kerchief on the
stove where a lighted candle was burning: it set the clothing on fire, but the Queen, awakening, quickly
threw it overboard and extinguished the fire. Thereupon Louis ordered de Joinville to see that all fires
and lights were put out at nightfall, except the great fire that is in the hold of the ship."
The punishment for disobedience to orders consisted of the offenders being placed in a boat
towed behind the ship, where they were drenched by the spray.
The practice of setting fire to an old vessel and sailing it into the enemy fleet or port dates back
many centuries. This form of warfare was greatly used in the Middle Ages; but a risk associated
with it was that of being caught grappling with an enemy ship when she was set alight by one's own
side. The classic case of this was when the Henry VII Regent was bound to the great Carrick of
Brest. A fire-ship bore down on the latter and set her on fire. The crew of the Regent could not
disentangle their ship in time, and both ships were lost.
Sir Francis Drake reported after the defeat of the Spanish Armada that "on July 21st, 1588, two
days before the main attack on the mighty Spanish Armada, a great ship, the Florenzia, a Biscayan,
was destroyed by an accidental fire which reached her powder and blew her up".
Fire later paid a great part in the defeat of the Spaniards. The Spanish Fleet dropped anchor in
Calais Roads, where they intended to get in touch with Parma's army of 30,000 men and a flotilla,
and to escort them to the Thames Estuary for the invasion of England. The fleet consisted of 136
ships of great size and strength of armament—the most powerful fleet the world had then known.
Sir William Winter, of the Vanguard, conferred with Lord Thomas Howard on the deck of the
flagship Ark Royal. Winter suggested that they send fire-ships into the Spanish Fleet when the tide
and wind was favourable. Eighty fully-prepared fire-ships were piloted into position by their crews,
and were set on fire. The crews left the fire-ships a long way away from the enemy, and relied
simply on the wind and tide to deliver the ships to the proper quarter. (Samuel Pepys records that in
1679 the practice was for crews to sail the fireships right into the enemy, and only then to set them
alight. These Commando-type seamen then took to the boats, and relied on the prevailing confusion
to make good their escape.)
The Spaniards at anchor in Calais remembered how at Antwerp a certain Italian, Giambelli, had
with fire-ships terrified their forces with m'aquinas de minas, or explosion ships. They
remembered, too, that Giambelli was now in the employ of the English; and such was their respect
for the weapon that they cut or slipped their cables and put to sea. No attempt was made to tow the
fire-ships aside and let them burn out, as the French sailors did successfully in the battle of La
Hogue in 1692. The Spaniards were in fact right. The fire-ships were equipped with loaded
ordnance, which exploded and fired their shells as the heat of the flames ignited the charges. This
was the chance which Howard was waiting for. Aided by the tide and wind, he split up and
destroyed the Spanish Fleet. What vessels escaped were overwhelmed by a terrific gale, and few
sailed home again to Spain.
There is no evidence that the fire-ships themselves inflicted any damage at all on the Spanish
Fleet; but they undoubtedly achieved their object of forcing the ships to leave their safe anchorage
in disorder, to be set upon by the English fleet.
A fascinating volume, A Packe of Spanish Lyes was published in London in December, 1588, to
refute Spanish claims to the rest of the world that their Armada had won victory. The Spaniards had

claimed, for example, that the Ark Royal had been sunk — a claim to be repeated with much
regularity by another enemy of England some 350 years later!
The general order books of the British Fleet taking part in the Battle of Trafalgar contain a
number of references to fire and fire prevention which make interesting reading today. The orders
for His Majesty's Ships Mars and Superb, dated 1803/4, are typical:
H.M.S. Mars: "Orders respecting Accidents by Fire"
It is presumed every person in the ship will be particularly careful to prevent accidents by fire; but should
there be at any time an alarm of fire in the ship, every person is immediately to report to their quarters and
the following regulations are to be adopted. If the fire should be discovered before the Main Mast, the
Fourth and Fifth Lieutenants with the Petty Officers and men quartered at the seven foremost guns are to
attend on their respective decks, and the bucket men of these guns are immediately to draw water at their
quarters to be conveyed by the other men whenever the Lieutenants may order. Should a fire be
discovered abaft the Main Mast, the Second and Third Lieutenants with the Petty Officers and men
quartered at the seven aftermost guns are then to attend their part of the ship and follow the directions as
above. The carpenters quartered in the well are immediately to turn the cocks that let water into the ship
(under the Lieutenant quartered on the lower deck who is not employed as already ordered) and to set the
pumps to work, pointing the canvas hose kept ready at the pumps for that purpose towards the fire.
The Lieutenant on the upper deck who is not employed as above is to keep the pump on the Main Deck
that leads into the cistern constantly worked by the men at his quarters. The Signal Lieutenant and
Midshipmen are to see the engine properly supplied with water and worked by the men quartered at the
Quarter Deck Guns, who are to make use of the wooden buckets for filling the engine that are kept ready
on the Quarter Deck, leading the engine hose towards the fire. The Carpenter and his crew are to be ready
with such tools as may be necessary whatever the fire may happen. Both Officers and men are ordered
most strictly to keep their stations and preserve silence, being the most likely method to prevent confusion
and consequently best to subdue the fire. The First Lieutenant to be where the fire is and to direct the
whole. (The Lower Deck ports to be kept down on the weather side to prevent a draft, without particular
orders to the contrary.)
Captain's orders for H.M.S. Superb contained the following references to fire:
Article
33rd No smoking tobacco is allowed but in the established place under the forecastle.
34th The Commanding Officer and Officer of the Watch will remember that spirits are always directed
to be drawn off upon Deck, and never by candlelight.
77th Upon an alarm of fire the Boarders, Engine and Fire-men with their respective Officers are to report
to the Quarter Deck. The Boarders are to be ranged on the starboard, and the firemen with their
buckets on the larboard side. The Marines with the Marine Officers are to appear under arms on
the poop. The First and Third Lieutenants are to report immediately at the place from whence the
alarm has arose. The Boatswain Gunner and Carpenter to the magazine and their storerooms. The
Surgeon and his Mates and Purser to their storerooms and slop rooms, each to examine these places
and to report with all haste to the Quarter Deck. The Day Mate, the Master at Arms and his
Corporals are to proceed to examine and report the tiers. The Pumpers with their Officers are
immediately to rig and fetch the pumps and fix and fill the long hoses, and water (by the Carpenters
stationed in the wings in action) shall immediately be let into the Cistern and well; the other
Carpenters with their axes and mauls are to assemble on the larboard gangway. The remaining
officers and men are to report to their different stations as suggested (unless the drum should beat),
and wait further orders from the Quarter Deck.
An interesting account of a fire-ship has been written by Charles Chambers, Surgeon on the
fire-ship H.M.S. Prometheus, which sailed from Portsmouth Harbour to take part in the
bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807. He begins by recording that on Saturday, August 25th, while
en route to Copenhagen, Captain Parker inflicted a punishment of two dozen lashes on the Purser's
Steward for negligently leaving a candle burning in his room in the cockpit! The Prometheus
proceeded to the Nore to take incombustibles, and to get the fire-room properly arranged. This was
done by two men sent for the purpose from Woolwich Warren (now The Royal Arsenal),
superintended by a Captain Bingham of the Royal Artillery.

"The invention certainly claims no inconsiderable share of ingenuity, and the flammable materials are so
constructed that in less than five minutes after the application of a lighted match to certain apparently
insignificant points, the whole ship would be involved in a complete blaze," writes Chambers. "The
combustibles are chiefly composed of sulphur, nitre, charcoal, etc., placed in barrels in the fire-room,
independent of which are several casks of charcoal and tar which would take fire simultaneously with the
above and add largely to the general conflagration."
"The method of igniting the whole is by means of port fire, which is required to be touched at four
different sockets and is thus communicated through the medium of what is termed 'the main leader' or
'train' to the different ramifications which convey it to the numerous partitions allotted in the fire-room for
the receptacle of combustibles. No explosion takes place. On the contrary, it is requisite to throw
overboard all the gunpowder on the ship previous to the time of setting fire to her, as otherwise it would
counteract the design by extinguishing and dispersing the fire. Grappling irons are affixed to the yard
arms and other convenient parts of the vessel to entangle and confine her to the ship of ships intended to
be burned."
The attack on Copenhagen was so successful, however, that the Prometheus was not required in
the action; and she returned to England at the end of the siege.
Chambers also writes an interesting account of Pyrotechnic Rockets used during naval
engagements of this time.
"They are tapered to a sharp point at one extremity which is made of iron, and should they fall on any
penetrable body must remain stationary to emit their flammable contents."
A certain Mr Congreve appears to have been the inventor of these pyrotechnic rockets, but there
is no record of how effective they were during the Copenhagen engagement, although it is stated
that some were fired against the town. (It is interesting to recall that some of the earliest types of
matches used to be called "Congreaves" — perhaps named after this expert pyrotechnician!)
Chambers also makes repeated reference during his account of the use of red-hot shot fired from
cannon into the town, and on to enemy vessels.
Even the pirates of the early eighteenth century had their fire prevention regulations, which were
rigidly enforced. The articles of Captain Shaw (1723) — which incidently were "swore to upon a
hatchet for want of a Bible"! — contained the following fire prevention clause:
Article 6 That man that shall snap his arms (flintlock guns) or smoke tobacco in the hold without a cap to his
pipe, or carry a lighted candle without a lanthorn, shall receive Moses' Law (forty stripes lacking one) on
the bare back.
One wonders whether, if such a law was enforced today, it would be successful in preventing
some of the many fires caused by illicit smoking!
Captain Shaw's Article 9 is amusing — though it might perhaps have been more gallantly framed
had the word "when" instead of "if " prefixed the sentence!
Article 9 If at any time we meet with a prudent woman, that man that offers to meddle with her, without her
consent, shall suffer present death.
During the growth of Britain as a maritime power in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, there are records of many disastrous fires; but in most cases the accounts are sketchy in
the extreme. The ship-builders of those times were extremely conscious of the need to provide
protection for the galley fire, and for stoves in cabins. Reference is also often made to a "great fire
in the hold", which is thought to have been for the purpose of providing warmth for the crew and a
means of drying their clothes.
A patent taken out by William Castle and Henry Ewbank in March, 1677, one of the earliest on
record, draws attention to the dangers of badly constructed fire hearths:

Patent No. 197:1677. Certain secure and commodious fire hearths for ships, made of iron, copper and
other materials whereof ships and vessels may be the better preserved from burning, which doeth often
happen from the fire hearths that have been hitherto used.
Unfortunately no specification or drawings are included, but the inventors were clearly of the
opinion that there was room for new thought on the subject.
A remarkable book entitled Various methods to prevent fires in houses and shipping and for
preserving the lives of people at fires was written by J. Bathoe and published in 1775. One passage
reads:
"I understand here many dismal acts that happen to ships at sea by effects of thunder and lightning; the
rigging set on fire, the masts split and severed to pieces, and many poor sailors struck dead on the decks.
The vanes on the top of the masts showing in what point the wind blows are made of iron. This attracts
the lightning, and occasions the damage to the men in the ships as related above. Were iron conductors
fitted to each mast and continued across the deck over the ship's side into the water, it would effectively
prevent this danger." (The author also draws attention to the great danger run by the ladies of his day, who
"wound their heads with wire, the most powerful of all conductors, and at the same time wore stockings,
shoes and gowns of silk, one of the most powerful repellents; that they prepared their bodies in the same
manner, according to the same principles as the electricians prepared their conductors for attracting the
fire of lightning"!)
There are many records of ships being lost or damaged through being set on fire after having
been struck by lightning. The fitting of lightning conductors was just beginning about the time of
Bathoe's book, but there is evidence to show that the Navy did not fit them to their ships until some
years later. The following extract from the log of H.M.S. Thisbe, dated January 4th, 1786, is
evidence of this:
FIGURE 2.3 An impression of H.M.S. Surinam after being struck by lightning off Bellisle on December 11th,
1806. The entry in the ship's log reads: P.M. 11.30 Main Mast shivered in pieces by Lightning, which stove in the
Deck, Killed 2 men and wounded 4, split both Pumps. A.M. 12 Fired Rockets, Blue Lights and False Fires, with
Signal Guns, got small Sails aft to keep the Ship to the Wind, and prevent her from drifting on the Shore.

2 p.m. Hove to under Storm Stay Sails. 1/4 past 4 Lightning disabled some of the people; a second flash set
Main Sails, Top and Mizen Stay Sails on Fire. Obliged to cut away Main Mast and carried away Mizen
Top Mast. Fore Top Mast chivered by lightning went overside about 9.
Another naval vessel, H.M.S. Surinam, was severely damaged, and two men were killed, when
she was struck by lightning on December 11th, 1806, off Bellisle.
Later, in the early nineteenth century, Captain Sir Snow Harris's lightning conductors were fitted
to practically all British vessels. They proved to be very efficient, and saved many vessels from
disaster.
Bathoe's book describes a number of disastrous ship fires which had taken place during the
century in which he wrote. The salient points of a few of them are set out below:
1727 June. H.M.S. Luxembourg

The cause of conflagration was rather remarkable. Some liquor had been spilled on the floor, and two
black boys were anxious to ascertain whether it was rum or merely water, being desirous in the former
case of preventing further loss. Unfortunately, they tried to settle the question by applying a light to it,
and immediately a flame burst forth which quickly ran along to the liquor barrel. The boys did their best
to extinguish it, but failed to raise the alarm for fear of punishment. The wind blew fresh, and soon the
whole ship was crackling and blazing in a tremendous conflagration.
1758 May. Latitude 48 off Lisbon, H.M.S. Prince George, 80 guns

"Advice is received from Admiral Broderick that on the 13th of last month His Majesty's ship, Prince
George, of 80 guns, in which the Admiral hoisted his flag, by some unknown accident took fire in the
afternoon; and after burning most furiously in spite of every effort to extinguish it, sank entirely down
about six in the evening. The Admiral could not give a particular account of the people on board who
were lost or who were saved, as the ship's company amounted to 780 men; but is greatly afraid of what he
has heard that the numbers lost exceeded the numbers saved."
1763 February. Jamaica

"The Brigantine Polly, in her passage from Havana to this island, took fire by the flame of a candle
catching some rum drawing out of a cask, by which accident two officers, one sergeant, two corporals, 71
soldiers, four sailors and four women and a child were entirely consumed in the flames."
1770. Bengal. India ship, Falmouth

"By a letter from a gentleman aboard this ship, a thunder storm happened which struck the ship with
lightning and they were wrecked in the mouth of the River Ganges; and out of the 160 men carried from
England there is not above half alive, the rest being burned or drowned, dead of the fatigue, or devoured
by tigers on the shore."
An interesting account of an invention by a Mr D. Hartley, entitled Fire Plates, was published in

1785. The author maintained that houses and ships could be made safe from fire by the simple
expedient of nailing either iron or copper plates to the undersides of floors or decks. Copper fire
plates were recommended for ship use because of the fact "that they could stand proof against the
constant soaking and corrosion of salt water".
Hartley must have had the gift of salesmanship, because he obtained a grant of £2,500 from
Parliament to defray his expenses in connection with the carrying out of experiments to test his
invention. The House of Commons on June 16th, 1774, "resolved that a sum not exceeding £2,500
be granted to His Majesty (King George III) to be paid to David Hartley, Esquire, towards enabling
him to defray the charge of experiments in order to ascertain the practicability and utility of his
invention for securing buildings against fire, and that the same be paid without favour or reward."
Hartley spent some of the money on erecting a two-storey house on Wimbledon Common, and
actually set fire to bundles of "faggots, furzes, charcoal, pitch and tar" whilst His Majesty and
members of his entourage supped tea in an upstairs room. Fortunately for His Majesty the
experiment was a success; and he emerged unscathed, though probably somewhat smoked, from his
ordeal!
Two years later, in 1776, the members of the Committee of City Lands of the Corporation of the
City of London witnessed a similar demonstration, and resolved to erect an obelisk on Putney

Common to commemorate David Hartley's work. The obelisk is still standing today, but few people
who pass realise whom it commemorates.
The Industrial Revolution which began in Britain in the early eighteenth century caused a
tremendous expansion of the shipping industry; for the new factories going up acquired an
enormous appetite for raw materials from foreign lands. The high incidence of fires in ships
engaged in trading caused ship owners to produce their own fire prevention regulations.
Typical of the regulations of the day were those issued by the Court of Directors of the East India
Company on January 17th, 1799. Fires were prohibited at night except for the use of the sick, and
then only by stove. Candles were to be extinguished by nine o'clock between decks and ten o'clock
at the latest in the cabins. Stern warning was issued about the need for the utmost precautions to be
taken to prevent lights from being visible to passing vessels. (This, of course, refers to the danger of
meeting pirates on the high seas.)
The risks run by the seamen of the day are also well indicated in a letter written by one Barlow,
Chief Mate in the Indiaman Delight, who wrote:
"Even in calm weather the seamen's lives were in danger of fire or sudden explosion from powder being
set aflame, as could easily happen through carelessness, or they were in danger of sinking and drowning
from the ship springing a leak; so that all the pumps and inventions that they can make cannot keep her
free from imminent danger."
The loss of the Queen Charlotte on March 17th, 1800, is also typical. The vessel caught fire
while some ten or twelve miles from Leghorn. Despite the fact that many shore boats and sailing
vessels went out to her aid, the fire increased rapidly; and at eleven o'clock the after magazine blew
up and the ship immediately sank. Thirty-seven officers and 599 seamen were lost in this fire,
either through burns or by being blown up when the ship exploded.
Throughout the early and middle part of the nineteenth century, also, many hundreds of
thousands of people left the shores of Britain to sail to a new life overseas. The emigrant ships
sailed under the most primitive conditions, often without enough food or water. Packed like herring
in a barrel, men and women suffered terrible hardship. Pestilence was rife, and many died of
disease. Many ships, too, foundered with heavy loss of life.
Fires also took their toll. The Ocean Monarch, with 396 emigrants and crew on board, sailed out
of Liverpool on August 24th, 1848, bound for the United States. She had proceeded only a few
miles when fire was discovered in the lazarette (the after-part of a ship's hold used for stores). In a
FIGURE 2.4 Burning of the Ocean Monarch in the River Mersy on August 24th, 1848.
178 persons lost their lives.

remarkably short time the whole ship was alight. Sails were set on fire and fell burning on to the
frightened masses on the deck. Practically no boats were available, so that the occupants of the
vessel crowded on to the forepart and even climbed out along the jib-boom. Rescue vessels came to
their aid, but 178 persons were burned to death.
On January 2nd, 1852, the 3,000-ton Royal Mail Steam Packet Company's steamer Amazon, on
her maiden voyage to the West Indies, was destroyed by fire off Portland Bill with the loss of 140
lives. The ship was launched at Blackwall, London, on Saturday, June 28th, 1851, and was
described as "the largest timber-built steam-ship ever constructed in England". She was powered
with engines of 800 h.p. (by Seaward and Capel, of Millwall) which drove the two paddles. These
engines were six months later to be blamed for the disastrous fire which cost so many lives. Hot
bearings on the axles of the paddles started the fire, which the deck fire engine failed to hold. A
gale was blowing, so it was decided to keep the engines running in order to keep the ship's head to
the wind. This was later to make the launching of the small boats extremely difficult; and in fact
only one was successfully got away. A survivor said: "The scene on deck was dreadful in the
extreme. When the flames had approached the after companion two male passengers came running
up from the saloon, all in flames, and running aft, fell on the deck." Within minutes the ship was
enveloped in flames, and many were either drowned after jumping overboard or were burnt to death.
A further disaster took place before the year was out. On December 24th, 1852, the steamship St.
George, en route from Liverpool to New York, caught fire in mid-Atlantic; and 52 people lost their
lives. Six years later, in the same area, the Austria (also a steam emigrant ship) was destroyed by
fire, and 471 persons perished.
The Cospatrick, on voyage to Auckland, took fire at midnight on November 17th, 1874, and only
five persons were saved out of a complement of 476.
These and many other similar incidents caused the Governments of the day to pass legislation
designed to improve the lot of seamen and passengers. Special provisions were made for emigrant
ships. An Act of 1803 attempted to control the number of passengers carried, but this was not
enforced. It was not until 1852, when a public outcry was made about the tragic loss of life at sea,
that a real attempt was made to control the emigrant ships. The 1852 Act not only limited the
number of passengers to be carried by reference to the ship's tonnage, but also stipulated a scale of
food required to be provided for passengers. The Board of Commissioners, established by Royal
Warrant in 1847 under the Secretary of State for the Colonies, was responsible for enforcing the
provisions of the 1852 Act. These powers were later transferred in 1872 to the Board of Trade.
Surprisingly enough, fire prevention on board ship did not figure at all in any of these early
Statutes.
The Nautical Magazine of 1887 contains an account of the loss of the City of Montreal, and
directs attention to the frequent fires taking place at this time in ships laden with cotton. The City of
Montreal was one of the old Inman Liners, having been built in Glasgow in 1872 and employed on
the transatlantic passenger service. She carried a crew of 97, and 145 passengers. Fortunately, the
life-saving equipment carried on board was ample; and good management when the fire took hold
prevented any loss of life, the last boat being picked up by a German barque 94 hours after leaving
from the ship. The ship carried, however, a cargo of 2,031 bales of cotton (the remainder being
bacon, cheese and other provisions). She sailed from New York on her homeward voyage on
August 6th, 1887. On the 10th, fire was discovered by the steerage steward, who saw smoke
coming up from a small hatchway a little forward of the boiler-room casing, and near the pantry on
the deck next below the upper deck. The hatch was battened down at the time; but it was soon
uncovered, and hand grenades were thrown down into the hold. Strenuous efforts were made by the
officers and crew to put out the fire; but without avail, and ultimately the ship had to be abandoned.
One question which engaged the attention of the Court was the means of dealing with fire by the
use of steam fire annihilators. We are told that there were two steam fire-extinguishers laid on to
seven different places; but unfortunately not to the compartments in which the fire broke out. The
reason stated for this by the owners was that it was not desirable to fit steam fire-extinguishers in
cornpartments usually occupied by steerage passengers. The Assessors said they saw no reason why

they should, not be provided for all cargo and passenger compartments, and that with proper stops
and cocks no danger need be apprehended with regard to the passengers.
The Assessors found that the fire hand grenades had been quite useless in this case, and that they
could not be relied upon as a means of extinguishing a fire when it had spread extensively before
being discovered. It was mentioned at the enquiry by Counsel for the Board of Trade that during the
past five years fires had occurred in 26 cotton ships at the port of loading, in seven at the ports of
unloading, and in 13 at sea.
A certain Dr Dupré, who carried out experiments on samples of the same consignment, stated
that in his opinion this particular variety of cotton was not liable to spontaneous combustion. He
also said that, even if spontaneous combustion had been the cause of the fire, it was more likely to
have occurred in some waste which had in it a sufficient quantity of oil or grease to account for the
fire. He gave as his opinion of other possible causes of the fire in this case:
1. That American matches were often found in bales of cotton, and that these could ignite by friction.
2. That in the lamps used while the cargo was being stowed, fine soot often accumulated in the upper part of
the lamp, from which sparks might fly without being observed.
3. The obvious danger from tobacco smoking.
4. That a spark from the funnel might have passed down a ventilator to the hold.
On the whole, Dr Dupré was of the opinion that some bales had been fired by some means while
loading, and that smouldering had gone on for a time until a sufficient quantity had been burned
away for a collapse to have taken place into the vacant space, whereupon a large mass of cotton had
taken fire.
The main interest in the Wreck Commissioners' report in this particular case lies in the fact that it
utterly discredited the theory that fires in cotton cargoes can, to any appreciable extent, be attributed
to spontaneous combustion. It appears that the Commissioners accepted Dr Duprés opinion without
FIGURE 2.5 The burning of the Royal West India mail steamship Amazon
off Portland Bill in January, 1852. 140 lives were lost.

reserve. From the evidence of stevedores, it appeared that the wharf from which the cotton had
been shipped was lighted by electricity; and that great care was used with regard to lamps, etc.,
when stowing the cargo.
Yet it must remain possible that, in spite of these precautions, the fire may have originated in the
carelessness of someone during the stowage of the cargo. The Superintendent of the Liverpool Fire
Brigade stated that there had been eleven cotton fires in ships in Liverpool in the previous years,
mostly in American cotton; and a Board of Trade return showed that 73 fires had been reported as
having occurred in cargoes of American cotton during the five months preceding the enquiry.
The Wreck Commissioners failed to reach any definite conclusions about the cause of fire, but
posed the question: "What is the cause of the numerous fires in cargoes of American cotton?"
A sequel was that the American Government itself offered a reward for the discovery of the
cause of fires in cotton ships. This soon resulted in the detection and conviction of three
incendiaries, who were sentenced to hard labour in the penitentiary, two for five years and one for
20 years. (It was whispered at the time that tugowners were especially interested in the occurrence
of these fires because of the amount of salvage they were thereby enabled to earn ...!)
Fire has not ceased to take its toll of ships and of human life with the passage of time, despite the
growing pace of fire-fighting invention and technique. Indeed, so long as flammable fuels are used,
mixed cargoes carried, and conventional furnishings provided, for so long must the risk of fire
remain an ever-present danger to those who sail the seas. Even a casual glace at the list of ship fires
appearing in Appendix 1 of this book must convince even the greatest optimist who believes that
fire is a thing of the past!
But to know your enemy is half the battle; and it is in an attempt to pass on some of the
knowledge which the author has acquired in a lifetime of fighting fires in ships and in port that he
has undertaken the writing of this book.

Analysis of Trends in Ship Fires 23
Chapter Three
ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN SHIP FIRES
The previous editions of Fire Aboard have documented major fires since 1800. The listing of major fires
now extends to over 100 pages and it was considered appropriate to present that information as an Appendix
rather than within the main body of the text.
A record of fires aboard ships and mobile drilling units has been maintained first by the Liverpool
Underwriters’ Association then by the Institute of London Underwriters (ILU) whose records have been
kept on computer since 1986.
A comparison has been made between the statistics prepared by the Liverpool Underwriters’ Association
for a five year period, 1953 through 1957, with a similar period 1992 to 1996. The manner in which the
statistics were prepared and reported by Liverpool Underwriters’ Association is different from those prepared
by the Institute of London Underwriters. This makes it difficult to produce like for like figures. What is
apparent is that whilst the incidence of fires in ships has diminished, the number of fires resulting in total losses
or sinkings has almost trebled. In 1957, for example, the Liverpool Underwriters’ Association report 8 total
losses for the year amounting to some 56,661 tons lost. In 1996, the Institute of London Underwriters report
235,738 tons lost in 36 incidents. Given world tonnage of 503 million tons in 42,000 ships, the fire loss rate
is 0.046 tons per ton. The fire loss rate is calculated by dividing the tonnage lost as a result of fire by the
estimated total world tonnage. The loss rate is a measure of the risk taken by an underwriter when insuring a
ship and influences the premium charged.
Appendix A contains a listing of fires aboard ships since 1800 and records all incidents classified as major
and above recorded in the monthly returns of the Liverpool Underwriters’ Association until 1984 and Institute
of London Underwriters since that date. The database upon which the records were based is included as part
of the CD ROM which accompanies this book.
The incidents are recorded by the month and year in which they occurred and generally in date order. The
ships name is recorded together with any other pertinent details such as her gross registered tonnage, the
particulars of the voyage and cargo carried and a narrative describing the incident where available. The
severity of incidents are classified by sinking, total losses which includes actual, constructive, and compromised
total losses and major incidents. It will be noted that a narrative is not available for many of the major incidents
recorded after 1986.
Another invaluable source of data is Norman Hooke’s Maritime Casualties 1963-1996 Second Edition
published by LLP Limited. However it does not list all the major incidents.
Generally excluded from the analysis are those fires and explosions which have resulted from collisions as
23
24 Rushbrook’s Fire Aboard
Analysis of Major Ship Fires 1977 to 1996

Severity of Loss listed by Number of Casualties
S ink ings
Tota l Los se s
M a jor Los se s
Num be r of Inc ide nts
150
100
50
0
1 97 7
1 97 8
1 97 9
1 98 0
1 98 1
1 98 2
1 98 3
1 98 4
1 98 5
1 98 6
1 98 7
1 98 8
1 98 9
1 99 0
1 99 1
1 99 2
1 99 3
1 99 4
1 99 5
1 99 6
Graph 3.1

Severity of Loss listed by Tonnage Affected
Sinkings
Total Losses
Major Losses
3
Tonnage Affected
2.5
2
Millions
1.5
1
0.5
0
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Graph 3.2

it is considered that this is primarily a matter of seamanship. That has not prevented inclusion in Chapter 4 of
the tragic incidents involving the Royston Grange, the Siestan and more recently the collision between the
British Trent and Western Winner off the Belgian coast.
We have also excluded from our statistical analysis those fires which were classified as War Casualties as
this tends to skew the analysis in an unrepresentative manner.
Data Analysis
The veracity of any data analysis depends wholly upon the quality of the data to be analysed. It must be
stressed here that the data analysed relates to those incidents which have been listed in the monthly returns of
first, the Liverpool Underwriters Association and since 1985, the returns of the Institute of London Underwriters
whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged. The data from the 1977 to 1985 returns was abstracted by
International Fire Investigators and Consultants. As has been already stated it is difficult to make a like for
like comparison but do allow trends to be observed. Generally speaking there is a reasonable correlation
between the total losses which includes sinkings and constructive total losses between this analysis and that
published by the Liverpool Underwriters’ Association. The correlation between our analysis and that of the
Institute of London Underwriters is possibly more accurate, being based as it is on computer records.
Number of Casualties
The downward trend in incidents can be seen in graph 3.1 opposite. It shows that the number of fires are
declining but over the last three years 1994 through 1996 the number of total losses and sinkings have
remained almost constant.
Whilst the number of major fires gives a measure of the probability of occurrence, of greater significance is
the tonnage lost or sunk as a result of fires and this is presented in graph 3.2. Excluding those incidents which
have resulted in major fires, but have not caused the vessel to be lost, for the 20 year period, 1977 to 1996,
the average annual loss rate resulting from fire (total losses and sinking) is about 300,000 tons per annum. This
has fallen significantly in the last five year period to about 220,000 tons.
Graph 3.3 shows the 20 year incident rate (red bar) plotted against the 1992-1996 incident rate (green
bar). Where the red bar exceeds the green bar the incident rate is increasing and the flag state is performing
less well than the world-wide average. Perhaps the most dramatic improvement over the last five years has
come from Greece whose share of world-wide fires has diminished from 14% to just over 5%. Though much
maligned at least in the British press, the Liberians have also improved and are much less prominent participants
in fire than generally thought. The Cypriots have clearly taken few steps to reduce the number of fires
occurring on their flagged ships and with the Panamanians and the Maltese have the distinction of being the
flags states whose ships are most likely to suffer fires. Surely an accolade which any nation could do without.
Amongst those nations who have performed less well in the last five years compared to the twenty year
average are Honduras, Malta, Russia, St Vincent and Turkey. Others have recorded small overall changes.
The value of such a table is to permit underwriters and Protecting & Indemnity Clubs (P&I) to make informed
choices as to whom they cover and at what rate. At a recent conference into Maritime Risk Assessment held
in London, Mr Stephen Redmond, Deputy Chairman of the Institute of London Underwriters, indicated that
in a “soft” market, hull and machinery underwriters were much less likely to adjust their rates to reflect the risk
taken, preferring instead to ride the average. By contrast, the losses suffered in 1990 through 1992 motivated
a significant investment in loss prevention and ship survey amongst the P&I Clubs and a hardening of attitude
against towards the worst by the best ship owners in what are after all mutual insuring organisations.
Some of the best examples of the loss prevention initiatives have been taken by the UK P&I Club whose
web site can be accessed from the links page on the CD-ROM. The North of England P&I Club has produced

Change in Fire Incident Rate by Flag
Am erican
British
Chinese
C y priot
Greek
H onduran
Indian
Italian
Japanese
Liberian
Maltese
N orwegian
Panamanian
Philippino
Russian
Singapore
South Korean
Spanish
St. Vincent 1977-96
Turkish 1991-96
Venezuelan
0% 5% 10% 15%
Percentage of Worldwide Incidents
Graph 3.3
have produced a down to earth and instructive booklet, written by Richard Bracken, entitled Personal
Injury Prevention. Such publications reflect an ongoing trend in the industry to promote loss prevention.
Another example is the Guide to Ship Fire-Fighting produced by the UK Ministry of Defence under BR
4007.
In the UK, a worrying trend has been the marked reduction in the number of the British Merchant Seamen
and Officers. Early retirement has meant that those promoted to positions of responsibility have neither the
experience nor are they mentored in the way they once were. As a result there is a failure to learn from
history. Professor Trevor Kletz’s book entitled Lessons from Disaster: How Organisations Have No
Memory and Accident Recur makes the point, albeit in the context of the petrochemical industry. One of the
purposes of this book is to help preserve the corporate memory and therefore the editor makes no apology
for retaining some of the more notable ship fires described in subsequent chapters. When it comes down to
it there are only three causes of fire: men, women and children and an unhealthy number still smoke! God
help him, the author still enjoys his Havana cigars!
Gross tonnage lost by fire listed for the top eight flag states is shown in the pie charts graph 3.4 and 3.5.
The charts show the tonnage lost for the flag states expressed as a percentage of the whole and includes all
constructive total losses, total losses and sinkings. Again a comparison can be made between the performance
over the last 20 years as against the last five years. The most significant change that will be noted is that in the
last five years the Maltese share of world tonnage losses due to fire have risen from 4.9% to 22.8%. This is a
significant rise and surely merits the Maltese Government taking a long hard look at its policies in regard to fire
safety aboard its flagged vessels.

Gross Tonnage Lost by Fire 1977 to 1996
Cypriot 1 2 .5 %
Danish 1 .5 %
Gre ek
Hondura n 4 7 .8 %
J apane se 2 2 .5 %
M a ltes e
Filipino 1 .4 %
Rus sia n 1 .1 %
7 .0 %
4 .9 %
Other 1 .4 %
Graph 3.4
Gross Tonnage Lost by Fire 1992 to 1996
Cypriot
14.8%
Danish
28.2%
Greek 5.4%
Honduran 9.1%
Japanese
Maltese
3.1% 2.2%
Filipino 3.1%
11.4%
Russian
22.8%
Other
Graph 3.5

Attention has already drawn to the drop in the number of fires aboard Greek vessels and this is also
reflected in the reduction from 22.5% to 9.1% share of world shipping fire losses.
A significant rise in Japanese losses will be noted perhaps due to the ageing of their fleet with respect to
others. Similarly rises in Cypriot, Danish, Honduran, Russian and Filipino ships will be noted.
The Significance of Vessel Age

Graph 3.6 shows the occurrence of fire expressed as tonnage affected by fire with respect to the age of the
casualty. It will be noted that the rate appears fairly steady during the first ten years of life then rises peaking
at 15 years of age. The probability of a fire occurring in vessels over ten years old is about double that in the
first flush of youth then settles down so that by twenty years and beyond the occurrence reverts to its original
rate. It appears that having been lavished with care in the first twenty years for those vessels which have not
been scrapped, the last ten are fairly uneventful.
The other interesting observation to be made is that a vessel is more likely to sink as a result of a fire in the
first ten years of life than in later years of service. The probability of occurrence may be significantly lower, but
the fires which do occur seem to have much greater consequence in the first five years particularly. Perhaps
the other effect being observed is that despite the severity of a fire, younger ships are more likely to be
repaired because of higher hull value than be declared a constructive total loss. This is an area worthy of
further research.
Fatalities
The worst loss of life ever recorded occurred on December 20, 1987 when the Ro-Ro Dona Paz was in
collision in the Sibuyan Sea, central Philippines with the Vector a tanker carrying 8,800 barrels of petroleum
products. In resulting fireball which engulfed both vessels 4,386 souls lost their lives and both ships subsequently
sank. Only 24 passengers and none of the Paz’s crew survived, whilst 2 of the Vector’s crew lived to tell the
tale. This tragedy, the largest ever peacetime maritime casualty, went largely unreported in the UK at least.
Excluding this incident and the loss of life resulting from collision, two thousand one hundred and thirty
persons lost their lives as a result of fires aboard ship during the period 1977 to 1996 as shown in Graph 3.7.
The review of the statistics highlights the danger to passengers aboard roll on roll off ferries and the
catalogue of disasters begins with the fire aboard the Tampomas II on January 24, 1981 when 431 lives were
lost as a result of a fire which started in the car deck — to the Scandinavian Star in April 1990 when 158
passengers and crew died, many in their cabins, even more in companionways, unable to find their way to the
safety of the deck only yards away. There is clearly a linkage between familiarity with ones surroundings such
as on a cruise ship and the alien environs of a the short duration voyage on a ro-ro or ferry. Quite simply there
is insufficient time on a short duration Ro-Ro ferry voyage of say three hours such as a Channel crossing, for
passengers to become familiar with the layout of the ship. The risk is even greater when the journey is made
at night when many passengers are asleep!
SOLAS was reviewed and amended in 1992, requiring the retrofitting of sprinklers in companionways,
improved fire detection systems and smoke control on vessels carrying more than 36 passengers. For the first
time these amendments comprising Regulations 41-1 and 41-2 of Chapter II-2 of SOLAS (reproduced in
Chapter 9) were retrospective in their application and required vessels to comply by October 1, 1997. The
report of the fire aboard the Romantica which took fire off the coast of Cyprus on October 4, 1997 is
awaited with interest by the maritime fire safety community who wish to evaluate the impact of these measures.
It has been reported in the press that the Flag State had granted the Romantica a dispensation giving more
time for her to comply with the latest requirements of SOLAS.
Whilst fires aboard passenger vessels were not common through 1992 to 1997, when one hears of proposals
to build a floating city which will accommodate over 65,000 persons, nearly a mile long and thirty storeys


Tonnage Affected and Lost listed by Vessel Age
2 .5
S ink ings
2 .0
Tota l Los se s
M a jor Los se s
Tonna ge
Millio n s
1 .5
1 .0
0 .5
0 .0
1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
9 10 11 12
13 14 15 16
17 18 19
20 21 22 23
24 25 26 27
28 29 30
Age of Vessel
Graph 3.6
Fatalities by Vessel Type
S pe cial T ank er
2 T ank er 110
862
R o-R o
685
R o-R o
N ot L is ted B ulk Carrie r
57
19 9
P as s enge r V es s el
B ulk Carrie r General Cargo
97 Container Ve s s e l
94 12
OB O 2
6 Chemical T anker F is hing V es s el
14 23
L iquified Gas T anke r
3 Container Ve s s e l
2
General Cargo
229 F is hing V es s el
117
19 77 - 9 6 19 92 -96
Graph 3.7

Fatalities 1977 to 1996 listed by Location sorted by Vessel Type
500
400
Number of Fa talities
300
S pecial B ulk Carrier
Container Ves s el P as s enger Ves s el
Liquified Gas T anker F is hing Ves s el
200 OB O General Cargo
Chemical T anker R o-R o
N ot L is ted T anker
100
0
ca r deck
engine room
tank
accommodation
ca rgo hold
de ck
ga lle y
pump room
unknown
Graph 3.8
Fatalities 1977 to 1996 listed by Vessel Type sorted by Location
1000
900
Number of Fatalities
unknown 800
pump room 700
galley 600
deck 500
cargo hold 400
accommodation 300
tank 200
car deck 100
engine room 0
Tanker
Ro-Ro
General Cargo
Fishing Vessel
Passenger Vessel
Bulk Carrier
Not Listed
Chemical Tanker
Liquified Gas Tanker

OBO
Container Vessel
Special
Total
Graph 3.9

high, the problems of fire safety management are immense and quite mind boggling. As are the consequences
of failure! Costing an estimated $6 billion, it might be worth considering investing in a sprinkler company or
two. In such vessels, of which the Oriana is a modern, if somewhat smaller forerunner, increasing reliance is
placed upon sophisticated fire detection systems described in Chapter 8. Such systems are self monitoring but
are not self maintaining and when the ceilings are repainted in the first refit, someone has to remember to go
round and check that the painters have removed the protective bags from the heads.
The reader is encouraged to review the incidents documented in summary form in Appendix A. Such a
review will be found to be instructive! Time and again one will read of an explosion aboard a tanker in which
one, two or more persons have been killed. It is a well known phenomenon that legislation is retroactive. You
can kill one hundred people singlely in separate incidents and not much notice is taken. The risk seems
acceptable. However, start killing a large number of people in a fire and Governments start to react to public
disquiet. The public’s perception by and large is that the maritime industry is safe — with some notable
exceptions like the Herald of Free Enterprise, the Estonia. It is narrowed by the natural bias to report
national events such that the Dona Paz and even the Scandinavian Star closer to home passed almost
unreported in the UK. The point is that the maritime industry is a global industry and it takes the efforts of the
IMO to push through changes which in any other industry would be implemented by public clamour.
It comes as no surprise that shipping is the last major industry to require that a safety assessment, sometimes
called a “safety case”, be a prerequisite in the design and operation of all vessels. The International Safety
Management Code is only a step in that direction and plans are already well underway to require that all
vessels calling at European Community ports have a safety case. However, it has become the policy of the
IMO Maritime Safety Committee to undertake a formal safety assessment of all recommendations being
considered for incorporation into SOLAS Regulations.
Whilst from the publics’ perspective, ro-ro’s and other passenger vessels will be the first focus of attention,
it is important that tankers receive the attention they merit. In the US and Europe for example, the storage of
inventories of flammable liquids in certain quantities requires the owner operator to undertake a risk analysis
and document the results in the form of a safety case. Such provisions were the outcome of the Cullen Inquiry
into the explosion affecting Piper Alpha offshore production platform which took place in the North Sea and
is described in Chapter 15.
Graphs 3.8 presents an analysis of the location in which fatalities occurred sorted by type of vessel. From
Graph 3.8 it will be observed that the greatest loss of life occurs in the engine room. These are the result of
numerous single or double fatality events. In contrast the loss of life which is recorded on the car deck results
from a small number of incidents accompanied by a large loss of life.
Graph 3.9 shows the listing of fatalities by vessel type sorted by location. Comment has already been
made upon the loss of life which has occurred upon tankers. However it is interesting to note that the number
of persons killed as a result of incidents involving tank explosions is similar to the loss of life in machinery
spaces. In contrast, fires in the engine rooms of ro-ro’s account for a very small percentage of lives lost in ro-
ro fires.
Tonnage Lost by Vessel Type

Not only does the greatest loss of life occur aboard tankers, but they account for the greatest loss of
tonnage as a result of fire and explosions. This is illustrated in the two pie charts which make up graph 3.10.
These show tonnage lost listed by the type of vessel upon which the loss has occurred. Over a twenty year
period, 1977 to 1996, tankers constitute approximately 50% of the vessels lost fire and explosion. A significant
change in the data will be noted in that in the period 1992 to 1996 ro-ro’s now comprise about 15% of losses
as compared to 4.8% in the twenty year period, 1977 to 1996.

Gross Tonnage Lost listed by Vessel Type
T anker 1977 - 96
3,240,083
S pecial
5,721 B ulk Carrier
R o-R o 948,821
296,282 Chemical T anker
Pas s enger Ves s el 53,066
36,384 Container Ves s el
OBO 37,561
74,770 F is hing Vess el
Liq
quified Gas T anker 154,074
7,895
General Cargo
1,337,682
1992 - 96
T anker
477,514
R o-R o
139,654
Bulk Carrier
182,695
General Cargo
234,452 Container Vess el
20,700
F ishing Ves sel
49,335
Graph 3.10
Location of Fires
The number of casualties which have occurred in the period 1997 to 1996 are shown graphed by
vessel type and sorted by location in Graph 3.11. This can be compared to similar information shown
in Graph 3.12 drawn from the annual reports of the Liverpool Underwriters Association which in
Appendix 5 presented details of all fire occurrences reported to them. Although this information is
still recorded by the Institute of London Underwriters it is not presented in their annual reports. Analysis
of the data suggests that there are other small fires occurring in various locations are extinguished
using portable appliances. The data bears out experience that there is a greater likelihood of more
serious fires occurring in machinery spaces for obvious reasons. Tonnage lost listed by location and
sorted by vessel type in the period 1977 to 1996 is shown in Graph 3.13. The same information is
presented listed by vessel type and sorted by location is shown in Graph 3.14.

Casualties listed by Vessel Type sorted by Location
900
800
Number of Casualties
700
unknown
600 tank
500 pump room
400 galley
300 engine room
200
deck
cargo hold
100
car deck
0
accommodation
Not Listed
Bulk Carrier
Chemical Tanker
Container Vessel
Fishing Vessel
General Cargo
Liquified Gas Tanker
OBO
Passenger Vessel
Ro-Ro
Special
Tanker
Graph 3.11
Location of Total and Partial Loss Fires 1977 to 1986

per The Liverpool Underwriters’ Association
Accommodation
8.9%
Unknow n
29.3% Cargo Spaces
20.4%
Stores Electrical Installation

0.5%
3.6%
Oil Tanks Funnels and Uptakes
0.7% 0.4%
Oil Burning Stokeholds Galleys
2.2% 0.9%
MachinerySpaces
33.1%
Graph 3.12

Tonnage Lost listed by Location sorted by Vessel Type

3.5
3.0
2.5
Tonnage Lost
unkno wn
2.0 tank
Millions
pump room
ga lley
1.5
engine roo m
de ck
1.0 ca rgo hold
ca r de ck
accommod atio n
0.5
0.0
Bulk Carrie r
Not Listed
Chemi cal Tanke r
Contai ner V esse l
Fishing Vessel
Ge nera l Ca rgo
Liquifie d Gas Tanke r
OBO
Pa ssenger Vessel
Ro-Ro
Specia l
Ta nker
Graph 3.13
Tonnage Lost listed by Vessel Type sorted by Location
2.5
2.0
T a nker
S p ecial
Tonnage Lost
1.5 R o -R o
Millions
P a s s enger V es s e l
OB O
L iq uified Gas T anker
1.0 Ge neral Carg o
F is hing Ves s el
Co ntainer Ve s s el
Chemica l T a nker
0.5 B ulk Ca rrier
N o t L is ted
0.0
car deck
accomm odati on
cargo hold
deck
engine room
gal ley
pum p room
tank
unknown
Graph 3.14

Ship Fires 1991 to 1993 Analysis of Engine Room Fires

Other In addition to the appraisal of ship fire
T ank, P ump R oom 10.3%
11.8% statistics for the period 1977 to 1996, a detailed
Car go H ol d
10.3%
analysis has been undertaken of fires in engine
E ngine R oom
rooms which occurred during the period 1991
Accommodati on 53.9%
13.7% to 1993. Graph 3.15 shows the incidence of
fire by location from which it will be seen that
Graph 3.15 fires in engine-rooms accounted for almost 54%
of all fires occurring between 1991 and 1993.
ER Fires - Degree of Loss A detailed study of these incidents reveal that
they are often initiated by an explosion, or result
Major
CT L or S unk
19.6%
from an uncontrolled release of flammable
41.0%
174 83 vapours or fuel into the engine room. The hot
flashover type flame produced presents a
167 considerable risk of injury to personnel manning
the space.
S mal l Understandably there is a reluctance to use
39.4%
carbon dioxide because of the risk of
asphyxiating those persons who may remain
Graph 3.16 injured in the engine room and one can see in
the statistics that this delay results in an
ER Fires - Tow vs Not Towed
escalation of the fire. Thus the damage caused
and the loss which results are greater. Indeed if
150 Towed
Not Towed
the fire grows too large the CO2 system can be
rendered ineffective, particularly if it proves
100 impossible to seal the compartment and baton
Incidents
down the space.

Graph 3.16 shows the degree of loss which
50 resulted from engine room fires in the period
grouped by CTLs or sinkings, major fires and
small incidents. 60% of all fires which occur in
0 engine rooms cause major damage to the ship
S mall Major CT L
and it is instructive to consider Graph 3.17 which
Graph 3.17 shows those vessels which required to be towed
back to port having been immobilised. It will
ER Fires by Vessel Type be noted that even in a small fire there is a 37%
probability of requiring to be towed back to port,
T ankers
16.5% B ulk 80% in the event of a major fire and, as might
11.6%
be expected, 93% if the case of CTL’s. Obviously
R oR o
15.8% F is hing if the ship has sunk, one does not need a tow!
14.4%
Graph 3.18 groups engine room fires by the
type of vessel upon which they have occurred.
Approximately 42% of all engine room fires
occur on general cargo vessels, 16.5 % on tankers
General
41.7% and 15.8% on roll-on roll-off vessels. The latter
is important because of the mix of risks
Graph 3.18

associated with ro-ro’s.

The Sally Star cross channel ferry has suffered two fires in her engine room, the first in December
1988, the second in August 1994. In this latter incident the ship had to be towed back to port and but
for the intervention of the Kent Fire Brigade Offshore fire fighting team the result might have been
quite different. The circumstances are published in the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch
(MAIB) report. Though equipped with halon, there was a 33 minute delay between the discovery at
0418 hours and it’s discharge commencing at 0451 hours.
It is instructive to note that the generators stopped automatically because of high cooling water
temperature in the diesel engines. This happened because the fuse box serving the cooling water
pumps for the auxiliary generators was situated within the main engine room and was affected by the
heat of the fire. The MAIB comments upon the failure of electrical power during an emergency
onboard, is not uncommon viz:
Investigation into previous accidents has raised concern over the reliability of emergency
power supplies. Because of this, the Department of Transport’s Marine Safety Agency
recently issued Merchant Shipping Notice number 1626 “Testing of Emergency Sources
of Electrical Power” which advises the need for a regular and formal testing procedure of
emergency generators under load.
Engine Room Fires sorted by Vessel Age
30
CT L
25 Major
Number of Incidents
20 S mall
15
10
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Age of Ves s el
Graph 3.19

Graph 3.19 shows the incidence of fire grouped

by severity and sorted by vessel age. It is interesting
to note that the graph does not follow the normal
bathtub curve opposite which is the accepted dictum
of reliability engineering. The bathtub curve (Figure
3.1) encapsulates the view that when first brought
into use there will be a number of early failures,
that there then will be period where the failure rate
is constant and as a component wears out, so the
failure rate increases towards the end of a
components useful life. By comparison with the
bathtub curve, Graph 3.19 shows that fires in engine FIGURE 3.1 The “bathtub” reliability curve.
rooms do not follow this pattern.
As might be expected there are a considerable number of incidents during the vessel’s first year and
would coincide with the “infant mortality rate” predicted in traditional reliability theory. The occurrence
rate rises until it peaks around vessels aged 10 or 11 years old and then falls, reaching a new peak
through years 15 to 20 where the rate is almost constant. In the 10 year period between age 15 to age
24, the probability of fire is not only increased but the proportion of those incidents which cause major
losses or CTLs also increases because the cost of repair exceeds the value of the hull. The rate of
occurrence then falls for vessels 25 years and older probably due to the care lavished upon them!
However, it will be noted that the incidents that do occur in vessels aged 25 and greater tend to be of
greater severity and the majority resulting in either major losses or CTLs for the reason previously
stated.
In September 1994, the Japanese Classification Society Nippon Kaiji Kyokai, published the results
of an investigation into 73 fires which occurred on ships classed with them in the period 1980 through
1992. Graphs 3.20 through 3.24 are drawn from the information published in their report which
contains further detailed information.
Graph 3.20 shows the causes of the engine room fires studied and that 57% involved the release of
either fuel, lubricating or waste oil. 26% of fires in engine rooms were the result of some electrical
defect and 10% resulted from repair work being undertaken, welding and the like. Turbochargers are
singled out and 7% of engine room fires start at or near the turbocharger.
Causes of Engine Room Fires
T urbocharger R epair W ork

7.0%
10.0%
E lectric
26.0%
F uel Oil
43.0%
L ube Oil
W as te Oil 11.0%
3.0%
Graph 3.20

Figure 3.2 below shows the sources of engine room fires plotted against the equipment’s where
they have occurred. The majority of fires will be observed to occur around the main engine or the
generators. However there are still numerous fires which occur near boilers and the electrical
switchboard often located, in the author’s experience, in the control room is another area of particular
concern and perhaps greater consideration should be given to protecting switchboards with some
form of cabinet protection such as carbon dioxide which provides a low cost solution to an area of
high risk.
NKK not only reports on where and how fires in engine rooms started, but looked at how they were
suppressed and this is shown in Graph 3.21. An astonishing 40% of all fires in engine rooms were
extinguished using portable appliances. This reflects both the efficacy and value of such devices but
also upon the importance of proper training and familiarisation with the fire fighting equipment
provided. Chapter 10 of this book is devoted to the training of personnel, the value of which cannot be
underestimated. 20% of fires were extinguished using sea water, 18% using fixed CO2 and 5% using
fixed foam. 15% of fires in engine rooms burn themselves out.
Graph 3.22 presents the method used to extinguish fires in engine rooms plotted against the actual
time taken to extinguish the fire. It will be noted that the effectiveness of portable appliances diminishes
with time and that they are most effective if employed in the first 15 minutes after which a fire has
been discovered. The graph also shows that there is a relatively narrow window of opportunity in
which it is likely that a CO2 system will be effective, that is in the first thirty minutes after a fire has
been discovered. The statistics indicate, that if applied after a fire has been burning for more than one
hour, CO2 is less likely to guarantee a successful outcome than if discharged in the early course of the
fire.
There is an understandable reluctance to use a fixed CO2 system, discharge of which would result
in the certain death of anyone trapped in the space. As a result the discharge of a CO2 system appears
to be viewed as a measure of last resort by ship’s officers.
FIGURE 3.2 The sources of fire in engine rooms.

(Nippon Kaiji Kyokai)

Suppression System However, it is the Author’s opinion that

the use of a CO2 system should be seen as
S e a-W ate r the measure of first resort if the fire cannot
20%
F ixed CO2 be tackled using portable equipment by
18%
engineers present. He believes that this can
B ur nt Out
15% be achievied by a water spray system for the
protection of engine room spaces. It will be
F ixed F oam recalled that in the case of the fire aboard the
5%
P o rtable F F T ug Sally Star there was a delay of 33 minutes
40% 2%
between the discovery of the fire and the
application of the halon gas. This no doubt
Graph 3.21 the result of having to account for all the duty
engineers and then sealing the space.
Suppression System vs Time Clearly one has to be assured that all
persons have vacated the engine room hence
12 the use of a roll-call board is recommended
10 and described more fully in Chapter 10. The
8 use of a roll-call board will assist in making a
Incidents
Unknown
Foam
rapid check to determine if anyone is missing,
6
Burnt Out possibly trapped in the engine room. A
4 Sea water
Fixed CO2 properly designed system should establish
Portable
2 within a minute or so the presence or absence
0 of engineers likely to be in the engine room.
0.25 0.5
Graph 3.23 shows the probability of
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 extinguishment plotted against time to
3.5
T ime (hours )
extinguish fires and shows that the longer the
discharge of CO2 is delayed, the less certain
a successful outcome. At the risk of repitition,
Graph 3.22
it is against this background that it has been
the author’s long held view that greater
Probability of Extinguishing an consideration should be given to the selective
Engine Room Fire vs Time application of water spray in engine rooms
designed to protect the individual risk areas.
90%
There is no better fire fighting medium and
80%
it’s availability of water at sea is guaranteed!
70%
The development of water mist systems which
significantly reduce the amount of water
Probability
60%
50% required and may go some way to alleviating

40%
an engineer’s natural fear that his equipment
30%
is going to rust if water is applied to it. Most
ship’s engineers of the author’s acquaintance
20%
having suffered a major fire which has
10%
0.25 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
immobilised the vessel because the electrics
T ime to E xtinguis h (hours ) have been burned out would choose water
spray in preference to CO2. This is discussed
Graph 3.23 at length in Chapter 8.

Chapter Four
Some Major Disasters to Ships at Sea
Of all fires, a fire at sea is potentially the most hazardous in terms of human life. The threat
arises not only from the fire itself but in equal measure from the sea which under gale conditions
represents a most hostile environment. Sailors know all too well the hazards associated with
launching lifeboats into rough seas and history records many tragedies whereby in such
circumstances many lives have been lost. The author makes no apology for including accounts of
fires which took place many years ago — for example the Morro Castle fire which occurred on 8
September 1934. The lessons to be learned from each of the fire cases discussed is as live today as
when the incidents took place. Indeed, it could be said that the comparison between and the lessons
to be learned from the Morro Castle and the Scandinavian Star fires — 1934 and 1990 — are
closely related. Little did the author think when he published the first Edition of Fire Aboard in
1961 that some 30 years later ship fires which were entirely preventable would still be taking place.
Nothing changes!
SOLAS is a wonderful piece of international legislation but until this can be properly enforced it
is clear that many preventable ship fire tragedies will still take place. It must be made abundantly
clear to management that failure to conform to reasonable standards, both of training and
maintenance of all fire equipment, will attract tough treatment for the perpetrators. This is not to
say that accidental fires will not occur. As already said the sea is a tough environment and from
time to time accidental fires will take place. Ships engine rooms are places within which it will be
difficult to achieve 100% fire safety. Circulating heated oil, coupled with surfaces hot enough to
cause the auto ignition of accidentally released hydrocarbons will always be with us. But the risk of
such incidents can be greatly reduced if more attention to safety was paid by the designers of the
machinery. Accepting that some fires are bound to take place this highlights the need for shipboard
personnel to be trained to the highest possible standard. How to achieve this is discussed elsewhere
in the book.
Perhaps the enforcement of the fire safety aspect of shipboard activities will be the next great
crusade to be undertaken by the International Maritime Organization!
The "MORRO CASTLE" Fire — September 8th, 1934

The Morro Castle, a ship of 11,520 gross registered tons with accommodation for 490
passengers, was built in 1930 for the American Ward Line at a cost of $4,800,000. Fitted with
turbo-electric drive, she was considered to be the finest and most luxurious vessel yet placed in the
coastwise service. The vessel was 508 ft. overall, and had three decks devoted to passenger
accommodation.
In common with the then current world practice, the ship was constructed with large quantities of
highly combustible linings and furnishings in the passenger and crew accommodation. Plywood
partitions and linings were extensively used in the staterooms, dining saloons, lounges, cabins and
other public rooms. Luxuriously equipped throughout, the ship had a "fire load" which was
obviously of a high order.
40
Some Major Disasters to Ships at Sea 41
Although the vessel was fitted on each

deck with fire-resisting partitions and doors
at the statutory 130-ft. intervals, staircases
were open from deck to deck and were lined
with combustible material. No automatic
means was provided for closing any of the
fire-stop doors.
An automatic fire-alarm system was
fitted to parts of the ship, including
staterooms, officers' quarters and the radio
room. Unfortunately, it had not been
thought necessary to have the fire-alarm
system installed in the passengers' public
rooms; and this defect was to have serious
consequences when the fire occurred. The
holds and engine-rooms were protected by
means of a carbon dioxide system; but no
part of the ship was fitted with a sprinkler
installation.
The usual type of fire-extinguishing
apparatus was fitted, as required by the U.S.
Steamboat Inspection Service. Soda-acid
fire-extinguishers were provided at all
strategic points. Two electrically driven
centrifugal pumps, with a capacity of 300
and 400 gallons per minute respectively, FIGURE 4.1 The Morro Castle burning in the
and one steam-driven fire/bilge pump of Atlantic off the New Jersey Coast
300 g.p.m., were available to charge the fire
main. Adequate hose and nozzles were provided.
The ship carried more than sufficient life-saving equipment for the number of passengers and
crew carried.
Tragedy had already struck the ship as she steamed on the last lap of her journey from Havana to
New York in the early hours of September 8th, 1934; for her Master, Captain Wilmott, had died just
after dinner that evening. Naturally, this had cast gloom over the 316 passengers and the 232
members of the crew. All festivities had been cancelled, and the ship was unusually quiet as she
steamed. close to the New Jersey coast. The sea was choppy, and an eighteen-knot wind was
blowing off the starboard quarter. Most of the passengers had retired for the night, but a few
remained drinking and talking at the lounge bar.
At about 2.45 a.m., Donald Campbell, an assistant steward, was informed by a passenger that the
writing-room was on fire. He immediately investigated and found that a locker was alight in the
writing-room on the port side of "B" Deck. This locker was used for storage purposes, and was
built into the wall near the lounge door. Campbell raised the alarm by telephoning the Chief
Steward and informing the night watchman. He then tried to tackle the fire with a portable
extinguisher, but found this ineffective.
The deck watchman immediately notified the bridge, and the Second Officer came to investigate.
He found the writing-room already well alight, and that portable extinguishers were having no
effect. About ten minutes later, at approximately 2.55 a.m., he returned to the bridge and sounded
the general alarm. The Acting Master, Captain Warms, took command at that time.
Unfortunately, early fire-fighting attempts were of a haphazard and ill-organised nature. Lines of
hose were got to work by members of the crew, assisted by passengers, who broke windows through
which to direct the jets. The flames, fed with oxygen from the open windows, and assisted both by
the way of the ship and by the strong wind, soon spread to the huge lounge, which extended the

whole width of the ship and was two decks high with a mezzanine floor at the deck above.
Windows were smashed on "A" deck above, and further assisted the spread of the flames.
Another bad mistake was that no attempt was made to shut the fire-resisting doors in the
bulkheads, and thus limit the fire to the section of its origin. Both doors into the writing-room, and
all the lounge doors, were left wide open. Obviously the fire parties had little knowledge of
fire-fighting; and no effective command was exercised.
According to the late William McFee, who wrote an account of the event, the crew was largely
made up of men who were not trained seamen, but who had paid to be taken on to the ship's
strength. This, coupled with the death of her regular Master, may have accounted for some of the
confusion which reigned throughout the ship from start to finish.
Twenty minutes after the initial alarm, the first radio call for assistance was made by the Chief
Radio Officer whose own cabin by this time was starting to burn. Before this, ships in the vicinity
and watchers on the shore had already reported that a large ship was on fire.
The ship continued on her way without slackening speed; and this, of course, drove the fire
quickly through the accommodation in an after direction. Soon, however, the ship was brought
about in an attempt to reach the New Jersey shore — with the result that the smoke and heat were
now driven forward, forcing those manning the branch-pipes to abandon their positions. This was
virtually the end of organised fire-fighting efforts, although a few members of the crew, assisted by
passengers, continued to try to hold the fire on the lower decks until rescue could be effected.
However, smoke was soon drawn down through the ventilators into the engine and boiler-rooms
from the upper part of the lounge and the boat deck; and about 3.31 a.m., conditions in the
engine-room became impossible. Power was shut off and the engine-room abandoned. About two
minutes before this, the main electric cable had been burnt through, and the entire ship was in
darkness.
With the ship no longer under way, the anchor was dropped and the vessel again headed up into
the wind. Once more the flames were driven aft. Only one emergency fire pump was now working;
so that, although it was subsequently proved that no fewer than 10 hydrants were open, there was
clearly no hope of any effective fire-fighting jets being available at this stage.
Many passengers were trapped in the cabins, while others emerged only to be caught by the heat
and smoke before they could find their way to open air. Both the main staircases were rendered
impassable by smoke or flame, and the only escape routes were by outside companionways aft, and
by a service stairway for'ard. The whole area was thick with smoke, with the exception of the
service stairway.
There appears to have been little attempt made by members of the crew to assist passengers to
make their escape from the interior of the vessel. Many passengers and most of the crew did,
however, manage to reach the boat deck.
At the subsequent enquiry, it was proved that many of the boats were filled by members of the
crew. The Chief Engineer escaped in No. 1 lifeboat, and of the 32 on board that boat, only one was
a passenger. Most of the passengers, indeed, were rescued by the crews of other vessels, including
the Andrea F. Luckenbach, the City of Savannah and the Monarch of Bermuda. (The latter vessel
was herself to be destroyed by fire in 1947, after having survived many adventures during the
Second World War.)
Those who could not escape in the ship's boats were driven to the stern of the vessel, where they
remained until the heat and smoke drove them to slide down ropes or jump into the sea. Many were
there picked up by rescue boats, and a few actually, swam to the shore — a distance of eight miles.
Of the 548 persons on board, a total of 124 lost their lives—89 passengers and 35 members of
the crew. Many of the rescued suffered from burns and other injuries.
Following the enquiry into the cause and course of the fire, which lasted a number of weeks, the
Acting Captain and the Chief Engineer were tried on various counts, and were sentenced to two and
four years' imprisonment respectively. These sentences, however, were later set aside by a superior
Court.

The main lessons to be learnt from the Morro Castle fire appear to be:
1. Linings should be of a fire-resisting nature.

2. Doors to compartments should be self-closing.
3. Automatic fire alarms should be installed throughout (or sprinklers fitted).
4. Fire doors should be capable of being closed by remote control.
5. Staircases should be totally enclosed, and fitted with self-closing doors.
6. Self-closing smoke-stop doors should divide all long corridors.
7. Emergency generators should be carried.
8. Crews should be trained in fire-fighting.
9. The action to be taken in case of fire should be clearly laid down, and urgently
brought to the notice of both passengers and crew.
10. All escape routes should be clearly indicated.
The "SEISTAN" — January 27th, 1958

On January 27th, 1958, the 7,440-ton motor vessel Seistan untied from a buoy off Cliffe, in the
Lower Hope Reach of the River Thames, and proceeded down-stream on the first leg of her voyage
to the Persian Gulf. Few of her Indian crew or of their white officers — 68 persons all told — were
destined ever to see the Thames again. . . .
The Seistan, a vessel 460 ft. long, 58 ft. in beam, and 28 ft. in depth, had been built in 1957 by
John Readhead and Sons, Ltd., South Shields, for her owners, the Strick Line, Ltd., of Camomile
Street, London. She had five holds, two forward of the machineryspace and three aft. Of two
decks, the centre castle contained the bridge and much of the accommodation. The Indian crew
were housed in the poop, with the serangs (overseers) in a deck-house above.
Being a new vessel, the Seistan complied in every way with the requirements of the Fire
Appliances Rules, 1952, and she had in fact a Ministry safety equipment certificate valid until July
25th, 1959. The fire appliances carried were as follows:
Description of Equipment Number

Carried
Power pumps (including one diesel-driven emergency pump) 3
1
Lengths of 21 /2 in. hose 9
Two-gallon foam extinguishers 16
Two-gallon water/CO2 extinguishers 14
Quart C.T.C. extinguishers 2
Ten-gallon foam extinguishers 2
Axes 6
Portable electric drill 1
Sand boxes 12
Electric safety-lamps 2
Smoke helmets, complete 2
Compressed-air breathing apparatus 1
TABLE 4.1
The holds and the machinery-spaces were protected by a steam smothering system.
The Seistan had loaded general cargo in Liverpool, and from the Millwall Dock, London. She
then moved down-stream to Cliffe, where she took on board about 156 tons of commercial
explosive, consisting of gelatine and Geophex, which were stowed in magazines of the M.S.B. type
at the forward end of No. 5 'tween-deck, on both port and starboard sides. Twenty-one cases of

safety fuses were also stowed in the 'tween-deck. Seven cases of commercial detonators, and one
case of Service detonators, were stowed in portable magazines of the M.S.D. type in the No. 4
bridge space. In addition, there were certain materials classified in the "Blue Book" (officially The
Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Explosives in Ships) as "dangerous goods". These were stowed
in No. 1 'tween-deck and forecastle space.
A more detailed description of No. 5 hold is necessary for full understanding of the narrative
which follows. At the after-end of the 'tween-deck, on both port and starboard sides, a number of
spirit lockers had been constructed, and were protected by means of a steel bulkhead with steel
doors. "Mepco" steel hatches were fitted on the main hatch, while the 'tween-deck hatch covers
were of wood. Centre-line bulkheads extended the whole height of the compartment in both the
'tween-deck and the lower hold, but were clear of the hatchways. A spiral stairway from the
mast-house at the after-end of the bridge space led down into the 'tween-deck, running in a recess in
the bulkhead separating Nos. 4 and 5 holds. A second spiral stairway led from the 'tween-deck to
the lower hold, the top of which at the upper deck level had a wooden cover fitted with locking bars.
The steel door leading to the compartment could also be locked. Four 18-in. cowl ventilators were
fitted at the corners of the hold. Within these ventilators were telescopic extensions, 12 in. in
diameter, which led into the lower hold. Each of the spirit lockers was fitted with a 12-in. diameter
cowl ventilator.
Among the general cargo in No. 5 hold, loaded in London, were two cases of toe puff destined
for Baghdad. The "Blue Book" describes toe puff as follows: "Box toe board used in the
manufacture of boots and shoes. Characteristic properties consist of several layers of fabric
impregnated with cellulose nitrate, solvent, rosin and dye. Liable to spontaneous combustion. To
be packed in tins or cans of suitable make, hermetically sealed, in turn packed in wooden cases; and
to be stowed on or under deck away from flammable cargo, and not to be stowed in the same hold
as explosives." A footnote adds: "There are no restrictions on toe puff material which has been
tested by the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation, and found not liable to spontaneous
combustion."
FIGURE 4.2 The remains of the 7,400-ton Seistan after the explosion that cost the
lives of 57 members of her crew on February 18th, 1958

The toe puff in question had been manufactured by Messrs. M. Morel and Co., Ltd., of Leicester,
who in 1949 had asked for a ruling from the Dangerous Commodities Section of the Ministry of
Transport as to the package of their goods for export, and had submitted samples for test. The tests
must have proved to be satisfactory, for the Ministry replied to Messrs. Morel stating: "This
material may be packed in wooden cases without the inner hermetically sealed tins, provided a
written declaration is given in respect of each shipment that it is free from the risk of spontaneous
combustion." Thereafter Messrs. Morel adopted the practice of giving with each consignment of
their toe puff a certificate headed "Ministry of Transport Decision 22/12/49, Reference M 3462/49",
and certifying that the goods had been properly dried, that they were free from risk of spontaneous
combustion, and did not come under the classification of "dangerous cargo". The consignment
shipped aboard the Seistan was accompanied by such a certificate.
All firemen serving in Leicester or Northampton, or any of the other centres of the boot and shoe
industry, are well aware of the risks associated with the manufacture and use of toe puffs. Fires in
this industry are comparatively common; and many are either directly traced to, or are thought to
have been started by, the spontaneous combustion of this material. In recent years, a slow burning
toe puff has been developed, which certainly reduces the speed of the flame; but there is as yet little
real evidence to show whether or not the material is indeed liable to spontaneous combustion. Toe
puffs are made of layers of cotton or woollen material impregnated with the previously mentioned
chemicals which, when soaked, go to form the hard toe-cap on boots and shoes. The ingredient
which renders toe puffs most liable to spontaneous combustion is probably the rosin, as that
material is well known to be capable of self-heating. Manufacturers usually dry the puffs carefully,
and allow them to cool before packing.
To return to the Seistan. She had an uneventful voyage across the Mediterranean and through the
Suez Canal, not long reopened; and on February 6th, Captain W. A. Chappell ordered No. 5 upper
hatch to be opened so that the mooring ropes: which were stowed on top of the cargo in No. 5
'tween-deck could be taken out. After the ropes had been removed, the hatch was battened down
again. The wooden cover of the spiral stairway leading to the lower hold was not disturbed. The
ship reached Port Said the following day.
Ten days later, at 0730 hours on February 17th, smoke was observed to be coming from the
starboard forward ventilator. Immediately the cowl was removed, and a line of hose directed down
the ventilator in an attempt to extinguish the fire which it was thought was burning in the
'tween-deck. Shortly afterwards, smoke was seen issuing from the port forward ventilator also, and
a second line of hose was got to work. The remaining two ventilators were plugged to reduce the
flow of air to the fire. The steam-smothering lines were then prepared, and steam was quickly
directed into the hold — the lines of hose being removed and the two ventilators plugged.
Knowing the danger of fire in a hold containing explosives, the Master ordered the lifeboats to be
swung out and directed the ship to an anchorage near Kais Island. This order was subsequently
changed; and the ship proceeded to Bahrein, where it was hoped assistance would be available to
clear the explosives from the magazines. The Chief Officer, wearing a smoke helmet, attempted; to
descend into the 'tween-deck; but failed because the smoke was too thick and his torch could not
penetrate it: Lines of hose were played on to the deck above No. 5 hold in order to keep it cool.
All that day and throughout the night steam smothering was kept up, until at about 0440 hours on
February 18th the Seistan anchored six miles off Bahrein. Two hours later the steam was turned off,
and the hatch cover removed. By this time there was little sign of smoke in the 'tween-deck, and it
was possible for men to get down with lines of hose which were used to cool the outsides of the
magazines. When the doors of the magazines were opened, a cloud of smoke and steam was
released, and had to be dispersed by means of the water hose.
A hasty conference was held with the Bahrein agents; and Captain Crombie, Marine
Superintendent of Messrs. Gray, Mackenzie and Company, arranged for the stevedores, who were
already standing by with lighters, to start unloading the explosives. It was noticed that some of the
cases containing the explosives were stained, and exuding a jelly-like substance which was coloured
red in some cases and green in others. It was later stated in evidence that the stains seen on the

cases were probably caused by the action of the smothering steam on the gelatine, one ingredient of
which was combined with acid magenta.
Now it is well known that when explosives start liquefying they are in a very unstable condition;
and there is no doubt that at this stage grave concern would have been felt by all the responsible
officers present. During the day, the Chief Officer and others managed to get into the lower hold
via the spiral stairway. It was very hot, but there was no sign of actual fire. The officers were able
to crawl over the top of the cargo about as far as the forward end of the hatch, and no greater heat
was experienced in any one part of the cargo than in another.
The native labourers continued working throughout the day, unloading the explosives and putting
them into lighters alongside; but they began to complain of violent headaches, as did some of the
ship's officers. Evidence was later given that headaches are common among workers in
nitro-glycerine factories, at any rate until they become immunised.
From time to time lines of hose were used to disperse smoke which was seen coming from under
some packages of prefabricated building material stowed on top of the 'tween-deck hatch.
At about midnight, when some 75 tons of explosives had been removed, it was decided to stop
discharging, probably because of the difficult conditions under which the labourers were working.
The hatch covers were put back, and steam smothering was resumed. This was continued all night,
until at about 0715 hours on February 19th the steam was shut off and the hatch covers removed.
The Chief Officer again descended into the 'tween-deck and played a line of hose into the area, in
conditions made difficult by thick smoke, for about three-quarters of an hour. He then reported to
the Master and suggested that the lower hold, in which he had established that the fire was located,
should be flooded. For some reason, it was held to be impossible to use the bilge line for this
purpose; the only practicable way was to flood the lower hold by means of lines of hose down the
ventilators. This was carried out for about an hour, when the Master countermanded the order to
flood and ordered steam smothering to be resumed.
It was then decided to move the Seistan closer in to the port. The Marine Superintendent of the
Bahrein Petroleum Company, accompanied by his assistant, boarded the vessel, and she was moved
to a new anchorage about three miles from the port.
Throughout the day, steam smothering was continued, until at about 2100 hours a glow was
observed in the vicinity of No. 5 hatch and sparks were seen to be thrown out from the hatch for a
considerable distance. This was described by an onlooker as "like a Roman candle"'.
Minutes later, an enormous explosion shattered the night air, and the Seistan was blown in two,
leaving a huge pall of black smoke hanging over the area like a funeral pyre. Part of the after-end of
the vessel, extending aft from the deck above No. 5 hold and from the forward bulkhead to No. 4
hold at keel level, was blown off and immediately sank. The remainder of the deck above No. 5
hold and part of the deck above No. 4 hold were folded forward, and descended upside down on the
funnel and bridge structure. What remained of the Seistan took fire, and she finally sank in about
seven fathoms of water.
The explosion killed 57 men, including Captain Chappell, almost the entire Indian crew, and four
members of the crew of a tug lying alongside. The shocked and injured survivors were rescued by
tugs and other craft which rushed to the scene immediately after the explosion.
The only cargo carried in No. 5 hold which could possibly have been liable to spontaneous
combustion was the two cases of toe puff; and it was established beyond reasonable doubt that the
fire started in the lower hold. Soon, moreover, other evidence accumulated to support the belief that
it was spontaneous combustion in toe puff material which had caused the Seistan fire. Only a few
days after the loss of the ship, two further cases of toe puff made by the same manufacturer left
London for Basrah. The cases were examined; it was found that the puffs were badly discoloured,
and that they fired spontaneously within four minutes at a temperature of 170oC.
Then, on April 30th, trouble was experienced on the Karaghistan from four similar cases of toe
puff carried in No. 5 'tween-deck. In the Gulf of Oman, smoke was seen to be coming from the
ventilators. Opening the hatch, the crew played a line of hose on to a burning case which proved to
contain toe puff. The case was removed and thrown overboard. Two days later, a similar incident

took place, but the case involved was left on deck after the fire had been put out. Only a few hours
later, yet a third case was similarly involved; and the fourth case was hurriedly removed from the
hold before it, too, could cause trouble.
The cases were examined, and the contents of cases two and three were found to be charred and
partly consumed; while the sheets in the fourth case showed signs of discoloration. Captain
Crombie, who had been actively involved in the Seistan fire, stated the fumes from these cases were
exactly and unmistakably the same as he had noticed on board the ill-fated ship. He described the
smell as being a mixture of camphor and eucalyptus.
Yet another piece of evidence was later forthcoming, when in July, 1958, a fire took place in the
factory of the manufacturers themselves, among a pile of sheets of toe puff. The cause of fire was
again given as spontaneous combustion.
It is impossible to say whether the original fire in the Seistan was ever extinguished; but the
evidence from the Karaghistan case suggests that it quite possibly was, and that the final disastrous
fire was in fact caused by the second case of toe puff material becoming involved.
A formal investigation under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, was held at Church House,
Westminster, on ten days between February 10th and 23rd, 1959, before Mr J. V. Naisby, Q.C.,
assisted by Captain Lewis Parfitt, D.S.C., Captain H. S. Hewson, and Captain C. W. Ede, R.A.
(Retd.).
The lessons to be learnt from the loss of the Seistan would appear to be the following:
1. Steam smothering is not such an efficient extinguishing agent as is carbon dioxide. If a CO2
system had been installed, the lower hold could have continued to be inhibited during the
time the explosives were being taken out of the 'tween-deck. The CO2, being heavier than
air, would have lain there until the ventilation was turned on. This would most certainly
have held the fire in check, even if it had failed to achieve its final extinction.
2. When steam smothering of a hold has commenced, it is not wise to open up too soon; for the
fire may easily break out again. A minimum period of 36 hours would seem to be needed,
and even longer should be allowed before opening up a hold containing fibrous materials.
The same applies for CO2, but a somewhat shorter period is permissible in some
circumstances.
3. It is appreciated that, in the Seistan case, premature reopening of the 'tween-deck may well
have had no bearing on the subsequent tragedy; for the second, and fatal, fire may have had
no causal connection with the first. The awful predicament facing Captain Chappell is also
appreciated. Knowing that he had 156 tons of explosive in the 'tween-deck, it is easy to
understand his desire to have it removed at the earliest opportunity.
4. When explosives are involved, a senior officer should not hesitate to flood the hold at an
early stage. Naturally, no man likes to take this drastic step, and perhaps be censured later
for his action. The Ministry of Transport would greatly assist Masters if they would issue an
instruction that this action should be taken at once in all cases of a fire in a hold containing
explosives. Perhaps such action could even be agreed internationally. "When in doubt,
flood!" should be the acknowledged rule.
5. Bilge lines should be fitted with a system of remote-controlled valves so that flooding can be
more quickly carried out. But when this is done, it is important to flood also from the top,
lest the fire be "floated" up to the underside of the 'tweendeck.
6. Magazines should be fitted internally with a system of sprinkler heads, to be actuated in an
emergency. The magazines should never be placed directly on the steel deck of the
'tween-deck. They should be raised off it so as to provide an insulated space which would
help to combat the danger of conducted heat. A sparge pipe1 fitted in this space would be a
great advantage, and would allow cooling water to be sprayed.
7. Adequate training in the use of breathing apparatus is a necessity for all officers.
1
A pipe with perforated holes through which water can be sprayed at right angles to
the run of the pipe.

8. The effect which the steam smothering had on the explosives in the Seistan must be made
widely known.
9. Cargo even remotely liable to spontaneous combustion must never be carried in a hold
containing explosives.
The"METEOR" Fire — May 22nd, 1971

The M.S. Meteor was a diesel engined steel passenger vessel built in 1955 in accordance with the
requirements of the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, 1948 (SOLAS). A
combination of Methods II and III were adopted but a sprinkler system was installed only in the
dining rooms and lounges on the Promenade Deck and throughout the passenger accommodation.
In 1968 the vessel was "upgraded" in compliance with the new Part G of Chapter II in the
SOLAS Convention adopted in 1966. The vessel also had in force a "Control Verification for
Foreign Vessel", issued by the United States Coast Guard and valid until November 4, 1971.
On May 22, 1971, on her return voyage from Alaska to Vancouver, whilst in the Strait of
Georgia about 60 miles from Vancouver, fire broke out in the crew accommodation on "B" Deck. It
was at 0235 hours when the look-out on the forecastle noticed a smell of smoke coming from the
forward deckhouse.
The look-out raised the alarm but he was unable to penetrate beyond "A" Deck in the crew
accommodation because of thick smoke and "gusts of flame" coming from "B" Deck. Wearing
breathing apparatus, the boatswain managed to get into "A" Deck and found that cabins No. 9 and
10 were on fire and that cabin No. 17 was becoming involved. Because of smoke and heat he was
soon forced to retire to open air. At this time cries for help could be heard coming from the crew
accommodation on "B" Deck.
In cabin No. 27, situated on the forward port side of "B" Deck, three mess girls suddenly saw
through the ventilators in the lower part of the door glowing embers on the deck outside. Prior to
this they had received no hint that the ship was on fire. Upon opening the door the flames burst into
the cabin and the three girls ran for their lives along the smoke-filled alleyway, being joined by
another crew member who occupied cabin No. 31. Only one of the four managed to reach safety —
her three companions perished in the fire.
The surviving girl stated that on making her escape she had observed that the corridor bulkheads
were on fire, "up to a height of about 1.5 metres above the floor. She also noticed "some moisture"
on the bulkhead opposite cabin No. 26, which instantly took fire (no doubt this would be paint
and/or varnish vapourising in the heat and spontaneously igniting).
At about 0235 hours the bridge was manned by the First Mate, the Helmsman and the Pilot,
when a smell of smoke was noticed and shouts were heard. The seriousness of the situation was not
realised and, "in order not to frighten passengers unnecessarily the fire alarm was not given". The
First Mate immediately called the Master and tried to find the Chief Officer but he was not in his
cabin. Upon the Mate's return to the bridge, about two minutes later, flames were already bursting
out of the doors on the starboard side of the forward deckhouse. The fire alarm was switched on but
did not function.
When the Master reached the bridge he ordered the ship's whistle to be sounded in order to warn
the passengers and crew. He neither heard any sound from the warning panel on the bridge, nor did
he see any warning lights on the panel.
The Second Engineer was on duty in the engine-room when the look-out informed him of the fire
and that water would be needed on deck. The fire pump was started at approximately 0244 hours,
(9 minutes after the first alarm). As he passed the manoeuvring stand the Second Engineer noticed
the warning lights for "A" and "B" Deck crew accommodation were lit and at the same time the
alarm bells started ringing. According to the Second Engineer's statement the alarm for closing the
watertight doors was given at 0315 hours, (40 minutes after the first alarm).
Only three persons managed to escape from the burning quarters. One of these — the mess girl
— made her way out in the first few minutes and the other two by smashing their cabin portholes

managed to obtain enough fresh air to keep

alive. These two persons were rescued some
thirty minutes after the start of the fire.
The Master was faced with an awesome
task! Over 30 members of his crew were
missing out of the total of 91 on board and he
had the lives of 67 passengers to look after.
Concurrently with the fire fighting operations
the passengers were mustered in the dining
room, where they were given lifebelts, served
with hot coffee and entertained by the cruise
leader. Lifeboats were swung out but the
Master decided to wait for daylight before
transferring the passengers to the car-ferry
Malaspina.
Because of the tremendous heat in the early
stages of the fire the fire-fighters were unable
to penetrate into the burning corridors via the
stairways. Nevertheless they did manage to
rescue the two crew members mentioned
above. The rescue parties also brought out a
number of persons from their cabins but sadly FIGURE 4.3 Aerial view of the cruise liner Meteor in
all these were already dead. which 32 crew members died in a fire on May 22nd. 1971
It took about five hours to bring the fire
under control and the ship got under way at 0700 hours, reaching Vancouver at 1227 hours, but final
extinction was not achieved until 1815 hours on Sunday May 23.
In the official report of the fire prepared by the Norwegian Government for submission to the
IMCO Sub-Committee on Fire Prevention there appears the following pregnant paragraph:
The impact of the gases: smoke and subsequent heat and the speed with which the
smoke and gases penetrated through the corridors, staircases and cabins seem to have
had the effect of a stunning blow to the breathing organs of the inhabitants of A- and
B-deck accommodations. The medical report indicates that a great number of the
victims must have lost consciousness during the first choking attack of the gases. From
the post mortem investigations it appears that the deceased had practically all of them
more than 50 per cent CO in their blood, a percentage which according to the medical
report is sufficient to cause death. With the corridors and staircases on fire and full of
smoke, with a high concentration of gases everywhere, the inhabitants of the cabins
have been faced with almost insurmountable difficulties in making their way through
the corridors.
All the horrors of a shipboard fire are contained in this extract from the official report!
There can be no doubt that the Master and his surviving crew performed heroic work and it is
greatly to their credit that the outcome of this incident was not worse than it was. Sadly though 32
members of the crew died in the fire and many more were injured and shocked. Not one of the
passengers suffered any injury.
The cause of this fire is not known but it could well have started in one of the crew's cabins and
smoking in bed might have been responsible.
But there are a number of lessons to be learned from this tragic fire, which if taken to heart might
mean that the victims had not died entirely in vain. These are as follows:

1. Sprinkler systems should be installed on board all large passenger vessels — in crew's
quarters as well as in passenger accommodation.
2. Automatic fire detectors should be installed. These should be of the type which detect
smoke rather than heat.
3. Strict attention should be paid to smoke-stopping so that the area of fire and smoke spread
be limited. Staircases should be fully enclosed.
4. All bulkheads, divisions and ceilings in accommodation areas should be constructed of
non-combustible materials giving at least 30 minutes fire protection. Decorative surfaces
should be constructed of Melamine laminates with a surface spread of flame at least to Class
2 when tested in accordance with BS 476: Part 7: 1971.
5. Conventional paints and varnishes should not be used internally in accommodation or
machinery spaces. If surfaces have to be painted then only fire retardant material should be
used and these should conform to the BS 476 specification outlined in (iv) above.
6. The use of polystyrene or polyurethane in furniture should be banned for shipboard use.
Table tops or bench surfaces should be constructed of Melamine decorative laminates — if
not of natural timber. Vynol coverings which produce toxic products should not be used.
7. On no account should there be any delay in raising the alarm when the presence of fire has
been notified. It is quite inexcusable that an officer should leave the bridge in order to
inform senior officers. There is a case for having a separate warning system to sound only in
the crew's quarters but this must be operated from the bridge without any delay.
8. Only by constant and realistic exercising can a crew avoid the delays which occurred in this
fire. It took 9 minutes before the engine-room was informed of the fire and the engineer
instructed to start the pumps. The watertight doors were not closed until 40 minutes after
the discovery of the fire. With proper training and procedures these two functions would
have been completed within, at most, two minutes of the initial alarm.
Collision between M.T. "TIEN CHEE" and S.S. "ROYSTON GRANGE" — May 11, 1972
Fate decreed that in the early morning darkness on May 11, 1972, two ships should be sailing
towards one another in the Punta Indio Channel in the estuary of the River Plate, which is bounded
by the South American republics of Argentina and Uruguay. One was the 12,595 tons gross
Liberian-Flag bulk oil carrier Tien Chee and the other the 10,262 tons gross British-Flag
refrigerator/passenger ship Royston Grange. The Tien Chee was proceeding westward upriver with
a cargo of crude oil on a voyage from Rosales to La Plata. The Royston Grange was proceeding
eastward downriver from Buenos Aires to Montevideo on a voyage to the United Kingdom.
Suddenly when in a position between buoy pairs 15 and 16 the two vessels came into collision
which resulted in the bow of the Royston Grange opening up the hull of the Tien Chee between No.
7 and No. 10 port wing tanks. The two ships, locked together, were almost immediately enveloped
in a tremendous fire, pivoted to port and grounded on the south side of the channel. Of the 74
persons on board the Royston Grange—63 crew, 10 passengers and the Argentine pilot—not one
survived this awful fire. Eight of the 42 crew members on board the Tien Chee died, either directly
from the fire or from drowning whilst attempting to escape. It was indeed fortunate that in the early
stages the bulk of the fire was on the port side of the Tien Chee so that it was just possible to launch
the starboard lifeboats. Even so those in the forward lifeboat had to jump into the sea when their
boat caught fire. The Master of the Tien Chee performed a heroic deed in supporting the Chief
Steward and a Deck Boy whilst they were in the water. Unfortunately the Chief Steward
subsequently died of his injuries.
The Commissioner of Maritime Affairs for the Republic of Liberia, Mr M. Fulton W. Yancy, Jr.,
appointed The Right Hon. Sir Gordon Willmer as Chairman and Captain Richard O. Patterson and
Captain Archie Horka as Members of a Marine Board of Investigation to enquire into the
circumstances of the collision. This Board convened a formal hearing at the Office of the American
Bureau of Shipping, 45 Broad Street, New York, N.Y. 10004, on January 15, 1973 and continued its

hearings up to and including January 22, 1973. The Commissioner accepted in full the Board's
Report, its Findings and Conclusions, in a document dated April 25, 1973.
The Conclusions put forward by the Board of Investigation make interesting reading and these
are recorded in full:—
32. The problem in this case is to ascertain the reason why these two vessels, proceeding up and
down the Channel respectively on substantially opposite courses, should come into collision
at an angle of 40o, as inferred by the surveyors and found by the Board. The witnesses from
the Tien Chee claimed that their vessel was at all times within a few degrees of a normal
up-Channel course, and alleged that the angle was wholly attributable to a sudden and rapid
sheer or swing to port on the part of the Royston Grange. This was challenged on behalf of
the owners of the Royston Grange, not on the basis of any factual evidence—for they were
not in a position to call any—but on the basis of expert evidence given by Dr Corlett, a
distinguished Naval Architect and Marine Engineer. The case for the Tien Chee was also
supported by expert evidence of another distinguished Naval Architect, namely Professor
Mansour, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Professor Mansour thought that a
sudden swing to port on, the part of the Royston Grange could be explained on the basis of
interaction between the two vessels. He explained that as the vessels approached each other
the Royston Grange could have been affected by the high pressure field created ahead of the
Tien Chee. This could have resulted in the Royston Grange yawing to starboard and
approaching close to the southern bank of the Channel, from which she might have
experienced a "rejection", causing her to swing back to port towards the deeper water. If
this coincided with her entry into the low pressure area opposite the midship section of the
Tien Chee, this swing to port could have been accentuated by the suction created by the Tien
Chee so as to become uncontrollable.
33. Much of Dr Corlett's evidence was based on a study of the detailed soundings in the area
further West and nearer to No. 16 Buoys, where according to the original statements of the
Pilot and Master of the Tien Chee the collision was at one time thought to have happened. It
FIGURE 4.4 The burned out remains of the S.S. Royston Grange in which 74 persons died.

was, however, ultimately, accepted by all parties that the collision must have happened in
the area now found by the Board.
Tragic though this case undoubtedly was, it pales into insignificance when compared with a
collision involving the Philippine inter-island 2,324 grt. motor ferry Dona Paz and the 629 grt.
Philippine coastal motor tanker Vector. The incident occurred on 20 December, 1987 in the Tablas
Strait of Dumali Point off Mindora Island. In this Strait is the busiest sea lane in the whole of the
more than 7,000 island archipelagos that makes up the Philippines.
The Vector with a crew of 13 was carrying 8,800 barrels of petroleum products and when the
collision took place a fire-ball resulted and both vessels were immediately engulfed in flames. By
the time the two ships sank a staggering 4,386 men, women and children had died. Only two
members of the Vector's crew survived whilst not one of the 58 crew of the Dona Paz lived to tell
the tale.
At the time of the disaster the number of passengers on The Dona Paz was listed as being only
1,586 (She was certified only to carry 1,518) along with the 58 crewmen. Another 2,755
unidentified passengers were being carried and were mainly travelling to visit friends and relatives
over the Christmas period. There can be no doubt that the vessel was massively overloaded.
A survivor estimated that there had been at least 1,000 children on board The Dona Paz and not
one survived. Only 275 bodies were ever recovered. Probably what must have happened was that
the grossly burned bodies simply went down with the ships.
Author acknowledges the information on this case gleaned from Norman Hooke's "MARITIME
CASUALTIES 1963 - 1996" Second Edition published by Lloyds of London Press.
The "SCANDINAVIAN STAR" Fire — 7 APRIL 1990
Introduction
The ship was built as a combination passenger ship and ferry for cars and trailers in 1971 at the
Dubigeon-Normandie shipyard at Prairie-au-duc in Nantes, France. Of 10,513 g.r.t., she was 141.60
m long and a beam of 21.90 m. The vessel was classified by Bureau Veritas, Paris and remained so
until September 1987, at which point it was classed by Lloyd's Register of Shipping. The vessel was
classed 100A1, Passenger/Ro-RoCargo/Ferry, LMC in Lloyd's Register of Shipping. It was this
society which carried out the last survey of the ship in Miami, Florida, conducted on 2 to 5 January
1990. This was, of course, not long before the fire which occurred on 7 April.
The survey was an ordinary Passenger Ship Safety Survey carried out in compliance with the
international rules SOLAS 1960 along with a few additional requirements retrospectively laid down
in SOLAS 1974 on behalf of the Flag State, the Bahamas. Prior to transfer to Scandinavia, the ship
operated in Miami, taking passengers on day trips (known locally as 'cruises to nowhere' and usually
engaged in gambling and sale of liqueur). At that time she was certified to take 1402 persons
including a crew of 250.
The owners decided in January 1990 to negotiate purchase of the Scandinavian Star and use the
vessel as a ferry operating between Oslo, Norway, and Fredrikshavn, Denmark. Purchase was
completed on March 30 1990. The decision was made that the vessel would be licensed to carry
1052 passengers, along with a crew of 100. The car deck had room for 280 cars or 30 trailers but at
the time of the fire had only 50 cars and 18 trucks on board. Crew numbered 99 and passengers
395.
At this time it was determined that, apart from a number of officers and a few ratings who had
previously sailed with the company, a completely new crew should be engaged. The Master,
Captain Hugo Larsen and the Chief Officer, Oddvar Finstad, had sailed with the Holger Danske,
the ship which was being replaced with the Scandinavian Star and were re-engaged. The bulk of
the crew were recruited in Portugal by Wallem Ship Management Ltd., of the Isle of Man. The fact
that few of the crew understood English was to attract severe criticism from the members of the
joint investigating committee which was set up by Sweden, Denmark and Norway, under the

FIGURE 4.5 The MV Scandinavian Star 10,513 grt car ferry (renamed the Candi) lying at
Southampton. 158 persons died aboard en route from Olso to Fredrikshavn on April 7, 1990.
FIGURE 4.7 The starboard passageway in which

the fire started (looking forward). The cabins are to
the right and the car deck to the left of the shot.
FIGURE 4.6 The fire started in a passageway on C

Deck (Car Deck) starboard side of the Scandinavian
Star. The point of origin was identified by the
degradation of the mineral wool insulation. FIGURE 4.8 Many passengers died in their cabins
as a result of smoke inhalation. Smoke spread
through the ventilation system and via the head of
the cabin door.

chairmanship of Mr Tore Schei, Supreme Court Judge, Norway. The committee produced an
excellently prepared official Norwegian Report, NOR 1991: 1E., which comprehensively covers
all aspects of the tragedy and draws attention to many errors of omission and commission.
Ownership of the Scandinavian Star was that of K/S Scandinavian Star but prior to the fire they
leased the ship to Project Shipping Ltd. The lease was as a bare boat charter party (based on the
standard contract Barecon A). This meant that the ship was leased without a crew but ready for
service. Project Shipping, in turn, leased the ship to VR DaNo ApS as a time charter party (based
on the standard contract Baltime 1983). This meant that the vessel was leased with a crew. In
point of fact the constitution of the ownership company was extremely complicated and this is
made clear in the report, indicating that the members of the investigating committee had some
difficulty in establishing the facts. This confusion regarding ownership was later to cause endless
difficulties for the lawyers representing the victims of the tragedy which is about to be revealed.
Description of Ship
Basically the ship had three complete decks in the hull and three in the superstructure. There was
also a narrow length of deck on either side of the space for cars and trailers. The ship was divided
into 12 watertight compartments with bulkheads extending from the keel to the freeboard deck.
The car deck formed the freeboard deck. Openings in the watertight bulkheads had watertight
doors. The car deck ran practically the entire length of the ship but bordered on either side by cabin
sections extending two decks up. The following plans illustrate the layout of the vessel as at the
time of the fire:
Fire Fighting and Protection Equipment

The fire fighting and protection equipment can be briefly described as follows:
1. Fire and Safety Plan — Copies were displayed on after mooring deck (poop deck); deck 5
(gulf deck); car deck 3 (C deck).
2. Automatic fire-detection and alarm system — Installed in the steering gear room,
control room, engine room, laundry, storerooms on deck 3, some of the food stores and the
bow thruster room. The system consisted of the ionisation smoke detector type, with alarm
bells in various control points. No automatic fire detection system was installed in the
accommodation areas.
3. Car Deck Sprinkler System — Open sprinklers on car deck, deck 3. System had seven
separate sections and could be supplied with water by a separate pump, as well as by the
ship's fire pumps. System complied with SOLAS 1960, as well as SOLAS 1974.
Note: After the fire it was found that the system had been badly maintained and that over
half the sprinkler heads were blocked with rust. The inspectors commented "The sprinkler
system did not appear to have been tested for a long time, since many of the heads seemed to
be blocked with rust." They went on to comment that the system was not used during the
course of the incident and thus had no effect upon the spread and development of the fire.
4. Fire Pumps — The ship had four fire pumps, each with a capacity of 90 m3 per hour. The
pumps were situated in different engine rooms and one could be supplied with power from
the emergency generator. Complied with the provisions of SOLAS 1960.
5. Pipelines and Hydrants — The arrangements of the pipelines and the number and
positioning of hydrants complied with SOLAS 60 and 74. Many of the hydrants were
double and were supplied with the corresponding number of hoses with spray and jet
nozzles.
6. Portable Fire Extinguishers — The number, position, type and size of extinguishers were
suitable and complied fully with both SOLAS 60 and 74.
7. Firemen's Outfits — There were "at least" seven sets of complete compressed air
breathing apparatus and reasonable number of spare air cylinders. A compressor for
re-charging the air cylinders was installed on the bridge deck close to the CO2 room.

FIGURE 4.9 The fire doors on the car deck resisted the spread of fire from the passageway behind.
The photograph illustrates the importance of ensuring that fire doors are closed.
FIGURE 4.10 The direction sign above illustrates FIGURE 4.11 The passageways were lined with 30 mm
the importance of clear signage. The signs were not thick asbestos silicate boards faced with 1.5 mm thick
in the Scandinavian language and like the one above laminate plastic layer. The laminate separated from the
were misleading. Passengers were offered choice of noncombustible base board. The laminate was combustible
routes, one of which directed them back into the and produced copious amounts of smoke which impeded
vessel instead of the alternative which offered a escape and toxic gases in lethal concentration which killed
direct route to safety via an enclosed stairway. many of the passengers. Note the heat and smoke level
attained by the fire.

8. CO2 System — Installed in the auxiliary and main engine rooms, separator and tank rooms,
and could be operated from the port corridor on the car deck (3) and from the bottle room
on the bridge deck (8). The system was not used in course of the fire but was almost
certainly in good working order. System complied with SOLAS 60.
9. Foam Stations — Ship was equipped with a system of permanent foam stations in various
parts of the engine room, separator room and on the car deck. The system was not used
during the course of the fire.
10. Halon 1301 System — This protected the paint locker aft on the port side of the car deck
(3) Could be released at three separate points. Not required under SOLAS 1960 (now a
requirement). Not used during fire.
11. Communication Equipment — 9 sets of walkie-talkie on board. Telephones could not
be tested after fire but no reports of any malfunction prior to fire.
12. Structural Fire Protection — Ship was divided into three main fire zones by two main
bulkheads. Bulkheads in the accommodation spaces were constructed of 30 mm-thick
asbestos silicate, covered by a 1.5 mm-thick layer of laminated plastic. Ceilings consisted of
10 mm-thick of asbestos silicate covered by a 1.5 mm-thick layer of laminated plastic.
The deck above the car space (5) was covered by a 75 mm-thick layer of vermiculite
'fireproof' insulation.
The doors to stairways were Class A-60 (1 hour) self-closing fire doors. Doors were held
open by magnetic catches, which could be released locally and from the bridge. Doors to the
car deck were A class self-closing sliding doors. These doors which opened onto the car
deck were supposed to be kept permanently closed but there were no indicators on the bridge
to check whether they were open or closed.
Plans available to the Enquiry Committee revealed that some doors had switches which were
activated when the door was completely shut. In each group of fire doors the switches
operated on series transition, so that when all the doors in the section were shut, an indicator
lit up on the control panel on the bridge.
The cabin doors were Class 15-B fire doors. In about 90 of the cabins amidships on the gulf
deck (5), the asbestos silicate below the ceilings was covered with a 4 mm-thick layer of
PVC.
Engine room insulation consisted of a 50 mm-thick layer of rock wool covered by perforated
steel plates. A Class bulkheads and deck insulation consisted of 2-25 mm rock wool, kept in
place by hoops about 300 mm apart, and joined by wires. All the structural protection, apart
from the following, complied with SOLAS :
a) There should have been a fire door on deck 7 (Sunset Deck) aft on the starboard
side. This opening only had a glazed door.
b) The doors to the cabins after the aftermost stairway on deck 4 should have been
equipped with automatic closing devices since they opened onto a stairway.
13. Ventilation to Engine Room and Car Deck — The fire dampers supplying ventilation to
the engine room were operated locally and from the control room. The fire dampers for the
supply of fresh air to the car deck were situated at the forward end of the built-up part of
deck 5, facing the forecastle. These consisted of hinged flaps kept open by props. When
these props were released (manually) the flaps fell under their own weight and could be
secured by wing nuts. These ventilation systems complied with SOLAS 1960.
14. Ventilation in the Accommodation Spaces — According to the fire plan therewere 92
fire dampers in the accommodation spaces. 78 of the dampers were manually operated, the
remainder closed automatically at a temperature of 60-70º. The manually operated vents
were of a type which took a long time to close. The reason for this was that at each vent
there was a cover which had to be removed by unscrewing four wing nuts. The covers then
had to be mounted over the vent openings and secured by means of a further four new wing
nuts. It quite clear that when fire strikes, time is of the essence and it is surprising that such
a cumbersome system could be approved. Indeed, this is recognised in the wording of the

official report, viz.

"However, SOLAS 1960 has no provisions stipulating that this
arrangement is not allowed."
Two negatives here but clear what the committee intended!
15. Emergency Energy Sources and Lights — The Report concludes the emergency lights
were provided only at the fire doors and then only by 25 watt bulbs so that the light intensity
in the escape corridors was low. After the fire the emergency generator was found to have
been completely burned out. In general the system conformed to SOLAS 1960.
16. Main Fire Alarm System — The entire system was installed to a very high standard. The
electricity supply to each alarm and passed through a distributor with a fuse for each alarm.
Cables were made of fire resisting material. The alarms were the robust klaxon type and 53
were installed throughout the ship. Surprisingly, in the accommodation area the sound level
was found to vary between 80 to 30 decibels (dB). In about 90 of the cabins the sound level
was less than 58 dB which was considered by the committee to be too low. Normally an
alarm system should have a sound level at least 10 to 15 dB's above the background noise
(could not be measured on the ship). The sound level in an undamaged area was measured
after the fire and it was found that the system did not conform to SOLAS 1960. This
omission was to have a quite significant effect upon the casualty list—out of the158 persons
who died in this fire some 99 bodies were found still in their cabins, presumably many of
whom did not hear the fire alarm!
17. Manual Fire Alarm System — The manual fire alarms were distributed, 11 on deck 8; 27
on deck 7; 13 on deck 6; 19 on deck 5; 23 on deck 4; 23 on deck 3; 16 on deck 2; 12 on
deck 1. Making a total of 144 in all. Upon an alarm point being pressed an audible signal
sounded in the main cabinet in the wheelhouse and identified the point of origin of the call.
Because the bridge was burned out it was not possible to test the system but it appeared to
conform to SOLAS 1960.
18. Motorised Lifeboats — A most disturbing situation relating to the condition of the ship's
lifeboats was revealed in the official Report. Of the 10 lifeboats, two had motors missing,
having been taken ashore for repair; three motors would not start; starting handles were
missing from two lifeboats; one motor started and two boats were not inspected. In fairness,
the Report makes mention that some of the equipment, for example, the starting handles
might have been removed after the fire. But much more serious was the heavily corroded
rudder stock and rudder hinge found on seven of the boats. Further, cracks of varying
severity were found in the glassfibre of five of the boats. These cracks and corroded parts
were clearly of long standing and an indication of the condition of the boats at the time of
the fire. And, it will be appreciated, the ship was in possession of a Safety Certificate! By
the Grace of God, none of these faults resulted in any of the casualties but it so easily could
have been otherwise.
19. Marking of Escape Routes — Boarding cards were not used on the Scandinavian Star on
the disaster voyage. The fact that these cards were not issued meant that passengers were
not able to follow the colour codes and consequently were unevenly distributed between the
muster stations. An interesting point arose, which was that the signs and notices were
positioned at eye level with the result that these could not be seen in the smoke logged
alleyways! Further, the signs and notices were not luminous, but, of course, this was not a
SOLAS requirement.
The marking of escape routes is terribly important in all passenger vessels but of all types, surely
the Ro-Ro Ferries must qualify for the highest possible attention. The reason being that the
commercial function of such vessels involves taking cars and passengers on, in the majority of
cases, short haul routes; such as apply in this case. These liners are, of necessity, complex
structures and for passengers who will spend only one night on board in cabins several decks down
from the embarkation point to which they must find their way in case of emergency, the prospects

must be quite frightening; unless the route to safety is absolutely and unequivocally clearly
indicated.
SOLAS Chapter II-2 Regulation 28-1 sets down the requirements for means of escape required
to be incorporated in these vessels. Unfortunately there is no specific requirements relating to the
marking of exit routes, text or symbols may be used. Though stricter requirements are laid down for
ro-ro passenger ships constructed on or after 1 July 1999. Unfortunately, there is still no reference to
the common-sense requirements that exit notices should be positioned low down on the doors and
bulkheads and should be illuminated. The standard practice on aircraft is to have illuminated
arrows on the floor which lead directly to the nearest exit. This is something that the maritime
industry should surely copy—and quickly before yet another tragic ship fire takes place.
In fairness to the shipowner the official report concludes as follows:
"The Committee wishes to point out the arrangement of corridors, exits, emergency
exits and escape routes on the Scandinavian Star was with one exception in accordance
with the provisions of SOLAS, and that generally speaking the arrangements were of the
same standard as those of similar passenger ships. The exception was a corridor with
a blind end that was too long."
But the author cannot resist the temptation to point to the fact that 20 bodies were found in this
blind end corridor! So perhaps in the memory of the victims the committee might not have played
down the importance of this breach of the regulations which might, of itself, been responsible for
these deaths.
Commissioning the Ship — The Scandinavian Star sailed from Frederikshavn at 2305 hours on
1 April 1990 and arrived in Oslo the following day 0815 hours. The ship left Oslo at 1920 hours on
2 April and arrived in Frederikshavn on 0750 hours on 3 April. It left again at 2010 hours, arriving
Oslo at 0810 hours on 4 April, leaving again at 1955 hours and arriving Frederikshavn at 0655
hours on 5 April. The ship left again for Oslo at 0908 hours arriving at 1800 hours, leaving again at
2128 hours arriving Frederikshavn at 0750 hours on 6 April. It left again at 1003 hours and arrived
in Oslo at 1900 hours that evening.
It is highly significant that the Radio Officer, Ms. Rasmussen, noted that when asked, that many
of the crew did not know their emergency plan numbers! She asked them to write these down and
told them, that it was their duty to know their own emr number.
The Start and Growth of Fire — The fatal voyage began when at 2145 hours on 6 April the
Scandinavian Star left Oslo for Frederikshavn. Unfortunately no fire drill was carried out that
night, otherwise some of the passengers might have had a dummy run and learned how to use the
exit route leading to an open deck and safety. In SOLAS Chapter III Regulation 18 Emergency
training and drills Paragraph 3.3 lays down:
"On a ship engaged on a short international voyage, if a muster of the passengers is not
held on departure, the attention of the passengers shall be drawn to the emergency
instructions required by regulations 8.2 and 8.4"
No boarding cards were issued to passengers and it is apparent that they were not informed about
the emergency instructions. Perhaps even worse, it is reported that fire and abandon ship drills
were not held within 24 hours of the ship leaving Frederikshavn on 1 April. This, of course, in clear
infringement of SOLAS Chapter III Regulation 18 3.1.
The ship caught fire during the early hours on 7 April — estimated to some time after 0200 — in
calm seas in the Skagerrak at approximately lat. 58 34N. long. 10 34E. Almost certainly, the point
of origin of the fire being the starboard corridor area adjoining stairway S2 on Deck 3 (Car Deck).
The cause, almost beyond doubt in this case, was that of arson. Previous to the start of the fire
there had been an earlier incident which had been set with piles of clothing outside cabins and this
had been easily extinguished by the crew, assisted by passengers. It is estimated that between two

to eight minutes after the start of the second fire it had attained a temperature of 200 kW, which was
hot enough to set fire to the corridor wall. The fire passed into stairway 2S on the starboard side
and upwards, indicating that the adjacent fire door was in the open position.
Smoke reached Deck 4 within one minute of the start and within a further two minutes started to
filter across the transverse alleyway into the port side of Deck 5. Smoke in this area was quickly
followed by flames. Witnesses described the flame spread across the transverse alleyway as "a ball
of fire". Actually on Deck 4 the smoke was slow to reach the port side and all the passengers in this
area were safely evacuated. The bridge was alerted when the fire reached Deck 5. The master of
the Scandinavian Star, Hugo Larsen, reported "The fire spread terrifyingly fast."
It is clear that much of the fuel for the fire came from the linings on the surfaces of the corridors
and stairways — 30 mm-thick asbestos silicate, covered by a 1.5 mm-thick layer of laminated
plastic. Investigators estimated that within five to eight minutes the smoke in the corridors on the
port side of Deck 5 contained so much carbon monoxide that anyone exposed to the gas would be
rendered unconscious within 30 seconds and death would ensue in three minutes.
Even more alarming was the evolution of hydrogen cyanide which was found in the blood of
many of the victims during the post-mortem examination. No doubt there would in addition be
evolution of hydrochloric acid gas from what were quite clearly combustible linings on this vessel.
Put together, this added up to a lethal cocktail of gases to which the unfortunate passengers were
subjected. Note: the author covers this subject more fully in Chapter 11.
Damage on decks 3, 4, and 5 was limited to the afterdecks area but fire later spread to effect the
whole of decks 6 and 7. Most of the fixtures and furniture on the accommodation and restaurant
were destroyed by fire.
Sadly, 158 persons died in this fire, 156 passengers and 2 members of the crew. About 25% of
the 99 of the passengers who were found in their cabins were located in the bathroom, often with
towels over their faces! At least 50 dead were recovered from the corridors, mainly in the after part
on the port side of Deck 5. Some 20 of the bodies were found in the two dead end corridors. One
victim was found on Deck 6.
Apart from the obvious difficulty of thick and toxic smoke, the passengers had only been on
board for a few hours before the fire broke out and were clearly not familiar with the escape route.
This lack of familiarity, coupled with the fact that the smoke was too heavy to enable passengers
clearly to see the exit signs and notices which were posted in relatively high positions, commonly
about eye level, must surely have contributed in a major way to the heavy loss of life.
Performance of Crew — If any lesson emerges from this tragedy it is that an especially high
standard of crew training in fire fighting is absolutely essential on these ships where the number of
passengers and therefore the potential loss of life, is high. Coupled with this is the need to have a
plan of action designed to mould highly disciplined teams of fire-fighters together and let them
practice until their teamwork is honed to such level that they instinctively perform to a satisfactory
standard.
Of paramount importance is the need to have good officers who have been trained to the highest
possible standard in all aspects of fire-fighting — particularly in the wearing of breathing apparatus
and in command and control procedures. Taught, the author would hopefully say, by really
experienced professional fire officers at a purpose built training facility, preferably, attached to a
live fire station where the atmosphere of a fire-fighters life will be reflected upon the students.
Sadly, in the case of this fire on the Scandinavian Star trained fire crews were conspicuous by
their absence. Fighting fire can be likened to a battle — absent leadership — lost cause. In this
instance leadership was conspicuous by its absence. At no time did the fire crews proceed to an
assembly point and be instructed in the team actions to be taken. Instead individuals acted entirely
on their own and did what they thought was correct in the light of what they perceived needed to be
done. Some did attempt to rescue people they observed to be in danger. Other went to the lifeboat
embarkation deck and assisted with the launching of the boats. The problem was compounded by
language difficulties affecting the multi national crew on board. Organisation, in terms of

fire-fighting teams, there was none. Organised fire-fighting conducted by the crew, there was
virtually none.
One or two brave souls, including the staff captain did don breathing apparatus and where the
heat allowed, attempted to search the accommodation area and rescue anyone still alive in this area.
It is clear that they did this work entirely on their own. How successful was their efforts is not
revealed in the official report, though some bodies later found on open deck had obviously been
taken out by these ad hoc fire-fighters. Whilst the staff captain and his few assistants were engaged
in this humanitarian work the captain abandoned the ship and boarded one of the rescue ships!
Later, much later, the staff captain, along with a few members of crew and one or two passengers
were rescued by helicopter whose pilot found them sheltering at the stern of the ship.
A well trained crew might at least have been expected to make a determined effort to fight this
fire and rescue many more people than they did. That the fire was difficult cannot be denied, but a
highly trained crew would surely have got to grips with the fire before it had time to get out of hand.
But, of course, it never should have been allowed to escalate to any extent if a constant patrol had
been put in place after the first fire had been discovered and extinguished.
It was clear beyond any doubt that this fire had been the result of arson and common-sense
dictated that the arsonist might strike again — as indeed he/she did! This omission must be laid at
the Captain's door and nobody else.
An interesting judgement was made by Judge Richard H. Levet, United States District Court, in
fire case, Asbestos Corporation Ltd et al against the defendants, Compagnie de Navigation
Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre, et al. The engine room fire occurred in 1964 and involved the M/V
Marquette. In his Findings Judge Levet made the following comments on the question of
unseaworthiness and these seem pertinent to the Scandinavian Star though clearly not an exact
replica:
"Pursuant to these statutory provisions, shipowners are exempt from liability for cargo
damage caused by shipboard fire except where the fire is "caused by the design or
neglect of such owner" (Fire Statute) or unless the fire is "caused by the actual fault or
privity of the carrier" (COGSA). These two phrases have essentially the same
meaning."
Unseaworthy Conditions on Board

1. Missing Fire Door — A fire door on the Saloon Deck (6) aft on the starboard side was
missing and the frame was fitted with a glazed door.
2. Untrained Crew — The crew were not properly trained in fire-fighting. Further, under
Chapter III Regulation 18 of SOLAS 1974, with amendments of 1983, a fire drill for the
crew should have been conducted within 24 hours of leaving Fredrikshavn on 1 April. No
such fire drill was carried out. Regulation 18 reads:
Abandon ship training and drills
1. This regulation applies to all ships.
3 Practice musters and drills
3.1 Each member of the crew shall participate in at least one abandon ship drill and one fire
drill every month. The drills of the crew shall take place within 24 hours of the ship leaving
a port if more that 25% of the crew have not participated in abandon ship and fire drills on
board that particular ship in the previous month. The Administration may accept other
arrangements that are at least equivalent for those classes of ship for which this is
impracticable.
Clearly more than 25% of the crew of the Scandinavian Star were new to the ship!
3. Lifeboats — Physical Condition The condition of the ship's lifeboats was highly
unsatisfactory.
4. Missing fire alarms — Three fire klaxon type alarms were missing from the points
indicated on the fire and safety plan.

5. Faulty sprinkler system — Over half of the sprinkler heads in the vital car deck were found
after the fire to be blocked with rust. The fact that Items 3 and 5 had no causal connection
with the actual loss of life does not alter the fact that the ship was not in conformity with
SOLAS — even by virtue of these two items — and it follows should not have been
permitted to leave port on 1 April 1990!
Other Conditions Which Affected Casualties — The Ship Not Being in Breach of SOLAS
Corridor Linings & Toxic Gases — It is clear that many of the people who died in the fire did
so as a direct result of being exposed to heavy smoke with a high toxic content. According to the
official report carbon monoxide gas was the main culprit and after only 5 to 8 minutes some of the
corridors on Deck 5 contained so much CO that persons exposed to the smoke would be rendered
unconscious within 30 seconds and death would ensue within 3 minutes.
The highly flammable nature of the bulkhead and ceiling linings is also highlighted in the report.
It is estimated that within 2 to 8 minutes at the start of the fire it had attained an effect of 200 kW,
which was enough to set fire to the corridor wall. From that point on the fire spread with alarming
speed. So here on board the Scandinavian Star that April night the unsuspecting passengers were
going to be subjected to awful dangers which would lead to some 40% (a horrifyingly high
proportion) of them being dead within a matter of hours. Sadly, the ship was in this regard fully in
compliance with the law because under SOLAS 1974 it had been decided not retrospectively to
apply the Regulations which would have alleviated the flammability and the toxic gases risk to
vessels built before 1996.
It is interesting to reflect that, no doubt influenced by their experience with the Scandinavian Star,
in May 1992 Norway submitted a paper to the Maritime Safety Committee in which attention was
drawn to the unsatisfactory safety conditions prevailing on board many existing passenger ships
which, perfectly legally, continued to sail. An appeal was made for the committee to withdraw the
"grandfather clauses" whereby the new safety measures only applied to new vessels. Quite
logically, the Norwegian's pointed out that to comply with these new safety procedures shipowners
were faced with much greater costs and that this led to the cheaper option of modification of
existing ships rather than building new replacements.
As part of the 16th Assembly Resolutions IMO Resolution A.653(16) Recommendation on
Improved Fire Test Procedures for Surface Flammability of Bulkhead, Ceiling and Deck Finish
Materials was adopted on 19 October 1989. This was followed by Resolution MSC.41(64) Interim
Standard For Measuring Smoke And Toxic Products For Combustion. The introduction of these
two Resolutions, amongst others, make a highly significant contribution towards safety of life at
sea. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that few, if any, lives would have been lost
as a result of the Scandinavian Star fire if these safety features had been incorporated on board.
Space does not allow for the printing in full the above documents but briefly: Surface flammability
of bulkhead, ceiling and deck finish materials have to meet improved fire test procedures. The
optical density of smoke produced by the test fires is limited:
1. For materials used as bulkheads, linings or ceilings, the DM should not exceed 200
under test.
2. For materials used as primary deck covering or surface floor, the DM should not
exceed 400 under test.
3. For plastic pipes and electric cables, the DM should not exceed 400 under test.
Toxicity is controlled by strictly limiting the gas concentration as follows: CO 1,450 ppm; CO2
60,000 ppm; HCl 310 ppm; HBr 50 ppm; HF 590 ppm; HCN 140 ppm; NOx 350 ppm; SO2 120
ppm; Acrolein 1.7 ppm; Formaldehyde 3.2 ppm.
Sound Level of Fire Alarm — After the fire a test of the fire alarm was carried out in
undamaged areas of the accommodation and obviously without the normal background noise. The
results varied from about 30 to 80 dBA. In about 90 of the cabins the sound level was less than 58

dBA. Clearly the sound level was too low but, of course, there was no requirement under SOLAS
1974 which laid down a specific level. MSC Resolution 48(66) — adopted June 1996, under
Clause 7.2.1.4 reads as follows:
The sound pressure level in cabins shall be at least 75 dBA and at least 10 dBA at the
sleeping position above ambient noise level.
In the US, the NFPA National Fire Alarm Code NFPA 72:1996 Clause 7.2.1.3 Sleeping Area
reads:
Sound level at least 15 dBA above average ambient sound or a sound level of at least 70
dBA, whichever is greater measured at the pillow level in the occupiable area.
In the UK, British Standard BS 5839 Part 1 1988 reads:
A minimum sound level of 75 dBA at the bed head with all doors shut.
Exit Signs Misleading — The official joint report notes that the signs were not in the
Scandinavian language and that the positions of some of the signs and notices made them
misleading.
The Rescue Operation — Immediately after the Scandinavian Star sent out a distress call a
major rescue operation was launched, coordinated by the rescue coordination centre at Sola,
Norway. A large number of rescue units, comprising helicopters, aircraft and rescue vessels were
called up from Norway, Sweden and Denmark. Fortunately in 1985 the three Scandinavian
Countries had ratified the "International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue. It was part of
the Convention's decision that neighbouring countries should set up Search and Rescue Regions,
each with at least one Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) and if necessary subordinate
centres known as Rescue Sub-Centres (RSC). The convention has been supplemented by the IMO
Search and Rescue Manual which outlines a set of guidelines for the promotion of international
routines for carrying out search and rescue operations. A second manual based on the Convention is
the Merchant Ship Search and Rescue Manual, MERSAR.
The primary task of a rescue service is to save human life. Putting out fire is considered to be
ship's responsibility. But, of course, sometimes a fire has to be put out in order to save human life
and it is the duty of the rescue service that such resources are supplied. In such cases the fire service
is called upon to render assistance.
The chronology of the external rescue is shown in the table opposite:
Conclusions
The author wonders how a passenger ship which was commencing a new trade was permitted to
leave port whilst not in seaworthy state. This by virtue of the five conditions outlined above.
Surely such a ship, even if holding an extant fire safety certificate issued some three months before,
should be the subject of a final check, other than by the owner, to establish that it fully complied
with SOLAS regulations. In addition to the ship being unseaworthy there were deficiencies in the
fire safety provisions, such as blank end corridors and an alarm system which clearly was not heard
by all the victims of this tragedy. Many of the dead lost their lives whilst attempting to find their
way out of the accommodation, whilst ingesting lethal gases which clearly came from the burning
bulkhead linings. And this in the nineteen nineties! The question is which of the regulatory bodies
would be responsible for giving final clearance to a passenger ship about to embark upon an entirely
new commercial venture? Would it be the Flag State, classification society, or the marine safety
board of the country from which the vessel would leave on an international voyage? The authors of
the official joint report appear to suggest that the fault lies with the owner's representative Mr Ole B.
Hansen and especially the Captain. The references in the report reads as follows:
The Committee's conclusion is that the "Scandinavian Star" was not ready to sail with
passengers on 1 April. The fact that the ship was pressed into service in spite of its
obvious unfitness from a safety point of view must be have been due to pressure from

Date / Time Description of Events

7 April 1990
0224 hrs Mayday signalled from Scandinavian Star to Tjøme Radio. 500 to 600
people on board "We are entering the lifeboats."
0225 hrs Scandinavian Star alerts Stena Saga and requests her to stand by.
0225 hrs Mayday relayed from TjØme Radio: "Scandinavian Star on fire. Ship
being abandoned. Immediate assistance required." (in English and
Norwegian). Several ships report for action immediately. Rescue
coordination centre (RCC Sola) notified.
0237 hrs Contact between RCC Sola and MRCC Göteborg and RCC
0242 hrs Karup. Request for and offers of help. Agreement between RCC Sola
and Göteborg that RCC Sola will be responsible RCC.
0247 hrs Stena Saga appointed CSS.
0250 hrs Stena Saga reaches Scandinavian Star.
0328 hrs Captain of Scandinavian Star notifies Stena Saga of evacuation.
0335 hrs First rescue helicopter reaches disabled ship.
0530 hrs First smoke diver lowered to Scandinavian Star.
0711 hrs Stena Saga is last ship to report number of survivors and deceased
taken on board.
1155 hrs Towing of Scandinavian Star to Lysekil, Sweden, begins.
1200 hrs MRCC Göteborg takes over as responsible RCC.
1200 hrs The Nord-Jylland takes over as OSC.
2117 hrs Scandinavian Star docked in Lysekil.
TABLE 4.2
the owner. The Committee is in no doubt that the crew, and especially the Captain, felt
under considerable pressure from the shipping company, through Mr Ole B. Hansen, to
put to sea. The company should have understood that considerations of safety were
being ignored when it put into operation a ship for so many passengers, with such an
untrained crew, within such a short time. The Committee has examined the situation on
the "Scandinavian Star" on 6 April with special attention. It concludes that on this date
it was still not justifiable to have undertaken a journey with passengers on board. It
points out that the senior officers were naturally aware of the situation on board at the
beginning of the disastrous voyage. It further points out that the owners had no reason
to think that the situation was any different on 6 April from that on 1 April in that it had
become any more justifiable from a safety point of view to sail with passengers.
Lessons must surely be learned from such an awful tragedy as struck the Scandinavian Star in
the early hours of 7 April 1990. If not, then 158 persons have died in vain. The Master of the
Scandinavian Star and the Mate were prosecuted, found guilty and each served a short prison
sentence.
To put such a high share of blame upon the Captain's shoulders for permitting the ship to sail
whilst in an unsatisfactory state of readiness from a safety point of view strikes the author as being
rather unfair. Such comment is not intended to defend all the Captain's actions just before and
certainly after the fire started. But it is to recognise that in a situation where a captain is being
pressed by his owner to commence trading when he knows full well that he is being asked to take a
serious risk, is to place him 'between a rock and a hard place'. It is so easy to say that the Captain
should have refused to sail and many would say that this is the action he should have taken but
human nature being what it is his actions, if certainly not condoned, can be understood!

It quite certainly surprised the author to learn that the ship left port with passengers on 1 April
1990 without a clearance from any of the regulatory authorities! If such a repetition of the events
which befell the Scandinavian Star is to be avoided in future then surely only the IMO can remedy
this situation. A new regulation should be introduced whereby, before a passenger ship is permitted
to commence a completely new service, the Flag State must be made responsible to carry out a
complete safety examination and where satisfied issue a clean bill of health.
Collision between the “BRITISH TRENT” and “WESTERN WINNER” — 3 June 1993
The Gods who decree such events decided that 15 miles off Ostend, at around 0543 hours on 3
June 1993 two vessels, the 20 year old 25,146 dwt, Bermuda registered BP motor tanker British
Trent and the 11 year old 30,396 dwt, Panamanian registered motor bulk carrier Western Winner
were to be involved in a catastrophic collision. Nine members of the crew of the British Trent were
to die and many more, including the master, to suffer varying degrees of burn injuries. Fortunately,
no injuries were suffered by the crew of the Western Winner.
Description and Movements of the British Trent before the Collision

The British Trent was owned by BP Shipping, Britannic House, Moor Lane, London. She was
classed at Lloyd's Register 100A1,LMC, and her port of registry was Hamilton, Bermuda. On board
were the Master, 5 deck officers, 6 engineer officers, 5 cadets, 17 ratings and two wives who were
sailing as supernumeraries. A total of 36 persons. All certificates, relating to the vessel and the
licences of the crew, were in order.
The British Trent was carrying 24,135 tonnes of unleaded gasoline, loaded in the port of
Antwerp. The ullage space of all her 22 tanks had been filled with inert gas from the vessel's own
IG system.
With a River Scheldt pilot on board she sailed from Antwerp at 1803 hours on 2 June, 1993,
clearing the Brendrecht Lock at 2256 hours. The weather in the area was north westerly wind force
3, with visibility reduced by fog. The vessel proceeded down river, passing Vlissingen at 0238
hours on 3 June at which point the river pilot disembarked and the sea pilot embarked. At 0500
hours, as the vessel approached the Wandelaar pilot station, she encountered fog with gave visibility
of some 370 metres. The pilot vessel, LB1, whose purpose was to provide pilot services was on
station between the SW Akkaert Buoy and the Al Buoy, reported that the fog had reduced visibility
at that point down to between 50 and 100 metres.
On the bridge the Second Officer was monitoring the Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) set
on the 12 mile range, whilst the Master had a second radar set on the 3 mile range — alternating
that with the 6 mile range. Lookouts were posted on the port and starboard wings of the bridge, but
none on the forecastle.
The Second Officer, on the ARPA set, identified three target ships one directly ahead and to the
east of the other two which were abeam of each other. These ships were eastbound, west of the SW
Akkaert Buoy and coming out of the traffic separation scheme. The lead ship was on a course of
089o at a speed of 8 knots with a closest line of approach of 0.8 miles. This information was passed
to the Master and the Pilot. At 0537 hours, the sea pilot disembarked and the British Trent
commenced her scheduled voyage to Fiumicino, Italy.
As the Pilot disembarked the Master manually sounded the fog horn, giving one long blast at
intervals of not more than two minutes. The ship gradually increased speed until just before the
collision, this reached four knots.
The Second Officer returned to the ARPA set and saw a target 1.5 miles away fine to port with a
CPA of 0.3 miles and reported this to the Master. The Master ordered the lookout on the port
bridge wing to keep a sharp lookout.

Description and Movements of the Western Winner before the Collision

The Western Winner was owned by Alpha Beta Investment Co Ltd, Monrovia, Liberia, and
managed by Fortuna Navigation Co Ltd, 1006-7 Harbour Crystal Centre, 100 Granville Road,
Tsimsdhatsui East, Kowloon, Hong Kong. She was classed at Lloyd's Register 100A1,LMC, and
her port of registry was Panama. On board were 24 crew, all of whom were from Korea.
Apparently little or no details of the qualification or licences held by any of the crew was released to
the members of the Marine Accident Investigation Branch of the UK Department of Transport;
other than the fact that the Master and officers held Panamanian licences. All the ship's certificates
were in order
The Western Winner was a bulk carrier with 5 holds serviced with 4 x 25 tonne SWL cranes.
The ship had completed discharging at London on 2 June and still had a part cargo of copper dross
on board.
With a Thames pilot on board, the ship sailed at 1830 hours bound for Vissingham in the
Netherlands. At about 0430 hours she was approaching the Wandelaar area on a course of 067o.
The Chief Officer was in charge of navigation and called the Master to the bridge. The Master
called the Wandelaar pilot and gave his estimated time of arrival as being at 0530 hours. Visibility
was down to about 400 metres and reducing. Two of the ship's three radars were operating, with the
ARPA set on the three mile range. The Master, the Chief Officer and a quartermaster manned the
bridge. There was no dedicated lookout, either on the bridge or at the bow of the vessel.
At 0455 hours when the Oost-Dyck Buoy was bearing 170o x 0.7 miles, Western Winner altered
course to 090o. The visibility was such that, using the whistle on the aft mast, a prolonged fog
signal was automatically sounded at intervals of not more than two minutes.
The Third Officer came on to the bridge at around 0530 hours to find that the ship was on
automatic pilot and the course set on 093o. He changed to hand steering and placed the engines on
"stand-by" with harbour speed of 100 rpm.
At 0531 hours the container vessel Ever Glowing, on a course of 190o at 9 knots in position 1.6
miles north-west of SW Akkaert Buoy, contacted Traffic Centre Zeebrugge and enquired about "a
vessel heading west at a speed of 12.27 knots and coming from a position two miles east-southeast
of the SW Akkaert Buoy". Zeebrugge Traffic Centre replied that no vessels were heading west but
two ships were heading eastbound just ahead of Ever Glowing. The Master of the British Trent
immediately called Ever Glowing on Channel 69 with the information that his was an outbound
vessel, about to disembark the pilot in position 1.5 miles from SW Akkaert Buoy. Ever Glowing
responded and said that she was trying to cross the channel in front of British Trent.
The Collision
The lookout on the port bridge wing of British Trent reported that a vessel was about one point
(111/4 o) on the port bow. The Master immediately ordered the wheel hard to starboard but it was
already too late and there was a collision within seconds of the sighting having been made. The
time was 0543 hours and the position was 100o x 1.22 miles from the SW Akkaert Buoy.
The Master of the Western Winner reported hearing a fog signal and at the same time saw the
bow of a tanker on his port bow. The vessels collided almost immediately and the Master ordered
the wheel hard to starboard. The stem of the Western Winner pushed into the side of the tanker and
the two vessels scraped along each other's port sides, damaging her hull by way of the port lifeboat.
As the two ships collided a fire ignited at the tanker's sheerstrake in way of No 2 cargo tank. The
fire moved aft as she scraped along the tanker's hull.
Western Winner put out a "MAYDAY" call on VHF Channel 6 at 0543 hours. British Trent put
out a "MAYDAY" call on VHF Channel 16 at 0544 hours and another a minute later on Channel
69.
The Fire
On board British Trent the Master immediately sounded the fire alarm and the crew mustered at
the starboard lifeboat which was made ready for embarkation.

Within minutes of the collision the tanker's engine control room had to be abandoned by virtue of
thick smoke which entered by way of the air conditioning ventilation inlets. Very soon the entire
engine room was filled with smoke and the on duty engineers had to leave the space. The Second
Engineer operated the stop controls for the two forward engine room ventilation fans but this did not
appear to reduce the ingress of smoke.
British Trent communicated with the pilot vessel at 0554 hours and received advice that their
launches would stand by in order to assist evacuation if required. At 0556 pilot vessel LB1
informed Oostende Pilot Control of the situation. Pilot Control passed the information that a
helicopter was preparing to come to the scene.
Meanwhile, on board British Trent a fire hose was rigged near the starboard lifeboat but there
was insufficient water in the main for this to be used. The Chief Engineer and the Electrician went
forward to start the emergency fire pump which was situated in the forward pump room, but whilst
actually engaged in setting up the appropriate valves they were driven back by dense smoke coming
from the port side of the main deck. The two officers had to beat a hasty retreat in order to save
their lives. Around this period the heat on the port side was so intense that the forward bridge
window crazed over. The Second and Third Engineers, wearing breathing apparatus, attempted to
re-enter the engine room in order to start the main fire pump but were driven back by the appalling
conditions.
The following procedures regarding the use of the fire pumps were followed as standard practice
on board the British Trent:
i) It was normal practice to have the auxiliary fire pump constantly running to
maintain a pressure of 4 bar in the main. This was sufficient to allow the use of one
25 mm fire hose to be got to work.
ii) In the event of an emergency it was the task of one of the engineers to go down to
the engine room pump flat—the lowest level—and start one of the two 10 bar main
fire pumps.
iii) There was a remote pump start button in the emergency generator room which was
situated on the port side of the third poop deck.
Actually, a series of events transpired to deny all efforts to get any meaningful pressure to the fire
main! The tremendously quick spread of fire ensured that the pumps could neither be started
locally, because the engine room was full of smoke, nor remotely, because the emergency generator
room was involved in flames and smoke. As stated above, the emergency fire pump could not be
started. But in any event, the fire main had been damaged in the collision and the efforts of these
two brave men would clearly have been in vain, even if they had managed to start the pump.
At 0557 hours the Master contacted the pilot vessel and requested that the two wives and one
cadet be taken off. After some difficulty, the Third Officer managed to rig a pilot ladder starboard
aft end of the main deck and the three people were able to board pilot vessel No 17. They were put
on to the pilot vessel at 0603 hours. Pilot vessel No 17 returned to the tanker and took off four
members of the catering staff who were landed on the pilot vessel at 0615 hours.
The Master, with a cadet at the wheel, tried to steer the vessel on a course of 200o in an
endeavour to keep the wind on the starboard side. But the fire quickly spread to affect the entire
bridge front and the Master decided to abandon the ship, ordering all bridge personnel to go to the
lifeboat. Before leaving the bridge, the Master stopped the engine and the Second Officer picked up
the visibility log book and the bridge movement log book. By this time the British Trent had turned
northwards so that the wind was now on her port side. Clearly this was making conditions on board
extremely hazardous.
At the starboard lifeboat a roll call was held and it was established that all person known to be
still on board were present. The Third Officer volunteered to go up to the boat deck, two decks
above the embarkation deck, in order to release the brake and lower the lifeboat. Suddenly, just as
all personnel had boarded the lifeboat, a very hot thick black cloud of smoke came over and down
upon them from the port side.

FIGURE 4.12 Fire-fighting tugs tackling the fire aboard the British Trent off the Belgian coast.
© Rex Features
FIGURE 4.13 Western Winner showing the extent of FIGURE 4.14 British Trent showing showing fire
damage to the port bow. damage to main deck. The cargo tanks did not explode
© Crown Copyright being protected by the inert gas system.
© Crown Copyright
FIGURE 4.15 The damage to the port after quarter on FIGURE 4.16 The hole at the tanker's sheerstrake in
the British Trent. The vessel was declared a way of No 2 port tank of the British Trent caused by the
constructive total loss. collision with the Western Winner.
© Crown Copyright © Crown Copyright

Conditions were immediately intolerable and everyone, including the Third Officer, were forced
to jump or fall into the sea in an attempt to save their lives. Once in the water the survivors faced
awful conditions, brought about by the thick smoke produced by the burning fuel. The survivors
reported on seeing areas of daylight through the smoke and of having swum towards that and away
from the burning oil.
The Rescue
Very bravely, the crews of the three launches from the pilot ship remained close to the burning
British Trent. Their heroic efforts were rewarded by pilot launch No 7 picking up five persons; No
11 picked up eleven survivors and three bodies; No 17 recovered six survivors and two bodies. The
survivors and the deceased were taken to the pilot vessel where the paramedics dressed superficial
burns and wounds. The more serious cases, including the Master who suffered from burns and
smoke inhalation, were airlifted by helicopter and taken to two hospitals in Belgium.
At 0757 hours the Dutch naval vessel HMNS Zierikzee picked up two bodies which left only two
persons missing. The bodies of these unfortunate men were recovered on 23 June and 3 July
respectively.
Salvage Efforts
It took the combined efforts of four fire fighting tugs to bring this fire under control. The
dramatic picture, which is on the front cover of this book, vividly illustrates the scene. By the time
the fire was extinguished, the entire after section had been burned out The vessel was towed to
Rotterdam on 10 June. She was declared a constructive total loss, sold to a Turkish shipbreaker and
towed to Aliaga in July, 1993.
Fortunately, because the cargo was unleaded petrol (gasoline), there was no problem with
pollution. The light volatiles burning off freely in the atmosphere. But it was this very volatility
which caused the fire to spread at such speed and resulted in such tragic loss of life.
Conclusions Reached by Marine Accident Investigation Branch

The conclusions reached by the MAIB, in their excellent Report which is published by Her
Majesty's Stationery Office, London, make interesting reading.
Comment
The recommendation made in the MAIB Report, regarding the desirability of providing the
means by which to start the main fire pump from the bridge, is well worthy of consideration by the
Safety Committee of IMO.
From a fire-fighters point of view, probably the most interesting lesson is the inability, in the
event of a collision which opens up the hull below the level of the oil, for the funnel (inert) gas
system to prevent immediate ignition of the released fuel. Nevertheless, it is clear from photographs
of the British Trent that no subsequent explosions were suffered in any of the remaining 21 cargo
tanks. Indeed, only about 3,600 tonnes, out of the 24,135 tonnes of cargo was lost. This indicates
that the inert gas in the undamaged tanks had done its job and that these remained inerted
throughout the incident. This surely is by virtue of a well designed system, otherwise the inert gas
from adjoining tanks must have escaped from the damage suffered in the vicinity of the No 2 port
cargo tank.
It is clear that the crew of the British Trent was very well trained in fire fighting and that they
tried desperately, and with great bravery, to tackle the fire. That they failed in their efforts was due
entirely to matters quite beyond their control.
The MAIB Report refers to the fact that their investigation was hampered by the fact that the
solicitors for the owners of the Western Winner refused permission for the Inspector to interview the
Master and officers of that vessel. Surely, as a matter of urgency, this is a matter to be taken up by
the IMO!

The author finds particularly interesting the reference in Part IV, Para. 12.3 of the Conclusions in
the MAIB Report:
“Western Winner” is considered not to have proceeded at a safe speed, not

to have kept an effective lookout and not to have made proper use of radar
given the conditions of restricted visibility that existed.
He recalls some years ago being in the English Channel in thick fog and on the bridge of a large
cruise ship with about a thousand persons on board, many of them being children. The Vessel was
almost stopped in the water with her fog horns sounding at regular intervals. Suddenly, there were
exclamations of alarm from the Master and the watch officers when a vessel was identified on radar
as being virtually on a collision course and proceeding far too fast for the prevailing conditions.
The author hurriedly left the bridge because clearly no visitors would have been welcome at this
time. Later, from an open deck he observed, in what seemed to be just a very few minutes later, and
hazily through the fog, the author observed a cross channel ferry crossing the bows at what was,
even to a layman, much too close for comfort. Later, the Master commented to the author that the
ferry had been travelling at high speed and clearly relying entirely upon the veracity of its radar.
The author was told by another officer who was on the bridge at the time, that the Master's comment
to the ferry was quite unprintable!

Chapter Five
Some Major Disasters To Ships In Port
In terms of numbers, fires on ships in port are more common than are fires in ships at sea.
Passenger ships are involved in such incidents more frequently than are cargo vessels — for the
reason that when such ships are at sea, a constant watch is being maintained by the crew, and
passengers are moving about until a late hour. Holds are battened down so that, unless a light is
dropped down an unprotected ventilator, there is little chance of a fire starting there. In other
words, the ship is "live".
In port it is different. The vessel is boarded by a mass of tradesmen, each performing a necessary
task, some of which involve burning or welding. Electricians are repairing or adding to the
installation, and the hatch covers are off for loading or unloading. Often the ship is in the hands of
relieving officers who lack the intimate local knowledge which comes of sailing a vessel. Pumps
may be dismantled for maintenance and repair, and automatic fire alarms may not be functioning for
the same reason. In other words, the ship is "dead".
When an efficient patrol system is in operation, the chances of a fire getting out of hand are
greatly minimised. Unfortunately, however, shipping companies differ widely in their conceptions
of what constitutes an "efficient patrol". Some are content to leave the patrol in the hands of their
coloured crews, few of whom speak English; so that when a fire is reported the officer of the watch
must go and see for himself before he dare call the fire brigade. Precious minutes are thus lost.
For larger vessels, at any rate, there is much to be said for putting professional patrolmen on
board whenever the ship docks for any length of time. After a few weeks at sea, the crew
themselves are not really in a fit state (this is meant in the kindest sense) efficiently to maintain a
24-hours-a-day patrol.
Five of the most serious fires which have taken place in passenger ships in port in relatively
recent times must now be described.
The "NORMANDIE" — February 9th, 1942

After Pearl Harbour, shipping was at a premium to the Allies, particularly large vessels which
could be used to transport American troops to combat zones overseas. The U.S. Government were
therefore well pleased to be able to take possession of this crack French liner in December, 1941,
and hastily made arrangements to fit her out for troop-carrying.
The Normandie had been built at St. Nazaire, and was completed in 1935. Of 80,000 gross tons,
she was the pride of the French Line and a contender for the title of the world's largest, fastest and
finest ship. She was 1,029 ft. long, and her turbo-electric engines could drive her through quadruple
screws at a speed of over 30 knots. She had a cargo capacity of 11,800 tons, and accommodation
for 1,972 passengers as well as a crew of 1,345.
A complete automatic fire-alarm system was fitted, consisting of no fewer than 1,000 detector
heads. A central fire station on "B" deck served as a command post for the fire protection system.
70
Some Major Disasters to Ships in Port 71
FIGURE 5.1 Diagrammatic sketch of the Normandie, indicating approximate locations of

the main vertical fire bulkheads, and general layout of the ship.
This station was constantly manned, and all patrols worked outwards from it. There were 224
fire-alarm stations from which a manual alarm could be given to the central station. A general
alarm sounding throughout the ship was controlled from the bridge.
All the holds and other less accessible places were protected by an audible smoke-detector
system. Nearly 5,000 lb. of carbon dioxide were available to fight fires in the holds. A fire main
system fed by three sets of pumps, each with a capacity of 1,000 g.p.m., supplied water for
fire-fighting purposes at a pressure of 142 lb. per square inch to the 504 hydrant outlets. Most of the
outlets were twins, enclosed in a locker which also contained lengths of hose and nozzles. The
French-type couplings did not fit the standard American type used by the New York Fire
Department. A large number of portable fire-extinguishers were available.
The fire patrol, working under the U.S. Coast Guard, consisted of four petty officers and 36 men.
Nine men were on duty at any one time. Regular fire drills were carried out by the patrolmen; but
other persons on board were not required to undertake such drill, nor were they given any
instructions what to do in case of fire.
A firm of fire engineers was employed changing over the hydrant and hose connections to
American types; but the work had not been completed at the time of which we speak.
By the terms of his contract, the contractor responsible for the refitting was bound by penalty
clause to "exercise the highest possible degree of care to protect the vessel from fires". The
contractor connected four two-and-a-half-inch hose-lines from hydrants on Pier 88 to standpipes
for'ard and aft on the starboard side of the ship, and detailed a group of 50 unskilled men to act as
firewatchers. The U.S. Navy had some scathing remarks to make later about the lack of training
these men had received.
On February 9th, 1942, there were more than 3,000 men on board the Normandie, including 500
men who were to form the ship's crew. These men were unfamiliar with the layout of the ship, and
had been assigned no duties or responsibilities in the event of emergency. About 110 burners and
welders were operating in various parts of the ship. One group of a burner, two fire-watchers and
nine labourers were engaged in the main saloon, which measured 100 ft. long by 85 ft. wide, in
cutting away four stanchions with the aid of oxyacetylene torches. Another group of workmen were
laying battleship linoleum in the same saloon.
Early in February, 1,140 bales of life-preservers had been stored in the saloon preparatory to
distribution about the ship. Each bale contained ten life-preservers made of kapok, and each was
covered with canvas wrapping. The bales had originally been stored in the centre of the room; but
on February 9th the linoleum layers—had moved them to the port side and had piled them round the
forward and after stanchions, and between these stanchions and the side wall of the saloon. An aisle
had been left between the bales leading to the open door on the port side of the saloon.
The main saloon had two fire doors, whose purpose was to prevent the spread of any fire in the
saloon to the smoking lounge aft, and to the gallery and grand hallway forward.

The fire-watchers had for equipment two three-gallon pails of water, an asbestos board about two
feet by three feet, and a semicircular metal shield about 36 in. high. A one-and-a-half-inch hose was
led from the port promenade and extended into the saloon; but as it does not seem to have been
connected to a hydrant, it was of little immediate use.
During the morning, two of the stanchions had been successfully cut away, and the gang left for
lunch. Returning just after 2 p.m., the men began to cut the remaining two stanchions round which
the life-preservers had been stacked. These were moved away and piled on others so as to make a
working space round the stanchions which was later variously reported as being between three and
eight feet wide.
The third stanchion was cut away without difficulty, and the gang proceeded to tackle the final
stanchion on the port side aft. Unfortunately, the regular fire-watchers were missing at this time,
and one of the labourers took over the job. He held the asbestos board above the metal shield to
prevent sparks from reaching the life-preservers; but when the stanchion was almost cut through and
needed to be lowered carefully to the deck, he laid down his shield in order to help. All that now
remained to be done was for the burner to snip off the final piece of stanchion; so the foreman in
charge of the party started to leave for another job. It was during the final seconds of the operation
that small flames were observed darting upwards from one or two of the bales nearest to the point
where the burner was working. The time was about 2.35 in the afternoon.
The men tried to beat out the flames with their hands, but the speed with which the fire took hold
defeated them. Buckets and hand-extinguishers were then tried, but to no avail. The line of hose
from the promenade deck was connected up and put to use; but it is recorded "that only a bucketful
of water came out of it". Meanwhile, the fire was spreading rapidly.
Unfortunately, as so often happens on board ship during a refit, many of the telephones and some
of the fire-alarm circuits were out of action. The general alarm controlled from the bridge had been
disconnected; and the fire patrol was quartered temporarily in a room on "A" deck which was
without telephonic communication to the central fire-control station. Messages had to be sent by
hand, with the result that there was delay before trained fire-fighters reached the scene.
By this time, the whole saloon was involved; and surrounding areas, including the smoking
lounge, were heavily charged with smoke. Fire-fighting was also hampered by the fact that
FIGURE 5.2 The 80,000 ton Normandie burning in New York harbour, February 9th, 1942.

someone had turned off all the lights as a safeguard against short circuits. Nor had the hydrant
conversion programme been completed in that section of the vessel, so that there was difficulty in
getting the hoses connected up.
Worst of all, no one was prepared to take over the responsibility of full command. The Naval
Inspector considered that he dealt only with the contractors, and that even with them his capacity
was an advisory one only. The Commanding Officer designate considered that he had not yet
assumed command. The District Material Officer, an experienced technician and marine engineer,
considered himself to be acting in an advisory capacity only, and gave orders only to members of his
own staff. The Lieutenant Commander in charge of the Coast Guard unit looked to orders from the
Captain of the Port. The Captain of the Port considered the Commanding Officer designate to be
already in command.
Fires are in effect battles, and battles call for commanders. None was available here.
Some 14 minutes after the fire had been reported to the ship's fire patrol, a call was put through
to the New York Fire Department. This call was received at 2.49 p.m., and the first fire engines
reached the dock some one and a half minutes later. Total Fire Department attendance, after four
alarms had gone out, eventually consisted of 24 pumpers, six ladder trucks, and three fire-boats, as
well as much other miscellaneous equipment. An unstated number of privately owned towboats
were also in use.
A serious feature of the fire (and one which had also been experienced during the Morro Castle
affair) was that smoke from the upper decks was soon drawn into the ship's engine-room. This
forced the Coast Guard engineers to close down and abandon the engine-room at about 3 p.m., some
45 minutes after the start of the fire. The lesson to be learnt is obviously that all skylights and other
apertures into an engine- or boiler-room must be closed at once when a fire breaks out on an upper
deck, and all air intake fans stopped.
By this time, three decks of the ship were seriously involved, and water in vast quantities was
needed to fight the fire. It was liberally supplied; for it is estimated that the three fire-boats alone
pumped 839,420 gallons of water on board during the fire-fighting operations.
Some 45 minutes later, however, the ship started to list to port; and as more and more water was
pumped into the superstructure, so this list gradually increased. The fire was under control by about
6.30 p.m., but by that time the Normandie was listing to port about 10 degrees. Attempts were
made to pump out some of the water trapped in the superstructure; but ejector pumps were not
available; and the large quantities of floating debris would soon have choked the conventional
suction strainers and so have stopped the pumps.
By 6.30 p.m. most of the firemen had returned to their stations, and the fire was virtually out.
But the naval authorities were by this time seriously concerned about the stability of the vessel, and
determined efforts were made to prevent her capsizing. Efforts were made to scuttle the gigantic
80,000-tonner by removing the plates from the condensers in the engine-room (the ship had no sea
cocks), but thick smoke prevented this being done. Efforts were also made to fill the starboard
double-bottom tanks by means of holes cut from the outside. It was difficult to locate the tanks
from outside, however, and only four of the seven tanks were in fact cut open. The effect of
partially filling these tanks did, however, lessen the list by a few degrees for a short time.
(An important incidental problem which the authorities had to consider before deciding on the
scuttling attempt was the fact that the bottom of the dock in which the Normandie lay sloped away
into deeper water under the regular berth of the still bigger British liner Queen Mary.)
By 9.30 p.m. the list had increased to about 17 degrees, at which she remained steady for a few
hours. But the incoming tide raised her from the bottom of the slip, and so increased her list. By
midnight this had reached 35 degrees; and the ship was abandoned 30 minutes later.
Some two hours later still, at 2.45 a.m., the Normandie rolled over and lay on her side−her
fire-scarred hulk completely blocking the whole vitally important dock.
The main lessons to be learnt from the Normandie fire are surely as follows:

1. Cutting and welding must never be allowed until all combustible material has been
adequately protected or removed to a safe distance.
2. The chain of command must be clearly laid down when a vessel is under refit.
3. Standardisation of couplings is essential.
4. Smoke from a fire on an upper deck must be prevented from being drawn down into the
engine-room.
5. All fire-watchers must be adequately trained.
6. Fire brigades must use water as sparingly as is consistent with their first task of putting out
the fire. They must be provided with equipment for removing all water used for fire-fighting
purposes as soon as it begins to threaten the stability of the ship.
7. All fire-resisting doors should at once be shut round the area of a fire as soon as it breaks
out, and should only be reopened to serve the minimum needs of the fire-fighting teams.
The "NORONIC" — September 17th, 1949

A small fire starting in a linen cupboard sparked off one of the greatest marine fire tragedies of
recent history. No fewer than 118 people died in the holocaust on board the s.s. Noronic at Queen's
Quay, Toronto, during the early morning of September 17th, 1949.
Ironically enough, in every passenger's cabin there hung a card reading as follows:
"FIRE. This steamer is equipped with modern fire prevention apparatus, in addition
to which the steamer is patrolled day and night by experienced watchmen for
the protection of the passengers. In case of fire, promptly notify any member
of the crew."
It is certain that the 524 passengers would not have slept so soundly that night had they realised
in what a perfunctory manner the fire patrolling was in fact being carried out by the "experienced
watchmen".
The Noronic (6,905 gross tons) was a vessel of five decks, including the main or freight deck,
and was built in Ontario in 1913. Passengers occupied the four upper decks, "A", "B", "C"and "D".
The ship was 362 ft. long, with a maximum breadth of 52 ft. The hull was of steel, with a
considerable amount of wood in the cabins, partitions, doors, decks, panelling, etc. The ship was
owned by Canada Steamship Lines, Limited, and was normally employed on a passenger run
between Windsor (Ontario) and Detroit (Michigan), to Duluth (Minnesota). At the time of the
disaster, however, the vessel was en route to the Thousands Islands and to Prescott (Ontario), on a
seven-day excursion run originating and terminating at Detroit. Although the vessel was plying into
United States waters and carrying American passengers, the United States Coast Guard had, by
international agreement, recognised Canadian regulations as approximating to their own standards,
and had issued a certificate which allowed the Noronic to operate to and from U.S. ports.
The Canadian Department of Transport had in turn issued a certificate allowing the Noronic to
ply as an "Inland Steamship Class 1" carrying 600 passengers and 200 crew, for the year ended
April, 1950.
The vulnerability to fire of the Noronic class of ship had, however, already been demonstrated,
when one of her two sister-ships, the Hamonic, had been destroyed by fire on July 17th at Point
Edward (Ontario). Although the two fires were of quite different origin (the Harmonic was set
alight when the pier alongside her took fire), the extremely rapid spread of fire in her superstructure
should have been a warning that the combustible contents of her type of ship demanded the most
stringent fire protection measures.
The other sister-ship, the Huronic, had been out of passenger service for some years.
No automatic fire-alarm or sprinkler system was installed, but manual fire alarms with switches
protected by glass panels were located in various positions throughout the ship. The breaking of a

glass sounded an alarm bell on the bridge; and a Klaxon warning signal, controlled from the bridge,
served to sound the general alarm.
The passengers were accommodated in the central portions of "A" and "D" Decks, and on all of
"C". "B" Deck was used for crew accommodation, and for public rooms. "E" Deck was used for
freight, and also contained the entrance hall for passengers-which meant that passengers on the
upper decks had to come down to this deck before they could get ashore. The distributions of
passengers was as follows: On "A" Deck, 94; on "C" Deck, 149; on "D" Deck, 281.
The Noronic arrived at Pier 9, Toronto Docks, at 6 p.m. on September 16th, intending to sail
again the following evening after her passengers had had the opportunity of seeing the city. By
midnight nearly all her passengers were aboard, but only 15 members of the crew were required to
be on duty. Yet there were 52 hydrants on board the vessel, and each hydrant was termed a "fire
station" to which members of the crew were to report in an emergency.
Although a fire patrol was scheduled to take place about once an hour, it lasted in fact less than
15 minutes, and did not cover the whole ship. The Chief Steward was nervous about fire; so he
usually instructed his own steward's crew, consisting of four bell-boys, to supplement the watch of
official patrolman and to report any fires direct to him. The bell-boys, however, had cleaning duties
to perform. The ballroom, in which a dance had finished at midnight, had to be cleared; and then all
decks, with the exception of "E" Deck, had to be swept clean. This work always took a
considerable time to carry out, sometimes lasting until five o'clock in the morning.
The fire originated in a small linen cupboard located just forward of the women's wash-room,
and opening on to the port corridor of "C" Deck just aft of the after stairway leading down to "D"
Deck. In this cupboard were kept towels, bed-linen and cleaning materials used by the maids.
(There was usually kept there also a large cardboard carton for holding wastepaper and other refuse
which the maids collected from the cabins and wash-rooms; but the maids, who had gone off duty at
7.45 p.m., later maintained in evidence that this carton had been removed from the cupboard earlier
in the night.)
The cause of the fire was never ascertained; but some passengers said in evidence that they had
observed maids smoking cigarettes in the linen closet during the previous day. Dr Joslyn Rogers,
Professor of Chemistry at the University of Toronto, could find no evidence of the fire having been
deliberately started, nor any evidence of spontaneous combustion having taken place.
The fire was discovered at about 2.30 a.m. by a passenger, a Mr Church, who noticed what he
described as a haze in the aft part of the starboard corridor on "C" Deck as he entered that corridor
from the lounge at the stern. On investigation, he found that smoke was issuing from the sides and
top of the door of the linen closet, which he tried and found was locked. From the "rustling and
small crackling" he could hear, he was afraid that someone was trapped inside; and he ran forward
along the port corridor calling out that the ship was on fire.
As he arrived amidships, he met the head bell-boy, O'Neill; and the two ran back to the linen
cupboard. O'Neill did not have a key to it, so he ran back down the main stair to the Chief
Steward's office on "D" Deck. He did not awaken the steward himself.
Returning to the linen cupboard, he got hold of an extinguisher, and then opened the door. The
extinguisher failed to control the fire, however, and flames started to come into the corridor.
O'Neill and Church then went to obtain a line of hose from the port corridor, probably leaving the
cupboard door open behind them. When they got back, with no water in the line of hose, although
Church had duly turned on the valve, the flames were pouring out of the cupboard and along the
corridor. (The reason for this failure of the water supply has never been satisfactorily explained,
although it is suggested that the two amateur fire-fighters might have put a few kinks in the hose as
they ran towards the fire.) Church later stated that it was his impression that at this point the heat
was "volatising" the varnish in the corridor and spreading the fire. He therefore left the scene, went
down to "D" Deck, roused his family, and left the ship.
O'Neill, realising that he could do no more fire-fighting single-handed, ran into the social hall
amidships and broke the glass in the fire-alarm box there. He then ran to the gangway on "E" Deck
and told the wheelsman about the fire.

It was now too late−the opening of the cupboard door and the delay in getting the hose to work
had allowed the fire to reach disastrous proportions. In the words of the Commissioner, the
Honourable Mr Justice R. L. Kellock, who later conducted the official enquiry: ". . . When the alarm
was given, it was no longer, in my opinion, a question of extinguishing the fire but of getting those
on board off the ship. O'Neill's failure to report the fire immediately on its discovery, due to his
lack of training as to what to do in such an eventuality, was fatal."
The lack of crew training and discipline was manifest in many other ways. Captain Taylor, when
he reached the scene, failed to organise his already short-handed crew into a proper team to warn the
passengers and effect an orderly evacuation of the ship. Instead, he himself ran about trying to
rouse passengers by personally breaking cabin windows and shouting warnings as he raced along
the decks.
The First Officer sounded the general alarm on the Klaxon horns which sounded throughout the
ship. He also attempted to sound the alarm of "one long, three short, one long" on the ship's
whistle, but the whistle jammed open and continued blowing.
The Second Officer later testified that when he heard the alarm, he left his quarters forward on
"A" Deck and went aft through the doors amidships on the port side. At that time the interior was
full of smoke, and flame was coming up the starboard stairway from "B" Deck. He, too, then began
to fight a rather lone battle, variously attempting to fight the fire personally and to rouse what
passengers he could. He did, however, pull off many of the metal screens from the cabin windows
on the "C" Deck promenade, and so allowed passengers to escape that way. (By this time the cabins
were on fire, and the roof of the deck was also alight.)
His subsequent action was to go forward to "C" Deck, where he found a few passengers whom he
helped to get to the bows of the ship. After one more attempt to check the starboard side of "C"
Deck, he went back to the bow of the ship and escaped over the side on a cable.
Other members of the crew similarly followed, each the dictates of his own judgment in
attempting to fight the fire or to rescue passengers. Lacking specific instructions, and receiving no
leadership, their efforts were generally ineffective.
As in so many other shipboard fires, the engine-room soon became untenable owing to thick
smoke, and the Chief Engineer was forced to evacuate his staff. But he sensibly ordered the pumps
to be left going, so as not to hamper any fire-fighting operations. When they left the engine-room,
the engineers assisted with the rescue of passengers, then themselves left the ship.
A dock watchman of Canada Steamship Lines was on Pier 9 near the bow of the Noronic when
he saw fire breaking through what appeared to be a window towards the stern of the ship, on the
starboard side between "B" and "C" Decks. Up till then, he had heard no alarm from the ship. He
immediately ran into the building on the dock close to where he was standing and called the Fire
Department. The time of this call was 2.38 a.m.
The later progress of the fire, as seen by the Fire Department, is contained in the following
extract from a report published by the Ontario Fire Marshal's Office:
THE S.S. "NORONIC" FIRE, SEPTEMBER 17th, 1949 − The disastrous fire which destroyed the S.S. Noronic
on September 17th, 1949, with such a large loss of life, occurred at C.S.L. Pier 9, Queen's Quay, Toronto. This ship
was built of steel with wooden interior work, which was covered with several layers of paint.
At 2.38 a.m. the first alarm was telephoned in by the C.S.L. Pier watchman, Mr Harper, from C.S.L. Office, Pier
9. It was responded to by District Chief J. Stevens with one pumper, one hose truck, one high-pressure truck, one
rescue squad truck and one aerial ladder 100 feet. En route to alarm, District Chief J. Stevens saw the ship ablaze,
and at 2.41 a.m. put in the second alarm by T.F.D. Radio Orders to Fire Alarm Telegraph to transmit a second alarm
on Box 6 (on Queen's Quay). This alarm was responded to by one District Chief, four pumpers, one aerial ladder 85
feet, one hook and ladder, one fire boat, Chief of Department and one Deputy Chief of Department.
A third alarm was radioed from the Pier, and this was responded to by one District Chief, five pumpers, one
high-pressure truck, two aerial ladders: one of 75 feet, and one of 100 feet. The fire was struck out September 17,
1949 at 4.51 a.m.
When District Chief J. Stevens first saw this ship, the three top decks were ablaze; and the only sign of life was on
"B" Deck bow and stem, where people were silhouetted against the flames and some were jumping from the ship. A
No. 5 Aerial (85' wooden-1931) ran to within 75 ft. of the bow of the Noronic, and a fully extended ladder at an

angle of about 25 degrees to "B" Deck port bow. At the moment the ladder touched the ship, a woman clambered on
it, followed by five or six men. Due to the motion of the ship and whip of the ladder with the weight, the tip of the
ladder came in for touch-down on bow of ship. Halfway down the ladder the woman faltered and the men behind
bunched up and the ladder snapped, hurling them all into the water. They were all rescued. No. 1 Aerial (100'
steel-1947), due to parked cars, had difficulty reaching north side of Quay, but right after No. 5's mishap it reached
within about 90 feet of bow to Noronic and fully extended 100 ft. aerial ladder to "C" Deck bow and braced the
ladder with a hand ladder about 15 ft. from base. Firemen got up this ladder and aided numerous passengers to
shore.
Few of the passengers seem to have heard the general alarm signal, for the steam whistle which
had jammed open was apparently drowning the noise of the Klaxons. With one exception, those
who died occupied staterooms on "A" and "C" Decks, there being only one occupant of "D" Deck
who was lost. A Dr Rogers, in his evidence at the enquiry, gave it as his view that many deaths
were due to the high temperature of the air inhaled. This produced unconsciousness, death
following by inhalation of carbon monoxide before there was any physical contact with the flames.
Mr Justice Kellock's Report found that the burning of the Noronic, and the loss of life, were
attributable to failure on the part of the owners and of the Master to have:
1. A continuous patrol of the ship for the purpose of detecting the presence of fire, such patrol
as was in existence being limited to approximately fifteen minutes out of every hour.
2. Any Organisation operative when the ship was in dock with passengers on board by which
information as to the outbreak of fire could be promptly despatched to some point from
which men trained in the methods of dealing with fire could be immediately despatched to
the locality.
3. Contemplated in any real sense the possibility of fire occurring at a dock. They had
maintained only fifteen men on duty out of a crew of one hundred and seventy-one, the
others being free to go ashore and liable, for all the Master or the officer on duty knew to the
contrary, actually to be on shore.
4. Any plan for arousing and getting the passengers off the ship in the event of fire while the
ship was in dock.
5. Trained the crew as to the proper steps to be taken on discovery of fire or in fire-fighting
methods, beyond giving them a knowledge of how to operate fire-extinguishers and hoses.
Mr Justice Kellock submitted the following recommendations, to cover all ships carrying more
than a very small number of passengers on all major Canadian fresh waters:
1. That the provision as to fire-resisting bulkheads in Regulation XVI of the International

Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea be made applicable to such ships.
2. That the provision of Regulation XLIII of the said Safety Convention as to the maintenance
of an efficient and continuous fire-patrol system (as well as an automatic fire-alarm or
fire-detecting system) be made applicable. Such alarm or detecting system should NOT be
restricted to such parts of the ship as were not accessible to the patrol system.
3. That the provisions of Regulation XLIV as to muster lists and the assigning of special duties
to different members of the crew in connection with the matters therein mentioned should
be applied, including:
(a) the muster of passengers;
(b) the extinction of fire;
(c) the warning of passengers;
(d) the assembling of passengers at muster stations;
(e) keeping order in the passages and on the stairways, and generally controlling the
movements of passengers. ("This will necessarily require adequate training of the
crew in methods of fire-fighting, together with the setting up and maintenance of an

effective organisation for despatching men so trained to the seat of the fire at the earliest
possible moment.")
4. That such ships be fitted with a sprinkler system protecting all enclosed parts of the vessel.
5. That muster charts should be prominently displayed in order that each member of the crew
may become familiar, not only with his own duties and fire and boat stations, but with those
of the crew who are to work with him.
6. That such ships be fitted with a public address system for directing passengers in an
emergency, and that the proper officers be trained in its use.
7. That all ships in dock should provide adequate, and more than a single, means of exit to
shore.
8. That passenger ships docking with the intention of remaining for any extended time be
required to be connected with the local telephone system, so that the aid of the local fire
department may be obtained without delay.
From a fireman's point of view, the main lessons to be learnt are that 118 lives were lost because
of failure, after discovery of the fire, to close the door to the compartment in which the fire
originated; and because of failure to raise an immediate alarm.
Once again, too, the fact emerges that the engine-room had to be abandoned at a very early stage
of the fire because smoke was being drawn down into it through ventilators and other openings.
The "EMPRESS OF CANADA"—January 25th, 1953

The most notable ship fire in a British port since the Second World War involved the 20,000-ton
liner Empress of Canada in the Gladstone Dock, Bootle, on Sunday, January 25th, 1953. Some
seven years previously, on March 1st, 1946, the 16,754-ton liner Empire Waveney had been so
severely damaged in adjoining Liverpool that she had to be broken up for scrap. Other post-war
port fires causing total or serious loss have befallen the Empress of Russia, the Monarch of
Bermuda, the Prague, and the Kronpins Frederik.
The Empress of Canada had been built for the Canadian Pacific Railway Company by John
Brown and Co., Ltd., Clydebank, in 1928. Of 20,325 gross tons, she was 582 ft. long, with a beam
of 75 ft. She had nine decks. Eleven main watertight transverse bulkheads extended upwards to the
underside of "C" Deck. Watertight doors were fitted in these bulkheads. Fourteen "fireproof"
bulkheads were fitted on or above "C" Deck, as follows: On "C" Deck, 5; on "B" Deck, 5; on "A"
Deck, 2; on the Promenade Deck, 1; on the Upper Promenade Deck, 1. Doors in the "fireproof"
bulkheads were either of three-tenth-inch steel, or of the "Roneo" type of pressed sheet steel in box
form filled with a fire-resisting material.
The three main staircases were located as follows:
1. From "D" Deck to "A" Deck (upper), in Forward Square just forward of No. 3 Hatchway.
2. From "C" Deck, approximately amidships at the Main Square, right up to the stairway
entrance to the sports deck.
3. From the Tourist Class Dining-room aft, from "D" Deck to "A" Deck.
These staircases were not enclosed; and it was shown in evidence that fire could break from "C"
Deck between one pair of fire stops to an adjacent range via other independent stairs−e.g. from "C"
Deck abaft No. 2 Fire Stop, up via the main stairs to "B" Deck, thence forward and over to the stairs
at the starboard side abreast the funnel hatch, then down these stairs to the cabin class
accommodation on "C" Deck forward of the No. 2 Fire Stop mentioned above; and also down to
"D" Deck via the stairs to crew and passenger spaces. There were also a number of other
independent staircases about the ship serving to negative several other pairs of fire stops.

(It should be stated in passing that proper

enclosure of staircases is now provided for by
the Merchant Shipping (Construction) Rules,
1952; but the Empress of Canada was exempt
from these Rules, having been built before
1952.)
Seven electrically-driven fire pumps were
connected to the fire main, six being in the
engine-room and one in the forward stokehold.
Power was supplied to these pumps by the
ship's main generators in the engine-room.
The pump in the stokehold was alternatively
powered from the emergency generator on "B"
Deck aft.
Twenty-eight lengths of canvas hose, with
branches, were distributed throughout the
ship; together with 134 portable fire
extinguishers, of which about one-quarter
were ashore for testing at the time of the fire.
Two smoke helmets, but no self-contained
breathing apparatus, were carried. Steam
smothering was provided in the cargo holds,
and both CO2 and steam smothering under the
boilers.
A manually-operated fire-alarm system,
FIGURE 5.3 consisting of 32 glassfronted switches, was
The Empress of Canada takes on a serious list during installed in the accommodation spaces. A
fire-fighting operations in the Gladstone Dock, Bootle.
small thermostatically controlled system
consisting of eleven alarm heads was installed
in the baggage and store rooms. Both systems were connected to alarm bells and indicators on the
bridge and in the engine-room. A Klaxon general-alarm system, operated from the bridge, covered
the whole ship.
The Empress of Canada was berthed in about 50 ft. of water in No. 1 North branch of the
Gladstone Dock, Bootle, near Liverpool, having come out of dry-dock the day before. The ship not
being in commission, only a skeleton crew was on board, consisting of an officer, two engineers, an
electrician, and a fire patrol. The fire patrol comprised a master-at-arms and five men. Patrols were
carried out at intervals of 90 minutes. There was a reporting centre at the only gangway, on "B"
Deck aft, where a smoke helmet, axe and other equipment were kept in readiness. The ship's fire
main was not maintained under pressure; and no actual connection had been made to the shore
main, although two hoses had been led to shore hydrants to enable this to be done in case of
necessity.
The shore mains consisted of a number of hydrants on a fiveinch main feeding from a nine-inch
supply. Under subsequent test, the output of these hydrants was found to be as follows:
1. With pump set in to five-inch main:

540 gallons per minute at a running pressure of 30 lb. per square inch−147 tons per hour.
2. Without pump:
Static pressure: 52 lb. per square inch.
Hydrant "A"alone:
Hydrants "A" and "B":

Hydrants "A", "B" and "C ":
375 gallons per minute at a running pressure-of 17 lb. per square inch−100 tons per hour.
A team of 291 workmen employed by the contractors, and a further 36 employed by the Shipping
Company, were on board in various parts of the ship during the afternoon, working under a
chargehand boiler-maker.
At approximately 3.45 p.m., two members of the shore-gang were on the boat deck when they
observed smoke coming over the deck rail out of the ship's side three or four decks down. They
took no action, perhaps thinking that the source of the smoke was the activities of the welders who
were working in various parts of the ship. Earlier still, between 3.25 and 3.30 p.m., a watchman on
a grain elevator, moored alongside the starboard side of the ship, had noticed smoke issuing from
the starboard shell door on "B" Deck abaft amidships, and from portholes just forward of the door.
He had hailed the ship, but on getting no reply took no further action.
It was not until about 4.10 p.m. that the chargehand boilermaker discovered the fire near the
dispensary on "B" Deck, and immediately broke an alarm glass and sent a man ashore to call the fire
brigade. Unfortunately, there was no one on the bridge to hear the alarm, and the engineer in the
engine-room failed to hear it because he was not near the operating platform where the bell was
situated. The ship's pumps not being running, the chargehand was unable to tackle the fire with the
ship's hose. So he warned the workmen in the vicinity and ordered them to leave the ship.
The Bootle Fire Brigade received the call at 4.17 p.m., and immediately responded with four
pumps and one emergency tender under the Deputy Chief Officer, reaching the dock some two
minutes later. The brigade made entry to the ship through an amidships shell door on "C" Deck, and
found a serious fire involving both "B" and "C" Decks. Two lines of hose were got to work from
the quayside hydrants, but because of the thick smoke the firemen had to wear breathing apparatus.
The officer in charge soon saw that the incident called for more machines, and sent a "Make
Pumps 8" message at 4.30 p.m. Five minutes later, this was increased to 12; and when Chief Officer
A. J. Greenslade arrived, he further increased the number to 20. Finally, at 6.20 p.m., the number
was increased to 30 pumps.
The concentration of smoke throughout the entire vessel was now severe, and made movement
both inside and out a difficult matter. Access to the bridge was impossible.
The great heat bottled up between decks, together with this complete lack of visibility, made the
fireman's task difficult in the extreme. About ten minutes at a time was all a fireman could stand
before having to come out for a spell of fresh air. To add to their difficulties, cylinders of acetylene,
left by the welders, were continually exploding in parts of the ship which could not be reached by
the jets. Such explosions have the power of small high-explosive bombs, so that courage as well as
skill was needed to continue fighting the fires inside the burning ship. Many cylinders, containing
both oxygen and acetylene, and each equally deadly if they had exploded, were removed by the
firemen from the interior of the ship and flung into the waters of the dock.
Being under refit and unladen, the vessel was in a very "tender" condition (as it is called), and
concern about her stability was felt at an early stage. Fortunately, a number of Mersey Docks and
Harbour Board officers were present, among them Captain W. R. Colbeck (Marine Surveyor) and
Captain Brock (Marine Salvage Department). Captain A. E. Shergold (General Manager at
Liverpool of Canadian Pacific Railways) was also in attendance in the early stages. The Chief Fire
Officer thus had access to valuable advice about the factors governing the stability of the vessel.
The ship was first seen to be listing at 5 p.m., when a one-degree list to port was observed. By
this time, 12 jets were being operated, which would be pumping water into the ship at an estimated
rate of 1,500 gallons per minute, or 420 tons per hour. By 7.45 p.m., about 40 jets were in use, and
the ship had taken a list of 10.5 degrees.
Apart from the jets inside, the fire was also being tackled through port-holes on the promenade
deck from the longitudinal gantries of the adjoining dock shed. (The ship's own pumps were never
got to work at all during the course of the fire, and all lines of hose had to be taken into the ship

from the quayside. The Assistant Chief Engineer came under criticism from the Assessors at the
enquiry which followed the fire for (a) not keeping the fire main charged before the fire, and (b) not
starting the pumps and charging the fire main after the fire had been discovered.)
Many attempts were made to lessen or counteract the weight of water which was causing the list.
The Salvor, a fire and salvage boat belonging to the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, tried to
pump water into the engine-room. Holes were cut at tactical points on the port side of "A" and "B"
Decks in an attempt to drain away trapped water in the accommodation. Counter-flooding was tried
by forcing water into No. 3 hold between the pipe tunnel and the shell on the starboard side.
Finally, Captain Brock and the Chief Fire Officer descended to the starboard deep tanks to see if it
was possible to fill them in an attempt to lessen the list to port. But certain plates had been removed
during the structural alterations which were taking place; and after about 300 tons of water had been
pumped into the tanks, it became obvious that this water too was flowing to port.
The question of scuttling the ship and allowing her to settle on the bottom of the dock was also
considered; but it was decided that the depth of water (50 ft.) posed a grave risk that she would not
settle in an upright position. It was also considered that, owing to her heavy list, she would tend to
slide away from the quay—as indeed she did when she eventually turned over.
As time went by, the list continued to develop; until at about 8.30p.m. it had reached some 17
degrees. (It is estimated that by this time about 2,400 tons of water had been used for fire-fighting
purposes generally.) The situation was now critical, and urgent consultation was held with the dock
and shipping experts.
At this conference it was decided to cease fire-fighting, and to hope that the water trapped high
up in the superstructure would drain away to lower regions. Sir Rex Hodges, General Manager of
the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, made the announcement: "We have decided," he said, "that
all we can do now is to let the fire burn itself out." It must be firmly noted that the fire brigade
agreed to this policy of abandonment with
extreme reluctance. Their efforts were
beginning to be successful, and the fire was
beginning to be subdued. Moreover, as the
Chief Fire Officer said at the time: "It will be
obvious to Fire Service officers that to have to
break off a fight against fire is foreign to the
tradition of the Fire Service, but such
decisions are forced upon us."
With the cessation of fire-fighting, the fire
raged unchecked. By 11.20 p.m. it involved
"A", "B" and "C" Decks, and the promenade
and boat decks. The list slowly increased until
it reached 30 degrees, and it became obvious
that the vessel was doomed. Shortly after 1.46
a.m. on January 26th, the Empress of Canada
slowly heeled over, and came to rest in the
dock with only her starboard side showing
above the water.
An enquiry lasting from December 7th to
22nd, 1953, and from January 5th to 8th,
1954, was held by the Ministry of Transport
under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, into
the loss of the Empress of Canada. Mr K. S.
Carpmael, Q.C., Commissioner of Wrecks,
was assisted by Messrs. F. Dann, Ivor J. Gray,
FIGURE 5.4 The end of the Empress of Canada. Smoke is
still rising from the damaged hull.

W. J. Nutton and Lewis Parfitt as Assessors. Their report was published on March 13th, 1954, and
consisted, despite the length of the enquiry, of a mere eight pages. (The report on the loss of the
Noronic ran to no fewer than 99 pages, though the enquiry occupied about the same time.)
Dr J. B. Firth, Director of the Home Office Forensic Science Laboratory at Preston, was one of
the most important witnesses. He gave it as his opinion that the rapid spread of fire was due to (a)
delayed detection of the fire, and consequently delayed fire call; and (b) inadequate fire-prevention
and fire-fighting equipment aboard. On the question of the vulnerability to fire of the Empress class
of ship, Dr Firth said: "It is literally a honeycomb of very light timber-work, and it is extremely
susceptible to ignition with its gangways and staircases. These all point to rapid spread of fire." Had
a sprinkler system been installed in the cabin in which the fire started, it would (in the opinion of Dr
Firth) have at least held the fire until the brigade arrived. He urged that the installation of temporary
or mobile sprinklers for ships undergoing repairs should be considered.
As to the cause of the fire itself, Dr Firth said that it must have been preceded by a "nursery
build-up" such as a slow smouldering fire in one of the cabins; but he could give no certain origin.
The Chief Officer of the Bootle Fire Brigade., Mr A. J. Greenslade, after giving evidence of the
difficulties facing the fire-fighters, finished with the now celebrated remark:
"My opinion is that liners, particularly if they are of British design, are made to burn.
A fire officer never views a ship as a beautiful looking hotel. We view it from the point
that there would be no holding it if it gets away."
This statement, though perhaps tactless, was nevertheless true−though it was wrong to single out
British ships, and though it should have been qualified by a reference to the age of the vessel.
The truth is that practically every ship, of any nationality, built before the last war is appallingly
vulnerable to fire. As these older ships are retired to the scrap-yard, so the position should improve
until the stage is reached when all ships afloat conform to the International Safety Convention
Rules (see Chapter 8). Yet even then it will take a brave man to say that a fire disaster is no longer
possible aboard ship.
The official Report on the Empress of Canada loss also refers to the Report of the Working Party
on Fire Prevention and Fire Fighting in Ships in Port, 1950 (see Chapter 9). Mr Carpmael and his
Assessors, while acknowledging that the Working Party Report had no statutory sanction,
commented nevertheless that it deserved the closest study by all interests concerned". They
expressed regret that no attempt had been made to carry the recommendations of the Report into
effect as far as the Canadian Pacific Railway Company's ships running into Liverpool were
concerned, especially in the following respects:
1. No liaison existed between the owners and the fire brigade in relation to the ship.
2. Fire patrol frequency was below the recommended standard. Clock patrols operated only at
night; and at the time of the disaster, personal alarms (as for example, whistles) were not
supplied.
3. A direct telephone from ship to fire brigade was not installed.
4. The fire main was uncharged, and no alternatives had been provided.
5. Fire doors and watertight doors were not closed.
6. The cylinders of oxygen and acetylene being used by the workmen would not appear to have
been left about the ship as wisely disposed as would have been possible.
The Court also deplored the fact the fire was not reported to the fire brigade until 4.17, p.m.,
although it had first been noticed between 3.25 and 3.30 p.m.
Speculating on the origin of the fire, the Court came to the conclusion that clandestine smoking
was the most likely cause. Probably a still-burning cigarette-end had at some time been discarded in
a cabin within the range of B.39 to B.53. They found it difficult to explain the fact that the fire had
burnt undetected for so long a time, but stated: "It may be, however, that the patrolling, on a Sunday
afternoon particularly, was something less than effective; and that the ventilating system, plus false
deckheads and other factors, aided concealment until it was too late."

The Report concluded that: "In the opinion of the Court, it is apparent that even now the
seriousness of fire risk on board a vessel in the situation of the Empress of Canada is not fully
appreciated"; and the final paragraph emphasised the necessity for picking the right type of man for
patrolling and fire-watching duties. It says with emphasis that "the man in charge should be
someone accustomed to taking charge, and not someone whose normal duties are confined to
looking after baggage".
The "SEAWISE UNIVERSITY"—January 9th, 1972

The Seawise University, a ship of 82,998 tons, had registered dimensions of, length 965.0 feet,
breadth 118.0 feet, depth 74.5 feet, and was built in 1940 for the Cunard Steamship Company
Limited by Messrs. John Brown and Company Limited, Clydebank. She was then named the
Queen Elizabeth and was destined to have a brilliant war-time career ferrying the impedimenta of
war, including vast numbers of allied servicemen, to combat zones throughout the world. Four sets
of single reduction geared steam turbines fed from twelve boilers developed a total of 200,000
horsepower and her superior speed enabled her to sail unescorted almost without fear of being
caught by Hitler's 'U' Boats.
The vessel had thirteen decks named, starting at the top, Sports Deck, Sun Deck, Boat Deck,
Promenade or "P" Deck, Main Deck or "M" Deck, "A" Deck, "B" Deck, Restaurant or "R" Deck,
"C", "D", "E","F"and "G" Decks. "A" Deck was the uppermost continuous deck extending from
stem to stern, "R" Deck the "bulkhead deck", "E", "F" and "G" Decks were partial decks only at the
ends of the vessel. There were public rooms and cabins on all decks from the "Sun" Deck down to
"D" Deck and there was a gymnasium on "E" Deck aft. Below the accommodation there were
holds, baggage rooms, storerooms etc., at the ends of the vessel and deep tanks for oil fuel at the
sides of the ship in the way of the machinery spaces. There was a double-bottom for fuel oil, water
ballast and fresh water extending from the fore-peak bulkhead to the after-peak bulkhead. There
were fifteen main transverse watertight bulkheads extending to the underside of "R" Deck dividing
the ship into holds, baggage areas, stores and machinery spaces. Water-tight doors were fitted in the
bulkheads dividing the compartments of the machinery spaces and in addition there were
twenty-one water-tight doors in the bulkheads dividing up the passenger accommodation on "C"
Deck. There were four main stairways on the ship and within these "fireproof" (so-called)
enclosures were contained nine lift shafts. There were in addition a number of auxiliary and many
minor stairways. Above "R" Deck the ship was divided in eight Main Vertical Zones by "fireproof"
bulkheads each being generally in line with a water-tight bulkhead below. Where these bulkheads
were not in line, the joining deck was insulated to preserve the integrity of the zone.
The war over the Queen Elizabeth and her sister ship the Queen Mary, returned to their owners
original intention of passenger carrying between Southampton and New York but with the
accelerating development of air travel, the writing was "already on the wall" for these huge vessels.
In 1968 the Queen Elizabeth was sold to American interests and for two years was a considerable
tourist attraction in Miami, Florida.
Mr C. Y. Tung, a Hong Kong businessman who controls a group of very successful associated
companies which includes the Island Navigation Corporation Limited, a Company operating about
four million tons of cargo and passenger ships trading worldwide and owning a repair and
maintenance yard at Lai Chi Kok, became interested in an idea for a "floating university". This
concept was first mooted by the Secretary General of the United Nations, the underlying purpose of
which was, "to provide an environment in which students of many races might mingle in conditions
which would be especially conducive to the promotion of mutual dependence and co-operation." Mr
Tung decided that the Queen Elizabeth was the ideal vessel, concluded the purchase in September,
1970 and set up the "Seawise Foundation Limited" to operate her as the Seawise University. He
decided that the work of reclamation and conversion would be done in Hong Kong by his own
repair organisation. After the minimum work necessary for a single voyage had been carried out the
ship sailed from Port Everglades under the flag of the Bahamas for Hong Kong on the 10th

February, 1971. She arrived on the 15th July, 1971, after many trials and tribulations, including an
air race fire in No. 4 boiler room, and was anchored to the north of Kau Yi Chau Island. Later she
was moved to a berth approximately half a nautical mile from the oil installations on the eastern
side of Tsing Yi Island, one mile from Ywai Chung container berth and two miles north of Green
Island explosives depot. The distance from the main Island Navigation Company's office and also
from the Central Government Pier was about three nautical miles. These distances were to assume
great importance when fire subsequently ravaged the huge vessel.
Obviously a great deal of work was going to be entailed in order to bring the vessel up to an
acceptable standard of safety required for the contemplated service. Two Classification bodies;
Lloyd's Register of Shipping and the U.S. Coastguard, drew up the requirements which were
designed to comply with the standards set by the Safety of Life at Sea Convention, 1948,
(S.O.L.A.S.), as modified by the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, 1966,
(I.M.C.O.) now called the Intermantional Maritime Organization (IMO).
The quite massive workload involved in the re-construction quite obviously added up to a most
frightening fire risk! Thirteen decks of this huge vessel laid open to a large number of workmen —
sometimes as many as 2,000 — many of whom necessarily had to use gas for burning and
oxyacetylene welding; fire doors left open to facilitate ease of movement; some combustible
material awaiting removal (in spite of all efforts to keep this to a minimum); smoking being carried
out on a very large scale; all this, and much more, in a "dead" ship made the situation one of great
delicacy so far as fire was concerned. When this situation is compounded by the fact that the ship
lies at anchor with about three miles of open water between it and the fire fighting services, then it
is small wonder that disaster lay just round the corner!
Sunday the 9th January, 1972, dawned as a fine sunny day, cool and dry. The sea was moderate
and a 12 knot wind was north-westerly on the port bow at a slight angle. Thirty-two shell doors
were open in "A", "B" and "C" Decks, as were many portholes. Security Guards were in position as
usual at the "R" Deck Main Square shell doors and the regular shift of four fire-fighters, fire
patrolmen and guards had come on duty at 8.00 a.m.
The work on board the vessel was far advanced — the ship was due to go on sea trials a week
later — but there was some hot work still going on at various points and the number of welders on
FIGURE 5.5 The Seawise University (ex Queen Elizabeth) taken just before she sank in Hong Kong harbour.
Hong Kong Fire Brigade Photograph

board at the time is estimated as being sixty. However, the Report of the Marine Court indicates
that there is no evidence to show that any of this "hot-work" was taking place in any area associated
with any of the fire outbreaks.
Three cabin boys who had been sweeping up rubbish on "M" Deck, first discovered smoke in the
area of the rubbish pile which they had previously left at a point in a cross-alley adjacent to an open
shell door on the port side of "B" Deck. Closer examination revealed very small flames burning on
this pile of rubbish but instead of tackling the incident they ran forward about 100 yards along the
alleyway shouting "fire". Here they met a special fire patrol party under the ship's fire officer. The
time was in the region of 11.20 to 11.25 a.m. One of the party ran to report to the Duty Officer who
announced over the Public Address System the fact that fire had broken out aft on "A"
Deck,−actually the point of origin was on "B" Deck. He then called all firemen and patrolmen to go
to the scene of the fire and called the engine-room staff to increase pressure on the fire main.
Immediately after making the announcement in Mandarin it was repeated in Cantonese but just after
this the Public Address System went dead.
At this stage Commodore Chen Ching-yien, who was presiding over a meeting in the Main
Restaurant, went up the main stairway to the locus of the call and discovered that there was thick
smoke at "A" Deck in the port alleyway and the fire situation appeared to be of a serious nature. In
accordance with Standing Orders he set up his Fire Control Centre in the "A" Deck office, but in
this huge complex vessel the communication problem he faced because of the failure of the Public
Address System can well be visualised. Inevitably there must have been a good deal of confusion
and this was certainly not helped when in quick succession two other fires were reported, one on the
Sun Deck and one aft on "B" Deck.
Some difficulties were experienced in getting through to the Fire Brigade on the 999 telephone
system and it was not until 11.52 a.m. that they received the call to the Seawise University.
Immediately three fireboats, Fireboats Nos. 1 and 2 and Fireboat the Alexander Grantham were
ordered to the scene. It is now that the three miles of water between the fireboats' station and the
Seawise University became of crucial importance! Fireboat No. 1 reached the scene at about 12.27
p.m., closely followed by the Alexander Grantham. But the fires had now been burning for an hour
or so and in such a huge vessel, with wide open corridors and stairways, the spread of flames,
coupled with the tremendous smoke-logging which must have taken place, made the task of the
Hong Kong Fire Brigade one of daunting difficulty. Getting to grips with such a widespread fire
situation in such complex surroundings presents difficulties which are almost impossible for laymen
to understand! Huge alleyways completely filled with choking black smoke reduce visibility to nil.
Heat in the form of flames and hot gasses rise up the open stairways down which the fire-fighters
must pass if they are to get to grips with the seat of the blaze. The great distances to be covered
mitigate against the normal duration of the breathing apparatus, and the sheer logistics of providing
a sufficient number of spare cylinders and facilities for re-charging them after use assume
impossible proportions when the fire is being fought so far from land bases.
By the time the Director of the Hong Kong Fire Services, Mr A. E. H. Wood, reached the
Seawise University at about 1.45 p.m. the situation on board must have been quite desperate. Even
before the first fireboat reached the scene Mr Worrallo, Assistant Chief Fire Officer, Hong Kong
Island, had circled the Seawise University in a helicopter at about 12. 10 p.m. and had seen smoke
pouring from the superstructure for half the length of the ship from the stern and had decided that
the situation was so serious that he sent out a "disaster alarm". This then can be taken as a measure
of the size of the problem facing the professional fire-fighters at the time of their arrival!
There is no doubt that the ship's small fire-fighting team did their best under very difficult
circumstances and indeed there is some evidence to suggest that the fires at 110 frame on "A" Deck
level were eventually wholly extinguished, both in the cross-alley and adjacent stairway.
Unfortunately the two other fires (at least) do not appear to have been tackled with the same
resolution and this is understandable in the light of the prevailing confusion brought about by the
communications failure and the very considerable effort required to get non-essential persons off the
ship to safety. A daunting task for Commodore Chen Ching-yien in the light of all the

circumstances. These other fires were allowed, simply because of the fact that there were not
enough trained personnel available, to get out of hand and it is easy to see how much they must have
spread in the hour or so before the arrival of the Hong Kong Fire Brigade.
Because of stability problems all fire-fighting ceased at 3.28 p.m. and all personnel were
withdrawn. Thereafter the fire raged unabated from stem to stern. The fireboat monitors continued
to play on the blazing superstructure and by 4.28 p.m. she was listing about 17o. All operations
ceased at about 7.00 p.m. and at noon the following day−10th January−the great vessel slowly rolled
over and came to rest at an angle of about 50o in some forty-three feet of water with her starboard
bilge buried deeply in the mud. Thereafter she continued to burn fiercely throughout the evening
and the night. The fire eventually burned itself out on the 11th January and all this time the Fire
Service was in attendance.
Under "The Merchant Shipping Ordinance (Chapter 281 of the Laws of Hong Kong)" a formal
investigation, which sat on 38 days between the 8th February and 4th April, 1972, was conducted in
Hong Kong before Mr Justice A. M. McMullin, assisted by Mr John Robson, M.B.E., B.Sc.,
F.R.I.N.A., C.ENG., and Captain John d'Oyly Green, R.N.R. (Retired), to enquire into the casualty
of the Seawise University. A most excellent Report dated 29th June, 1972, was produced and
should certainly be closely studied by anyone wishing to carry out a similar exercise of converting
one of these huge vessels in the future. The "General Conclusions" and "Recommendations"
contained in the Report are as follows: -
General Conclusions
168. As stated above this Court is satisfied that there were at least three major sites of fire, all of
them occurring within minutes of each other and there may have been other independent sites as
well. While there is no direct and conclusive evidence on the matter, the Court is also satisfied that
by far the most likely cause of the fire was a series of deliberate acts by a person or persons
unknown. Conducing to this view−to which we have come with reluctance and after a most serious
weighing of evidence−are the following factors:
(a) The number and size of the independent outbreaks. The speed with which each gained
ground and became uncontrollable denotes an initial outbreak of considerable size and of
great immediate spread, indicating the possibility of the use of some highly inflammable
reagent; once firmly alight in several places, of course, the immensely rapid spread was due
principally to the readily inflammable miles of seasoned timber, panelling and furniture,
with the plentiful supply of air through the long open corridors and with the huge open
squares acting as chimneys.
(b) The outbreak occurred when virtually all the workmen had withdrawn for lunch either in the
Restaurant or ashore, when most of the areas initially affected could reasonably be expected
to be, and to a large extent were, free of human traffic. The mere timing of the outbreaks is,
therefore, in itself, significant.
169. We would eliminate such causes as welding and cigarette smoking. The evidence shows that
the precautions prevailing on board the ship in relation to both these hazards were adequate. As to
the first of them the Court is satisfied that there is no evidence that welding was the cause of any
fire. In the first place no welding work was being done near to any of the areas in which fire or a
strong concentration of smoke indicating fire, was first observed. Secondly, the places where
welding was going on had been visited by numbers of persons including the Commodore, Mr Poon,
Professor Sung Howe and other senior officers up to and after 10.55 a.m., the time when the
welders went off duty, and nothing amiss was observed. Thirdly, so far from it being the case that
there was a last feverish endeavour to get the bulk of welding work done, the situation was that the
major welding work was already finished and the welding force had run-down to less than a third of
what it had been at the height of the operation. Fourthly, of the thirty-odd fires which had broken
out aboard the Seawise, prior to the 9th of January, the majority had been caused by welding or
hot-work and each of these had been adequately dealt with.

170. We are satisfied that fire watchers were employed and efficiently deployed in the course of
renovations. In any case the odds against three independent serious welding fires breaking out in
localities considerably distant from each other are so high as not to be worth consideration.
171. The same observation applies, a fortiori, in relation to the second most prolific cause of such
fires viz: cigarette smoking. Indeed the possibility of three separate major fires breaking out at
approximately the same time as a result of any common cause of a purely accidental or negligent
nature or even a combination of such causes, is obviously a very remote one.
172. There had been no evidence that any of the outbreaks observed on the Seawise can have been
due to faulty electrical wiring and we think that this is a possibility which requires no further
discussion.
173. The Court has been impelled to what may seem a somewhat dramatic and disturbing
conclusion. It has made no attempt to assign blame for any criminal act nor has it sought to
determine the identity of the person or persons who, if we are right, must be responsible for the
casualty. There is nothing in the evidence which could fairly be said to support even speculation in
the matter, nor do we believe that the pursuit of any line of inquiry in the present forum, beyond
those actually pursued before us, could have resulted in more than the promotion of speculation.
174. In this connection it may be well to mention, for the sake of completeness, that in the course
of the inquiry we received one anonymous letter purporting to identify a named individual as the
begetter of the scheme to destroy the ship. This letter, we understand, has been investigated by the
Police and we wish only to say that the form and tenor of it were such that we felt obliged to
disregard it wholly and that it has played no part whatsoever in the conclusion to which we have
come. As for that conclusion it will, no doubt, be a matter for the relevant authorities to consider
what, if any, further investigations are advisable.
175. We have had occasion to make a number of criticisms of various aspects of the organisation,
but in the final analysis all such criticisms remain academic. Even if everything had been on the
scale and according to the more stringent prescriptions which the Court believes to have been
necessary to control any emergency of reasonably foreseeable character and size, it is the conclusion
of the Court, in the circumstances as they occurred and in view of the extraordinary extent and
nature of the outbreak, that the Seawise would not have been saved from total destruction by fire.
176. As to her capsizing, while it is true that the major cause of that was the inflow of water
through the open shell doors, yet had they been closed and had fire-fighting with hoses continued
FIGURE 5.6 Fire on the Greek ferry Heleanna killed 25 passengers and crew.

from the outside, such external operations, by then the only possible operations, would not have
succeeded in extinguishing the fire. Had they continued, it is reasonable to assume that her list,
which was substantial at the time that the shell door sills went under, would have continued to
increase, and it is not possible to say that she would not have capsized before she burned out. While
therefore the leaving open of the shell doors was clearly a mistake, and one which made her
capsizing inevitable, it does not necessarily follow that, had they not been open, her final position
would have been any better, but there is a possibility that it might have been.
Recommendations
177. This Court finds itself in substantial agreement with the recommendations made by the
Commissioners of the "Jumbo" Inquiry, concerning the tidying of the present legislative tangle. The
inadequacies of the present situation are admirably dealt with in paragraphs 96 to 101 of that
Report. Of the alternative recommendations put forwards, the Court favours the suggestion that the
Director of Marine be given overall control of such operations as relate to the repair, renovation and
refitting of shipping in the harbour. There is already in existence a Code of Safe Practice for the
Shipbreaking Industry; a copy of this Code was given as a precautionary measure, together with the
contingency plan, to Captain Lam. It is a detailed Code but most of its provisions were of no direct
relevance to the operations going on board the Seawise. We have, however, been informed by Mr
Alexander, that a working party comprising private interests and Government Departments was
formed in October, 1971, for the purpose of drawing up a complementary code in respect of the
shipbuilding and shiprepair industries. We understand this Code is not yet in existence. The
existing Code for the shipbreaking industry and the projected Code for the shiprepair industry are
intended for the guidance of shipowners, masters etc. They are not themselves enforceable as
legislative provisions. 178. Strict compliance with any such Code could, however, be made a
condition of the issue of a "dead" ship permit. Not knowing the terms of the proposed Code, the
Court is, of course, unable to say how effective such a condition might be.
179. If the Director of Marine is to be made responsible for the manner of carrying on ship repair
activities the overhaul of the legislation may require some time and it will certainly require
considerable thought. As we have seen there are three Ordinances and three Departments with
dubious and over-lapping areas of responsibility. If effective control is to be given in this respect to
FIGURE 5.7 Destruction in a ship's hold following explosion and fire involving drums of calcium hypochlorite.

the Director of Marine, it may require not merely the setting up of an Industrial Safety Division
within the Marine Department, as was suggested by the Commissioners in the "Jumbo" Inquiry, but
possibly also the provision of an additional special Advisory Unit within that Division to deal with
the prevention and detection of fires aboard ships. The Court can also foresee that the delimiting of
the zones of responsibility between the three Departments, to which reference has been made in this
Report, may be a matter of some complexity.
180. Meanwhile, to avoid delay, it is suggested that a satisfactory interim solution might be found
by a simple amendment to the Merchant Shipping (Control of Ports) Regulations (Cap. 281 of the
Laws of Hong Kong) providing that no repairs should be undertaken upon any ship without the
Director's permission. The first part of this new provision could be achieved simply by deleting the
words which follow the word "secured" in the penultimate line of Sub-Regulation 4 of Regulation 5
so that the Sub-Regulation would then read as follows:
"(4) Except with the prior permission of the Director, no dead ship shall be anchored, moored or
secured at any place within the waters of the Colony nor, except with such permission, shall any
repairs be undertaken upon any ship that is so anchored, moored or secured."
The remaining provisions of Regulation 5 could then be left as they are, although it would no
doubt be advisable to add a penalty clause to cover the failure to apply for the Director's permission.
It would then be the duty of the Owner or Agent or Master of any vessel, whenever repairs of any
kind were to be carried out aboard, and subject to penalty for failure to do so, to apply, for such
permit to the Director who would issue it upon such conditions as he saw fit. The conditions to be
imposed would, of course, be directly geared to the size of the works to be undertaken. It would be
open to the Director in minor cases to impose no conditions at all, or, at the other end of the scale,
to impose serious and drastic conditions of the sort which we think might have been imposed in the
present case. It should be stressed, finally, that if such an interim measure were introduced, it would
be highly advisable for the Director and his officers to consult with the other departments primarily
concerned, in particular the Fire Services Department and the Labour Department, in working out
the conditions to be imposed.
181. Thought might also be given to amending the present definition of a "dead" ship in such a
way as to increase the Director of Marine's powers in relation thereto by:
(a) giving him power to declare a ship dead whether the owners approve or not;
(b) providing that a ship should be capable, not merely of being effectively propelled but also of
being effectively manoeuvred within the time limit;
and
(c) by giving the Director a discretion in relation to this time limit: something on the following
lines is very tentatively suggested:−
"The expression "dead ship" means a ship that, in the judgement of the Director of Marine,
is unable to be effectively propelled and manoeuvred within twenty-hours notice or within
such lesser time as the Director shall in any given case appoint."
The "BETELGEUSE" Fire — January 8th 1979

Owned and operated by the French Oil Company, Total, the French Government holding a
majority stake, the Betelgeuse, a crude oil tanker of 61,776 grt was built by Chantlers de
l'Atlantique, St. Nazaire in 1968. Port of Registry was Le Harve and she was classified by Bureau
Veritas, Paris. Carrying 75,000 metric tonnes of Arabian Heavy crude and 40,000 metric tonnes of
Arabian Light crude, the tanker left Ras Tanura, Saudi Arabia, on 24 November, 1978 bound for
Leixoes, in Portugal. Originally the intention was to call first at Sines, south of Lisbon , in order to
lighten ship but the weather was too rough for her to enter harbour. Then fate took a hand when she
found that a ship had sunk at the entrance to Leixoes harbour denying access to that port. She was
then instructed to sail for Whiddy Island, situated in Bantry Bay, County Cork, Ireland, where an oil
terminal was operated by Gulf Oil Terminal (Ireland) Ltd. Arriving at Bantry on 4 January 1979,

FIGURE 5.8 Map of Bantry Bay and environs showing the Gulf Oil Terminal on Whiddy Island
and the offshore jetty at which the Betelguese was moored.
she tied up port side to the north berth at the offshore jetty at 2000 hours on Saturday 6 January.
This jetty had no surface connection with the shore, which was some 396 metres away.
In the early hours of 8 January the vessel suddenly and quite without warning, broke in two by
way of the No. 4 permanent ballast tanks. It is estimated that some 15,000 tons of crude oil was
released and a catastrophic fire almost immediately engulfed both the ship and the jetty. Sadly, the
43 persons on the tanker, including the wife of a crew member and two visitors to the ship, along
with the 7 Gulf Oil employees on the jetty, all died in the fire. A measure of the suddenness and the
overwhelming nature of the fire can be gauged by the fact that no one piece of fire fighting
equipment, either on the vessel or the jetty, was operated.

Government Inquiry
Under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) (Amendement) Act, 1979, the Irish Government
appointed a tribunal, whose sole member was the Honourable Mr Justice Declan Costello, to
conduct an inquiry and produce a report into the tragedy. He was assisted by
Dr Hugh Kenneth Black, BSc PhD Scientific Consultant; Captain Donald George Hindle, Master
mariner; Mr Gerrard Van Zoon, Chief Engineer and Mr Jens Theodor Wilse, Naval Architect,
Senior Principal Surveyor, Det Norske Veritas. The tribunal produced a most comprehensive and
excellently prepared report titled " Report on the Disaster at Whiddy Island, Bantry, Co. Cork on 8th
January 1979." In spite of the fact that in part the author is somewhat critical of a part of the
findings he would nevertheless recommend that all students of shipboard fire and especially
surveyors responsible for the issue of safety certificates under SOLAS regulations, and thus upon
whose shoulders rest the safety of all persons who sail, would make this Report compulsory reading.
The Report, almost 500 pages long, is thoroughly well prepared and presented along with excellent
plans and photographs. The author has reproduced some of these as well as a number of
photographs taken during his own investigation. There are so many lessons to be learned from this
disaster and the sheer horror of the fire, coupled with the fact that it was completely avoidable, will
be horribly apparent to the reader.
History of Vessel
From the time of building in 1968 the Betelgeuse was classified by Bureau Veritas. The first
Hull Special Survey was carried out at St. Nazaire in November 1972. The second Special Survey
at Singapore in May/June 1977. She also underwent an Annual Hull Survey at Leixoes in June
1978. But it was the Special Survey carried out in dry-dock at the Sembawang Shipyard, Singapore,
which holds the key to the eventual tragedy which was to happen some six months later! Serious
corrosion of steelwork was observed and recorded as follows:
"General corrosion was found in all the cargo and deep tanks. However corrosion was in
advanced state in both fore deep tanks, No 1 port cargo tank, No 2 port and starboard cargo tanks,
No 4 port and starboard ballast tanks, No 4 port and starboard cargo tanks and No 5 port and
starboard cargo tanks and No 6 port and starboard cargo tanks and necessary repairs were carried
out by plate or section renewals as the case may be."
Certainly, repairs were carried before the tanker left Singapore but the fact that she broke in two
so soon after must call into question the standard of the repairs because examination after the fire
revealed advanced deterioration of much of the steelwork.
Layout of Terminal
The Whiddy Oil Terminal layout was and still is basically, in accordance with Figures 5.8, 5.9
and 5.10 but because the fire did not affect the Island itself the description here will concentrate on
the offshore jetty. An 8 inch fire main, fed by three 1,000 g.p.m. diesel pumps developing 250 lbs
per sq inch, was laid from the pump house at Ascon Jetty underwater to feed a 6 inch ring main on
the centre platform and two six inch legs leading to Dolphins 1 and 22. On the centre platform itself
the main followed a square and was suspended under the top deck of the platform. There were four
hydrants on the centre platform and three on each of the eastern and western catwalks, each having
four 2½ inch (65 mm) deliveries.
At the extreme end of Dolphins 1 and 22 there were six-point pump-in manifolds into which the
fire fighting tugs could charge the fire main in a like manner to the main pumping station at Ascon
Jetty. Also fitted here was a 100-gallon foam tank fitted with in-built in-line inductors whereby the
main could be supplied with foam. Hose and FB10 branches were supplied at both stations.
The lower deck of the central platform was protected by means of a 1,500 gallon (6,819 l)
pre-mix foam system having 24 distribution heads. The system was designed to be automatic and
had a fusible link drop-weight system connected to a battery of four 50 lb (22.7 kg) carbon dioxide
cylinders which, when pierced, would discharge the foam so as to cover the lower deck of the

FIGURE 5.9 Plan showing the layout of the tank farm and the control buildings on Whiddy Island.
Also shows the route of submarine pipelines to the offshore jetty.
FIGURE 5.10 Plan and elevation of offshore jetty including loading platform and
Dolphins 1 and 22 along with plan of system of Chiksans.

platform to a depth of 1½-2 inch (40-50 mm).

The upper deck which housed all the operating compartments, including the main control room,
was protected by four foam monitors. Two of these were mounted on top of the Chicksan towers at
the north-eastern and south-western corners of the platform at a height of 55 feet (16.8 m) above the
deck level. Theses two monitors were designed to deliver finished foam at a rate of 5,000 gallons
per minute (22,730 l). The other two monitors were mounted on steel towers some 10 feet (3 m)
high and delivered 1,840 gallons (8,365 l) of finished foam per minute. The four monitors were
served by three 1,200 gallon (5,455 l) tanks of concentrate. The three tanks could be coupled
together so that the entire output of 3,600 gallons (16,365 l) of foam could be supplied to any single
monitor, or any other desirable combination. The output from all the foam monitors was designed
to be remotely operated direct from the control room by means of a nitrogen powered pressurised
system. But both slewing and elevation had to be carried out manually by a mechanical process at
the base of each tower.
A water curtain system was provided at each of the two berthing faces designed to provide a
cooling curtain between the jetty and visiting tankers. Additionally, there was a drenching system to
protect the Chicksan tower steel structures and also to provide protection for the access stairways to
the two Chicksan operating rooms and the major monitors on top of the tower units. The three
outward faces of each tower structure were protected by three risers servicing a number of multiple
spray heads at various levels.
There were adequate supplies of self-contained breathing apparatus, including 10-minute escape
sets, aluminium fire proximity suits, first aid kits, stretchers, fire hose, foam branches and portable
extinguishers, which were well up to international standards. There was on Whiddy Island a fire
training ground at which live training could be carried out including simulating cross fires, ring
fires, running fires and large crude spill fires. The Report concluded that all Gulf Oil personnel
were well trained both in fire fighting and fire prevention techniques.
The Start of the Fire

Mr John Connolly, the dispatcher, was alone on duty in the control room on the night of the fire
and his graphic description of the start of the incident which he gave during his testimony makes
interesting reading:
" I was sitting on my high chair at the radio desk looking towards the jetty and I heard what I call
creaking noise. I thought at the start that it must have come from the Chicksan arms but then all of a
sudden I realised that we were in danger because this creaking was followed immediately by a noisy
cracking noise and immediately I could see the bow of the ship go up in the air and at the same time
a small fire appeared at the water edge alongside the ship. In a very short time this fire got out of all
proportions...."
The fire spread with tremendous speed and the prevailing wind carried the burning oil in an
easterly direction which carried it along the port side of the tanker and beneath the jetty in the
direction of the Dolphin 22. The fact that not a single piece of fire equipment, either on the ship or
on the jetty, was brought to bear on the fire is proof positive that this fire was catastrophic from
within a very short time of the breaking of the tanker. It has been estimated that some 15,000
tonnes of crude oil were involved in the first stage of the fire. Present on the ship and the jetty were
men of action all of whom had received fire training and it is inconceivable that not a single piece of
fire fighting equipment had been got to work if such action had been possible. To have tackled this
fire immediately, even in order to save their own lives, would have been a natural action. Then
there is the fact that all the Gulf Oil victims who were on the jetty at the time, along with a few
members of the ship's crew who managed to bet off the tanker, ran eastwards and downwind
towards Dolphin 22. Eleven bodies were recovered from on or beneath this Dolphin and all had
suffered severe explosive forces and burning injuries. An attempt had been made to escape from
Dolphin 22 by means of an inflatable raft which was found floating off the end of the jetty but,
perhaps because of the effect of an explosion nobody had boarded this craft. Yet, even after the fire

FIGURE 5.11 The Betelguese lying at the offshore jetty taken at mid-day on January 8, 1979. Note the absence of
fire damage on the bow section and at Dolphin 1.
was extinguished most of the walkway running form the level of the central platform to Dolphin 1
was quite untouched by fire. Then why did those men on the the jetty not run to the west rather than
the east? Most, if not all, had been sailors and no breed of men better understand the effects of
wind direction and if only by instinct its effect in a fire situation, and surely if only it had been
possible, they would have run upwind towards the safety of Dolphin 1. The author who incidentally
appeared at the Tribunal as an expert witness on behalf of Gulf Oil, is in no doubt whatsoever that
the fire simply overwhelmed those unfortunate enough to be present and sadly there was absolutely
nothing they could have done to save their lives.
The Report severely criticises the operating company for not having fire fighting tugs in close
proximity to the jetty and whilst it must be said that this is valid, the author is convinced that the
physical scale and speed of development of this incident was such that not even a flotilla of fire tugs
could have managed to control the fire in time to have saved any of the victims. The Gulf "Policy
and Procedures" Manual provided that "Two tugs were to be on 24-hour stand-by duty when a
tanker of the size of the "Betelgeuse" was berthed at the jetty and to be available immediately in the
event of an emergency." In point of fact on the night of the disaster one tug only was manned and
on stand-by duty. It was moored to a buoy east of Whiddy Point East, a distance of about 2.8 miles
(4.5 km) from the jetty and out of sight of it and any tanker berthed there. Laymen might not
understand that for a tug to release itself from its mooring takes a few minutes and by the time it
was possible to commence physical fire fighting it would in these circumstances — fairly strong
wind, fire under the jetty and right round the after part of the tanker — it would have been too late.
Even if two stand-by tugs had been moored nearby and manned by the best trained crews this fire
could not have bee controlled in less than 30 or 40 minutes. Realistically, and only if everything
went pretty well according to plan it would have taken hours rather than minutes. Certainly it
would have been possible for a rescue craft to approach the bow of the tanker and remove any
persons standing there because this was upwind and even after the fire was out, this area was

virtually unaffected forward of the manifold area (Figures 5.10, 5.11 and 5.20). But not a single
member of the crew managed to get along the deck to this safe haven. Hardly surprising when one
considers that the tanker had broken in two and a sea of fire lay between the after and forward end
of the ship!
It is clear that two explosions occurred, the first was relatively small and affected the area of the
permanent ballast tanks which must have taken place at an early stage of the fire. The second was a
massive explosion which took place simultaneously in the No 6 centre tank and in all three of the
No 5 tanks. This explosion occurred between 0106-0108 hours.
Responsibility for the Disaster

The Tribunal allocated blame between the ship and the terminal as follows (Chapter 21):
21.1.1 Total's responsibility

The Tribunal has found that the initiating event of the disaster was the buckling of the ship's structure in a
way of the permanent ballast tanks; that this was immediately followed by explosions in the permanent
ballast tanks and the breaking of the ship's back. The ship thereafter was a total loss. These events were
produced as a result of a conjunction of two separate factors; a seriously weakened hull due to inadequate
maintenance, and an excessive stress due to incorrect ballasting on the night of the disaster.
The seriously weakened hull was the result of conscious and deliberate decisions take at different times by
the management of Total. In particular, deliberate decisions were taken not to renew certain of the
longitudinal and not to renew the ship's cathodic protection at the time of it's last major dry-dock at
Singapore in the summer of 1977. Neither the Master nor the Chief Officer of the ship could have been
aware, on the night of the disaster, how seriously weakened the vessel was. They, however, were
responsible for the manner in which ballasting was carried out. Had the vessel been properly maintained,
it is probable that the structure of the vessel would not have failed. But decisions were taken which
resulted in very large stresses being placed on the centre of the ship and they should have been aware that
a potentially dangerous sagging condition could result. However, had Total supplied the ship with
loadicator or similar instrument for calculating stresses, it would have been immediately apparent that the
programme which was adopted would have produced a bending moment considerably in excess of the
permitted one. As it is highly improbable that the Master and Chief Officer would have failed to use a
loadicator had one been available, and as the ship would probably have been able to withstand the stresses
of a ballasting arrangement which it would indicate as appropriate, the absence of a loadicator contributed
considerably to the error that was made. The major share of the responsibility for the loss of the ship must,
therefore, lie on the management of Total.
21.1.2 The vessel had no inert gas system. Had such a system been installed then all the ullage spaces in the tanks
which contained the Arabian Light crude would have contained non-combustible gases, and after the
discharge of the Arabian Heavy crude, the empty tanks i.e. Nos. 1 and 6 across and Nos. 2 to 5 centre
tanks - would have been inerted before ballasting began. Repairs to the port PBT had been carried out in
Jeddah, but it is likely that the PBT would have been inerted once those repairs had been completed. Thus
all the tanks would have contained non-combustible gases when the initial buckling process began.
The inerting process introduces into the tanks gases which are low in oxygen. The buckling process would
have resulted in the creation of vents in the side plating and, undoubtedly, it is possible that the gases in
the PBT's could have entered into the flammable range as as result of the ingress of air from the outside
atmosphere. As the buckling process continued, incendive sparks could have resulted in explosions in
these tanks. Thus, it cannot be said with any certainty that an inerting system would have avoided the
explosions which followed the initial buckling, and it cannot be said that the rupture of the bottom plating
would not have occurred or that oil would not have spilled out into the sea, had the tanks been inerted.
It is, however, reasonably clear that the disaster would have been of much smaller dimensions had the
tanks been inerted. The disaster was accompanied by a series of explosions into the atmosphere and a
major explosion in way of the No. 6 tanks — in particular the major explosion at 01.06-01.08 hours.
These explosions might have been minimised or, indeed, might have been entirely avoided had the tanks
contained non-flammable gases. It is, indeed, quite possible that the spread of fire might have been
sufficiently contained so as to permit the rescue of both jetty crew and the personnel on board the ship.
Certainly, the absence of an inerting system made much more likely a disaster of the enormous dimensions
which, in fact, occurred.

FIGURE 5.12 The mid-section looking forward. The paintwork on deck and under the manifold is undamaged.
FIGURE 5.13 The initial and final positions of Betelguese after her deck had
buckled and she had suffered two explosions.

21.1.3 The initial failure of the ship's structure, for which Total was responsible, was only the first of a series of
events which subsequently developed into a disaster of enormous proportions, causing the loss of fifty
lives and damage to, and loss of, property on a major scale. Certain of the Tribunal's conclusions bear
directly on the the responsibility for what happened after the ship initially broke it's back — these will be
considered in subsequent paragraphs.
21.2.1 Gulf's responsibility
As appears earlier in the Report, the Tribunal has concluded

(a) that the dispatcher on duty at Gulf Control was absent from the Control Room when the disaster
commenced;
(b) that the stand-by tug was not moored where it should have been;
(c) that Gulf failed to provide suitable escape craft for evacuation in an emergency; and
(d) that Gulf had been wrong in dismantling disembarkation facilities from Dolphin 1 and the automatic
pressurisation of the fire-mains.
The effect of these facts on the development of the disaster will now be considered.
(a) The consequences of the absence of the dispatcher from the Control Room
The initiation of the disaster was not seen by the dispatcher in the Control Room at the terminal. It is
reasonably probable that had it been so observed, the lives of both the jetty crew and of those on board the
ship would have been saved.
The disaster began shortly after 00.30 hours. The initiating event caused the hull to collapse and a fire to
burn on the water not far forward of the ship's manifold. In it's early stages the fire was not of large
proportions, although considerable quantities of smoke were emitted from it. During this first phase,
which lasted for about ten minutes, the fire was growing in intensity, but it remained localised at a point in
the centre of the ship. At 00.40 hours the fire spread on both sides of the ship. The initial hull failure had
caused large quantities of oil to pour out into the sea. The vapours from these became ignited and the fire
spread under the centre platform and the catwalk of the jetty. At 00.50 hours approximately, the flames
from the fire on the sea had not reached the height of the catwalk, nor Dolphin 22; and the fire remained
localised at the centre of the ship. A few minutes later, however, a dramatic increase in the intensity and
size of the fire occurred and the whole of the jetty became enveloped in flames.
It is reasonable to assume that, had the fire been observed at 00.31-00.32 hours, immediate assistance
would have been summoned. Both the Donemark and the Snave were at the Ascon Jetty. It would not
have taken them more than two minutes to leave Ascon harbour and both could have travelled to the jetty
within about seven minutes. Certainly, by 00.40 hours both boats could have been close to the ship and
Dolphin 22. The situation was, of course, fraught with danger, but the fire on the ship at that time was
confined amidships, and the fire on the sea did not reach Dolphin 22 and envelop it until a little after 00.50
hours. Thus, there would have been two boats available, for a period of about ten minutes, to take the jetty
crew off Dolphin 22, together with any members of the ship's crew who had reached it. In addition, both
boats would have been available to pick up members of the ship's crew who were unable to reach Dolphin
22 and who could have jumped overboard or climbed down ladder or ropes.
The explosion which accompanied the initiating event was forward of the personnel building in which the
jetty crew, with possible exceptions, would have been when the disaster commenced. The exceptions were
the PPO who would have been on Dolphin 22 and, perhaps, the PCO who might have been on the ship.
The personnel building did not suffer any explosion damage, and it can be assumed that the initiating event
did not result in the death of any member of the jetty crew. The ship's crew would have been distributed in
the poop accommodation, the engine room and the cargo control room well away from the he point of the
explosions in the permanent ballast tanks. It is possible that a member of the crew was on duty close to the
manifold, but the explosions did not damage the deck manifold, and he would have escaped the
consequences of the initiating event. All of the fifty persons comprising the jetty crew, the ship's crew and
others would probably have been alive at the time when the two boats from the Ascon Jetty could have
reached the scene of the disaster. The two boats were capable of rescuing that number of people in the
time available to them.
It is to be borne in the mind that the rescue operations would have augmented by the considerable
assistance of the tug from about 00.50 hours onwards. It would have taken something in the region of 20
minutes, form the time of alert, for the tug to reach Dolphin 22. Even assuming that the major expansion

FIGURE 5.14 Trailer-mounted foam gun at SW corner FIGURE 5.15 Hydrant at the NE corner of upper deck.
of upper deck. Three of the four inlets have hose No hose attached.
couplings attached.
FIGURE 5.16 Hydrant at the NW corner of upper deck. FIGURE 5.17 Close-up view of area of missing
Fog nozzle attached. walkway and badly distorted steel access ladder at the
west end of the central platform. Note the spalled
concrete and general damage.
FIGURE 5.18 Looking east to the breasting dolphin FIGURE 5.19 General view taken looking west from
and to Dolphin 22. The entire walkway has been the top of the NE Chicksan tower.
destroyed.

of the fire had occurred before the tug Bantry Bay reached the ship and the jetty, it's fire-fighting
equipment would have been of immense help in rescuing anyone who had not already got aboard the
Donemark or the Snave. It was equipped with both foam monitors and water hydrants, and it's presence
would have added significantly to the chances of rescue, by retarding the progress of the fire and shielding
survivors from some of the heat.
Thus, even if no attempt to contain the fire was made, it seems probable that rescue could have been
effected. But had the fire-mains been pressurised, (as they would have been immediately the dispatcher
saw the fire) and had it been known that rescue was on the way, and had proper co-ordination of the rescue
been possible, then it is likely that some effort to fight the fire from the jetty would have been made. After
a very short internal the smoke and fumes from the fire, in way of the ship's manifold, would have made it
impossible to fight the fire from the he centre platform. It is probable that the jetty crew were forced to
evacuate the centre platform without first taking with them the self-contained breathing apparatus which
was available, and that they could not go back to obtain it. But there were three fire-hydrants on each of
the catwalks on either side of the centre platform, and one each breasting dolphin there was a fixed foam
concentrate tank, with in-built line and inductor close to the hydrants, so that foam-throwing capacity on
the breasting dolphins existed. The position of the fire on the ship was such that an attempt to fight the fire
form the breasting dolphins might have been made, and would have been possible had the mains been
pressurised. This would have helped to contain the spread of the fire and would have facilitated the rescue
operations.
(b) The consequences of the absence of a stand-by tug from the proximity of the jetty
The Bantry Bay, the stand-by tug on duty on the night of the disaster, was equipped with two pumps each
with a capacity of 900 gallon(4,091 l) per minute and a pressure of 200 psi. It had four elevated monitors,
the topmost of which was of "superjet" capacity 5,000 gallons (22,730 l) per minute whilst the other three
had a capacity of 1,849 gallons (8364 l) per minute. It carried 5,400 gallons (24,548 l) of standard protein
foam concentrate.
Gulf's "Policy and Procedures" Manual required that when a tanker was berthed a tug should be
"immediately" available to assist in fire-fighting. Because of a decision taken in 1969 this requirement in
it's Manual became impossible of fulfilment. The " Bantry Bay" was moored 2.8 miles (4.5 km) away
from the jetty, and at a point around Whiddy Point East, so that it was out of sight of the jetty and any ship
berthed there, and was not available to fight a fire at the jetty for about 20 minutes from the time it was
alerted. Apart from Gulf's own requirements, proper regard for the safety of life and property required that
the stand-by tug should have been much closer to the jetty and in sight of it. Evidence (which the Tribunal
finds acceptable) established that a mooring position for a stand-by tug could have been obtained which
would have meant that, by slipping it's anchor or mooring, it could have been at the scene of a fire within
four minutes of seeing it.
Had Gulf maintained the stand-by tug close to and in sight of the jetty, it is reasonably probable that, not
withstanding the absence from the Control Room of the dispatcher on the night of the disaster, the lives of
the jetty crew and those on board ship would have been saved.
The member of the crew of the tug on watch would have seen the fire at its' commencement. By slipping
its anchor or mooring the tug could have been at the scene of the fire before 00.40 hours, when the fire
spread alongside the ship. It is highly probable that it could have contained the spread of the fire—indeed,
it is quite possible that it could have extinguished it altogether. Undoubtedly, great quantities of oil had
escaped in the early stages of the catastrophe and the risk of a further ignition of flammable vapour was a
high one. But the presence of the tug would have meant that it should have been possible to contain any
further fire until rescue of persons on the ship and the jetty had been completed.
The stand-by channel of the Bantry Bay was Channel 16. The stand-by channel of both the Donemark and
the Snave was Channel 14. But Channel 14 was available to the Bantry Bay and it is certain that it would
have been able to attract the attention of both the Donemark and the Snave so that these craft, in addition
to the tug, would have been available at an early stage of the disaster, and the three vessels could have
evacuated all on the ship and on the jetty.

FIGURE 5.20 View of the west walkway showing the FIGURE 5.21 Control room and mess room from the
extent of fire damage. south side.
FIGURE 5.22 View looking down to the Chicksan on FIGURE 5.23 Looking east to Dolphin 22. The control
the north side of the central platform. The control building is in the centre of the shot and the NE Chicksan
building is on the right of the shot. tower to the left.
FIGURE 5.24 The six, 2½ inch charging points for the FIGURE 5.25 Dolphin 22 showing the extent of
water main on Dolphin 22. A similar system was spalling of the concrete and exposed reinforcing rods.

(c) The consequences of the absence of suitable escape craft at the jetty
There was no connection between the jetty and the Island and the only means of immediately evacuating
the jetty was by inflatable rafts. These proved to be entirely inadequate. Furthermore, Gulf should have
been aware of the hazardous situation created by the decision to locate the stand-by tug out of sight of and
far from the he jetty and should have provided suitable escape craft at the jetty.
Had these been provided it is reasonably probable that, not withstanding the absence from the Control
Room of the dispatcher, and the fact that the stand-by tug was not immediately available, the lives of the
jetty crew and those on board the ship could have been saved. Even two small craft would have been
sufficient. In addition to the capacity of such craft, it can be assumed that, by bringing some members of
the crew ashore within a very short time of the disaster, the alarm would have been realised much earlier
than it was and the assistance of the Donemark and the Snave would have been available not long after
00.40 hours.
(d) The consequences of the absence of a disembarkation facility at Dolphin 1
In 1970/71, modifications were made to the offshore jetty access ladders. The loser parts of the access
ladders at Dolphin 1 were cut off so that access to the jetty from the water was not possible, except at
Dolphin 22. The reasons given for this action were that it would make the jetty more secure from a
possible terrorist attack and, more importantly, that the ladders had been abused by having small craft
moored to them. It was recognised that consequences from the point of view of safety followed form this
decision and so (a) the number of lifebuoys on the jetty was increased, (b) five Jacob's ladders were
installed and (c) two inflatable life-rafts were purchased and one put at each end of the jetty. In 1975, steel
ladders were added to the piling on some of the dolphins which gave access to a small built-in rescue
platform above the high waterline. Form about 1970, however, the jetty crew would have known that the
only means of access of rescue craft to the jetty would be at Dolphin 22.
The Tribunal considers that the decision to remove the disembarkation facilities form Dolphin 1 was a
wrong one and that consideration for effective emergency evacuation should have outweighed those which
ere said to have justified it. In an emergency, disembarkation should be mad up-wind of any smoke.
Proper emergency drill have trained the jetty crew to move up-wind of any fire on the ship. Whilst it is
just possible that the smoke from the fire may have made access to the eastern catwalk impossible, it is
more likely that this was not so and that the crew ran to Dolphin 22 from the centre platform because they
were aware that rescue from Dolphin 1 would be extremely difficult, and they were familiar with the
disembarkation from Dolphin 22.
Had access at Dolphin 1 been maintained, and had the jetty crew been properly trained in emergency
procedures so that they would run up-wind of the fire, then it is probable that the lives of the jetty crew on
the centre platform would have been saved, as the fire did not approach Dolphin 1 and no fire or heat or
explosive damaged was caused to it. However, it is possible that that Plant Protection Operator might
have decided not to go to Dolphin 1 because of the large volume of smoke through which he would have to
run, and it is highly improbable that any members of the crew of the ship could have got there.
(e) The consequences of the decision to discontinue the automatically pressurised fire-main
Until 1970 the fire-mains on the island and on the jetty remained constantly charged at pressure of 250 psi.
This meant that it was only necessary to turn a valve on a hydrant on the jetty to operate any of the
fire-fighting equipment. This system was altered in 1970 due, it was stated, to problems of maintenance.
A remote start-stop switch was installed in the he Control Room for the electric pumps and the fire-pump.
The result was that before the water was available in the mains the pumps had to be switched on by the
dispatcher in the Control Room. Because of his absence from the Control Room on the night of the
disaster there was no water in the fire-mains, with which the jetty crew could have fought the fire, until
sometime shortly after 00.45 hours.
The fire started at 00.31-00.32 hours. It followed explosions in the PBTs and was on the water which had
covered the deck of the ship close to the manifold. Whilst the fire was, at it's inception, a comparatively
small one, it was accompanied by large volumes of smoke which were blown on to the centre platform.
The effect of the explosion and the smoke was to cause the members of the jetty crew to evacuate
immediately the centre platform, and no attempt was made to use the fire-fighting equipment on the centre
platform. It is highly unlikely that the valves were turned on and that they were then turned off again when
it was found that no water was available, and so it would appear that the absence of pressure in the mains

did not affect the situation—the emergency was such that the crew evacuated the centre platform as
quickly as possible.
The flames and smoke were such that, in all probability, they would at the early stages not have inhibited
an attempt to fight the fire from the eastern breasting dolphin. No attempt, in fact, was made — probably
because of the fact that, after the evacuation of the centre platform, the crew became aware that it was not
possible to alert Gulf Control, and they would have been conscious of the futility of attempting to fight the
fire. But had the situation been otherwise, and and had the main been under constant pressure (as it was up
to 1970) then their experience and training would have prompted them to attempt to fight the fire from the
breasted dolphin. It is not possible to state with any certainty how successful they would have been, and it
is not possible to evaluate the consequences of their inability to do so.
It can, however, be said that, given the absence of the dispatcher form the Control Room, and the position
of the tug on the night of the disaster, had the fire-main been under pressure the jetty crew might possibly
have been able to contain the fire. They might have prevented the fire from developing in the manner in
which it did, and so have permitted rescue of both the crew of the ship and the jetty crew by the
Donemark and the Snave to be effected.
21.3.1 The loss of cargo and damage to the jetty.
When the ship broke it's back the parcel of Arabian Light crude was still on board in the Nos. 2 to 5 wing
tanks. At the commencement of the disaster, oil form Nos. 3 and 4 wing tanks escaped into the sea. Later
at 01.06-01.08 hours, the No. 5 centre tank and the No. 6 tanks exploded and the Arabian Light crude in
the No. 5 wing tanks flowed into the sea. No explosions occurred forward of the PBTs and after the wreck
was salvaged it became possible to pump to shore the contents fo the No.2 wing tanks. Had the alert been
raised at shortly after 00.30 hours, or had the stand-by tug been closer to the jetty, it is probable that the
fire would have been contained of No. 5 wing tanks would have been salvaged from the wreck, as were the
contents of the No. 2 wing tanks.
Had the tug been moored in sight of the jetty and close to it, it would have been able to contain the fire and
probably extinguish it before it spread on either side of the ship. The obvious action for the tug then to
take was to remove the ship immediately from the jetty. The jetty crew could easily have operated the
quick-release hood (specifically designed for such an emergency) and facilities were specifically provided
on the ship's bow and stern to enable the tug speedily to pull the ship off the jetty. Had the tug been
moored where it should have been, some damage to the jetty would undoubtedly have been caused by the
initial fire. But it would have been comparatively slight compared to that which, in fact, occurred.
It will be seen that the Tribunal concluded that the dispatcher, Mr John Connolly, was absent
from the Control Room at the time the disaster commenced and it is particularly this conclusion
FIGURE 5.26 The "Seabeck" quick-release mooring FIGURE 5.27 Looking west from Dolphin 22 the
gear on the top deck of Dolphin 22. These had not been quick-release mooring gear is in the foreground of the
shot. The lifting barge is in the background.

which the author feels is suspect. Earlier in the report in this regard the following comments are
made:
1. "The evidence clearly establishes that the disaster can be divided into three phases. Phase 1 lasted from about
00.31-00.32 hours to 00.40 hours approximately; Phase 2 lasted from 00.40 hours until the massive explosion at
01.06-01.08 hours approximately; and Phase 3 covers the period from the massive explosion to the final sinking
of the vessel."
2. "The evidence of the dispatcher and four of his colleagues is directly and irreconcilably contradicted by a large
number of persons who saw or heard the disaster at a time much earlier than that deposed to by the dispatcher
and his colleagues. If the evidence of these eyewitnesses is correct, then the fire was raging on the ship and the
jetty at a time when the dispatcher watching the scene continuously and nothing untoward was happening, and at
a time when, according to the crew of the Donemark, a visitor was being left at Dolphin 22.
3. "The Tribunal was fortunate in having available to it a considerable number of witnesses whose memory was
accurate, whose powers of observation were well developed and whose testimony could be cross-checked with
other reliable evidence. With the aid of this evidence it has been possible to ascertain when the disaster began
and obtain an accurate description of its progress. The Tribunal has no hesitation in accepting this evidence and
rejecting that of Gulf's dispatcher and that of his fellow employees referred to above. Their evidence will be
considered in greater detail in the next Chapter."
4. "It will be noted that it is impossible to reconcile this description of the outbreak of fire [dispatcher's] with that
given by the independent eyewitnesses. Their evidence establishes that there was a small fire on the ship for
approximately 8 minutes. It was after this that it suddenly spread aft and on the sea—a description which cannot
be reconciled with that given by Mr Connolly."
The author would comment on each of the above extracts from the Tribunal's report as follows:
1. There can be no doubt that Mr Connolly did get wrong the timing of the start of the
breaking of Betelgeuse. His recording as to the time of the start of the incident - 0055
hours — was clearly made as a recollection some time after the event. In such an awful
situation it would have been virtually impossible for him to have made an accurate record
of this time. He was alone in the Control Room and had to carry out a significant number
of tasks including:
a) press three buttons on the console to start the fire pumps situated close to the
Ascon Jetty;
b) shut down the emergency block valves at the jetty;
c) go from the console to the emergency phone on the wall of the Control Room to
call the operator at the Bantry Exchange and instruct him to initiate the "full
emergency procedures";
d) return to the console to call the Donemark on Channel 14 telling her that there
was a fire on the tanker;
e) radio the fire tug Bantry Bay on Channel 16 telling her of the fire and that the ship
was breaking up;
f) call the Snave on Channel 14 giving the same information;
g) leave the console and go to a control point and pressing two buttons to operate the
sirens on the jetty and on the Gulf Control building on the island;
h) return to the console and telephone the postmistress on Whiddy Island to request
assistance from Gulf personnel;
i) telephone Mr Downey at the office in the power house to inform him of the
incident;
j) telephone Mr Flynn, the Terminal Operations Manager and gave him an outline of
the situation.
Possibly Mr Connolly received bad advice from some source, exhorting him to stick
rigidly to his recollection as to the time of the start of the tragedy! If so, this quite clearly
was unwise. All he needed have said was that the time he had jotted down in the log was

in fact his best guess of the time entered well after the event and it was quite impossible
for him to record this and the early sequence of events with any great accuracy. He could
have gone on to say that the time of his call to the Bantry Telephone Exchange would no
doubt be accurately recorded and that he would be happy to accept this time as being close
to the initiating event. If only Mr Connolly had done this he would quite surely have been
spared a lot of anguish!
As an aside, those preparing emergency procedures should consider the number of tasks
and the order in which they are to be fulfilled to ensure that operators are not
overburdened.
2. The fact that four of the Gulf witnesses agreed with the timings put forward by the
dispatcher was, to say the least, unfortunate. It certainly must have appeared to members
of the Tribunal that collusion had taken place and that a deliberate attempt was being
made to falsify the evidence. Consideration should be given to providing a 'black box' in
control rooms to record the times of events. In this incident such provision would have
saved a considerable amount of investigative effort and in the author's view the quite
incorrect impression that Mr Connolly had something to hide.
3. The Tribunal was indeed fortunate in having available reasonably accurate times
relating to different major stages of the tragedy. But, in the author's opinion, too much
reliance was placed upon the various witnesses opinion as to the size, timing and
development of the fire. Of the eight witnesses who had a side-on view of Betelgeuse, the
closest to the fire was some 3 miles away and at that range the author would not like to
rely upon the accuracy of their recollection and quite certainly not upon their description
of the initial size of the fire—said by one witness to be six foot high and in the shape of a
pyramid. The two witnesses who had an end-on view of the tanker were situated some 4
to 4.4 miles away!
With regard to estimates of time, the author recalls a fatal fire which occurred in
Edinburgh during his period in command. A no doubt well intentioned member of the
public accused the brigade of having taken "20 minutes" to arrive at the fire. Fortunately,
the brigade operated a system whereby all 999 calls were automatically recorded — time
and voice — and also that of the VHF call from the first appliance to reach the fire. The
actual time taken by the brigade to reach the scene was four and a half minutes! Estimates
of time given by those involved in or observing incidents, including fires, are notoriously
inexact.
4. In the author's opinion, the Tribunal had insufficient evidence to establish "that there
was a small fire on the centre of the ship for approximately 8 minutes" and should not
have relied upon the statements of lay persons situated miles away from the scene to the
extend it did. Eight minutes is an awfully long time for the duty crew on the tanker and
the Gulf personnel on the jetty to twiddle their thumbs and take no overt action to fight
this "small fire". It is unthinkable that this can have been the situation and that no action
was taken to fight the fire which point the tribunal accepted but obviously disregarded.
The author, along with other experts, personally checked every piece of fire equipment
first on the central platform and the intact walkway leading to Dolphin 22. No pumps had
been started; not one single hydrant valve had been opened; the foam systems had not
been operated; portable extinguishers were intact and remains of burned hose in the fire
boxes indicated that they had not been touched. On board the salvaged parts of the tanker,
especially the middle section including the cargo manifolds, no hydrants had been opened
and the vital deck foam systems had not been operated.
Fifteen thousand tonnes of crude oil is a lot of fuel and it must surely be beyond all
reasonable doubt that the scale and dramatic suddenness of the incident, simply
overwhelmed those present and it was a case of having to run for ones life rather than to
attempt to fight an impossibly huge fire.
According to the Japanese classification society Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (NKK), there have

been very few incidents of hull cracking in ships younger than ten years old. But
interestingly by the time ships reach 18 years of age, the rate of occurence rises twenty
fold.
Conclusions
If ever there was a tragedy which should never have happened, this was it! Full knowledge of the
fact that the steelwork in the vicinity of the No. 4 permanent ballast tanks was seriously wasted and
thus reduced in strength was in the hands of the owners. This information was made available as far
back as the summer of 1977 when a Second Special Survey had been conducted in Singapore.
Certainly, some of the steelwork was replaced but events prove that even at this time — 6 months
before the tragedy—the general condition of this 10 year old ship was far from satisfactory. One
wonders if this should not also have been noted by the classification society and steps taken to
rectify the situation!
Surprisingly, at the very time of the disaster, this clearly sub-standard tanker was being put up for
sale and its problems and risks were to be passed to another owner and unsuspecting crew. The
morality of such transactions must be called into question. The author believes that in the UK it is
illegal to sell a second-hand car without divulging information about its physical condition which
might be dangerous to occupants and other road users. It is high time similar laws were applied to
ships! IMO please note.
As a footnote to the Betelgeuse disaster, quite surely the author's most poignant case: Two
surveyors, Mr James A Stewart from London and Mr Elias Tsakos from Greece, both visited the
ship the previous day for the purpose of conducting a survey, which had been requested by two
independent Greek ship owners who were contemplating purchase of the tanker which had been put
up for sale by French owners, Total Petroleum. Both the men left the ship at about 1700 hours on 7
January 1979 and only a matter of hours of the splitting of the hull.
The photographs taken by Mr Stewart so shortly before the tragedy were used in evidence at the
enquiry and provided a graphic and undeniably sad record of the external condition of the vessel.
The other side of the coin is represented by another surveyor, the late Mr Michael Harris, Cargo
Inspector, Moore, Barrett and Redwood Ltd, who fate decreed would board Betelgeuse about
midnight, only to be burned to death some half hour later. This surely reflects the sheer horror of
this event and of ship fires in general.

Chapter Six
Some Major Disasters In Port Installations
Serious fires involving port installations were all too common up until the middle 1970's but the
use of containers has reduced the incidence of major fires in port installations. Nevertheless the
Author has decided that, if only for historic reasons, he should include a list of the major incidents
which have occurred worldwide from 1941 up to and including 1975. Of particular interest is the
Texas City disaster which, was initiated by ammonium nitrate in a ship's hold, and killed over 500
people in the port area. They have occurred all over the world, and have involved huge losses in
terms of goods, buildings and money — and sometimes of human life. The loss of port facilities
can bring disaster to an entire community in loss of earnings caused by the diversion of shipping to
other ports. The destruction of a large refrigerated warehouse, for example, can bring about what
amounts to a boycott of the port by shipping until rebuilding can be completed. Not much less
serious can be the dislocation caused by the blocking of a berth when a ship which has been on fire
has turned over on to its side.
Some idea of the formidable extent of the problem can be gauged from a study of the following
list of fires involving piers (and piers only) which have taken place in North America alone since
1941:
Date Location and Loss

1941-May 31st Jersey City, N.J.Dockside Warehouses $5,000,000.
1941-August 18th Brooklyn, New York. Pier No. 27. This fire also destroyed the
3,570-ton freighter Panuco. 34 lives lost. Damage: $1,340,000.
1942-January 8th New York, North River Pier No. 83. $474,000.
1942-February 5th Mystic Terminal Co. Pier, Charlestown, Boston. $225,000.
1944-May 6th Montreal, Quebec. Pier Storage Shed. $645,000.
1944-August 11th Hoboken, New Jersey. Pier No. 4. $2,000,000.
1944-December 17th Chesapeake & Ohio Railroad Pier. $1,000,000.
1945-January 17th Norfolk Navy Yard Annexe, Norfolk, Virginia. $370,000.
1945-July 17th Port Edward, Ontario. Wharf. Fire spread to the 6,905 ton ship
Hamonic which was burnt out. One life lost. Damage:
$3,000,000.
1945-August 30th Oregon Shipbuilding Company. Wharf. $3,000,000.
1945-December 5th Long Beach, California. Ship Repair Pier. $1,000,000.
1946-January 25th St. George, Staten Island, N.Y. Two piers of the Baltimore & Ohio
Railroad. $750,000.
1946-June 25th St. George, Staten Island, N.Y. New York Ferry Terminal.
$2,000,000.
1946-July 14th Pictou, Nova Scotia. Three piers, a ferry-boat and three small
boats destroyed. $1,000,000.
106
Some Major Disasters in Port Installations 107
1946-August 11th West New Brighton, Staten Island, N.Y. Marine Repair Yard.
$500,000.
1947-January 8th Weehawken, N.J. Railroad Terminal Pier. $6,000,000.
1947-August 25th Port Alberni, British Columbia. $500,000.
1947-September 28th New York. Grace Line Pier. $3,050,000.
1947-October 23rd Portland, Maine. State Pier. $500,000.
1948-January 6th New York. New York Dock Co. Pier. $827,000.
1948-August 3rd Longview, Washington. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. $853,000.
1948-December 24th Montreal, Quebec. Victoria Pier. $400,000.
1949-March 1st Oakland, California. Pier No. 4, Army Base. $1,000,000.
1949-June 26th Staten Island, N.Y. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. $250,000.
1951-January 16th Baltimore, Maryland. U.S. Government Pier. Also totally
destroyed 25,000-ton troopship George Washington. $10,300,000.
(See later in this Chapter.)
1951-February 17th Baltimore. Chesapeake Marine Railway Co. Two piers. $800,000.
1953-October 4th Vallejo, California. U.S. Navy Pier. One life lost. Damage:
$500,000.
1954-December 18th "Slopeline" Pier, New York. Set alight by crashing aircraft.
$1,250,000.
1955-June 17th Charlesion, S.C. Pier, totally destroyed. $2,750,000.
1956-January 10th Near Houston, Texas. 1,080ft. wooden pier. Drydock also
destroyed. $3,000,000.
1956-June 28th San Francisco, California. Associated Oil Co. Pier. $750,000.
1956-July 1st Liverpool, Nova Scotia. Parts of two wharfs and five wharf
buildings. $770,000.
1956-December 3rd Brooklyn, New York. Luckenbach Steamship Co. Pier. 10 lives
lost. $7,600,000. (See later in this Chapter.)
1957-April 23rd Coney Island, N.Y. Steeplechase Pier. $250,000.
1957-June 29th Jersey City, N.J. Pennsylvania Railroad Pier. $276,000.
1957-July 9th Seabrook, Texas. Pier and pleasure boat warehouse. $500,000.
1957-July 26th Boston, Mass. Pocahontas Coal Co. Pier. $465,000,
1964-May 28th Jersey City, New Jersey. Vacant 1,000 ft long loading trestle;
spread to four other piers and several floating trestles.
$10,000,000.
1967-February 14th Prince Rupert, British Columbia. Dynamite used to control spread
of fire.
1967-August 8th Everett, Washington. Cigarette ignited grass and rubbish under
shore end of pier.
1967-October 3rd San Francisco, California. Cutting torch ignited flammable
vapours. $200,000.
1967-March 7th Newport News, California. Short circuit. $1,250,000.
1968-April 30th Longview, Washington. Strong wind spread fire which damaged
190 feet of pier; 1,700 feet of conveyor belt, etc. $300,000.
1968-May 28th San Francisco, California. Spontaneous heating of bulk storage of
copra. $2,445,000.
1968-November 28th Seattle, Washington. Grounded electric wire under pier; fire
spread to two adjoining piers; automatic sprinklers assisted in
limiting structural damage, but could not prevent fire from
spreading in joist channels above sprinklers. $550,000.
1969-June 20th Beaumont, Texas. Fire destroyed entire dock. $500,000.

1969-August 26th Portland, Oregon. 900-foot-long wharf; superstructure sprinklered,

but fire developed rapidly under wharf prior to entering
superstructure. $625,000.
1970-August 23rd Ketchikan, Alaska. Boys playing on wharf believed to have started
fire in. heavy timber decking; fire burned into warehouse on wharf
$251,000.
1972-June 10th Prince Rupert, British Columbia. 1,000-foot wharf spread to three
other exposures; direct damage over $10,000,000; indirect losses
much higher.
1973-April 14th Santa Barbara, California. Wooden pier with large restaurant on
top; closed for night; $649,006.
1973-July 6th Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 400-foot-long wood and metal pier; no
ships berthed as pier was up for rent; cause unknown. $250,000.
1974-March 8th Saint John, New Brunswick. Canadian National Government pier.
$7,000,000.
1974-July 20th Lewes, Delaware. 600-foot-long pier used only part-time.
$1,500,000.
1974-November 25th Los Angeles, California. Blamed on welding operation. $200,000.
1975-February 22nd Lunenburg, Nova Scotia. Receiving sheds on creosoted pile docks;
apparently sparks from welding operations lodged in
heavily-creosoted piling. $1,300,000.
1975- September 24th San Francisco, California. Large pier with warehouse mostly
vacant; fire spread to retired ferry boat, now used as offices,
moored alongside. Over $1,000,000.
Piers, however, are not the only port installations which burn. Enormous damage has also been
done by fire to other port and harbour installations in recent years, as the following brief accounts of
a few of the more interesting ones will show. This catalogue of death and destruction should serve
to emphasise the vulnerability of these installations, and the responsibility which rests on those in
charge of them to pay the most active and constant attention to all aspects of fire prevention and
control.
The Amerika-Australië Cold-Storage Warehouses, Amsterdam — September 11th, 1948

The Amerika-Australië cold-storage warehouses are located between the Haven and the
Binnehaven, Amsterdam.
The two warehouses formed, at the time of the fire, one continuous building-basement and five
storeys high-some 370 ft. long, about 80 ft. wide, and 70 ft. high. The main walls were of brick, as
was the party wall which separated the Amerika from the Australië. The common roof was of
wood, covered with asphalt and lined with cork bound with bitumen. Floors were partly of wood,
and partly of concrete on which bitumen had been laid. Every storey was divided into
compartments by means of timber partitions lined with insulating cork—there being three such
compartments on every storey in the Australië, and four on every storey in the Amerika. The two
staircases in each warehouse were protected by fire-resisting walls, and had fire-resisting doors at
every level.
The warehouses.contained at the time a huge quantity of foodstuffs; principally meat, butter,
eggs, fish and vegetables.
At 5.28 a.m. on September 11 th, 1948, the Amsterdam Fire Brigade were called to an outbreak
of fire at the warehouses, and arrived to find the Amerika building well alight on the second floor.
Thick smoke made conditions extremely difficult, and the firemen were unable to get to the seat of
the fire. Not least among their difficulties was the peculiar construction of the warehouses
themselves, on every floor of which an insulated corridor ran the whole length of the building

FIGURE 6.1 The Amerika-Australië cold storage warehouses well alight on September 11 th, 1948.
©K.L.M. Photograph
between the insulated chambers and both outside walls — with the result that water directed from
fireboats could not reach the fire.
Unfortunately, too, most of the fire-resisting doors on the staircases had been open at the time of
the outbreak, and this allowed the fire to reach the higher floors', where it "mushroomed" and spread
rapidly, fed by the combustible nature of the contents and of the structure. The cork linings gave off
pungent fumes which made the use of breathing apparatus necessary. Soon the rapid spread of fire,
coupled with the smoke, drove the firemen out of the building, and it became obvious that the
Amerika was doomed.
All efforts were directed towards saving the Australië. Lines of hoses were taken up to the roof,
through which the firemen broke holes to enable them to direct a curtain of water down the face of
the party wall. Soon every timber floor and the roof of the Amerika collapsed; and it was many
hours before the firemen could be sure that the Australië was saved. The loss, in terms of foodstuffs
and refrigerated storage space was immense. Food supplies for the City of Amsterdam were
seriously upset for many months while rebuilding was in progress.
The lack of adequate fire separation within the building, and the absence of sprinkler systems and
of automatic fire alarms connected to the nearest fire station — all these were major factors
contributing to the great loss. It is significant, too, that the concrete floors of the Amerika building,
though not the wooden ones, were intact after the fire; and it is possible that the flames might have
been confined to the second floor if the fire doors on the staircases had been properly closed.
The cause of the outbreak has never been certainly identified; it is thought that it may have been
caused by the boiling over of some tar being used in the course of repair work.
The Gladstone Dock Fire — November 9th - 10th, 1949

The Gladstone Dock, Bootle (later famous for the loss of the Empress of Canada), had earlier
been the scene, on November 9th, 1949, of one of the largest dock warehouse fires ever to take
place in Britain. The monetary loss mounted eventually to some £2,000,000; to which must be
added the loss; of valuable storage facilities for a long period of time.
The building—South No. 2 Branch, Gladstone Dock Shed — was a reinforced concrete structure
consisting of ground and two storeys, approximately 1,277 ft. long by 100 ft. wide. The roof was

covered with one and a half inches of asphalt. An unusual feature of construction was the narrow
construction joints filled with bitumen which existed in the floors adjacent to party walls.
The interior of the building was divided into four parts by three fire-resisting concrete party
walls. Very large double sliding doors made of iron were fitted in the party walls; and sliding
wooden doors were installed along the whole length, of the building on both north and south faces.
Highly combustible merchandise was stored in large quantity in the warehouse. The ground and
first floors contained general goods for export and import, and ships' stores; but the top floor held
more than 5,000 tons of rubber, over 350 tons of cotton seed in 3,864 bags, and approximately 700
tons of wool in 4,822 bales.
The Bootle Fire Brigade received a fire call to the warehouse at 11.10 a.m.; but as the crews
turned out from the station about a mile away, they could already see a dense cloud of black smoke
towering over the dock area. It was obvious that they had not been summoned as soon as the fire
had been discovered.
When the brigade reached the scene some two minutes later, the whole area was already filled
with acrid black smoke from the burning rubber and wool; and a really tough job faced the
fire-fighters. Molten rubber was flowing down the staircases and on to the quay-side. Bitumen
from the construction joints in the floors had melted, and was ablaze. The wooden access doors
could not be opened, so that it was difficult to hit the seat of the fire. Inside the concrete structure,
terrific heat was being generated, and little ventilation was possible. A strong wind was blowing the
flames along the length of the warehouse, and towards a large timber-yard situated some 150 yards
from the fire.
Soon all but 400 ft. of the warehouse was alight; and only by dint of strenuous fire-fighting
efforts was further spread prevented. Thirty-five pumps and three fire-boats were used at the scene
of the fire, many of them to put up a water curtain to prevent the flames from reaching the
timber-yard. The fire mains on the Dock, which consisted of one five-inch and one six-inch supply
pipes, were inadequate for a conflagration of such a size; so that most of the pumps had to be set
into the dock itself.
The fire was eventually brought under control at 5.30 a.m. the next day, November 10th; but not
before heavy damage had been done to the contents and structure of the building. The greatest
damage, as would be expected, was on the upper floors. One and a half hours after the outbreak, the
roof had collapsed at one point by reason of the failure of the reinforced concrete used in the roof
columns; and a further extensive collapse took place an hour later. The reinforced concrete columns
on the ground and first floors, however, were found to be intact, apart from surface spalling, when
the fire was finally extinguished.
Twelve three-ton roof cranes were destroyed when the roof collapsed.
The cause of the fire has never been ascertained, although it is certain that it started in the
north-west corner of the second floor.
The main lessons to be learnt from the outbreak seem to be as follows:
1. Such a building should always be protected by a sprinkler system.

2. An automatic fire alarm, connected to the nearest fire station, is an essential protection.
3. The fire brigade must be called without delay as soon as any outbreak of fire in port or dock
installations is discovered.
4. Some form of ventilation which can be used in time of fire is desirable in the case of a
monolithic concrete building. Otherwise the internal build-up of heat can become too great.
5. The concrete aggregate (Rossett gravel) used in the roof columns had a silica content of
approximately 75 per cent, and contained various types of stone which reacted (so it is
thought) differently to the exceptionally high temperature prevailing. This would account
for the early collapse of the columns.

6. Reinforced concrete columns in high-fire-load industrial premises should always be

constructed with a limestone or blast furnace stag mix. When the column is over 12 inches
in diameter, such a mix has been proved to give a fire-resistance of at least four hours.
7. The failure of the sliding iron double-doors in the party walls to prevent the spread of fire
seems to have been due to the very large size of the doors. Such doors should never exceed
56 sq. ft. in area.
The Baltimore Pier Fire — January 16th, 1951

The 1,200ft.long US Government Pier at Hawkins Point, Baltimore, Maryland, was built for
ammunition loading during the Second World War. Ninety feet wide, the pier had a concrete deck
laid on two-inch planks. These in turn rested on wooden beams, and on girders set on wooden piles.
A trestle 160ft. long by 41ft. wide, of similar construction, connected the pier to the mainland.
Draft stops1 constructed of loosely fitted two-inch by six-inch planks were located at approximately
150-ft. intervals in the substructure. There were no superstructures, apart from two small wooden
wash-rooms.
The pier was fitted with an alternate wet/dry sprinkler system, but the system had been damaged
by frost in 1947 and had not been repaired. Two 1,000 g.p.m. fire pumps which fed the system from
Baltimore Harbour through an eight-inch main had been allowed to fall into disrepair, and were not
available for fire-fighting purposes. An electric fire-alarm system was installed, and connected to
the Fire Department. Two hydrants on a 10in. City main were situated at a distance of more than
1,000ft. from the pier, but these too were unserviceable. Valve stems were bent, valves broken, and
one hydrant knocked out of plumb.
On January 16th, 1951 two decommissioned transports, the 25,000 ton George Washington and
the Edmund Alexander, both manned by skeleton crews, were tied up at off-shore berths. The pier
itself was shared by the U.S. Maritime Commission and the Merrit, Chapman and Scott
Corporation, a construction company who were using the inshore berths for loading and unloading
railroad cars and barges by means of railroad cranes, the materials handled being destined for use in
the construction of the Chesapeake Bay Bridge. One tug, two barges and a floating crane were tied
up to the pier itself
At about 4 p.m., smoke and flames were seen by several construction company employees and by
the transport ship guards coming from beneath the pier at a point in the substructure some 200ft.
from the land end. The alarm was transmitted without delay, and the brigade responded with three
engine companies, one ladder truck and one fire-boat. Before the first appliance arrived, however,
the fire, fanned by high winds and feeding on the mass of oil-soaked timbers forming the
substructure, had already spread a further 50ft. inshore.
The firemen were immediately at a disadvantage. No hydrants within reasonable distance were
serviceable; the tide was out, and the appliances had great difficulty in getting water by reason of
the high lifts involved. Assistance was called; and within two and a half hours of the call, 53 land
appliances and four fire-boats were at work. All water had to be relayed from long distances, and
the firemen on the pier found that the 40 m.p.h. wind prevented them from getting at the fire in the
substructure with their jets. The fireboats, too, found that their turret nozzles could not be
sufficiently depressed to reach the burning substructure. No approach from the land side was
possible save over the burning deck.
In face of all these difficulties, it is not surprising that the fire-fighting was of a somewhat
ineffectual nature. Some four hours after the outbreak of fire, at. about 8.15 p.m., the pier started to
collapse, and all firemen were hastily ordered off it. The spread of fire then became so quick that
the construction company employees were unable to release the tug and barges tied to the pier.
These were soon afire; and when their hawsers burnt through, they drifted away in flames.
1
"Draft stops" (American spelling) consist of extension pieces made of wood — or more commonly of a non-flammable
materia l— which are fitted transversely beneath the main planking of a pier, with the object of forming a barrier or check to
the flames if the underside of the pier decking becomes involved in a fire.

The crews of the two transports, also, either failed to realise the seriousness of the outbreak or
were unwilling to assume responsibility for moving the vessels without permission. Eventually
authority was obtained (from Washington, D.C., itself!) to move the ships, and the Edmund
Alexander was towed to safety, in the nick of time. The George Washington, however, was soon
enveloped in flames, and the four fire-boats concentrated their efforts on trying to save her. A
six-degree list had developed by early morning; and it was decided that the vessel should be left to
burn out rather than risk having her capsize and sink.
The eventual loss caused by this fire was estimated as being in the region of $10,300,000.
The main lessons of the fire, the cause of which was never discovered, are:
1. All fire equipment must always be maintained in efficient Working order.

2. Piers should never be constructed of highly flammable materials.
3. There should always be someone on the spot empowered to take executive action in case of
emergency. The George Washington was not in any danger until at least one and a half
hours after the initial fire had started; and she could easily have been towed to safety in time.
4. Access points for fire appliances should always be provided close to high fire risks, in such a
position that they can be used even at low tide.
The Maydon Wharf Fire, Durban — June 15th, 1953

Maydon Wharf stretches for about one and a half miles along the northern side of Durban Bay,
starting from the harbour entrance at The Point.
The particular building which, on June 15th, 1953, was involved in a £2,000,000 fire, measured
650ft. 16 long by 360ft. wide, and was then being used for storing a variety of goods, including
wool and jute. Of single-storey construction, it had walls of framed concred with brick panels. The
roof, about., 30ft. high, was mainly arched, and was constructed of corrugated iron resting on
concrete trusses which contained glazed lighting panels. One small extension was roofed with
timber trusses covered with corrugated iron sheeting.
The building was in a very congested area, and was surrounded by large, but low, buildings not
more than 40ft. away. These buildings were occupied respectively by a large woodworking firm
and by a fertiliser manufacturer; and there was also a large building of asbestos cement which was
in use as a store for unworked timber.
Internal hydrants had been installed, but no sprinkler system. Public mains of four-inch and
eight-inch capacity were available in the surrounding streets.
The Durban Fire Brigade received a call to the wharf at 4.41 p.m. They arrived to find the
building already well alight and part of the roof fallen in, with showers of burning embers swirling
about on to surrounding buildings. In such circumstances, the first rule is always to protect
buildings threatened by a spread of the fire; and the brigade quickly got lines of hose to work, until
23 jets were in use. None of the surrounding buildings was high enough to serve as a fire-fighting
platform; so extension ladders from which to direct the water jets had to be erected on the two long
sides of the burning building itself.
Fire-fighting continued throughout the night, the firemen's task being made difficult by the fall of
walls which were being pushed out by bales of juts swelling under the application of water.
Fortunately, none of the firemen was injured; and they were successful in preventing the fire from
reaching the £400,000 worth of wool stored at one end of the burning building.
A further difficulty encountered was the fall of corrugated iron sheets on to burning material in
such a way as to prevent the jets from reaching the flames.
The next morning, by which time the fire was well under control, it was seen that all the internal
reinforced concrete columns had failed, and that the roof had fallen in over nearly the whole of the
affected area. An examination of the columns showed that they had been reinforced (with half-inch
steel rods) only at the four corners. The intense heat had caused the thin concrete covering to spall,
and the reinforcing rods must have melted at a very early stage.

The cause of the fire was never ascertained. The main lessons to be learnt from this fire are:
1. Sprinkler systems must be installed in all large warehouse buildings.

2. Automatic fire alarms connected to the nearest fire station are an essential element of
protection.
3. All structural elements in such buildings should have a fire resistance of at least four hours.
4. Timber trusses should never be permitted in an otherwise fire-resisting building.
5. Buildings covering a large area should have fire-resisting partitions extending right up to the
roof.
The Czaar Peter and Nederland Warehouses, Zaandam — October 15th, 1954
Cocoa-butter, cocoa-beans, nut kernals, timber doors, paint and other combustible
commodities—all these together constitute a formidable fire risk. When these materials are stored
in old buildings, four and five storeys high, and lacking any appreciable internal fire
protection—then the mixture becomes one of deadly potential.
The Czaar Peter and Nederland Warehouses, occupied by Messrs. C. Kamphtiys Fabr., N.V.,
were situated at Zaandam, on the river Zann in the Netherlands. Four and five storeys high
respectively, and having an area of 10,750 sq. ft. and 13,000 sq. ft., the buildings were of brick
construction, with timber floors supported on unprotected iron columns and joists. Fire-resisting
metal doors were provided between the two buildings.
The cause of fire is one which is all too usual on board ship; a portable electric light was left
lying face downwards on combustible material. At 10 p.m. on October 14th, 1954, workmen turned
off the main lighting as they finished work for the night; but the portable lamp was left switched on
(its tight-fitting conical metal shade preventing this from being noticed), and connected to an
electric point on the floor above. The lamp was resting on a bag of cocoa-bean husks.
At 5.15 a.m. on October, 15th, the Zaandam Fire Brigade was called by a porter in a factory on
the other side of the river, and arrived to find a serious fire burning on the first floor of the Czaar
FIGURE 6.2 The Czaar Peter and Nederland Warehouses, Zaandam.

Burning oils flowing from the warehouses can be seen on the surface of the river.
©K.L.M. Photograph

Peter warehouse. They got into the building with lines of hose; but the intense heat, coupled with
dense smoke, soon made their position untenable and drove them from the building. Attempts were
made to fight the fire from the Nederland warehouse through the fire-resisting doors, but again the
intense heat made this impossible. The doors were hastily slammed shut as burning fats flowed
across the floor, spreading fire everywhere in their path.
Unfortunately, however, these fire-resisting doors were not sufficiently tight-fitting, and the
burning fat was able to flow into the Nederland building, which was soon burning furiously also. It
was soon obvious that both buildings were doomed, and all efforts were concentrated on preventing
the spread of fire to adjoining property. Burning fats and oils were flowing from the warehouses
and spreading on the River Zaan, seriously threatening adjoining warehouses and two fire-boats.
The crews of these fire-boats, however, managed to depress their water jets sufficiently to beat out
the flames.
Both warehouse buildings collapsed and were completely burnt out, but adjoining property was
saved. The heat of the fire at one time was so great that the windows of buildings over 120 ft.
distant melted, in spite of the water curtain put up by firemen. The main lessons to be learnt from
the fire are:
1. Sprinkler systems must be installed in all such fire risks.
2. Automatic fire alarms connected to the nearest fire station should invariably be installed. .
3. Fire-resisting doors should be fitted with adequate sills to prevent burning fats or oils from
flowing underneath them.
4. Buildings adjoining high fire risks should be fitted with drencher systems to minimise the
risk of radiated heat or of flying embers.
The Luckenbach Pier Fire — December 3rd, 1956

The worst of the many pier fires suffered by New York City took place at the Luckenbach Pier on
Monday, December 3rd, 1956. Ten people were killed, and the damage amounted to $7,600,000.
The pier was 1,748 ft. long (the longest in New York), by 150 ft. wide. Built in 1916, it was
constructed of heavy wooden piles 20 in. in diameter, with wooden cross members of similar weight
carrying a reinforced concrete deck 14 in. thick, on which was laid a two-inch asphalt wearing
surface. A steel-framed metal-clad shed, one storey high, extended the whole length of the pier, and
was protected by sprinklers fed by an eight-inch main. Draft stops, or curtains, were installed in
such a way that no more than 200 sprinkler heads were situated between adjacent curtains2. A vast
miscellany of goods was stored in the huge building. Some 41,000 tons of sisal, several flammable
liquids, 25,000 lb. of foam rubber stacked in jute bags, paint, olive-oil, horse hair, unrefined sugar,
chemicals and, worst of all, no fewer than 37,000 lb. of Cordeau detonant fuse contained in 1,950
cartons. This quantity of Cordeau fuse is estimated to contain seven and a half tons of "Class A"
explosive.
The cause of the fire will never be known, but it is thought to have been started in the stack of
foam rubber by sparks from an acetylene welding torch. Certainly the speed with which the fire
spread, and the inability of the sprinkler system to hold the flames in check, made this a very likely
cause. The sprinkler heads opened at a very early stage; but the mass of combustible material was
so great that the system was unequal to the task. Five dock workers attempted to control the fire
with portable fire-fighting equipment; but these, too, were quite ineffective, and the men soon had
to run for their lives.
At 3.16 p.m., the Brooklyn Central Fire Station received an urgent call reporting the fire. The
first turn-out consisted of five pumps, two ladders and one fire-boat. Four minutes later, a radio call
for assistance was made by the officer in charge of the first attendance; and a further three pumps,
2
The number of sprinkler heads permitted in a given area is indicative of the effectiveness or otherwise of the system. Only
200 heads to a section indicates that the area between "stops" was small enough to have controlled the fire had it not been
for the excessive combustible content.

two rescue trucks, one ladder and a second

fire-boat were despatched. A third, then a
fourth, call for assistance then went out in quick
succession.
The firemen started to attack from the land
end, and the fireboat Fire Fighter was got to
work alongside the pier. Suddenly and without
any warning, some 25 minutes after the initial
call, there was a terrific explosion about
half-way along the pier. A hole 175 ft. by 75 ft.
was blown in the pier, and burning debris was
hurled over half a mile into the city, causing
hundreds of fires on shore and on adjoining
piers. St. Barnabas himself, the Patron Saint of
firemen, must have been on duty that afternoon; FIGURE 6.3 The Luckenbach Pier Fire, December 3rd,
for although 25 firemen in the shed were blown 1956, showing the huge gap caused by the explosion of
over and the entire crew of seven in the fire-boat Cordeau detonant fuse. The fire-boat to the right of the
were blasted overboard, not one man was killed
(although many were injured). The fire-boat crew in particular had a lucky escape; for only two
minutes before the explosion they had been working exactly opposite the spot at which it took place.
Ten longshoremen, however, were killed outright, and 246 more were seriously hurt.
A major rescue operation at once faced the fire brigade. Injured persons were lying everywhere,
both along the now-almost severed offshore end of the pier and on the land end. The Police
Department despatched three complete disaster units, four marine launches, nine emergency squads
and 20 radio cars. Two helicopters were used to direct rescue work, fire attack and ship removal.
With great initiative, the crews of ships lying at adjoining piers fought the fires caused by the
explosion in buildings alongside their own vessels. The Flying Enterprise II, commanded by the
celebrated Captain Kurt Carlson, got no fewer than 11 lines of hose to work on the roof of the 29th
Street pier alongside which she was lying.
Fire appliances racing to the scene of the disaster were ordered to tackle any fires they might
meet on their way to the pier. This plan worked with great success, and soon all fires away from the
Luckenbach Pier itself were under control.
After some three and a half hours, the pier fire was under control; but it was not until two days
later that it was completely extinguished, and even then "watch lines" (fire patrols) had to be
maintained to guard against a possible further outbreak. The main lessons to be learnt from the fire
are these:
1. Explosives must never be stored among highly flammable materials. "Class A" explosives,
when they must be stored at all, should be rigorously segregated into separate buildings of a
highly fire-resisting nature.
2. Goods should not be stacked too close to sprinkler heads.
3. Acetylene torches should never be used close to flammable materials unless the most
stringent precautions are taken.
4. Automatic fire alarms connected to the nearest fire station are a necessity.
5. All these, and other, safety precautions must be rigidly enforced at all times by all harbour
authorities.
6. Fire Prevention officers of the local fire brigade should be invited to carry out regular
inspections to advise on the adequacy and efficient state of maintenance of all firefighting
equipment, and on the effectiveness of all safety precautions and routines.

The Texas City Disaster — April 16th-17th, 1947

It is difficult to imagine a more innocuous,looking substance than ammonium nitrate fertiliser.
Though it is used extensively throughout the world, few even of the experts at this time realised its
awful explosive potential.
Yet there had been one or two isolated explosions involving ammonium nitrate during the
twentieth century, at least one of which should have served as a warning. On September 21st, 1921,
at the Oppau factory of the Badische Company in Germany, a disastrous explosion had killed over
500 persons and destroyed 2,138 buildings. It is recorded that this disaster was caused when
dynamite was used to break up a rock-like mass of ammonium nitrate crystals which had formed in
some tanks, Since ammonium nitrate has long been used as a constituent of many explosives, it was
later concluded that sympathetic detonation must have taken place.
Any possible doubt about the deadly nature of ammonium nitrate was, however, finally and
tragically removed on the morning of April 16th, 1947, when a 7,000-ton ship loaded with 2,300
tons of fertiliser blew up with enormous violence in an American harbour, killing well over 500
people and causing immense damage, both from the initial explosion and from a second which
followed when another vessel, also containing ammonium nitrate, was set on fire and blew up some
16 hours later.
The port of Texas City, Texas, is located on Galveston Bay on the Gulf of Mexico. The
topography is completely flat, and the town only a few feet above the sea level. Developed during
the twentieth century, the port is modern in every sense of the word. Vast chemical and oil plants
dominate the scene.
On the morning of April 16th, the Grandcamp, a French-owned Liberty ship, was lying at Pier O
in the North Slip. Next to her, in the Main Slip, lay the 6,214ton Highflyer (American), across from
which lay another American ship, the 7,176-ton Wilson B. Keene. These were luckily the only large
ships in the dock at the time.
The Grandcamp, which had been in port a few days, was engaged in loading ammonium nitrate
fertiliser contained in 100lb. paper bags. She had taken on board about 2,300 tons of fertiliser, of
which about 1,400 tons lay in No. 2 hold, and 880 tons in No. 4.
FIGURE 6.4 The Texas City Disaster Area.

Peanuts, twine and boxed machinery were stored in the 'tweendecks of these two holds. Because
of engine repairs, the ship was not capable of moving under her own steam.
At 8 a.m., stevedores coming on duty re-started loading operations in No. 4 hold, which showed
no trace of fire when the hatches were lifted off. At about 8.15 a.m., however, smoke was seen
coming out of an open space about eight inches wide between the hull and cargo battens. Attempts
were made to put out the fire with cans of drinking water, and then with portable extinguishers; but
the fire and smoke seemed only to increase in intensity, and within five minutes drove both
stevedores and crew out of the hold. A line of hose from the ship's main was got ready; but for fear
of damaging the cargo, the first mate would not allow it to be used. Instead, the hold was battened
down and steam injection was commenced. This had only been going on for a few minutes when
the hatch covers blew off, some of them falling back into the hold. Flames and smoke began to
pour out of the now open hold.
At last someone thought it was about time to call the fire brigade, and at 8.30 a.m. the Texas Fire
Department received the alarm. The crew of the Grandcamp had been ordered to leave the ship just
before the firemen arrived, and had congregated on the quay together with the many other interested
spectators who always gather on these occasions. The 27 firemen attending the incident ran out of
lines of hose from the quayside mains. A Press photographer took a picture of them doing so —
and then ran to catch his noon edition.
By this simple action he saved his life. No one knows how far the firemen had got with their
task; for at 9.12 a.m. the Grandcamp blew up with a shattering roar, and comletely disintegrated.
All the firemen, the entire crew, and all the interested spectators were killed at once. Buildings over
a wide area were flattened or severely damaged, and fires were started by blazing fragments blown
from the ship throughout the port area. Well over 400 people were either killed outright or burnt to
death as they lay, injured and helpless, in the path of the fires. A great tidal wave swept through the
port, tore the Highflyer from her moorings and smashed her against the Wilson B. Keene on the
other side of the dock, where the two ships remained locked together. A barge, 150ft. long by 28ft.
wide, and with a draught of 11ft., was deposited 100ft. inshore and came to rest on the quayside.
Two private aeroplanes which happened to be flying overhead were blown out of the sky, and their
occupants were killed.
The great Monsanto chemical works suffered the worst damage. Range upon range of their
buildings were either flattened or set on fire. Most of the fires were caused by the ignition of
combustible hydrocarbons, especially in the polystyrene building, in the ethylene purification units,
in the process equipment and control facilities of the alkylation unit, in the distillation towers, and
in the 14 main storage tanks of benzol, fuel oil and other lowvapour-pressure hydrocarbons.
Ground fires were caused by the fracturing of pipe lines carrying flammable liquids; and to add to
the unpleasantness, a quantity of bulk sulphur stored in a terminal warehouse was set on fire, with a
wide area soon affected by the resulting noxious fumes. Six large oil-tanks in the Stone Oil
Company's farm were also set on fire by the initial explosion.
All this by itself would have taxed the resources of any full strength fire brigade; but half the
personnel of the Texas City Brigade were dead, the water mains in the port area were all out of
action, and access to the docks was by now completely blocked by wreckage or fire. Volunteer
firemen came in from as far afield as Houston, 50 miles away, when they heard of the disaster on
the radio. The US Army sent fire-fighting units from Fort Crocker; and as the day wore on, other
communities despatched all the fire-fighting appliances they could spare to help the stricken town.
For a long time only rescue work, not proper fire-fighting, was all that was possible; but the oil
companies' own brigades worked like demons to prevent the burning oil-tanks from causing a
further catastrophe.
Two tugs were sent from Galveston to render what help they could, but were unable to force a
way into the harbour because of floating debris and the dense smoke and fumes. The crews picked
up survivors, and temporarily went back to base.
Meanwhile, the uninjured remnants of the crews of the Highflyer and the Wilson B. Keene were
finding that the fires in the Monsanto Chemical Works, together with the sulphur fumes from the

terminal warehouse, were rendering their position impossible. Taking their wounded with them,
they dropped anchors to prevent drift, and abandoned ship. The terrific force of the explosion had
twisted the superstructure of the Highflyer and had blown off all her hatch covers. Some 2,000 tons
of sulphur were distributed between Nos. 2 and 4 holds — and 360 more tons of deadly ammonium
nitrate lay in Hold No. 3.
Lying as she was, with open holds exposed to the heat and flying embers from the fires burning
all round her, it could only be a matter of time before the ship caught fire; and at about 6 p.m. she
was seen to be alight. The authorities called for volunteers from Galveston to man tugs, and to try
to tow her out of the dock into the bay.
The tugs, with their courageous crews, arrived at about 11.15p.m. Well knowing the appalling
risk, men wearing breathing apparatus boarded the ship with cutting apparatus, and after much
effort managed to cut through the anchor chain. Tow lines were secured, but the Highflyer and the
Wilson B. Keene were jammed too tightly together, and the manouvre failed. As the last man left
the ship, he saw white smoke issuing from No. 3 hatch.
Thick smoke and fumes were by now making the task of the tug crews almost impossible; and
they were ordered to withdraw at 12.55 a.m. on the morning of April 17th. Only 15 minutes later, at
1.10 a.m., the Highflyer also blew up, the entire ship disintegrating and shooting red-hot missiles
thousands of feet into the air. Witnesses described the scene as resembling a gigantic fireworks
display. Many more warehouses were damaged by concussion, and others already damaged in the
first explosion were reduced to rubble. Even reinforced concrete buildings were shattered. A pall
of black smoke towering into the sky marked the scene for a long time after the explosion.
The Wilson B. Keene was in turn destroyed, with only her forepart left showing above water in
her slip. Fortunately, however, all the rescue workers had been withdrawn to a safe distance in
time, and only one man in known to have been killed by this second explosion.
The red-hot missiles from the Highflyer, however, at once began to cause many more fires,
particularly in the oil-tank farms in the Humble and Richardson Companies' areas south of the main
terminal facilities. In the Humble Pipe Line Co. property, four tanks were ignited immediately, and
four more took fire later from the exposure. In the Stone farm, two tanks lit. In the Republic
Company's refinery, one tank was ignited; and in the United Carbide and Carbon terminal, an
aluminium tank containing isopropylacetate, and one steel tank, also burned.
A State of Emergency was now declared by the Governor of Texas, and the State Department of
Public Safety was charged with coordinating all police and rescue activities. Fire-fighting and
rescue work continued during the next two days; and by April 18th the majority of the fires were
under control. By the following day most of the bodies of the dead had been found and removed,
and the fires had either burnt out or had been extinguished.
The number of known dead was later given as 468, but over 100 others were missing and have
never been accounted for since. The injured totalled 3,000, of whom more than 800 were detained
in hospital. Two thousand people had their homes badly damaged, and 15,000 people were fed
daily during the emergency period lasting several days.
The monetary loss was enormous, and has been estimated by the US National Fire Prevention
Association (NFPA) as being in the region of 67 million dollars.
The lessons to be learnt from this appalling disaster may be listed as follows:
1. Ammonium nitrate packed in bulk in a ship's hold has an enormous explosive potential.
2. There is also danger in packing the nitrate in paper bags. Metal drums or wooden casks are
essential; and any drums damaged during loading operations should be at once removed, and
the spillage carefully swept up.
3. Delay in calling the fire brigade can be fatal. (It is good practice to c~l the fire brigade
immediately to any fire which breaks out on a vessel in port.)
4. Water only, but water in great quantity, must be used for fire-fighting when ammonium
nitrate is concerned. On no account must the hold be battened down and steam injection
applied. Carbon dioxide, foam, and other such extinguishing agents are equally dangerous,

and should never be used. The reason is that ammonium nitrate is an oxygen producer, and
so provides its own oxygen to aid combustion. But it also dissolves in water, and this has an
unusual cooling effect on the mass. (Many other chemicals produce heat when dissolving in
water.)
5. The "No Smoking" rule must be rigidly enforced at all times during loading or unloading.
6. Lines of hose should always be laid out ready during loading or unloading.
7. Ammonium nitrate must be kept entirely segregated from all organic, acidic, oxidising,
highly combustible or explosive material. This applies to the entire hold, including the
'tweendeck. Shelter deck vessels3 are generally unsuitable for carrying nitrates. Storage
should also be at a safe distance from all steam lines and electric cables.
8. The officer in charge of the fire brigade must be in unchallenged command of all
fire-fighting operations. In the Texas City disaster, a ship's officer, sooner than allow water
to damage his cargo, gave the order to batten down the hold and apply steam. Any
experienced fire officer would have known that to deal thus with fire in a readily oxidisable
material was to court disaster. (Questions relating to a ship's stability, on the other hand, are
the prerogative of the ship's officer.)
The International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code lists ammonium nitrate as a "strong
supporter of combustion". Its characteristic properties include the rendering of certain substances
easily flammable. The crystals are soluble in water. In temperatures above 400°F., rapid
decomposition may occur, with evolution of heat and poisonous gas. Forms an explosive mixture
when mixed with certain organic materials. A damgerous good declaration and packaging certificate
must be furnished certifying that the substance does not contain added organic material other than of
a nature and within an approved limit. The following conditions of carriage are laid down:
Details of Main or Details of Protective Stowage in Passenger Restrictions in Ships

Inner Packing or Outer Packing and Cargo Ships carrying Explosives
1. Glass or earthenware containers 1. Packed with suitable inorganic 1. On or under deck. Away from Must, if stowed under deck or in a
of suitable make, effectively protective material in wooden all combustible cargo and strong shelter deck place, be separated
closed. cases. acids. from the explosives by the engine
and boiler rooms space or by one
2. ditto. 2. Packed singly in: 2. ditto. complete hold in a horizontal plane;
(a) Wicker hampers with wicker and if in a shelter deck space there
bonnets; or must, in addition, be an efficient
(b) stout slatted crates lined with fire stop (ie a complete steel
suitable inorganic protective bulkhead or one in which the
material, and with adequate openings are effectively closed by a
protection of the neck of the stout steel plate or plates secured to
container; or the bulkhead) between the place in
(c) strong iron hampers with iron which the goods are carried and the
bonnets with not less than ½ inch holds in which the explosives are
of packing material; the whole to stowed. If carried on the open deck,
be contained in a case, crate or they must not be directly above the
hamper unless the diameter of the hold in which the explosives are
base of the metal hamper is stowed and if the the explosives are
approximately equal to the in the compartment immediately
diameter of the top of the hamper. below the deck, the goods must be
separated from them by a distance
2(a). Suitable polythene bags, 2(a). Packed in wooden cases with 2(a). On or under deck. Away
of at least one compartment.
effectively closed. suitable inorganic protective from all combustible cargo and
material. Not more than 1 cwt. per strong acids.
case.
3. Tins or cans of suitable make, 3. Packed in wooden cases. 3. ditto.
effectively closed.
4. Suitable new metal drums (eg 4. — 4. ditto.
steel) effectively closed, which
may or may not be lined with a
suitable material or coated
internally with suitable paint or
lacquer.
3
A "sheIter deck" vessel is one which has a continuous deck, running the length of the ship, from which access can be gained
to every one of the holds. Obviously in such a ship a serious fire in one of the holds can easily spread along the shelter deck,
and so throughout the ship.

Two Similar Explosions — Brest and Melbourne

Only four months after the Texas City disaster, it was the turn of the city of Brest in France to
suffer a similar mishap. On July 28th, 1947, at 12.35 p.m., the 7,000 ton Liberty ship Ocean
Liberty, laden with mixed cargo including 3,309 tons of ammonium nitrate fertiliser, took fire in
Brest Harbour. Again steam smothering was tried, despite the recent tragic warning.
The fire spread with great speed, and about one and threequarter hours after the start the
authorities started to tow the ship from its position at the West Quay. She was taken about half a
mile from the nearest port installation, where various unsuccessful attempts were made to sink her;
but at 5.38 p.m. she blew up with a terrific explosion which killed 21 people and injured a further
100 in the city. Had the ship not been moved from the densely populated harbour area, the loss of
life would have been enormous.
Many serious fires were started in the city, and the resources of the fire brigade were taxed to the
limit. Damage to shore installations alone is estimated at $2 million.
The menace of the readily oxidising agents was further hammered home when the 10,000-ton
British freighter Mahia blew up on August 6th, 1947, in the Victoria Docks, Melbourne, with the
loss of 10 lives. Sodium chlorate in iron drums was this time involved, the total quantity being no
more than 40 tons. It is thought that the iron containers had deteriorated during the voyage,
permitting spillage of the contents.
During unloading, a friction spark from a metal drum probably started a fire. Within the next
few minutes, four minor explosions took place—and no doubt scattered more material over the deck
on which the cargo was being carried. Unfortunately, though, some of the burning material was
blown down the open hatches of Nos. 4 and 5 holds and a far bigger explosion followed. Isolated
fires were started on the roofs of adjoining buildings up to 150, yards from the ship. It required 15
lines of hose finally to extinguish the fire some six hours later. The victims were men who had been
working in the holds, and who were trapped when the explosions took place.
This fire serves as a serious warning that sodium chlorate, even when contained in metal drums,
can be a hazardous cargo which demands extreme care in handling.
The Bombay Dock Catastrophe — April 14th, 1944

Article 24 of the Merchant Shipping (Safety and Load Line Conventions) Act, 1932, prohibits
the carriage of goods liable to endanger the lives of passengers or the safety of the ship unless "for
the public service of the State under conditions authorised by the, Administration".
The public service of the State was being taxed to its extreme limit in April, 1944, when
Bombay's docks were crowded with shipping, most of whose holds were crammed with the
impedimenta of war. Ships' manifests showed that thousands of tons of high explosives were being
carried which, in happier times, would never have been allowed inside the docks. Some really
dreadful mixtures of cargo were permitted to individual ships under the exigencies of war. The Fort
Stikene, for example, a 7,000-ton British freighter built in Canada, carried in her holds dried fish,
3,000 tons of cotton, 155 gold ingots worth £2 million, and 1,395 tons of ammunition and high
explosives. Worse still, about 300 tons of T.N.T. packed in wooden cases lay in the 'tween-decks of
No. 2 hold, the lower hold of which contained ammunition, baled Punjab cotton, and dried fish.
Now of all cargoes carried by ships, cotton has the worst record, bar none, in terms of the
incidence of fire. And so the stage was set for the worst dock disaster of all time.
The Fort Stikene arrived in Bombay from Karachi on April 13th 1944, and berthed in the
Victoria Dock. Unloading began at 8 a.m. the following day. No. 2 hold was opened, and the
stevedores started to discharge the dried fish which lay on top of the baled cotton. (Normally, of
course, the ammunition and explosives would have been removed from the 'tween-decks first; but
this was wartime, and safety regulations were forgotten. The only precautions which had been taken
were that hoses had been laid out from a hydrant on the quayside and led on board the ship. Not
even the statutory red flag was flying at the mast-head.)

Just after lunch, at about 1.30 p.m., fire was discovered in the lower hold among the baled cotton.
The stevedores at once stopped work, and the crew began to tackle the fire with lines of hose from
the deck mains. Only 40 minutes later was the Bombay Fire Brigade informed that a ship laden
with explosives was on fire.
The brigade eventually arrived to find smoke pouring from No. 2 hold. They immediately got to
work with lines of hose-as they had done so often in the past, for fires in cotton were not uncommon
in Bombay. The technique is to force in literally tons of water in an attempt to soak it into the heart
of the burning bales. (Inert-gas producers were unknown at this time, and in any event would have
been too risky to use in the light of the T.N.T. in the 'tween-decks.)
An awful dilemma soon faced Colonel J. R. Sadler, the officer with ultimate responsibility for
fire-fighting operations within the port. Should he order the Fort Stikene to be towed to sea and
abandoned or sunk, or should he rely on his fire brigade being able to extinguish the fire? He
decided that the risk of trying to get her out of the harbour, which would be a slow business owing
to the tortuous route, was too great to bear. During this time, the ship would be able to use only her
own equipment to hold the fire, and he thought it better to leave her where she was. Colonel
Sadler's position was an impossible one. If he had ordered the ship to move, and she had blown up
before she reached the open sea, he would have been accused of taking her out of fire brigade hands.
As it later turned out, he was to be accused of leaving her in fire brigade hands!
An officer of the Indian Army Ordnance Corps, knowing the danger, suggested that the ship be
scuttled at the quayside. But the Master refused to accept responsibility for this, and no one seemed
to have the right to give the appropriate order.
Meanwhile, fire-fighting operations were proceeding, but without much sign of the fire
diminishing. Smoke was so thick that the men could hardly see what they were doing. Soon after 3
p.m., a "hot spot" appeared on the starboard shell plating at the forward end of No. 2 hold. The fire
brigade sent for their cutting apparatus to cut through into the hold; but the apparatus was defective,
and they never achieved their object. The dockyard engineer sent for a gang with the necessary
equipment to perform this task; but by the time they arrived, the area in question was so hot that the
men could not get near it with their cutting torches.
At about 3.45 p.m. black smoke started to billow out of the hold; some of the explosives were
starting to ignite. It became obvious that the ship was doomed, and that she might blow up at any
minute. Nevertheless, the firemen continued to pour water into the 'tweendecks in an attempt to
cool the boxes of T.N.T.; but the water rising in the hold forced up some burning bales of cotton (or
the timber battens on which they rested)
to the underside of the 'tween-deck.
Soon the T.N.T. cases started to burn,
and the firemen ran for safety.
It was too late. At seven minutes
past four, the Fort Stikene blew up with
a colossal explosion, and spread havoc
over a large area. Every fireman in the
area, 40 in number, was killed outright;
all that was ever found of these gallant
Indians was their steel helmets. Huge
quantities of debris and blazing cotton
were flung into the sky, to fall and set
fire to warehouses, dock buildings and
other ships in the harbour. The Fort
Stikene was blown in two; and her
boiler, still intact, was later found half a
mile away in the city. A huge tidal
FIGURE 6.5 Plans of the Bombay Docks. wave crossed the dock, tore ships from

their moorings, and smashed them against the quays. One 5,000-ton coaster actually came to rest
across and on top of a low warehouse building. The 3,935-ton British vessel Jalapadma, which had
been moored ahead of the Fort Stikene, came to rest alongside what remained of that ship.
A second enormous explosion followed at 4.33 p.m., probably again in the Fort Stikene, and
completed the scene of death and destruction. A flaming column of black smoke shot nearly 2,000
ft. into the air, and red-hot debris showered everywhere. It is recorded that the entire poop-deck of
the Jalapadma, complete with its 12-pounder gun, was blown over buildings 40 ft. high to land 200
yards away in the main road outside the docks. Almost every ship and shed in the docks was alight
and the sky was black with smoke and dust. Ships torn from their moorings floated at random about
the docks, those of their crews who were still capable of action being frantically at work trying to
extinguish the fires raging on board.
A further 25 firemen had been killed, and 83 injured, in the second explosion; so that almost the
entire brigade was now out of action. With most of the dock area, and some 25 ships, on fire, this
was a most serious situation. The Army were called in to assist; but it was not until four days later
that the last big fire was put out. Smaller fires continued to smoulder for two weeks in the ruins of
the huge warehouses, with their grain, paper, paint, cotton and other contents.
The casualty figures were finally assessed at 231 persons killed and 476 injured among the
various Services, the fire brigade, and dock employees; and over 500 civilians killed and 2,408
injured. Twelve ships were lost, in addition to the Fort Stikene: Baroda, British, 3,205 tons; Fort
Crevier, British, 7,131 tons; Kingyuan, British, 2,653 tons; El Hind, British, 5,314 tons; Jalapadma,
British, 3,935 tons; Rod el Farag, Egyptian, 6,842 tons; Generaal van der Heyden, Dutch, 1,213
tons; Generaal van Sweiten, Dutch, 1,300 tons; Tenombo, Dutch, 872 tons; Graciosa, Norwegian,
1,773 tons; Iran, Panamanian, 5,704 tons; and Norse Trade, Panamanian, 3,507 tons. They formed
a total of over 50,000 tons of shipping which the Allies could ill spare at such a time — in addition
to which a further 50,000 tons of shipping was more or less severely damaged.
The report of the Commission appointed to conduct an enquiry into the incident came to the
conclusion that the most likely cause of fire was the careless disposal of a cigarette or other smoking
material. "Other factors contributing to the disaster," stated their Report, "undoubtedly include the
following:
1. Failure to realise the seriousness of the fire at the start.

2. Absence of any centralised executive control with power to issue paramount orders, and to
co-ordinate the various authorities and services concerned.
3. Improper stowage of cotton above and below explosives and ammunition.
4. Failure to locate immediately the seat of the fire, and to concentrate fire-fighting efforts
thereon.
5. Delay in summoning the fire brigade.
6. Lack of any alarm-signal procedure by which docks could be cleared of non-essential
personnel; and failure of civil police to give warning to other ships in the dock of the
impending disaster.
7. Failure to cover the hatchways of Nos. 4 and 5 holds after the outbreak of fire in No. 2 hold.
This failure left a direct path for the fire to spread to the explosives in No. 4 hold.
8. Neither the Commodore, Royal Indian Navy, nor the Naval Officer-in-Charge, to both of
whom authority was given under the Defence of India Rules to order a ship on fire in the
docks to be scuttled or beached was informed of the fire.
9. Either the Bombay Fire Brigade Services' gas-cutting apparatus, or its manipulation, was
defective, and failed to cut any hole in the side of the ship when the attempt was made."
The one redeeming feature about the whole affair was the way in which Lloyds and the British
Insurance Companies accepted their responsibilities towards the victims of the explosion. The
disaster created a situation unprecedented in insurance history in India, and an emergency meeting
of representatives of Fire, Marine and Accident Insurance Companies was held on the day after the

explosion to discuss the position as it affected insurance interests. It would have been easy for the
Companies to plead that the entire loss was the responsibility of the Government; but they did not
do so.
To quote from the Insurance Index of June, 1944: "A plan of immediate compensation was then
decided upon". Broadly, the damage to property on land fell into two main headings: (a) damage by
fire, and (b) blast damage without fire. The Government of India scheme also differentiated
between property insured against fire risks and property which was not. The Government have
decided to pay 100 per cent of the damage to insured property, while insurers have agreed to make a
voluntary contribution of 12½ per cent of the ascertained damage as calculated on the values
declared for insurance under fire policies. In the case of owners of uninsured property, they will be
compensated by the Government to the extent of 75 per cent of the damage. Where damage
occurred from blast without the intervention of fire, the Government has agreed to pay 100 per cent
compensation if the property was covered by fire insurance policies extended to cover explosion,
and 87½ per cent if the property was either uninsured or was insured by a policy not so extended.
"Insurers of accident risks are prepared to settle the ascertained claims, subject to Government
reimbursement, to the extent of 50 per cent. Marine underwriters agreed to the same procedure,
subject to a 40 per cent Government reimbursement."
It is doubtful whether any other group of insurance interests in the world would have adopted so
generous an attitude.

Chapter Seven
The Legal Environment
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is simply to lay the foundation of the basic legal environment in
which ships operate and the legislation which govern the safety of ships against the risk, or
consequence of fire, and which will apply whenever a casualty occurs resulting from this cause.
After men went down to the sea in ships in any great numbers there must inevitably have arisen
problems and disputes which required settlement in a civilised manner as represented by law.
Rhodian Law, arising from the Island of Rhodes, is believed to be the forerunner of maritime law
and dates back as far as 900 B.C. Sadly almost nothing is known of the content of this ancient piece
of legislation.
As the author said in the Second Edition of FIRE ABOARD:
It is with a feeling of trepidation that the Author approaches this subject knowing full
well that he is, both by profession and inclination, a fire-fighter and as such has a very
limited knowledge of the law. After much soul searching decided that he should include
this Chapter, if only to attempt to explain some of the problems which can befall unwary
shipowners and to alert masters' and others to the responsibility they shoulder under
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts. Naturally the Author's approach is that of a
complete layman and he hopes that his many lawyer friends throughout the world will
forgive any obvious transgressions which appear.
Maritime law is a mix of the law of the Flag States, the Port States, International Convention and
is influenced by Protecting and Indemnity Clubs, Hull and Machinery Underwriters and Insurers and
not least follows marine accidents. Fire-fighters the world over have a saying that "new safety
legislation is only produced when there is a sufficiently long row of corpses". For example, as a
result of the death of 158 persons on board the Scandinavian Star all new ships built after 1994
required to fitted with smoke detection systems and companion ways with sprinklers. Existing
vessel had until October 1997 to be retrofitted. This incident is described in greater detail in
Chapter 4.
One outcome of the Piper Alpha Disaster described in Chapter 10, was that offshore safety
became the responsibility of the Health and Safety Executive in the UK. The Cullen Report also
recommended all offshore operators produce detailed safety cases1 for existing and new structures
which include ships adapted or built as floating production units. This was subsequently adopted.
The adoption and implementation of the International Safety Management Code (ISM) and the
Seafarers' Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Code by the IMO have moved the
shipping industry in the same direction. Indeed in the near future it is likely that European
1
A safety case is a written appraisal of all risks to which personnel on a platform are exposed. The safety case describes the measure
adopted which mitigate the risk to an acceptably low level.
124
The Legal Environment 125
Community Members will require their flag ships to produce safety cases. This will start with high
risk vessels such as tankers, chemical carriers, ferries and the like.
International Maritime Organisation
Initially the all embracing legislation which applies is that which is prepared by the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO), in the form of a Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention,
produced as a series of Regulations, or Rules, which then await ratification by its member States —
a process which usually takes a number of years. Later amendments are made by means of a
Protocol. Currently, in the IMO there are world-wide 137 Member States and two Associate
Members. The IMO then does not as a body itself produce legislation but this is left to each
National Government to prepare its own individual law in the form of an Act. The Regulations
contained in the Convention in effect become minimum standards to which all Member States must
conform. But internationally all nations signatory to the IMO recognise and accept the universality
of the Regulations. The current edition of the Safety of Life at Sea Regulations (SOLAS) 1974, and
the Amendments of 1982, 1992, 1994 and 1996 was published in the Consolidated Edition of 1997.
It should be borne in mind however, that SOLAS is a evolving and changing set of regulations and
the reader is cautioned to check those rules in force or to come into force. One of the easiest ways
of doing this is to use the Lloyds Register "Rulefinder" software which is regularly updated and
contains both current and projected legislation as well as their own Classification Rules.
There are, of course, other than the subject of fire, many other important subjects incorporated in
SOLAS. The chapters of SOLAS are listed below:
CHAPTER I General provisions

CHAPTER II-1 Construction - Subdivision and stability, machinery and electrical
installations
CHAPTER II-2 Construction - Fire protection, fire detection and fire extinction
CHAPTER III Life-Saving Appliances, Etc.
CHAPTER IV Radiotelegraphy and radiotelephony
CHAPTER V Safety of navigation
CHAPTER VI Carriage of cargoes
CHAPTER VII Carriage of dangerous goods
CHAPTER VIII Nuclear ships
CHAPTER IX Management for the safe operation of ships
CHAPTER X Safety measures for high-speed craft
CHAPTER XI Special measures to enhance maritime safety
SOLAS covers the entire application of fire safety on board ship and the applicable regulation is
reproduced in full at the start of each section dealing with each piece of equipment or fire safety
management system. Those parts of SOLAS which apply to fire safety, in the main from
Chapter II-2, are reproduced in Chapters 8 and 9 where the application of the regulations are
illustrated and discussed in detail.
In addition to SOLAS the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime
Organization produces circulars and resolution many of which relate to fire. A list of the IMO
Regulations and Codes is reproduced in Appendix B.
UK Legislation
So far as England and later the United Kingdom is concerned, it is quite surprising that no Acts
of Parliament were enacted to lay down safety standards for ships until almost the 19th Century.
Clearly successive Governments adopted a laissez faire attitude towards such mundane matters. It
was not until 1870 that Mr Samuel Plimsoll introduced his famous resolution asking for legislation
to control load lines on ships and pressing for other general safety requirements. However it was

not until 1890 that the "Plimsoll Line" regulations

were embodied in an Act of Parliament.
Earlier there had been an Act passed —
Merchant Shipping Act 1871 — which required
that the draught of all merchant ships be indicated
at bow and stern. But the first U.K. act which
embodied safety and comfort features for
passengers and crew was the Merchant Shipping
Act 1894. Even in this very lengthy Act, consisting
as it does of 748 sections and 22 schedules, only
two references are made to fire. Section 290 of the
Act ordained that every emigrant ship shall be
provided "with a fire engine in proper working
order and of such description and power, and either
with or without such other apparatus for
extinguishing fire as the emigration officer may
approve". In Section 432 it lays down that "every
British seagoing steamship not used wholly as a tug
shall be provided with a hose capable of being
connected with the engines of the ship, and adapted
for extinguishing fire in any part of the ship".
An early nineteenth century advertisement for a
ship's fire pump manufactured by Shand, Mason &
Co in order to satisfy the requirement of ships FIGURE 7.1 Advertisement for ship's fire pump which
conforms to the 1884 Act.
having to provide a fire pump on board, is
reproduced in Figure 7.1. This 1894 Act
consolidated in the Merchant Shipping Act of 1995 is cited in quite modern cases, for example, the
collision case involving The Lady Gwendolen which is described in "Ship Fires and the Law".
Section 186 of the 1995 Act excludes the owner of a UK ship from liability for the loss or
damage of any property by reason of fire except where the loss or damage results from an act or
omission of the owner.
It is interesting to note that the United States of America had a similar provision going back to
1851 - "9 Statute 635". Section 182 provided the shipowner with a statutory defence to claims for
damage by fire to merchandise shipped on board his vessel, unless the fire is caused by his design or
neglect. This appears under the Fire Statute, 46 United States Code, viz:
"Loss by fire - No owner of any vessel shall be liable to answer for or make good to any
person any loss or damage, which may happen to any merchandise whatsoever, which
may be shipped, taken in, or put on board any such vessel, by reason or by any means of
any fire happening to or on board the vessel, unless such fire is caused by the design or
neglect of such owner."
Section 183(a) of the Code provides a statutory limit to the shipowners liability for losses
occurring without his privity or knowledge, viz:
"The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign, for any
embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of any property, goods, or
merchandise shipped or put on board that vessel, or for any loss, damage or injury by
collision, or for, any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage or forfeiture, done, occasioned,
or incurred without the privity and knowledge of such owner or owners shall not, except
in the cases provided for in subsection (b) of this section, exceed the amount of value of
the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight the pending."

The Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts

The "Carriage of Goods by Sea Act", (U.K. COGSA 1971 Chapter 19) is of particular interest to
all nations signatory to the Brussels Convention 1924 and indeed to all persons with an interest in
commercial shipping. The Rules in this Act means the International Convention for the unification
of certain rules of law relating to bills of lading signed at Brussels on 25th August, 1924 — the
Hague Rules, as amended by the Protocol signed at Brussels on 23rd February, 1968 - the
Hague-Visby Rules and the Protocol signed at Brussels on 21st December 1979. Virtually the same
Rules are enacted in the United States viz: "U.S. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936" (COGSA) 46
U.S.C.1300 ET SEQ. Almost the only difference between the UK and the US legislation is that, as
is usual with such documents emanating from both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, the latter is laid out
in a much more readable form. Main headings introduce each individual clause and this is of great
benefit to the reader. Attention is drawn to the fact that the headings are provided purely for
convenience and do not form part of the statutory text. If only British legislators would take a leaf
out of their American counterparts book!
The main effect of the amendments to COGSA as contained in the British 1971 Act is as follows:
1. Application of Hague Rules as amended
(1) In this Act, "the Rules" means the International Convention for the unification of
certain rules of law relating to bills of lading signed at Brussels on 25th August 1924,
as amended by the Protocol signed at Brussels on 23rd February 1968.
(2) The provisions of the Rules, as set out in the Schedule to this Act, shall have the
force of law.
(3) Without prejudice to subsection (2) above, the said provisions shall have effect
(and have the force of law) in relation to and in connection with the carriage of goods
by sea in ships where the port of shipment is a port in the United Kingdom, whether or
not the carriage is between ports in two different States within the meaning of Article X
of the Rules.
(4) Subject to subsection (6) below, nothing in this section shall be taken as applying
anything in the Rules to any contract for the carriage of goods by sea, unless the
contract expressly or by implication provides for the issue of a bill of lading or any
similar document of title.
(5) [Repealed].
(6) Without prejudice to Article X(c) of the Rules, the Rules shall have the force of law
in relation to-
(a) any bill of lading if the contract contained in or evidenced by it expressly
provides that the Rules shall govern the contract, and
(b) any receipt which is a non-negotiable document marked as such if the contract
contained in or evidenced by it is a contract for the carriage of goods by sea which
expressly provides that the Rules are to govern the contract as if the receipt were
a bill of lading, but subject, where paragraph (b) applies, to any necessary
modifications and in particular with the omission in Article III of the Rules of the
second sentence of paragraph 4 and of paragraph 7.
(7) If and so far as the contract contained in or evidenced by a bill of lading or receipt
within paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (6) above applies to deck cargo or live
animals, the Rules as given the force of law by that subsection shall have effect as if
Article 1(c) did not exclude deck cargo and live animals. n this subsection "deck cargo"
means cargo which by the contract of carriage is stated as being carried on deck and
is so carried.
2. Contracting States, etc. - omitted
3. Absolute warranty of seaworthiness not to be implied in contracts to which Rules
apply. There shall not be implied in any contract for the carriage of goods by sea to
which the Rules apply by virtue of this Act any absolute undertaking by the carrier of
the goods to provide a seaworthy ship.
4. Application of Act to British possessions, etc. - omitted
5. Extension of application of Rules to carriage from ports in British possessions, etc. -
omitted
6. Supplemental.
(1) This Act may be cited as the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971.
(2) It is hereby declared that this Act extends to Northern Ireland.

(3) The following enactments shall be repealed, that is-

(a) the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1924, 1924 c. 22.
(b) section 12(4)(a) of the Nuclear Installations Act 1965,1965 c. 63. and, without
prejudice to section 38(1) of the Interpretation Act 1889, the reference to the said
Act of 1924 in section 1(1)(i)(ii) of the Hovercraft Act 1968 shall include a reference
to this Act. 1968 c. 59.
(4) It is hereby declared that for the purposes of Article VIII of 1894 c. 60. Rules
section 502 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (which, as 1958 c. 62. amended by
the Merchant Shipping (Liability of Shipowners and Others) Act 1958, entirely exempts
shipowners and others in certain circumstances from liability for loss of, or damage to,
goods) is a provision relating to limitation of liability.
(5) This Act shall come into force on such day as Her Majesty my by Order in Council
appoint, and, for the purposes of the transition from the law in force immediately before
the day appointed under this subsection to the provisions of this Act, the Order
appointing the day may provide that these provisions shall have effect subject to such
transitional provisions as may be contained in the Order.
By virtue of the fact that in maritime cases involving cargo interests, almost invariably the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act is cited, it seems appropriate here, particularly for the benefit of
non-legal readers, to record the all important Schedule to this Act. The Schedule to the U.K. Act
(COGSA 1971) the Hague Rules, as amended by the Brussels Protocol 1968, reads as follows:
SCHEDULE
THE HAGUE RULES AS AMENDED BY THE BRUSSELS PROTOCOL 1968
Article I
In these Rules the following words are employed with the meanings set out below:-
(a) "Carrier" includes the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage
with a shipper.
(b) "Contract of Carriage" applies only to contracts of carriage covered by a bill of
lading or any similar document of title, in so far as such document relates to the
carriage of goods by sea, including any bill of lading or any similar document as
aforesaid issued under or pursuant to a charter party from the moment at which such
bill of lading or similar document of title regulates the relations between a carrier and a
holder of the same.
(c) "Goods" includes goods, wares, merchandise, and articles of every kind
whatsoever except live animals and cargo which by the contract of carriage is stated
as being carried on deck and is so carried.
(d) "Ship" means any vessel used for the carriage of goods by sea.
(e) "Carriage of goods" covers the period from the time when the goods are loaded on
to the time they are discharged from the ship.
Author's note: Apropos sub-section (e) above, the U.S. Harter Act 1893, which is still law
though largely superseded by COGSA, covers the goods until these are delivered and unlike
COGSA has no limitation of time. Neither did COGSA repeal or amend the Pomerene Act which
relates to bills of lading in interstate and foreign commerce, commonly known as the "Pomerene
Bills of Lading Act" (U.S. Code, Title 49, secs. 81-124, 39 Stat. 638). The Pomerene Act does not
apply to bills of lading issued in foreign countries for shipment to the U.S.
Article II
Subject to the provisions of Article VI, under every contract of carriage of goods by sea
the carrier, in relation to the loading, handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care and
discharge of such goods, shall be subject to the responsibilities and liabilities, and
entitled to the rights and immunities hereinafter set forth.
Article III
1. The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise
due diligence to -
(a) Make the ship seaworthy.
(b) Properly man, equip and supply the ship.

(c) Make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers and all other parts of the ship in
which good are carried, fit and safe for their reception carriage and preservation.
2. Subject to the provisions of Article IV, the carrier shall properly and carefully load,
handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried.
3. After receiving the goods into his charge the carrier or the master or agent of the
carrier shall, on demand of the shipper, issue to the shipper a bill of lading showing
among other things -
(a) The leading marks necessary for identification of the goods as the same are
furnished in writing by the shipper before the loading of such goods starts, provided
such marks are stamped or otherwise shown clearly upon the goods if uncovered, or
on the cases or coverings in which such goods are contained, in such a manner as
should ordinarily remain legible until the end of the voyage.
(b) Either the number of packages or pieces, or the quantity, or weight, as the case
may be, as furnished in writing by the shipper.
(c) The apparent order and condition of the goods. Provided that no carrier, master or
agent of the carrier shall be bound to state or show in the bill of lading any marks,
number, quantity, or weight which he has reasonable ground for suspecting not
accurately to represent the goods actually received, or which he has reasonable
means of checking.
4. Such a bill of lading shall be prima facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of the
goods as therein described in accordance with paragraph 3 (a), (b) and (c). However
proof to the contrary shall not be admissible when the bill of lading has been
transferred to a third party acting in good faith.
5. The shipper shall be deemed to have guaranteed to the carrier the accuracy at the
time of shipment of the marks, number, quantity and weight, as furnished by him, and
the shipper shall indemnify the carrier against all loss, damages and expenses arising
or resulting from inaccuracies in such particulars. The right of the carrier to such
indemnity shall in no way limit his responsibility and liability under the contract of
carriage to any person other than the shipper.
6. Unless notice of loss or damage and the general nature of such loss or damage be
given in writing to the carrier or his agent at the port of discharge before or at the time
of the removal of the goods into the custody of the person entitled to delivery thereof
under the contract of carriage, or, if the loss or damage be not apparent, within three
days, such removal shall be prima facie evidence of the delivery by the carrier of the
goods as described in the bill of lading. The notice in writing need not be given if the
state of the goods has, at the time of their receipt, been the subject of joint survey or
inspection. Subject to paragraph 6bis the carrier and the ship shall in any event be
discharged from all liability whatsoever in respect of the goods, unless suit is brought
within one year of their delivery or of the date when they should have been delivered.
This period may, however, be extended if the parties so agree after the cause of action
has arisen. In the case of any actual or apprehended loss or damage the carrier and
the receiver shall give all reasonable facilities to each other for inspecting and tallying
the goods. 6bis. An action for indemnity against a third person may be brought even
after the expiration of the year provided for in the preceding paragraph if brought within
the time allowed by the law of the Court seized of the case. However, the time allowed
shall be not less than three months, commencing from the day when the person
bringing such action for indemnity has settled the claim or has been served with
process in the action against himself.
7. After the goods are loaded the bill of lading to be issued by the carrier, master, or
agent of the carrier, to the shipper shall, if the shipper so demands, be a "shipped" bill
of lading, provided that if the shipper shall have previously taken up any document of
title to such goods, he shall surrender the same as against the issue of the "shipped"
bill of lading, but at the option of the carrier such document of title may be noted at the
port of shipment by the carrier, master, or agent with the name or names of the ship or
ships upon which the goods have been shipped and the date or dates of shipment, and
when so noted, if it shows the particulars mentioned in paragraph 3 of Article III, shall
be for the purpose of this article be deemed to constitute a "shipped" bill of lading.
8. Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or
the ship from liability for loss or damage to, or in connection with, goods arising from
negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this article or
lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in these Rules, shall be null and
void and of no effect. A benefit of insurance in favour of the carrier or similar shall be
deemed to be a clause relieving the carrier from liability.

Author's note: Under Article III shipowners have a clear cut duty to exercise due diligence to
provide their ships which are in all respect seaworthy. This involves not only to properly man,
equip and supply the ship; but in addition, must ensure that all parts in which goods are carried are,
"fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation." Cases which invoke some, or all, of
these clauses include: Marquette; Don Jose Figueras; North America and the Damodar Tanabe all
cases which are described in detail in "Ship Fires and the Law".
Briefly, in the case of the Marquette the judge decided that the ship was unseaworthy by virtue of
not fitting a valve on the outside of the engine room casing whereby the steam smothering system
could in the event of a fire in the space be operated safely.
The Don Jose Figueras was declared unseaworthy by virtue of having:
"An incompetent master and crew. They were not properly trained in the use of the
vessel's fire-fighting equipment, principally the CO2 system. They did not possess
elemental a knowledge of the properties, function, and the use of CO2."
In the case of the North America the judge found that the ship was unseaworthy by virtue of a
crew which was untrained in fire-fighting procedures. Further, that the crew were inadequate both
in number and rank.
The Damodar Tanabe case was, in the author's experience, almost unique in that the judge found
the ship to be unseaworthy, yet gave the ship the decision in law. The judge described his decision
as being "oxymoronic" (apparent contradiction) and the author would say "amen" to that! This is
both an interesting and complex case and covers over forty pages in "Ship Fires and the Law".
Readers might find the account of this fire to be of interest. Very briefly, the case involved a bulk
FIGURE 7.2 Looking aft shows a close-up view of FIGURE 7.3 In the No. 3 lower hold showing bales of
wood pulp aboard the Damodar Tanabe. Note how the wood pulp which have swollen tightly against the
bales have quite literally squeezed themselves out of the underside of the wing (saddle) tank. Explosives had to be
hold, in the manner of toothpaste out of a tube. The used to free the cargo. Note the distorted steelwork of
sheer power of this action is amply demonstrated. the underside of the tank caused by the tremendous
FIGURE 7.4 Inside starboard wing tank showing large FIGURE 7.5 Looking down into No. 3 hold showing
steel webs distorted and broken through the pressure the very small amount of actual fire damage to the
exerted by the swollen wood pulp in the No. 3 hold. This wood pulp.
pressure was so huge that even the ship's side was bowed
outwards.

carrier not fitted with a CO2 system in the cargo holds. She was carrying a cargo of baled wood
pulp, well known for its propensity to swell in contact with water and so dangerous as to warrant
many of the Flag States issuing warning notices against allowing the cargo to become wet.
Actually, the ship had on board an 'M' Notice issued by the Indian Government pointing to the
dangers of wood pulp absorbing water. As far back as 1973 the UK Department of Trade and
Industry had issued as an instruction for the Guidance of Surveyors, a dire warning relating to the
dangers associated with an ingress of water into holds containing wood pulp. The actual wording is
short:
Wood pulp should only be carried in compartments where the entry of water can be
prevented. In particular, the air pipes and ventilators leading to such compartments
must be effectively closed and protected against possible damage from deck cargo.
With no CO2 system available when the cargo in a hold became involved in fire the master had
no recourse other than to use water in order to control the outbreak. Not to have done so would
have inevitably led to the fire spreading and the loss of the ship. In the event, the cargo swelled to
such extent that the 100 ton hatch covers on the affected hold were torn off and lifted some two
metres above the level of the coaming. Even the ship's side was bowed outwards by the tremendous
pressure exerted and huge steel webs in a wing tank were distorted and broken. Only superb
seamanship on the part of the Master enabled the ship, through tremendous seas to reach the safety
of Honolulu.
The carrier and the ship will escape liability, "unless suit is brought within one year of their
delivery, or the date when they should have been delivered." There is, of course, the waiver
contained in 6bis which relates to an action for indemnity against a third person. One of the obvious
difficulties faced by carriers is that bills of lading must be issued upon request of the shipper (Para.
3 (a)(b)(c) and clearly there is no way that packages can be opened up and checked for accuracy of
shippers description of contents. Again, of course, there are waivers to protect the carrier -
paragraphs 4, 5 and 6.
There was a famous arson case in the UK in the 1930's, (Leopold Harris) where it was
established that in some of the cases involved, the goods on which insurance was claimed had been
salvaged from previous fires and were therefore of substantially lessor value. The perpetrator in this
case was sentenced to a number of years as a guest of His Majesty!
Article IV
1. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or resulting
from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on the part of the carrier
to make the ship seaworthy, and to secure that the ship is properly manned, equipped
and supplied, and to make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers and all other
parts of the ship in which goods are carried fit and safe for their reception, carriage and
preservation in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article III. Whenever
loss or damage has resulted from unseaworthiness the burden of proving the exercise
of due diligence shall be on the carrier or other person claiming exemption under this
article.
2. Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or
resulting from:
(a) Act, neglect, or default of the master, mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in
the navigation or in the management of the ship.
(b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier.
(c) Perils, dangers and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters.
(d) Act of God.
(e) Act of war.
(f) Act of public enemies.
(g) Arrest or restraint of princes, rulers or people, or seizure under legal process,
(h) Quarantine restrictions.
(i) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his agent or representative. (j)
Strikes or lockouts or stoppage or restraint of labour from whatever cause, whether
partial or general.
(k) Riots and civil commotions.
(l) Saving or attempting to save life or property at sea.

(m) Wastage in bulk or weight or any other loss or damage arising from inherent
defect, quality or vice of the goods.
(n) Insufficiency of packing.
(o) Insufficiency or inadequacy of marks.
(p) Latent defects not discoverable by due diligence.
(q) Any other cause arising without the actual fault or privity of the carrier, or without
the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier, but the burden of proof shall
be on the person claiming the benefit of this exception to show that neither the actual
fault or privity of the carrier nor the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the
carrier contributed to the loss or damage.
3. The shipper shall not be responsible for loss or damage sustained by the carrier or
the ship arising or resulting from any cause without the act, fault or neglect of the
shipper, his agents or his servants.
4. Any deviation in saving or attempting to save life or property at sea or any
reasonable deviation shall not be deemed to be an infringement or breach of these
Rules or of the contract of carriage, and the carrier shall not be liable for any loss or
damage resulting therefrom.
5. (a) Unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper
before shipment and inserted in the bill of lading, neither the carrier nor the ship shall
in any event be or become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the
goods in an amount exceeding the equivalent of 10,000 francs per package or unit or
30 francs per kilo of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged, whichever is the
higher.
5. (b) The total amount recoverable shall be calculated by reference to the value of
such goods at the place and time at which the goods are discharged from the ship in
accordance with the contract or should have been so discharged. The value of the
goods shall be fixed according to the commodity exchange price, or, if there be no
such price, according to the current market price, or, if there be no commodity
exchange price or current market price, by reference to the normal value of goods of
the same kind and quality.
5 (c) Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is used to consolidate
goods, the number of packages or units enumerated in the bill of lading as packed in
such article of transport shall be deemed the number of packages or units for the
purpose of this paragraph as far as these packages or units are concerned. Except as
aforesaid such article of transport shall be considered the package or unit.
5 (d) A franc means a unit consisting of 65.5 milligrammes of gold of millesimal
fineness 900. The date of conversion of the sum awarded into national currencies
shall be governed by the law of the Court seized of the case.
5 (e). Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be entitled to the benefit of the limitation of
liability provided for in this paragraph if it is proved that the damage resulted from an
act or omission of the carrier done with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage would probably result.
5 (f). The declaration mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph, if embodied in
the bill of lading, shall be prima facie evidence, but shall not be binding or conclusive
on the carrier.
5 (g) By agreement between the carrier, master or agent of the carrier and the shipper
other maximum amounts than those mentioned in sub-paragraph (a) of this paragraph
may be fixed, provided that no maximum amount so fixed shall be less than the
appropriate maximum mentioned in that sub-paragraph.
5 (h). Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible in any event for loss or
damage to, or in connection with, goods if the nature or value thereof has been
knowingly mis-stated by the shipper in the bill of lading.
6. Goods of an flammable, explosive or dangerous nature to the shipment whereof the
carrier, master or agent of the carrier has not consented with knowledge of their nature
and character, may at any time before discharge be landed at any place, or destroyed
or rendered innocuous by the carrier without compensation and the shipper of such
goods shall be liable for all damages and expenses directly or indirectly arising out of
or resulting from such shipment. If any such goods shipped with such knowledge and
consent shall become a danger to the ship or cargo, they may in like manner be
landed at any place, or destroyed or rendered innocuous by the carrier without liability
on the part of the carrier except to general average, if any.

Article IV BIS
1. The defences and limits of liability provided for in these Rules shall apply in any
action against the carrier in respect of loss or damage to goods covered by a contract
of carriage whether the action be founded in contract or in tort.
2. If such an action is brought against a servant or agent of the carrier (such servant or
agent not being an independent contractor), such servant or agent shall be entitled to
avail himself of the defences and limits of liability which the carrier is entitled to invoke
under these Rules.
3. The aggregate of the amounts recoverable from the carrier, and such servants and
agents, shall in no case exceed the limit provided for in these Rules.
4. Nevertheless, a servant or agent of the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of
the provisions of this article, if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or
omission of the servant or agent done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and
with knowledge that damage would probably result.
Author's note: Article IV lies at the very heart of the shipowners responsibility and the
difficulty facing the lawyers attempting to establish that a given fire and subsequent loss, or damage,
was "....caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier." (Para. 2(b)) But the burden of proving
the exercise of due diligence initially rests with the carrier. (Para.1) Actually, in a trial this burden
moves back and forwards between plaintiff's and defendants and has been likened to a game of
"ping pong" as in the case of the Damodar Tanabe described in "Ship Fires and the Law". It is of
particular interest to note how the action of the "master, mariner, pilot, or servants of the carrier"
can be defended in the case of one or more of these persons perpetrating some "act, neglect, or
default". On the surface, the actions in a specific case of a master, mariner, pilot, or servant, might
seem to be outrageously careless, or even downright stupid, but unless his action can be traced back
to some failure on the part of the carrier to anticipate and guard against such, then "actual fault or
privity" will not be established. Here again, in addition to the above named vessel, the following
cases having a direct bearing, apropos diligence and unseaworthiness, namely the Marquette, Don
Jose Figueras and North America, again details of these cases can be found in "Ship Fires and the
Law".
Article V
A carrier shall be at liberty to surrender in whole or in part all or any of his rights and
immunities or to increase any of his responsibilities and obligations under these Rules,
provided such surrender or increase shall be embodied in the bill of lading issued to
the shipper. The provisions of these Rules shall not be applicable to charter parties,
but if the bills of lading are issued in the case of a ship under a charter party they shall
comply with the terms of these Rules. Nothing in these Rules shall be held to prevent
the insertion in a bill of lading of any lawful provision regarding general average.
Author's note: It will be seen that COGSA, which is not an all embracing code of law but rather
a codification of some of the terms, does not make it mandatory for bills of lading to be prepared
and there is no penalty imposed for a failure to draw up same. But apparently the U.S. Harter Act
which of course is still in force, does require that such bills be issued. Nevertheless, whether
legalistically required or not, such bills of lading are almost invariably prepared for every voyage
and the importance of drawing these up in such form as to ensure that the documents will withstand
the attempts of lawyers determined to 'drive a horse and cart' through them will be obvious to the lay
reader. The proper construction of these Bills has assumed almost an art form. Reader's wishing to
further their knowledge on this and indeed on all matters of law pertaining to shipping, could do no
better than consult what is probably one of the most comprehensive books available on the subject,
namely The Law of the Admiralty by Gilmore and Black2.
Article VI
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding articles, a carrier, master or agent of
the carrier and a shipper shall in regard to any particular goods be at liberty to enter
into any agreement in any terms as to the responsibility and liability of the carrier for
2
The Law of Admiralty by Grant Gilmore, Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School and Charles L. Black, Jr., Henry R. Luce Professor
of Jurisprudence Yale Law School, published under the University Textbook Series, by The Foundation Press, Inc., Mineola, New York.

such goods, and as to the rights and immunities of the carrier in respect of such
goods, or his obligation as to seaworthiness, so far as this stipulation is not contrary to
public policy, or the care or diligence of his servants or agents in regard to the loading,
handling, stowage, carriage, custody, care and discharge of the goods carried by sea,
provided that in this case no bill of lading has been or shall be issued and that the
terms agreed shall be embodied in a receipt which shall be a non-negotiable document
and shall be marked as such. Any agreement so entered into shall have full legal
effect. Provided that this article shall not apply to ordinary commercial shipments made
in the ordinary course of trade, but only to other shipments where the character or
condition of the property to be carried or the circumstances, terms and conditions
under which the carriage is to be performed are such as reasonably to justify a special
agreement.
Article VII
Nothing herein contained shall prevent a carrier or a shipper from entering into any
agreement, stipulation, condition, reservation or exemption as to the responsibility and
liability of the carrier or the ship for the loss or damage to, or in connection with, the
custody and care and handling of goods prior to the loading on, and subsequent to the
discharge from, the ship on which the goods are carried by sea.
Article VIII
The provisions of these Rules shall not affect the rights and obligations of the carrier
under any statute for the time being in force relating to the limitation of the liability of
owners of sea-going vessels.
Article IX
These Rules shall not affect the provisions of any international Convention or national
law governing liability for nuclear damage.
Article X
The provisions of these Rules shall apply to every bill of lading relating to the carriage
of goods between ports in two different States if:
(a) the bill of lading is issued in a contracting State, or
(b) the carriage is from a port in a contracting State, or
(c) the contract contained in or evidenced by the bill of lading provides that these Rules
or legislation of any State giving effect to them are to govern the contract. whatever
may be the nationality of the ship, the carrier, the shipper, the consignee, or any other
interested person.
The last two paragraphs of this article are not reproduced. They require contracting States to
apply the Rules to bills of lading mentioned in the article and authorise them to apply the Rules to
other bills of lading. Articles 11 to 16 of the International Convention for the unification of certain
rules of law relating to bills of lading signed at Brussels on 25th August 1924 are not reproduced.
They deal with the coming into force of the Convention, procedure for ratification, accession and
denunciation, and the right to call for a fresh conference to consider amendments to the Rules
contained in the Convention. COGSA then is the 'bible' which governs the transportation of goods
world-wide and should be carefully studied by all persons aspiring to become expert witnesses in
ship fire cases. It will be seen that this Act has remained remarkably little changed since first
published on the 25th August 1924, as amended by the Protocol signed at Brussels on 23rd February
1968 and by the Protocol signed at Brussels on 21st December 1979.
United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Hamburg, 1978

These are known as the 'Hamburg Rules' and came into effect, for 20 countries who ratified the
convention, in November 1992. Part I. General Provisions, contains Articles 1 to 3 inclusive.
Part II. Liability of the Carrier, Articles 4 to 11 inclusive. Part III. Liability of the Shipper,
Articles 12 and 13. Part IV. Transport Documents, Articles 14 to 18 inclusive. Part V, Claims
and Actions, Articles 19 to 22. Part VI, Supplement Provision, Articles 23 to 26. The reason

why the United Nations should hold this Convention and publish these Rules, when there was
already in existence what may be considered to be very similar legislation, is not given. The reason
in part at least, may have been to define "the carrier". Although in the UK a Master signing Bills of
Lading signs on behalf of "the carrier" this is not so in other jurisdictions particularly where a time
charter is involved. The Hamburg Rules define the carrier as the person by whom or in whose name
the contract of carriage is concluded and those details are expressly included in the Bills of Lading.
Whilst the named party may sub-contract the carriage, for the purposes of the Hamburg rules the
named party remains the carrier. The Master signs on behalf of the Carrier whomever that may be.
This document follows fairly closely the IMO COGSA but there are a number of obvious
differences. For example, Article 1. Definition No. 5 of Hamburg Rules 1978, specifically
includes "live animals" whilst these are excluded under the Hague Rules.
The Scope of Application, which is Article 2 of the Convention, also highlights some of the
differences:
1. The provisions of this Convention are applicable to all contracts of carriage by sea
between two different States, if:
(a) the port of loading as provided for in the contract of carriage by sea is located in a
Contracting State, or
(b) the port of discharge as provided for in the contract of carriage by sea is located in
a Contracting State, or
(c) one of the optional ports of discharge provided for in the contract of carriage by sea
is the actual port of discharge and such port is located in a Contracting State, or
(d) the bill of lading or other document evidencing the contract of carriage by sea is
issued in a Contracting State, or (e) the bill of lading or other document evidencing the
contract of carriage by sea provides that the provisions of this Convention or the
legislation of any State giving effect to them are to govern the contract.
2. The provisions of this Convention are applicable without regard to the nationality of
the ship, the carrier, the actual carrier, the shipper, the consignee or any other
interested person.
3. The provisions of this Convention are not applicable to charter-parties. However,
where a bill of lading is issued pursuant to a charter-party, the provision of the
Convention apply to such a bill of lading if it governs the relation between the carrier
and the holder of the bill of lading, not being the charterer.
4. If a contract provides for future carriage of goods in a series of shipments during an
agreed period, the provisions of this Convention apply to each shipment. However,
where a shipment is made under a charter-party, the provisions of paragraph 3 of this
Article apply.
Space restrictions prevent any complete recording of the provisions of the Hamburg Rules but
Article 5. of Part II "Basis of Liability" is of particular interest:
1. The carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss or damage to the goods, as well as
from delay in delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss, damage or delay took
place while the goods were in his charge as defined in Article 4, unless the carrier
proves that he, his servants or agents took all measures that could reasonably be
required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences.
2. Delay in delivery occurs when the goods have not been delivered at the port of
discharge provided for in the contract of carriage by sea within the time expressly
agreed upon or, in the absence of such agreement, within the time which it would be
reasonable to require of a diligent carrier, having regard to the circumstances of the
case.
3. The person entitled to make a claim for the loss of goods may treat the goods as
lost if they have not been delivered as required by Article 4 within 60 consecutive days
following the expiry of the time for delivery according to paragraph 2 of this Article.
4. (a) The carrier is liable
(i) for loss or damage to the goods or delay in delivery caused by fire, if the claimant
proves that the fire arose from fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants or
agents;

(ii) for such loss, damage or delay in delivery which is proved by the claimant to
have resulted from the fault or neglect of the carrier, his servants or agents, in taking
all measures that could reasonably be required to put out the fire and avoid or mitigate
its consequences.
(b) In case of fire on board the ship affecting the goods, if the claimant or the carrier so
desires, a survey in accordance with shipping practices must be held into the cause
and circumstances of the fire, and a copy of the surveyor's report shall be made
available on demand to the carrier and the claimant.
5. With respect to live animals, the carrier is not liable for loss, damage or delay in
delivery resulting from any special risks inherent in that kind of carriage. If the carrier
proves that he has complied with any special instructions given to him by the shipper
respecting the animals and that, in the circumstances of the case, the loss, damage or
delay in delivery could be attributed to such risks, it is presumed that the loss, damage
or delay in delivery was so caused, unless there is proof that all or a part of the loss,
damage or delay in delivery resulted from fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his
servants or agents.
6. The carrier is not liable, except in general average, where loss, damage or delay in
delivery resulted from measures to save life or from reasonable measures to save
property at sea.
7. Where fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants or agents combines
with another cause to produce loss, damage or delay in delivery the carrier is liable
only to the extent that the loss, damage or delay in delivery is attributable to such fault
or neglect, provided that the carrier proves the amount of the loss, damage or delay in
delivery not attributable thereto.
Author's note: It is interesting to see that by contrast with the softer approach adopted in the
IMO COGSA, viz: Article IV 2 "Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or
damage arising or resulting from - (b) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or privity of the
carrier." The U.N. COGSA uses stronger wording, viz: Article 5 "4(a) The Carrier is liable (i) for
loss or damage to goods or delay in delivery caused by fire, if the claimant proves that the fire arose
from fault or neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants or agents." and in 4(a)(ii), the carrier, his
servants or agents, is required to take "...all measures that could reasonably be required to put out
the fire and avoid or mitigate its consequences." Emphasis added. Taken together this imposes a
much greater burden upon the carrier and clearly demands that even more strict attention be paid to
ensure that those on board are trained to a high standard in fire prevention and fire fighting
procedures in order to show all reasonable measures have been taken.
Some people might consider that the Hamburg rules may be viewed as a more equitable approach
between Shipper and Carrier, except however, if you are a Carrier or indeed a P&I Club who at
present do not permit their members to use Hamburg Rules without their express prior agreement!
Imagine the confusion which will no doubt ensue. A Shipper for example may bring suit against a
Carrier in a Hamburg Contracting State believing in so doing that his rights are better protected. The
Carrier however may wish the suit to be heard where the Hague-Visby Rules apply but be unable to
prevent the case being heard in the Hamburg State.
A more detailed analysis and comparison of the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules is to
be found in "Marine Claims" by Christof Luddeke3.
Marine Insurance
The "Bubble" Act of 1720 the result of the collapse of the South Sea Company ruining many
investors in the process established the charters to the Royal Exchange and the London Assurance
Companies who were empowered to offer marine insurance. The Marine Insurance Act of 1745
limited the insured value to that of the vessel and by custom and practice hull and machinery
insurances limited to 75% of the insured value. Hull and machinery insurance is governed in the
UK by the Marine Insurance Act of 1906.
3
Published by Lloyd's of London Press Limited 1993.

As a consequence, ship owners grouped together into organisations to provide cover for those
matters excluded from hull and machinery insurance underwritten in the Lloyds market. These
groups became the P&I (Protecting and Indemnity) Clubs of today.
P&I cover extends to:
1. Personal injury to or illness or loss of life of a crew member
Cover includes the cost of repatriation, funeral expenses and of sending a substitute if that is required.
Claims in tort and in contract law are covered provided compensation paid under conditions of
contract has been agreed with the Club.
2. Personal injury to or loss of life of stevedores:
Attention must be paid to local law concerning the duties of a Ship Owner towards stevedores who
may be injured or killed in the course of fulfilling their duties aboard ship.
3. Personal injury to or illness or loss of life of passengers and others:
In certain jurisdictions claims in respect of injury, illness or death of passengers may be limited and is
discussed at greater length later in this chapter. However in other countries, notably the US such
limits to liability are unlikely no apply. Shipowners may also be liable in tort for other visitors such as
Customs Officials, Pilots, Surveyors, and indeed Fire investigators!
4. Loss of personal effects:
Liability of the shipowner to crew, passengers and others in respect of the loss or damage to their
personal effects is covered.
5. Diversion expenses:
In recent years the problem of stowaways in some Latin American ports has become acute particularly
if the vessel is sailing on to North America. Cover extends to the cost of having to divert to put
stowaways ashore or to repatriate them from whence they came. Some clubs also extend cover in
respect of refugees. A ship may also have to divert to obtain treatment for a sick or injured person
aboard.
6. Life Salvage:
In rare instances a shipowner may become liable to pay an award for a life saved which is not payable
under the hull or cargo insurances.
7. Collision Liabilities:
a) One Fourth Collision Liability:
The English form of hull policy limits underwriters to pay out 75% of the value of the losses to ship
and or cargo arising out of collision. The balance is paid by the Club.
b) Other risks excluded from the Running Down Clause:
Club cover includes wreck removal of the member's vessel, removal of the wreck of any other vessel
involved, liability to cargo in the member vessel and to cargo interests in other vessels involved if it
can be proved that the member vessel is in part to blame for the collision.
c) Excess Collision Liability:
In view of the possibility of a ship of low value colliding with a ship of high value this head of claim
is important because some hull policies limit payment not only to 75% of the total value of the claim
but to the value of the vessel whichever is the lower.
8. Loss or Damage to Property other than cargo:
Claims under this head my result from contact with wharves, docks, locks and the like. Claims might
also result from damage to ships and their cargoes from excessive speed.
9. Pollution:
Claims in respect of pollution are covered by the club up to a limit of $300 million arising out of each
accident or occurrence.
10. Towage Contract Liabilities:
Members are covered for liabilities arising out of harbour towage and beyond harbour with the prior
agreement of the Club.
11. Liabilities under Contracts and Indemnities:
Liability arising out of most contracts will be covered by the Club by prior agreement.
12. Wreck Liabilities:
Club cover extends to the cost of raising, removing, destroying, lighting or marking a wreck, less the
value of that which is recovered as a result of the recovery or removal.
13. Cargo Liabilities:
Cover against cargo liabilities is extended on the understanding that the contract of carriage will be at
least as favourable to the shipowner as that afforded by the Hague or Hague-Visby Rules. Where the
sea leg of a contract of carriage is undertaken by a club vessel, cover is extended from inland point to
inland point. A shipowner may also recover the additional cost of discharging or disposing of a
damaged cargo.

14. Cargo's proportion of general average or salvage:

Club cover extends in the event that a shipowner has breached the contract of carriage such that cargo
do not participate in general average.
15. Certain expenses of salvors:
Given the Club's interest in avoiding oil pollution incidents, cover extends to the expenses of salvors
which are not covered by hull policies and do not arise out of salvage awards made under Lloyd's
Form or general maritime law.
16. Fines:
A member is covered by the Club for fines incurred by the shipowner or employees.
17. Legal Costs:
The Club covers the costs incurred in defence to a claim made against a member in respect of services
provided by lawyers, surveyors and other experts including fire investigators! In practice the defence
is usually managed by the Club.
18. "Omnibus" cover:
The Omnibus Rules gives the Directors of a Club the discretionary powers to indemnify a Member
for an unforeseen risk which exceptionally falls outside the express terms of Club cover.
The concept of general average is a very old one. The Rhodian law decrees that if for example in
order to lighten a ship in danger of running onto a rocky shore, and merchandise is thrown
overboard, that which has been given for all shall be replaced by the contribution of all. Inherent to
the concept of general average is that there has been a peril faced and averted by the sacrifice by
some or all of the cargo.
Mr Justice Grier, in a case Barnard v. Adams gave an interesting outline of the circumstances
required to invoke general average, viz:
1st. A common danger, a danger in which the ship, cargo and crew all participate; an danger imminent and
apparently 'inevitable', except by voluntarily incurring the loss of a portion of the whole to save the
remainder.
2nd. There must be a voluntary jettison, jactus, or casting away, of some portion of the joint concern for the
purpose of avoiding this imminent peril, periculi imminentis evitandi causa, or, in other words, a transfer
of the peril from the whole to a particular portion of the whole.
3rd. This attempt to avoid the imminent common peril must be successful."
Particular average is that loss suffered by cargo by the peril itself i.e. having been burned or
damaged by smoke from a fire. General average on the other hand is that cargo which has been
damaged by water used to control and extinguish the fire.
Jurisdiction
Amongst experts, practitioners and lawyers in the UK, one of the most often asked and perhaps
most vexing of questions is "Who is in control of a marine casualty?" following incidents like the
grounding and subsequent sinking of the Braer on the Shetland Islands, Scotland and the Sea
Empress which ran aground in the approaches to Milford Haven, Wales causing massive pollution.
Who has control depends largely on the jurisdiction where the vessel finds herself in trouble. If
it is in the United States, the US Coast Guard Captain of Port has command. Similarly in Chile
where the Editor was recently a similar system prevailed although the Charterers representative was
in charge of co-ordination on the vessel.
UK Law is none too clear on the point and the expert is often in the middle of a large group of
people in fierce argument, each attempting as best he knows now, to protect his particular interest or
that of his Principals.
It is interesting to note that the UK Fire Services Act 1947 makes it clear that the Fire Brigade in
whose area4 the fire occurs have control. Some Harbourmasters might dispute this! The Author
would urge caution on all Senior Fire Brigade Officers to work extremely closely with all other
interested parties particularly with regard to a ship capsizing during fire-fighting operations.
Readers would do well to remember that whoever is in control carries the responsibility.
Sometimes discretion is the better part of valour!
4
In Scotland the Fire Brigade are responsible for all fires in estuarial waters. In England, the Act is interpreted such that Brigades are
responsible for fires occurring out to the low water mark. There can be no argument however that the Fire Brigade are in control of a fire
on a ship tied up alongside even if Salvors are rendering a service!

Chapter Eight
Fire-Fighting Equipment Aboard Ship

The theme of this Chapter is the practical application of the provision of all the mandatory
fire-fighting equipment required to be provided on board ship under the existing Safety of Life at
Sea Regulations (SOLAS) 1974, and the Amendments of 1982, 1992, 1994 and 1996. These
regulations cover the entire application of fire safety on board ship and the requirements under
SOLAS are summarised at the start of each section dealing with each piece of equipment. There
are, of course, other than the subject of fire, many other important subjects incorporated in the
SOLAS 1974 Regulations. These include,
CHAPTER II-1 Part A — General;
Part B — Subdivision and Stability;
Part C — Machinery Installations;
Part D — Electrical Installations;
Part E — Additional Requirements for Periodically Unattended
Machinery Spaces.
CHAPTER III — Life-Saving Appliances, Etc.
CHAPTER IV — Radiotelegraphy and Radiotelephony.
CHAPTER V — Safety of Navigation.
CHAPTER VI — Carriage of Grain.
Introduction to Chapter II-2 of SOLAS

Apart from construction details, the shipboard aspects of fire are contained in chapter II-2 of
SOLAS which is subdivided into the following parts. The system by which the clauses are
numbered can be confusing particularly as to sub and subsub clauses. Of necessity, the SOLAS
regulation and paragraph numbering system is followed here:
CHAPTER II-2 Part A — General;

Part B — Fire Safety Measures for Passenger Ships;
Part C — Fire Safety Measures for Cargo Ships;
Part D — Fire Safety Measures for Tankers.
Chapter II-2 Construction — Fire protection, fire detection and fire extinction
Part A General
Regulation 1. Application
1.1 Unless expressly provided otherwise, parts A, C and D of this chapter shall apply to ships the keels
of which are laid or which are at a similar stage of construction on or after 1 July 1986, and part B of
this chapter shall apply to ships the keel of which are laid or which are at a similar stage of
construction on or after 1 October 1994.
139
1.2 For the purpose of this chapter, the term a similar stage of construction means the stage at which:
.1 construction identifiable with a specific ship begins; and
.2 assembly of that ship has commenced comprising at least 50 tonnes or one per
cent of the estimated mass of all structural material, whichever is less.
1.3 For the purpose of this chapter:
.1 the expression ships constructed means ships the keels of which are laid or
which are at a similar stage of construction;
.2 the expression all ships means ships constructed before, on or after 1 July 1986;
.3 a cargo ship, whenever built, which is converted to a passenger ship shall be

treated as a passenger ship constructed on the date on which such a conversion
commences.
2.1 Unless expressly provided otherwise, for ships constructed before 1 July 1986 the Administration
shall ensure that the requirements which are applicable under chapter II-2 of the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended by resolution MSC.1(XLV) adopted on 20
November 1981, are complied with and for ships constructed before 1 October 1994 the
Administration shall ensure that the requirements which are applicable under part B of chapter II-2
of the International Convention of the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended by resolutions
MSC.1(XLV), MSC.6(48), MSC.13(57), MSC.22(59) and MSC.24(60) are complied with.
3.1 All ships which undergo repairs, alterations, modifications and outfitting related thereto shall
continue to comply with at least the requirements previously applicable to these ships. Such ships,
if constructed before 1 July 1986 shall, as a rule, comply with the requirements for ships
constructed on or after that date to at least the same extent as they did before undergoing such
repairs, alterations, modifications or outfitting. Repairs, alterations and modifications of a major
character1 and outfitting related thereto shall meet the requirements for ships constructed on or
after 1 July 1986 in so far as the Administration deems reasonable and practicable.
3.2 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 3.1, passenger ships carrying more than 36
passengers when undergoing repairs, alterations, modifications and outfitting related thereto shall
comply with the following:
.1 all materials introduced to these ships shall comply with the requirements with
regard to material applicable to ships constructed on or after 1 October 1994;
and
.2 all repairs, alterations, modifications and outfitting related thereto involving the
replacement of material of 50 tonnes or above, other than that required by
-regulation 411, shall comply with the requirements applicable to such ships
constructed on or after 1 October 1994.
4.1 The Administration of a State may, if it considers that the sheltered nature and conditions of the
voyage are such as to render the application of any specific requirements of this chapter
unreasonable or unnecessary, exempt from those requirements individual ships or classes of ships
entitled to fly the flag of that State which, in the course of their voyage, do not proceed more than
20 miles from the nearest land.
4.2 In the case of passenger ships which are employed in special trades for the carriage of large
numbers of special trade passengers, such as the pilgrim trade, the Administration of the State
whose flag such ships are entitled to fly, if satisfied that it is impracticable to enforce compliance
with the requirements of this chapter, may exempt such ships from those requirements, provided
that they comply fully with provisions of:
.1 the rules annexed to the Special Trade Passenger Ships Agreement, 1971; and
.2 the rules annexed to the Protocol on Space Requirements for Special Trade
Passenger Ships, 1973.
1
The following repairs, alterations and modifications should be recognized as being of a "major character":
1 Any change that substantially alters the dimensions of a ship. Example — Lengthening by adding new midbody. New
midbody should comply with Chapter II-2 of SOLAS 1974 as amended.
2 Any change that substantially alters the passenger-carrying capacity of a ship. Example — Vehicle deck converted to
passenger accommodation. New accommodation should comply with Chapter II-2 of SOLAS 1974 as amended.
3 Any change that substantially increases a ship's service life. Example — Renewal of passenger accommodation on one
entire deck. Renewed accommodation should comply with Chapter II-2 of SOLAS 1974 as amended. (Interpretation agreed
by the Maritime Safety Committee at its fiftieth session.)

Fire-Fighting Equipment Aboard Ship 141
Regulation 2. Basic principles

1 The purpose of this chapter is to require the fullest practicable degree of fire protection, fire
detection and fire extinction in ships.
2 The following basic principles underlie the regulations in this chapter and are embodied in the
regulations as appropriate, having regard to the type of ships and the potential fire hazard involved:
.1 division of ship into main vertical zones by thermal and structural boundaries;
.2 separation of accommodation spaces from the remainder of the ship by thermal

and structural boundaries;
.3 restricted use of combustible materials;
.4 detection of any fire in the zone of origin;
.5 containment and extinction of any fire in the space of origin;
.6 protection of means of escape or access for fire fighting;
.7 ready availability of fire-extinguishing appliances;
.8 minimization of possibility of ignition of flammable cargo vapour.
Regulation 3. Definitions
For the purpose of this chapter, unless expressly provided otherwise:
1 Non-combustible material2 is a material which neither burns nor gives off flammable vapours in
sufficient quantity for self-ignition when heated to approximately 750°C, this being determined to
the satisfaction of the Administration by an established test procedure3. Any other material is a
combustible material.
2 A standard fire test is one in which specimens of the relevant bulkheads or decks are exposed in a
test furnace to temperatures corresponding approximately to the standard time-temperature curve.
The specimen shall have an exposed surface of not less than 4.65 m2 and height (or length of deck)
of 2.44 m, resembling as closely as possible the intended construction and including where
appropriate at least one joint. The standard time-temperature curve is defined by a smooth curve
drawn through the following temperature points measured above the initial furnace temperature:
at the end of the first 5 min 556°C

3 "A" class divisions are those divisions formed by bulkheads and decks which comply with the
following:
.1 they shall be constructed of steel or other equivalent material;
.2 they shall be suitably stiffened;
.3 they shall be so constructed as to be capable of preventing the passage of

smoke and flame to the end of the one-hour standard fire test;
.4 they shall be insulated with approved non-combustible materials such that the
average temperature of the unexposed side will not rise more than 139°C above
the original temperature, nor will the temperature, at any one point, including any
joint, rise more than 180°C above the original temperature, within the time listed
below:
2
If a material passes the test as specified in resolution A.270(VIII) it should be considered as "non-combustible" even if it
consists of a mixture of inorganic and organic substances. (Interpretation approved by the Maritime Safety Committee at its
forty-sixth session, SLS.14/Circ.17.
3
Refer to the Improved Recommendation on Test Method for Qualifying Marine Construction Materials as Non-Combustible,
adopted by the Organization by resolution A.472(XII).

class "A-60" 60 min

class "A-30" 30 min
class "A-15" 15 min
class "A-0" 0 min
.5 the Administration may require a test of a prototype bulkhead or deck to ensure

that it meets the above requirements for integrity and temperature rise.4
4 "B" class divisions are those divisions formed by bulkheads, decks, ceiling or linings which comply
with the following:
.1 they shall be so constructed as to be capable of preventing the passage of flame

to the end of the first half hour of the standard fire test;
.2 they shall have an insulation value such that the average temperature of the
unexposed side will not rise more than 139°C above the original temperature, nor
will the temperature at any one point, including any joint, rise more than 225°C
above the original temperature, within the time listed below:
class "B-15" 15 min

class "B-0" 0 min
.3 they shall be constructed of approved non-combustible materials and all

materials entering into the construction and erection of "B" class divisions shall
be non-combustible, with the exception that combustible veneers may be
permitted provided they meet other requirements of this chapter;
.4 the Administration may require a test of a prototype division to ensure that it

meets the above requirements for integrity and temperature rise5.
5 "C" class divisions are divisions constructed of approved non-combustible materials. They need
meet neither requirements relative to the passage of smoke and flame nor limitations relative to the
temperature rise. Combustible veneers are permitted provided they meet other requirements of this
chapter.
6 Continuous "B" class ceilings or linings are those "B" class ceilings or linings which terminate only
at an "A" or "B" class division.
7 Steel or other equivalent material. Where the words steel or other equivalent material occur,
equivalent material means any non-combustible material which, by itself or due to insulation
provided, has structural and integrity properties equivalent to steel at the end of the applicable
exposure to the standard fire test (e.g. aluminium alloy with appropriate insulation).
8 Low flame spread means that the surface thus described will adequately restrict the spread of
flame, this being determined to the satisfaction of the Administration by an established test
procedure.
9 Main vertical zones are those sections into which the hull, superstructure, and deckhouses are
divided by "A" class divisions, the mean length of which on any deck does not in general exceed 40
m.
10 Accommodation spaces are those spaces used for public spaces, corridors, lavatories, cabins,
offices, hospitals, cinemas, games and hobbies rooms, barber shops, pantries containing no
cooking appliances and similar spaces.
11 Public spaces are those portions of the accommodation which are used for halls, dining rooms,
lounges and similar permanently enclosed spaces.
12 Service spaces are those spaces used for galleys, pantries containing cooking appliances, lockers,
mail and specie rooms, storerooms, workshops other than those forming part of the machinery
spaces, and similar spaces and trunks to such spaces.
13 Cargo spaces are all spaces used for cargo (including cargo oil tanks) and trunks to such spaces.
14 Ro-ro cargo spaces are spaces not normally subdivided in any way and extending to either a
substantial length or the entire length of the ship in which goods (packaged or in bulk, in or on rail
or road cars, vehicles (including road or rail tankers), trailers, containers, pallets, demountable
4
Refer to the Recommendation on Fire Test Procedures for "A", "B" and "F" Class Divisions, adopted by the Organization by
resolution A.517(13).
5
Refer to the Recommendation on Fire Test Procedures for "A", "B" and "F" Class Divisions, adopted by the Organization by
resolution A.517(13).

tanks or in or on similar stowage units or other receptacles) can be loaded and unloaded normally
in a horizontal direction.
15 Open ro-ro cargo spaces are ro-ro cargo spaces either open at both ends, or open at one end and
provided with adequate natural ventilation effective over their entire length through permanent
openings in the side plating or deckhead to the satisfaction of the Administration.
16 Closed ro-ro cargo spaces are ro-ro cargo spaces which are neither open ro-ro cargo spaces nor
weather decks.
17 Weather deck is a deck which is completely exposed to the weather from above and from at least
two sides.
18 Special category spaces are those enclosed spaces above or below the bulkhead deck intended for
the carriage of motor vehicles with fuel in their tanks for their own propulsion, into and from which
such vehicles can be driven and to which passengers have access.
19 Machinery spaces of category A are those spaces and trunks to such spaces which contain:
.1 internal combustion machinery used for main propulsion; or
.2 internal combustion machinery used for purposes other than main propulsion
where such machinery has in the aggregate a total power output of not less than
375 kW; or
.3 any oil-fired boiler or oil fuel unit.
20 Machinery spaces are all machinery spaces of category A and all other spaces containing
propulsion machinery, boilers, oil fuel units, steam and internal combustion engines, generators
and major electrical machinery, oil filling stations, refrigerating, stabilizing, ventilation and
air-conditioning machinery, and similar spaces, and trunks to such spaces.
21 Oil fuel unit is the equipment used for the preparation of oil fuel for delivery to an oil-fired boiler, or
equipment used for the preparation for delivery of heated oil to an internal combustion engine, and
includes any oil pressure pumps, filters and heaters dealing with oil at a pressure of more than 0.18
N/mm2.
22 Control stations are those spaces in which the ship's radio or main navigating equipment or the
emergency source of power is located or where the fire recording or fire control equipment is
centralized.
22.1 Central control station is a control station in which the following control and indicator functions are
centralized:
.1 fixed fire detection and alarm system;
.2 automatic sprinklers, fire detection and alarm system;
.3 fire door indicator panel;
.4 fire door closure;
.5 watertight door indicator panel;
.6 watertight door opening and closing;
.7 ventilation fans;
.8 general/fire alarm;
.9 communication systems including telephones; and
.10 microphone to public address system.
22.2 Continuously manned central control station is a central control station which is continuously
manned by a responsible member of the crew.
23 Rooms containing furniture and furnishings of restricted fire risk are, for the purpose of regulation
26, those rooms containing furniture and furnishings of restricted fire risk (whether cabins, public
spaces, offices or other types of accommodation) in which:
.1 all case furniture such as desks, wardrobes, dressing tables, bureaux, dressers,
is constructed entirely of approved non-combustible materials, except that a
combustible veneer not exceeding 2 mm may be used on the working surface of
such articles;
.2 all free-standing furniture such as chairs, sofas, tables, is constructed with

frames of non-combustible materials;

.3 all draperies, curtains and other suspended textile materials have, to the
satisfaction of the Administration, qualities of resistance to the propagation of
flame not inferior to those of wool of mass 0.8 kg/m2;6
.4 all floor coverings have, to the satisfaction of the Administration, qualities of

resistance to the propagation of flame not inferior to those of an equivalent
woollen material used for the same purpose;
.5 all exposed surfaces of bulkheads, linings and ceilings have low flame-spread
characteristics; and
.6 all upholstered furniture has qualities of resistance to the ignition and

propagation of flame to the satisfaction of the Administration.7
24 Bulkhead deck is the uppermost deck up to which the transverse watertight bulkheads are carried.
25 Deadweight is the difference in tonnes between the displacement of a ship in water of a specific
gravity of 1.025 at the load waterline corresponding to the assigned summer freeboard and the
lightweight of the ship.
26 Lightweight is the displacement of a ship in tonnes without cargo, fuel, lubricating oil, ballast water,
fresh water and feedwater in tanks, consumable stores, and passengers and crew and their effects.
27 Combination carrier is a tanker designed to carry oil or alternatively solid cargoes in bulk.
28 Crude oil is any oil occurring naturally in the earth whether or not treated to render it suitable for
transportation and includes:
.1 crude oil from which certain distillate fractions may have been removed; and
.2 crude oil to which certain distillate fractions may have been added.
29 Dangerous goods are those goods referred to in regulation VII/2.
30 Chemical tanker is a tanker constructed or adapted and used for the carriage in bulk of any liquid
product of a flammable nature listed in either:
.1 chapter 17 of the International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships
Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk adopted by the Maritime Safety
Committee by resolution MSC.4(48), hereinafter referred to as "the International
Bulk Chemical Code", as may be amended by the Organization; or
.2 chapter VI of the Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying
Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk adopted by the Assembly of the Organization by
resolution A.212(VII), hereinafter referred to as "the Bulk Chemical Code", as has
been or may be amended by the Organization;
whichever is applicable.
31 Gas carrier is a tanker constructed or adapted and used for the carriage in bulk of any liquefied gas
or other products of a flammable nature listed in either:
.1 chapter 19 of the International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships
Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee by
resolution MSC.5(48), hereinafter referred to as "the International Gas Carrier
Code", as may be amended by the Organization; or
.2 chapter XIX of the Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying
Liquefied Gases in Bulk adopted by the Assembly of the Organization by
resolution A.328(IX), hereinafter referred to as "the Gas Carrier Code", as has
been or may be amended by the Organization;
whichever is applicable.
32 Cargo area is that part of the ship that contains cargo tanks, slop tanks and cargo pump-rooms
including pump-rooms, cofferdams, ballast and void spaces adjacent to cargo tanks and also deck
areas throughout the entire length and breadth of the part of the ship over the above-mentioned
spaces.
33 For ships constructed on or after 1 October 1994, in lieu of the definition of main vertical zones
provided in paragraph 9, the following definition shall be applied: Main vertical zones are those
6
Refer to the Recommendation on Test Method for Determining the Resistance to Flame of Vertically Supported Textiles and
Films, adopted by the Organization by resolution A.471(XII), and amendments to the Recommendation adopted by resolution
A.563(14)
7
Refer to the Recommendation on Fire Test Procedures for Upholstered Furniture, adopted by the Organization by resolution
A.563(14)

sections into which the hull, superstructure and deckhouses are divided by "A" class divisions, the
mean length and width of which on any deck does not in general exceed 40 m.
34 Ro-ro passenger ship means a passenger ship with ro-ro cargo spaces or special category spaces
as defined in this regulation.
It is highly unlikely that the SOLAS 1974 Convention will ever be replaced by a new instrument.
This is because on 20 November 1981 (Resolution MSC.1(XLV))8 became law on a completely new
basis known as "tacit acceptance". Under "tacit acceptance" an amendment to the Convention
enters into force on a specified date (usually about two years after the amendment is adopted) unless
it is rejected by one-third of the Contracting Parties or Contracting Parties whose combined fleets
represent 50 per cent of world tonnage. This is a great improvement in terms of the time lapse
which historically followed before the decisions taken by a new Convention entered into force. For
example, the results of the work carried out by the 1974 SOLAS Conference, held in London from
21 October to 1 November and attended by 71 countries (SOLAS 1974), did not become law until
May 1980. The amendments adopted by the marine Safety Committee at its forty-fifth session on
20 November 1981 came into force on 1 September 1984.
At its sixtieth session in April 1992 two sets of amendments, by resolution MSC.24(60),
designed to improve fire safety measures on existing passenger ships by making various changes in
chapter II-2 of the Convention and adding two new regulations. The other, MSC.27(60), requires
ro-ro passenger ferries built before 29 April 1990 to comply with new provisions on survivability
according to the schedule laid out in the amendments. At its sixty-first session in December 1992,
by resolution MSC.27(61), further amendments were adopted, including: provisions concerning
access to spaces in the cargo areas of oil tankers and communications between the navigating bridge
and machinery spaces, various measures relating to electric power, and a series of changes to
chapter II-2 dealing with the fire protection requirements on new ships. Under the tacit acceptance
procedure all three sets of amendments were to enter into force on 1 October 1994.
At its sixty-third session in May 1994, resolution MSC.31(63), was adopted. This contains two sets
of amendments concerning fire protection and safety of navigation to chapters II-2 and V of the
Convention. Subject to tacit acceptance procedure, one set is expected to enter into force on 1
January 1996, and the other on 1 July 1998.
At its sixty-fourth session in December 1994, resolution MSC.42(64), was adopted and contains
amendments concerning the carriage of cargoes and dangerous goods to chapters VI and VII. These
came into force on 1 January 1996.
The Conference of Contracting Governments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention held meetings at
the IMO Headquarters in May 1994 and adopted a number of resolutions amending or referring to
the Convention. Three new chapters were added - Chapters IX (Management for the Safe Operation
of Ships), X (Safety Measures for High-Speed Craft), and XI (Special Measures to Enhance
Maritime Safety).
Quite apart from any consideration of the safety of human life, the huge capital cost of a ship is
nowadays so enormously high that it is surely important to protect the investment against the
ravages of fire. The sea is probably the most severe environment in which fire equipment is
expected, year in and year out, to perform. This means that owners should insist, not only in
complying with SOLAS, which one has to do in any case, but to make every effort to provide the
best available fire protection/fire fighting equipment. As in many aspects of human life the cheapest
is not necessarily the best! It is important to get advice from independent experts as to the
availability, on a world-wide basis, of the individual pieces of fire equipment required to be
installed on board ship in order to satisfy SOLAS regulations.
8
2. DETERMINES in accordance with article VIII(b)(vi)(2)(bb) of the Convention that all of the above-mentioned amendments
shall be deemed to have been accepted, unless prior to 1 March 1984, more than one third of Contracting Governments to
the Convention or Contracting Governments the combined merchant fleets of which constitute not less than fifty per cent of
the gross tonnage of the world's merchant fleet, have notified their objections to the amendments.
3. INVITES Contracting Governments to note that in accordance with article VIII(b)(vii)(2) of the Convention the
amendments, upon their acceptance in accordance with paragraph 2 above, shall enter into force on 1 September 1984.

It appears to the author that there are a few very basic rules governing the fire equipment
provided on board ship:
(a) Equipment must be the best available for each type of fire risk on board;
(b) Personnel must be completely trained to use properly every piece of equipment;
(c) Equipment must be maintained in a perfect state of repair;
(d) Equipment should be immediately on hand and well signposted
The method adopted here by the author has been to take in turn every piece of equipment, either
fixed or portable, provided for the fighting, detection, or control of fire aboard ship; to sketch for
each a brief historical introduction; to recite in outline the principal Statutory requirements which
apply; and finally to comment at greater length on such aspects of its installation, maintenance,
capacity and use (or sometimes, in the author's opinion, misuse!) as seem either debatable or
important.
Two comments of a general nature might, however, be made at the outset; for the author
harbours strong feelings on them both.
The first is a matter which concerns every type of ship, every type of equipment, every type of
ship owner, and every marine insurance company in the world. It is this: quite apart from any
consideration of the safety of human life, the capital cost of a ship is nowadays so enormously high
that almost any amount of time, of brain-power, of imagination and of capital outlay will be well
spent on ensuring that, if fire does break out aboard ship, the means for its detection, control and
swift extinction are:
(a) Immediately at hand;

(b) In a perfect state of maintenance and repair;
(c) Reasonably simple to operate; and
(d) As efficient for their purpose as they can humanly be made.
In very few fields of human activity can it be so certainly true that a little effort expended in good
time, and a little capital expended to intelligent purpose, will one day — as surely as God made Fire
and Water — save not only human lives but also thousands of pounds of good hard cash.
The second comment involves a matter of some delicacy; yet it is one which the author feels sure
he should make for all that.
It is a matter of surprise and regret to many officers of the British Fire Service that only rarely are
they consulted on the question of fire prevention on board ship. Every Local Authority Fire Brigade
maintains a Fire Prevention Department staffed by very experienced officers, whose knowledge is
freely available on request. Yet many ship owners, ship builders, and even some Port Authorities
with respect to their own local Fire Brigades, appear strangely reluctant to avail themselves of this
knowledge, experience and fund of goodwill.
No Fire Officer of any experience would attempt to deny the competence, conscientiousness or
high professional skill of these "opposite numbers" of his in the shipping world. But, equally, no
such Fire Officer will ever be persuaded that the actual, physical experience of fighting a fire on
board a ship does not give an insight into the nature of ship-board fire which must inevitably be
denied to those whose experience of the problem is largely theoretical.
The author is certain sure he is on firm ground in stating that the eager co-operation of the Fire
Service throughout the British Isles in the establishment of close liaison on these matters is there for
the asking. He finds it hard to see how the setting-up of such liaison could fail to be in the best
interests of all concerned.

FIRE PUMPS, FIRE MAINS, HYDRANTS AND HOSES
Historical Introduction
Credit for the invention of the first force pump in history is given by Hero to Ctesibius, an
engineer of Alexandria, but it was about the same period (287-212 B.C.) that Archimedes invented
his famous Screw Pump. This was an instrument for raising water by tube in the form of a screw
wound round inside a cylinder. It is quite possible that many of the great ships of the period would
be equipped with such pumps to get rid of bilge water, as well as for purposes of fire fighting.
Knowledge of these pumps, however, as well as of so many other things, seems to have been lost
in the Middle — or Dark Ages; and it is not until the fifteenth century that we have positive
knowledge of mechanical pumps being used on board ship. The type of pump most commonly
found on board ship in the Elizabethan age appears to have been either the Chain or the Rope Pump.
The first named pump consisted of an endless chain to which were attached at regular intervals
small cups. These ran within a closed trunk and filled with water as they passed through the bilge
compartment, carried the water to an upper deck and were then either discharged overboard or
emptied into tanks kept for the washing-down of decks or for fire-fighting. The Rope Pump, which
is thought to be even older than the Chain Pump, operated in much the same way, the difference
being that the rope — of fluffy construction — gathered to itself a quota of water which was flung
off by centrifugal force as it passed over a pulley wheel in an upper deck and into a holding tank as
described above.
Almost every ship of any size also carried a manually operated fire pump on deck. These pumps
were portable and ran on small wheels or skids. Many old models of sailing ships show such
mobile fire pumps stationed on deck.
In 1643, Toricelli announced his great discovery that water could be raised in a tube by utilising
the pressure of the atmosphere. The apparatus he constructed consisted of a tube 60 ft. long,
secured in a perpendicular position with its lower end in water. With a syringe he then extracted the
air in its upper end and showed that water would rise in the tube to a maximum height of between
32 and 33 feet. He found it was impossible to induce the water to rise any higher; and rightly
concluded that the weight of the atmosphere exerted a constant pressure on the surface of the earth.
This theory was violently attacked by the Churchmen of the day and it was left to the French
mathematician Pascal to prove that Torricelli had been right. Pascal found that the higher he
climbed up a mountain — he chose the Puy de Dôme, near Clermont-Ferrand, one of the highest
mountains in France — the lower would mercury stand in a tube. (Pascal's column of mercury in
fact stood at 28 in. at the foot of the mountain and 25 in. at the top.)
Torricelli's discovery was of obvious importance to designers of pumps; and from the end of the
sixteenth century onwards reciprocating pumps employing an air vessel were in common use.
Later, as steam power developed, rotary — and then centrifugal — pumps came into use.
Crude versions of the centrifugal pump were designed as early as 1732 by a M. le Démor in
France; but it was not until 1839, when the American inventor Andrews designed a volute casing,
that the design found favour for use aboard ship. John George Appold designed a very efficient
centrifugal pump which gained a Council medal at the Great Exhibition in 1851. To this day the
medal is preserved in King's College, London. But the centrifugal pump did not come into general
use for fire-fighting until the beginning of the twentieth century — though it had been extensively
used on board ship for circulating purposes for 50 years before. In 1881 three fire pumps having a
combined capacity of 600 tons per hour (2,230 g.p.m.) were manufactured by Messrs. J and H
Gwynne and installed on the Cunard liner Servia.
Statutory Requirements
The 1982 the 1992 and the 1994 Amendments to SOLAS 1974 (the 1982 Amendments came into
force on September 1 1984) are a tremendous improvement on those contained in the original
document. Greatly more specific in their application much of the detail which in the earlier
SOLAS was left to be decided by the Administrations has now been tightened up. So far as the

author is concerned probably the most interesting amendment refers to the protection of fuel
delivery lines between the high-pressure fuel pumps and fuel injectors. Engine room fires caused by
bursts in such lines igniting on hot surfaces are legend. He has been writing on this subject for very
many years and it is pleasing to see a measure adopted which will undoubtedly reduce the incidence
of engine room fires in the future. This can only be helpful to the surveyors of the future who have
to inspect and certify such equipment prior to issuing Safety Equipment Certificates. Recent
Resolutions from the Marine Safety Committee of the IMO include:
Resolution MSC.24(60) deals with "Fire safety measures for existing passenger ships" —
adopted 10 April 1992.
Resolution MSC.26(60) with "Existing ro-ro passenger ships" — adopted 10 April 1992.
Resolution MSC.27(61) with "Adoption of amendments to the International Convention for the
Safety of Life at Sea, 1974" — adopted 11 December 1992.
Regulation 4 of the Amendments to SOLAS 74 covers fire pumps — as well as fire mains,
hydrants and hoses. The following is a synopsis of the very detailed requirements governing the
provision of the capacity, number and arrangement of pumps. The regulation is subdivided into the
following main subsections being:
1 Scope
2 Capacity of fire pumps
3 Arrangement of fire pumps and of fire mains
4 Diameter of and pressure in the fire mains
5 Number and position of hydrants
6 Pipes and hydrants
7 Fire hoses
8 Nozzles
9 Location and arrangement of water pumps, etc., for other
fire-extinguishing systems
Regulation 4. Fire pumps, fire mains, hydrants and hoses

1 Every ship shall be provided with fire pumps, fire mains, hydrants and hoses complying as
applicable with the requirements of this regulation.
2 Capacity of fire pumps
2.1 The required fire pumps shall be capable of delivering for fire-fighting purposes a quantity of water,
at the pressure specified in paragraph 4, as follows:
.1 pumps in passenger ships, not less than two thirds of the quantity required to be
dealt with by the bilge pumps when employed for bilge pumping; and
.2 pumps in cargo ships, other than any emergency pump, not less than four thirds
of the quantity required under regulation II-1/21 to be dealt with by each of the
independent bilge pumps in a passenger ship of the same dimension when
employed in bilge pumping, provided that in no cargo ship need the total
required capacity of the fire pumps exceed 180 m3/h.
2.2 Each of the required fire pumps (other than any emergency pump required in paragraph 3.3.2 for
cargo ships) shall have a capacity not less than 80% of the total required capacity divided by the
minimum number of required fire pumps but in any case not less than 25 m3/h and each such pump
shall in any event be capable of delivering at least the two required jets of water. These fire pumps
shall be capable of supplying the fire main system under the required conditions. Where more
pumps than the minimum of required pumps are installed the capacity of such additional pumps
shall be to the satisfaction of the Administration.
3 Arrangements of fire pumps and of fire mains
3.1 Ships shall be provided with independently driven fire pumps as follows:

.1 Passenger ships of 4,000 tons gross tonnage and upwards: at least three
.2 Passenger ships of less than 4,000 tons gross tonnage and cargo ships of 1,000
tons gross tonnage and upwards: at least two
.3 Cargo ships of less than 1,000 tons gross tonnage: to the satisfaction of the
Administration
3.2 Sanitary, ballast, bilge or general service pumps may be accepted as fire pumps, provided that they
are not normally used for pumping oil and that if they are subject to occasional duty for the transfer
or pumping of oil fuel, suitable change-over arrangements are fitted.
3.3 The arrangement of sea connections, fire pumps and their sources of power shall be such as to
ensure that:
.1 In passenger ships of 1,000 tons gross tonnage and upwards, in the event of a
fire in any one compartment all the fire pumps will not be put out of action.
.2 In cargo ships of 2,000 tons gross tonnage and upwards, if a fire in any one
compartment could put all the pumps out of action there shall be an alternative
means consisting of a fixed independently driven emergency pump which shall
be capable of supplying two jets of water to the satisfaction of the
Administration. The pump and its location shall comply with the following
requirements:
.2.1 The capacity of the pump shall not be less than 40% of the total
capacity of the fire pumps required by this regulation and in any
case not less than 25 m3/h.
.2.2 When the pump is delivering the quantity of water required by

paragraph 3.3.2.1, the pressure at any hydrant shall be not less
than the minimum pressures given in paragraph 4.2.
.2.3 Any diesel driven power source for the pump shall be capable of
being readily started in its cold condition down to a temperature of
0°C by hand (manual) cranking. If this is impracticable, or if lower
temperatures are likely to be encountered. Consideration is to be
given to the provision and maintenance of heating arrangements,
acceptable to the Administration, so that ready starting will be
assured. If hand (manual) starting is impracticable, the
Administration may permit other means of starting. These means
shall be such as to enable the diesel driven power source to be
started at least six times within a period of 30 min, and at least
twice within the first 10 min.
.2.4 Any service fuel tank shall contain sufficient fuel to enable the
pump to run on full load for at least three hours and sufficient
reserves of fuel shall be available outside the main machinery
space to enable the pump to be run on full load for an additional
15 h.
.2.5 The total suction head and the net positive suction head of the
pump shall be such that the requirements of paragraphs 3.3.2,
3.3.2.1, 3.3.2.2 and 4.2 of this regulation shall be obtained under
all conditions of list, trim, roll and pitch likely to be encountered in
service.
.2.6 The boundaries of the space containing the fire pump shall be
insulated to a standard of structural fire protection equivalent to
that required for a control station in regulation 44.
.2.7 No direct access shall be permitted between the machinery space

and the space containing the emergency fire pump and its source
of power. When this is impracticable an Administration may
accept an arrangement where the access is by means of an
airlock, each of the two doors being self-closing, or through a
watertight door capable of being operated from a space remote
from the machinery space and the space containing the
emergency fire pump and unlikely to be cut off in the event of fire
in those spaces. In such cases a second means of access to the
space containing the emergency fire pump and its source of
power shall be provided.

.2.8 Ventilation arrangements to the space containing the independent

source of power for the emergency fire pump shall be such as to
preclude, as far as practicable, the possibility of smoke from a
machinery space fire entering or being drawn into that space.
.2.9 Ships constructed on or after 1 October 1994, in lieu of the

provisions of paragraph 3.3.2.6 , shall comply with the following
requirements: The space containing the fire pump shall not be
continuous to the boundaries of machinery spaces of a category A
or those spaces containing main fire pumps. Where this is not
practicable, the common bulkhead between the two spaces shall
be insulated to a standard of structural fire protection equivalent
to that required for a control station in regulation 44.
.3 In passenger ships of less than 1,000 tons gross tonnage and cargo ships of less
than 2,000 tons gross tonnage, if a fire in any one compartment could put all the
pumps out of action the alternative means of providing water for fire-fighting
purposes are to the satisfaction of the Administration.
.3.1 For ships constructed on or after 1 October 1994, the alternative

means to be provided in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 3.3.3 shall be an independently driven, power-operated
emergency fire pump and with its source of power and sea
connection located outside the machinery space.
.4 In addition, in cargo ships where other pumps, such as general service, bilge and
ballast, etc., are fitted in a machinery space, arrangements shall be made to
ensure that at least one of these pumps, having the capacity and pressure
required by paragraphs 2.2 and 4.2, is capable of providing water to the fire main.
3.4 The arrangements for the ready availability of water supply shall be:
.1 in passenger ships of 1,000 tons gross tonnage and upwards such that at least
one effective jet of water is immediately available from any hydrant in an interior
location and so as to ensure the continuation of the output of water by the
automatic starting of a required fire pump;
.2 in passenger ships of less than 1,000 tons gross tonnage and in cargo ships to
the satisfaction of the Administration;
.3 in cargo ships with a periodically unattended machinery space or when only one
person is required on watch, there shall be immediate water delivery from the fire
main system at a suitable pressure, either by remote starting of one of the main
fire pumps with remote starting from the navigating bridge and fire control
station, if any, or permanent pressurisation of the fire main system by one of the
main fire pumps, except that the Administration may waive this requirement for
cargo ships of less than 1,600 tons gross tonnage if the arrangement of the
machinery space access makes it unnecessary;
.4 in passenger ships, if fitted with periodically unattended machinery spaces in

accordance with regulation II-1/54, the Administration shall determine provisions
for fixed water fire-extinguishing arrangement for such spaces equivalent to
those required for normally attended machinery spaces.
3.5 Relief valves shall be provided in conjunction with all fire pumps if the pumps are capable of
developing a pressure exceeding the design pressure of the water service pipes, hydrants and
hoses. These valves shall be so placed and adjusted as to prevent excessive pressure in any part
of the fire main system.
3.6 In tankers isolation valves shall be fitted in the fire main at poop front in a protected position and
on the tank deck at intervals of not more than 40 m to preserve the integrity of the fire main system
in case of fire or explosion.
Comment
Readers will surely be intrigued, possibly bemused, by the use of the somewhat quaint formulae
adopted here to establish the capacity of fire pumps required to be fitted on cargo ships —
Regulation 4 paragraph 2.1.2 Amendments to SOLAS 1974 stated above! Of course, the historical
reason for linking the output of these pumps to the bilge pump is that this, along with the sanitary,
ballast and general service pump, may be accepted as a fire pump under SOLAS. The author would

FIGURE 8.1 Cross section through typical self priming fire and bilge pump.

see the advantage of linking the fire

duty to the general service pump but
has difficulty in appreciating the
linkage with the others, especially the
sanitary pump — see Regulation 4
paragraph 3.2.
But in any event the author would
in the first place, question the
necessity of requiring such convoluted
formulae to arrive at the output of fire
fighting pumps. A distinct problem is
that it is difficult to marry the two
functions — say the sanitary pump
with that of the fire pumping
requirements. Pressure demands are
surely incompatible and the resultant
compromise must surely be less than
satisfactory. It would be much more
simple and direct to lay down the
capacity of fire pumps according to
the size of the vessel concerned! The
formula contained in the Amendments
to SOLAS 74 which requires a
minimum pressure at all hydrants
according to the size and type of the
vessel is reasonable. Furthermore,
would it not indicate an acceptance of
the fact that fire on board ship is a
FIGURE 8.2 Typical emergency fire and bilge pump. Note the desperately serious happening and one
valve extended spindles which permit remote operation from which justifies deep consideration?
outside the machinery space. It is good to see that the somewhat
absurd formula which appeared in
earlier legislation — "fire pumps must be capable of providing a horizontal throw of at least 40 ft. at
every nozzle, when used with any of the fire hoses and nozzles provided" — has now been dropped
in favour of the more sensible and realistic standards detailed above. The point is that the 40 ft.
throw can be achieved with a half-inch nozzle at 30o elevation with a pressure as low as 20 lb. per
sq. in. To operate a No.2 size mechanical foam branch a minimum pressure of 60 lb. per sq. in. and
a water supply of 50 gal. per min. is required.
Serious consideration should therefore be given to the installation, as standard practice, of pumps
able to deliver a minimum of 150 (and preferably 250) gal. per min. at a running pressure of 60 lb.
per sq. in. at upper deck levels.
At least one large Shipping Company has already realised the folly of fitting pumps plainly
unequal to the demands which could be made on them in case of fire. In place of the 80 lb. per sq.
in. at the pump for which they formerly asked, they now specify 120 or even 140 lb. per sq. in. This
means that really effective pressures will be available on the upper decks, and that foam or ejector
equipment can also be got to work at that level.
The Royal Navy, too (it is understood), are now specifying much higher pressures for their fire
pumps than they used to deem sufficient.
The practice of using a single pump for double duty in fire-fighting and bilge pumping is very
common — by reason of the savings both of initial cost and of space. The practice is, moreover,
generally acceptable to the Ministry.
There are, however, practical difficulties in trying to marry these two functions, and the resultant
design is generally a compromise ideal for neither. When the fire duty pressure is considerably

increased, the pump ceases to be satisfactory for sanitary or other uses. Some pressure lower than
the ideal is therefore apt to be accepted as a compromise. A further objection is that pumps
deteriorate when used for daily functions. There is therefore danger that a double-duty pump will
no longer be at peak efficiency when suddenly required for fire purposes.
Before ordering pumps which serve for fire-fighting purposes on board ship it is strongly
recommended that pump specialists be consulted. It is important that where pumps have dual
functions the performance characteristics be carefully matched, otherwise, when used together for
fire-fighting, the one operating at the highest head will take precedence over all the others in use at
the one time. In effect this means that only the output from the highest rated pump will be available
for fire-fighting.
The additional cost of, and the sacrifice of the small amount of space required to house, separate
fire pumps is, in the Author's opinion, beyond doubt a sound investment. Such units need not be
self-priming; and they can be of very simple design, and can thus be run safely at high speed. The
Drysdale Company Ltd. has produced a single-stage pump which operates at 130 lb. per sq. in. at
3,500 r.p.m., and which gives an output of 175 gal. per min. at 300 ft. head with no suction lift.
This single-purposes pump is suitable for both a.c. and d.c. electric motor drives.
To obviate the use of a high-efficiency pump for wash-down purposes, the sanitary pump could
be used for those purposes instead. Centrifugal rather than reciprocating fire pumps are
recommended. With the former, there is often no need for escape valves to be fitted, which greatly
simplifies the installation — and which obviates catastrophes such as occurred during a recent test
on a Class I ship, when an irate cabin steward complained that one of his cabins got flooded every
time a relief valve which had been positioned there was operated! With high-efficiency pumps,
relief valves on the fire main are essential; for if all the input horse-power is expended within the
pump at zero draw-off, severe damage will result over a period. (Normally, relief valves are
designed to discharge between one-half and two-thirds of the designed pump capacity overboard at
the corresponding pump delivery pressure.)
The positioning of the relief valve in a cabin
was, of course, a grievous error in design.
Besides putting part of the ship's "payload" out
of action until the valve could be put
somewhere else, there was inherent in the
mishap a danger less obvious, but certainly no
less serious. Fire drills are seldom popular
aboard ship. They upset routine; they provide
easy occasion for falling foul of harassed
seniors; and when realistically carried out, they
are apt to make a mess.
Yet realistic fire drills are an absolutely
essential part of crew training; and it is
important to avoid grounds for any even
partially legitimate argument which can be
advanced, or suggested, against them. (Such as
the flooding of the unfortunate steward's cabin.
"Fire drill in five minutes' time? Aye aye, sir!
But, beggin' your pardon, what about that cabin
on 'B' deck, sir?" — one can almost hear the
experienced petty officer sowing the seeds of
procrastination and doubt!)
The increased use of oil fuel in engine-rooms
makes the fire risk in a modern ship so high that FIGURE 8.3 Typical automatic self-priming pump.

owners should seriously consider the installation of additional power-operated fire pumps for
vessels which are not required by Statute to have them.
Lloyds Register of Shipping published a standard for fire-fighting tugs as follows:
Equipment Fire-fighting Ship Category

1 2 3
3
Minimum total pump capacity (m /hour) 2,400 7,200 10,000
Minimum number of water monitors 2 3 4
3
Minimum discharge rate per monitor (m /hour) 1,200 1,800 1,800
Minimum of trajectory of jets of monitors above sea level (m) 45 70 70
Minimum rang eof monitor jets (m) 120 150 150
Minimum fuel capacity for monitors (hours) 24 96 96
Number of hose connections each side of ship 4 8 8
Number of fireman's outfits 4 8 8
Table 8.1
The capacity required of these vessels is such that they are still to come into common usage and
many port tugs do not meet the fire-fighter 1 standard.
Emergency pumps are usually situated in the steering flat; fore peak; forward coffer dam in some
oil tankers; or in the shaft tunnel in the case of older ships. Of these positions the steering flat is to
be recommended but it is terribly important that access to the space is maintained smoke free at all
times — see comments under "The Siting of Pumps Aboard".
FIGURE 8.4 Performance curve for a Drysdale MHS2 FIGURE 8.5 Typical pump characteristic curve
fire pump with 3½"/3½" branches.

When the emergency pump is located in the shaft tunnel it is important for the watertight door to
the engine-room to be capable of being closed from a position unlikely to be affected by a fire in the
engine-room.
Messrs. Russell Newbery and Co. Ltd. have produced a diesel emergency fire pump which
develops 111 b.h.p. at 1,300 r.p.m. The pump is of the single-stage centrifugal type, with three-inch
suction and two-inch delivery branches. The output is 120 g.p.m., or 32 tons per hour, against a
total head of 120 ft. The pressure is 52 lb. per sq. in., and the pump throws two half-inch jets a
distance of between 58 and 75 ft. according to head. The pump is fitted with a primer having
friction drive, which is released when water reaches the pump casing. Cooling water for the pump
during starting is contained in a header tank. When the pump is operating, cooling is achieved by
tapping a small quantity of water from the delivery side and circulating it through the header tank.
FIGURE 8.6 Sectional view of typical water-ring air pump.

A similar type of pump has been produced by Messrs. Sigmund Pumps Ltd., the main differences
being that the engine is air-cooled by means of a combined flywheel fan, and that a water seal
self-priming system is employed.
Messrs. Weir Pumps the successor of Messrs Mather & Platt Limited, of Manchester, produce
high quality fire pumps of all kinds which are suitable for use on board ship and for installation on
offshore structures.
Messrs. Ruston Diesels Ltd. manufacture a pumping unit to SOLAS specifications. Either air- or
water-cooled engines are provided. The Mark 2 YBZ engine is a twin-cylinder diesel which
develops 12 b.h.p. at 1,500 r.p.m. The pump has a three-inch suction and two-inch delivery, and is
self-priming. The whole unit weighs only 10 cwt.
WATER PIPES AND HYDRANTS

Historical
It was not until the early nineteenth century that the use of water mains made of wood died out in
Europe. These wooden pipes were made of tree trunks, each normally between five and ten feet in
length and by virtue of its good resistance to water, were made of elm-wood. Holes were bored, or
burned by means of red hot iron balls, through each length to a diameter of up to six inches (15cm).
One end of each section was tapered to form a cone and the other suitably enlarged to take the
cone-shaped end of the next length.
The fire main was then buried in the roadway (no tar macadam in those days) and its position
indicated. When fire broke out the fire-fighters simply dug up the road to expose the main; bored a
hole with a gimlet; allowed the hole to fill with water; placed the suction hose in the hole and
pumped the water towards the fire.
There are a number of very amusing stories relating to fire fighting in those days. The fire
companies formed by the individual insurance companies were fiercely independent and great
rivalry developed.
At a fire attended by a number of companies (the Great Fire of Edinburgh in 1824 is a good
example) the one who first bored the main and commenced fighting the fire appeared to onlookers
to be the only one actually doing anything positive. What their rivals did was to dig up the road
upstream of the supply source (no ring mains in those days!) and thus depleted the amount of water
available to the first named company. Actual fights broke out between members of the rival
companies, no doubt cheered on by the populace!
Regulation 4. Fire pumps, fire mains, hydrants and hoses (continued)
4 Diameter of and pressure in the fire mains
4.1 The diameter of the fire main and water service pipes shall be sufficient for the effective distribution
of the maximum required discharge from two fire pumps operating simultaneously, except that in
the case of cargo ships the diameter need only be sufficient for the discharge of 140 m3/hour.
4.2 With two pumps simultaneously delivering through nozzles specified in paragraph 8 the quantity of
water specified in paragraph 4.1, through any adjacent hydrants, the following minimum pressures
shall be maintained at all hydrants:
Passenger ships:
4,000 tons gross tonnage and upwards 0.31 N/mm2 (44.95 p.s.i)
see footnote
0.27 N/mm2 (39.15 p.s.i.)
1,000 tons gross tonnage and upwards
but under 4,000 tons gross tonnage
To the satisfaction of
Under 1,000 tons gross tonnage the Administration

Cargo ships:
6,000 tons gross tonnage and upwards 0.27 N/mm2
1,000 tons gross tonnage 0.25 N/mm2 (36.25 p.s.i.)

but under 6,000 t.g.t.
Under 1,000 tons gross tonnage To the satisfaction of

the Administration
4.3 The maximum pressure at any hydrant shall not exceed that at which the effective control of a fire
hose can be demonstrated.
5 Number and position of hydrants
5.1 The number and position of hydrants shall be such that at least two jets of water not emanating
from the same hydrant, one of which shall be from a single length of hose, may reach any part of
the ship normally accessible to the passengers or crew while the ship is being navigated and any
part of any cargo space when empty, any ro/ro cargo space or any special category space in which
latter case the two jets shall reach any part of such space, each from a single length of hose.
Furthermore, such hydrant shall be positioned near the access to the protected spaces.
5.2 In the accommodation, service and machinery spaces of passenger ships the number and position
of hydrants shall be such that the requirements of paragraph 5.1 may be complied with when all
watertight doors and all doors in main vertical zone bulkheads are closed.
5.3 Where, in a passenger ship, access is provided to a machinery space of category A at a low level
from an adjacent shaft tunnel, two hydrants shall be provided external to, but near the entrance to
that machinery space. Where such access is provided from other spaces, in one of those spaces
two hydrants shall be provided near the entrance to the machinery space of category A. Such
provision need not be made where the tunnel or adjacent spaces are not part of the escape route.
6 Pipes and hydrants
6.1 Materials readily rendered ineffective by heat shall not be used for firemains and hydrants unless
adequately protected. The pipes and hydrants shall be so placed that the fire hose may be easily
coupled to them. The arrangements of pipes and hydrants shall be such as to avoid the possibility
of freezing. In ships where deck cargo may be carried, the positions of the hydrants shall be such
that they are always readily accessible and the pipes shall be arranged as far as practicable to avoid
risk of damage by such cargo. Unless one hose and nozzle is provided for each hydrant in the ship,
there shall be complete interchangeability of hose couplings and nozzles.
6.2 A valve shall be fitted to serve each fire hose so that any fire hose may be removed while the fire
pumps are at work.
6.3 Isolating valves to separate the section of the fire main within the machinery space containing the
main fire pump or pumps from the rest of the fire main shall be fitted in an easily accessible and
tenable position outside the machinery spaces. The fire main shall be so arranged that when the
isolating valves are shut all the hydrants on the ship, except those in the machinery space referred
to above, can be supplied with water by a fire pump not located in this machinery space through
pipes which do not enter this space. Exceptionally, the Administration may permit short lengths of
the emergency fire pump suction and discharge piping to penetrate the machinery space if it is
impracticable to route it externally provided that the integrity of the fire main is maintained by the
enclosure of the piping in a substantial steel casing.
Comment
Paragraph 5.3 requires a hydrant to be positioned in the shaft tunnel as illustrated in Figure 8.7.
This permits fire-fighters to get below the heat wave and make a direct attack upon the fire. The
need to standardise on the coupling size and design is obvious and the author would deprecate the
choice given in paragraph 6.1 above. The only alternative being where hose reels are fitted these do
not require to follow the standard coupling size. It is of the utmost importance that all personnel
likely to be engaged in fighting fire on board a given ship should be familiar with the isolating
valves outlined in paragraph 6.3 above. It is much too late to discover when the fire breaks out that
nobody on board has any knowledge how to isolate a damaged section of the fire main.

History of Fire Hose

Though there can be little doubt that some form of fire hose was used in ancient times, the
earliest written description of such found by the author relates to a Dutch painter, Jan van Heijden,
who in 1672 produced a leather hose with sewn seams for fire-fighting purposes. It is recorded that
he was made Chief Officer of the Amsterdam Fire Brigade that same year.
As can be imagined, the sewn seams gave a great deal of trouble; it was not overcome until 1807,
when Messrs. Sellers and Pennock, of Philadelphia, substituted iron rivets for the stitching. In
1819, a Mr. Jacob Perkins, of London, hit upon the idea of using copper rivets to make the hose
practically watertight and to obviate the problem of rust associated with the ferrous metal.
The first woven canvas hose was made in Germany and it was not until 1821 that its manufacture
spread to Britain. This early hose was woven on hand looms, until the first power loom was
invented by Messrs. Reddaways, of Manchester. It is interesting to reflect that although canvas hose
was not made in Britain at the time of the Battle of Trafalgar, it was certainly used on board the
men-o'-war of that period and is specifically mentioned by more than one Captain in his "Orders of
the Day". This indicates that the Germans must have had a thriving little export industry!
FIGURE 8.7 Hydrants should be provided in shaft tunnels at entrances to engine room to facilitate fire-fighting.
The practice of lining hose with rubber was not started until the beginning of the 20th century
and many fire brigades were slow to adopt it, even up to the outbreak of the Second World War.
Now the availability of plastics has replaced the heavy rubber lining and this greatly improves the
lot of today's fire-fighters.

7 Fire hoses
7.1 Fire hoses shall be of material approved by the Administration and shall be sufficient in length to
project a jet of water to any of the spaces in which they may be required to be used. Their
maximum length shall be to the satisfaction of the Administration. Each hose shall be provided
with a nozzle and the necessary couplings. Hoses specified in this Chapter as "fire hoses" shall
together with any necessary fittings and tools be kept ready for use in conspicuous positions near
the water service hydrants or connections. Additionally in interior locations in passenger ships
carrying more than 36 passengers fire hoses shall be connected to the hydrants at all times.
7.2 Ships shall be provided with fire hoses the number and diameter of which shall be to the
satisfaction of the Administration.

7.3 In passenger ships there shall be at least one fire hose for each of the hydrants required by
paragraph 5 and these hoses shall be used only for the purpose of extinguishing fires or testing the
fire-extinguishing apparatus at fire drills and surveys.
7.4.1 In cargo ships of 1,000 tons gross tonnage and upwards the number of fire hoses to be provided
shall be one for each 30 m length of the ship and one spare but in no case less than five in all. This
number does not include any hoses required in any engine or boiler room. The Administration may
increase the number of hoses required so as to ensure that hoses in sufficient number are available
and accessible at all times, having regard to the type of ship and the nature of trade in which the
ship is employed.
7.4.2 In cargo ships of less than 1,000 tons gross tonnage the number of fire hoses to be provided shall
be to the satisfaction of the Administration.
Comment
Quite surely it would be in the interest of all concerned if the IMO would lay down a standard
specification, both for the type and diameter of fire hose, the size and type of couplings to be
adopted for shipboard use. The great advantage would be that there would be available
interchangeability of such equipment between ships in the case of salvage attempts on the high seas
and indeed when suffering a fire in port adjoining ships could assist one another.
Under Regulation 4 paragraph 7.2 above it is left to the discretion of the Administration to decide
the diameter of the hose. The Author wishes that the IMO with their great experience had specified
hose sizes thus removing choice from the equation. The author firmly believes that for shipboard
use 45 mm (1¾ inch) lightweight hose made of lined synthetic material is to be recommended.
Larger diameter hose, say 65 mm (2½ inch) is too inflexible and thus both difficult to manoeuvre in
the confines of a ship, not to mention its tendency to require two men to handle it during
movements and to control the jet reaction. On the other hand one man can easily handle and control
the smaller hose, even under high pressure. This is a tremendously important factor for the men
handling the hose in the confines of the engine room; a hold; fore or after peak stores; or in the
narrow twisting passages to be found in accommodation spaces. The friction loss in this size of
hose is not significant by virtue of the fact that the length of the hose lines is quite short on board
ship and the amount of water available is more than adequate to supply the largest size of nozzle
permitted on board ship, namely 19 mm — See Regulation 4 paragraph 8.1.
The advantage of using man-made fibres and
plastic linings is that it is hydraulically as good as
cast-iron pipes; does not freeze readily; is unaffected
by sea water, mildew, oil, sunlight, acid or alkali;
and, most important of all for shipboard use, can be
used, drained then rolled up and left without any
elaborate washing and drying.
The author has a preference for hose to be stowed
"flaked" rather than rolled up, connected to the
hydrant and with the nozzle connected up and either
lying on top of the hose, or better still, be laid on a
suitable shelf above the hose. When required to be
used the branchman simply grabs the nozzle and
runs towards the fire. Once the fire area is reached
it is easier for any remaining flaked hose to be to be
pulled into the letter "S" form, than to get rid of
surplus rolled hose. The hydrant should not, of
course, be turned on until all the hose has been run
out.
The author was brought up with the instantaneous
British type coupling and naturally had a tendency to FIGURE 8.8 Angus "Duraline" fire hose on
board ship. "Duraline" is unaffected by seawater
favour this design, but after years of travelling the
and resistant to most chemicals.
world is now convinced that this is not the best type

FIGURE 8.9 Left to right: UK male instantaneous coupling; UK female coupling and a hermaphrodite coupling.
for use on board ship. The salt atmosphere tends to cause the lugs to stick and make it difficult to
achieve a secure connection. He is convinced that the hermaphrodite coupling is the best type
available, with screw type following close behind! Unlike the British couplings, with male and
female connections, it make no difference which end of the hose is run towards the fire and whilst it
may take a few seconds longer with hermaphrodite or screw couplings to connect lengths of hose
together, the advantages greatly outweigh the disadvantages. Many, possibly most, fire services in
the world use a form of hermaphrodite coupling and a survey could be made to standardise on the
type most commonly in use. The 65 mm coupling size is probably the most commonly found but
here again a comprehensive survey would elicit the answer.
Plastic couplings have been available for a number of years and, on the face of it, seem to
provide the perfect answer to shipboard use. The author would council caution to anyone thinking
that these couplings are 'the answer to a maiden's prayer'. Experience has shown that where ships
are plying into very hot climates, such as the Persian Gulf, the couplings can and do crack badly
after a short time. This is due to the different expansion ratio of the plastic and the metal ring in the
male coupling. Plastic incorporating metal parts is undoubtedly a suspect material when it comes
to having to cope with dramatic differences in temperature. Apparently under such circumstances a
migration of the polymers takes place and the plastic becomes brittle and can crack and even shatter
under quite a small blow.

8 Nozzles
8.1 For the purposes of this
Chapter, standard nozzle
sizes shall be 12 mm, 16
mm and 19 mm or as near
thereto as possible.
8.2 For accommodation and

service spaces, a nozzle
size greater than 12 mm
need not be used.
8.3 For machinery spaces and

exterior locations, the
nozzle size shall be such as
to obtain the maximum
discharge possible from
two jets at the pressure
mentioned in paragraph 4
from the smallest pump,
provided that a nozzle size
greater than 19 mm need
not be used.
8.4 All nozzles shall be of an

approved dual purpose type
(i.e. spray/jet) incorporating
FIGURE 8.10 The Arkon 1702 hand-controlled branch.
a shut-off.

Comment
Unless well maintained, these variable nozzles have a tendency to stick and the author has found
instances where the jamming was so severe as to require releasing by a liberal application of oil and
only then after securing the branch in a vice and applying considerable force. When fire actually
strikes it is terribly off-putting and obviously time wasting to discover that the nozzle you are
handling cannot be operated. Part of every fire drill should include actually operating the relevant
nozzles. But it is important that all the nozzles on board should be opened and closed at regular
intervals and this should be done on a weekly basis.
THE SITING AND ARRANGEMENT OF PUMPS ABOARD

9 Location and arrangement of water pumps, etc., for other fire-extinguishing
systems
Pumps required for the provision of water for other fire-extinguishing systems required by this
Chapter, their sources of power and their controls shall be installed outside the space or spaces
protected by such systems and shall be so arranged that a fire in the space or spaces protected will
not put any such system out of action.
Comment
The fairly standard practice of siting the
emergency fire pump on VLCC's in the fore peak is
one of doubtful virtue. These spaces can be
anything up to 1,000 feet from the accommodation
and, by their very nature, provide a very hostile
environment in terms of condensation and even
flooding by sea water when something goes wrong.
In a gale men cannot get along the deck to operate
or service these pumps and the electric wiring
connecting to the remote starting devices is terribly
vulnerable to damage and/or physical deterioration.
On balance the Author would rather see the
emergency fire pump sited right aft and placed in a
fully protected compartment having direct access
from the open after poop deck. If the steering flat
is used it is imperative that a really effective fire
and smoke-stop door be provided to completely
seal off the engine-room in case of fire in that
space. Means must be provided to close this door
from a protected position not likely to be affected
by fire in the engine- or boiler-rooms. Remote
starting facilities should be provided from the
Bridge, Cargo Control Room and from the Main
Pump Room.
The DESMI SL submersible pump (Figure 8.11
left) is typical of this type of dual-purpose unit. Its
sealed electric motor can function efficiently even
when tilted to an angle of 30 deg. — a condition
which might easily be encountered at sea and even,
though less probably, during fire-fighting
operations in port.
FIGURE 8.11 DESMI SL submersible pump.

Hosereels
When one considers that the British Fire Service (and no doubt many other countries) put out
98% of all fires by means of hose reels it never ceases to surprise the author that these appliances
have not become more generally in use on board ship, particularly in passenger and crew
accommodation. A hose reel can deal with quite a serious fire, certainly one involving a single
cabin, or even a smallish public room. In effect, the hose reel does the work of an unlimited number
of portable fire extinguishers. Because of the small nozzle size, usually 7 mm (¼ inch) water
damage is kept to the minimum. Being on a reel the small bore hose, commonly 12 mm (½ inch)
can easily be pulled out and take to the point of use by female members of staff, some of whom
might possibly find it difficult to manoeuvre even the 45 mm hose. These hose reels will not
replace fire hydrants but, especially on passenger ships and ferries, the additional relatively small
cost would seem to represent a sound fire security measure.
The type of hosereel recommended is one in which the water is automatically turned on as the
hose is pulled from the reel and taken towards the fire. Having to turn on a supply valve is an
unnecessary complication and can cause delay. There are many instances where untrained persons
have run with the nozzle of a conventional hose reel to the fire but, upon finding that water did not
flow when the cock was turned on, have assumed that the reel was faulty and simply abandoned the
effort.
FIGURE 8.12 Taylor Dunford's "Norsen" Automatic Hose Reel. Sketch shows detail of operation of
the automatic valve. The outer cylinder is attached to the water inlet, and does not rotate. the inner
cylinder is contained into a bend, to which hose is attached. As the hose unwinds from the reeel, the
bend and the inner cylinder rotate. The plunger, which cannot rotate, moves along the axis of the reel,
thus opening the valve. Rewinding the hose unto the reel, reverses the action.

FIXED FIRE-FIGHTING SYSTEMS

Historical
An interesting patent taken out by a certain Ambrose Godfrey is preserved in the Guildhall
Museum:
GODFREY, Ambrose.
A new invention for extinguishing fires in ships by explosion and suffocation. The
materials of the said invention consist of casks and other vessels of several forms and
sizes, some of which are filled with water only, others with water and a certain
chemical preparation together, and others with certain chemical preparation mixed
with other dry matters without any water; and with each of the said vessels is a charge
of gun powder contained in a tin or box which has a double neck but which is fastened
to each end of the vessel; and through one of the said necks there is fixed fuses of
wildfire by which the said gun powder is to be fired and blown up.
The contrivance is designed to be thrown on to the fire, whereby the gun powder would
explode and the water or other chemical would be disposed on to the flames.
A. D. 1723, November 12th; No. 458
There is, however, no record of this apparatus having been actually installed on board ship.
The famous firm of Merryweather's, established for almost 300 years and still one of the world's
foremost fire-engineering firms, in their catalogue of 1882 state:
"On some of the vessels of the White Star Line an ingenious arrangement for using
carbonic acid gas and steam, either together or separately, is adopted. This is
applicable to extinguishing fires in the coal bunkers or amongst the cargo; but for
obvious reasons cannot be used in compartments occupied by passengers. "
No further details of the installation are

available.
In their catalogue of 1906, an account
is given of a fixed CO2 system for the
protection of ships' holds. A cut-away
section drawing (Figure 8.13) shows the
cylinders and controlling valves in a
compartment on the upper deck, and the
supply pipes leading to the holds and other
accommodation. Merryweather's say that
they developed this system in
collaboration with a Professor Lewes, of
the Royal Naval College.
Carbon dioxide was used as a
fire-extinguisher on land in the early
1800's; but it is unlikely to have been used
to protect shipping much before the
Merryweather-Lewes installation. The
Author can find no record of the name of
the first ship to be so protected.
FIGURE 8.13 The earliest form of carbon

dioxide protection for ship's holds, copied from
Messrs. Merryweather's catalogue of 1906

Overview of Statutory Requirements applying to Fixed Fire-fighting Systems

The following SOLAS Regulations apply:
Regulation 5 Fixed gas fire-extinguishing systems — (General)
Regulation 7 Fire-extinguishing arrangements in machinery spaces
Regulation 8 Fixed low-expansion foam fire-extinguishing systems in machinery spaces
Regulation 9 Fixed high-expansion foam fire-extinguishing systems in machinery
spaces
Regulation 10 Fixed water-spraying fire-extinguishing systems in machinery spaces
Regulation 37 Protection of special category spaces — (Passenger ships)
Regulation 38 Protection of cargo spaces, other than special category spaces, intended for
the carriage of motor vehicles with fuel in their tanks for their own
propulsion
Regulation 39 Fixed fire-extinguishing arrangements in cargo spaces
Regulation 53 Fixed protection arrangements in cargo spaces — (Cargo ships)
Regulation 54 Special arrangements for ships carrying dangerous goods
The requirements relating to each of the above Regulations, with Regulation 6 - Fire
extinguishing arrangements intervening will now be discussed at length:
Regulation 5. Fixed gas fire-extinguishing systems

1 General
1.1 The use of a fire-extinguishing medium which, in the opinion of the Administration, either by itself
or under expected conditions of use gives off toxic gases in such quantities as to endanger
persons shall not be permitted.
1.2 The necessary pipes for conveying fire-extinguishing medium into protected spaces shall be
provided with control valves so marked as to indicate clearly the spaces to which the pipes are led.
Suitable provision shall be made to prevent inadvertent admission of the medium to any space.
Where a cargo space fitted with a gas fire-extinguishing system is used as a passenger space, the
gas connection shall be blanked during such use.
1.3 The piping for the distribution of fire-extinguishing medium shall be arranged and discharge
nozzles so positioned that a uniform distribution of medium is obtained.
1.4 Means shall be provided to close all openings which may admit air to or allow gas to escape from a
protected space.
1.5 Where the volume of free air contained in air receivers in any space is such that, if released in such
space in the event of fire, such release of air within that space would seriously affect the efficiency
of the fixed fire-extinguishing system, the Administration shall require the provision of an additional
quantity of fire-extinguishing medium.
1.6 Means shall be provided for automatically giving audible warning of the release of
fire-extinguishing medium into any space in which personnel normally work or to which they have
access. The alarm shall operate for a suitable period before the medium is released.
1.7 The means of control of any fixed gas fire-extinguishing system shall be readily accessible and
simple to operate and shall be grouped together in as few locations as possible at positions not
likely to be cut off by a fire in a protected space. At each location there shall be clear instructions
relating to the operation of the system having regard to the safety of personnel.
1.8 Automatic release of fire-extinguishing medium shall not be permitted, except as permitted by
paragraph 3.3.5 and in respect of local automatically operated units referred to in paragraphs 3.4
and 3.5.
1.9 Where the quantity of extinguishing medium is required to protect more than one space, the
quantity of medium available need not be more than the largest quantity required for any one space
so protected.
1.10 Except as otherwise permitted by paragraphs 3.3, 3.4 or 3.5, pressure containers required for the
storage of fire-extinguishing medium, other than steam, shall be located outside protected spaces
in accordance with paragraph 1.13.
1.11 Means shall be provided for the crew to safely check the quantity of medium in the containers.

1.12 Containers for the storage of fire-extinguishing medium and associated pressure components shall
be designed to pressure codes of practice to the satisfaction of the Administration having regard to
their locations and maximum ambient temperatures expected in service.
1.13 When the fire-extinguishing medium is stored outside a protected space, it shall be stored in a
room which shall be situated in a safe and readily accessible position and shall be effectively
ventilated to the satisfaction of the Administration. Any entrance to such a storage room shall
preferably be from the open deck and in any case shall be independent of the protected space.
Access doors shall open outwards, and bulkheads and decks including doors and other means of
closing any opening therein, which form the boundaries between such rooms and adjoining
enclosed spaces shall be gas-tight. For the purpose of the application of the integrity tables in
regulations 26, 27, 44 and 58, such storage rooms shall be treated as control stations.
1.14 Spare parts for the system shall be stored on board and be to the satisfaction of the Administration.
2 Carbon dioxide systems

2.1 For cargo spaces the quantity of carbon dioxide available shall, unless otherwise provided, be
sufficient to give a minimum volume of free gas equal to 30% of the gross volume of the largest
cargo space so protected in the ship.
2.2 For machinery spaces the quantity of carbon dioxide carried shall be sufficient to give a minimum
volume of free gas equal to the larger of the following volumes, either:
.1 40% of the gross volume of the largest machinery space so protected, the
volume to exclude that part of the casing above the level at which the horizontal
area of the caseing is 40% or less of the horizontal area of the space concerned
taken midway between the tank top and the lowest part of the casing; or
.2 35% of the gross volume of the largest machinery space protected, including the
casing;
Provided that the above-mentioned percentages may be reduced to 35% and 30% respectively for
cargo ships of less than 2, 00 tons gross tonnage; provided also that if two or more machinery
spaces are not entirely separate they shall be considered as forming one space.
2.3 For the purpose of this paragraph the volume of free carbon dioxide shall be calculated at 0.56
m3/kg.
2.4 For the machinery spaces the fixed piping system shall be such that 85% of the gas can be
discharged into the space within 2 min.
2.5 Carbon dioxide systems installed on or after 1 October 1994 shall comply with the following
requirements:
.1 Two separate controls shall be provided for releasing carbon dioxide into a
protected space and to ensure the activities of the alarm. One control shall be
used to discharge the gas from its storage containers. A second control shall be
used for opening the valve of the piping which conveys the gas into the
protected space.
.2 The two controls shall be located inside a release box clearly identified for the
particular space. If the box containing the controls is to be locked, a key to the
box shall be in a break-glass-type enclosure conspicuously located adjacent to
the box.
Comment
Fixed CO2 systems, both for engine rooms and cargo spaces on vessels over 2,000 tons g.r.t.,
were approved for use by the introduction of SOLAS 1960. Whilst it is certainly true to say that
fixed CO2 has been a vast improvement on the earlier steam smothering system, it is far from being
infallible. For example, when an engine room is involved in fire, a delay in applying the gas is
almost inevitable whilst a check is made to determine that all persons have escaped from the space.
As the rate at which a fire grows is exponential even a short delay can result in significant fire
growth and consequent damage. A study of fires involving engine rooms — by far the most
common place for fire to strike on board ship — indicated that almost invariably the electrical
equipment was damaged and the ship had to be taken in tow — that is if she did not sink!
In many of these cases it is revealed that crews had simply not been properly trained to operate
the system.
For the protection of cargo spaces it is quite obvious that only a fixed gas system is really
suitable. Of necessity, such spaces are commonly filled with cargo and only a gas can hope to

penetrate down through the inevitable air

spaces left in the stow. But here again the
crew have to be properly trained if the fire
has to be controlled and then extinguished.
Water will only be successful where the fire
is confined to an upper surface which is
within reach — for example if the hatch
covers are in place and it lies conveniently
beneath a ventilator, or an inspection trunk.
Foam would at best be a 'hit or a miss'
system.
Each of the three types of systems
permitted for the protection of machinery
spaces and the gas systems for cargo holds
will now be discussed in turn.
Characteristics of Carbon Dioxide

Carbon dioxide, a colourless, odourless
gas, is one and a half times heavier than air.
As it is discharged into a protected space, its
rapid expansion into gas form produces a
refrigerating effect.
The characteristic appearance of
discharging CO2 is that of a cloud of snow.
This snow rapidly sublimes into gas,
absorbing heat from the surrounding
atmosphere as it does so.
It is estimated that the latent heat of
carbon dioxide is less than 300 British
Thermal Units per pound. But since water at
boiling point has a latent heat of 973 B.T.U.'s
FIGURE 8.14 Shows the operation of a typical fixed CO2 per lb., it must not be supposed that the
system for the protection of holds. cooling effect of CO2 by itself plays a very
large part in the putting-out of a fire.
When heated, liquid carbon dioxide has a coefficient of expansion greater than that of any known
substance. Its rapid change of volume can be seen in Figure 8.15 below.
The critical temperature of CO2 in liquid form is 31.35°C. (88.43°F). If the liquid be heated
above this point, it will pass into the gaseous state without any change in volume. It is therefore
important to its effectiveness as an extinguishing agent that carbon dioxide shall be maintained in
liquid form preparatory to use. For if the CO2 were to be
already in a gaseous state when it was released from the Expansion of Carbon Dioxide Liquid
storage cylinder, as it would be if the temperature of the 115
storage room were above 31°C, its expansion ratio would 110
be greatly reduced, and its efficiency as an extinguishing
Volume (m3)
agent automatically lowered. It follows that the storage 105
cylinders should be kept in a place unlikely to be affected 100
by fire or by extreme atmospheric temperatures.

95
At normal temperature and pressure, the expansion
ratio of CO2 from liquid to gas form is 450; and one 90
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
kilogram of liquid CO2 will produce 0.56 cubic metres of Temperature (°C)
gas (one lb. of liquid will produce 8.5 cubic feet of gas).
FIGURE 8.15

Carbon dioxide gas is not toxic; though if inhaled in a heavy concentration, it will suffocate. The
fear of suffocating persons trapped in an engine space often leads to a long delay as the
Master/Chief Engineer ensures that everyone is safe or is rescued before applying the gas to
extinguish the fire.
The modus operandi of CO2 in extinguishing fire is to displace air and thus reduce the oxygen
content in the protected area below that which will support combustion. A reduction (from the
normal 21 per cent) to 15 per cent of oxygen will extinguish most fires; but with some materials a
much lower concentration is necessary. For example, fire involving cotton, jute and similar cargoes
can be satisfactorily controlled but in almost all cases the material continues to smoulder even when
the oxygen concentration has been reduced to below eight per cent. Above this percentage,
smouldering material is very liable to re-ignite. The Author has witnessed bales of cotton which
have been immersed for many hours in the sea and which have re-ignited after having been landed
ashore!
It must be stated that deep seated fires involving fibrous material, such as jute or cotton, are quite
unlikely to be finally extinguished by CO2 or any other smothering gas! Such fires will continue to
smoulder in spite of the application of gas extending over days, weeks, or even in some recorded
cases for months. The beauty of the gas is that it holds the fire in a quiescent state and thus enables
a ship to reach port safely where the only recourse is to work out the cargo.
The Fixed CO2 Installation

A typical fixed CO2 system employs a battery of solid-drawn steel cylinders to contain liquefied
gas in 30 or 45 kg sizes, at pressures ranging between 750 and 850 lb. per sq. in. at 60o F. At 140o
F. the pressure rises to 2,400 lb. per sq. in., at which pressure a safety disc will burst and release the
gas. Either carbon steel or manganese steel — the latter being somewhat lighter — can be used in
the manufacture of the cylinders, which must conform either to British Standard Specifications 401,
1287 and 1288, or NFPA 12.
Non-return valves provided in the discharge manifolds allow a cylinder to be disconnected
without affecting the use of the remaining cylinders, and stop gas feeding back into empty cylinders.
In this way, the installation can be operated without any gas escaping to open air from the point at
which a cylinder may have been removed.
FIGURE 8.16 Shows the operation of a Walter Kidde fixed CO2 and alarm system for the protection of holds.

It is necessary to carry out periodic routine tests to ensure that the CO2 content of each cylinder is
satisfactory. Every cylinder is stamped with its empty and its full weights; and the usual method of
checking is to weigh each cylinder on a beam scale. This is normally supplied by the
fire-equipment manufacturer when the system is installed. In some cases it is suspended from a
steel rod permanently installed along the top of the bank of cylinders.
The weighing of the cylinders, even when a rod has been installed to carry the beam scale, is
quite an undertaking. Recently, however, a liquid-level detector has been developed which greatly
simplifies the operation. The cylinders are so filled by the manufacturer that liquid CO2 occupies
two-thirds of the water capacity of the cylinder at normal temperatures; but this varies as
temperatures increase, until at 82 oF. the liquid fills the entire cylinder. The detector utilises
ultrasonic waves which is held against the side of the cylinder to ascertain the liquid level in the
cylinder. By reference to the temperature prevailing, the contents of the cylinder can then be readily
calculated.
Discharge of the liquid contents of the cylinders is normally maintained through an
internally-fitted solid-drawn pipe. When this internal pipe is not fitted, the cylinders have to be
inverted before use; but this is not common practice.
The cylinders can be stored in any suitable compartment so situated that no fire in any area to be
covered by the system would be likely to affect their use. The usual place is in a compartment on
the main deck amidships.
Pipes of at least 20 mm (¾") solid-drawn galvanised steel lead the gas from the cylinders to the
holds, where they terminate in gas discharge nozzles. These nozzles are of a flat mushroom shape
for cargo spaces, but bowl-shaped for machinery-spaces — the reason for the difference being to
reduce the velocity of discharge of the gas in the latter case. If this were not done, a high-velocity
gas discharge would cause serious turbulence in the machinery-space and would tend to blow the
flames away before extinguishing them. In holds, the nozzles are fitted under the decks of the cargo
spaces where they are unlikely to be damaged by cargo. The rate of gas discharge into cargo spaces
is not specified by SOLAS. However in the case of engine spaces SOLAS specifies that 85% of the
gas must be discharged into the space within two minutes. Pipes must have been tested to the
satisfaction of the Administration per SOLAS Regulation 5 paragraph 1.12. The American Rules
are much more specific - as regards the minimum size of the piping than is SOLAS. The Table 10.2
below shows Pipe Sizes taken from the Code of Federal Regulations 46 Chapter 1(10-95 Edition)
Table 34.15-5(e)(5) issued by the United States Government :
This question of the minimum size of piping is important; for freezing and subsequent blocking
of the system can easily take place if pipes of too small a diameter are used. This is a point which
Maximum Quantity Minimum Pipe

of CO2 required Size
(in pounds) (in inches)
1
100 /2
3
225 /4
300 1
600 11/4
1,000 11/2
2,450 2
2,500 21/2
4,450 3
7,100 31/2
10,450 4
15,000 41/4
Table 8.2

FIGURE 8.17 The Walter Kiddie bulkhead type FIGURE 8.18 Pyrene smoke detection cabinet.
smoke-detecting cabinet (44 lines), with The cabinet is usually located on the bridge and
three-way valves in cabinet. the three-way valves are situated near or in the
CO2 room.
causes some concern to many reputable fire-engineering companies when tendering in competition
for an installation to which the SOLAS Regulations apply. SOLAS might with advantage be
amended as to ensure that all installations have pipe dimensions such that CO2 systems will not fail
at the crucial moment. Alternatively SOLAS should specify the maximum discharge time for
systems as they have done for engine spaces.
As to discharge arrangements, the method favoured by the Walter Kidde Company is for
cylinders to be discharged one at a time, but Pyrene prefer to discharge from four cylinders at a time
by means of suitable valves. Operating wrenches for the systems are always kept in break-glass
boxes so as to obviate the danger of accidental or unauthorised use. A system of valves directs the
gas into the desired hold. The holds in turn are divided into their 'tween-deck and main
compartments, so that gas can be directed into the affected part of an individual hold.
Experience has shown that unless a CO2 system is properly maintained, leakage of gas will take
place from the unions when the installation is actuated. In one recent case, escaping carbon dioxide
filled the bottle storage-room, and an engineer had rapidly to don a set of breathing apparatus in
order to tighten the cylinder unions before extra gas could be directed in a hold containing copra on
fire.
The author would suggest that no CO2 system can be considered complete unless it incorporates
both a smoke-detector and an alarm system. Early warning of fire is essential if the outbreak is to
be controlled before it reaches serious dimensions. A description of these devices is given later in
this Chapter.
Low Pressure Bulk CO2 Systems

A recent development in CO2 fixed systems is that of housing the gas in one or more large
storage tanks and this has many obvious advantages. The bulk gas can be delivered to a docked
ship in road tankers and thus avoids the handling of the massively heavy cylinders found in the
conventional systems. Further this system cuts out the large number of connections necessary to
connect individual cylinders to the manifold, at which point in practice serious leakage can take
place. Finally, the system has the great merit that it is "multi-shot" and a much greater reserve of

FIGURE 8.19 Typical low pressure CO2 system
gas can be carried. The system is known as "Low Pressure CO2" and operates at 300 lbs. sq. in. as
against 750 lbs. sq. in. in the normal installation.
These storage tanks can be quite large, some with a capacity of 36 tons - equivalent to inerting a
space of 64,285 m3. In ships with huge hold areas, such as car carriers, the tanks are often
duplicated. A fire detection and alarm system can, and should, be incorporated.
The CO2 is stored in a fully insulated and refrigerated horizontal, cylindrical, pressure vessel to in
the UK to Lloyd's Class I standards, constructed from materials suitable for the operating conditions
of 21 kg/cm2 (300 lb/in2) and -17oC. (2oF). The tank is usually to BS 1501 Grade 32A standard the
steel in which has low temperature properties to -50o C.
Two refrigeration units, each capable of maintaining the liquid carbon dioxide at operating
temperature and pressure are provided. In the event
of failure of one of the refrigeration units the
standby unit will automatically operate and
simultaneously an alarm will function to indicate
failure. The units are of the marine type and are
sized to cope with heat leakage from an ambient
temperature of 46o C. Relief valves are fitted and
are designed to operate at 24.5 kg/cm2 (350 lb./in.2).
The discharge from these relief valves is required to
be piped away to a safe area from the CO2 room.
Two relief valves are mounted on a three port,
two-way changeover valve which allows a relief
valve to be removed for servicing while ensuring
that at least one of the pair is protecting the storage
vessel at all times.
The British Board of Trade also require an
additional pair of relief valves set to relieve at 27
kg/cm2 (385 lb./in.2) to be mounted on a three port, FIGURE 8.20 The Distillers Company (Carbon
two-way changeover valve connected to the storage Dioxide) Limited refrigeration console for ship's
vessel. Continuous contents indication is given by low pressure CO2 system.

FIGURE 8.21 Completion work being carried out on bulk CO2 storage tanks.
means of a remote reading electrical type gauge. Facilities for alarms are provided on the
equipment and comprise two sets of level switching contacts which are adjustable. One contact is
normally set to operate at a loss of 5 per cent of the vessel's contents and the other to operate should
the vessel be filled to higher than 98 per cent of its free volume. In addition the provision of a
standby contents indicator is required by way of a vertical, external, uninsulated pipe which can be
filled with liquid CO2 to the vessel by opening one valve. The liquid level can then be determined
by visual indication of frosting on the outside of the pipe, or by a radio-active source detector as
used for CO2 cylinders. The UK Distillers Company (Carbon Dioxide) Ltd., insulate their tanks
with 4-in. of polyurethane foam with fire-resistant additive, clad with sheet aluminium.
In the event of fire the system is simple to use and the operator has only to release a given
quantity of CO2 necessary to inhibit a given space according to maker's instructions. As with any
CO2 system it is terribly important that these instructions be carefully followed.
The Operation of CO2 Systems Under Fire Conditions

During investigation following ship fires the Author has been struck, and often horrified, by the
misuse of CO2 installations by the crew. A common fault is that of opening up the hold or
machinery space much too quickly and thus allowing the precious and irreplaceable gas to escape to
atmosphere. The inevitable outcome is that the fire bursts out again, often with disastrous effect. In
some of these cases, with predictable results, holds or machinery spaces have been opened literally
within minutes of the CO2 being applied. CO2 has no magical properties and it must be appreciated
that, especially in cargo holds, it takes an appreciable time before the situation gets better. In the
early stages the fire can even appear to get worse in terms of smoke and gas emission but this is a
natural phenomenon, usually caused by the in-rushing gas fanning the flames in the early stages.
Patience and faith in the equipment is demanded and there is nothing whatsoever to be gained by
opening up the hold when a ship is at sea and no replacement gas is available.
A classic case of what should be done in the event of a hold fire concerns the SS. Ben Vannoch
owned by Ben Line Steamers, Leith. This vessel suffered a fire in a hold containing jute whilst en
route from India to Liverpool in the U.K. The initial discharge of 30 bottles of CO2 was made and

thereafter at regular intervals topping-up was carried out. Fourteen days later the vessel reached
Liverpool, still with a few bottles of unused CO2 on board. The cargo was still smouldering but it
was worked out successfully with minimum damage to the ship and cargo. As long as the hatch
covers are kept secure the dilution of the carbon dioxide will be is kept to a minimum
In the case of an engine-room fire the gas should be allowed to remain for at least an hour, and
preferably two, before a physical inspection is made by engineers wearing breathing apparatus.
Entry should be made from the lowest possible level in order to keep below the heat wave.
Hold fires, on the other hand, demand that the space be kept tightly battened down until the ship
reaches port — no matter how long this takes. Even on reaching port there should be no undue
haste to open up until everything is in readiness for working out the cargo. The Author would
council everyone — professional fire brigades included — to take their time and not, as so often is
the case, to rush to take off the hatches in order to see what is happening. Far better to add supplies
of gas for topping-up purposes, for a day or two if necessary, until arrangements have been made to
handle the damaged cargo. Such arrangements can mean working out cargo from adjoining holds,
at least in 'tween deck spaces where the heat from the fire will be greatest, before tackling the fire
itself. If this is not done and the fire gets away when the hatches are taken off there is a grave risk
of it spreading. It is sad to have to admit it but the Author has in recent years read accounts in the
technical fire press where professional fire brigades have been directly responsible for massive
damage to ship and cargo, caused quite clearly by precipitate action. Cases of flooding holds and
the water causing damage to cargo in adjoining holds are far too common. The story of the old bull
and the young bull is salutary, which the Author will be delighted to explain upon application!!
Completely ignoring the instructions issued by the manufacturers of CO2 systems is another
common fault perpetrated by shipboard personnel. If the instructions say that a given number of
cylinders should be applied to a given space there is nothing to be gained by exceeding this. Yet
here again the Author knows of cases where the entire supply of gas has been applied in the very
early stages of a fire, leaving no reserve for the essential topping-up process. It must be appreciated
that cargo holds, be they ever so tight, will leak gas if this builds up too high a pressure. In extreme
cases this pressure might even lift the hatch covers.
Obviously the maker's instructions will include reference to the effect that all possible means of
ventilation to the affected space be shut off before applying the gas. Equally important, everyone
must be out of the area before the gas is turned on.
The following steps are issued as guide to be followed in the case of a cargo hold fire whilst the
vessel is at sea:
1. Identify position of fire on the detector, i.e. Upper or lower 'tween deck, or lower hold. If no
detector system is installed it must be assumed that the entire hold is involved.
2. Shut off forced ventilation if operating, close flaps and place canvas covers over vent
openings. If smoke is seen coming from around the hatches caulk the spaces with any
suitable materials on hand but do not wait to do this before applying the CO2.
3. Close bridge alarm valve to the affected hold and keep a careful watch on the alarm to see if
adjoining spaces are affected.
4. Order responsible officer to proceed to the CO2 control room and operate the appropriate
valve or valves required to direct the gas to the hold in question. Identify the number of
cylinders required to be opened and operate the valves. Remember that the fire will not just
simply go out. Heated decks, hatch covers and bulkheads will take a long time to cool and
this can take days rather than hours. Signs of smoke will, almost inevitably, be observed
escaping from slight cracks in vents and possibly round the hatches but remember that this
will be a mixture of both smoke and CO2 which is white coloured.
5. If heat can be felt on the open deck or hatch covers, copious supplies of water should be
poured over the affected areas to assist in cooling. Open-ended hose lines should be used
for this purpose.

6. Where construction and cargo stowage permits the adjoining 'tween decks should be entered
by men wearing breathing apparatus and the bulkhead separating the affected hold felt for
signs of heat. But under no circumstances should the main hatch covers be removed to
facilitate entry. If heat is present on one of these bulkheads it might be possible to take in a
line of hose and lightly spray water onto the affected surface. Similarly if the engine-room
adjoins the affected hold a close watch should be kept for transmitted heat and if this is
present water should be lightly sprayed over the area. It is a good idea to secure
thermometers against the bulkhead and monitor the heat being conducted through from the
adjoining hold. This will provide a good indication of the progress, or otherwise, of the
fire and dictate further action required to be taken.
7. If the action outlined in 6 above is not possible it might be necessary to direct a supply of
CO2 into one or both of the adjoining holds. It is obvious that there will not be sufficient gas
on board to fill all three holds but if, for example, the fire is clearly in the upper 'tween deck,
it should be possible to spare a few bottles which should be directed into the adjoining
'tweens. An important factor is the ship's position relative to a suitable port where aid is
available in the shape of replenishment supplies of CO2 and fire-fighting services. The
maker's instructions regarding the number of cylinders required to be used for the purpose of
topping-up should be consulted and the appropriate sum done. It is impossible to be more
specific for so much depends upon the number of gas cylinders on board and the ship's
position relative to land. Figure 8.22 overleaf taken from Ship Fires and The Law —
Through the Eyes of a Fire-fighter sets out the sort of notice the Author thinks should be
posted in all CO2 rooms.
8. Apply the appropriate number of topping-up cylinders in accordance with the suggested
CO2 Operation Notice in Figure 8.22a.
9. Notify Port Authorities of estimated time of arrival and state circumstances for the benefit of
the Fire Brigade. Advise ship's agent to make arrangements to replenish supplies of CO2.
10. If a separate supply of CO2 is installed for engine-room protection it is sometimes possible
to transfer some of the cylinders to augment the hold system. But all the prevailing
circumstances should be considered before taking such action — such as the number of
cylinders available for the hold system, distance from port, whether there is a serious risk
that the fire might spread to the engine-room, especially when the fire is situated in an
adjoining hold.
11. ON NO ACCOUNT SHOULD THE AFFECTED HOLD BE OPENED UP WHILST
THE SHIP IS AT SEA.
An engine-room fire requires somewhat different techniques:
1. Upon the alarm being raised and it being obvious that the fire cannot be tackled by means of
hose lines, evacuate the engine-room and call the roll to account for all personnel.
2. Close all doors, ventilators, skylights, funnel flaps etc.
3. Shut down oil fuel supplies at the emergency control points.
4. Operate the CO2 system.
5. Start the emergency fire pump and if necessary, spray water onto heated areas of the casing.
6. Keep the space tightly battened down and leave for a minimum of one and preferably two or
even three hours if possible before carrying out an inspection. Entry should be made at the
lowest possible level by engineers wearing breathing apparatus. They should take with them
a charged line of hose fitted with a spray nozzle. Any smouldering fires should be
extinguished. The door through which entry is effected should be left open sufficient only to
admit the hose line.
7. When it is certain that the fire is out, open up all the ventilation in order to remove the
smoke and CO2 gas. Be sure that there is no gas left in the space before men enter without
wearing breathing apparatus.

FIRE
HATCH COVERS OPEN
Unless it is immediately obvious that you can extinguish the
fire by means of the equipment readily to hand, then replace the
hatch covers, close off ventilators, apply the CO2 to the space
strictly in the quantity recommended by the manufacturer of the
system. Cool deck and hatch area with a copious supply of water.
CALL FIRE DEPARTMENT. Inform them of the action taken to
control the fire and state that the preferred method is to keep the
hold closed, apply topping-up CO2 and leave for at least 24 hours
before opening up and commence taking out the cargo; controlling
smouldering bales by means of water spray and not by jets. FIGURE 8.22a This notice applies to
all types of cargo - but especially to
HATCH COVERS CLOSED fibrous materials such as cotton,
IN PORT esparto grass and similar. The only
Keep hatch covers closed and proceed as above.
exception would be where the nature
AT SEA
Keep hatch covers closed at all times. Apply CO2 as above.
of the cargo makes it positively
Top up gas supply as indicated by manufacturer. Work out the dangerous to use CO2, examples of
number of cylinders of gas left and the estimated time of arrival at such chemicals being ammonium
a port of safe refuge. Where it becomes obvious that there are not nitrate where the action should be in
sufficient cylinders left to carry out the manufacturer's
accordance with the hazardous goods
instructions, work out a simple sum whereby the ship will arrive
without any full bottles and apply gas on a pro rata hourly basis
viz:
Hours taken to reach port

Number of cylinders
e.g. 105 hours to port - 35 cylinders available = 1 cylinder

every 3 hours
Inform port authority and request attendance of Fire

Department.
Ammonium Nitrate
FIRE
HATCH COVERS OPEN
ON NO ACCOUNT CLOSE HATCH COVERS
USE COPIOUS SUPPLY OF WATER FIGURE 8.22b This notice applies to
a particularly dangerous cargo
ammonium nitrate, a cargo with which
DO NOT USE CO2 OR STEAM it is inappropriate to use CO2.
HATCH COVERS CLOSED

WHEREVER POSSIBLE, OPEN HATCH COVERS
AND PROCEED AS ABOVE.
WHERE IMPOSSIBLE, PROCEED TO APPLY A
COPIOUS SUPPLY OF WATER, THROUGH
VENTILATORS AND SERVICE HATCH

Halon Systems
Regulation 5. Fixed gas fire-extinguishing systems
3 Halogenated hydrocarbon systems1
3.1 The use of halogenated hydrocarbons as fire-extinguishing media is only permitted in machinery
spaces, pump-rooms and in cargo spaces intended solely for the carriage of vehicles which are not
carrying any cargo.
3.2 When halogenated hydrocarbons are used as the fire-extinguishing media in total flooding systems:
.1 The system shall be arranged for manual initiation of power release only.
.2 If the charge of halogenated hydrocarbon is required to supply more than one

space, the arrangements for its storage and release shall be such that
compliance with paragraphs 3.2.9 or 3.2.10 respectively, is obtained.
.3 Means shall be provided for automatically stopping all ventilation fans serving
the protected space before the medium is released.
.4 Means shall be provided to manually close all dampers in the ventilation system
serving a protected space.
.5 The discharge arrangements shall be so designed that the minimum quantity of

medium required for cargo spaces or machinery spaces in paragraphs 3.2.9 or
3.2.10 respectively can be substantially discharged in a nominal 20 s or less
based on the discharge of the liquid phase.
.6 The system shall be designed to operate within a temperature range to the

.7 The discharge shall not endanger personnel engaged on maintenance of

equipment or using the normal access ladders and escapes serving the space.
.8 Means shall be provided for the crew to safely check the pressure within
containers.
.9 The quantity of extinguishing medium for cargo spaces intended solely for the
carriage of vehicles which are not carrying any cargo shall be calculated in
accordance with table 5.1. This quantity shall be based on the gross volume of
the protected space. In respect of Halon 1301 and 1211, the quantity shall be
calculated on a volumetric ratio basis, and in respect of Halon 2402 on a mass
per unit volume basis.
.10 The quantity of extinguishing media for machinery spaces shall be calculated in
accordance with table 5.2. This quantity shall be based on the gross volume of
the space in respect of the minimum concentration and the net volume of the
space in respect of the maximum concentration, including the casing. In respect
of Halon 1301 and 1211, the quantity shall be calculated on a volumetric ratio
basis, and in respect of Halon 2402 on a mass per unit volume basis.
.11 For the purpose of paragraphs 3.2.9 and 3.2.10, the volume of Halon 1301 shall
be calculated at 0.16 m3/kg and the volume of Halon 1211 shall be calculated at
0.14 m3/kg.
3.3 Only Halon 1301 may be stored within a protected machinery space. Containers shall be individually
distributed throughout that space and the following requirements shall be complied with:
.1 A manually initiated power release, located outside the protected space, shall be
provided. Duplicate sources of power shall be provided for this release and shall
be located outside the protected space and be immediately available except that
for machinery spaces, one of the sources of power may be located inside the
protected space.
.2 Electric power circuits connecting the containers shall be monitored for fault
conditions and loss of power. Visual and audible alarms shall be provided to
indicate this.
1
Refer to resolution A.719(17) concerning prevention of air pollution from ships, adopted by the Organisation.

.3 Pneumatic or hydraulic power circuits connecting the containers shall be

duplicated. The sources of pneumatic or hydraulic pressure shall be monitored
for loss of pressure. Visual and audible alarms shall be provided to indicate this.
.4 Within the protected space, electrical circuits essential for the release of the
system shall be heat-resistant, e.g. mineral-insulated cable or equivalent. Piping
systems essential for the release of systems designed to be operated
hydraulically or pneumatically shall be of steel or other equivalent heat-resisting
material to the satisfaction of the Administration.
.5 Each pressure container shall be fitted with an automatic over-pressure release

which, in the event of the container being exposed to the effects of fire and the
system not being operated, will safely vent the contents of the container into the
protected space.
.6 The arrangement of containers and essential for the release of any system shall
be such that in the event of damage to any one power release line through fire or
explosion in a protected space, i.e., a single fault concept, at least two thirds of
the fire-extinguishing charge required by paragraphs 3.2.9 or 3.2.10 for that
space can still be discharged having regard to the requirement for uniform
distribution of medium throughout the space. The arrangements in respect of
systems for spaces requiring only one or two containers shall be to the
.7 Not more than two discharge nozzles shall be fitted to any pressure container
and the maximum quantity of agent in each container shall be to the satisfaction
of the Administration having regard to the requirement for uniform distribution of
medium throughout the space.
.8 The containers shall be monitored for decrease in pressure due to leakage and
discharge. Visual and audible alarms in the protected area and on the navigating
bridge or in the space where the fire control equipment is centralised shall be
provided to indicate this condition, except that for cargo spaces, alarms are only
required on the navigating bridge or the space where the fire control equipment
is centralised.
3.4 Local automatically operated fixed fire-extinguishing units containing Halon 1301 or 1211, fitted in
enclosed areas of high fire risk within machinery spaces, in addition to, and independent of, any
required fixed fire-extinguishing system may be accepted subject to compliance with the following:
.1 The space in which such additional local protection is provided shall preferably
be on one working level and on the same level as the access. At the discretion of
the Administration more than one working level may be permitted subject to an
access being provided on each level.
.2 The size of the space and arrangements of accesses thereto and machinery
therein, shall be such that escape from anywhere in the space can be effected in
not more than 10 s.
.3 The operation of any unit shall be signalled both visually and audibly outside
each access to the machinery space and at the navigating bridge or in the space
where the fire control equipment is centralised.
.4 A notice indicating that the space contains one or more automatically operated
fire-extinguishing units and stating which medium is used, shall be displayed
outside each access thereto.
.5 Discharge nozzles shall be so positioned that the discharge does not endanger
personnel using the normal access ladders and escapes serving the
compartment. Provision shall also be made to protect personnel engaged in
maintenance of machinery from inadvertent discharge of the medium.
.6 The fire-extinguishing units shall be designed to operate within a temperature

range to the satisfaction of the Administration.
.7 Means shall be provided for the crew to safely check the pressure within the
containers.
.8 The total quantity of extinguishing medium provided in the local automatically

operated units shall be such that a concentration of 7% in respect of Halon 1301
and 5.5% in respect of Halon 1211 at 20°C based on the net volume of the

enclosed space is not exceeded. This requirement applies when either a local
automatically operated unit or a fixed system fitted in compliance with paragraph
3.2 has operated, but not when both have operated. The volume of Halon 1301
shall be calculated at 0.16 m3/kg and the volume of Halon 1211 shall be
calculated at 0.14 m3/kg.
.9 The time of discharge of a unit, based on the discharge of the liquid phase, shall
be 10 s or less.
.10 The arrangement of local automatically operated fire-extinguishing units shall be

such that their release does not result in loss of electrical power or reduction of
the manoeuvrability of the ship.
3.5 Automatically operated fire-extinguishing units, as described in paragraph 3.4, fitted in machinery
spaces over equipment having a high fire risk, in addition to and independent of any required fixed
fire-extinguishing system, may be accepted subject to compliance with paragraphs 3.4.3 to 3.4.6,
3.4.9 and 3.4.10 and with the following:
.1 The quantity of medium provided in local automatically operated units shall be

such that a vapour in air concentration not greater than 1.25% at 20°C based on
the gross volume of the machinery space is obtained in the event of their
simultaneous operation.
.2 The volume of Halon 1301 shall be calculated at 0.16 m3/kg and the volume of
Halon 1211 shall be calculated at 0.14 m3/kg.
Comment
Under the 1992 Amendments to SOLAS 1974, halon, due to its adverse effect upon the
stratosphere — causes depletion of the ozone layer and is said to be partially responsible for the
noticeable warming of the earth's atmosphere — is no longer an acceptable system and from that
date its use is prohibited on all new ships.
Manufacturers often claimed that halon was non-toxic in extinguishing concentrations. Whilst
this may be true for the ideal extinguishing concentration, when the gas comes in contact with flame
and heated surfaces the breakdown products produced are certainly less safe and may not be
non-toxic as claimed.
The Montreal Protocol agreed the phasing out of ozone depleting chemicals the most significant
of which are chloroflorocarbons (CFC's) and halons. Halon 1301 has an ozone depletion potential
(ODP) of 16 and production of new halon ceased in 1994. As a result storage banks have been set
up to reclaim and reuse existing halon stocks from refrigeration and fire protection systems. The
US Environment Protection Agency (EPA) established the Significant New Alternatives Program
(SNAP) to encourage to development of new gases and extinguish media.
In some ways the demise of halons under the Montreal Protocol is to be regretted since halons
are particularly effective weight for volume extinguishing agents viz a viz carbon dioxide. 17
volumes of CO2 are required to inert a space as compared with 1 volume of halon.
A number of alternative gases have been developed as halon replacements and these are
described and discussed below.
Alternatives to Halon
The search for the halon alternatives has led to the development of halocarbon gases, inert gases,
and water based systems. The water based systems include: foam enhanced sprinklers, water mist
or water fog and finally foam. These are discussed later.
Table 8.3 overleaf shows the properties of the gaseous alternatives to halon.
Despite considerable effort no manufacturer has been able to develop a slot-in replacement for
halon. The nearest equivalent is NAF SII which because of its relatively high global warming
potential its use is likely to be disallowed. The storage factors are tabulated in Table 8.4 overleaf.
The replacement of halon therefore requires in most cases more space to and weight to be made
available for the storage cylinders. The piping almost invariably requires to be replaced which on
any vessel is a sizeable operation.

Name Formula Extinguishing Ozone Depletion Global Warming

Concentration Potential Potential
Halon 1301 CF3Br 5% 16 4,900
Halocarbons
CEA 4310 C4F10 6% 0 7,000
FM 200 C3F7H 7% 0 2,900
FE 13 CHF3 16% 0 11,700
NAF SIII HDFC blend 12% 0.05 1,600
Inert Gases
Argon Ar 42% 0
Argonite 50% Ar 50% N2 40% 0
Inergen 40%Ar 52% N2 40% 0
8% CO2
Carbon Dioxide CO2 30% 0 1
Table 8.3
Large scale tests and comparisons between the agents have been undertaken by the UK Loss
Prevention Council and US Agencies. As might expected the halocarbons perform better than inert
gases requiring both a lower extinguishing concentration and time to extinguishment as indicated in
Table 8.5 below:
Table 8.5 indicates that the halocarbon gases produce hydrogen fluoride gas in use though the
inert gases do not. It is claimed that Inergen manufactured by Wormald in its extinguishing
Agent Storage Relative Storage Relative Storage

Pressure Mass Volume
Halon 1301 360 1 1
CEA 410 360 1.9 1.9
FE 13 609 1.7 1.7
FM 200 360 1.7 1.7
NAF SIII 360 1.1 1.4
Argon 2,370 2 10
Argonite 220 2 10
Inergen 2,180 2 10
CO2 750 1.6 17
Table 8.4
Agent Extinction Min O2 Max CO2 Max HF

Time (s) (%) (%) (vpm)
Halon 1301 9 18.91 not present 270
CEA 410 10 18.07 not present 1,556
FE 13 5 15.61 not present 1,029
FM 200 8.6% 7 17.65 not present 2,140
NAF SIII 11 16.69 not present 2,927
Argon 73 9.04 0.8 0
Argonite 99 10.68 0.67 0
Inergen 62 10.24 4.14 0
Table 8.5

concentration is respirable and the author has witnessed a small scale demonstration of its use as an
extinguishant. However for the reasons already stated above its use with persons present should not
be countenanced in normal circumstances and rescuers should wear breathing apparatus.
STEAM SMOTHERING
Historical
Although there is no record of when the first steam-smothering system was installed on board
ship, it is known that in 1872 such a system was fitted to the Inman liner City of Montreal. This
ship was destroyed by fire in the Atlantic in August, 1887. During the subsequent enquiry, it was
proved that the so-called "Steam Annihilators" had not been fitted in the compartment in which the
fire originated.
Regulation 5. Fixed gas fire-extinguishing systems (continued)
4 Steam systems
In general, the Administration shall not permit the use of steam as a fire-extinguishing medium in
fixed fire-extinguishing systems. Where the used of steam is permitted by the Administration it shall
be used only in restricted areas as an addition to the required fire-extinguishing medium and with
the proviso that the boiler or boilers available for supplying steam shall have an evaporation of at
least 1.0 kg of steam per hour for each 0.75 m3 of the gross volume of the largest space so
protected. In addition to complying with the foregoing requirements the systems in all respects
shall be as determined by, and to the satisfaction of, the Administration.
Comment
The IMO have deleted this medium for future use but, of course, it will still be found in a few
older existing vessels.
Other Gas Systems

Regulation 5. Fixed gas fire-extinguishing systems (continued)
5 Other gas systems

5.1 Where gas other than carbon dioxide or halogenated hydro-carbons, or steam as permitted by
paragraph 4 is produced on the ship and is used as a fire-extinguishing medium, it shall be a
gaseous product of fuel combustion in which the oxygen content, the carbon monoxide content,
the corrosive elements and any solid combustible elements have been reduced to a permissible
minimum.
5.2 Where such gas is used as the fire-extinguishing medium in a fixed fire-extinguishing system for
the protection of machinery spaces, it shall afford protection equivalent to that provided by a fixed
system using carbon dioxide as the medium.
5.3 Where such gas is used as a fire-extinguishing medium in a fixed fire-extinguishing system for the
protection of cargo spaces, a sufficient quantity of such gas shall be available to supply hourly a
volume of free gas at least equal to 25% of the gross volume of the largest space protected in this
way for a period of 72 h.
Historical
The principal disadvantage of CO2 stored in metal cylinders as a fire-fighting agent on board ship
is that there is no assured continuity of supply. Once the total amount of gas carried aboard has
been used, there can be no more until the ship reaches a properly equipped port. Meanwhile, of
course, any fire which has not been fully put out can rage unchecked; while any new one could be
appallingly dangerous.
By no means all foreign ports have the facilities for recharging expended CO2 cylinders. A
vessel arriving at such a port after a fire-fight at sea will therefore be expensively delayed until
charged bottles (which are heavy and costly to transport) can reach her, by sea or by air, from her
home country or from the nearest available source of supply. It is doubtful in this day and age

whether any Classification Society or Flag State Surveyor would allow a vessel to sail until she was
properly equipped with all the necessary fixed fire fighting systems. (Common prudence certainly
would not!)
It was a couple of incidents such as these, to vessels of his company's fleet in the 1950's, which
led Mr J. H. Joyce, Chairman of Elder Dempster Lines Ltd., to suggest the use, for fire-fighting
purposes, or either flue gas from the boilers or exhaust gas from the main engines of motor ships.
Co-operative work by the Pyrene Co. Ltd., by Messrs. W. C. Holmes Ltd., and by senior technical
experts of the shipping company led thereafter to the design and production of the first purpose built
inert-gas producer to be made in Britain. It was called, after the names or initials of its inventors,
the "Pyrene-E.D.-Hol Inert-Gas Fire-Extinguishing Installation". The very first system was installed
on board the m.v. OTI and apparently worked well in practice — see Figure 8.23. This equipment
has fallen out of use, but was the forerunner of modern inert gas systems for tankers which are fully
described in Chapter 12.
An interesting development however has been that the demise of halon systems has resulted in a
reappraisal of the value of such on cargo vessels for hold protection. Whilst having fallen out of
general usage the author would not be surprised to learn of the modern variant of funnel gas systems
being developed and fitted to new vessels.
The original suggestion that flue gas from the ship's boilers or exhaust gas from the main diesel
engines be used for fire-fighting did not in practice work out, for the following reasons:
1. It proved impossible at this time to keep the oxygen and carbon monoxide content down to
an acceptable minimum, or the CO2 content (which along with the nitrogen is what is
wanted for "inerting" purposes) high enough. Even an efficient oil-fuel burner cannot
produce flue gas containing more than 14 per cent or 15 per cent of CO2 — the remainder of
the gas consisting of nitrogen, unburned hydrocarbons, about 0.1 per cent of carbon
monoxide and (inevitably) a small percentage of oxygen. In a badly-operated or inefficient
system, the CO2 content can drop to nine per cent; the carbon monoxide will rise to several
per cent, and the oxygen as high as 15 or 16 per cent. This decided the developers that the
main engines could not be utilised.
2. It was thought that the most advantageous figures of gas content would never likely to be
long obtained from plant which, being in almost daily use to propel the ship, will deteriorate
with age.
3. When the main engines are out of commission when the ship is in harbour — or, worse still,
when they are undergoing maintenance or repair — they cannot quickly produce flue gas.
The fire-smothering equipment would therefore be out of action for lengthy periods, at
regular and fairly frequent intervals.
4. Flue gas is given off at a high temperature, and containing numerous small particles of
incompletely burnt hydrocarbons, still incandescent. It would therefore need to be both
cooled and screened before it could be used for fire-fighting purposes without risk of making
a bad job worse. This problem was easily surmounted with the development of cooling
systems when some years later Funnel Gas proved so effective in keeping inerted the ullage
area in cargo tanks.
5. No fuel oil having a high sulphur content could be used in the main engines if the flue gas
was to be employed for fire-fighting afterwards. For sulphur dioxide forms the dangerous
and corrosive sulphuric acid when in the presence of water vapour — and water vapour in a
fire-fight at sea it is neither possible nor desirable to exclude.
For these and other reasons, the Pyrene-E.D.-Hol system is a CO2 generator which utilises the
combustion products of diesel oil, but which is entirely separate from the ship's engines. It is a
self-contained unit, housed in a special compartment on the upper deck amidships. The generator
consists of a horizontal oil-fired furnace with a fire-brick lining, surrounded by a water jacket. At
one end is fitted an oil burner with fuel and air regulators; the other end opens into a cooling

FIGURE 8.23 Arrangement of the smoke detection and inert gas fire
extinguishing installation on the m.v. Oti
FIGURE 8.24 Section showing the inert gas system

chamber. A separate unit, mounted either above the combustion chamber or on the deck alongside
it, consists of a water-cooled diesel engine which drives an air blower, a diesel fuel pump and an
alternator whose job is to supply current to an electric motor which in turn drives the cooling-water
pump. Both electric motor and pump are situated at a point in the vessel where the suction lift is
below 20 ft., usually at the forward end of the shaft tunnel where, of course, no lift is involved. (The
pump has a capacity of 4,600 g.p.h., which means it can also be used as the emergency fire pump
under SOLAS Regulations.) Air control valves on the burner are marked with "Start" and "Running"
positions. The diesel oil used is kept at a constant pressure by means of a governor valve. The
generator unit is galvanised throughout to resist corrosion; for sea water is normally used for
cooling.
The second ship to be equipped with this apparatus departed somewhat from the original design.
The engine, compressor and alternator were housed separately in the compartment, instead of being
mounted on the combustion chamber. The arrangement can be seen in Figure 8.28.
When the unit is started up, the engine automatically circulates cooling water round the
combustion chamber water-jacket and the engine, and to the sprayer at the top of the cooling tower.
At the same time, diesel oil and air are forced under pressure to the burner valves. The exhaust
gases then pass from the combustion chamber to the cooling tower. Here they are forced through
water which is itself made to pass through a labyrinth of Lessing Rings. These are cylindrical
pieces of galvanised metal about one inch in diameter, so arranged as to prevent the gas from rising
too quickly to the top of the cooling tower and so giving it more time to cool. Any solid
incandescent particles in the exhaust gases are extinguished by contact with the water, and carried
out of a drain at the bottom of the tower.
The cooled gas (it is still, as a matter of fact, at a slightly higher temperature than that of the
water through which it has first been passed) then enters the main distribution pipework, a number
of drains in which ensure that any droplets of water are removed. The function of the inert-gas,
once released, is of course to reduce the oxygen content of the air in the permeable space of an
affected hold to below ignition point. It will be remembered from the last Section that this varies
from about 15 per-cent for most combustible substances to as low as eight per cent for cotton, jute
and other fibrous materials given to smouldering.
The Pyrene-E.D.-Hol apparatus consumes diesel oil at the rate of about 25 gallons an hour. This
oil is stored in separate tanks; but it would obviously be no difficult matter to replenish these from
the ship's main supply tanks in the event of a prolonged emergency. The apparatus is therefore
capable of producing inert-gas in virtually unlimited quantities. The ability to do this could be of
immense value even in the event of a fierce oil-fed fire in an engine-room which other extinguishing
media had failed to inhibit. Ordinarily, however, the inert-gas producer, with its somewhat slow
rate of gas production, is not suitable as protection for engine-room or machinery-spaces.
A British Test of the "Pyrene-E.D.-Hol" Apparatus

An interesting test demonstration of the Pyrene-E.D.-Hol Inert-Gas Fire-Extinguishing
Installation was given aboard the Elder Dempster motor vessel Oti at Belfast on April 5th and 6th,
1956, when there were present (in addition to representatives of the owners and apparatus
manufacturers) Surveyors from the Ministry of Transport and representatives from Lloyd's Register
of Shipping.
The tests consisted of lowering into various holds and 'tween deck spaces burning oil lamps
suspended at differing heights, and drums full of burning waste; and of observing and measuring
their behaviour under varying conditions. The oxygen and CO2 contents of the air in the holds were
carefully measured at regular intervals by means of "Orsat tests". (Portable Orsat apparatus is used
in the analysis of flue, furnace and exhaust gases. Its method of operation is that a sample of the gas
is successively "scrubbed" by solutions which absorb selectively its CO2, CO and oxygen contents.).

FIGURE 8.26 The R-burner, a

sophisticated design of high
intensity burner manufactured by
Hygrotherm Engineering Ltd.
Key
A. Air duct B. Air relief valve C. Air regulator D. Oil fuel governor valve
E. Oil fuel regulator F. Air space G. Flame H. Fire-brick lining J. Water
jacket K. Float chamber with high-level water switch L Lessing ring
FIGURE 8.25 Sketch showing the layout of the FIGURE 8.27 CO and O2
Pyrene-E.D.-Hol inert gas producer production from R-burner.
FIGURE 8.28 The inert gas generation room on the m.v Ondo. FIGURE 8.29 The inert gas manifold.
First Test (No. 2 Hold)

No. 2 Hold, completely empty, had a known volume of 100,000 cu. ft., and was 22 ft. deep. Four
lighted storm lamps were placed in various positions in the hold. Readings were taken every few
minutes from three Orsat sets positioned in the hold, with the following results:

7.25 p.m. Inert-gas turned into hold

7.35 p.m. CO2 = 1% at Position A.
7.45 p.m. CO2 = 2% at Positions A and C.
7.45 p.m. CO2 = 21/2%, at Position B.
7.55 p.m. Lamps 1 and 2 extinguished.
7.56 p.m. CO2 = 3% at Position A.
7.57 p.m. All four lamps extinguished.
8.00 p.m. CO2 = 4% at Positions A and D.
Second Test (No. 2 Hold)

Thirteen lighted storm lamps were spaced about the hold at various heights in such a way as to
cover its whole extent. The port forward ventilator was left open to the extent of eight inches
diameter. One hatch board was removed and loosely covered with a tarpaulin to facilitate
observation into the hold.
Inert-gas from the producer under test was turned into the hold at 12 noon. The lamps were
progressively extinguished, but not in any particular order from the top of the hold. There was,
however, some tendency for the lowest lamps (placed right down on the tank tops) to go out before
the others; but some lamps more than halfway up the hold actually went out before lamps at lower
levels. The last observable lamp to be extinguished went out after 30 minutes of "inerting". It was
one situated about 10 ft. above the tank tops; but other lamps placed forward at four feet under the
deck head were not visible.
Measurements of the oxygen concentration were made over a three-hour period from 12 noon,
and at the last test it was found that the oxygen content of the air in the hold had dropped to six and
a half per cent. The CO2 content reached a maximum of 12.6 per cent. (The significant figure is, of
course, that of the oxygen; for at an oxygen content of six and a half per cent even a smouldering
cargo of cotton or jute would be extinguished.)
A small perforated tin (quart size) was then filled with lighted cotton waste, and lowered into the
hold to a position approximately six feet above the tank tops. After 20 minutes, the fire in the
cotton waste was completely extinguished. (This was impressive, for it is just this type of fire
involving fibrous material deep down in a loaded hold which is most difficult to fight. It cannot be
reached with water, either in the form of mist, spray or solid jet. Thick smoke makes the working of
the cargo a difficult, laborious and extremely expensive task. Steam smothering, which might be
effective, causes appreciable damage by condensation. Total flooding from batteries of CO2 bottles
is effective; but it takes a considerable time — and you may run out of gas!)
Next, at 4 p.m., a "tree" of lighted storm lamps as illustrated in Figure 8.30 was lowered into the
hold. It was seen that as each branch of lamps entered the hold at the hatch covers, they were
almost immediately extinguished. It was impossible to strike a match in the opening of the hatch
cover; and petrol lighters not only failed to light, but no sparks were discernible at the flints.
When the hatch covers were removed, there was no unpleasant smell noticeable at the
weather-deck hatches.
Third Test (No. 1 Hold)

No. 1 Hold, also empty, had a known volume of approximately 55,000 cu. ft. Its average height
was 20 ft. Thirteen lighted storm lamps were placed in a 10-ft. diameter circle on the tank tops.
The gas was turned on; and 12 minutes later all 13 lamps had been extinguished.
The results of the oxygen concentration measurements are given in Figure 8.31. Twelve lamps
were then suspended one foot apart on a rope, and lowered into the hold (see Figure 8.32).
Immediately each lamp entered the hold, it was extinguished. Having regard to the volume of the
two holds (100,000 and 55,000 cu. ft.), the results of these three tests are very consistent. It should

FIGURE 8.30 The lamp "tree". FIGURE 8.31 Reduction in oxygen concentration.
be noted that all three were carried out in empty holds; for obviously the amount of permeable space
in a hold will have a direct bearing on the time it will take to put out a given fire in it.
Fourth Test (No. 1 'Tween-Deck)

No. 1 'tween-deck had a known volume of approximately 50,000 cu. ft. Its average height was
11 ft. Seven lighted storm lamps were placed at various locations. Twenty minutes after the gas
was turned on, all seven lamps were extinguished. Lighted storm lamps then lowered into the hold
were also immediately extinguished.
A 10-gal. oil drum, perforated at the sides, was filled with dry wood wool loosely placed, some
tightly-rolled wood wool soaked in paraffin, some old hemp rope dry, some old hemp rope soaked
in paraffin, and small pieces of oily rags and wood chips. This flammable mixture was set alight,
and given a minute or two to get well away. It was then lowered into the hold.
The flames died immediately. The smouldering
material was left submerged in the inert-gas, just
above the 'tween-deck; and after 12 minutes, it was
raised and emptied for examination. All trace of
fire was found to be completely extinguished.
A second test was then carried out, with the
same result.
Finally, a bucket containing paraffin was
lighted, and allowed to burn until the galvanising
had melted from the top of the container. It was
then lowered into the hold-and was immediately
extinguished.
During the tests, the equipment proved
admirably suited to the capacities of the sea-going
staff, who took very readily indeed to the idea of
an unlimited supply of gas on hand when they
wanted it! To the ship's engineers, the simple
generator was no more than a diesel engine, plus
an electric generator, a pump and a furnace — all
of them basically simple and familiar, and easy to
operate.
FIGURE 8.32

An American Test
The effectiveness of the inert-gas producer as a fire-extinguisher has long been known in the
United States; and the US. National Cargo Bureau, Inc., officially approves its use as protection for
ships loading cotton in American ports.
This confidence is based on the results of many full-scale tests — one of the most remarkable of
which was carried out, under strict scientific control, in the US. Coastguard cutter Phobos in San
Francisco Bay. This test, also, is worth reporting substantially in full.
U.S.C.G. CUTTER PHOBOS-AK 129

SAN FRANCISCO BAY, ANCHORAGE No. 6-A, BERTH No. 11
Findings Of Fire Test No. Eight

On October 4th, 1946, a fire was ignited in approximately 1,000 bales of cotton stowed in No. 4
Hold of Liberty Ship U.S.C.G. Cutter Phobos. It was intended that conditions attending this fire
simulate conditions of a ship at sea with a loaded hold. It was further intended to utilise an inert-gas
producer to attempt extinguishment, and/or sufficient control to work the cargo safely. This gas
producer was installed especially for the purposes of this experiment, and had a continuous capacity
of approximately 500 cubic feet per hour, as well as a storage capacity of 1,000 cubic feet. The
product of the machine was approximately 12 to 14% carbon dioxide, 0 to 2% oxygen, and from 0
to 1.5% carbon monoxide, the balance being nitrogen,
The vessel was fitted with standard approved smoke-detecting system, giving visual, audible, and
olfactory warning of fire. For experimental purposes, a marine-type carbon monoxide alarm was
also installed. Rigging was already placed for removal of ventilators; but no other attempts were
made to prepare the vessel prior to the ignition of the fire, other than the installation of scientific
testing equipment.
The vessel was moored to a buoy; the wind was westerly 6.1 m.p.h.; the weather was clear and
sunny; air temperature was 62o F.; sea temperature 62o F.; barometer 30.12. The port ventilator was
trimmed into the wind, the starboard out of it; and the ventilators were kept trimmed in accordance
with changes in the heading of the vessel.
Air movement in the lower hold over the cargo was extremely lazy, with measurable movement
only directly under the ventilators, where it was less than 50 f.p.m. There was practically no air
movement across the cargo in the square of the hatch.
Fire was ignited at 0930 hrs., Friday, October 4th; and in comparison with previous fires, ignition
was rapid. During the first fifteen minutes, there was evidence of faint smoke and low
concentrations of carbon monoxide; and within twenty minutes both audible alarms sounded.
Immediately after the audible alarms, there was a general flash fire; and temperatures rose rapidly at
all thermocouple points, reaching a maximum of 1,825o F. near the seat of ignition. Immediately
after the flash, light-coloured smoke issued from both ventilators; but within three minutes the port
ventilator had again become an intake, and very dark smoke issued from the starboard ventilator
cowl. During the next few minutes, there were several alterations of the air movement in the port
ventilator.
Immediate steps were taken to seal the ventilators; the seals were identical with those used in
previous tests, the operation being completed within three minutes. The fire was permitted to burn
with the ventilators sealed for one hour, during which the oxygen burned out to approximately
8.4%. Carbon dioxide was approximately 11%, and carbon monoxide approximately 3%.
Immediately after sealing, there was a drop in temperature at all thermocouple points; and at the end
of an hour the maximum temperature recorded was 229o F.
At this time (1100 hrs.) the introduction of inert-gas into the hold was started. The operation was
begun by releasing 1,000 cubic feet of inert-gas which had been stored in accumulators at 300
pounds pressure, and was continued by operation of the inert-gas producer. The discharge of gas
was through a one-half inch pipe terminating in an open end at a point 15 feet from the deckhead,
and in the forward starboard corner of the hold, The inert-gas producer had a capacity of

approximately 500 cubic feet per hour; and its product at this time was 14% carbon dioxide, 1%
oxygen and 0.2% carbon monoxide, the balance being nitrogen. During the release of gas, there
was a moderate billowing of tarpaulins on the Main Deck hatch, which subsided within five
minutes. During the normal operations of the inert-gas producer, there was no noticeable pressure
on the tarpaulins.
During the first twelve hours of operation, temperatures reduced to an average of 75o F., with a
maximum of 86o F. near the source of ignition; the oxygen content was reduced to 6%. After
twenty-four hours operation, all temperatures were below 80o F. and oxygen was down to 5.5%.
After thirty-six hours operation, temperatures were all below 75o F. and oxygen was 4.8%.
On Monday, October 7th, at 0845 hrs. (71 hours 10 minutes after the time of ignition), the
opening of the hatches was started. By this time the inert-gas producer had been operated during a
period of 69 hours and 40 minutes, of which 5 hours and 35 minutes was consumed in servicing
operations with the machine shut down. The net operating period of the machine was 64 hours and
5 minutes, and approximately 33,000 cubic feet of gas had been produced. The oxygen content of
the hold at this time was 3.5%, and all temperatures in the hold were normal.
When the hatches were opened, the atmosphere in the hold was found to be clear, with no
evidence of heat or smoke, and the bales were all cool to the touch. There was scorching of bales
around the point of ignition; but the fire had not progressed into either wing, or further forward than
the after hatch coaming.
The inert-gas producer continued in operation during the discharge of cargo; and upon
completion of discharge of the cargo, the oxygen content measured in a bale was still down to 8.2%,
although the atmosphere in the upper part of the hold to within three feet of the cargo had cleared
sufficiently to support a flame lamp. There was still sufficient carbon monoxide in the upper hold
to require the use of respiratory protection throughout the unloading period. By 1500 hrs., a total of
102 bales had been removed from the hold to a steel barge alongside, and reignition had not
occurred either on the barge or in the hold. Unloading of the cargo had been continued to a point at
which all of the bales which had been directly involved in the fire, as well as those immediately
surrounding them, had been removed from the hold. In comparison with previous tests, a relatively
small number of bales were removed as an effort was made to work rapidly and directly to the seat
of the fire, with removal of a minimum number of bales.
At 1540 hrs., the hatches were secured, and the seals removed from the ventilators. The
air-mover was placed on the starboard ventilator and operated for two hours, at the end of which
time analysis showed the hold to be relatively gas-free. Reignition did not occur during this period
of forced ventilation.
Damage to Cargo
The cargo consisted of approximately 1,000 bales, and of these less than 10% were involved in
the fire, with burning of varying degrees in no place exceeding one to two inches maximum depth.
There was a limited amount of white ash on the bales directly around source of ignition. After
approximately 10% of the cargo had been removed from the hold, the danger of reignition in the
hold was passed.
Cargo was taken from the hold unbroken, using cargo hooks. Aside from damage from previous
fires, the cargo, as a result of this fire, was estimated to be salvageable to an extent of over 95%.
Apparent Course of Fire

From the point of ignition the fire apparently followed the voids between bales, working
principally forward and upward. The fire stopped forward progress at the after edge of the hatch
trunk. Progress of the fire aft did not exceed a distance of 10 feet. The progress of the fire
athwart-ship extended for a distance of about six feet toward the starboard side, and fifteen feet
toward the port side from the point of ignition. The fire did not penetrate the port wing aft of the
centreline bulkhead. The downward progress of the fire did not extend further than to a point about

three feet above the top of the shaft alley. The area of maximum burning was directly above the
point of ignition.
Very few dunnage boards had been used in the portion of the cargo directly involved in the fire.
However, these dunnage boards were charred at the voids between bales, and in a few cases were
burned completely through. There was no structural damage to ship or fittings.
The results of this test can only be regarded as extremely favourable to the inert-gas producer as
an efficient extinguisher of fire.
Clearly, the important thing is the reduction of the oxygen content of the air in the cargo space.
Probably the CO2 itself plays but a small part in the actual extinguishment of the fire. Carbon
dioxide, being one and a half times heavier than air, will tend to drop to the bottom of the hold;
while the nitrogen, which is only fractionally lighter than air, will diffuse with the atmosphere and
force by displacement a percentage of oxygen-laden atmosphere.
A fire breaking out when the ship is in port should be battened down after inerting, for a period
of hours depending on the nature of the cargo carried. A hold with a general cargo consisting
mainly of cased goods could safely be opened after a few hours, for example; but after a fire
involving jute it would be unwise to open up in less than 48 hours.
The only type of cargo on which gas-smothering is likely to be ineffective is one involving
substances which "carry" their own oxygen, and release it as and when they burn. Examples are
celluloid, chlorates, nitrates and the permanganates. For such cargo, water copiously applied
through open-ended hose, not in jet form, is the best solution.
PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS

Historical
To a certain Captain Manby must go the credit of having in 1816 invented a portable fire
extinguisher which expelled water under pressure from compressed air. In the somewhat pompous
language of his day, Manby describes his extinguisher as being filled with an "antiphlogistic fluid".
It was actually water mixed with pearl ash! Manby was a quite remarkable man who, amongst
many other things, invented the rocket line for the rescue of shipwrecked mariners.
Merryweather's the great London fire engine manufacturers, in their catalogue of 1882, show
soda-acid "extinctors" as they were called. The makers claimed that, "the extinctor acts as a
generator of carbonic acid gas, which has a marvellous effect on fire, as it instantly displaces the
oxygen of the air it comes into contact with, and consequently combustion at once ceases, oxygen
being essential to fire". It is doubtful if Merryweather's actually invented this extinguisher but they
might have done because this is the first reference the author could find to such appliances
throughout a pretty exhaustive search in the British Library.
Regulation 6. Fire extinguishers2

1 All fire extinguishers shall be of approved types and designs.
1.1 The capacity of required portable fluid extinguishers shall be not more than 13.5
litre and not less than 9 litres. Other extinguishers shall be at least as portable
as the 13.5 litre fluid extinguisher and shall have a fire-extinguishing capability at
least equivalent to that of a 9 litre fluid extinguisher.
1.2 The Administration shall determine the equivalents of fire extinguishers.
2 Spare charges shall be provided in accordance with requirements to be specified by the

Administration.
3 Fire extinguishers containing an extinguishing medium which, in the opinion of the Administration,
either by itself or under expected conditions of use gives off toxic gases in such quantities as to
endanger persons shall not be permitted.
4 A portable foam applicator unit shall consist of an air-foam nozzle of an inductor type capable of
being connected to the fire main by a fire hose, together with a portable tank containing at least 20
2
Refer to Revised Guidelines for Marine Portable Fire Extinguishers adopted by the Organisation by Resolution A.602 (15).

litres of foam-making liquid and one spare tank. The nozzle shall be capable of producing effective
foam suitable for extinguishing an oil fire, at the rate of at least 1.5 m3/min.
5 Fire extinguishers shall be periodically examined and subjected to such tests as the Administration
may require.
6 One of the portable fire extinguishers intended for use in any space shall be stowed near the
entrance to that space.
7 Accommodation spaces, service spaces and control stations shall be provided with portable fire
extinguishers of appropriate types and in sufficient number to the satisfaction of the
Administration. Ships of 1,000 tons gross tonnage and upwards shall carry at least five portable
fire extinguishers.
Comment
In SOLAS 1960 specifications were laid down for the different type of fire extinguishers but a
new approach has been adopted for SOLAS 1974. The onus has now been placed upon the State
Administrations' to approve the type and design of such appliances. The number of spare charges to
be provided also falls upon the Administration. The only departure contained in this approach
relates to the portable foam applicator — paragraph 4 — where only air-foam is approved and this
means that the use of chemical foam is being ruled out for shipboard use.
The author would like to see included in these regulations the requirement that portable fire
extinguishers be discharged at two yearly intervals. This is of particular relevance in the case of dry
powder fire extinguishers which, due to the inevitable vibration, along with the wave movement
associated with ships, have a tendency, through time, for the powder to become compacted, or
caked. The discharge of these appliances can form a most useful drill session.
Whenever possible, extinguishers should be suspended on a bracket, with the base not more than
76 mm (2 ft. 6 in) above the floor. Especially in engine rooms and similar congested spaces, the fire
fighting equipment should be clearly indicated; and should, whenever possible, be kept at a
recognised "fire point". In this way — and particularly where the "fire point" is outlined by means
of red lines on the bulkhead or round a column — there is less chance of delay in finding a suitable
extinguisher in the case of a sudden outbreak of fire. The number of fire points will be dictated by
the size and geometry of the protected space. As a basic rule "fire points" should be positioned
along the probable line of retreat from a fire — i.e. at exit doorways, foot of stairways, etc. Most
people tend at first to run away from a fire; but as they reach the doorway, or bottom of a stair, the
comforting sight of the fire appliances serve to remind them that perhaps the fire can be put out!
There is a tendency around today for what the author considers too much reliance being placed
upon the efficacy of dry powder fire extinguishers for general use on board ship. Over zealous
salesmen tend to make highly exaggerated claims which they unblushingly present to unsuspecting
customers as a panacea for all manner of fires. Powder has been developed which it is claimed can
handle all fires involving Class "A" Paper, Wood, Textile, Fabric; Class "B" Flammable Liquids;
and Class "C" Flammable Gases. Also claimed to be suitable for Electrical Hazards and Vehicle
Protection. Whilst under certain circumstances it is true that powder will be effective in putting out
fires in each one of these classes, it is quite surely no panacea. Even in the case of a fire involving,
say, bed and bedding in a cabin, the fire might, or might not be put out, though immediate flaming is
knocked down. But the released powder reduces visibility almost to nothing and restricts breathing
to the extent that the user can be forced to retreat for a while. Incidentally, so far as the author is
aware, no one has done any work to find if any lung problems can result from ingesting this powder!
Reverting to the fire, it is almost certain that this will still be smouldering in the blankets and/or
mattress and as re-ignition can take place, will still have to be put out with water. But in any event
it is to be recommended that the burned bed clothes and the mattress be removed and thrown over
the side. In the case of similar land incidents, removal away from the building is recommended.
Many instances can be quoted where in such circumstances re-ignition has taken place and resulted
in serious escalation of the original small fire. The main criticism of dry powder is that there is no
associated cooling, as with most other types of extinguishers. The author still believes that a water
extinguisher is much more effective and safer for this type of fire.

FIGURE 8.33 Typical cross sections through water fire extinguishers.
FIGURE 8.34 Typical cross sections through Dry Powder fire extinguishers.

When it comes to engine room fires then dry powder extinguishers can be positively dangerous.
One of the most common fires to be found in engine rooms is where a fuel line bursts and the
flowing oil is ignited on a hot surface, such as the manifold or the exhaust of a diesel engine, a
superheated steam line, or a boiler front. These surfaces are hot enough to cause the oil to ignite by
what is known as auto-ignition. Table 8.6 below lists typical values of the auto-ignition temperature
for a range of flammable gases and vapours3 commonly carried aboard ship or of interest to the
maritime community.
Gas or Vapour Auto-ignition Gas or Vapour Auto-ignition

Temperature Temperature
(0C) (0C)
Hydrogen 400 Acetylene 305
Methane 537 Ethylene 450
Ethane 472 Methanol 385
Propane 450 Ethanol 363
Butane 288 Acetone 465
Octane 206 Benzene 560
Nonane 205 Naptha 288
Gasoline 280-471 Methyl Ethyl Ketone 404
Carbon monoxide 609 Liquified Petroleum Gas (LPG) 405-450
Table 8.6
Dry powder will initially knock down the flames but the oil continues to alight on the hot surface
and because the powder has no cooling effect, as soon as the powder settles the fire will start all
over again. But this time if the oil is in an atomised form, as it will be from a high pressure source
such as the supply line on a diesel engine, then there is a serious risk of an explosion occurring
when re-ignition of the inevitably expanded gas cloud takes place. Some years ago the author
investigated a really serious engine room fire involving a bulk carrier where the engineers reported
that by use of dry powder extinguishers they had put the fire out no less than nine times but
re-ignition kept taking place until they were forced from the space and had to put on the fixed CO2
system.
This not before extensive damage had occurred. Water in spray form, the author firmly believes,
is by far the best medium to fight fire involving the type of oils to be found in engine rooms. The
use of Aqueous Film Forming Foam — "AFFF" for short and commonly known as "Light Water"
and, of course, consists over 90% of water, is absolutely ideal for engine room protection.
Dry powder is unlikely to be effective in putting out fire involving wiring insulation within an
enclosed main electrical switchboard — unless it is possible for the user to get round the back of the
housing where there is usually found access by way of a wire meshed screen through which the
contents can be directed. And even then, it is doubtful if the fire will be completely extinguished.
Simply discharging the extinguisher towards the front or sides of the impenetrable structure is
clearly a waste of effort. Obviously, the same applies to the CO2 type of appliance. Probably the
answer lies in having a built-in protection in the form of a fixed inert gas system installed in the
cabinets of main switchboards!
3
The data is extracted from Table 3-1m of the National Fire Protection Association Handbook Eighteenth Edition 1997.

FIGURE 8.35 Typical cross sections through Carbon Dioxide fire extinguishers.
FIGURE 8.36 Typical cross sections through Foam fire extinguishers.

FIRE-EXTINGUISHING ARRANGEMENTS IN MACHINERY SPACES

The history of carbon dioxide fixed systems for general use aboard ship i.e. cargo holds, is
covered under comment introducing Regulation 5.
High expansion foam being a recent development does not warrant a description of its
development.
The other systems to which Regulation 7 refers, in particular high pressure water spray are
discussed below.
HIGH-PRESSURE WATER SPRAY

Historical
Many years ago Messrs. Mather & Platt Limited, of Manchester (now Messrs. Wormald)
developed a system of water spray for the protection on land of transformers, switchgear, flammable
liquids etc., which they called MULSIFYRE. The system of extinguishing oil fires works on the
principle of projecting water at high pressure in the form of spray. The spray on striking the oil
forms an oil-in-water emulsion which consists of a great number of tiny oil globules, each
surrounded by a film of water. This film of water prevents the globule of oil from taking fire; and of
course, cools any hot metal surfaces in the vicinity. This system is particularly recommended for
protection of areas in which lubricating, fuel and diesel oils are stored or used.
The system is now commonly used for the protection of ships machinery spaces, pump rooms
and the like and is marketed under the Trade Name, MULSISPRAY.
Regulation 7 Fire-extinguishing arrangements in machinery spaces

1 Spaces containing oil-fired boilers or oil fuel units
1.1 Machinery spaces of category A containing oil-fired boilers or oil fuel units shall be provided with
any one of the following fixed fire-extinguishing systems:
.1 a gas system complying with the provisions of regulation 5;
.2 a high-expansion foam system complying with the provisions of regulation 9;
.3 a pressure water-spraying system complying with the provisions of regulation 10.
In each case if the engine and boiler rooms are not entirely separate, or if fuel oil can drain from the
boiler room into the engine-room, the combined engine and boiler rooms shall be considered as
one compartment.
1.2 There shall be in each boiler room at least one set of portable foam applicator units complying with
the provisions of regulation 6.4.
1.3 There shall be at least two portable foam extinguishers or equivalent in each firing space in each
boiler room and in each space in which a part of the oil fuel installation is situated. There shall be
not less than one approved foam-type extinguisher of at least 135 l capacity or equivalent in each
boiler room. These extinguishers shall be provided with hoses on reels suitable for reaching any
part of the boiler room. In the case of domestic boilers of less than 175 kW in cargo ships the
Administration may consider relaxing the requirements of this paragraph.
1.4 In each firing space there shall be a receptacle containing sand, sawdust impregnated with soda, or
other approved dry material in such quantity as may be required by the Administration. An approved
portable extinguisher may be substituted as an alternative.
2 Spaces containing internal combustion machinery
Machinery spaces of category A containing internal combustion machinery shall be provided with:
.1 One of the fire-extinguishing systems required by paragraph 1.1.
.2 At least one set of portable air-foam equipment complying with the provisions of
regulation 6.4.

.3 In each such space approved foam-type fire extinguishers, each of at least 45 l

capacity or equivalent, sufficient in number to enable foam or its equivalent to be
directed on to any part of the fuel and lubricating oil pressure systems, gearing
and other fire hazards. In addition, there shall be provided a sufficient number of
portable foam extinguishers or equivalent which shall be so located that no point
in the space is more than 10 m walking distance from an extinguisher and that
there are at least two such extinguishers in each such space. For smaller spaces
of cargo ships the Administration may consider relaxing this requirement.
3 Spaces containing steam turbines or enclosed steam engines
In spaces containing steam turbines or enclosed steam engines used either for main propulsion or
for other purposes when such machinery has in the aggregate a total output of not less than 375
kW there shall be provided:
.1 Approved foam fire extinguishers each of at least 45 l capacity or equivalent

sufficient in number to enable foam or its equivalent to be directed on to any part
of the pressure lubrication system, on to any part of the casings enclosing
pressure lubricated parts of the turbines, engines or associated gearing, and any
other fire hazards. However, such extinguishers shall not be required if at least
equivalent to that required by this subparagraph is provided in such spaces by a
fixed fire-extinguishing system fitted in compliance with paragraph 1.1.
.2 A sufficient number of portable foam extinguishers or equivalent which shall be

so located that no point in the space is more than 10 m walking distance from an
extinguisher and that there are at least two such extinguishers in each such
space, except that such extinguishers shall not be required in addition to any
provided in compliance with paragraph 1.3.
.3 One of the fire-extinguishing systems required by paragraph 1.1, where such

spaces are periodically unattended.
4 Fire-extinguishing appliances in other machinery spaces
Where, in the opinion of the Administration, a fire hazard exists in any machinery space for which
no specific provisions for fire-extinguishing appliances are prescribed in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3,
there shall be provided in, or adjacent to, that space such a number of approved portable fire
extinguishers or other means of fire extinction as the Administration may deem sufficient.
5 Fixed fire-extinguishing systems not required by this chapter
FIGURE 8.37 Wormald "Mulsispray" system for Tankers.

FIGURE 8.38 Wormald Mulsispray systems for tankers.
FIGURE 8.39 Wormald Mulsispray system.

Where a fixed fire-extinguishing system not required by this chapter is installed, such a system
6 Machinery spaces of category A in passenger ships
7 In passenger ships carrying more than 36 passengers each machinery space of category A shall be
provided with at least two suitable water fog applicators1.
Comment
Under Regulation 7 above "a pressure water-spraying system" is one of the three permitted fixed
systems which is required to protect machinery spaces containing oil-fired boilers or oil fuel units
— the other two being a gas system, or a high-expansion foam system (see comments above). The
specifications for the working of such systems are contained in Regulation 10.
Comparison of Water Spray with Foam and Gas Systems for Machinery Spaces
In making the case for water spray it is necessary to outline the disadvantages and dangers
associated with other forms of fixed fire systems for use in machinery spaces. The author would
comment on these as follows:
Low expansion foam (within the range 6 to 10:1).

The major weakness associated with fixed low expansion foam installations are:
i. Foam is effective only in the horizontal plane. Normally the practice is to lay a blanket of
foam 6" deep, controlled by save-alls around the high risk areas. But experience shows that
the most dangerous fires are those involving burst fuel lines higher up in the space. The
released oil can be ignited by superheated steam lines, exhaust manifolds, electric motors or
switchgear and few of these surfaces lie conveniently within 6 inches of floor plates. The
author has investigated a large number of engine-room fires and very few of these could
have been controlled by means of the fixed foam system.
ii. Foam systems are difficult to test so that there is little guarantee that the installation will
function properly when required.
iii. Foam compound is expensive and because it deteriorates over a period has to be replaced a
number of times throughout the life of the vessel. Bulk foam compound is difficult to handle
and a great deal of effort is required to empty then replenish the tank. The formation of
sludge is a problem.
iv. A feature of engine-room fires is the frequency in which men are injured in the initial blast
or trapped by the resultant fire. Low expansion foam offers little or no protection in these
circumstances.
Although not relevant to the protection of machinery spaces, the author draws the readers
attention to the effect of wind upon foam thrown from monitors about which he comments in more
detail in the following chapter relating to Tankers.
Medium expansion foam (within the range 100 to 150:1).

i. Offers a much greater coverage than low expansion foam but cannot provide total flooding
of the space.
ii. Suffers from the same disadvantages as outlined above for low expansion foam.
High expansion foam (within the range 1,000 to 1).

High expansion foam is quite effective in some circumstances but suffers the following serious
disadvantages:
i. For very large engine-rooms, generators with massive output are required and thus involve
the construction of large ducts. For example, to produce 24,000 cubic feet per minute of
1
A water fog applicator might consist of a metal L-shaped pipe, the long limb being about 2 m in length capable of being fitted
to a fire hose and the short limb being about 250 mm in length fitted with a fixed water fog nozzle or capable of being fitted
with a water spray nozzle.

High X foam an outlet area of 6 feet by 6 feet is required. This trunking has to be led to
strategic points because the foam quality suffers if it is allowed to drop too great a distance.
In order to fill a large engine-room in an acceptable time either a number of generators are
required, or one with an enormous trunking which would be very difficult to fit into the
space.
ii. Owing to the build-up of back pressure it is found in practice impossible to completely fill a
given space so that fire can be burning above the foam level.
iii. Contrary to a common belief anyone enveloped in High X foam, particularly where a high
head is concerned, will experience the greatest difficulty in making their escape. A number
of cases have arisen, some in this country, where men have lost their lives in this foam. Even
persons who are wearing breathing apparatus would find it very difficult to escape from a
foam filled engine-room of any great size. The foam produces an eerie atmosphere of total
silence and nil visibility which has a definite claustrophobic effect upon anyone in its midst
and this destroys all sense of direction. A person lying injured in the foam would be killed
by suffocation.
iv. Once the space has been filled with foam great difficulty would be experienced in having it
cleared. This could take many hours and the danger to the vessel in a narrow waterway can
well be imagined.
Carbon Dioxide: High pressure (750 lbs. per sq. in.).

High pressure CO2 although in many ways an effective medium suffers from the following
defects:
i. If not applied within 10-12 minutes CO2 is rarely successful in achieving final extinction but
almost invariably leaves incipient pockets of fire which have to be tackled by members of
the crew.
ii. Use of CO2 in engine-rooms has, in a number of cases investigated by the author, resulted in
such damage as to put the vessels in dock for major repairs lasting for many weeks and even
months. The main difficulty is that the gas cannot be applied before everyone has got out of
the space and all doors, ventilators, trunks and skylights have been closed. This means that
very often the fire is not tackled before it has gained a substantial hold and severe damage
has already been caused to machinery and to, quite literally, miles of electric cable.
iii. The cylinders are extremely heavy and present problems of maintenance. An important
feature is that of getting cylinders recharged in many ports of the world which can result in
expensive delay before the ship is allowed to sail.
iv. Because it is a "once-off" system there is little or no reserve should the gas be introduced
before all the enclosures are operated, or some mechanical failure prevents their proper
actuation.
v. Experience has shown that upon being actuated serious leakage of gas can occur at the
cylinder valves and at pipe unions along the piping runs. Many cases are on record where
gas leakage in the cylinder storage compartment has been so great as to make it difficult, or
even impossible, to enter the space without recourse to breathing apparatus.
vi. If men are lying injured in the space the Master and the Chief Engineer are faced with the
awful dilemma in that they are aware that by turning on the CO2 the victims will inevitably
be killed. Experience shows that this factor can result in very long delay between the start of
the fire and the application of CO2.
vii. There is a very serious risk to life associated with the accidental release of CO2. This danger
is highlighted by a tragic incident involving the Norwegian vessel Pollo, in the port of
Trondheim in 1970, where 12 men died and 100 were badly affected following the
accidental release of CO2, Yet another release of gas on board the Ocean Bridge, in Glasgow
in 1971, cost the lives of two men.

Carbon Dioxide: Low Pressure (350 lbs. per sq. in.).

Low pressure CO2 suffers from the same disadvantages as outlined in (i), (ii), (vi) and (vii) above
refering to high pressure CO2 systems.
Halon Systems
There are many ships afloat with such systems and owners may be faced with the choice of
replenishing or replacing the systems. Halon is no longer an acceptable medium for use in new
buildings. Although there is no present requirement that existing systems be removed such is being
suggested in some quarters.
The best known of the halogenated hyrocarbons is Halon 1301:BTM (bromotrifluoromethane)
and Halon 1211: BCF (bromochlorodifluoromethane). The author comment belows as to the merits
and demerits of halon systems also apply to the new generation inert and halocarbon gases
discussed per Regulation 5.
i. Although these chemicals are not, in the percentages used, highly toxic in the raw state,
when in contact with hot metal surfaces which are synonymous with fire conditions quite
different conditions can result. The author would not care to remain in an engine-room after
a fire had been tackled by means of halogens unless he was protected by means of
self-contained breathing apparatus.
ii. The total flooding with halogens has to be carried out within ten seconds. The effect upon
the unprotected lungs of persons within the protected space at the time could well be serious
as the tremendous rush of gas enters the area.
iii. These gases are extremely costly and experience has shown that there can occur quite severe
leakages. This can result in a constant cash drain in topping-up the system. Of even greater
importance is the fact that these halogens will not be available at anything like the scale of
CO2, so that there will be many more ports in the world without the resources for
replenishing supplies. Owners will have to think very seriously about this aspect as the cost
of flying out heavy gas cylinders can be extremely high.
Water Mist and Water Fog

The reader will note that at present water mist, water fog or a foam enhanced sprinkler system
cannot satisfy the conditions laid down in Regulation 10 paragraph 2 of 5 litres per square metre per
minute. Whilst the Maritime Safety Committee of the International Maritime Organization has
published a test protocol by which water mist and water fog systems are to be tested prior to
approval, no system has yet met those requirements. The author would advise great caution before
placing too much reliance on water fog or water mist as extinguishing agents in these areas. One of
the great advantages of water based systems is that they can be used immediately and a Master of
Chief Engineer is not placed in the unenviable dilemma of when to apply carbon dioxide if persons
are unaccounted. However, any delay allows the fire to grow, and in certain circumstances water
impinging on superheated surfaces can breakdown and water gas be formed. There is no
circumstance in which the author could recommend the use of water mist and water fog in a
machinery space because of this risk and the greater propensity of water mist and water fog to
breakdown and form flammable gases when they impinge on superheated surfaces due to their fine
droplet size.
Final Comment on High Pressure Water Spray Systems

To sum up! The author finds that for the protection of manned machinery spaces on board ship
nothing is so attractive as the use of water spray. Water has life-saving properties, is cheap,
plentiful, effective and non-toxic. When mixed with AFFF foam, water spray becomes even more
efficient.
Foam, if the author had his way, would be banned for use as a fixed system for machinery spaces
because its effectiveness is greatly in doubt. Perhaps the IMO Maritime Safety Committee might
care to consider this in time for the next SOLAS Conference?

FOAM INSTALLATIONS IN MACHINERY SPACES

Historical
Although use of this method of protection on board ship is relatively recent, chemical knowledge
of the production of foam is surprisingly old. Two of the first workers on foams, Quinke and
Morangani in Berlin in 1868, examined the phenomenon of tension at the interface air/liquid; they
found that interfacial tension (air/liquid) existed in all liquid surfaces, and was the same for all
angles of the interface. It varied in degree with the nature of the liquid, and decreased with increase
of temperature. The effect was slight at ordinary temperatures.
The first suggestion for the use of foam as a means of combating the conflagration of an
inflammable liquid lighter than water appears to have come from Laurent in St. Petersburg in 1904;
but it was not until 1925 that Urquhart produced a practical version of Laurent's suggestion of a
foam generator introducing a powder mixture into a water stream, producing foam by chemical
reaction after solution. This system was very successful, and was introduced the following year in
British Merchant Ships.
Simonis records, however, an earlier introduction into Britain of foam apparatus for fire brigade
use in 1912, when small hand fire-extinguishers were supplied to the London and Liverpool Fire
Brigades, and to the Bradford Dyers' Association.
In 1933 Wagener took out British Patent No. 403,291 for a foam-making branch-pipe, specifying
the entrainment of air by a turbulent liquid; while in 1935 a patent was taken out by the Komet
Kompagnie für Optik, Mechanik und Electro-Technik AG, covering the generation of foam by the
impact of, and subsequent turbulence arising from, converging jets. Another German patent of 1938
describes the use of hoof and horn meal chemically decomposed by caustic soda, and of the
neutralised liquor from paper manufacture in combination with various materials, in the production
of foam.
The introduction of mechanical foam (largely by Germans) just before the outbreak of the
Second World War helped greatly in many British fire-fighting operations involving oil-fuel and
petrol tanks on land during the war years. The size, weight and complexity of portable chemical
foam apparatus was such that it was difficult to carry on already overloaded war-time fire engines.
The mechanical foam system, on the other hand, was light, simple to operate, and occupied a much
smaller space.
Mechanical foam installations on board ship were common during the war, and in the post-war
period there has been a rapid growth in the use of this form of protection for engine-room and
machinery-spaces.
Statutory Requirements
All ships are required to comply with Regulation 7 "Fire-extinguishing arrangements in
machinery spaces"; Regulation 8 "Fixed low-expansion foam fire-extinguishing systems in
machinery spaces"; Regulation 9 "Fixed high-expansion foam fire-extinguishing systems in
machinery spaces"; Tankers must comply with Regulation 60 "Cargo tank protection" and
Regulation 61 "Fixed deck foam systems"
Regulation 8 Fixed low-expansion foam fire-extinguishing systems in machinery spaces

1 Where in any machinery space a fixed low-expansion foam fire-extinguishing system is fitted in
addition to the requirements of regulation 7, such system shall be capable of discharging through
fixed discharge outlets in not more than 5 min a quantity of foam sufficient to cover to a depth of
150 mm the largest single area over which oil fuel is liable to spread. The system shall be capable
of generating foam suitable for extinguishing oil fires. Means shall be provided for effective
distribution of the foam through a permanent system of piping and control valves or cocks to
suitable discharge outlets, and for the foam to be effectively directed by fixed sprayers on other
main fire hazards in the protected space. The expansion ratio of the foam shall not exceed 12 to 1.
2 The means of control of any such systems shall be readily accessible and simple to operate and
shall be grouped together in as few locations as possible at positions not likely to be cut off by a
fire in the protected space.

Regulation 9 Fixed high-expansion foam fire-extinguishing systems in machinery

spaces
1.1 Any required fixed high-expansion foam system in machinery spaces shall be capable of rapidly
discharging through fixed discharge outlets a quantity of foam sufficient to fill the greatest space to
be protected at a rate of at least 1 m in depth per minute. The quantity of foam-forming liquid
available shall be sufficient to produce a volume of foam equal to five times the volume of the
largest space to be protected. The expansion ratio of the foam shall not exceed 1,000 to 1.
1.2 The Administration may permit alternative arrangements and discharge rates provided that it is
satisfied that equivalent protection is achieved.
2 Supply ducts for delivering foam, air intakes to the foam generator and the number of
foam-producing units shall in the opinion of the Administration be such as will provide effective
foam production and distribution.
3 The arrangement of the foam generator delivery ducting shall be such that a fire in the protected
space will not affect the foam generating equipment.
4 The foam generator, its sources of power supply, foam-forming liquid and means of controlling the
system shall be readily accessible and simple to operate and shall be grouped in as few locations
as possible at positions not likely to be
cut off by a fire in the protected space
Comment
As stated above, it will be obvious to the reader
that the author does not favour fixed foam — either
low or high expansion — for use in machinery
spaces but because it is internationally acceptable a
reasonably full description of such systems must be
included here.
Chemical foam installations which rely on the
interaction of two chemicals, usually aluminium
sulphate and a solution of sodium bicarbonate to
which is added a stabiliser, are now rarely found on
board ship. Many of the small two-gallon portable
extinguishers do, however, work on this principle;
but even these are giving way to more modern
types. Difficulties in storage of the requisite
chemicals make necessary careful checks to ensure
satisfactory working in time of need. FIGURE 8.40 Cross-section of a ship showing:
A — Chubb CO2 protection for the holds;
B — Foam protection for the boiler-room.
Experience has shown that, after a few years,

FIGURE 8.41 Chubb chemical foam extinguishers deteriorate to such
Mechanical foam Installation
Pump-operated type.
a marked degree that they perform much below
peak efficiency.
Key In the Fire Service, mechanical foam has
A. Foam compound tank now almost entirely superseded chemical foam.
B. Inductor Unit It consists of a single solution which can be
E Water control valve introduced into the water stream, aerated at the
F. Pressure gauge
branch-pipe, and thrown as a stable foam on to
G. Water meter
the area of the fire. The foam-making
compound is liquid, and is easily stored in cans
or drums.
A number of different mechanical foams are
available, but the most commonly used one is a
compound of protein.

FIGURE 8.42 Chubb Mechanical Foam Installation-Self-contained Pressurised Type.
Normally, a three per cent compound-to-water solution is used, and this gives foam protection "at
a ratio of eight-to-one" at 100 lb. per sq. in. This means that 100 gallons of water at 100 lb. per sq.
in., plus three gallons of compound per minute, give 800 gallons per minute of foam. The Rules lay
down the period of time within which the area must receive its six-inch blanket of foam as being
five minutes.
There are two methods of providing the
necessary pressures required for the
production of a satisfactory foam:
1. The ship's pumps-providing they can
give a running pressure of at least 75
lb. per sq. in. at the pump delivery;
or
2. A pressurised water tank with a
separate compound tank system,
with CO2 cylinders supplying the
motive power.
If the water comes from the ship's pumps,
a dual supply is required in case one should
failure
A typical compound tank, of a capacity
determined by the area of the fuel tank top
in the space to be protected, is provided with
FIGURE 8.43 This schematic diagram shows the general
two small-bore pipes, the high-pressure pipe
principle of Chubb Pre-mix foam installations. In the event
of fire, the link (A) fuses, allowing the weight (B) to fall: terminating at the top of the tank, the
this raises the lever of the pierce head (C), which releases low-pressure pipe being connected to an
CO2 gas from the cylinder bracket (D) into the storage tank internal siphon tube. These two pipes are
(E). The solution of foam-making compound and water (D) connected to an induction unit incorporating
into the storage tank (E). The solution of foam-making a venturi fitting. When water flows through
compound and water (F) is forced up the siphon tube and the induction unit on its way to the
along the outlet pipe to foammakers (G), where air is
entrained to complete the formation of foam, which is
boiler-room system, it draws through the
sprayed over the fire by foam spreaders (H). low-pressure pipe the correct amount of

foam compound. Water-plus-compound is then led to a number of foam makers situated in the
boiler-room at approximately the centreline of the boilers. Air is introduced, and foam is
immediately formed and conveyed to a number of foam spreaders situated in the most suitable
positions over the fuel tank tops, and usually also underneath the floor plates. In order to ensure that
water is not pumped to the boiler-room after the foam compound has been used up, thus breaking
down the foam, the high-pressure water supply pipe to the compound tank is fitted with a
water-meter indicating to the ship's engineers when sufficient water has been passed to the latter,
necessitating the closing of the main water-control valve.
For vessels having two machinery-spaces, one foam-making compound tank and induction unit
may be fitted with distribution valves to discharge foam into either space at will. If necessary, twin
tanks and induction units can be fitted (one for each machinery space), and in such systems the units
are usually cross-connected so that foam can be discharged into either space from either unit, or
from both together.
When ship's pumps are either not available, or cannot provide the necessary output and pressure,
a self-contained pressurised system is used, independent of outside motive power. Such a system
comprises a water storage tank and a foam compound tank, the size of which will depend on the
area to be protected. One or more cylinders of CO2 are fitted for expelling the water from the
storage tank. Operation of the system is the same as with the pump-operated type, save that pressure
to the water is by the CO2 instead of by the pumps.
Pre-Mixed Mechanical Foam

The Pyrene Company system employs a pre-mixed solution of foam compound and water, thus
dispensing with the need for a separate compound tank and induction unit.
This simplification is a tremendous advantage so far as the ship's engineer is concerned.
One of the benefits is that a high-quality foam is instantly produced at the discharge nozzle. In all
other systems, a preliminary discharge of water precedes the foam, which can be dangerous in
certain types of fire. A further advantage is that an ample foam supply can be certainly provided for
any specific fire risk, scientifically calculated to provide the exact quantity for the calculated danger.
Both the Pyrene pre-mix and the other foam systems can be made to operate by means of a
fusible-link detecting system. When the fusible link fails, a weight is dropped and releases CO2 into
the head space of the tank, forcing the solution through the pipework to the foam spreaders in the
area of the fire.
The storage tank is a cylindrical vessel designed for a maximum working pressure of 150 lb. per
sq. in. Its capacity is determined by the depth of foam coverage required at all points to be protected.
The tank is fitted with an inlet connection from a CO2 cylinder (or cylinders) of appropriate
capacity, having a disclosure valve and a lever-operated piercing head. The rate of discharge of CO2
gas is controlled so that a continuous pressure of 100-120 lb. per sq. in. is maintained within the
storage tank, ensuring a constant rate of flow of the outgoing solution.
Although the author does not favour foam, either low or high-expansion for fixed protection of
machinery spaces, clearly it is an excellent medium for use for the protection of cargo tank deck
areas.
Regulation 10 Fixed pressure water-spraying fire-extinguishing systems in machinery

spaces
1 Any required fixed pressure water-spraying fire-extinguishing system in machinery spaces shall be
provided with spraying nozzles of an approved type.
2 The number and arrangement of the nozzles shall be to the satisfaction of the Administration and
shall be such as to ensure an effective average distribution of water of at least 5 l/m2 per minute in
the spaces to be protected. Where increased application rates are considered necessary, these
shall be to the satisfaction of the Administration. Nozzles shall be fitted above bilges, tank tops and
other areas over which oil fuel is liable to spread and also above other specific fire hazards in the
machinery spaces.

3 The system may be divided into sections, the distribution valves of which shall be operated from
easily accessible positions outside the spaces to be protected and will not be readily cut off by a
fire in the protected space.
4 The system shall be kept charged at the necessary pressure and the pump supplying the water for
the system shall be put automatically into action by a pressure drop in the system.
5 The pump shall be capable of simultaneously supplying at the necessary pressure all sections of
the system in any one compartment to be protected. The pump and its controls shall be installed
outside the space or spaces to be protected. It shall not be possible for a fire in the space or spaces
protected by the water-spraying system to put the system out of action.
6 The pump may be driven by independent internal combustion machinery but, if it is dependent upon
power being supplied from the emergency generator fitted in compliance with the provisions of
regulation II-1/44 or regulation II-1/45, as appropriate, that generator shall be so arranged as to start
automatically in case of main power failure so that power for the pump required by paragraph 5 is
immediately available. When the pump is driven by independent internal combustion machinery it
shall be so situated that a fire in the protected space will not affect the air supply to the machinery.
7 Precautions shall be taken to prevent the nozzles from becoming clogged by impurities in the water
or corrosion of piping, nozzles, valves and pump.
Comment
Engineers, quite naturally, are concerned about possible damage which can be caused by the
application of water onto delicate machinery. The author, from his own experience, can dispel any
doubts on this score. Perhaps the most telling argument in favour is to point out that the various
Electricity Generating Authorities in the United Kingdom have for many years been amongst the
largest users of water spray systems This important industry uses water spray for the protection of
very many of its transformer stations and significantly, for many of the largest switchgear
installations. In any event it must be appreciated that the fire itself will cause damage and if not put
out quickly this will far outweigh any small loss caused by the application of water. The pros and
cons of water versus other media is discussed later.
It will be appreciated that the amount of water required to be projected per square metre of
protected area is absolutely critical. Water fog installations, which at one time were thought to be
the answer, are on this score no longer acceptable. Tests carried out at the Fire Research Station at
Borehamwood revealed that the water droplet size was the key to success and this has been reflected
in the Regulations. It must be said that Messrs. Mather & Platt recognised this from the outset.
Special sprayer nozzles are attached to a fixed system of piping of suitable size, according to the
area to be protected. The nozzles are designed effectively to cover all the area to be protected
according to its geometry and many types are available. The sprayers are directional and are
carefully sited to avoid indiscriminate spraying of electrical items. The type, location and number of
sprayer nozzles vary according to the requirements of each particular risk.
The installation is divided into sections each with its own manually-operated quick opening
valve to control the water supply to the sprayers. These valves can be either manually or air
actuated. Ideally there should be two quite separate control points, one in the machinery space itself,
preferably in the engine-room control compartment, and the other located outside the protected
space, preferably with access from the open deck. In the event of fire, only those sprayers which
protect the area involved need be brought into operation.
If required, the system can be operated automatically by means of fusible links. An automatic fire
alarm can also be incorporated in the installation-and this refinement is to be recommended,
especially in the case of unmanned engine-rooms. Alarm bells can be made to sound locally, and
also in the engineers' quarters and on the bridge.
Quite obviously the best and most effective systems will use a pressurised fresh water tank as the
first line of defence against fire in the machinery space. Such a system ensures that the first attack
on the fire is by means of fresh water and from past experience it is clear that it is more likely that
the outbreak will be controlled before the salt water back-up arrives. The modus operandi is that
upon the opening of one or more of the section valves the air pressure within the tank discharges the

fresh water onto the fire; once the pressure within the tank drops to a pre-determined level one or
more of the fire pumps is started and a continuous supply of water is thus ensured.
A pressure of at least 50 lb. per sq. in. is necessary for the proper operation of the system. To
provide the necessary water supply, a special centrifugal pump is installed. The pumping set is
designed to start automatically when a control valve is opened, or when a hydrant is opened to
provide "at will" equipment. ("At will" equipment means portable lines of hose fitted with
diffusion-type spray nozzles. This equipment can be used to tackle small fires without bringing the
full system to bear and has the great advantage that initially only fresh water is used.)
A recent and interesting development-credit for which belongs to the Royal Navy — is the
addition of aqueous film forming foam (AFFF) to the water pressure tank in a 6 per cent
concentration. This achieves a much quicker knock-down of the fire and this additive is strongly
recommended.
In the 1970's the Esso Petroleum Company retro-fitted a number of their existing VLCC's with
water spray systems in addition to the fixed foam installations with which the vessels were
equipped. Because of space limitations pressure tanks were not incorporated. Obviously such
systems could only be accepted without a pressure tank by the Classification Societies as additional
to and not in place of the existing fixed foam systems. Each of these water spray systems was
divided into seven sections designed to protect:
1. Main boiler.
2. Auxiliary boiler.
3. Turbo alternator and diesel oil tanks.
4. Diesel alternator and fuel oil tank bulkhead.
5. Main turbine and gears, plus opening in lower engine deck.
6. Cargo oil pumps.
7. Emergency escape ladders.
These systems have been successfully used on fires on a number of occasions in which damage
was kept to a minimum and the ships involved delayed for a matter of days rather than weeks or
months, which had been the Company's experience in previous incidents of a very similar nature.
The author is convinced that of all systems available for the protection of machinery spaces
against fire, water spray is far and away the best. The advantages he sees are as follows:
1. The installation is relatively simple and makes use of fire-fighting pumps which are in any
case required to be provided on board. Maintenance is utterly simple and involves little
more than checking that the pressure tank is charged with air and that the quick-acting
valves are operating freely.
2. Water is freely available whilst the ship is afloat and whilst in dry dock the system can be
connected to the shore supply.
3. On the basis of thermal capacity2 and latent heat of vaporisation3 water is a most excellent
fire extinguisher since both these figures are high. Indeed the absorbing power of water is
much greater than that of any other substance suitable for extinguishing fire. The
importance of this is that flash-back fires caused when flowing oil is striking hot surfaces
are virtually eliminated.
4. The system initially uses fresh water which causes the minimum damage to machinery. If
the fire is sufficiently large to require the salt water back-up then the small amount of
consequential damage is likely to be very small indeed and, in any event, much less than the
fire itself would cause.
5. A common misconception is that water spray causes severe damage to hot metal-such as
superheated steam pipes. A very eminent metallurgist has expressed the opinion that such
2
Thermal Capacity of a substance is the amount of heat needed to raise temperature of unit weight of the substance through
one degree.
3
Latent Heat of Vaporisation is the absorption of heat which occurs when a liquid is changed to its vapour.

damage does not in fact take place and this is quite certainly borne out by the investigations
made by the author into engine-room fires which have been extinguished by means of water
spray. When water spray hits such surfaces it is immediately turned into steam which itself
assists to control the fire. If such dangers did exist it will be readily appreciated that the use
of water in engine-rooms would be prohibited but all authorities require the provision of
hydrants and spray nozzles in such areas.
6. A most important feature outlining the value of water spray as an extinguishing medium is
that associated with the saving of life! Anyone lying injured in the vicinity of a fire is
enveloped in water spray and thus protected from further injury. Many engineers whose
ships are fitted with these systems feel that it performs a most useful service in cooling the
area in the event of an accidental steam leak.
7. Water spray can be turned on literally within seconds of an outbreak of fire without having
to abandon the space. This is of extreme importance when the vessel is in a restricted
waterway, where a collision or stranding can spell disaster.
8. In the larger vessels the system can be divided into any number of sections which can be
operated individually in the appropriate area. The means of escape route can be covered
thus aiding persons cut off by the fire.
9. After use the system is immediately ready again on standby without having to resort to any
costly replenishment of gas or foam.
A classic example of the value of the water spray system took place in 1970 when the P. & O.
Liner Oriana was involved in an engine-room fire whilst in Southampton Water. The fire was
quickly put out and the vessel sailed again within a few days along with her original passengers.
Damage was limited to a small amount of electric wiring in the vicinity of the fire. By contrast, a
similar fire which took place about the same time brought utter disaster to the Norwegian Liner
Fulvia which was not fitted with a water spray system.
Regulation 11 Special arrangements in machinery spaces

1 The provisions of this regulation shall apply to machinery spaces of category A and, where the
Administration considers it desirable, to other machinery spaces.
2.1 The number of skylights, doors, ventilators, openings in funnels to permit exhaust ventilation and
other openings to machinery spaces shall be reduced to a minimum consistent with the needs of
ventilation and the proper and safe working of the ship.
2.2 Skylights shall be of steel and shall not contain glass panels. Suitable arrangements shall be made
to permit the release of smoke, in the event of fire, from the space to be protected.
2.3 In passenger ships, doors other than power-operated watertight doors, shall be so arranged that
positive closure is assured in case of fire in the space, by power-operated closing arrangements or
by the provision of self-closing doors capable of closing against an inclination of 3.5° opposing
closure and having a fail-safe hook-back facility, provided with a remotely operated release device.
3 Windows shall not be fitted in machinery space boundaries. This does not preclude the use of glass
in control rooms within the machinery spaces.
4 Means of control shall be provided for:
.1 opening and closure of skylights, closure of openings in funnels which normally

allow exhaust ventilation, and closure of ventilator dampers;
.2 permitting the release of smoke;
.3 closing power-operated doors or actuating release mechanism on doors other

than power-operated watertight doors;
.4 stopping ventilating fans; and
.5 stopping forced and induced draught fans, oil fuel transfer pumps, oil fuel unit
pumps and other similar fuel pumps.

5 The controls required in paragraph 4 and in regulation 15.2.5 shall be located outside the space
concerned, where they will not be cut off in the event of fire in the space they serve. In passenger
ships such controls and the controls for any required fire-extinguishing system shall be situated at
one control position or grouped in as few positions as possible to the satisfaction of the
Administration. Such positions shall have a safe access from the open deck.
6 When access to any machinery space of category A is provided at a low level from an adjacent shaft
tunnel, there shall be provided in the shaft tunnel, near the watertight door, a light steel fire-screen
door operable from each side.
7 For periodically unattended machinery spaces in cargo ships, the Administration shall give special
consideration to maintaining fire integrity of the machinery spaces, the location and centralization
of the fire-extinguishing system controls, the required shutdown arrangements (e.g. ventilation, fuel
pumps, etc.) and may require additional fire-extinguishing appliances and other fire-fighting
equipment and breathing apparatus. In passenger ships these requirements shall be at least
equivalent to those of machinery spaces normally attended.
8 A fixed fire detection and alarm system complying with the provisions of regulation 14 shall be
fitted in any machinery space:
.1 where the installation of automatic and remote control systems and equipment
has been approved in lieu of continuous manning of the space; and
.2 where the main propulsion and associated machinery including sources of main
electrical supply are provided with various degrees of automatic or remote
control and are under continuous manned supervision from a control room.
Comment
Category A machinery spaces are defined in Regulation 3.19:
Machinery spaces of category A are those spaces and trunks to such spaces which contain:
.1 internal combustion machinery used for main propulsion; or
.2 internal combustion machinery used for purposes other than main propulsion
where such machinery has in the aggregate a total power output of not less than
375 kW; or
.3 any oil-fired boiler or oil fuel unit.
In the past skylights were generally glazed and the author was pleased to note the change in the
regulations which require that skylight do not contain glass panels (Regulation 11.2.2).
The author has on many occasions, perhaps the most notable case being the MV Marquette4,
where the complete inaccessibility of the means to operate the fire-fighting systems within a
machinery space has been compromised by a fire which prevented access to the controls. The
standard required by SOLAS is that the alternative or emergency control point must be located
outside the compartment of origin and reached from the open deck thus providing time and ability
to operate the controls (regulation 11.5). Regulation 15.2.5 extends this principle in respect of the
means of isolating from a safe position the fuel, lubricating and other flammable oils stored in day
tanks contained in machinery spaces.
SPRINKLER SYSTEMS
Historical
Sprinklers were invented by an Englishman, John Carey, in 1806. Perforated sprinkler heads
were connected to a pipe system, and controlled by weighted valves held shut by a cord or string.
The burning of the cord automatically opened the valve, and water was projected on to the fire.
There is, however, no record of this system actually being installed in a building.
Major A. Stewart Harrison, of the London Volunteers, invented the automatic sprinkler head in
1864; but it was an American,, Henry Parmelee, who in 1874 perfected an automatic system which
was quickly adopted in factory premises- throughout the United States. The first installation in
4
For a full account of the fire aboard the MV Marquette see page 157 et seq. of Ship Fire and the Law through the eyes of a
fire-fighter published by Lloyds of London Press 1995.

Britain was in a Lancashire cotton mill in 1882, and thereafter many industrial premises installed
the Parmelee system.
The first mention of a sprinkler system for use on board ship is found in a patent specification, No.
33 of 1853, lodged by an Englishman, John Browne:
A.D. 1853, January 6th; No. 3333

BROWNE, John.
In case of fire he proposes to arrange an apparatus at or near the bows of the ship in such manner as the forward
motion thereof shall cause a large body of water to be taken into the apparatus, and from thence by pipes or
otherwise conveyed to that part of the ship where combustion is suspected or has taken place.
Browne's system would undoubtedly work-provided, of course, that the ship was under way; but
once again there is no record of such a system having been adopted.
Ten years later, William Miller, of London, patented a system (No. 1414: June 8th, 1863) of
dividing a ship into small cellular watertight compartments
varying in dimensions into cubic feet or cubic yards or larger, but never very large, which cells may be arranged in
the vessel where found most convenient but they must always be of sufficient number and capacity to float the
vessel when filled with water to the required height.
Miller proposed that pipes to admit water "with great liberty" should lead to every compartment,
so that any fire could be quickly extinguished. The inventor also included details of a visual alarm
system consisting of open-ended tubes leading from each space, from which smoke would issue
when a fire occurred.
Miller's system of dividing up a vessel into small compartments has, of course, long since been
adopted in fighting ships; but it is quite impracticable in the Merchant Marine.
In America, the Parmelee sprinkler was soon superseded by a greatly improved design developed
by Frederick Grinnell, of Providence, Rhode Island. This sprinkler head was held in the closed
position by a soldered strut which, on being subjected to heat from fire, melted and allowed water to
flow. Although there have been improvements in detail. Grinnell sprinkler heads have, now been in
constant use throughout the world for almost a hundred years, and many thousands of fires have
been successfully extinguished by their use.
Although many men had ideas of installing a sprinkler system in a ship following John Browne's
patent in 1853, it was not until 1914 that the Hamburg-Amerika Line fitted "Grinnell" Automatic
Sprinklers on their 50,000-ton liner Imperator, and on her sister ship, the Vaterland. The sprinklers
were installed in the officers' and crews' quarters; and it was intended that if the experiment proved
a success, the installation would be extended to protect the major portions of the vessels. The First
World War intervened, however, and both ships were interned until after its conclusion.
The first record of a sprinkler system being installed in a British ship is in 1933, when Messrs.
Mather and Platt Ltd., of Manchester, installed a "Grinnell" Automatic Sprinkler and Fire-Alarm
System on the Princess Maud, which had been built by Wm. Denny Bros. Ltd., of Dumbarton, for
the L.M.S. Railway's Larne-Stranraer service. Captain J. W. Harris, Marine Superintendent of the
L.M.S. Railway, must have had profound faith in the system; for before a large audience of marine
engineers and officials he deliberately set fire to a double-berth cabin while the ship was on her
trials. Two mattresses in the cabin were covered with wood chippings and shavings, and a quantity
of paraffin was poured over them before being lit. The Captain's faith in the system was fully
justified; for it is recorded that "within a few seconds the sprinkler system came into action, and in
less than 20 seconds the fire was under control. In two minutes the fire was completely extinguished
and the water shut off. Two minutes later the fused sprinkler was replaced by a new one, and the
system was again ready for action."
The Orient Line was the first British company to fit a sprinkler installation to a large passenger
ship, and the Cunard Line soon followed in the majestic R.M.S. Queen Mary.

Regulation 12 Automatic sprinkler, fire detection and fire alarm systems

1.1 Any required automatic sprinkler, fire detection and fire alarm system shall be capable of immediate
operation at all times and no action by the crew shall be necessary to set it in operation. It shall be
of the wet pipe type but small exposed sections may be of the dry pipe type where in the opinion of
the Administration this is a necessary precaution. Any parts of the system which may be subjected
to freezing temperatures in service shall be suitably protected against freezing. It shall be kept
charged at the necessary pressure and shall have provision for a continuous supply of water as
required in this regulation.
1.2 Each section of sprinklers shall include means for giving a visual and audible alarm signal
automatically at one or more indicating units whenever any sprinkler comes into operation. Such
alarm systems shall be such as to indicate if any fault occurs in the system.
1.2.1 In passenger ships such units shall give an indication of any fire and its location
in any space served by the system and shall be centralized on the navigating
bridge or in the main fire control station, which shall be so manned or equipped
as to ensure that any alarm from the system is immediately received by a
responsible member of the crew.
1.2.2 In cargo ships such units shall indicate in which section served by the system
fire has occurred and shall be centralized on the navigating bridge and in
addition, visible and audible alarms from the unit shall be placed in a position
other than on the navigating bridge, so as to ensure that the indication of fire is
immediately received by the crew.
2.1 Sprinklers shall be grouped into separate sections, each of which shall contain not more than 200
sprinklers. In passenger ships any section of sprinklers shall not serve more than two decks and
shall not be situated in more than one main vertical zone. However, the Administration may permit
such a section of sprinklers to serve more than two decks or be situated in more than one main
vertical zone, if it is satisfied that the protection of the ship against fire will not thereby be reduced.
2.2 Each section of sprinklers shall be capable of being isolated by one stop valve only. The stop valve
in each section shall be readily accessible and its location shall be clearly and permanently
indicated. Means shall be provided to prevent the operation of the stop valves by any unauthorized
person.
2.3 A gauge indicating the pressure in the system shall be provided at each section stop valve and at a
central station.
2.4 The sprinklers shall be resistant to corrosion by marine atmosphere. In accommodation and service
spaces the sprinklers shall come into operation within the temperature range from 68°C to 79°C,
except that in locations such as drying rooms, where high ambient temperatures might be
expected, the operating temperature may be increased by not more than 30°C above the maximum
deckhead temperature.
2.5 A list or plan shall be displayed at each indicating unit showing the spaces covered and the
location of the zone in respect of each section. Suitable instructions for testing and maintenance
shall be available.
3 Sprinklers shall be placed in an overhead position and spaced in a suitable pattern to maintain an
average application rate of not less than 5 l/m2/min over the nominal area covered by the sprinklers.
However, the Administration may permit the use of sprinklers providing such an alternative amount
of water suitably distributed as has been shown to the satisfaction of the Administration to be not
less effective.
4.1 A pressure tank having a volume equal to at least twice that of the charge of water specified in this
subparagraph shall be provided. The tank shall contain a standing charge of fresh water, equivalent
to the amount of water which would be discharged in one minute by the pump referred to in
paragraph 5.2, and the arrangements shall provide for maintaining an air pressure in the tank such
as to ensure that where the standing charge of fresh water in the tank has been used the pressure
will be not less than the working pressure of the sprinkler, plus the pressure exerted by a head of
water measured from the bottom of the tank to the highest sprinkler in the system. Suitable means
of replenishing the air under pressure and of replenishing the fresh water charge in the tank shall
be provided. A glass gauge shall be provided to indicate the correct level of the water in the tank.
4.2 Means shall be provided to prevent the passage of seawater into the tank.
5.1 An independent power pump shall be provided solely for the purpose of continuing automatically
the discharge of water from the sprinklers. The pump shall be brought into action automatically by
the pressure drop in the system before the standing fresh water charge in the pressure tank is
completely exhausted.

5.2 The pump and the piping system shall be capable of maintaining the necessary pressure at the level
of the highest sprinkler to ensure a continuous output of water sufficient for the simultaneous
coverage of a minimum area of 280 m2 at the application rate specified in paragraph 3.
5.3 The pump shall have fitted on the delivery side a test valve with a short open-ended discharge pipe.
The effective area through the valve and pipe shall be adequate to permit the release of the required
pump output while maintaining the pressure in the system specified in paragraph 4.1.
5.4 The sea inlet to the pump shall wherever possible be in the space containing the pump and shall be
so arranged that when the ship is afloat it will not be necessary to shut off the supply of seawater to
the pump for any purpose other than the inspection or repair of the pump.
6 The sprinkler pump and tank shall be situated in a position reasonably remote from any machinery
space of category A and shall not be situated in any space required to be protected by the sprinkler
system.
7.1 In passenger ships there shall be not less than two sources of power supply for the seawater pump
and automatic alarm and detection system. Where the sources of power for the pump are electrical,
these shall be a main generator and an emergency source of power. One supply for the pump shall
be taken from the main switchboard, and one from the emergency switchboard by separate feeders
reserved solely for that purpose. The feeders shall be so arranged as to avoid galleys, machinery
spaces and other enclosed spaces of high fire risk except in so far as it is necessary to reach the
appropriate switchboards, and shall be run to an automatic change-over switch situated near the
sprinkler pump. This switch shall permit the supply of power from the main switchboard so long as
a supply is available therefrom, and be so designed that upon failure of that supply it will
automatically change over to the supply from the emergency switchboard. The switches on the
main switchboard and the emergency switchboard shall be clearly labelled and normally kept
closed. No other switch shall be permitted in the feeders concerned. One of the sources of power
supply for the alarm and detection system shall be an emergency source. Where one of the sources
of power for the pump is an internal combustion engine it shall, in addition to complying with the
provisions of paragraph 6, be so situated that a fire in any protected space will not affect the air
supply to the machinery.
7.2 In cargo ships there shall not be less than two sources of power supply for the seawater pump and
automatic alarm and detection system. If the pump is electrically driven it shall be connected to the
main source of electrical power, which shall be capable of being supplied by at least two
generators. The feeders shall be so arranged as to avoid galleys, machinery spaces and other
enclosed spaces of high fire risk except in so far as it is necessary to reach the appropriate
switchboards. One of the sources of power supply for the alarm and detection system shall be an
emergency source. Where one of the sources of power for the pump is an internal combustion
engine it shall, in addition to complying with the provisions of paragraph 6, be so situated that a fire
in any protected space will not affect the air supply to the machinery.
8 The sprinkler system shall have a connection from the ship's fire main by way of a lockable
screw-down nonreturn valve at the connection which will prevent a backflow from the sprinkler
system to the fire main.
9.1 A test valve shall be provided for testing the automatic alarm for each section of sprinklers by a
discharge of water equivalent to the operation of one sprinkler. The test valve for each section shall
be situated near the stop valve for that section.
9.2 Means shall be provided for testing the automatic operation of the pump on reduction of pressure
in the system.
9.3 Switches shall be provided at one of the indicating positions referred to in paragraph 1.2 which will
enable the alarm and the indicators for each section of sprinklers to be tested.
10 Spare sprinkler heads shall be provided for each section of sprinklers to the satisfaction of the
Administration.
Comment
It is not the purpose nor indeed the function of SOLAS to specify how a sprinkler system shall be
designed. Sensibly it opts to describe performance criteria which must be met. The design of
sprinkler systems has evolved from the use of tables to pipework networks whose resistance to the
flow of water is calculated using sophisticated computers and often linked to computer aided
drafting and design systems. In the UK, the Fire Offices Committee whose rules were in common
usage up to and including the 29th edition have been supplanted by the Loss Prevention Council
Rules for Automatic Sprinkler Systems which themselves have been incorporated in British
Standard BS5306: 1990. In the US systems are designed in accordance with the excellent NFPA 13

published by the National Fire Protection Association or in accordance with Factory Mutual
International Standard FM 28N.
It is surprising that Regulation 12 does not require the provision of an auxiliary supply with
shut-off valves and non-return valves for the purpose of connecting to a shore supply when the
vessel is in dry dock. The connection to the system should be by means of an international shore
connection coupling as described in Regulation 19. A full description of this device follows later in
this chapter. At sea providing the means of pumping water are available, the ship has access to an
inexhaustible supply, which is unlike a land based system where alternative supplies: connection to
the public mains and tank storage are often required. Obviously, whilst in dry dock, a ship system is
limited to the contents of its small fresh water tank unless it is connected to an alternative shore
supply.
In the wording of Regulation 12.1.1 "Any required automatic sprinkler, fire detection and fire
alarm system shall be capable of immediate operation at all times and no action by the crew shall
be necessary to set it in operation." and it is these characteristics which in part distinguish sprinkler
systems from other water spray systems in machinery spaces which have been described earlier.
The systems generally are required to be of the wet pipe type but where small sections are
exposed to low temperatures it is permissible to install dry pipe systems. Sprinkler systems are
grouped into zones, each zone being limited to not more than 200 sprinkler heads. Each section
must include the means of giving automatic visual and audible indication of operation. Faults
which develop must also be indicated.
On passenger ships the sprinkler systems must indicate on the navigating bridge or at the main
fire control station the location of a fire in any space protected by the system. These locations must
of course be manned at all times. On a cargo ship, the indication at the navigating bridge is only
required to indicate that a fire has occurred in an individual section (Regulation 12.1.2). It is
general practice to provide visual and audible indicators in the crew quarters.
Pressure Tank
A pressure tank must be provide and shall contain fresh water. The tanks must be twice the size
of the capacity required shall be sufficient to provide a one minute supply over 280 m2 at a
discharge rate of 5 litres per metre squared per minute. This is equivalent to a capacity of 1,400
litres or 370 gallons (imp) and results in a requirement of 2,800 litres or 740 gallons (imp.) gross
capacity. It is usual to fit 1,000 gallon
tanks. The tank must be kept half filled
with water under a pressure of not less
than 70 lb/in2, plus the pressure resulting Pressure vs Height
from a head of water measured from the 50
bottom the tank to the highest sprinkler in

the system. This can be calculated using
(pounds per sq. inch
40
the Figure 8.44 opposite.

A pressure gauge relief valve and a
Pressure
30
water level indicator are fitted to the tank,

together with stop valves or cocks. An 20
electrically-driven air compressor

maintains the pressure at the correct 10
value.
The height of the highest sprinkler 0
above the pressure gauge on the control 1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91
valves can be calculated by reference to Height (feet)

Figure 8.44 which shows the relation
between pressure and the height of a
column of water. FIGURE 8.44 Pressure developed by a
column of water of known height.

Pumps
An automatic centrifugal pump, independent of any other fire pump, must be available; and must
be capable of maintaining a continuous output of 1,400 litres per minute (370 gpm) which requires
the frictional losses and loss due to static head for the pipe network to be calculated. These
hydraulic calculations are generally made by computer but it is possible to follow the UK Loss
Prevention Council Rules which contain tables of pipe sizes and frictional losses to estimate the
pressure head at which the pump is required to function.
The size of pipes are not specified in the Regulations except that the pump and piping system
"shall be capable of maintaining the necessary pressure at the level of the highest sprinkler to ensure
a continuous output of water sufficient for the simultaneous coverage of a minimum are of 280 m2
at the application rate specified: 5 l/m2/min (Regulation 12.5.2).
The pump must be situated where it is easily accessible, and where it is not liable to damage
from fire or any other cause. It must be fitted with direct sea suction; and arrangements must be
made for it to come automatically into action whenever the pressure in the system drops, and before
the fresh water charge in the pressure tank is exhausted. (In practice, pumps usually start to operate
as soon as the pressure drops below 25 lb. per sq.in. on the highest sprinkler.).
There must be at least two independent sources of power to operate the pump, the air compressor
and the automatic alarm; and arrangements must be made to ensure that sea water does not enter the
pressure tank.
A two-inch diameter waste pipe must be fitted on the delivery side, together with a short
open-ended discharge pipe for testing purposes.
As stated earlier the author would like
to see an auxiliary supply consisting of
hose couplings with shut-off valves and
non-return valves for connecting to the
shore supply, in order that when the vessel
is in dry dock the system can be fed from
the shore by the local Fire Brigade. If the
shore mains pressure is sufficient, a line of
hose can be connected to keep the system
charged during refits.
A connection from the ship's fire main
is fitted with a shut-off screw-down
non-return valve at the connection, in
order to prevent a back flow from the
sprinkler system to the fire main. The
FIGURE 8.45 The positioning of back-pressure valves for a purpose of this connection is to provide an
typical arrangement of water supplies in a sprinkler system. alternative supply in case of failure of the
centrifugal pump.
All shut-off valves, for the shore supply
and for the ship's main connection alike, must be clearly and permanently marked in such a way as
to show their purpose, and they must be capable of being locked in the closed position.
Piping for Sprinkler Systems

All pipes must be of steel, of adequate strength having regard to the pressures to which they will
be subjected; and they must be properly jointed and supported.
SOLAS in accordance with its functional approach does not specify the size of pipes to be used;
however both the UK Loss Prevention Council Rules and NFPA 13 give tables from which pipe
sizes can be estimated in small installations. Pipe sizes in large complex and multizone installations
require to be calculated hydraulically.

Connections must be provided to supply fresh

water to the pressure tank, and to flush out the
piping system should it have been charged with
salt water. Any pipes liable to freezing must be
adequately insulated.
Sprinkler Heads
SOLAS requires that all sprinkler heads must be
resistant to corrosion by marine atmosphere and
capable of operating with salt water. The heads
must come into operation at a temperature not less
than 155oF (68oC) and not more than 174oF (79oC):
except in drying-rooms and similar spaces wherein
KEY
the operating temperature may be increased by not A: Cast iron body, B and C: Cast Iron division walls, D: Bronze ring,
more than 30oC above the maximum deckhead E: clack valve, F: composition disc, G: Central guide pin, H: Guide.
temperature (Regulation 12.2.4).
FIGURE 8.46 A typical non-return or back-pressure
When installed on board ship, sprinkler heads valve designed to prevent the flow of water from the
must be grouped in sections (called "Installations" higher-pressure supply into the lower-pressure supply.
by all the makers), none of which may contain Water can pass through the valve only in the direction
more than 200 heads. Every section of heads must of the arrows by raising clack E. Any flow of water in
be controlled by one control valve; and no other the reserve direction forces clack E on to its seating D,
valves may be provided for controlling any of the and closes the valve.
sprinklers in that section. These control valves
must be readily accessible, and clearly and permanently marked. No unauthorised person may
operate a control valve. No section of sprinkler heads may serve more than two decks, nor may it be
in more than one main vertical zone nor in more than one watertight compartment. The
Administration may, however, waive this requirement if they think that such waiver would improve
the fire protection of the vessel (Regulation 12.2.1).
SOLAS does not give guidance as to the maximum distance between sprinkler heads requiring
that the heads be spaced in a suitable pattern to maintain an average application rate of not less than
5 l/m2/min over the nominal area covered by the sprinklers. In contrast NFPA 13 limits the
maximum distance between heads to 15 feet in extra light hazard areas and to 12 feet in Extra High
Hazard Occupancies.
SOLAS does not require a specific number of spare heads to be provided for each installation,
but shore practice is to provided at least six spare heads for every installation. These spare heads
must be stored in boxes or holders close to the control valve controlling the section, and must be
clearly and permanently marked to show their contents.
Regulation 12.2.1 states:
In passenger ships any section of sprinklers shall not serve more than two decks and
shall not be situated in more than one main vertical zone. However, the Administration
may permit such a section of sprinklers to serve more than two decks or be situated in
more than one main vertical zone, if it is satisfied that the protection of the ship against
fire will not thereby be reduced.
In view of the number of separate compartments into which a ship is divided, it is obvious that
the number of separate sprinkler installations which she will have to carry is very much greater than
would be needed to cover the equivalent volume of a building on land. A ship's watertight
bulkheads are usually only about 65 ft. apart; while above the bulkhead decks, the fire resisting
bulkheads are normally 131 ft. apart, even less. All these bulkheads form a large number of
comparatively small vertical sections; and it is nearly always necessary to install a separate sprinkler
system within each vertical section. Furthermore, it is considered by many naval architects that
when pipes run too far in a horizontal direction there is a risk of their fracturing in heavy weather.
The average 25,000-ton liner, therefore, will carry as many as 20 separate installations, while the
largest vessels may carry up to 50.

It follows from this, of course, that individual ship's

sprinkler installations are very much smaller than are the
normal sections designed for use on land. It has already been
said that the maximum number of heads which may be fitted
to a single shipboard installation is 200. On land
installations, the maximum runs up to 1,000.
The Quartzoid Bulb head has its waterway sealed by a
soft metal gasket held tightly in position by a non-corroding
Quartzoid Bulb strut. The bulb itself contains a highly
FIGURE 8.47 A typical quartzoid bulb expansible liquid very sensitive to heat, and capable of
exerting great disruptive force when heated to the operative
sprinkler head.
temperature. A small quantity of gas is left in the bulb when
it is hermetically sealed; and when the liquid expands under the influence of heat, this bubble is
gradually compressed until it can be compressed no further, and the bulb is almost wholly filled
with the expanding liquid. Any further rise in temperature increases the pressure within the bulb
until it becomes such that the bulb is shattered. When this happens, the gasket is released and,
together with the supporting assembly, is carried away from the main body of the sprinkler head by
the emerging water. The stream of water impinges with force on to a deflector fixed at the lower end
of the sprinkler head in such a manner as to cause a well-spread and heavy shower to fall in the area
desired.
A great advantage of this type of sprinkler head is its enormous resistance to pressure exerted on
it from without. Indeed, if the head be tested to destruction under hydraulic pressure applied
externally, the bulb will remain intact even after the metal parts have failed. The bulb is also very
resistant to extreme cold, and can withstand the hottest climates.
Ambient temperatures can vary widely throughout a ship. It follows that sprinkler heads fitted in
(for instance) certain parts of the engine-room or machinery space must possess a critical (shatter)
temperature much higher than those to be used in the passenger accommodation. "Grinnell"
Quartzoid Bulbs are accordingly made to operate at seven different temperatures between 155o F.
and 360o F. Each type of bulb is made in a different colour, the rating of each being shown in the
Table below:
Rating of Head Working Temperature which shall not be Colour of Bulb

exceeded where Head is located
135o F. or 57o C. 86o F. or 30o C. ORANGE
155o F. or 68o C. 120o F. or 49o C. RED
o o o o
175 F. or 79 C. 140 F. or 60 C. YELLOW
200o F. or 93o C. 165o F. or 74o C. GREEN
o o o o
286 F. or 141 C. 250 F. or 121 C. BLUE
360o F. or 182o C. 320o F. or 160o C. MAUVE
o o o o
440-500 F. or 227-260 C. 400 F. or 205 C. BLACK
Table 8.7
Automatic Sprinkler Alarms

Under Regulation 12.1.2 of SOLAS requires that all sprinkler installations on board ship shall
incorporate an automatic alarm system which shall give both visual and audible warning as soon as
any sprinkler head is opened. The audible alarm must sound at one or more points in the ship, in
such a way as to come rapidly to the attention of the Master and crew; and it must indicate the
presence and position of any fire in the spaces protected by the system. It is a requirement of
Regulation 12.7.1 (passenger ships) and 12.7.2 (cargo ships) that alternative sources of power are
provided to operate the system in the event of failure of main supply.

KEY
1—Compressor Starting Panel 2—Pressure Tank 3—Air Compressor 4—Oil Separator 5—Compressor
Safety Valve 6—Compressor B.P. Valve 7—Compressor Stop Valve 8—Pressure Tank Pressure Gauges
9—Pressure Tank Water Level Indicator 10—Pressure Tank Drain Valve 11—Pressure Tank Safety Valve
12—Fresh Water Supply Stop Valve 13—Fresh Water Supply HP Valve 14—Fresh Water Feed 15—Shore
Connections 16—Pressure Tank Delivery Stop Valve 17—Pressure Tank Delivery B.P. and Alarm Valve
18—Pressure Tank Delivery Stop Valve 19—Diaphragm Alarm Switch (Pressure Tank) 20—Shore
Connection Stop Valve 21—Shore Connection B.P. Valve 22—Pressure Tank Alarm Bell 23—Hose Adaptor
24—Trunk Main 25—Pump Test Valve 26—Pump Delivery Stop Valve 27—Pump Delivery B.P. Valve
28—Automatic Pressure Relay 29—Pump 30—Installation Control Valves 3l—Automatic Relay Isolating
Valve 32—Release Valve 33—Indicator Pilot Lamp 34—Indicator 35—Alarm Bell 36—Automatic Starting
Panel 37—Diagram of Ship 38—Sprinkler Head 44—Stop Valve Alarm Switch 54—Trunk Main Drain Valve
55—Air Release Valve
FIGURE 8.48 Sketch of a typical automatic sprinkler and fire-alarm system.
In essence, a sprinkler system consists of a series of water pipes, either under pressure or
connected to a quick-acting pump, attached to which at predetermined intervals are heads which
open automatically when subjected to the heat of a fire.
A good sprinkler system can fairly be likened to a fully-trained fireman standing by in each and
every space covered by the installation, with a charged line of hose ready to project water on to a
fire in its earliest stages, for 24 hours a day and 365 days a year, plus an extra day for Leap Year!
Fire officers know that rarely indeed does a fire "get away" in a building protected by an efficient
sprinkler system-and when the installation incorporates also a device for giving a visible and
audible alarm, automatically, whenever a sprinkler head is activated, then it can fairly be said to
afford a high degree of fire protection. The main features are shown in Figures 8.48 and 8.49.

The sprinkler detection and alarm system makes use of a circuit in which a small current is
constantly flowing while the system is "dead". When a fire causes a head to shatter, a small quantity
of water flows up a half-inch alarm pipe, presses against a rubber diaphragm, and actuates a switch
which breaks the circuit. The diaphragm switch consists of a standard-pattern tumbler switch,
controlled by a flexible diaphragm opposed by a helical spring. The switch is coupled to an alarm
bell and indicator panel in the wheel-house, which is capable of giving both audible and visual
warning that fire has broken out. Alarm bells ring also in the crew's quarters and in the engine-room
— a most desirable feature, since there can be no guarantee that the alarm in the wheel-house will
always be heard when the ship is in port, with the bridge probably untenanted.
There can be little doubt that a "break", or "closed" type of circuit in an alarm system provides
the most reliable protection, for as soon as any fault of an electrical nature occurs in the circuit, the
circuit current is broken, and the alarm sounds even without any sprinkler head having shattered.
The effective functioning of the "Grinnell" system is further evidenced by an ever-glowing pilot
lamp placed at the side of the visual indicator panel.
A further safeguard makes it impossible for the water mains valve to be turned off, in ignorance
or in error, without the alarm being sounded. The valve is fitted with a switch unit which is in series
with the diaphragm switch. This switch unit remains closed as long as the valve is in the fully-open
position; but when the hand-wheel controlling the valve is turned about three turns towards the
"closed"' position, the switch opens, breaks the circuit, and the alarm is given.
The circuit is also broken, and the alarm
given, if the cover of the switch unit is
opened. There is no reason why it ever
should be, for the unit is fitted with a
visual indicator showing whether the
mains valve is open or closed.
Figure 8.49 illustrates the detailed
working of the system. Each set of valves
consists of a main stop valve 52, a special
back pressure and alarm valve 41 with
subsidiary valves for testing 42 and
draining 45, and a diaphragm-operated
alarm switch 40. The main stop valve is an
isolating valve which must always be
strapped "OPEN"" except when sprinkler
heads are being replaced or repairs are
being carried out on the system. The stop
valve alarm switch is shown at 44.
The alarm valve is a special type of
pressure valve. It is fitted with a bronze
seating 47 which is machined with an
annular groove communicating with the
alarm equipment. Under normal
conditions, the composition face of the
alarm valve clack 46 rests on the face of
the seating 47, and prevents access of 39—Pressure Gauge (above valve) 40—Diaphragm A1arm Switch
water to the groove. In the event of fire, (Installation) 41—Alarm Valve 42—Testing Valve 43—Alarm Cock
water flows through the alarm valve to the 44—Stop Valve Alarm Switch 45—Drain Valve 46—Alarm Valve Clack
opened sprinkler head, and in doing so 47—Alarm Valve Seat with Annular Groove 48—Inspection Cap
raises the clack from the seating. Some 49—Drop Orifice 50—Drain Pipe 51—Pressure Gauge (below valve)
water can now flow through the annular 52—Stop Valve 53—Strainer
groove and via the opened alarm cock 43
and strainer 53 to diaphragm switch 40. FIGURE 8.49 Typical installation control valves.

The upper valve 42 is for testing purposes; when opened, it allows the same quantity of water to
pass through the alarm valve as would pass if one sprinkler opened. This causes the clack to lift, and
permits water to pass through the grooved seat to the diaphragm and so operates the automatic
switch.
The lower and larger valve 45 is for draining the water from the installation.
Two pressure gauges are fitted. One 51, coupled to the stop valve, indicates the pressure of the
water in the trunk main below the alarm valve; while the second 39, coupled to the alarm valve,
shows the pressure of water in the installation proper above the alarm clack valve.
The alarm stop cock 43 is fitted between the alarm valve and the switch. It must be strapped with
the handle in the "OPEN" position, and should only be closed to stop the bell ringing after a fire has
been located and is being dealt with.
The strainer 53 is fitted on the same connection as the alarm stop cock. Water passing through
this strainer has two outlets — one to the automatic switch, and the other through a small orifice 49
to the drain pipe 50. Thus, in the event of a slight leakage of water occurring between the alarm
valve clack 46 and its seating by reason of dirt or grit lodging between the face of the clack and its
seating, the water entering the alarm connection will flow through the orifice to drain, and will not
build up a pressure behind the diaphragm switch. An inspection cap 48 is removable, and gives
access to the small orifice for cleaning purposes.
The manufacturers recommend action as follows:
Action in Case of Fire

On hearing the sprinkler alarm, the Officer in charge should take the following action:
1. Sound the general alarm to summon the crew.
2. Check the position of the fire, which will be shown on the annunciator administration in
the wheel-house or fire control station.
3. Order one man to stand by the main valve of the installation concerned. (Note. — This man
must be ready to shut the alarm connection plug cock and in the main stop valve WHEN
ORDERED TO DO SO — BUT NOT BEFORE.)
4. Proceed to, and ascertain the extent of, the fire.
5. Order a line of hose to be laid out, and have hand extinguishers brought to the scene. (Note
— It will sometimes be found that although the fire is being held perfectly in check, some
small pockets of fire which cannot be reached by the sprinkler spray are still burning.).
6. When it is certain that the fire is extinguished, order the shutting down of the main stop
valve and of the alarm connection plug cock. The drain and test valves should be fully
opened.
7. Make a very careful examination of the fire area to see that it is quite safe. Particular
attention must be paid to ensure that fire is not burning behind panelling, under bunks, etc.
Action after a Fire

Immediate action must be taken to put the system back into working order after a fire:
Any sprinkler heads which have been actuated by the fire must be replaced. Care
should be taken to ensure that the Quartzoid Bulb Sprinklers are of the correct
temperature rating (this is marked on the deflector). A special spanner for replacing the
heads is provided beside the spare bulbs. Make sure that a good joint has been made,
otherwise a leak will take place at the sprinkler head.
1. Close the drain and test valves, and open the main stop valve slightly, allowing water to fill
the pipes slowly. When the two pressure gauges show the same reading, the valve can be
fully opened and strapped in that position. (Note — So long as the main stop valve is
opened, the Main Stop Valve Alarm Switch will continue to operate and the alarm bells
will ring. They can be switched off, if necessary, by opening the cover of the switch; but
this is not recommended.).

2. If the fire has been of sufficient severity to cause the pump for the water supply to come
into operation, it can be stopped by pressing the "STOP" button on the side of the starting
panel.
3. All salt water must be completely drained from the system by means of the trunk main drain
valve.
4. The pressure tank must now be filled, and the whole installation charged with fresh water.
The water in the tank should be brought to the correct level and air pressure.
Since the first "Grinnell" sprinkler system was installed on the Princess Maud in 1933, quite
literally thousands of potentially serious ship fires have been successfully extinguished with its aid.
There can be no doubt that, for the protection of passenger and crews' accommodation, and of
public and service spaces alike, a well-designed sprinkler system is a first-rate insurance against the
spread of an uncontrollable fire. It is highly probable that the fire which started in a cabin on
administration the Empress of Canada on a fateful Sunday afternoon in January, 1953, while she
was lying in the Gladstone Dock, Bootle, and which caused her to be totally burnt out — that this
fire could quite easily have been put out almost at once by a single sprinkler head, using only the
stand-by supply of water in the pressure tank.
It would have been a cheap form of insurance.
Sprinkler systems are commonly found throughout passenger ships and as a result of the tragedy
aboard the Scandinavian Star (see Chapter 4) have become a mandatory requirement under the
terms of SOLAS Regulation 36.2 which states:
Passenger ships carrying more than 36 passengers shall be equipped with an automatic
sprinkler, fire detection and fire alarm system of an approved type and complying with
the requirements of Regulation 12, or the guidelines developed by the Organization5 for
an approved equivalent sprinkler system in all service spaces, control stations and
accommodation spaces, including corridors and stairways.
FIGURE 8.50 Diagram of connections for fire-alarm indicator used

with a typical sprinkler system.
5
Refer to the Revised guidelines for approval of sprinkler systems equivalent to that referred to in SOLAS Regulation II-2/12
adopted by the Organization by Resolution A.800(19).

FIRE DETECTION AND ALARM SYSTEMS

Historical
Just as the prevention of fire, and its extinction once begun, exercised the minds of men from
ancient times to the present day, so too must they have dreamed of finding means to warn them that
fire had broken out. Only in the early nineteenth century, however, when scientists like Faraday
were learning to harness electricity, could the dream come nearer to reality.
An interesting account of two inventions designed to give an early warning of fire on board ship
is contained in a book of Patent Specifications, 1861-66. As with so many of these early inventions,
there is no record of their having been actually installed in a ship; but there seems to be no reason to
suppose that they would not have functioned satisfactorily if they had. The first patent reads:
AD. 1865, August 9th; No. 2065 WEST, Charles.

Apparatus for giving immediate warning of undue heat, whether occasioned by fire, spontaneous
combustion or any other causes of leakage in ships.
The apparatus consists of a hollow iron tube of such size and diameter as may be most suitable;
but the dimensions of those to be generally used are about 5" in length, and 12/16ths" in
diameter on the exterior and 10/16ths" in the interior. The bore, however, 10/16ths" does not
extend beyond 3" of the five in length, the remaining 2" having a much smaller bore varying
from the 16th to the 32nd part of an inch. The metal tube is closed at the larger end and the
whole of this part filled with mercury. A closely fitting insulated wire is then inserted in the
remaining part of the neck of the tube, descending to within a short distance of, but not touching,
the mercury.
When the apparatus is exposed to heat, the mercury will rise in proportion to the increase of
temperature, and will make contact with the wire in the neck of the tube at the degree of heat to
which the instrument may be regulated. The wire is soldered to the outside of the metal tube.
This wire is insulated and leads to the indicator, and through these the metallic connection is
contained at one of the poles of the battery.
The apparatus is for giving warning in case of fire in ships.
The second patent followed a year later, and reads as follows:
AD. 1866, November 3rd; No. 2862 GISBORNE, John Sacheverell.

An improved automatic means and apparatus to give warning of the dangerous existence of fire
in warehouses, ships and other structures and places.
The apparatus consists of two metallic wires which are good conductors of electricity placed
close to each other. In this position they are electrically insulated by or with gutta percha or
other insulating material liquefied at lower temperatures, but one or both of the wires are
connected to a galvanic battery.
When only one is connected the electric circuit is not made, and no current reaches the signal
end. As soon, however, as the insulating material softens or melts with the heat of the fire, the
wires will touch one another, and thereby allow a current to pass and operate the signalling
apparatus.
When both ends of the wire are connected to the battery, then a current passes constantly
through to the signal end. In the event, however, of wires touching each other, then the circuit
will be softened and so cease to reach the signal end, at which time a warning will be given.
Gisborne's alarm is interesting in that he offered both a closed and an open-circuit system. This is
the forerunner of the modern line detection system described later.
It was not until the beginning of the twentieth century that automatic fire-alarm systems began to
be fitted in ships-and then only in those belonging to the most fire-minded Companies.

In 1863, William Miller patented an idea for the first smoke detection system. It was very
simple, consisting merely of open-ended pipes running from the lower part of the hull, and
terminating at the upper deck. Fire in a compartment was detected when smoke issued from the
pipes.
Some 70 years ago, the Walter Kidde Company began manufacturing a marine smoke detector
which works in conjunction with their CO2 flooding system. Basically, the system worked on
Miller's principle; but the addition of a positive suction in the piping made it a much more efficient
alarm.
These types of systems are still commonplace on cargo vessels, where pipes are lead to a glass
fronted cabinet containing a smoke detector. On alarm a visual inspection of the cabinet can confirm
from which pipe smoke is issuing and thereby the source of the fire.
Regulation 13 Fixed fire detection and fire alarm systems

1 General requirements
1.1 Any required fixed fire detection and fire alarm system with manually operated call points shall be
capable of immediate operation at all times.
1.2 Power supplies and electric circuits necessary for the operation of the system shall be monitored
for loss of power or fault conditions as appropriate. Occurrence of a fault condition shall initiate a
visual and audible fault signal at the control panel which shall be distinct from a fire signal.
1.3 There shall be not less than two sources of power supply for the electrical equipment used in the
operation of the fire detection and fire alarm system, one of which shall be an emergency source.
The supply shall be provided by separate feeders reserved solely for that purpose. Such feeders
shall run to an automatic change-over switch situated in or adjacent to the control panel for the fire
detection system.
1.4 Detectors and manually operated call points shall be grouped into sections. The activation of any
detector or manually operated call point shall initiate a visual and audible fire signal at the control
panel and indicating units. If the signals have not received attention within 2 min an audible alarm
shall be automatically sounded throughout the crew accommodation and service spaces, control
stations and machinery spaces of category A. This alarm sounder system need not be an integral
part of the detection system.
1.5 The control panel shall be located on the navigating bridge or in the main fire control station.
1.6 Indicating units shall, as a minimum, denote the section in which a detector or manually operated
call point has operated. At least one unit shall be so located that it is easily accessible to
responsible members of the crew at all times, when at sea or in port, except when the ship in out of
service. One indicating unit shall be located on the navigating bridge if the control panel is located
in the main fire control station.
1.7 Clear information shall be displayed on or adjacent to each indicating unit about the spaces
covered and the location of the sections.
1.8 Where the fire detection system does not include means of remotely identifying each detector
individually, no section covering more than one deck within accommodation, service and control
stations shall normally be permitted except a section which covers an enclosed stairway. In order to
avoid delay in identifying the source of fire, the number of enclosed spaces included in each
section shall be limited as determined by the Administration. In no case shall more than fifty
enclosed spaces by permitted in any section. If the detection system is fitted with remotely and
individually identifiable fire detectors, the sections may cover several decks and serve any number
of enclosed spaces.
1.9 In passenger ships, if there is no fire detection system capable of remotely and individually
identifying each detector, a section of detectors shall not serve spaces on both sides of the ship
nor on more than one deck and neither shall it be situated in more than one main vertical zone
except that the Administration, if it is satisfied that the protection of the ship against fire will not
thereby be reduced, may permit such a section of detectors to serve both sides of the ship and
more than one deck. In passenger ships fitted with individually identifiable fire detectors, a section
may serve spaces on both sides of the ship and on several decks but may not be situated in more
than one main vertical zone.
1.10 A section of fire detectors which covers a control station, a service space or an accommodation
space shall not include a machinery space of category A.
1.11 Detectors shall be operated by heat, smoke or other products of combustion, flame, or any
combination of these factors. Detectors operated by other factors indicative of incipient fires may

be considered by the Administration provided that they are no less sensitive than such detectors.
Flame detectors shall only be used in addition to smoke or heat detectors.
1.12 Suitable instructions and component spares for testing and maintenance shall be provided.
1.13 The function of the detection system shall be periodically tested to the satisfaction of the
Administration by means of equipment producing hot air at the appropriate temperature, or smoke
or aerosol particles having the appropriate range of density or particle size, or other phenomena
associated with incipient fires to which the detector is designed to respond. All detectors shall be
of a type such that they can be tested for correct operation and restored to normal surveillance
without the renewal of any component.
1.14 The fire detection system shall not be used for any other purpose, except that closing of fire doors
and similar functions may be permitted at the control panel.
1.15 Fire detection systems with a zone address identification capability fitted on or after 1 October 1994
shall be so arranged that:
.1 a loop cannot be damaged at more than one point by a fire;
.2 means are provided to ensure that any fault (e.g. power break; short circuit;
earth) occurring in the loop will not render the whole loop ineffective;
.3 all arrangements are made to enable the initial configuration of the system to be
restored in the event of failure (electrical, electronic, informatic);
.4 the first indicated fire alarm will not prevent any other detector to initiate further
fire alarms.
2 Installation requirements
2.1 Manually operated call points shall be installed throughout the accommodation spaces, service
spaces and control stations. One manually operated call point shall be located at each exit.
Manually operated call points shall be readily accessible in the corridors of each deck such that no
part of the corridor is more than 20 m from a manually operated call point.
2.2 Smoke detectors shall be installed in all stairways, corridors and escape routes within
accommodation spaces. Consideration shall be given to the installation of special purpose smoke
detectors within ventilation ducting.
2.3 Where a fixed fire detection and fire alarm system is required for the protection of spaces other
than those specified in paragraph 2.2, at least one detector complying with paragraph 1.11 shall be
installed in each such space.
2.4 Detectors shall be located for optimum performance. Positions near beams and ventilation ducts or
other positions where patterns of air flow could adversely affect performance and positions where
impact or physical damage is likely shall be avoided. In general, detectors which are located on the
overhead shall be a minimum distance of 0.5 m away from bulkheads.
2.5 The maximum spacing of detectors shall be in accordance with the table below:
Type of detector Maximum floor area Maximum distance Maximum distance

per detector part between centres away from bulkheads
Heat 37 m2 9m 4.5 m
2
Smoke 74 m 11m 5.5 m
The Administration may require or permit other spacings based upon test data which demonstrate
the characteristics of the detectors.
2.6 Electrical wiring which forms part of the system shall be so arranged as to avoid galleys, machinery
spaces of category A, and other enclosed spaces of high fire risk except where it is necessary to
provide for fire detection or fire alarm in such spaces or to connect to the appropriate power
supply.
3 Design requirements
3.1 The system and equipment shall be suitably designed to withstand supply voltage variation and
transients, ambient temperature changes, vibration, humidity, shock, impact and corrosion
normally encountered in ships.
3.2 Smoke detectors required by paragraph 2.2 shall be certified to operate before the smoke density
exceeds 12.5% obscuration per metre, but not until the smoke density exceeds 2% obscuration per
metre. Smoke detectors to be installed in other spaces shall operate within sensitivity limits to the

satisfaction of the Administration having regard to the avoidance of detector insensitivity or

oversensitivity.
3.3 Heat detectors shall be certified to operate before the temperature exceeds 78°C but not until the
temperature exceeds 54°C, when the temperature is raised to those limits at a rate less than 1°C per
minute. At higher rates of temperature rise, the heat detector shall operate within temperature limits
to the satisfaction of the Administration having regard to the avoidance of detector insensitivity or
oversensitivity.
3.4 At the discretion of the Administration, the permissible temperature of operation of heat detectors
may be increased to 30°C above the maximum deckhead temperature in drying rooms and similar
spaces of a normal high ambient temperature.
Comment
The most efficient patrol system imaginable could not hope to discover every fire on board ship
the instant it breaks out — and the speed at which fire can spread through combustible materials,
given favourable circumstances, is quite extraordinary. The attraction to ship owners of a system
which can offer efficient and automatic fire-watching protection to any part of the ship in which it is
installed would seem to be so great as to be scarcely worth mentioning.
Alarm systems which automatically give warning of the outbreak or potential for fire and
explosion have indeed been in existence for a number of years.
It must surely be beyond doubt that, even since the last edition of FIRE ABOARD was published
in 1979, there has been a marked improvement in the level of standards for fire alarm systems as
required by SOLAS Regulations. There are so many desperately vulnerable and inaccessible places
on board ship in which fire can start and develop unseen that shipowners should consider installing
such equipment, even where the type and size of vessel does not fall within the mandatory
requirement to provide a fire alarm system Certain it is that many of the past major ship fire
disasters, especially those involving passenger vessels, would beyond question have been avoided
had such equipment been installed.
Even at the risk of tiresome repetition, it must be said once again that, next only to its prevention,
the early detection and extinction of fire is, in the truest sense of a grossly-abused word, VITAL. A
fire which an untrained man can put out with a hand-extinguisher, given time to spread, will tax the
resources of an entire modern Fire Brigade.
Fire and gas detection systems fall into four main categories:
(i) Gas Detection (flammable and toxic)
(ii) Flame Detection
(iii) Smoke Detection
(iv) Heat Detection.
On board ship and on offshore structures it is quite common to find all four types installed,
especially on the latter and on tankers and chemical carriers. Each system actuates audible as well
as visual signals. Detectors can be linked to automatically operate fire-extinguishing and
suppression systems initiate emergency shutdown systems (ESD) and isolate potential ignition
sources such as welding outlets, the latter being of vital importance in the case of leakage of
flammable and explosive gas mixtures.
The main body for approvals for maritime and offshore applications for fire detection and alarm
systems within the UK is Lloyd's Register. They assess a system on the basis of three criteria as
follows:-
1. Type approval. This includes testing against agreed marine standards. These standards
include tests not normally contained within the land based application standards such as
special vibration tests, salt mist tests, etc.
2. Software validation. This covers the quality control procedures for the preparation and
application of the system software.
3. System configuration. This assesses the arrangement of the system for specific applications.
One of the conventions in fire detection system configurations was to require that system
communications were duplicated. This is now considered unnecessary and current guidance

is given in document United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association: Guidance for

instrumentation based detection systems which allows single communication links.
Lloyd's Register does not support the use of fuzzy logic processors on the grounds that the
technology is not checkable or repeatable.
Gas Detection
Flammable gas detectors should be certified
to comply with the SOLAS requirements for
flameproof equipment including all glanding,
cables and connections. Flammable gas detectors
should be located in areas where it has been
determined that flammable gases are normally
present, or could be present, as a result of
equipment failure. Flammable gas detectors
should also be sited on the intakes to safe areas
such as accommodation areas and on the inlets to FIGURE 8.51 A Chubb fire 100 series
internal combustion engines to shutdown the Flammable Gas Sensor.
engine in the event of detection of gas and to
prevent overspeed. Vessels operating in the vicinity of offshore platforms should be provided with
flammable gas detection at each ventilation intake. The majority of flammable gas sensors operate
using the "Wheatstone Bridge" principle. Within the housing are two sets of finely wound filaments
known as pellistors which are impregnated with chemicals of differing electrocatalytic properties.
One of the pellistors is rendered insensitive to flammable gas by encapsulation in glass or resin but
balances out the small resistance change due to fluctuations in ambient temperature. The pellistors
form two arms of a "Wheatstone Bridge" circuit and the operating current supplies the heat to bring
the electrocatalysts to their correct operating temperature. In the presence of flammable gas, a
catalytic reaction takes place on the surface of the exposed pellistor raising its temperature and
hence its electrical resistance. This unbalances the bridge and the out-of-balance voltage produced
is proportional to the amount of gas present. The signal thus derived is amplified and displayed as a
percentage of the Lower Explosive limit (LEL). Most sensors can detect a wide range of flammable
gases and vapours in the range 0 - 100% LEL. Detectors using electrocatalytic pellistors can be
susceptible to poisoning by chemicals. Silicon based materials in particular can render the sensor
inoperative. Advances in gas detection technologies in recent years include semiconductors such as
the Taguchi type, tin oxide semiconductor sensor, infrared and laser techniques.
The control equipment is normally set to operate output relays at two points:
(a) At 25% of the lower explosive limit (Low level alarm) and
(b) At 75% of the lower explosive limit (High level alarm).
Gas detection systems that initiate the release of suppression systems or an ESD normally
incorporate coincident functions, i.e. a response is required from more than one detector before an
action is initiated. Detectors may be operated singly or in groups of two or three. Group functions
are typically as follows:
Group 1 One detector giving alarm only at low level, initiation of an ESD and isolation of
ignition sources at high gas level.
Group 2 Two detectors coincidence interlocked; Alarm and isolation of ignition sources at low
gas level on either detector. Initiation of an ESD at high gas level on either one.
Alarm ESD and isolation of ignition sources when both attain low or high gas level.
Group 3 Three detectors coincidence interlocked. Alarm and isolation of ignition sources at
low gas level on one, two, or all three detectors. ESD and isolation of ignition sources
at high gas level on any one detector. Alarm, ESD and isolation of ignition sources
when any two detectors attain low or high gas level.

Toxic Gas Detection

Fire and gas systems on offshore structures, vessels operating in the vicinity of offshore
structures and some oil and chemical carriers are fitted with Hydrogen sulphide sensors as part of
the fire and gas system. Hydrogen sulphide is both highly toxic and is flammable. Sensors are
generally located at low level as the gas is heavier than air and tends to accumulate in these areas.
Hydrogen sulphide sensors generally use a semiconducting sensing element and are constructed in a
similar manner to flammable gas sensors.
Regular exposure of the sensing element to a test gas mixture containing hydrogen sulphide is
often required to maintain the detectors sensitivity.
Flame Detection
There are two main components of the electromagnetic spectrum
that are normally used for flame detection — these being Infrared
(IR) and Ultraviolet (UV).
UV detectors use a Geiger-Muller type tube and a tungsten
cathode, and will detect ultraviolet radiation in wavelengths from
1850 to 2450 Angstrom units. It is therefore outside the radiation
range of sunlight and artificial light. Unfortunately only a small
fraction of the radiation emitted by flames is outside this bandwidth
and therefore the detector requires to be extremely sensitive. To
offset this sensitivity many detectors incorporate electronic
counters. UV detectors have however been notoriously prone to
false and unwanted alarms and therefore a move has been made in
recent years to the use of IR or combined UV/IR for flame
detection. The cleanliness of the UV detector lens is also critical as
a thin film of oil will adversely affect the detectors ability to receive
UV radiation. Some manufacturers equipment allows for
components of the detector's electronic equipment and also the
cleanliness of the viewing lens to be checked from the Control
Panel UV detector enclosures should conform to Class I, Groups FIGURE 8.52 Wormald Miniature
A, B, C, D and Class II, Groups E, F and G, UL 698 Standards of Ultra Violet Flame detector Type
C7050B
Safety for Hazardous Installations.
Infrared detectors respond to the electromagnetic radiation
resulting from the formation of carbon dioxide during the
combustion of hydrocarbon and other carbon bearing materials.
For this reason normal IR detectors and also for that matter UV
flame detectors cannot detect the invisible flames of such gases as
Hydrogen. Recent advances in flame imaging detectors developed
for the space shuttle hydrogen flare are available as both portable
and fixed installations for hydrogen flame detection.
Infrared detectors can be designed to respond to flicker
frequencies between 1 and 10 hertz and also to respond to
specific frequencies of IR. Solar blind detectors are now common
that are immune to both solar IR and are immune to false alarms
from welding. IR detectors are much less susceptible than UV to
lens contamination by oil and dirt. Where IR detectors are used in
areas where hydrocarbon gases could be found they should have
an intrinsically safe certificate. Advances in infrared flame
detection have been made in the area of flame imaging which
offer significant advantages over traditional IR detection and
FIGURE 8.53 Thorn Infrared elimination of false or unwanted alarms.
Flame detector Type S112

Ionisation Smoke Detectors

In the 1950's there was a THE IONISATION CHAMBER
promising new development in The principle of the ionisation
chamber is illustrated opposite.
smoke detectors based on nuclear The passage of alpha particles
physics and these devices have through the air results in the
formation of positively and
proved to be especially valuable negatively charged ions from the
on board ship. Known firstly as molecules of air in the chamber.
Under the influence of the voltage
radioactive detectors and invented applied to the plates P1 and P2,
by Swiss scientists (although these ions move - giving rise to a
minute electric current which can
British physicists also made be detected and measured on a
substantial contributions towards sufficiently sensitive instrument,
its development into an approved G.
smoke detector), the apparatus

was first produced in Britain by ALPHA PARTICLES IN
ACTION
the Minerva Detector Company The manner in which the passage
Ltd. of alpha particles through air
gives rise to ionisation is
The 'point type' ionisation illustrated opposite based on
smoke detector works on the cloud chamber photographs of
principle of using an ionisation alpha particle tracks. Every alpha
particle dislodges electrons from
chamber in which the air is the air molecules in its path,
rendered conductive by the alpha leaving a trail of positive and
negative ions. Over 100 billion
particles emitted from a small alpha particles stream out from 1
quantity of the element gram of radium each second.
They move with a speed about
Americium, or less commonly 1/15th that of light and have a
Radium. The ionisation splits the range in air of some 2½ in.
molecules in the air into either
positively or negatively charged THE CURRENT THROUGH
ions. When a potential is applied THE IONISATION CHAMBER
2
On their passage to plate P of
to the electrodes in the sensing the ionisation chamber, some of
chamber, positive ions are the positive ions may meet and
neutralise negative ions moving
attracted to the negative electrode 1
towards the other plate P . The
and negative ions to the positive extent to which this happens
depends on the voltage applied
electrode. This movement of ions between the plates. Above a
creates an electric current which certain voltage, however,
can be measured and is amplified substantially all the negative ions
1
reach P and all positive ions
by solid state circuitry. Ionisation 2
reach P . Thereafter the current
detectors have traditionally been through the chamber remains
constant. The curve shows the
considered to be the most relationship between ionisation
appropriate type of detector for current and applied voltage.
the detection of invisible smoke
FIGURE 8.54 shows the operating principles that
particles from fires involving
flaming combustion at an early
stage of fire development. Environmental considerations and significant advances in other forms of
detection are however, leading to a gradual phasing out of this type of detector.
The ionisation smoke detector is, at present, the most common type found in the home.
Unfortunately this detector is somewhat subject, if inappropriately located, or set at too fine
sensitivity, to giving false alarms. Battery operated detectors are nullified if householders remove
the battery. The reason often given by survivors of a subsequent tragedy is, that even the fumes from
lightly burned toast was sufficient to set off the alarm. They say that this condition became so awful,
that in desperation, the detector battery was removed.

Legislation in the UK requires permanently wired smoke detectors to be fitted in the hallway at
each storey of new housing to avoid the problem of battery removal! As the unit cost of the optical
detector has decreased, they are increasing fitted as standard in place of the ionisation type.
Whatever the case, for home; office; factory; or ship; and for every available type of detector,
designers must always be deeply conscious about the risk of providing a piece of equipment which
is too sensitive in low risk situations which results in too many false alarms. There must be an
optimum level of sensitivity for all situations, even in the highest risk category, and for each
individual case this should not be exceeded. Some modern addressable systems are self learning
and by monitoring background signal levels, they automatically set the alarm threshold thus
minimising the frequency of false alarms.
Optical Smoke Detectors

There are three main types of optical point
type detectors. Those that measure light scatter,
those that measure obscuration, and those that
use a laser to detect smoke particles. Advances in
optical detector technology has significantly
improved the response of these detectors to both
smouldering and flaming combustion and they
must now be considered in preference to
ionisation detectors. The method of operation of
a typical conventional obscuration detector uses
light produced by an LED within the sensing
chamber. The light is directed onto a receiver on
the opposite side of the chamber. Smoke particles
entering the chamber obscure the beam of light
and when the level at the receiver drops to a
predetermined level an alarm is raised. In a light
FIGURE 8.55 Apollo obscuration smoke detector.
scatter detector the emitter and receiver are
separated by a small barrier and therefore the
receiver does not see the emitted light. When
smoke particles enter the chamber, light is
reflected from the particles onto the receiver.
When a sufficient level of light is received an
alarm is raised. Smoke detectors should be used
for general coverage but are susceptible to
actuation by wind or dust. Consideration must be
given to the location of detectors therefore to
spurious operation. The effect of ventilation
airflows from ventilation outlets must also be
considered and possible stratification. This can
occur when the temperature in the upper part of
a compartment is higher than that at lower levels.
FIGURE 8.56 Diagram of the Notifier The smoke cools at it rises and in areas of low air
movement can form a layer that is unable to
reach the detector.
A recent development by a company, Notifier, is the use of laser technology in place of the light
beam. The laser detector incorporates an extremely bright laser diode and integral lens that focuses
the light beam to a very small point near the receiving photo sensor. Particles entering this narrow
beam then activate the photo sensor. This type of detector is up to 50 times more sensitive than a
conventional optical detector. Sensitivity can be adjusted to suit the expected conditions. Detectors
have also been developed incorporating both optical and heat sensing elements which provide

significant immunity to false alarms and

discrimination between smoke from fires and non
fire sources of false alarms such as steam and
cigarette smoke. Cerberus has developed a
multi-sensor detector, known as the PolyRex
Detector, within their AlgoRex system range. The
PolyRex is a combined optical smoke and an
additional heat sensor that actively increases the
sensitivity wavelength band of the optical detector
if heat is detected.
FIGURE 8.57 The Stratos High Sensitivity Smoke
Detection Laser Forward Scattering and Simultaneous
High Sensitivity Smoke Detection (HSSD)
Sampling system used by the ICAM Fire Tracer HSSD The basis of this type of sampling system is a
system shown below. detector unit incorporating a high intensity light
source or laser. The detector chamber can be
located at a convenient location remote from the
protected area. A fan is incorporated in the unit
and draws a sample of air from the protected
space into the detector unit through pipework.
Systems can be configured to consecutively
sample from areas such as holds or electrical
cabinets. Originally these systems were designed
for very high sensitivity detection and gained a
reputation as being susceptible to false or
unwanted alarms. Advances in the design of these
systems, attention to methods of installation and
the environment in which the system is to be
installed has now lead to these types of systems
being used for an ever increasing range of
applications. Some particular marine uses include
FIGURE 8.58 The ICAM Fire Tracer system
sampling from holds and areas where normal
point type detectors would be inaccessible. The
location of the detector unit remote from the
protected space minimises work associated with
maintenance and testing, one HSSD unit being
capable of replacing a large number of point type
detectors.
Heat Detection
Point type heat detectors operate by two main
methods, these being the use of differing
coefficients of expansion of metals and
expansion of air. These detectors can, if required,
be intrinsically safe for use in hazardous
locations conforming to Class I, Groups A, B, C
and D, and Class II; Groups E, F and G: by using
Zener barriers to limit the current to the detector
installed in a 'safe' area. There are two main types
of heat detector these being rate of rise and fixed
temperature. The simplest form of fixed
temperature detector is that described earlier
FIGURE 8.59 Cartridge type heat detector

where the operation of the detector depends on the melting of solder holding a set of contacts
together.
An extremely robust design is the cartridge type heat detector which operates by expansion. The
stainless steel barrel of the detector has a high coefficient of expansion. A sprung metal bow inside
the barrel is fitted with electrical contacts and has a lower coefficient. A rise in temperature,
causes the barrel to expand and allows normally open contacts to close thus initiating the alarm at a
preset point. The temperature at which this occurs is normally set at 140 oF. but a rapid rise in
temperature will, by virtue of the differing coefficients of expansion of its components, cause the
detector to operate earlier.
Duct Detectors
Ventilation ductwork on board ships is a route for the spread of smoke and heat around the ship.
To compensate, ductwork can be provided with fire protective cladding and fire dampers fitted at
bulkheads and compartment boundaries as discussed in Chapter 9. The operation of these dampers
can be achieved either by a fusible link which releases the damper at a predetermined temperature,
or by an actuator, normally pneumatic, which closes the damper following a signal from the
detection system. Fires in fans and filters can however remain undetected by the compartment
detection system as can smoke entering extract ducts from compartments under certain conditions.
It is good practice therefore to consider the fitting of detectors in the ductwork. These detectors can
be located on the outside of the duct with pipework arranged drawing from and returning to the
duct. The pressure differential thus created allows the air form the duct to pass into a small sampling
chamber and then back into the duct. Alternatively recent developments in enhanced sensitivity
point type smoke detectors allow certain types to be fitted directly in the duct. The “3D” detector
manufactured by The ADT Company combines a photoelectric smoke sensor with a fixed
temperature type heat sensor. As well as use as an open area “point” detector, it is claimed that the
detector can also be used for direct insertion into ducts up to 3 feet wide by 3 feet high and at up to
air speeds of 5000 feet/minute (1500 m/min). In such circumstances the detector can be fitted
without requiring special housings or supply tubes.
Linear Heat Detection Cable

There are a number of line type methods for heat detection currently available. These include
pressurised tubing which when reaching a certain temperature ruptures; electrical cables that
incorporate dielectric materials where conductivity changes as a function of temperature;
thermocouple cables where contact is made simply by the meeting of conductors; and fibre optic
cables which can measure temperatures at individual locations along the cable.
The main element of the fibre optic linear detection cable manufactured by Cerberus, consists of
a fibre optic cable that is tightly connected by an “aramid” fibre to a parallel running, wax filled
plastic tube. A plastic jacket protects the cable and tube against mechanical damage. A combination
power supply and signal evaluation unit transmits a laser pulse through the fibre optic cable at
regular intervals. Each pulse produces reflection signals which have a characteristic pattern at
normal room temperature. If the temperature within the cable exceeds a preset threshold in the
range 40 to 90 0C, the wax expands thereby deforming the fibre optic cable. This in turn changes the
reflection signals and the evaluation unit generates an alarm.
Some of the line detectors, such as the Graviner ‘Firewire’, are of robust construction using a
thin stainless steel tube containing an axial wire. The gap between the wire and the tube is filled
with a semiconducting material. The system was originally developed for aircraft engine
applications and is therefore suitable for applications such as detection for gas turbines and in
corrosive atmospheres. The system is installed as a loop to the control unit and will still function if
cut. A further type of linear heat detection is by the use of pressurised tubing. In the event of fire the
tubing melts and release a gas. The system can either contain nitrogen supplied from a small
cartridge or is connected to a supply of extinguishing agent.

In the former case, rupture of the tube by heat,

releases the pressure which in turn initiates
actions such as alarm, emergency shutdown, or
release of extinguishant. In the latter case,
extinguishant is released directly at the point of
rupture which is where one expects the fire to be.
This type of pressurised cable has the advantage
that it does not require electricity to be routed
through the protected area, thus of itself creating
a potential ignition source. In addition the tubing
is simple, robust, resistant to corrosion and
FIGURE 8.60 Cerberus Fibre Optic virtually maintenance free.
Linear Heat Detection Cable. Linear heat detection cable is most suited to
the detection of fire on cable trays and for use in
some of the more hostile environments where smoke detection would be inappropriate. It should be
remembered however that as with all heat detectors, that if they are not exposed directly to a heat
source, the response is likely to be slower than smoke detection.
Cameras and Video Imaging

One of the interesting new developments in detection technology is the use of monitoring of
either infrared or existing close circuit television video images and by a system of pixel analysis and
comparison changes in visual images can be recognised. It is particularly suited to the monitoring
of unmanned machinery spaces. Initial tests indicate this form of detection is more sensitive than
the human eye or the best optical detectors because it does not rely upon the transport and
accumulation of combustion products to the detecting head. Tests have yet to prove the technology
in different environments, background lighting and effect of wind.
Carbon Monoxide Detectors.

Carbon monoxide is produced by the majority of fires and is also an initial product of surface
oxidation. Carbon monoxide fire detectors are however a developing technology although carbon
monoxide “gas leakage” detectors have been available for many years. Some manufacturers are
however actively engaged in the development of this type of fire detection which should become
available within the next few years. It is unlikely however that this technology would be used alone
but would form part of a multisensor detector. It is understood that the Thorn Company have been
developing this technology for use as a fire detector for 10 to 12 years. Thorn are developing an
electrochemical cell carbon monoxide detector which will include processing circuitry for analogue
addressable configurations. The main benefit of carbon monoxide detection is that fires can be
detected in the very early stage and theoretically significantly earlier than by the detection of smoke
particles alone.
The main application for carbon monoxide detection is for risks where the fire product is likely
to include high levels of the gas. It is not considered suitable for electrical and electronic cabinets
as slow developing fires from smouldering PVC produce little carbon monoxide.
Readers may be interested to know that fire experts use carbon monoxide detectors as part of
their standard kit to determine whether or not a fire is still active, or that the gas is present in
harmful concentration in a ship’s hold or engine room.
Fire Detection and Alarm Control Equipment

The collecting and processing of information received from the fire and gas detectors is carried
out at a centralised fire detection control panel on more the complex vessels such as chemical
carriers, tankers and passenger liners; as well, of course, on offshore installations.

This control equipment is normally sited in a ‘safe’ area i.e. an area where appropriate provisions
have been made to prevent the ingress of flammable or explosive gases and vapours.
The fire panel is the heart of the fire detection system and not only receives signals from and
monitors the condition of the detectors but initiates actions such as operating audible and visual
alarms, initiating the shutdown of ESD systems, closing fire dampers, starting fire pumps etc.
The simplest form of fire detection and control panels commonly available for marine use are
termed “conventional panels”. The panel monitors the detectors for open and closed circuits and
simply initiates actions through the use of 24 volt direct current, or volt free relay contacts. In
recent years however, major technological changes have occurred with the development of
microprocessors and software based detection systems.
The first generation of these microprocessor controlled systems was the “analogue addressable”
system which provided a number of advantages over the simple alarm/fault only capability of the
conventional type systems.
The analogue addressable system uses detectors that provide an analogue output and can
therefore provide information to the control panel relating to the condition of the detector such as
increasing smoke level, or the detector becoming contaminated with dust and dirt. Detectors and
alarm sounders are arranged as a loop and can be interrogated by the control system in both
directions thus allowing cabling faults or device faults to be located rapidly.
Addressable devices can also be added to the loop for the closure of fire dampers or initiation of
fire-fighting systems.
FIGURE 8.61 Autronica system range for ship safety management

and condition monitoring equipment.

Computer instructions, known as ‘software algorithms’, can be developed to allow fires to be

recognised and non-fire sources of spurious alarms to be rejected. The software of such a system
allows corrections to be made for background noise, ambient conditions, or changes in detector
sensitivity. However, even this level of intelligence is not capable of discriminating between such
products as cooking odours, cigarette smoke, or aerosol sprays. To allow more accurate
discrimination, further information for analysis can be provided by the use of additional or multiple
sensors, such as smoke detectors, together with heat detectors or carbon monoxide detectors. These
processing algorithms are currently an area of considerable research and development in an attempt
to develop systems which are inherently immune from false alarms and discriminate between types
of fires. Multivariate analysis is one method currently being developed that uses statistical methods
to analyse fire and non-fire signatures in real time.
This approach has been used successfully for many years in process plants where the amount of
information available would overwhelm an operator if received in an unprocessed state. Artificial
neural networks are being developed for fire detection and process information in a similar manner
to the biological nervous system. Neural networks incorporate many highly miniaturised
microprocessors that are interconnected and can learn by altering the connections between each
microprocessor in a similar manner to the synaptic connections between neurones in the human
nervous system. In this way the detection system can learn to recognise a large range of conditions
and process information from multiple sensors. The Cerburus Algorex detection system claims to
make use of this technology together with fuzzy logic, the processing algorithm being based on
probabilistic techniques.
Not only have there been and will be in the future, significant advances in the means of detection
and rejection of false alarms, significant advances have also been made in recent years in the areas
of control by computers. Fire and gas systems on offshore structures have, for some years, been
combined with the plant information and control system such that in the event of an alarm, fire
detection information is displayed graphically on the same computer screens as process information.
The P&O cruise ship Oriana was the first ship to install Thorn Security's "Saturn Safety
Management System". This is a real time multitasking computer which can monitor and control
various safety sub systems, including fire doors, sprinklers, low level escape lighting, and fire patrol
from remote terminals. The company claim that this system can be connected to up to 20 “Minerva
Marine Controllers” on a local network (LAN) employing up to 19,800 devices, including smoke
and heat detectors, call points, fire door monitoring, fire patrol points, and alarm sounders. The
Oriana has been fitted with eight "Minerva Marine Controllers" and four remote terminals which
enable simultaneous monitoring from remote points of no less than approximately 6,000 devices.
Sounders and Visual Alarms

A selection of visual and audible warning devices are shown in figures 8.62 and 8.63.
FIGURE 8.62 A selection of Wormald Visual Indicators. FIGURE 8.63 Clifford & Snell
“Yodalarm” sounders

Regulation 13-1 Sample extraction smoke detection systems

(This regulation applies to ships constructed on or after 1 February 1992)
1 General requirements
1.1 Wherever in the text of this regulation the word system appears, it shall mean sample extraction
smoke detection system.
1.2 Any required system shall be capable of continuous operation at all times except that systems
operating on a sequential scanning principle may be accepted, provided that the interval between
scanning the same position twice gives an overall response time to the satisfaction of the
Administration.
1.3 Power supplies necessary for the operation of the system shall be monitored for loss of power. Any
loss of power shall initiate a visual and audible signal at the control panel and the navigating bridge
which shall be distinct from a signal indicating smoke detection.
1.4 An alternative power supply for the electrical equipment used in the operation of the system shall
be provided.
1.5 The control panel shall be located on the navigating bridge or in the main fire control station.
1.6 The detection of smoke or other products of combustion shall initiate a visual and audible signal at
the control panel and the navigating bridge.
1.7 Clear information shall be displayed on or adjacent to the control panel designating the spaces
covered.
1.8 The sampling pipe arrangements shall be such that the location of the fire can be readily identified.
1.9 Suitable instructions and component spares shall be provided for the testing and maintenance of
the system.
1.10 The functioning of the system shall be periodically tested to the satisfaction of the Administration.
The system shall be of a type that can be tested for correct operation and restored to normal
surveillance without the renewal of any component.
1.11 The system shall be designed, constructed and installed so as to prevent the leakage of any toxic or
flammable substances or fire-extinguishing media into any accommodation and service space,
control station or machinery space.
2 Installation requirements
2.1 At least one smoke accumulator shall be located in every enclosed space for which smoke
detection is required. However, where a space is designed to carry oil or refrigerated cargo
alternatively with cargoes for which a smoke sampling system is required, means may be provided
to isolate the smoke accumulators in such compartments for the system. Such means shall be to
the satisfaction of the Administration.
2.2 Smoke accumulators shall be located for optimum performance and shall be spaced so that no part
of the overhead deck area is more than 12 m measured horizontally from an accumulator. Where
systems are used in spaces which may be mechanically ventilated, the position of the smoke
accumulators shall be considered having regard to the effects of ventilation.
2.3 Smoke accumulators shall be positioned where impact or physical damage is unlikely to occur.
2.4 Not more than four accumulators shall be connected to each sampling point.
2.5 Smoke accumulators from more than one enclosed space shall not be connected to the same
sampling point.
2.6 Sampling pipes shall be self-draining and suitably protected from impact or damage from cargo
working.
3 Design requirements
3.1 The system and equipment shall be suitably designed to withstand supply voltage variations and
transients, ambient temperature changes, vibration, humidity, shock, impact and corrosion
normally encountered in ships and to avoid the possibility of ignition of flammable gas air mixture.
3.2 The sensing unit shall be certified to operate before the smoke density within the sensing chamber
exceeds 6.65% obscuration per metre.

3.3 Duplicate sample extraction fans shall be provided. The fans shall be of sufficient capacity to
operate with the normal conditions or ventilation in the protected area and shall give an overall
response time to the satisfaction of the Administration.
3.4 The control panel shall permit observation of smoke in the individual sampling pipe.
3.5 Means shall be provided to monitor the airflow through the sampling pipes so designed as to
ensure that as far as practicable equal quantities are extracted from each interconnected
accumulator.
3.6 Sampling pipes shall be a minimum of 12 mm internal diameter except when used in conjunction
with fixed gas fire-extinguishing systems when the minimum size of pipe should be sufficient to
permit the fire-extinguishing gas to be discharged within the appropriate time.
3.7 Sampling pipes shall be provided with an arrangement for periodically purging with compressed
air.
Comment
To install a total flooding system for hold protection without incorporating a fire-detecting
device is like producing a motor car without an engine. To install a fire detection system which
does not incorporate an audible signal is like producing the same car without a horn! Yet it was not
until 1 February 1992 - SOLAS Regulation 13-1 - that new ships were required to fit a smoke
detection and an audible alarm to the CO2 systems required to be provided for cargo hold
protection. Prior to this date, a large number of CO2 systems were installed on cargo ships which
relied entirely upon a visual sighting in order to raise the alarm of fire! Many of these vessels are
still sailing today!
Under Regulation 13-1 1.6 there is requirement that the detection of smoke shall initiate a visual
and audible signal at the control panel and the navigating bridge. Whilst this is fine whilst the ship
is at sea, it is another story when she is in port and the bridge is both locked and unmanned. In the
latter circumstances there is real danger that the audible alarm will not be heard and it is quite
certain that the visual signal will be missed. Nor indeed, if an olfactory system is incorporated, will
anyone be able smell the smoke! The author would like to see an inclusion in the Regulation which
requires that an alarm signal be required to sound in the deck and engineers’ quarters and, if this is
not considered to be too onerous, in the Master's office as well!
Many existing smoke sampling systems incorporate an olfactory device but his is not a
requirement of Regulation 13-1. This is a pity because the author is aware of a number of cases
where this device produced the first warning about a fire which was in an early stage of
development, when a pungent smell attracted the attention of people on the bridge. The human nose
is extremely sensitive to changes in smell! Now it might well be that the audible alarm was due to
operate within a very short time of the olfactory warning but any time gained must be considered to
be a bonus. Ideally, all fires should be discovered at their incipient stage!
The smoke detecting systems developed by Messrs. Walter Kidde and by the Chubb Company
are two of the basic types. In the Kidde system, smoke-detecting pipes of threequarters of an inch
diameter are led from every hold to a cabinet on the bridge. This is equipped with an automatic
alarm as well as visual and sense-of-smell detection. Samples of air are continuously drawn from
each hold, and passed through a dark chamber traversed by beams of invisible light which have
nevertheless the ability to illuminate strongly any smoke rising from the holds. Every pipe end is
clearly labelled, so that the hold from which the smoke is being drawn can be quickly and surely
identified.
When the system is coupled to a CO2 flooding installation (as it usually is), the valve to the
cabinet is closed manually, and gas can be directed promptly into the hold on fire. To do this it is
necessary for a man to proceed to the CO2 storage room and operate the appropriate number of
cylinders. With some systems the CO2 can be released directly from the bridge, but more
commonly, the valves to release the CO2 are to be found in the CO2 room where the cylinders are
stored.
The viewing chamber of the Walter Kidde Detector contains flexible pipes connected to the
hot-galvanised, solid drawn steel pipes coming from the holds, and joining them to the visual part of

FIGURE 8.64 Schematic smoke detection and CO2 extinguishing layout of a
Walter Kidde fixed CO2 and alarm system, with single sampling pipe to bridge.
the chamber. These pipes terminate in half-inch diameter glass tubes, which pass through a
brightly-lit lamp box. Their ends protrude into the viewing chamber, where they are shielded by
metal chimneys. Light travels by multiple reflection and refraction along these tubes, irradiating the
region near their ends with a diffuse light. Though invisible, this is capable of illuminating smoke
issuing from any tube. The viewing chamber window is angled from the vertical like a jeweller's
window, so as to prevent disturbing reflections from interfering with the view of the chimneys. By
lifting a flap on the front of the viewing chamber, it is possible to examine the glass tubes a few
inches below the lamp box. In this part of each tube is a moulded nylon propeller-type draught
indicator, whose rotation confirms that the line is not blocked.
The Chubb viewing chamber is similar in principle, save that the draught indicator is in the form
of a celluloid ball, the vibration of which indicates that the tube is free from obstruction and that air
is being sucked through the pipe by the fans. Twin fan motors working alternatively by suction are
installed so as to ensure continuity of service.
The second basic type of smoke-detection system has been developed with the object of
eliminating much of the pipework leading to the bridge. Instead of the multiple-point cabinet,
connected to all holds, being installed on the bridge, it is placed lower down in the ship, generally in
the compartment housing the CO2 controls. A. single pipe is then taken to the bridge, terminating in
a small cabinet. Suction fans and motors are housed, as before, in the bridge. In the event of a fire
in a hold, the smoke warning is seen by the crew on the bridge, who know only that a fire has
broken out but not exactly where. A man is sent swiftly down to the multiple-point indicator, where
the appropriate valves are turned to direct CO2 into the hold in which it is needed.
The Chubb Smoke Detector works through a balanced photoelectric cell circuit, in conjunction
with a beam of light within an instrument case. As long as the air from the tubes is clear, the
balance of the circuit is maintained; but when smoke issues from a single tube, some of it enters the
smoke detector and reflects light from the beam, so upsetting the balance of the cell circuit and
instantly operating the alarm bells. This principle of "reflected light" enables high sensitivity to be
achieved without loss of stability during normal running.
In order to obviate continuous burning of the projection lamp, a form of automatic circuit breaker
is employed, which energises the detector for 10 seconds in every minute. A cancelling switch is
fitted, however, so that the instrument will remain continuously lit when under test. Once the alarm
bells have been activated, they continue to ring whether the detector is energised or not; and a
separate button is fitted whereby the bells may be cancelled after the detector has been reset.
In the Walter Kidde Audible Detector a concentrated filament lamp and lens together form a
parallel beam. After the beam has been reduced to square shape by a mask, it passes through a
slightly larger square of inward-facing, barrier-layer type photocells. These cells are very stable,
requiring no high-tension supply; they are normally illuminated by only a small amount of stray
light, so that the output of the four in parallel is only about 15 micro-amps. This current is balanced
by the output of the end cell, which lies at a small angle to the direction of the beam and which

FIGURE 8.65 Schematic layout of photoelectric audible detector used in the Kidde Marine Smoke Detector.
therefore receives light obliquely. The orientation of this cell is adjustable, so that the circuit may
be balanced initially. The presence of smoke in the detector cuts off light from the end cell, and
reflects some of it on to the cells of the square. The difference in output currents thus caused passes
through a relay, which in turn causes the audible and visual alarms to function.
The circuit is so arranged that if a gradual deterioration of a photocell, or a gradual distortion of
the projector-lamp filament, takes place, a "fault" indication is given, not a false alarm.
Regulation 14 Fixed fire detection and fire alarm systems for periodically unattended
machinery spaces
1 A fixed fire detection and fire alarm system of an approved type in accordance with the relevant
provisions of regulation 13 shall be installed in periodically unattended machinery spaces.
2 This fire detection system shall be so designed and the detectors so positioned as to detect rapidly
the onset of fire in any part of those spaces and under any normal conditions of operation of the
machinery and variations of ventilation as required by the possible range of ambient temperatures.
Except in spaces of restricted height and where their use is specially appropriate, detection
systems using only thermal detectors shall not be permitted. The detection system shall initiate
audible and visual alarms distinct in both respects from the alarms of any other system not
indicating fire, in sufficient places to ensure that the alarms are heard and observed on the
navigating bridge and by a responsible engineer officer. When the navigating bridge is unmanned
the alarm shall sound in a place where a responsible member of the crew is on duty.
3 After installation the system shall be tested under varying conditions of engine operation and
ventilation.
Crankcase Monitoring
SOLAS 1974 as amended in 1982 which entered into force in September 1984 took cognisance
of the risks associated with crankcase explosions particularly in unmanned machinery spaces.
Chapter II-1 Part C Machinery Installations
Except where expressly provided otherwise part C applies to passenger ships and cargo
ships
Regulation 27 Machinery
4 Internal combustion engines of a cylinder diameter of 200 mm or a crankcase volume of 0.6 m3 and
above shall be provided with crankcase explosion relief valves of a suitable type with sufficient
relief area. The relief valves shall be arranged or provide with means to ensure that discharge from
them is so directed as to minimise the possibility of injury to personnel.
Chapter II-1 Part E Additional requirements for periodically unattended machinery spaces
Regulation 47 Fire Precautions

2 Internal combustion engines of 2,250 kW and above or having cylinders of more than 300 mm bore
shall be provided with crankcase oil mist detectors or engine bearing temperature monitors or
equivalent devices.
Comment
Although it is not a common occurrence, crankcase explosions in compression ignition engines
do occur from time to time. When they do, they are often violent; and so form a serious hazard to
members of the engine-room staff. The most serious incident recorded is one in 1947, in which
such an explosion killed 28 people on board a large ship.
In addition to the direct danger to life itself, there is always present the further danger that such
an explosion may cause a serious fire in the engine-room. Such a fire might well be difficult to
fight, on account of the damage which would be caused by a violent explosion. There would almost
surely be casualties to be removed to safety; and it might even happen that the steel access stairways
will have been so distorted as to become impassable.
Within the crankcase of a diesel engine when it is running, there is a fine mist consisting of warm
air and minute droplets of oil, together with some exhaust gases. Normally, this mixture is quite
safe and cannot be ignited by a spark. But when a bearing overheats, a "hot-spot" is produced
which causes any oil in contact with it to vaporise into a white cloud. This vaporised oil mist can
now be readily ignited by a spark or by contact with hot metal surface. Experiments show that
condensed oil mist is generated copiously by the time the surface temperature has reached 350 oC
and that if this temperature be sufficiently increased, explosions will occur at temperatures
sometimes as low as 500 oC.
The Walter Kidde Company have produced a "Crankcase Monitor" which uses CO2 flooding as a
means of preventing crankcase explosions. The makers claim that an experienced engineer can, by
examining crankcase samples, quickly discover any tendency to overheating; and can take remedial
action which not only averts an explosion, but also often saves an extensive future overhaul. A
novel feature of the installation is that 30 per cent by volume of CO2 inhibits all danger of explosion
in the crankcase, yet allows the engine to continue running until it can be safely stopped. This could
be of great importance, for instance, when the vessel was negotiating a narrow waterway.
The Crankcase Monitor described protects two engines simultaneously, by continuously drawing
samples of the contents from both crankcases. It measures the optical density of these samples, and
gives an alarm if this density exceeds a predetermined value.
The Monitor takes the form of a steel-framed cabinet in the upper portion of which is a
resiliently-mounted sub-frame carrying the detector proper. This consists of two sampling tubes
carrying the crankcase samples, and two reference tubes, all closed at both ends by glass discs
which revolve slowly between felt wipers. A single lamp is used in conjunction with lenses and
mirrors to send a beam of light along each tube axially. At the end of each sampling tube is a
photocell whose output is balanced against that of a similar cell at the end of the corresponding
reference tube. It follows that the unbalanced current in each circuit is a measure of the optical
density of the contents of the sampling tube.
Any normal oil rain withdrawn from the
crankcase is precipitated in the sampling
pipes and returns to the crankcase; but
condensed oil mist generated in the event of
overheating will travel along the sampling
pipes to the detector in less than 10 seconds.
In the lower part of the cabinet are
mounted two suction motors, each driving
two fans. One fan draws samples from one
crankcase and the other, entirely separate,
draws samples from the other. Samples are
returned to their respective crankcases. One FIGURE 8.66 Shows the principle of condensed-oil-mist
motor is for use on odd dates and the other

on even. Also in the bottom half of the cabinet are flame and oil
traps, and non-return valves.
Access is provided by means of doors to the double-pole
isolating switch, to the balance and test controls for initial setting
up, and to the projector lamp.
Associated with each crankcase is a visual inspection port at
which the sample can be examined in a light beam; a test outlet; a
meter indicating the optical density of the sample; an amber
warning lamp and two red alarm lamps; a bell and a siren cut-off ;
and a reset push.
On the lower part of the panel is the motor change-over switch,
and a green lamp indicating that the motors and projector lamp are
functioning.
All lamps in the equipment are under-run for longevity; lamps
and relays are resiliently mounted; and the whole design is claimed
to have reliability and long life as its principal aims.
Nevertheless, it will be necessary to renew the projector lamp FIGURE 8.67 The Walter Kidde
Crankcase Monitor.
from time to time, its life depending mainly on the amplitude and
frequency of vibration encountered. Associated with the fault and
warning lamps is a bell, and with the red alarm lamps a siren.
This patented system, which is shown in Figure 8.67 above, prevents any unbalance resulting
from fouling of the glasses, and reduces the effect of fluctuations in the ship's supply voltage.
Since an alarm from the detector would be a matter of great concern, calling for immediate and
drastic action, it is important to avoid any possibility of false alarm. The most likely cause of such
an event is a gradually increasing unbalance of the circuit resulting from deterioration of one of the
light-sensitive cells. Creeping of the micro-ammeter needle would be noticed by observant
watchkeepers; but automatic protection against false alarms is provided by arranging for a gradual
fault to give a "fault" indication before the "alarm" condition is reached.
FIGURE 8.68 Diagram shows the Kidde system of sampling and CO2 flooding pipes with
crankcase monitor and gas bottles, installed on a typical five-cylinder engine.

Recent Example of a Crankcase Explosion

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated a case of such a main engine
explosion involving the 7,745 grt. Irving Nordic which occurred on 4 March, 1993, off Yarmouth,
Nova Scotia. A synopsis of the interesting TSB report is as follows:
The second engineer was on watch carrying out routine maintenance. At about 1112 hours he
heard an explosion from the main engine and observed white smoke and oil vapour coming from the
explosion-relief doors on the starboard side. He realised that a crankcase explosion had taken place
and immediately shut down the engine and evacuated the engine room. Fortunately, there was no
fire and none of the crew were injured. An initial investigation revealed that the No 8 liner, piston,
wrist pin and connecting rod had sustained damage.
At the time of the explosion the vessel was carrying 1,005 tonnes of refined petroleum products,
6,600 tonnes of water ballast, 487 tonnes of intermediate fuel oil (IFO), 85 tonnes of diesel fuel and
20,000 litres of lubricating oil.
Amongst the damage found to the main engine , those directly related to the investigation were as
follows:
1. Abnormal wear beyond the manufacturer's recommended limits in units Nos 2, 3, and 9 and
over 50 per cent were in the No 6 unit.
2. Abnormal ring groove clearances to pistons in all units except No 7.
3. The top piston ring in units Nos 2, 8 and 9 and the No 4 piston ring in units Nos 2 and 9
were broken.
4. The top piston ring in No 4 had been previously installed upside down: the last overhaul by
the ship's staff was on 6 July 1992.
5. All main and bottom-end bearings were scored and some showed impressions of metal
strands from the final lubricating oil safety strainer.
6. The final lubricating oil safety strainer was destroyed.
7. The No 8 unit connecting rod and piston pin were seized.
8. A hard white/grey deposit was on the piston crowns.
9. Four crankcase doors were slightly damaged and no longer provided and effective Crankcase
seal.
After the explosion, a main engine lubricating oil sample was taken and analysed by an
independent laboratory which indicated an abnormal level of chromium in the oil. Deposits from
the piston crown were also analysed and showed 72 per cent calcium sulphate , 21.33 per cent
calcium, 0.23 per cent sodium and 0.14 per cent potassium; the remainder was various trace
elements and ash.
According to the engine manufacturer, the cylinder liner wear rate is expected to be between
0.010 and 0.015 mm/1,000 hours' running time. The cylinder liner wear measurements taken at the
time of the occurrences and during routine maintenance periods showed that the average wear rates
varied between 0.157 mm/1,000 hours and 0.223 mm/1,000 hours; i.e., over 14 times the normal
wear rate.
Between the last two consecutive routine maintenance inspections on 7 May 1992 and 15 March
1993, the number of running hours on the No 8 liner was 4,307, giving a wear rate of 0.3761
mm/1,000 hours, i.e., 25 times the normal wear rate.
The TSB Report concluded that the cause of the explosion was:
"The scoring and the material deposited on the No 8 liner, and the scuffing of the piston crown
depict conditions that would be consistent with a breakdown of the cylinder liner lubrication
film. This breakdown would have resulted in metal-to-metal contact between the piston rings
and the liner with consequential hot spots on the liner. Further, the combustion gas blow-by can
also ignite hydrocarbon vapours. Thus, those hot spots and/or combustion gas blow-by would
likely cause ignition of the lubricating oil vapour/mist, resulting in the crankcase explosion.
The crankcase explosion in the main engine of the "IRVINE NORDIC" was caused most likely by
the ignition of the crankcase oil vapour/mist as a result of hot spots in the way of the No 8

cylinder liner and/or combustion gas blow-by. The primary contributing factor to this
occurrence was the substandard condition of the main engine"
Comment
In every field of engineering, including that of fire equipment, the importance of good
maintenance, cannot be over stressed. Good fire prevention relates not only to the design of the
equipment but equally so to the way in which it is maintained. A malfunction in any piece of fire
equipment at the point of need can result in catastrophe — even death! Fire engineers beware!
The author is quite mystified as to the reason why the ship diesel engine builders do not
incorporate a detection and fixed fire fighting system in all their engines. It is common knowledge
that these engines do have a propensity to have explosions in the crankcase and that over the year
engineers have lost their lives. Common prudence would suggest that it is the responsibility of the
engine builders to incorporate safeguards against such explosions. There exists today equipment,
such as the Walter Kiddie system described above, which will operate at such speed that the
explosion will be avoided altogether. The legislation came into force applying to ships constructed
after September 1984. It follows that there must be many ships afloat without the benefit of
crankcase protection.
An extension of the principles of
crankcase monitoring have been
introduced by Quality Monitoring
Instruments Limited (QMI Multiplex)
who have developed a system for
monitoring the presence of oil mist in
engine room spaces as well as engine
crankcases. Their system will detect
the presence of an oil mist before a
smoke detector will operate and
therefore provides early warning of a
defect in the engine systems which
could give rise to a fire and / or
explosion. The photograph opposite
shows such an installation in a tanker's FIGURE 8.69 Quality Monitoring Instruments Limited, detector
engine space. fitted in the machinery space of the Shell UK Tanker M/T
Regulation 15 Arrangements for oil fuel, lubricating oil and other flammable oils
(Paragraphs 2.9 to 2.12 of this regulation apply to ships)
1 Limitations in the use of oil as fuel
The following limitations shall apply to the use of oil as fuel:
.1 Except as otherwise permitted by this paragraph, no oil fuel with a flashpoint of

less than 60°C shall be used.1
.2 In emergency generators oil fuel with a flashpoint of not less than 43°C may be
used.
.3 Subject to such additional precautions as it may consider necessary and on

condition that the ambient temperature of the space in which such oil fuel is
stored or used shall not be allowed to rise to within 10°C below the flashpoint of
the oil fuel, the Administration may permit the general use of oil fuel having a
flashpoint of less than 60°C but not less than 43°C.
.4 In cargo ships the use of fuel having a lower flashpoint than otherwise specified
in this paragraph, for example crude oil, may be permitted provided that such
1
Refer to resolution A.565(14) concerning recommended procedures to prevent the illegal or accidental use of low flash point
cargo as fuel, adopted by the Organization.

fuel is not stored in any machinery space and subject to the approval by the
Administration of the complete installation.
The flashpoint of oils shall be determined by an approved closed cup method.
2 Oil fuel arrangements
In a ship in which oil fuel is used, the arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of
the oil fuel shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and persons on board and shall at least
comply with the following provisions:
.1 As far as practicable, parts of the oil fuel system containing heated oil under
pressure exceeding 0.18 N/mm2 shall not be placed in a concealed position such
that defects and leakage cannot readily be observed. The machinery spaces in
way of such parts of the oil fuel system shall be adequately illuminated.
.2 The ventilation of machinery spaces shall be sufficient under all normal

conditions to prevent accumulation of oil vapour.
.3 As far as practicable, oil fuel tanks shall be part of the ship's structure and shall
be located outside machinery spaces of category A. Where oil fuel tanks, other
than double bottom tanks, are necessarily located adjacent to or within
machinery spaces of category A, at least one of their vertical sides shall be
contiguous to the machinery space boundaries, and shall preferably have a
common boundary with the double bottom tanks, and the area of the tank
boundary common with the machinery spaces shall be kept to a minimum. Where
such tanks are situated within the boundaries of machinery spaces of category A
they shall not contain oil fuel having a flashpoint of less than 60°C. In general the
use of free-standing oil fuel tanks shall be avoided. When such tanks are
employed their use shall be prohibited in category A machinery spaces on
passenger ships. Where permitted, they shall be placed in an oil-tight spill tray of
ample size having a suitable drain pipe leading to a suitably sized spill oil tank.
.4 No oil fuel tank shall be situated where spillage or leakage therefrom can
constitute a hazard by falling on heated surfaces. Precautions shall be taken to
prevent any oil that may escape under pressure from any pump, filter or heater
from coming into contact with heated surfaces.
.5 Every oil fuel pipe, which, if damaged, would allow oil to escape from a storage,
settling or daily service tank situated above the double bottom, shall be fitted
with a cock or valve directly on the tank capable of being closed from a safe
position outside the space concerned in the event of a fire occurring in the space
in which such tanks are situated. In the special case of deep tanks situated in any
shaft or pipe tunnel or similar space, valves on the tank shall be fitted but control
in the event of fire may be effected by means of an additional valve on the pipe or
pipes outside the tunnel or similar space. If such additional valve is fitted in the
machinery space it shall be operated from a position outside this space.
.6 Safe and efficient means of ascertaining the amount of oil fuel contained in any
oil fuel tank shall be provided.
.6.1 Where sounding pipes are used, they shall not terminate in any space where the risk of ignition of
spillage from the sounding pipe might arise. In particular, they shall not terminate in passenger or
crew spaces. As a general rule, they shall not terminate in machinery spaces. However, where the
Administration considers that these latter requirements are impracticable, it may permit
termination of sounding pipes in machinery spaces on condition that all the following
requirements are met:
.6.1.1 in addition, an oil-level gauge is provided meeting the requirements of subparagraph

.6.2;
.6.1.2 the sounding pipes terminate in locations remote from ignition hazards unless
precautions are taken, such as the fitting of effective screens, to prevent the oil fuel in
the case of spillage through the terminations of the sounding pipes from coming into
contact with a source of ignition;
.6.1.3 the termination of sounding pipes are fitted with self-closing blanking devices and with
a small-diameter self-closing control cock located below the blanking device for the
purpose of ascertaining before the blanking device is opened that oil fuel is not present.
Provision shall be made so as to ensure that any spillage of oil fuel through the control
cock involves no ignition hazard.
.6.2 Other oil-level gauges may be used in place of sounding pipes. Such means, like the means
provided in subparagraph .6.1.1, are subject to the following conditions:

.6.2.1 in passenger ships, such means shall not require penetration below the top of the tank
and their failure or overfilling of the tanks shall not permit release of fuel;
.6.2.2 in cargo ships, the failure of such means or overfilling of the tank shall not permit
release of fuel into the space. The use of cylindrical gauge glasses is prohibited. The
Administration may permit the use of oil-level gauges with flat glasses and self-closing
valves between the gauges and fuel tanks.
.6.3 Means prescribed in subparagraph .6.2.1 or .6.2.2 which are acceptable to the Administration
shall be maintained in the proper condition to ensure their continued accurate functioning in
service.
.7 Provision shall be made to prevent overpressure in any oil tank or in any part of the oil fuel system,
including the filling pipes. Any relief valves and air or overflow pipes shall discharge to a position
which, in the opinion of the Administration, is safe.
.8 Oil fuel pipes and their valves and fittings shall be of steel or other approved material, except that
restricted use of flexible pipes shall be permissible in positions where the Administration is
satisfied that they are necessary. Such flexible pipes and end attachments shall be of approved
fire-resisting materials of adequate strength and shall be constructed to the satisfaction of the
Administration.
.9 All external high-pressure fuel delivery lines between the high-pressure fuel pumps and fuel
injectors shall be protected with jacketed piping systems capable of containing fuel from a
high-pressure line failure. A jacketed pipe incorporates an outer pipe into which the high-pressure
fuel pipe is placed, forming a permanent assembly. The jacketed piping system shall include a
means for collection of leakages and arrangements shall be provided for an alarm to be given of a
fuel line failure.
.10 All surfaces with temperatures above 220ºC which may be impinged as a result of a fuel system
failure shall be properly insulated.
.11 Oil fuel lines shall be screened or otherwise suitably protected to avoid, as far as praticable, oil
spray or oil leakages onto hot surfaces, into machinery air intakes, or other sources of ignition. The
number of joints in such piping systems shall be kept to a minimum.
.12 Ships constructed before 1 July 1998 shall comply with the requirements of paragraphs 2.9 to 2.11
not later than 1 July 2003, except that a suitable enclosure on engines having an output of 375 kW
or less having fuel injection pumps serving more than one injector may be used as an alternative to
the jacketed piping system in paragraph 2.9.
3 Lubricating oil arrangements
The arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of oil used in pressure lubrication
systems shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and persons on board. The arrangements
made in machinery spaces of category A, and whenever practicable in other machinery spaces,
shall at least comply with the provisions of paragraphs 2.1, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.10 and 2.11,
except that:
.1 this does not preclude the use of sight-flow glasses in lubricating systems
provided that they are shown by test to have a suitable degree of fire resistance;
.2 sounding pipes may be authorized in machinery spaces; the requirements of

paragraphs 2.6.1.1 and 2.6.1.3 need not be applied on condition that the
sounding pipes are fitted with appropriate means of closure.
4 Arrangements for other flammable oils
The arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of other flammable oils employed
under pressure in power transmission systems, control and activating systems and heating
systems shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and persons on board. In locations where
means of ignition are present, such arrangements shall at least comply with the provisions of
paragraphs 2.4, 2.6, 2.10 and 2.11 and with the provisions of paragraphs 2.7 and 2.8 in respect of
strength and construction.
5 Periodically unattended machinery spaces
In addition to the requirements of paragraphs 1 to 4, the oil fuel and lubricating oil systems shall
.1 Where daily service oil fuel tanks are filled automatically, or by remote control,
means shall be provided to prevent overflow spillages. Other equipment which
treats flammable liquids automatically, e.g. oil fuel purifiers, which, whenever
practicable, shall be installed in a special space reserved for purifiers and their
heaters, shall have arrangements to prevent overflow spillages.

.2 Where daily service oil fuel tanks or settling tanks are fitted with heating
arrangements, a high temperature alarm shall be provided if the flashpoint of the
oil fuel can be exceeded.
6 Prohibition of carriage of flammable oils in forepeak tanks
Fuel oil, lubrication oil and other flammable oils shall not be carried in forepeak tanks.
Comment
The author is somewhat doubtful as to the propriety of Regulation 15.1.4 as he has personal
experience of incidents where the use of crude oil whether authorised or not has resulted in serious
fires and explosions, some with loss of life. It one case the entire bow of a tanker was blown off,
lives were lost and a serious fire ensued. In this and other cases known to the author, engine room
fires have been traced to the illegal use of crude oil mixed with fuel oil.
In Regulation 15.2 paragraph 6.2.1 requires the safe termination of sounding pipes in locations
remote from ignition hazards or being screened from potential sources of ignition. Unfortunately
the author is only too well aware of screens having failed or been removed temporarily when a spill
has occurred at a sounding pipe and been ignited. One such incident aboard the MV Protector
Alpha is more fully described at Chapter 15 of Ship Fires and the Law published by Lloyds of
London Press 1995.
SOLAS at paragraph .6.6.2 envisages the use of oil level gauges in preference to sounding pipes
provided that there is protection against overfilling and that in that event the spill is contained away
from sources of ignition.
Paragraphs 2.9 through 2.12 apply to ships whose keels are laid after July 1, 1998 but all ships
built before that date must comply with these new regulations by July 1, 2003. These regulations
require that all high pressure pipework such as injectors are double walled thus minimising the
hazard of oil mist igniting in the event of a pipe failure.
This type of fire is all too common and the author is reminded of one such incident aboard a ship
off Malta. Before the author arrived at the scene it had been suggested that the fire occurred high up
in the engine room and might have been the result of a deliberate act. When the author arrived he
found the engine room flooded to the third level and a considerable amount of fire damage high up
in the space. The fire expert for the other party suggested that the fire had started at or above the
third level despite it being obvious from the damage patterns that the source originated below the
water level. Accordingly the author is insisted that the engine room be pumped out before the
investigation reached a conclusion. Figures 8.70 to 8.73 show that the cause of this fire was quite
clearly the result of a failure in the high pressure injector pipe to cylinder number 5 of the diesel
generator. Fire investigators should never be too hasty in reaching a conclusion as to the cause of a
fire, particularly when the scene is still obscured by water or other debris.
Paragraph 5.1 deals with the arrangements to prevent overflow spillage where the daily service
oil fuel tanks are filled automatically or by remote control in periodically unattended machinery
spaces.
It is a requirement that other automatic equipment that treats the oil without the attendance of
engineers, e.g. oil fuel purifiers and their heaters, should where possible be segregated into special
places. The author suggests that this equipment be located in a fire resisting enclosure and be
protected by a local fixed CO2 system.
Oil fuel purifiers are an extremely common source of engine room fires, as illustrated in the
excellent study by ClassNK entitled "Engine Room Fire Guidance to Fire Prevention" published by
Nippon Kaiji Kyokai in 1994.

FIGURE 8.71 The Superintendent points to the

crack in the injector pipe.
FIGURE 8.70 Look down onto No 2 diesel generator. FIGURE 8.72 Chalk was used to highlight the crack
Fire started over No 5 cylinder — engineer's hand on in the injector pipe which ran around half the
rocker arm
FIGURE 8.73 High pressure fuel pipe under test. Spray is seen coming out
of the crack an wetting board in background. It was impossible to build up
static pressure with the hand-operated test pump.

Regulation 16 Ventilation systems in ships other than passenger ships carrying more
than 36 passengers
1 Ventilation ducts shall be of non-combustible material. Short ducts, however, not generally
exceeding 2 m in length and with a cross-section not exceeding 0.02 m2 need not be
non-combustible, subject to the following conditions:
.1 these ducts shall be of a material which, in the opinion of the Administration, has
a low fire risk;
.2 they may only be used at the end of the ventilation device;
.3 they shall not be situated less than 600 mm, measured along the duct, from an
opening in an "A" or "B" class division including continuous " B" class ceilings.
2 Where the ventilation ducts with a free-sectional area exceeding 0.02 m2 pass through class "A"
bulkheads or decks, the opening shall be lined with a steel sheet sleeve unless the ducts passing
through the bulkheads or decks are of steel in the vicinity of passage through the deck or bulkhead
and the ducts and sleeves shall comply in this part with the following:
.1 The sleeves shall have a thickness of at least 3 mm and a length of at least 900
mm. When passing through bulkheads, this length shall be divided preferably
into 450 mm on each side of the bulkhead. These ducts, or sleeves lining such
ducts, shall be provided with fire insulation. The insulation shall have at least the
same fire integrity as the bulkhead or deck through which the duct passes.
Equivalent penetration protection may be provided to the satisfaction of the
Administration.
.2 Ducts with a free cross-sectional area exceeding 0.075 m2 shall be fitted with fire
dampers in addition to the requirements of paragraph 2.1. The fire damper shall
operate automatically but shall also be capable of being closed manually from
both sides of the bulkhead or deck. The damper shall be provided with an
indicator which shows whether the damper is open or closed. Fire dampers are
not required, however, where ducts pass through spaces surrounded by "A"
class divisions, without serving those spaces, provided those ducts have the
same fire integrity as the divisions which they pierce.
3 Ducts provided for the ventilation of machinery spaces of category A, galleys, car deck spaces,
ro-ro cargo spaces or special category spaces shall not pass through accommodation spaces,
service spaces or control stations unless they comply with the conditions specified in
subparagraphs .1.1 to .1.4 or .2.1 and .2.2 below:
.1.1 the ducts are constructed of steel having a thickness of at least 3 mm and 5 mm
for ducts the widths or diameters of which are up to and including 300 mm and
760 mm and over respectively and, in the case of such ducts, the widths or
diameters of which are between 300 mm and 760 mm having a thickness to be
obtained by interpolation;
.1.2 the ducts are suitably supported and stiffened;
.1.3 the ducts are fitted with automatic fire dampers close to the boundaries
penetrated; and
.1.4 the ducts are insulated to "A-60" standard from the machinery spaces, galleys,
car deck spaces, ro-ro cargo spaces or special category spaces to a point at least
5 m beyond each fire damper;
or
.2.1 the ducts are constructed of steel in accordance with paragraphs 3.1.1 and 3.1.2;
and
.2.2 the ducts are insulated to "A-60" standard throughout the accommodation
spaces, service spaces or control stations;
except that penetrations of main zone divisions shall also comply with the requirements of
paragraph 8.
4 Ducts provided for ventilation to accommodation spaces, service spaces or control stations shall
not pass through machinery spaces of category A, galleys, car deck spaces, ro-ro cargo spaces or
special category spaces unless they comply with the conditions specified in subparagraphs .1.1 to
.1.3 or .2.1 and .2.2 below:
.1.1 the ducts where they pass through a machinery space of category A, galley, car
deck space, ro-ro cargo space or special category space are constructed of steel
in accordance with paragraphs 3.1.1 and 3.1.2;

.1.2 automatic fire dampers are fitted close to the boundaries penetrated; and
.1.3 the integrity of the machinery space, galley, car deck space, ro-ro cargo space or
special category space boundaries is maintained at the penetrations;
or
.2.1 the ducts where they pass through a machinery space of category A, galley, car
deck space, ro-ro cargo space or special category space are constructed of steel
in accordance with paragraphs 3.1.1 and 3.1.2; and
.2.2 the ducts are insulated to "A-60" standard within the machinery space, galley, car
deck space, ro-ro cargo space or special category space;
except that penetrations of main zone divisions shall also comply with the requirements of
paragraph 8.
5 Ventilation ducts with a free cross-sectional area exceeding 0.02 m2 passing through "B" class
bulkheads shall be lined with steel sheet sleeves of 900 mm in length divided preferably into 450
mm on each side of the bulkheads unless the duct is of steel for this length.
6 Such measures as are practicable shall be taken in respect of control stations outside machinery
spaces in order to ensure that ventilation, visibility and freedom from smoke are maintained, so that
in the event of fire the machinery and equipment contained therein may be supervised and continue
to function effectively. Alternative and separate means of air supply shall be provided; air inlets of
the two sources of supply shall be so disposed that the risk of both inlets drawing in smoke
simultaneously is minimized. At the discretion of the Administration, such requirements need not
apply to control stations situated on, and opening on to, an open deck, or where local closing
arrangements would be equally effective.
7 Where they pass through accommodation spaces or spaces containing combustible materials, the
exhaust ducts from galley ranges shall be constructed of "A" class divisions. Each exhaust duct
shall be fitted with:
.1 a grease trap readily removable for cleaning;
.2 a fire damper located in the lower end of the duct;
.3 arrangements, operable from within the galley, for shutting off the exhaust fans;
and
.4 fixed means for extinguishing a fire within the duct.
8 Where in a passenger ship it is necessary that a ventilation duct passes through a main vertical
zone division, a fail-safe automatic closing fire damper shall be fitted adjacent to the division. The
damper shall also be capable of being manually closed from each side of the division. The
operating position shall be readily accessible and be marked in red light-reflecting colour. The duct
between the division and the damper shall be of steel or other equivalent material and, if necessary,
insulated to comply with the requirements of regulation 18.1.1. The damper shall be fitted on at
least one side of the division with a visible indicator showing whether the damper is in the open
position.
9 The main inlets and outlets of all ventilation systems shall be capable of being closed from outside
the spaces being ventilated.
10 Power ventilation of accommodation spaces, service spaces, cargo spaces, control stations and
machinery spaces shall be capable of being stopped from an easily accessible position outside the
space being served. This position should not be readily cut off in the event of a fire in the spaces
served. The means provided for stopping the power ventilation of the machinery spaces shall be
entirely separate from the means provided for stopping ventilation of other spaces.
Comment
The author has already drawn attention to the importance of being able to isolate the different
parts of the ventilation system in order to prevent smoke spread. This was discussed in detail in
connection with the fire aboard the Scandinavian Star see Chapter 4 page 52. Figure 4.8 at page 53
shows the smoke infiltration into the cabins which resulted in the obscuration of vision and
ultimately the death by asphyxiation of a number of passengers. Readers may recall that according
to the fire plan there were 92 fire dampers in the accommodation spaces. Of these 78 were manually
operated and the remainder closed automatically at 60 - 70 ºC.

On larger passenger vessels systems of smoke control are installed which allow smoke to be
vented in a controlled manner and stairways and companion ways pressurised in order to keep them
smoke free.
It should be noted that paragraph 7 required extract hoods over galley ranges to be protected by a
fixed fire suppression system. Whilst this is laudable, fires in extract ducts and galley hoods can be
prevented by regular cleaning at appropriate intervals and removal of deposits of grease in the traps,
filters and ducts.
THE FIREMAN'S OUTFIT

Historical
The earliest effective breathing apparatus for firemen was invented by an Englishman, Charles
Anthony Deane, in 1823. His patent drawings show a close helmet, flexible air tubes, and a pump
admitting air over the glasses in front of the helmet so as to remove condensation cause by the
exhaled breath. London firemen used this equipment with great success for many years; and it was
also used for diving.
A year after Deane's invention, a miner, John Roberts, produced a smoke respirator or hood, and
demonstrated it before the Society of Arts, whom promptly awarded him the munificent sum of 50
guineas (£52.50) plus a gold medal. King George IV presented him with 100 guineas, and the
Manchester Guardian newspaper followed with a similar sum.
Deane's equipment was in constant use until the year 1901 when the German firm of
Draegerwerk invented a self-contained oxygen set which allowed firemen better to get to grips with
fire without the encumbrance of heavy air tubes. To this day, Draeger is a major manufacturer of
breathing apparatus for fire fighting services throughout the European Community.
Regulation 17 Fireman's Outfit

1 A fireman's outfit shall consist of:
1.1 Personal equipment comprising:

.1 Protective clothing of material to protect the skin from the heat radiating from the
fire and from burns and scalding by steam. The outer surface shall be
water-resistant.
.2 Boots and gloves of rubber or other electrically non-conducting material.
.3 A rigid helmet providing effective protection against impact.
.4 An electric safety lamp (hand lantern) of an approved type with a minimum
burning period of 3h.
.5 An axe to the satisfaction of the Administration.
1.2 A breathing apparatus of an approved type which may be either:
.1 a smoke helmet or smoke mask which shall be provided with a suitable air pump
and a length of air hose sufficient to reach from the open deck, well clear of
hatch or doorway, to any part of the holds or machinery spaces. If, in order to
comply with this subparagraph, an air hose exceeding 36 m in length would be
necessary, a self-contained breathing apparatus shall be substituted or provided
in addition as determined by the Administration; or
.2 a self-contained compressed-air-operated breathing apparatus, the volume of air
contained in the cylinders of which shall be at least 1,200 l, or other
self-contained breathing apparatus which shall be capable of functioning for at
least 30 min. A number of spare charges, suitable for use with the apparatus
provided, shall be available on board to the satisfaction of the Administration. In
passenger ships carrying more than 36 passengers, at least two spare charges
for each breathing apparatus shall be provided, and all air cylinders for breathing
apparatus shall be interchangeable.
2 For each breathing apparatus a fireproof lifeline of sufficient length and strength shall be provided
capable of being attached by means of a snaphook to the harness of the apparatus or to a separate
belt in order to prevent the breathing apparatus becoming detached when the lifeline is operated.
3 All ships shall carry at least two fireman's outfits complying with the requirements of paragraph 1.
3.1 In addition, there shall be provided:

.1 in passenger ships for every 80 m, or part thereof, of the aggregate of the lengths
of all passenger spaces and service spaces on the deck which carries such
spaces or, if there is more than one such deck, on the deck which has the largest
aggregate of such lengths, two fireman's outfits and two sets of personal
equipment, each set comprising the items stipulated in paragraphs 1.1.1, 1.1.2
and 1.1.3. In passenger ships carrying more than 36 passengers, two additional
fireman's outfits shall be provided for each main vertical zone;
.2 in tankers, two fireman's outfits.
3.2 In passenger ships carrying more than 36 passengers, for each pair of breathing apparatus there
shall be provided one water fog applicator which shall be stored adjacent to such apparatus.
3.3 The Administration may require additional sets of personal equipment and breathing apparatus,
having due regard to the size and type of the ship.
4 The fireman' outfits or sets of personal equipment shall be so stored as to be easily accessible and
ready for use and, where more than one fireman's outfit or more than one set of personal equipment
is carried, they shall be stored in widely separated positions. In passenger ships at least two
fireman's outfits and one set of personal equipment shall be available at any one position. At least
two fireman's outfits shall be stored in each main vertical zone.
The Physiology of Respiration

To maintain life, the human body requires oxygen, which is extracted from the air drawn into the
lungs at a rate depending upon the amount of work being performed. Air consists of about 79 per
cent of nitrogen and 21 per cent of oxygen (ignoring the small quantities of other gases — carbon
dioxide, argon, helium, etc. - which together amount to less than one per cent by volume). When we
breathe, about 4 per cent of the inhaled oxygen is absorbed into the blood stream and about 4 per
cent of carbon dioxide is exhaled. The nitrogen plays virtually no part in maintaining life.
In quiet respiration, we breathe in about 30 cubic inches of air at a time; in a deep breath we take
in another 120 cu. ins., or 150 cu. ins. in all. On a really deep respiration we can give out 100 cu.
ins. of air in addition to the 150, making 250 cu. ins. in all. Called vital capacity it varies in
different persons. There is always in the depths of the lungs about 100 cu. ins. of air which cannot
be breathed out and the air we breathe in is mixed by diffusion. This air in the depths of the lungs is
called alveolar air and is by no means pure; in fact it contains about 5% to 6% of CO2 and 13% to
14% of oxygen. The breathing mechanism works automatically to maintain these levels.
Respiration not only brings in oxygen for use in the body, but removes waste in the form of CO2
which is brought from the tissues by the venous blood; coming from the right side of the heart; this
venous blood is sent through the lungs to be purified.
Reduced haemoglobin — that is, haemoglobin deprived of oxygen — is dark red, whilst
oxyhaemoglobin is bright red.
AIR INHALATION EXHALATION

oxygen 20.93% 16.7%
nitrogen 79.04% 79.7%
CO2 0.03% 3.6%
Table 8.8
The chief indication of oxygen want is given by the blue colour of the lips and face. This is due
to the haemoglobin of the red corpuscles in the capillaries being less saturated with O2 than usual. If
the capillaries are full, the colour is blue or plum; if not, distended, leaden or grey. The want of O2 is
more extreme than in the latter case, which indicates failure of the circulation and oxygen should be
administered as quickly as ever possible in order to avoid the development of the grey condition
which can bring about the failure of the heart and the central nervous system. Oxygen want first
increases the breathing rate, then impairs the respiratory centre and makes the breathing shallow and
irregular. If oxygen can be given in time, both the colour of the face and the vigour of breathing are
restored. A vital part of resuscitation is to attempt to regularise the heart beat which could well be

in a state of fibrillation - described by a doctor as "writhing like a bag of worms". Chest massage is
probably the surest way of reversing this action.
The late Professor J B S Haldane conducted a series of experiments on the amount of oxygen
consumed during different degrees of exertion; the results he obtained are shown in the following
Table:
Oxygen
Consumed Air Breathed Volume of Number of
Degree of Exertion per minute, per minute, Air at each Respirations
in litres in litres Respiration per minute
Rest in bed 0.237 7.7 0.457 16.8
Rest, standing 0.328 10.4 0.612 17.1
Walking at 2 miles per hour 0.780 18.6 1.27 14.7
Table 8.9
From the Table it will be obvious that the greater the exertion, the greater the quantity of oxygen
is consumed by the human body. Any breathing apparatus to be worn for fire-fighting must
obviously be capable of supplying oxygen at a minimum rate of two litres per minute, or air at a
minimum rate of 46 litres per minute. Men working really hard require even more oxygen; so that
breathing apparatus, in practice, is designed to provide additional supplies when necessary. This is
usually achieved by the fitting of a bypass control, which is operated by the wearer when required.
Self-contained breathing apparatus can, in turn, be divided into oxygen and compressed air.
Self-contained breathing apparatus can, in turn, be divided into two sub-types — either closed
circuit or open circuit. In the closed circuit type pure oxygen is used, and means is provided to
extract the exhaled carbon dioxide; the oxygen is replaced, and the breathing cycle continues. The
open-circuit type passes all exhaled air to atmosphere, and provides a new supply of air at every
inhalation of the lungs.
In the British Fire Service the use of self-contained closed circuit oxygen breathing apparatus are
used for specific risks where a long duration is required. However, oxygen breathing apparatus is
commonly found on board eastern European vessels and by some port fire brigades. It is the
Author's opinion that oxygen is for the professional and that for shipboard use he would strongly
recommend the use of compressed air sets.
Although oxygen sets do have certain advantages, such as longer duration for a given weight and
the reduction in bulk achieved by the canister type favoured in the USA, they have a number of
drawbacks:
1. They are relatively complex in design and thus demand a fairly high degree of training on
the part of the operator to a level which is difficult to achieve on board ship. A lot of practice
is needed before a wearer can feel confident and undistracted by his set when he is working
in thick smoke or in a poisoned atmosphere. To send a man into a fire before he has had the
opportunity of really knowing the working of this type of apparatus is dangerous.
2. Oxygen is apt to activate to a dangerous extent any small quantities of noxious gases which
may already be present in, or which may effect entrance into, the wearer's lungs. When the
set is worn after even a trace of such fumes as carbon monoxide, ammonia gas or acid fumes
has got into the lungs, the effect of the pure oxygen seems to be greatly to increase the toxic
effect. In a closed circuit, although the CO2 is being removed there is no way of escape for
the noxious gases. They become absorbed into the blood stream; and the result is at best
acute discomfort to the wearer.
3. A high standard of maintenance is required and this is difficult to achieve on board ship.

4. Costs are high, both for the apparatus itself and for the replenishment of the oxygen. This is
particularly true of the canister type and mitigates against adequate use in training. Air, on
the other hand, is cheap and always immediately available in unlimited amount. This is
especially true in the case of ships carrying compressors capable of recharging the air
cylinders
SOLAS Regulation 17.1.2.2, speaks first of "a self-contained compressed-air-operated breathing
apparatus" followed by "or other self-contained breathing apparatus which shall be capable of
functioning for at least 30 min.". This means that if an Administration wishes it can either specify or
allow the use of oxygen. Compressed air sets of the open-circuit type are now very widely provided
on board the majority of the world's ships. Air sets are much more simple in design, require less
maintenance, are easier to recharge and in an emergency can be worn by men who have the
minimum practice in wearing them and can be worn under water. For this reason, one of the more
commonly-used types of compressed air set merits description.
The Siebe-Gorman Compressed-Air

Breathing Apparatus
This type of apparatus has been approved by the
UK Department of Transport, and is carried on
many ships. It is described in the diagrams and
illustrations which follow. The set described is
known as the "Airmaster" which incorporates a
single cylinder but there is also available a twin
cylinder model known as the "International". The
equipment is of the open circuit type of breathing
apparatus in which the wearer exhales direct to
atmosphere. The cylinder has a capacity of 1,240
litres in the standard set, or 2,250 litres when
supplied with the new ultra-lightweight cylinder.
Air pressure in the cylinders is 1,980 lbs. sq. in.
(132 atmospheres), and 3,000 lbs. sq. in. (204
atmospheres), respectively. The working duration FIGURE 8.74 Siebe Gorman "Airmaster" compressed
is 21 and 46 minutes respectively, calculated in
accordance with BS 4667 part 2. The actual
duration depends upon the amount of work being done and, it must be said, the degree of training
the wearer has undertaken. In either case a reserve period of 10 minutes is almost universally
adopted.
For the American market the standard cylinder pressure is 2,216 lbs. sq. in. (150 atmospheres)
and the set is built to meet the exacting MESA (Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration)
and the NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health) specifications.
Figure 8.75 illustrates an exploded view of the high pressure reducing valve. This is a "piston
type", reducer in which a spring loaded piston is balanced by the reduced pressure at which it is set.
The valve seating is an integral part of the piston, and when the pressure at the back of the piston is
reduced by operation of the demand valve, the spring pushes the piston and seating off the fixed jet
thus allowing air to pass through the piston to the low pressure outlet. When the demand valve
closes, the back pressure acting on the piston overcomes the spring pressure and the piston moves
forward to shut off the main air supply from the cylinder. At a cylinder pressure of 132 atmospheres
the reduced pressure should be between 80 and 90 lbs. sq. in. At 200 atmospheres the reduced
cylinder pressure should be between 85 and 95 lbs. sq. in.
Air now passes up the supply hose to the second stage reducer or demand valve which is situated
in the front of the face mask. This demand valve comprises a stainless steel body and thin rubber
diaphragm which is retained in position by a cover and spring clip. Secured to the inside of the
valve body and bearing upon the diaphragm is a spring-loaded lever which operates a non-return

inlet valve. Bearing upon the lever, the diaphragm is pulled inwards by the suction caused when the
wearer inhales. This movement of the diaphragm is transmitted to the lever which pivots away from
the inlet valve allowing it to open and admit air. On exhalation, the suction on the diaphragm is
removed and the lever, pulled by the spring, moves the inlet valve to the closed position. The
amount of air passed depends entirely upon the demand made by the wearer.
The face mask is made of rubber and has an air cushion seal designed to accommodate all facial
contours. Into this is fitted a tough moulded visor giving panoramic vision and firmly retained in
position by a removable metal clamping band. Five rubber straps hold the mask firmly in place on
the head. A speech diaphragm or microphone attachment can easily be fitted to the mask by the
removal of a blanking plug. The mask incorporates a non-return valve which vents the exhaled air
direct to atmosphere.
The frame comprises a lightweight backplate with harness attachments and cylinder cradle. The
cylinder and first stage reducer are mounted directly on the frame, together with a high pressure pipe
providing the pressure gauge and whistle connections. The harness is made of Terylene and is
attached to the frame. The marine version is fitted with a waist and chest strap to which is secured a
hempcovered wire lifting lanyard.
A high pressure flexible hose connects the gauge to the high pressure connection on the frame.
The gauge is calibrated in atmospheres and has a red warning section from 0-15. The automatic
shut-off valve is connected directly to the pressure gauge and provides for automatic isolation of the
gauge in the event of failure.
A warning whistle is fitted to the connection on the frame. The whistle is pre-set to sound when
the pressure in the cylinder has fallen to 42 - 44 atmospheres (43.4 - 45.5 kg/cm2). This is
approximately 10 minutes at moderate work rate before the cylinder is exhausted.
Cylinders can be changed quickly by virtue of the fingertight handwheel connection which is
sealed with an "O" ring. A second mask attachment is fitted on the low pressure side of the reducer
and may be used in the following ways:
FIGURE 8.75 Explode view of Siebe Gorman "Airmaster" high pressure reducing valve.

1. A supply of air can be transferred from

a rescuer to a trapped breathing
apparatus wearer whose air supply has
been exhausted.
2. By attaching an additional mask
complete with demand valve and tube
at this point, a man can be rescued
from a toxic atmosphere.
3. A mask and extension hose up to 120
feet (37 m) long can be fitted,
permitting the wearer to enter confined
spaces without carrying the apparatus
FIGURE 8.76 Complete Marine set of Siebe Gorman
with him.
"Airmaster" breathing apparatus, comprising - one
4. Air can be supplied from another self-contained set, two spare cylinders, safety helmet,
source, e.g. ship's airline, thus reserving test guage and 120 feet hemp-covered wire lifeline.
the cylinder air for use either in an
emergency or for work beyond the full
extent of the hose.
Similar compressed air breathing apparatus sets are made by a number of other manufacturers
and are available in the UK. These include, Chubb Panorama Ltd.; Draeger Safety Group Ltd. and
Mine Safety Appliances Company. In the USA Scott has been making compressed air breathing
apparatus since 1945. Another manufacturer of note is Interspiro.
Trolly Unit
The problems associated with search, rescue and recovery of persons overcome in the
cathedral-like spaces as represented by cargo tanks on VLCC's or the large bulk carriers has been
greatly alleviated by the development of the Hose Reel and Trolly Compressed Air Breathing
Apparatus. These spaces are extremely complex and so huge that the half-hour sets have barely
sufficient duration for a quick examination, far less providing the time to find the victim, apply
resuscitation, get him on to a stretcher and hauled to
safety.
It is now possible for rescuers to enter tanks wearing
the standard breathing apparatus but fed with air from the
trolly unit through the second mask attachment. This
allows for unlimited duration and once the victim has been
found the rescuers can, if necessary, revert to their own
self-contained sets, quickly apply an air resuscitator, get
him onto a stretcher and organise his evacuation.
A great deal of practice is required but the author has
been very much impressed by the speed and efficient way
in which in the 1970's the crews of Esso Company vessels
managed to accomplish the recovery of "bodies" from
cargo tanks. The technique followed by Esso involved the
use of self-contained breathing apparatus, trolley unit,
ship's airline, sheer legs, blocks and tackle, air lamps,
rescue lines, resuscitator, walkie talkie sets, stretchers etc.
Sailing with these tankers on a number of occasions the
author has observed during practice in recovering "bodies"
from cargo tanks the time from start to finish being
reduced progressively from around 40-45 minutes to less FIGURE 8.77 Siebe Gorman Hose Reel and
Trolly Compressed Air Breathing Apparatus
than 20 minutes. It must be emphasised that this can only fitted with a Dictron low pressure warning
be achieved by practice and with the full support of the

FIGURE 8.78 Diagram outlining the Trolly Unit using one self-contained air breathing
apparatus and one auxiliary mask and harness. The air is being supplied from the ship's
own air supply through a Siebe Gorman heavy duty air filter.

crew. Safety is not bought cheaply in terms of effort and everyone must realise that regular practice
is required to safely and successfully carry out such complicated evolutions. It is much too late to
wait until an accident takes place!
The hose reel and trolly is a composite apparatus whose basic constituent is a twelve inch
diameter hose reel which will accommodate up to 300 feet (91 m) of supply hose. Air is supplied,
either from the ship's air line through a heavy duty air filter, or from twin air bottles carried on the
trolly itself. Two men can simultaneously be supplied with air by means of a "Y" piece and, of
course, it is highly desirable that men work in pairs when engaged in either fire-fighting or rescue
work. The extremely versatile nature of the apparatus can be seen from a study of Figure 8.77.
The air resuscitator is not shown in this drawing but this lung-governed apparatus automatically
"breathes" for the victim during the time it takes to get him out to open air. Obviously it is highly
dangerous to use oxygen resuscitation equipment anywhere near cargo tanks and this air
development represents an important lifesaving facility for use on board tankers and chemical
carriers.
Readers might be somewhat surprised to learn that mouth to mouth resuscitation has been known
about for thousands of years. Reference to Elijah in the 2nd Book of Kings:
"and Elijah went up, and lay upon the child, and put his mouth upon his mouth, and his
eyes upon his eyes, and his hands upon his hands, and he stretched himself upon the
child, and the flesh of the child waxed warm. Then he returned and walked in the house
to and fro and went up and stretched himself upon him; and the child sneezed seven
times and the child opened his eyes!"
Basically the trolley set operates in the same way as the self-contained apparatus. The high
pressure manifold is connected to the high pressure reducing valve which is bolted to the reel frame.
This reducing valve is of the piston type. The piston is spring loaded and air is transferred from the
inlet side of the valve to the top of the piston via inlet ports. These are so arranged that a pressure of
80 lbs. sq. in. (5-6 kg/cm2) overcomes the spring pressure and allows a seating to close the inlet jet.
A non-return valve is fitted so that one cylinder can be replaced whilst the other is in use. This
means that the trolly unit can be operated for as long as spare air cylinders are available. A warning
whistle can be fitted to indicate when the pressure in a cylinder in use falls to 43 atmospheres (44.5
kg/cm2).
Located at one end of the reducing valve, a red handwheel operates the constant flow valve.
When this is operated air is allowed to flow continuously to the wearers. In addition the face-pieces
supplied for use with the trolley unit are fitted with red coloured screwed button valves which, when
operated, achieve the same effect. Whilst in practice there will rarely be any need to use the constant
flow valve on the trolly itself, it has great value when used to supply fresh air to an unconscious
person in circumstances where a resuscitator is not available. Obviously where the victim has
stopped breathing only artificial respiration can succeed.
When using the trolly unit supplied from the ship's airline it is advisable to use a low pressure
warning device. The men wearing the apparatus can well be out of sight and a long distance from
fresh air so that a drop in air pressure demands instant change-over to cylinder supply. The low
pressure warning device is a detachable low voltage electrical device which is intrinsically safe to
BS 1259: 1958 for use in combustible atmospheres. It is connected to the inlet of the low pressure
reducing valve via a "T" piece. The device gives an audible warning and lights a red lamp when the
ship's air falls below 25 lb. sq. in. (1.76 kg/cm2).
It is an obvious advantage to have a means of communication between the wearers and the fresh
air base. Purpose-built systems are available from the manufacturers and these are strongly
recommended. Where such systems are not provided it is of interest to note that very good signals
can be received by means of the ship's walkie-talkie sets. To transmit, the breathing apparatus
wearers should hold the walkie-talkie microphone against the blank cap fitted on the face piece and

speak normally. In practice it has been found that excellent signals can be received on deck from
even the farthest point of the largest cargo tanks on board VLCC'S.
High Pressure Air Charging Equipment

A great weakness associated with self contained breathing apparatus is that its use is limited to
the number of charged air cylinders available on board. In port this presents little difficulty but at
sea it is quite a different story. A difficult smoky fire can use up an awful lot of cylinders,
particularly when men are working - as they should - in pairs. The author recently investigated a
very difficult fire in a passenger liner where the fire was all but extinguished when the air cylinders
ran out. Fortunately a salvage vessel arrived in time to augment supplies and disaster was averted.
Some forward looking companies install air compressors on board their ships for the purpose of
recharging breathing apparatus cylinders. But these are few in relation to the whole and the author
would like to see this practice greatly extended. Indeed this is a subject which the author would like
to see on the agenda for the next SOLAS Conference.
The great advantage of having an air compressor on board is that adequate on-board training with
self contained breathing apparatus can be carried out without having to worry about maintaining an
adequate reserve of charged cylinders. Fire drills are certainly much more interesting when
conducted with live equipment and personnel respond wonderfully to this approach. It is important
to give all members of the crew the opportunity to handle the fire equipment provided in order to
maintain their enthusiasm. Naturally those men designated to wear breathing apparatus in fire
situations should receive more concentrated training than given to the crew generally and over a
period this should cover every area of the ship in which a fire could possibly break out.
When selecting a compressor it is very important to decide what type of cylinders are going to be
used on board the ship in question. In the case of VLCC'S, large bulk carriers, chemical carriers and,
of course, practically all passenger vessels, it is very strongly recommended that the long life
ultra-lightweight cylinders be adopted. It is not really a good idea to have two types of cylinders on
board the one ship because this can lead to complications when recharging is required. Where such
an arrangement is unavoidable it is terribly important to provide safeguards designed to ensure that
the 1,980 lbs. sq. in. cylinders are not inadvertently charged to 3,000 lbs. sq. in., otherwise a most
serious accident can occur. The manufacturers of this equipment can advise.
The Dunlop Company produce compressors which are ideal for shipboard use. These
compressors are designed to provide medically pure air for fire-fighters, divers and aqualung users.
The capacity of the compressor should be such that it is capable of charging an empty cylinder to
full within 15 minutes. There is a tremendous advantage in providing a decanting system whereby
one or more 90 cu. ft. master air cylinders, depending on
the size and complexity of the ship, can be used quickly
to re-charge the small bottles in time of emergency. The
large cylinders can then be topped-up at leisure by
means of the compressor.
The standard Dunlop charging set consists of an air
cooled 4-stage reciprocating type compressor with a
self-contained lubricating system. The compressor and
driving motor are mounted on a lightweight frame and
the power unit is either a diesel engine or an electric
motor.
Compressed air is passed first through a cooling coil
and then to the oil and water trap and dehydrator which
purifies and dries the air on its way to the delivery
manifold. A dew-point of -60 oC is normal, using
aluminium oxide dehydrators and meets the purity FIGURE 8.79 Dunlop high pressure air
charging equipment with compressor
requirements of NATO, British Home Office and
powered by three-phase electric motor.
Defence Ministries and the American Air Force.

FIGURE 8.80 shows a cut-away section of an air cooled 4-stage reciprocating compressor.
This question of purity is terribly important and few ships' systems can be suitable for charging
self-contained cylinders. When such systems are used in conjunction with the Trolly Unit the air has
to be passed through a heavy duty filter but this is not to be recommended when charging the high
pressure self-contained cylinders.
Compressor units are available in a range from 5 to 15 cubic feet per minute with pressures up to
4,000 lbs. sq. in. and incorporate gauges, pressure cut-out switches and relief valves to enable
breathing apparatus cylinders to be safely inflated to any required pressure.
The Advantages of Compressed-Air Breathing Apparatus

The great advantage of compressed-air breathing apparatus is that it can be worn in an emergency
by a comparatively untrained man, who should feel quite at his ease while wearing it. This remark is
NOT to be taken to imply, however, that the author thinks it desirable for untrained men to be
placed in such a position. On the contrary, he most strongly recommends that every person on board
ship who is at all likely to be called upon to wear the set should receive regular training by
experienced instructors, including wearing the apparatus in smoke. There are excellent training
establishments in different parts of the country; and where there are none readily available, it is
certain that if the Chief Fire Officer or Firemaster of the Local Authority Fire Brigade be
approached with a request, arrangements can be made for ship's officers to use the Brigade's training
facilities.
The UK Merchant Notice 1494 "Fire-Fighting Training" June 1992 outlines the training required
and lists the fire schools at which such training is available. These include The Scottish
International Fire Training Centre, MacDonald Road, Edinburgh, which the author founded in 1962
and other training establishments throughout the country. All these courses include concentrated

training in the use and wearing of breathing apparatus. A fine example of a fire training school is
that of the Texas A&M University which sets a very high standard. The facilities at this school are
quite unsurpassed. New schools for training personnel engaged in the offshore oil and shipping
industry are being opened up all over the world as the demand for training increases. Much of this
demand has been fuelled by the higher standards being enforced by the SOLAS Regulations. Then
there is the much closer attention being paid to safety in the offshore oil industry, following
disasters such as the Piper Alpha on July 6, 1988 where tragically 165 of 226 persons aboard were
killed.
The author finds it surprising that SOLAS does not require breathing apparatus sets to be
provided exclusively for the use of the engine-room staff. Of all the parts of a ship in which a fire is
likely to start, the engine-room and machinery-space is the most complex. In the event of an
engine-room fire in which valves have to be found and turned off, only an engineer can do the job. It
is difficult enough for a stranger to find his own way out of a large modern engine-room space with
all lights on — let alone when moving blind in thick smoke. To locate a particular valve in such
circumstances is virtually impossible for anyone but a trained engineer working in familiar
surroundings.
For the conditions likely to be met in an engine-room or machinery-space when fire has broken
out, there can be no doubt that a self-contained type of breathing apparatus is essential; for the
wearer of a set embodying a trailing air-hose tube will almost certainly get hopelessly tangled up.
For this reason, the author would recommend that, in all large ships, two sets of breathing apparatus
be provided over and above those currently required to be carried by law, these to be kept in the
Engine Room Control Room and ready for instant use. It would not, in his convinced opinion, be an
over-insurance.
The Smoke Helmet or Smoke Mask

Despite the fact that the British Fire Service has abandoned the use of smoke helmets and smoke
masks since 1942, the author is by no means convinced that this equipment has outlived its
usefulness on board ship. Fire Service experience cannot, in any event, be a decisive argument for
or against their use; for there is all the difference in the world between the professional fireman,
with his constant and efficient training in the use of self-contained breathing apparatus, and the
ship's officer with so many duties to perform and so little chance of training with such equipment.
Under SOLAS Regulation 17.1.2.1 an Administration may permit the carrying of a smoke helmet
or smoke mask, along with a suitable air pump and a length of air hose sufficient to reach from the
open deck , well clear of hatch or doorway, to any part of the holds or machinery spaces. But if this
requires the use of an air hose exceeding 36 m in length, a self-contained breathing apparatus must
be provided in place or in addition to the smoke helmet.
The really telling argument in favour of some equipment alternative to the self-contained
breathing apparatus being carried on board ship is that, whereas on land it is relatively easy to obtain
back up supplies of oxygen and compressed air cylinders, such is by no means the case at sea. Far
away from land additional supplies are out of the question until either port is reached or a passing
ship can provide help, unless, of course, an air compressor and/or a decanting system has been
provided on board. But in the case of very small vessels it would be unreasonable to expect owners
to provide such charging facilities.
It is pleasing to observe that since the First Edition of Fire Aboard was published in 1961,
SOLAS has toughened up the Regulations relating to the provision of breathing apparatus. Yet, as
stated earlier there is still room for improvement and this can easily be brought about by requiring
the carrying of compressors for recharging air cylinders.
A brief description of the apparatus and a few do's and don'ts might be useful here. The apparatus
consists of a helmet or mask connected to armoured air hose of three-quarter-inch diameter. This is
usually made in 30-ft. lengths which can be fitted together to make an air-line as long as 120 or even
150 ft. The air hose terminates in a bellows, either hand or foot operated, or in a rotary blower. The
air inlet must be protected so that the supply of air cannot be obstructed; and it must be capable of

being secured in fresh air. The man operating the pump must always ensure that he is situated in
fresh air, and that he does not pump smoke to the wearer. Telephonic communication between the
man in the helmet and the man on the bellows or blower is a very desirable addition. Anyone who
has worn this apparatus will agree that it is the loneliest job on earth. When you get down into a
smoke-laden hold, your colleagues might be a million miles away! This being so, the comfort which
the wearer gets from being able to speak to a fellow human being is of the utmost value. Another
great advantage is that those outside can get a first-hand work-picture of conditions down below,
and so can prepare appropriate fire-fighting action without delay.
The telephone wires are carried inside the armoured hose; earphones and a larynx microphone is
worn by the fire-fighter.
Quite recently, voice-energised telephone sets have been produced which require neither batteries
nor valves. The telephone wires have been made an integral part of the armoured life-line itself, and
can therefore be used with either self-contained breathing apparatus or with smoke helmets. The
R.F.D. Company have marketed a set which they call "The Two-Way Voice-Energised Telephone
Life-Line".
One day, no doubt, there will be developed a tiny short-wave radio, probably transistorised,
which will dispense with the need for any wires at all. This will be a real boon to all wearers of
breathing apparatus.
The Wearing of Breathing Apparatus or Smoke Helmet

It is highly desirable that men who will be required to fight fires on board ship should have
received adequate training - preferably at a recognised fire school run by professional fire-fighters.
Naturally, the wearing of breathing apparatus will have assumed a great deal of attention during the
training. Certain fundamental principles of great importance apply to the wearing of breathing
apparatus of any kind.
1. The golden rule is "The Three C's" — "Always keep Cool, Calm and Collected!" To dress
hurriedly and dash into a smoke-laden atmosphere is to court disaster. (In any case, the fire
which calls for the use of breathing apparatus is, by its very nature, rarely of the type which
demands the all-out speed usually associated with fire-fighting.) The quick shallow
breathing which comes from over-exertion or excitement is the worst possible state in which
to don breathing apparatus. It has been said that the four per cent of carbon dioxide which is
inhaled at every breath is, when the breathing is slow and normal, safely expelled to
atmosphere. When the breathing is quick and shallow, however, the carbon dioxide tends to
be retained in the lungs, and quickly brings on a state of distress. Steady breathing, then, is
of the utmost importance.
2. A man who has already "swallowed" a lot of smoke or noxious fumes — particularly those
of ammonia or acid type — should never be asked to wear breathing apparatus until a
reasonable time (say, one hour) has elapsed.
3. Dressing should be carried out in fresh air; and only when the wearer is sure he is properly
rigged should he enter the fire area. When moving in thick smoke, even in familiar
surroundings, the greatest care must be taken. There are many pitfalls awaiting the unwary -
open hatch covers, staircases, lift wells, floor obstructions, and many others. A good rule is
always to take the weight on one foot before placing the other forward. In really difficult
surroundings, it will be far easier to crawl than it will be to walk.
4. Practice in dressing, in wearing the set, and in movement through restricted areas,
blindfolded if possible, is essential. It is only by making this drill as realistic as it can be
made that confidence is built up; so that when an actual fire is encountered the wearer can
concentrate entirely on fire-fighting, knowing full well that his apparatus is dependable.
5. It is quite obvious that whilst engaged in fire-fighting in smoky conditions men wearing
breathing apparatus will inevitably be out of sight of their colleagues. This make it terribly
important to keep a record of the times at which the b.a. wearers must return to the fresh air

base when their cylinder contents are low. Failure to return at the appropriate time must
prompt an immediate search and hopefully a rescue, by a second team of b.a. wearers. It
could be argued that the men could simply be hauled out by use of the of their lifelines
which they should be wearing — Regulation 17.2. But having regard to the complex nature
of a ship, lines have a nasty habit of becoming snagged and render such action impossible.
This especially so when the fire involves the engine room or other machinery space, but
even accommodation areas can be quite complex and especially so when clouded in smoke.
Hopefully, the warning whistles on the breathing apparatus will serve as a guide as to the
position of the trapped men but remember that this signal will only sound for about ten
minutes before the air in the cylinder is completely exhausted.
6. The provision of a life-line and of an adjustable safety belt or harness is required under
SOLAS Regulation 17.2; but the manipulation of this line by the man assisting the
fire-fighter calls for a certain amount of skill. A steady strain should be maintained on the
line all the time. It is dangerous to allow it to go slack because then it can catch in or round
an obstruction and become a source of deadly danger to the wearer. There are, in fact,
several places on board a ship — entering an engine-room from an upper deck is one
example — in which a life-line attached to the wearer but not physically controlled by him
can be so dangerous that it becomes essential for him to carry the life-line himself and to pay
it out as he goes. The line is left lying on the deck, and will be there to guide him back to
fresh air on the return journey.
7. Water is to the fireman as ammunition is to the soldier. It is therefore always advisable to
take a line of hose towards a fire even on a reconnaissance mission, so that if necessary
fire-fighting can begin immediately. This is where the one-and-three-quarter-inch hose
comes in so useful, being so much easier to handle than the two-and-a-half-inch size. A
hand-control nozzle should always be carried also on such an occasion.
It is desirable that these procedures apply to all ships having to provide breathing apparatus but
the author would suggest that in the case of cruise ships, passenger vessels and all types of ferries, it
becomes an absolute necessity. Such vessels are by their very nature extremely complex in layout
and tax the expertise of even the best trained b.a. wearers in the professional fire services.
Questions might well be asked as how men could fail to return to their fresh air base immediately
the warning signal sounded? Two actual case histories, both involving professional fire-fighters,
will serve to illustrate.
In the first case two men were searching cabins in a long alleyway in order to discover the point
of origin of a not too serious but smoky fire. For some reason which has never been explained the
two men, it must be said somewhat foolishly, left the security of their line of hose and the lifeline
which had been run out along the handrail and entered what turned out to be a series of store rooms.
Sadly, the men became confused in the smoke and lost their way out. A second team of fire-fighters
entered the alleyway when it was feared that something had gone wrong with the first team and it
was past the time they should have returned. This team did at one stage hear the faint sound of a
warning whistle but failed to trace its origin. By the time the second team of fire-fighters had found
the cabin of origin and extinguished the fire it was too late. When the smoke was cleared both men
were found to be dead in a chill room compartment..
The moral here is never to leave the safety of your lifeline and/or the line of hose, remember
following either of these will lead directly to the fresh air base and safety!
There is another lesson to be learned from this incident. The 2½ inch (65mm) hose used in this
instance and commonly found on board many ships is much too inflexible to manoeuvre in the
confines of a ship. Much better to use 1¾ inch (45mm) or 1½ inch (38mm) hose which, even when
under high pressure, is easily handled by one man. Had these unfortunate men been using the
smaller diameter hose it is highly likely that they would have taken it with them as they left the
lifeline and would have thus given themselves an infallible guide to safety. The author makes
reference to this subject in the section dealing with Regulation 4.7 through 4.7.4.2.

The second example again involved a two man team engaged in fighting an engine room fire
when they were both incapacitated by being caught and burned when a flashover1 occurred.
Fortunately, by following the sound of their warning whistles, a second team of fire-fighters
managed to reach the injured men and remove them to safety. Though badly injured both men
survived.
These examples indicate how vital it is that back-up teams of fire-fighters are available on board
ship and without having had previous training it is highly unlikely that a successful outcome will be
achieved in time of a crisis situation
If men are to work in pairs as is laid down by all the world's fire services it stands to reason that
the provision of only two set of breathing apparatus is unsatisfactory and highlights a weakness
associated with Regulation 17.3 viz.:
All ships shall carry at least two fireman's outfits complying with the requirements of
paragraph 1
Clearly, where only two sets of breathing apparatus are provided on board and both are being
used in fighting the fire there is no back-up apparatus available to enable a rescue attempt to be
made in time of need. As a minimum standard the author would suggest that a smoke helmet, or
mask, be provided in addition to the self-contained breathing apparatus. But when only two sets of
b.a. are available it would surely be prudent for one man be sent in to perform the actual fire
fighting. If accident should befall the wearer then at least there would be a possibility of a rescue
attempt being made by the wearer of the second set. The author would argue strongly that the
minimum number of sets of breathing apparatus on board any ship to which these regulations apply
should be four and not two. He would also argue that it should be a requirement that an air
compressor be provided in order to recharge the air cylinders — especially in passenger ships.
Certainly, under Regulation 17.3.3, the Administration may require additional sets of personal
equipment and breathing apparatus, but sadly experience teaches that there are nations who always
seem loath to adopt voluntary safety standards and opt for the minimum on every possible occasion.
Entry Control Officer

World-wide, professional fire brigades have for many years adopted specific safety standards to
safeguard personnel during firefighting operations requiring the use of breathing apparatus. This by
virtue of the fact that in the past many lives have been lost during such operations. Some of these
procedures, though excellent for professionals, are perhaps unnecessarily complicated for use on
board ship. The following procedure, which the author considers to be a minimum standard on
board ship, is recommended:
1. The accurate recording of this information is vital in order to safeguard the lives of the
wearers of b.a. and clearly demands good training and regular back-up drills at which
breathing apparatus is used. On board ship it is recommended that the Entry Control Officer
be nominated from the junior ranks of the commissioned or non-commissioned officers. It is
terribly important to keep up to date the name of the appointee to this position, as well, of
course, the designated members of the fire fighting team.
2. There should be a nominated assembly point on board every ship to which the fire party
report upon the raising of the alarm. The author favours the after peak by virtue of it being a
area sheltered from the weather and unlikely to be the point at which an actual fire will start.
Many ships appear to favour making the assembly point at areas such as the seamans' mess
deck, the advantage being seen that this is totally familiar to even fairly new joined
personnel but should the fire start in this area confusion is likely. The Control Board itself
should be stowed as near as possible to the exit door whilst remaining in a protected
environment. The Control Officer would uplift the board on his way to the exit door and
1
A flashover is the point at which the contents of a large part of the room of origin of a fire is giving off flammable gases from
their heated surfaces and which upon the opening of a door or the breaking of a window, suddenly and with sometimes
almost explosive violence, spontaneously ignite to involve the entire contents.

take it to the pre-planned assembly point. It is important that a roll call should be able to be
carried out quickly and accurately to account for all members of the fire parties. This subject
is covered in great detail in CHAPTER 10 under the heading of "ROLL CALL".
3. When the officer in charge of the fire party decides that breathing apparatus is required to
be worn, the two nominated wearers hand the set identifying tally to the Control Officer who
will check the contents of the air cylinder and from the duration table record the time at
which the alarm signal will sound. Men will be warned to report to the fresh air base as
soon as the reducing contents of the air cylinders cause the alarm signal to sound. A
refinement of this system can be considered. The Control Officer could be provided with an
air horn which he would sound when the b.a. wearers should return to fresh air, say, one
minute before the anticipated sounding of the cylinder contents alarm.
A typical B.A. Entry Control Board is shown in Figure 8.81. This should be a perspex covered
board 300mm wide and 850mm high fitted with a clock; a table in a vertical column outlining a list
of cylinders pressures ranging from 100 to 200 bar; four horizontal columns listing cylinder air
pressures of 1,024 p.s.i., 1,800, 2,250 and 2,400 p.s.i.; four vertical columns in which is recorded in
minutes the time at which the warning air contents alarm will sound. Beneath the perspex cover on
the left hand side of the board should be up to twelve pockets into which can be inserted small
tallies identifying the wearer of the individual sets of breathing apparatus in use at the incident. On
these individual tallies will be recorded the "Cylinder Pressure" and the "Time In". To the right
hand side of the individual tallies are three columns TIME OF WHISTLE; LOCATION OF TEAM;
REMARKS.
FIGURE 8.81 Standard BA Control Board as used by Lothian and Borders Fire Brigade.

Regulation 18 Miscellaneous items
(Paragraphs 2.4 and 8 of this regulation apply to ships constructed on or after 1 February 1992.
Paragraph 7 of this regulation applies to all ships.)
1.1 Where "A" class divisions are penetrated for the passage of electric cables, pipes, trunks, ducts,
etc., or for girders, beams or other structural members, arrangements shall be made to ensure that
the fire resistance is not impaired, subject to the provisions of regulation 30.5.
1.2 Where "B" class divisions are penetrated for the passage of electric cables, pipes, trunks, ducts,
etc., or for the fitting of ventilation terminals, lighting fixtures and similar devices, arrangements
shall be made to ensure that the fire resistance is not impaired.
2.1 Pipes penetrating "A" or "B" class divisions shall be of materials approved by the Administration
having regard to the temperature such divisions are required to withstand.
2.2 Where the Administration may permit the conveying of oil and combustible liquids through
accommodation and service spaces, the pipes conveying oil or combustible liquids shall be of a
material approved by the Administration having regard to the fire risk.
2.3 Materials readily rendered ineffective by heat shall not be used for overboard scuppers, sanitary
discharges, and other outlets which are close to the waterline and where the failure of the material
in the event of fire would give rise to danger of flooding.
2.4 For the protection of cargo tanks carrying crude oil and petroleum products having a flashpoint not
exceeding 60°C, materials readily rendered ineffective by heat shall not be used for valves, fittings,
tank opening covers, cargo vent piping, and cargo piping so as to prevent the spread of fire to the
cargo.
3 Electric radiators, if used, shall be fixed in position and so constructed as to reduce fire risks to a
minimum. No such radiators shall be fitted with an element so exposed that clothing, curtains, or
other similar materials can be scorched or set on fire by heat from the element.
4 Cellulose-nitrate-based films shall not be used for cinematograph installations.
5 All waste receptacles shall be constructed of non-combustible materials with no openings in the
sides or bottom.
6 In spaces where penetration of oil products is possible, the surface of insulation shall be
impervious to oil or oil vapours.
7 Paint lockers and flammable liquid lockers shall be protected by an appropriate fire-extinguishing
arrangement approved by the Administration.
8 Helicopter decks shall be of a steel or steel equivalent fire-resistant construction. If the space below
the helicopter deck is a high fire risk space, the insulation standard shall be to the satisfaction of
the Administration. Each helicopter facility shall have an operations manual, including a description
and a checklist of safety precautions, procedures, and equipment requirements. If the
Administration permits aluminium or other low melting metal construction that is not made
equivalent to steel, the following provisions shall be satisfied:
.1 If the platform is cantilevered over the side of the ship, after each fire on the ship
or on the platform, the platform shall undergo a structural analysis to determine
its suitability for further use.
.2 If the platform is located above the ship's deckhouse or similar structure, the
following conditions shall be satisfied:
.2.1 the deckhouse top and bulkheads under the platform shall have no openings;
.2.2 all windows under the platform shall be provided with steel shutters;
.2.3 the required fire-fighting equipment shall be to the satisfaction of the Administration;
.2.4 after each fire on the platform or in close proximity, the platform shall undergo a structural
analysis to determine its suitability for further use.
Comment
Fire tests the quality of fire stops between spaces and it is not unusual to find that smoke has
filtered from one compartment to another as a result of some minor defect or alteration to the ships
structure. Such alterations are often made with every intention to stop up the hole at a later date.

For now it seems unimportant — that is until a fire occurs. Considerable progress has been made in
the field of fire seals for openings and numerous intumescent products which expand and seal an
opening or gap in the structure are available to supplement traditional methods.
The author doubts the wisdom of allowing a flag state to permit flammable liquids to be routed
through accommodation spaces and would discourage this practice.
Paragraph 3 takes account of a common source of land fires: clothes or curtains being ignited
because they have been placed over or have come into contact with an electric radiator.
The particular risks associated with the operation of helicopters is discussed briefly in Chapter
12.
Regulation 19 International shore connection.2
1 Ships of 500 tons gross tonnage and upwards shall be provided with at least one international
shore connection, complying with provisions of paragraph 3.
2 Facilities shall be available enabling such a connection to be used on either side of the ship.
3 Standard dimensions of flanges for the international shore connection shall be in accordance with
the following table:
Description Dimension
Outside diameter 178 mm
Inside diameter 64 mm
Bolt circle diameter 132 mm
Slots in flange 4 holes 19 mm in diameter spaced equidistantly on a
bolt circle of the above diameter, slotted to the flange
periphery
Flange thickness 14.5 mm minimum
Bolts and nuts 4, each of 16 mm diameter, 50 mm in length
4 The connection shall be of steel or other suitable material and shall be designed for 1.0 N/mm2
services. The flange shall have a flat face on one side and on the other shall be permanently
attached to a coupling that will fit the ship's hydrant and hose. The connection shall be kept aboard
the ship together with a gasket of any material suitable for 1.0 N/mm2 services, together with four
16 mm bolts, 50 mm in length, and eight washers.
Comment
Figure 8.82 shows the arrangement of the
international ship to shore connection.
One day, the author would like to see a standard
type of international coupling for hydrants, hoses and
nozzles. If such a standard were adopted, within a few
years every ship afloat would be able to use one
another’s equipment in the event of an emergency and
assistance from another vessel required.
FIGURE 8.82 The International Ship

to Shore Connection
2
Refer to resolution A.470(XII) concerning international shore connection (shore side), adopted by the Organization.

Regulation 20 Fire control plans.3
(This regulation applies to all ships).
1 In all ships general arrangement plans shall be permanently exhibited for the guidance of the ship's
officers, showing clearly for each deck the control stations, the various fire sections enclosed by
"A" class divisions, the sections enclosed by "B" class divisions together with particulars of the fire
detection and fire alarm systems, the sprinkler installation, the fire-extinguishing appliances, means
of access to different compartments, decks, etc. and the ventilating system including particulars of
the fan control positions, the position of dampers and identification numbers of the ventilating fans
serving each section. Alternatively, at the discretion of the Administration, the aforementioned
details may be set out in a booklet, a copy of which shall be supplied to each officer, and one copy
shall at all times be available on board in an accessible position. Plans and booklets shall be kept
up to date, any alterations being recorded thereon as soon as practicable. Description in such plans
and booklets shall be in the official language of the flag State. If the language is neither English nor
French, a translation into one of those languages shall be included. In addition, instructions
concerning the maintenance and operation of all the equipment and installations on board for the
fighting and containment of fire shall be kept under one cover, readily available in an accessible
position.
2 In all ships a duplicate set of fire control plans or a booklet containing such plans shall be
permanently stored in a prominently marked weathertight enclosure outside the deckhouse for the
assistance of shoreside fire-fighting personnel.4
3 Fire drills shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of regulation III/18.
4 In ships carrying more than 36 passengers, plans and booklets required by this regulation shall
provide the information regarding fire protection, fire detection and fire extinction based on the
guidelines issued by the Organization5
Comment
Figures 8.83 and 8.84 taken from NFPA 1405 “Guide for Land-Based Fire-Fighters who respond
to Marine Fires” show the typical symbols found on fire plans. The author would like to see copies
of the plans displayed at three locations on board ship:
1. outside the fire station, if installed or on the bulkhead in the officers’ accommodation,
2. on the bulkhead in the ratings’ accommodation, and
3. in the engine control room.
The availability of instructions concerning the maintenance and operation of fire-fighting
equipment is an excellent requirement. A useful addition would be instructions on how to tackle
the various types of fire which could be encountered on each vessel i.e. passenger, cargo, oil tanker,
chemichal carrier, ferry. The “International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code” and the “Emergency
Procedures for Ships carrying Dangerous Goods” published by the IMO give helpful but necessarily
limited advice about what to do in the event of a fire. Both publications will be avaiable on board —
or certainly should be. A book on shipboard fire-fighting should also be available for all ranks.
Regulation 21 Ready availability of fire-extinguishing appliances
Fire-extinguishing appliances shall be kept in good order and be available for immediate use at all
times.
Regulation 22 Acceptance of substitutes
1 This regulation applies to all ships.
2 Where in this chapter any special type of appliance, apparatus, extinguishing medium or
arrangement is specified in any ship, any other type of appliance etc., may be allowed, provided the
Administration is satisfied that it is not less effective.
3
Refer to resolution A.654(16) concerning graphical symbols for fire control plans, adopted by the Organization.
4
Refer also to MSC/Circ. 451: Guidance concerning the location of fire control plans for assistance of shoreside fire-fighting
personnel.
5
Reference is made to the guidelines to be developed by the Organization.

FIGURE 8.83 Fire Control Plan Symbols

FIGURE 8.84 Fire Control Plan Symbols

Chapter Nine
Other Requirements Of SOLAS With

A Bearing On Fire Safety
The purpose of this Chapter is to consider in detail, so far as they have a bearing on the
problems of fire protection and control, the provisions of SOLAS 1974, along with amendments,
which have not been covered in Chapter Eight of this book. Clearly, only the relevant Regulations
will be printed. Chapter II-1 Construction is divided into six sections:
Part A — General
Part B — Subdivision and stability (Passenger ships)
Part B1 — Subdivision and damage stability of cargo ships
Part C — Machinery installations
Part D — Electrical Installations
Part E — Additional requirements for periodically
unattended machinery spaces
The above Regulations cover a wide range of constructional detail — most of which, though of
outstanding value and interest, is clearly outside the scope of this book.
Chapter II-2 has largely been covered in Chapter Eight but where introducing a subject not so
covered, this will be identified.
The method of presentation adopted in Chapter Eight has been followed here. Every subject
being considered in regular order, (listing sequentially, passenger vessels, cargo ships and tankers)
commencing where appropriate, with a short historical introduction followed, where the author
considers it pertinent, by comment relating to the requirements bearing on the subject matter being
discussed.
Watertight Doors
Historical
The first watertight doors manufactured in Britain were made by the famous and old established
firm of J. Stone and Co. (Charlton) Ltd., now a major constituent of Messrs. Stone Platt Industries
Ltd. It was in 1899 that, in conjunction with the then Chief Engineer of the Australian Telegraph
Company, the firm designed a power-operated watertight door which was fitted in the s.s. John
Pender. The door was arranged to open and close by hydraulic power, and was also fitted with a
manual control.
Three years later, the London and North Western Railway fitted power-operated doors,
controlled from the bridge, in their two new cross-channel steamers Slievemore and Scotia.
Hydraulic power was used, together with a power unit with four main pipes operating the hydraulic
cylinders connected to the doors.
About this time also, Norddeutscher Lloyd fitted their liner Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse with the
newly developed Dorr type of power-operated watertight doors. The Hamburg-Amerika Line, not
265
266
Rushbrook’s Fire Aboard
FIGURE 9.1 A typical layout of Messrs. Stone’s “Hyston” system of power-operated watertight
doors. The diagram includes a sketch showing the system for handling of door and control valve.

Other Requirements of SOLAS
267
FIGURE 9.2 A typical layout of the “Hyston” hydraulically operated watertight doors control system ( Class III)
268
Rushbrook’s Fire Aboard
FIGURE 9.3 A typical layout for Messrs. Stone’s fire-door control gear.

Other Requirements of SOLAS 269
to be outdone, promptly fitted 22 power-operated Stone hydraulic doors to its star vessel, the
Deutschland, then holder of the Blue Riband of the Atlantic.
The system fitted to the Deutschland was also of the "four main" type, and had as its power unit
a steam-hydraulic pump with four large steam-hydraulic accumulators which alone had sufficient
power to close, open and re-close all the doors in the ship. (The ability of all watertight-door
control systems to perform these three operations has become a requirement embodied in the
various International Conventions on the Safety of Life at Sea, and in the Regulations of the
Statutory Authorities in all maritime countries) The working pressure of 700 lb. per sq. in. adopted
on the Deutschland is still today employed in all Messrs. Stone's power-operated door systems.
Great interest was aroused in shipping circles by the Deutschland experiment, and more and
more vessels were fitted with such doors. The Stone Company alone supplied no fewer than 89
systems in the year 1904.
By 1911, development work lasting over several years had enabled the company to introduce a
"two-main" hydraulic system which greatly simplified the installation. The first ship to be fitted
with it was the L.N.W.R. steamer Greenore in 1912.
The principle of the new system was that the two mains were so arranged as to act as both
exhaust and pressure mains or, alternatively, as pressure and exhaust mains, according to the
movement of a master valve controlled from the bridge. The pressure flowing through the main
moved the piston in the door cylinder and thus operated the door. With all doors closed from the
bridge, any single door could be opened locally by a control-valve handle at either side of it; this
altered the disposition of the valve, changed the direction of flow of the pressure fluid, and so
opened the door. After the operator had passed through, retaining the handle in the open position
as he did so, he would then release it, so enabling the valves to return to normal and the door to
re-close under bridge control.
The advent of the diesel engine brought with it the need to operate doors by methods other than
steam. Electrically-driven pumps were introduced for use on vessels in which no steam was
available; and in 1924, Stone's developed their hydro-pneumatic system, in which the hydraulic
pressure is provided by a full-capacity electrically-driven pump in circuit both with the mains and
with an air-loaded accumulator. In the event of pump failure, this accumulator can by itself
provide the power necessary to open and close all doors.
Chapter II-1 Regulation 15. Openings in watertight bulkheads in passenger ships

1 The number of openings in watertight bulkheads shall be reduced to the minimum compatible with
the design and proper working of the ship; satisfactory means shall be provided for closing these
openings.
2.1 Where pipes, scuppers, electric cables, etc., are carried through watertight subdivision bulkheads,
arrangements shall be made to ensure the watertight integrity of the bulkheads.
2.2 Valves not forming part of a piping system shall not be permitted in watertight subdivision
bulkheads.
2.3 Lead or other heat sensitive materials shall not be used in systems which penetrate watertight
subdivision bulkheads, where deterioration of such systems in the event of fire would impair the
watertight integrity of the bulkheads.
3.1 No doors, manholes, or access openings are permitted:
.1 in the collision bulkhead below the margin line;
.2 in watertight transverse bulkheads dividing a cargo space from an adjoining

cargo space or from a permanent or reserve bunker, except as provided in
paragraph 10.1 and in regulation 16.
3.2 Except as provided in paragraph 3.3, the collision bulkhead may be pierced below the margin line
by not more than one pipe for dealing with fluid in the forepeak tank, provided that the pipe is fitted
with a screwdown valve capable of being operated from above the bulkhead deck, the valve chest
being secured inside the forepeak to the collision bulkhead. The Administration may, however,
authorize the fitting of this valve on the after side of the collision bulkhead provided that the valve
is readily accessible under all service conditions and the space in which it is located is not a cargo
space.

3.3 If the forepeak is divided to hold two different kinds of liquids the Administration may allow the
collision bulkhead to be pierced below the margin line by two pipes, each of which is fitted as
required by paragraph 3.2, provided the Administration is satisfied that there is no practical
alternative to the fitting of such a second pipe and that, having regard to the additional subdivision
provided in the forepeak, the safety of the ship is maintained.
4.1 Watertight doors fitted in bulkheads between permanent and reserve bunkers shall always be
accessible, except as provided in paragraph 9.4 for between-deck bunker doors.
4.2 Satisfactory arrangements shall be made by means of screens or otherwise to prevent the coal
from interfering with the closing of watertight bunker doors.
5 Subject to paragraph 11, not more than one door, apart from the doors to bunkers and shaft
tunnels, may be fitted in each main transverse bulkhead within spaces containing the main and
auxiliary propulsion machinery including boilers serving the needs of propulsion and all
permanent bunkers. Where two or more shafts are fitted, the tunnels shall be connected by an
intercommunicating passage. There shall be only one door between the machinery space and the
tunnel spaces where two shafts are fitted and only two doors where there are more than two
shafts. All these doors shall be of the sliding type and shall be so located as to have their sills as
high as practicable. The hand gear for operating these doors from above the bulkhead deck shall
be situated outside the spaces containing the machinery.
6.1 Watertight doors, except as provided in paragraph 10.1 or regulation 16, shall be power-operated
sliding doors complying with the requirements of paragraph 7 capable of being closed
simultaneously from the central operating console at the navigating bridge in not more than 60 s
with the ship in the upright position.
6.2 The means of operation whether by power or by hand of any power-operated sliding watertight
door shall be capable of closing the door with the ship listed to 15° either way. Consideration shall
also be given to the forces which may act on either side of the door as may be experienced when
water is flowing through the opening applying a static head equivalent to a water height of at least
1 m above the sill on the centreline of the door.
6.3 Watertight door controls, including hydraulic piping and electric cables, shall be kept as close as
practicable to the bulkhead in which the doors are fitted, in order to minimize the likelihood of
them being involved in any damage which the ship may sustain. The positioning of watertight
doors and their controls shall be such that if the ship sustains damage within one fifth of the
breadth of the ship, as defined in regulation 2, such distance being measured at right angles to the
centreline at the level of the deepest subdivision load line, the operation of the watertight doors
clear of the damaged portion of the ship is not impaired.
6.4 All power-operated sliding watertight doors shall be provided with means of indication which will
show at all remote operating positions whether the doors are open or closed. Remote operating
positions shall only be at the navigating bridge as required by paragraph 7.1.5 and at the location
where hand operation above the bulkhead deck is required by paragraph 7.1.4.
6.5 In ships constructed before 1 February 1992, doors which do not comply with paragraphs 6.1 to 6.4
shall be closed before the voyage commences, and shall be kept closed during navigation; the
time of opening such doors in port and of closing them before the ship leaves port shall be
entered into the log-book.
7.1 Each power-operated sliding watertight door:
.1 shall have a vertical or horizontal motion;
.2 shall, subject to paragraph 11, be normally limited to a maximum clear opening

width of 1.2 m. The Administration may permit larger doors only to the extent
considered necessary for the effective operation of the ship provided that other
safety measures, including the following, are taken into consideration:
.2.1 special consideration shall be given to the strength of the

door and its closing appliances in order to prevent leakages;
.2.2 the door shall be located outside the damage zone (B / 5);
.2.3 the door shall be kept closed when the ship is at sea, except
for limited periods when absolutely necessary as determined
by the Administration;
.3 shall be fitted with the necessary equipment to open and close the door using
electric power, hydraulic power, or any other form of power that is acceptable to
the Administration;
.4 shall be provided with an individual hand-operated mechanism. It shall be

possible to open and close the door by hand at the door itself from either side,
and in addition, close the door from an accessible position above the bulkhead

deck with an all round crank motion or some other movement providing the
same degree of safety acceptable to the Administration. Direction of rotation or
other movement is to be clearly indicated at all operating positions. The time
necessary for the complete closure of the door, when operating by hand gear,
shall not exceed 90 s with the ship in the upright position;
.5 shall be provided with controls for opening and closing the door by power from
both sides of the door and also for closing the door by power from the central
operating console at the navigating bridge;
.6 shall be provided with an audible alarm, distinct from any other alarm in the
area, which will sound whenever the door is closed remotely by power and
which shall sound for at least 5 s but no more than 10 s before the door begins
to move and shall continue sounding until the door is completely closed. In the
case of remote hand operation it is sufficient for the audible alarm to sound only
when the door is moving. Additionally, in passenger areas and areas of high
ambient noise the Administration may require the audible alarm to be
supplemented by an intermittent visual signal at the door; and
.7 shall have an approximately uniform rate of closure under power. The closure
time, from the time the door begins to move to the time it reaches the
completely closed position, shall in no case be less than 20 s or more than 40 s
with the ship in the upright position.
7.2 The electrical power required for power-operated sliding watertight doors shall be supplied from
the emergency switchboard either directly or by a dedicated distribution board situated above the
bulkhead deck. The associated control, indication and alarm circuits shall be supplied from the
emergency switchboard either directly or by a dedicated distribution board situated above the
bulkhead deck and be capable of being automatically supplied by the transitional source of
emergency electrical power required by regulation 42.3.1.3 in the event of failure of either the main
or emergency source of electrical power.
7.3 Power-operated sliding watertight doors shall have either:
.1 a centralized hydraulic system with two independent power sources each

consisting of a motor and pump capable of simultaneously closing all doors. In
addition, there shall be for the whole installation hydraulic accumulators of
sufficient capacity to operate all the doors at least three times, i.e.
closed-open-closed, against an adverse list of 15°. This operating cycle shall be
capable of being carried out when the accumulator is at the pump cut-in
pressure. The fluid used shall be chosen considering the temperatures liable to
be encountered by the installation during its service. The power operating
system shall be designed to minimize the possibility of having a single failure in
the hydraulic piping adversely affect the operation of more than one door. The
hydraulic system shall be provided with a low-level alarm for hydraulic fluid
reservoirs serving the power-operated system and a low gas pressure alarm or
other effective means of monitoring loss of stored energy in hydraulic
accumulators. These alarms are to be audible and visual and shall be situated
on the central operating console at the navigating bridge; or
.2 an independent hydraulic system for each door with each power source
consisting of a motor and pump capable of opening and closing the door. In
addition, there shall be a hydraulic accumulator of sufficient capacity to operate
the door at least three times, i.e. closed-open-closed, against an adverse list of
15°. This operating cycle shall be capable of being carried out when the
accumulator is at the pump cut-in pressure. The fluid used shall be chosen
considering the temperatures liable to be encountered by the installation during
its service. A low gas pressure group alarm or other effective means of
monitoring loss of stored energy in hydraulic accumulators shall be provided at
the central operating console on the navigating bridge. Loss of stored energy
indication at each local operating position shall also be provided; or
.3 an independent electrical system and motor for each door with each power
source consisting of a motor capable of opening and closing the door. The
power source shall be capable of being automatically supplied by the
transitional source of emergency electrical power as required by regulation
42.4.2-in the event of failure of either the main or emergency source of electrical
power and with sufficient capacity to operate the door at least three times, i.e.
closed-open-closed, against an adverse list of 15°.
For the systems specified in 7.3.1, 7.3.2 and 7.3.3, provision should be made as
follows:
Power systems for power-operated watertight sliding doors shall be separate

from any other power system. A single failure in the electric or hydraulic
power-operated systems excluding the hydraulic actuator shall not prevent the
hand operation of any door.

7.4 Control handles shall be provided at each side of the bulkhead at a minimum height of 1.6 m above
the floor and shall be so arranged as to enable persons passing through the doorway to hold both
handles in the open position without being able to set the power closing mechanism in operation
accidently. The direction of movement of the handles in opening and closing the door shall be in
the direction of door movement and shall be clearly indicated.
7.5 As far as practicable, electrical equipment and components for watertight doors shall be situated
above the bulkhead deck and outside hazardous areas and spaces.
7.6 The enclosures of electrical components necessarily situated below the bulkhead deck shall
provide suitable protection against the ingress of water1.
7.7 Electric power, control, indication and alarm circuits shall be protected against fault in such a way
that a failure in one door circuit will not cause a failure in any other door circuit. Short circuits or
other faults in the alarm or indicator circuits of a door shall not result in a loss of power operation
of that door. Arrangements shall be such that leakage of water into the electrical equipment
located below the bulkhead deck will not cause the door to open.
7.8 A single electrical failure in the power operating or control system of a power-operated sliding
watertight door shall not result in a closed door opening. Availability of the power supply should
be continuously monitored at a point in the electrical circuit as near as practicable to each of the
motors required by paragraph 7.3. Loss of any such power supply should activate an audible and
visual alarm at the central operating console at the navigating bridge.
8.1 The central operating console at the navigating bridge shall have a "master mode" switch with two
modes of control: a "local control" mode which shall allow any door to be locally opened and
locally closed after use without automatic closure, and a "doors closed" mode which shall
automatically close any door that is open. The "doors closed" mode shall automatically close any
door that is open. The "doors closed" mode shall permit doors to be opened locally and shall
automatically reclose the doors upon release of the local control mechanism. The "master mode"
switch shall normally be in the "local control" mode. The "doors closed" mode shall only be used
in an emergency or for testing purposes. Special consideration shall be given to the reliability of
the "master mode" switch.
8.2 The central operating console at the navigating bridge shall be provided with a diagram showing
the location of each door, with visual indicators to show whether each door is open or closed. A
red light shall indicate a door is fully open and a green light shall indicate a door is fully closed.
When the door is closed remotely the red light shall indicate the intermediate position by flashing.
The indicating circuit shall be independent of the control circuit for each door.
8.3 It shall not be possible to remotely open any door from the central operating console.
9.1 All watertight doors shall be kept closed during navigation except that they may be opened during
navigation as specified in paragraphs 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4. Watertight doors of width of more than 1.2 m
permitted by paragraph 11 may only be opened in the circumstances detailed in that paragraph.
Any door which is opened in accordance with this paragraph shall be ready to be immediately
closed.
9.2 A watertight door may be opened during navigation to permit the passage of passengers or crew,
or when work in the immediate vicinity of the door necessitates it being opened. The door must be
immediately closed when transit through the door is complete or when the task which necessitated
it being open is finished.
9.3 Certain watertight doors may be permitted to remain open during navigation only if considered
absolutely necessary; that is, being open is determined essential to the safe and effective
operation of the ship's machinery or to permit passengers normally unrestricted access
throughout the passenger area. Such determination shall be made by the Administration only after
careful consideration of the impact on ship operations and survivability. A watertight door
permitted to remain thus open shall be clearly indicated in the ship's stability information and shall
always be ready to be immediately closed.
9.4 Sliding watertight doors fitted between bunkers in the between-decks below the bulkhead deck
may sometimes be open at sea for the purpose of trimming coal. The opening and closing of these
doors shall be recorded in such log-book as may be prescribed by the Administration.
10.1 If the Administration is satisfied that such doors are essential, watertight doors of satisfactory
construction may be fitted in watertight bulkheads dividing cargo between deck spaces. Such
doors may be hinged, rolling or sliding doors but shall not be remotely controlled. They shall be
1
Refer to the following IEC publication 529, 1976:
.1 electrical motors, associated circuits and control components; protected to IPX7 standard;
.2 door position indicators and associated circuit components; protected to IPX8 standard; and
.3 door movement warning signals; protected to IPX6 standard.
Other arrangements for the enclosures of electrical components may be fitted provided the Administration is satisfied that an equivalent
protection is achieved. The water pressure testing of the enclosures protected to IPX8 shall be based on the pressure that may occur at the
location of the component during flooding for a period of 36 h.

fitted at the highest level and as far from the shell plating as practicable, but in no case shall the
outboard vertical edges be situated at a distance from the shell plating which is less than one fifth
of the breadth of the ship, as defined in regulation 2, such distance being measured at right angles
to the centreline at the level of the deepest subdivision load line.
10.2 Such doors shall be closed before the voyage commences and shall be kept closed during
navigation; the time of opening such doors in port and of closing them before the ship leaves port
shall be entered in the log-book. Should any of the doors be accessible during the voyage, they
shall be fitted with a device which prevents unauthorized opening. When it is proposed to fit such
doors, the number and arrangements shall receive the special consideration of the Administration.
11 Portable plates on bulkheads shall not be permitted except in machinery spaces. Such plates shall
always be in place before the ship leaves port, and shall not be removed during navigation except
in case of urgent necessity at the discretion of the master. The times of removal and replacement
of any such portable plates shall be recorded in the log-book, and the necessary precautions shall
be taken in replacing them to ensure that the joints are watertight. The Administration may permit
not more than one power-operated sliding watertight door in each main transverse bulkhead larger
than those specified in paragraph 7.1.2 to be substituted for these portable plates, provided these
doors are closed before the ship leaves port and remain closed during navigation except in case of
urgent necessity at the discretion of the master. These doors need not meet the requirements of
paragraph 7.1.4 regarding complete closure by hand-operated gear in 90 s. The time of opening
and closing these doors, whether the ship is at sea or in port, shall be recorded in the log-book.
12.1 Where trunkways or tunnels for access from crew accommodation to the stokehold, for piping, or
for any other purpose are carried through main transverse watertight bulkheads, they shall be
watertight and in accordance with the requirements of regulation 19. The access to at least one
end of each such tunnel or trunkway, if used as a passage at sea, shall be through a trunk
extending watertight to a height sufficient to permit access above the margin line. The access to
the other end of the trunkway or tunnel may be through a watertight door of the type required by its
location in the ship. Such trunkways or tunnels shall not extend through the first subdivision
bulkhead abaft the collision bulkhead.
12.2 Where it is proposed to fit tunnels piercing main transverse watertight bulkheads, these shall
receive the special consideration of the Administration.
12.3 Where trunkways in connection with refrigerated cargo and ventilation or forced draught trunks
are carried through more than one watertight bulkhead, the means of closure at such openings
shall be operated by power and be capable of being closed from a central position situated above
the bulkhead deck.
Comment
Many of these regulations are of little concern to a fire officer, but some have a direct bearing
on fire-fighting operations.
The number of openings in watertight bulkheads must be kept to the minimum compatible with
the design and proper working of the ship. Access to the shaft tunnel must be from a watertight
trunkway extending to a point above the margin line, and via a watertight door at the other end. A
sill must be provided at each door opening as high as possible in the ship. The means of closing
openings in watertight bulkheads is generally by means of sliding doors; but in certain positions
above the deepest sub-division load water line, hinged doors are allowed.
Every sliding watertight door in ships must be connected with an indicator at every position
from which the door can be closed, showing whether the door is open or closed. A warning signal
must be fitted to every door indicating that it is about to be closed. The signal must precede the
closing of the door, so that everybody can be warned to move out of the way.
Watertight doors must be operated by power, and be capable of being simultaneously closed
from a central control on the bridge. When these doors are power-controlled from a central
control, the system must be so arranged that they can also be operated by power at the door itself.
The arrangement must be such that the door will close automatically after being opened at the door
itself, if it has first been closed from the central control; and must be capable of keeping the door
itself closed notwithstanding any attempt made to open it at the central control. Handles for
controlling the power system must be so arranged on both sides of the bulkhead that any person
passing through the doorway can hold both handles in the open position simultaneously.
In every ship of there must be at least two sources of power for opening and closing all sliding
watertight doors. An indicator must be provided at the central control to show whether sufficient
power is available for such purposes. Any fluid used in the system must be non-freezing at any
temperatures likely to be encountered by the ship.

Efficient hand-operating gear must also be provided for these doors, such that it can be operated
both at the door itself and at an accessible position above the bulkhead deck. In the latter position,
the hand-operating gear must be operated by an all-round crank.
1. Watertight doors which automatically close and stay closed as long as the central control is in
the "ON" position are a source of great difficulty to firemen. Although it is highly desirable that
all such doors should be kept closed at sea, during fire-fighting operations in port, things are very
different. In the case of a bad fire in the engine-room, for instance, the only effective entry for the
fire-fighters may be via the shaft tunnel. Now between the entrance to the tunnel shaft and the
engine-room of a very large vessel there may well be two or more watertight doors to traverse.
Firemen attempting to take hose through these doors find that it is almost always cut neatly in two
when the doors automatically close—and there is no way of quickly notifying the bridge "for
Heaven's sake to open the switch quick! Imagine, too, the thought of a fireman in the tunnel,
probably working in the pitch dark, on finding that these massive doors (which can easily cut a
man in half) are closing behind him, and not knowing how to get a message to the bridge to leave
them open! It is this sort of situation which makes it imperative that all port firemen should make
regular visits to, and conduct exercises on, all major vessels which enter the docks covered by the
Brigade to which they belong. For example the Queen Elizabeth (QE II) has as many as 49 of
these power-controlled doors, so the magnitude of the problem can easily be seen.
2. Watertight doors which are not power-operated from a central control are required to be
provided with a means of communication from the bridge to the controlling position. This can be
by means of either telegraph or telephone. It would obviously be an advantage if similar means of
communication, preferably by telephone, could be provided beside every watertight door. This
would enable the fire-fighters to talk to the bridge, and ask for the doors to be made capable of
local control.
If this cannot be done, the installation of an isolating switch or valve suitably protected behind a
glass panel, to be broken only in an emergency, would be a desirable substitute. It is appreciated
that some additional means would have to be provided whereby the door would again be closed in
the event of fire driving the firefighters from the compartment. This might be by means of an
overriding control on the bridge which would only be operated when it was absolutely certain that
all fire-fighters had made their escape through the door in question.
3. Occasionally the emergency pump is fitted here, and it can readily be started by the
fire-fighter. Two or three lengths of hose should also be permanently stored at this point, together
with a spray nozzle.
It will be recalled that Chapter II-2 Regulation 11 paragraph 6 states:
When access to any machinery space of category A is provided at a low level from an
adjacent shaft tunnel, there shall be provided in the shaft tunnel, near the watertight
door, a light steel fire-screen door operable from each side.
These doors can be easily opened and closed by men fighting an engine-room fire and give
protection to the fire-fighters whilst the heavy watertight door leading into the engine-room was
open. The firemen could then partly open the light-weight protecting door, enough only to insert
and direct their water jet to the best advantage while receiving the maximum of protection against
heat and flames themselves. The superior manoeuvrability of such a light-weight door would
allow much greater flexibility of fire-fighting operations than does the necessarily slow movement
of the heavy main watertight door with its electrical or manual controls. Thus the fire-fighters will
be in the most advantageous position vis-à-vis heat.
4. There have been over the years some disastrous fires on land in which huge buildings have
been lost through the great build-up of heat under roofs impervious to the upward passage of air.
The classic case is probably the General Motors Fire at Livonia, U.S.A., in 1953, in which an
almost new building covering an area of no less than 34½ acres suffered damage amounting to
some $55,000,000. The Jaguar Motors fire at Coventry in 1957 was another example of a building

without adequate controllable ventilation in which a disastrous loss occurred. (In both cases,
needless to say, heavy claims were met by Lloyd's and the British insurance companies. The
re-insurance and "excess-of-loss" facilities offered by the London market are such that it can
seldom be unaffected by a major industrial or maritime fire anywhere in those areas of the world in
which it is permitted to afford cover.)
Such fires prove that the automatic stopping-up of all ventilation as soon as a fire breaks out,
without any provision for opening to atmosphere should circumstances so require, can be a very
dangerous procedure. Serious thought is now being given by fire-fighters to the pro's and con's of
controllable ventilation in dealing with fires on land (including harbour and dock areas with large
warehouses packed with highly flammable goods); and the author sees no reason why the problem
should be regarded as less urgent on board ship.
A good deal of practical experience, and a close study of many fires in engine-rooms, leads him
to believe that it would be desirable to install at the top of all engine-room casings a haystack type
of lantern such as has long been used to protect the stage areas of theatres-with the proviso that any
such form of ventilation should not be automatically operated but should be capable of being
opened or closed by remotely located controls. These controls must be situated where they are
unlikely to be affected by any fire in the engine-room or machinery-space. (The purpose of the
haystack lantern installed in theatres is to draw upwards the hot gases from a fire on the stage, and
to allow the fire-fighters to get beneath the flames. This enables the fire-fighting to be carried out,
FIGURE 9.4 Sketch shows the effect of smoke when the engine-room skylights are closed and
the watertight door from the shaft tunnel is opened.
FIGURE 9.5 Sketch shows how an open engine-room skylight makes easy fire-fighting access
available from the shaft tunnel.

not only in comparative comfort, but also (which is far more important) under conditions in which
the fire-fighters can see what they are doing.)
Everybody knows that "hot air rises". It follows that in the course of a fire, the hottest place is
always at roof level. This being true, fire-fighters always like to get level with (or if possible
underneath) any fire with which they are engaged. Even in the case of a relatively small cabin fire,
the fire-fighters lie on the floor to escape the heat wave.
When a ship's engine-room or machinery-space is involved, the best way in which to get to
close quarters with it is via the shaft tunnel, if one is installed. It should be explained, for the
benefit of the non-seafaring reader, that the shaft tunnel follows the line of the drive shafts and
extends from the stern and enters the engine-room horizontally at floor level where the opening is
protected by a massive watertight door. It should also be said that in most modern ships
engine-rooms are situated right aft, which means that shaft tunnels are very short indeed. It is only
by following this route that fire-fighters can achieve their object of getting level with, or
underneath the flames.
When the whole of the engine-room casing has been battened down, however, it is obviously
very dangerous for the fire-fighters to open the watertight door leading from the shaft tunnel to the
engine-room. They are liable to be met by a blast of flame and hot gases which will at least chase
them out on deck again, even if it does not cause injury or worse. If, on the other hand, a hatch or
fanlight at the top of the engine-room casing is left open, the air to feed the fire will be drawn
along the shaft tunnel past the fire-fighters, and will draw the hot gases away from them (see
Figure 9.5).
It is, of course, correct practice, if fixed fire-fighting installations are fitted to the engine-room,
and if everyone has certainly made his escape, to batten down completely and to allow the
extinguishing medium to do his work. But even then there will inevitably be times when the
machine will fail and men will have to go in and do the job.
In such a crisis, the following sequence of operations should be maintained:
1. All ventilators should be shut down, and all horizontal openings leading out of the
engine-room, such as the doors leading into the engineers' accommodation, should be
closed.
2. Emergency fire pumps should be started.
3. A line of hose, with a spray nozzle attached, should be led to the watertight door at the
entrance to the engine-room. There should be found in the tunnel, close to the watertight
door, a hydrant fitted especially to assist in the event of an engine room fire.
4. The water should be turned on, but the control nozzle at the end of the hose should be kept
closed.
5. All personnel in, or liable to enter, the shaft tunnel should don breathing apparatus.
6. On a signal from the officer in charge of the fire-fighting (and from him only), a hatch or
fanlight at the top of the engine-room casing should be opened.
7. The watertight door should then be opened slightly, and the fire-fighters should play their
jet into the engine-room, protecting themselves behind the cover of the door as they do so.
8. When the atmosphere has been somewhat cooled, the door should be fully opened and the
jet advanced into the engine-room, together with as many others as can be connected up. It
is important that water should then be used to the best advantage. For example, if it is
known that there are over-head oil-tanks in the engine-room, these should be hit with a jet
to keep them cool. But this is the only time a jet should be used — at all other times
fire-fighting in engine-rooms should be carried out with water spray. If the area in which
the fire started is known, it must obviously receive special attention; and all metal which
might have been heated by the fire enough to cause it to re-ignite (or "flash-back") should
be carefully cooled. Fire under the engine-room plates should also receive special
attention.
9. As soon as the fire is under control, all available ventilation should be opened to remove
smoke and to dissipate the remaining heat.

Other Requirements of SOLAS
277
FIGURE 9.6 A typical Messrs. Stone’s hydraulic-skylight control system.

This whole problem of ventilation control during the fighting of fires in engine-rooms and
machinery-spaces is one to which not nearly enough attention has been directed. As the
Scandinavian Star illustrated, the control of the ventilation system is of the utmost importance in
preventing smoke spread in passenger vessels. Smoke not only makes breathing difficult and in
sufficient concentration is lethal, its initial effect is to impede vision and disorientate those
attempting to find the emergency exits. This is where low level escape route marking either by
lights or by fluorescent tape can be of great benefit to those trying to find their way out. It can also
be of use to fire-fighters trying to find their way about. The author has advocated at conferences
and in many articles the benefits of low level exit signs. It is with much pleasure that he notes such
a system has been installed aboard the Oriana who have used aircraft type floor lighting in
alleyways as a positive guide for passengers to reach the exits.
Regulation 23. Damage control in passenger ships

There shall be permanently exhibited, for the guidance of the officer in charge of the ship, plans
showing clearly for each deck and hold the boundaries of the watertight compartments, the
openings therein with the means of closure and position of any controls thereof, and the
arrangements for the correction of any list due to flooding. In addition, booklets containing the
aforementioned information shall be made available to the officers of the ship.
Regulation 23-1. Damage control in dry cargo ships

1 There shall be permanently exhibited or readily available on the navigating bridge, for the guidance
of the officer in charge of the ship, a plan showing clearly for each deck and hold the boundaries
of the watertight compartments, the openings therein with the means of closure and position of
any controls thereof, and the arrangements for the correction of any list due to flooding. In
addition, booklets containing the aforementioned information shall be made available to the
officers of the ship2. [See footnote 25]
2 Indicators shall be provided for all sliding doors and for hinged doors in watertight bulkheads.
Indication showing whether the doors are open or closed shall be given on the navigating bridge.
In addition, shell doors and other openings which, in the opinion of the Administration, could lead
to major flooding if left open or not properly secured, shall be provided with such indicators.
3.1 General precautions shall consist of a listing of equipment, conditions and operational
procedures, considered by the Administration to be necessary to maintain watertight integrity
under normal ship operations.
3.2 Specific precautions shall consist of a listing of elements (i.e. closures, security of cargo,
sounding of alarms, etc.) considered by the Administration to be vital to the survival of the ship
and its crew.
Comment
Under the subject of damage control—Regulations 23 and 23.1—it is difficult to understand
why there should be any difference between the main list of requirements applicable to passenger
and cargo vessels. In the case of the former ship type the first line reads:
There shall be permanently exhibited, for the guidance of the officer in charge of the
ship, plans ....
In the case of the latter ship type the first line reads:
There shall be permanently exhibited or readily available on the navigating bridge, for
the guidance....
Surely it is equally important for all types of ship to have these important plans "permanently
exhibited" with no choice of having them "readily available". Readily available can so easily lead
to "mislaid" or even "lost" at the crucial time they are urgently required!
2
Refer to MSC/Circ.434: Guidelines for the preparation of information on the effect of flooding to be provided to masters of dry cargo ships.

Regulation 24. Marking, periodical operation of watertight doors, etc., in passenger ships
2.1 Drills for the operating of watertight doors, sidescuttles, valves and closing mechanisms of
scuppers, ash-chutes and rubbish-chutes shall take place weekly. In ships in which the voyage
exceeds one week in duration a complete drill shall be held before leaving port, and others
thereafter at least once a week during the voyage.
2.2 All watertight doors, both hinged and power operated, in main transverse bulkheads, in use at sea,
shall be operated daily.
3.1 The watertight doors and all mechanisms and indicators connected therewith, all valves, the
closing of which is necessary to make a compartment watertight, and all valves the operation of
which is necessary for damage control cross-connections shall be periodically inspected at sea at
least once a week.
3.2 Such valves, doors and mechanisms shall be suitably marked to ensure that they may be properly
used to provide maximum safety.
Regulation 25. Entries in log of passenger ships

2 Hinged doors, portable plates, sidescuttles, gangway, cargo and coaling ports and other openings,
which are required by these regulations to be kept closed during navigation, shall be closed before
the ship leaves port. The time of closing and the time of opening (if permissible under these
regulations) shall be recorded in such log-book as may be prescribed by the Administration.
3 A record of all drills and inspections required by regulation 24 shall be entered in the log-book with
an explicit record of any defects which may be disclosed.
Comment
The importance of regular fire drills and how they should be conducted is discussed in detail at
Chapter 13.
Chapter II-1 Part C Machinery Installations
Regulation 39. Location of emergency installations in passenger ships

Emergency sources of electrical power, fire pumps, bilge pumps except those specifically serving
the spaces forward of the collision bulkhead, any fixed fire-extinguishing system required by
chapter II-2 and other emergency installations which are essential for the safety of the ship, except
anchor windlasses, shall not be installed forward of the collision bulkhead.
Electrical Installations
Chapter II-1 Part D Electrical Installations
Regulation 40. General

1 Electrical installations shall be such that:
.1 all electrical auxiliary services necessary for maintaining the ship in normal
operational and habitable conditions will be ensured without recourse to the
emergency source of electrical power;
.2 electrical services essential for safety will be ensured under various emergency
conditions; and
.3 the safety of passengers, crew and ship from electrical hazards will be ensured.
2 The Administration shall take appropriate steps to ensure uniformity in the implementation and
application of the provisions of this part in respect of electrical installations3.
3
Refer to the Recommendations published by the International Electrotechnical Commission and, in particular, Publication 92-Electrical
Installations in Ships.

Regulation 41. Main source of electrical power and lighting systems

1.1 A main source of electrical power of sufficient capacity to supply all those services mentioned in
regulation 40.1.1 shall be provided. This main source of electrical power shall consist of at least
two generating sets.
1.2 The capacity of these generating sets shall be such that in the event of any one generating set
being stopped it will still be possible to supply those services necessary to provide normal
operational conditions of propulsion and safety. Minimum comfortable conditions of habitability
shall also be ensured which include at least adequate services for cooking, heating, domestic
refrigeration, mechanical ventilation, sanitary and fresh water.
1.3 The arrangements of the ship's main source of electrical power shall be such that the services
referred to in regulation 40.1.1 can be maintained regardless of the speed and direction of rotation
of the propulsion machinery or shafting.
1.4 In addition, the generating sets shall be such as to ensure that with any one generator or its
primary source of power out of operation, the remaining generating sets shall be capable of
providing the electrical services necessary to start the main propulsion plant from a dead ship
condition. The emergency source of electrical power may be used for the purpose of starting from
a dead ship condition if its capability either alone or combined with that of any other source of
electrical power is sufficient to provide at the same time those services required to be supplied by
regulations 42.2.1 to 42.2.3 or 43.2.1 to 43.2.4.
1.5 Where transformers constitute an essential part of the electrical supply system required by this
paragraph, the system shall be so arranged as to ensure the same continuity of the supply as is
stated in this paragraph.
5 Ships constructed on or after 1 July 1998:
.1 in addition to paragraphs 1 to 3, shall comply with the following:
.1.1 where the main source of electrical power is necessary for

propulsion and steering of the ship, the system shall be so
arranged that the electrical supply to equipment necessary for
propulsion and steering and to ensure safety of the ship will be
maintained or immediately restored in the case of loss of any
one of the generators in service;
.1.2 load shedding or other equivalent arrangements shall be

provided to protect the generators required by this regulation
against sustained overload;
.1.3 where the main source of electrical power is necessary for

propulsion of the ship, the main busbar shall be subdivided
into at least two parts which shall normally be connected by
circuit breakers or other approved means; so far as is
practicable, the connection of generating sets and other
duplicated equipment shall be equally divided between the
parts; and
.2 need not comply with paragraph 4."
2.1 A main electric lighting system which shall provide illumination throughout those parts of the ship
normally accessible to and used by passengers or crew shall be supplied from the main source of
electrical power.
2.2 The arrangement of the main electric lighting system shall be such that a fire or other casualty in
spaces containing the main source of electrical power, associated transforming equipment, if any,
the main switchboard and the main lighting switchboard, will not render the emergency electric
lighting system required by regulations 42.2.1 and 42.2.2 or 43.2.1, 43.2.2 and 43.2.3 inoperative.
2.3 The arrangement of the emergency electric lighting system shall be such that a fire or other
casualty in spaces containing the emergency source of electrical power, associated transforming
equipment, if any, the emergency switchboard and the emergency lighting switchboard will not
render the main electric lighting system required by this regulation inoperative.
3 The main switchboard shall be so placed relative to one main generating station that, as far as is
practicable, the integrity of the normal electrical supply may be affected only by a fire or other
casualty in one space. An environmental enclosure for the main switchboard, such as may be
provided by a machinery control room situated within the main boundaries of the space, is not to
be considered as separating the switchboards from the generators.
4 Where the total installed electrical power of the main generating sets is in excess of 3 MW, the
main busbars shall be subdivided into at least two parts which shall normally be connected by
removable links or other approved means; so far as is practicable, the connection of generating

sets and any other duplicated equipment shall be equally divided between the parts. Equivalent
arrangements may be permitted to the satisfaction of the Administration.
Regulation 42. Emergency source of electrical power in passenger ships

1.1 A self-contained emergency source of electrical power shall be provided.
1.2 The emergency source of electrical power, associated transforming equipment, if any, transitional
source of emergency power, emergency switchboard and emergency lighting switchboard shall be
located above the uppermost continuous deck and shall be readily accessible from the open deck.
They shall not be located forward of the collision bulkhead.
1.3 The location of the emergency source of electrical power and associated transforming equipment,
if any, the transitional source of emergency power, the emergency switchboard and the emergency
electric lighting switchboards in relation to the main source of electrical power, associated
transforming equipment, if any, and the main switchboard shall be such as to ensure to the
satisfaction of the Administration that a fire or other casualty in spaces containing the main source
of electrical power, associated transforming equipment, if any, and the main switchboard or in any
machinery space of category A will not interfere with the supply, control and distribution of
emergency electrical power. As far as practicable, the space containing the emergency source of
electrical power, associated transforming equipment, if any, the transitional source of emergency
electrical power and the emergency switchboard shall not be contiguous to the boundaries of
machinery spaces of category A or those spaces containing the main source of electrical power,
associated transforming equipment, if any, or the main switchboard.
1.4 Provided that suitable measures are taken for safeguarding independent emergency operation
under all circumstances, the emergency generator may be used exceptionally, and for short
periods, to supply non-emergency circuits.
2 The electrical power available shall be sufficient to supply all those services that are essential for
safety in an emergency, due regard being paid to such services as may have to be operated
simultaneously. The emergency source of electrical power shall be capable, having regard to
starting currents and the transitory nature of certain loads, of supplying simultaneously at least the
following services for the periods specified hereinafter, if they depend upon an electrical source
for their operation:
2.1 For a period of 36 h, emergency lighting:
.1 at every muster and embarkation station and over the sides as required by
regulations III/11.4 and III/15.7;
.2 in alleyways, stairways and exits giving access to the muster and embarkation
stations, as required by regulation III/11.5;
.3 in all service and accommodation alleyways, stairways and exits, personnel lift
cars;
.4 in the machinery spaces and main generating stations including their control
positions;
.5 in all control stations, machinery control rooms, and at each main and
emergency switchboard;
.6 at all stowage positions for firemen's outfits;
.7 at the steering gear; and
.8 at the fire pump, the sprinkler pump and the emergency bilge pump referred to
in paragraph 2.4 and at the starting position of their motors.
2.2 For a period of 36 h:
.1 the navigation lights and other lights required by the International Regulations
for Preventing Collisions at Sea in force; and
.2 on ships constructed on or after 1 February 1995, the VHF radio installation

required by regulation IV/7.1.1 and IV/7.1.2; and, if applicable:
.2.1 the MF radio installation required by regulations IV/9.1.1, IV/9.1.2, IV/10.1.2 and
IV/10.1.3;
.2.2 the ship earth station required by regulation IV/10.1.1; and
.2.3 the MF/HF radio installation required by regulations IV/10.2.1, IV/10.2.2 and
IV/11.1.

.1 all internal communication equipment required in an emergency;
.2 the shipborne navigational equipment as required by regulation V/12; where

such provision is unreasonable or impracticable the Administration may waive
this requirement for ships of less than 5,000 tons gross tonnage;
.3 the fire detection and fire alarm system, and the fire door holding and release
system; and
.4 for intermittent operation of the daylight signalling lamp, the ship's whistle, the
manually operated call points, and all internal signals that are required in an
emergency;
unless such services have an independent supply for the period of 36 h from an accumulator
battery suitably located for use in an emergency.
.1 one of the fire pumps required by regulation II-2/4.3.1 and 4.3.3;
.2 the automatic sprinkler pump, if any; and
.3 the emergency bilge pump and all the equipment essential for the operation of
electrically powered remote controlled bilge valves.
2.5 For the period of time required by regulation 29.14 the steering gear if required to be so supplied
by that regulation.
2.6 For a period of half an hour:
.1 any watertight doors required by regulation 15 to be power-operated together

with their indicators and warning signals;
.2 the emergency arrangements to bring the lift cars to deck level for the escape of
persons. The passenger lift cars may be brought to deck level sequentially in an
emergency.
2.7 In a ship engaged regularly on voyages of short duration, the Administration if satisfied that an
adequate standard of safety would be attained may accept a lesser period than the 36 h period
specified in paragraphs 2.1 to 2.5 but not less than 12 h.
3 The emergency source of electrical power may be either a generator or an accumulator battery,
which shall comply with the following:
3.1 Where the emergency source of electrical power is a generator, it shall be:
.1 driven by a suitable prime mover with an independent supply of fuel having a

flashpoint (closed cup test) of not less than 43°C;
.2 started automatically upon failure of the electrical supply from the main source
of electrical power and shall be automatically connected to the emergency
switchboard; those services referred to in paragraph 4 shall then be transferred
automatically to the emergency generating set. The automatic starting system
and the characteristic of the prime mover shall be such as to permit the
emergency generator to carry its full rated load as quickly as is safe and
practicable, subject to a maximum of 45 s; unless a second independent means
of starting the emergency generating set is provided, the single source of stored
energy shall be protected to preclude its complete depletion by the automatic
starting system; and
.3 provided with a transitional source of emergency electrical power according to

paragraph 4.
3.2 Where the emergency source of electrical power is an accumulator battery, it shall be capable of:
.1 carrying the emergency electrical load without recharging while maintaining the
voltage of the battery throughout the discharge period within 12% above or
below its nominal voltage;
.2 automatically connecting to the emergency switchboard in the event of failure of

the main source of electrical power; and
.3 immediately supplying at least those servicesspecified in paragraph 4.

3.3 The following provision in paragraph 3.1.2 shall not apply to ships constructed on or after 1
October 1994:
unless a second independent means of starting the emergency generating set is provided, the
single source of stored energy shall be protected to preclude its complete depletion by the
automatic starting system.
3.4 For ships constructed on or after 1 July 1998, where electrical power is necessary to restore
propulsion, the capacity shall be sufficient to restore propulsion to the ship in conjunction with
other machinery, as appropriate, from a dead ship condition within 30 min after blackout.
4 The transitional source of emergency electrical power required by paragraph 3.1.3 shall consist of
an accumulator battery suitably located for use in an emergency which shall operate without
recharging while maintaining the voltage of the battery throughout the discharge period within
12% above or below its nominal voltage and be of sufficient capacity and so arranged as to supply
automatically in the event of failure of either the main or emergency source of electrical power at
least the following services, if they depend upon an electrical source for their operation:
4.1 For half an hour:
.1 the lighting required by paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2;
.2 all services required by paragraphs 2.3.1, 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 unless such services
have an independent supply for the period specified from an accumulator battery
suitably located for use in an emergency.
4.2 Power to operate the watertight doors, as required by regulation 15.7.3.3, but not necessarily all of
them simultaneously, unless an independent temporary source of stored energy is provided.
Power to the control, indication and alarm circuits as required by regulation 15.7.2 for half an hour.
5.1 he emergency switchboard shall be installed as near as is practicable to the emergency source of
electrical power.
5.2 Where the emergency source of electrical power is a generator, the emergency switchboard shall
be located in the same space unless the operation of the emergency switchboard would thereby be
impaired.
5.3 No accumulator battery fitted in accordance with this regulation shall be installed in the same
space as the emergency switchboard. An indicator shall be mounted in a suitable place on the
main switchboard or in the machinery control room to indicate when the batteries constituting
either the emergency source of electrical power or the transitional source of emergency electrical
power referred to in paragraph 3.1.3 or 4 are being discharged.
5.4 The emergency switchboard shall be supplied during normal operation from the main switchboard
by an interconnector feeder which is to be adequately protected at the main switchboard against
overload and short circuit and which is to be disconnected automatically at the emergency
switchboard upon failure of the main source of electrical power. Where the system is arranged for
feedback operation, the interconnector feeder is also to be protected at the emergency
switchboard at least against short circuit.
5.5 In order to ensure ready availability of the emergency source of electrical power, arrangements
shall be made where necessary to disconnect automatically non-emergency circuits from the
emergency switchboard to ensure that power shall be available to the emergency circuits.
6 The emergency generator and its prime mover and any emergency accumulator battery shall be so
designed and arranged as to ensure that they will function at full rated power when the ship is
upright and when inclined at any angle of list up to 22.5° or when inclined up to 10° either in the
fore or aft direction, or is in any combination of angles within those limits.
7 Provision shall be made for the periodic testing of the complete emergency system and shall
include the testing of automatic starting arrangements.
Regulation 42-1 Supplementary emergency lighting for ro-ro passenger ships

1 In addition to the emergency lighting required by regulation 42.2, on every passenger ship with
ro-ro cargo spaces or special category spaces as defined in regulation II-2/3:
.1 all passenger public spaces and alleyways shall be provided with

supplementary electric lighting that can operate for at least three hours when all
other sources of electrical power have failed and under any condition of heel.
The illumination provided shall be such that the approach to the means of
escape can be readily seen. The source of power for the supplementary lighting
shall consist of accumulator batteries located within the lighting units that are
continuously charged, where practicable, from the emergency switchboard.
Alternatively, any other means of lighting which is at least as effective may be

accepted by the Administration. The supplementary lighting shall be such that

any failure of the lamp will be immediately apparent. Any accumulator battery
provided shall be replaced at intervals having regard to the specified service life
in the ambient conditions that they are subject to in service; and
.2 a portable rechargeable battery operated lamp shall be provided in every crew
space alleyway, recreational space and every working space which is normally
occupied unless supplementary emergency lighting, as required by
subparagraph .1, is provided.
Regulation 43. Emergency source of electrical power in cargo ships

1.1 A self-contained emergency source of electrical power shall be provided.
1.2 The emergency source of electrical power, associated transforming equipment, if any, transitional
source of emergency power, emergency switchboard and emergency lighting switchboard shall be
located above the uppermost continuous deck and shall be readily accessible from the open deck.
They shall not be located forward of the collision bulkhead, except where permitted by the
Administration in exceptional circumstances.
1.3 The location of the emergency source of electrical power, associated transforming equipment, if
any, the transitional source of emergency power, the emergency switchboard and the emergency
lighting switchboard in relation to the main source of electrical power, associated transforming
equipment, if any, and the main switchboard shall be such as to ensure to the satisfaction of the
Administration that a fire or other casualty in the space containing the main source of electrical
power, associated transforming equipment, if any, and the main switchboard, or in any machinery
space of category A will not interfere with the supply, control and distribution of emergency
electrical power. As far as practicable the space containing the emergency source of electrical
power, associated transforming equipment, if any, the transitional source of emergency electrical
power and the emergency switchboard shall not be contiguous to the boundaries of machinery
spaces of category A or those spaces containing the main source of electrical power, associated
transforming equipment, if any, and the main switchboard.
1.4 Provided that suitable measures are taken for safeguarding independent emergency operation
under all circumstances, the emergency generator may be used, exceptionally, and for short
periods, to supply non-emergency circuits.
2 The electrical power available shall be sufficient to supply all those services that are essential for
safety in an emergency, due regard being paid to such services as may have to be operated
simultaneously. The emergency source of electrical power shall be capable, having regard to
starting currents and the transitory nature of certain loads, of supplying simultaneously at least the
following services for the periods specified hereinafter, if they depend upon an electrical source
for their operation:
2.1 For a period of 3 h, emergency lighting at every muster and embarkation station and over the sides
as required by regulations III/11.4 and III/15.7.
2.2 For a period of 18 h, emergency lighting:
.1 in all service and accommodation alleyways, stairways and exits, personnel lift
cars and personnel lift trunks;
.2 in the machinery spaces and main generating stations including their control
positions;
.3 in all control stations, machinery control rooms, and at each main and
emergency switchboard;
.4 at all stowage positions for firemen's outfits;
.5 at the steering gear; and
.6 at the fire pump referred to in paragraph 2.5, at the sprinkler pump, if any, and at
the emergency bilge pump, if any, and at the starting positions of their motors.
.1 the navigation lights and other lights required by the International Regulations
for Preventing Collisions at Sea in force;
.2 on ships constructed on or after 1 February 1995 the VHF radio installation

required by regulation IV/7.1.1 and IV/7.1.2; and, if applicable:
.2.1 the MF radio installation required by regulations IV/9.1.1,

IV/9.1.2, IV/10.1.2 and IV/10.1.3;
.2.2 the ship earth station required by regulation IV/10.1.1; and

.2.3 the MF/HF radio installation required by regulations IV/10.2.1,

IV/10.2.2 and IV/11.1.
.1 all internal communication equipment as required in an emergency;
.2 the shipborne navigational equipment as required by regulation V/12; where

such provision is unreasonable or impracticable the Administration may waive
this requirement for ships of less than 5,000 tons gross tonnage;
.3 the fire detection and fire alarm system; and
.4 intermittent operation of the daylight signalling lamp, the ship's whistle, the
manually operated call points and all internal signals that are required in an
emergency;
unless such services have an independent supply for the period of 18 h from an accumulator
battery suitably located for use in an emergency.
2.5 For a period of 18 h one of the fire pumps required by regulation II-2/4.3.1 and 4.3.3 if dependent
upon the emergency generator for its source of power.
2.6.1 For the period of time required by regulation 29.14 the steering gear where it is required to be so
supplied by that regulation.
2.6.2 In a ship engaged regularly in voyages of short duration, the Administration if satisfied that an
adequate standard of safety would be attained may accept a lesser period than the 18 h period
specified in paragraphs 2.2 to 2.5 but not less than 12 h.
3 The emergency source of electrical power may be either a generator or an accumulator battery,
which shall comply with the following:
3.1 Where the emergency source of electrical power is a generator, it shall be:
.1 driven by a suitable prime mover with an independent supply of fuel, having a

flashpoint (closed cup test) of not less than 43°C;
.2 started automatically upon failure of the main source of electrical power supply
unless a transitional source of emergency electrical power in accordance with
paragraph 3.1.3 is provided; where the emergency generator is automatically
started, it shall be automatically connected to the emergency switchboard; those
services referred to in paragraph 4 shall then be connected automatically to the
emergency generator; and unless a second independent means of starting the
emergency generator is provided the single source of stored energy shall be
protected to preclude its complete depletion by the automatic starting system;
and
.3 provided with a transitional source of emergency electrical power as specified in

paragraph 4 unless an emergency generator is provided capable both of
supplying the services mentioned in that paragraph and of being automatically
started and supplying the required load as quickly as is safe and practicable
subject to a maximum of 45 s.
3.2 Where the emergency source of electrical power is an accumulator battery it shall be capable of:
.1 carrying the emergency electrical load without recharging while maintaining the
voltage of the battery throughout the discharge period within 12% above or
below its nominal voltage;
.2 automatically connecting to the emergency switchboard in the event of failure of

the main source of electrical power; and
.3 immediately supplying at least those services specified in paragraph 4.
3.3 The following provision in paragraph 3.1.2 shall not apply to ships constructed on or after 1
October 1994:
unless a second independent means of starting the emergency generating set is provided, the
single source of stored energy shall be protected to preclude its complete depletion by the
automatic starting system.
3.4 For ships constructed on or after 1 July 1998, where electrical power is necessary to restore
propulsion, the capacity shall be sufficient to restore propulsion to the ship in conjunction with
other machinery, as appropriate, from a dead ship condition within 30 min after blackout.

4 The transitional source of emergency electrical power where required by paragraph 3.1.3 shall
consist of an accumulator battery suitably located for use in an emergency which shall operate
without recharging while maintaining the voltage of the battery throughout the discharge period
within 12% above or below its nominal voltage and be of sufficient capacity and shall be so
arranged as to supply automatically in the event of failure of either the main or the emergency
source of electrical power for half an hour at least the following services if they depend upon an
electrical source for their operation:
.1 the lighting required by paragraphs 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.1. For this transitional phase, the
required emergency electric lighting, in respect of the machinery space and accommodation and
service spaces may be provided by permanently fixed, individual, automatically charged, relay
operated accumulator lamps; and
.2 all services required by paragraphs 2.4.1, 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 unless such services have
an independent supply for the period specified from an accumulator battery suitably located for
use in an emergency.
5.1 The emergency switchboard shall be installed as near as is practicable to the emergency source of
electrical power.
5.2 Where the emergency source of electrical power is a generator, the emergency switchboard shall
be located in the same space unless the operation of the emergency switchboard would thereby be
impaired.
5.3 No accumulator battery fitted in accordance with this regulation shall be installed in the same
space as the emergency switchboard. An indicator shall be mounted in a suitable place on the
main switchboard or in the machinery control room to indicate when the batteries constituting
either the emergency source of electrical power or the transitional source of electrical power
referred to in paragraph 3.2 or 4 are being discharged.
5.4 The emergency switchboard shall be supplied during normal operation from the main switchboard
by an interconnector feeder which is to be adequately protected at the main switchboard against
overload and short circuit and which is to be disconnected automatically at the emergency
switchboard upon failure of the main source of electrical power. Where the system is arranged for
feedback operation, the interconnector feeder is also to be protected at the emergency
switchboard at least against short circuit.
5.5 In order to ensure ready availability of the emergency source of electrical power, arrangements
shall be made where necessary to disconnect automatically non-emergency circuits from the
emergency switchboard to ensure that electrical power shall be available automatically to the
emergency circuits.
6 The emergency generator and its prime mover and any emergency accumulator battery shall be so
designed and arranged as to ensure that they will function at full rated power when the ship is
upright and when inclined at any angle of list up to 22.5° or when inclined up to 10° either in the
fore or aft direction, or is in any combination of angles within those limits.
7 Provision shall be made for the periodic testing of the complete emergency system and shall
include the testing of automatic starting arrangements.
Regulation 44. Starting arrangements for emergency generating sets

1 Emergency generating sets shall be capable of being readily started in their cold condition at a
temperature of 0°C. If this is impracticable, or if lower temperatures are likely to be encountered,
provision acceptable to the Administration shall be made for the maintenance of heating
arrangements, to ensure ready starting of the generating sets.
2 Each emergency generating set arranged to be automatically started shall be equipped with
starting devices approved by the Administration with a stored energy capability of at least three
consecutive starts. A second source of energy shall be provided for an additional three starts
within 30 min unless manual starting can be demonstrated to be effective.
2.1 Ships constructed on or after 1 October 1994, in lieu of the provision of the second sentence of
paragraph 2, shall comply with the following requirements: The source of stored energy shall be
protected to preclude critical depletion by the automatic starting system, unless a second
independent means of staring is provided. In addition, a second source of energy shall be
provided for an additional three starts within 30 minutes unless manual starting can be
demonstrated to be effective.
3 The stored energy shall be maintained at all times, as follows:
.1 electrical and hydraulic starting systems shall be maintained from the emergency
switchboard;
.2 compressed air starting systems may be maintained by the main or auxiliary

compressed air receivers through a suitable nonreturn valve or by an emergency

air compressor which, if electrically driven, is supplied from the emergency

switchboard;
.3 all of these starting, charging and energy storing devices shall be located in the
emergency generator space; these devices are not to be used for any purpose
other than the operation of the emergency generating set. This does not preclude
the supply to the air receiver of the emergency generating set from the main or
auxiliary compressed air system through the nonreturn valve fitted in the
emergency generator space.
4.1 Where automatic starting is not required, manual starting is permissible, such as manual cranking,
inertia starters, manually charged hydraulic accumulators, or powder charge cartridges, where
they can be demonstrated as being effective.
4.2 When manual starting is not practicable, the requirements of paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be complied
with except that starting may be manually initiated.
Comment
The regulations governing electrical installations, particularly those dealing with emergency
power and lighting, are most comprehensive and collectively must make a significant contribution
towards safer ships—especially for ro-ro's and passenger ships.
Regulation 45. Precautions against shock, fire and other hazards of electrical origin
1.1 Exposed metal parts of electrical machines or equipment which are not intended to be live but
which are liable under fault conditions to become live shall be earthed unless the machines or
equipment are:
.1 supplied at a voltage not exceeding 55 V direct current or 55 V, root mean square

between conductors; auto-transformers shall not be used for the purpose of
achieving this voltage; or
.2 supplied at a voltage not exceeding 250 V by safety isolating transformers

supplying only one consuming device; or
.3 constructed in accordance with the principle of double insulation.
1.2 The Administration may require additional precautions for portable electrical equipment for use in
confined or exceptionally damp spaces where particular risks due to conductivity may exist.
1.3 All electrical apparatus shall be so constructed and so installed as not to cause injury when
handled or touched in the normal manner.
2 Main and emergency switchboards shall be so arranged as to give easy access as may be needed
to apparatus and equipment, without danger to personnel. The sides and the rear and, where
necessary, the front of switchboards shall be suitably guarded. Exposed live parts having voltages
to earth exceeding a voltage to be specified by the Administration shall not be installed on the
FIGURE 9.7 A typical electrical

switchboard of late 70's vintage.

front of such switchboards. Where necessary, nonconducting mats or gratings shall be provided
at the front and rear of the switchboard.
3.1 The hull return system of distribution shall not be used for any purpose in a tanker, or for power,
heating, or lighting in any other ship of 1,600 tons gross tonnage and upwards.
3.2 The requirement of paragraph 3.1 does not preclude under conditions approved by the
Administration the use of:
.1 impressed current cathodic protective systems;
.2 limited and locally earthed systems; or
.3 insulation level monitoring devices provided the circulation current does not
exceed 30 mA under the most unfavourable conditions.
3.2-1 For ships constructed on or after 1 October 1994, the requirement of paragraph 3.1 does not
preclude the use of limited and locally earthed systems, provided that any possible resulting
current does not flow directly through any dangerous spaces.
3.3 Where the hull return system is used, all final subcircuits, i.e. all circuits fitted after the last
protective device, shall be two-wire and special precautions shall be taken to the satisfaction of
the Administration.
4.1 Earthed distribution systems shall not be used in a tanker. The Administration may exceptionally
permit in a tanker the earthing of the neutral for alternating current power networks of 3,000 V (line
to line) and over, provided that any possible resulting current does not flow directly through any of
the dangerous spaces.
4.2 When a distribution system, whether primary or secondary, for power, heating or lighting, with no
connection to earth is used, a device capable of continuously monitoring the insulation level to
earth and of giving an audible or visual indication of abnormally low insulation values shall be
provided.
4.3 Ships constructed on or after 1 October 1994, in lieu of the provisions of paragraph 4.1, shall
comply with the following requirements:
.1 Except as permitted by 4.3.2 earthed distribution systems shall not be used in a

tanker.
.2 The requirement of paragraph 4.3.1 does not preclude the use of earthed
intrinsically safe circuits and in addition, under conditions approved by the
Administration, the use of the following earthed systems:
.2.1 power supplied, control circuits and instrumentation circuits

where technical or safety reasons preclude the use of a system
with no connection to earth, provided the current in the hull is
limited to not more than 5 amps in both normal and fault
conditions; or
.2.2 limited and locally earthed systems, provided that any possible
resulting current does not flow directly through any of the
dangerous spaces; or
.2.3 alternating current power networks of 1,000 V root mean

square (line to line) and over, provided that any possible
resulting current does not flow directly through any of the
dangerous spaces.
5.1 Except as permitted by the Administration in exceptional circumstances, all metal sheaths and
armour of cables shall be electrically continuous and shall be earthed.
5.2 All electric cables and wiring external to equipment shall be at least of a flame-retardant type and
shall be so installed as not to impair their original flame-retarding properties. Where necessary for
particular applications the Administration may permit the use of special types of cables such as
radio frequency cables, which do not comply with the foregoing.
5.3 Cables and wiring serving essential or emergency power, lighting, internal communications or
signals shall so far as practicable be routed clear of galleys, laundries, machinery spaces of
category A and their casings and other high fire risk areas. In ro-ro passenger ships, cabling for
emergency alarms and public address systems installed on or after 1 July 1998 shall be approved
by the Administration having regard to the recommendations developed by the Organization [See
footnote 175]. Cables connecting fire pumps to the emergency switchboard shall be of a
fire-resistant type where they pass through high fire risk areas. Where practicable all such cables
should be run in such a manner as to preclude their being rendered unserviceable by heating of
the bulkheads that may be caused by a fire in an adjacent space.

5.4 Where cables which are installed in hazardous areas introduce the risk of fire or explosion in the
event of an electrical fault in such areas, special precautions against such risks shall be taken to
the satisfaction of the Administration.
5.5 Cables and wiring shall be installed and supported in such a manner as to avoid chafing or other
damage.
5.6 Terminations and joints in all conductors shall be so made as to retain the original electrical,
mechanical, flame-retarding and, where necessary, fire-resisting properties of the cable.
6.1 Each separate circuit shall be protected against short circuit and against overload, except as
permitted in regulations 29 and 30 or where the Administration may exceptionally otherwise permit.
6.2 The rating or appropriate setting of the overload protective device for each circuit shall be
permanently indicated at the location of the protective device.
7 Lighting fittings shall be so arranged as to prevent temperature rises which could damage the
cables and wiring, and to prevent surrounding material from becoming excessively hot.
8 All lighting and power circuits terminating in a bunker or cargo space shall be provided with a
multiple-pole switch outside the space for disconnecting such circuits.
9.1 Accumulator batteries shall be suitably housed, and compartments used primarily for their
accommodation shall be properly constructed and efficiently ventilated.
9.2 Electrical or other equipment which may constitute a source of ignition of flammable vapours shall
not be permitted in these compartments except as permitted in paragraph 10.
9.3 Accumulator batteries shall not be located in sleeping quarters except where hermetically sealed
to the satisfaction of the Administration.
10 No electrical equipment shall be installed in any space where flammable mixtures are liable to
collect including those on board tankers or in compartments assigned principally to accumulator
batteries, in paint lockers, acetylene stores or similar spaces, unless the Administration is satisfied
that such equipment is:
.1 essential for operational purposes;
.2 of a type which will not ignite the mixture concerned;
.3 appropriate to the space concerned; and
.4 appropriately certified for safe usage in the dusts, vapours or gases likely to be
encountered.
11 In a passenger ship, distribution systems shall be so arranged that fire in any main vertical zone as
is defined in regulation II-2/3.9 will not interfere with services essential for safety in any other such
zone. This requirement will be met if main and emergency feeders passing through any such zone
are separated both vertically and horizontally as widely as is practicable.
Comment
The following comments are made from a fire-fighter's point of view:
A main electric lighting system required to provide illumination throughout the ship must be so
arranged that, in the event of fire or other casualty in spaces containing the main source of power,
associated transforming equipment, if any, the main switchboard and main lighting switchboard
will not render the emergency lighting system inoperative. Similarly, in the event of a fire or other
casualty in spaces containing emergency sources of electrical power, associated transforming
equipment, if any, the emergency switchboard and the emergency lighting switchboard will not
render the main lighting system inoperative.
The main switchboard must be so placed relative to one main generating station that, as far as
practicable, the integrity of the normal electric supply may be affected only by fire or other
casualty in one space.
Not less than two main generating sets must be provided on all ships in which electrical power
is the only means of maintaining the auxiliary services essential for the propulsion or the safety of
the ship. The power of the generating sets must be such that either set can maintain the operation
of the essential services in the event of the other breaking down.
Arrangements must be made to safeguard the generating sets from partial flooding of the ship's
machinery-space, either through leakage from a damaged compartment or otherwise.

All ships must be fitted with a self-contained emergency source of electrical power, situated in a
position above the bulkhead deck outside the machinery casings. In the case of a ship engaged on
a "long international voyage", the set must be capable of operating for a period of 36 hours.
The emergency power must be capable of operating simultaneously:
1. the ship's emergency bilge pump, if it is electrically operated;

2. the ship's watertight doors, if they are electrically operated;
3. the ship's emergency lights at every boat station on deck and overside, in all alleyways,
stairways and exits, in the machinery-space, in the control stations where radio, main
navigating and central fire-recording equipments are situated, and in the place where the
emergency generator (if any) is situated;
4. the ship's navigation lights, if operated solely by electric power;
5. all communication equipment and signals which may be required in an emergency, if they
are electrically operated from the ship's main generating sets;
6. the ship's sprinkler pump, if it is electrically operated; and
7. the ship's daylight signalling lamp, if it is operated by the ship's main source of electric
power.
If the source of electrical power supplying the emergency electrical load is a generator it shall
be driven by a compression-ignition engine with an independent fuel supply and with efficient
starting arrangements. The fuel provided for such engine shall have a flash point not lower than
43o C, 110o F, which in practice rules out the use of petrol or paraffin as a fuel.
The emergency source of electrical power may be an accumulator battery, which must be
capable of carrying the emergency electrical load without recharging, while maintaining the
voltage of the battery throughout the discharge period within 12% above or below its normal
voltage. It must be automatically connected to the emergency switchboard upon failure of the main
source of electrical power. Further, it must be capable of supplying all the services outlined in
Regulation 42 paragraphs 4; 4.1.1; 4.1.2; 4.2 without being recharged or suffering an excessive
voltage drop.
FIGURE 9.8 A fuseboard at the back

of a switchboard of German
construction. These ceramic fuses
unscrew. The centre melts in the event
of an overload or short circuit to
indicate that the fuse has blown.
The emergency source of electrical power shall be so arranged that it will operate efficiently
when the ship is listing 22½ degrees, or when the trim of the ship is 10 degrees from an even keel
If the emergency source of electrical power is an accumulator battery, the arrangements shall be
such that the ship's emergency lighting system shall come into operation automatically in the event
of the failure of the main source of power for the ship's main lighting system. If the emergency
source of electrical power is a generator, an accumulator battery shall be provided as a temporary
source of electrical power so arranged as to come into operation automatically in the event of a

failure of the main or emergency source of electrical power, and in the case of passenger ships, of
sufficient capacity:
1. to operate all the ship's emergency lighting system continuously for 36 hours;
2. to operate for 36 hours all navigation lights, communication equipment, fire detecting
systems and signals which may be required in an emergency, if they are electrically
operated from the ship's main generating sets.
3. to operate for 36 hours one of the fire pumps, the sprinkler pump, if any, and the
emergency bilge pump, along with the electrically powered remote controlled bilge valves.
4. while such lighting system is in operation, to close the ship's watertight doors if they are
electrically operated for a period of half an hour.; but not necessarily to close all of such
doors simultaneously; to operate the sound signals, which gave warning that power
operated watertight doors are about to close, if such sound signals are electrically operated;
and bring the lift cars to deck level to enable persons to escape.
Means shall be provided by which the automatic arrangements referred to in these Regulations
can be tested.
General electrical precautions covered by the Rules include the following:
Every electrical cable in ships must be protected by metal sheathing at all points where an
electrical fault could cause a fire. The whole installation must be electrically continuous, and must
be earthed.
All joints in electrical conductors must be made in junction or outlet boxes, which must be of
such construction as to prevent the spread of fire therefrom.
Lighting fittings must be so arranged as to prevent rises in temperature which could damage the
wiring, or which would result in a risk of fire in surrounding materials.
Electric space heaters must be constructed and fixed so as to reduce the risk of fire to a
minimum. The elements of such heaters must not be so exposed as to scorch or set on fire clothing,
curtains or similar materials.
Accumulator batteries must be so housed in boxes or compartments as to minimise the risk of
damage and the accumulation of explosive gas. No electrical devices likely to arc may be housed
in the same compartment as the accumulator batteries, unless such devices are flame-proof.
All ships must be provided with an adequate quantity of replacements for those parts of the
electrical equipment and installations which it would be necessary to replace for the safety of the
ship.

Chapter Ten
Fire Safety Measures Aboard Passenger Vessels
This chapter reviews the particular requirements of Chapter II-2 of SOLAS which apply to
passenger vessels. Many of the requirements have already been described in detail in Chapter
Eight and will not be repeated here. However, the SOLAS regulations are reproduced in full for
the sake of clarity since they have not been quoted earlier.
Alternative Systems of Fire Prevention

Attempts were made at the 1948 IMO International Conference on the Safety of Life at Sea to
find agreement on a single system of fire prevention technique which would be acceptable to all
the participating nations, and which could then be recommended by the Conference as an
international standard system, to be implemented by the subsequent domestic legislative processes
of all the participants.
Agreement, however, was found to be impossible of attainment; and a compromise was reached
under which all participants agreed to accept in their domestic legislation any of the three rival
systems or "Methods" which had been put forward by (respectively) the United States of America,
Great Britain and France.
These three systems can be very briefly summarised as follows:
Method I (generally known in the shipping world as "The American Method") requires the
construction in the accommodation spaces and service spaces of a system of internal bulkheading
consisting of "B" Class divisions, together with an automatic fire-alarm and fire-detecting system
in these spaces.
Method II ("The British Method") stipulates the fitting of an automatic sprinkler, fire-detection
and fire-alarrn system in the accommodation spaces and service spaces.
Method III ("The French Method") demands the sub-division of all accommodation and service
spaces by "A" Class and "B" Class divisions; together with the fitting in all such spaces of an
automatic fire-alarm and fire-detection system, and restrictions on the use in them of all
During subsequent meetings of the International Conference, the rules were altered and
amended to reflect bitter experience gained over the passage of years. In particular, the fire aboard
the Scandinavian Star was a watershed and it was decided that all passenger vessels should be
protected by means of sprinkler systems. This rather piric victory for the British was a long time
coming. However, the three construction methods still apply to cargo ships and are described
more fully in Chapter 11.
292
Fire Safety Aboard Passenger Ships 293
Chapter II-2 Construction - Fire protection, fire detection and fire extinction
Part B Fire Safety Measures Aboard Passenger Vessels
Regulation 23 Structure
1 The hull, superstructures, structural bulkheads, decks and deckhouses shall be constructed of
steel or other equivalent material. For the purpose of applying the definition of steel or other
equivalent material as given in regulation 3.7 the "applicable fire exposure" shall be according to
the integrity and insulation standards given in the tables of regulations 26 and 27. For example,
where divisions such as decks or sides and ends of deckhouses are permitted to have "B-0" fire
integrity, the "applicable fire exposure" shall be half an hour.
2 However, in cases where any part of the structure is of aluminium alloy, the following shall apply:
.1 The insulation of aluminium alloy components of "A" or "B" class divisions,

except structure which, in the opinion of the Administration, is
non-load-bearing, shall be such that the temperature of the structural core does
not rise more than 200°C above the ambient temperature at any time during the
applicable fire exposure to the standard fire test.
.2 Special attention shall be given to the insulation of aluminium alloy

components of columns, stanchions and other structural members required to
support lifeboat and liferaft stowage, launching and embarkation areas, and
"A" and "B" class divisions to ensure:
.2.1 that for such members supporting lifeboat and liferaft areas and "A" class
divisions, the temperature rise limitation specified in paragraph 2.1 shall apply
at the end of one hour; and
.2.2 that for such members required to support "B" class divisions, the
temperature rise limitation specified in paragraph 2.1 shall apply at the end of
half an hour.
3 Crowns and casings of machinery spaces of category A shall be of steel construction adequately
insulated and openings therein, if any, shall be suitably arranged and protected to prevent the
spread of fire.
Comment
"A" Class (or Fire-resisting) Divisions are those divisions formed by bulkheads and decks
which comply with the following requirements:
1. They shall be constructed of steel or other equivalent material;

2. They shall be suitably stiffened;
3. They shall be so constructed as to be capable of preventing the passage of smoke and flame
up to the end of the one hour Standard Fire Test;
4. The division shall have an adequate insulating value having regard to the nature of the
adjacent spaces. In general, where such bulkheads and decks are required to form fire
resisting divisions between spaces either of which contains adjacent woodwork, wood
lining, or other combustible material, they shall be so insulated that, if either face is
exposed to the Standard Fire Test for one hour, the average temperature on the unexposed
face will not increase at any time during the test by more than 250 oF. (139 oC.) above the
initial temperature, nor shall the temperature at any one point, including any joint, rise
more than 325 oF. (180 oC.) above the initial temperature. Reduced amounts of insulation,
or none at all, may be provided where (in the opinion of the Administration) a reduced fire
hazard is present.
class "A-60" 60 min
class "A-30" 30 min
class "A-15" 15 min
class "A-0" 0 min
"B" Class (or Fire-retarding) Divisions are those divisions formed by bulkheads which are so
constructed as to be capable of preventing the passage of flame up to the end of the first half-hour
of the Standard Fire Test. The division shall have an adequate insulating value, having regard to

the nature of the adjacent spaces. The division shall be so constructed that if either face is exposed
for the first half-hour period of the Standard Fire Test, the average temperature on the unexposed
face of the division will not increase at any time during the first 15 minutes of the test in the case
of a non-combustible division, or the duration of the test in the case of a combustible division, by
more than 250 oF. (139 oC.) above the initial temperature on that face. The temperature at any one
point, including any joint, shall not increase by more than 405 oF. (225 oC.) above the initial
temperature.
The Standard Fire Test

The Standard Fire Test was defined in IMO Resolution A517(13) and published in the 1993
edition of Fire Test Procedures which also includes the following resolutions on fire test
procedures adopted by the Assembly at its sixteenth (1989) and seventeenth (1991) sessions:
1. A.652(16): Recommendation on fire test procedures for upholstered furniture;

2. A.653(16): Recommendation on improved fire test procedures for surface flammability
of bulkhead, ceiling and deck finish materials (supersedes A.516(13) and
A.564(14));
3. A.687(17): Fire test procedures for ignitability of primary deck coverings (supersedes
A.214(VII));
4. A.688(17): Fire test procedures for ignitability of bedding components.
A standard fire test is one in which specimens of the relevant bulkheads or decks are exposed in
a test furnace to temperatures corresponding approximately to the standard time-temperature curve.
The specimen shall have an exposed surface of not less than 4.65 m2 and height (or length of deck)
of 2.44 m, resembling as closely as possible the intended construction and including where
appropriate at least one joint. The standard time-temperature curve is defined by a smooth curve
drawn through the following temperature points measured above the initial furnace temperature:
The test furnace is required to follow time-temperature relationships approximately as follows:1
Time (minutes) Temperature

(°C)
Standard Fire Test
At the end of the first 5 556 Time Temperature Curve
1000
At the end of the first 10 659
900
Temperature (deg C)
At the end of the first 15 718

800
At the end of the first 30 821 700
At the end of the first 60 925 600
Table 10.1 500

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Time (minutes)
In the UK, there are a number of testing laboratories including the Loss Prevention Council
(previously known as the FOC), and Warrington Fire Research. The Fire Research Station (FRS)
of the Building Research Establishment, (formerly known as the DSIR) continues to undertaken
research into the fire resistance of structure and their response to fire using their excellant facilities
at Cardington which a hangar, now converted, was used by the R101 airship.
1
Material used in the construction of a fire-resisting or fire-retarding division is tested in the following way: The specimen section of bulkhead,
having a surface area of not less than 50 square feet (4.65 square metres) and a height of 8 feet (2.44 metres), resembling as closely as possible the
intended construction and including, where appropriate, at least one joint, is placed to form one side of a vertical gas-fired furnace. The
temperature within the furnace is increased steadily within the range of the time-temperature curve—i.e. 1,000o F. at 5 minutes—1,760o F. at 60
minutes. The specimen will be deemed to have failed the test if it does not satisfy the requirements contained in the definitions for "A" or "B"
Class divisions. Non-combustible material is a material which neither burns nor gives off flammable vapours in sufficient quantity for self-ignition
when heated to approximately 750°C, this being determined to the satisfaction of the Administration by an established test procedure. Any other
material is a combustible material.

FIGURE 10.1 Sketch shows how fire can spread FIGURE 10.2 Sketch shows how the use of
through bulkhead by conduction of heat. fire-resisting linings can prevent the spread of fire
through conduction. The air space between the lining
and the bulkheads is an essential feature.
Wherever possible, full-size tests are undertaken; though if the normal structure is over 10 ft. by
10 ft., a section only is tested. During the test, the normal design load of the division is applied.
Not fewer than five thermocouples are attached to the unexposed face of the test structure, to
measure the temperature reached on the side away from the fire.
Regulation 24 Main vertical zones and horizontal zones

1.1 In ships carrying more than 36 passengers, the hull, superstructure and deckhouses shall
be subdivided into main vertical zones by "A-60" class divisions. Steps and recess shall
be kept to a minimum but where they are necessary, they shall also be "A-60" class
divisions. Where a category 26.2.2(5), 26.2.2(9) or 26.2.2(10) space is on one side of the
division the standard may be reduced to "A-0".
1.2 For ships carrying not more than 36 passengers, the hull, superstructure and deckhouses
in way of accommodation and service spaces shall be subdivided into main vertical zones
by "A" class divisions. These divisions shall have insulation values in accordance with
tables in regulation 27.
2 As far as practicable, the bulkheads forming the boundaries of the main vertical zones above he
bulkhead deck shall be in line with the watertight subdivision bulkheads situated immediately
below the bulkhead deck. The length and width of main vertical zones may be extended to a
maximum of 48 m in order to bring the ends of main vertical zones to coincide with subdivision
watertight bulkheads or in order to accommodate a large public space extending for the whole
length of the main vertical zone provided that the total area of the main vertical zone is not greater
than 1,600 m2 on any deck. The length or width of a main vertical zone is the maximum distance
between the furthermost points of the bulkheads bounding it.
3 Such bulkheads shall extend from deck to deck and to the shell or other boundaries.
4 Where a main vertical zone is subdivided by horizontal "A" class divisions into horizontal zones
for the purpose of providing an appropriate barrier between sprinklered and non-sprinklered
zones of the ship, the divisions shall extend between adjacent main vertical zone bulkheads and
to the shell or exterior boundaries of the ship and shall be insulated in accordance with the fire
insulation and integrity values given in table 27.2.
5.1 On ships designed for special purposes, such as automobile or railroad car ferries, where the
provision of main vertical zone bulkheads would defeat the purpose for which the ship is
intended, equivalent means for controlling and limiting a fire shall be substituted and specifically
approved by the Administration.
5.2 However, in a ship with special category spaces, any such space shall comply with the applicable
provisions of regulation 37 and in so far as such compliance would be inconsistent with
compliance with other requirements of this part, the requirements of regulation 37 shall prevail.

Regulation 25 Bulkheads within a main vertical zone

1.1 For ships carrying more than 36 passengers all bulkheads which are not required to be "A" class
divisions shall be at least "B" class or "C" class divisions as prescribed in the tables in regulation
26.
1.2 For ships carrying not more than 36 passengers all bulkheads within accommodation and service
spaces which are not required to be "A" class divisions shall be at least "B" class or "C" class
divisions as prescribed in the tables in regulation 27.
1.3 All such divisions may be faced with combustible materials in accordance with the provisions of
regulation 34.
2 In ships carrying not more than 36 passengers, all corridor bulkheads where not required to be
"A" class shall be "B" class divisions which shall extend from deck to deck except:
.1 when continuous "B" class ceilings or linings are fitted on both sides of the
bulkhead, the portion of the bulkhead behind the continuous ceiling or lining
shall be of material which, in thickness and composition, is acceptable in the
construction of " B" class divisions but which shall be required to meet "B"
class integrity standards only in so far as is reasonable and practicable in the
opinion of the Administration;
.2 in the case of a ship protected by an automatic sprinkler system complying with

the provisions of regulation 12, the corridor bulkheads of "B" class materials
may terminate at a ceiling in the corridor provided such a ceiling is of material
which, in thickness and composition, is acceptable in the construction of "B"
class divisions. Notwithstanding the requirements of regulations 26 and 27,
such bulkheads and ceilings shall be required to meet "B" class integrity
standards only in so far as is reasonable and practicable in the opinion of the
Administration. All doors and frames in such bulkheads shall be of
non-combustible materials and shall be so constructed and erected as to
provide substantial fire resistance to the satisfaction of the Administration.
3 All bulkheads required to be "B" class division, except corridor bulkheads prescribed in
paragraph 2, shall extend from deck to deck and to the shell or other boundaries unless the
continuous "B" class ceilings or linings fitted on both sides of the bulkheads are at least of the
same fire resistance as the bulkhead, in which case the bulkhead may terminate at the continuous
ceiling or lining.
Regulation 26 Fire integrity of bulkheads and decks in ships carrying more than 36
passengers
(Paragraphs 2.2(7) and 2.2(13) of this regulation apply to ships constructed on or after 1 February 1992)
1 In addition to complying with the specific provisions for fire integrity of bulkheads and decks
mentioned elsewhere in this part, the minimum fire integrity of all bulkheads and decks shall be as
prescribed in tables 1 to 2. Where, due to any particular structural arrangements in the ship,
difficulty is experienced in determining from the tables the minimum fire integrity value of any
divisions, such values shall be determined to the satisfaction of the Administration.
2 The following requirements shall govern application of the tables:
.1 Table 1 shall apply to bulkheads not bounding either main vertical zones or
horizontal zones. Table 2 shall apply to decks not forming steps in main vertical
zones nor bounding horizontal zones.
.2 For determining the appropriate fire integrity standards to be applied to

boundaries between adjacent spaces, such spaces are classified according to
their fire risk as shown in categories (1) to (14) below. Where the contents and
use of a space are such that there is a doubt as to its classification for the
purpose of this regulation, it shall be treated as a space within the relevant
category having the most stringent boundary requirements. The title of each
category is intended to be typical rather than restrictive. The number in
parentheses preceding each category refers to the applicable column or row in
the tables.
(1) Control stations

Spaces containing emergency sources of power and lighting.
Wheelhouse and chartroom.
Spaces containing the ship's radio equipment.
Fire-extinguishing rooms, fire control rooms and fire-recording stations.
Control room for propulsion machinery when located outside the propulsion
machinery space.
Spaces containing centralized fire alarm equipment.

Spaces containing centralized emergency public address system stations and

equipment.
(2) Stairways
Interior stairways, lifts and escalators (other than those wholly contained within
the machinery spaces) for passengers and crew and enclosures thereto.
In this connection a stairway which is enclosed at only one level shall be
regarded as part of the space from which it is not separated by a fire door.
(3) Corridors
Passenger and crew corridors.
(4) Evacuation stations and external escape routes

Survival craft stowage area.
Open deck spaces and enclosed promenades forming lifeboat and liferaft
embarkation and lowering stations.
Muster station, internal and external.
The ship's side to the waterline in the lightest seagoing condition,
superstructure and deckhouse side situated below and adjacent to the liferaft's
and evacuation slide's embarkation areas.
(5) Open deck spaces

Open deck spaces and enclosed promenades clear of lifeboat and liferaft
embarkation and lowering stations.
Air spaces (the space outside superstructures and deckhouses).
(6) Accommodation spaces of minor fire risk

Cabins containing furniture and furnishings of restricted fire risk.
Offices and dispensaries containing furniture and furnishings of restricted fire
risk.
Public spaces containing furniture and furnishings of restricted fire risk and
having a deck area of less than 50 m2.
(7) Accommodation spaces of moderate fire risk

Spaces as in category (6) above but containing furniture and furnishings of
other than restricted fire risk.
Public spaces containing furniture and furnishings of restricted fire risk and
having a deck area of 50 m2 or more.
Isolated lockers and small store-rooms in accommodation spaces having areas
less than 4 m2 (in which flammable liquids are not stowed).
Sale shops.
Motion picture projection and film stowage rooms.
Diet kitchens (containing no open flame).
Cleaning gear lockers (in which flammable liquids are not stowed).
Laboratories (in which flammable liquids are not stowed).
Pharmacies.
Small drying rooms (having a deck area of 4 m2 or less).
Specie rooms.
Operating rooms
(8) Accommodation spaces of greater fire risk

Public spaces containing furniture and furnishings of other than restricted fire
risk and having a deck area of 50 m2 or more.
Barber shops and beauty parlours.
(9) Sanitary and similar spaces

Communal sanitary facilities, showers, baths, water closets, etc.
Small laundry rooms.
Indoor swimming pool area.
Isolated pantries containing no cooking appliances in accommodation spaces.
Private sanitary facilities shall be considered a portion of the space in which
they are located.
(10) Tanks, voids and auxiliary machinery spaces having little or no fire risk
Water tanks forming part of the ship's structure.
Voids and cofferdams.
Auxiliary machinery spaces which do not contain machinery having a pressure
lubrication system and where storage of combustibles is prohibited, such as:
ventilation and air-conditioning rooms; windlass room; steering gear room;
stabilizer equipment room; electrical propulsion motor room; rooms containing
section switchboards and purely electrical equipment other than oil-filled
electrical transformers (above 10 kVA); shaft alleys and pipe tunnels; spaces for
pumps and refrigeration machinery (not handling or using flammable liquids).
Closed trunks serving the spaces listed above.
Other closed trunks such as pipe and cable trunks.

(11) Auxiliary machinery spaces, cargo spaces, cargo and other oil tanks and other
similar spaces of moderate fire risk
Cargo oil tanks.
Cargo holds, trunkways and hatchways.
Refrigerated chambers.
Oil fuel tanks (where installed in a separate space with no machinery).
Shaft alleys and pipe tunnels allowing storage of combustibles.
Auxiliary machinery spaces as in category (10) which contain machinery having
a pressure lubrication system or where storage of combustibles is permitted.
Oil fuel filling stations.
Spaces containing oil-filled electrical transformers (above 10 kVA).
Spaces containing turbine and reciprocating steam engine driven auxiliary
generators and small internal combustion engines of power output up to 110
kW driving generators, sprinkler, drencher or fire pumps, bilge pumps, etc.
Closed trunks serving the spaces listed above.
(12) Machinery spaces and main galleys

Main propulsion machinery rooms (other than electric propulsion motor rooms)
and boiler rooms.
Auxiliary machinery spaces other than those in categories (10) and (11) which
contain internal combustion machinery or other oil-burning, heating or pumping
units.
Main galleys and annexes.
Trunks and casings to the spaces listed above.
(13) Store-rooms, workshops, pantries, etc.

Main pantries not annexed to galleys.
Main laundry.
Large drying rooms (having a deck area of more than 4 m2).
Miscellaneous stores.
Mail and baggage rooms.
Garbage rooms.
Workshops (not part of machinery spaces, galleys, etc.).
Lockers and store-rooms having areas greater than 4 m2, other than those
spaces that have provisions for the storage of flammable liquids.
(14) Other spaces in which flammable liquids are stowed

Lamp rooms.
Paint rooms.
Store-rooms containing flammable liquids (including dyes, medicines, etc.).
Laboratories (in which flammable liquids are stowed).
.3 Where a single value is shown for the fire integrity of a boundary between two
spaces, that value shall apply in all cases.
.4 In determining the applicable fire integrity standard of a boundary between two

spaces within a main vertical zone or horizontal zone which is not protected by
an automatic sprinkler system complying with regulation 12 or between such
zones neither of which is so protected, the higher of the two values given in the
table shall apply.
.5 Where a sprinklered zone and a non sprinklered zone meet within accomodation
and service spaces, the higher of the two values given in the tables shall apply
to the division between the zones.
.6 Notwithstanding the provisions of regulation 25 there are no special

requirements for material or integrity of boundaries where only a dash appears
in the tables.
.7 The Administration shall determine in respect of category (5) spaces whether

the insulation values in table 1 shall apply to ends of deckhouses and
superstructures, and whether the insulation values in table 2 shall apply to
weather decks. In no case shall the requirements of category (5) of table 1 and 2
necessitate enclosure of spaces which in the opinion of the Administration need
not be enclosed.
3 Continuous "B" class ceilings or linings, in association with the relevant decks or bulkheads, may
be accepted as contributing wholly or in part, to the required insulation and integrity of a division.
4 In approving structural fire protection details, the Administration shall have regard to the risk of
heat transmission at intersections and terminal points of required thermal barriers.

Table 26.1 - Bulkheads not bounding either main vertical zones or horizontal zones
Spaces (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
a
Control stations (1) B-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-60 A-60 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-60 A-60 A-60 A-60
Stairways (2) A-0a A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-15 A-15 A-0c A-0 A-15 A-30 A-15 A-30
Corridors (3) B-15 A-60 A-0 B-15 B-15 B-15 B-15 A-0 A-15 A-30 A-0 A-30
Evacuation stations and (4) A-0 A-60b A-60b A-60b A-0 A-0 A-60b A-60b A-60b A-60b
external escape routes
Open desk spaces (5) - A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0
Accommodation spaces of (6) B-0 B-0 B-0 C A-0 A-0 A-30 A-0 A-30
minor fire risk
Accommodation spaces of (7) B-0 B-0 C A-0 A-15 A-60 A-15 A-60
moderate fire risk
Accommodation spaces of (8) B-0 C A-0 A-30 A-60 A-15 A-60

greater fire risk
Sanitary and similar spaces (9) C A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0
Tanks, voids and auxiliary (10)
machinery spaces having A-0a A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0
little or no fire risk
Auxiliary machinery spaces, (11)
cargo spaces, cargo and other
oil tanks and other similar A-0a A-0 A-0 A-15
spaces of moderate fire risk
Machinery spaces and main (12) A-0a A-0 A-60

galleys
Store-rooms, workshops, (13) A-0a A-0
pantries, etc.
Other spaces in which (14)
flammable liquids are stowed A-30
See notes following table 26.2
FIGURE 10.3 Section of a typical passenger vessel showing the "A" Class bulkheads dividing the ship into main
vertical zones not exceeding 131 feet long and bounding machinery spaces, main stairways, lifts and control stations.
Fire Protection Association

Table 26.2 - Decks not forming steps in main vertical zones nor bounding horizontal zones
Space below Space above (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
Control stations (1) A-30 A-30 A-15 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-15 A-30 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-60 A-0 A-60
Stairways (2) A-0 A-0 - A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-30 A-0 A-30
a
Corridors (3) A-15 A-0 A-0 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-15 A-15 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-30 A-0 A-30
Evacuation stations and (4)
external escape routes A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 - A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0
Open desk spaces (5) A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 - A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0
Accommodation spaces of (6)
minor fire risk A-60 A-15 A-0 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0

moderate fire risk A-60 A-15 A-15 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-15 A-15 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0

greater fire risk A-60 A-15 A-15 A-60 A-0 A-15 A-15 A-30 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0
Sanitary and similar spaces (9) A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0
Tanks, voids and auxiliary (10)
machinery spaces having A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0a A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0
little or no fire risk
Auxiliary machinery (11)
spaces, cargo spaces, cargo
and other oil tanks and A-60 A-60 A-60 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-15 A-30 A-0 A-0 A-0a A-0 A-0 A-30
other similar spaces of
moderate fire risk
Machinery spaces and main (12)

galleys A-60 A-60 A-60 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-60 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-30 A-30a A-0 A-60
Store-rooms, workshops, (13)
pantries, etc. A-60 A-30 A-15 A-60 A-0 A-15 A-30 A-30 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0
Other spaces in which (14)
flammable liquids are A-60 A-60 A-60 A-60 A-0 A-30 A-60 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0
stowed
Notes: To be applied to tables 26.1 to 26.2
a Where adjacent spaces are in the same numerical category and superscripta appears, a bulkhead or deck between such spaces need
not be fitted if deemed unneccessary by the Administration. For example, in category (12) a bulkhead need not be required
between a galley and its annexed pantries provided the pantry bulkhead and decks maintain the integrity of the the galley
boundaries. A bulkhead is, however, required between a galley and machinery space even though both spaces are in category (12).
b The ship's side, to the waterline in the lightest seagoing condition, superstructure and deckhouse sides situated below the adjacent
to the liferafts and evacuation slides may be reduced to "A-30".
c Where public toilets are installed completely within the stairway enclosure, the public toilet bulkhead within the stairway enclosure
can be of "B" class integrity.
Comment
IMO have taken a great step forward by producing in the SOLAS 1974 easily readable tables
from which it is possible to find the fire resistance of bulkheads and decks between adjoining
spaces. A study of these tables reproduced above, with the approval of the IMO, enable designers
to ascertain the required standard of fire resistance for each space on board.
There is growing awareness of the important effect which combustible wall linings in crew and
passenger accommodation can have on the rapidity and spread of fire within a ship. Many serious
fires in industrial premises on land have underlined the danger of rapid surface flame spread over
certain types of combustible wall and roof linings; and the lessons learnt from the loss of the
Scandinavian Star and the Romantica must not be forgotten.
There is no doubt that the ideal solution is the widespread installation of efficient modern
fire-resisting linings and furnishings in all service and accommodation spaces of ships of every
Class, coupled with the provision of an adequate sprinkler protection and detection systems. It has

been estimated that a ship of 9,000 tons gross, constructed with conventional combustible linings
and partitions, carried a fire load of 11¼ million British Thermal Units. With fire-resisting linings
throughout the same ship carries a fire load of only some five million British Thermal Units—a
spectacular reduction indeed. This reduction however, has been offset by the widespread use of
polymeric foams in furnishings.
It is significant that Det Norske Veritas, the Norwegian Classification Society operate a special
category, now referred to as Class "F", which indicates that the vessel in question is protected to a
higher degree than that required by international standards. The letter "F" is added to the Class
designation of the ship (with, hopefully, corresponding premium benefits) provided plans are
submitted showing that attention has been paid to such matters as fire alarms, fire pumps,
fire-resisting partitions or bulkheads in accommodation spaces and in deck, engine-room and
boiler-room accommodation, and the fitting of fire-extinguishing appliances in all cargo holds.
Before considering the fire-resisting materials available for use on board the author would like
to comment upon his experience gained from attending and sometimes actually fighting ship fires
in many parts of the world during the past nine years. It has been particularly noticeable that, apart
from actual fire spread, the emission of smoke is causing all sorts of difficulties for ships' crews.
A disturbing feature is that this smoke is much more highly toxic than was experienced in the past.
The author is reminded of his fire service experience where before the last war it was quite
unusual for fire-fighters to wear breathing apparatus — hence the term "smoke-eaters". After the
war ended it became more and more necessary for fire-fighters to wear this protective equipment
by virtue of the fact that, even at house fires, men were being overcome by smoke at an
unprecedented rate and many required to have hospital treatment. It took a long time for members
of the British Fire Service to realise the only new dimension being experienced was that plastics
had been introduced into house furnishings and that highly toxic gases were being evolved in fires.
A further disturbing feature is that, particularly in the smaller vessels of under 4,000 gross tons,
it is quite common to find that even in almost new ships the entire accommodation area has been
gutted by fire. An empty space remaining of an area which had once been occupied by cabins and
public spaces. In this day and age there is really no excuse for building ships of any size in which
the units of construction, bulkheads, linings, grounds and ceilings, actually contribute to the spread
of fire. By its very nature a ship—any ship—is peculiarly vulnerable to fire and, of course, once at
sea the crew cannot dial a convenient telephone number to call on the services of a professional
fire brigade. The ship's crew IS the fire brigade and particularly when a heavy sea is running, there
is no safe refuge to which they can retreat.
In the author's experience there is a vastly different effect in fires involving PVC and
Melamine—the former producing intolerable and the latter tolerable smoke conditions. Examples
of such risks are:-
1. Combustible bulkheads, linings, grounds and ceilings;

2. PVC surfaced steel sheeting;
3. combustible paints and varnishes;
4. furniture—chairs, settees etc.—incorporating polyurethane or polystyrene, which not only
burns very fiercely but produces volumes of highly toxic gases and smoke. Many of the
vinyl coverings add to the toxic hazard; and
5. unprotected steel casings bounding the machinery spaces which by conduction allow fire to
spread out of this high risk area into the accommodation. This should not, of course, apply
to ships built after 1965, but unfortunately cases have arisen where, due to dockyard
activity, the integrity has been impaired. Another common fault is that these engine-room
casing doors are not maintained as being self-closing so that when a fire occurs it quickly
spreads out into the accommodation.
Taking each in turn the author would comment and offer the following suggestions:

1. All bulkheads, linings, grounds and ceilings in the accommodation areas should be
constructed of noncombustible materials giving at least 30 minutes of fire resistance. Too
often the author has observed ceilings constructed of material offering little or no resistance
to fire. Yet it is an absolutely basic fact that heat rises and it must be obvious that ceilings
must be constructed of such material as will prevent the passage of fire to the dangerous
concealed spaces above. It also goes, almost without saying, that the doors to cabins and
public spaces should have a similar resistance and be made and maintained self-closing.
2. The use of PVC coatings on steel structures is bound to add to the smoke and toxic hazard
to be faced in the confines of a ship. This type of construction is not recommended. An
additional hazard and one which should not be taken lightly is that when PVC burns it
produces under fire conditions large quantities of HCl. The HCl fumes will penetrate into
compartments housing electrical switchgear and if allowed to reach the bridge and/or the
control room in the case of a tanker or chemical carrier, the results can be quite
catastrophic. The acid fumes will undoubtedly cause terrible damage to delicate navigation
equipment, radar, cargo control gear, etc., and it is entirely possible that the loss in this
direction will far outweigh that caused by the fire itself. Decorative surfaces are much safer
when constructed of Melamine laminates which should have a surface spread of flame at
least to Class 2 when tested in accordance with BS 476: Part 7: 1997.
3. Conventional paints and varnishes should not be used internally in accommodation or
machinery spaces. If surfaces have to be painted then only fire retardant material should be
used and these should conform to the BS specification outlined above.
4. The use of polyurethane or polystyrene in furniture should be banned for shipboard use.
Table tops or bench surfaces should be constructed of Melamine decorative laminates if not
of natural timber. Vynol coverings which produce toxic products should not be used.
5. Engine-room fires account for a large proportion of the total and it is essential that the
casings be protected and maintained to at least A-60 standard. This protection should also
apply to the casing doors and it is essential that these be maintained self-closing at all
times.
It is, of course, impossible to eliminate completely all combustibles from accommodation areas
and indeed it would make life on board pretty dull if this could be achieved. But the installation of
suitable fire detection equipment, the complete use of noncombustible panels and bulkheads,
coupled with sprinkler systems in the case of passenger ships, VLCC'S, bulk and chemical carriers,
is strongly recommended.
Having drawn attention to a few of the problems the author would like to see Classification
Societies draw up new standards whereby the smoke and gas producing elements of structure,
including paints and varnishes, are controlled to a reasonably safe level for shipboard use. This
would have to be on an international scale and IMO is the natural body through which the
standards for smoke and gas emission would be laid down. The various fire research bodies
throughout the world, including the Fire Research Station at Borehanwood, England, would no
doubt be more than willing to lend their considerable expertise to such a project. It should be
noted that IMO have already gone part of the way to meeting the smoke emission test in respect of
deck coverings—IMO Resolution A214.
A great deal of research has been devoted to the production of wall and partition linings which
provide adequate thermal insulation, coupled with a low rate of surface flame spread and has
resulted in the following Resolution being adopted and test procedure defined.
Resolution MSC.61(67) Adoption of The International Code for Application of Fire Test Procedures
(adopted on 5 December 1996)
Part 2 - Smoke and Toxicity Test
2 Fire test procedure
2.1 General

Smoke generation tests shall be conducted in accordance with standard ISO 5659:1994, Part 2 and
additional test procedures as described in this part of the Code. To carry out the tests in
accordance with this standard, modifications of the arrangements and procedures to the ISO
standard shall be made, if necessary.
2.2 Test specimen

Preparation of test specimen shall be in accordance with the practice outlined in resolutions
A.653(16), A.687(17) and A.753(18). In the case of cables, only specimens of those with maximum
insulation thickness need be tested.
2.3 Test conditions

Irradiance to the specimen during the test shall be kept constant. Three specimens shall be tested
under each of the following conditions:
.1 irradiance of 25 kW/m2 in the presence of pilot flame;
.2 irradiance of 25 kW/m2 in the absence of pilot flame; and
.3 irradiance of 50 kW/m2 in the absence of pilot flame.
2.4 Duration of tests

The test shall be carried out for at least 10 min. If the minimum light transmittance value has not
been reached during the 10-minute exposure, the test shall be continued for a further 10-minute
period.
2.5 Test results
2.5.1 Specific optical density of smoke (Ds) as defined below shall be recorded during
the test period at least every 5 s:
Ds = (V/(A * L)) * log10(Io /I)
where:
V = total volume of the chamber (m3)

A = exposed area of the specimen (m2)
L = optical length (m) of smoke measurement
Io = light intensity before the test
I = light intensity during the test (after absorption by the smoke).
2.5.2 When making toxicity measurements, the sampling of fumes shall be made
during the testing of the second or the third specimen at each test condition,
from the geometrical centre of the chamber within 3 min of the time when the
maximum specific optical density of smoke is reached. The concentration of
each toxic gas shall be determined as ppm in the chamber volume.
2.6 Classification criteria
2.6.1 Smoke
An average (Dm) of the maximum of Ds of three tests at each test condition shall
be calculated.
.1 for materials used as surface of bulkheads, linings or ceilings, the

Dm shall not exceed 200 in any test condition;
.2 for materials used as primary deck covering, the Dm shall not

exceed 400 in any test condition;
.3 for materials used as floor covering, the Dm shall not exceed 500
in any test condition; and
.4 for plastic pipes and electric cables, the Dm shall not exceed 400
in any test condition.
2.6.2 Toxicity
The gas concentration measured at each test condition shall not exceed the
following limits:
CO 1450 ppm HBr 600 ppm

HCl 600 ppm HCN 140 ppm
HF 600 ppm SO2 120 ppm
NOX 350 ppm
2.7 Test report

A test report shall contain the following information:

.1 type of the material, i.e. surface finish, floor covering, primary deck covering, pipes,
etc;
.2 trade name of the material;
.3 description of the material;
.4 construction of the specimen;
.5 name and address of the manufacturer of the material;
.6 Dm at each heating and ignition condition;
.7 concentrations of toxic gases in ppm, if applicable;
.8 judgement according to paragraph 2.6;
.9 name and address of the testing laboratory; and
.10 date of testing.
New materials are already on the market, and actually installed in ships, which totally resist any
surface spread of fire, yet at the same time have an excellent decorative finish. A number of
British and foreign firms are specialising in the production of materials which satisfy the
requirements of SOLAS; and brief descriptions of some of these materials must now be given.
Cape Boards
Cape Industrial Products Limited produce a material bearing the name "Cape Marine Board"
which is manufactured in Glasgow and has been widely used for the protection of accommodation
areas in all types of vessels throughout the world.
"Cape Marine Board" is a non-combustible board manufactured from autoclaved calcium
silicate, reinforced with selected minerals and fibres. The boards do not contain asbestos or other
mineral fibres. Class "A" boards weigh 17.8 kg/m2 and measure 2.4 by 1.2 m. The panels can be
veneered with decorative finishes such as wood veneers but more commonly with melamine
laminates.
"Cape Marine Board" provides "A60" Class
protection for bulkheads, stairwells,
boiler-rooms and engine-room casings. For
"A60" single-sided protection a minimum 19.1
mm thick board is used in conjunction with
mineral wool. When covered with a decorative
laminate the board is nominally 22 mm thick.
As "A60" ceiling insulation 16 mm thick board
can be used provided it is installed not less
than 300 mm beneath a steel deck.
This technique of leaving an air space as
additional insulation between the steel and its
main insulation is of very great importance in
terms of fire resistance. There is no doubt that
the effectiveness of any fire screen is greatly
increased if it is not in immediate contact with
any heat-conducting material.
For "B30" Class bulkheads "Cape Marine
Board" can be used in 22 mm thick boards with
rigid veneers on either side. "C" Class
bulkheads, which must be of non-combustible
material but with no specific degree of fire
FIGURE 10.4 Section of a passenger ship showing "A"
resistance, can be constructed of 11.5 mm and "B" Class bulkheads and divisions, and the "Cape
Marine Board" protection.

FIGURE 10.5 KEY 1. Fire-resisting bulkheads ("A"

Class)-2. Stairwell ("A" Class)-3. Boiler-room casing
("A" Class)-4. Engine-room casing insulation
incorporating air-duct ("A" Class)-S. Wireless
Telegraphy Office (Control station "A" Class)-6.
Aluminium structure protected with "Cape Marine Board"
("A" Class)-7. Step bulkhead ("A" Class)-8. "B" Class
division (incombustible)-9. Shipside lining-10. Ceiling
"Marine Board"-Il. Dado linings (comfort insulation)-12. FIGURE 10.6 Cape Industrial Products Ltd., "Cape
"Marine Board" "B" Class incombustible door-13. Steel Marine Board" as an "A" Class division.
stairway with "Marine Board" under-14. "Marine Board"
window box-15. Double bulkhead-16. Acoustic ceiling
in public space.
FIGURE 10.7 Cape Marine Board. FIGURE 10.8 Decorative A60 boards.

FIGURE 10.9 Cape Marine Board head and foot FIGURE 10.10 Cape Marine Board ceiling detail.
details.
FIGURE 10.11 Cape Marine Board being installed in FIGURE 10.12 Cape lightweight marine system
the accommodation area of a bulk carrier. which has achieved 60 minute fire rating for bulkhead
linings, deckhead linings and free standing
requirements.

FIGURE 10.13 Typical wall details for Cape Marine Board.
FIGURE 10.14 Typical ceiling details for Cape Marine Board.

board, with or without applied decorative surfaces. Cape Boards and Panels Limited manufacture
doors complete with metal frames to satisfy "B" Class requirements.
Various types of decorative surface—such as Formica Decorative Laminate—can be veneered
to "Cape Marine Board" to provide a composite panel which combines protection against fire with
an attractive appearance to meet current ship design requirements. Probably the main attraction of
this entire assembly is that it does not develop smoke, flammable and toxic gases when heated by
fire.
The "Cape Marine Board" is completely non-combustible and is easy to cut and handle.
Cape also manufacture a lightweight metal faced board which can be used as a free standing
partition and has "A60" rating.
Durasteel
"Durasteel" panelling is a composite flat sheeting consisting of two light-gauge metal
facing-sheets securely keyed by a patented process to a highly compressed asbestos composition
core. Pressure exceeding two tons per square inch is used in manufacture, so that all moisture is
driven from the fibre. This, it is claimed, ensures perfect bonding and consolidation of the sheet.
The sheeting has a marked degree of mechanical strength, say the makers, and can stand up to
quite severe blows which would be likely to damage many other types of panelling. This feature
makes it particularly valuable for use in holds or other parts of a ship where the bulkheads have to
be able to withstand mechanical shock.
The standard panels are 5 ft. 11 in. by 2 ft. 5½ in., and 7 ft. 11½ in. by 2 ft. 5½ in. in area; and
are made in thicknesses of one-eighth inch, quarter inch and three-eighths inch—the weight per
square foot being two and a half pounds, four and a half pounds and six pounds respectively.
Exposed edges are protected by light steel channel binding, and either three-inch or four-inch steel
cover strips can be used across butt joints.
A galvanised finish is standard, but the panels can be painted like normal surfaces. Decorative
plastic sheeting can also be applied to the panels if required. The company have recently
succeeded in securing an excellent bond with a cold cement glaze: the resulting finish is very rich
and decorative. During a Standard Fire Test, the glaze withstood a temperature of over 800o C.
and was unaffected save for slight discoloration.
When fitted to both sides of a bulkhead, the insulation is to consist of Durasteel 3VF2 panels ¼"
thick, with 3" x ½" Durasteel straps at the butts and edges. When, with approval of this Ministry,
it is-fitted to one side only of a bulkhead or deck, the insulation is to consist of two Durasteel
3DF2 panels, each 3/8" thick, separated by a sheet of Durasteel Durac ¼" thick, the butts of the
Durasteel panels being midway between those of the Durac sheet. The composition of the
insulation is to be, in all cases, the same as that fitted to the bulkhead tested by the Joint Fire
Research Organisation; and the method of
fitting and other relevant details are to be in
accordance with the arrangements shown on
the attached drawing marked with the
Department's approval stamp. The insulation
is to be continued along the vertical and
horizontal boundaries adjacent to the
bulkhead for a distance of at least 15 inches.
Messrs. Durasteel Ltd. also make
fire-resisting doors which have a Fire Offices'
Committee Rating "C" (two hours). The
"Duracheck" door is of laminated steel
seven-eighths inch thick, and asbestos bound
round all edges in stout 10-gauge channel
section. FIGURE 10.15 Detail of "Durasteel" sheeting,
and method of securing to bulkheads.

Navilite·N
"Navilite·N" is manufactured by Messrs. Dansk Eternit Fabrik A/S, Denmark, and is an
approved non-combustible material, supplied for bulkheads, linings, ceilings, etc., on board ship.
The board is a material based on a fibre-reinforced, auto-claved calcium silicate matrix composed
by hydrated lime and diatomaceous earth and is totally free of asbestos.
The application of "Navilite·N" conforms to the basic principles on fire safety on board ships as
stated in the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, 1974:
1. division of ship into main vertical zones by thermal and structural boundaries;
2. separation of accommodation spaces from the remainder of the ship by thermal and
structural boundaries;
3. restricted use of combustible materials;
4. detection of any fire in the zone of origin;
5. containment and extinction of any fire in the space of origin;
6. protection of means of escape or access for fire fighting;
7. ready availability of fire-extinguishing appliances;
8. minimization of possibility of ignition of flammable cargo vapour.
Standard tests have been carried out in accordance with IMO Resolution A163 (ES iv) dated
November 1968, for "Navilite·N", vertically as "A" Class and "B" Class bulkheads and
horizontally as "A" Class deck structures and "B" Class ceilings.
Approvals for "Navilite·N" to be used for bulkheads and linings cover the fields of application
stipulated in the below sketches.
Dimensions of steel structures in accordance with IMO Resolution A163 (ES iv).
The thicknesses indicated of "Navilite·N" are core thicknesses, to which should be added the
thickness of surface materials to give total thickness.
Bulkhead structures marked with arrows from both sides are approved for general
application—structures marked with only one arrow are approved for restricted application in
Mounting Details
Below figures show mounting details of
"Navilite·N" ceiling panels and framing systems.
The sketched systems are in accordance with
mounting of test specimens during standard fire
testing.
1. Steel strips: A Class, spacing 1200 x 1200

mm; B Class, spacing 600 x 1200 mm
2. Self-tapping screws No. 10, spacing 400 mm
3. Steel framing, spacing 600 x 1200 mm
4. Framing, welded
5. Framing, joined by means of connecting
places
6. Omega steel sections, 19 mm overlap
7. "Navilite·N" Ceiling Panels
FIGURE 10.16 Dansk Eternit-Fabrik

A/S details of ceiling and deck
structures.

FIGURE 10.17 Dansk Eternit-Fabrik A/S details of approved bulkhead constructions.
places where the possibility of fire exists from the marked side exclusively. Any requirements
specified for the application of such bulkheads are stated in the certificates of approval.
"Navilite-N" was extensively used in the Royal Caribbean Cruise Line's beautiful cruise ships,
M/S Nordic Prince, M/S Song of Norway, M/S Nordic Prince and M/S Sun Viking. These vessels
meet the requirements of the US Coast Guard Rules and Regulations for passenger vessels, the
Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, including the Amendments of 1966 and 1967, U.S.
Department of Health Regulations, as well as the Norwegian "Skibskontrollen's" rules and the
vessels are built to Det Norske Veritas Class + 1A1.

Regulation 27 Fire integrity of bulkheads and decks in ships carrying not more than 36
passengers
mentioned elsewhere in this part, the minimum fire integrity of bulkheads and decks shall be as
prescribed in table 1 and table 2.
.1 Tables 1 and 2 shall apply respectively to the bulkheads and decks separating
adjacent spaces.
.2 For determining the appropriate fire integrity standards to be applied to

divisions between adjacent spaces, such spaces are classified according to
their fire risk as shown in categories (1) to (11) below. The title of each category
is intended to be typical rather than restrictive. The number in parentheses
preceding each category refers to the applicable column or row in the tables.

Spaces containing emergency sources of power and lighting. Wheelhouse and
chartroom. Spaces containing the ship's radio equipment. Fire-extinguishing
rooms, fire control rooms and fire-recording stations. Control room for
propulsion machinery when located outside the machinery space. Spaces
containing centralized fire alarm equipment.
(2) Corridors
Passenger and crew corridors and lobbies.
(3) Accommodation spaces

Spaces as defined in regulation 3.10 excluding corridors.
(4) Stairways
the machinery spaces) and enclosures thereto.
In this connection, a stairway which is enclosed only at one level shall be
(5) Service spaces (low risk)

Lockers and store-rooms not having provisions for the storage of flammable
liquids and having areas less than 4 m2 and drying rooms and laundries.
(6) Machinery spaces of category A

Spaces as defined in regulation 3.19.
(7) Other machinery spaces

Spaces as defined in regulation 3.20 excluding machinery spaces of category A.
(8) Cargo spaces

All spaces used for cargo (including cargo oil tanks) and trunkways and
hatchways to such spaces, other than special category spaces.
(9) Service spaces (high risk)

Galleys, pantries containing cooking appliances, paint and lamp rooms, lockers
and store-rooms having areas of 4 m2 or more, spaces for the storage of
flammable liquids, and workshops other than those forming part of the
machinery spaces.
(10) Open decks

Open deck spaces and enclosed promenades having no fire risk. Air spaces (the
space outside superstructures and deckhouses).
(11) Special category spaces


spaces within a main vertical zone or horizontal zone which is not protected by
an automatic sprinkler system complying with the provisions of regulation 12 or
between such zones neither of which is so protected, the higher of the two
values given in the tables shall apply.

spaces within a main vertical zone or horizontal zone which is protected by an
automatic sprinkler system complying with the provisions of regulation 12 or
between such zones both of which are so protected, the lesser of the two values

given in the tables shall apply. Where a sprinklered zone and a non-sprinklered
zone meet within accommodation and service spaces, the higher of the two
values given in the tables shall apply to the division between the zones.
be accepted as contributing, wholly or in part, to the required insulation and integrity of a division.
4 External boundaries which are required in regulation 1 to be of steel or other equivalent material
may be pierced for the fitting of windows and sidescuttles provided that there is no requirement
for such boundaries to have "A" class integrity elsewhere in this part. Similarly, in such
boundaries which are not required to have "A" class integrity, doors may be of materials to the
Table 27.1 - Fire integrity of bulkheads separating adjacent spaces
Spaces (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Control stations (1) A-0c A-0 A-60 A-0 A-15 A-60 A-15 A-60 A-60 * A-60
Corridors (2) Cc B-0c A-0a B-0c A-60 A-0 A-0 A-15 * A-15
c
B-0 A-0d
Accommodation (3) Cc A-0a B-0c A-60 A-0 A-0 A-15 * A-30
spaces c
B-0 A-0d A-0d
Stairways (4) A-0a A-0a A-60 A-0 A-0 A-15 * A-15
c
B-0 B-0c A-0d
Service spaces (5) Cc A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-0
(low risk)
Machinery spaces (6) * A-0 A-0 A-60 * A-60

of category A
Other machinery (7) A-0b A-0 A-0 * A-0

spaces
Cargo spaces (8) * A-0 * A-0

b
Service spaces (9) A-0 * A-30
(high risk)
Open decks (10) A-0

Special category (11) A-0
spaces
Notes: To be applied to both tables 27.1 and 27.2, as appropriate.
a For clarification as to which applies, see regulations 25 and 29.

b Where spaces are of the same numberical category and superscript b appears, a bulkhead or deck of the rating shown in the
tables is only required when the adjacent spaces are for a different purpose, eg in category (9). A galley next to a galley does
not require a bulkhead but a galley next to a paint room requires an "A-0" bulkhead.
c Bulkheads separating the wheelhouse and chartroom from each other may be "B-0" rating.
d See 2.3 and 2.4 of this regulation
e For the application of regulation 24.1.2, "B-0" and "c", where appearing in table 27.1, shall be read as "A-0".
f Fire insulation need not be fitted if the machinery space in category (7), in the opinion of the Administration, has little or no
fire risk.
* Where an asterisk appears in the tables, the division is required to be of steel or other equivalent material but is not required to
be of an "A" class standard.
For the application of regulation 24.1.2 an asterisk, where appearing in table 27.2, except for categories (8) and (10), shall be
read as "A-0".

Table 27.2 - Fire integrity of decks separating adjacent spaces
Space Space (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
below above
Control stations (1) A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-30
Corridors (2) A-0 * * A-0 * A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-0
Accommodation (3) A-60 A-0 * A-0 * A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-30
spaces
A-0d
Stairways (4) A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-0 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-0
Service spaces (5) A-15 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-0
(low risk)
Machinery spaces (6) A-60 A-60 A-60 A-60 A-60 * A-60 A-30 A-60 * A-60
of category A
Other machinery (7) A-15 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-0 A-0 * A-0
spaces
Cargo spaces (8) A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-0 * A-0
Service spaces (9) A-60 A-30 A-30 A-30 A-0 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-30
(high risk)
A-0d A-0d A-0d
Open decks (10) * * * * * * * * * - A-0
Special category (11) A-60 A-15 A-30 A-15 A-0 A-30 A-0 A-0 A-30 A-0 A-0
spaces
A-0d
See notes under table 27.1
Comment
The hull, superstructure, structural bulkheads, decks and deckhouses of every ship carrying
more than 36 passengers, must be constructed of steel but the may allow such parts to be
constructed of other materials if satisfied that they offer equal fire resistance
The hull, superstructure and deck-houses of every ship must be sub-divided by bulkheads of
"A" Class divisions into main vertical zones. The mean length of no such zone may exceed 131 ft.
Any steps and recesses in the bulkheads must be of "A" Class divisions.
Whenever possible, portions of such divisions which extend above the ship's bulkhead deck
must be in line with watertight subdivision bulkheads situated immediately below the bulkhead
deck. The divisions must extend from deck to deck and to the ship's shell plating, and in the case
of a deck-house to the external plating thereof. The Board may exempt any ship from this
requirement if he is satisfied that it would be incompatible with the purpose for which the ship is
designed, and that other equally effective methods of fire protection have been adopted.
All ships, if fitted with internal combustion propelling or with oil-fired boilers, must have their
accommodation spaces separated from the machinery-spaces by "A" Class divisions
Where "A" Class divisions are pierced for the passage of electric cables, pipes, trunkways,
girders or beams, or for any other purpose, the openings must be so arranged that the fire resistance
of the division is unimpaired. Trunkways and ducts passing through these divisions must be fitted
with dampers controllable on either side of the division. The dampers must be readily accessible,
must be marked in red, and must be fitted with indicators to show whether they are open or shut.
Any openings must be provided with the means of closure permanently attached to the division.
The means of closure must be no less than the division itself in resisting fire. Where "A" Class
divisions are pierced by tonnage openings, the means of closure shall be by steel plates.
Construction of all doors and door frames in "A" Class divisions, with the means of securing
them when closed, must provide resistance to fire as well as to the passage of smoke and flame as
far as practicable equivalent to that of the bulkheads in which they are situated. Watertight doors

are not required to be insulated. Any door in such a division must be so constructed that it can be
opened and closed by one person from either side of the division.
Every door, not being a watertight door in an "A" Class division, must be self-closing and be
fitted with the means whereby it may be readily released from the open position. These doors must
be of such design that their self-closing mechanism can close against an inclination of 3½ degrees.
During fire drills it is terribly important that these control devices be operated and all personnel
must clearly understand their function as well as position.
A new departure in the means of escape regulations is that for passenger ships, standards are
laid down for the design of stairways, corridors and lobbies. Stairways must not be less than 900
millimetres in clear width and be fitted with handrails on each side. The width is increased by 10
millimetres for every one person in excess of 90 persons. In no case is the distance between hand
rails permitted to be wider than 1.8 metres.
Regulation 28 Means of escape

(Paragraph 1.8 of this regulation applies to ships constructed on or after 1 January 1994).
1 Stairways and ladders shall be arranged to provide ready means of escape to the lifeboat and
liferaft embarkation deck from all passenger and crew spaces and from spaces in which the crew
is normally employed, other than machinery spaces. In particular, the following provisions shall be
complied with:
.1 Below the bulkhead deck two means of escape, at least one of which shall be
independent of watertight doors, shall be provided from each watertight
compartment or similarly restricted space or group of spaces. Exceptionally, the
Administration may dispense with one of the means of escape, due regard being
paid to the nature and location of spaces and to the number of persons who
might normally be employed there.
.2 Above the bulkhead deck there shall be at least two means of escape from each
main vertical zone or similarly restricted space or group of spaces at least one of
which shall give access to a stairway forming a vertical escape.
.3 If a radiotelegraph station has no direct access to the open deck, two means of
escape from or access to such station shall be provided, one of which may be a
porthole or window of sufficient size or another means to the satisfaction of the
Administration.
.4 A corridor, lobby or part of a corridor from which there is only one route of
escape shall be prohibited.
.5 At least one of the means of escape required by paragraphs 1.1 and 1.2 shall
consist of a readily accessible enclosed stairway which shall provided
continuous fire shelter from the level of its origin to the appropriate lifeboat and
liferaft embarkation decks, or to the uppermost weather deck if the embarkation
deck does not extend to the main vertical zone being considered. In the latter
case, direct access to the embarkation deck by way of external open stairways
and passageways shall be provided and shall have emergency lighting in
accordance with regulation III/11.5 and slip-free surfaces under foot. Boundaries
facing external open stairways and passageways forming part of an escape route
and boundaries in such a position that their failure during a fire would impede
escape to the embarkation deck shall have fire integrity, including insulation
values, in accordance with the tables in regulation II-2/ The widths, number and
continuity of escapes shall be as follows:
.5.1 Stairways shall not be less than 900 mm in clear width. Stairways shall be fitted
with handrails on each side. The minimum clear width of stairways shall be
increased by 10 mm for every one person provided for in excess of 90 persons.
The maximum clear width between handrails where stairways are wider than 900
mm shall be 1,800 mm. The total number of persons to be evacuated by such
stairways shall be assumed to be two thirds of the crew and the total number of
passengers in the areas served by such stairways. The width of the stairways
shall conform to the standards not inferior to those adopted by the
Organization.2
.5.2 All stairways sized for more than 90 persons shall be aligned fore and aft.
.5.3 Doorways and corridors and intermediate landings included in means of escape
shall be sized in the same manner as stairways.
2
Reference is made to the standards to be developed by the Organization.

.5.4 Stairways shall not exceed 3.5 m in vertical rise without the provision of a landing
and shall not have an angle of inclination greater than 45°.
.5.5 Landings at each deck level shall be not less than 2 m2 in area and shall increase
by 1 m2 for every 10 persons provided for in excess of 20 persons but need not
exceed 16 m2, except for those landings servicing public spaces having direct
access onto the stairway enclosure.
.6 Protection of access from the stairway enclosures to the lifeboat and liferaft
embarkation areas shall be to the satisfaction of the Administration.
.7 Stairways serving only a space and a balcony in that space shall not be considered
as forming one of the required means of escape.
.8 Where public spaces span three or more decks and contain combustibles such as
furniture and enclosed spaces such as shops, offices and restaurants, each level
within the space shall have two means of escape, one of which shall give direct
access to an enclosed vertical means of escape meeting the requirements of
paragraph 5.
.9 Where the Administration has granted dispensation under the provisions of

paragraph .1.1, this sole means of escape shall provide safe escape. However,
stairways shall not be less than 800 mm in clear width with handrails on both
sides.
.10 In addition to the emergency lighting required by regulations II-1/42 and III/11.5, the
means of escape including stairways and exits, shall be marked by lighting or
photoluminescent strip indicators placed not more than 0.3 m above the deck at all
points of the escape route including angles and intersections. The marking must
enable passengers to identify all the routes of escape and readily identify the
escape exits. If electric illumination is used, it shall be supplied by the emergency
source of power and it shall be so arranged that the failure of any single light or cut
in a lighting strip, will not result in the marking being ineffective. Additionally, all
escape route signs and fire equipment location markings shall be of
photoluminescent material or marked by lighting. The Administration shall ensure
that such lighting or photoluminescent equipment has been evaluated, tested and
applied in accordance with the guidelines developed by the Organization.3
2.1 In special category spaces the number and disposition of the means of escape both below and above
the bulkhead deck shall be to the satisfaction of the Administration and in general the safety of
access to the embarkation deck shall be at least equivalent to that provided for under paragraphs
1.1, 1.2, 1.5 and 1.6.
2.2 One of the escape routes from the machinery spaces where the crew is normally employed shall
avoid direct access to any special category space.
3.1 Two means of escape shall be provided from each machinery space. In particular, the following
provisions shall be complied with:
.1 Where the space is below the bulkhead deck the two means of escape shall consist
of either:
.1.1 two sets of steel ladders as widely separated as possible, leading to doors in the
upper part of the space similarly separated and from which access is provided to
the appropriate lifeboat and liferaft embarkation decks. One of these ladders shall
provide continuous fire shelter from the lower part of the space to a safe position
outside the space; or
.1.2 one steel ladder leading to a door in the upper part of the space from which access
is provided to the embarkation deck and additionally, in the lower part of the space
and in a position well separated from the ladder referred to, a steel door capable of
being operated from each side and which provides access to a safe escape route
from the lower part of the space to the embarkation deck.
.2 Where the space is above the bulkhead deck, the two means of escape shall be as
widely separated as possible and the doors leading from such means of escape
shall be a position from which access is provided to the appropriate lifeboat and
liferaft embarkation decks. Where such means of escape require the use of
ladders, these shall be of steel.
3.2 In a ship of less than 1,000 tons gross tonnage, the Administration may dispense with one of the
means of escape, due regard being paid to the width and disposition of the upper part of the space;
and in a ship of 1,000 tons gross tonnage and above, the Administration may dispense with one
means of escape from any such space so long as either a door or a steel ladder provides a safe
3
Reference is made to the guidelines to be developed by the Organization.

escape route to the embarkation deck, due regard being paid to the nature and location of the space
and whether persons are normally employed in that space.
3.3 Two means of escape shall be provided from a machinery control room located within a machinery
space, at least one of which will provide continuous fire shelter to a safe position outside the
machinery space.
4 In no case shall lifts be considered as forming one of the required means of escape.
Comment
Reference is made to what appears to the author to be the most interesting points contained in
the new means of escape regulations.
Ships to which the Rules apply must be provided with such doorways, stairways, ladderways
and other means of escape as will provide a readily accessible escape route for all persons aboard.
Design and construction must be such that all means of escape can be easily used by the persons
for whom they are intended. The number and width of such means of escape must be sufficient for
the intended number of persons using it in times of emergency. The dimensions and design
features relating to stairways is contained in Regulation 28 paragraphs 1.5.1, 1.5.4 and 1.5.5.
In all ships there must be provided below the bulkhead deck at least two such means of escape
from each compartment bounded by watertight bulkheads or from similarly restricted space or
group of spaces and at least one of the means of escape must be independent of watertight doors
Above the bulkhead deck at least two such means of escape from each space bounded by main
vertical zone bulkheads or from each similarly restricted space or groups and one of the means of
escape provided must give access to the lifeboat or liferaft embarkation deck or decks, or to a
stairway leading to such decks.
At least one of the means of escape must be enclosed so as to afford, as far as practicable,
continuous fire shelter from the level of its origin to the lifeboat and liferaft embarkation deck or
decks.
A corridor, lobby or part of a corridor from which there is only one route of escape is
prohibited. Readers will recall that the account of the Scandinavian Star tragedy in Chapter 4
revealed that some 20 passengers died in the two blank end corridors. This new requirement will
thus make a significant contribution towards making safer passenger ships.
It is interesting to note that all stairways sized for more that 90 persons must be aligned fore and
aft. Here again, in the Scandinavian Star, some of the stairways were aligned thwartship
Without doubt the new Regulation 28 paragraph 1.10 should make it much easier for passengers
to find their way to the safety of the embarkation deck. The route, including stairways and exits,
"shall be marked by lighting or photoluminescent strip indicators placed not more than 0.3 m
above the deck at all points of the escape route including angles and intersections." It is interesting
to note that the new passenger liner Oriana has incorporated the aircraft type floor strip lighting to
lead passengers to safety in an emergency. In the Second Edition of Fire Aboard, Page 464 —
published in 1979 — and in many articles since, the author has been advocating that this type of
device be fitted in passenger ships and he is naturally pleased about this new development.
Two means of escape must be provided from each machinery space. Below the bulkhead deck
the two means of escape must consist of steel ladders separated as widely as possible. One of the
ladders must provide continuous fire shelter from the lower part of the space and lead to a safe
position outside the space. Alternatively, one steel ladder leading to a door in the upper part of the
space from which access is provided to the embarkation deck is permitted, provided that in the
lower part of the space and in a position well separated from the ladder, there is fitted a steel door
capable of being operated from each side and which provides access to a safe escape route to the
embarkation deck.
Where the space is above the bulkhead deck, the two means of escape must be as widely
separated as possible and the doors leading from such means of escape must be in such position
from which provides access to the appropriate lifeboat and liferaft embarkation decks.
The author has already made reference to means of escape from machinery spaces and he
greatly welcomes the fact that there must be provided two means of escape from within the

control room, one of which must provide continuous fire shelter to a safe position outside the
machinery space, up which engineers can escape in a smoke and heat-free environment. Such
provision means that, especially if a water spray system is installed, engineers can operate this
system, according to the position of the fire, in a safe environment from within the control room
knowing that, in the unlikely event of not being able to control the fire, their means of escape is
fully secure. This is something that the author has been advocating for many years! See Fire
Aboard, Second Edition.
In Chapter 8, the author has expressed his opinion that at least two sets of self contained
breathing apparatus should be provided in these control rooms. Wearing this equipment engineers
can safely go to the seat of the fire and if necessary use a line of hose from a hydrant to finalise
extinction. Most times the fire will in fact be extinguished by the fixed water spray system
In cargo ships — see Chapter II-2 Regulation 45 — very similar requirements for means of
escape from machinery spaces is required. The notable exception being that there is no
requirement that alternative means of escape be provided from the control rooms in machinery
spaces. Why this should be quite baffles the author. In the larger vessels, VLCC's being a good
example, the machinery spaces are very large indeed and the fire risks quite surely mirror those to
be found in passenger ships. Hopefully, this omissiom will be rectified in the next round of
legislation. Means of escape from any public room which may be used for the purpose of concerts,
cinema shows or similar forms of entertainment must be adequate having regard to the number of
persons who may be in the audience and the seating must be arranged in rows to ensure free access
to the exits. Where subdued lighting is used, the exits must be constructed to open outwards .
This Rule is delightfully vague and ignores such elementary precautions such as requiring that
chairs should not be freestanding but must be battened together in groups. Single chairs can easily
be knocked over in the excitement created by a fire and this can create a good deal of panic. No
mention is made of the width of gangways necessary where large numbers of persons congregate
and such a stipulation would be most helpful to ships' personnel. It is simply not good enough to
use the term "adequate".
In every ship to which the Regulations apply stairways and ladderways must be arranged so as
to provide ready means of escape to the lifeboat embarkation deck from all crew spaces, passenger
spaces and other spaces in which the crew are normally employed.
There must be provided from each engine-room, shaft tunnel and boiler-room two means of
escape as widely separated as practicable, one of which may be a watertight door if a such a door is
available as a means of escape. Where no such watertight door is available, the two means of
escape must consist of two sets of steel ladders leading to separate doors in the casing or elsewhere
from which there is access to the lifeboat or liferaft embarkation deck or decks.
There must be no direct opening between the crew accommodation (other than recreation
spaces), and any spaces used as: 1. Permanent coal bunkers; 2. Oil-fuel bunkers; 3. Cargo or
machinery-spaces; 4. Lamp-rooms or paint-rooms; 5. Store-rooms not forming part of the
accommodation (other than store-rooms for engine-room or deck department stores); 6. Chain
lockers; or 7. Cofferdams.
Regulation 28-1 Escape routes on ro-ro passenger ships

1 Requirements applicable to all ro-ro passenger ships
1.1 This paragraph shall apply to all ro-ro passenger ships. For ships constructed before 1 July 1997
the requirements of the regulation shall apply not later than the date of the first periodical survey
after 1 July 1997.
1.2 Handrails or other handholds shall be provided in all corridors along the entire escape route, so
that a firm handhold is available every step of the way, where possible, to the assembly stations
and embarkation stations. Such handrails shall be provided on both sides of longitudinal
corridors more than 1.8 m in width and transverse corridors more than 1 m in width. Particular
attention shall be paid to the need to be able to cross lobbies, atriums and other large open spaces
along escape routes. Handrails and other handholds shall be of such strength as to withstand a
distributed horizontal load of 750 N/m applied in the direction of the centre of the corridor or
space, and a distributed vertical load of 750 N/m applied in the downward direction. The two loads
need not be applied simultaneously.

1.3 Escape routes shall not be obstructed by furniture and other obstructions. With the exception of
tables and chairs which may be cleared to provide open space, cabinets and other heavy
furnishings in public spaces and along escape routes shall be secured in place to prevent shifting
if the ship rolls or lists. Floor coverings shall also be secured in place. When the ship is
underway, escape routes shall be kept clear of obstructions such as cleaning carts, bedding,
luggage and boxes of goods.
1.4 Escape routes shall be provided from every normally occupied space on the ship to an assembly
station. These escape routes shall be arranged so as to provide the most direct route possible to
the assembly station, and shall be marked with symbols in accordance with the recommendations
of the Organization.4
1.5 Where enclosed spaces adjoin an open deck, openings from the enclosed space to the open deck
shall, where practicable, be capable of being used as an emergency exit.
1.6 Decks shall be sequentially numbered, starting with "1" at the tank top or lowest deck. These
numbers shall be prominently displayed at stair landings and lift lobbies. Decks may also be
named, but the deck number shall always be displayed with the name.
1.7 Simple "mimic" plans showing the "you are here" position and escape routes marked by arrows,
shall be prominently displayed on the inside of each cabin door and in public spaces. The plan
shall show the directions of escape, and shall be properly oriented in relation to its position on the
ship.
1.8 Cabin and stateroom doors shall not require keys to unlock them from inside the room. Neither
shall there be any doors along any designed escape route which require keys to unlock them when
moving in the direction of escape.
2 Requirements applicable to ro-ro passenger ships constructed on or after 1 July 1997
2.1 The lowest 0.5 m of bulkheads and other partitions forming vertical divisions along escape routes
shall be able to sustain a load of 750 N/m to allow them to be used as walking surfaces from the
side of the escape route with the ship at large angles of heel.
2.2 The escape route from cabins to stairway enclosures shall be as direct as possible, with a
minimum number of changes in direction. It shall not be necessary to cross from one side of the
ship to the other to reach an escape route. It shall not be necessary to climb more than two decks
up or down in order to reach an assembly station or open deck from any passenger space.
2.3 External routes shall be provided from open decks, referred to in paragraph 2.2, to the survival
craft embarkation stations.
2.3 Requirements applicable to ro-ro passenger ships constructed on or after 1 July 1999
For ro-ro passenger ships constructed on or after 1 July 1999, escape routes shall be evaluated by
an evacuation analysis early in the design process. The analysis shall be used to identify and
eliminate, as far as practicable, congestion which may develop during an abandonment, due to
normal movement of passengers and crew along escape routes, including the possibility that crew
may need to move along these routes in a direction opposite the movement of passengers. In
addition, the analysis shall be used to demonstrate that escape arrangements are sufficiently
flexible to provide for the possibility that certain escape routes, assembly stations, embarkation
stations or survival craft may not be available as a result of a casualty.
Comment
For escape routes on ro-ro passenger ships the main additional features required are as follows:
1. Handrails have to be provided in all corridors along the entire escape route. These rails
have to be provided on each side of longitudinal corridors more than 1.8 metres wide and in
transverse corridors more than 1 metre wide. Even the strength of these handrails is laid
down in small corridors. 28.1, 1.2 showed it should be possible to incorporate in the
handrail design, indented or superimposed on the rails, arrows pointing in the direction of
escape, so that even in thick smoke passenger can 'feel' their way out of the interior to the
embarkation deck.
2. Obviously no obstruction, furniture etc., is permitted in the escape corridors.
3. Escape routes must provide the most direct route possible to an assembly point and marked
by symbols in accordance with the recommendations of the organisation.
4
Refer to Symbols related to life-saving appliances and arrangements, adopted by the Organization by resolution A.760(18).

4. Decks should be numbered,

starting at 1 for the lowest deck and
so on. In the past each company
decided their own procedure for
describing decks and this could be
most confusing to a visitor. This
standardised deck marking is
greatly welcomed. Named decks
are all very well for the crew but
difficult for passengers on board
for a matter of hours, or days at
most.
5. Simple mimic plans "you are here"
are required to be posted on the
inside of cabin doors. Escape
routes have to be marked with
arrows. This is another extremely
valuable requirement and can well
result in saving of life.
6. For ships constructed after 1 July,
FIGURE 10.18 A typical view of ship's accommodation after a 1999 all escape routes have to be
fire has occurred. All combustible material, including bulkheads evaluated by evacuation analysis.
and ceilings, have been completely destroyed.
There are a number of proprietary computer models already in existence which help designers
analyze the movement of people with respect to escape routes. For example, "E-scape" is an
evacuation simulation tool that is claimed to have been created to aid the safety professional in
ensuring buildings are able to meet safety regulations. The assumptions behind "E-scape" have
been compiled from an investigation into modelling human behaviour during evacuation. It is
claimed that theatres, public buildings, office buildings, offshore platforms and nuclear
installations can all be modelled successfully. AEA Technologies at Warrington UK have
developed a model called "Egress" and Professor Galea of the University of Greenwich is also
active in this research field.
Regulation 29 Protection of stairways and lifts in accommodation and service spaces

1 All stairways shall be of steel frame construction except where the Administration sanctions the
use of other equivalent material, and shall be within enclosures formed of "A" class divisions, with
positive means of closure at all openings, except that:
.1 a stairway connecting only two decks need not be enclosed, provided the
integrity of the deck is maintained by proper bulkheads or doors in one
'tween-deck space. When a stairway is closed in one 'tween-deck space, the
stairway enclosure shall be protected in accordance with the tables for decks in
regulations 26 or 27;
.2 stairways may be fitted in the open in a public space, provided they lie wholly
within such public space.
2 Stairway enclosures shall have direct access to the corridors and be of a sufficient area to prevent
congestion, having in view the number of persons likely to use them in an emergency. Within the
perimeter of such stairway enclosures, only public toilets, lockers or non-combustible material
providing storage for safety equipment and open information counters are permitted. Only public
spaces, corridors, public toilets, special category spaces, other escape stairways required by
1.5and external areas area permitted to have direct access to these stairway enclosures.
3 Lift trunks shall be so fitted as to prevent the passage of smoke and flame from one 'tween-deck to
another and shall be provided with means of closing so as to permit the control of draught and
smoke.

Comment
The author would comment as follows. The whole value of a protected staircase depends upon
the enclosure being complete when fire breaks out. Cabin hooks or any other similar fastenings to
hold self-enclosing doors in the open position should therefore be discouraged. It is not generally
realised that it is not only the passage of flame which must be prevented, but also that of smoke;
for smoke can quickly render a staircase impassable to people wanting to make their escape. This
important point should be forcibly brought home to the crew during all fire drills.
Regulation 30 Openings in "A" class divisions

1 Except for hatches between cargo, special category, store, and baggage spaces, and between such
spaces and the weather decks, all openings shall be provided with permanently attached means of
closing which shall be at least as effective for resisting fires as the divisions in which they are
fitted.
2 The construction of all doors and door frames in "A" class divisions, with the means of securing
them when closed, shall provide resistance to fire as well as to the passage of smoke and flame,
as far as practicable, equivalent to that of the bulkheads in which the doors are situated. Such
doors and door frames shall be constructed of steel or other equivalent material. Watertight doors
need not be insulated.
3 It shall be possible for each door to be opened and closed from each side of the bulkhead by one
person only.
4 Fire doors in main vertical zone bulkheads and stairway enclosures shall satisfy the following
requirements:
.1 The doors shall be self-closing and be capable of closing with an angle of inclination
of up to 3.5° opposing closure, and shall have an approximately uniform rate of
closure of no more than 40 s and no less than 10 s with the ship in the upright
position.
.2 Remote-controlled sliding or power-operated doors shall be equipped with an alarm

that sounds at least 5 s but no more than 10 s before the door begins to move and
continue sounding until the door is completely closed. Doors designed to re-open
upon contacting an object in its path shall re-open sufficiently to allow a clear
passage of at least 0.75 m, but no more than 1 m.
.3 All doors shall be capable of remote and automatic release from a continuously
manned central control station, either simultaneously or in groups, and also
individually from a position at both sides of the door. Indication must be provided at
the fire control panel in the continuously manned central control station whether each
of the remote-controlled doors are closed. The release mechanism shall be so
designed that the door will automatically close in the event of disruption of the control
system or central power supply. Release switches shall have an on-off function to
prevent automatic resetting of the system. Hold-back hooks not subject to central
control station release are prohibited.
.4 Local power accumulators for power-operated doors shall be provided in the

immediate vicinity of the doors to enable the doors to be operated at least ten times
(fully opened and closed) using the local controls.
.5 Double-leaf doors equipped with a latch necessary to their fire integrity shall have a
latch that is automatically activated by the operation of the doors when release by the
system.
.6 Doors giving direct access to special category spaces which are power-operated and
automatically closed need not be equipped with alarms and remote-release
mechanisms required in .2 and .3.
5 In ships carrying not more than 36 passengers, where a space is protected by an automatic
sprinkler system complying with the provisions of regulation 12 or fitted with a continuous "B"
class ceiling, openings in decks not forming steps in main vertical zones nor bounding horizontal
zones shall be closed reasonably tight and such decks shall meet the "A" class integrity
requirements in so far as is reasonable and practicable in the opinion of the Administration.
6 The requirements for "A" class integrity of the outer boundaries of a ship shall not apply to glass
partitions, windows and sidescuttles, provided that there is no requirement for such boundaries to
have "A" class integrity in regulation 3. Similarly, the requirements for "A" class integrity shall not
apply to exterior doors in superstructures and deckhouses.

7 All "A" class doors located in stairways, public spaces and main vertical zone bulkheads in escape
routes shall be equipped with a self-closing hose port of material, construction and fire resistance
which is equivalent to the door into which it is fitted, and shall be a 150 mm square clear opening
with the door closed and shall be inset into the lower edge of the door, opposite the door hinges,
or in the case of sliding doors, nearest the opening.
Regulation 31 Openings in "B" class divisions

1.1 Doors and door frames in "B" class divisions and means of securing them shall provide a method
of closure which shall have resistance to fire equivalent to that of the divisions5 except that
ventilation openings may be permitted in the lower portion of such doors. Where such opening is
in or under a door the total net area of any such opening or openings shall not exceed 0.05 m2.
When such opening is cut in a door it shall be fitted with a grill made of non-combustible material.
Doors shall be non-combustible.
1.2 Cabin doors in "B" class divisions shall be of a self-closing type. Hold-backs are not permitted.
2 The requirements for "B" class integrity of the outer boundaries of a ship shall not apply to glass
partitions, windows and sidescuttles. Similarly, the requirements for "B" class integrity shall not
apply to exterior doors in superstructures and deckhouses. For ships carrying not more than 36
passengers, the Administration may permit the use of combustible materials in doors separating
cabins from the individual interior sanitary spaces such as showers.
3 In ships carrying not more than 36 passengers where an automatic sprinkler system complying
with the provisions of regulation 12 is fitted:
.1 openings in decks not forming steps in main vertical zones nor bounding
horizontal zones shall be closed reasonably tight and such decks shall meet the
"B" class integrity requirements in so far as is reasonable and practicable in the
opinion of the Administration; and
.2 openings in corridor bulkheads of "B" class materials shall be protected in

accordance with the provisions of regulation 25.
Comment
"Self-locking" type should read "self-closing". In a fire situation it is easy to think of a
passenger leaving his cabin on an alert of fire and finding the smoke too thick to breathe. Not
having his key, he cannot get back into his cabin which might well serve as a safe refuge until
rescue comes! The banning of holdbacks, or cabin hooks is a sensible precaution.
Regulation 32 Ventilation systems

(Paragraph 1.7 of this regulation applies to ships constructed on or after 1 January 1994).
1 Passenger ships carrying more than 36 passengers
1.1 The ventilation system of a passenger ship carrying more than 36 passengers shall, in addition to
this part of this regulation, also be in compliance with the requirements of regulation 16.2 to 16.6,
16.8 and 16.9.
1.2 In general, the ventilation fans shall be so disposed that the ducts reaching the various spaces
remain within the main vertical zone.
1.3 Where ventilation systems penetrate decks, precautions shall be taken, in addition to those
relating to the fire integrity of the deck required by regulations 18.1.1 and 5 , to reduce the
likelihood of smoke and hot gases passing from one 'tween-deck space to another through the
system. In addition to insulation requirements contained in this regulation, vertical ducts shall, if
necessary, be insulated as required by the appropriate tables in regulation
1.4 Except in cargo spaces, ventilation ducts shall be constructed of the following materials:
.1 ducts not less than 0.075 m2 in sectional area and all vertical ducts serving more
than a single 'tween-deck space shall be constructed of steel or other equivalent
material;
.2 ducts less than 0.075 m2 in sectional area other than the vertical ducts referred to
in paragraph 1.4.1, shall be constructed of non-combustible materials. Where
such ducts penetrate "A" or "B" class divisions due regard shall be given to
ensuring the fire integrity of the division;
5
Reference is made to the Recommendation on Fire Test Procedures for "A", "B" and "F" class divisions, adopted by resolution A.517(13).

.3 short lengths of duct, not in general exceeding 0.02 m2 in sectional area nor 2 m
in length, need not be non-combustible provided that all of the following
conditions are met:
.3.1 the duct is constructed of a material of low fire risk to the satisfaction of the
Administration;
.3.2 the duct is used only at the terminal end of the ventilation system; and
.3.3 the duct is not located closer than 600 mm measured along its length to a penetration of
an "A" or "B" class division, including continuous "B" class ceilings.
1.5 Stairway enclosures shall be ventilated and shall be served only by an independent fan and duct
system which shall not serve any other spaces in the ventilation system.
1.6 All power ventilation, except machinery space and cargo space ventilation and any alternative
system which may be required under regulation 16.6, shall be fitted with controls so grouped that
all fans may be stopped from either of two separate positions which shall be situated as far apart
as practicable. Controls provided for the power ventilation serving machinery spaces shall also be
grouped so as to be operable from two positions, one of which shall be outside such spaces.
Fans serving power ventilation systems to cargo spaces shall be capable of being stopped from a
safe position outside such spaces.
1.7 Where public spaces span three or more open decks and contain combustibles such as furniture
and enclosed spaces such as shops, offices and restaurants, the space shall be equipped with a
smoke extraction system. The smoke extraction system shall be activated by the required smoke
detection system and be capable of manual control. The fans shall be sized such that the entire
volume within the space can be exhausted in 10 min or less.
1.8 Ventilation ducts shall be provided with suitably located hatches for inspection and cleaning,
where reasonable and practicable.
1.9 Exhaust ducts from galley ranges in which grease or fat is likely to accumulate shall meet
requirements regulation II-2/16.3.2.1 and 16.3.2.2 and shall be fitted with:
.1 a grease trap readily removable for cleaning unless an alternative approved

grease removal system is fitted;
.2 a fire damper located in the lower end of the duct which is automatically and
remotely operated, and in addition a remotely operated fire damper located in the
upper end of the duct;
.3 a fixed means for extinguishing a fire within the duct;
.4 remote control arrangements for shutting off the exhaust fans and supply fans,
for operating the fire dampers mentioned in .2 and for operating the
fire-extinguishing system, which shall be paced in a position close to the
entrance to the galley. Where a multi-branch system is installed, means shall be
provided to close all branches exhausting through the same main duct before an
extinguishing medium is released into the system; and
.5 suitably located hatches for inspection and cleaning.
2 Passenger ships carrying not more than 36 passengers
2.1 The ventilation system of passenger ships carrying not more than 36 passengers shall be in
compliance with regulation 16.
Comment
The attention of readers is drawn to the author's comments on the fire aboard the Scandinavian
Star which is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. In particular attention is drawn to the spread of
smoke into cabins via the ventilation system which is illustrated in figure 4.8 on page 53. Many
passengers aboard the Scandinavian Star died in their cabins as a result of smoke inhalation.
Regulation 33 Windows and sidescuttles

1 All windows and sidescuttles in bulkheads within accommodation and service spaces and control
stations other than those to which the provisions of regulation 6 and of regulation 2 apply, shall be
so constructed as to preserve the integrity requirements of the type of bulkheads in which they are
fitted.
2 Notwithstanding the requirements of the tables in regulation 26 and 27, all windows and
sidescuttles in bulkheads separating accommodation and service spaces and control stations

from weather shall be constructed with frames of steel or other suitable material. The glass shall
be retained by a metal glazing bead or angle.
3 Windows facing life-saving appliances, embarkation and muster areas, external stairs and open
decks used for escape routes, and windows situated below liferaft and escape slide embarkation
areas shall have the fire integrity as required in the tables in regulation. Where automatic
dedicated sprinkler heads are provided for windows, A-0 windows may be accepted as equivalent.
Windows located in the ship's side below the lifeboat embarkation areas shall have the fire
integrity at least equal to "A-0" class.
Regulation 34 Restricted use of combustible materials

1 Except in cargo spaces, mail rooms, baggage rooms, or refrigerated compartments of service
spaces, all linings, grounds, draught stops, ceilings and insulations shall be of non-combustible
materials. Partial bulkheads or decks used to subdivide a space for utility or artistic treatment shall
also be of non-combustible material.
2 Vapour barriers and adhesives used in conjunction with insulation, as well as insulation of pipe
fittings, for cold service systems need not be non-combustible, but they shall be kept to the
minimum quantity practicable and their exposed surfaces shall have qualities of resistance to the
propagation of flame to the satisfaction of the Administration.
3 The following surfaces shall have low flame-spread characteristics:6
.1 exposed surfaces in corridors and stairway enclosures, and of bulkheads, wall

and ceiling linings in all accommodation and service spaces and control
stations;
.2 concealed or inaccessible spaces in accommodation, service spaces and control

stations.
4 The total volume of combustible facings, mouldings, decorations and veneers in any
accommodation and service space shall not exceed a volume equivalent to 2.5 mm veneer on the
combined area of the walls and ceilings. In the case of ships fitted with an automatic sprinkler
system complying with the provisions of regulation 12, the above volume may include some
combustible material used for erection of "C" class divisions.
5 Veneers used on surfaces and linings covered by the requirements of paragraph 3 shall have a
calorific value not exceeding 45 MJ/m2 of the area for the thickness used.
6 Furniture in stairway enclosures shall be limited to seating. It shall be fixed, limited to six seats on
each deck in each stairway enclosure, be of restricted fire risk, and shall not restrict the passenger
escape route. The Administration may permit additional seating in the main reception area within
a stairway enclsoure if it is fixed, non-combustible and does not restrict the passenger escape
route. Furniture shall not be permitted in passenger and crew corridors forming escape routes in
cabin areas. In addition to the above, lockers of non-combustible material, providing storage for
safety equipment required by regulations, may be permitted.7
7 Paints, varnishes and other finishes used on exposed interior surfaces shall not be capable of
producing excessive quantities of smoke and toxic products.
8 Primary deck coverings, if applied within accommodation and service spaces and control stations,
shall be of approved material which will not readily ignite, or give rise to toxic or explosive hazards
at elevated temperatures.8
Regulation 35 Details of construction

1 In accommodation and service spaces, control stations, corridors and stairways:
.1 air spaces enclosed behind ceilings, panelling or linings shall be suitably divided
by close-fitting draught stops not more than 14 m apart;
.2 in the vertical direction, such enclosed air spaces, including those behind linings
of stairways, trunks, etc. shall be closed at each deck.
2 The construction of ceiling and bulkheading shall be such that it will be possible, without
impairing the efficiency of the fire protection, for the fire patrols to detect any smoke originating in
6
Refer to the Guidelines on the evaluation of fire hazard properties of materials, adopted by the Organization by resolution A.166(ES.IV), and to
the Recommendation on Improved Fire Test Procedures for Surface Flammability of Bulkhead, Ceiling and Deck Finish Materials adopted by
the Organization by resolution A.653(16).
7
Refer to the Recommendation on Fire Test Procedures for Upholstered Furniture, adopted by the Organization by resolution A.652(16), and to
the Fire Test Procedures for Ignitability of Bedding Components, adopted by the Organization by resolution A.688(17).
8
Refer to the Fire Test Procedures for Ignitability of Primary Deck Coverings, adopted by the Organization by resolution A.687(17).

concealed and inaccessible places, except where in the opinion of the Administration there is no
risk of fire originating in such places.
Regulation 36 Fixed fire detection and fire alarm systems and automatic sprinkler, fire
detection and fire alarm systems
1 In passenger ships carrying not more than 36 passengers there shall be installed throughout each
separate zone, whether vertical or horizontal, in all accommodation and service spaces and, where
it is considered necessary by the Administration, in control stations, except spaces which afford
no substantial fire risk such as void spaces, sanitary spaces, etc., either:
.1 a fixed fire detection and fire alarm system of an approved type and complying
with the requirements of regulation 13 and so installed and arranged as to detect
the presence of fire in such spaces; or
.2 an automatic sprinkler, fire detection and fire alarm system of an approved type
and complying with the requirements of regulation 12 or the guidelines
developed by the Organization9 for an approved equivalent sprinkler system and
so installed and arranged as to protect such spaces and, in addition, a fixed fire
detection and fire alarm system of an approved type complying wit the
requirements of regulation 13 so installed and arranged as to provide smoke
detection in corridors, stairways and escape routes within accommodation
spaces.
2 Passenger ships carrying more than 36 passengers shall be equipped with an automatic sprinkler,
fire detection and fire alarm system of an approved type complying with the requirements of
regulation 12, or the guidelines developed by the Organization10 for an approved equivalent
sprinkler system in all service spaces, control stations and accommodation spaces, including
corridors and stairways. Alternatively, control stations where water may cause damage to essential
equipment may be fitted with an approved fixed fire-extinguishing system of another type. A fixed
fire detection and fire alarm system of an approved type shall be installed, complying with the
requirements of regulation 13 so installed and arranged as to provide smoke detection in service
spaces, control stations and accommodation spaces, including corridors and stairways. Smoke
detectors need not be fitted in private bathrooms and galleys. Spaces having little or no fire risk
such as voids, public toilets and similar spaces need not be fitted with an automatic sprinkler
system, or fixed fire detection and alarm system."
Comment
The requirement to fit sprinkler systems on passenger ships carrying more than 36 passengers is,
the author believes, the most effective of all fire prevention measures. Providing such systems are
well designed, properly installed and crews fully understand their purpose, surely loss of life
through fires starting in cabins, public rooms and companion ways will become a thing of the past.
Regulation 37 Protection of special category spaces

1 Provisions applicable to special category spaces whether above or below the bulkhead deck
1.1 General
1.1.1 The basic principle underlying the provisions of this regulation is that as normal
main vertical zoning may not be practicable in special category spaces,
equivalent protection must be obtained in such spaces on the basis of a
horizontal zone concept and by the provision of an efficient fixed
fire-extinguishing system. Under this concept a horizontal zone for the purpose
of this regulation may include special category spaces on more than one deck
provided that the total overall clear height for vehicles does not exceed 10 m.
1.1.2 The requirements of regulations 16, 18, 30 and 32 for maintaining the integrity of
vertical zones shall be applied equally to decks and bulkheads forming the
boundaries separating horizontal zones from each other and from the remainder
of the ship.
1.2 Structural protection
1.2.1 In passenger ships carrying more than 36 passengers, the boundary bulkheads
and decks of special category spaces shall be insulated to "A-60" class standard.
However, where a category 2.2(5), 2.2(9) or 2.2(10) space is on one side of the
division the standard may be reduced to "A-0".
9
Provisions contained in SOLAS Protocol 1988 are not incorporated in the present consolidated text.
10
Reference is made to the guidelines to be developed.

1.2.2 In passenger ships carrying not more than 36 passengers the boundary
bulkheads of special category spaces shall be insulated as required for category
(11) spaces in table 1 and the horizontal boundaries as required for category (11)
spaces in table 2.
1.2.3 Indicators shall be provided on the navigating bridge which shall indicate when
any fire door leading to or from the special category spaces is closed.
1.3 Fixed fire-extinguishing system.11
Each special category space shall be fitted with an approved fixed pressure water-spraying system
for manual operation which shall protect all parts of any deck and vehicle platform in such space,
provided that the Administration may permit the use of any other fixed fire-extinguishing system
that has been shown by full-scale test in conditions simulating a flowing petrol fire in a special
category space to be not less effective in controlling fires likely to occur in such a space.
1.4 Patrols and detection
1.4.1 An efficient patrol system shall be maintained in special category spaces. In any
such space in which the patrol is not maintained by a continuous fire watch at
all times during the voyage there shall be provided a fixed fire detection and fire
alarm system of an approved type complying with the requirements of
regulation 13. The fixed fire detection system shall be capable of rapidly
detecting the onset of fire. The spacing and location of detectors shall be tested
to the satisfaction of the Administration taking into account the effects of
ventilation and other relevant factors.
1.4.2 Manually operated call points shall be provided as necessary throughout the
special category spaces and one shall be placed close to each exit from such
spaces.
1.5 Fire-extinguishing equipment
There shall be provided in each special category space:
.1 at least three water fog applicators;
.2 one portable foam applicator unit complying with the provisions of regulation
6.4, provided that at least two such units are available in the ship for use in
such spaces; and
.3 such number of portable fire extinguishers as the Administration may deem

sufficient, provided that at least one portable extinguisher is located at each
access to such spaces.
1.6 Ventilation system
1.6.1 There shall be provided an effective power ventilation system for the special
category spaces sufficient to give at least 10 air changes per hour. The system
for such spaces shall be entirely separated from other ventilation systems and
shall be operating at all times when vehicles are in such spaces. The
Administration may require an increased number of air changes when vehicles
are being loaded and unloaded. Ventilation ducts serving special category
spaces capable of being effectively sealed shall be separated for each such
space. The system shall be capable of being controlled from a position outside
such spaces.
1.6.2 The ventilation shall be such as to prevent air stratification and the formation of
air pockets.
1.6.3 Means shall be provided to indicate on the navigating bridge any loss or
reduction of the required ventilating capacity.
1.6.4 Arrangements shall be provided to permit a rapid shutdown and effective

closure of the ventilation system in case of fire, taking into account the weather
and sea conditions.
1.6.5 Ventilation ducts, including dampers, shall be made of steel and their
arrangement shall be to the satisfaction of the Administration.
2 Additional provisions applicable only to special category spaces above the bulkhead deck
2.1 Scuppers
11
Refer to the Recommendation on Fixed Fire-Extinguishing Systems for Special Category Spaces, adopted by the Organization by resolution
A.123(V).

In view of the serious loss of stability which could arise due to large quantities of water
accumulating on the deck or decks consequent on the operation of the fixed pressure
water-spraying system, scuppers shall be fitted so as to ensure that such water is rapidly
discharged directly overboard.
2.1.1 In view of the serious loss of stability which could arise due to large quantities
of water accumulating on the deck or decks consequent on the operation of the
fixed pressure water-spraying system, scuppers shall be fitted so as to ensure
that such water is rapidly discharged directly overboard.
2.1.2 Discharges
2.1.2.1 In all ro-ro passenger ships discharge valves for scuppers, fitted with positive means of
closing operable from a position above the bulkhead deck in accordance with the requirements
of the international Convention on Load Lines in force, shall be kept open while the ships are
at sea.
2.1.2.2 Any operation of the valves referred to in paragraph 2.1.2.1 shall be recorded in the log-book.
2.2 Precautions against ignition of flammable vapours
2.2.1 On any deck or platform, if fitted, on which vehicles are carried and on which
explosive vapours might be expected to accumulate, except platforms with
openings of sufficient size permitting penetration of petrol gases downwards,
equipment which may constitute a source of ignition of flammable vapours and,
in particular, electrical equipment and wiring, shall be installed at least 450 mm
above the deck or platform. Electrical equipment installed at more than 450 mm
above the deck or platform shall be of a type so enclosed and protected as to
prevent the escape of sparks. However, if the Administration is satisfied that the
installation of electrical equipment and wiring at less than 450 mm above the
deck or platform is necessary for the safe operation of the ship, such electrical
equipment and wiring may be installed provided that it is of a type approved for
use in an explosive petrol and air mixture.
2.2.2 Electrical equipment and wiring, if installed in an exhaust ventilation duct, shall
be of a type approved for use in explosive petrol and air mixtures and the outlet
from any exhaust duct shall be sited in a safe position, having regard to other
possible sources of ignition.
3 Additional provisions applicable only to special category spaces below the bulkhead deck
3.1 Bilge pumping and drainage
In view of the serious loss of stability which could arise due to large quantities of water
accumulating on the deck or tank top consequent on the operation of the fixed pressure
water-spraying system, the Administration may require pumping and drainage facilities to be
provided additional to the requirements of regulation II-1
3.2.1 Electrical equipment and wiring, if fitted, shall be of a type suitable for use in
explosive petrol and air mixtures. Other equipment which may constitute a
source of ignition of flammable vapours shall not be permitted.
3.2.2 Electrical equipment and wiring, if installed in an exhaust ventilation duct, shall
be of a type approved for use in explosive petrol and air mixtures and the outlet
from any exhaust duct shall be sited in a safe position, having regard to other
possible sources of ignition.
Comment
A special category space is defined in SOLAS and the car deck of a roll on-roll off ferry is a
good example of such a space.
They are defined at Regulation 3 paragraph 18 as being those enclosed spaces above or below
the bulkhead deck intended for the carriage of motor vehicles with fuel in their tanks for their own
propulsion, into and from such vehicles can be driven and to which passengers have access.
The attention of readers is drawn to the provisions of paragraph 1.5 of this regulation. It is
surely wrong to position the water fog applicators and the portable foam applicator within the
special category space. Much better to position these outside the entrances and connected up to
hose and hydrant. This will enable the fire team who will be wearing breathing apparatus to
advance towards the seat of the fire whilst holding the means whereby to fight the fire.

Portable extinguishers on the other hand, should be located within the space in generous
number at strategic positions including, for example, at exit doors both inside and outside the
space. The fixed water spraying system in conjunction with a fixed detection system, and backed
up by an efficient patrol system provides a very comforting level of protection against fire.
Regulation 38 Protection of cargo spaces, other than special category spaces, intended for
the carriage of motor vehicles with fuel in their tanks for their own
propulsion
(Paragraph 1 of this regulation applies to ships constructed on or after 1 February 1992)
In any cargo space (other than special category spaces) containing motor vehicles with fuel in
their tanks for their own propulsion, the following provisions shall be complied with.
1 Fixed fire detection
There shall be provided a fixed fire detection and fire alarm system complying with the
requirements of regulation 13 or a sample extraction smoke detection system complying with the
requirements of regulation 13-1. The design and arrangements of this system shall be considered
in conjunction with the ventilation requirements referred to in paragraph 3.
2 Fire-extinguishing arrangements
2.1 There shall be fitted a fixed fire-extinguishing system which shall comply with the provisions of
regulation 5, except that, if a carbon dioxide system is fitted, the quantity of gas available shall be
at least sufficient to give a minimum volume of free gas equal to 45 % of the gross volume of the
largest such cargo space which is capable of being sealed, and the arrangements shall be such as
to ensure that at least two thirds of the gas required for the relevant space shall be introduced
during 10 min. Any other fixed gas fire-extinguishing system or fixed high expansion foam
fire-extinguishing system may be fitted provided it gives equivalent protection. Furthermore, any
cargo space designated only for vehicles which are not carrying any cargo may be fitted with fixed
halogenated hydrocarbon fire-extinguishing systems which shall comply with the provisions of
regulation 5.
2.2 As an alternative, a system meeting the requirements of regulation 1.3 may be fitted, provided that
regulation 2.1 or 3.1, as appropriate, is also complied with.
2.3 There shall be provided for use in any such space such number of portable fire extinguishers as
the Administration may deem sufficient. At least one portable extinguisher shall be located at each
access to such spaces.
3 Ventilation system
3.1 There shall be provided an effective power ventilation system sufficient to give at least 10 air
changes per hour for ships carrying more than 36 passengers, and 6 air changes per hour for
ships carrying not more than 36 passengers. The system for such cargo spaces shall be entirely
separate from other ventilation systems and shall be operating at all times when vehicles are in
such spaces. Ventilation ducts serving such cargo spaces capable of being effectively sealed
shall be separated for each such space. The system shall be capable of being controlled from a
position outside such spaces.
3.2 The ventilation shall be such as to prevent air stratification and the formation of air pockets.
3.3 Means shall be provided to indicate on the navigating bridge any loss or reduction of the required
ventilating capacity.
3.4 Arrangements shall be provided to permit a rapid shutdown and effective closure of the ventilation
system in case of fire, taking into account the weather and sea conditions.
3.5 Ventilation ducts, including dampers, shall be made of steel and their arrangement shall be to the
4 Precautions against ignition of flammable vapours
4.1 Electrical equipment and wiring, if fitted, shall be of a type suitable for use in explosive petrol and
air mixtures. Other equipment which may constitute a source of ignition of flammable vapours
shall not be permitted.
4.2 Electrical equipment and wiring, if installed in an exhaust ventilation duct, shall be of a type
approved for use in explosive petrol and air mixtures and the outlet from any exhaust duct shall be
sited in a safe position, having regard to other possible sources of ignition.
4.3 Scuppers shall not be led to machinery or other spaces where sources of ignition may be present.

Comment
In these large spaces the fitting of low pressure bulk-tank storage of CO2 is to be preferred to
individual CO2 cylinders. This system enables much larger quantities of CO2 to be stored and in
most such installations give a backup supply of gas rarely found in the high pressure system which
is more fully described in Chapter 8.
Regulation 39 Fixed fire-extinguishing arrangements in cargo spaces

1 Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the cargo spaces of ships of 1,000 tons gross tonnage and
upwards shall be protected by a fixed gas fire-extinguishing system complying with the provisions of
regulation 5, or by a fixed high expansion foam fire-extinguishing system which gives equivalent
protection.
2 Where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Administration that a ship is engaged on voyages of such
short duration that it would be unreasonable to apply the requirements of paragraph 1 and also in ships
of less than 1,000 tons gross tonnage, the arrangements in cargo spaces shall be to the satisfaction of
the Administration.
3 A ship engaged in the carriage of dangerous goods shall be provided in any cargo spaces with a fixed
gas fire-extinguishing system complying with the provisions of regulation 5.1 or with a fire-extinguishing
system which in the opinion of the Administration gives equivalent protection for the cargoes carried.
Comment
The author would not recommend the fitting of high expansion foam systems for protecting
cargo spaces. Holds are much better protected by CO2 gas which can make its way down into the
lower reaches of the cargo through the inevitable gaps in the stow. By comparison, high expansion
foam will almost certainly achieve little or no penetration of the lower reaches of the stow and will
simply lie on top of the cargo without even filling the ullage space up to the underside of the hatch
covers. Then when it comes to attempt to reach the seat of the fire, fire-fighters will find foam to
be a B****y nuisance to get rid of! CO2 is the option favoured by the author.
Regulation 40 Fire patrols, detection, alarms and public address systems

(Paragraph 7 applies to ships constructed on or after 1 January 1994).
1 Manually operated call points complying with the requirements of regulation 13 shall be installed.
2 A fixed fire detection and fire alarm system complying with the requirements of regulation 13 or a
sample extraction smoke detection system complying with the requirements of regulation 13 shall
be provided in any cargo space which, in the opinion of the Administration, is not accessible,
except where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Administration that the ship is engaged on
voyages of such short duration that it would be unreasonable to apply this requirement.
3 All ships shall at all times when at sea, or in port (except when out of service), be so manned or
equipped as to ensure that any initial fire alarm is immediately received by a responsible member
of the crew.
4 A special alarm, operated from the navigating bridge or fire control station, shall be fitted to
summon the crew. This alarm may be part of the ship's general alarm system but it shall be
capable of being sounded independently of the alarm to the passenger spaces.
5 A public address system or other effective means of communication shall be available throughout
the accommodation and service spaces and control stations and open decks. Each member of the
fire patrol shall be provided with a two-way portable radio telephone apparatus.
6 For ships carrying more than 36 passengers an efficient patrol system shall be maintained so that
an outbreak of fire may be promptly detected. Each member of the fire patrol shall be trained to be
familiar with the arrangements of the ship as well as the location and operation of any equipment
he may be called upon to use.
7 Where public spaces span three or more open decks and contain combustibles such as furniture
and enclosed spaces such as shops, offices and restaurants, the entire main vertical zone
containing the space shall be protected throughout with a smoke detection system complying with
regulation 13, with the exception paragraph 1.9.
7.1 Passenger ships carrying more than 36 passengers shall have the detection alarms for the systems
required by regulation 2 centralized in a continuously manned central control station. In addition,

controls for remote closing of the fire doors and shutting down the ventilation fans, shall be
centralized in the same location. The ventilation fans shall be capable of reactivation by the crew
at the continuously manned control station. The control panels in the central control station shall
be capable of indicating open or closed positions of fire doors, closed or off status of the
detectors, alarms and fans. The control panel shall be continuously powered and should have an
automatic change-over to standby power supply in case of loss of normal power supply. The
control panel shall be powered from the main source of electrical power and the emergency source
of electrical power defined by regulation II-1/42 unless other arrangements are permitted by the
regulations, as applicable.
7.2 The control panel shall be designed on the fail-safe principle, e.g. an open detector circuit shall
cause an alarm condition, as noted in -regulations II-2/13.1.3 and II1/51.1.4.
Comment
Despite the tremendous advances made in detection technology, it is heartening to note that the
IMO continues to recognise the importance and value of an efficient fire patrol. Some companies
maintain patrols in their docked vessels on a scale much more comprehensive than could be
deemed necessary to comply with the law. They argue, quite rightly, that an efficient patrol,
though costly, can not only prevent or extinguish fires at a relatively harmless early stage; but will
also keep down pilferage, and by quick detection often prevent or minimise damage by, for
example, burst water or oil pipes.
The author has found it most remarkable how, in ships having an efficient uniformed fire patrol,
the attention paid by both crew and visiting workmen to elementary fire prevention is improved
out of all recognition. The matter of uniform is of first-rate importance. It lends dignity to the
patrolmen's position, and enables them to exercise a measure of control of the very many different
sorts of extra people who find their way on board a ship during her stay in port, who are not direct
employees of the company which owns her.
The proper selection of personnel is of great importance. It simply does not pay to employ just
any type of labour for such a responsible job. Patrolmen need a marked sense of duty to carry out
efficiently a job which could easily become tedious to the type of man who was unable to
appreciate the importance of the work. Retired firemen or, policemen should make ideal
patrolmen, both having had long experience in a disciplined service; but the difficulty is that on
retirement such men rarely want a job which requires working shifts.
Careful selection of the officer in charge of a patrol is of the utmost importance. He must have
had experience of handling men, and must be able to rouse and maintain keenness and enthusiasm
among his staff. He must truly appreciate the importance of his work and must be able, for
example, to make daily checks of the clock tapes, day in and day out, year after year, without
getting careless and neglecting this important task (for any lapse by a patrolman must be instantly
corrected if an efficient patrol is to be maintained). At the same time he must be the type of officer
who can get the most out of his men by encouraging their own sense of self-discipline (which is,
after all, the finest type of discipline there is). He should be capable of writing a reasonable report,
and of talking intelligently about the fire risks associated with the many and varied chemicals and
materials which may be carried in a ship's holds.
The author's experience — admittedly many years ago — in the Royal Group of London Docks
(now unfortunately closed) which satisfies him that such men are no impossible paragons of virtue;
but that they were actually found in considerable numbers by some of the companies which
regularly used those Docks.
Liaison between the patrols and the local Fire Service is of the utmost importance. Every
patrolman should take a course of elementary fire-fighting at his local fire station, the course to
include training in smoke, using the type of equipment provided by his company on the ships he
patrols. This will not only make the individual patrolman feel that he is much more than an
ordinary watchman, but a real fire-fighter in his own right; it will also pay large dividends by virtue
of the fact that the fireman and patrolman will get to know one another personally, which is of
great value when a fire does take place. A trained patrolman, too, once he has called the Brigade,
will automatically know what action to take while waiting for them to arrive. For example, he
could throw a line to the quayside so that the firemen can without delay get a line of hose on board.
Indeed, he can himself haul the uncharged line on board before the officer in charge of the Brigade

can even reach the scene of the fire. His advice, moreover, on what is involved in the fire can be
very valuable; and his knowledge of the whereabouts of the fire-extinguishing apparatus on board
even more so. It is a fact of life that most fire brigades prefer to use their own pumps and hose
with which to fight a shipboard fire. Rightly or wrongly, this is because fire-fighters believe that
their equipment is more reliable than commonly found on board ships!
Whatever the fire-fighting competence of the properly trained patrolman, however, he must
never forget that cardinal rule of fire-fighting aboard ship in port (it is clearly laid down in black
and white in the Regulations of many port authorities) which says that the local Fire Brigade must
always be notified at once of any fire, however small, which breaks out on board, even if it appears
certain that it can be extinguished by means readily to hand. There is not a Fire Brigade
throughout the world which would rather turn out in response to an early call to a fire, only to find
it has been safely put out by the time they arrive, than they would run any risk of a bad fire getting
hold and endangering the vessel itself and indeed the port installations they are there to protect.
The trouble lies in just those words "safely put out". Ship fires tend to be the trickiest and most
treacherous types a fireman ever has to meet. The sort of thing which happens is well illustrated
by the case of the wireless operator of a 10,000-ton cargo vessel berthed in the Royal Albert Dock
during 1956. This chap found that an overheated resistance in his radio set had set fire to a part of
the wood panelling in his cabin. He extinguished the fire (as he thought); but failed (and here, it
must be repeated, he was in direct breach of P.L.A. Regulations) to notify either the ship' fire part
or to have a call made to the Fire Brigade. An hour or so later, another officer found the wireless
cabin on fire, the first man having failed to notice that the fire he thought he had extinguished had
in fact spread behind the panelling, and that he had cheerfully left a potentially serious fire burning
unchecked.
The Importance of "Clocking-In

Human nature being what it is, there is no doubt that an efficient patrol system on board ship
cannot be run without an arrangement whereby every patrolman has to "clock in" at pre-arranged
times and at known points on his beat.
The siting of these clocks is of great importance, and must be carefully thought out so as to
ensure that all the most vulnerable points in the ship are unfailingly visited at frequent interval.
Whenever possible, the clocks to be "punched" must be situated actually inside the high-risk
compartments to be protected (ironing-rooms, baggage-rooms, smoke-rooms and the like). A
clock merely sited in the corridor outside one of these compartments is of no use at all in ensuring
that a patrolman has carried out his job of periodical inspection thoroughly and conscientiously.
It is also a good thing that the efficiency of the patrol system should be tested from time to time,
and that the men should know quite clearly that these tests are liable to take place, and why.
Nothing elaborate is necessary. A smouldering rag in a bucket deliberately left in a place where it
should be immediately found and reported is quite enough.
Regulations for a Fire Patrol — A Working Specimen

During the author's time of service one of the many big shipping companies regularly using was
the Shaw Savill and Albion Company and the Union-Castle Mail Steamship Company Ltd. who
ran patrol systems aboard their ships which experience has proved to be notably efficient. It may
therefore be worth going in some detail into the arrangements made by the latter Company (by
whose permission the facts which follow are given).
The fire-patrol system operated by the Union-Castle Line comprised a team of 12 men per ship.
These men worked in three shifts of eight hours each, each team consisting of four men.
Patrols took 50 minutes to complete; with three men at a time constantly on patrol, the fourth
remaining in the Fire Station (Fire Control Room).
The duty system operated as follows:

Man Commence Finish Man Commence Finish Man Commence Finish

"A" 06.00 06.50 "A" 14.00 14.50 "A" 22.00 22.50
"B" 06.20 07.10 "B" 14.20 15.10 "B" 22.20 23.10
"C" 06.40 07.30 "C" 14.40 15.30 "C" 22.40 23.30
"D" 07.00 07.50 "D" 15.00 15.50 "D" 23.00 23.50
"A" 07.20 08.10 "A" 15.20 16.10 "A" 23.20 00.10

"B" 07.40 08.30 "B" 15.40 16.36 "B" 23.40 00.30
"C" 08.00 08.50 "C" 16.00 16.50 "C" 24.00 00.50
"D" 08.20 09.10 "D" 16.20 17.10 "D" 00.20 01.10
"A" 08.40 09.30 "A" 16.40 17.30 "A" 00.40 01.30

"B" 09.00 09.50 "B" 17.00 17.50 "B" 01.00 01.56
"C" 09.20 10.10 "C" 17.20 18.10 "C" 01.20 02.10
"D" 09.40 10.30 "D" 17.40 18.30 "D" 01.40 02.30
"A" 10.00 10.50 "A" 18.00 18.50 "A" 02.00 02.50

"B" 10.20 11.10 "B" 18.20 19.10 "B" 02.20 03.10
"C" 10.40 11.30 "C" 18.40 19.30 "C" 02.40 03.30
"D" 11.00 11.50 "D" 19.00 19.50 "D" 03.00 03.50
"A" 11.20 12.10 "A" 19.20 20.10 "A" 03.20 04.10

"B" 11.40 12.30 "B" 19.40 20.30 "B" 03.40 04.30
"C" 12.00 12.50 "C" 20.00 20.50 "C" 04.00 04.50
"D" 12.20 13.10 "D" 20.20 21.10 "D" 04.20 05.10
"A" 12.40 13.30 "A" 20.40 21.30 "A" 04.40 05.30

"B" 13.00 13.50 "B" 21.00 21.50 "B" 05.00 05.50
"C" 13.20 14.10 "C" 21.20 22.10 "C" 05.20 06.10
"D" 13.40 14.30 "D" 21.40 22.30 "D" 05.40 06.30
ALL PATROLMEN TO KEEP STRICTLY TO THE TIMES SHOWN ON THIS

ROTA. EVERY PATROL TO COMMENCE WITH DECK POSITIONS IN
CORRECT ORDER, FINISHING WITH ACCOMMODATION POSITIONS. THIS IS
IMPORTANT. ALL REPORTS TO BE ENTERED IN THE REPORT BOOK,
WITH CORRECT TIMES, IMMEDIATELY THE DUTY OFFICER HAS BEEN
INFORMED.
ARM BANDS ARE TO BE WORN AND TORCHES CARRIED ON ALL PATROLS.
PATROL CLOCK AND TORCH MUST BE HANDED OVER BY THE
PATROLMAN TO HIS RELIEF.
The Standing Instructions for all Fire Patrolmen were set out as follows:
1. All Fire Patrolmen are to report to the ship's Duty Officer immediately upon
commencement of duty.

2. Fire Patrolmen to remain on board until relieved, the Patrol Clock, Official Armband and
Torch to be handed over to the relief, together with any report and observations made
during the hours of duty.
3. Grinnell Sprinkler System and CO2 Hold-Smothering Installation to be tested daily, at
source, in company with the Duty Officer. Grinnell Sprinkler Pilot Light and Smoke
Detector Installation to be tested during each Patrol.
4. All Clock Points must be covered regularly at the stated intervals, according to the Rota
List. If, for any reason, all Clock Points are not completed, a report is to be made in the
Report Book.
5. On every Patrol, observation must be made over the stern of the vessel to make sure that
Barges are reasonably clear of the ship's propellers. If any Barge or Barges are close to the
propellers, the Duty Officer is to be notified immediately, noting (if possible), the name or
names of the Barge or Barges. This is most important on Night Patrol.
6. On every Patrol, special observation is to be made throughout the vessel for Fire Hazards,
such as bedding, curtains and other material, being placed too near radiators, and litter
accumulating in the accommodation and storeroom alleyways. This is to be reported to the
Duty Officer, and a further report made later, when cleared.
7. Smoking is not permitted in or near hatches, and in or around Passenger Accommodation.
Fire Patrolmen are to see that this is observed.
8. When cargo work ceases each day in holds, Fire Patrolmen are to inspect holds before
closing up, and see that clusters are extinguished.
9. In case of fire or any unusual occurrence during the period of duty, the Duty Officer is to be
notified immediately.
10. Fire Patrolmen to make sure that all hoses are connected to hydrants in the Passenger
Accommodation immediately the vessel arrives in dock. Deck hoses to be coupled up and
flaked along deck for instant use by 5 p.m. daily.
11. Fire Patrolmen to acquaint themselves with the positions of hydrants and fire-extinguishers,
and to report any extinguisher that is missing or out of commission.
12. Whilst in dry-dock, or at any time when ship's pumps are not available, inspect
"ship-to-shore" hose-to-deck service, and make sure that they are connected to quay
hydrant.
13. All fire-doors, portholes, shipside doors, etc., to be closed on completion of work each day.
14. Patrol Book to be signed at the completion of each round. Fire Patrolmen to report to the
Duty Officer at frequent intervals. If any door is locked, causing the incomplete patrolling
of the vessel, the Duty Officer is to be notified immediately and he will have the door
opened.
15. In case of fire, however slight, the following action must be taken:
(1) Duty Officer to be notified. (The Duty Officer has clear instructions to immediately
call the Fire Brigade.)
(2) "A" MAN-To patrol the vessel continuously, looking for further outbreaks of FIRE.
"B" MAN-To close all fire-doors, shipside doors, portholes, etc., so as to exclude all
draught; and to await further instructions from the Duty Officer.
"C" MAN-To wait at the head of the gangway to conduct the Fire Brigade Officer to
the Duty Officer; and to await further instructions from the Duty Officer.
"D" MAN-To keep with the Duty Officer and to await his instructions.
(3) Breathing apparatus to be made ready.
(4) Axe and Crowbar to be laid ready.
(5) All fire-hoses to be connected and made ready.
(6) Emergency Escape Ladder to be made fast and thrown overside to quay.
(Author's Note: This is a Jacob's ladder, painted red and normally stowed on the quay side
of the forewell deck. Its position is marked by a board, 22 in. wide by 12 in. deep, reading
in red letters on a white background: Escape Ladder. To be used only in Emergency)

It was also a standing order that, whenever a Union-Castle vessel docks in London, the Officer
in charge of the Fire Patrol shall have delivered to the head of the gangway a rack containing:
2 Water Extinguishers
1 Foam Extinguisher
1 Carbon Dioxide. Extinguisher
1 Axe
1 Crowbar
1 Set Compressed-Air Breathing Apparatus
1 Metal container holding complete set of plans of the ship
This rack remains in position until the moment when the vessel leaves port. Its usefulness to
firemen arriving in answer to a sudden call would be very great indeed.
Regulation 41 Special requirements for ships carrying dangerous goods

The requirements of regulation 54 shall apply, as appropriate, to passenger ships carrying
dangerous goods.
Regulation 41-1 Upgrading of passenger ships carrying more than 36 passengers

constructed before 1 October 1994
1 This regulation shall apply to passenger ships carrying more than 36 passengers constructed
before 1 October 1994.
2 Passenger ships which do not comply with all the requirements of chapter II-2 applicable to ships
constructed on or after 25 May 1980 (requirements of chapter II-2 of SOLAS 1974, as adopted by
the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, applicable to new passenger ships)
shall comply with the following:
.1 paragraph 1 of regulation 41-2 not later than 1 October 1994; and
.2 paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 or regulation 41-2 not later than 1 October 1974; and
.4 all the requirements of chapter II-2 applicable to ships constructed on or after 25

May 1980 (requirements of chapter II-2 of SOLAS 1974, as adopted by the
International Conference on the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, applicable to new
passenger ships) not later than 1 October 2010.
3 Passenger ships which comply with all the requirements applicable to ships constructed on or
after 25 May 1980 (applicable requirements of chapter II-2 of SOLAS 1974, as amended by
resolutions MSC.1(XLV), MSC.6(48), MSC.11(55), MSC.12(56), MSC.13(57) and MSC.22(59)) shall
.2 paragraph 2 and 4 of regulation 41-2 not later than 1 October 1997; and
.4 paragraph 5 of regulation 41-2 not later than 1 October 2005 or 15 years after the
date of construction of the ships, whichever is later.
4 For the purpose of this regulation, passenger ships complying in their entirety with all the
requirements of part H of chapter II contained in amendments to the International Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, adopted by the Assembly of the Organization by resolution A.122(V),
may be regarded as passenger ships complying with the requirements applicable to passenger
ships constructed on or after 25 May 1980 (requirements of chapter II-2 of SOLAS 1974, as adopted
by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, applicable to new passenger ships).

Comment
The author applauds the introduction of updating the older passenger vessels and accepts the
inevitability of the period of grace given to achieve comparison with ships constructed after
October 1, 1994.
Regulation 41-2 Requirements for passenger ships carrying more than 36 passengers
before 1 October 1994
1.1 Plans and booklets required by regulation 20 shall provide information regarding fire protection,
fire detection and fire extinction based on the guidelines developed by the Organization.12
1.2 Each member of the fire patrol shall be provided with a two-way portable radiotelephone
apparatus.
1.3 Water fog applicators shall be provided as required in regulations 7.6, 17.3.2 and 1.5.1.
1.4 Portable foam applicators shall be provided as required in regulations 7.1.2, 7.2.2 and 1.5.2.
1.5 All hose nozzles provided shall be of an approved dual-purpose type (i.e. spray/jet type)
incorporating a shutoff.
2 All accommodation and service spaces, stairway enclosures and corridors shall be equipped with
smoke detection and alarm system system of an approved type and complying with the
requirements of regulation 13. Such system need not be fitted in private bathrooms, and spaces
having little or no fire risk such as voids and similar spaces. Detectors operated by heat instead of
smoke shall be installed in galleys.
3 Smoke detectors connected tot he smoke detection and alarm system shall also be fitted above
ceilings in stairways and corridors in the areas where ceilings are of combustible construction.
4.1 Hinged fire doors in stairway enclosures, main vertical zone bulkheads and galley boundaries
which are normally kept open shall be self-closing and be capable of release from a central control
station and from a position at the door.
4.2 A panel shall be placed in a continuously manned central control station to indicate whether the
fire doors on stairway enclosures, main vertical zone bulkheads and galley boundaries are closed.
4.3 Exhaust ducts from galley ranges where grease or fat is likely to accumulate and which pass
through accommodation spaces or spaces containing combustible materials shall be constructed
of "A" class divisions. Each galley range exhaust duct shall be fitted with:
.1 a grease trap readily removable for cleaning, unless an alternative grease

removal process it fitted;
.2 a fire damper located in the lower end of the duct;
.3 arrangements operable from within the galley for shutting off the exhaust fans;
.4 fixed means for extinguishing a fire within the duct; and
.5 suitably located hatches for inspection and cleaning.
4.4 Only public toilets, lifts, lockers of non-combustible materials providing storage for safety
equipment and open information counters may be located within the stairway enclosure
boundaries. Other existing spaces within the stairway enclosure:
.1 shall be emptied, permanently closed and disconnected from the electrical

system; or
.2 shall be separated from the stairway enclosure by the provision of "A" class
divisions in accordance with regulation. Such spaces may have direct access to
stairway enclosures by the provision of "A" class doors in accordance with
regulation 26, and subject to a sprinkler system being provided in these spaces.
However, cabins shall not open directly onto the stairway enclosure.
4.5 Spaces other than public spaces, corridors, public toilets, special category spaces, other stairways
required by regulation 1.5, open deck spaces and spaces covered by paragraph 4.4.2 are not
permitted to have direct access to stairway enclosures.
12
Reference is made to the guidelines to be developed.

4.6 Existing machinery spaces of category (10) described in regulation 2.2 and existing back offices
for information counters which open directly into the stairway enclosure may be retained, provided
that they are protected by smoke detectors and that back offices for information counters contain
only furniture of restricted fire risk.
4.7 In addition to the emergency lighting required by regulations II-1/42 and III/11.5, the means of
escape including stairways and exits shall be marked, at all points of the escape route including
angles and intersections, by lighting or photoluminescent strip indicators placed note more than
0.3 m above the deck. The marking must enable passengers to identify all routes of escape and
readily identify the escape exists. If electric illumination is used, it shall be supplied by the
emergency source of power and it shall be so arranged that the failure of any single light, or cut in
a lighting strip, will not result in the marking being ineffective. Additionally, all escape route signs
and fire equipment location markings shall be of photoluminescent material. The Administration
shall ensure that such lighting or photoluminescent equipment has been evaluated, tested and
applied in accordance with the guidelines developed by the Organization.13
4.8 A general emergency alarm system shall be provided. The alarm shall be audible throughout all
the accommodation and normal crew working spaces and open decks, and its sound pressure
level shall comply with the standard developed by the Organization.14 The alarm shall continue to
function after it has triggered until it is manually turned off or is temporarily interrupted by a
message on the public address system.
4.9 A public address system or other effective means of communication shall be available and audible
throughout the accommodation, public and service spaces, control stations and open decks.
FIGURE 10.19 The use of photoluminescent markings required under Regulation 41-2 paragraph 4.7 should be
extended to all ships. Diagram courtesy of Maritime Progress Limited, Legion House, Godstone, Kenly, Surrey,
CR8 5YS. (www.maritimeprogress.com)
13
Refer to the guidelines to be developed by the Organization.
14
Reference is made to the Code on alarms and indicators adopted by the Organization by resolution A.686(17).

4.10 Furniture in stairway enclosures shall be limited to seating. It shall be fixed, limited to six seats on
each deck in each stairway enclosure, be of restricted fire risk, and shall not restrict the passenger
escape route. The Administration may permit additional seating in the main reception area within
stairway enclosures, if it is fixed, non-combustible, and does not restrict the passenger escape
route. Furniture shall not be permitted in passenger and crew corridors forming escape routes in
cabin areas. In addition to the above, lockers of non-combustible material, providing storage for
safety equipment required by regulations, may be permitted.
5 Accommodation and service spaces, stairway enclosures and corridors shall be fitted with an
automatic sprinkler, fire detection and fire alarm system complying with the requirements of
regulation 12 or the guidelines developed by the Organization15 for an approved equivalent
sprinkler system. A sprinkler system need not be fitted in the private bathrooms, and spaces
having little or no fire risk such as voids and similar spaces.
6.1 All stairways in accommodation and service spaces shall be of steel frame construction except
where the Administration sanctions the use of other equivalent material, and shall be within
enclosures formed of "A" class divisions, with positive means of closure at all openings, except
that:
.1 a stairway connecting only two decks need not be enclosed, provided the
integrity of the deck is maintained by proper bulkheads or doors in one
'tween-deck space. When a stairway is closed in 'tween-deck space, the stairway
enclosure shall be protected in accordance with the tables for decks in
regulation 26;
.2 stairways may be fitted in the open in a public space, provided they lie wholly
within such public spaces.
6.2 Machinery spaces of category A shall be fitted with a fixed fire-extinguishing system comply with
the requirements of regulation 7.
6.3 Ventilation ducts passing through divisions between main vertical zones shall be equipped with a
fail-safe automatic closing fire damper which shall also be capable of being manually closed from
each side of the division. In addition, fail-safe automatic closing fire dampers with manual
operation from within the enclosure shall be fitted to all ventilation ducts serving both
accommodation and service spaces and stairway enclosures where they pierce such enclosures.
Ventilation ducts passing through a main fire zone division without serving spaces on both sides
or passing through a stairway enclosure without serving that enclosure need not be fitted with
dampers provided that the ducts are constructed and insulated to A-60 standard and have no
openings within the stairway enclosure or in the trunk on the side which is not directly served.
6.4 Special category spaces and ro-ro cargo spaces shall comply with the requirements of regulations
37 and 38, respectively.
6.5 All fire doors in stairway enclosures, main vertical zone bulkheads and galley boundaries which
are normally kept open shall be capable of release from a central control station and from a
position at the door.
Comment
The author applauds the introduction of low level way finding markings required in Regulation
41-2 paragraph 4.7. An example of the use of such markings is shown in Figure 10.19. The
inquiry into the fire aboard the Scandinavian Star highlighted just how important it is for people to
be able to find their escape route. Many people died a matter of feet from a door to the open deck.
Low level marking not only helps people find their way, but encourages them to stay low, below
the smoke horizon.
15
Refer to the guidelines to be developed by the Organization.

Chapter Eleven
Fire Safety Measures Aboard

Cargo Vessels And Tankers
Much of the regulations regarding the structure of cargo vessels and tankers are similar to the
regulations which apply to passenger vessels. The regulations are listed below for ease of reference
without comment. Of importance, however, is that the reader notes that there are three different
methods of construction as outlined below to which cargo ships must conform.
These three systems can be very briefly summarised as follows:
Method I (generally known in the shipping world as "The American Method") requires the
construction in the accommodation spaces and service spaces of a system of internal bulkheading
consisting of "B" Class divisions, together with an automatic fire-alarm and fire-detecting system
in these spaces.
Method II ("The British Method") stipulates the fitting of an automatic sprinkler, fire-detection
and fire-alarrn system in the accommodation spaces and service spaces.
Method III ("The French Method") demands the sub-division of all accommodation and service
spaces by "A" Class and "B" Class divisions; together with the fitting in all such spaces of an
automatic fire-alarm and fire-detection system, and restrictions on the use in them of all
In pursuance of the obligation undertaken at the 1948 Conference, the British Government
codified its acceptance, as adequate and valid fire protection in all ships, of all three rival
"Methods", by putting appropriate clauses and provisions into the Merchant Shipping
(Construction) Rules, 1952 which were subsequently revised in 1965 and to which the Second
Edition of Fire Aboard referred extensively.
The alternative methods of construction are now listed in Regulation 42 of SOLAS reproduced
below.
Regulation 42 Structure
1 Subject to the provisions of paragraph 4, the hull, superstructure, structural bulkheads, decks and
deckhouses shall be constructed of steel or other equivalent material.
2 The insulation of aluminium alloy components of "A" or "B" class divisions, except structure which
in the opinion of the Administration is non-load-bearing, shall be such that the temperature of the
structural core does not rise more than 200°C above the ambient temperature at any time during the
applicable exposure to the standard fire test.
337
3 Special attention shall be given to the insulation of aluminium alloy components of columns,
stanchions and other structural members required to support lifeboat and liferaft stowage,
launching and embarkation areas, and "A" and "B" class divisions, to ensure:
.1 that for such members supporting lifeboat and liferaft areas and "A" class
divisions, the temperature rise imitation specified in paragraph 2 shall apply at
the end of 1 h; and
.2 that for such members required to support "B" class divisions, the temperature
rise limitation specified in paragraph 2 shall apply at the end of half an hour.
4 Crowns and casings of machinery spaces of category A shall be of steel construction adequately
insulated and openings therein, if any, shall be suitably arranged and protected to prevent the
spread of fire.
5 One of the following methods of protection shall be adopted in accommodation and service areas:
.1 Method IC - The construction of all internal divisional bulkheading of

non-combustible "B" or "C" class divisions generally without the installation of
an automatic sprinkler, fire detection and fire alarm system in the
accommodation and service spaces, except as required by regulation 52.1; or
.2 Method IIC - The fitting of an automatic sprinkler, fire detection and fire alarm
system as required by regulation 52.2 for the detection and extinction of fire in
all spaces in which fire might be expected to originate, generally with no
restriction on the type of internal divisional bulkheading; or
.3 Method IIIC - The fitting of a fixed fire detection and fire alarm system as required
by regulation 52.3, in all spaces in which a fire might be expected to originate,
generally with no restriction on the type of internal divisional bulkheading,
except that in no case must the area of any accommodation space or spaces
bounded by an "A" or "B" class division exceed 50 m2. Consideration may be
given by the Administration to increasing this area for public spaces.
6 The requirements for the use of non-combustible materials in construction and insulation of the
boundary bulkheads of machinery spaces, control stations, service spaces, etc., and the protection
of stairway enclosures and corridors will be common to all three methods outlined in paragraph 5.
Regulation 43 Bulkheads within the accommodation and service spaces

1 All bulkheads required to be "B" class divisions shall extend from deck to deck and to the shell or
other boundaries, unless continuous "B" class ceilings or linings are fitted on both sides of the
bulkhead in which case the bulkhead may terminate at the continuous ceiling or lining.
2 Method IC-All bulkheads not required by this or other regulations of this part to be "A" or "B" class
divisions, shall be of at least "C" class construction.
3 Method IIC-There shall be no restriction on the construction of bulkheads not required by this or
other regulations of this part to be "A" or "B" class divisions except in individual cases where "C"
class bulkheads are required in accordance with table 44.1.
4 Method IIIC-There shall be no restriction on the construction of bulkheads not required by this part
to be "A" or "B" class divisions except that the area of any accommodation space or spaces
bounded by a continuous "A" or "B" class division must in no case exceed 50 m2 except in
individual cases where "C" class bulkheads are required in accordance with table 44.1.
Consideration may be given by the Administration to increasing this area for public space.
Regulation 44 Fire integrity of bulkheads and decks

mentioned elsewhere in this part, the minimum fire integrity of bulkheads and decks shall be as
prescribed in tables 44.1 and 44.2.
.1 Tables 44.1 and 44.2 shall apply respectively to the bulkheads and decks
separating adjacent spaces.
.2 For determining the appropriate fire integrity standards to be applied to divisions

between adjacent spaces, such spaces are classified according to their fire risk
as shown in categories (1) to (11) below. The title of each category is intended to

Fire Safety Aboard Cargo Ships and Tankers 339
Spaces (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Control stations (1) A-0c A-0 A-60 A-0 A-15 A-60 A-15 A-60 A-60 * A-60
Corridors (2) B-0
C B-0 B-0 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-30
A-0c
Accommodation (3) B-0
spaces Ca,b B-0 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-30
A-0c
Stairways (4) B-0 B-0 *
A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-30
A-0c A-0c *
Service spaces (5)
(low risk) C A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-0
Machinery (6)
spaces of * A-0 A-0g A-60 * A-60f
category A
Other machinery (7)
spaces A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-0
d
Cargo spaces (8) A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-0
Service spaces (9)
(high risk) * A-0d * A-30
Open decks (10) - A-0

Ro-ro cargo (11)
spaces *h
Notes: To be applied to tables 44.1 and 44.2, as appropriate.
a No special requirements are imposed upon bulkheads in methods IIC and IIIC fire protection.
b In case of method IIIC "B" class bulkheads of "B-0" rating shall be provided between spaces or groups of spaces
of 50m2 and over in area.
c For clarification as to which applies, see regulations 43 and 46.
d Where spaces are of the same numberical category and superscript d appears, a bulkhead or deck of the rating
shown in the tables is only required when the adjacent spaces are for a different purpose, eg in category (9). A
galley next to a galley does not require a bulkhead but a galley next to a paint room requires an "A-0" bulkhead.
e Bulkheads separating the wheelhouse, chartroom and radio room from each other may be "B-0" rating.
f "A-0" rating may be used if no dangerous goods are intended to be carried or if such goods are stowed not less
than 3 m horizontally from such bulkhead.
g For cargo spaces in which dangerous goods are intended to be carried out, regulation 54.2.8 applies.
h Bulkheads and decks separating ro-ro cargo sapces shall be capable of being closed reasonably gastight and such
divisions shall have "A" class integrity in so far as is reasonable and practicable in the opinion of the Administration.
i Fire insulation need not be fitted if the machinery space in category (7), in the opinion of the Administration, has
little or no fire risk.
* Where an asterisk appears in the tables, the division is required to be of steel or other equivalent material but is not
required to be of "A" class standard.
be typical rather than restrictive. The number in parentheses preceding each

category refers to the applicable column or row in the tables.

Spaces containing emergencysources of power and lighting.
Control room for propulsion machinery when located outside the machinery
space.
(2) Corridors
Corridors and lobbies.

Spaces as defined in regulation 3.10, excluding corridors.

Space Space (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
below above
Control stations (1) A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-60
Corridors (2)
A-0 * * A-0 * A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-30
Accommodation (3)
spaces A-60 A-0 * A-0 * A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-30
Stairways (4)
A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-0 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-30
Service spaces (5)

(low risk) A-15 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-0
Machinery spaces (6)

of category A A-60 A-60 A-60 A-60 A-60 * A-60i A-30 A-60 * A-60
Other machinery (7)

spaces A-15 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-0 A-0 * A-0
Cargo spaces (8) A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-0 * A-0
Service spaces (9)
(high risk) A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0d * A-30
Open decks (10) * * * * * * * * * - *

Ro-ro cargo (11)
spaces A-60 A-30 A-30 A-30 A-0 A-60 A-0 A-0 A-30 * *h

(4) Stairways
Interior stairway, lifts and escalators (other than those wholly contained within
the machinery spaces) and enclosures thereto.
In this connection, a stairway which is enclosed only at one level shall be



Spaces as defined in regulation 3.20 excluding machinery spaces of category A.
(8) Cargo spaces

All spaces used for cargo (including cargo oil tanks) and trunkways and
hatchways to such spaces.

flammable liquids, and workshops other than those forming part of the
machinery spaces.
(10) Open decks

space outside super-structures and deckhouses).
(11) Ro-ro cargo spaces

Spaces as defined in regulation 3.14. Cargo spaces intended for the carriage of
motor vehicles with fuel in their tanks for their own propulsion.
may be pierced for the fitting of windows and sidescuttles provided that there is no requirement for
such boundaries to have "A" class integrity elsewhere in this part. Similarly, in such boundaries

which are not required to have "A" class integrity, doors may be of materials to the satisfaction of
the Administration.
Regulation 45 Means of escape

1 Stairways and ladders shall be so arranged as to provide, from all accommodation spaces and from
spaces in which the crew is normally employed, other than machinery spaces, ready means of
escape to the open deck and thence to the lifeboats and liferafts. In particular the following general
provisions shall be complied with:
.1 At all levels of accommodation there shall be provided at least two widely

separated means of escape from each restricted space or group of spaces.
.2.1 Below the lowest open deck the main means of escape shall be a stairway and the second escape
may be a trunk or a stairway.
.2.2 Above the lowest open deck the means of escape shall be stairways or doors to an open deck or
a combination thereof.
.3 Exceptionally the Administration may dispense with one of the means of escape,
due regard being paid to the nature and location of spaces and to the numbers of
persons who normally might be quartered or employed there.
.4 No dead-end corridors having a length of more than 7 m shall be accepted. A

dead-end corridor is a corridor or part of a corridor from which there is only one
escape route.
.5 The width and continuity of the means of escape shall be to the satisfaction of
the Administration.
.6 If a radiotelegraph station has no direct access to the open deck, two means of
access to or egress from such station shall be provided, one of which may be a
porthole or window of sufficient size or other means to the satisfaction of the
Administration, to provide an emergency escape.
2 In all ro-ro cargo spaces where the crew is normally employed the number and locations of escape
routes to the open deck shall be to the satisfaction of the Administration, but shall in no case be
less than two and shall be widely separated.
3 Except as provided in paragraph 4, two means of escape shall be provided from each machinery
space of category A. In particular, one of the following provisions shall be complied with:
.1 two sets of steel ladders as widely separated as possible leading to doors in the
upper part of the space similarly separated and from which access is provided to
the open deck. In general, one of these ladders shall provide continuous fire
shelter from the lower part of the space to a safe position outside the space.
However, the Administration may not require the shelter if, due to the special
arrangement or dimensions of the machinery space, a safe escape route from the
lower part of this space is provided. This shelter shall be of steel, insulated,
where necessary, to the satisfaction of the Administration and be provided with a
self-closing steel door at the lower end; or
.2 one steel ladder leading to a door in the upper part of the space from which
access is provided to the open deck and additionally, in the lower part of the
space and in a position well separated from the ladder referred to, a steel door
capable of being operated from each side and which provides access to a safe
escape route from the lower part of the space to the open deck.
4 In a ship of less than 1,000 tons gross tonnage, the Administration may dispense with one of the
means of escape required under paragraph 3, due regard being paid to the dimension and
disposition of the upper part of the space.
5 From machinery spaces other than those of category A, escape routes shall be provided to the
satisfaction of the Administration having regard to the nature and location of the space and whether
persons are normally employed in that space.
6 Lifts shall not be considered as forming one of the required means of escape as required by this
regulation.
Comment
Regulation 45 paragraph 1.4 permits dead-end corridors not exceeding 7 m in length. By
comparison, Regulation 28 paragraph 1.4 which applies to passenger ships does not permit dead-end

corridors. This reflects the experience aboard the Scandinavian Star in which many of those who
died were found in dead-end corridors or simply a step away from the safety of the open deck.
Realising that emergency lighting can also fail or be obscured by smoke, many new cargo ships
are being fitted with photoluminescent strip indicators which comply with Regulation 41-2
paragraph 4.7. Such systems whilst primarily designed to aid escape, also assist wayfinding by
fire-fighters in smoke logged compartments. Figure 10.19 at page 335 taken from the brochure of
Maritime Progress Limited of Surrey England, illustrates how such systems should be used. The
author commends the use of such systems on all vessels, not just passenger ships.
Whilst paragraph 6 of Regulation 45 correctly prescribes against consideration of a lift as a
means of escape, where a lift is fitted in a control room or machinery space, it is possible to utilise
the shaft to provide an alternative means of escape for personnel. The thinking behind this idea is,
quite contrary to standard practice and advice, to use the lift and/or shaft in time of fire in order to
reach safety. A trap door is fitted both on the
floor and in the roof of the cage-the former being
capable of being opened from outside the bottom
of the cage and fitted with a short collapsible
ladder to facilitate entry — the latter from inside
the cage with access by means of a short
permanently fixed ladder. The opening of either
of these doors in the cage immediately cuts off
the power supply. A steel ladder runs throughout
the length of the lift shaft within easy reach of the
access doors at all levels. The normal doors to
the lift are fitted with an over-riding switch
whereby they can be opened in an emergency,
even when the cage is not at that level. The
actuation of this switch cuts off all power to the
lift and cannot be turned on again without phy
sically going down again to the point at which it
had been operated. The reason for this is that the
power might come on again — say, by the
starting of an emergency generator — whilst men
are escaping up the ladderway within the lift
shaft. Anyone actually inside the lift cage when
it stops simply has to open the roof hatch and
climb up the ladder to reach open air. All doors
in the shaft can be opened from within. Persons
escaping up the shaft from below the cage open
the bottom hatch, get into the cage, open the top
hatch and continue their climb to reach safety in
a smoke-free environment. All doors must be FIGURE 11.1 Suggested method for using a lift
solid and tight fitting to prevent the ingress of shaft as a means of escape for personnel from a
machinery space.
smoke. The principle is illustrated in figure 11.1
opposite.
Regulation 46 Protection of stairways and lift trunks in accommodation spaces, service

spaces and control stations
1 Stairways which penetrate only a single deck shall be protected at least at one level by at least
"B-0" class divisions and self-closing doors. Lifts which penetrate only a single deck shall be
surrounded by "A-0" class divisions with steel doors at both levels. Stairways and lift trunks which
penetrate more than a single deck shall be surrounded by at least "A-0" class divisions and be
protected by self-closing doors at all levels.

2 On ships having accommodation for 12 persons or less, where stairways penetrate more than a
single deck and where there are at least two escape routes direct to the open deck at every
accommodation level, consideration may be given by the Administration to reducing the "A-0"
requirements of paragraph 1 to "B-0".
3 All stairways shall be of steel frame construction except where the Administration sanctions the use
of other equivalent material.
Regulation 47 Doors in fire-resisting divisions

1 The fire resistance of doors shall, as far as practicable, be equivalent to that of the division in which
they are fitted. Doors and door frames in "A" class divisions shall be constructed of steel. Doors in
"B" class divisions shall be non-combustible. Doors fitted in boundary bulkheads of machinery
spaces of category A shall be reasonably gastight and self-closing. In ships constructed according
to method IC, an Administration may permit the use of combustible materials in doors separating
cabins from individual interior sanitary accommodation such as showers.
2 Doors required to be self-closing shall not be fitted with hold-back hooks. However, hold-back
arrangements fitted with remote release devices of the fail-safe type may be utilized.
3 In corridor bulkheads ventilation openings may be permitted only in and under the doors of cabins
and public spaces. The openings shall be provided only in the lower half of a door. Where such
opening is in or under a door the total net area of any such opening or openings shall not exceed
0.05 m2. When such opening is cut in a door it shall be fitted with a grille made of non-combustible
material.
4 Watertight doors need not be insulated.
Regulation 48 Ventilation systems

The ventilation systems of cargo ships shall be in compliance with the provisions of regulation 16,
except paragraph 8.
Regulation 49 Restricted use of combustible materials

1 All exposed surfaces in corridors and stairway enclosures and surfaces including grounds in
concealed or inaccessible spaces in accommodation and service spaces and control stations shall
have low flame-spread characteristics.1 Exposed surfaces of ceilings in accommodation and
service spaces and control stations shall have low flame-spread characteristics.
2 Paints, varnishes and other finishes used on exposed interior surfaces shall not offer an undue fire
hazard in the judgement of the Administration and shall not be capable of producing excessive
quantities of smoke.
3 Primary deck coverings, if applied within accommodation and service spaces and control stations,
shall be of approved material which will not readily ignite, or give rise to toxic or explosive hazards
at elevated temperatures.2
Regulation 50 Details of construction

(Paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 of this regulation apply to ships constructed on or after 1 February 1992)
1 Method IC-In accommodation and service spaces and control stations all linings, draught stops,
ceilings and their associated grounds shall be of non-combustible materials.
2 Methods IIC and IIIC-In corridors and stairway enclosures serving accommodation and service
spaces and control stations, ceilings, linings, draught stops and their associated grounds shall be
of non-combustible materials.
3 Methods IC, IIC and IIIC
3.1 Except in cargo spaces or refrigerated compartments of service spaces, insulating materials shall
be non-combustible. Vapour barriers and adhesives used in conjunction with insulation, as well as
the insulation of pipe fittings, for cold service systems, need not be of non-combustible materials,
but they shall be kept to the minimum quantity practicable and their exposed surfaces shall have
qualities of resistance to the propagation of flame to the satisfaction of the Administration.
1
Refer to the Guidelines on the evaluation of fire hazard properties of materials, adopted by the Organization by resolution A.166(ES.IV), and to
the Recommendation on Improved Fire Test Procedures for Surface Flammability of Bulkhead, Ceiling and Deck Finish Materials, adopted by
the Organization by resolution A.653(16).
2
Refer to the Recommendation on Fire Test Procedures for Ignitability of Primary Deck Coverings, adopted by the Organization by resolution
A.687(17).

3.2 Where non-combustible bulkheads, linings and ceilings are fitted in accommodation and service
spaces they may have a combustible veneer with a calorific value not exceeding 45 MJ/m2 of the
area for the thickness used.
3.3 The total volume of combustible facings, mouldings, decorations and veneers in any
accommodation and service space bounded by non-combustible bulkheads, ceilings and linings
shall not exceed a volume equivalent to a 2.5 mm veneer on the combined area of the walls and
ceilings.
3.4 Air spaces enclosed behind ceilings, panellings, or linings, shall be divided by close-fitting draught
stops spaced not more than 14 m apart. In the vertical direction, such air spaces, including those
behind linings of stairways, trunks, etc., shall be closed at each deck.
Regulation 51 Arrangements for gaseous fuel for domestic purposes

Where gaseous fuel is used for domestic purposes the arrangements for the storage, distribution
and utilization of the fuel shall be such that, having regard to the hazards of fire and explosion
which the use of such fuel may entail, the safety of the ship and the persons on board is preserved.
Regulation 52 Fixed fire detection and fire alarm systems Automatic sprinkler, fire
detection and fire alarm systems
1 In ships in which method IC is adopted, a fixed fire detection and fire alarm system of an approved
type complying with the requirements of regulation 13 shall be so installed and arranged as to
provide smoke detection and manually operated call points in all corridors, stairways and escape
routes within accommodation spaces.
2 In ships in which method IIC is adopted, an automatic sprinkler, fire detection and fire alarm system
of an approved type complying with the relevant requirements of regulation 12 shall be so installed
and arranged as to protect accommodation spaces, galleys and other service spaces, except
spaces which afford no substantial fire risk such as void spaces, sanitary spaces, etc. In addition, a
fixed detection and fire alarm system of an approved type complying with the requirements of
regulation 13 shall be so installed and arranged as to provide smoke detection and manually
operated call points in all corridors, stairways and escape routes within accommodation spaces.
3 In ships in which method IIIC is adopted, a fixed fire detection and fire alarm system of an approved
type complying with the requirements of regulation 13 shall be so installed and arranged as to
detect the presence of fire in all accommodation spaces and service spaces, except spaces which
afford no substantial fire risk such as void spaces, sanitary spaces, etc.
Regulation 53 Fire protection arrangements in cargo spaces

(Paragraphs 2.1 and 3 of this regulation apply to ships constructed on or after 1 February 1992)
1 General
1.1 Except for cargo spaces covered in paragraphs 2 and 3, cargo spaces of ships of 2,000 tons gross
tonnage and upwards shall be protected by a fixed gas fire-extinguishing system complying with
the provisions of regulation 5 or by a fire-extinguishing system which gives equivalent protection.
1.2 The Administration may exempt from the requirements of paragraph 1.1 cargo spaces of any ship if
constructed and solely intended for carrying ore, coal, grain, unseasoned timber, non-combustible
cargoes or cargoes which, in the opinion of the Administration, constitute a low fire risk. Such
exemptions may be granted only if the ship is fitted with steel hatch covers and effective means of
closing all ventilators and other openings leading to the cargo spaces.3
1.3 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 1.1, any ship engaged in the carriage of dangerous
goods shall be provided in any cargo spaces with a fixed gas fire-extinguishing system complying
with the provisions of regulation 5 or with a fire-extinguishing system which in the opinion of the
Administration gives equivalent protection for the cargoes carried.
2 Ro-ro cargo spaces
2.1 Fire detection
There shall be provided a fixed fire detection and fire alarm system complying with the
requirements of regulation 13. The fixed fire detection system shall be capable of rapidly detecting
the onset of fire. The type of detectors and their spacing and location shall be to the satisfaction of
the Administration taking into account the effects of ventilation and other relevant factors. After
being installed the system shall be tested under normal ventilation conditions and shall give an
overall response time to the satisfaction of the Administration.
2.2 Fire-extinguishing arrangements

3
Refer to the Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes-Emergency Schedule B14, entry for coal.

2.2.1 Ro-ro cargo spaces capable of being sealed shall be fitted with a fixed gas
fire-extinguishing system which shall comply with the provisions of regulation 5,
except that:
.1 If a carbon dioxide system is fitted, the quantity of gas available

shall be at least sufficient to give a minimum volume of free gas
equal to 45% of the gross volume of the largest such cargo space
which is capable of being sealed, and the arrangements shall be
such as to ensure that at least two thirds of the gas required for
the relevant space shall be introduced during 10 min;
.2 a halogenated hydrocarbon system may be used only for spaces

designated only for vehicles which are not carrying any cargo;
.3 any other fixed gas fire-extinguishing system or fixed high

expansion foam fire-extinguishing system may be fitted provided
the Administration is satisfied that an equivalent protection is
achieved;
.4 as an alternative, a system meeting the requirements of regulation

1.3 may be fitted. However, the drainage and pumping
arrangements shall be such as to prevent the build-up of free
surfaces. If this is not possible the adverse effect upon stability of
the added weight and free surface of water shall be taken into
account to the extent deemed necessary by the Administration in
its approval of the stability information.4 Such information shall
be included in the stability information supplied to the master as
required by regulation II-1/
2.2.2 Ro-ro cargo spaces not capable of being sealed shall be fitted with a system
meeting the requirements of regulation 1.3. However, the drainage and pumping
arrangements shall be such as to prevent the build-up of free surfaces. If this is
not possible the adverse effect upon stability of the added weight and free
surface of water shall be taken into account to the extent deemed necessary by
the Administration in its approval of the stability information.* Such information
shall be included in the stability information supplied to the master as required
by regulation II-1/
2.2.3 There shall be provided for use in any ro-ro cargo space such number of portable
fire extinguishers as the Administration may deem sufficient. At least one
portable extinguisher shall be located at each access to such a cargo space.
2.2.4 Each ro-ro cargo space intended for the carriage of motor vehicles with fuel in
their tanks for their own propulsion shall be provided with:
.1 at least three water fog applicators;
.2 one portable foam applicator unit complying with the provisions

of regulation 6.4 provided that at least two such units are
available in the ship for use in such ro-ro cargo spaces.
2.3 Ventilation system
2.3.1 Closed ro-ro cargo spaces shall be provided with an effective power ventilation
system sufficient to provide at least six air changes per hour based on an empty
hold. Ventilation fans shall normally be run continuously whenever vehicles are
on board. Where this is impracticable, they shall be operated for a limited period
daily as weather permits and in any case for a reasonable period prior to
discharge, after which period the ro-ro cargo space shall be proved gas-free. One
or more portable combustible gas detecting instruments shall be carried for this
purpose. The system shall be entirely separate from other ventilating systems.
Ventilation ducts serving ro-ro cargo spaces capable of being effectively sealed
shall be separated for each cargo space. The Administration may require an
increased number of air changes when vehicles are being loaded or unloaded.
The system shall be capable of being controlled from a position outside such
spaces.
2.3.2 The ventilation shall be so arranged as to prevent air stratification and the
formation of air pockets.
2.3.3 Means shall be provided to indicate any loss of the required ventilating capacity
on the navigating bridge.
4
A.123(V).

2.3.4 Arrangements shall be provided to permit a rapid shutdown and effective closure
of the ventilation system in case of fire, taking into account the weather and sea
conditions.
2.3.5 Ventilation ducts, including dampers, shall be made of steel and their
arrangement shall be to the satisfaction of the Administration.
Closed ro-ro cargo spaces carrying motor vehicles with fuel in their tanks for their own propulsion
shall comply with the following additional provisions:
.1 Except as provided in paragraph 2.4.2, electrical equipment and wiring shall be

of a type suitable for use in explosive petrol and air mixtures.
.2 Above a height of 450 mm from the deck and from each platform for vehicles, if
fitted, except platforms with openings of sufficient size permitting penetration of
petrol gases downwards, electrical equipment of a type so enclosed and
protected as to prevent the escape of sparks shall be permitted as an alternative
on condition that the ventilation system is so designed and operated as to
provide continuous ventilation of the cargo spaces at the rate of at least ten air
changes per hour whenever vehicles are on board.
.3 Other equipment which may constitute a source of ignition of flammable vapours

shall not be permitted.
.4 Electrical equipment and wiring in an exhaust ventilation duct shall be of a type

approved for use in explosive petrol and air mixtures and the outlet from any
exhaust duct shall be sited in a safe position, having regard to other possible
sources of ignition.
.5 Scuppers shall not be led to machinery or other spaces where sources of ignition
may be present.
3 Cargo spaces, other than ro-ro cargo spaces, intended for the carriage of motor vehicles with fuel
in their tanks for their own propulsion
Cargo spaces, other than ro-ro spaces intended for the carriage of motor vehicles with fuel in their
tanks for their own propulsion, shall comply with the requirements of paragraph 2 except that in
lieu of the requirements of paragraph 2.1 a sample extraction smoke detection system complying
with the requirements of regulation 13-1 may be permitted and paragraph 2.2.4 need not be
complied with.
Comment
Whilst Regulation 53 paragraph 1.2 permits the omission of a fixed gas fire-extinguishing system
where the cargo carried is deemed by the Administration to be "low fire risk", the author urges
caution in the light of the fire aboard the Damador Tanabe described in detail at page 130. Despite a
cargo being "low fire risk", the risk of fire remains and in the author's opinion, a fixed gas
fire-extinguishing system is a prudent precaution. Figure 11.2 overleaf show fire-fighters from
Tayside Fire Brigade, Scotland using a thermal imaging camera to identify hot spots in a cargo of
would pulp. The fire was successfully controlled using CO2. Figure 11.3 shows the extent of fire
spread through the gaps in the stow of wood pulp, this despite the prompt application of the
extinguishing gas.
There are of course cargoes for which the use of a fixed gas fire-extinguishing system is
ineffective or inappropriate and these are listed in IMO Maritime Safety Committee Circular 671
reproduced below:
MSC/Circular.671
Lists Of Solid Bulk Cargoes Which Are Non-combustible Or Constitute a Low Fire Risk
Or For Which a Fixed Gas Fire-extinguishing System Is Ineffective
The Maritime Safety Committee
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its sixty-fourth session (5 to 9 December 1994), agreed there was a need to
provide Administrations with guidelines regarding the provisions of regulation II-2/53 of the SOLAS
Convention concerning exemptions from the requirements for fire-extinguishing systems.

2 The Committee also agreed the annexed table 1 providing a list of solid bulk cargoes which are
non-combustible or constitute a low fire risk, and recommended Member Governments to take into account the
information contained in that table when granting exemptions under the provisions of regulation II-2/53.1.
3 The Committee further agreed the annexed table 2 providing a list of solid bulk cargoes for which a fixed gas
fire-extinguishing system is ineffective, and recommended that cargo spaces in a ship engaged in the carriage of
cargoes listed in table 2 be provided with a fire-extinguishing system which provides equivalent protection. The
Committee agreed the Administrations should take account of the provisions of regulation II-2/54.2.1 when
determining suitable requirements for an equivalent fire-extinguishing system.
4 The annexed tables will be reviewed periodically by the Maritime Safety Committee. Member Governments are
requested to provided the Organization, when granting exemptions to ships for the carriage of cargoes not
included in table 1, with data on the non-combustibility or fire risk properties of such cargoes. Member
Governments are also requested to provide the Organization, when equivalent fire-extinguishing systems are
required for the agreed carriage of cargoes not included in table 2, with data on the inefficiency of fixed gas
fire-extinguishing systems for such cargoes.
5 The purpose of this circular is to provide guidance to Administrations. It should not, however, be considered as
precluding Administrations of their right to grant exemptions for cargoes not included in table 1 or to impose
any conditions when granting such exemptions under the provision of SOLAS regulation II-2/53.1.
Annex - List of Solid Bulk Cargoes which are Non-Combustible or Constitute a Low Fire Risk
Table 1 List of solid bulk cargoes which are non-combustible or constitute a low fire risk
Cargoes listed in regulation II-2/53
Ore
Coal
Grain
Unseasoned timber
Cargoes listed in the Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (BC Code)
All cargoes listed in appendices A and C of the BC Code
The following cargoes listed in appendix B of the BC Code:
FIGURE 11.2 (Above) Fire-fighters from Tayside

Fire Brigade using a thermal imaging camera to
check for hot spots following a fire in a cargo of
wood pulp held quiescent by the prompt use of a CO2
system.
FIGURE 11.3 (Left) The seat of the fire after the

cargo of wood pulp had been worked out. Note the
fire spread throughout the gaps in the stow.

Aluminium processing by-products

Aluminium ferrosilicon powder (including briquettes)
Aluminium silicon powder, uncoated
Calcined pyrides (Pyritic ash, Fly ash)
Direct reduced iron briquettes, hot moulded
Ferrophosphorus (including briquettes)
Ferrosilicon, containing more than 30% but less than 90% silicon (including briquettes)
Ferrosilicon, containing 25% to 30% silicon, or 90% or more silicon (including briquettes)
Fluorspar (calcium fluoride)
Lime (unslaked)
Magnesia (unslaked)
Pencil pitch
Petroleum coke [See footnote 1]
Radioactive Material, Low Specific Activity Material (LSA-1)
Radioactive Material, Surface Contaminated Object(s) (SCO-1)
Silicomanganese
Sulphur (lump or coarse grained powder)
Vanadium ore
Woodchips with moisture content of 15% or more
Wood pulp pellets with moisture content of 15% or more
Zinc ashes
Zinc dross
Zinc residues
Zinc skimmings
Table 2 List of Solid Bulk Cargoes for which a fixed gas fire-extinguishing system is ineffective and
for which a fire-extinguishing system giving equivalent protection shall be available
The following cargoes listed in appendix B of the BC Code:
Aluminium nitrate
Ammonium nitrate
Ammonium nitrate fertilizers
Barium nitrate
Calcium nitrate
Lead nitrate
Magnesium nitrate
Potassium nitrate
Sodium nitrate
Chilean natural nitrate
Sodium nitrate and potassium nitrate, mixture
Chilean natural potassic nitrate
When loaded and transported under the provision of the BC Code.
The reader is directed to the publications listed below for detailed advice concerning the carriage
of the cargoes listed above:
1. Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (BC Code) published by the IMO
2. Thomas' Stowage Third Edition revised by Capt. K. S. Rankin published by Brown, Son and
Ferguson, Ltd.
3. Bulk Carrier Practice by Capt. J. Isbester published by The Nautical Institute.
Paragraph 2.2.1.4 permits the use of water spray systems for the protection of ro-ro cargo spaces
provided cogniscance has been given to the provision of drainage sufficient not to compromise the
vessel's stability. The use of water mist systems is also anticipated which, with its lower application
rate, has certain attractions to mariners. However, the tests laid down by the IMO to which water
mist systems must comply, require the sucessful application in test volumes up to 3,000 m3 and one
industry view is that water mist will be used primarily for unit protection rather than volume
protection.

Regulation 54 Special requirements for ships carrying dangerous goods

(Paragraphs 2.3 of this regulation apply to ships constructed on or after 1 February 1992)
1 General
1.1 In addition to complying with the requirements of regulation 53 for cargo ships and with the
requirements of regulations 37, 38 and 39,5 for passenger ships as appropriate, ship types and
cargo spaces, referred to in paragraph 1.2, intended for the carriage of dangerous goods shall
comply with the requirements of this regulation, as appropriate, except when carrying dangerous
goods in limited quantities6 unless such requirements have already been met by compliance with
the requirements elsewhere in this chapter. The types of ships and modes of carriage of dangerous
goods are referred to in paragraph 1.2 and in table 54.1, where the numbers appearing in paragraph
1.2 are referred to in the top line. Cargo ships of less than 500 tons gross tonnage constructed on
or after 1 February 1992 shall comply with this regulation, but Administrations may reduce the
requirements and such reduced requirements shall be recorded in the document of compliance
referred to in paragraph 3.
1.2 The following ship types and cargo spaces shall govern the application of tables 54.1 and 54.2:
.1 Ships and cargo spaces not specifically designed for the carriage of freight
containers but intended for the carriage of dangerous goods in packaged form
including goods in freight containers and portable tanks.
.2 Purpose-built container ships and cargo spaces intended for the carriage of
dangerous goods in freight containers and portable tanks.
.3 Ro-ro ships and ro-ro cargo spaces intended for the carriage of dangerous
goods.
.4 Ships and cargo spaces intended for the carriage of solid dangerous goods in
bulk.
.5 Ships and cargo spaces intended for carriage of dangerous goods other than
liquids and gases in bulk in shipborne barges.
2 Special requirements
Unless otherwise specified the following requirements shall govern the application of tables 54.1,
54.2 and 54.3 to both "on-deck" and "under-deck" stowage of dangerous goods where the numbers
of the following paragraphs are indicated in the first column.
2.1 Water supplies
2.1.1 Arrangements shall be made to ensure immediate availability of a supply of water

from the fire main at the required pressure either by permanent pressurization or
by suitably placed remote arrangements for the fire pumps.
2.1.2 The quantity of water delivered shall be capable of supplying four nozzles of a
size and at pressures as specified in regulation 4, capable of being trained on
any part of the cargo space when empty. This amount of water may be applied by
equivalent means to the satisfaction of the Administration.
2.1.3 Means of effectively cooling the designated under-deck cargo space by copious
quantities of water, either by a fixed arrangement of spraying nozzles, or flooding
the cargo space with water, shall be provided. Hoses may be used for this
purpose in small cargo spaces and in small areas of larger cargo spaces at the
discretion of the Administration. In any event the drainage and pumping
arrangements shall be such as to prevent the build-up of free surfaces. If this is
not possible the adverse effect upon stability of the added weight and free
surface of water shall be taken into account to the extent deemed necessary by
the Administration in its approval of the stability information.7
2.1.4 Provision to flood a designated under-deck cargo space with suitable specified
media may be substituted for the requirements in paragraph 2.1.3.
5
Refer to section 17 of the General Introduction to the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code) for operational measures in
association with the requirements of this regulation.
6
Refer to section 18 of the General Introduction to the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code (IMDG Code) for a definition of the term
limited quantities.
7
A.123(V).

Table 54.1 - Application of the requirements to different modes

of carriage of dangerous goods in ships and cargo spaces
Wherever X appears in table 54.1 it means that this requirement is applicable to all classes of dangerous goods as
given in the appropriate line of table 54.3, except as indicated by the notes.
Regulation 54.1.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5

Not Container Closed Open ro-ro Weather Solid dangerous Shipborne
specifically cargo ro-ro cargo decks goods in bulk barges
designed spaces cargo spaces
spaces
Regulation 54.2
.1.1 x x x x x For application of x

requirements of
.1.2 x x x x x Regulation 54 to -
different classes
.1.3 x x x x - of dangerous x
goods, see
.1.4 x x x x - table 54.2 x
0.2 x x x x - xd
0.3 x x x - - xd
.4.1 x xa x - - xd
.4.2 x xa x - - xd
0.5 x x x - - -
.6.1 x x x x x -
.6.2 x x x x x -
0.7 x - - x x -
0.8 x xb x x x -
0.9 - - xc x - -
Notes
a For clases 4 and 5.1 not applicable to closed freight containers
For clases 2, 3, 6.1 and 8 when carried in closed freight containers the ventilation rate may be reduced to not less
than two air changes. For the purpose of this requirement a portable tank is a closed freight container.
b Applicable to decks only.
c Applies only to closed ro-ro cargo spaces, not capable of being sealed.
2.2 Sources of ignition
Electrical equipment and wiring shall not be fitted in enclosed cargo spaces, closed vehicle deck
spaces, or open vehicle deck spaces unless it is essential for operational purposes in the opinion
of the Administration. However, if electrical equipment is fitted in such spaces, it shall be of a
certified safe type8 for use in the dangerous environments to which it may be exposed unless it is
possible to completely isolate the electrical system (by removal of links in the system, other than
fuses). Cable penetrations of the decks and bulkheads shall be sealed against the passage of gas or
vapour. Through runs of cables and cables within the cargo spaces shall be protected against
damage from impact. Any other equipment which may constitute a source of ignition of flammable
vapour shall not be permitted.
2.3 Detection system
Ro-ro cargo spaces shall be fitted with a fixed fire detection and fire alarm system complying with
the requirements of regulation 13. All other types of cargo spaces shall be fitted with either a fixed
fire detection and fire alarm system complying with the requirements of regulation 13 or a sample
extraction smoke detection system complying with the requirements of regulation 13-1. If a sample
extraction smoke detection system is fitted, particular attention shall be made to regulation
13-1.1.11 in order to prevent the leakage of toxic fumes into occupied areas.
8
Refer to the Recommendations published by the International Electrotechnical Commission and, in particular, Publication 92-Electrical
Installations in Ships.

Table 54.2 - Application of the requirements to different classes of dangerous good for ships
and cargo spaces carrying solid dangerous goods in bulk
Class - Chapter VII 4.1 4.2 4.3f 5.1 6.1 8 9
Regulation 54.2
.1.1 x x - x xg xg x
e
.1.2 x x - x - - x
0.2 x xg x xg - - xg
.4.1h xg xg x xg - - xg
.4.2h x xg x xg - - xg
0.6 x x x x x x x
0.8 g g g
x x x x x x x
Notes
e This requirement is applicable when the characteristics of the substance call for large
qunatities of water for fire fighting.
f The hazards of substances in this class which may be carried in bulk are such that special
consideration must be given by the Administration to the construction and equipment of the
ships involved in addition to meeting the requirements enumerated in this table.
g Refer to the International Maritime Dangerous Good Code (resolution A.81 (1V) as amended)
or the Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (resolution A.434 (XI) as amended), as
appropriate.
h At least natural ventilation is required in enclosed cargo spaces intended for carriage of solid
dangerous goods in bulk. In cases where the power ventilation is required in the Code of
Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (resolution A.434 (XI) as amended), the use of portable
ventilation units (equipment) to the satisfaction of the Administration may suffice.
2.4 Ventilation
2.4.1 Adequate power ventilation shall be provided in enclosed cargo spaces. The
arrangement shall be such as to provide for at least six air changes per hour in
the cargo space based on an empty cargo space and for removal of vapours from
the upper or lower parts of the cargo space, as appropriate.
2.4.2 The fans shall be such as to avoid the possibility of ignition of flammable gas air
mixtures. Suitable wire mesh guards shall be fitted over inlet and outlet
ventilation openings.
2.5 Bilge pumping
Where it is intended to carry flammable or toxic liquids in enclosed cargo spaces, the bilge
pumping system shall be designed to ensure against inadvertent pumping of such liquids through
machinery space piping or pumps. Where large quantities of such liquids are carried, consideration
shall be given to the provision of additional means of draining those cargo spaces. These means
2.6 Personnel protection
2.6.1 Four sets of full protective clothing resistant to chemical attack shall be provided
in addition to the fireman's outfits required by regulation 17. The protective
clothing shall cover all skin, so that no part of the body is unprotected.
2.6.2 At least two self-contained breathing apparatuses additional to those required by

regulation 17 shall be provided.
2.7 Portable fire extinguishers
Portable fire extinguishers with a total capacity of at least 12 kg of dry powder or equivalent shall be
provided for the cargo spaces. These extinguishers shall be in addition to any portable fire
extinguishers required elsewhere in this chapter.
2.8 Insulation of machinery space boundaries
Bulkheads forming boundaries between cargo spaces and machinery spaces of category A shall be
insulated to "A-60" standard, unless the dangerous goods are stowed at least 3 m horizontally away
from such bulkheads. Other boundaries between such spaces shall be insulated to "A-60" standard.

Table 54.3 - Applications of the requirements to different classes of dangerous goods

except solid dangerous good in bulk
Class - Chapter VII 1 2 3 4 5.1 5.2 6.1 8
Regulation 54.2
.1.1 x x x xp x xp x x
i p p
.1.2 x x x x x x - -
.1.3 xk - - - - - - -
.1.4 xk - - - - - - -
0.2 l m m,p m,p
x x x - - - x x
0.3 - x x x x - x x
.4.1 j m p p m,p m,p
- x x x x - x x
.4.2 - xl xm - - - xm,p xm,p
0.5 - - xm - - - xn xm
0.6 - x x x x xp x x
p p
0.7 - - x x x x x xp
0.8 xk,o x x x xp - xp xp
0.9 x x xm xp x - xm xm
Notes
i This requirement is applicable when the characteristics of the substance call for large quantities
of water for fire fighting.
j Applicable to flammable or poisonous gases.
k Except goods of class 1 in division 1.4, compatibility group S.
l All flammable gases.
m All liquids having a flashpoint below 23oc (closed cup test).
n Liquids only.
o Goods of class 1 shall be stowed 3m horizontally away from the machinery space boudnaries in
all cases.
p Refer to the International Maritime Dangerous Goods code (resolution A.81 (XI) as amended),
as appropriate.
2.9 Water spray system
Each open ro-ro cargo space having a deck above it and each space deemed to be a closed ro-ro
cargo space not capable of being sealed shall be fitted with an approved fixed pressure
water-spraying system for manual operation which shall protect all parts of any deck and vehicle
platform in such space, except that the Administration may permit the use of any other fixed
fire-extinguishing system that has been shown by full-scale test to be no less effective. In any event
the drainage and pumping arrangements shall be such as to prevent the build-up of free surfaces. If
this is not possible the adverse effect upon stability of the added weight and free surface of water
shall be taken into account to the extent deemed necessary by the Administration in its approval of
the stability information.9
3 Document of compliance
The Administration shall provide the ship with an appropriate document as evidence of compliance
of construction and equipment with the requirements of this regulation.
9
A.123(V).

Comment
The carriage of dangerous goods in regulated by the International Maritime Dangerous Goods
Code (IMDG Code) published by the IMO and last amended in 1996 when Amendment 28 was
issued. Together with the Emergency Procedures for Ships Carrying Dangerous Goods (EmS) also
published by the IMO, these documents contain vital information and advice on the procedures to
be followed in the event of an emergency while carrying dangerous goods.
Dangerous goods are divided into the following classes:
1. Class 1 — Explosives
2. Class 2 — Gases: compressed, liquified or dissolved under pressure
3. Class 3 — Flammable liquids
4. Class 4 — Flammable Solids: Substances liable to spontaneous combustion
Substances which, in contact with water, emit
flammable gases
5. Class 5 — Oxidising substances (agents) and organic peroxides
6. Class 6 — Toxic and infectious substances
7. Class 7 — Radioactive materials
8. Class 8 — Corrosives
9. Class 9 — Miscellaneous dangerous substances and articles
FIGURE 11.4 Typical Dangerous Goods Labels

The labels used to mark dangerous goods are shown in Figures 11.4 and 11.5 which has been
reproduced from the IMDG Code. In addition to labeling packages and the containers into which
they are stuffed, shippers are obliged to provide a Dangerous Goods declaration and Container
Packing Certificate. These documents (often one and the same piece of paper) contain important
information about the product's characteristics and include the materials UN number which allows it
to be identified in more detail using the IMDG Code, Sax's Dangerous Properties of Industrial
Materials or the US Coast Guard Chemical Hazards Response Information System (CHRIS).
The prevalent use of containers has helped restrict fire severity in many cases, but as most marine
fire experts will tell you, not a case goes by where what's thought to be loaded is actually loaded.
The editor attended an incident where hydrogen peroxide, a class 5.1 material was incorrectly
manifested, labelled and therefore stowed under deck. For whatever reason, some of the drums burst
inside one of the containers which was stowed on the tank top and a fire ensued. Hydrogen
peroxide, in sufficient concentration, will cause timber to self ignite. (Plywood is commonly used
for the base of most containers.) Upon further investigation the hold was also found to contain class
4.1 and class 8 goods and a container of calcium hypochlorite (class 5.1). In this incident high
expansion foam proved invaluable in inerting the lower hold while the containers in the tween deck
were extinguished and worked out.
FIGURE 11.5 Typical Dangerous Goods Labels

Fire Safety Measures Aboard Tankers

It is not the purpose of this book to deal with each type of tanker or gas carrier in detail but to
make a number of general points which are applicable to any type of tanker vessel. A bibliography
of publications dealing with the safety measures and fire safety measures to be adopted on such
vessels can be found at the end of the chapter.
The student wishing to further their knowledge on this subject is directed to the International
Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals, (ISGOTT) Fourth Edition, published by the
International Chamber of Shipping, Oil Companies, International Marine Forum and International
Association of Ports and Harbours, published by Witherby & Co Limited, 32 Aylesbury Street,
London, EC1R 0ET.
Part D of Chapter II-2 of SOLAS describes the fire safety measures for tankers and the
requirements are broken down as undernoted in regulations 55 through 63. Regulations 55 to 58
have been broadly discussed in Chapter 10 which describes passive fire safety measures and
construction details.
Regulation 55 Application
Regulation 56 Location and separation of spaces
Regulation 57 Structure, bulkheads within accommodation and
service spaces and details of construction
Regulation 59 Venting, purging, gas-freeing and ventilation
Regulation 60 Cargo tank protection
Regulation 61 Fixed deck foam systems
Regulation 62 Inert gas systems
Regulation 63 Cargo pump-rooms
Regulation 55 Application
1 Unless expressly provided otherwise, this part shall apply to tankers carrying crude oil and
petroleum products having a flashpoint not exceeding 60°C (closed cup test), as determined by an
approved flashpoint apparatus, and a Reid vapour pressure which is below atmospheric pressure
and other liquid products having a similar fire hazard.
2 Where liquid cargoes other than those referred to in paragraph 1 or liquefied gases which introduce
additional fire hazards are intended to be carried, additional safety measures shall be required to
the satisfaction of the Administration, having due regard to the provisions of the International Bulk
Chemical Code, the Bulk Chemical Code, the International Gas Carrier Code and the Gas Carrier
Code, as appropriate.
3 This paragraph applies to all ships which are combination carriers. Such ships shall not carry solid
cargoes unless all cargo tanks are empty of oil and gas-freed or unless the arrangements provided
in each case are to the satisfaction of the Administration and in accordance with the relevant
operational requirements contained in the Guidelines for Inert Gas Systems10.
4 Tankers carrying petroleum products having a flashpoint exceeding 60°C (closed cup test) as
determined by an approved flashpoint apparatus shall comply with the provisions of part C, except
that in lieu of the fixed fire-extinguishing system required in regulation 53 they shall be fitted with a
fixed deck foam system which shall comply with the provisions of regulation 61.
5 The requirements for inert gas systems of regulation 60 need not be applied to:
.1 chemical tankers constructed before, on or after 1 July 1986 when carrying

cargoes described in paragraph 1, provided that they comply with the
requirements for inert gas systems on chemical tankers developed by the
Organization11;
.2 chemical tankers constructed before 1 July 1986, when carrying crude oil or
petroleum products, provided that they comply with the requirements for inert
gas systems on chemical tankers carrying petroleum products developed by the
Organization12;
10
Refer to the Revised Guidelines for Inert Gas Systems, adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee at its forty-eighth session in June 1983
(MSC/Circ.353)
11
Refer to the Regulation for Inert Gas Systems on Chemical Tankers, adopted by the Organization by resolution A.567(14).
12
Refer to the Interim Regulation for Inert Gas Systems on Chemical Tankers Carrying Petroleum Products, adopted by the Organization by

.3 gas carriers constructed before, on or after 1 July 1986 when carrying cargoes
described in paragraph 1, provided that they are fitted with cargo tank inerting
arrangements equivalent to those specified in paragraph 5.1 or 5.2; or
.4 chemical tankers and gas carriers when carrying flammable cargoes other than
crude oil or petroleum products such as cargoes listed in chapters VI and VII of
the Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous
Chemicals in Bulk or chapters 17 and 18 of the International Code for the
Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk:
.4.1 if constructed before 1 July 1986; or
.4.2 if constructed on or after 1 July 1986, provided that the capacity of tanks used for
their carriage does not exceed 3,000 m3 and the individual nozzle capacities of tank
washing machines do not exceed 17.5 m3/h and the total combined throughput
from the number of machines in use in a cargo tank at any one time does not
exceed 110 m3/h.
6 Chemical tankers and gas carriers shall comply with the requirements of this part, except where
alternative and supplementary arrangements are provided to the satisfaction of the Administration,
having due regard to the provisions of the International Bulk Chemical Code, the Bulk Chemical
Code, the International Gas Carrier Code and the Gas Carrier Code, as appropriate.
Regulation 56 Location and separation of spaces

(This regulation applies to ships constructed on or after 1 February 1992)
1 Machinery spaces shall be positioned aft of cargo tanks and slop tanks; they shall also be situated
aft of cargo pump-rooms and cofferdams, but not necessarily aft of the oil fuel bunker tanks. Any
machinery space shall be isolated from cargo tanks and slop tanks by cofferdams, cargo
pump-rooms, oil fuel bunker tanks or ballast tanks. Pump-rooms containing pumps and their
accessories for ballasting those spaces situated adjacent to cargo tanks and slop tanks and pumps
for oil fuel transfer shall be considered as equivalent to a cargo pump-room within the context of
this regulation, provided that such pump-rooms have the same safety standard as that required for
cargo pump-rooms. However, the lower portion of the pump-room may be recessed into machinery
spaces of category A to accommodate pumps, provided that the deck head of the recess is in
general not more than one third of the moulded depth above the keel, except that in the case of
ships of not more than 25,000 tonnes deadweight, where it can be demonstrated that for reasons of
access and satisfactory piping arrangements this is impracticable, the Administration may permit a
recess in excess of such height, but not exceeding one half of the moulded depth above the keel.
2 Accommodation spaces, main cargo control stations, control stations and service spaces
(excluding isolated cargo handling gear lockers) shall be positioned aft of all cargo tanks, slop
tanks, and spaces which isolate cargo or slop tanks from machinery spaces but not necessarily aft
of the oil fuel bunker tanks and ballast tanks, but shall be arranged in such a way that a single
failure of a deck or bulkhead shall not permit the entry of gas or fumes from the cargo tanks into an
accommodation space, main cargo control stations, control station, or service spaces. A recess
provided in accordance with paragraph 1 need not be taken into account when the position of these
spaces is being determined.
3 However, where deemed necessary, the Administration may permit accommodation spaces, main
cargo control stations, control stations, and service spaces forward of the cargo tanks, slop tanks
and spaces which isolate cargo and slop tanks from machinery spaces, but not necessarily forward
of oil fuel bunker tanks or ballast tanks. Machinery spaces, other than those of category A, may be
permitted forward of the cargo tanks and slop tanks provided they are isolated from the cargo tanks
and slop tanks by cofferdams, cargo pump-rooms, oil fuel bunker tanks or ballast tanks. All of the
above spaces shall be subject to an equivalent standard of safety and appropriate availability of
fire-extinguishing arrangements being provided to the satisfaction of the Administration.
Accommodation spaces, main cargo control spaces, control stations and service spaces shall be
arranged in such a way that a single failure of a deck or bulkhead shall not permit the entry of gas
or fumes from the cargo tanks into such spaces. In addition, where deemed necessary for the safety
or navigation of the ship, the Administration may permit machinery spaces containing internal
combustion machinery not being main propulsion machinery having an output greater than 375 kW
to be located forward of the cargo area provided the arrangements are in accordance with the
provisions of this paragraph.
4 In combination carriers only:
.1 The slop tanks shall be surrounded by cofferdams except where the boundaries
of the slop tanks where slop may be carried on dry cargo voyages are the hull,
main cargo deck, cargo pump-room bulkhead or oil fuel bunker tank. These
cofferdams shall not be open to a double bottom, pipe tunnel, pump-room or
other enclosed space. Means shall be provided for filling the cofferdams with
resolution A.473(XII).

water and for draining them. Where the boundary of a slop tank is the cargo
pump-room bulkhead, the pump-room shall not be open to the double bottom,
pipe tunnel or other enclosed space; however, openings provided with gastight
bolted covers may be permitted.
.2 Means shall be provided for isolating the piping connecting the pump-room with
the slop tanks referred to in paragraph 4.1. The means of isolation shall consist
of a valve followed by a spectacle flange or a spool piece with appropriate blank
flanges. This arrangement shall be located adjacent to the slop tanks, but where
this is unreasonable or impracticable, it may be located within the pump-room
directly after the piping penetrates the bulkhead. A separate pumping and piping
arrangement incorporating a manifold shall be provided for discharging the
contents of the slop tanks directly to the open deck for disposal to shore
reception facilities when the ship is in the dry cargo mode.
.3 Hatches and tank cleaning openings to slop tanks shall only be permitted on the
open deck and shall be fitted with closing arrangements. Except where they
consist of bolted plates with bolts at watertight spacing, these closing
arrangements shall be provided with locking arrangements which shall be under
the control of the responsible ship's officer.
.4 Where cargo wing tanks are provided, cargo oil lines below deck shall be
installed inside these tanks. However, the Administration may permit cargo oil
lines to be placed in special ducts which shall be capable of being adequately
cleaned and ventilated and be to the satisfaction of the Administration. Where
cargo wing tanks are not provided, cargo oil lines below deck shall be placed in
special ducts.
5 Where the fitting of a navigation position above the cargo area is shown to be necessary, it shall be
for navigation purposes only and it shall be separated from the cargo tank deck by means of an
open space with a height of at least 2 m. The fire protection of such a navigation position shall in
addition be as required for control spaces in regulation 1 and 2 and other provisions, as applicable,
of this part.
6 Means shall be provided to keep deck spills away from the accommodation and service areas. This
may be accomplished by provision of a permanent continuous coaming of a suitable height
extending from side to side. Special consideration shall be given to the arrangements associated
with stern loading.
7 Exterior boundaries of superstructures and deckhouses enclosing accommodation and including

any overhanging decks which support such accommodation, shall be insulated to "A-60" standard
for the whole of the portions which face the cargo area and on the outward sides for a distance of 3
m from the end boundary facing the cargo area. In the case of the sides of those superstructures
and deckhouses, such insulation shall be carried as high as is deemed necessary by the
Administration.
8.1 Except as permitted in paragraph 8.2 below, access doors, air inlets and openings to
accommodation spaces, service spaces, control stations and machinery spaces shall not face the
cargo area. They shall be located on the transverse bulkhead not facing the cargo area or on the
outboard side of the superstructure or deckhouse at a distance of at least 4% of the length of the
ship but not less than 3 m from the end of the superstructure or deckhouse facing the cargo area.
This distance need not exceed 5 m.
8.2 The Administration may permit access doors in boundary bulkheads facing the cargo area or within
the 5 m limits specified in paragraph 8.1, to main cargo control stations and to such service spaces
as provision rooms, store-rooms and lockers, provided they do not give access directly or indirectly
to any other space containing or provided for accommodation, control stations or service spaces
such as galleys, pantries or workshops, or similar spaces containing sources of vapour ignition.
The boundary of such a space shall be insulated to "A-60" standard, with the exception of the
boundary facing the cargo area. Bolted plates for the removal of machinery may be fitted within the
limits specified in paragraph 8.1. Wheelhouse doors and wheelhouse windows may be located
within the limits specified in paragraph 8.1 so long as they are designed to ensure that the
wheelhouse can be made rapidly and efficiently gas and vapour tight.
8.3 Windows and sidescuttles facing the cargo area and on the sides of the superstructures and
deckhouses within the limits specified in paragraph 8.1 shall be of the fixed (non-opening) type.
Such windows and sidescuttles in the first tier on the main deck shall be fitted with inside covers of
steel or other equivalent material.
Comment
It will be noted that there is only one method of complying with these provisions unlike cargo
ships where there are three different accepted methods of fire division.

Regulation 57 Structure, bulkheads within accommodation and service spaces and

details of construction
1 For the application of the requirements of regulations 42, 43 and 50 to tankers, only method IC as
defined in regulation 5.1 shall be used.
2 Skylights to cargo pump-rooms shall be of steel, shall not contain any glass and shall be capable of
being closed from outside the pump-room.

1 In lieu of regulation 44 and in addition to complying with the specific provisions for fire integrity of
bulkheads and decks mentioned elsewhere in this part, the minimum fire integrity of bulkheads and
decks shall be as prescribed in tables 58.1 and 58.2.
.1 Table 58.1 and 58.2 shall apply respectively to the bulkhead and decks separating
adjacent spaces.
Spaces (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Control stations (1) A-0c A-0c A-60 A-0 A-15 A-60 A-15 A-60 A-60 *
Corridors (2) B-0
C B-0 B-0 A-60 A-0 A-60 A-0 *
A-0a
Accommodation spaces (3) B-0
C B-0 A-60 A-0 A-60 A-0 *
A-0a
Stairways (4) B-0
A-60 A-60 A-0 A-60 A-0 *
A-0a
Service spaces (5)
(low risk) C A-60 A-0 A-60 A-0 *
Machinery spaces of (6)

category A * A-0 A-0d A-60 *
Other machinery spaces (7)

A-0b A-0 A-0 *
Cargo pump-rooms (8) * A-60 *

Service spaces (9)
(high risk) A-0b *
Open decks (10) -
Notes: To be applied to tables 58.1 and 58.2, as appropriate.
a For clarification as to which applies, see regulations 43 and 46 of this chapter.

b Where the spaces are of the same numberical category and superscript b appears, a bulkhead or deck of the rating
shown in the table is only required when the adjacent spaces are for a different prupose, eg in category (9). A
galley next to a galley does not require a bulkhead but a galley next to a paint room requires an "A-0" bulkhead
c Bulkheads separating the wheelhouse, chartroom and radio room from each other may be "B-0" rating.
d Bulkheads and decks between cargo pump-rooms and machinery spaces of category A may be penetrated by
cargo pump shaft glands and similar glanded penetrations, provided that gastight seals with efficient lubrication or
other means of ensuring the permanence of the gas seal are fitted in way of the bulkhead or deck.
e Fire insulation need not be fitted if the machinery sapce in category (7), in the opinion of the Administration, has
little or no fire risk.
* Where an asterisk appears in the tables, the division is required to be of steel or other equivalent material but is not
required to be "A" standard.

Space above (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Space below
Control stations (1) A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-60 A-0 - A-0 *
Corridors (2)
A-0 * * A-0 * A-60 A-0 - A-0 *
Accommodation spaces (3)

A-60 A-0 * A-0 * A-60 A-0 - A-0 *
Stairways (4)
A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-0 A-60 A-0 - A-0 *
Service spaces (5)

(low risk) A-15 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-60 A-0 - A-0 *
Machinery spaces of (6) A-60 A-60 A-60 A-60 A-60 * A-60c A-0 A-60 *
category A
Other machinery spaces (7)

A-15 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 * A-0 A-0 *
Cargo pump-rooms (8) - - - - - A-0d A-0 * - *

Service spaces (9)
(high risk) A-60 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-0 A-60 A-0 - A-0b *
Open decks (10) * * * * * * * * * -
.2 For determining the appropriate fire integrity standards to be applied to divisions

between adjacent spaces, such spaces are classified according to their fire risk
as shown in categories (1) to (10) below. The title of each category is intended to
be typical rather than restrictive. The number in parentheses preceding each
category refers to the applicable column or row in the tables.

Spaces containing emergency sources of power and lighting.
Control room for propulsion machinery when located outside the machinery
space.
(2) Corridors
Corridors and lobbies.

Spaces as defined in regulation 3.10, excluding corridors.
(4) Stairways
the machinery spaces) and enclosures thereto. In this connection, a stairway
which is enclosed only at one level shall be regarded as part of the space from
which it is not separated by a fire door.



Spaces as defined in regulation 3.20 excluding machinery spaces of category.
(8) Cargo pump-rooms

Spaces containing cargo pumps and entrances and Trunks to such spaces.


flammable liquids and workshops other than those forming part of the machinery
spaces.
(10) Open decks

space outside superstructures and deckhouses).
may be pierced for the fitting of windows and sidescuttles provided that there is no requirement for
such boundaries to have "A" class integrity elsewhere in this part. Similarly, in such boundaries
which are not required to have "A" class integrity, doors may be of materials to the satisfaction of
the Administration.
5 Permanent approved gastight lighting enclosures for illuminating cargo pump-rooms may be
permitted in bulkheads and decks separating cargo pump-rooms and other spaces provided they
are of adequate strength and the integrity and gastightness of the bulkhead or deck is maintained.
Regulation 59 Venting, purging, gas-freeing and ventilation

1 Cargo tank venting
1.1 The venting systems of cargo tanks are to be entirely distinct from the air pipes of the other
compartments of the ship. The arrangements and position of openings in the cargo tank deck from
which emission of flammable vapours can occur shall be such as to minimize the possibility of
flammable vapours being admitted to enclosed spaces containing a source of ignition, or collecting
in the vicinity of deck machinery and equipment which may constitute an ignition hazard. In
accordance with this general principle the criteria in paragraphs 1.2 to 1.10 will apply.
1.2 The venting arrangements shall be so designed and operated as to ensure that neither pressure nor
vacuum in cargo tanks shall exceed design parameters and be such as to provide for:
.1 the flow of the small volumes of vapour, air or inert gas mixtures caused by
thermal variations in a cargo tank in all cases through pressure/vacuum valves;
and
.2 the passage of large volumes of vapour, air or inert gas mixtures during cargo
loading and ballasting, or during discharging.
1.3.1 The venting arrangements in each cargo tank may be independent or combined with other cargo
tanks and may be incorporated into the inert gas piping.
1.3.2 Where the arrangements are combined with other cargo tanks, either stop valves or other
acceptable means shall be provided to isolate each cargo tank. Where stop valves are fitted, they
shall be provided with locking arrangements which shall be under the control of the responsible
ship's officer. Any isolation must continue to permit the flow caused by thermal variations in a
cargo tank in accordance with paragraph 1.2.l.
1.4 The venting arrangements shall be connected to the top of each cargo tank and shall be
self-draining to the cargo tanks under all normal conditions of trim and list of the ship. Where it
may not be possible to provide self-draining lines, permanent arrangements shall be provided to
drain the vent lines to a cargo tank. Seems to be a retrograde step to permit, presumably hand
operated, valves to drain lines!
1.5 The venting system shall be provided with devices to prevent the passage of flame into the cargo
tanks. The design, testing and locating of these devices shall comply with the requirements
established by the Administration which shall contain at least the standards adopted by the
Organization13.
1.6 Provision shall be made to guard against liquid rising in the venting system to a height which
would exceed the design head of cargo tanks. This shall be accomplished by high-level alarms or
overflow control systems or other equivalent means, together with gauging devices and cargo tank
filling procedures.
1.7 Openings for pressure release required by paragraph 1.2.1 shall:
13
Refer to MSC/Circ.677 on revised standards for the design, testing and locating of devices to prevent the passage of flame into cargo tanks in
tankers and to MSC/Circ.450/Rev.1 on revised factors to be taken into consideration when designing cargo tank venting and gas-freeing
arrangements.

.1 have as great a height as is practicable above the cargo tank deck to obtain
maximum dispersal of flammable vapours but in no case less than 2 m above the
cargo tank deck;
.2 be arranged at the furthest distance practicable but not less than 5 m from the
nearest air intakes and openings to enclosed spaces containing a source of
ignition and from deck machinery and equipment which may constitute an
ignition hazard.
1.8 Pressure/vacuum valves required by paragraph 1.2.1 may be provided with a bypass arrangement
when they are located in a vent main or masthead riser. Where such an arrangement is provided
there shall be suitable indicators to show whether the bypass is open or closed.
1.9 Vent outlets for cargo loading, discharging and ballasting required by paragraph 1.2.2 shall:
.1.1 permit the free flow of vapour mixtures; or
.1.2 permit the throttling of the discharge of the vapour mixtures to achieve a velocity
of not less than 30 m/s;
.2 be so arranged that the vapour mixture is discharged vertically upwards;
.3 where the method is by free flow of vapour mixtures, be such that the outlet shall
be not less than 6 m above the cargo tank deck or fore and aft gangway if
situated within 4 m of the gangway and located not less than 10 m measured
horizontally from the nearest air intakes and openings to enclosed spaces
containing a source of ignition and from deck machinery and equipment which
may constitute an ignition hazard;
.4 where the method is by high-velocity discharge, be located at a height not less

than 2 m above the cargo tank deck and not less than 10 m measured
horizontally from the nearest air intakes and openings to enclosed spaces
containing a source of ignition and from deck machinery and equipment which
may constitute an ignition hazard. These outlets shall be provided with high
velocity devices of an approved type;
.5 be designed on the basis of the maximum designed loading rate multiplied by a

factor of at least 1.25 to take account of gas evolution, in order to prevent the
pressure in any cargo tank from exceeding the design pressure. The master shall
be provided with information regarding the maximum permissible loading rate
for each cargo tank and in the case of combined venting systems, for each group
of cargo tanks.
1.10 In combination carriers, the arrangement to isolate slop tanks containing oil or oil residues from
other cargo tanks shall consist of blank flanges which will remain in position at all times when
cargoes other than liquid cargoes referred to in regulation 55.1 are carried.
2 Cargo tank purging and/or gas-freeing14
Arrangements for purging and/or gas-freeing shall be such as to minimize the hazards due to the
dispersal of flammable vapours in the atmosphere and to flammable mixtures in a cargo tank.
Accordingly:
.1 When the ship is provided with an inert gas system, the cargo tanks shall first be
purged in accordance with the provisions of regulation 62.13 until the
concentration of hydrocarbon vapours in the cargo tanks has been reduced to
less than 2 % by volume. Thereafter, gas-freeing may take place at the cargo tank
deck level.
.2 When the ship is not provided with an inert gas system, the operation shall be
such that the flammable vapour is discharged initially:
.2.1 through the vent outlets as specified in paragraph 1.9; or
.2.2 through outlets at least 2 m above the cargo tank deck level with a vertical efflux
velocity of at least 30 m/s maintained during the gas-freeing operation; or
.2.3 through outlets at least 2 m above the cargo tank deck level with a vertical efflux
velocity of at least 20 m/s and which are protected by suitable devices to prevent
the passage of flame.
When the flammable vapour concentration at the outlet has been reduced to 30% of the lower
flammable limit, gas-freeing may thereafter be continued at cargo tank deck level.
14
Refer to the Revised standards for the design, testing and location of devices to prevent the passage of flame into cargo tanks in oil tankers
9MSC/Circ. 373/Rev. 1) and to the Revised factors to be taken into consideration when designing cargo tank venting and gas freeing
arrangements (MSC/Circ. 450/Rev.1).

3 Ventilation
3.1 Cargo pump-rooms shall be mechanically ventilated and discharges from the exhaust fans shall be
led to a safe place on the open deck. The ventilation of these rooms shall have sufficient capacity to
minimize the possibility of accumulation of flammable vapours. The number of changes of air shall
be at least 20 per hour, based upon the gross volume of the space. The air ducts shall be arranged
so that all of the space is effectively ventilated. The ventilation shall be of the suction type using
fans of the non-sparking type.
3.2 The arrangement of ventilation inlets and outlets and other deckhouse and superstructure boundary
space openings shall be such as to complement the provisions of paragraph 1. Such vents,
especially for machinery spaces, shall be situated as far aft as practicable. Due consideration in this
regard should be given when the ship is equipped to load or discharge at the stern. Sources of
ignition such as electrical equipment shall be so arranged as to avoid an explosion hazard.
3.3 In combination carriers all cargo spaces and any enclosed spaces adjacent to cargo spaces shall
be capable of being mechanically ventilated. The mechanical ventilation may be provided by
portable fans. An approved fixed gas warning system capable of monitoring flammable vapours
shall be provided in cargo pump-rooms and pipe ducts and cofferdams referred to in regulation
56.4 adjacent to slop tanks. Suitable arrangements shall be made to facilitate measurement of
flammable vapours in all other spaces within the cargo area. Such measurements shall be made
possible from open deck or easily accessible positions.
4 Inerting, ventilation and gas measurement
4.1 This paragraph shall apply to oil tankers constructed on or after 1 October 1994.
4.2 Double hull and double bottom spaces shall be fitted with suitable connections for the supply of air.
4.3 On tankers required to be fitted with inert gas systems:
.1 double hull spaces shall be fitted with suitable connections for the supply of
inert gas;
.2 where such spaces are connected to a permanently fitted inert gas distribution
system, means shall be provided to prevent hydrocarbon gases from the cargo
tanks entering the double hull spaces through the system; Suggest these
spaces be permanently connected to the inert gas system.
.3 where such spaces are not permanently connected to an inert gas distribution
system, appropriate means shall be provided to allow connection to the inert gas
main. I would strongly argue that all double hull spaces be fitted with an inert
gas system. For such a space to contain an explosive mixture of gas requires a
degree of structural failure but surely this is not impossible to imagine in an old
ship, say, over 10 years of age. In the event of a collision there would in such
circumstances be a serious risk of an explosion.
4.4.1 Suitable portable instruments for measuring oxygen and flammable vapour
concentrations shall be provided. In selecting these instruments, due attention
shall be given for their use in combination with the fixed gas-sampling-line
systems referred to in paragraph 4.4.2.
4.4.2 Where atmosphere in double hull spaces cannot be reliably measured using
flexible gas sampling hoses, such spaces shall be fitted with permanent gas
sampling lines. The configuration of such line systems shall be adapted to the
design of such spaces.
4.4.3 The materials of construction and dimensions of gas sampling lines shall be
such as to prevent restriction. Where plastic materials are used, they should be
electrically conductive.
Comment
Excellent though the requirements of this Regulation undoubtedly are, the author would suggest
that there should be no exception to require that all double hull spaces should be permanently
connected to the inert gas distribution system — Regulation 59, paragraph 4.3.3. It is all too easy to
overlook the fact that flammable gas has accidentally entered such spaces and the use of flexible gas
sampling hoses seems to be somewhat archaic — Regulation 59, paragraph 4.4.2. Anything which
reduces the burden on the Cargo Officer is surely worthwhile — especially when considering that
the spaces in question will surely tend to be "out of sight — out of mind".
The author has on a number of occasions observed badly maintained wire flame screens on board
tankers. In one case, involving a tanker which had been involved in a fire in Elat, Israel, the wire

screens in cargo tank vents were found to have deteriorated to the extent that they were actually
holded.
Clearly, such flame screens should be the subject of regular inspection and should be replaced at
the first sign of deterioration. Indeed, it would be prudent to automatically replace these at regular
intervals, say every five years. The International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals, at
paragraphs 6.2.3 and 24.3.2, discusses the provision of flame screens on vents and temporary flame
screens where access is made to tanks for the purpose of ullaging.
The danger of flammable vapours leaking into adjacent spaces is well illustrated in the account
of the explosion and fire aboard the Ioannis Carras. In this incident, as the case was settled, details
cannot be discussed, except to say that, by some means or other, crude oil found its way into the fuel
oil tank in the forepeak. There was an accumulation of flammable vapours in the bow, which was
ignited by an unknown source, but probably of electrical origin. The result was that two men lost
their lives and the entire bow section was blown off just above the water line. The purpose of this
illustration is not to suggest that spaces which are entered by persons from open air should be
inerted, but to illustrate the danger of the accumulation and ignition of accumulations of flammable
vapour in any space on board ship adjacent to tanks carrying the volatile liquids such as crude oil.
Engineers should avoid like the plague the temptation to mix low flashpoint fuel, such as crude
oil, with lubricating oil or fuel oil. Many explosions taking place in engine rooms are known to
have resulted from this practice.
Regulation 60 Cargo tank protection

1 For tankers of 20,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards the protection of the cargo tanks deck area
and cargo tanks shall be achieved by a fixed deck foam system and a fixed inert gas system in
accordance with the requirements of regulations 61 and 62, except that, in lieu of the above
installations, the Administration, after having given consideration to the ship's arrangement and
equipment, may accept other combinations of fixed installations if they afford protection equivalent
to the above, in accordance with regulation I/5.
2 To be considered equivalent, the system proposed in lieu of the deck foam system shall:
.1 be capable of extinguishing spill fires and also preclude ignition of spilled oil not
yet ignited; and
.2 be capable of combating fires in ruptured tanks.
3 To be considered equivalent, the system proposed in lieu of the fixed inert gas system shall:
.1 be capable of preventing dangerous accumulations of explosive mixtures in

intact cargo tanks during normal service throughout the ballast voyage and
necessary in-tank operations; and
.2 be so designed as to minimize the risk of ignition from the generation of static

electricity by the system itself.
4 Tankers of 20,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed before 1 September 1984 which are
engaged in the trade of carrying crude oil shall be fitted with an inert gas system, complying with
the requirements of paragraph 1, not later than:
.1 for a tanker of 70,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards 1 September 1984 or the
date of delivery of the ship, whichever occurs later; and
.2 for a tanker of less than 70,000 tonnes deadweight 1 May 1985 or the date of
delivery of the ship, whichever occurs later except that for tankers of less than
40,000 tonnes deadweight not fitted with tank washing machines having an
individual throughput of greater than 60 m3/h the Administration may exempt
such tankers from the requirements of this paragraph, if it would be
unreasonable and impracticable to apply these requirements, taking into account
the ship's design characteristics.
5 Tankers of 40,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards constructed before 1

September 1984 which are engaged in the trade of carrying oil other than crude
oil and any such tanker of 20,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards engaged in the
trade of carrying oil other than crude oil fitted with tank washing machines
having an individual throughput of greater than 60 m3/h shall be fitted with an
inert gas system, complying with the requirements of paragraph 1, not later than:

.1 for a tanker of 70,000 tonnes deadweight and upwards 1 September 1984 or the
date of delivery of the ship, whichever occurs later; and
.2 for a tanker of less than 70,000 tonnes deadweight 1 May 1985 or the date of
delivery of the ship, whichever occurs later.
6 All tankers operating with a cargo tank cleaning procedure using crude oil washing shall be fitted
with an inert gas system complying with the requirements of regulation 62 and with fixed tank
washing machines.
7 All tankers fitted with a fixed inert gas system shall be provided with a closed ullage system.
8 Tankers of less than 20,000 tonnes deadweight shall be provided with a deck foam system
complying with the requirements of regulation 61.
Regulation 61 Fixed deck foam systems

1 The arrangements for providing foam shall be capable of delivering foam to the entire cargo tanks
deck area as well as into any cargo tank the deck of which has been ruptured.
2 The deck foam system shall be capable of simple and rapid operation. The main control station for
the system shall be suitably located outside the cargo area, adjacent to the accommodation spaces
and readily accessible and operable in the event of fire in the areas protected. The foam guns
should be capable of being trained remotely from a protected space with a clear view over the tank
deck, such as the bridge, or the cargo control room.
3 The rate of supply of foam solution shall be not less than the greatest of the following:
.1 0.6 l/min per square metre of cargo tanks deck area, where cargo tanks deck area
means the maximum breadth of the ship multiplied by the total longitudinal
extent of the cargo tank spaces;
.2 6 l/min per square metre of the horizontal sectional area of the single tank having
the largest such area; or
.3 3 l/min per square metre of the area protected by the largest monitor, such area
being entirely forward of the monitor, but not less than 1,250 l /min.
4 Sufficient foam concentrate shall be supplied to ensure at least 20 min of foam generation in
tankers fitted with an inert gas installation or 30 min of foam generation in tankers not fitted with an
inert gas installation when using solution rates stipulated in paragraphs 3.1, 3.2 or 3.3, whichever is
the greatest. The foam expansion ratio (i.e., the ratio of the volume of foam produced to the volume
of the mixture of water and foam-making concentrate supplied) shall not generally exceed 12 to 1.
Where systems essentially produce low-expansion foam but an expansion ratio slightly in excess of
12 to 1, the quantity of foam solution available shall be calculated as for 12 to 1 expansion ratio
systems. When medium-expansion ratio foam (between 50 to 1 and 150 to 1 expansion ratio) is
employed, the application rate of the foam and the capacity of a monitor installation shall be to the
5 Foam from the fixed foam system shall be supplied by means of monitors and foam applicators. At
least 50% of the foam solution supply rate required in paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 shall be delivered
from each monitor. On tankers of less than 4,000 tonnes deadweight the Administration may not
require installation of monitors but only applicators. However, in such a case the capacity of each
applicator shall be at least 25% of the foam solution supply rate required in paragraphs 3.1 or 3.2.
6.1 The number and position of monitors shall be such as to comply with paragraph 1. The capacity of
any monitor shall be at least 3 l/min of foam solution per square metre of deck area protected by
that monitor, such area being entirely forward of the monitor. Such capacity shall be not less than
1,250 l/min.
6.2 The distance from the monitor to the farthest extremity of the protected area forward of that monitor
shall not be more than 75% of the monitor throw in still air conditions.
7 A monitor and hose connection for a foam applicator shall be situated both port and starboard at
the front of the poop or accommodation spaces facing the cargo tanks deck. On tankers of less
than 4,000 tonnes deadweight a hose connection for a foam applicator shall be situated both port
and starboard at the front of the poop or accommodation spaces facing the cargo tanks deck.
8 Applicators shall be provided to ensure flexibility of action during fire-fighting operations and to
cover areas screened from the monitors. The capacity of any applicator shall be not less than 400
l/min and the applicator throw in still air conditions shall be not less than 15 m. The number of foam
applicators provided shall be not less than four. The number and disposition of foam main outlets
shall be such that foam from at least two applicators can be directed on to any part of the cargo
tanks deck area.

9 Valves shall be provided in the foam main, and in the fire main when this is an integral part of the
deck foam system, immediately forward of any monitor position to isolate damaged sections of
those mains.
10 Operation of a deck foam system at its required output shall permit the simultaneous use of the
minimum required number of jets of water at the required pressure from the fire main.
Comment
During the course of preparing the this edition of Fire Aboard the author's attention was drawn to
the affect of wind upon the throw from foam monitors. Even medium expansion and quite certainly
high expansion foam will be susceptible to strong winds at deck level and might make it impossible
to get near enough to actually reach the seat of the fire. Paragraph 6.2 suggests that the maximum
effect of wind upon a foam monitor is to reduce the throw by 25% — hence the 75% rule.
The author is indebted to Mr J. Scheffey P.E. of Hughes Associates, Inc. who answered an email
enquiry in this regard and supplied a copy of the United States Naval Research Laboratory
Memorandum Report 5952 entitled Aircraft Carrier Flight Deck Fire Fighting Tactics and
Equipment Evaluation Tests which, as they say, was exactly "on point".
The study was initiated following the crash of an EA-6B aircraft on the flight deck of the USS
Nimitz on May 26, 1981. The extensive research program sought to:
address possible deficiencies in shipboard fire fighting procedures and systems and to
identify potential areas for improvement. The test program included evaluation of
existing shipboard equipment such as handlines, the flight deck washdown system and
the P-16 fire-fighting vehicle, as well as proposed improvements such as high flow rate
monitors (up to 12,000 gpm), hose tie down devices and robots. The effectiveness of
both water and Aqueous Film Forming Foam in cooling ordnance exposed to a
hydrocarbon pool fire was also investigated. The systems were evaluated in simulated
aircraft carrier flight deck fires using a specially designed debris pile fire as a standard
or reference fire and under wind conditions of 0 - 30 knots. A total of 216 fire tests and
56 non-fire tests were conducted.
The results of the test programme with respect to monitors is summarised below:
1. Within their effective range, all monitors (1,000 to 12,000 gpm) were found to extinguish
debris pile fires, and to limit ordnance heat rise when the fire was attacked from the
unshielded side.
2. None of the monitors could extinguish the debris pile tire when directed against the shielded
side.
3. A 30 knot wind reduced the effective range of monitors in a crosswind attack on a debris
pile fire to less than 1/3 the distance under no wind conditions. Crosswind velocities as low
as 10 knots had significant impact on stream reach.
4. Monitors, within their effective range, controlled ordnance heat rise to minimal levels (less
than 50°F) when operated against other than the shielded side of the debris pile.
5. The increase in effective crosswind range of monitors to extinguish debris fires was not
proportional to increases in flow, higher flows giving progressively smaller increases in
distance.
6. When monitors were operated at a 60° angle into the wind, with access to the unshielded
side of the debris pile, the fire was generally extinguished at ranges 25% to 50% greater than
in a 90° crosswind.
7. To be effective under crosswind conditions with access to partially shielded debris piles,
monitors having flow rates in excess of 6,000 gpm/monitor would have to be located on
opposite sides of the flight deck at 150 ft intervals, and would have to be erected to a height
of 30 ft to clear parked aircraft.

8. Monitors mounted at 30 ft heights with flow rates of 1,000 gpm in crosswind attacks on the
side of a debris pile could not extinguish running fuel fires located closer than 50 ft from the
base of the pile due to shielding of the fire by the simulated aircraft wing (debris pile roof).
9. High flow monitors present a significant safety hazard to people and aircraft due to the high
kinetic energy of the stream.
As the collision between the Western Winner and the British Trent discussed in Chapter 4
highlights, this is a matter of concern an the author commends the above research work to the
review of the Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO. The use of foam monitors are illustrated in
Figures 11.6 through 11.9 below.
FIGURE 11.7 Schematic drawing showing the

dimensions of tankers an average tug might have to
deal with when fighting a fire. SKUM drawing 1-596
courtesy of Svensha Skum AB of Sweden.
FIGURE 11.6 The fire aboard the Megaborg being

controlled by SKUM MK-250EL monitors.
FIGURE 11.8 A typical foam monitor aboard a FIGURE 11.9 A remote-controlled foam/jet monitor
product carrier. manufactured by Svensha Skum AB of Sweden.

Inert Gas Systems

It would take up far too much space to attempt to describe all the major incidents involving
tankers which have occurred over recent years but the reader can trace these by studying the cases
listed in Chapter 3. Though an old case, the loss of the 111,442 ton Berg Istra in December 1975
along with the lives of 30 crew members will serve as an example.
The first inert gas systems were known as "Funnel Gas Systems" and so far as the UK is
concerned credit for the development of the first funnel gas system appears to belong to the British
Petroleum Company who in 1963 fitted out their first tanker. B.P. applied a great deal of research
and development to this project and are to be congratulated upon taking this initiative which no
doubt has already saved lives and will quite certainly save many more in the future. But, as with
practically all new ideas, it took disaster in the shape of three devastating explosions, occurring over
a three week period in December 1969, to shake the tanker industry into action. The three tankers
involved being the 204,723 ton Mactra, the 109,423 ton Kong Haakon, and the 104,373 ton
Marpassa. Incidentally B.P. gave all their design technology for funnel gas systems free of charge
to their competitors which was a most public spirited action.
Regulation 62 Inert gas systems.15

(Paragraphs 19.1 and 19.2 of this regulation apply to ships constructed on or after 1 February 1992)
1 The inert gas system referred to in regulation 60 shall be designed, constructed and tested to the
satisfaction of the Administration. It shall be so designed16 and operated as to render and maintain
the atmosphere of the cargo tanks17 non-flammable at all times, except when such tanks are
required to be gas-free. In the event that the inert gas system is unable to meet the operational
requirement set out above and it has been assessed that it is impracticable to effect a repair, then
cargo discharge, deballasting and necessary tank cleaning shall only be resumed when the
"emergency conditions" laid down in the Guidelines on Inert Gas Systems are complied with.
2 The system shall be capable of:
.1 inerting empty cargo tanks by reducing the oxygen content of the atmosphere in
each tank to a level at which combustion cannot be supported;
.2 maintaining the atmosphere in any part of any cargo tank with an oxygen content
not exceeding 8% by volume and at a positive pressure at all times in port and at
sea except when it is necessary for such a tank to be gas-free;
.3 eliminating the need for air to enter a tank during normal operations except when
it is necessary for such a tank to be gas-free;
.4 purging empty cargo tanks of a hydrocarbon gas, so that subsequent gas-freeing

operations will at no time create a flammable atmosphere within the tank.
3.1 The system shall be capable of delivering inert gas to the cargo tanks at a rate of at least 125% of
the maximum rate of discharge capacity of the ship expressed as a volume.
3.2 The system shall be capable of delivering inert gas with an oxygen content of not more than 5% by
volume in the inert gas supply main to the cargo tanks at any required rate of flow.
4 The inert gas supply may be treated flue gas from main or auxiliary boilers. The Administration may
accept systems using flue gases from one or more separate gas generators or other sources or any
combination thereof, provided that an equivalent standard of safety is achieved. Such systems
should, as far as practicable, comply with the requirements of this regulation. Systems using stored
carbon dioxide shall not be permitted unless the Administration is satisfied that the risk of ignition
from generation of static electricity by the system itself is minimized.
5 Flue gas isolating valves shall be fitted in the inert gas supply mains between the boiler uptakes
and the flue gas scrubber. These valves shall be provided with indicators to show whether they are
open or shut, and precautions shall be taken to maintain them gastight and keep the seatings clear
of soot. Arrangements shall be made to ensure that boiler soot blowers cannot be operated when
the corresponding flue gas valve is open.
15
Refer to MSC/Circ.450/Rev.l: Revised factors to be taken into consideration when designing cargo tank venting and gas-freeing arrangements,
MSC/Circ.485: Clarification of inert gas system requirements under SOLAS 1974, as amended, and to MSC/Circ.387: Revised Guidelines for
Inert Gas Systems.
16
Refer to MSC/Circ.450/Rev.l: Revised factors to be taken into consideration when designing cargo tank venting and gas-freeing arrangements,
MSC/Circ.485: Clarification of inert gas system requirements under SOLAS 1974, as amended, and to MSC/Circ.387: Revised Guidelines for
Inert Gas Systems.
17
Throughout this regulation the term cargo tank includes also slop tanks.

6.1 A flue gas scrubber shall be fitted which will effectively cool the volume of gas specified in
paragraph 3 and remove solids and sulphur combustion products. The cooling water arrangements
shall be such that an adequate supply of water will always be available without interfering with any
essential services on the ship. Provision shall also be made for an alternative supply of cooling
water.
6.2 Filters or equivalent devices shall be fitted to minimize the amount of water carried over to the inert
gas blowers.
6.3 The scrubber shall be located aft of all cargo tanks, cargo pump-rooms and cofferdams separating
these spaces from machinery spaces of category A.
7.1 At least two blowers shall be fitted which together shall be capable of delivering to the cargo tanks
at least the volume of gas required by paragraph 3. In the system with gas generator the
Administration may permit only one blower if that system is capable of delivering the total volume
of gas required by paragraph 3 to the protected cargo tanks, provided that sufficient spares for the
blower and its prime mover are carried on board to enable any failure of the blower and its prime
mover to be rectified by the ship's crew.
7.2 Two fuel oil pumps shall be fitted to the inert gas generator. The Administration may permit only
one fuel oil pump on condition that sufficient spares for the fuel oil pump and its prime mover are
carried on board to enable any failure of the fuel oil pump and its prime mover to be rectified by the
ship's crew.
7.3 The inert gas system shall be so designed that the maximum pressure which it can exert on any
cargo tank will not exceed the test pressure of any cargo tank. Suitable shutoff arrangements shall
be provided on the suction and discharge connections of each blower. Arrangements shall be
provided to enable the functioning of the inert gas plant to be stabilized before commencing cargo
discharge. If the blowers are to be used for gas-freeing, their air inlets shall be provided with
blanking arrangements.
7.4 The blowers shall be located aft of all cargo tanks, cargo pump-rooms and cofferdams separating
these spaces from machinery spaces of category A.
8.1 Special consideration shall be given to the design and location of scrubber and blowers with
relevant piping and fittings in order to prevent flue gas leakages into enclosed spaces.
8.2 To permit safe maintenance, an additional water seal or other effective means of preventing flue gas
leakage shall be fitted between the flue gas isolating valves and scrubber or incorporated in the gas
entry to the scrubber.
9.1 A gas regulating valve shall be fitted in the inert gas supply main. This valve shall be automatically
controlled to close as required in paragraphs 19.3 and 19.4. It shall also be capable of automatically
regulating the flow of inert gas to the cargo tanks unless means are provided to automatically
control the speed of the inert gas blowers required in paragraph 7.
9.2 The valve referred to in paragraph 9.1 shall be located at the forward bulkhead of the forwardmost
gas-safe space18 through which the inert gas supply main passes.
10.1 At least two nonreturn devices, one of which shall be a water seal, shall be fitted in the inert gas
supply main, in order to prevent the return of hydrocarbon vapour to the machinery space uptakes
or to any gas-safe spaces under all normal conditions of trim, list and motion of the ship. They shall
be located between the automatic valve required by paragraph 9.1 and the aftermost connection to
any cargo tank or cargo pipeline.
10.2 The devices referred to in paragraph 10.1 shall be located in the cargo area on deck.
10.3 The water seal referred to in paragraph 10.1 shall be capable of being supplied by two separate
pumps, each of which shall be capable of maintaining an adequate supply at all times.
10.4 The arrangement of the seal and its associated fittings shall be such that it will prevent backflow of
hydrocarbon vapours and will ensure the proper functioning of the seal under operating conditions.
10.5 Provision shall be made to ensure that the water seal is protected against freezing, in such a way
that the integrity of seal is not impaired by overheating.
10.6 A water loop or other approved arrangement shall also be fitted to each associated water supply
and drain pipe and each venting or pressure-sensing pipe leading to gas-safe spaces. Means shall
be provided to prevent such loops from being emptied by vacuum.
10.7 The deck water seal and loop arrangements shall be capable of preventing return of hydrocarbon
vapours at a pressure equal to the test pressure of the cargo tanks.
10.8 The second device shall be a nonreturn valve or equivalent capable of preventing the return of
vapours or liquids and fitted forward of the deck water seal required in paragraph 10.1. It shall be
18
A gas-safe space is a space in which the entry of hydrocarbon gases would produce hazards with regard to flammability or toxicity.

provided with positive means of closure. As an alternative to positive means of closure, an

additional valve having such means of closure may be provided forward of the nonreturn valve to
isolate the deck water seal from the inert gas main to the cargo tanks.
10.9 As an additional safeguard against the possible leakage of hydrocarbon liquids or vapours back
from the deck main, means shall be provided to permit this section of the line between the valve
having positive means of closure referred to in paragraph 10.8 and the valve referred to in
paragraph 9 to be vented in a safe manner when the first of these valves is closed.
11.1 The inert gas main may be divided into two or more branches forward of the nonreturn devices
required by paragraph 10.
11.2.1 The inert gas supply main shall be fitted with branch piping leading to each
cargo tank. Branch piping for inert gas shall be fitted with either stop valves or
equivalent means of control for isolating each tank. Where stop valves are fitted,
they shall be provided with locking arrangements, which shall be under the
control of a responsible ship's officer.
11.2.2 In combination carriers, the arrangement to isolate the slop tanks containing oil
or oil residues from other tanks shall consist of blank flanges which will remain
in position at all times when cargoes other than oil are being carried except as
provided for in the relevant section of the Guidelines on Inert Gas Systems.
11.3 Means shall be provided to protect cargo tanks against the effect of overpressure or vacuum
caused by thermal variations when the cargo tanks are isolated from the inert gas mains.
11.4 Piping systems shall be so designed as to prevent the accumulation of cargo or water in the
pipelines under all normal conditions.
11.5 Suitable arrangements shall be provided to enable the inert gas main to be connected to an external
supply of inert gas.
12 The arrangements for the venting of all vapours displaced from the cargo tanks during loading and
ballasting shall comply with regulation 1 and shall consist of either one or more mast risers, or a
number of high-velocity vents. The inert gas supply main may be used for such venting.
13 The arrangements for inerting, purging or gas-freeing of empty tanks as required in paragraph 2
shall be to the satisfaction of the Administration and shall be such that the accumulation of
hydrocarbon vapours in pockets formed by the internal structural members in a tank is minimized
and that:
.1 on individual cargo tanks the gas outlet pipe, if fitted, shall be positioned as far
as practicable from the inert gas/air inlet and in accordance with regulation 1.
The inlet of such outlet pipes may be located either at deck level or at not more
than 1 m above the bottom of the tank;
.2 the cross-sectional area of such gas outlet pipe referred to in paragraph 13.1
shall be such that an exit velocity of at least 20 m/s can be maintained when any
three tanks are being simultaneously supplied with inert gas. Their outlets shall
extend not less than 2 m above deck level;
.3 each gas outlet referred to in paragraph 13.2 shall be fitted with suitable blanking
arrangements;
.4.1 If a connection is fitted between the inert gas supply mains and the cargo piping
system, arrangements shall be made to ensure an effective isolation having
regard to the large pressure difference which may exist between the systems.
This shall consist of two shutoff valves with an arrangement to vent the space
between the valves in a safe manner or an arrangement consisting of a
spool-piece with associated blanks;
.4.2 the valve separating the inert gas supply main from the cargo main and which is
on the cargo main side shall be a nonreturn valve with a positive means of
closure.
14.1 One or more pressure/vacuum-breaking devices shall be provided to prevent the cargo tanks from
being subject to:
.1 a positive pressure in excess of the test pressure of the cargo tank if the cargo
were to be loaded at the maximum rated capacity and all other outlets are left
shut; and
.2 a negative pressure in excess of 700 mm water gauge if cargo were to be

discharged at the maximum rated capacity of the cargo pumps and the inert gas
blowers were to fail.

Such devices shall be installed on the inert gas main unless they are installed in the venting system
required by regulation 1.1 or on individual cargo tanks.
14.2 The location and design of the devices referred to in paragraph 14.1 shall be in accordance with
regulation 1.
15 Means shall be provided for continuously indicating the temperature and pressure of the inert gas
at the discharge side of the gas blowers, whenever the gas blowers are operating.
16.1 Instrumentation shall be fitted for continuously indicating and permanently recording, when the
inert gas is being supplied:
.1 the pressure of the inert gas supply mains forward of the nonreturn devices
required by paragraph 10.1; and
.2 the oxygen content of the inert gas in the inert gas supply mains on the
discharge side of the gas blowers.
16.2 The devices referred to in paragraph 16.1 shall be placed in the cargo control room where provided.
But where no cargo control room is provided, they shall be placed in a position easily accessible to
the officer in charge of cargo operations.
16.3 In addition, meters shall be fitted:
.1 in the navigating bridge to indicate at all times the pressure referred to in

paragraph 16.1.1 and the pressure in the slop tanks of combination carriers,
whenever those tanks are isolated from the inert gas supply main; and
.2 in the machinery control room or in the machinery space to indicate the oxygen
content referred to in paragraph 16.1.2.
17 Portable instruments for measuring oxygen and flammable vapour concentration shall be provided.
In addition, suitable arrangement shall be made on each cargo tank such that the condition of the
tank atmosphere can be determined using these portable instruments.
18 Suitable means shall be provided for the zero and span calibration of both fixed and portable gas
concentration measurement instruments, referred to in paragraphs 16 and 17.
19.1 For inert gas systems of both the flue, gas type and the inert gas generator type, audible and visual
alarms shall be provided to indicate:
.1 low water pressure or low water flow rate to the flue gas scrubber as referred to
in paragraph 6.1;
.2 high water level in the flue gas scrubber as referred to in paragraph 6.1;
.3 high gas temperature as referred to in paragraph 15;
.4 failure of the inert gas blowers referred to in paragraph 7;
.5 oxygen content in excess of 8% by volume as referred to in paragraph 16.1.2;
.6 failure of the power supply to the automatic control system for the gas regulating
valve and to the indicating devices as referred to in paragraphs 9 and 16.1;
.7 low water level in the water seal as referred to in paragraph 10.1;
.8 gas pressure less than 100 mm water gauge as referred to in paragraph 16.1.1.
The alarm arrangement shall be such as to ensure that the pressure in slop tanks
in combination carriers can be monitored at all times; and
.9 high gas pressure as referred to in paragraph 16.1.1.
19.2 For inert gas systems of the inert gas generator type, additional audible and visual alarms shall be
provided to indicate:
.1 insufficient fuel oil supply;
.2 failure of the power supply to the generator;
.3 failure of the power supply to the automatic control system for the generator.
19.3 Automatic shutdown of the inert gas blowers and gas regulating valve shall be arranged on
predetermined limits being reached in respect of paragraphs 19.1.1, 19.1.2 and 19.1.3.
19.4 Automatic shutdown of the gas regulating valve shall be arranged in respect of paragraph 19.1.4.

19.5 In respect of paragraph 19.1.5, when the oxygen content of the inert gas exceeds 8% by volume,
immediate action shall be taken to improve the gas quality. Unless the quality of the gas improves,
all cargo tank operations shall be suspended so as to avoid air being drawn into the tanks and the
isolation valve referred to in paragraph 10.8 shall be closed.
19.6 The alarms required in paragraphs 19.1.5, 19.1.6 and 19.1.8 shall be fitted in the machinery space
and cargo control room, where provided, but in each case in such a position that they are
immediately received by responsible members of the crew.
19.7 In respect of paragraph 19.1.7 the Administration shall be satisfied as to the maintenance of an
adequate reserve of water at all times and the integrity of the arrangements to permit the automatic
formation of the water seal when the gas flow ceases. The audible and visual alarm on the low level
of water in the water seal shall operate when the inert gas is not being supplied.
19.8 An audible alarm system independent of that required in paragraph 19.1.8 or automatic shutdown of
cargo pumps shall be provided to operate on predetermined limits of low pressure in the inert gas
main being reached.
20 Tankers constructed before 1 September 1984 which are required to have an inert gas system shall
at least comply with the requirements of regulation 62 of chapter II-2 of the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974.19 In addition they shall comply with the requirements of this
regulation, except that:
.1 inert gas systems fitted on board such tankers before 1 June 1981 need not
comply with the following paragraphs: 3.2, 6.3, 7.4, 8, 9.2, 10.2, 10.7, 10.9, 11.3,
11.4, 12, 13.1, 13.2, 13.4.2, 14.2 and 19.8;
.2 inert gas systems fitted on board such tankers on or after 1 June 1981 need not
comply with the following paragraphs: 3.2, 6.3, 7.4, 12, 13.1, 13.2 and 14.2.
21 Detailed instruction manuals shall be provided on board, covering the operations, safety and
maintenance requirements and occupational health hazards relevant to the inert gas system and its
application to the cargo tank system.20 The manuals shall include guidance on procedures to be
followed in the event of a fault or failure of the inert gas system.
Comment
There can be absolutely no doubt that the advent of the inert gas system has made the greatest
single contribution of all time to the safety of tankers and those who sail on them! Inert gas systems
aboard tankers and combination carriers use the products of combustion from: uptake gas from a)
the ship's main or auxilliary boilers; b) an independent system or c) a gas turbine fitted with an
afterburner. The output of inert gas is required to be at least 125% of the maximum rate of
discharge capacity of the ship, expressed as a volume — Regulation 62 paragraph 3.1
The International Chamber of Shipping Subcommittee on Tanker Safety defines inert gas as
follows:
"An inert-gas is one that is chemically inactive and incapable of supporting chemical
change of interaction. The minimum quantity of oxygen required to support combustion
under ideal conditions is 11% by volume."
Most authorities require a limit of oxygen of not exceeding 6% of atmosphere in any part of the
cargo tank at all times when the vessel is in port, or at sea. Under Regulation 62 paragraph 2.2 this
figure can go up to 8%.and some go as low as 5%. Under proper boiler operation the flue gases
contain no more than 4 to 5% oxygen by volume but it is important to realise that this level is
achieved in automatically controlled systems - manually controlled boilers are unlikely to maintain
such a low production of O2. Regulation 62 paragraph 3.2 requires that the inert gas be delivered
with an oxygen content of not more than 5% by volume in the inert gas supply main to the cargo
tanks at any required rate of flow
The exhaust gases from compression ignition engines contain too high a percentage of O2,
especially under low light loading conditions and are considered to be unsuitable for inerting
purposes. For this reason only inerting systems utilising the exhaust gases from boilers have been
approved.
Typical composition of inert gas would be:
19
The text as adopted by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, 1974.
20
Refer to the Revised Guidelines for Inert Gas Systems, adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee at its forty-eighth session in June 1983
(MSC/Circ.353).

Gas Percentage
Carbon dioxide 12 to 14 per cent
Oxygen 3 to 5 per cent
Sulphur dioxide 0.2 to 0.4 per cent
Nitrogen balance
Temperature 400o C. maximum
The passage of the flue gas is as follows:

1. from boiler uptakes via isolating valves; to
2. scrubbing tower where it enters under a water seal in the base, gas bubbles up through a
water spray which removes practically all the sulphur dioxide along with any solid particles;
to
3. water separator to the fans where it is blown through a deck water seal into the inert gas
main; and to
4. individual cargo tanks where the requisite amount of gas is delivered at a slight positive
pressure.
The scrubbing tower itself has to be positioned aft of all cargo tanks, pump-rooms and coffer-
dams separating these spaces from the machinery spaces of catagory A — Regulation 62 paragraph
6.3. Figure 11.10 below shows a Peabody 20,000 m3/hr scrubber installed on an open deck and
Figure 11.11 shows a cut away view inside the Peabody circular scrubber.
Figure 11.12 shows a schematic of the Peabody inert gas system below which its components are
tabulated.
SOLAS requires two blowers to be fitted whereby the requisite amount of volume of gas required
by paragraph 3 above, is delivered to the cargo tanks. However, an Administration may permit only
one blower if this is capable of delivering all the gas required to the protected cargo tanks —
Regulation 62 paragraph 7.1. The blowers have to be located aft of all cargo tanks, cargo
pump-rooms and cofferdams separating these spaces from machinery spaces of catagory A —
Regulation 62 paragraph 7.4
FIGURE 11.10 Peabody scrubber installed FIGURE 11.11 Isometric view of the Peabody circular
on a open deck. scrubber.

FIGURE 11.12 Schematic arrangement of the Peabody inert gas plant.
Item No. Description Item No. Description

No. Off No. Off
1 Scrubber 22 2 Pump suction & discharge valves
2 Deck water seal 23 1 Pump suction strainer
3 Blower No.1 24 1 Pump suction shipside valve
4 Blower No.2 25 1 Water cross connection to seal
5 2 Boiler uptake valve 26 1 Deck seal water seal connection
6 Blower control valves 27 1 Scrubber water seal connection
7 Main control valve with positioner 28 Heating coil steam trap
8 Recirculation control valve 29 1 Flow switch
9 Non-return valve 30 1 Ships service to seal water
10 1 Scrubber cooling water pump 31 1 Pressure switch & isolating cock
11 2 Scrubber plate feed valves 32 1 Ships supply pressure relief
12 1 Scrubber sprays feed valve 33 1 Ships supply pressure regulator
13 1 Pressure gauge 0-20 34 1 Cross connection from ships supply
PSI scale metric-inches
14 High level float switch 35 2 Pressure gauge cock
15 Low level float switch 36 1 Pressure gauge
16 1 Scrubber water seal drain 37 1 Deck seal drain
17 Deck seal level float switch 38 1 Seal pot
18 1 Deck seal drain valve 39 Emergency supply
19 1 Heating coil steam inlet valve 40 Drain
20 Gas analyser panel 41 Seat water pump
21 1 Scrubber effluent overboard discharge

Under operational conditions the inert gas is fed into the cargo tanks during discharge of the oil
at an overpressure sufficient to prevent the ingress of air. Once the tank is empty of oil, cleaning
can then begin by washing with water jets and because this takes place in an inert atmosphere the
risk of explosion is removed. During the voyage out to the loading port the, inert gas is replenished
quite automatically to maintain a slight positive pressure within the tanks. Whilst the new cargo is
being taken on board the inert gas is displaced through non-return valves — known as
pressure/vacuum, or p.v. valves — but the atmosphere is always maintained at a safe level of around
3 to 5 per cent of oxygen. No reversal of the inert gas can take place by virtue of the two seals, on
the deck and in the scrubbing tower. An interesting requirement is that means have to be provided
to enable the gas main to be connected to an external supply of inert gas — Regulation 62 paragraph
11.5. Such plants are now kept available as part of port states emergency response provisions.
It is claimed that, in addition to the obvious one of preventing explosions, these inert gas systems
have two important advantages. Operators have observed that the slight positive pressure within the
tanks result in a marked improvement in discharge rate. The second advantage claimed is that there
is quite a marked diminution in the rate of corrosion of steelwork brought about by the removal of
the sulphur dioxide and reduction in oxidization.
These inert gas systems are required to incorporate audible and visual alarms to indicate,
amongst other things,for the following conditions:
1. High oxygen content of gas.

2. Low level in the water seal water levels in both scrubber and deck seal units.
3. Low seal water pressure or flow rates in both scrubber and deck seal units.
4. Low gas pressure.
5. High gas pressure.
6. Insufficient fuel oil supply.
7. Failure of power supply to generator.
In support of these alarms there should be provided automatic shutdown facilities in the event of,
low water pressure, high gas temperature, blower failure and high water level in the scrubber. On
the automatic shut-down of the inert gas plant the following valves should automatically close:
boiler uptake, fan discharge and main inert valve — Regulation 62 paragraphs 19.1 to 19.4.
The alarms to be provided in paragraphs 19.1.5, 19.1.6 and 19.1.8 are required to be fitted in the
machinery space and cargo control room — Regulation 62 paragraph 19.6.
The Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO issued the undernoted guidance in MSC/Circular
353 (Annex) reproduced below:
8 EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
8.1 In the event of total failure of the inert gas system to deliver the required quality and quantity of
inert gas and maintain a positive pressure in the cargo tanks and slop tanks, action must be taken
immediately to prevent any air being drawn into the tank. All cargo tank operations should be
stopped, the deck isolating valve should be closed, and the vent between it and the gas pressure
regulating valve should be opened and immediate action should be taken to repair the inert gas
system.
8.2 In the case of tankers engaged in the carriage of crude oil it is essential that the cargo tanks be
maintained in the inerted condition to avoid the hazard of pyrophoric iron sulphide ignition. If it is
assessed that the tanks cannot be maintained in an inerted condition before the inert gas system
can be repaired, an external supply of inert gas should be connected to the system through the
arrangements required by regulation 62.11.5 as soon as practicable, to avoid air being drawn into
the cargo tanks.
8.3 In the case of product carriers, if it is considered to be totally impracticable to effect a repair to
enable the inert gas system to deliver the required quality and quantity of gas and maintain a
positive pressure in the cargo tanks, cargo discharge and deballasting may only be resumed
provided that either an external supply of inert gas is connected to the system through the
arrangements required by regulation 62.11.5, or the following precautions are taken:

.1 In the case of tankers built on or after 1 September 1984, the venting system is
checked to ensure that approved devices to prevent the passage of flame into
cargo tanks are fitted and that these devices are in a satisfactory condition.
.2 In the case of tankers built before 1 September 1984 the flame screens are
checked to ensure that they are in a satisfactory condition.
.3 The valves on the vent mast risers are opened.
.4 No free fall of water or slops is permitted.
.5 No dipping, ullaging, sampling or other equipment should be introduced into the

tank unless essential for the safety of the operation. If it is necessary for such
equipment to be introduced into the tank, this should be done only after at least
30 minutes have elapsed since the injection of inert gas ceased. All metal
components of equipment to be introduced into the tank should be securely
earthed. This restriction should be applied until a period of five hours has
elapsed since injection of inert gas has ceased.
8.4 In the case of product carriers, if it is essential to clean tanks following a failure of the inert gas
system and inerted conditions as defined in regulation 62.2.2 cannot be maintained, tank cleaning
should be carried out with an external supply of inert gas connected to the system. Alternatively, if
an external supply of inert gas is not connected to the ship, the following precautions should be
taken, in addition to 8.3.1 to 8.3.5:
.1 Tank washing should be carried out only on one tank at a time.
.2 The tank should be isolated from other tanks and from any common venting
system or the inert gas main and maximum ventilation output should be
concentrated on that tank both before and during the washing process.
Ventilation should provide as far as possible a free flow of air from one end of
the tank to the other.
.3 The tank bottom should be flushed with water and stripped. The piping system
including cargo pumps, cross-overs and discharge lines should also be flushed
with water.
.4 Washing should not commence until tests have been made at various levels to
establish that the vapour content in any part of the tank is below 10% of the lower
flammable limit.
.5 Testing of the tank atmosphere should continue during the washing process. If
the vapour level rises to within 50% of the lower flammable limit, washing should
be discontinued until the vapour level has fallen to 20% of the lower flammable
limit or less.
.6 If washing machines with individual capacities exceeding 60 m3/h are to be used,

only one such machine shall be used at any one time on the ship. If portable
machines are used, all hose connections should be made up and bonding cables
tested for continuity before the machines are introduced into the tank and should
not be broken until after the machines have been removed from the tank.
.7 The tank should be kept drained during washing. If build-up of wash water occurs,
washing should be stopped until the water has been cleared.
.8 Only clean, cold seawater should be used. Recirculating systems should not be
used.
.9 Chemical additives should not be used.
.10 All deck openings, except those necessary for washing and designed venting
arrangements, should be kept closed during the washing process.
8.5 During cargo operations in port, more stringent regulations of the port Authorities shall take
precedence over any of the foregoing emergency procedures.
8.6 The attention of the ship's master should be drawn to regulation 11(c) of chapter 1 of the 1978
SOLAS Protocol in the event of the inert gas system having become inoperative.
Regulation 63 Cargo pump-rooms

1 Each cargo pump-room shall be provided with one of the following fixed fire-extinguishing systems
operated from a readily accessible position outside the pump-room. Cargo pump-rooms should be
provided with a system suitable for machinery spaces of category A.

1.1 Either a carbon dioxide or a halogenated hydrocarbon system complying with the provisions of
regulation 5 and with the following:
.1 the alarms referred to in regulation 5.1.6 shall be safe for use in a flammable
cargo vapour/air mixture;
.2 a notice shall be exhibited at the controls stating that due to the electrostatic
ignition hazard, the system is to be used only for fire extinguishing and not for
inerting purposes.
1.2 A high-expansion foam system complying with the provisions of regulation 9, provided that the
foam concentrate supply is suitable for extinguishing fires involving the cargoes carried.
1.3 A fixed pressure water-spraying system complying with the provisions of regulation 10.
2 Where the extinguishing medium used in the cargo pump-room system is also used in systems
serving other spaces, the quantity of medium provided or its delivery rate need not be more than
the maximum required for the largest compartment.
Comment
There has been debate about the use of carbon dioxide in cargo pump rooms and explosions have
been attributed to ignition of flammable gas by static discharge when CO2 was applied.
The Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO issued the following guidance:
MSC/Circular.672 - Measures To Prevent Explosions In Oil Tanker Pump Rooms
The Maritime Safety Committee
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its sixty-fourth session (5 to 9 December 1994), noted that the International
Association of Classification Societies (IACS), having considered the possibility and probable causes of
explosion in pump rooms on oil tankers, had agreed a Unified Requirement (UR F39) introducing new oil tanker
safety requirements.
2 The Committee, agreeing there was a need to amend the relevant regulations of chapter II-2 of the SOLAS
Convention to properly address measures aiming at preventing explosions in tanker cargo pump rooms, prepared
a set of requirements, given in annex, with a view to adopting relevant amendments to the Convention at the
earliest possible opportunity.
3 Member Governments are requested to apply the measures contained in the annex to new and existing oil tankers,
pending the formal adoption and entry into force of the relevant requirements.
Annex - Measures To Prevent Explosions In Cargo Pump Rooms On New And Existing Oil Tankers
1 Cargo pumps, ballast pumps and stripping pumps, installed in cargo pump rooms and driven by shafts passing
through pump room bulkheads should be fitted with temperature sensing devices for bulkhead shaft glands,
bearings and pump casings. Alarm should be initiated in the cargo control room or the pump control station.
2 Lighting in cargo pump room should be interlocked with ventilation such that ventilation should be in operation
to energize the lighting. Emergency lighting, if fitted, should not be interlocked.
3 A system for continuously monitoring the concentration of hydrocarbon gases should be fitted. Sampling points
or detector heads should be located in suitable positions in order that potentially dangerous leakages are readily
detected. Suitable positions may be the exhaust ventilation duct and lower parts of the pump room above floor
plates. This system should raise alarms as indicated under the following conditions:
.1 when hydrocarbon gas concentrations exceed 1% of the lower flammable limit (LFL), an automatic
intermittent audible and visual alarm signal should be effected in the pump room, and entry space
thereto, to alert personnel that the atmosphere in the space is not safe to be in without respiratory
protection. This alarm should be also be sounded in the cargo control room; and
.2 when hydrocarbon gas concentrations exceed 30% of the lower flammable limit (LFL), an automatic
continuous audible and visual alarm signal should be effected in the pump room, engine room, cargo
control room, and navigation bridge to alert personnel as to the potential hazard of explosion.
4 All pump rooms should be provided with bilge level monitoring devices together with appropriately locked
alarms.

A further circular was issued following representations from various parties that the 1% lower
explosive limit alarm threshold was an unworkable limit.
MSC/Circular.774 - (adopted 12 December 1996) -

Revised Measures to Prevent Explosions in Oil Tanker Cargo Pump-Rooms
The Maritime Safety Committee,
1 The Maritime Safety Committee, at its sixty-fourth session (5 to 9 December 1994), noted that the International
Association of Classification Societies (IACS), having considered the possibility and probable causes of
explosion in cargo pump-rooms on oil tankers, had agreed a Unified Requirement (UR F39) introducing new oil
tanker safety requirements.
2 MSC 64, agreeing that there was a need to amend the relevant regulations of chapter II-2 of the SOLAS
Convention to properly address measures aiming at preventing explosions in tanker cargo pumprooms, prepared a
set of requirements, given in MSC/Circ.672, with a view to adopting relevant amendments to the Convention at
the earliest possible opportunity.
3 The Committee, at its sixty-seventh session (2 to 6 December 1996), considering that the alarm level of 1% of the
lower flammable limit provided in MSC/Circ.672 cannot be effectively required because of the possibility of false
alarms, approved the revised measures as set out in the annex.
4 Member Governments are requested to apply the revised measures contained in the annex to new and existing oil
tankers, pending the formal adoption and entry into force of any relevant requirements.
Annex - Revised Measures to Prevent Explosions in Oil Tanker Cargo Pump-Rooms

of New and Existing Oil Tankers
1 Cargo pumps, ballast pumps and stripping pumps, installed in cargo pump-rooms and driven by shafts passing
through pump room bulkheads should be fitted with temperature sensing devices for bulkhead shaft glands,
bearings and pump casings. Alarm should be initiated in the cargo control room or the pump control station.
2 Lighting in cargo pump-rooms should be interlocked with ventilation such that ventilation should be in operation
when switching on the lighting. Failure of the ventilation system should not cause the lighting to go out.
Emergency lighting, if fitted, should not be interlocked.
3 A system for continuous monitoring of the concentration of hydrocarbon gases should be fitted. Sampling points
or detector heads should be located in suitable positions in order that potentially dangerous leakages are readily
detected. Suitable positions may be the exhaust ventilation duct and lower parts of the pump-room above floor
plates. When the hydrocarbon gas concentration reaches a pre-set level which should not be higher than 10% of
the lower flammable limit, a continuous audible and visual alarm signal should be automatically effected in the
pump-room, engine control room, cargo control room and navigation bridge to alert personnel to the potential
hazard.
4 All pump-rooms should be provided with bilge level monitoring devices together with appropriately located
alarms.
Clearly, if there is a fire in the cargo pump room there is not a danger that discharging CO2 will
cause an explosion and its use is appropriate. If, however, a flammable atmosphere is detected then
it is a matter of judgement as to whether or not the risk of using a CO2 system out-weighs the risk of
not using it. That is a decision best taken by the Master with advice from his senior officers taking
cogniscance of the notice at the controls — Regulation 63 paragraph 1.1.2. That said, the author
can do no more than reiterate his opinion that water spray in its various forms provides the best
overall protection.

Bibliography
1. International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals, (ISGOTT) Fourth Edition,
published by the International Chamber of Shipping, Oil Companies, International Marine
Forum and International Association of Ports and Harbours, published by Witherby & Co
Limited, 32 Aylesbury Street, London, EC1R 0ET.
2. Bulk Carrier Practice by Captain J Isbester published by the Nautical Institute
3. Towards Safer Ships and Cleaner Seas: A handbook for modern tankship operations.
Compiled by J R Dudley published by GARD.
4. IMO model course 1.02 Advanced Training Programme on Oil Tanker Operations.

Chapter Twelve
The Training of Personnel
Having investigated a large number of ship fires in many parts of the world the author has been
very forcibly struck by the differing behaviour of ships' crews under very similar circumstances. In
one case it is obvious that panic has ensued and abandonment of the vessel undertaken in indecent
haste indeed completed so fast that some crew members fell into the sea and were lost. In another
incident the crew stayed to fight the fire but did everything wrong so that the fire spread and the ship
was lost. The third example and the one which restores the author's faith in his fellow man,
produces a much happier outcome. Led by capable officers the fire is tackled methodically, using
the correct equipment and in a short space of time has been extinguished.
What is it that distinguishes the crews of the three vessels which form the case histories outlined
above? In the first case not only is it obvious that no meaningful fire drills have been carried out on
board but equally obvious that the officers and crew lacked basic training and, dare the author say,
moral fibre. There is little more to add! In the second illustration the crew are reasonably well led
but the officers on board either lacked basic fire training altogether, or have quite forgotten what
they had learned about the subject. Certainly such a crew have not received proper on board
instruction and it is quite obvious that fire drills have simply been a token in order to meet the
requirements of the Law. It is, of course, a simple matter to record in the ship's log that fire drills
have been carried out at the prescribed intervals. In the third case it is perfectly obvious that the
Master, officers and crew have not only been well trained but have also shown a responsible attitude
to the subject of fire and treated it with the respect which it deserves. There is absolutely no
substitute for training and when fire strikes and the "chips are down" this third crew will always
succeed where others fail. Basically though it is clear to the author that these successful cases fall to
the Masters and Chief Engineers who are on top of their jobs and such men will always win out in
the end.
Owners have a responsibility to ensure that their officers and men have not only received basic
training but that adequate supervision is given on a continuing basis to the conduct of meaningful
fire drills on board their vessels. There is no point in providing sophisticated fire equipment on
board if the crew do not know how to use it in an emergency. In many of these fire cases it is
obvious that owners have been quite content to limit their supervision to that of checking the ship's
log to see that the fire and boat drills are recorded at the required intervals. This is simply not good
enough and, in default, owners lay themselves open to expensive Court decisions if they persist in
this attitude. Owners must be satisfied that their crews properly understand and have been well
trained in the operation of all fire equipment installed on board their vessels and not leave it to
chance that this will be the case. Modern fire equipment, such as fixed inert gas systems, although
relatively easy to operate, are effective only if all the makers instructions are carefully followed.
Wrongly operated they might as well not have been on board!
It goes, almost without saying, that proper maintenance of fire equipment, is an owner's
responsibility and yet far too often this important subject is neglected. Safety equipment is checked
at two yearly intervals by the Classification Societies but in between times much can go wrong if
proper supervision is not maintained. Too often, when fire strikes, it is discovered that an important
piece of equipment does not function correctly and the consequences of this can be quite disastrous.
379
When such a thing happens it is a reflection both on the quality of maintenance on board and
neglect on the part of the Master who should have made certain that all fire equipment is actively
used during drill periods. Naturally all fixed systems cannot be physically turned on but the method
of operation should be the subject of instruction and a visual inspection made of the operating
mechanism. On the other hand, there is no excuse for not starting up and testing all the fire pumps
on board because experience indicates that this is a common area of failure particularly where
emergency pumps are concerned.
Incidentally the siting of these emergency fire pumps often leaves much to be desired. There is
no earthly use in placing an emergency pump in such position as will render it inaccessible in the
event of an engine-room fire (probably the only time when it is really needed). An example of this
concerns an all-aft vessel of 3,000 tons where the emergency fire pump was placed in the steering
flat. So far so good but the only access to this compartment was through an accommodation
alleyway one level below the main deck. When fire from the engine-room burst out into the
accommodation the crew could not reach the steering flat, were left without the means to fight the
fire and therefore with no alternative but to abandon ship, The lesson behind this incident is that had
proper fire drills been carried out on board this ship it would surely have become obvious that this
vital pump was badly sited. But this would only have become apparent if really meaningful fire
drills had been conducted. The purpose of a good drill is to pose situations which cover as widely
as possible the manner in which fire can spread from its point of origin and decide the action to be
taken to tackle the worst case scenario.
Following each fire drill it is very important that all those taking part should be gathered together
to discuss what had taken place and to offer constructive criticism and suggestions.
Since the First Edition of Fire Aboard was published there has been a universal acceptance of the
need to adequately train seamen in the art of fire prevention and fire-fighting which is now
enshrined in the 1978 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers. This Convention was amended in 1995 when the STCW Code was
adopted as an annex to the Convention.
The STCW Code lays down the minimum standards of training and certification expected of
officers and crew. The minimum standards with respect to fire fighting are reproduced below:
STCW95 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and

Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978 and the Seafarers Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Code
Part A Mandatory Standards Regarding Provisions of the Annex to the STCW

Convention
Chapter VI Standards Regarding Emergency, Occupational Safety, Medical Care

and Survival Functions
Section A-VI/1 Mandatory minimum requirements for familiarization and basic

safety training and instruction for all seafarers
Familiarization training
1 Before being assigned to shipboard duties, all persons employed or engaged on a seagoing ship
other than passengers, shall receive approved familiarization training in personal survival
techniques or receive sufficient information and instruction, taking account of the guidance given in
part B, to be able to:
.1 communicate with other persons on board on elementary safety matters and

understand safety information symbols, signs and alarm signals;
.2 know what to do if:

The Training of Personnel 381
.2.1 a person falls overboard,
.2.2 fire or smoke is detected,
.2.3 the fire or abandon ship alarm is sounded;
.3 identify muster and embarkation stations and emergency escape routes;
.4 locate and don life-jackets,
.5 raise the alarm and have basic knowledge of the use of portable fire extinguishers;
.6 take immediate action upon encountering an accident or other medical emergency

before seeking further medical assistance on board; and
.7 close and open the fire weathertight and watertight doors fitted in the particular
ship other than those for hull openings.
Basic training1
2 Seafarers employed or engaged in any capacity on board ship on the business of that ship as part
of the ship's complement with designated safety or pollution prevention duties in the operation of
the ship shall, before being assigned to any shipboard duties
.1 receive appropriate approved basic training or instruction in:
.1.1 personal survival techniques as set out in table A-VI/1-1,
.1.2 fire prevention and fire-fighting as set out in table A-VI/1-2,
.1.3 elementary first-aid as set out in table A-VI/1-3,
.1.4 personal safety and social responsibilities as set out in table

A-VI/1-4.
.2 be required to provide evidence of having achieved the required standard of

competence to undertake the tasks, duties and responsibilities listed in column 1
of tables A-VI/1-1, A-VI/1-2, A-VI/1-3 and A-VI/1-4 within the previous five years
through:
.2.1 demonstration of competence, in accordance with the methods

and the criteria for evaluating competence tabulated in columns
3 and 4 of those tables; and
.2.2 examination or continuous assessment as part of an approved

training programme in the subjects listed in column 2 of those
tables.
3 The Administration may, in respect of ships other than passenger ships of more than 500 gross
tonnage engaged on international voyages and tankers, if it considers that a ship's size and the
length or character of its voyage are such as to render the application of the full requirements of this
section unreasonable or impracticable, exempt to that extent the seafarers on such a ship or class
of ships from some of the requirements, bearing in mind the safety of people on board, the ship and
property and the protection of the marine environment.
In Part B of Annex 2 of the STCW Code, guidance is given as to the content of training courses
as undernoted:
Part B - Recommended Guidance Regarding Provisions of the STCW Convention and its Annex
Chapter VI - Guidance Regarding Emergency, Occupational Safety, Medical Care and Survival Functions
Section B-VI/1 - Guidance regarding familiarization and basic safety training and instruction for all seafarers
1
The following IMO Model Courses may assist in the preparation of courses:
.1 IMO Model Course 1.19 - Personal Survival
.2 IMO Model Course 1.20 - Basic Fire-Fighting
.3 IMO Model Course 1.13 - Medical Emergency - Basic Training
.4 IMO Model Course 1.19 - Personal Survival
.5 IMO Model Course 1.21 - Human relationships

Fire prevention and fire-fighting

1 The basic training in fire prevention and fire-fighting required by section A-VI/1 should include at
least the theoretical and practical elements itemized in paragraphs 2 to 4 hereunder.2
Theoretical training
2 The theoretical training should cover:
.1 the three elements of fire and explosion (the fire triangle), fuel; source of ignition;
oxygen;
.2 ignition sources: chemical; biological; physical;
.3 flammable materials: flammability; ignition point; burning temperature; burning

speed; thermal value; lower flammable limit (LFL); upper flammable limit (UFL);
flammable range; inerting; static electricity; flashpoint; auto-ignition;
.4 fire hazard and spread of fire by radiation, convection, and conduction;
.5 reactivity;
.6 classification of fires and applicable extinguishing agents;
.7 main causes of fire on board ships: oil leakage in engine-room; cigarettes,

overheating (bearings); galley appliances (stoves, flues, fryers, hotplates, etc.);
spontaneous ignition (cargo, wastes, etc.); hot work (welding, cutting, etc.);
electrical apparatus (short circuit, non-professional repairs); reaction, self-heating
and auto-ignition; arson; static electricity;
.8 fire prevention;
.9 fire and smoke detection systems; automatic fire alarms;
.10 fire-fighting equipment including:
.10.1 fixed installations on board and their locations; fire mains,

hydrants; international shore connection; smothering
installations, carbon dioxide (CO2), foam; halogenated
hydrocarbons; pressure water spray system in special category
spaces, etc.; automatic sprinkler system; emergency fire pump;
emergency generator; chemical powder applicants; general
outline of required and available mobile apparatus; high
pressure fog system; high expansion foam; new developments
and equipment;
.10.2 firefighter's outfit, personal equipment; breathing apparatus;

resuscitation apparatus; smoke helmet or mask; fireproof
life-line and harness; and their location on board; and
.10.3 general equipment including fire hoses, nozzles, connections,

fire axes; portable fire extinguishers; fire blankets;
.11 construction and arrangements including escape routes; means for gas freeing
tanks; Class A, B and C divisions; inert gas systems;
.12 ship fire-fighting organization, including general alarm; fire control plans, muster
stations and duties of individuals; communications, including ship-shore when in
port; personnel safety procedures; periodic shipboard drills; patrol systems;
.13 practical knowledge of resuscitation methods;
.14 fire-fighting methods including sounding the alarm; locating and isolating;
jettisoning; inhibiting; cooling; smothering; extinguishing; reflash watch; smoke
extraction; and
.15 fire-fighting agents including water, solid jet, spray, fog, flooding; foam, high,
medium and low expansion; carbon dioxide (CO2); halon, aqueous film forming
foam (AFFF); dry chemical powder; new developments and equipment.
2
IMO Model Course 1.20 - Basic Fire-Fighting may be of assistance in the preparation of courses.

Practical training
3 The practical training given below should take place in spaces which provide truly realistic training
conditions, (e.g. simulated shipboard conditions), and whenever possible and practical should also
be carried out in darkness as well as by daylight and should allow the trainees to acquire the ability
to:
.1 use various types of portable fire extinguishers;
.2 use self-contained breathing apparatus;
.3 extinguish smaller fires, e.g. electrical fires, oil fires and propane fires;
.4 extinguish extensive fires with water (jet and spray nozzles);
.5 extinguish fires with either foam, powder or any other suitable chemical agent;
.6 enter and pass through, with life-line but without breathing apparatus, a
compartment into which high expansion foam has been injected;
.7 fight fire in smoke-filled enclosed spaces wearing self-contained breathing

apparatus;
.8 extinguish fire with water fog, or any other suitable fire-fighting agent in an
accommodation room or simulated engine-room with fire and heavy smoke;
.9 extinguish an oil fire with fog applicator and spray nozzles; dry chemical powder
or foam applicators;
.10 effect a rescue in a smoke-filled space wearing breathing apparatus.
General
4 Trainees should also be made aware of the necessity of maintaining a state of readiness on board.
Elementary first aid3

5 The training in elementary first aid required by regulation VI/1 as part of the basic training should be
given at an early stage in vocational training, preferably during pre-sea training, to enable seafarers
to take immediate action upon encountering an accident or other medical emergency until the arrival
of a person with first aid skills or the person in charge of medical care on board.
Personal safety and social responsibilities

6 Administrations should bear in mind the significance of communication and language skills in
maintaining safety of life and property at sea and in preventing marine pollution. Given the
international character of the maritime industry, the reliance on voice communications from
ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore, the increasing use of multi-national crews, and the concern that
crew members should be able to communicate with passengers in an emergency, adoption of a
common language for maritime communications would promote safe practice by reducing the risk
of human error in communicating essential information.
7 Although not universal, by common practice English is rapidly becoming the standard language of
communication for maritime safety purposes, partly as a result of the use of the Standard Marine
Navigational Vocabulary, as replaced by the IMO Standard Marine Communication Phrases.
8 Administrations should consider the benefits of ensuring that seafarers have an ability to use at
least an elementary English vocabulary, with an emphasis on nautical terms and situations.
Table A VI/1 shows the competency criteria.

In addition to the above requirements, the STCW Code lays down mandatory minimum
standards for officers and engineers in respect of advanced fire fighting which are reproduced
overleaf:
3
IMO Model Course 1.13 - Medical Emergency - Basic Training may be of assistance in the preparation of courses.

KNOWLEDGE, UNDERSTANDING METHODS FOR CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING

COMPETENCE AND PROFICIENCY DEMONSTRATING COMPETENCE
COMPETENCE
Minimise the risk of Shipboard fire-fighting organization Assessment of evidence obtained from Initial actions on becoming aware of an
fire and maintain a approved instruction or attendance at an emergency conform with accepted
state of readiness to Location of fire fighting appliances and approved course practices and procedures
respond to emergency emergency escape routes
situations involving Action taken on identifying muster
fire The elements of fire and explosion (the signals is appropriate to the indicated
fire triangle) emergency and compiles with
established procedures
Types and sources of ignition
Flammable materials, fire hazards and

spread of fire
The need for constant vigilance
Actions to be taken on board ship
Fire and smoke detection and automatic

alarm systems
Classification of fire and applicable

extinguishing agents
Fight and extinguish Fire fighting equipment and its location Assessment of evidence obtained from Clothing and equipment are appropriate
fires on-board approved instruction or during to the nature of the fire-fighting
attendance at an approved course operations
Instruction in: including practical demonstration in
spaces which provide truly realistic The timing and sequence of individual
1. Fixed installations training conditions (e.g. simulated actions are appropriate to the prevailing
shipboard conditions) and, whenever circumstances and conditions
2. fire-fighter's outfits possible and practical, in darkness, of
the ability to: Extinguishment of fire is achieved
3. personal equipment using appropriate procedures,
1. use various types of portable fire techniques and fire-fighting agents
4. fire-fighting appliances and extinguishers
equipment Breathing apparatus procedures and
2. use self-contained breathing techniques comply with accepted
5. fire-fighting methods apparatus practices and procedures
6. fire-fighting agents 3. extinguish smaller fires, e.g.

electrical fires, oil fires, propane fires
7. fire-fighting procedures
4. extinguish extensive fires with water
8. use of breathing apparatus for using jet and spray nozzles
fighting fires and effecting rescues
5. extinguish fires with foam, powder
or any other suitable chemical agent
6. enter and pass through with lifeline

but without breathing apparatus a
compartment into which high expansion
foam has been injected
7. fight fire in smoke-filled enclosed

spaces wearing self-contained
breathing apparatus
8. extinguish fire with water fog, or any

other suitable fire-fighting agent in an
accommodation room or simulated
engine-room with fire and heavy smoke
9. extinguish oil fire with fog

applicator and spray nozzles, dry
chemical powder or foam applicators
10. effect a rescue in a smoke-filled

space wearing breathing apparatus
Table A VI/1

Section A-VI/3 Mandatory minimum training in advanced fire-fighting

Standard of competence
1 Seafarers designated to control fire-fighting operations shall have successfully completed advanced
training in techniques for fighting fire, with particular emphasis on organization, tactics and
command, and shall be required to demonstrate competence to undertake the tasks, duties and
responsibilities listed in column 1 of table A-VI/3.
2 The level of knowledge and understanding of the subjects listed in column 2 of table A-VI/3 shall be
sufficient for the effective control of fire-fighting operations on board ship4.
3 Training and experience to achieve the necessary level of theoretical knowledge, understanding and
proficiency shall take account of the guidance given in part B of this Code.
4 Every candidate for certification shall be required to provide evidence of having achieved the
required standard of competence within the previous five years, in accordance with the methods for
demonstrating competence and the criteria for evaluating competence tabulated in columns 3 and 4
of table A-VI/3.
KNOWLEDGE, UNDERSTANDING AND METHODS FOR CRITERIA FOR

COMPETENCE PROFICIENCY DEMONSTRATING EVALUATING
COMPETENCE COMPETENCE
Control fire fighting Fire fighting procedures at sea and in port with Practical exercises and instruction Actions taken to control fires are
operations aboard particular emphasis on organization, tactics and conducted under approved and truly based on a full and accurate
ships command realistic training conditions (e.g.: assessment of the incident using
simulated shipboard conditions) and, all available sources of
Use of water for fire extinguishing, the effect on whenever possible and practicable, in information
ship stability, precautions and protective darkness
procedures The order of priority, timing and
sequence of actions are
Communication and co-ordination during fire appropriate to the overall
fighting operations requirements of the incident and to
minimise damage and potential
Ventilation control, including smoke extractor damage to the ship, injuries to
personnel and impairment of the
Control of fuel and electrical systems operational effectiveness of the
ship
Fire fighting process hazards (dry distillation,
chemical reaction, boiler uptake fires, etc.) Transmission of information is
prompt, accurate, complete and
Fire fighting involving dangerous goods clear
Fire precautions and hazards associated with the Personal safety during fire control
storage and handling of materials (paints, etc.) activities is safeguarded at all
times
Management and control of injured persons
Procedures for co-ordination with shore based

fire fighters
Organise and train Preparation of contingency plans Practical exercises and instruction Composition and Organization of
fire parties conduct under approved and truly fire control parties ensure the
Composition and allocation of personnel to fire realistic training conditions, e.g. prompt and effective
parties simulated shipboard conditions implementation of emergency
plans and procedures
strategies and tactics for control of fires in
various parts of the ship.
Inspect and service Fire detection systems; fixed fire extinguishing Practical exercises using approved Operational effectiveness of al fire
fire detection and systems; portable and mobile fire extinguishing equipment and systems in a realistic detection and extinguishing
extinguishing equipment including appliances, pumps and training environment systems and equipment is
systems and rescue, salvage, life support, personal protective maintained at all times in
equipment and communication equipment accordance with performance
specifications and legislative
Requirements for statutory and classification requirements.
surveys
Investigate and Assessment of cause of incidents involving fire Practical exercises in a realistic Causes of fire are identified and
compile reports on training environment the effectiveness of counter
incidents involving measures are evaluated
fire
Table A VI/3
4
IMO Model Course 2.03 - Advanced Training in Fire-Fighting may be of assistance in the preparation of courses.

At the time of writing the IMO had not produced guidance on the content of the sylabus for
advanced fire-fighting training. We are obliged to the Firemaster, Colin Cranston, of Lothian and
Borders Fire Brigade for permission to reproduce the advanced training sylabus currently in use at
their school.
In the UK eleven fire schools, mostly operated by the British Fire Service, have been established
and provide courses which train to the above minimum standards. These schools are listed in the
Department of Transport Merchant Shipping Notice M.1494 the text of which is reproduced below.
Other Governments approve their own national fire training establishments whose courses must
conform to the STCW Code standards.
Department of Transport
MERCHANT SHIPPING NOTICE No. M.1494
Fire-Fighting Training
Notice to Shipowners, Masters, Officers and Seamen in the Merchant Navy; and Owners,
Skippers and Crew of Fishing Vessels
This Notice supersedes Merchant Shipping Notice No. M.1466
1. This Notice updates the addresses of the centres holding fire-fighting courses approved by the Department as suitable for officers and
other key personnel (4-day course) and sets out provisions for recognition of non-UK fire-fighting certificates.
2. In general, all Deck and Marine Engineer Officer candidates making application for their first UK Certificates of Competency should
have attended an approved fire-fighting course held at one of the centres listed in this Notice or alternatively, hold a recognised
non-UK fire-fighting certificate. The exception is a candidate for Deck Officer (Fishing Vessel) Class 3 who only need have attended
the basic fire-fighting course (normally 2 days).
3 The department may recognise the validity of non-UK fire-fighting certificates, provided,
(a) the fire-fighting certificate is from a country whose certificates of competency are recognised as equivalent to UK certificates of
competency, and
(b) the fire-fighting course referred to in the Certificate is approved by the Port State Administration as complying with the
International Conference on Training and Certification of Seafarers, 1978 in terms of IMO Resolution A437(XI) Annex 1, Basic
Training of Crews in Fire-Fighting and Annex 2, Advanced Training in Fire-Fighting.
4. In view of the realism obtained by course instructors in simulating dangerous fires at sea, the approved 4-day fire-fighting course is
considered to be unsuitable for cadets/officers trainees at the pre-sea stage of their training. Pre-sea cadets/officer trainees are
recommended, however, to take the basic fire-fighting course in the first instance, then take the approved 4-day course towards the end
of their training.
5. The following centres hold 4-day fire-fighting courses approved by the Department of Transport as suitable for officers and other key
personnel:
ABERDEEN ABERDEEN FIRE TRAINING CENTRE

Grampian Fire Brigade
North Anderson Drive
Aberdeen
CHORLEY LANCASHIRE COUNTY FIRE BRIGADE

International Training Centre
Washington Hall,
Chorley
EDINBURGH MacDONALD ROAD FIRE STATION5

1 Dryden Terrace
Edinburgh EH7 4JL
5
Now known as the Scottish International Fire Training Centre

GLASGOW STRATHCLYDE FIRE BRIGADE

Brigade Training School
90 Maitland Street
Glasgow G4 OHX
HULL NORTH HULL FIRE STATION

Clough Road
Hull HU6 7PL
LOWESTOFT/NORWICH LOWESTOFT COLLEGE

St Peter Street, Lowestoft
and PETANS FIRE TRAINING CENTRE
Norwich
MAIDSTONE/GRAVESEND NATIONAL SEA TRAINING COLLEGE

Denton, Gravesend DAl2 2HZ
(In conjunction with Kent Fire Brigade)
MORETON-IN-MARSH HOME OFFICE

Fire Service College,
Moreton-in-Marsh, Gloucestershire GL56 0RH
PLYMOUTH DEVON FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE TRAINING CENTRE

Glen Road Plympton
Plymouth, Devon PL7 3XT
SOUTHAMPTON SOUTHAMPTON INSTITUTE OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Newton Road, Maritime Operations Centre
Warsash S03 6ZL
SOUTH SHIELDS TYNE AND WEAR METROPOLITAN FIRE BRIGADE

Fire Training Centre, Wapping Street
South Shields
Department of Transport
Marine Directorate
London WC1V 6LP
June 1992
"M" Notice 764 lays down that the Department of Trade (now called the Department of
Transport) with effect from September 1, 1976, issue only one dispensation to an officer who has
not satisfactorily completed an approved four day fire-fighting course.
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE
MERCHANT SHIPPING NOTICE No. M.764
DISPENSATIONS: FIRE-FIGHTING TRAINING
Notice to Shipowners, Masters, Officers and Seamen of the Merchant Navy
1. As from 1st September 1976, the Department of Trade will issue only one dispensation from the requirement to carry a duly certified
officer on a merchant navy ship in respect of a person who has not satisfactorily completed an approved four-day fire-fighting
course.
2. Persons in respect of whom such dispensations have been issued for the purpose of the examination of a vessel from the provisions of
Section 92 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 under the powers of Section 78 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1906, and persons who
expect to be considered for such dispensations in the future, are accordingly advised that it is in their own interests to complete as
soon as possible, if they have not already done so, an approved four-day fire-fighting course as detailed in Merchant Shipping Notice
No. M.643.
3. Shipowners should also pay particular attention to the terms of this -notice, in order to make sure that they do not seek a
dispensation from the Department in respect of a person who the Department will refuse to accept in terms of this notice.
Department of Trade, Marine Division, London, June 1976

The Edinburgh Merchant Navy Fire Training School at MacDonald Road was originally
designed and set up by the author and he feels that it would be appropriate to give a description of
the premises and the training carried out.
Through the generosity of the forward-looking South Eastern Fire Brigade Committee (now
Lothian and Borders Fire Brigade) money was provided to build a "'ship on dry land" at the new fire
station situated at MacDonald Road, Edinburgh. The author drew up the basic design in 1962 and
handed the project over to Henry Robb's Shipbuilding Yard, Leith (now Robb Caledon Shipbuilders
Ltd.) who produced working drawings, then built the "ship" in sections and finally installed the
structure at the fire station. From a study of the plans reproduced as Figures 12.1 to 12.3 inclusive,
it will be seen that the "ship" incorporates, 10 cabins; galley; saloon; bridge; wireless room; ship's
office; hold with 'tween deck; engine-room with dummy engines, pumps generators, engineers
stores and workshop, watertight door to shaft tunnel and a tunnel escape ladder. A "MultiSpray"
system is installed in the engine-room and a full sprinkler system fitted throughout the
accommodation. Both these systems were provided and installed free of charge by Messrs. Mather
& Platt Limited (now Wormald) of Manchester, as a most generous contribution towards safety of
life at sea. It should also be said that Messrs. Henry Robb Limited built the "Ship" at little or no
profit with the same object in view.
It was decided that the fire school should operate for the purpose of training Merchant Navy
Officers and was opened in 1964. Since that date many thousands of officers have attended and the
FIGURE 12.1 The "ship" at MacDonald Road Fire Station, Edinburgh as new in 1962
FIGURE 12.2 A merchant navy officer under training at MacDonald Road, Edinburgh

school has built up a world-wide reputation for providing highly realistic and exceedingly tough
training. From the beginning the author decided that real fires and not smoke bombs would be used
so that trainees would experience the real thing and would thus be equipped to tackle actual
incidents on board their own ships. In the event one of the most satisfying results of this policy is
the number of appreciatory letters received from shipping companies, paying tribute to the action of
their officers who had attended the Edinburgh Fire School and had put their training to good use in
actual fire incidents.
Students attend for a period of four days and the training syllabus is as follows:-
LOTHIAN AND BORDERS FIRE BRIGADE
THE SCOTTISH INTERNATIONAL FIRE TRAINING CENTRE
STANDARD SYLLABUS 4 DAY M.N.T.B. STAGE II INTENSIVE FIREFIGHTING COURSE
DAY ONE
0900 - 0915 COURSE REGISTRATION AND INTRODUCTION
0915 - 0925 Course Aims and Objectives
0925 - 1000 PAST SHIP FIRES
(A slide presentation showing various shipping disasters involving fires)
1015 - 1100 DEALING WITH FIRE
(A video presentation and talk discussing the correct use of fire extinguishers on A,B and C
class fires)
1100 - 1230 PRACTICAL FIREMANSHIP
(A lecture on the skills needed to both attack and successfully extinguish a fire)
FIGURE 12.3 Plans of the "ship" at MacDonald Road, now called the Scottish International Fire Training Centre.

1400 - 1500 SEARCH AND RESCUE

(A lecture on the skills needed to carry out a coherent a proper search pattern)
1515 - 1700 BREATHING APPARATUS: THE DRAGER BA 90
(A lecture presentation describing the type of compressed air breathing apparatus used at the
Centre and how to use it)
DAY TWO
0900 - 0915 Protective clothing issue, C.A.B.A. issue. Breathing Apparatus dressing drill, check, set appraisal.
0915 - 1015 SHIP MODULE SHOWROUND. EXERCISE: TOWER
1030 - 1215 EXERCISE: PRACTICAL EXTINGUISHER HANDLING.
EXERCISE: HOSE HANDLING.
1410 - 1520 EXERCISE: CAGE ASSAULT.
EXERCISE: HIGH EXPANSION FOAM DEMONSTRATION.
1550 - 1610 LECTURE: HEAT & HUMIDITY.
(a lecture on the effects of a fire-fighters performance in an environment of high heat and humid
conditions)
1610 - 1630 End of day discussion and look forward.
DAY THREE
0900 - 1000 EXERCISE: GALLEY FIRE.
EXERCISE: HEAT BARRIER.
1015 - 1210 EXERCISE: H AND U DECK SEARCH.
1230 - 1300 Marine Firefighting Video : Fire-fighting.
1400 - 1510 EXERCISE: LINE OF HOSE EXTERNAL HYDRANT H DECK.
1545 - 1625 MARINE FIRE PREVENTION
(A video presentation describing the prevention of fire on board Ships).
1625 - 1630 End of day discussion and look forward.
DAY FOUR
0910 - 1000 EXERCISE: B.A.I. TWEEN DECK.
1015 - 1210 EXERCISE: PORT ENGINE ROOM (OIL FIRE).
1330 - 1430 EXERCISE: FLANGE LEAK FIRE.
1505 - 1520 Course Summation.
1520 - 1545 Course debrief and evaluation.
1545 - 1600 Issue of competency certificates.
For a number of years the Brigade have been operating a three day Merchant Navy Training
Board Stage III Command and Control Course the syllabus of which is reproduced below.
THE SCOTTISH INTERNATIONAL FIRE TRAINING CENTRE
STANDARD SYLLABUS
3 DAY M.N.T.B. STAGE III COMMAND AND CONTROL COURSE
DAY ONE
0900 - 0915 COURSE REGISTRATION AND INTRODUCTION
0915 - 1000 COMMAND AND CONTROL — PRINCIPLES: ELEMENTS OF LEADERSHIP
A lecture presentation highlighting leadership qualities and skills
1015 - 1040 COMMAND AND CONTROL — PRINCIPLES: PRE-PLANNING
A lecture presentation on the necessity of pre-planning in order to develop a team response to
fire
1040 - 1300 COMMAND AND CONTROL — PRINCIPLES: TRAINING
A presentation revising skills that need to be developed both by students and crews to achieve
maximum efficiency
1400 - 1430 Protective clothing issue and C.A.B.A. familiarisation
1430 - 1500 Centre and ship module familiarisation
1515 - 1630 'EXERCISE FAMILIARISATION'
A basic search and rescue exercise designed to refresh students skills in hostile environments.
'H' and 'U' search

1630 - 1745 DEBRIEF
DAY TWO — COMMAND AND CONTROL EXERCISES

0910 - 1000 EXERCISE 1 — ENGINE ROOM FIRE AND 'H' DECK SEARCH
1015 - 1240 EXERCISE 2 — ENGINE ROOM FIRE, PERSONS REPORTED
1400 - 1500 EXERCISE 3 — B.A.I TWEEN DECK
1535 - 1645 EXERCISE 4 — SHAFT TUNNEL FIRE
1645 - 1700 DEBRIEF
DAY THREE — COMMAND AND CONTROL EXERCISES

0900 - 1000 EXERCISE 5 — ENGINE ROOM FIRE (B.A. ROOM)
1015 - 1240 EXERCISE 6 — SHAFT TUNNEL (5X FOAM BRANCH)
1400 - 1500 CONSOLIDATION
A discussion on aspects of the Course that will assist students devise fire strategies onboard
vessels
1515 - 1700 End of course discussion and issue of competency certificates.
This syllabus is currently under review and is being adjusted to reflect the course content and
training objectives of the STCW CODE.
On-Board Fire Training

As the ship fires described in Chapter 4 highlight, particularly that aboard the Scandinavian
Star, the conduct of fire drills on board ships is of vital importance. Clearly, this on-board training
will, in the main, be carried out by officers' who have passed one or both of the courses outlined
above. It is of paramount importance that breathing apparatus be regularly worn during fire drills
because it is essential that men should be completely at home with this equipment. The availability
of spare air cylinders and preferably along with a compressor whereby re-charging can be done on
board is a prerequisite. The wearing of breathing apparatus is a much more skilled business than
many people are prepared to admit. One could cite as evidence of this a passage from the report of
the Inquiry into the loss of the Seistan (see Chapter 4) which it was stated that:
"The Chief Officer wearing a smoke helmet, attempted to descend the spiral stairway
into the 'tweendeck, but was unable to do so because the smoke was so dense that his
torch was unable to penetrate it".
Now no one would suggest for a moment that the Chief Officer in question was anything other
than a brave man, who would have forced his way into the hold had it been possible for any man
with his degree of training to do so. Yet the reason given for his failure would never be accepted as
adequate by any fire-fighters, professional and volunteer alike, all of whom are trained in the use of
breathing apparatus to a standard which enables them to move about freely in strange surroundings,
in smoke so thick that no torch could hope to penetrate it. Surely, the raison d'être of breathing
apparatus is that wearers can work and survive in irrespirable atmospheres! But, and it is a big but,
to expect men to enter thick black smoke without having received practical training is to ask too
much.
Fire-Control Training for Ships' Engineers

A study of the long list of serious ship fires contained in Chapter 3 and detailed in Appendix 'A',
reveal that those starting in engine rooms and machinery spaces account for a significant proportion
of the total. This points quite clearly to the need to conduct more fire drills in these areas. It is
obvious that because of the complex nature of machinery spaces, engineers are best equipped to
fight such fires. Only the engineers know the disposition of the machinery and the attendant
controls. But having said this the author would stress that it is still necessary from time to time to
hold joint drills with deck personnel involved. Cases have arisen where almost all of the engineers
have been knocked out by an engine-room explosion and only deck personnel have been left to fight
the fire.

Chief Engineer's should make a study of their domain and decide wherein lie the individual
points at which fire could break out. Having decided, he should systematically include each area in
a fire drill, taking care that all his staff are included. This means in effect that each individual
exercise must be conducted at least twice in order to include off-duty personnel. It is important that
each individual should be informed of the purport of each fire drill in order that they fully
understand the significance of the situation. It is the author's experience that men respond well to
this approach. There is another important benefit likely to be derived from this practice! Knowing
the areas most likely to become involved in fire almost inevitably focuses attention to these and
personnel thus becomes conscious of the need to prevent this taking place and to carry out
preventative maintenance. Prevention is better than cure!
It is a matter for great satisfaction to the author to find how far the recommendations contained
even in the First Edition of Fire Aboard, concerning the fire training of Merchant Navy personnel
have now been implemented. Certainly, as can be seen from a study of Chapter 3, the record of
fires in ships of many flags is getting better and the author would like to think that this is a direct
outcome of the recognition that realistic training is an essential part of a mariners qualification.
These standards are now enshrined in the International Convention on Standards of Training,
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978 - Seafarers Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping (STCW) Code adopted in 1995. Conversely, a study of the 'pie' charts will show that
apparently this lesson has yet to penetrate the minds of responsible officials in a few countries
whose record is abysmal. It would be wrong, of course, not to pay tribute here to the excellent work
performed by the Members of the IMO Fire Sub-Committee and the British Department of
Transport. Overseas, the Japanese and Scandinavian countries appear to be particularly active in
this field. But the U.S. Coast Guard, in co-operation with the National Fire Protection Association,
probably deserve the highest praise. In particular, the Coast Guard have built up a most excellent
record, not only publishing what are arguably the finest and most comprehensive set of Rules and
Regulations governing merchant ships but also have a fine reputation for actively being engaged in
rescue, fire-fighting and salvage services.
MUSTERS AND FIRE DRILLS
Chapter III Life-saving appliances and arrangements
Part B Ship requirements
Regulation 8 Muster list and emergency instructions

2 Clear instructions to be followed in the event of an emergency shall be provided for every person on
board6.
3 Muster lists complying with the requirements of regulation 53 shall be exhibited in conspicuous
places throughout the ship including the navigating bridge, engine-room and crew accommodation
spaces.
4 Illustrations and instructions in appropriate languages shall be posted in passenger cabins and be
conspicuously displayed at muster stations and other passenger spaces to inform passengers of:
.1 their muster station;
.2 the essential actions they must take in an emergency;
.3 the method of donning lifejackets.
6
Refer to resolution A.691(17) concerning safety instructions to passengers.

Part B - Requirements for Ships and Life-Saving Appliances
Section V - Miscellaneous
Regulation 37 - Muster list and emergency instructions

1 The muster list shall specify details of the general emergency alarm and public address system
prescribed by section 7.2 of the Code and also action to be taken by crew and passengers when this
alarm is sounded. The muster list shall also specify how the order to abandon ship will be given.
2 Each passenger ship shall have procedures in place for locating and rescuing passengers trapped
in their staterooms.
3 The muster list shall show the duties assigned to the different members of the crew including:
.1 closing of the watertight doors, fire doors, valves, scuppers, sidescuttles,

skylights, portholes and other similar openings in the ship;
.2 equipping of the survival craft and other life-saving appliances;
.3 preparation and launching of survival craft;
.4 general preparations of other life-saving appliances;
.5 muster of passengers;
.6 use of communication equipment;
.7 manning of fire parties assigned to deal with fires; and
.8 special duties assigned in respect to the use of fire-fighting equipment and

installations.
4 The muster list shall specify which officers are assigned to ensure that life-saving and fire
appliances are maintained in good condition and are ready for immediate use.
5 The muster list shall specify substitutes for key persons who may become disabled, taking into
account that different emergencies may call for different actions.
6 The muster list shall show the duties assigned to members of the crew in relation to passengers in
case of emergency. These duties shall include:
.1 warning the passengers;
.2 seeing that they are suitably clad and have donned their lifejackets correctly;
.3 assembling passengers at muster stations;
.4 keeping order in the passageways and on the stairways and generally controlling
the movements of the passengers; and
.5 ensuring that a supply of blankets is taken to the survival craft.
7 The muster list shall be prepared before the ship proceeds to sea. After the muster list has been
prepared, if any change takes place in the crew which necessitates an alteration in the muster list,
the master shall either revise the list or prepare a new list.
8 The format of the muster list used on passenger ships shall be approved.
Regulation 53 Muster list and emergency instructions

1 The muster list shall specify details of the general emergency alarm signal prescribed by regulation
50 and also action to be taken by crew and passengers when this alarm is sounded. The muster list
shall also specify how the order to abandon ship will be given.
2 The muster list shall show the duties assigned to the different members of the crew including:
.1 closing of the watertight doors, fire doors, valves, scuppers, sidescuttles,

skylights, portholes and other similar openings in the ship;
.2 equipping of the survival craft and other life-saving appliances;
.3 preparation and launching of survival craft;

.4 general preparation of other life-saving appliances;
.5 muster of passengers;
.6 use of communication equipment;
.7 manning of fire parties assigned to deal with fires;
.8 special duties assigned in respect of the use of fire-fighting equipment and

installations.
3 The muster list shall specify which officers are assigned to ensure that life-saving and fire
appliances are maintained in good condition and are ready for immediate use.
4 The muster list shall specify substitutes for key persons who may become disabled, taking into
account that different emergencies may call for different actions.
5 The muster list shall show the duties assigned to members of the crew in relation to passengers in
case of emergency. These duties shall include:
.1 warning the passengers;
.2 seeing that they are suitably clad and have donned their lifejackets correctly;
.3 assembling passengers at muster stations;
.4 keeping order in the passageways and on the stairways and generally controlling
the movements of the passengers;
.5 ensuring that a supply of blankets is taken to the survival craft.
6 The muster list shall be prepared before the ship proceeds to sea. After the muster list has been
prepared, if any change takes place in the crew which necessitates an alteration in the muster list,
the master shall either revise the list or prepare a new list.
7 The format of the muster list used on passenger ships shall be approved.
Comment
The muster list indicates the various duties to be assigned to the different members of the crew.
Note that the muster list shall be prepared, or, if a new list is not necessary, revised after the
agreement with the crew has been signed and before the ship proceeds to sea, and shall be dated and
signed by the Master. If after the muster list has been prepared, any change takes place in the crew
which necessitates an alteration in the muster list, the Master shall either revise the list or prepare a
new list.
Copies of the muster list shall be posted in several parts of the ship, and in particular in the
crew's quarters, before the ship proceeds to sea and shall be kept so posted while the ship is at sea.
Emergency Signal for Passengers

Muster stations for all passengers shall be appointed for the event of an emergency and the
position of those stations and the meaning of all signals affecting passengers, with precise
instructions as to what they are to do, shall be clearly stated in English and such other languages as
are appropriate on cards posted in their cabins and in conspicuous places in other passenger
quarters. Readers will note that in the case of the tragic Scandinavian Star fire — see Chapter 4 —
the official Norwegian Report strongly criticizes the fact that the passengers had not been informed
of the emergency procedures operating on board.
The emergency signal for summoning passengers to the muster stations shall be a succession of
seven or more short blasts followed by one long blast on the whistle or siren. This signal shall be
supplemented by other means of warning audible throughout the ship which shall be electrically
operated and capable of being operated from the bridge.

Drills
SOLAS Chapter II-2 Part A General
Regulation 20 Fire control plans7

3 Fire drills shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of regulation III/18.
Chapter III Regulation 18 Emergency training and drills

2 Manuals
A training manual complying with the requirements of regulation 51 [8] shall be provided in each crew
messroom and recreation room or in each crew cabin.
3 Practice musters and drills9
3.1 Each member of the crew shall participate in at least one abandon ship drill and one fire drill every
month. The drills of the crew shall take place within 24 h of the ship leaving a port if more than 25%
of the crew have not participated in abandon ship and fire drills on board that particular ship in the
previous month. The Administration may accept other arrangements that are at least equivalent for
those classes of ship for which this is impracticable.
3.2 On a ship engaged on an international voyage which is not a short international voyage, musters of
the passengers shall take place within 24 h after their embarkation. Passengers shall be instructed
in the use of the lifejackets and the action to take in an emergency. If only a small number of
passengers embark at a port after the muster has been held it shall be sufficient, instead of holding
another muster, to draw the attention of these passengers to the emergency instructions required by
regulations 8.2 and 8.4.
3.3 On a ship engaged on a short international voyage10, if a muster of the passengers is not held on
departure, the attention of the passengers shall be drawn to the emergency instructions required by
regulations 8.2 and 8.4.
3.4 Each abandon ship drill shall include:
.1 summoning of passengers and crew to muster stations with the alarm required by
regulation 6.4.2 and ensuring that they are made aware of the order to abandon
ship specified in the muster list;
.2 reporting to stations and preparing for the duties described in the muster list;
.3 checking that passengers and crew are suitably dressed;
.4 checking that lifejackets are correctly donned;
.5 lowering of at least one lifeboat after any necessary preparation for launching;
.6 starting and operating the lifeboat engine;
.7 operation of davits used for launching liferafts.
3.5 Different lifeboats shall, as far as practicable, be lowered in compliance with the requirements of
paragraph 3.4.5 at successive drills.
3.6 Each lifeboat shall be launched with its assigned operating crew aboard and manoeuvred in the
water at least once every 3 months during an abandon ship drill. The Administration may allow ships
operating on short international voyages not to launch the lifeboats on one side if their berthing
arrangements in port and their trading patterns do not permit launching of lifeboats on that side.
However, all such lifeboats shall be lowered at least once every 3 months and launched at least
annually.
7
Refer to resolution A.654(16) concerning graphical symbols for fire control plans.
8
Author's note: training manuals are described later in this chapter.
9
Refer to MSC/Circ.544 concerning fire drills and on-board training.
10
Short international voyage is an international voyage in the course of which a ship is not more than 200 miles from a port or
place in which the passengers and crew could be placed in safety. Neither the distance between the last port of call in the
country in which the voyage begins and the final port of destination nor the return voyage shall exceed 600 miles. The final
port of destination is the last port of call in the scheduled voyage at which the ship commences its return voyage to the
country in which the voyage began.

3.7 As far as is reasonable and practicable, rescue boats other than lifeboats which are also rescue
boats, shall be launched each month with their assigned crew aboard and manoeuvred in the water.
In all cases this requirement shall be complied with at least once every three months.
3.8 If lifeboat and rescue boat launching drills are carried out with the ship making headway, such drills
shall, because of the dangers involved, be practised in sheltered waters only and under the
supervision of an officer experienced in such drills11.
3.9 Emergency lighting for mustering and abandonment shall be tested at each abandon ship drill.
3.10 Each fire drill shall include:
.1 reporting to stations and preparing for the duties described in the muster list
required by regulation 8.3;
.2 starting a fire pump using at least the two required jets of water to show that the
system is in proper working order;
.3 checking fireman's outfits and other personal rescue equipment;
.4 checking the relevant communication equipment;
.5 checking the operation of watertight doors, fire doors, and fire dampers;
.6 checking the necessary arrangements for subsequent abandonment of the ship.
3.11 Fire drills should be planned in such a way that due consideration is given to regular practice in the
various emergencies that may occur depending on the type of ship and its cargo.
3.12 The equipment used during drills shall immediately be brought back to its fully operational
condition, and any faults and defects discovered during the drills shall be remedied as soon as
possible.
3.13 Drills shall, as far as practicable, be conducted as if there were an actual emergency.
4 On-board training and instructions
4.1 On-board training and instructions in the use of the ship's life-saving appliances, including survival
craft equipment, and in the use of the ship's fire-extinguishing appliances shall be given as soon as
possible but not later than two weeks after a crew member joins the ship. However, if the crew
member is on a regularly scheduled rotating assignment to the ship, such training shall be given not
later than two weeks after the time of first joining the ship. Individual instruction may cover different
parts of the ship's life-saving and fire-extinguishing appliances, but all the ship's life-saving and
fire-extinguishing appliances shall be covered within any period of 2 months.
4.2 Each member of the crew shall be given instructions which shall include but not necessarily be
limited to:
.1 operation and use of the ship's inflatable liferafts;
.2 problems of hypothermia, first-aid treatment of hypothermia and other appropriate

first-aid procedures;
.3 special instructions necessary for use of the ship's life-saving appliances in

severe weather and severe sea conditions;
.4 operation and use of fire-extinguishing appliances.
4.3 On-board training in the use of davit-launched liferafts shall take place at intervals of not more than
4 months on every ship fitted with such appliances. Whenever practicable this shall include the
inflation and lowering of a liferaft. This liferaft may be a special liferaft intended for training
purposes only, which is not part of the ship's life-saving equipment: such a special liferaft shall be
conspicuously marked.
5 Records
The date when musters are held, details of abandon ship drills and fire drills, drills of other
life-saving appliances and on-board training shall be recorded in such log-book as may be
prescribed by the Administration. If a full muster, drill or training session is not held at the
appointed time, an entry shall be made in the log-book stating the circumstances and the extent of
the muster, drill or training session held.
11
Refer to resolution A.624(15) concerning guidelines on training for the purpose of launching lifeboats and rescue boats from
ships making headway through the water.

Comment
Regulation 18 very adequately covers emergency training and drills. The essential requirement
of a good fire drill is that it be made as realistic as possible, and never allowed to become
stereotyped and routine. Once this happens, every man-jack of the crew taking part will instantly
become bored with the whole thing; and the entire drill will become a waste of time, and worse.
During the drill, pumps must actually be operated, real water must flow through the hose, live
extinguishers must be set off. Never mind the mess; it won't take long to clear up afterwards (and
even if it does, no one will much mind, provided "the party" has been a good enough one — and
provided, of course, that it has stopped well short of taking a line of hose into the first-class
lounge!).
Ideally, in fact, fire drills should be actively enjoyed and looked forward to. This can quite well
be achieved provided that every drill is "laid on" with imagination, and that the make-believe is kept
to the very minimum. It is far better, for instance, to start a drill by letting off all the fire-bells
unexpectedly, as they would ring in a genuine emergency, than it is to post a notice two days before
saying there will be a fire drill at such-and-such a time on Thursday forenoon. (Indeed, it is possible
to maintain that no drill is a really good one that doesn't catch a popular member of the crew in his
shower ... !)
When carrying out fire drills it is terribly important to actively involve all members of the crew.
There is nothing more soul destroying to the "victims" than having to stand around during drills
doing nothing but twiddling their thumbs. The author has carried out a fairly large number of ocean
voyages for the purpose of conducting on-board crew training and he has found it necessary to
involve even the newest and youngest personnel. Nothing stimulates interest more than the feeling
that one is performing a useful function and to this end there is no harm in letting all the crew in,
turn have the opportunity to physically wear breathing apparatus even if some of these individuals
are unlikely ever to do so under actual fire conditions. Obviously this depends very much upon the
availability of an adequate supply of spare air cylinders—or better still an air compressor, but where
a smoke helmet is provided this can be worn to an unlimited extent. Similarly the younger members
of the crew should be encouraged during fire drills to operate portable fire extinguishers and they
should be given the task, under supervision, to re-charge these and put them back in service.
Apart from the need to conduct fire drills involving the entire crew there is a strong case for
involving on more numerous occasions the specialised fire parties. This gives them the opportunity
to practice as a team and, of course, it is teamwork which contributes so much to successful
fire-fighting. During these drills breathing apparatus should be worn and line signals diligently
practiced until the team know these like the back of their hands. It is always a good idea for men
wearing breathing apparatus to be blindfolded so that they become accustomed to penetrating
compartments without seeing where they are going, because in an actual fire situation visibility is
quite often down virtually to nil.
As has been stated in a previous Chapter, it is important that fire equipment should be used live
during drills. Pumps should be started, hose run out and nozzles—particularly the hand control
type-tested. It is very important that men get the chance to "get the feel" of the equipment and, for
example, practice adding a length of hose to a line and the correct way to replace a burst hose. Even
in the engine-room hose should be charged and the water directed into the bilges, from which
position it can be safely pumped out.
Drills should be varied every time, and hypothetical fire situations invented to cover every
possible contingency. Try to visualise how a given fire would actually spread, and plan your drill
accordingly — never forgetting how the thick smoke which will assuredly accompany the fire can
often make detection of its seat a tricky problem in itself. Bear always in mind for every drill a
particular lesson or lessons you want to teach; and don't fail to ram the points home, briefly but
vigorously, before the stand-down is given.
With your basic plan made, you will find that a little ingenuity and some cardboard can work
wonders. Print the words "STAIRCASE BLOCKED"; "CORRIDOR SMOKE-LOGGED"; "FIRE
HERE", and such-like on cards, and place them at tactical points about the ship, so that those
coming upon them unexpectedly are forced to think out alternative routes. Selected crew-men can

be "planted" as casualties, and others sent in to rescue them and get them to their boat station. Try in
every possible way to make the drill interesting, and even fun for the men and not just something
which has to be put up with and got over as quickly as possible.
Another thing well worth doing during the course of a fire drill is to set junior officers to work
making stability calculations for a given number of hoses playing for a given period of time on to an
imaginary fire burning in a given part of the superstructure of the ship (see Chapter 13 for a fuller
discussion of this problem of impaired stability). If senior officers were to bear in mind the fact that
formula for the output of a nozzle is given by equation below:
where d is the diameter of the nozzle in inches squared, and p the pressure of water at the nozzle
25d 2 p
expressed in pounds per square inch, it would be possible for them to check their juniors' work
without any loss of dignity—yet with possibly considerable benefit to their own nautical education!
For example using the above formula it can be calculated that you get about one ton of water per
minute through a one inch nozzle at 100 psi.
Roll Call
Before any fire drill is physically started it is important that the roll is called and all personnel
accounted for. This roll call is particularly significant in the case of an engine-room fire where,
before a CO2 system can be turned on, the space must be evacuated. Many such fires have been
allowed to spread because of the confusion and delay caused by a lack of positive knowledge
regarding the whereabouts of all the engineering staff. It is, of course, just such incidents which
prompts the author to believe that water spray is far and away the best system for the protection of
such spaces because there is no need to batten down—and call for a tow, if not to abandon ship, as
is all too common where gas smothering systems are concerned. See Chapter 3.
Now calling the roll from a prepared list can be time wasting and sometimes uncertain. To
overcome this problem the author would like to put forward a suggestion whereby these difficulties
can be obviated. Basically the system use a tally on which is recorded each individual's name and,
if required, his number.
It is a simple matter to issue each man with a tally but the difficulty is that when the fire occurs
there is no guarantee that he will have it with him at the crucial time. To position such tallies in
every cabin is unsatisfactory because of the considerable waste of time occasioned by men having to
return there in an emergency and also because the fire itself might prevent this action. He could, of
course, wear the tally on a chain or cord round his neck but here again he might forget it, for
example after taking a shower and the system would fall down .
The system suggested is for a tally board, on which a tally is attached for each person on board,
to be provided and housed in such position as will guarantee that it will always be accessible no
matter where or what the fire situation. For example, on tankers, bulk or chemical carriers, the
situation which commends itself for initial assembly and roll call is the aftermost open deck (poop
deck) of the vessel. This position has the enormous advantage that it is protected by the huge
accommodation/bridge/engine-room housing and experience indicates that this area remains
relatively unaffected even after a devastating explosion has ruptured cargo tanks. In practice it is
important that the board be positioned under cover and the point suggested is in an alleyway just
inside the aftermost door leading to the open deck. In this position it will be available under all
circumstances. As almost all modern ships are now of all aft construction this aftermost position
could well be universally acceptable and this would have the very great advantage that newly joined
crew members would automatically repair there in time of emergency—even before they had time to
have the local conditions explained to them.
Before going on to describe the Roll Call Board in detail it is important to outline the
characteristics of a good shipboard fire Organisation:
1. The Organisation should be simple to understand by all personnel.
2. It should be easy to keep up to date and require the least possible effort on the part of the
administration.

3. The system adopted should be made as standard as possible throughout a Fleet, bearing in
mind differences between ships.
4. It should incorporate a Roll Call procedure so as to account for all personnel within a minute
or so.
5. It should ensure that personnel with appropriate skills be utilised for the various fire and
rescue situations likely to be met on board, e.g. deck crew for accommodation, holds or
tanks; engineers for machinery spaces; purser and steward for first aid.
6. The minimum number of men should form the fire parties, e.g. 5 for Main Party, 5/6 for
Back-up Party; 4 for First Aid Party (experience shows that too large numbers leads to
confusion).
7. All personnel not actually engaged in fire-fighting or rescue to remain at the Muster Point
where they are available to undertake individual tasks as required by the Master and/or Chief
Engineer, according to the situation prevailing at the time.
8. Good communications are essential, e.g. fire telephone or walkie talkie, between the Muster
Point, the Bridge and the seat of the fire.
9. Realistic fire/rescue drills should be regularly carried out and should ensure that, over a
period, all parts of the ship which could possibly be involved are covered.
10. So far as is practicable standard fire
equipment should be used throughout
a Fleet.
11. All officers and as many of the crew as
possible should attend shore fire
courses. Officers should take refresher
courses every five years.
Reverting to the tally board itself. The
board should be made of thick Marine
plyboard. Slots in the board should
accommodate a sufficient number of tallies,
size 2 x 2 inches, to cater for the maximum
number of persons likely to be on board at any
one time, e.g. including wives of crew and
supernumeries. Care must be taken to ensure
that the tallies are so secured that they will not
be blown away by gale force winds when the
board is taken out onto the open after-poop
deck. In addition there should be a larger tally
attached to the bottom of the board with
printed headings "Bridge" and "Engine Room
Control". Figure 12.4 illustrates the tally
board which was developed by the author for
use on Esso tankers in the 1970's.
The tallys should be arranged in numerical
order according to the crew list, which means
in practice starting at the top left hand side
with the Master and Deck Officers, then the
Chief Engineer and Engineering Officers,
followed by Senior Ratings, down through the
remainder of the crew and any supernumeries
who might be on board. By following this
practice men know approximately the position
on the board at which they will find their own FIGURE 12.4 Crew's roll call and muster board.
tally.

As soon as possible after a crew change the Purser (or an other officer nominated by the Master)
must bring the tally board up to date. A chinagraph pencil is suitable for this purpose.
In the event of fire, manning of the Bridge and Engine-Room Control, as well as the Radio
Room, is essential and to avoid unnecessary movement of personnel it is suggested the following
procedure be adopted:
BRIDGE Master, Officer of the Watch, Watchkeeping A.B.

RADIO ROOM Radio Officer.
ENGINE-ROOM Chief Engineer, Officer of the Watch, Assistant Watchkeeper,
Electrician.
There are decided advantages associated with holding the Watchkeepers on post during an
emergency because they will be familiar with the current state of the vessel. Individual Master's and
Chief Engineer's might wish to have additional personnel reporting to their respective controls and
this will be quite in order providing their names are recorded on the large tally.
The suggested operation of this Roll Call system is as follows:
1. The first man to reach the Tally Board will take it to a predetermined position on the
After-poop Deck. It is important that a means of communication be provided-such as a hand
held radio or fixed telephone.
2. The first watchkeeping deck officer to arrive on the After-poop Deck will assume the task of
Control Officer until relieved by the person nominated to assume this role.
3. Each crew member and supernumery will remove his tally from the board and place it in his
pocket. NOTE: If an individual is wearing garments without pockets he should hand his
tally to a colleague for safe keeping for it is essential that these be replaced on the board
after the emergency.
4. Members of the various parties, main, back-up, first aid, utility etc. should assemble on the
open deck in readily identifiable groups.
5. As soon as the Engine-Room party has reached their control point the Chief Engineer will
notify the Bridge. The Radio Officer will similarly report. The Master, using the talk-back
telephone, or other means of communication, will then notify the Control Officer that all
personnel whose names appear on the large tally have properly reported.
6. The Control Officer will ensure that all persons on the poop deck have removed their
individual tallies. Upon receiving confirmation from the Bridge he will then remove the
tallies of those persons who have reported to their respective stations on the Bridge, Engine
and Radio Rooms. At this stage no tallys will remain on the board unless relating to a
missing person or persons. In the latter case the Control Officer will notify the Bridge and
despatch an appropriate number of the Utility Party to conduct a search.
7. Acting upon instructions received from the Master the Control Officer will despatch the
appropriate fire party, or parties, to the seat of the fire or other emergency. The Master need
not necessarily wait until the Roll Call has been completed before despatching the Main Fire
Party. This party will consist of Deck personnel in the case of accommodation or deck
incidents and Engineers where machinery space is concerned.
8. All personnel not immediately involved must remain, on the Poop Deck at all times until
ordered to move by the Control Officer. In this position these men will be available for such
tasks as shutting ventilators, fetching additional equipment such as spare air cylinders,
launching lifeboats etc.
In conjunction with this plan it is a good idea where two lifeboats are provided to number all
crew cabins on board the ship in such a way as to achieve an even distribution of crew. Odd
numbers to proceed to the starboard and even numbers to the port boats. This means that the Master

and Chief Deck Officer will have odd and even numbers respectively and so on down through the
various ranks. The Chief and First Engineers will also have odd and even numbers so that there is a
senior officer from deck and engine-room in each lifeboat. Where a greater number of lifeboats is
concerned it simply requires a variation of this system.
The numbering of cabins using numerals which stand proud of the door has another advantage.
It is an unfortunate fact of life that, as a race, seamen are guilty of smoking in bed and where this
very regrettable habit results in fire the inevitable outcome is the production of a great deal of
smoke. Finding the affected cabin in a smoke filled alleyway can sometimes be extremely difficult
but made much easier if the rescuers can positively identify the appropriate number by feel. In
practice the man will be shown as missing following the calling of the roll and providing his cabin
number is recorded on his tally it becomes a relatively simple matter to find this even in thick
smoke.
Some shipping companies in fact operate their fire plan on cabin numbers allocating this rather
than names to individual duties e.g. Main Fire Party Nos. 4, 20, 23, 24, 29. Difficulties can arise
when men are allocated other cabins and an individual occupying one of these might not be suitable,
by virtue of age or aptitude, to perform a task such as breathing apparatus wearer. On balance the
author favours names being allocated for the various functions.
It is recommended that shipping companies prepare standard forms upon which is printed the
various headings applicable to action to be taken by the crew upon the sounding of an alarm and
detail of their action in case of fire. This should be divided into two parts, one for deck and
accommodation fires and the other for engine-room fires. On this form should be recorded headings
BRIDGE, MAIN FIRE PARTY, BACK-UP PARTY, UTILITY GROUP, ENGINE-ROOM PARTY,
FIRST AID and names appended as appropriate. Opposite each heading should be printed the duties
of each party e.g. Main Fire Party-Attack Fire; Utility Party as Instructed by Control Officer. The
alarm signals should be included in order that all the crew are familiar with these. These forms
could, with advantage, include a simple line drawing layout of each deck and should be posted (i)
on the Bridge; (ii) in Officers Accommodation; (iii) in Ratings Accommodation; (iv) in Engine
Room Control.
There is a further use for this very positive system for calling the roll. Everyone who has sailed
on the very large tonnage ships knows that occasionally someone is reported missing and this causes
a minor flap to occur. Usually the individual has gone to work in a remote spot and failed to say
where he was going. But the Master cannot rely on this being the case and it is essential that he find
the missing man because it is always conceivable that he has fallen overboard, in which case the
ship must turn around. He could, of course be trapped by the fire itself, or is lying injured, or has
taken ill and unable to help himself. Rather than waste time searching the ship the easiest thing to
do is to sound the general alarm and conduct a roll call. This takes only a very few minutes and
positively reveals the true position. The man who was the cause of the furore usually turns up,
somewhat red faced, to the accompaniment of ribald remarks from his colleagues, particularly those
off-watch and enjoying a deep sleep at the time! But on the other hand if the fears are realised the
Master knows positively that he has to take urgent action to find out what has happened to the man.
Training Manuals
Chapter III Life-saving appliances and arrangements
Part C Life-saving appliance requirements
Regulation 51 Training manual

The training manual, which may comprise several volumes, shall contain instructions and
information, in easily understood terms illustrated wherever possible, on the life-saving appliances
provided in the ship and on the best methods of survival. Any part of such information may be

provided in the form of audio-visual aids in lieu of the manual. The following shall be explained in
detail:
.1 donning of lifejackets and immersion suits, as appropriate;
.2 muster at the assigned stations;
.3 boarding, launching, and clearing the survival craft and rescue boats;
.4 method of launching from within the survival craft;
.5 release from launching appliances;
.6 methods and use of devices for protection in launching areas, where appropriate;
.7 illumination in launching areas;
.8 use of all survival equipment;
.9 use of all detection equipment;
.10 with the assistance of illustrations, the use of radio life-saving appliances;
.11 use of drogues;
.12 use of engine and accessories;
.13 recovery of survival craft and rescue boats including stowage and securing;
.14 hazards of exposure and the need for warm clothing;
.15 best use of the survival craft facilities in order to survive; [See footnote 91]
.16 methods of retrieval, including the use of helicopter rescue gear (slings, baskets,
stretchers), breeches-buoy and shore life-saving apparatus and ship's
line-throwing apparatus;
.17 all other functions contained in the muster list and emergency instructions;
.18 instructions for emergency repair of the life-saving appliances.
Comment
Although the training manuals required to be prepared in accordance with SOLAS concentrate on
life savings arrangements the readers attention is drawn to the fact that the training manuals must
also include details about the detection systems and the roles to be fulfilled by officers and crew
under the vessels emergency instructions.
As a final piece to this Chapter the author would draw attention to the greatly increased attention
being paid in all its many guises, to safety, which is exemplified by the new ISM Code.
Management, in all its many and varied forms, including owners, charter parties, shippers of
hazardous goods, stevedores, surveyors and perhaps above all, Classification Societies, should be
warned that they ignore the dictates of this code at their peril. Out of sight, out of mind, is quite
simply not an option in this day and age. Anyone doubting this would be well advised to read the
author's comments on this subject in the case of the Scandinavian Star fire — Chapter 4.

Chapter Thirteen
Fire-Fighting in Ships in Port and at Sea
Despite the many hundreds of bad fires on board ship of which detailed record has been kept, it
is doubtful if any two of these outbreaks have been (from the fire-fighter's point of view) identically
similar. Fire aboard is, indeed, capable of achieving almost infinite variety in the cause and manner
of its outbreak, in the place where it starts, in the direction in which it spreads, and in the types of
fuel on which it will feed.
For this reason, anything in the nature of a fully comprehensive treatise on the fighting of fire
aboard ship would be almost impossible to write; and if written, would be almost useless in practice
by reason of its inevitable bulk. A good introduction to the subject is nevertheless available in The
Manual of Firemanship, published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office. Another useful guide for
landbased fire-fighters tackling ship fires is NFPA 1405 published by the National Fire Protection
Association in the US.
What follows in the rest of this Chapter is an attempt to underline certain basic principles which
should be observed in all ship fire-fighting; to pass on certain practical hints which the author has
learnt by hard experience; and to throw out one or two ideas for the future. The problems presented
differ greatly according to whether the vessel concerned is in harbour when the fire breaks out, or at
sea. (It may surprise the non-seagoer to learn that the average merchant vessel spends almost as
much of her working life in the one condition as in the other.)
Since there will obviously be more possible lines of counterattack open to the "defending forces"
when the ship is in port, the main emphasis in the discussion has been shaped accordingly; but much
of what is said will be equally applicable, mutatis mutandis, to the fighting of fire at sea.
FIRE-FIGHTING IN PORT
The Importance of Proper Liaison
The first, and by far the most important, thing the author would say about the fighting of any fire
in a port (whether it be on a ship berthed there or in the port installations themselves) is that, to
achieve maximum success, it must be a combined operation. As the UK Working Party of 1949
stress so strongly in their Report, there is the most pressing need for the closest possible personal
liaison between the Harbour Authorities, the ship-owners or ship-managers using the port, the
shipbuilders or ship repairers working in it, and the public Fire Brigades protecting it.
It is really imperative that senior Fire Brigade officers should regularly meet and be on friendly
terms with the Harbour Masters, with the senior Police Officers, the Shore Superintendents, the
senior Shore Engineer Officers representing all the shipping companies, and with the senior Officers
of all major vessels regularly using the port they cover. Only by this personal acquaintance can
really efficient liaison be maintained during fire-fighting operations; for then each officer already
knows his counterpart and will, it is to be hoped, have learnt to respect each other's particular
problems and point of view.
It is of no earthly use waiting until the fire starts before making this acquaintance. There often
comes a time in fire-fighting on board a large ship when difficult decisions have to be taken, and
403
taken quickly. For example, when to cease putting any more water on to a fire because a list is
assuming dangerous proportions, or whether the ship should be moved to another part of the dock,
or out of the dock altogether so as to safeguard the entire dock system. When such decisions have
to be taken, the advantage of knowing that the man in civilian clothes you are talking to in the dead
of night, and at a time when the fire is threatening to get completely out of hand — that this man is
the senior Shore Superintendent of the company that owns the ship involved is worth another
pump's crew to the fire officer in charge. And the Harbour Master and several others come into the
same category.
Not only must the senior Officers meet and get to know one another, however. It is almost
equally important that the rank and file of the Fire Brigades should be encouraged to go aboard the
principal ships using the docks, so that they can get a working knowledge of the topography of these
vessels. If the fire-fighter from the local Station (who, it must be realised, has probably never been
to sea in his life) can get to know the "ins and outs" of a ship — its companion ways, the cargo
ports and other openings in the ship's side, the connections for the shore-to-ship hydrants, the
galleys and lift-shafts, the various decks and the accommodation to be found at each level, the
means of escape from that level, the chain locker and the. paint store, the engine-room and the
position of the settling tanks, the shaft tunnel access, the access to 'tween-decks and hold, the
refrigeration engine-room, the baggage and store-rooms and the thousand-and-one other vital
corners which exist on a large passenger ship if he can get a real working knowledge of all this, then
the chances of a fire getting so badly out of hand as to result in a "burn-out" will assuredly be
greatly reduced.
Close liaison with the Police is also essential; and the author would stress the great advantages to
both Services which can come from reciprocal talks given to the rank-and-file of both by senior
Officers of the other. The assistance which the Police can render to the Fire Service in time of a
really serious fire cannot be overestimated. Traffic control, the clearing of non-essential people
from a ship or a quayside, assistance in getting hold of key personnel whose advice is urgently
required, communications generally, and specialised assistance during the subsequent enquiry into
the cause of fire are only part of the story.
No less important is it that a fire-fighter should have detailed personal knowledge of the port
installations and warehouses he is supposed to be protecting. Large warehouses and refrigerated
stores are complicated structures; and he will be well advised to pay special attention to such points
as the various ways into the building, the nearest available water supplies, design of staircases, the
position and method of closing fire-resisting doors., the position of sprinkler stop valves and of
refrigerator controls, and (last but not least) the nature of the refrigerant being used.
Conversely, of course, the Port Officials in charge of the warehouses might do well to remember
that their Fire Brigade colleague is apt to be keenly interested in any special fire risks which may
from time to time accumulate in storage. If, for instance, large quantities of rubber or fats, or other
similar substances presenting special hazards, are due to arrive in such-and-such a ship on such and
such a day, the local "fire chief" is certain to be very interested indeed to be told . He may even
have some quite useful ideas on how the stuff can most safely be stored!
The Fire Officer, in turn must always be ready to co-operate to the full with the officials of his
Port, and to help with any special services even if they are not directly connected with fire-fighting.
Nothing could be further from the author's mind than to suggest that this sort of co-operation and
liaison is a rare thing in British ports. Indeed, he takes with pleasure this opportunity of expressing
his grateful thanks to all those many people who offered him such unstinted help, in these and other
matters, during the years (1954-59) when he was in charge of the East Ham Fire Brigade covering
the Royal Group of London Docks.
At the same time, it is true to say that there remain one or two shipping companies who are not as
keen to help as they might be when an approach is made to them by the local Fire Brigade.
Conversely, it is also true that there are some Fire Brigades who feel perhaps too strongly that men
on duty should never be allowed outside their Station save to answer an actual call to a fire.

Fire-fighting in Ships in Port and at Sea 405
To both, the author would suggest that they may be missing a number of good opportunities of
increasing their own efficiency at their own jobs.
Some Principles of Fire-fighting

All fires need fuel and oxygen before they can burn; and all fires produce heat. Take away any
one of these three elements, and the fire goes out.
The three basic methods of fire-fighting are therefore: COOLING, STARVING and
SMOTHERING. When water is applied to burning material in a ship's cabin the temperature of the
fuel is reduced below its ignition point, and the fire is put out by COOLING.
When bales of burning cotton are removed from a hold, or when a ship on fire at sea can be so
manoeuvred that the flames are "blown overboard", the fire is put out by STARVING it.
When an inert-gas system actuated in a burning hold succeeds in reducing the oxygen content of
the air in that hold to below 15 per cent by volume, that fire is put out by SMOTHERING.
Since water can only extinguish a fire by cooling the fuel to below its ignition point, it follows
that water directed on to a fire is only achieving its maximum effectiveness if it is being turned into
steam by direct contact with the flames.
To raise water from a normal temperature to boiling point absorbs some 150 British Thermal
Units per pound from the agent which is heating it. But to turn that boiling water into actual steam
requires that as much as 973 B.T.U.'s per lb. be given up by the heating agent.
Ideally, therefore, no drop of water being directed on to a fire should ever drain away from the
scene of the fight. It should all be turned into steam.
In practice, of course, this is never anywhere near possible. But what is worth watching is the
evidence which can be supplied by the water which does drain away. If it is still quite cold, it can
hardly have been playing any great part in reducing the temperature. It might therefore be as well to
give urgent thought to the question of whether it might be better directed.
Hot air rises! Everybody knows that in the common household oven you put the food which
needs most heat on the top shelf, while stuff which merely needs to be kept warm goes on to the
bottom shelf.
It is no different in a fire. It is therefore basically good fire-fighting to get as nearly level with a
fire as possible, and even beneath it if you can. In this way you get below the heat wave, and can
undertake in comparative comfort what may look to a bystander a really hazardous operation.
This important truth is very sharply brought home to all young trainee fire-fighters when they are
made to tackle their first practice fire. They find that if they lie flat on the floor of the fire chamber,
they can breathe far more easily, and can also dodge the heat wave which exists only a foot or two
off the ground.
Or look at a compartment which has been on fire. You will see that the most severe damage is
always done near the ceiling. The top panels, too, will often be burned out of the door, while the
bottom panels are virtually undamaged.
With those few paragraphs of introduction, it is time to consider in more detail particular types of
fire which can break out in a ship in port.
Remember first, though, that if a bad one is to be put out, it will only be by means of a real
combined operation. CALL THE FIRE BRIGADE, therefore, however insignificant the emergency
may seem to be. And if things look like getting really bad, try, to see that such people as the
Harbour Master, the Shore Superintendent of the shipping company, and the Dock Police are
informed with as little delay as possible.
Fire in a Hold
All professional fire-fighters know that one of the worst types of fire they may be called upon to
face is the one raging in a basement below ground level. There is frequently no other way to get at
it save from on top and that is the one direction from which it is sometimes impossible, generally
dangerous, and always beastly unpleasant to make the approach!

From a fire-fighting point of view, a ship's hold is no better than a steel-enclosed basement. A
wise fire-fighter will therefore be glad to seize any good excuse for not immediately opening up a
burning hold, and climbing down into it with a line of hose before he has to.
Yet this is by no means the only reason why the author is convinced that there has in the past
been a tendency to open up burning holds far too quickly. Admitting, and admiring, as he does the
trained fire-fighter's ingrained urge to get to grips with the seat of a fire with the least possible
delay, he believes nevertheless that there is much to be said for "playing the waiting game" with any
normal (but see below) fire in a hold, and would again urge all fire-fighters to consider and
reconsider the report of the United States Coast Guard on their smothering-gas experiment with the
U.S.C.G. cutter Phobos, described in Chapter 8.
If 95 per cent of a cargo can be saved by a certain line of attack and one which involves also
minimal risk of structural damage to the vessel itself, what matters it that final extinction of the fire
may take 48 hours or so? Is the fire-fighter's eager urge to take instant and aggressive
counter-offensive action against fire always wisely indulged?
The author believes that, in the case of most "normal" fires in a ship's hold, it is not. During
investigation into many ship fires which have occurred in port the author is forced to the conclusion
that world-wide many fire brigades are still much too anxious to open up holds without giving any
great thought as to the consequences. Naturally when a hold is uncovered the action taken is a
matter for judgement on the part of the officer in charge. He would urge, rather, that wherever a
fixed extinguishing system is fitted in an endangered hold (be it inert-gas or even the less effective
steam), it be actuated at once, and the hold in question be kept tightly battened down until
temperature, smoke and other tests indicate that the fire has been beaten down or suppressed.
Particularly strongly would he urge this advice when a bulk cargo of fibrous materials, such as
cotton, is involved.
The lengthy period of time which this "holding action" may be expected (indeed, must be
allowed) to last will give the defence ample time to work out a coherent plan of later attack (should
one be necessary), in the light of such factors as the nature, amount and method of storage of the
cargo in the affected hold, the contents of adjoining compartments, the availability of fire-fighting
"ammunition" and equipment, and so on.
The fire-fighters might also usefully employ some part of the breathing-space afforded them to
weigh realistically what would be involved in the alternative policy of immediate counterattack. If a
fire be deep-seated in a hold filled to capacity, it is going to take three or four days' hard work, at the
best of times, to get down to it. If the nature of the burning material, plus the added oxygen fed to
the fire by the very act of "opening up" if these two factors combine to fill the hold with smoke (as
they almost certainly will), the time taken will probably be much longer, there will certainly be
labour trouble (there always is in these conditions), and there will also be grave risk of injury to
those taking part.
The outstandingly important exception to this rule of "Try smothering first, if available" is if a
cargo of nitrates or sulphates is involved. The only answer in this case (as has already been
emphasised in Chapter 4) is SPEED and WATER — and the maximum of both.
It is also possible that immediate action will be essential when explosives are being carried in the
'tween-decks. If the fire be severe, and unless it is certain that the fixed inert-gas smothering
installation will be rapidly effective, swift flooding may be the only alternative to total destruction
of the ship, and of all the port installations in its vicinity. (Remember that, even if it happens to be
available, steam smothering must NEVER be attempted when explosives are present.)
One of the risks associated with flooding a hold is that burning material may be floated upwards
until the flames are in contact with the underside of the upper 'tween-deck, whose temperature they
may raise to a dangerous extent.
The best way of avoiding this danger is to hose in the maximum possible quantity of water from
the very outset. Every available pump should be deployed to pour in water through open-ended
hose. They should be set to work through all ventilators, and if possible from such vantage points
within the hold itself as where trunkways pass to the lower hold from mast-houses. If the engineers

can advise that the non-return valves fitted in most bilge suction pumps do not make the project
impossible, let these pumps too be mobilised to accelerate the rate of flooding.
One further method of getting water quickly into a hold is also available — namely, to cut a hole
in the side of the ship. But that is a drastic step which should only be taken as a last resort — and
then only in consultation with the Harbour Master, whose word in such a matter must be final.
The author was recently involved in a ship fire in a foreign port which will serve as an
illustration of the value in playing a "waiting game". The ship in question was a two hold cargo
vessel of 4,000 tons deadweight, carrying 1,750 tons of baled raw cotton. Whilst at sea fire was
discovered in number one hold. The Master wisely applied CO2 gas from the ship's fixed system
and steamed for the nearest port. Whilst still at sea the Master realised that the supply of CO2
would be exhausted before reaching port and he called for the assistance of a salvage vessel. The
deck at the forward part of No. 1 hold was extremely hot, to the extent that the paint was badly
blistered. Having carefully considered the situation the Salvage Master decided to beach the
stricken ship on a sandbank outside the port and it was at that point that the author was called to
assist.
Arriving on the scene, some five days after the initial fire, the author found the situation as
described above. The action taken was to continue to apply a few bottles of CO2 every four hours or
so for the purpose of topping-up and to caulk with gypsum the many leaks in the hatch covers. Heat
at the forward end of the hold was slowly reduced. over the following five days, but because baled
cotton was involved it was known that the fire could never be finally extinguished by means of inert
gas.
This time was not wasted but used to prepare all the equipment which would be required when
the hold was finally opened and the cargo worked out. Preparations included the procurement of a
dumb barge to lie alongside and onto which would be loaded any fire damaged bales removed from
the hold. Fire-fighting gear, such as compressed air breathing apparatus, hose, spray nozzles,
portable fire extinguishers and a 45 gallon steel drum was fitted with lifting tackle. It was intended
that the steel drum be partly filled with water and into this would be placed any hot embers found
when the seat of the fire was reached. A resuscitator was provided in case anyone was overcome
during the fire-fighting. An Industrial Chemist was employed to test the gases in the hold and
regular checks made of the temperature. As the price of flammable gas detectors has fallen, most
fire experts carry gas detectors as standard. Some instruments are able to measure oxygen, carbon
monoxide, hydrogen sulphide and flammable gas concentration expressed as a percentage of the
lower explosive limit. Such instruments are not only useful in determining the whether or not an
atmosphere is inerted, but by measuring carbon monoxide and LEL, information about fire activity
can be deduced.
Heat at the forward end of the hatch was reduced to the extent that it was possible to keep a hand
on the metal surfaces. All the equipment was ready and at this point the author, wearing breathing
apparatus, went down an inspection trunk on the forepeak, taking with him a charged line of hose
fitted with a spray nozzle. He found that there were a number of smouldering bales some 12-15 feet
down but that fire had not reached the top of the stow, other than some scorching on the top layer
extending about 20 feet aft. The action taken at this stage was to spray the smouldering bales, then
very lightly spray the upper surfaces of bales just below deck level. Next the forward pontoon was
removed and men wearing breathing apparatus immediately began taking out cotton bales
immediately over the area of the fire. A few layers down the bales were found to have been on fire
and after spraying with water these were immediately removed to the dumb barge. After an hours
very hard work the seat of the fire was reached and the charred remains of badly burned bales were
placed in the water-filled drum. Work continued until a trunk was dug down to the bottom of the
hold and only "green" bales were exposed.
Only some twenty five tons of cotton was removed and the success of the operation can be
judged from the fact that a mere six tons were lost — the remainder being the subject of salvage.
The balance of the cargo was completely undamaged. This incident quite certainly shows the value
of proceeding slowly and with careful planning in order to achieve a satisfactory outcome in the

case of a fire in a ship's hold. The Salvage

Company's action in this case showed great skill
and restraint which is an example to their
colleagues operating in this field.
When a hold has to be worked out after a fire
in which CO2 gas has been used, the gas should be
cleared in layers as the cargo is removed, so
retaining its inhibiting effect as long as possible.
When this is done, it is wise to get a chemist to
take samples of the air so as to ensure safe
working conditions for the stevedores.
The best method of clearing CO2, is by means
of extractor fans and flexible hose. The use of
windsails is not recommended because they tend
to create excessive turbulence.
It is essential that a careful watch be kept on
the condition of all bulkheads in compartments
adjoining the fire on all sides, lest the fire be FIGURE 13.1 Sketch shows how CO2 smothering
spread by conduction of heat. This is a fairly gas can be used to control fire in the lower hold
while cargo is being worked from the 'tween-deck.
simple matter when the adjoining holds are During the lengthy period of time which a fixed
empty, or if the next-door compartment be a smothering installation must be given to do its
machinery-space. It is less simple when the work, the-fire-fighters need not be idle.
adjoining holds are full of merchandise.
Into such holds it is usually best to introduce carbon dioxide, when available, as a precautionary
measure to inhibit the spread of fire.
Again, when an upper 'tween-deck is being cleared, a most careful watch must be kept on the
temperature of the deck, which should be sprayed to keep it cool if there is any sign of heat. On no
account should the hatches leading to a lower hold or lower 'tween-deck in which a fixed
installation has been actuated be opened until the upper 'tween-deck has been completely cleared.
If, despite the foregoing, a hatch has got to be opened, the following rules will be found useful:
1. Never open a hatchway until charged lines of hose are laid out ready for action, and the
officer in charge has decided on his plan of campaign.
2. Connect up, whenever possible, to a supply of fresh water from quayside hydrants. Dock
water is both salt and dirty (which damages cargo), and often strewn with floating debris
(which is apt to block pumps).
3. Close all openings in the ship's side (loading doors, port-holes, etc.) at a very early stage.
This will stop unnecessary air reaching the fire; and if the vessel should later develop a
bad list, it will obviate the danger of flooding from dock water getting into the hull.
4. It is a good early move to test the temperature of the smoke coming from the ventilators;
for from this a good guide can often be obtained as to the severity of the lire. It can also
often be ascertained by the volume of smoke coming from the ventilators whether a fire is
burning in the lower hold or in a 'tween-deck; for separate ventilators are often installed at
each of these levels in a hold.
5. Breathing apparatus — as many sets as there are available should always be donned before
the hatches are opened, so as to give the wearers ample time to get "settled into" them
before they are called into action.
6. When a man wearing breathing apparatus has to climb down into a hold pouring forth
smoke and heat, he must take with him a line of charged, preferably small bore and quite
certainly not 2½ inch hose, fitted with a controlled spray nozzle, or at least a line to guide
him back to open air. For the descent of a vertical ladder into a burning hold or
engine-room undoubtedly calls for a particular type of nerve. Far from the friendly

daylight or the glow of comrades' lamps, and encumbered with his heavy apparatus, the
fire-fighter must grope his way to a steel ladder leading to a hold, the bottom of which
may be as much as 40 ft. below him. He must rely entirely on his sense of touch, never
transferring his weight from one foot to the other until he is certain it is safe. He feels
very lonely down there — and colleagues on deck seem a million miles away!
Once on top of the cargo (which is never stowed in nice level layers!) and still completely
blind, he must poke about until he finds the actual seat of the fire. (All fire-fighters worthy
of the name intensely dislike playing water merely on to smoke — though it must be
admitted that there are occasions when there is no alternative.) Having found the seat of
the fire the fire-fighter must then set about tackling it with the line of hose which will have
been lowered to him at the foot of the ladder. If he has remembered his training, he will
have fastened a line to lead him back to the foot of the ladder, but it may still be a long
time before he can begin the long climb back into fresh air.
When the smoke has dispersed and the details of his journey can be clearly seen, he will
be able to afford a quiet smile as he looks down into the hold and sees perhaps the ladder
which “stepped in" suddenly as it passed through a tween-deck and so had him hanging on
by his fingertips while his feet clawed frantically for the next rung. Or he will recognise
the cave formed by huge packing cases which had him so baffled when he crawled into it
during his search for the seat of the fire. It looks so easy now-but how different it was in
the middle of that dangerous "Blind Man's Buff"!
It is indeed difficult for someone who has never tried to breathe and move in thick smoke,
in surroundings which are completely strange, to appreciate fully what a fire-fighter's job
entails. Ship's officers joining a new ship spend quite a lot of time getting to know the
layout of the vessel and not infrequently get lost in the process. How much harder to
explore the same ship when it is "blacked out" by impenetrable smoke!
Incidentally, it is worth mentioning at this point one rather unexpected, but nevertheless
very real, danger which must be guarded against when moving in thick smoke about a
strange engine-room. In these circumstances even his own lifeline can be a source of
deadly danger to the wearer. There is a real risk of the line being caught up in, for
instance, an electrical generator with results for the wearer which can be imagined. In
such circumstances, it is sound practice for the lifeline to be carried by the fire-fighter, and
played out by him as he goes in towards the fire. It should not be attached to his body.
7. When an attack with lines of hose is being mounted in a laden hold, branches fitted with
hand control spray nozzle should generally be used, because they cause less water
damage to cargo.
8. If a fire-fighter, unable despite vigorous efforts to locate the seat of fire, is forced to apply
water in a more random attempt to reduce the general temperature, he should remember
that heat rises, and should direct his jet first of all to the roof of the compartment. He
should then shut off, and wait a few moments to see if his move has helped to reveal the
actual source of fire.
9. If this latter be situated beneath the wings of the hold, it will follow that, unless the
branchman can get right down on top of the cargo, he will not be able to hit the fire at all.
If this is impossible because of the heat, what is termed a "slung branch" will be found
useful. An uncharged length of hose fitted with an open nozzle is laid out on deck, and a
long line is attached to the hose coupling by means of a clove hitch and a half hitch taken
round the nozzle. Two men stationed at either side of the open hatch then lower the hose
to a point about half-way down the compartment on fire. The water is then turned on, and
the men can direct the hose to any point at will by manipulating the line. (See Fig. 13.2)
Most Fire Brigades, of course, also carry either cellar nozzles or revolving branches, both of
which are very effective in such situations.

Fire in Accommodation Spaces

Fires in accommodation spaces, unlike
fires in holds, must always be tackled with
the utmost speed. The fire load in such
spaces is very high indeed, and the long rows
of cabins and alleyways form traps which
quickly become smoke-logged and filled with
heat. The elaborate system of ventilation
trunking, and the miles of cable ducts, also
tend to transmit heat and smoke over
appreciable distances, and make the task of
confining the fire very great. On the bigger FIGURE 13.2 Fire-fighting in a 'tweed-deck by means of a
"slung branch".
passenger vessels, all the public spaces such
as dining-rooms and lounges are very large,
and are furnished like their counterparts in a luxury hotel. In particular, they are panelled; and this
(particularly in older ships in which modern fire-resisting materials have not been used) can lead to
a rapid spread of fire.
The installation of sprinklers and automatic fire alarms in such spaces which is now mandatory
in respect of passenger ships must, of course, be of tremendous value. In the case of cargo ships
these must now conform to one or other of the three alternative Methods of Protection laid down
and this must surely lead to improved fire safety.
When a vessel is in port, with only a skeleton crew and a mass of tradesmen on board, the
accommodation spaces present a very high fire risk. An efficient patrol system is the best
insurance; but experience in the loss of the Empress of Canada shows that it must be backed by an
efficient alarm system maintained in good working order. A considerable physical effort is
demanded of a person needing to raise the alarm on finding a fire deep down in a large ship, if no
electrical alarm system is installed. This is particularly so at such times as a Sunday afternoon,
when few members of the crew will be aboard. Delays amounting to several minutes can elapse in
such circumstances before the fire is tackled; and once a fire has reached a certain stage, termed the
"flash-over" stage by fire-fighters, such delays can have serious consequences. (The flashover stage
is reached when all the combustible materials in a compartment, including the paint on its walls, are
beginning to exude flammable vapours which is only waiting to reach its flash point before bursting
suddenly into flame, frequently with explosive violence).
At this "flashover" point, a fire passes from the stage at which a hand extinguisher can be
expected to put it out, to a stage at which a line or lines of hose are needed. It is for this reason that
speed of attack is essential in tackling all fires which break out where there is ample air available to
supply oxygen to the outbreak.
The "flashover" explanation just given should also make it clear to the layman why the door of a
compartment on fire should never be opened until fire-fighting equipment is in readiness. Even
then, if it should seem that a really serious fire is burning on the other side of the door, it is often
better not to open it but to smash a bottom door panel and to direct a cooling jet towards the ceiling,
in an effort to bring down the temperature.
When the time does come to enter the burning compartment, the branchman should remember to
crouch low or even to crawl in lying on the floor, so as to prevent the blast of heat and smoke which
will be released from chasing him back into the corridor. Immediately, also, he should first of all
direct his jet towards the ceiling so as to cool the atmosphere and to prevent the fire bursting out of
the compartment through the opened door.
The officer in charge of an accommodation fire should, as a first move, shut off the ventilating
system and see that all fire-resisting doors in the vicinity are closed. This ventilation control is of
the greatest importance, and calls for the closest co-operation between the fire officer and the ship's
officers. . The greatest care must be taken to ensure that all sides of the affected area are properly
covered, so that the fire cannot spread by conduction, behind panelling, or through cable or

ventilating ducts, and break out behind the fire-fighters. Again, when a serious fire has involved a
whole range of cabins or compartments, the essential thing is to surround it and to prevent it from
spreading. It is no use attacking from one side only, and so merely chasing fire out of one area into
another. The only time when a single direction attack can be justified is when there is a good
fire-resisting division against which the fire can be driven and put out.
Once a fire is surrounded, and that means on all six sides, if that is at all possible then, and only
then, should the jets close in and systematically beat out the flames.
The officer in charge of a fire-fighting operation should never be seen personally handling
fire-fighting equipment. Instead, he should be constantly moving round the area, noting the possible
spread of fire and generally handling the operation as an Army commander would direct his troops
in battle.
The indiscriminate smashing of windows and ports is something to be avoided at all costs.
When ports and windows have to be broken, this should only be done by direct order of the officer
in charge — and then not until charged lines of hose are in readiness to insert through the openings.
The Noronic fire described in Chapter 5 vividly illustrates the danger of opening doors and
smashing windows before fire-fighting equipment is in readiness.
When a bad fire has involved a number of panelled apartments such as cabins, etc., it is a
precaution well worth taking (even in the ship-owner's own interest) to strip completely all
panelling so as to make sure that fire is not still smouldering behind it.
Last but not least, no officer commanding a fire-fight in accommodation spaces should ever
forget the danger of impairing a ship's stability by unnecessary use of excessive water in her upper
compartments. There are occasions, it is true, when desperate measures have to be taken — even
the total flooding of an entire compartment may have to be resorted to in an emergency. But it is a
good general rule that water should be used as sparingly as possible (and therefore with particular
attention to its maximum effectiveness) in all compartments high above the water-line.
More will be said about this particular problem in the next Chapter.
Fire in Refrigerated Spaces

Fire-fighting in refrigerated spaces is among the most difficult of all such operations on board
ship. The degree of compartmentation involved, coupled with the frequently lethal smoke is given
off, make even the finding of the seat of fire a serious problem. The very heavy doors are difficult
to open when all vision is blanketed by heavy smoke; and the refrigerant itself can cause a lot of
trouble if a leak in the system should occur, particularly where ammonia (NH3) is concerned.
Some refrigerants, too — in particular methyl chloride (CH3Cl) are highly flammable and
explosive; while it is not always appreciated that there is an explosion risk with ammonia also
although admittedly it is not a very great one because the explosive limits of NH3 are very narrow
indeed.
The main trouble with ammonia is its very irritant effect on the skin. This makes it essential that
full-face masks be worn in any concentration of it. When smoke is also present, only self contained
breathing apparatus with a full-face-mask can be used.
An incidental point of importance to be remembered is that the special ammonia masks required
to be stored near all ammonia refrigerated spaces provide no protection whatever against smoke.
Since this fact may not be appreciated by an inexperienced wearer, who may thus be tempted into a
false sense of security when wearing one of these masks, it is urged that the wearing of them in
smoke should be absolutely forbidden.
Fortunately the modern trend in the shipping world is to use Fluorocarbon "12" (Freon), CCl2F2,
in refrigeration systems. This is an inert gas and is of low toxicity.
The question of the insulating material used in refrigeration spaces is also of importance. Cork,
and other insulators of a similar nature, have the unfortunate property of being able to smoulder for
a long time, and then suddenly bursting into flame. The only way to ensure that a cork fire is really
out is to cut back the affected area until "green" material is reached.

The author is convinced that only totally inert materials should be used for lining refrigerated
compartments.
Fires in refrigerated compartments usually occur when the spaces are empty of their normal
perishable cargo, and the ship is undergoing refit; though cases have also occurred of a fire
spreading to them from a cargo hold. Whatever the origin of the fire, water is the best extinguishing
medium. It should be used in spray form.
When fire-fighting in these compartments, it is important to pay strict attention to cold air
trunkways, which provide a ready means of communicating fire from one compartment to another
(sometimes allowing it to skip one entire section in the process). These trunkways, too, particularly
in the older type of ship, pass through several bulkheads and cover an appreciable area in the region
of the 'tween-decks. When this is so, the assistance of the refrigeration engineer, and a study of a
plan of the installation, is an essential preliminary to a fire-fight.
Another essential preliminary to such an encounter is to shut down the refrigerating system itself,
and to stop all ventilator fans.
Fires in Fore and After Peaks

These two rather inaccessible areas of a ship's interior are frequently used as general store-rooms
for such flammable substances as paint, canvas, lifebuoys, ropes and so on. Fires in them are
therefore common, and present some special features of their own.
It is true that fire in these compartments can usually spread in one direction only (aft or for'ard, as
the case may be — a fact which relieves the officer in charge of the need to watch any bulkhead but
one for the telltale signs of conduction of heat. But that is about the only good thing which can be
said for them.
The main difficulty in tackling them is that the fire-fighter's only possible line of approach is
generally down a restricted hatchway which is acting as a vigorous flue for the heat. It is indeed,
often impossible for a man to get down at all. In such circumstances, it is often a good plan to
lower an uncharged line of hose in a "slung branch", as already described; and then to turn the water
quickly on, and to swing the nozzle about at random in an attempt to hit the fire. Though essentially
a "hit and miss" affair, this is a method which often succeeds.
Both fore and aft peaks, however,
normally extend vertically to cover two or
three decks, and the stairways leading from
one of these levels to the next below it are
staggered in such a way that it is extremely
difficult to get a line of hose down to the
lower levels. Unless a man can get down to
do this, indeed, the task is impossible; and
circumstances can easily arise when the
flooding of a lower compartment by a mere
pouring into it of vast random quantities of
water from on top is the only answer.
The damage which — such a clumsy and
"inartistic" method of fire-fighting is bound
to cause makes it all the more desirable for
these compartments of a ship to be covered
by a fixed inert-gas installation. The closed FIGURE 13.3 Sketch shows fore-peak with three
nature of the compartments would make decks. Since the access hatches are not directly one
beneath the other, it is impossible to tackle a fire on a
inert-gas peculiarly effective in them-so lower deck by lowering a "revolving" nozzle from the
effective, indeed, that even if a fixed upper-deck hatch. Gas-smothering, or high expansion
installation is lacking, the author believes it foam, would be effective if heat stopped the fire-fighters
might often be possible for the ship's going below with-a line of hose.
engineers to rig up a temporary carbon

dioxide supply line which could be surprisingly successful. The smothering gas should be held in
place for at least 24 hours; the space could then probably be entered by men wearing breathing
apparatus, who would put out any smouldering pockets of fire with a line of hose.
One further difficulty in dealing with fire in the fore or after peaks of a large modern vessel is
that the access to them is seldom from the open deck, but rather through other compartments which
are roofed in. This instantly adds to a fire-fighter's difficulties by reason of the certain accumulation
in these built-over compartments of thick, choking smoke. When the wearing of breathing
apparatus has to be added to the other unpleasantnesses of dealing with this type of fire, it is little
wonder that fore and after peak fires are seldom listed among the "fire-fighter's favourites"! But this
situation is one in which high expansion foam can be used with success and if available should be
tried.
Fire in Engine-rooms and Machinery-spaces

Oil represents an undeniably great fire hazard in the modem engine-room. The quantities of oil
carried aboard, much of it ready heated and under pressure, mean that when an oil fire starts it is
liable to spread with great rapidity, to produce very great heat, and to carry explosive potentialities
which make it exceptionally dangerous to fight.
Another point to remember is that most oils will spontaneously ignite without the presence of a
naked flame if they come in contact with a surface whose temperature exceeds about 550°
Fahrenheit. There are plenty of places in a ship's machinery-space where temperatures in excess of
this can be found superheated-steam pipes, diesel exhausts, boiler fronts, and even overheating
bearings being among them.
Even without such liquid contact, all oils vaporise readily and oil vapour can easily be ignited by
sparks from the commutator in an electric generator, or from a pump motor. Great care is therefore
needed to prevent the accumulation in any machinery-space of what may be called "casual" oil
coming from such sources as fractured fuel lines, leaking joints, the overfilling of tanks, omission to
replace caps on sounding pipes, or the leaving about of piles of oily rags and waste.
Flash-backs from boilers are also a frequent cause of engine-room fires (and are especially liable,
in addition, to cause horrible burns to engine-room staff). It must be unequivocally stated, however,
that such occurrences are almost always caused by sheer carelessness, and by inattention to the
normal precautions which should be taken when starting up a boiler.
Crankcase explosions too are by no means uncommon and, can result in serious fire situations, as
well as causing injury to personnel. Crankcase monitors should be fitted to all major diesel engines.
Indeed, it is true to say that the majority of all engine-room fires would have been prevented from
occurring if only reasonable attention had been paid to normal safety precautions, including the
proper maintenance of pipelines and of all high-pressure gear. The most scrupulous cleanliness is
all-important (though it must be admitted that most engine-rooms, in British ships at least, are
models in this respect). It is significant, however, to note that many engine-room fires originate
when junior staff are in charge. This proved fact would seem to indicate that all Chief Engineers
would be well advised to take even greater pains in educating and disciplining their staffs in this
important matter. But wouldn't it be better if greater attention was paid at the design stage to ensure
that the routing of oil-carrying pipe lines would, as far as possible, keep clear of ignition sources?
Most engine-room fires start initially by a burst flange or pipe releasing oil onto diesel exhausts,
superheated steam surfaces, such as at the H.P. Turbine, or the commutator of an electric motor. A
little intelligent thought could surely obviate much of the risk!
Once an engine-room fire has started, speed of counter attack is vital. Fire-fighting equipment
should not only be well maintained, but should be intelligently positioned so that it can be quickly
grabbed and brought to bear on a fire. Clear indication of the whereabouts of such equipment is
also important; and it is a good idea to outline in red paint the positions of all extinguishers on the
bulkheads, stanchions or pillars on which they are hanging; for this makes it easy to see if any one
of them is missing from its appointed position. The importance of portable equipment is illustrated

in the analysis of fires in engine rooms undertaken by the NKK Classification Society reported in
Chapter 3.
The author has been greatly struck throughout his career by the infrequency with which
engine-room staff of all grades seem to make use of the hydrants and spray nozzles which are kept
in the engine-room to fight fires breaking out in their domain. They seem always to grab their foam
extinguishers instead.
Now it is a fact that a spray nozzle delivering water will knock out the type of oil fire normally
encountered in machinery-spaces far quicker and more effectively than will the ordinary portable
foam extinguisher. These latter are comparatively slow and cumbersome things to get to work, and
they will not extinguish a fire until the whole area affected is completely covered in foam to a depth
of some inches. Dry powder and CO2 extinguishers have severe limitations in that they have no
cooling properties and where oil is flowing onto hot surfaces, fires tend to keep flashing back.
Where a fixed water spray system has been installed there should be no hesitation in applying this to
the affected area. A little water damage is greatly to be preferred to massive fire loss.
Incidentally, it has been found that water fog sprayed onto the victim who has suffered serious
steam burns greatly assists to alleviate his injuries. The salt water appears to prevent much of the
blistering associated with such burns and thus greatly reduces the loss of body fluid which is a
serious threat to life. There is much to be said for providing "fog tips" in the engine-room and for
training engineers to use these in case of burn
injuries. The application of the cold salt water
also assists to relieve pain and thus reduce the
effect of shock. In serious cases the victim should
be immersed in a tepid salt water bath as soon as
he has been removed from the engine-room. But
it is essential that the water fog be applied without
delay.
It has been found that water spray does not
have any really serious effect upon superheated
steam pipes-indeed the resulting cloud of steam
may usefully help to inhibit the spread of fire.
When a fire in an engine-room is serious
enough to have driven out the engine-room staff,
the first thing which must be done is to use the
extended spindles to shut off all valves
controlling the oil feed lines as illustrated in
Figure 13.4. This job is the clear responsibility of
the Chief Engineer; but it is so important that the
Fire Brigade officer taking over command of the
fire-fight should make a special point of checking
that it has been properly done.
If the crew have properly battened down the
space, shut off all ventilation and applied a fixed
CO2 system, the fire officer should wait for at
least two hours to allow the gas to do its work.
He should then send in breathing apparatus
wearers through the lowest possible entrance
door, taking with them a charged line of small
diameter hose — a hose reel is ideal for this
purpose. Nine out of ten times the fire will be FIGURE 13.4 An extended spindle system used
completely out but occasionally some smouldering to shut off valves from outside an engine-room or
lagging, or the like, will be found and this can be machinery space.
quickly extinguished. All that now remains to do

is to open up and ventilate the space and make certain that all the inert gas is removed before
allowing engineers to go down and inspect the damage. It might be possible to start up the
ventilation fans to assist in dispersing the gas, providing the motors have not been damaged by the
fire.
Where for some reason-such as an explosion — it has not been possible to batten down the
spaces the fire officer must attack the fire with lines of hose, or by the use of high expansion foam.
But in the largest vessels the machinery spaces are huge-almost cathedral-like — and few fire
brigades have High X generators of sufficient capacity to tackle such a fire by this means.
Obviously the easiest way to tackle such an engine-room fire is via the shaft tunnel, thereby getting
below the heat wave, but few modern ships have this facility. If only more ships were provided
with enclosed escape ladderways from the engine-room control then this would provide a most
useful means of access for the fire-fighters. Failing this the best chance of success lies with an
attack via the lowest access deck in the engine-room casing. This enables the fire-fighters to get
beneath the main heat wave. It will entail all men working in breathing apparatus, some to watch
the possible fire spread into the accommodation, and some to penetrate the engine-room itself. In
the initial stages the access door should be opened only wide enough to admit nozzles and the water
should be directed first upwards and then throughout the space. Once the main fire has been
knocked down it should be possible to force an entry and complete the job.
Many people, even fire-fighters, fear an explosion taking place in one of the many oil tanks
within the engine-room but experience indicates that such a happening is highly unlikely to occur
within the first few hours. Certainly these tanks can eventually explode but still there are many
cases on record where engine-room fires have raged unchecked for days and yet no serious
explosions have taken place.
The recommended method of fighting an engine-room fire via the shaft tunnel is that when the
fire-fighters are in position, with lines of hose charged, a ventilation area, such as a skylight, should
be opened so as to create a flue path for the flames and hot gases. If this is not done there is a grave
risk that the fire-fighters will be overwhelmed by the blast of heat and smoke which will be met
when they open the watertight door. If perchance this watertight door has been left open and there
is no means whereby it can be closed, the situation becomes very difficult indeed and might even
prevent this line of attack being made.
Even a single line of hose in capable hands can tackle a serious engine-room fire with great
success. The secret is to get down beneath the heat wave, and to drive the fire out of the
compartment. For this reason it is essential that steps be taken before the attack to ensure that any
horizontal doors leading from the engine-room into the engineers' accommodation spaces are
closed; for otherwise the fire will quickly spread.
Two points worthy of comment are, first, that the time taken to run hose from the deck down the
escape trunkway and along the shaft tunnel is quite appreciable, and would be much shortened by
the installation of a hydrant in the shaft tunnel at the entrance to the engine-room. And, second, that
when fire-fighters start their approach on the fire through the shaft tunnel, the officer in charge on
the bridge should at once switch off the automatic controls which ensure that the watertight doors
throughout the ship automatically return to their closed position after being opened. If the bridge
thus fails to switch over to local control,, there is grave risk that fire-fighters may receive injury
from the doors, and a certainty that their lines of hose will be repeatedly severed. It greatly pleases
the author to note that following the publication of the First Edition of this book his suggestion for
the provision of a hydrant in the shaft tunnel at the engine-room entrances has now become
mandatory.
Fire in a boiler-room will of course be tackled by methods similar to the above, save that in this
case the approach will be made through the engine-room, and through the forward escape shaft if
one be present. For tackling fires in bilges or on the tank tops, water spray, foam, CO2 or even
steam smothering from a fixed installation will almost certainly be effective.
Rarely indeed do the main storage tanks in the double bottoms take fire. When they do, the
actuation of a fixed water spray, foam, CO2 or steam system will usually be effective.

Fire in Oil Tankers

Vulnerable to fire as all tankers must by their very nature at all times be, experience has proved
that the greatest hazards arise, not when the tanks are full of oil, but when they are empty or nearly
so, and the place of the oil is taken by a dreadfully flammable mixture of oil vapour and air.
This condition can arise when full tanks have been split open following a collision at sea; but it
always does arise when a vessel has just completed discharge of oil at her delivery port, and the
operation known as "de-gassing" her tanks is under way. This is the most dangerous period of a
tanker's life, and demands the taking of the most stringent safety precautions.
The advent of funnel gas systems has dramatically reduced the risk of explosion, certainly in the
case of tankers of 100,000 metric tons deadweight and upwards and combination tankers of 50,000
metric tons deadweight but the problem remains in the case of many hundreds of smaller vessels.
One of the first dramatic illustrations of the value of inert gas systems concerned the collision
between two sister crude oil-carrying tankers off the South African Coast on December 16, 1977.
The tankers were the 330,869 ton Venpet and the 330,905 ton Venoil, the former being in ballast and
the latter fully laden. The after starboard wing tank of the Venpet appears to have been ripped open,
as was the after starboard bunker tank. Yet although a very serious fire developed there was
apparently no devastating explosion, as would almost certainly have occurred but for the presence
of the inert gas in the cargo tanks. This incident highlights the value of such inerting systems being
installed on all tankers which carry low flashpoint cargoes.
Pump rooms must be considered to be high risk areas on tankers and in the past many disastrous
fires have started in these compartments. Too many of these cases have arisen where an accidental
leakage of cargo has managed to get through the pump shaft stuffing box seals and caused a
devastating explosion in the engine room. The proper design of these seals appear to be very much
neglected, especially where naphtha is concerned. Naphtha has the characteristic of "creeping"
through commonly used packing materials. The author understands that carbon to ceramic seals, or
those which use an oil-filled seal or pressure chamber on the pump side, are very much more
satisfactory.
What happens when a head of oil accidentally forms within the pump room is that the slight
pressure involved forces the liquid through one or more of the pump seals into the engine-room and
a highly combustible gas accumulates. There are so many sources of ignition in an engine-room
that an explosion can quickly follow. Engineers faced with such a horrible situation should
immediately use lines of hose to spray as much water as possible around the area of the leak in an
attempt to precipitate the gas and reduce the explosive risk. If a water spray system is fitted this
should be immediately turned on. A blanket of foam should be laid over the bilges but, in the case
of naphtha, this requires to be of the alcohol-resistant type (fluoroprotein). On no account should
CO2 be used because there is a grave risk that static electricity will be formed and this can initiate an
explosion. It is, of course, this predilection towards the production of static which has prompted the
authorities to ban the use of CO2 in pump rooms for inerting.
Returning to the question of cargo getting into pump rooms, this situation gives the crew a very
difficult problem as to how they are going to get rid of the oil. It is essential to trace the cause of the
leak and get this stopped with the utmost speed. Obviously it is not possible to start the bilge
pumps because of the risk of explosion. The use of ejector pumps or laboriously removing the oil in
drums seems to be the only safe answer.
Another problem associated with pump rooms is that of “means of escape” By their very nature
these are narrow spaces and it is difficult to provide any alternative means of escape. Obviously
there can be no escape forward in the case of the main pump room and surveyors do not like to see
any openings in the engine-room bulkhead. But it must be said that the author has seen this type of
escape in a tanker where double doors and an air-lock was installed. Perhaps the method adopted
by the Esso Petroleum Company is, under all the circumstances, the best that can be achieved. That
Company protect their VLCC's pump rooms by means of water spray systems and provide the
means whereby this can be instantly turned on at the press of a switch within the space itself by
anyone trapped therein.

Another method of controlling fire in full, or partially full, oil tanks has been developed by the
Socony Vacuum Oil Co., and seems to have great promise. Simply stated, the principle is to inject
air or an inert-gas into the bottom of a full tank, and so to create a turbulence which will force cold
fuel to the top of the tank, and will so reduce the temperature of the surface oil to below its ignition
point. This method has already proved highly effective with the less flammable heavier oils; but
with the low-flash-point fuels, it has been found that the fire cannot be finally extinguished. The
reduction in burning rate achieved is so great, however, that conventional appliances can be brought
to beat at close quarters to finish the job.
The minimum air or gas pressure required for effective working is one pound for every two and a
half feet of the height of the highest tank; and the quantity of air or gas available must be sufficient
for a 30 minute supply at up to 10 cu. ft. per minute per 100 sq. ft. of surface area. Any normal air
compressor can be used, provided it can supply at the pressure and rate specified. An inert gas
producer would also be effective, given the same capacity; and it would have the further advantage
of producing an output available for direct fire inhibiting purposes elsewhere in the ship.
Another technique of tanker protection has been devised which greatly adds to the comfort of the
crew during the vessel's stay in port. Previously, the persistence of dangerous oil vapours during all
loading or unloading operations had made it necessary to impose an irritating ban on smoking
throughout the ship, and very severe restrictions on the use of fire for cooking in the galleys. The
new technique consists in maintaining in the engine-room and accommodation spaces for the
duration of the vessel's stay in port a constant air pressure slightly above that of the atmosphere. In
this way, dangerous vapours are prevented from entering, with great consequent diminution of the
fire hazard. The fresh air inlets to the system are so situated that no vapour can normally be sucked
in; but if anything should go wrong, and a concentration of vapour approaching one-third of the
lower danger limit should enter, an automatic alarm is sounded and the air is deflected to pass
through carbon filters.
TANKER FIRES IN PORT

Tanker fires in port can vary from those affecting accommodation, engine-room and the like,
which can be classified as normal, to the disaster situation which follows a devastating explosion.
Such a happening is usually accompanied by heavy loss of life the Sansinena disaster in Los
Angeles in 1976 is a good example. Others have occurred in different parts of the world. Such
incidents present the fire departments with mind-boggling problems. People have to be rescued,
bodies recovered, fires spreading both on water and on land have to be tackled over an enormous
area. The sheer logistics in terms of men, appliances, foam supplies, literally miles of hose, fire
boats etc. has to be seen to be believed.
Any port which accommodates tanker berths must have a most comprehensive disaster plan and
such is the scale of the possibilities, this must embrace a very wide area and a large number of fire
departments as well as other organisations, such as the police and ambulance services. For this plan
to work smoothly it is absolutely essential to hold regular exercises in order to test the Organisation
and keep it up to date. The UK is perhaps fortunate in that in almost every case the brigades with
large port risks cover an extensive area and have under their direct command large numbers of men
and appliances. In addition there is a statutory provision under the UK Fire Services Act whereby
mutual aid between brigades is mandatory. In the United States they are less fortunate in that there
can exist two, or even more, independent fire departments in a single port area. But it must be said
that such aid is freely given, although the aftermath has sometimes been the subject of acrimonious
argument and even litigation between fire departments albeit that the Coast Guard Captain of Port
has control of the incident.
Fires in tanks containing crude oil demand an all out and instant attack with foam. The difficulty
is to apply this foam effectively; and it generally has to be done through apertures caused by damage
to the deck or the ship's side, through open hatchways, through ullage holes or open Butterworth

caps. Water from high-pressure open jets may be used to cool the area surrounding the fire; but it
must never be directed into the tanks themselves.
A very real peril which municipal fire-fighters should be especially prepared to meet in these
circumstances, however, is that burning oil may be discharged or spilt on to the water round the
ship, and may thence float away on the surface to endanger the rest of the port. The classic case of
the distance which such burning oil can travel, and the speed at which it can spread, is the loss of
the 10,000 ton tanker Markay following an explosion caused by the ignition of vapours given off
during the loading of butane-blended gasoline in Los Angeles Harbour at 2.05 a.m. on June 22nd,
1947. Eleven lives were lost in the explosion itself; and within a very few minutes the burning
gasoline has spread right across the 600 ft. wide slip and had set fire to berths opposite along a
1,200 ft. length.
It is now quite obvious that tankers should be protected by an inert gas system described in
Chapter 11 at page 367. The author is understandably proud to reflect that, in the First Edition of
Fire Aboard, he recommended, that tankers be protected by means of inert gas and that this was
written a number of years before B.P. fitted out their first ship.
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that inert gas systems will be effective in the case of laden
tankers involved in collision. The case of the collision between the British Trent and the Western
Winner — see page 64 — is a case in point. Where cargo tanks are ripped open and oil spews out
then it is the oil which immediately becomes involved in fire. Once this oil drops to the level where
air is admitted then the atmosphere within the tanks will quickly reach the explosive range. The
circumstances will dictate the speed at which this will take place but it is likely to be measured in
seconds rather than minutes. This factor has been recognised by the Chamber of Shipping of the
United Kingdom in their publication "Tanker Safety Code", final paragraph, pages 11- 17 viz:
Inert gas will not prevent external fire of liquid petroleum escapes by leakage, overflow,
burst hose or collision damage. Moreover, there is sufficient petroleum vapour within
the tank, the inert gas vapour may become diluted to a flammable condition should it
escape to the air either through normal deck openings or upon collision.
In the case of unladen tankers involved in collision and fitted with inert gas, it is much more
likely that no explosion would follow. This is because the atmosphere within the tanks is totally
inert and, even when air is suddenly admitted, there is virtually no fuel available to provide an
explosive mixture. A further point is that even if there was a sizeable amount of sludge in the
bottom of the tank and this became ignited, the fuel would simply burn away without creating a
disruptive explosion. The inert gas in the adjoining tanks would prevent the fire spreading by
conduction.
Unfortunately there have arisen cases where, for one reason or another, the inert gas systems on
board tankers were inoperative. Port Authorities will have to consider very seriously whether they
should allow such a vessel to load or unload cargo until such time as the system is repaired.
Past experience indicates that when a tanker in port suffers a serious explosion which is
immediately followed, both on board and shoreside, by fire then the surviving crew are powerless to
get the ship's fire-fighting equipment into action. Similarly, depending upon the extent of the fires,
it is quite on the cards that the shoreside workers will be unable to do much, if any, fire-fighting in
the early stages.
But not all tanker fires are of this magnitude and it is prudent that fire-fighting facilities be
provided on tanker jetties. Space does not allow anything other than a very rough outline as to the
equipment recommended but for a more complete coverage readers should study the International
Oil Tanker & Terminal Safety Guide. Such equipment includes the following:
1. 8-inch (200 mm) water main with pillar hydrants fitted at intervals of about 215 feet (65
metres). The size and type of outlets to be agreed with the local authority fire brigade.

2. Pressure on the main should be around 150 lbs. sq. in. (11 kgf/cm2) for water and 200 lbs.
sq. in (14 kgf/cm2) for foam.
3. 3 lengths of 2½ inch (64 mm) x 75-feet (23 m) hose should be provided at each hydrant
along with spray/jet nozzle and one FB10X foam branch complete with pick-up tube and
20 gallons foam compound. This equipment should be housed in a readily identifiable
box.
4. An automatic foam compound induction system should be provided whereby the fire main
can be charged with foam when required. It is obviously better if this is on a separate
main but it is possible to get by with a dual system. Fluoroprotein foam is recommended
and an adequate stock maintained.
5. Elevated foam monitors should provide overlapping cover along the length of the jetty.
As a rough guide, taking wind into account, this means that there should be no more than
200 feet (61 m) between monitors. Because the fire might prevent persons physically
reaching the monitors it is important that these be hydraulically controlled from a position
unlikely to be affected by the fire. In practice the Control Room forms an ideal position
from which to operate the monitors. The controls should be capable of turning the
monitors through 360°, as well as causing them to elevate and depress.
6. A foam tender should be provided and stored well away from the jetty. This should carry
at least 1,500 gall. (6,819 litres) water and 200 gall. (909 litres) compound.
7. Control Rooms should be designed as "Safe Refuges" in the event of fire. Positive
pressure within the room should be maintained at about 5 mm water gauge. A drencher
system should cover the entire outside of the fire-resisting building; glazing to be
fire-resisting in metal frames and with as small an area as is compatible with reasonable
visibility. Internally there should be installed an independent life support air system, with
at least six hours supply and emergency lighting for the same period. It is important that
control of all fire fighting equipment be maintained within the room. This means careful
siting of the building so as to provide the best possible line of sight for the operators,
coupled with being far enough away to minimise the blast from a possible explosion. The
following controls should be provided within the Control Room:
a) Starting facilities for the fire pumps.
b) Foam for the monitors and water/foam main including controls for directing foam to
required area.
c) Water spray system for top and bottom protection of the jetty.
d) Termination equipment for fire alarm and detector system. This should include gas
detection.
e) Communication system between ship and shore fire departments.
8. A boom defence system should be made available. The British Petroleum Company have
developed such a system marketed under the name "Vikoma Sea-Pack".
Such then is the daunting prospect presented by such a disaster and the author would counsel his
fire service colleagues worldwide, to reflect upon this and take steps now to prepare for such an
eventuality in their own areas.
FIRE-FIGHTING AT SEA
A bad fire in a ship at sea is an alarming experience for all aboard, and a very heavy burden
indeed is cast upon her Master, who must continue to bear full responsibility for all fire-fighting
decisions made while the ship is at sea, whatever outside help and advice may be available to him.
The basic principles of fire-fighting aboard ship are not radically changed by the fact of her being
at sea when the fire breaks out; the difficulty is that the practical application of these principles may
be made very much harder by such factors as high winds, heavy seas, limited supplies of
fire-fighting equipment (CO2 bottles, portable extinguishers, etc.), and the necessity of relying

wholly in the vital early stages of the fire, at any rate on the ship's own equipment and personnel to
control the fire.
It is in such circumstances that the irreplaceable value of previous crew training becomes so
evident. It really matters little how magnificently a ship may be equipped with all the latest
fire-detecting and fire-fighting devices if her crew do not know how to use them properly, and if
they are not quickly organised and effectively led.
All officers and senior ratings should attend a properly organised shore fire training
establishment and preferably one in which conditions most closely follow the shipboard
environment. Real and not make-believe fires should be fought during such training in order that
the trainees really know what to expect when faced with an actual incident. The value of well
maintained breathing apparatus must be brought home by the certain knowledge that without it men
will die, or at best be overcome by smoke and/or lethal gases. Only such well trained officers can
impart their knowledge to the remainder of the crew and successfully lead the attack upon an actual
fire on board their ship.
Throughout this book the author has given advice upon how the many and varied types of ship
fires should be tackled, so that there is no need to repeat all these here. But there is one type of fire
which does however bear repetition and that namely is an incident involving the cargo holds! Far
too often hatches are removed within hours, or even in extreme cases within minutes, of having
applied CO2 to a hold. It cannot be stressed too strongly that the only course open to a Master is to
shut down all ventilation to the affected and surrounding holds, apply the CO2 and then go carefully
round the hatch stopping up any visible leaks with any suitable materials on hand.
Great care must be taken to follow the maker's instructions and apply in the first instance only the
recommended number of CO2 bottles. Similarly the number of bottles to be applied for purposes of
topping-up must be injected strictly in accordance with instructions. There is absolutely no point in
deviating from the carefully prepared instructions because the makers of these systems, who are
quite obviously experts in their field, know precisely the amount of CO2 required in order to reduce
the oxygen in a given hold to the point at which combustion cannot take place. Remember that the
supply of CO2 is finite and that it can not be replaced until the ship reaches port. The Master of a
vessel involved in fire should make a simple calculation based on the number of CO2 bottles which
will be left after the initial application and the estimated time lapse before port is reached. If the
distance is great and the resultant time reveals that by sticking strictly to the topping-up rate supplies
will run out before reaching port, an adjustment will have to be made in this case. But this is the
only time when such a deviation can be justified.
It must be appreciated that hold fires which involve fibrous materials such as cotton, jute, esparto
grass, cotton seed etc., cannot ever be completely extinguished by CO2 and that eventually the cargo
must be worked out. But the important thing to remember is that the inert gas will hold the fire in a
quiescent, or dormant, state for a very long time. Cases are known to the author where such fires
have been quietly held for periods of up to four weeks before the cargo was removed and the fire
finally extinguished.
A further feature about CO2 when applied to a burning hold is that the fire does not always die
down immediately but the inert gas must be given time to do its work. The fact that the deck still
remains hot does not mean that the hold must be opened up. In some cases it even appears that the
fire gets worse before it gets better! But whilst at sea it is absolutely essential that the integrity of
the space must be maintained, otherwise there is a grave risk that the ship will be lost. ,
In the author's opinion large passenger vessels, now mainly engaged in cruising, should carry one
or more ex-professional fire-fighters. These men could be made responsible for the proper
maintenance of all fire equipment on board — fire-alarms, fixed installations, portable fire
extinguishers, hose, breathing apparatus, hydrants and small gear. In the event of fire, they would
form the essential nucleus of experience in the counter-attack, playing the all-important part which
the trained N.C.O. plays in military operations in the field.
Another highly important task for these trained men would be the enforcement, through the
proper channels, of good fire-prevention discipline; and they should be actively encouraged to

"smell out" and report potential fire hazards which might have been overlooked when the ship's fire
control regulations were being drawn up.
On the discovery of fire at sea, the first actions of the ship's Master should be to reduce speed at
once; and to order all mechanical ventilation to be closed down until the location and circumstances
of the outbreak can be exactly determined, and a plan for counter attack made.
One of the great difficulties of fighting fire at sea is that the way of the vessel itself, as well as
the winds of varying force and direction which are seldom absent for long, both tend greatly to
increase the volume and pressure of the air which is essential to the fire's existence. If weather
conditions allow, the ship should be stopped dead in an endeavour to lower this pressure of air — or
even set to steam downwind at a speed sufficient to counteract the effects of the following breeze.
In a stronger blow, however, the Master should always endeavour to manoeuvre his vessel so that
the wind will be in the most favourable quarter from the point of view of effective fire-fighting
operations. He should always try, in other words, to "blow the fire overboard". In the case of fire in
the after-peak, for instance, the ship would be headed directly into the wind; conversely, she would
be headed downwind if the fire were located for'ard. Fire in a cabin or other accommodation space
more nearly amidships would generally be better tackled with the wind on the port or starboard
quarter, according to the site of the fire.
The reasons for closing down all mechanical ventilation at once must be obvious. Fire lives on
the oxygen in the air; so the less of it that it gets, the better. When a plan for counterattack has been
laid, however, and is on the point of being put into action, the intelligent use of ventilation (as was
explained earlier in this Chapter) can be a major weapon in the hands of the attackers.
This is especially true in the event of the most deadly type of fire which can assail a vessel at sea.
Fire in the engine-room strikes at the very heart of a ship; for it threatens to deny to the Master
control of his vessel, and it may also cripple some of the main fire-fighting equipment aboard. The
defences against this menace can be listed as follows:
1. good fire-prevention discipline;
2. efficient fixed fire-fighting installations covering engine-room and machinery-spaces;
3. a crew well trained in fire-fighting action, with well trained officers to lead them; and
4. speed in counter-attack, probably through either the shaft-tunnel or the boiler-room, but in
either case using the techniques of fire-fighting and ventilation control already described.
The key to it all, however, is the proper training of personnel. Fires at sea are always alarming,
and generally difficult to fight; but with well trained men who know their enemy and have learnt to
understand his habits, led by cool and experienced officer, there is seldom reason why the fight
should be lost.
The Flying Fire Squad: A Proposal for International Action

In August, 1959, an undersea oil well drilled by the Arabian Oil Company 35 miles off the
western coast of the Persian Gulf caught fire. No one on the spot could put it out and hundreds of
barrels of valuable oil were being lost with every hour that passed. So an emergency call was made
to a specialist; and Mr. Paul Adair, a professional oil-well fire-fighter from Texas who has tackled
scores of such fires in almost every oil-producing area of the world, was summoned to the spot by
air. In due course, the fire was extinguished by means of explosives placed under Mr. Adair's
skilled direction (with the aid, incidentally, of the Kuwait Fire Brigade under then Chief Officer Ali
Abdul Razzak Saleh and their new deepsea-fire-boat Munquez); and Mr. Adair flew off back to
Texas no doubt adequately rewarded for his highly specialist services.
Is there not a lesson in this for the fire-fighter? Could there not be devised a scheme whereby a
ship's Master, faced with a severe fire either at sea or in a port lacking good fire-fighting facilities
anywhere in the world, would be able to summon to his urgent aid a specialist already equipped and
poised to undertake the job? A scheme on the following lines — fanciful as it may sound at first
hearing — may at least serve to stimulate thought on a matter which the author believes to be of real
urgency.

Action, to be effective, would clearly have to be international in scale. It is proposed, therefore,

that the countries signatory to the International Convention for the Safety of Lives at Sea, 1974,
should agree to divide up the oceans of the world into areas in each of which a particular nation
would make itself responsible for the maintenance of an Emergency Fire Advisory Service, whose
help would be available to ships of all flags on demand. Countries possessing a seaboard would
readily assume responsibility, no doubt, for areas reasonably contiguous to their own coasts; but the
remoter parts of the Ocean would be different-and a much more costly matter. How pleasant it
would be, nevertheless, to watch the nations of the world, now squabbling to assert their rights over
wider and yet wider areas of so-called "territorial waters". competing instead to offer their services
to ships of all nations in wider and yet wider areas of the world's less accessible seas!
The "Service" provided would consist, at least to begin with, of the transport to a stricken vessel
of one man only, together with as much gear as could be carried on his person or lowered to him
from the helicopter in which he would travel. More, indeed, he would not need; for the essence of
the idea is that his principal "luggage" would be his experience and specialist advice — not just a
few more bottles of CO2 or an extra pair of hands on a hose.
That being so, it is possible, even, to imagine a brave man, called to a ship on fire beyond
helicopter range, parachuting from an aircraft into the sea, to be picked up by a boat's crew from the
stricken vessel. Given reasonable weather, an anti-immersion suit and/or an inflatable rubber dingy,
there would be no lack of volunteers, the author is convinced, from a body of men so imbued with
the traditions of public service as are the professional fire-fighters of most nations of the world.
A less drastic method of bringing specialist help to a vessel on fire would be by radio. There are
many cases on record of quite complicated surgical operations being carried out by ships' officers
acting on wireless advice from a skilled surgeon many hundreds of miles away.
Radio, in any case, would have an essential part to play in the scheme even in circumstances of
lesser difficulty. A standard message procedure, universally adopted and giving such information as
the size of the ship involved, the exact location of the fire, the nature of the cargo (if affected) and
the contents of neighbouring holds, the fire-fighting facilities available aboard and the action against
the outbreak already taken-all this would be invaluable knowledge to the expert in helping him to
make the necessary preparations or to radio the appropriate advice before he set out.
The experts themselves, of course, would have to be volunteers — and almost certainly
volunteers from among existing personnel of the various National Fire Services. The author is
confident that as far as the British Fire Service is concerned any call for such volunteers would be
enthusiastically welcomed and hugely overfilled.
It might well be, however, that some amendment would have to be made to existing British
legislation before the British contingent of the proposed "International Fire Flying Squad" could
legally start operating on the high seas. It is true that Section 3 (d) of the Fire Services Act, 1947,
empowers a Fire Authority to employ a Fire Brigade coming under its jurisdiction, outside its own
area; but there seems to be some legal doubt whether this power could be stretched to include any
area outside British territorial waters.
The sort of problems— legal and other — which the "Flying Squad" would need to have solved
before even the first call for help reached them are well illustrated by the taking of an initiative by
the Kent Fire Brigade thirty years ago. (The parallel is not an exact one, of course; but it is
exemplary — and the story is a good enough one to bear re-telling, in any case!).
In the very dry summer of 1949, there was an exceedingly severe outbreak of forest fires in the
French Department of Landes, south of Bordeaux. Reading about these fires, and of the strain to
which they were subjecting the French Fire Services, in his Sunday newspaper, the Chief Officer of
the Kent Fire Brigade, Lieut. Commander J. H. Fordham C.B.E., R.N. (retd.), determined at once to
see if there was anything he could do to help.
First, he obtained by telephone from the Chairman of the Fire Service Committee of his County
Council, and from the Home Office, permission to send a contingent of men and appliances to help
his French colleagues. The Home Office then telephoned the Foreign Office, who in turn
telephoned the French Ambassador, then on a visit to Paris. The Ambassador conveyed the offer to

the French Government; and the latter's grateful acceptance was conveyed back through the same
channels by Monday afternoon.
By the time this formal approval was received, the entire contingent was waiting on the quayside
at Dover, fully kitted up; and complete with French currency, bulk passports issued by the local
French Consul, and French Railway tickets for all personnel and vehicles from Calais to Bordeaux.
It is pleasant to add that the contingent was able to render services in the field which called forth
some most generous tributes from the French Authorities.
Quickly though it was mounted, however, this remarkable expedition undeniably met with
procedural delays before it could leave the shores of England — delays which would probably have
proved fatal in the event of a ship fire on the high seas. There would be plenty of loose ends of
many kinds-legal and logistic, as well as purely technical — which would need tying up before the
new Service could be ready to start operating in an emergency.
Most of the foregoing appeared in the First and Second Editions of Fire Aboard and really very
little has happened to implement the suggestions made. Assistance given in the case of ship fire
taking place at sea has been limited almost exclusively to the tug/salvage boats, naval vessels and
the odd case of a merchant ship helping with rescue and fire-fighting.
Without being too critical of the work of the salvage tugs because the author greatly admires the
men who man these craft and the hazardous work which they regularly perform — in many cases it
is quite obvious that a much better result could have been achieved, if only they had had more
professional fire service experience to guide their efforts. It must be said though that there are one
or two notable exceptions in different parts of the world. Probably the most common fault is that of
playing water monitors from a distance and expecting, or hoping, to put out an accommodation fire,
instead of getting on board and attacking by hand-held hose lines. Long range fire-fighting is rarely
successful because so little of the water actually gets to the fire itself.
The rewards for salvage are high and it must surely be in the interest of companies engaged in it
to employ, somewhere in the Organisation, an ex-fire officer who has served in one of the large port
areas. Such a man should understand ships but, of much greater importance, he will have had a
wealth of practical fire-fighting experience which he can impart to the salvage men.

Chapter Fourteen
The Problem of Impaired Stability
When water is used in large quantities to attack a fire which has broken out in a ship high above
the water line, there is always a danger that much of this water may be trapped in such a way that it
cannot drain either out or down; that this considerable extra weight in the superstructure may shift
to one side or other of the vessel's centre line; and that the ship's stability may in consequence be
gravely impaired. The capsizing of the Empress of Canada in the Gladstone Dock, Bootle
(Lancashire) on January 25th, 1953, is probably the classic case in point (see narrative in Chapter 5).
Let us first of all attempt to assess the size of the problem by looking at some facts. The formula
for the delivery of a fire-hose through a nozzle has already been given in Chapter 12 as: 25d2√p
where d is the diameter of the nozzle in inches, and p the pressure of water at the nozzle expressed
in pounds per square inch.
In the event of a fairly serious fire confined to one section in the passenger accommodation of a
liner, it is reasonable to assume that the minimum number of jets required will be two three
quarter-inch nozzles delivering at 100 lb. per sq. in. Each nozzle will therefore discharge 140 gal.
per min. making a total of 280 gallons, or one and a quarter tons, delivered per minute. Assuming
that the fire-fight will last at this intensity for a period of one hour, a total of 75 tons of water will
have been discharged into the superstructure-and if one-inch nozzles were being used instead of
three quarter-inch, the total would rise to 129 tons.
Now assume that the vessel already had a slight list to one side or the other before the fire broke
out-as it very probably would have if it were loading or discharging cargo. These scores of tons of
trapped water will flow naturally into the list, and will so tend to make it worse.
It is interesting to compare, in passing, some figures which can be pretty accurately calculated
from the known facts about the Empress of Canada disaster. The fire was raging on two whole
decks at the time when the first pump arrived, and later spread to a third. A total of 30 pumps
attended in all; so it is probably no exaggeration to guess that an average of some 10
three-quarter-inch jets would be constantly in action against a fire of such magnitude. These 10 jets
would deliver some 375 tons of water per hour. In the five hours which elapsed between discovery
of the fire and the abandonment of the fire-fight by reason of the development of a 20-degree list to
port, the total of water delivered must have been in the order of some 1,875 tons. No doubt some of
this water would have drained away to lower regions of the vessel; yet a very large quantity must
certainly have remained trapped in the superstructure. Since the author has heard experienced ships'
officers declare that the imposition of as little as 100 tons of water in certain compartments high
above the water line can, in certain circumstances, gravely impair the stability of a large passenger
vessel, it is perhaps small wonder that the Empress of Canada capsized when she did.
FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE A SHIP'S STABILITY

Although responsibility for questions affecting the state of a vessel's stability during a fire-fight
must remain unequivocally with the officers or representatives of the ship itself, the firemen should
at least know enough about the allied problems of the Gravity and Buoyancy of a floating vessel to
424
The Problem of Impaired Stability 425
be able to listen intelligently when a seaman

expresses concern on that score at the height
of a long fire-fight.
The stability of a ship depends on a
relationship between her centre of buoyancy
and her centre of gravity which is known as
her GM — where G is her Centre of Gravity
and M is known as her Metacentric Height.
The centre of gravity of a ship is that
point at which her weight may be taken to
act (in a vertically downward direction, of
course). Her centre of buoyancy is the
centre of gravity of the water she displaces
(which may be taken to be that point within
her bulk at which the upward push of the FIGURE 14.1 Sketch shows the effect of water used
displaced water is concentrated). during fire-fighting operations in the "top hamper" of a
Chambers's Technical Dictionary defines large passenger ship. Ejector pumps used during
"metacentre", as follows: fire-fighting could remove surplus water.
If a vertical line (be) drawn through the Centre of gravity of a body floating in
equilibrium in a liquid, and a second vertical line . . . through the Centre of buoyancy ...
when the body is slightly displaced from its equilibrium position, the two lines meet in a
point called the metacentre.
The distance between the centre of a ship's gravity and her metacentre is her Metacentric Height
(M). When her M is higher than her G, she is stable; when her G is higher than her M, she is not.
The Figures 14.2 and 14.3 illustrate the point.
In Figure 14.2, M is higher than
G and the ship has a tendency to
right herself. In Figure 14.3, G is
higher than M and the ship has a
tendency to overbalance and
capsize.
When large quantities of water
are trapped high up in a ship, and a
list causes them to surge either to
port or to starboard, both the FIGURE 14.2 A vessel will FIGURE 14.3 A vessel will
tend to right herself when the tend to capsize when the centre
vessel's G and her M are radically centre of gravity is lower than of gravity is higher than the
disturbed and her inherent stability metacentre.
may be disastrously impaired.
Pre-Calculation of GM Values
It will be obvious from the foregoing that some pretty involved calculations are needed before a
ship's officer can give confident advice about the weight of water which can be imposed at any point
in his ship without endangering her stability. In the event of a fire bad enough to raise doubts about
a ship's stability, the time needed to make these calculations may well be short.
The author would recommend, therefore, that there be worked out beforehand for every ship a
series of tables giving her GM in varying conditions of load, when varying weights of water are
imposed on her at varying points in her structure. Not only would this vital information thus be
made instantly available in a crisis; it would also be of considerable value to a young officer making
his first acquaintance with a new ship.

There exists an admirable piece of equipment called a Ralston Indicator, which can quite quickly
provide the information needed. By the manipulation of small weights on a scaled plan section of
the vessel, the GM is immediately found for an infinite variety of loading conditions. This
Indicator, which is already carried on board a small number of ships, might with advantage, it
would seem, be carried aboard all major vessels.
Two Miscellaneous Points

Two further points are worth making before we pass on to a consideration of the precautions
which: can be taken against the danger of impaired stability.
The first is this: whereas fire-fighters are used to calculating water delivered from jets in terms of
so many gallons per minute, seamen always think in terms of so many tons per hour. The fire
officer must therefore accustom himself to being able to calculate quickly in terms of tonnage. It
will help him to do so if he remembers that a one-inch jet can be reckoned to deliver about one ton
of water per minute; while a three-quarter-inch nozzle or a diffuser nozzle can each be reckoned to
deliver about half a ton per minute.
The second point is that nothing which has been said in this Chapter should lead any fire-fighter
to think that he can with impunity pump large quantities of water indiscriminately into any parts of a
vessel other than her superstructure. The fact is that large surface areas of water slopping about
loose in any part of a ship constitute a potential menace to her stability; and there are cases on
record of fire-fighting operations even in the engine-room and lower holds being the direct cause of
a vessel's capsize.
THE EJECTOR PUMP

It will be appreciated from the foregoing that a senior fire officer's anxieties during a fire-fight in
the course of which much water is being pumped into a ship would be much relieved if he had at
hand an efficient means of removing some of this water from any compartment in which it might
lodge.
The ship's own pumps, of course, are useless for this purpose, for they can work only in the lower
regions of the vessel in which they have been installed. Nor can any conventional Fire Brigade
pump of the self-propelled variety be brought aboard a ship, save in the most unusual
circumstances. Not only would great physical difficulties be involved in getting it there; but the use
of its internal-combustion engines in the necessarily confined spaces of a ship would be very
dangerous on account of the poisonous exhaust fumes.
Nor, it is possible, would such a pump be of much use even if it could be got safely to work on
board. It could not remove water from the points maybe two or three decks below the main access
deck in which the water might well have been trapped; and the conventional fire pump does not
operate efficiently if the suction has to be led over the top of obstructions located at a level higher
than that of the pump inlet. It is superfluous to say that such obstructions are liable to be
encountered on a ship's deck, especially in a crisis of this nature.
It was considerations such as these which some years ago led Mr. E. T. Hayward, O.B E.,
M.I.FireE. Chief Officer of the Southampton Fire Brigade, to design: and develop a simple — but
efficient pump which makes use of a very old hydraulic principle to remove water by means of an
apparatus having no moving parts.
The great attractions of this piece of equipment, called an ejector pump, are its very light weight
(only about 13 lb.), and the fact that it can be got to work in any place into which men can get with a
line of hose. Once in position and connected up, the pump can be left entirely on its own, leaving
the fire-fighters free to get on with their fire-fighting duties.
A further advantage of this, and other, ejector pumps is that they are not nearly so liable to
become choked with debris as are conventional pumps, in which the pump impellers operate within
a casing machined to very fine limits. Indeed, tests of the Hayward type pump have shown that
sludge, sand, shingle, and even solid particles up to a cross-sectional area of three and a half inches,

can safely pass through it. This is a most valuable property; for it is quite astonishing how much
loose debris collects in a given space on board ship, particularly when she is undergoing a refit in
dock.
The fact that the Hayward pump is of such simple construction that no moving parts are involved
means that not only is it cheap to manufacture, but also that it needs no maintenance beyond seeing
that the connecting threads are protected from physical damage.
The general principle of operation of ejector pumps is shown in Figures 14.4 to 14.6. Water is
delivered under pressure to the ejector from a hydrant or conventional fire pump (called, in such a
role, the "priming pump"), through a line of hose to a nozzle in the ejector pump which terminates
over the suction inlet, and which directs the jet of water along the body of the pump to the outlet.
The velocity of the water is greatly increased as it passes through the nozzle; and this creates an
area of pressure at the suction inlet which is well below atmospheric pressure. This causes air to be
exhausted from the suction hose; and the water which it is intended to remove rises until it is caught
up in the high pressure jet and then passed to the delivery side of the pump. At this point the action
becomes- similar to that of a jet pump; and if the outlet hose can be taken to a point lower than that
of the ejector, the action also becomes syphonic.
The "Noble" Ejector Pump illustrated in Figures 14.5 and 14.6, consists of a two and a half inch
male instantaneous coupling, terminating in a nozzle which is situated in the body of the pump
above a four inch round-thread male coupling. To this latter coupling is attached suction hose,
which is lowered into the water it is intended to remove. The discharge end of the pump also
terminates in a four inch round thread male coupling, to which is attached the delivery hose.
Different sizes of nozzle (usually one inch, seven
eighth inch and three quarter inch) are provided,
to be used according to the output from the
priming pump.
The amount of water which can be removed
by pumps of the ejector type varies with the
height at which the pump has to operate above
the water to be removed. This height is termed
the "suction lift”.
A further limitation attaches to the height
above the pump to which the water removed has
FIGURE 14.4 Cross-section diagram of Mechans to be delivered. The vertical distance between
water-ejector pump. the centre lines of the pump and the outlet of the
discharge is called the "barrier height".
During tests of the "Noble" Ejector Pump
carried out under ideal conditions in a Fire
Station, the following results were obtained:
At a suction lift of eight feet (about the
distance between two decks of a ship), with an
inlet pressure of 100 lb. per sq. in., a one inch
nozzle, and a barrier height of zero, an output of
440/450 gal. per min. was achieved. With a
three-quarter-inch nozzle, the output dropped to
about 360 gal. per min. (80 per cent).
The output from the pump is fairly static with
FIGURE 14.5 The Hughes Mark 11 "Noble" ejector suction lifts up to 31 ft., after which it begins to
pump. This large-capacity pump is capable of drop sharply.
discharging 450 g.p.m. One of the principal Increase of the barrier height to five feet (with
advantages of an ejector pump is that it has no
the one-inch nozzle and pressure as above)
moving parts. It can therefore pump water, sludge,
sand, or any suspended matter which can pass reduces the output to 350 gal. per min. A 10-ft.

barrier height further reduces it to 280 gal. per

min.; and a barrier over 15 ft. so reduces the
output that it becomes clear that ejector pumps
cannot be efficiently used when such conditions
obtain.
It will be seen from the above that, whenever
possible, one-inch nozzles should be fitted. The
only time when smaller nozzles should be used is
if the priming pump cannot deliver. about 300
gal. per min., at pressures up to 120 lb. per sq. in.
When pressures in the order of 75 lb. per sq. in.
FIGURE 14.6 The Hughes Mark 11 "Noble" ejector and 50 lb. per sq. in. are all that is available, the
pump, showing detachable nozzles and C spanner. maximum barrier height must be reduced to 10 ft.
and five feet respectively.
An Ejector Pump Test Aboard Ship
A further test of an ejector pump was held on board the t.m.v. City of Durban in the Royal Albert
Dock, East Ham, on December 8th, 1955. The purpose of the exercise was to gain experience of
using an ejector pump to remove water from a large passenger/ cargo vessel during simulated
fire-fighting conditions, and to study the discharge figures with the pump outlet at various, barrier
heights. It was thought that the output figures which had been obtained under ideal conditions on a
Fire Station drill ground could hardly be expected under operational conditions on board a vessel in
dock, and it was intended to check them.
For the purpose of the test, the swimming pool on the upper deck, 19 ft. by 16 ft. was filled to a
depth of 2 ft. 9 in. making its contents 5,225 gallons. Every three inches of the pool's depth
contained 475 gallons.
The priming pump, which had a capacity of 350/500 gal. per min was situated on the quay, and
was fed by two lines of hose from a double hydrant. The pump was operating at a pressure of 135
lb. per sq. in. through one line of two and three quarter inch rubber lined hose. It is estimated that
this gave a pressure at the ejector pump of 100 lb. per sq. in.
The ejector pump itself was positioned on the side of the swimming pool; and an eight foot
length of four-inch armoured suction hose was lowered into the water, creating a suction lift of five
feet.
Three tests were carried out, with barrier heights of zero, 15 and 25 ft. respectively. The
following Table shows the results achieved:
RESULT OF EJECTOR PUMP TESTS, USING A ONE-INCH NOZZLE
Test Time taken Depth of Water Position of Ejector Gallons per Gallons per Tons per
No. Pump, and Barrier Minute Hour Hour
Height Removed Removed Removed
Suction Lift:- 5 feet
1 5 mins 2' 9" to 2' 0" 285 17,100 76
Barrier:- Zero
2 3 mins 2' 0" to 1' 9" 158 9,480 42
Barrier:- 15 feet
3 6 mins 1' 9" to 1' 6" 80 4,800 21
Barrier:- 25 feet
TABLE 14.1

It will be noted that the greater the barrier height above the level of the water which is to be
removed, the greater is the energy which has to be expended to remove it. The amount of water
removed is reduced in direct proportion to the height of the delivery hose above the surface of the
water. Thus it will be seen in Table 14.1 that, whereas 285 gal. per min. were removed when the
outlet was level with the surface of the water, only 80 gal. per min could be pumped away when the
outlet was 25 ft. higher.
Nevertheless the tests clearly proved the value of even one of these PUMPS working during a
fire-fight; for the maximum removal figure of 76 tons per hour is actually higher than could be
achieved by many ship's pumps, even if the trapped water happened to be in a part of the ship in
which they could be brought to bear on it.
A Theoretical Calculation of De-Watering Potential

The amount of water which would be used to extinguish a given fire on board ship can never be
calculated with complete accuracy. Circumstances vary so much that two fires are hardly ever alike,
either in the manner of fire spread or in the means employed to combat it.
Nevertheless, working from the assumptions that every threequarter-inch branch of fire-fighting
hose will deliver 140 gal. per min., and every one-inch branch 250 gal. per min., the author has
prepared a Table showing the theoretical number of ejector pumps which would be needed to deal
with the surplus water which would have been delivered in differing fire situations on board ship.
It is appreciated, of course, that the figures given are in some respects unreal, in that the
quantities of water liable to be trapped in a dangerous position during a fire-fight will never in
practice be anything like as large as the quantities delivered by the jets. Some of this water will be
turned into steam, and will evaporate to atmosphere. More will drain away to lower regions of the
ship, where it will be dealt with by the ship's own pumps. Most important of all, the jets will never
in practice be going full out (as is assumed in Table 14.2 below). Hand-control branches will
certainly be in use, enabling the individual branchmen handling them to shut off as soon as they
have beaten out the particular area of fire they have been tackling. The sum of these factors will in
practice reduce the theoretical maximum of water needing to be removed by at least one-half; and
will correspondingly lower the number of ejector pumps needed to do the job.
The output of an ejector pump having a one-inch nozzle and an inlet pressure of 100 lb. per. sq.
in. is taken in the Table as being 350 gal. per min. — a figure rather lower than midway between
that experienced under ideal conditions and that obtained during the test on the City of Durban.
Even remembering that the column eight figures of "Number of Ejector Pumps Needed" can in
practice be at least halved, it is evident from the above Table that the number of pumps which
would theoretically be needed to cope with the inflow of water during a serious fire-fight becomes
unacceptably large as soon as the average barrier height exceeds 15 ft.
The Danger of Excessive Barrier Height

Indeed, it is not too much to carry this conclusion a stage further, and to say that no ejector pump
can effectively operate against a head much in excess of 15 ft. For there are positive dangers
associated with inefficient use of these pumps above this height.
It will be appreciated that, when the barrier height is great, the incoming jet of water from the
priming pump has to overcome the weight of water in the delivery side of the ejector pump. The
higher the barrier, -the greater this weight becomes until at about 30 ft. an inlet pressure of even 130
lb. per sq. in. is fully absorbed.
The minute this happens, the incoming water is forced down the suction side of the pump. In
this condition, an ejector pump is positively aggravating a situation it was intended to cure; for it is
pouring water into the ship, instead of removing it from her. When it is realised that an ejector
pump may easily be operating in a place where its working is obscured by thick smoke, and that in
any event it will normally be left unattended, the gravity of such a reversal of function becomes
obvious.

THEORETICAL QUANTITIES OF WATER NEEDED TO BE REMOVED DURING A FIRE-FIGHT

AND THE NUMBER OF EJECTOR PUMPS REQUIRED FOR THE PURPOSE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Number Size Gallons Tons Gallons Tons Output in g.p.m. of one Number of Ejector
of per per per per Ejector Pump at 100 lb. per Pumps Needed to
of Fire-
Jets Minute Minute Hour Hour square inch with a one-inch Remove all Water
fighting Delivered Delivered Delivered Delivered nozzle Delivered
Jets in
(a) (b) (c)
Use
5 feet 5 feet 5 feet (a) (b) (c)
Suction: Suction: Suction:
0 feet 15 feet 25 feet
Barrier Barrier Barrier
2 ¾" 280 1-25 16,800 75 1 2 4
1" 500 2-23 30,000 134 2 4 7
5 ¾" 700 3-12 42,000 192 350 158 80 2 5 9
1" 1.25 5-59 75,000 335 4 8 16
10 ¾" 1,400 6-25 84,000 384 4 9 19
1" 2,500 11-16 150,000 670 7 16 32
15 ¾" 2,100 9-37 126,000 576 6 14 27
1" 3,750 16-74 225,000 1,005 11 24 50
20 ¾" 2,800 12-5 168,000 768 8 18 35
1" 5,000 22-32 300,000 1,339 14 32 64
TABLE 14.2
It is, therefore, of prime importance that the highest possible pressure should always be
maintained in an ejector pump, and that the barrier heights given earlier in this Chapter should never
be exceeded.
The figures, indeed, bear repetition.
At an inlet pressure of 100 lb. per sq. in., and with a one-inch nozzle, the barrier height
must not exceed 15 ft. At pressures of 75 lb. per sq. in. and 50 lb. per sq. in., the maximum
barrier height must be reduced to 10 ft. and 5 feet respectively.
An Ejector Pump Which Will Not Reverse

Action
To obviate the dangers associated with
inefficient use of ejector pumps, Messrs. Mechans
Ltd., of Glasgow, have designed a type of pump
which is most unlikely to reverse its action and
pump water back into a flooded area. The sizes in
which this pump is made range from two inches to
eight inches in internal working diameter.
A series of tests on the five-inch-diameter
model was carried out by the Glasgow Fire
Service, under Firemaster Martin Chadwick,
C.B.E., M.I.FireE. Standard Home Office six-inch
plastic piping was used; and with a barrier height FIGURE 14.7 Result of a test of Mechans five-inch
of two feet, and a pump pressure of 120 lb. per. sq. ejector pump carried out by the City of Glasgow Fire
Brigade.

in. through a one-inch jet, over 700 gal. per

min. were removed (176 tons per hour), is a
very satisfactory figure indeed.
The results of the tests are shown in
Figures 14.7 and 14.8.
Provided the difficulty of ensuring a
sufficiently airtight joint with the plastic
piping can be overcome, the efficiency of the
Mechans range of pumps when used with this
standard plastic piping (of which Fire
Brigades hold large emergency reserves)
would seem to make the pumps of
considerable potential value to the Fire FIGURE 14.8 Performance table of Mechans
Service. three-and-a-half-inch, five-inch and eight-inch ejector pumps.
Permanent Ejector-type Pump Installations: on Board Ship

The author believes that the permanent fitting of two types of ejector-pump installation on all
ships of, say, 15,000 tons and upwards is a measure which would win warm approval from all Port
Fire Brigades, and which would certainly constitute a worthwhile extra insurance premium for the
ship owner who put them in.
The first type of installation recommended is that of a number of simple (and therefore relatively
inexpensive) ejector pumps, permanently fitted in all positions where quantities of water sufficient
to endanger the stability of the vessel could lodge high up in the ship during fire-fighting operations.
The one-inch nozzle should be fitted as standard in these pumps; and the Fire Brigade inlet should
be two-and-a-half-inch male instantaneous coupling. This should be connected to the pump by rigid
piping, and should be accessibly situated at a point unlikely to be involved in a fire.
The four-inch outlets from the pumps should, if possible, discharge directly, overside; and should
be positioned so as to give the lowest possible barrier height in no event greater than 15 ft. and if
possible negative in relation to the respective suction points If overside discharge is impossible,
each outlet should be connected by rigid piping to a point adjacent to its inlet; and should terminate
in a four-inch round-thread male coupling from which the Fire Brigade could run a four-inch
suction hose (for use as discharge hose in this case) to the side of the ship.
The pumps themselves should be installed so that the suction points are situated at the lowest
levels at which water could lodge; and they should be protected by a wire cage of irregular pattern
whose function would be to prevent their inlets from being choked by free-floating articles.
The second type of installation is desirable by reason of the fact that nearly every Fire Brigade in
a port area is called upon from time to time to pump out some part or other of a vessel which is
taking water, but whose own pumps either cannot cope or are for some reason out of action. In the
case of a large vessel, this can be a very difficult business; because it may be as much. as 30 or 40 ft.
from the working level of an engine-room of a 20,000 ton ship to the nearest point above the water
line from which water can be discharged; and because standard Fire Brigade pumps powered by
internal combustion engines are dangerous to use in confined areas such as the shaft tunnel, on
account of the lethal carbon-monoxide content of their exhaust fumes..
The author's experience of many such occasions has led him to believe that a deep-lift pump of
simple design similar to that of the ejector pump should be fitted as standard equipment on all large
ships. Examples of such apparatus are the "Aberdeen" deep lift pump and the Merryweather
"Aquator".
Both these pumps are similar in action to the ejector pumps just described; but they have the
tremendous advantage that they can operate successfully against a head of as much as 60 ft.
The "Aquator" is fed with water from a fire pump through a single line of two-and-a-half-inch
hose (preferably rubber-lined); and the energy of this inlet water is used to lift the large quantity

delivered to delivery hose attached to the pump outlet. The apparatus consists of an
aluminium-alloy body incorporating a two-stage high-efficiency ejector nozzle. The base of the
body of the pump incorporates an inlet strainer plate, and eyes are provided for the attachment of
lowering ropes. The inlet is a British Standard two and a half inch instantaneous male coupling;
while the outlet can be obtained in sizes ranging from four inches to six inches the type of coupling
being designed to suit individual requirements.
For a British Fire Brigade to be able to use it, this outlet should be a four-inch British Standard
round thread coupling, unless a supply of suction hose is kept permanently available on board. The
two-and-a-half-inch inlet connection is in standard use throughout Britain.
A Fire Brigade Experiment

As a matter of what might perhaps be
described as academic Fire Service interest,
the East Ham Fire Brigade, when under the
author's command, carried out a series of
tests with the object of finding out to what
extent a chain of ordinary ejector pumps
linked together could carry out the functions
of one of the deep lift pumps described.
What, in other words is the maximum
height to which water can be raised by the
use of a series of ejector pumps working in
relay?
One such test showed that three ordinary
ejector pumps, using six-inch piping at the
discharge and with booster lines of hose set
in at the intermediate and upper pumps, could
eject water at a height of more than 40 ft.
above the original suction point. FIGURE 14.9 Performance chart of the Merryweather
Far be it from the author to suggest that "Aquator" deep lift ejector pump.
this experimental test is in any way suitable
for adoption as standard Fire Service operational technique. But it does show the sort of thing
which can be let us say, devised to deal with an emergency salvage operation in the engine room of
a large vessel all but waterlogged in consequence of a fire which has wrecked all her own pumps
before being extinguished.

Chapter Fifteen
Fire Protection of Offshore Structures
It would be possible to write a full length book on the subject of offshore fire safety alone and the
author must be content to limit this chapter to the inclusion of only a broad description of the
hazards that can be encountered and the general principles of fire safety. The preparation of the
safety case for an offshore structure is a lengthy procedure involving many man-years of effort, one
of the main risks to personnel and the structure being fire and explosion . It will be apparent that
much of what has been included in this book relating to fire-fighting equipment and procedures for
the marine environment is applicable to situations on an offshore structure. The approach taken in
this chapter is to discuss each of the main areas of fire safety design of an offshore structure in turn
and describe some of the means whereby fire and explosions can be prevented, controlled or
extinguished as appropriate.
This chapter does not aim to deal with the design of the structure or process with respect to fire
safety. Fire safety management and emergency response are important procedural tools for the
prevention of fire and dealing with incidents. The concepts of fire safety management and
emergency response are similar to those in a normal marine environment which are discussed in
detail elsewhere in this book.
Offshore oil structures range in size and complexity from simple wellhead platforms, with one or
more oil wells and minimal other facilities, to the major integrated platforms on which there are the
hazards of an offshore drilling rig, an oil refinery, a power station generating enough power for a
small town, a 200 bed hotel and a helicopter port. Often situated a hundred miles or more from the
nearest land, personnel are at great risk when uncontrolled fire breaks out or an explosion occurs.
This is especially the case when the incident necessitates abandoning the installation in heavy seas
and high winds. In common with most fires at sea, the crew of an offshore installation may have
little outside help during a life threatening incident.
Offshore installations are very varied. The most complex fire safety problems arise on the
permanent production installations, such as the Brent Bravo Platform operated by Shell exploration
and Production shown in Figure 15.1. In addition, there are the different fire hazards of Mobile
Offshore Drilling Unit, known as MODU's, and of many other types of offshore facilities such as
accommodation units, heavy lift units, and diving support units. Figure 15.2 shows a typical
MODU, in this case a three legged jack-up drilling rig. Associated with all offshore operations
there are vessels for support, supply and special services such as fire fighting, diving operations and
construction. Figures 15.3 to 15 .7 illustrate the some of the principal areas on an offshore platform.
The North Sea is the offshore area with which readers are most likely to be familiar, but it is only
one of many offshore provinces. Other major production fields are found in the Gulf of Mexico,
California, the Gulf waters and many areas of Southeast Asia. Fire hazards and engineering are
similar in these different areas, but the regulations affecting safety management and the
sophistication of both technical and emergency support services vary immensely.
433
Fire Protection of Offshore Structures 435
Fires and explosions of varying severity have occurred throughout the history of offshore oil and
gas operation. The explosion and subsequent fire that ultimately destroyed Occidental Petroleum's
Piper Alpha installation in the UK North sea incidents.. Piper Alpha has led us — albeit at the
expense of grave loss of life and immense suffering of the survivors — to new and deeper
knowledge of fire hazards and, possibly equally significant, to a far better understanding of the
importance of explosion hazards and their potential to lead to ensuing fires of the utmost severity.
Because its lessons have had a profound influence not only on North Sea safety but also throughout
the world, a description of the Piper Alpha disaster has been included below.
PIPER ALPHA
On the night of July 6, 1988 at approximately 2200 hours, an explosion occurred on the Piper
Alpha oil production platform that lead to the loss of 165 lives of the 226 platform personnel and 2
crew of a fast rescue craft that was carrying out life saving activities in the vicinity of the platform.
The Piper Alpha oil production platform was owned by a consortium comprising Occidental
Petroleum (Caledonia) Limited, Texaco Britain Limited, Texas Petroleum Limited and International
Thomson plc. The Platform was operated by Occidental.
The purpose of the platform was the extraction of crude oil and gas from oil bearing formations
in the Northern North sea. It was approximately 110 miles North East of Aberdeen, Scotland.
The platform was provided with facilities for drilling and workover, processing of fluids
extracted from the formation, general utilities and accommodation for platform personnel.
The main process was the separation of gas, oil and water.
The oil was exported via a 30 inch diameter, 128 mile long pipeline to the Flotta oil terminal in
the Orkneys. A second oil pipeline from the nearby Claymore Platform joined this pipeline 22
miles from Piper Alpha. The Claymore platform was also operated by Occidental.
Natural gas from Piper Alpha was exported to the Claymore platform via a 16 inch diameter
pipeline for use as a fuel gas and also via an 18 inch, 34 mile long pipeline to the Manifold
Compression Platform (MCP-01) from where it was routed to the St Fergus terminal on mainland
Scotland.
A further platform, the Texaco Tartan Alpha exported gas to the Piper Alpha platform via an 18
inch diameter, 12 mile long pipeline, from where it was routed via MCP-01 to St Fergus. The oil
from the Tartan platform was exported to the Flotta oil terminal via the Claymore Platform.
Platform Description
The Piper Alpha platform comprised top side facilities supported by an eight legged steel jacket
positioned on the sea bed.
The top sides included production facilities, living quarters, utilities, drilling and workover and a
heli-deck. The main production and utilities areas were separated into self-contained modules each
designed for specific functions and separated by fire compartment boundaries.
The production modules were on a deck at the 84 ft level. Module A contained the well heads,
Module B the production separators where oil, gas and water were separated, Module C gas
compression, where the gas was compressed prior to export from the platform and Module D
utilities such as power generation and water treatment.
Below the production deck at the 68 ft level of the deck support frame were the pig launchers and
traps and the condensate injection pumps. Import and export pipeline risers were also at this level
with the exception of the main oil line which terminated in Module B.
Above the well heads in Module A was the drilling rig and drilling sub structure. The two flare
booms were at the Southeast and Southwest corners of Module A.
Adjacent to the derrick and drilling sub structure were a number of other modules including the
mud module and the gas conservation module (GCM). The gas conservation module was installed
following the removal of the second derrick. The accommodation module was to the North of the
platform above which was the heli-deck.

The pig trap for the gas pipeline from Tartan and the pig launchers on the pipelines from MCP-
01 and Claymore were on the 68 ft level. The Dive complex, JT flash drum, condensate suction
vessel and condensate injection pumps were on the 68 ft level.
The Piper Alpha platform was provided with a comprehensive fire and gas detection system
arranged to provide an alarm and an initiate a platform emergency shutdown (ESD). Gas detectors
were provided in Modules A to C and at the 68 ft level. Gas detectors in Module C were mainly at
roof level although there were some at lower levels.
Fire water was provided from a ring main supplying water spray deluge systems and hydrants.
Deluge systems protected the whole of Modules A, B and C and part of Module D including the fire
pumps. On the 68 ft level the deluge was provided for the protection of the pig traps and launchers.
Water deluge was provided for the Claymore pig trap, the condensate injection pumps and part of
the produced water area. Operation of the deluge was automatic via flame or heat detectors in each
module. Facilities were provided for the manual release of a deluge if required.
Piper Alpha Process Description

Piper Alpha produced oil and gas from underground formations, the fluids passing from the well
to the well heads and thence to the production separators in Module B. In the production separators
the fluid was separated into its principal components; oil, water and gas. The oil was pumped by
booster pumps, to the main oil line (MOL) pumps, metered and exported via the main oil pipeline
to the Flotta Terminal.
The gas from the separators could be processed in two ways. Phase 1 mode was the method
used when the platform was first constructed and the gas was flared off. In 1978 facilities were
installed for meeting requirements for export of the gas to St Fergus by the inclusion of a gas
dehydration unit and a Joule Thomson (JT) gas expansion valve. The dehydration unit was
removed in 1983 and the gas conservation module (GCM) installed at the site of the second derrick
which had been removed. This means of processing the gas was termed the Phase 2 Mode and was
in use from December 1980 until July 1988, with the exception of a period from April to June 1984
and the period immediately preceding the disaster when it was operational in the Phase 1 Mode.
Gas from the separators was passed to a knockout drum where condensate was removed and then
to three centrifugal compressors where the pressure was raised first to 675 psi and then by the first
stage of two reciprocating compressors to 1465 psi.
In Phase 2 Mode the gas passed through molecular sieve dryers in the gas conservation module
(GCM) and was cooled by reducing the pressure across a turbo expander such that condensate was
formed. The condensate was passed to a distillation column where methane gas was stripped before
being returned to the JT flash drum. The gas passed to the outlet of the JT flash drum.
From the outlet of the JT flash drum the gas was compressed by the second stage of two
reciprocating compressor and used for gas lift, export or was passed to the flare.
The condensate from the JT flash drum was taken to two condensate booster pumps where the
pressure was raised prior to metering and injection into the main oil line.
In Phase 1 Mode the GCM was isolated and the gas from the first stage of the reciprocating
compressors was reduced in pressure across the JT valve (PCV 21), into the JT flash drum such that
condensate was formed. The condensate was then processed as described above and the gas from
the outlet of the JT flash drum passed to the second stage of the two reciprocating compressors as
before.
The condensate from the JT flash drum was pumped into the main oil line by two condensate
booster pumps arranged in series with a pair of condensate injection pumps. Both sets of these
pumps were on the 68 ft level below the main production deck.
One pump was normally operating and one on standby. No automatic change over of the pumps
was provided. If one of the pumps tripped or stopped it was necessary to start the standby pump
manually.
Each of the condensate injection pumps was protected from over-pressure on the delivery side by
a pressure safety valve (PSV). The PSV on the A pump was PSV504 and the valve on B pump was

PSV505. Both of these valves were in Module C on the production deck above. Relief lines from
the pumps on the 68 ft level ran up through the floor of Module C to the valves and then returned
back through the floor of the module to the 68 ft level to the condensate suction vessel.
Produced water from the production separators was passed to a plate skimmer and then to
hydrocyclones to remove any residual oil prior to discharge overboard.
Events Leading Up to the Disaster

During the time leading up to the explosion on July 6, 1988, there was a work programme in
place that involved some major construction work including the installation of a riser at the 68 ft
level for the Chanter field, change-out of the GCM molecular sieve dryers, overhaul of the prover
loop and metering skid in B module and work on the gas lift lines at the wellheads in module A.
The plant had not operated in the Phase 1 Mode since 1984 and changeover to this mode from
the Phase 2 Mode of operation took place on Sunday July 3, 1988. to accomplish this, the plant was
shut down, with the exception of one centrifugal compressor which remained running to supply fuel
gas to the turbines for power generation. At this time the molecular sieve dryers were spaded off
but not the GCM itself.
As a result of the maintenance work on the GCM on July 6,1988, the gas process was operating
in Phase 1 Mode. In this mode there was the potential for formation of hydrates in the pipework
which could cause blockages and result in the failure of components to operate correctly. The
potential for hydrate formation was recognised by Occidental management and compensated for by
additional methanol injection at a calculated rate 12 times greater than the normal rate of injection.
There was however an interruption to the methanol injection at the JT valve on July 6, 1988
between 1600 and 2000 hours that reduced the flow to about half the required rate.
On the day of the explosion the condensate injection pump in operation was the B pump. The A
pump was off-line for maintenance consisting of a full 24 month preventative maintenance
schedule, repair of the pump coupling and the recertification of PSV 504. The recertification of the
valve required that it be removed from the pump and reconditioned and tested remotely in a
contractors container. As part of this operation it was necessary, in accordance with normal
practice, to electrically isolate the pump and fit blank flanges to the suction and delivery lines. The
work would be carried out under the platform's permit to work system.
On July 5, 1988 contract personnel who were to undertake the recertification work inspected the
PSV504 which was located in C Module. A permit to work was raised and the conditions of this
permit included the fitting of blank flanges to the open pipework, and isolations as required by the
lead operator. The lead operator attended to the isolations, however the valve service contractor
did not observe any valves being closed and believed that the lead operator was carrying out a check
of the isolations. The valve service contractor left C Module to visit the control room and on his
return found that PSV504 had been removed to the floor of the module.
Following removal of PSV504 to the contractor's container by the platform crane, blank flanges
were taken individually to the pump by an employee of the valve service company who confirmed
to his supervisor that they had been fitted. His supervisor did not check that this action had been
carried out correctly.
Work on the PSV was completed by the evening of July 5, 1988 but as the crane was not
available to restore the valve to C module the supervisor decided to replace the valve the following
day and took the permit to the control room for suspension.
The following day, July 6, 1988 at approximately 1650 hours a decision was made by the
maintenance superintendent to restrict the maintenance being carried out on pump A to repair of the
coupling.
At approximately 2145 to 2150 on the evening of July 6, 1988 the working condensate injection
pump B on the 68 ft level tripped. The lead operator left the control room and together with the
phase 1 operator, an attempt was made to restart the pump but without success. A loss of
lubricating oil or the formation of hydrates were considered at the time as possible reasons for the

pump tripping and failing to restart. The result of the loss of both of the condensate booster pumps
would then have caused a build-up of condensate in the JT flash drum.
At about this time an alarm was received in the control room that the control room operator
interpreted as being the JT flash drum high level alarm. He contacted the lead operator to inform
him of the situation and to initiate the unloading of the reciprocating compressors. This was
standard practice to reduce the flow of condensate into the JT flash drum. Unless this action was
taken the plant would shutdown after a period of approximately 30 minutes. A 'black start' of the
plant would then be necessary using an emergency generator designated for this task.
On his return to the control room the lead operator indicated that he was intending to restart the
A condensate pump but that there was a permit to work in force with respect to planned
maintenance of the pump instrumentation and an electrical isolation was in force.
The lead operator stated that he wished to get the planned maintenance permit signed off and the
electrical supply restored to the pump. At no time was any reference made to the absence of
PSV504 which had not been reinstated. The lead operator signed off the permit for the A
condensate pump so that it could be electrically de-isolated and left the control room to return to the
pumps on the 68 ft level. The control room operator liaised with the platform electricians to arrange
the de-isolation.
At approximately 2155 the tripping of two centrifugal compressors was indicated in the control
room. This was followed by a low level gas alarm in module C from detectors near to a third
centrifugal compressor. Immediately after the tripping of this compressor a series of gas alarms was
received in the control room; three low level alarms and a high level alarm in C module. The
control room operator was in the process of accepting these alarms when he was blown across the
control room by an explosion.
Following this initial explosion a large fireball issued from the West side of the platform and an
oil pool fire developed in module C that spilled over and began to affect the 68 ft level below. The
initial explosion disabled the main power supplies and communications with the adjacent platform.
The firewater deluge failed to operate automatically as they had been isolated as diving operations
were being undertaken.
The ESD system operated closing the valve on the main oil line and depressurising the process
with all gas being sent to the flare. The emergency shutdown valves associated with the gas
pipelines to adjacent platforms did not shutdown automatically and this task would normally be
carried out by an action of the control room operator from the control room.
Following the initial explosion the offshore installation manager installation (OIM) sent a
Mayday message from the radio room.
As a result of the loss of communications with adjacent platforms, the Texaco Tartan platform
although aware that there was a fire on the Piper Alpha was unaware of the scale of the emergency
and continued production, sending gas through the pipeline to Piper Alpha. Some 20 minutes after
the initial explosion, the pool fire which had spread to the 68 ft level caused the rupture of the
Tartan pipeline riser. This resulted in a massive uncontrolled release of gas which enveloped the
majority of the platform in a fireball.
At this time those that were able were abandoning the installation by whatever means were
available. Some climbed down knotted ropes to the sea whilst others jumped from higher points
such as the pipedeck into the sea. A large proportion of platform personnel found their way to the
lifeboats blocked and had been instructed by the OIM to wait in the dining room until helicopters
arrived to take them off. The heli-deck could not be used safely and the majority of those personnel
who waited in the accommodation module perished, some due to effects of fire and other when the
support for the accommodation module failed and it fell into the sea.
Of those who survived by jumping from the platform and who reached the sea by other means, a
large proportion were rescued by the crew of the standby vessels Silver Pitt and Sandhaven using
fast rescue craft. Two crew of the fast rescue craft of the Sandhaven lost their lives during a riser
rupture. The crew of the fast rescue craft of the Silver Pitt were themselves rescued by helicopter

when their craft began to sink. The multipurpose support and firefighting vessel MSV Tharos
assisted in the rescue and firefighting operations.
At approximately 2250 hours the riser for the pipeline from MCP-01 ruptured and at
approximately 2318 hours the Claymore riser ruptured. On the morning of July 7, 1988 only A
module remained standing on four of the original eight legs of the supporting jacket, the other four
legs being sheared off at water level. The wells in Module A continued to leak burning reservoir
fluids for several days until they were extinguished by specialists, in the capable hands of Mr Red
Adair.
Investigation and Inquiry into the Disaster

An investigation into the disaster was immediately instigated by the UK Department of Energy
under the direction of Mr J Petrie then head of the Petroleum Engineering Division who, under a
longstanding agency agreement with the Health and Safety Executive, were responsible for policing
offshore safety. The 'Petrie' report postulated two scenarios as potential causes, either a
hydrocarbon leak from the site of PSV504 or a leak due to the ingestion of liquid hydrocarbons into
the reciprocating compressors causing mechanical failure of the compressors.
A public inquiry into the disaster was instigated and was presided over by the Scottish Judge
Lord Cullen over a period of approximately two years. The findings of this inquiry are recorded in a
two volume report entitled 'The public inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster' published by the Her
Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO). The report concluded that the cause of the initial explosion
was a gas leak probably through a gap in the order of 8 — 10 mm diameter and that the mass of fuel
was of the order of 30 — 80 kg. The report concludes that the point of origin of the explosion was
in C Module. Wind tunnel tests commissioned from BMT fluid mechanics were undertaken in an
attempt to determine the most likely source of the release based on the gas detectors that went into
alarm immediately prior to the initial explosion. It was found from these wind tunnel tests that only
a leak from PSV504 or PSV 505 fitted the correct pattern. Further tests were carried out to
determine if the type of leak could have originated from the blank flanges fitted over the openings in
the lines following the removal of PSV504. It was determined that if the flange had been tightened
using a spanner that this type of leak could not have occurred but that if the blank flange was only
finger tight that a leak that was directionally downward was probable.
The inquiry attempted to determine why the condensate pump A was restarted when the only
pressure safety valve serving the pump (PSV504) was absent. It was concluded that the lead
operator was indeed ignorant of the fact that this valve was missing and that this was the result of a
breakdown of communications and poor handover procedures between shifts.
Although a range of other scenarios were considered, the most probable cause of the disaster
which occurred on the Piper Alpha platform on the evening of July 6, 1988 was a release of gas
from a poorly tightened blank flange following the starting of condensate pump A. The source of
ignition of the gas cloud was not identified.
CHANGES IN OFFSHORE PRACTICE FOLLOWING PIPER ALPHA

Piper Alpha installation was in compliance with all the relevant offshore legislation at the time of
the disaster, and the weather conditions that night were benign; but there was still a huge loss of life
and the fire systems were revealed as inadequate for the actual incident. This pointed to the need to
re-examine the ideas on which the legislation had been founded, and to analyse the technical basis
of fire and explosion safety offshore. These were tasks tackled in the Inquiry, and admirably
reported by Lord Cullen.
In the aftermath of Piper Alpha, there were significant changes in the legislation governing
offshore operations in the UK Sector of the north Sea. Of wider significance, the offshore oil and
gas industry came to a new view of the potential severity of explosion and ensuing fire as a potential
source of disaster.

The legislative regime in the UK North Sea prior to Piper Alpha was prescriptive. That is to say
the various regulations required specific safety provisions and management procedures. Such an
approach is followed in many industries, including the maritime, aviation and other transportation
industries. A prescriptive regime has advantages for management since the requirements are
explicitly stated by the authorities. However, one of the lessons which emerged clearly from the
Piper Alpha inquiry is that such a regime may not address safety management issues adequately.
Although an inspecting authority such as a classification or certification society can identify
prescribed construction and engineering measures and assess the adequacy of their implementation,
it is much more time consuming and complex for an inspecting authority to analyse safety
management methods and state their adequacy.
For some years prior to Piper Alpha, onshore industries in the UK had been regulated using a
goal setting approach. This requires the management of an enterprise or facility to take the lead in
setting safety goals and saying how these goals are achieved. Characteristic features of a goal
setting regime include a safety case for high hazard facilities, submitted to the authorities, where the
management's goals and their implementation are explained. At the time of Piper Alpha, the only
offshore province in which this type of approach was used was the Norwegian sector of the North
Sea. The Norwegian approach to the regulation of offshore safety owed much to that used onshore
in the UK.
One of the most crucial findings of the Piper Alpha inquiry was that the regulation of offshore
safety in the UK North Sea should be changed to a goal setting regime and that the enforcing
authority should be the Health and Safety Executive which had responsibility for oversight of
onshore industry in the UK. Over the ensuing years there has been a complete transformation of the
UK's offshore legislation, starting with requirements for offshore safety cases and moving on to
legislation concerning the management of safety systems.
Lord Cullen recommended a wide ranging reform of offshore legislation that formed two
principal complementary elements;
1. Each owner/operator should be required to prepare a safety case for submission to the
Health and Safety Executive and that the HSE should approve the submission. The safety
case should demonstrate that the company have a suitable safety management system.
2. A programme of progressive reform of existing prescriptive legislation should be undertaken

into a format in terms of meeting objectives, referred to as goal setting. The reformed
legislation should incorporate specific improvements recommended in the report.
The first stage of these reforms was initiated by the Offshore Safety Act 1992, under which came
the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992 (Statutory Instrument (SI) 1992/2885)
(SCR). These regulations required that a safety case be submitted for all installations that had
reached design stage after May 31, 1993 and for all existing installations by November 30, 1993.
The regulations applied to both fixed and mobile installations. The offshore industry responded
vigorously to the new legislation. The safety case regime has now become an integral part of UK
offshore practice. Further developments have led to the widespread acceptance of the need to
formally identify major accident hazards on an offshore installation, to analyse the potential for
adverse consequences in terms of loss of life or injury to the crew and to analyse the safety measures
through which these hazards are controlled. This discipline has not of itself led to great changes in
engineering practice, but has set the engineering practice on a much better foundation of reasoned
analysis.
On June 20, 1995 SI 743 The Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion and
Emergency Response) Regulations 1995 came into force. These are known as the PFEER
regulations. The key points in this important legislation include a requirement for structured
assessment of fire and explosion hazards and measures, which must be repeated on a regular basis
to ensure that the risks are properly understood and controlled.

The PFEER Regulations also introduced into law the concept of performance standards for safety
critical systems, these performance standards being set by the operator. Although these concepts are
implicit in earlier regulations, the PFEER regulations make plain the responsibilities of the operator
and the approach which must be taken to demonstrating that the performance standards are achieved
in installation design and throughout the operating lifetime. The approach to demonstrating that
performance standards are achieved recognises the need for involvement of a competent
examination of the design of equipment and systems, similar in essence to the long established role
of the classifying and certifying authorities but with no legal requirement for approval by such
bodies.
A further set of regulations, The Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc.)
Regulations 1996 have extended the performance standards concept to safety systems addressing
risks other than fire and explosion. These regulations complement the PFEER regulations for
designers and for offshore operators. Numerous other regulations concerning safety and safety
management have been promulgated for the UK sector and influence matter of fire and explosion ,
but are outside the scope of this Chapter.
This upheaval in offshore safety legislation in the UK has affected other offshore areas, though
authorities in other provinces have not slavishly followed the details of UK practice. Oil and gas
companies have an acute awareness of the need for consistency in worldwide operations so that the
best parts of the UK approach have been taken up for application elsewhere.
RISK ASSESSMENT
Lord Cullen's report and the ensuing legislation identify risk identification and assessment as
central to the management of safety offshore including fire and explosion.
The greatest risk on board on board any offshore structure involved in the exploration or
production of oil and gas is that of an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbon gas the results of which if
ignited can lead to the catastrophic loss the structure and multiple loss of lives. Piper Alpha was a
tragic example of the destructive energy of such a release.
There any many areas and activities on an oil exploration and production facility that could give
rise to a significant release of gas under pressure. In the majority of cases the potential cause will
not be due to an inherent defect in the equipment but will occur as a result of activities where the
normal operation of the facility is interrupted or where procedural safeguards fail. Periodic plant
shutdowns for maintenance are a time of risk when flanges can be insufficiently tightened or
valves incorrectly fitted giving rise to a leak or overpressurising of equipment when the process is
restarted. Activities such as wirelining and well servicing which require to be carried out on live
pressurised wells are by their nature hazardous and require strict operating procedures for such tasks
to be carried out safely.
Some of the most severe potential hazards arise from drilling operations, whether they are done
from an integrated production and drilling installation or from a drilling unit (MODU). Loss of
control of the well which is being drilled or overhauled can lead to an effectively unlimited release
of flammable hydrocarbons flowing at high rate onto the platform or drilling rig. This spectacular
and extremely dangerous incident is a blow-out. During drilling operations the well must be
constantly monitored for potential kicks caused by pressure building up which if uncontrolled can
lead to a blow-out. A column of water based or oil based mud serves to compensate formation
pressure, cool the drill bit and circulate cuttings to the shale shakers. The mud density and height
of the mud column is carefully monitored to prevent kicks and the supply monitored against return.
The mud is also monitored for gas. Blow-out preventors (BOP stacks) will be installed on the
platform once the well has been drilled to a sufficient depth, so that the driller can rapidly close in
the well if a blow-out is anticipated. These BOPs will incorporate pipe, blind and shear rams, the
purpose of the latter being to shear the drill string as last resort prior to abandoning the well.
Blow-out preventors with heave compensators are installed on semi-submersibles to allow the
drill string to be sheared and the semi-submersible to move away from the area of danger both in the

event of a blow out or in the event of severe unanticipated weather conditions when the rig does
not have sufficient time to withdraw the drill string from the well. Prior to the fitting of the BOP
stack the platform or semi-submersible is vulnerable to an uncontrolled release of gas from shallow
reservoirs. In these instances a divertor will be fitted to direct gas away from the installation
structure.
Separation modules where oil water and gas are separated are areas where there is the potential
for the release of live crude under pressure and gas and therefore jet fires and running pool fires as
well as gas deflagration must be considered in the design of the structure and layout of equipment.
The layout of equipment and pipework should be designed to minimise turbulence of the advancing
flame front by locating items of equipment such that they offer the least path of resistance.
Computer models are available for planning module layouts to minimise turbulence.
Gas compression, metering equipment and pig launchers all have the potential for a significant
release of gas as a result of the pressures that may be generated prior to export. The pressures
involved may be as high as 150 barg. An incorrectly assembled high pressure fitting of only 5mm
diameter failing at these pressures can give rise to a release of gas which if ignited could cause a
major explosion and subsequent fire.
Natural gas liquids (NGL) and condensate are also likely to be encountered in gas compression
modules and present similar hazards to liquefied petroleum gases (LPG). Vents from scrubbers
which remove gases from systems such as seal oil are potential fire hazards and should terminate
clear from the structure.
The fire hazard from process hydrocarbon releases can take the form of a pool fire or a jet fire, or
a combination. Other possibilities arise such as a running fire or a flash fire and, in the event of
secondary failure of process equipment, a BLEVE1 due to evaporation of volatile hydrocarbon under
extreme pressure. The fire risk assessment will consider each major source of release, its process
conditions of pressure and temperature and the inventory available to a fire in order to evaluate the
risk to personnel and to critical facilities, as well as the risk of escalation.
Naturally, offshore releases can lead to an explosion as the initial result of ignition. This was the
case in the Piper Alpha disaster, and it has become recognised that explosion with ensuing fire is
one of the most hazardous accidents. Although an offshore module may appear to be well
ventilated, research on semi-confined explosions has shown that they can be extremely severe
leading to overpressures of several bar. Such high overpressures can cause failure of major
structures (for example fire walls, as happened in Piper Alpha), to dislocation of process equipment
leading to secondary releases and to damage to detection and suppression systems. The fire and
explosion risk analysis will often show that the risks from explosions are much more severe than
those from fire because of the potential impact on protective systems.
An additional hazard arising from vessels and lines which carry gases or liquids containing
hydrogen sulphide is the potential for the formation of pyrophoric scales. These scales when
exposed to air can dry out and spontaneously combust. Precautions may require to be implemented
when cleaning or inspecting vessels and equipment during plant shutdown.
In addition to the inherent fire risk of the oil and gas there are the fire hazards associated with
the utilities, maintenance, accommodation and helicopter operations which pose a potential risk to
the facility and those working on it.
Utilities operations may include power generation using gas turbines, heating using oil thermal
transfer systems, which recover heat from turbine exhausts and oily water separation all of which
present fire and explosion hazards. High and low voltage switchrooms are present on all offshore
structures and present a risk of fire and explosions in high voltage switchgear.
Fire hazards in accommodation areas include the ignition of paper and bedding by smoking and
cooking operations in the galley areas. Helicopter operations can be extremely hazardous
particularly during conditions of fog or high wind and when landing on semi-submersibles and drill
ships in heavy seas.
1
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion

OFFSHORE FIRE-FIGHTING EQUIPMENT
Detection Control and Alarm

A comprehensive fire and gas detection system is necessary for offshore oil exploration and
production facilities for both personnel safety and prevention of commercial loss. The fire and gas
system is used to provide a warning to operating personnel of an impending hazardous condition,
to initiate the automatic shutdown of the process via the emergency shutdown (ESD) system and
isolate potential electrical sources of ignition such as welding outlets. The fire and gas system is
also used to initiate the operation of automatic fixed fire fighting systems.
All areas of an off shore production platform and the majority of areas of a semi-submersible will
be covered by a fire detection system using sensors appropriate to the anticipated fire hazard.
General coverage will be provided by ionisation or optical smoke detectors which are made
intrinsically safe by the use of zener barriers or other devices to limit the current in the detector to
below that which has sufficient energy to ignite a flammable atmosphere.
The selection and siting of smoke detectors requires careful consideration as they can be
susceptible to wind and high airflows from ventilation systems which could adversely affect the
operation of the detector. Dust and water sprays can also cause spurious alarms. Particularly in
areas housing electrical and control equipment, smoke detectors need to be highly sensitive to
respond to an incident in good time to permit control. Conventional detectors are rarely suitable,
and many operators now use aspirating detectors to improve response.
Coverage for specific areas where a hydrocarbon release is likely to give rise rapidly to flaming
combustion should be provided by the use of infrared (IR) or ultraviolet (UV) flame detectors. IR
detection is becoming more wide spread in its use for offshore structures as detectors have been
developed which are immune to non fire like sources of radiation such as the sun and welding.
Twin referenced IR detection has been used on some platforms to discount the flame from the flare
stack. UV and IR detectors should be enclosed in flameproof enclosures for use in hazardous areas
where a flammable atmosphere could occur. Point type heat detectors may be used in areas where
smoke detectors could be susceptible to spurious operation or where the risk is not suited to the use
of flame detectors. These would normally be rate of rise detectors or where these may be
susceptible to large fluctuations of temperature such as in galleys, fixed temperature heat detectors
should be used.
Frangible bulbs may be used as part of a wet sprinkler system for use in accommodation and
workshop areas or for the release of air from pipework in a preaction system which subsequently
initiates the release of a waterspray. The response time of frangible bulb detectors outdoors may be
less than satisfactory and most installations control the operation of deluge systems by flame
detection as well as any air pressure control system based on frangible bulbs.
Linear heat detection cable is used for some specific risks such as detection within turbine
enclosures, often in conjunction with flame detectors. Detection tubing pressurised with nitrogen
can be used for some risks such as bearings of compressors and pumps which on being subjected to
flame, melts and initiates the release of a streaming extinguishing agent.
Flammable gas detectors should be provided on production platforms in process areas,
ventilation intakes to normally non hazardous areas such as accommodation modules or workshops,
and at intakes to turbines and diesels. Gas detectors should also be fitted to the intakes of support
vessels working in the proximity of production platforms. Gas detectors for the drilling facilities of
production platforms, semi-submersibles and jackups should be provided in areas such as the shale
shakers, mud room and drill floor. Flammable gas detectors are normally arranged to provide a low
level gas alarm when a gas concentration equivalent to 25% of the lower flammable limit of
methane in air is reached. In these circumstances on a production platform, an alarm should be
raised in the central control room and platform status indicator lights should indicate a gas alarm.
On detection of gas at an equivalent level of 50% of the lower flammable limit of methane in air, an
automatic phased shutdown and depressurisation of the process should occur. Process gas should

be diverted to the flare stack in order to reduce the inventory of flammable gas within the process
and prevent escalation of an event.
Gas detection on semi-submersibles and support vessels will normally only provide an indication
in the control room and operate sounders and in some cases status lights to alert personnel. Gas
detectors may operate on the Wheatsone bridge principle where a pellistor encapsulated in resin is
compared with an exposed pellistor, using a Wheatstone bridge circuit. The out of balance voltage
produced is proportional to the amount of gas present. Direct sensing of gas on the surface of a
semiconductor is also used as the basis of some types of sensor. More recently, detectors which
respond to absorption of infrared radiation by hydrocarbons have been proven reliable and sensitive
and have become generally accepted as a preferred technology for flammable gas detection. IR gas
detectors may be of the point type or beam type, though the latter must be set up with care to avoid
false alarms.
Hydrogen sulphide may also be present on an installation or may affect vessels working around
the installation. Hydrogen sulphide is both extremely toxic and flammable and may be present as
result of sour hydrocarbon in the formation or by the action of bacteria in stagnant sea water.
Typical areas where hydrogen sulphide may occur on production platforms are in separators, oil
storage at the bottom of legs where sea water is used to equalise the pressure on the storage cells
and in drain systems. Hydrogen sulphide detectors will normally be incorporated as part of the fire
and gas detection system with detectors placed at low level where hydrogen sulphide could
accumulate.
Status lights should be provided at intervals around the facility including the entrance and exits
to modules, at lifeboats, the heli-deck and drill floor to indicate the status of the platform. Typical
colours for status lights are green for normal, yellow flashing for a gas alarm, red flashing for a fire
alarm and blue flashing for abandon installation. Status lights may however vary from facility to
facility.
The main fire and gas panel for a production platform is normally situated in the main control
room or in an adjacent E&I room. A number of systems still incorporate LED indicators
superimposed over a schematic of the platform areas. Small systems on semi-submersibles and
jackups may comprise simply a small control panel with LED indications for fire and fault for each
detector. More recent developments incorporate graphic displays through either the use of a
dedicated fire and gas VDU or by incorporation of the fire and gas system display output into the
process control VDU's.
In the case of the latter, a fire alarm should take precedence over normal condition process
information and a graphical representation of the platform provided on screen with indications of
the detector (s) in alarm and any automatic fire-fighting systems that may have activated. The more
sophisticated system may incorporate three main microprocessors with triple redundancy allowing
reconfiguration of the system on one microprocessor whilst maintaining a backup microprocessor
operational in case of a major system fault. Alarms are provided throughout a process platform by
the use of status indicator lights, and the platform public address system which can normally
broadcast both voice messages and alarms. Platform status indicator lights normally incorporate a
yellow gas alarm indicator, red fire alarm indicator and a blue abandon platform alarm indicator
although the exact configuration of these may vary from platform to platform. On some
installations field alarm panels also provide an LED indication of the area and type of alarm at
various locations throughout the platform. The means for raising an alarm is provided by manual
breakglass callpoints in flame proof housings distributed throughout process, utility and
accommodation and drilling areas. The means for sounding the platform alarm, broadcasting
announcements and sounding the abandon platform alarm is also provided in the control room and
OIM's office.
First Aid Manual Fire-Fighting Equipment

Portable fire extinguishers should be located throughout the facility appropriate to the risk. Water
extinguishers should be distributed throughout the accommodation areas, stores and workshops and

wherever there is a class A risk. The addition of a foam concentrate such as aqueous film forming
foam (AFFF) greatly increases the performance of water extinguishers particularly for use on
hydrocarbon fires. Low freeze additive should be added in those locations where extinguishers may
be subject to freezing.
Carbon dioxide extinguishers should be located throughout the facility for fires involving
electrical equipment. These will be throughout accommodation areas, stores, workshops electrical
rooms and at regular intervals around the process and drilling areas. Carbon dioxide extinguishers
should also be provided in crane cabs, wireline and logging units, and any temporary contractors
accommodation.
Dry powder extinguishers are suitable for general purpose and for the extinguishment of
hydrocarbon fires and gas fires. Although they have no cooling effect the dry powder is an
extremely effective extinguishing agent and an excellent first line of attack backed up by foam or
waterspray. A word of warning should be given here! Under certain circumstances it is advisable
to shutoff the supply of gas or burning oil prior to extinguishment as gas or vapours could build up
and ultimately ignite causing an explosion with far worse results than the initial fire.
Large mobile dry powder trolley units should be installed for use in oil separation modules,
wellhead areas, heli-deck and drill floor. Portable dry powder extinguishers should also be provided
for use whenever hot work is to be undertaken and should be made a condition of the hot work
permit.
In addition to the location of extinguishers at intervals throughout the platform it is
recommended that fire points comprising a number of extinguishers are located at the main
intersection of walkways within modules in large offshore platforms.
Halogenated hydrocarbon typically BCF for portable extinguishers and hosereels and BTM for
fixed installations were for a number of years recommended for use on offshore platforms and were
an extremely effective. Damage to the stratospheric ozone layer has however led to a large number
of countries world-wide signing an agreement known as the Montreal protocol to cease producing
halogenated hydrocarbons such as CFC's HFC's; and HCFC's that damage the ozone layer. For this
reason such extinguishants are no longer installed on offshore structures. New streaming agents for
use in portable extinguishers are being developed by manufactures as replacements for portable
extinguishers and both inert gas blends and chemical replacements are being developed for use in
fixed systems. The author recommends that the advice of an independent body should be sought
before adopting any of the potential alternatives for use as they may have potential penalties with
respect to weight, toxicity or future banning as more restrictions on their use are brought into force.
Hosereels should generally be sited throughout accommodation areas and should be provided
with a spray/jet nozzle. The length of hose should normally not exceed 100 feet and have a
diameter of one inch. The type of hose reel where turning the reel automatically turns on the water
is recommended as this avoids the necessity for the user having to turn on a valve before tackling
the fire. An isolation valve should also be provided on the supply for maintenance.
Hydrants on offshore structures should generally be located such that a minimum of two hoses
should be able to reach any part of the installation including drilling areas inside modules and on
external walkways. The exceptions to this would be areas where this would be impracticable such
as the legs of drilling derrick. It is normal practice to fit double hydrant outlets for the majority of
locations using female instantaneous 2½ inch connections. Bayonet connectors may also be
encountered on some structures. Fire hose should be 1¾ inch diameter as 2½ inch does not lend
itself to the confined spaces and tight corners that are required to be encountered on an offshore
structure. 2½ inch hose may however be required for supply to portable monitors or portable water
curtains and should be stored adjacent to these items of equipment. Standard nozzles should be of
the spray/jet variety to allow access to be gained to valves and controls behind the safety of a water
shield and to contain fire within a compartment on initial opening of a door or hatch. It is important
that from the shutoff position that spray is first turned on, otherwise inadvertently a hard striking jet
may be used on an oil fire with undesirable effect. Fog nozzles should be provided for specific
applications.

The facility should be provided with a number of foam hydrants for specific risk areas involving
hydrocarbons such as the oil separation module, bulk diesel tanks, glycol tanks and bulk methanol.
Foam concentrate should be stored in stainless steel or suitably lined tanks fitted with an inline
inductor or a bladder tank with proportioner serving the hydrant. Foam hydrants should be located
outside the risk area and should be provided with foam branches. Spray jet nozzles can also be used
for delivery of film forming foams such as AFFF which do not require aspiration. Alcohol resistant
foam should be provided for such risks as methanol or other polar solvents. Portable foam trolley
units may be provided if the risk does not warrant the provision of a fixed foam tank.
Deluge and Other Water Based Systems

These systems are used for the suppression of hydrocarbon fires and with the addition of foam
for extinguishment. The objective is to control the fire and protect equipment within modules and
structural members from fire damage. Deluges normally comprise high velocity water spray
nozzles on dry distribution pipework arranged within modules for area protection, equipment
protection or directed at individual structural members for cooling using a discharge density of
approximately 10 litres/min/m2. Areas typically requiring protection by deluge will be gas
compression and oil separation modules, the wellhead area, drill floor and drilling substructure, the
inside of the legs of platforms, compressed gas bottle storage and paint stores. Localised protection
of vessels and equipment such as separators, wellheads, mud tanks, bulk diesel and methanol tanks
and aviation fuel tanks should be undertaken. Water curtains can be used in some circumstances
for the subdivision of large modules. Medium velocity watersprays are in some cases provided for
the protection of diesel engines and areas of similar fire hazard however water ingress affecting the
operation items of equipment such as firepumps and emergency generators in the event of an
inadvertent discharge should be taken into consideration. Deluge systems should be fed from the
firemain via deluge valves located in an adjacent fire compartment or safe area. The deluge valve
should be activated by operation of flame detectors within the protected area, via release of air from
a frangible bulb or manually from a remote safe location. The facility for manual release at the
deluge valve should be provided. Deluge valves should be provided with upstream and downstream
isolation valves for maintenance and testing and a pressure or flow switch should be incorporated
into the downstream dry pipework to initiate an alarm in the event of system discharge and to
confirm that the valve has operated. The fire extinguishing capability of deluge systems may be
enhanced by the addition of foam concentrate which is discharged without aspiration through the
spray heads. Film forming foams such as AFFF are the most appropriate for this application. The
foam concentrate can be introduced into the firewater main supplying deluges by the use of a
centralised system incorporation bulk foam concentrate tank, foam pump and variable foam
proportioner or individually at each deluge by induction via the use of an orifice plate type inductor.
Drains within deluge protected areas should be sized to allow for the large quantities of water and
should be fitted with oil traps. Raised bunds should be constructed to prevent oil or water passing
through openings to lower decks e.g. through cable penetrations and stairwells. Penetrations should
be sealed between fire compartments.
Automatic sprinklers should be fitted in accommodation areas, stores and workshops where the
risk is predominantly from 'Class A' fires involving cellulosic materials. Sprinkler systems should
be filled with potable water to prevent deposits accumulating in the pipework and legs leading to the
frangible bulbs. Bulbs with an operating temperature of 68ºC are most suitable for general areas.
The sprinkler systems should be supplied from a header tank of potable water with the ability for a
sea water inlet if the level in the tank falls below a predetermined level. All sprinkler systems
should be fitted with flow switches to provide an alarm in the event of operation of the system.
Isolation and drain down facilities should be provided for maintenance and replacement of the
frangible bulbs.
The heli-deck on any offshore structure must be provided with adequate facilities for combating
a fire involving spilled fuel from refuelling operations or following an uncontrolled descent onto the
heli-deck. This will normally be accomplished by the provision of monitors capable of discharging

a foam solution commonly AFFF, over the heli-deck. It is common practice to provide two to three
monitors dependant on the expected type of aircraft and spaced equidistantly around the heli-deck to
allow for variations in wind direction. The upwind monitor will normally be manned during
helicopter landing and refuelling operations by a member of the heli-deck crew or firefighting team
dressed in a close proximity fire fighting suit and helmet. Gutters should be provided around the
edge of the heli-deck to prevent fuel and foam falling to the structure below the heli-deck. Foam
systems will comprise either inline inductors fitted to tanks of foam concentrate for each monitor
located at the edge of the heli-deck, or a bladder tank or foam proportioning system serving all
three monitors which can be located some distance from the heli-deck. In the case of bladder tanks
isolation valves should be provided and closed following manning of the monitors to prevent back
siphoning of the foam concentrate into the firemain.
Water Supplies
In a regime based on risk assessment of fire and explosion hazards, it is necessary to consider
scenarios in establishing the required water supplies and their reliability. Typically, two fire water
supplies (direct drive pumps or combined generator-pump sets) would be installed each being
capable of supplying the largest calculated demand for two adjacent deluge systems or for the worst
anticipated fire scenario together with two fire water monitors to allow manual intervention. One of
the fire pumps could be diesel driven and the other electric supplied either solely from the platform
supply or backed up by a dedicated diesel generator.
The fire pumps should be located below the lowest expected sea water level to ensure a constant
supply of water. For some installations it may be necessary to provide pumping in connections to
allow a support vessel to augment the supply in case of failure of one of the pumps. An electric
pump or a cross connection from the utility water supply (with a check valve on the connection to
prevent loss of fire water to the utility circuit) will normally be provided to maintain the firemain at
a constant pressure. Initiation of the firepumps may be via sensors in the system which detect a
pressure drop or by direct start of the fire pumps from the control room or push buttons located at
intervals around the installation including the heli-deck. Facilities should be provided for local start
in the event of a power failure, even if automatic start is initiated by the emergency shutdown
system (ESD) in the event of an unexpected process shutdown. The water coolant system
surrounding the engine should be kept warm to facilitate starting in cold climates. The firepumps
should feed into firewater ringmains at two separate locations. A pressure of 7.0 barg — 7.5 barg
should be available at the highest point, normally the heli-deck.
The requirement for an adjacent deluge is necessary to compensate for strong winds which could
adversely affect the operation of a single system. For smaller installations, semi-submersibles etc.
the fire pump may only be required to be sized for a single system. Fire water supplies will
generally need to be completely independent, with engines and pump drive components in separate
fire compartments with separate supplies of diesel. Control and instrumentation circuits should be
designed and routed such that they are not susceptible to common cause failure from fire or
mechanical damage.
Diesel day tanks and air inlets to fire pumps should be located in normally non hazardous
locations. Combustion and ventilation air inlets should be provided with gas detection arranged to
shutdown the firepump and prevent overspeed in the event of a release of gas. Day tanks should be
arranged to shutdown on operation of either automatic fire detection in the firepump compartment
or melting of a fusible link arranged over the engine. Day tanks should themselves have pumped
supplies from the bulk diesel tanks. Handpumps should be provided for filling day tanks in the
event of power failure.
For installations where large deluge systems and water curtains are used, the ringmain may be
separated into high and low pressure sides, the high pressure side being in the region of 15 bar and
serving fixed waterspray systems, fixed monitors and high pressure hydrants for portable monitors.
The low pressure system in the region of 7 bar would then be used solely for the supply to hydrants

and utilities outlets. Pressure reducers may be required to be used on hydrants at low level on a
production platform.
Ring mains will normally be constructed of copper nickel alloy (Kunifer) though recent
installations have used epoxy pipes. Epoxy materials can be used for sections of fire main running
through low hazard areas, and they have been shown to withstand fire exposure reasonably well.
Sections required to withstand movement and impact e.g. spool pieces supporting hydrants will
normally be constructed from mild steel suitably lined with butyl or epoxy coating to prevent
erosion and corrosion. Great care requires to be taken to prevent galvanic corrosion between
dissimilar metals used in the system, since offshore conditions are notably harsh for all materials
due to the salt laden air.
Firemains will not generally be painted but will be suitably lagged using mineral fibre and sheet
metal cladding. All firemains used in a region where the temperature is expected to be below
freezing should be provided with trace heating taped to the pipework. All ringmains should be
provide with block valves to subdivide the main for maintenance and damage control.
Block valves should be provided at each designated fire compartment boundary or module
boundary. Each outlet should be provided with a block valve to facilitate change out of hydrants
without draining down the system. Each major valve should itself be capable of being changed
without draining down the system. Butterfly valves with rubber seats are suitable for this service
and can be used with gearboxes and extended spindles to allow operation of valves located in
normally inaccessible area.
Local Suppression Systems

For many fire risks on an offshore platform there is a requirement for a local suppression system
to address a specific risk. The turbines used for power generation or to drive gas compressors are
one obvious example, and others include large diesel engine drives as well as electrical and control
room areas where the equipment is critical to operations and vulnerable to a small fire. Vent stacks
are often fitted with a system to put out a fire which might arise due to lightning strike.
Halon 1301, chemically bromotrifluromethane, CBrF3 known as BTM was used extensively on
offshore platforms for the protection of electrical rooms, turbine acoustic enclosures, control rooms
and as a flare snuff. As discussed earlier however BTM is one of the gases that are controlled under
the Montreal protocol and are being actively replaced.
In a large number of cases a fire engineering solution can be achieved that negates the
requirement for any type of fixed suppression system. Control rooms are manned twenty for hours a
day and it could be argued that any fire can be dealt with by control room staff using portable
extinguishers. Advances have been made in the application of high sensitivity smoke sampling
which can detect incipient fires in electrical cubicles and allow rapid intervention before a large fire
develops. Localised cabinet protection can also be adopted using significantly less extinguishing
agent. The practice adopted by the British navy of bayonet fittings for CO2 portable extinguishers in
electrical cubicles is an effective method of in cabinet firefighting without requiring to open the
cubicle door.
In those cases where a suppression system is required water mists and fine water sprays should
be considered as an alternative. Fine water sprays have been extensively tested and found effective
in real fire situations for the acoustic enclosures of turbines and for replacement flare snuff systems.
Fine water sprays have also been found to be effective for engine room fires particularly with the
addition of a foam concentrate. As there is no standard for fine water spray each application should
be dealt with individually and advice sought from the manufacturer as to the applicability of the
product.
Carbon dioxide for fixed systems has traditionally been used in non manned areas such as
electrical rooms, pump rooms and similar spaces on semi-submersibles. Carbon dioxide has the
advantage for mobile installation that it is available world-wide which is unlikely to be the case
with some of the current halon replacements. Carbon dioxide is an effective extinguishing agent
that extinguishes by diluting the oxygen content in the space to level where combustion is no longer

supported. At these concentrations life is also not supported and carbon dioxide is both toxic and an
asphyxiant and must be designed and installed with an adequate number of safeguards. As noted
elsewhere, there have been many instances of fatalities caused not by fire but by a carbon dioxide
suppression system, highlighting the importance of engineering and management safeguards. Such
safeguards may include isolation valves on the discharge pipework, odourisers in the gas etc. A
properly designed carbon dioxide system remains an effective extinguishing system but the
requirement for caution cannot be overemphasised.
Means of Escape
The principle of means of escape is that a person should always be able to turn their back on a
fire and escape away from it. In practice this means ensuring that there are always alternative routes
to allow escape from a compartment however this is not always practicable e.g. from platform legs
which can be over 600 feet deep or from drilling derricks where the only rapid means of escape for
the derrickman from his monkey board is via an inertia reel. It is not practicable in many of the legs
to total enclose vertical ladders although this practice is adopted for some of the shorter ladders on
some platforms. The practice advocated if a person is in the leg in the event of a fire on the
structure itself is to remain at the bottom of the leg. It is normal practice to be in radio contact
with a leg sentry who will alert platform personnel as to your whereabouts when reporting at his
muster station. A record of those working down the legs should also be kept in the platform control
room. In the event of a fire in the leg itself the deluge system should be operated. Breathing
apparatus sets radios and gas detectors should be carried on the person of all those working down
deep legs of offshore platforms. As the time taken to climb from the bottom of one of these legs
may be in excess of 15 minutes rebreather sets where the carbon dioxide is scrubbed from a closed
circuit and a small amount of fresh oxygen is added , should be used. Adequate training should be
given to all personnel before allowing them to enter a platform leg. The legs of facilities such as
semi-submersibles are not of such a depth and regular access is required to pump rooms and
machinery spaces in the pontoons. Access to these pontoons is normally by a lift in the legs with an
emergency escape ladder in the lift shaft. On some facilities it is possible to pass along the pontoon
from one leg to another through watertight doors thereby providing a true means of escape. Escape
breathing apparatus should be provided in all area in pontoons where access is required.
The means of escape on the platform itself is ultimately to a safe area, commonly called the
Temporary Refuge, from which the crew can be evacuated using lifeboats if required. Fire
protection of accommodation external walls and floors should aim to withstand a severe fire and
ventilation fire dampers should prevent the ingress of smoke into the accommodation. All such safe
area should be kept pressurised by the ventilation system to prevent the ingress of flammable gas.
All electrical sources of ignition should be isolated and an emergency shutdown initiated in the
event that gas is detected at the accommodation air inlets. When designing a platform the preferable
location for the accommodation is as far away from drilling and process activities as practicable and
there is much to be said for siting living accommodation on a separate facility such as a floating
accommodation barge or on a separate platform connected by a link bridge.
Much discussion of the Piper Alpha disaster centred on whether it was "reasonably practicable"
to provide separate accommodation for offduty personnel. The tension between business priorities
and best possible practice for lifesafety is exemplified by this discussion, the result of which
remains inconclusive. To some offshore safety specialists, the main drawback of quantitative risk
analysis is that it provides a malleable tool for justifying inferior safety for offshore personnel in
order to improve the returns to the oil company.
All area of the platform should be provided with emergency lighting with at least a two hour
capability. Emergency signage should be provided to direct personnel to escape routes. The use of
luminous strips at low level in stairwells and alongside escape routes is recommended.
In the event of a major fire or explosion the final means of escape is to abandon the facility. The
preferable means of abandonment is by helicopter or personnel transfer basket to a standby vessel.

As sea conditions are often severe particularly in locations such as the North Sea abandonment
by lifeboat is a last resort.
Launching a lifeboat and disconnecting from the falls is a hazardous operation as it requires all
weight to be removed from the falls to enable them to be released. Consideration should be given to
the use of freefall lifeboats which overcome this difficulty and allow escaping personnel to rapidly
distance themselves from a burning structure due to the momentum of the freefall lifeboat.
All lifeboats should be provided with over deck watersprays operated by the engine to cool the
lifeboat in the event of oil burning on the sea. Each lifeboat should in addition be provided with
self contained air supply.
In the unlikely event that platform personnel have to take to the water in lifejackets to be rescued
by the standby vessel stairs should be provided which can be lowered from the cellar deck to the
spider deck.
FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
The recent developments in fire and explosion safety design and management for the North Sea
are being reflected in other areas of the world. The industry continues to place large resources in
research and development aimed at improving the understanding of these major hazards and
technologies for reducing risk. There can be no doubt that there remains a large variation between
the world's best offshore safety standards and the other end of the spectrum. The maritime fire
safety practitioner will find it worth watching the offshore sector, not just for the possibility of new
technology and methods which can be adapted to other problems but also to understand how fire
safety decisions are taken and justified in an industry where investments are frequently in hundreds
of millions of pounds sterling.

Index 1
Italic page numbers refer to illustrations and charts. Amazon 20, 21

American cotton 20–2
"A" class divisions "The American Method" 292, 337
bulkheads 296 Amerika-Australi cold-storage warehouses 108–9,109
Cape Marine Board 305 ammonia masks 411
doors and frames 313–14 ammonia (NH3) 411
fire integrity 312, 340–1 ammonium nitrate 116–19
main vertical zones 295 conditions of carriage (IMDG) 119
openings 320–1 explosions 117, 118, 120
passenger vessels 299 operational notice 174
SOLAS definition 141–2 segregation 119
structure 293 water extinguishing 118
abandon ship drill 395 Amsterdam Fire Brigade 108
Aberdeen deep lift pump 431 analogue addressable systems 229–30
Aberdeen Fire Training Centre 386 Appold, John George 147
accommodation spaces Aquator deep lift pump 431–2, 432
automatic fire alarms 410 aqueous film forming foam
combustible wall linings 300 (AFFF) 191, 198, 204, 445, 446–7
fire integrity 297, 311, 339, 359 Archimedes 5, 13, 147
fire-fighting 410–11 Ark Royal 14, 15
portable fire extinguishers 189 Arkon 1702 hand-controlled branch160
smoking 49, 75, 82, 442 ARPA see Automatic Radar Plotting Aid
SOLAS definition 142 arson
sprinkler systems 300 Leopold Harris 131
tanker location 356 Scandinavian Star 58–9, 60
ventilation system 410 Seawise University 86
accumulator batteries 282, 283, 285, 289, 290–1 asbestos 55, 59
acetylene torches 115 asphalt 110
see also welding assembly points see muster points
acid fumes 302 "at will" equipment 204
addressable control devices 229–30 audible detectors 233, 234
The ADT Company 227 auto-ignition 191
advanced fire-fighting, mandatory minimum standards Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) 64
384–5 automatic sprinkler alarms 213–17
AFFF see aqueous film forming foam action after fire 216–17
after-peak fires 412–13 action in case of fire 216
air control valves 215–6, 215
compressors 253–4, 253, 254, 258 functioning 215–16, 215
respiration 246 sketch 214
aircraft carriers, foam monitors 365–6 valves 215–6, 215
"Airmaster" compressed air breathing apparatus 248–50, Autronica, ship safety range 229
248, 249, 250
alarm systems 334 "B" class divisions
see also fire detection and alarm systems bulkheads 296
automatic sprinkler alarms 213–17 fire integrity 298, 312, 340
dock installations 110, 113, 114 openings 321
Empress of Canada 79 SOLAS definition 142
inert gas systems 374 structure 293–4
legislation 61–2 Babylon, water pumps 5
manual 74–5 back pressure valves 211, 211, 212
Meteor 48 ballasting, Betelgeuse 95
Normandie 70–1, 72 Baltimore Pier 111–12
Noronic 74–5 Bantry Bay 90
offshore installations 443–4 see also Whiddy Oil Terminal
Scandinavian Star 54, 57, 60 Bantry Bay (tug) 94, 97, 99, 101, 102
volume 61–2 Barnard v. Adams 138
alcohol 15, 18 Bathoe, J. 17–18
alpha particles 224 bathtub curve 37, 37
alum 12 Battle of Actium 13
aluminium alloy 293, 338 Battle of Salamis 13
alveolar air 246 Battle of Trafalgar 15

Index 2
Ben Vannoch, hold fire 171–2 oxygen 247–8

Berg Istra 367 Scandinavian Star 60
Betelgeuse 89–105, 94, 96 Siebe-Gorman "Airmaster" 248–50,248, 249, 250
see also Whiddy Oil Terminal SOLAS regulations 245–6, 255, 258
ballasting 95 training 254–5, 256–8, 391
cargo loss 102 valves 248–9
casualties 93–4 wearing 256–8
corrosion 91 Brent Bravo Platform 433, 434
evidence 103–4 British Merchant Seamen and Officers 26
foam-gun 98 "The British Method" 292, 337
Government Inquiry 91 British Petroleum Company (B.P.) 367
hydrants 98 British Thermal Units 301
responsibility 95–103 British Trent/Western Winner collision 64–9, 67
Special Survey 91 foam monitors 366
start of fire 93–5 MAIB report 68–9
Total's responsibility 95, 97 MAYDAY calls 65
Tribunal 95–103 pre-collision movements 64–5
vessel history 91 rescue operation 68
witnesses 103–4 salvage efforts 68
bilge lines 46, 47 Brooklyn Central Fire Station 114
bilge pumps 148, 150, 151, 152 Browne, John 207
carriage of dangerous goods 351 Brussels Convention 1924 127
emergency 281, 284, 290, 291 Brussels protocol 1968, COGSA 128–34
special category spaces 326 Bryant and May Museum 2
Bill of Lading 128, 129, 131–5 Bubble Act 1720 136
Blackstone, G. V. 3 Building Research Establishment 294
BLEVE see boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion bulkhead deck 295
blow out escape routes 314, 316
offshore installations 441 SOLAS definition 144
preventers 434, 441–2 bulkheads 42, 48, 50
Blue Book 44 see also watertight bulkheads
boilers, flash-backs 413 cargo ships 338–41
boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion (BLEVE) 442 collision 269, 270
Bombay Dock 120–3 combustible 301, 302
casualties 121–2 Dansk Eternit-Fabrik A/S approved310
explosions 121–2 fire integrity 296–300, 311–13, 338–41,339, 340,
fire-fighting 121 358–60
inquiry report 122 fire-resisting 77, 212, 295
insurance 122–3 Scandinavian Star 54, 61
boom defence system, tanker jetties 419 Seawise University 83
Bootle Fire Brigade 110 SOLAS regulations 295–300, 311–13
BOPs see blow out preventers buoyancy 425
BP see British Petroleum Company burns, water fog sprays 414
Bracken, Richard 26
Braidwood, James 3–4 "C" class divisions 142, 296
Bramah, Joseph 7 cabins
breathing see respiration see also accomodation spaces
breathing apparatus numbering 400–1
see also respiration; trolley units cables, fire-resistant 288
closed circuit 247 Caesar, Julius 4
compressed air 247, 248–50, 254–5 calcium hypochlorite 88
control boards 258–9, 259 Caligula 4
control rooms 317 cameras, fire detection 228
cylinder pressure 248 Canada, Transportation Safety Board (TSB) 237
entry control officer 258 Cape Industrial Products Limited 304
face mask 249 Cape Marine Boards 304–8, 304
frame 249 ceiling details 306, 307
hold fires 408 decorative surfaces 305, 308
hose 249 head and foot details 306
inventor 245 specifications 305
open circuit 247, 248–50 wall details 307

Index 3
capsizing 424 venting 360–1

see also sinking; stability carriage of dangerous goods
carbon dioxide bilge pumping 351
see also fixed CO2 systems; low pressure bulk CO2 detection systems 350
systems document of compliance 352
characteristics 166–7 ignition systems 350
clearing 408 machine space insulation 351
concentrations 182, 184 personal protection 351
crankcase explosion prevention 235 portable fire extinguishers 351
cylinders 197 requirement application 350, 351, 352
disadvantages 179, 197–8 SOLAS regulations 349–52
effect with time 38–9, 39 ventilation 351
engine room fires 35, 38–9, 41, 56, 165, 172, 173, 414 water spray systems 352
fire extinguishers 192, 414, 445 water supplies 349
generator 180–2 Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts (UK COGSA 1971)
high pressure 197 127–34
liquid expansion 166 Brussels Protocol 1968 128–34
pre-mixed foam 202 Hague Rules 127–8, 135
preference over steam 47 cars see ro-ro passenger ships
smothering 408, 412–13, 420 cartridge type heat detector 226, 227
storage cylinders 166, 167–8 Castle, William 16
carbon monoxide 61, 228, 407 category A machinery spaces 206
Carey, John 206 CCTV see closed circuit television cameras
cargo area, SOLAS definition 144 ceilings 142, 301, 302
cargo pump-rooms 416 central control stations 143
fire integrity 359 centre of gravity 425, 425
MSC regulations 377 centrifugal pumps 9, 41, 147, 153, 204, 211
SOLAS regulations 375–6 Cerberus
ventilation 362 Algorex detection system 230
cargo ships fibre optic linear detection cables 227,228
construction detail 343–4 multi sensor smoke detector 226
damage control 278 chain pumps 6–7, 147
emergency lighting 284–6, 290, 342 Chambers, Charles 15
emergency power sources 284–6 Chappell, Captain W. A. 45, 46, 47
escape routes 317, 341–2 Charlotte Dundas 8
fire division 337 Chemical Hazards Response Information System (CHRIS),
SOLAS regulations 337–78 US Coast Guard 354
stairways 339, 341 chemical tankers 144, 355–6
structure 337–8 Chiksan towers, Whiddy jetty 93, 98, 100
cargo spaces Ching-yien, Commodore Chen 85
see also cargo tanks; ro-ro cargo spaces; special CHRIS see Chemical Hazards Response Information
category spaces System
fire detection 344 Chubb Company
fire integrity 311, 340 Flammable Gas Detector 222
fire protection 344–6 mechanical foam installation 200, 201
fire-extinguishing arrangements 327, 328, 345, 406 pre-mix foam installation 201
fire-fighting at sea 420 smoke detectors 232, 233
fire-fighting in dock 405–9 City of Durban, ejector pumps 428
fixed CO2 systems 165–6, 166, 172–3 City of Montreal 20–2, 179
fixed fire detection 327 Class A explosives 114
flammable vapours 346 Classification Societies 302
low pressure bulk CO2 systems 328 Claymore Platform 435
motor vehicles 327–8 Clermont 8
protection 327–8 Clifford & Snell, Yodalarm sounders 230
SOLAS definition 142 closed circuit breathing apparatus 247
ventilation systems 327, 345–6 closed circuit television cameras (CCTV) 228
cargo tanks closed ro-ro cargo spaces 143
cleaning 374 clothing see fireman's outfit
protecting 363–4 CO2 see carbon dioxide
purging 361 Code of Safe Practice 88
ventilating 362 COGSA see Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts (UK 1971)

Index 4
Cole's pump 6–7, 6 current, ionisation smoke detectors 224

collision bulkheads 269, 270 cutting apparatus 122
combination carriers 144, 356–7 Cyprus 25
combustible materials, restricted use 323, 343 Czaar Peter Warehouse 113–14,113
combustion products 371
communication systems damage control 278
breathing apparatus 256 Damodar Tanabe 130–1, 130, 133, 346
emergency power equipment 56, 282, 285, 290 dampers, duct detectors 227
Piper Alpha 438 dangerous goods
radio 422 see also carriage of dangerous goods
Scandinavian Star 56 classification 353
telephones 78 labels 353, 353, 354
watertight doors 273, 274 SOLAS definition 144
compressed air breathing apparatus 247, 248–50, 254–5 Dangerous Goods Declaration 354
compressors, air 253–4, 253, 254, 258 Dansk Eternit Fabrik A/S 309
concrete aggregate 110 approved bulkhead construction 310
conduction, fire spread 295 ceiling and deck details 309
Congreve, pyrotechnic rockets 16 Navelite-N 309–10, 309
Connolly, John 102, 103 data analysis 25
construction, SOLAS regulations 265–91, 323–4, 343–4 data recording 23
Container Packing Certificate 354 daylight signalling lamps, emergency 282, 285, 290
continuous "B" class ceilings 142 de-gassing, oil tankers 416
control panels, fire detection and alarm systems 228–30 "dead" ships 70, 89
control stations dead-end corridors 59, 341–2
breathing apparatus 258–9, 259, 317 deadweight, SOLAS definition 144
emergency lighting 281, 284 Deane, Charles Anthony 245
escape routes 317 decks, fire integrity 296–300, 311–13
fire integrity 296–7, 311, 339, 359 deep lift pumps 431–2
portable fire extinguishers 189 deluge systems, offshore installations 436, 446–7
SOLAS definition 143 D‚mor, M. le 9, 147
tanker jetties 419 Department of Transport
tanker location 356 Merchant Shipping Notice M.764 387–8
controlled ventilation Merchant Shipping Notice M.1494 386–7
accommodation spaces 410 DESMI SL submersible pumps 161, 161
engine rooms 274–6, 275, 278, 415, 421 Det Norske Veritas 301, 310
cooling 405 Deutschland, watertight doors 269
Cordeau detonant fuse 114 Devon Fire and Rescue Service Training Centre 387
corridors diesel emergency fire pumps 155
fire integrity 297, 311, 339, 359 diesel generators 180, 182, 242
furnishings 335–6 disasters
cotton 120–1 see also individual ships
CO2 extinguishing 167 port installations 106–23
fire testing 186–8 ships at sea 40–69
ships 20–2 ships in port 70–105
storage 110, 122 dispensation, fire-fighting training 387
waiting game 406, 407 Don Jose Figueras 130
couplings, standardisation 74 Dona Paz 52
courses, fire-fighting 386–7 collision 28
crankcase explosions 235, 237–8, 413 unreporting 31
crankcase monitoring 234–8, 413 doors
Kidde Crankcase Monitor 235, 236 see also fire-resisting doors; watertight doors
SOLAS regulations 234–5 dock installations 111
crew, training 379–402, 420, 421 lightweight 274
Crombie, Captain 45, 47 power-operated 320
crude oil 239, 241 self-closing 43, 314
Betelgeuse 89–105 SOLAS regulations 320–1, 343
SOLAS definition 144 double hull spaces, tankers 362
tank fires 417 double-duty pumps 150, 151, 152–3
Tien Chee 50 Draeger Safety Group Ltd. 245
Ctesibius 5, 147 draft stops 111
Cullen Inquiry, Piper Alpha 31, 439, 440 Drake, Sir Francis 14

Index 5
drills see fire drills emergency shut down (ESD) 221, 443, 447
dry powder extinguishers 189, 190, 191, 414, 445 Piper Alpha 436, 438
Drysdale Company Ltd 153, 154 emergency signal, passengers 394
DSIR see Building Research Establishment emergency systems
ducts see also emergency shut down
detectors 227 alarms 335
ventilation 243–5 bilge pumps 282
Dunlop compressors 253, 253 electrical installations 279, 280, 281–7, 290
Dupr‚, Dr 21–2 fire pumps 154–6, 161, 380
"Duraline" fire hose 159 generators 57, 282, 283, 285, 286–7
Durasteel panelling 308, 308 switchboards 281, 283, 286, 287
Durban Fire Brigade 112 emigrant ships 19–20
Empress of Canada 78–83, 79, 81, 410
E-scape, simulation tool 319 alarm system 79
earthing, electrical apparatus 287 bulkheads 78
Edinburgh doors 78
fire brigade 3–4 fire-fighting 80–1
Merchant Navy Fire Training School 388–91 fire-fighting equipment 79
efficient patrolling 70 fire-patrol 80
Egress, simulation tool 319 impaired stability 424
Egyptians, early vessels 4 inquiry 81–3
ejector pumps 426–32 listing 80–1
barrier height 427–8, 429–30 smoke 80
nozzles 427 sprinkler system 217
permanent installations 431–2 staircases 78
principle of operation 427, 427 enclosed steam engines 194
in relay 432 Engine Room Fire Guidance to Fire Prevention (NKK
specifications 427–8 1994) 241
testing 427–8 engine room fires
theoretical calculations 429, 430 1991-1993 35
Elder Dempster Lines Ltd 180 analysis 35–9
electrical installations controlled ventilation 274–6, 275, 278, 415
see also generators; lighting systems crankcase explosions 234–8
earthing 287 degree of loss 35
emergency power supply 279, 280, 281–7, 290 extinguishing time 38, 39
fire-resistant cables 288 fire control training 392
power sources 280 fire-fighting 275–6, 278, 413–15
SOLAS regulations 279–91 fixed CO2 systems 35, 38–9, 41, 56, 165, 172, 173, 414
switchboards 280, 287–8, 287, 289 fixed fire-fighting systems, comparison 196–8
watertight doors 271–2, 290 fuel delivery lines 148
wiring 87 lightweight protecting doors 274
electrodes, ionisation smoke detectors 224 oil tank explosions 415
embarkation stations portable fire extinguishers 38, 191, 413–14
emergency lighting 281 Sally Star 36, 39
escape routes to 315–16 skylights 275–6, 275, 277, 278
lifeboats 317 smoke 78
emergency instructions 392–4 sources 37–8, 37, 38
emergency lighting 280, 281–3, 335 suppression systems 38, 39
cargo ships 284–6, 290, 342 towing 35
control stations 281, 284 vessel age 36, 37
embarkation stations 281 vessel type 35–6, 35
exits 281, 284 water 39, 191
machinery spaces 281, 284 watertight doors 275–6, 278
passenger ships 281–4, 291 engineers, fire-control training 391–2
ro-ro passenger ships 283–4 entry control officer 258–9
Scandinavian Star 57 Environment Protection Agency (EPA), US 177
SOLAS regulations 281–6, 289–91 EPA see Environment Protection Agency
stairways 281, 284 escape routes
emergency plan numbers 58 bulkhead deck 314, 316
Emergency Procedures for Ships Carrying Dangerous cargo ships 341–2
Goods (EmS), IMO 262, 353 embarkation deck 315–16

Index 6
fire integrity 297 Tyne and Wear Metropolitan 387

ladders 314, 315 Zaandam 113–14
low level marking 278, 316, 336 fire control plans 262, 263–4
machinery spaces 315 fire detection and alarm systems 218–34
markings 278, 316, 318, 319, 335,335 see also crankcase monitoring; fixed fire detection and
Morro Castle 42 alarm systems
offshore installations 449–50 accommodation spaces 410
photoluminescent markings 335, 335 cameras and video imaging 228
ro-ro passenger ships 317–19 cargo ships 344
Scandinavian Star 57–8, 62 control equipment 228–30
SOLAS regulations 314–19 emergency power supply 282, 285
stairways 314–15, 316 flame detectors 221, 223, 223
ESD see emergency shut down gas detectors 221, 222–3, 222
Esso Petroleum Company 204, 416 group functions 222
Estonia, public perception 31 heat detectors 221, 226–8, 226, 228
evacuation simulation tools 319 history 218–19
evacuation stations, fire integrity 297 maintenance 31
Ewbank, Henry 16 Meteor 50
exhaust ducts 322, 334 Morro Castle 41, 43
exhaust gases 180 offshore installations 443–4
exits, emergency lighting 281, 284 patenting 218–19
explosions sample extraction smoke detection systems 231–2
crankcases 234–8, 413 Scandinavian Star 54
Grandcamp 117 sensitivity 224, 225–6
Highflyer 118 smoke detectors 219, 221, 224–6,224, 225, 226, 231–2
Mahia 120 SOLAS regulations 219–21, 231–2, 234, 324, 334, 344
Ocean Liberty 120 sounders 230
oil tanks 415 unattended machinery 234
Piper Alpha 438 visual alarms 230
Seistan 46 fire division
explosives cargo ships 337
ammonium nitrate 116–19, 120 passenger ships 292
Class A 114 tankers 356–7
fire-fighting 406 fire drills
Seistan 43–4, 47 breathing apparatus 253, 391
sodium chlorate 120 lifeboats 395–6
TNT 120, 121 SOLAS regulations 58
extended spindle system 414, 414 training 153, 379, 380, 395–8
extinguishers see portable fire extinguishers watertight doors 279
extract ducts, cleaning 245 fire extinguishers see fixed fire-fighting systems; portable
fire extinguishers
false alarms 225–6, 230, 236–7 fire floats 9
familiarization training 380–1 fire incident rate, worldwide 25, 26
fats, burning 114 Fire Insurance Companies 3, 4
ferries see ro-ro passenger ships fire integrity values 296–300, 312–13,339, 340, 359
fertiliser see ammonium nitrate fire load, Morro Castle 40
fibre optic linear detection cables 227 fire loss rate 23
fire brigades fire mains 156–61
Amsterdam 108 fire marks 3
Bootle 110 fire organisation 398–9, 417
Durban 112 fire panel 228–30
Edinburgh 3–4 fire patrols 77, 328, 410
future ideas 421–3 clocking-in 330
Hong Kong 85 regulations 330–3
insurance 3 selection 329
Lancashire County 386 training 329–30
Liverpool 199 fire plates 18
port knowledge 404 fire pumps 147–56, 152
ship knowledge 404 see also double duty pumps
Strathclyde 387 capacity 148, 150, 152
Texas City 117 emergency 154–6, 161, 380

Index 7
history 147–8 engine rooms 41, 56, 172, 173, 414

isolation valves 150 maintenance 168, 169
offshore installations 447 maximum discharge time 169
pressures 152–3 offshore installations 448–9
procedure 66 operation 171–3, 174
relief valves 150, 153 pump room ban 416
Scandinavian Star 54 smoke detection 232–3
self-priming 151, 153 SOLAS regulations 165
siting and arrangement 148–50, 161 Walter Kidde CO2 and alarm system 167
SOLAS regulations 148–50 fixed deck foam systems 364–5
Fire Research Station (FRS) 294 fixed fire detection and alarm systems
fire-box, portable 2 cargo ships 344
fire-fighting cargo spaces 327
accommodation spaces 410–11 SOLAS regulations 324
after-peak fires 412–13 unattended machinery 234
at sea 419–23 fixed fire-fighting systems 163–217
cargo spaces 327, 405–9 see also fixed CO2 systems; foam installations; inert gas
cooling 405 systems; sprinkler systems; steam smothering
decision making 404 cargo spaces 328, 406
engine rooms 275–6, 278, 413–15 comparison 196–8
fore-peak fires 412–13, 412 Halon systems 56, 175–9, 198
machinery spaces 413–15 high-pressure water spray 193–8, 348, 352, 414
oil tankers 416–19 history 163
passenger vessels 420–1 other gas systems 346–8
personal liason 403–4 SOLAS regulations 164–5
in port 403–19 special category spaces 325
principles 405 fixed pressure water-spray systems
refrigerated spaces 411–12 advantages 204–5
smothering 405, 406 nozzles 203
starving 405 pressure 204
tugs 154, 423 SOLAS regulations 202–3
warehouses 108–9 valves 203
fire-pistons 2 fixed temperature heat detector 226–7
fire-resisting divisions 293, 295 flame detectors 223, 223
fire-resisting doors 41, 42, 60, 74, 83, 114, 343 flame screens, tankers 362–3
fire-resisting materials 304–10 flammable gases
cabling 288 auto-ignition temperatures 191
Cape Marine Boards 304–8, 304, 305, 306 detectors 221, 222, 222, 407, 443–4
Durasteel panelling 308, 308 Piper Alpha 436
Navilite-N 309–10, 309 flammable liquids
passenger ships 301 lockers 260
fire-retarding divisions 293–4 oils 240–1
fire-ships risk analysis 31
Prometheus 15–16 flammable vapours 346
Spanish Armada 14 flash-backs 276, 413
fireballs, Dona Paz/Vector 28 flashover stage 258, 410
fireboats 111 flashpoints 238–9, 290, 355, 417
Firebrand 10 flint-and-steel 2
fireman's outfit 245–58 flooding 46, 47
see also breathing apparatus see also stability
history 245 Flourocarbon "12" (CCl2F2) 411
personal equipment 245 flue gases 180, 372
Scandinavian Star 54 flying fire squad concept 421–3
SOLAS regulations 245–6 foam enhanced sprinkler systems 177, 198
Firewire heat detection cable 227 foam fire extinguishers 192, 414
first aid 383 foam hydrants, offshore 446
see also burns foam installations 177
fixed CO2 systems 163, 163, 167–74 see also aqueous film forming foam
cargo pump rooms 377 cargo spaces 328
cargo spaces 166 chemical 200
cylinders 167–8 crude oil 417

Index 8
deterioration 200 Grafton, Cole's pump 6–7, 6

disadvantages 196–7, 198 Grandcamp 116–17
fixed high expansion 196–7, 200 Graviner, Firewire 227
fixed low expansion 196, 199 gravity see centre of gravity
history 199 Great Fire of London 3
mechanical 199–202, 200, 201 Great Western 8
patenting 199 Greece 25, 28
pre-mixed mechanical foam 201, 202 Greek Fire 11–13, 11
pressure 201 Greenore 269
Scandinavian Star 56 Grier, Mr Justice 138
SOLAS regulations 199–200 "Grinnell"
statutory requirements 199 automatic sprinklers 207
foam monitors 366 Quartzoid Bulbs 213
aircraft carriers 365–6 sprinkler systems 207, 215, 217
Megaborg 366 Guide to Ship Fire-Fighting (MOD) 26
remote-controlled 366 Gulf, Betelgeuse disaster 97, 99
tanker jetties 419
wind effects 365 Hague Rules, COGSA 127–8, 135
FOC see Loss Prevention Council Hague-Visby Rules 136
foodstuffs, storage 108, 109 halogenated hydrocarbon systems 56
force pumps 5–7, 147 disadvantages 198
fore-peak fires 412–13, 412 halon alternatives 177–9
Fort Stikene 120–2 halocarbon gases 177
frangible bulbs, sprinkler systems 443 Inergen 178
"The French Method" 292, 337 NAF SII 177
Freon see Flourocarbon "12" properties 178
friction matches 2–3 storage factors 178
FRS see Fire Research Station ozone depletion 177
fuel SOLAS regulations 175–7
see also oil Halon 1211:BCF 175–7
engine room delivery lines 148 Halon 1301:BTM 56, 175–7
gaseous 344 Halon 2402 175
funnel gas systems 367, 416 Hamburg Rules 134–6
furnishings 410 hand grenades 20
combustible 301 hand pumps 5, 6
corridors 335–6 hand squirts 3
fire-resisting 300 handrails, passenger ships 317
Meteor 50 Hansen, Ole B. 62, 63
Morro Castle 40–1 Harris, Captain Sir Snow 18
polystyrene 50 Harris, Leopold 131
polyurethane 50 Harrison, Major A Stewart 206
SOLAS definition 143–4 Harter Act 1893, US 128
fuseboards 290 Hartley, D. 18
hatchways, opening 408–9
galley hoods, cleaning 245 Hayward, E. T. 426
Galveston Bay 116, 116 Hayward ejector pump 426–7
Garay, Blasco de 8 Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 440
gas see flammable gases heat detectors see fire detection and alarm systems
gas carriers 144 heat waves 405, 415
gas conservation modules (GCM) 435, 436, 437 Heleanna 87
gas detectors see flammable gases; toxic gas detectors helicopter decks 260
GCM see gas conservation modules Herald of Free Enterprise 31
Geiger-Muller tube 223 hermaphrodite couplings 160, 160
General Motors, US 274 high expansion foam 196–7
generators cargo spaces 328
diesel 180, 182, 242 engine room fires 415
SOLAS regulations 280, 282, 283, 285, 286–7, 289, 290 high pressure air charging equipment 253–4,253
Gisborne, John Sacheverell 218 high pressure reducing valves, breathing apparatus 248–9
Gladstone Dock 109–11 high sensitivity smoke detection (HSSD) 226, 226
GM values 425–6 high-pressure water spray systems 414
Godfrey, Ambrose 163 carriage of dangerous goods 352

Index 9
fixed system comparisons 196–8 ignition engines 234–8

history 193 ILU see Institute of London Underwriters
ro-ro cargo spaces 348 IMCO see Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
SOLAS regulations 193–6 Organization
Highflyer 116, 117–18 IMDG see International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code
history 1–22 immunity certificates 3
fire detection and alarm systems 218–19 Imperator 207
fireman's outfit 245 Independence 7
fixed fire-fighting systems 163 Industrial Revolution, Britain 19
foam installations 199 Inergen 178
high-pressure water spray systems 193 inert gas 177, 180, 411, 412
hose 158 definition 371
inert gas systems 367 producers 180–8
matches 2–3 typical composition 371–2
portable fire extinguishers 188 inert gas systems 95
pumps 5, 147–8 see also Pyrene Co. Ltd.
sprinkler systems 206–7 alarm systems 374
steam smothering 179 cargo spaces 406
water pipes 156 cotton fires 406, 407
watertight doors 265, 269 emergency procedures 374–5
History of the British Fire Service (Blackstone) 3 flue gas passage 372
hogshead 6 history 367
holds see cargo spaces oil tanks 416, 417
Home Office Fire Services College 387 Oti 181
Hong Kong Fire Brigade 85 Peabody 372, 373
Hooke, Norman 23 pressure/vacuum valves 374
horizontal zones 295 SOLAS regulations 367–71
hose 408 tankers 362, 367–76, 418
couplings 160, 160 Infrared (IR) flame detectors 223,223, 443
diameters 159 injector pipes 242
engine room fires 415 instantaneous light 2
history 158 Institute of London Underwriters (ILU) 23, 25, 32
line of 257 insulation
nozzles 160–1, 160 "A" class divisions 295
SOLAS regulations 158–9 carriage of dangerous goods 351
standardisation 159 refrigeration spaces 411
tanker jetties 419 insurance 136–8
Hose Reel and Trolly Compressed Air Breathing claims 131
Apparatus see trolley units companies 122–3, 275
hosereels 162, 162, 445 Fire Brigades 3
hot spots Insurance Index (1944) 123
thermal imaging camera 347 integrity values see fire integrity values
vapourised oil mist 235, 238 Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization
Howard, Lord Thomas 14 (IMCO) 84
HSSD see high sensitivity smoke detection internal combustion machinery 193–4
Hughes Mark 11 Noble ejector pump427, 428 International Convention on Standards of Training,
hull return system 288 Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (1978)
hydrants 79–80, 408 380–5
engine rooms 415 International Fire Investigators and Consultants 25
isolating valves 157 International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code
offshore installations 445 119, 262, 353, 354
Scandinavian Star 54 see also carriage of dangerous goods
SOLAS regulations 157 International Maritime Organization (IMO) 124, 125
tanker jetties 418 see also Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Regulations
hydraulic power 265, 267, 269 Emergency Procedures for Ships Carrying Dangerous
hydro-pneumatic doors 269 Goods (EmS) 262, 353
hydrochloric acid 302 fire test procedures 294
hydrogen cyanide 59 International Conference on the Safety of Life at Sea
hydrogen sulphide 223, 442, 444 1948 292
Regulations and Codes 125
ICAM Fire Tracer system 226 safety assessment 31

Index 10
International Oil Tanker & Terminal Safety Guide 418 UK 125–6

International Safety Management (ISM) Code 31, 124 LEL see lower explosive limit
international shore connections 261, 261 life-lines 250, 255–6, 257, 409
ionisation smoke detectors 224–5, 224 lifeboats
IR see Infrared British Trent 66
Irving Nordic 237–8 cabin numbering 400–1
ISM see International Safety Management Code condition 60
isolating valves embarkation deck 317
fire pumps 150 fire drills 395–6
hydrants 157 motorised 57
tankers 150 offshore installations 450
lifts
J. Stone and Co. Ltd 265 escape routes 341, 342, 342
firedoor control gear 268 protection 319, 342–3
hydraulic watertight doors 267 light scatter smoke detectors 225
hydraulic-skylight system 277 Light Water see Aqueous Film Foaming Foam
hydro-pneumatic doors 269 lightning 17–18
power-operated watertight doors266 lightning conductors 17–18
Jacob's ladder 332–3 lights
Jaguar Motors 274–5 see also emergency lighting
Japan 28 navigation 281, 284, 290, 291
John Pender 265 portable electric 113
Jones, Paul 7 systems 280–1
Joseph's Well, Cairo 5 lightweight, SOLAS definition 144
Joule Thompson (JT) flash drum 436, 438 lightweight protecting doors 274
Joyce, J. H. 180 linear heat detection cables 227, 228, 443
JT see Joule Thompson liquified petroleum gas (LPG) 442
Jumbo inquiry 88, 89 listing
jurisdiction 138 Empress of Canada 80–1
jute impaired stability 424
CO2 extinguishing 167 Normandie 73
storage 112 Seawise University 86, 87–8
watertight door operation 270
Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse 265 "live" ships 70
Klaxon horns, Noronic 76, 77 Liverpool Fire Brigade 199
Kletz, Trevor 26 Liverpool Underwriters' Association 23, 25, 32
Kong Haakon 367 Lloyds
insurance 122, 275
ladders 314, 315, 341, 342 Register "Rulefinder" software 125
laminate 55, 59 Register of Shipping 52, 154, 221–2
lamp rooms, fire integrity 298 load lines, UK legislation 125–6
Lancashire County Fire Brigade 386 loadicators 95
Larsen, Hugo 59 local suppression systems, offshore installations 448–9
lasers location of fires 32–4, 33–4
HSSD 226 London 3, 4, 9, 199
smoke detectors 225 Loss Prevention Council 211, 294
law see maritime law low expansion foam 196
Law of Admiralty (Gilmore & Black) 133 low fire risk cargo 346–8
legislation low flame spread, SOLAS definition 142
see also maritime law; regulations; Safety of Life at Sea low level marking, escape routes 278, 316, 336
19th century 20 low pressure bulk CO2 systems 169–71
alarm volume 61–2 alarm facilities 171
COGSA 127–34, 135 cargo spaces 328
goal setting regime 440 fixed systems comparison 198
household smoke detectors 225 refrigeration units 170, 170
MSC 61, 377 relief valves 170
NFPA 62, 118, 211, 392 schematic 170
offshore installations 439–41 storage tanks 169–70, 171
prescriptive 440 lower explosive limit (LEL) 222, 407
retroactivity 31 Lowestoft College 387
toxicity 61 LPG see liquified petroleum gas

Index 11
lubricating oil Control of Ports Regulations 89

chromium 237 Safety and Load Line Conventions Act 1932 120
SOLAS regulations 240 Merryweather's 9, 163
Luckenbach Pier 114–15, 115 MESA see Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration
Luxemburg 18 metacentre 425, 425
metacentric height 425
MacDonald Road Fire Station 386, 388–91 Meteor 48–50, 49
"the Ship" 388, 388, 389 bulkheads 48, 50
training syllabus 389–91 casualties 49
McFee, William 42 fire alarm 48
machinery spaces furnishings 50
emergency lighting 281, 284 lessons 50
escape routes 315, 316 official report 49
extinguishing arrangements 193–206 sprinkler system 48, 50
fire integrity 297–8, 311, 340, 359 methyl chloride (CH3Cl) 411
fire-fighting 413–15 Miller, William 207, 219
insulation 351 Minerva Detector Company Ltd. 224, 230
SOLAS definition 143 Mining Enforcement and Safety Administration (MESA),
tanker location 356 US 248
ventilation ducts 243 mobile offshore drilling units (MODU) 433,434
Mactra 367 MODU see mobile offshore drilling units
magazines, storage 43–4, 47 Monsanto chemical works 117
Magnus, Olaus 12–13 Montreal Protocol 177
Mahia 120 Morro Castle 40–3, 41
MAIB see Marine Accident Investigation Branch casualties 42
main vertical zones 295 crew 42
bulkheads 296 extinguishing apparatus 41
SOLAS definition 142, 144–5 fire-fighting 41–2
maintenance furnishings 40–1
breathing apparatus 247 lessons 43
diesel engines 238 mouth to mouth resuscitation 252
fire equipment 379–80 MSC see Maritime Safety Committee
Piper Alpha 437 Mulsifyre 193
ports 70 Mulsispray 193, 194, 195
Malta 27 multi sensor smoke detector 226
Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) 36 multivariate analysis 230
Marine Insurance Acts 136–8 muster lists and charts 78, 392–4, 399
Maritime Casualties 1963-1996 Second Edition (Hooke) muster stations 258, 281, 297, 394
23 see also embarkation stations
maritime law 124–38 MV Protector Alpha 241
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) 377
Markay 418 naphtha, creeping 416
Marpassa 367 National Fire Prevention Association (NFPA) 62, 118, 211,
Marquette 130 392
Mars, Battle of Trafalgar 15 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
matches, history 2–3 (NIOSH), US 248
Mather & Platt Ltd. 156, 193, 203, 207 National Sea Training College 387
Matriculoeii 3 natural gas liquids (NGL) 442
MAYDAY calls 65 navigational equipment
Maydon Wharf 112 emergency power supply 282, 285
mechanical foam installations see foam installations lights 281, 284, 290, 291
Mechans ejector pump 427, 430–1, 430, 431 Navilite-N 309–10, 309
medium expansion foam 196 Nederland Warehouse 113–14,113
Melamine laminates 301 neural networks, fire detection 230
Memoirs of the Crusades (Villehardouin and de Joinville) NGL see natural gas liquids
13–14 NH3 see ammonia
Merchant Shipping NIOSH see National Institute for Occupational Safety and
1871 Act 126 Health
1894 Act 126 Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (NKK) 37, 104, 144
1995 Act 126 nitrate 406
Construction Rules 1952 337 see also ammonium nitrate

Index 12
NKK see Nippon Kaiji Kyokai process module 434

Noble ejector pump 427, 427, 428 ring mains 448
non-combustible materials risk assessment 441–2
see also fire-resisting materials status lights 444
SOLAS definition 141 water supplies 447–8
solid bulk cargoes 346–8 well head module 434
Nordic Prince 310 Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992 440
Normandie 70–4, 71, 72 Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction,
alarm system 70–1, 72 etc.) Regulations 1996 441
fire patrol 71, 72 Offshore Safety Act 1992 440
fire-fighting 72–3 oil
lessons 73–4 see also flammable oils; lubricating oil; oil fuel; Piper
life-preservers 71, 72 Alpha
listing 73 burning 114
saloon 71 engine rooms 153–4, 413
welding 72, 74 level gauges 240, 241
Noronic 10, 74–8, 411 oil fuel
alarm systems 74–5 distribution 239
crew 77 flash point 238–9
fire patrolling 74, 75, 77 purifiers 241
fire-fighting 75 SOLAS regulations 238–40
Justice Kellock's Report 77 sounding pipes 239–40, 241
Ontario Fire Marshal's Report 76 storage 239
North America 130 units 143, 193
North America, pier fires 106–8 utilization 239
North Carolina 7 oil production platforms see offshore installations
North Hull Fire Station 387 oil tank explosions 415
Notifier, laser smoke detectors 225 oil tankers
nozzles see also tankers
ejector pumps 427 Betelgeuse 89–105
hose 160–1, 160 de-gassing 416
volume formula 398, 424 fire-fighting 416–17
water-spraying 203 funnel gas systems 416
inert gas systems 416
obscuration smoke detectors 225 oil-fired boilers 193
Occidental Petroleum Limited 435 on-board training 391, 396
Ocean Bridge 197 Ondo, inert gas generation 183
Ocean Liberty 120 open circuit breathing apparatus 247, 248–50
Ocean Monarch 19–20, 19 open deck spaces, fire integrity 297, 311, 340
ODP see ozone depletion potential open ro-ro cargo spaces 143
offshore installations 433–50 Oppau factory disaster 116
see also Piper Alpha optical smoke detectors 225–6, 225
alarm systems 443–4 Oriana
blow out preventers 434, 441–2 engine room fire 205
deluge systems 436, 446–7 escape routes 316
drill floor 434 low level exit signs 278
escape routes 449–50 Thorn's Saturn Safety Management System 230
ESD systems 443 Orsat tests 182
fire control 443–4 Oti, inert-gas producer 181, 182–5
fire detection 443–4 overloading, Dona Paz 52
fire mains 448 oxygen
fire pumps 447 breathing apparatus 247–8
fire-fighting equipment 443–9 concentrations 182, 184
fixed CO2 systems 448–9 respiration 246
flare stack 434 starvation 246–7
future developments 450 ozone depleting chemicals 177
hydrants 445–6 ozone depletion potential (ODP) 177
legislation 439–41
lifeboats 450 P&I see Protecting & Indemnity Clubs
local suppression systems 448–9 Packe of Spanish Lyes 14–15
PFEER 440–1 paint rooms 260, 298

Index 13
paints Cullen Inquiry 31, 439, 440

combustible 301, 302 deluge system 436
Meteor 50 ESD system 436, 438
Parmelee, Henry 206 explosions 438, 439
Parmelee sprinkler 207 flammable gas detectors 436
partial loss fires 33 flare boons 435
partitions, fire-resisting 41 gas exportation 435
Pascal 147 gas processing 436
passenger vessels GCM 435, 436, 437
see also ro-ro passenger ships investigation 439
alternative fire prevention methods 292 JT flash drum 436, 438
automatic sprinkler systems 324 legislative effects 124, 439–41
cargo spaces 327–8 maintenance 437
central control station 329 Module C 435, 436, 437, 438, 439
combustibles 301–2 oil exportation 435
damage control 278 platform description 435–6
doors 320–1 process description 436–7
emergency lighting 281–4, 291 production separators 436
emergency power 281–4, 291 PSVs 436–7, 439
emergency signals 394 public inquiry 31, 439, 440
escape routes 314–18 pipes
fire detection and alarm 324, 328, 329 injector pipes 242
fire integrity 296–300 smoke detection 232–3
fire patrols 328, 329–33 SOLAS Regulations 156–7, 260
fire test procedures 302–3 sounding pipes 239–40, 241
fire-fighters 420–1 sparge pipes 47
fire-resisting materials 301, 304–10 sprinkler systems 211–12
main zones 295–6 water 156–7
public address systems 328 plastics, toxicity 301
sidescuttles 322–3 Plimsoll Line regulations 126
SOLAS regulations 292–336 Plimsoll, Samuel 125–6
special category spaces 324–6 plywood, Morro Castle 40
sprinkler systems 217 point type detectors
stairways 297, 311, 314–15, 316, 319 heat 226–7
top hamper 425 smoke 224
upgrading 333 Police, personnel liason 404
ventilation systems 321–2 Pollo, accidental CO2 release 197
windows 322–3 PolyRex Detector 226
patrolmen see fire patrols polystyrene 50, 302
Peabody inert gas system 372, 373 polyurethane 50, 302
pellistors, gas detectors 222 polyvinylchloride (PVC) 301, 302
Personal Injury Prevention (Bracken) 26 Pomerene Act, US 128
personnel Pontifex Maximus 2
Police liason 404 portable electric lights 113
training 379–402 portable fire extinguishers
Petans Fire Training Centre 387 accommodation spaces 189
Petrie report, Piper Alpha 439 availability 262
PFEER (Prevention of Fire and Explosion and Emergency carbon dioxide 192, 414, 445
Response) 440–1 carriage of dangerous goods 351
Philopator, Ptolemy 4–5 control stations 189
Phobos 406 data 32
apparent course of fire 187–8 discharging 189
cargo damage 187 dry powder 189, 190, 191, 414, 445
fire test findings 186–8 engine rooms 38, 191, 413–14
phosphorus, portable fire-box 2 foam 192, 414
photoelectric audible detector 233,234 history 188
photoluminescent markings, escape routes 316, 335,335, Morro Castle 41
342 offshore installations 444–5
piers, fires 106, 111–12, 114–15 Scandinavian Star 54
pipelines, Scandinavian Star 54 service spaces 189
Piper Alpha 435–41 soda-acid 41

Index 14
SOLAS regulations 188–9 p.v. valves see pressure/vacuum valves

wall brackets 189 PVC see polyvinylchloride
water 189, 190 Pyrene Co. Ltd. 180
portable fire-box 2 pre-mixed mechanical foam system 202
portable pumps 147 Pyrene-E.D.-Hol Inert-Gas Fire Extinguishing
potash 2 Installation
powder fire extinguishers see dry powder fire extinguishers American Test 186–8
power-operated doors 320 British Tests 182–5, 185
pre-mixed mechanical foam 201, 202 layout 183
prescriptive legislation 440 principles 180, 182
pressure smoke detection cabinet 169
carbon dioxide 197, 198 pyrophoric scales 442
fire pumps 152–3 pyrotechnic rockets, 19th century 16
foam installations 201
oil fuel 240 Quality Monitoring Instruments Ltd., crankcase monitoring
sprinkler systems 210, 211 238, 238
pressure safety valves (PSV), Piper Alpha 436–7, 439 quartzoid bulb sprinkler heads 213,213, 216
pressure/vacuum valves 374 Queen Charlotte 19
pressurised tubing, heat detection 227–8 Queen Elizabeth 83, 274
Prevention of Fire and Explosion and Emergency Response Queen Mary 207
(PFEER) Regulations 1995 440–1
priming pumps 427, 428 R-burner 183
Prince George 18 radiators, electric 260, 261, 291
Princess Maud radios
automatic sprinklers 207 emergency power 282, 284–5
"Grinnell" sprinkler system 217 fire-fighting instructions 422
Prometheus, fire-ship 15–16 Ralston Indicator 426
Protecting & Indemnity (P&I) Clubs 25–6, 136, 137–8 re-ignition 189
PSV see pressure safety valves real time fire detection 230
public address systems 78, 328, 335 reciprocating pumps 5, 5, 6, 9, 9, 147, 153
public spaces record of fires 23
escape routes 317 red-hot-shot 10, 16
SOLAS definition 142 Redmond, Stephen 25
pump-rooms see cargo pump-rooms reducing valves, breathing apparatus 248–9
pumps reflected light, smoke detectors 233
see also ejector pumps; fire pumps refrigerated spaces 411–12
advertisement 126 Register of Shipping 52, 154, 221–2
bilge 148, 150, 151, 152 regulations
centrifugal 9, 41, 147, 153, 204, 211 see also International Maritime Organization; Safety of
chain 6–7, 147 Life at Sea; United States
characteristic curve 154 19th century 15, 19
Cole's 6–7, 6 Bill of Lading 128, 129, 131–5
deep lift 431–2 Bubble Act 1720 136
double-duty 150, 151, 152–3 Control of Ports 89, 120
emergency 380 fire patrols 330–3
force 5–7, 147 Flag State examinations 64
hand 5, 6 IMDG Code 119, 262, 353, 354
history 5 Merchant Shipping Acts 120, 126
manually operated 147 offshore installations 439–41
portable 147 Offshore Safety Act 1992 440
priming 427, 428 PFEER 440–1
reciprocating 5, 5, 6, 9, 9, 147, 153 Plimsoll Line 126
rope 5, 5, 147 Safety and Load Line Conventions Act 1932 120
rotary 7, 8, 9, 9, 147 reliability theory 37
sanitary 150, 152, 153 relief valves
screw 4, 5, 147 fire pumps 150, 153
sprinkler systems 211 low pressure bulk CO2 systems 170
steam 8–9 respiration 246–8
submersible 161, 161 responsibility, jurisdiction 138
Taylor's rope-operated 7, 7 Rhodian Law 124, 138
water-ring air 155 risk analysis

Index 15
flammable liquids 31 damage control 278

offshore installations 441–2 definitions 141–5
ro-ro cargo spaces doors 320–1, 343
escape routes 341 duty assignment 77
fire integrity 340 electrical installations 279–91
fire protection 344–5 emergency installations 279, 281–7
SOLAS definition 142 emergency instructions 392–4
water mist systems 348 emergency training and drills 58
water spray systems 348 escape routes 58, 314–18, 341–2
ro-ro passenger ships fire control plans 262
see also passenger vessels fire detection and alarm systems 219–21, 231–2, 234
car decks 324–6 fire integrity tables 299, 300
Dona Paz 28, 31 fire mains 156–7
emergency lighting 283–4 fire pumps 148–56
escape routes 317–19 fire-patrol system 77
fatalities 28, 29, 30 fire-resisting bulkheads 77
Herald of Free Enterprise 31 fireman's outfit 245–6
Scandinavian Star 28, 31 fixed fire-fighting systems
SOLAS definition 145 automatic sprinklers 208–9
tonnage lost 32 CO2 systems 165
Roberts, John 245 general 164–5
rockets, 19th century 16 Halon systems 175–7
Roebuck, Dampier 6 other gas systems 179
Rogers, Dr Joslyn 75 steam smothering 179
roll call board 39, 398, 399–400,399 water-spray systems 193–6, 202–3
roll calls 66, 259, 398–401 flammable liquid lockers 260
Romans flammable oils 240–1
early vessels 4–5 helicopter decks 260
fire-fighting 3 hose 158–9
screw pump 4 hydrants 157
Vestals 1–2 inert gas systems 367–71
Romantica 28, 300 international shore connections 261
rope pumps 5, 5, 147 lifts 319
Rossett gravel 110 lubricating oil 240
rotary pumps 7, 8, 9, 9, 147 machinery spaces 205–6
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company 20 muster lists 392–4
Royal Navy oil fuel 238–40
fire pumps 152 openings in divisions 320–1
water-spray systems 204 paint lockers 260
Royston Grange 51 Passenger Ship Safety Survey 52
see also Tien Chee/Royston Grange collision passenger vessels 292–336
rubber, storage 110 pipes 260
"Rulefinder" software 125 portable fire extinguishers 188–9
Russell Newberry and Co. Ltd. 155 radiators 260, 261
Ruston Diesels Ltd 156 sidescutters 322–3
special category spaces 324–6
Sadler, Colonel J. R. 121 sprinkler systems 212
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 Regulations 28, 40, stairways 319
48, 139–263 structure 338
amendments 145, 177, 292 tacit acceptance 145
application 139–40 tankers 355–77
basic principles 141 training manual 402
breathing apparatus 245–6, 255, 258 ventilation systems 243–5, 321–2, 343
bulkheads 295–300, 311–13, 338–41 waste receptacles 260
cargo spaces 327–8 water pipes 156–7
cargo vessels 337–78 watertight bulkhead openings 269–73
carriage of dangerous goods 349–52 watertight doors 269–73
chapters 125 windows 322–3
combustible materials 323, 343 St George 20
construction details 265–91, 323–4, 343–4 Sally Star, engine room fire 36, 39
crankcase explosions 234–5 salt water fog sprays, burn alleviation 414

Index 16
sample extraction smoke detection systems 231–2 explosion 46

Sandhaven fast rescue craft 438 explosives 43–4, 47
sanitary pumps 150, 152, 153 fire-extinguishing equipment 43
sanitary spaces 297, 334 lessons 47–8
Sansinena 417 steam smothering 45, 46, 47, 48
Sax's Dangerous Properties of Industrial Materials 354 toe puffs 44–5, 46, 48
Scandinavian Star 28, 52–64 self-contained breathing apparatus 247
accommodation spaces 53, 300 Servia, pumps 147
bulkheads 54 service spaces
C Deck 53, 54, 55, 58 fire integrity 311, 340, 359
cabins 53, 300 portable fire extinguishers 189
casualties 59 SOLAS definition 142
cause of fire 58–9, 60 tanker location 356
commissioning 58 Shand, Mason & Co, advertisement 126
crew 52, 59–60 Shaw, Captain 16
dead-end corridors 59, 341–2 Shell Exploration and Production 433
doors 54 Ship Fires and the Law 241
escape route markings 57–8, 62 shore connections 261, 261
escape routes 316, 336 shore supply valves 211
fire protection equipment 54–7 Short History of Marine Engineering (Smith) 8–9
fire-fighting equipment 54–7 sidescuttles
growth of fire 59 SOLAS regulations 322–3
joint investigating committee 52, 54, 62–3 tanker location 357
legislative effect 124, 217 Siebe-Gorman
lessons 63–4 "Airmaster" breathing apparatus 248–50,248, 249, 250
Norwegian Report 54 trolley units 250
ownership 54 Sigmund Pumps Ltd 156
passageways 53, 55, 59, 61 Significant New Alternatives Program (SNAP), US 177
rescue operation 62, 63 Silver Pitt fast rescue craft 438–9
smoke 322 sinking, age significance 28
SOLAS effects 292 Siphos, London 3
toxic gases 61 Sirius 8
unreporting 31 skylights, engine rooms 275–6, 275, 277, 278
unseaworthy conditions 60–1 Slievemore 265
ventilation 53, 56–7, 278, 322 slung branches 409, 410, 412
Scotia 265 smell, smoke detection 232
screw pumps 4, 5, 147 smoke 301
scrubbing towers, inert gas systems 372 engine rooms 78
scuppers 325–6 fire-fighting 409
Seafarer's Training Certification and Watchkeeping Meteor 48
(STCW) Code 124, 380–5 Morro Castle 42
Seaford, pumps 6 Normandie 73, 74
Seawise Foundation Limited 83 Noronic 76, 78
Seawise University 83–9, 84, 87 on-board fire training 391
arson 86 Scandinavian Star 59, 61
bulkheads 83 Seistan 45, 46
doors 83 stopping 50
electrical wiring 87 ventilation effects 322
fire-fighting 85–6, 87–8 smoke detectors 219, 221
fire-patrol 85 fixed CO2 systems 232–3
harbour position 84 HSSD 226, 226
hold 88 ionisation smoke detectors 224–5, 224
investigation 86 lasers 225
Jumbo inquiry 88, 89 legislation, UK household 225
listing 86, 87–8 light scattering smoke detectors 225
report 86–9 multi sensor smoke detectors 226
stairways 83 obscuration smoke detectors 225
welding 84, 86–7 optical smoke detector 225–6, 225
seaworthy, legal definition 130 passenger ships 329
Seistan 43–8, 44 sample extraction 231–2
casualties 46 ventilation effects 225

Index 17
smoke generation tests 302–4 pumps 211

smoke helmets 255–8 quartzoid bulb heads 213, 213, 216
smoke masks 255 recommendations 78, 82
smoking Scandinavian Star 54, 61
accommodation areas 49, 75, 82, 442 shore supply valves 211
bans 16, 119, 332, 417 SOLAS regulations 208–9, 212, 324
Seawise University 86–7 sprinkler heads 212–13
Superb 15 US regulations 209
workmen 84 zones 210
smothering 405, 406 stability 424–32
see also fixed CO2 systems; inert gas systems; steam accommodation spaces 411
smothering determining factors 424–6
SNAP see Significant New Alternatives Program ejector pumps 426–32
Socony Vacuum Oil Co. 417 GM values 425–6
soda-acid fire-extinguishers 41 stairways
sodium chlorate 120 dimensions and design 314–15, 316
software algorithms 230 direct access 334
solar blind flame detectors 223 emergency lighting 281, 284
SOLAS see Safety of Life at Sea Regulations enclosed 50, 78–9
solid bulk cargoes 346–8 escape routes 314–15, 341
Song of Norway, Navelite-N 310 fire integrity 297, 311, 339, 359
sounders 230 protection 319, 342–3
sounding pipes, oil fuel 239–40, 241 Seawise University 83
Southampton Institute of Higher Education 387 Standard Fire Test 294–5
Spanish Armada 14 Durasteel panelling 308
sparge pipes 47 fire-resisting divisions 293
special category spaces fire-retarding divisions 294
bilge pumps 326 SOLAS definition 141
fire extinguishing equipment 325 time temperature curve 294
fixed fire extinguishing system 325 starving, fire-fighting 405
patrols and detection 325 status lights, offshore installations 444
protection 324–6 STCW see Seafarer's Training Certification and
scuppers 325–6 Watchkeeping Code
SOLAS definition 143 steam engines 8, 194
structural protection 324–5 steam fire-extinguishers 20
ventilation system 325 steam pumps 8–9
spontaneous combustion steam smothering 165, 405
cotton 21 cargo spaces 406
toe puffs 44–5, 46–7, 48 Empress of Canada 79
spray nozzles, fire-fighting 409 history 179
sprinkler heads 47 Seistan 45, 46, 47, 48
sprinkler systems 206–217, 336 SOLAS regulations 179
see also automatic sprinkler alarms steam turbines 194
accommodation spaces 300, 410 steamships 8, 20
alarm indicator connections 217 steel 142, 293
back-pressure valves 211, 211, 212 Stevens, District Chief J. 76
cargo ships 344 Stone Platt Industries Ltd. 265
connections 212 store-rooms 298
dock installations 110, 111, 113, 114 stored energy sources 286–7
emergency power supply 282, 290, 291 Strathclyde Fire Brigade 387
foam enhanced 177 Stratos HSSD Laser system 226
frangible bulbs 443 submersible pumps 161, 161
history 206–7 sulphates, fire-fighting 406
legislation 209 sulphur, fumes 117
Meteor 48, 50 sulphuric acid 2
offshore installations 446 Sultan 9
Parmelee sprinkler 207 Sun Viking 310
passenger ships 217 Superb 15
patenting 207 Surinam 17, 18
piping 211–12 switchboards
pressure 210, 211 electrical 280, 287–8, 287, 289

Index 18
emergency 281, 283, 286, 287 total loss fires, location 33

protection 38 towing 35
symbols, fire control plans 263–4 toxic gases
Syringes, London 3 detectors 223
Scandinavian Star 61
Tanker Safety Code 418 toxicity tests 303, 304
tankers 355–77 training 379–402
see also chemical tankers; combination carriers; gas approved courses 386–7
carriers; oil tankers basic training 381
bulkheads 358–60 breathing apparatus 254–5, 256–8, 391
cargo pump-rooms 359, 362, 375–6 crew 59–60, 420, 421
cargo tanks dispensation 387–8
protection 363–4 emergency instructions 392–4
purging 361 emergency training 395
ventilating 362 familiarization training 380–1
venting 360–1 fire drills 153, 379, 380, 395–8
double hull spaces 362 fire-control training 391–2
fatalities 28, 29, 30 first aid 383
fire division 356–7 MacDonald Road Fire Station 388–91
fires in port 417–19 manual 402
fixed deck foam systems 364–5 muster list 392–4
flame screens 362–3 on-board 391, 396
inert gas systems 362, 367–76, 418 owner's responsibility 379–80
isolation valves 150 personal safety 383
location of spaces 356–7 practical training 383
pump rooms 416 roll calls 398–401
tonnage loss 31–2, 32 social responsibilities 383
Taylor Dunford's "Norsen" Automatic Hose Reel162 STCW Code 380–5
Taylor's rope-operated pump 7,7 theoretical training 382
telephones, voice-energised 256 Transportation Safety Board (TSB), Canada 237
temporary refuge, offshore installations 449 trend analysis 23–39
Texaco Tartan Alpha 435 triboli 13
Texas City Brigade 117 trinitrotoluene (TNT) 120, 121
Texas City disaster 106, 116–19 trolley units 250–253, 250, 251, 445
casualties 117 trunkways 273
damage 118 tugs 154, 423
fire-fighting 117–18 Tung, Mr C. Y. 83
geography 116 tunnels 273
Grandcamp explosion 117 turpentine 11
Highflyer explosion 118 Twenty Famous Naval Battles (Rawson) 13
lessons 118–19 Tyne and Wear Metropolitan Fire Brigade 387
monetary loss 118
theoretical training 382 Ultraviolet (UV) flame detectors 223,223, 443
thermal imaging camera, hot spots 347 Union-Castle Line, fire patrols 330–3
Thisbe, lightning 17 United Kingdom
Thorn Fire Services Act 1947 138
carbon monoxide detectors 228 legislation 125–6
infrared flame detector 223 Loss Prevention Council Rules 211
Saturn Safety Management System 230 Merchant Notice 1494 "Fire-Fighting Training" June
tidal waves 117, 121–2 1992 254
Tien Chee/Royston Grange collision United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by
casualties 50 Sea (Hamburg 1978) see Hamburg Rules
investigation 50–2 United States
time-temperature curve, Standard Fire Test 294,294 see also North America
TNT see trinitrotoluene CHRIS 354
toe puffs 44–5, 46–7, 48 Coast Guard 354, 392
tonnage lost by fire 27, 31–2, 32, 34 COGSA 127
Tooley Street fire 4 EPA 177
top hamper, passenger ships 425 Harter Act 1893 128, 133
Toricelli 147 MESA 248
Total, Betelgeuse disaster 95, 97 National Cargo Bureau, Inc. 186

Index 19
NFPA 118, 211, 392

NIOSH 248 Walker, John 2–3
Pomerene Act 128 walkie-talkies 252–3
SNAP 177 Walter Kidde
statutes 126 Audible Detector 233, 234
UV see Ultraviolet Crankcase Monitor 235–6, 235, 236
fixed CO2 and alarm system 167
valves smoke detectors 169, 219, 232–3, 233
automatic sprinkler alarms 215–6, 215 War Commentaries (Caesar) 4
back pressure 211, 211, 212 warehouses, fires 108–11
breathing apparatus 248–9 Warms, Captain 41
engine rooms 414 Warrington Fire Research 294
isolation valves 150, 157 waste receptacles 260
pressure/vacuum 374 water
PSV 436–7, 439 curtain systems 93
relief valves 150, 153, 170 fresh 408
shore supply 211 pipes 156–7
trolley units 252 post-fire removal 74
vapourised oil mist, hot-spots 235, 238 pressure v height 210
Various methods to prevent fires in houses and shipping water fire extinguishers 189, 190
and for preserving the lives of people at fires (Bathoe) water fog installations 198, 203, 414
17–18 water mist systems 177, 348
varnishes, combustible 301 disadvantages 198
Vaterland, automatic sprinklers 207 engine room fires 191
Vector 28, 52 water spray see fixed pressure water-spray systems; high
venous blood 246 pressure water-spray systems
Venpet/Venoil collision 416 water-ring air pumps 155
ventilation watertight bulkheads, openings 212, 269–73
see also controlled ventilation watertight doors 54, 265–79, 314, 415
accomodation spaces 410 control 268, 270, 272
cargo pump-rooms 362 emergency power supply 282, 283, 290, 291
concrete buildings 110 engine rooms 275–6, 278
controllable 274–6, 275, 278, 410, 415, 421 four-main hydraulic system 269
ducts 321–2, 336 hand-operating gear 274
engine rooms 274–6, 275, 278, 415 history 265, 269
Scandinavian Star 53, 56–7, 278, 322 hydraulic 265, 267
smoke detector effects 225 log-book 279
SOLAS regulations 243–5 operational drills 279
ventilation systems power supply 271–2
cargo ships 343 problems 274
cargo spaces 327, 345–6 sliding 272
carriage of dangerous goods 351 SOLAS regulations 269–73
closing down 421 specifications 270–1
SOLAS regulations 321–2, 343 two-main hydraulic system 269
special category spaces 325 warning signals 273, 274
venting, cargo tanks 360–1 weapons 11–13
vertical zones see main vertical zones weather deck, SOLAS definition 143
vessel age Weir Pumps 156
engine room fires 36, 37 welding
significance 28, 29 Normandie 72, 74
vessel type piers 114
engine room fires 35 Seawise University 84, 86–7
fatalities 29, 30, 31 West, Charles 218
tonnage lost 31–2, 32, 34 Western Winner 65, 67
Vestals 1–2 see also British Trent/Western Winner collision
video imaging, fire detection 228 Wheatstone Bridge, gas detectors 222
Vikoma Sea-Pack 419 Whiddy Oil Terminal 91–3, 92
vinyl coverings, combustible 301 offshore jetty 91–3, 92
visual alarms 230 Chiksan towers 93, 98, 100
vital capacity 246 control room 97, 100, 101, 102
voice-energised telephones 256 disembarkation facilities 101

Index 20
Dolphins 91, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102
escape routes 99, 101
fire damage 102
fire-fighting equipment 91, 93
jetty crew 101–2
walkway 98, 100
stand-by tug 94, 97, 99, 101, 102
Wilson B. Keene 116, 117–18
wind, foam effects 365
windows
SOLAS regulations 322–3
tanker location 357
Winter, Sir William 14
Wood, A. E. H. 85
wood pulp 131, 347
wood-friction 2
wool, storage 110, 112
workshops, fire integrity 298
Wormald 193
Inergen 178
"Mulsispray" system 193, 194, 195
Visual Indicators 230
Zaandam Fire Brigade 113–14

Fire Aboard

A little fire is quickly trodden out,
Which being suffered, rivers cannot quench.
KING HENRY VI, Part 3 —Act iv, Scene viii

Rushbrook's
FIRE ABOARD
Third Edition
THE PROBLEMS OF
PREVENTION AND CONTROL IN
SHIPS, PORT INSTALLATIONS
AND OFFSHORE STRUCTURES
Frank Rushbrook, C.B.E., F.I.Fire.E, Consociate.I.Mar.E

Fire Consultant, Marine Specialist: latterly Firemaster Lothian and Borders Fire Brigade
Ex Chief Fire Officer, County Borough of East Ham Fire Brigade
Edited by
James F. Lygate B.Sc., M.Sc., Ph.D., A.R.I.C.S., A.I.Fire.E., M.I.F.S.
Principal Consultant, International Fire Investigators and Consultants, Glasgow, Scotland
BROWN, SON & FERGUSON, LIMITED

GLASGOW

Copyright in all countries signatory to the Berne Convention
all rights reserved
First Published 1961

Second Edition 1979
Copyright © by Frank Rushbrook
Third Edition 1998
ISBN 0 85174 659 4

Brown, Son & Ferguson, Ltd., Glasgow, G41 2SD
Made and printed in Scotland.

To my hated, but deeply respected, Enemy
FIRE
In whose Prevention, Detection and Swiftest Extinction
Much of my life has been spent

Frank Rushbrook whilst Firemaster of Lothian and Borders Fire Brigade

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
FRANK RUSHBROOK became a fireman in 1938 when, as a young ex-photographer who had
decided to make fire-fighting his career, he was posted to the Central Fire Station in Lauriston
Place, Edinburgh. Here he gained a solid foundation of experience at a large number of fires.
In December, 1941, he was promoted Section Leader and given command of a five-pump station
in the heart of the industrial and dock areas of Edinburgh, gaining experience in the management of
men, and as Officer-in-Charge at a wide variety of fires. In 1944, he was selected to attend the first
Long Course in Fire Prevention at the N.F.S. College at Brighton - the most comprehensive course
available to fire officers in Britain. On return to duty, he was promoted Company Officer, and
given the responsibility of re-organising the Fire Prevention Department for the South-Eastern area
of Scotland.
In 1948, Mr Rushbrook became Fire Prevention Officer with the Northumberland County Fire
Brigade; and three years later attained Divisional rank as Third Officer of the Leicester City Fire
Brigade - an appointment which gave him the opportunity of attending major fires in operational
command, and first-hand experience of the higher administration of a Fire Brigade.
In April, 1952, came promotion to Deputy Firemaster of the Lanarkshire County Fire Brigade;
and in 1954 appointment as Chief Fire Officer of the County Borough of East Ham, whose area
includes the famous "Royal" Group of London Docks.
It was in East Ham, by virtue of his experience in the Royal Docks, that he realised the crying
need for Merchant Navy personnel to receive training in order that they be prepared to tackle
shipboard fires and, in 1955, he started short fire courses for this purpose.
During his service in East Ham, Mr Rushbrook personally pioneered the Fire Brigade use of
under-water breathing apparatus; and a news story in The Times towards the end of July, 1959, told
the following tale: "While a badly listing ship at London Docks yesterday threatened to turn turtle,
Chief Officer Frank Rushbrook, of East Ham Fire Brigade, wearing a self-contained frogman's
outfit, dived to the flooded lower deck. By closing eight portholes he enabled the ship, the German
motor vessel Vogelsand, 1,262 tons, to be pumped out." The firefighters of East Ham Fire Brigade
formed the first Underwater Rescue Service in Britain.
In 1959, Mr Rushbrook returned to his home town to become Assistant Firemaster and shortly
after he assumed Command of the Edinburgh & South-East of Scotland Fire Brigade (now Lothian
& Borders Fire Brigade). One of his first tasks was to start planning an imaginative fire school for
the purpose of training Merchant Navy Officers in all aspects of shipboard fires and fire prevention.
To this end he designed a 'Ship on dry land' incorporating: engine room with dummy engines,
pumps, generators etc.; shaft tunnel with water-tight door and vertical escape trunk; galley; saloon;
10 cabins; hold with tweendeck; wireless room and bridge. A full sprinkler and MulsiSpray system
was installed by Messrs Mather & Platt of Manchester. The 'ship' was provided with a heating
system capable of bringing up the ambient temperature to over 90ºF, and a humidifier to produce
conditions synonymous with fire. From the start real fires and not smoke bombs were used during
training as many M.N. Officers' can confirm when they proudly show their burn scars but he was
convinced that only by feeling the heat and breathing the hot gases, could students have the type of
experience designed to equip them to tackle the real thing! This school has trained (and continues
to train) many thousands of officers from almost every shipping company in the United Kingdom,
vii
as well as many overseas countries. It operates on behalf of the British Shipping Federation and is
one of the official schools recognised by the Department of Trade and Industry.
Mr Rushbrook had a very distinguished career in the British Fire Service, including becoming
President of the Institution of Fire Engineers and culminating, in the 1970 New Year's Honours List,
by being awarded the insignia of Commander of the Order of the British Empire.
On completion of service, in April 1970, Mr Rushbrook retired from his Firemaster's post in
order to set up as a Fire Consultant. Since then he has become known widely throughout the world
as an authority on all matters pertaining to ship fires. He has appeared as an Expert Witness in
many parts of the world but mainly in the United States of America. Mr Rushbrook pioneered a
new concept of On-Board fire training and has personally trained the crews of 14 V.L.C.C.'s, during
ocean voyages. This type of training has also been carried out on oil-related structures including
pipelaying and trench digging barges. He was, for a number of years, consultant to Lloyd's Register
of Shipping and currently acted in this capacity for a number of shipping companies and
shipbuilders. In addition Mr Rushbrook has reported upon and worked on ships actually on fire in
many parts of the world.
As Firemaster, Mr Rushbrook initiated the establishment of the Department of Fire Safety
Engineering at the University of Edinburgh which was founded in 1973. He took a keen interest in
the running of the department and lectured on the Masters programme on the subject of ship fires. It
was there that he met Jim Lygate, whose progress as a Masters and Doctoral student he followed
with interest.
In 1990 Mr Rushbrook invited Jim Lygate to join him and establish the firm International Fire
Investigators and Consultants (IFIC) in which Mr Rushbrook continues to take a keen interest.
In 1995 an account of some of the more important ship fire cases in which Mr Rushbrook had
been involved was published by Lloyd's of London Press under the title Ship Fires and the Law
through the Eyes of a Firefighter.
viii
PREFACE
When I was a young fireman the fire which made the greatest impression on my mind was one
started in the engine-room of a merchant ship in Leith Docks in the early hours of a winter's
morning in 1940. It was a cold night and the doors of the engine room casing leading to the
engineers' quarters had been left open. So, when the fire started in oil fuel in the engine-room, it
spread almost immediately along the engineers' alleyway where it "mushroomed" along the entire
length, involving the bulkhead linings and cutting off all means of escape.
By the time the brigade arrived, and attempted to fight their way along the alleyway, men who
were trapped in the cabins, the portholes of which were too small to allow the occupants any hope
of escaping, could be heard screaming. This lasted for only a matter of seconds but it seemed to the
firefighters to be an eternity. The problem was that the flames were pouring out of the open casing
doors and it was not until the main fire could be subdued by jets played in through the skylights that
we were able to reach the cabins. Sadly, it was too late to save any of the men.
I resolved there and then to devote a part of my working life to the task of making ships safer
from the dreadful hazards of Fire Aboard. This book is, in large measure, the outcome of that
resolve.
Little did I think whilst writing the First Edition of FIRE ABOARD in the late 1950's that some
40 years later ship fires, especially passenger ships, would still be as vulnerable to fire. The
Scandinavian Star fire, on 7 April 1990, cost the lives of 158 passengers and crew — See Chapter 4
commencing Page 52. And, surprise, surprise, just as this book is on its final stage towards
publication yet another passenger/cruise ship is involved in a disastrous fire. Fortunately, in this
case no lives were lost. A brief account of this incident will have to suffice:
In the early hours of Saturday October 4 1997, whilst 60 miles off the southern coast
of Cyprus, fire started in the engine room of the 60 year old 10,500 tonne cruise liner
M/V Romantica. On board were 487 passengers and 186 members of crew. Clearly,
all attempts made to fight the fire failed and the ship had to be abandoned. Most of the
passengers and crew escaped by means of the ship's lifeboats but a number were
winched aboard RAF helicopters scrambled from Akrotiri. Fortunately this was
achieved without injury. A sister ship Princess Victoria successfully picked up all
occupants of the lifeboats. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary troop carrier Sir Tristian went to
the scene and offered fire-fighting assistance. The Romantica was built in Hamburg in
1939, having seen service as a hospital ship during the 1939/45 war. She would have
been built to conform to SOLAS 1929 which entered into force in 1933. Her maiden
voyage as a cruise ship was in August 1997.
Presumably, the vessel was fully in class but one wonders if she conformed to SOLAS
1974! The Secretary-General of the IMO, Mr William A. O'Neil, in a message produced
in connection with World Maritime Day 1991 made two observations which might well
have been written with this accident in mind:
1. "A glance at the annual statistics for losses at sea shows that people travelling on
ships with the worst record are 114 times more likely to be involved in an accident than
those on board ships from the country with the best. This is unacceptable."
2. "The danger is that if the improvement in the casualty rate that marked the 1980's is
halted in the 1990's many lives will be lost. In 1989 3.7 million people took their
vacation on a cruise liner; by the end of this century this figure is expected to grow to
ix
10 million a year. Yet in recent years there have been a number of accidents to
passenger ships which have resulted in the death of hundreds of people. Will 10 million
people really want to go to sea if they think that there is a serious risk of a fire on
board, or of the ship sinking and those responsible for safety are not doing anything to
improve the situation?"
Surely Mr O'Neil's comments represent a challenge to the Flag States and the Classification
Societies who undertake supervision of safety standards under SOLAS!
A ship can be likened to a village or even a small town in that it contains all the services
necessary to maintain life. Lighting, power, heating and ventilation, sewerage, water supplies,
communications, bakery, restaurant, police, fire brigade, doctor and lawyer, all these services must
be provided on board. Additionally, there is the main propulsion machinery and navigational
equipment required to get the ship safely across the oceans of the world. When fire strikes there is
no convenient dialling the emergency services and having the fire brigade in attendance within a
very few minutes. The crew is the fire brigade and they must be well trained and given good
equipment with which to tackle the outbreak.
Since the last Edition of FIRE ABOARD was published an entirely new situation has arisen. It
has become commonplace for charges to be laid against those in authority for failure to conform to
safety standards leading to loss of life or injury. Enforcement bodies, such as Classification
Societies, are now fairly regularly being involved in both criminal and civil actions. Within
companies — shipping companies included — even the highest echelons of management are not
immune from such criminal charges and there is no way in which they can abdicate their
responsibility. This change of attitude on the part of governments towards matters of safety should
certainly encourage owners and senior managers of all organisations responsible for conforming to
such to take an active interest in all aspects of safety, if only to protect their own personal interest.
At this point I should like to express my thanks to those who have assisted in the preparation of
this book. I am especially grateful to Dr Jim Lygate, Principal Consultant of International Fire
Investigators and Consultants, Rushbrook House, 220 Ayr Road, Glasgow, G46 6SR, UK. Jim, in
spite of being heavily committed in running a most successful fire consultancy business and
perforce spending a lot of time overseas on investigation of ship fires, agreed to tackle the onerous
task of Editorship and thus removing a great weight from my ageing shoulders. He has been a tower
of strength to me throughout the two years the book has been in preparation. His unrivalled
knowledge of fire science — in my opinion he is at the top of his profession — has been invaluable.
I am particularly impressed by the way Jim has prepared the statistical analysis and 'pie' charts
drawn from Appendix A and presented in Chapter 3. As author, I take all responsibility for the
contents of this book, any mistakes et al.
To Steve Brooker, IFIC's Senior Consultant, I would express my thanks for his contribution to
the content of Chapter 15 "Protection of Offshore Oil Structures". Steve has spent a number of years
as safety officer on several offshore oil production platforms. To the IFIC office staff, under the
capable hands of Mo Burkey, many thanks for their valuable work carrying out a lot of the necessary
duties associated with writing this technical book and doing endless proof reading.
Last but certainly not least my thanks are due to my publishers for their forbearance in the face
of an unavoidable delay in producing the manuscript and for advice received.
Frank Rushbrook
Edinburgh, March 1998
x
EDITOR'S REMARKS
It is in some ways a fitting tribute to Mr Rushbrook that these few words should be penned
somewhere over the Mediterranean at 35,000 feet whilst I am returning from investigating another
ship fire.
Until the Marquette, also known as the Asbestos Corporation case, not many fires aboard ships
were investigated by fire specialists, it being commonly regarded as a lost cause to sue a ship owner.
The Marquette changed all that.
I first met Mr Rushbrook when, as a Masters student in the Department of Fire Safety
Engineering at the University of Edinburgh, I attended his lectures on ship fires. I had of course
learned about this legend — he had been instrumental in establishing and obtaining the fundings for
the first chair of Fire Engineering anywhere in the world to which Professor David Rasbash was the
first and sadly, for the time being at least, the last occupant. That the Department of Fire Safety
Engineering did not grow and survive the swingeing cuts of the 1980s, is a real loss, one which he
feels keenly. Perhaps the new millennium will see a restoration of the fortunes of Fire Science in
Edinburgh.
At the end of his lecture, Mr Rushbrook recited a poem The Three Bears learned as a junior
officer whilst stationed at Lauriston Place Fire Station from the then Fire Force Commander W. B.
Muir. I have a sneaking suspicion he knew that Mr Rushbrook would one day fill his shoes. I have
heard him recite The Three Bears on many occasions encapsulating as it does so many lessons on
fire and explosion prevention! I can never hope to fill Mr Rushbrook's shoes — few modern
firefighters will ever fight as many fires as he has. He was on 24 hour duty not like the rota system
of today.
I have come by a different route to fire science engineering — from a family of chartered
surveyors — only to be captivated, enthralled and frightened by fire. I recall seeing the films of the
fires in the Joelma and San Andreas building in Sao Paulo, Brazil when an undergraduate and being
struck as one after another threw themselves to certain death from the sunshades of the San Andreas
building after the fire was out.
I recall the launch of the Second Edition of this book. Mr Rushbrook was invited to a dinner
held at the end of an external course run by the Department of Fire Safety Engineering and brought
a copy of Fire Aboard to present to the Department. I was present to receive the Graviner Sword as
the top Masters student of 1979. Little did I guess then that I would become the Editor of the next
Edition!
I got to know Mr Rushbrook a little better over the course of the next three years when I was
researching fires and explosions on offshore oil production platforms, after which another famous
name in the world of fire investigation, Dr J H Burgoyne, was my external examiner.
I toyed with the idea of asking Mr Rushbrook for a job when I finished my Doctorate but
chickened out. What could an experienced firefighter do with a young fire scientist? I accepted an
offer from YARD in Glasgow, a fine company of marine engineers.
When we met again eight years later I was less bashful. I enjoyed my period participating in the
family surveying practice. The skills of business management, report writing, negotiation and
xi
contract law: I learned from my father have proved invaluable. Sadly my father died before this
project came to fruition. But I yearned to return to fire science and fire investigation.
Mr Rushbrook invited me to join him and in 1991, with his support, the firm took the style
International Fire Investigators and Consultants. In the seven years since, we have proved the value
of the combined knowledge of the experienced firefighter and fire scientist. It is a pattern the firm
continues today having proved in practice the synergism that exists between the two.
What's new in the Third Edition?

This edition is a mix of the old and the new. Largely the technique of firefighting aboard ships
has remained the same. For instance, CO2 protection of holds is little changed. The 1980's have not
seen a dramatic increase in shipping and the fleet world-wide is ageing and not being replaced. The
firefighters and ships officers' are more likely to encounter 1970's than 1990's technology when it
comes to firefighting.
An important change is the resurgence of passenger vessels and we have tried to reflect this in
the Third Edition. It is interesting that the Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS) still requires
regular fire patrols to be conducted, even if a fully analogue addressable smoke and fire detection
system is fitted. Quite right too! One of the finest qualities of the human nose is its ability to detect
fire!
Chapter 3 is replaced with an analysis of ship fires embracing the period 1977 through 1996, it
draws upon the listing of major ship fires which now appears as an appendix to the book.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have been extended and updated: some older case studies have been replaced
by modern equivalents. Dr Trevor Kletz, CBE published a book entitled Lessons from Disaster
subtitled "How organisations have no memory and accidents recur". Even a casual glance at the
case studies should cause the reader to reflect how true this is. Chapter 7 — The Legal
Environment — is completely new and describes the framework of law that governs safety at sea.
The Third Edition continues the principle of reciting the "rules" applicable to the seafarers and
illustrating how they apply. Chapters 8 through 11 follow Chapter II-2 of SOLAS 1974, as at
September 1997. Chapters 12 to 14 are substantially unaltered but cognisance is taken of the ISM
code and it's implications on training.
Finally, I am grateful for the help of my Senior Consultants at IFIC: Mr S E Brooker and Dr F S
Ashmore for revising Chapter 15 which describes offshore fire protection.
Included with the book is a copy on CD ROM. This makes the information contained therein
portable. Personally, I travel with the NFPA codes, SAX's Dangerous Properties of Industrial
Materials, the US Coast Guards CHRIS System, Lloyds Rulefinder and THE GOOD BOOK on CD.
In book form these occupy about 4 feet of paper on my shelves - all this on five circles of plastic.
Now if they'd only make my laptop truly portable!
Mr Rushbrook has worked well into his 80's and continues to take an active interest in the firm. I
was once asked by a rather jaded colleague what kept him going. I answered that for him, fire was
his calling, his vocation and not just a job. I also regard fire as my calling and I think this is why we
have worked so well together — he the mentor, I the mentee.
It has been my good fortune to be trained by Frank Rushbrook and to co-operate with him in the
editing of the Third Edition, has been my privilege.
Dr James F Lygate
March 1998
xii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
Chapter 1. Fire-Fighting Through the Ages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 2. The Fighting of Fire in Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Chapter 3. Analysis of Trends in Ship Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Chapter 4. Some Major Disasters to Ships at Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Chapter 5. Some Major Disasters to Ships in Port . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Chapter 6. Some Major Disasters in Port Installations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Chapter 7. The Legal Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Chapter 8. Fire-Fighting Equipment Aboard Ship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Chapter 9. Other Requirements of SOLAS with a Bearing on Fire Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
Chapter 10. Fire Safety Aboard Passenger Vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
Chapter 11. Fire Safety Aboard Cargo Vessels and Tankers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
Chapter 12. The Training of Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 379
Chapter 13. Fire-Fighting in Ships in Port and at Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403
Chapter 14. The Problem of Impaired Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
Chapter 15. Fire Protection of Offshore Oil Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
Appendix A. Fire Incidents aboard Ships from 1800 to 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A1
Appendix B. List of IMO Resolutions, Circulars and Advisory Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B1
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index 1
xiii
LIST OF FIGURES AND GRAPHS
Page No.
FIGURE 1.1 Roman screw pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
FIGURE 1.2 Machine of Ctesibius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
FIGURE 1.3 A rope pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
FIGURE 1.4 Plans and profile of Mr Cole's pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
FIGURE 1.5 Chain pump in the USS Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
FIGURE 1.6 Taylor's rope operated pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
FIGURE 1.7 Joseph Bramah's rotary fire pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
FIGURE 1.8 A sixteenth century reciprocating rotary pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
FIGURE 1.9 The fire ship Firebrand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
FIGURE 1.10 A red-hot-shot carrier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
FIGURE 1.11 The twisted deck of the Noronic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
FIGURE 2.1 An early Greek sea-fight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
FIGURE 2.2 The Aeolipylic War-Dragon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
FIGURE 2.3 HMS Surinam after being struck by lightening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
FIGURE 2.4 The burning of the Ocean Monarch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
FIGURE 2.5 The burning of the Amazon off Portland Bill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
FIGURE 3.1 The "bathtub" reliability curve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
FIGURE 3.2 The sources of fires in engine rooms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
GRAPH 3.1 Severity of loss listed by number of casualties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
GRAPH 3.2 Severity of loss listed by tonnage affected. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
GRAPH 3.3 Change in fire incident rate by flag . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
GRAPH 3.4 Gross tonnage loss by fire 1977 to 1996. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
GRAPH 3.5 Gross tonnage loss by fire 1992 to 1996. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
GRAPH 3.6 Tonnage affected and lost listed by vessel age. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
GRAPH 3.7 Fatalities by vessel type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
GRAPH 3.8 Fatalities 1977 to 1996 listed by location sorted by vessel type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
GRAPH 3.9 Fatalities 1977 to 1996 listed by vessel type sorted by location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
GRAPH 3.10 Gross tonnage lost listed by vessel type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
GRAPH 3.11 Casualties listed by vessel type sorted by location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
GRAPH 3.12 Location of total and partial loss fire 1977 to 1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
GRAPH 3.13 Tonnage lost listed by location sorted by vessel type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
GRAPH 3.14 Tonnage lost listed by vessel type sorted by location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
GRAPH 3.15 Ship fires 1991 to 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
GRAPH 3.16 Engine room fires - degree of loss. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
GRAPH 3.17 Engine room fires - tow vs not towed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

List of Figures and Graphs
Page No.
GRAPH 3.18 Engine room fires - by vessel type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
GRAPH 3.19 Engine room fires - by vessel age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
GRAPH 3.20 Causes of engine room fires. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
GRAPH 3.21 Suppression System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
GRAPH 3.22 Supression system vs time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
GRAPH 3.23 Probability of extinguishing an engine room fire vs time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
FIGURE 4.1 The Morro Castle burning in the Atlantic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
FIGURE 4.2 The remains of the Seistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
FIGURE 4.3 The Meteor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
FIGURE 4.4 The SS Ryston Grange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
FIGURE 4.5 The MV Scandinavian Star . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
FIGURE 4.6 The point of origin of the fire on the Scandinavian Star . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
FIGURE 4.7 The starboard passageway aboard theScandinavian Star . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
FIGURE 4.8 Smoke deposition above a cabin door aboard theScandinavian Star . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
FIGURE 4.9 The fire doors on the car deck of theScandinavian Star . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
FIGURE 4.10 The directional signs aboard the Scandinavian Star . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
FIGURE 4.11 Damage to non combustible linings aboard theScandinavian Star . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
FIGURE 4.12 Fire fighting tugs tackling the fire aboard theBritish Trent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
FIGURE 4.13 The damage to the port bow of the Western Winner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
FIGURE 4.14 Fire damage to the main deck of the British Trent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
FIGURE 4.15 Damage to the port after quarter of theBritish Trent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
FIGURE 4.16 The hole in the British Trent's sheerstrake . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
FIGURE 5.1 Sketch of the Normandie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
FIGURE 5.2 The Normandie burning in New York Harbour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
FIGURE 5.3 The Empress of Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
FIGURE 5.4 The capsized hull of the Empress of Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
FIGURE 5.5 The Seawise University before she sank in Hong Kong Harbour. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
FIGURE 5.6 The fire damaged remains of the Greek ferryHeleanna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
FIGURE 5.7 A ship's hold after an explosion involving calcium hypochlorite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
FIGURE 5.8 Map of Bantry Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
FIGURE 5.9 Plan of Whiddy Island oil terminal, Bantry Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
FIGURE 5.10 Plan of the tanker jetty at Bantry Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
FIGURE 5.11 The Betelguese lying at the Whiddy Island tanker jetty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
FIGURE 5.12 The mid section of the Betelguese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
FIGURE 5.13 The initial and final positions of the Betelguese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
FIGURE 5.14 A trailer mounted foam gun on the Whiddy Island tanker jetty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
FIGURE 5.15 A hydrant on the Whiddy Island tanker jetty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
FIGURE 5.15 A fog nozzle attached to a hydrant on the Whiddy Island tanker jetty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
FIGURE 5.17 A badly distorted steel access ladder to the central platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
FIGURE 5.18 The breasting dolphins at the Whiddy Island tanker jetty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
FIGURE 5.19 A general view looking West of the Whiddy Island tanker jetty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
FIGURE 5.20 The West walkway of the Whiddy Island tanker jetty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
FIGURE 5.21 The control room and mess room of the Whiddy Island tanker jetty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
FIGURE 5.22 The north side of the central platform of the Whiddy Island tanker jetty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

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FIGURE 5.23 The control building on the central platform of the tanker jetty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
FIGURE 5.24 The charging points of the water main on Dolphin 22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
FIGURE 5.25 The spalling of concrete on Dolphin 22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
FIGURE 5.26 The "seabeck" quick release mooring gear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
FIGURE 5.27 The lifting barge at the tanker jetty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
FIGURE 6.1 Cold store warehouses well alight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
FIGURE 6.2 The Czaar Peter and Nederland Warehouses, Zaandam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
FIGURE 6.3 The Luckenbach Pier fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
FIGURE 6.4 The Texas City distaster area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
FIGURE 6.5 Plans of the Bombay docks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
FIGURE 7.1 The Shand Mason patent ship fire engine. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
FIGURE 7.2 Expansion of wood pulp aboard the Damodar Tanabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
FIGURE 7.3 Swollen bales of wood pulp in No 3 hold of the Damodar Tanabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
FIGURE 7.4 Damage to the steel webs caused by the expansion of wood pulp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
FIGURE 7.5 The fire damage in wood pulp aboard theDamodar Tanabe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
FIGURE 8.1 Cross section through a typical self priming fire pump. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
FIGURE 8.2 A typical emergency fire and bilge pump. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
FIGURE 8.3 A typical automatic self priming pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
FIGURE 8.4 Performance curve for a Drysdale MHS2 fire pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
FIGURE 8.5 Typical pump characteristic curve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
FIGURE 8.6 Sectional view through a typical water-ring air pump. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
FIGURE 8.7 Hydrants in shaft tunnels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
FIGURE 8.8 Angus "Duraline" fire hose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
FIGURE 8.9 Couplings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
FIGURE 8.10 The Arkon 1702 hand control branch. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
FIGURE 8.11 DESMI SL submersible pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
FIGURE 8.12 The Taylor Dunford's "Norsen" automatic hosereel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
FIGURE 8.13 The earliest form of carbon dioxide protection for ship's holds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
FIGURE 8.14 The operation of a typical fixed CO2 system for holds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
FIGURE 8.15 The expansion of carbon dioxide liquid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
FIGURE 8.16 A Walter Kidde fixed CO2 system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
FIGURE 8.17 The Walter Kidde bulkhead type smoke detecting cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
FIGURE 8.18 The Pyrene smoke detection cabinet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
FIGURE 8.19 Typical low pressure CO2 system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
FIGURE 8.20 The refrigeration console for a low pressure CO2 system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
FIGURE 8.21 Bulk CO2 storage tanks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
FIGURE 8.22a/b CO2 usage notices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
FIGURE 8.23 The detection and extinguishing installation on the MV Oti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
FIGURE 8.24 Cross section showing the inert gas system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
FIGURE 8.25 The Pyrene inert gas producer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
FIGURE 8.26 The R-burner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
FIGURE 8.27 The CO and O2 production from R-burner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
FIGURE 8.28 Inert gas generation room on the m.v Ondo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
FIGURE 8.29 An inert gas manifold . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

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FIGURE 8.30 The lamp "tree" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
FIGURE 8.31 Reduction in oxygen concentration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
FIGURE 8.32 Test lamps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
FIGURE 8.33 Water fire extinguishers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
FIGURE 8.34 Dry powder fire extinguishers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
FIGURE 8.35 Carbon dioxide fire extinguishers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
FIGURE 8.36 Foam fire extinguishers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
FIGURE 8.37 Wormald "Mulsispray" system for tankers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
FIGURE 8.38 Diagram of the Wormald "Mulsispray" system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
FIGURE 8.39 Diagram of the Wormald "Mulsispray" system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
FIGURE 8.40 Chubb foam system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
FIGURE 8.41 Details of Chubb mechanical foam installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
FIGURE 8.42 Pressurised Chubb mechanical foam installation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
FIGURE 8.43 Chubb pre-mix foam installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
FIGURE 8.44 Pressure vs height of water column. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
FIGURE 8.45 Positioning of back pressure valves on a sprinkler system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
FIGURE 8.46 Cross section through a typical non return or back pressure valve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
FIGURE 8.47 A typical Quartzoid sprinkler head . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
FIGURE 8.48 A typical automatic sprinkler and fire alarm system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
FIGURE 8.49 Typical installation control valves. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
FIGURE 8.50 Fire alarm indicator connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
FIGURE 8.51 A Chubb flammable gas sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
FIGURE 8.52 Wormald ultra violet flame detector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
FIGURE 8.53 Thorn infrared flame detector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
FIGURE 8.54 Ionisation detector operating principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
FIGURE 8.55 Apollo obscuration smoke detector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
FIGURE 8.56 The Notifier VIEW laser fire detector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
FIGURE 8.57 The Stratos high sensitiviity smoke detection system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
FIGURE 8.58 The ICAM fire tracer system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
FIGURE 8.59 Cartridge type heat detector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
FIGURE 8.60 Cerberus fibre optic linear heat detection cable. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
FIGURE 8.61 Autronica range of ship detectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
FIGURE 8.62 A selection of Wormald visual indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
FIGURE 8.63 Clifford and Snell "Yodalarm" sounders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
FIGURE 8.64 Schematic smoke detection and CO2 extinguishing system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
FIGURE 8.65 Photoelectric smoke detector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
FIGURE 8.66 Condensed oil mist detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
FIGURE 8.67 The Walter Kidde crankcase monitor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
FIGURE 8.68 Diagram of Kidde crankcase monitoring system on a typical five cylinder
engine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
FIGURE 8.69 QMI Limited machinery space detector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
FIGURE 8.70 A diesel generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
FIGURE 8.71 Cracked injector pipe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
FIGURE 8.72 Close up of crack in injector pipe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

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FIGURE 8.73 Injector pipe under test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
FIGURE 8.74 Siebe Gorman "Airmaster" apparatus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
FIGURE 8.75 "Airmaster" high pressure reducing valve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
FIGURE 8.76 "Airmaster" breathing apparatus locker. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
FIGURE 8.77 Trolley mounted breathing apparatus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
FIGURE 8.78 Diagram of trolley mounted breathing apparatus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
FIGURE 8.79 Dunlop high pressure air charging equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
FIGURE 8.80 Cut-away section of four stage reciprocating air compressor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
FIGURE 8.81 Standard BA control board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
FIGURE 8.82 International ship to shore connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
FIGURE 8.83 Fire control plan symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
FIGURE 8.84 Fire control plan symbols continued. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
FIGURE 9.1 The "Hyston" power operated water tight door . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
FIGURE 9.2 The layout of the "Hyston" water tight door . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
FIGURE 9.3 Stone's fire door control gear. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
FIGURE 9.4 The effect of smoke in a sealed engine room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
FIGURE 9.5 The effect of opening the engine room skylight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
FIGURE 9.6 Stone's hydraulic skylight control system. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
FIGURE 9.7 Typical electrical switchboard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
FIGURE 9.8 Typical German fuseboard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
FIGURE 10.1 Fire spread by conduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
FIGURE 10.2 Use of fire resisting linings to prevent fire spread. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
FIGURE 10.3 Cross section of typical passenger vessel showing "A" class bulkheads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
FIGURE 10.4 "A" and "B" class bulkheads and divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
FIGURE 10.5 Fire resisting bulkheads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
FIGURE 10.6 Cape marine board: "A" class divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
FIGURE 10.7 Cape marine board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
FIGURE 10.8 Decorative A60 boards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
FIGURE 10.9 Head and foot details of Cape marine board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
FIGURE 10.10 Cape marine board ceiling detail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
FIGURE 10.11 Installation of Cape marine board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
FIGURE 10.12 Cape lighweight marine system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
FIGURE 10.13 Typical wall details for Cape marine board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
FIGURE 10.14 Typical ceiling details for Cape marine board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
FIGURE 10.15 Details of "Durasteel" sheeting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
FIGURE 10.16 Navlite ceiling and deck structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
FIGURE 10.17 Navlite approved bulkhead construction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
FIGURE 10.18 Ship's accommodation following a fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
FIGURE 10.19 The use of photoluminescant markings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
FIGURE 11.1 Use of a lift shaft as a secondary means of escape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 342
FIGURE 11.2 Use of a thermal imaging camera to check for hot spots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
FIGURE 11.3 The seat of a wood pulp fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
FIGURE 11.4 Typical dangerous goods labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353
FIGURE 11.5 Typical dangerous goods labels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354

Page No.
FIGURE 11.6 Fire aboard the Megaborg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
FIGURE 11.7 Tug monitor throw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
FIGURE 11.8 Typical foam monitor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
FIGURE 11.9 A remote controlled foam jet monitor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
FIGURE 11.10 Peabody scrubber installed on an open deck. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
FIGURE 11.11 Isometric view of the Peabody circular scrubber. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372
FIGURE 11.12 Schematic arrangement of Peabody inert gas plant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
FIGURE 12.1 The ship at MacDonald Road Fire Station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
FIGURE 12.2 A merchant navy officer under training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
FIGURE 12.3 Plans of the ship at MacDonald Road Fire Station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
FIGURE 12.4 Crew's roll call and muster board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
FIGURE 13.1 Use of CO2 smothering gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408
FIGURE 13.2 Use of a "slung branch" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
FIGURE 13.3 Fire-fighting in a fore-peak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
FIGURE 13.4 An extended spindle system used to shut off valves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
FIGURE 14.1 Effect of water used for fire-fighting operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
FIGURE 14.2 Tendency to roll back . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
FIGURE 14.3 Tendency to roll over . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
FIGURE 14.4 Cross section of water ejector pump. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
FIGURE 14.5 Large capacity ejector pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
FIGURE 14.6 The Hughes mark 11 "Noble" ejector pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
FIGURE 14.7 Test results of five inch ejector pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
FIGURE 14.8 Performance table of ejector pumps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
FIGURE 14.9 Performance chart of Merryweather Aquator deep lift ejector pump. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 432
FIGURE 15.1 The Brent Bravo oil production platform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
FIGURE 15.2 A jackup platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
FIGURE 15.3 The drill floor on an oil production platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
FIGURE 15.4 A typical blow out preventer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
FIGURE 15.5 A typical flare stack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
FIGURE 15.6 The well head module of an oil production platform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434
FIGURE 15.7 A process module on an oil production platform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 434

RUSHBROOK - Fire Aboard Ship-3rdEd-1998

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Chapter One

Fire-Fighting Through the Ages

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the City had been destroyed and over 400

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even by today's standards! Its effect on the

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New Pump, Mr Coles Old Chain Pump

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A plan of Cole's pump fitted on the Grafton is

FIGURE 1.6 Taylor's rope-operated pump, 1780.

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FIGURE 1.7 Joseph Bramah's rotary fire pump.

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The Fighting of Fire in Ships

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Aspaltum, nepta, dragantum, pix quoque Greca;

Item: Sulphur, petroleum, colopho, resi, terebinthi,

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Magnus could make nothing out of these old

Vinesauf's description of a naval battle in 1190 also makes interesting reading:

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H.M.S. Mars: "Orders respecting Accidents by Fire"

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1727 June. H.M.S. Luxembourg

1758 May. Latitude 48 off Lisbon, H.M.S. Prince George, 80 guns

1763 February. Jamaica

1770. Bengal. India ship, Falmouth

An interesting account of an invention by a Mr D. Hartley, entitled Fire Plates, was published in

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ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN SHIP FIRES

Analysis of Major Ship Fires 1977 to 1996

Analysis of Major Ship Fires 1977 to 1996

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Change in Fire Incident Rate by Flag

Percentage of Worldwide Incidents

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Gross Tonnage Lost by Fire 1977 to 1996

Gross Tonnage Lost by Fire 1992 to 1996

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The Significance of Vessel Age

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Analysis of Major Ship Fires 1977 to 1996

Fatalities by Vessel Type

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Fatalities 1977 to 1996 listed by Location sorted by Vessel Type

Fatalities 1977 to 1996 listed by Vessel Type sorted by Location

Liquified Gas Tanker

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Tonnage Lost by Vessel Type

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Gross Tonnage Lost listed by Vessel Type