黑格尔（Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel）是一位德国哲学家，他的著作《精神现

象学》（Phenomenology of Spirit）被认为是现代哲学的里程碑。在这部作品中，黑格尔提
出了他的著名的“辩证法”（dialectic），其中包括他的三段论（thesis，antithesis，synthesis）
理论。这些理论对于理解现代社会和政治十分重要。
黑格尔的论文也对当今世界具有重要意义。他的理论帮助我们理解社会和政治的发
展过程。通过他的三段论，我们可以看到事物的发展是不断变化的，而不是静止不
变的。这对于我们把握当今世界的变化和发展具有重要意义。
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McTaggart,
John
McTaggart
Ellis,
1964
[1910],
A
Commentary
of
Hegel’s
Logic,
New
York:
Russell
and
Russell
Inc.
(This
edition
is
a
reissue
of
McTaggart’s
book,
which
was
first
published
in
1910.)
11.7k
views
Aristotle
was
the
first
philosopher
to
establish
categories.
He
set
up
the
following
ten
categories,
taking
clues
from
grammar:
Hegel
[6]
•
1.
The
Phenomenology
of
Spirit:
“Lordship
and
Bondage”
•
.-
Hegel
Talks
Funny!
•
Example:
•
“SELF-
CONSCIOUSNESS
has
before
it
another
self-
consciousness;
it
has
come
outside
itself.
This
has
a
double
significance.
•
“First
it
has
lost
its
own
self,
since
it
finds
itself
as
an
other
being;
•
secondly,
it
has
thereby
sublated
that
other,
for
it
does
not
regard
the
other
as
essentially
real,
but
sees
its
own
self
in
the
other.
•
“It
must
cancel
this
its
other.
To
do
so
is
the
sublation
of
that
first
double
meaning,
and
is
therefore
a
second
double
meaning.
First,
it
must
set
itself
to
sublate
the
other
independent
being,
in
order
thereby
to
become
certain
of
itself
as
true
being,
secondly,
it
thereupon
proceeds
to
sublate
its
own
self,
for
this
other
is
itself
...”
•
Can
sense
be
attached
to
these
odd
things?
None
7.9k
views
Karl
Marx
and
the
Young
Hegelians
strongly
criticized
that
perspective;
Hegel
had
over-
reached
in
his
abstract
conception
of
"absolute
Reason"
and
had
failed
to
notice
the
"real"—
i.e.
undesirable
and
irrational
–
life
conditions
of
the
proletariat.
Marx
inverted
Hegel's
idealist
dialectics
and
advanced
his
own
theory
of
dialectical
materialism,
arguing
that
"it
is
not
the
consciousness
of
men
that
determines
their
being,
but
that
their
social
being
that
determines
their
consciousness."[24]
Marx's
theory
follows
a
materialist
conception
of
history
and
geographic
space,[25]
where
the
development
of
the
productive
forces
is
the
primary
motive
force
for
historical
change.
The
social
and
material
contradictions
inherent
to
capitalism
lead
to
its
negation
–
thereby
replacing
capitalism
with
Communism,
a
new,
rational
form
of
society.[26]
All
credibility,
all
good
conscience,
all
evidence
of
truth
come
only
from
the
senses.
Friedrich
Wilhelm
Nietzsche.
Alyssa
Supple.
Leben.
Er
war
am
15.
Oktober
1844
geboren
Er
lebte
in
Röcken
bei
Lützen
(in
der
nähe
von
Leipzig).
Einfluss
auf
die
Philosophie.
Fourth,
later
concepts
both
determine
and
also
surpass
the
limits
or
finitude
of
earlier
concepts.
Earlier
determinations
sublate
themselves—they
pass
into
their
others
because
of
some
weakness,
one-
sidedness
or
restrictedness
in
their
own
definitions.
There
are
thus
limitations
in
each
of
the
determinations
that
lead
them
to
pass
into
their
opposites.
As
Hegel
says,
“that
is
what
everything
finite
is:
its
own
sublation”
(EL-
GSH
Remark
to
§81).
Later
determinations
define
the
finiteness of the earlier determinations. From the point of view of the concept of Being-for-itself, for
instance, the concept of a “something-other” is limited or finite: although the something-others are
supposed to be the same as one another, the character of their sameness (e.g., as apples) is captured
only
from
above, by the higher-level, more universal concept of Being-for-itself. Being-for-itself reveals the
limitations
of
the
concept of a “something-other”. It also rises above those limitations, since it can do something that
the
concept of a something-other cannot do. Dialectics thus allows us to get beyond the finite to the
universal. As Hegel puts it, “all genuine, nonexternal elevation above the finite is to be found in this
principle [of dialectics]” (EL-GSH Remark to §81). Stuttgart and, in 1788, he enrolled in the
Theological Seminary of Tubingen, where he If read carefully, Marx’s account of Hegel’s philosophy
is
fairly accurate. But his use of the word ‘synthesis’ has subsequently led to grave misunderstandings.
Magee typifies this erroneous view when he writes, “because the synthesis is a new situation it
contains new conflicts, and therefore becomes the beginning of a new triad of thesis, antithesis,
synthesis.” Not surprisingly, statements like this have puzzled people and contributed to the
exaggerated air of mystery surrounding Hegel’s thought. Are these new conflicts supposed to exist
within the synthesis? (And if so, why are they different from the original conflicts out of which it
was
formed?) Or does the synthesis constitute a new thesis, over against which its equal and opposite
antithesis must be formed? Both interpretations suggest a process which would carry on indefinitely,
a
waltz rhythm of: Hegel [15] • [question: What does all this about “realising its existence” mean??] •
A
note on talk about “realization”: • (1) people have hopes and dreams, which are sometimes realized,
sometimes not • (2) this implies that at time t, there’s an idea of how we want things to be, and • at
time t + n -- where n is some reasonably definite number - either those things have come about, or
not. If they have, we’re satisfied (maybe!); if not, not. • (3) but when it is claimed that it is, not our
hopes etc but our existence that is • “realized” - or not? - where is this pre-existing idea that can be
compared with how things turned out? • In Hegel, it’s nowhere! • No matter what happens, existence
is
“realized” • This is to say that - whatever happens, happens • Big deal! • [yet such talk has been very
popular at various times...] insight he offers aconception of two eras of art, the ‘artistic’ era and the
era of ‘aesthetic In Hegel’s other works, the moves from stage to stage are often driven, not only by
syntax and semantics—that is, by logic (given his account of logic)—but also by considerations that
grow out of the relevant subject matter. In the Phenomenology, for instance, the moves are driven by
syntax, semantics, and by phenomenological factors. Sometimes a move from one stage to the next
is
driven by a syntactic need—the need to stop an endless, back-and-forth process, for instance, or to
take a new path after all the current options have been exhausted (cf. section 5). Sometimes, a move
is
driven by the meaning of a concept, such as the concept of a “This” or “Thing”. And sometimes a
move is driven by a phenomenological need or necessity—by requirements of consciousness, or by
the
fact that the Phenomenology is about a consciousness that claims to be aware of (or to know)
something. The logic of the Phenomenology is thus a phenomeno-logic, or a logic driven by
logic—syntax and semantics—and by phenomenological considerations. Still, interpreters such as
Quentin Lauer have suggested that, for Hegel, Rosen, Michael, 1982, Hegel’s Dialectic and its
Criticism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Relation Categorical Judgment: S is P. The
Hegelian dialectical formula: A (thesis) versus B (anti-thesis) equals C (synthesis). For example: If
(A) my idea of freedom conflicts with (B) your idea of freedom then (C) neither of us can be free
until everyone agrees to be a slave. 210 Ethical Issues in HIV Vaccine Trials That is to say, argues the
Antithesis position, we must be prepared to insure: • that prospective volunteers will have full
information about (Prov. 8:13) Copyright © 2015 by Reg Harris. (Updated June, 2023.) All rights
reserved. Reproduction of this article or any part thereof in any form without the expressed written
permission of the author is strictly prohibited. Posting this article or any part thereof to the Internet
in
any form without the expressed written permission of the author is a violation of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act and strictly prohibited. For permission to use, please contact Reg Harris.
このページは30秒後にFC2ホームページのトップページにジャンプします。 22,127 views • 7 upvotes
•
Made by tonyvenuti 3 years ago in politics Since One and Many have been exhausted, the next
stage, Ratio, must, necessarily, employ a different strategy to grasp the elements in play. Just as
Being-for-itself is a concept of universality for Quality and captures the character of a set of
something-others in its content (see section 1), so Ratio (the whole rectangle with rounded corners)
is
a
concept of universality for Quantity and captures the character of a set of quantities in its content
(EL §105–6; cf. Maybee 2009, xviii–xix, 95–7). In another version of syntactic necessity driven by
exhaustion, the dialectical development will take account of every aspect or layer, so to speak, of a
concept or form—as we saw in the stages of Purpose outlined above, for instance (section 2). Once
all
the
aspects or layers of a concept or form have been taken account of and so exhausted, the dialectical
development
must
also, necessarily, employ a different strategy in the next stage to grasp the elements in play. Lauer,
Quentin, 1976, A Reading of Hegel’s “Phenomenology of Spirit”, New York: Fordham University
Press. Hegel [45] • [According to Alan Patten] (a professor of politics at Princeton) • 1. Hegel’s state
is
a
“constitutional monarchy” with a powerful civil service and a bicameral legislature... • the idea is to
ensure that those with superior knowledge and virtue occupy key positions of power • cvil service
selected on merit • thoroughly trained and socialized • “into a knowledge of and commitment to the
universal” • with checks against corruptions etc.. • 2. “The claim that the Hegelian state is a necessary
part of this structure • amounts to the proposition that the • (a) ties of sentiment and affections
[family] and of [thesis?] • (b) mutual advantage and collegiality (civil society) [antithesis?] • are not
sufficient to guarantee that people will accept the sacrifices and burdens needed to support a
freedom-developing institutional structure” • So they require (c) - The State (again, the synthesis?) •
“Mutual advantage ... can have tremendous integrative effects within the • context of an established
market economy, but it is much less able to support the background norms, rules, and institutions that
make such an economy possible in the first place.” [Patten, not Hegel, but summarizing Hegel] © The
Book of Threes 2024 Caspar david friedrich. By: Jaina, Madison, and Nimi. About friedrich.
Friedrich
was
among the first to depict the Romantic transcendental landscape Landscapes were temples: his
painting were altarpieces [PR], Elements of the Philosophy of Right [Philosophie des Rechts], edited
by Allen W. Wood and translated by H.B. Nisbet, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
The
Frankfort School reformulated dialectics into a concrete method of investigation, derived from the
Hegelian philosophy that an idea will pass over into its own negation, as the result of conflict
between the inherently contradictory aspects of the idea.[20] In opposition to previous modes of
reasoning, which viewed things in abstraction, each by itself and as though endowed with fixed
properties, Hegelian dialectics considers ideas according to their movement and change in time,
according to their interrelations and interactions.[20] 59.2k views
reasoning,
where
thesis
and
antithesis
are
com
bined
into
a
synthesis,
is
a
potentially
useful
framework
to
help
managers
tackle
paradox
without
having
to
subdue
any
of
the
contradictory
goals
it
Mueller
-
The
Hegel
Legend
of
Thesis-
Antithesis-
Synthesis
by
nachin111
Fig.
10-
9.
Outer
Developmental
Four-
Position
Base
Natural
Order
Thesis
Antithesis
and
Synthesis
in
Human.
reasoning,
where
thesis
and
antithesis
are
com
bined
into
a
synthesis,
is
a
potentially
useful
framework
to
help
managers
tackle
paradox
without
having
to
subdue
any
of
the
contradictory
goals
it,
Marx
and
Mill
Thesis,
Antithesis,
Synthesis
“A
spectre
is
haunting
Europe,
the
spectre
of
Communism”1
wrote
Karl
Marx
in
1848
on
the
eve
of
the
European
Revolutions..
Likewise,
reason
proceeds
with
thinking
freely,
but
thinking
is
made
with
certain
forms,
which
are
under
the
influence
of
the
images
of
form.
Kant’s
sorts
of
antinomies
(cf.
section
3
above)
or
contradictions
more
generally
are
therefore,
as
Hegel
puts
it
in
one
place,
“in
all
objects
of
all
kinds,
in
all
representations,
concepts
and
ideas”
(EL-
GSH
Remark
to
§48).
Hegel
thus
seems
to
reject,
as
he
himself
explicitly
claims
(SL-
M
439–40;
SL-
dG
381–82),
the
law
of
non-
contradiction,
which
is
a
fundamental
principle
of
formal
logic—the
classical,
Aristotelian
logic
(see
entries
on
Aristotle’s
Logic
and
Contradiction)
that
dominated
during
Hegel’s
lifetime
as
well
as
the
dominant
systems
of
symbolic
logic
today
(cf.
Priest
1989:
391;
Düsing
2010:
97–103).
According
to
the
law
of
non-
contradiction,
something
cannot
be
both
true
and
false
at
the
same
time
or,
put
another
way,
“x”
and
“not-
x”
cannot
both
be
true
at
the
same
time.
juvenile
theological
writings.
In
1801,
he
entered
the
University
of
Jena,
called
by
Aristotle
was
the
first
philosopher
to
establish
categories.
He
set
up
the
following
ten
categories,
taking
clues
from
grammar:
HEGEL
THESIS
ANTITHESIS
SYNTHESIS
PDF
PRIMROSE
Here,
of
the
three
concepts
("Socrates,"
"man"
and
"mortal"),
"mortal"
has
the
greatest
extension;
therefore,
it
is
called
the
"major
term."
Next,
"Socrates"
has
the
smallest
in
extension;
therefore,
it
is
called
the
"minor
term."
The
extension
of
"man"
is
between
the
two;
therefore,
it
is
called
the
"middle
term."
If
we
label
the
major
term
as
P,
the
minor
term
as
S,
and
the
middle
term
as
M,
the
above
example
can
be
indicated
as:
German
idealist
philosopher,
leading
figure
of
Western
philosophy;
He
was
born
in
Not
only
the
structure
of
human
logic,
but
also
the
structure
of
human
cognition
and
the
structure
of
existence
of
all
things
are
based
on
the
structure
of
the
Original
Image.
Furthermore,
the
structure
of
the
way
in
which
the
human
being
acts
in
relationship
to
the
natural
world,
that
is,
the
structure
of
the
exercise
of
dominion
over
all
things,
is
also
based
on
the
structure
of
the
Original
Image,
as
explained
in
the
formation
of
the
outer
four-
position
base
in
the
"Theory
of
the
Original
Image."
In
this
way,
the
logical
structure,
the
cognitive
structure,
the
structure
of
existence,
and
the
structure
of
dominion
are
all
based
on
the
structure
of
the
Original
Image.
It
is
only
natural,
then,
that
we
find
mutual
relationships
among
these
structures.
This
means
that
logic
has
something
to
do
with
epistemology,
with
ontology,
and
with
the
practical
aspects
of
education,
ethics,
and
so
forth.
Thus,
one
of
the
basic
postulates
of
Unification
Logic
is
that
it
is
connected
with
various
other
fields
(Fig.
10-
7).
The
Law
of
Identity
can
be
expressed
by
the
form
"A
is
A,"
as
in
the
statement, "a flower is a flower." This implies that, in spite of changes in phenomena, the substance
of
the
flower remains unchanging. This also implies identity in thinking itself That is to say, the concept of
"flower" has one and the same meaning in every case. Furthermore, this principle can also imply that
two concepts are in agreement, as in the statement, "a bird is an animal." For the concept of Being,
for example, its moment of understanding is its moment of stability, in which it is asserted to be pure
presence. This determination is one-sided or restricted however, because, as we saw, it ignores
another
aspect of Being’s definition, namely, that Being has no content or determination, which is how Being
is
defined in its dialectical moment. Being thus sublates itself because the one-sidedness of its moment
of
understanding undermines that determination and leads to the definition it has in the dialectical
moment. The speculative moment draws out the implications of these moments: it asserts that Being
(as pure presence) implies nothing. It is also the “unity of the determinations in their comparison
[Entgegensetzung]” (EL §82; alternative translation): since it captures a process from one to the
other, it includes Being’s moment of understanding (as pure presence) and dialectical moment (as
nothing or undetermined), but also compares those two determinations, or sets (-setzen) them up
against (-gegen) each other. It even puts Being into a new state (as the prefix ent- suggests) because
the
next concept, Nothing, will sublate (cancel and preserve) Being. Figuratively speaking, the sensory
center (sensibility) corresponds to the entrance of a house; the parietal association area
(understanding) corresponds to the reception room; and the frontal association area (reason)
corresponds to the living room or study. When informed of the visit of a guest, the host receives the
guest in the reception room. At that point, the host tries to understand what the guest says while
meeting the guest face to face. At this time, the host is not in a position to think freely about just
anything he chooses, because his thinking is shaped by his conversation with the guest. This can be
compared to the stage of understanding. Karl Marx and the Young Hegelians strongly criticized that
perspective; Hegel had over-reached in his abstract conception of "absolute Reason" and had failed
to
notice the "real"— i.e. undesirable and irrational – life conditions of the proletariat. Marx inverted
Hegel's idealist dialectics and advanced his own theory of dialectical materialism, arguing that "it is
not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but that their social being that determines
their consciousness."[24] Marx's theory follows a materialist conception of history and geographic
space,[25] where the development of the productive forces is the primary motive force for historical
change. The social and material contradictions inherent to capitalism lead to its negation – thereby
replacing capitalism with Communism, a new, rational form of society.[26] Note that, although Hegel
acknowledged that his dialectical method was part of a philosophical tradition stretching back to
Plato, he criticized Plato’s version of dialectics. He argued that Plato’s dialectics deals only with
limited philosophical claims and is unable to get beyond skepticism or nothingness (SL-M 55–6; SL-
dG
34–5; PR, Remark to §31). According to the logic of a traditional reductio ad absurdum argument, if
the
premises of an argument lead to a contradiction, we must conclude that the premises are
false—which leaves us with no premises or with nothing. We must then wait around for new
premises to spring up arbitrarily from somewhere else, and then see whether those new premises put
us back into nothingness or emptiness once again, if they, too, lead to a contradiction. Because Hegel
believed that reason necessarily generates contradictions, as we will see, he thought new premises
will indeed produce further contradictions. As he puts the argument, then, Hegel grasped the
development of Idea as the dialectical development of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. The Idea alienates
itself and becomes nature; and later, by becoming spirit through humankind, it recovers itself.
According
to
Hans Leisegang, this way of thinking is unique to Hegel, and is based on his study of the Bible.
Specifically, Hegel's philosophy of opposition, which is transcended by a higher synthesis, is said to
be
based
on
the
theme of certain passages from the Gospel according to John, such as "Unless a grain of wheat falls
into
the
earth and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies, it bears much fruit," and "I am the resurrection and the
life; he who believes in me, though lie dies, yet shall lie live." 14 From this position, Hegel conceived
of
God as Logos, or Idea, and held that God manifests Himself in the external world just as the life of
a
seed sown on the earth manifests itself in the outside. Here lies the fundamental cause of Hegel's
errors. Trivium & Quadrivium The Trivium The three elementary subjects of literary e... The Law of
Contradiction can be expressed by the form "A is not not-A." It can be regarded as the Principle of
Identity
stated in reverse. In saying that "a flower is not not-flower," one is actually saying that "a flower is a
flower." Likewise, in saying that "a bird is not other than an animal," one is actually saying that "a
bird is an animal." One is an affirmative way of expression, and the other is a negative way of
expression, but the content is the same. HEGEL. George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Born Stuttgart,
Germany (Where Porsches are born too!) in 1770. Studies theology at Tubingen Univ. Professor at
Heidelberg. Hegel’s Main Ideas. In a similar way, Hegel’s answer to Kant is that we can get out of
our heads to see what the world is like in itself—and hence can have knowledge of the world in
itself—because the very same rationality or reason that is in our heads is in the world itself. As Hegel
apparently put it in a lecture, the opposition or antithesis between the subjective and objective
disappears by saying, as the Ancients did, Bradenhalterman.net - All Rights Reserved. Hegel first
explained
the
development of Being-Nothing-Becoming in the world of Idea. Since Being as it is has no
development, lie thought of Nothing as something to be opposed to Being. Then, as the unity of the
opposition between Being and Nothing, Becoming comes into being, he held. There is a problem in
this
view, however. For Hegel, Nothing originally is merely an interpretation of Being, and Being and
Nothing are not separated. 12 However, Hegel separated Being and Nothing, and explained as if
Being and Nothing were opposed to each other. [PhG], Phenomenology of Spirit [Phänomenologie
des Geistes]. Because the translations of PhG listed below use the same section numbers, citations
simply to “PhG” refer to either translation. If the phrasing in English is unique to a specific
translation, the translator’s initial is added. In Hegel’s other works, the moves from stage to stage are
often driven, not only by syntax and semantics—that is, by logic (given his account of logic)—but
also
by
considerations that grow out of the relevant subject matter. In the Phenomenology, for instance, the
moves are driven by syntax, semantics, and by phenomenological factors. Sometimes a move from
one
stage to the next is driven by a syntactic need—the need to stop an endless, back-and-forth process,
for instance, or to take a new path after all the current options have been exhausted (cf. section 5).
Sometimes, a move is driven by the meaning of a concept, such as the concept of a “This” or
“Thing”. And sometimes a move is driven by a phenomenological need or necessity—by
requirements of consciousness, or by the fact that the Phenomenology is about a consciousness that
claims
to
be
aware of (or to know) something. The logic of the Phenomenology is thus a phenomeno-logic, or a
logic
driven by logic—syntax and semantics—and by phenomenological considerations. Still, interpreters
such as Quentin Lauer have suggested that, for Hegel,
Although
the
speculative
moment
negates
the
contradiction,
it
is
a
determinate
or
defined
nothingness
because
it
is
the
result
of
a
specific
process.
There
is
something
particular
about
the
determination
in
the
moment
of
understanding—a
specific
weakness,
or
some
specific
aspect
that
was
ignored
in
its
one-
sidedness
or
restrictedness—that
leads
it
to
fall
apart
in
the
dialectical
moment.
The
speculative
moment
has
a
definition,
determination
or
content
because
it
grows
out
of
and
unifies
the
particular
character
of
those
earlier
determinations,
or
is
“a
unity
of
distinct
determinations”
(EL
Remark
to
§82).
The
speculative
moment
is
thus
“truly
not
empty,
abstract
nothing,
but
the
negation
of
certain
determinations”
(EL-
GSH
§82).
When
the
result
“is
taken
as
the
result
of
that
from
which
it
emerges”,
Hegel
says,
then
it
is
“in
fact,
the
true
result;
in
that
case
it
is
itself
a
determinate
nothingness,
one
which
has
a
content”
(PhG-
M
§79).
As
he
also
puts
it,
“the
result
is
conceived
as
it
is
in
truth,
namely,
as
a
determinate
negation
[bestimmte
Negation];
a
new
form
has
thereby
immediately
arisen”
(PhG-
M
§79).
Or,
as
he
says,
“[b]ecause
the
result,
the
negation,
is
a
determinate
negation
[bestimmte
Negation],
it
has
a
content”
(SL-
dG
33;
cf.
SL-
M
54).
Hegel’s
claim
in
both
the
Phenomenology
and
the
Science
of
Logic
that
his
philosophy
relies
on
a
process
of
“determinate
negation
[bestimmte
Negation]”
has
sometimes
led
scholars
to
describe
his
dialectics
as
a
method
or
doctrine
of
“determinate
negation”
(see
entry
on
Hegel,
section
on
Science
of
Logic;
cf.
Rosen
1982:
30;
Stewart
1996,
2000:
41–3;
Winfield
1990:
56).
At
a
pinch,
we
could
call
these
three
Positions
the
thesis,
antithesis
and
synthesis.
But
the
third
position
is
not
a
combination
of
the
first
two,
but
a
focus
on
the
relation
between
them.
It
is
therefore
(at
a
lowly
level)
analogous
to
the
Hegelian
relational
category
of
‘Spirit’.
And,
far
from
resolving
the
conflict,
the
‘synthesis’
proves
just
as
unsatisfactory
as
the
previous
approaches,
forcing
the
thinker
to
reconsider
the
whole
way
of
posing
the
problem,
using
a
new
set
of
concepts
which
will
move
the
discussion
to
a
higher
level
and
create
the
second
triad
in
the
book’s
structured
progress.
And
the
third
term
of
the
first
triad
isnot
the
first
term
of
the
second
triad,
which
is
already
posed
within
the
new
conceptual
schema.
Hegel
[29]
•
[here’s
one
idea
to
consider
(cribbed
from
Allen
Patten):
•
“To
be
free,
I
must
stand
back
from
the
given
command
or
impulse
and
reflect
on
whether
it
constitutes
a
sufficient
reason
to
act
in
some
particular
way”
•
[note:
that
is
obviously
not
true
so
far
as
social
affairs
are
concerned,
as
we
usually
think
about
it.
What
we
think
is
that
if
nobody
stops
you
from
doing
some
fool
thing,
then
you
are
free
to
do
it...]
•
[There’s
the
question
whether
one’s
own
impulses,
etc.,
can
be
said
to
“constrain”
us.]
•
Can
what
we
want
be
an
obstacle
to
doing
what
we
want?
•
[acting
on
some
wants
can
certainly
prevent
others
from
being
fulfilled,
yes.
•
The
idea
has
to
be
that
we
count
some
wants
as
more
important
than
others.
•
But
even
so,
it
seems
that
we
can
still
act
on
the
less
important
ones.
(no?)
•
Then,
what
measures
importance?
-
-
an
interesting
question.
•
There’s
how
much
you
want
to,
ex
ante;
and
how
much
you
like
it
when
you
get
it,
ex
post!
•
-
whether
you’re
better
off
from
doing
what
you
want
is
another
question.
Mueller
-
The
Hegel
Legend
of
Thesis-
Antithesis-
Synthesis
by
nachin111
Thesis/
Antithesis/
Synthesis
Structure
in
Presentations
and
Papers
All
presentations
and
papers
in
CISC
497
are
expected
to
address
the
social,
ethical
and
legal
issues
of
a
topic
using
the
thesis,
antithesis,
synthesis
framework
of
dialectical
reasoning.
Dialectical
reasoning
is
a
method
of
reasoning
in
which
one
starts
with
a
thesis
and
develops
a
contradictory
antithesis,
both
with
I
admit
that
what
the
OP
is
suggesting
is
possible,
I
just
don't
think
it
is
a
guaranteed
outcome.
Totally
defunded
police
departments
nationwide?
All
15,400
of
them?
The
cities
perhaps,
but
rural
locations
are
unlikely
to
allow
it,
funding
depts
themselves
if
need
be.
And
I
think
that
you
are
more
likely
to
local
militias
than
UN.
Also,
the
thesis
and
antithesis
do
not
seem
contradictory
to
me.
Rather
than
contradicting,
the
former
would
seem
to
justify
the
latter
-
-
according
to
the
progressive
left
extremists.
Georg
Friedrich
Händel.
En
presentation
av
Lisa
K,
Mathilda,
Nathalie,
Rachel
och
Rebecka
L.
23
februari
1685.
Halle,
Tyskland.
Musikalisk
Talang.
Johann
Sebastian
Bach,
Domenico
Scarlatti.
Harmonilära.
Tidens
kompositionsstil.
Juridik,
1702.
Almira
och
Nero,
1705.
The
three
fundamental
stages
of
Hegel’s
dialectic
are
defined
as
the
formulation
of
a
thesis,
an
antithesis
and
the
overall
resolution
between
the
conflicting
sides
merging
into
a
synthesis
(Magee,
2010).
For
clarification
purposes,
let’s
pretend
a
Hegelian
dialectic
example
of
a
smoker
and
a
nonsmoker.
The
smoker
can
formulate
his
or
her
thesis
statement
by
presenting
the
fact
that
the
Hegel
(1770-
1831
A.D.)
sees
the
dialectic
as
an
assertion
(thesis)
which
meets
its
contradiction
or
negation
(antithesis)
and
the
tension
between
these
opposites
is
resolved
by
absorption
into
a
synthesis.
Fifth,
because
the
determination
in
the
speculative
moment
grasps
the
unity
of
the
first
two
moments,
Hegel’s
dialectical
method
leads
to
concepts
or
forms
that
are
increasingly
comprehensive
and
universal.
As
Hegel
puts
it,
the
result
of
the
dialectical
process
For
over
fifty
years,
Hegel
interpreters
have
rejected
the
previous
trust
that
Hegel
used
thesis-
antithesis-
synthesis
dialectics.
during
this
incisive
research
of
Hegel's
philosophy,
Leonard
F.
Wheat
exhibits
that
the
fashionable
interpretation
is
fake.
Mueller
-
The
Hegel
Legend
of
Thesis-
Antithesis-
Synthesis
by
nachin111
phenomeno-
logy
is
a
logic
of
appearing,
a
logic
of
implication,
like
any
other
logic,
even
though
not
of
the
formal
entailment
with
which
logicians
and
mathematicians
are
familiar.
(Lauer
1976:
3)
Hegel’s
description
of
the
development
of
Purpose
does
not
seem
to
fit
the
textbook
Being-
Nothing-
Becoming
example
or
the
thesis-
antithesis-
synthesis
model.
According
to
the
example
and
model,
Abstract
Purpose
would
be
the
moment
of
understanding
or
thesis,
Finite
Purpose
would
be
the
dialectical
moment
or
antithesis,
and
Realized
Purpose
would
be
the
speculative
moment
or
synthesis.
Although
Finite
Purpose
has
a
different
determination
from
Abstract
Purpose
(it
refines
the
definition
of
Abstract
Purpose),
it
is
hard
to
see
how
it
would
qualify
as
strictly
“opposed”
to
or
as
the
“antithesis”
of
Abstract
Purpose
in
the
way
that
Nothing
is
opposed
to
or
is
the
antithesis
of
Being.
occupation
of
Bohemia
and
Moravia.
He
was
forced
to
leave
his
job
at
the
university
How
did
Hegel
respond
to
Kant’s
skepticism—especially
since
Hegel
accepted
Kant’s
Copernican
revolution,
or
Kant’s
claim
that
we
have
knowledge
of
the
world
because
of
what
we
are
like,
because
of
our
reason?
How,
for Hegel, can we get out of our heads to see the world as it is in itself? Hegel’s answer is very close
to
the
ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle’s response to Plato. Plato argued that we have knowledge of the
world
only through the Forms. The Forms are perfectly universal, rational concepts or ideas. Because the
world
is
imperfect, however, Plato exiled the Forms to their own realm. Although things in the world get
their definitions by participating in the Forms, those things are, at best, imperfect copies of the
universal Forms (see, e.g., Parmenides 131–135a). The Forms are therefore not in this world, but in a
separate realm of their own. Aristotle argued, however, that the world is knowable not because things
in
the
world
are
imperfect copies of the Forms, but because the Forms are in things themselves as the defining
essences of those things (see, e.g., De Anima [On the Soul], Book I, Chapter 1 [403a26–403b18];
Metaphysics, Book VII, Chapter 6 [1031b6–1032a5] and Chapter 8 [1033b20–1034a8]). Next is the
theory concerning Essence. Hegel's logic moves from Essence to Appearance, and from Appearance
to
Actuality. Then comes the theory concerning the Notion. Notion moves from subjective Notion to
Objective Notion, and from Objective Notion to the Idea. Within the Idea, there are three stages,
namely,
Life, Cognition, and the Absolute Idea. The Absolute Idea is the final destination in the development
within
logic. If Hegel’s account of dialectics is a general description of the life of each concept or form,
then
any
section
can
include as many or as few stages as the development requires. Instead of trying to squeeze the stages
into
a
triadic form (cf. Solomon 1983: 22)—a technique Hegel himself rejects (PhG §50; cf. section
3)—we can see the process as driven by each determination on its own account: what it succeeds in
grasping (which allows it to be stable, for a moment of understanding), what it fails to grasp or
capture (in its dialectical moment), and how it leads (in its speculative moment) to a new concept or
form
that
tries to correct for the one-sidedness of the moment of understanding. This sort of process might
reveal a kind of argument that, as Hegel had promised, might produce a comprehensive and
exhaustive exploration of every concept, form or determination in each subject matter, as well as
raise dialectics above a haphazard analysis of various philosophical views to the level of a genuine
science. –––, 2013, The Open Society and its Enemies, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (This
is
a
one-
volume republication of the original, two-volume edition first published by Princeton University
Press in 1945.) このページは 30秒後にFC2ホームページのトップページにジャンプします。 Priest,
Graham, 1985, “Inconsistencies in Motion”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 22(4): 339–346. An
assertion
of
something
about
a
certain
object is called a Judgment." Logically, a judgment is an affirmation or denial of a relation among
certain
concepts. When expressed in language, a judgment is called a proposition. Kant thought Hume’s
argument led to an unacceptable, skeptical conclusion, and he rejected Hume’s own solution to the
skepticism (see Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, B5, B19–20). Hume suggested that our idea of
causal necessity is grounded merely in custom or habit, since it is generated by our own imaginations
after repeated observations of one sort of event following another sort of event (see Hume’s A
Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Section VI; Hegel also rejected Hume’s solution, see EL §39).
For
Kant, science and knowledge should be grounded in reason, and he proposed a solution that aimed
to
reestablish the connection between reason and knowledge that was broken by Hume’s skeptical
argument. Kant’s solution involved proposing a Copernican revolution in philosophy (Critique of
Pure Reason, Bxvi). Nicholas Copernicus was the Polish astronomer who said that the earth revolves
around the sun, rather than the other way around. Kant proposed a similar solution to Hume’s
skepticism. Naïve science assumes that our knowledge revolves around what the world is like, but,
Hume’s criticism argued, this view entails that we cannot then have knowledge of scientific causes
through reason. We can reestablish a connection between reason and knowledge, however, Kant
suggested, if we say—not that knowledge revolves around what the world is like—but that
knowledge
revolves around what we are like. For the purposes of our knowledge, Kant said, we do not revolve
around the world—the world revolves around us. Because we are rational creatures, we share a
cognitive structure with one another that regularizes our experiences of the world. This
intersubjectively shared structure of rationality—and not the world itself—grounds our knowledge.
Other scholars have defined the necessity of Hegel’s dialectics in terms of a transcendental
argument. A transcendental argument begins with uncontroversial facts of experience and tries to
show that other conditions must be present—or are necessary—for those facts to be possible. Jon
Stewart
argues, for instance, that “Hegel’s dialectic in the Phenomenology is a transcendental account” in
this
sense, and thus has the necessity of that form of argument (Stewart 2000: 23; cf. Taylor 1975: 97,
226–7; for a critique of this view, see Pinkard 1988: 7, 15). Since the “Absolute” concepts for each
subject matter lead into one another, when they are taken together, they constitute Hegel’s entire
philosophical system, which, as Hegel says, “presents itself therefore as a circle of circles” (EL-GSH
§15). We can picture the entire system like this (cf. Maybee 2009: 29): In terms of cerebral
physiology, as was explained in the chapter on Epistemology, it is considered that the sensory stage
of
thinking takes place in the sensory center; the understanding stage, in the parietal association area;
and
the
rational stage, in the frontal association area. The latest II survey data also showed the bull-bear
spread to have fallen to a new low for 2015: This syllogism makes the mistake of the minor term
being
unduly distributed (the fallacy of illicit minor); still such inductive inferences are possible in natural
science because of the "principle of uniformity in nature" and the "law of causality." The former
means that all phenomena in the natural world have the same form, and the latter means that there
are
always cause and effect in natural phenomena. Dialektika Hegel (Thesis, AntiThesis, Sintesis)
Dialektika Hegel saya rasa cukup dikenal di kalangan para pecinta Ilmu ilmu sosial. Sebagai sebuah
doktrin yang cukup mampu bertahan dan diikuti oleh banyak orang dialektika Hegel ibarat sebuah
teori Newton yang diamini dan dianggukki oleh sosiolog maupun pemerhati sosial yang lainnya. It is
painfully evident that Popper did not understand Hegel except at the most superficial level. Any time
someone uses the terminology of "thesis, antithesis, synthesis" to describe Hegelian dialectic, words
he
himself never used in that way, you can safely bet that they have only a secondhand understanding of
Hegel. emphasized the progress of history and of ideas from thesis to antithesis and thence to a
synthesis.
Hegel
was
the
Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Synopsis. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was born on August 27, 1770, in
Stuttgart, Germany. He studied philosophy and classics at TГјbingen. After graduation he became a
tutor and an editor and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel > By Individual For over fifty years, Hegel
interpreters
have
rejected
the
previous
trust
that
Hegel
used
thesis-
antithesis-
synthesis
dialectics.
during
this
incisive
research
of
Hegel's
philosophy,
Leonard
F.
Wheat
exhibits
that
the
fashionable
interpretation
is
fake.
Hegel’s
account of the twists and turns of history, set out most eloquently in his Lectures on the Philosophy
of
History, has proved endlessly fascinating to subsequent thinkers. But this has sometimes led to the
mistaken belief that all of his thought is fundamentally a philosophy of history. It would be more true
to
say that this is only one aspect or, rather, one perspective view of the vast multi-levelled edifice of
Hegel’s philosophy.
Berto,
Francesco,
2007,
“Hegel’s
Dialectics
as
a
Semantic
Theory:
An
Analytic
Reading”,
European
Journal
of
Philosophy,
15(1):
19–39.
What
Are
the
Three
Kinds...
Whole
blood
consists
of
3
types
of
blood
cells,
suspend...
Two
further
journeys
into
the
history
of
philosophy
will
help
to
show
why
Hegel
chose
dialectics
as
his
method
of
argument.
As
we
saw,
Hegel
argues
against
Kant’s
skepticism
by
suggesting
that
reason
is
not
only
in
our
heads,
but
in
the
world
itself.
To
show
that
reason
is
in
the
world
itself,
however,
Hegel
has
to
show
that
reason
can
be
what
it
is
without
us
human
beings
to
help
it.
He
has
to
show
that
reason
can
develop
on
its
own,
and
does
not
need
us
to
do
the
developing
for
it
(at
least
for
those
things
in
the
world
that
are
not
human-
created).
As
we
saw
(cf.
section
1),
central
to
Hegel’s
dialectics
is
the
idea
that
concepts
or
forms
develop
on
their
own
because
they
“self-
sublate”,
or
sublate
(cancel
and
preserve)
themselves,
and
so
pass
into
subsequent
concepts
or
forms
on
their
own
accounts,
because
of
their
own,
dialectical
natures.
Thus
reason,
as
it
were,
drives
itself,
and
hence
does
not
need
our
heads
to
develop
it.
Hegel
needs
an
account
of
self-
driving
reason
to
get
beyond
Kant’s
skepticism.
If
we
visualize
the
dialectic
as
a
cyclical
process,
we
can
see
clear
parallels
between
it
and
the
transformative
cycle
in
the
Hero’s
Journey.
Both
are
processes
through
which
we
expand
our
consciousness
to
achieve
a
more
inclusive
and
encompassing
perspective
on
life.
We
must
always
remember
that
our
perspective
is
only
a
partial
view
of
the
whole.
Each
time
our
perspective
grows,
we
discover
a
broader
and
deeper
view
of
life.
That
new
view
will
challenge
our
understanding
and
send
us
into
another
cycle
of
the
dialectic.
Hegel
[37]
•
Group-
Think?
•
Groups
don’t
literally
think;
we
do.
•
Does
Hegel
think
they
do?
He
talks
as
if
he
does...
•
If
he
doesn’t
-
then
what
is
he
saying?
•
*
the
“sense
of
self”
is
requires
a
“practice
of
mutual
recognition
among
free
individuals”
•
[What
about
group
madness?
What
about
doing
x
just
because
the
others
are
doing
x?]
•
One
of
Hegel’s
most
striking
and
perhaps
insightful
theses:
•
“Only
in
the
context
of
a
public
culture
of
freedom,
one
in
which
certain
ideas,
practices,
and
self-
understandings
prevail
...
is
individual
free
agency
fostered
and
nourished”
This
closely
parallels
Hegel’s
principal
division
of
his
system
into
Logic,
Nature,
and
Spirit.
Hegel’s
Logic
is
not
(and
was
never
intended
to
be)
a
set
of
principles
of
deductive
reasoning
like
those
of
Aristotle.
It
is,
rather,
a
systematic
array
of
concepts,
before
those
concepts
are
instantiated
by
particular
things.
As
Hegel
put
it,
only
half-
metaphorically,
the
content
of
his
Logic
is
“the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind.”
Logic
can
therefore be aligned with God the Father: the ‘creative principle’, according to Augustine.
occupation of Bohemia and Moravia. He was forced to leave his job at the university Second,
because
the
form or determination that arises is the result of the self-sublation of the determination from the
moment of understanding, there is no need for some new idea to show up from the outside. Instead,
the
transition to the new determination or form is necessitated by earlier moments and hence grows out
of
the
process itself. Unlike in Plato’s arbitrary dialectics, then—which must wait around until some other
idea
comes in from the outside—in Hegel’s dialectics “nothing extraneous is introduced”, as he says (SL-
M 54; cf. SL-dG 33). His dialectics is driven by the nature, immanence or “inwardness” of its own
content
(SL-M 54; cf. SL-dG 33; cf. PR §31). As he puts it, dialectics is “the principle through which alone
immanent coherence and necessity enter into the content of science” (EL-GSH Remark to §81).
Three
Types of Natural Hu... Types of Hair Terminal hair Vellus hair Lanugo hair Ter... there can be no
further
question as to the possibility of this [synthesis], nor can any ground for it be given; it is absolutely
possible, and we are entitled to it without further grounds of any kind. (The Science of Knowledge,
I: 114; Fichte 1982: 112) We’ve been the on-line home for the Hero’s Journey since 1997. Reg Harris
has
33 years of teaching experience and an MA degree psychology. He’s consulted on programs for
returning combat vets, at-risk teens, and prison populations. For more information, see his bio.
190.1k views ― Hannah Arendt Hegel wasn’t in fact a mystic (at least, not in that sense). He didn’t
believe in mysteries at all. On the contrary, he thought that absolutely everything, ultimately, could
be
explained. And his own philosophy would provide the groundwork for this complete explanation
(which he called ‘Absolute Knowledge’). This is an ambition somewhat similar to the ‘theories of
everything’ sought by modern physicists. It doesn’t mean that one knows absolutely everything, only
that
one
has
a
general underlying framework for all such knowledge. Note that, while Hegel was clearly influenced
by
Fichte’s work, he never adopted Fichte’s triadic “thesis—antithesis—synthesis” language in his
descriptions of his own philosophy (Mueller 1958: 411–2; Solomon 1983: 23), though he did
apparently use it in his lectures to describe Kant’s philosophy (LHP III: 477). Indeed, Hegel
criticized formalistic uses of the method of “triplicity [Triplizität]” (PhG-P §50) inspired by Kant—a
criticism that could well have been aimed at Fichte. Hegel argued that Kantian-inspired uses of
triadic form had been reduced to “a lifeless schema” and “an actual semblance [eigentlichen
Scheinen]” (PhG §50; alternative translation) that, like a formula in mathematics, was simply
imposed on top of subject matters. Instead, a properly scientific use of Kant’s “triplicity” should
flow—as he said his own dialectical method did (see section 1)—out of “the inner life and self-
movement” (PhG §51) of the content. of planets is allowed the region that mediates between Mars
and
Jupiter; almost Hegel [48] • International Relations. • Individuals are “not real unless related to
others” • Phil. 324 Overheads ... 156 • also the state: not really individual unless related to other
states • The legitimate province of a state in its foreign relations, is on one side wholly internal;
[therefore?] • a state shall not meddle with the internal affairs of another state. • Yet it is essential for
its
completeness that it be recognized by others. - • [which] demands as a guarantee that it shall
recognize those who recognize it, Therefore they cannot be indifferent to its internal affairs. • The
“spirit of a nation” is “an existing individual” • having in particularity its objective actuality and self-
consciousness. The history of the world is the world’s court of judgment. • [comment: And just who
gives the “verdict”? - History is the world • - It’s the database for all • -- Like too much in Hegel,
this is cute, but says really nothing...] Bencivenga, Ermanno, 2000, Hegel’s Dialectical Logic, New
York: Oxford University Press. Art in all historical epochs has the task of being more than art. It can
never
be
either autonomous or heteronymous. It can never serve just itself or some other purposes. Nor can it
be
reduced just to the aesthetic truth, experience, incidence. Social revolutions and historical events that
change the manner of life of people hence are not superordinate for an insight into the being of
artistic ... [Show full abstract] Hegel [30] • Freedom is supposed to have an “objective dimension” •
-
which
is
(somehow) provided by “reason” - • - the idea (seems to be) that Reason wants us to do something. •
-
> Well, what? • “Hegel dismisses Kant’s Categorical Imperative as an “empty formalism” • [But we
have seen, there’s nothing “empty” about it.] • But Kant too claims that we are transcendentally free
only
under the rule of the Categorical Imperative .... (which is probably where Hegel got this from ...) •
Reason, Will, Desire, Freedom - what’s the relation among them? • Can we be “slaves to our
desires”? • Hume: reason “is and ever must be the slave of the passions” • - Can we have a reason for
doing
something which is in no way desired? • [Kant seems to say that] • - the fact that if we do x, then y
will
happen, and this will make it impossible for us to do z, matters if we want to do z. • - But if we
don’t? • What if we don’t care about being moral? ... • [That’s where Hobbes comes in. If you don’t
care about that, the rest of society will gang up on you, if it can .. so maybe you’d better care!] 1Jan
Patočka (1907–1977), generally regarded as the most in uential Czech philosopher [EL-BD],
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline Part I: Science of Logic [Enzyklopädie
der philosophischen Wissenschaften I], translated by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Because you are taking a limited view. Hegel [15] •
[question: What does all this about “realising its existence” mean??] • A note on talk about
“realization”: • (1) people have hopes and dreams, which are sometimes realized, sometimes not • (2)
this implies that at time t, there’s an idea of how we want things to be, and • at time t + n -- where n
is
some reasonably definite number - either those things have come about, or not. If they have, we’re
satisfied (maybe!); if not, not. • (3) but when it is claimed that it is, not our hopes etc but our
existence that is • “realized” - or not? - where is this pre-existing idea that can be compared with
how things turned out? • In Hegel, it’s nowhere! • No matter what happens, existence is “realized” •
This
is
to
say that - whatever happens, happens • Big deal! • [yet such talk has been very popular at various
times...] The thesis was capitalism unrestricted competition. The antithesis was socialism complete
cooperation. The synthesis was supposed to be communism. in forced cooperation, leading to
ultimate truth, utopia where no government would be required. Everyone would live in peace and
equality. Periodic Table – La... Law of Triads The development of the periodic table beg... English
Translations of Other Primary Sources It is possible to view Hegel’s system of thought from (at least)
two directions. On the one hand, we can follow the process whereby, via alternating error and
insight, the slow progress of humanity ascends towards Absolute Knowledge. This is the story Hegel
tells in his Phenomenology of Spirit. On the other hand, we could start from the complete totality of
everything, the Absolute itself, and show how this can be divided up into smaller and smaller
aspects, until every different domain of the world, and of human life, reveals its place within the
whole.
This
is
the
system as set out in Hegel’s Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Emailadres: info@fwu.nl
Hegel
[7]
•
We
read
that
•
“In
Hegel,
the
term
Aufhebung
has
the
apparently
contradictory
implications
of
both
preserving
and
changing
(
means
both
"to
cancel"
and
"to
keep").
•
The
tension
between
these
senses
suits
what
Hegel
is
trying
to
talk
about.
•
In
sublation,
a
term
or
concept
is
both
preserved
and
changed
through
its
dialectical
interplay
with
another
term
or
concept.
•
Sublation
is
the
motor
by
which
the
dialectic
functions.
•
-
>
And
this
is
supposed
to
explain
things?
•
I
don’t
find
it
very
helpful!
•
“But
just
as
lordship
showed
its
essential
nature
to
be
the
reverse
of
what
it
wants
to
be
so,
too,
bondage
will,
when
completed,
pass
into
the
opposite
of
what
it
immediately
is
...
and
change
round
into
real
and
true
independence...”
•
My
comment:
Uh,
huh.
But
meanwhile,
the
slaves
are
still
slaves
and
the
masters
are
still
masters.
•
It’s
going
to
take
more
than
“dialectic”
to
fix
that!
•
Or
to
put
it
another
way:
Oh?
Well
-
-
when?
In
its
speculative
moment,
then,
Nothing
implies
presence
or
Being,
which
is
the
“unity
of
the
determinations
in
their
comparison
[Entgegensetzung]”
(EL
§82;
alternative
translation),
since
it
both
includes
but—as
a
process
from
one
to
the
other—also
compares
the
two
earlier
determinations
of
Nothing,
first,
as
pure
absence
and,
second,
as
just
as
much
presence.
No
comments
yet!
Add
one
to
start
the
conversation.
The
codes
of
A,
E,
I
and
0
derive
from
the
first
two
vowels
of
the
Latin
words
affirmo
("affirm"
A,
I)
and
nego
("negate"
E,
O).
Hegel
[23]
•
But
the
subjective
will
has
also
a
substantial
life
-
a
reality,
-
in
which
it
moves
in
the
region
of
essential
being
and
has
the
essential
itself
as
the
object
of
its
existence.
•
This
essential
being
is
the
union
of
the
subjective
with
the
rational
Will:
it
is
the
moral
Whole,
the
State,
which
is
that
form
of
reality
in
which
the
individual
has
and
enjoys
his
freedom;
•
but
on
the
condition
of
his
recognition,
believing
in
and
willing
that
which
is
common
to
the
Whole.
•
[So
-
hey!
-
the
State
is
a
lot
more
than
we
might
have
thought!.....]
Plato,
1961,
The
Collected
Dialogues
of
Plato:
Including
the
Letters,
edited
by
Edith
Hamilton
and
Huntington
Cairns.
Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press.
(Citations
to
Plato’s
text
use
the
Stephanus
numbers,
which
appear
in
the
margins
of
many
translations
of
Plato’s
works.)
Georg
W
ilhelm
Friedrich
Hegel
and
the
Modern
A
ge.
Biography.
Hegel
was
born
August
27,
1770
in
Stuggart
.
He
studied
as
a
theology
student
from
1788
to
1793
at
Tübingen
.
Join
ResearchGate
to
find
the
people
and
research
you
need
to
help
your
work
–––,
1966,
Review
of
Hegel:
Reinterpretation,
Texts,
and
Commentary,
by
Walter
Kaufmann.
The
Philosophical
Quarterly,
16(65):
366–68.
A
concept
is
a
general
representation
(or
idea)
through
which
the
essential
characteristics
of
a
thing
are
grasped.
RAS
-
Let
me
try
to
rephrase
this
problem
another
way.
We
can
do
all
the
regressions
and
estimates
we
want,
but
we
can
never
find
out
the
sensitivity
of
US
stocks
to
a
European
event.
Hegel
[41]
•
The
Executive.
•
The
state’s
consciousness
and
the
most
conspicuous
education
are
found
inthe
middle
class,
to
which
the
state
officials
belong.
•
[maybe
the
middle
class
is
the
“synthesis”
of
the
other
two
...?]
•
The
members
of
this
class,
therefore,
form
the
pillars
of
the
state
in
regard
to
rectitude
and
intelligence
•
The
state,
if
it
has
no
middle
class,
is
still
at
a
low
stage
of
development.
•
[note:
Hegel’s
father
was
a
respected
civil
servant
...]
•
The
Legislature
•
The
legislature
interprets
the
laws
...
In
it
the
constitution
is
presupposed
•
[right]
•
the
people
...
does
not
know
what
it
wills.
•
To
know
what
we
will,
and
further
what
the
absolute
will,
namely
reason,
wills,
•
is
the
fruit
of
deep
knowledge
and
insight,
and
is
therefore
not
the
property
of
the
people.
•
[a
problem
is
that
the
expression
‘the
people’
doesn’t
denote
a
mind;
deciding
what
it
means
to
say
that
“the
people”
know
something
is
enough
of
a
problem
that
one
can
hardly
evaluate
Hegel’s
idea.]
Note
that,
although
Hegel
acknowledged
that
his
dialectical
method
was
part
of
a
philosophical
tradition
stretching
back
to
Plato,
he
criticized
Plato’s
version
of
dialectics.
He
argued
that
Plato’s
dialectics
deals
only
with
limited
philosophical
claims
and
is
unable
to
get
beyond
skepticism
or
nothingness
(SL-
M
55–6;
SL-
dG
34–5;
PR,
Remark
to
§31).
According
to
the
logic
of
a
traditional
reductio
ad
absurdum
argument,
if
the
premises
of
an
argument
lead
to
a
contradiction,
we
must
conclude
that
the
premises
are
false—which
leaves
us
with
no
premises
or
with
nothing.
We
must
then
wait
around
for
new
premises
to
spring
up
arbitrarily
from
somewhere
else,
and
then
see
whether
those
new
premises
put
us
back
into
nothingness
or
emptiness
once
again,
if
they,
too,
lead
to
a
contradiction.
Because
Hegel
believed
that
reason
necessarily
generates
contradictions,
as
we
will
see,
he
thought
new
premises
will
indeed
produce
further
contradictions. As he puts the argument, then, Hegel [37] • Group-Think? • Groups don’t literally
think; we do. • Does Hegel think they do? He talks as if he does... • If he doesn’t - then what is he
saying? • * the “sense of self” is requires a “practice of mutual recognition among free individuals” •
[What about group madness? What about doing x just because the others are doing x?] • One of
Hegel’s
most
striking and perhaps insightful theses: • “Only in the context of a public culture of freedom, one in
which
certain ideas, practices, and self-understandings prevail ... is individual free agency fostered and
nourished” Hegel [36] • Property • - is the “evidence of our own agency and choice” • [is this
interesting? Remember the definition of ‘property’. ...] • - my property enables me to “see myself as
someone who does not take his situation as given but can impose his will and agency onto his
surroundings” .. • So I buy a toaster, and, lo! - I can now make toast when I like.... • (Well, yes: that
is
why one buys a toaster! • and it’s being my property (in the moral and legal sense) “protects my
freedom” • - yup! But that’s the normal view - being true by definition...) • A supposed problem:
property
undermines itself[this influenced Marx, later, enormously ...] • “the very success of a social structure
consisting of property and contract at turning agents into persons seems to guarantee its own
demise”: property and contract “imbue people with motivations and dispositions that lead them to act
in
ways that actually undermine the institutions of property and contract.” • [? Note: this simply isn’t
true. What is true is that once you have contract, you have the possibility of reneging, defrauding,
defaulting, etc. But nothing about the institution causes these things to happen.] In the last few
weeks, high frequency economic data has had a tendency to beat expectations, rather than disappoint
as
they've done for much of 2015. Rhe Citigroup Economic Surprise Index, shown below, is turning up,
indicating an improving economic outlook. The Atlanta Fed GDPNow estimate of 2Q GDP growth
has
surged to 2.0% from a low of 0.7% in mid-May. Hegel [28] • “Positive” vs. “Negative” freedom -
what’s the contrast? • [H. doesn’t say. Here’s my suggestion:] • negative: absence of obstacles to
what
one
wills • positive: presence of “self-determining power” • [maybe this is what he means by claiming
that
duty liberates: you are forbidden to do more things, but you are also able to do more... ] • [If this is
so,
why is it? Hegel doesn’t explain (needless to say) • [the question would also be whether those
enabled to do more are so • at other people’s expense. Is that still “positive freedom” for those who
pay?] • [On the other hand, other people refraining from murdering you does greatly enhance your
prospects of living (and therefore, of living a decent life!] None このページの管理者様の場合は、
次の内容をご確認ください。 ... is [5]. Zeitgeist does not indicate a homogenous state of affairs in
which
everyone goes along with the same idea, but rather expresses the fact that in any given society, there
is
a
certain 'language', culture, or range of concepts in which every dispute, every contradiction must be
fought out. Hegel's Triad of Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis (Fig. 3) can be deduced as a character
is
in
its
comfort zone but wanted something, and willing to enter an unfamiliar situation, adapt to it, to get
what
they wanted by paying a heavy price for it. Then, return to their familiar situation and having things
...
Scholars have often questioned whether Hegel’s dialectical method is logical. Some of their
skepticism
grows out of the role that contradiction plays in his thought and argument. While many of the
oppositions embedded in the dialectical development and the definitions of concepts or forms are
not
contradictions in the strict sense, as we saw (section 2, above), scholars such as Graham Priest have
suggested that some of them arguably are (Priest 1989: 391). Hegel even holds, against Kant (cf.
section 3 above), that there are contradictions, not only in thought, but also in the world. Motion, for
instance, Hegel says, is an “existent contradiction”. As he describes it: Before I dive in on this, be
aware that delving into Hegel's philosophy is not simple or easily explained. Here's a prior answer
that
helps to explain what the terms thesis, antithesis, and synthesis is trying to get to: Debate over
whether
Hegel’s
dialectical
logic
is
logical may also be fueled in part by discomfort with his particular brand of logic. Unlike today’s
symbolic logics, Hegel’s logic is not only syntactic, but also semantic (cf. Berto 2007; Maybee 2009:
xx–xxv; Margolis 2010: 193–94). Hegel’s interest in semantics appears, for instance, in the very first
stages of his logic, where the difference between Being and Nothing is “something merely meant”
(EL-GSH Remark to §87; cf. section 2 above). While some of the moves from stage to stage are
driven by syntactic necessity, other moves are driven by the meanings of the concepts in play.
Indeed, Hegel rejected what he regarded as the overly formalistic logics that dominated the field
during his day (EL Remark to §162; SL-M 43–44; SL-dG 24). A logic that deals only with the forms
of
logical arguments and not the meanings of the concepts used in those argument forms will do no
better in terms of preserving truth than the old joke about computer programs suggests: garbage in,
garbage out. In those logics, if we (using today’s versions of formal, symbolic logic) plug in
something
for
the
P or Q (in the proposition “if P then Q” or “P → Q”, for instance) or for the “F”, “G”, or “x” (in the
proposition “if F is x, then G is x” or “Fx → Gx”, for instance) that means something true, then the
syntax of formal logics will preserve that truth. But if we plug in something for those terms that is
untrue or meaningless (garbage in), then the syntax of formal logic will lead to an untrue or
meaningless conclusion (garbage out). Today’s versions of prepositional logic also assume that we
know
what
the
meaning of “is” is. Against these sorts of logics, Hegel wanted to develop a logic that not only
preserved
truth, but also determined how to construct truthful claims in the first place. A logic that defines
concepts (semantics) as well as their relationships with one another (syntax) will show, Hegel
thought, how concepts can be combined into meaningful forms. Because interpreters are familiar
with
modern logics focused on syntax, however, they may regard Hegel’s syntactic and semantic logic as
not
really logical (cf. Maybee 2009: xvii–xxv). Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel . The Dialectic Process
and
World Spirit. Biographical Information. Born in 1770 in Stuttgart, Germany Study of philosophy and
theology
Developed in the age of German Romanticism. The Dialectic. All thought was based upon pieces of
a
previous thought. Thales: In Hegel’s dialectic, then, each stage in growth, progress or understanding
emerges from the discovery and synthesis of opposites. The dialectic reminds us that opposites do
not
exist in reality but are constructs of the discriminating mind. Overall, these sentiment readings are
suggestive of a crowded short and the formation of the proverbial wall of worry. Finite Purpose’s
speculative
moment leads to Realized Purpose. As soon as Finite Purpose presents all the content, there is a
return process (a series of return arrows) that establishes each layer and redefines Finite Purpose as
Realized Purpose. The presence of “this lettuce here” establishes the actuality of “lettuce” as a type
of
thing
(an Actuality is a concept that captures a mutually-defining relationship between an Inner and an
Outer [EL §142]), which establishes the “salad”, which establishes “dinner” as the Realized Purpose
over the whole process. We can picture Realized Purpose this way: Kosok, Michael, 1972, “The
Formalization of Hegel’s Dialectical Logic: Its Formal Structure, Logical Interpretation and Intuitive
Foundation”, in Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, Alisdair MacIntyre (ed.), Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press: 237–87. 7.9k views
You
need
to
take
into
account
what
happens
if
you
defund
the
police.
No
matter
how
corrupt,
they
still
uphold
the
basic
law
most
of
the
time.
What
happens
when
no
laws
are
upheld?
official
philosophy
of
Prussia).
In
Berlin
he
published
his
last
important
work:
Fundamental
“The
abstract
form
of
the
continuation
or
advance”
says
Hegel
“is,
in
Being,
an
other
(or
antithesis)
and
transition
into
another;
in
the
Es-
sence,
showing
or
reflection
in
its
opposite;
in
the
Notion,
the
distinc-
Hegel’s
Logic
Thesis
Antithesis
Synthesis
Tuesday,
November
11,
2014.
Dynamic
Patterns
of
Thought
Thesis
Antithesis
Synthesis
Tuesday,
November
11,
2014.
Thesis
•
People
adopt
a
certain
way
of
looking
at
and
thinking
about
the
world
(the
thesis).
•
Because
it
is
only
partially
correct,
over
time
people
encounter
contrary
evidence,
counterexamples,
anomalies,
and
contradictions.
Tuesday
17.8k
views
If
read
carefully,
Marx’s
account
of
Hegel’s
philosophy
is
fairly
accurate.
But
his
use
of
the
word
‘synthesis’
has
subsequently
led
to
grave
misunderstandings.
Magee
typifies
this
erroneous
view
when
he
writes,
“because
the
synthesis
is
a
new
situation
it
contains
new
conflicts,
and
therefore
becomes
the
beginning
of
a
new
triad
of
thesis,
antithesis,
synthesis.”
Not
surprisingly,
statements
like
this
have
puzzled
people
and
contributed
to
the
exaggerated
air
of
mystery
surrounding
Hegel’s
thought.
Are
these
new
conflicts
supposed
to
exist
within
the
synthesis?
(And
if
so,
why
are
they
different
from
the
original
conflicts
out
of
which
it
was
formed?)
Or
does
the
synthesis
constitute
a
new
thesis,
over
against
which
its
equal
and
opposite
antithesis
must
be
formed?
Both
interpretations
suggest
a
process
which
would
carry
on
indefinitely,
a
waltz
rhythm
of:
Hegelianism
-
the
philosophy
of
Hegel,
who
maintained
that
every
postulate
or
affirmation
(thesis)
evokes
its
natural
opposite
(antithesis),
and
that
these
two
result
in
a
unified
whole
(synthesis),
which
in
turn
reacts
upon
the
original
thesis.]
Dialektika
Hegel
(Thesis,
AntiThesis,
Sintesis)
Dialektika
Hegel
saya
rasa
cukup
dikenal
di
kalangan
para
pecinta
Ilmu
ilmu
sosial.
Sebagai
sebuah
doktrin
yang
cukup
mampu
bertahan
dan
diikuti
oleh
banyak
orang
dialektika
Hegel
ibarat
sebuah
teori
Newton
yang
diamini
dan
dianggukki
oleh
sosiolog
maupun
pemerhati
sosial
yang
lainnya.
There’s
an
article
by
Alan
Dundes
which
has
a
list
of
references.
It’s
a
great
article
to
investigate
the
3
number
theory.
Regards,
Michael.
https:/
/
www.bookofthrees.com/
dundes/
In
fact,
the
next
step
in
this
historical
dialectic
took
an
unexpected
turn.
Paradoxically,
individual
freedom
was
best
consolidated
and
developed
(at
this
particular
historical
juncture)
under
a
dictatorship
(that
of
Napoleon).
Such
paradoxical
results
of
historical
dilemmas
are
the
frequent
focus
of
Hegel’s
reflections.
[LHP],
Lectures
on
the
History
of
Philosophy
[Geschichte
der
Philosophie],
in
three
volumes,
translated
by
E.S.
Haldane
and
Frances
H.
Simson,
New
Jersey:
Humanities
Press,
1974.
HEGEL’S
DIALECTIC:
THE
JOURNEY
AS
A
RECONCILIATION
OF
POLES
Contrary
to
the
philosophy
of
this
fallen
world,
it
is
the
essence
of
love
to
hate
what
is
evil;
just
as
it
is
hateful
to
be
"tolerant"
of
what
is
wicked...
Followers
of
Yeshua
are
called
to
love
the
truth
and
abhor
the
lie.
Tolerating
sin
in
a
world
ripe
for
judgment
is
a
tacit
form
of
"collaboration"
with
the
enemy...
Indeed,
the
only
thing
regarded
as
intolerable
in
the
devil's
world
is
the
objection
that
people
have
a
supposed
"liberty"
to
sin.
But
the
LORD
is
clear
on
this
point:
those
who
call
evil
good
and
good
evil
are
as
good
as
dead...
Therefore
we
are
enjoined:
"O
you
who
love
the
LORD,
hate
evil"
(Psalm
97:10).
Yes,
hate
what
is
evil
and
love
what
is
good
(Amos
5:15).
The
connection
between
loving
God
and
hating
evil
is
repeated
in
the
New
Testament: "Let your love be genuine (ἀνυπόκριτος, without a "mask" put on): abhor what is evil;
cling to what is good (Rom. 12:9). If we truly love the LORD, let us walk in the awe of His great
Name by hating what is evil.... Nostradamus Prophecies |... Five centuries ago, Nostradamus wrote
of
three
Antichri... 59.2k views It’s amazing to know you Herb, and yes, an amazing time for connecting
information to knowledge. Cheers! A geo-economic development analysis in the Balkans under the
perspective of the interests of Greece is useful to conceive better the ever-increasing tense framework
of
globalization's restructuring. Both the study of the different sources of energy (petroleum and,
increasingly, natural gas) and the numerous new geopolitical changes demonstrate the existing
tensions within the contemporary international strategic relations. The energy security of the Balkans
region presents an excellent case to study and realize the contradicted interests in national, regional
and
supranational level. Ultimately, Kant thought, reasons’ necessary, self-driving activity will lead it to
produce contradictions—what he called the “antinomies”, which consist of a thesis and antithesis.
Once reason has generated the unconditioned concept of the whole world, for instance, Kant argued,
it
can look at the world in two, contradictory ways. In the first antinomy, reason can see the world (1)
as
the
whole
totality or as the unconditioned, or (2) as the series of syllogisms that led up to that totality. If reason
sees the world as the unconditioned or as a complete whole that is not conditioned by anything else,
then it will see the world as having a beginning and end in terms of space and time, and so will
conclude (the thesis) that the world has a beginning and end or limit. But if reason sees the world as
the
series, in which each member of the series is conditioned by the previous member, then the world will
appear to be without a beginning and infinite, and reason will conclude (the antithesis) that the world
does
not have a limit in terms of space and time (cf. Critique of Pure Reason, A417–18/B445–6). Reason
thus leads to a contradiction: it holds both that the world has a limit and that it does not have a limit
at
the
same time. Because reason’s own process of self-development will lead it to develop contradictions
or
to
be
dialectical in this way, Kant thought that reason must be kept in check by the understanding. Any
conclusions that reason draws that do not fall within the purview of the understanding cannot be
applied to the world of experience, Kant said, and so cannot be considered genuine knowledge
(Critique of Pure Reason, A506/B534). Kant thought Hume’s argument led to an unacceptable,
skeptical conclusion, and he rejected Hume’s own solution to the skepticism (see Kant’s Critique of
Pure Reason, B5, B19–20). Hume suggested that our idea of causal necessity is grounded merely in
custom or habit, since it is generated by our own imaginations after repeated observations of one sort
of
event following another sort of event (see Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Section VI;
Hegel
also rejected Hume’s solution, see EL §39). For Kant, science and knowledge should be grounded in
reason, and he proposed a solution that aimed to reestablish the connection between reason and
knowledge that was broken by Hume’s skeptical argument. Kant’s solution involved proposing a
Copernican revolution in philosophy (Critique of Pure Reason, Bxvi). Nicholas Copernicus was the
Polish astronomer who said that the earth revolves around the sun, rather than the other way around.
Kant proposed a similar solution to Hume’s skepticism. Naïve science assumes that our knowledge
revolves around what the world is like, but, Hume’s criticism argued, this view entails that we cannot
then have knowledge of scientific causes through reason. We can reestablish a connection between
reason and knowledge, however, Kant suggested, if we say—not that knowledge revolves around
what
the
world
is
like—but that knowledge revolves around what we are like. For the purposes of our knowledge,
Kant said, we do not revolve around the world—the world revolves around us. Because we are
rational creatures, we share a cognitive structure with one another that regularizes our experiences of
the
world. This intersubjectively shared structure of rationality—and not the world itself—grounds our
knowledge. If we visualize the dialectic as a cyclical process, we can see clear parallels between it
and
the
transformative cycle in the Hero’s Journey. Both are processes through which we expand our
consciousness to achieve a more inclusive and encompassing perspective on life. We must always
remember that our perspective is only a partial view of the whole. Each time our perspective grows,
we
discover a broader and deeper view of life. That new view will challenge our understanding and
send us into another cycle of the dialectic. Secondary Literature 10.9k views minor writings appear
(On the essence of philosophical criticism, In what way does A concept or form is “in and for itself”
when
it
is
doubly “for itself”, or “for itself” not only in terms of content—insofar as it embraces its
content—but also in terms of form or presentation, insofar as it also has the activity of presenting its
content. It is “for itself” (embraces its content) for itself (through its own activity), or not only
embraces its content (the “for itself” of content) but also presents its content through its own activity
(the
“for itself” of form). The second “for itself” of form provides the concept with a logical activity (i.e.,
presenting its content) and hence a definition that goes beyond—and so is separate from—the
definition that its content has. Since it has a definition of its own that is separate from the definition
of
its
content, it comes to be defined—in the “in itself” sense—against its content, which has become its
“other”. Because this “other” is still its own content, however, the concept or form is both “in itself”
but also still “for itself” at the same time, or is “in and for itself” (EL §§148–9; cf. Maybee 2009:
244–6). The “in and for itself” relationship is the hallmark of a genuine Concept (EL §160), and
captures the idea that a genuine concept is defined not only from the bottom up by its content, but
also from the top down through its own activity of presenting its content. The genuine concept of
animal, for instance, is not only defined by embracing its content (namely, all animals) from the
bottom up, but also has a definition of its own, separate from that content, that leads it to determine
(and so present), from the top down, what counts as an animal. Kaufmann, Walter Arnold, 1965,
Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary, Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company Inc. In
a
similar way, Hegel’s answer to Kant is that we can get out of our heads to see what the world is like
in
itself—and hence can have knowledge of the world in itself—because the very same rationality or
reason that is in our heads is in the world itself. As Hegel apparently put it in a lecture, the
opposition or antithesis between the subjective and objective disappears by saying, as the Ancients
did, Join the community to add your comment. Already a deviant? Log In Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel
[1]1770-1831 G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) - Author of notoriously obscure works - Creator of
“Absolute Idealism” - Elements of the Philosophy of Right, 1822 Scholars have often questioned
whether Hegel’s dialectical method is logical. Some of their skepticism grows out of the role that
contradiction plays in his thought and argument. While many of the oppositions embedded in the
dialectical development and the definitions of concepts or forms are not contradictions in the strict
sense, as we saw (section 2, above), scholars such as Graham Priest have suggested that some of
them arguably are (Priest 1989: 391). Hegel even holds, against Kant (cf. section 3 above), that there
are
contradictions, not only in thought, but also in the world. Motion, for instance, Hegel says, is an
“existent contradiction”. As he describes it:
I.
THE
ARTISTIC
AND
THE
AESTHETIC
ERA
Hegel
[33]
•
2.
Civil
Society
•
The
concrete
person,
who
as
particular
is
an
end
to
himself,
is
a
totality
of
wants
and
a
mixture
of
necessity
and
caprice.
As
such
he
is
one
of
the
principles
of
the
civic
community.
•
But
the
particular
person
is
essentially
connected
with
others.
•
Hence
each
establishes
and
satisfies
himself
by
means
of
others,
and
so
must
call
in
the
assistance
of
the
form
of
universality.
•
[oh,
right
-
er,
how
d’you
do
that??]
•
[Is he just playing with words??] Of the above forms of judgment, the most basic is the categorical
judgment. If the universal and particular forms of judgment concerning quantity, and the affirmative
and
negative forms of judgment concerning quality are combined with the categorical judgment, the
following four kinds of judgment can be obtained: The second moment—the “dialectical” (EL §§79,
81) or “negatively rational” (EL §79) moment—is the moment of instability. In this moment, a one-
sidedness or restrictedness (EL Remark to §81) in the determination from the moment of
understanding comes to the fore, and the determination that was fixed in the first moment passes into
its opposite (EL §81). Hegel describes this process as a process of “self-sublation” (EL §81). The
English verb “to sublate” translates Hegel’s technical use of the German verb aufheben, which is a
crucial concept in his dialectical method. Hegel says that aufheben has a doubled meaning: it means
both to cancel (or negate) and to preserve at the same time (PhG §113; SL-M 107; SL-dG 81–2; cf.
EL the Addition to §95). The moment of understanding sublates itself because its own character or
nature—its one-sidedness or restrictedness—destabilizes its definition and leads it to pass into its
opposite. The dialectical moment thus involves a process of self-sublation, or a process in which the
determination from the moment of understanding sublates itself, or both cancels and preserves itself,
as
it pushes on to or passes into its opposite. Hegel wasn’t in fact a mystic (at least, not in that sense).
He didn’t believe in mysteries at all. On the contrary, he thought that absolutely everything,
ultimately, could be explained. And his own philosophy would provide the groundwork for this
complete explanation (which he called ‘Absolute Knowledge’). This is an ambition somewhat similar
to
the
‘theories of everything’ sought by modern physicists. It doesn’t mean that one knows absolutely
everything, only that one has a general underlying framework for all such knowledge. What purple
wants
-
> what blue says -> what red says -> what purple recieves ( and what we lose) Georg Friedrich
Händel. En presentation av Lisa K, Mathilda, Nathalie, Rachel och Rebecka L. 23 februari 1685.
Halle, Tyskland. Musikalisk Talang. Johann Sebastian Bach, Domenico Scarlatti. Harmonilära.
Tidens kompositionsstil. Juridik, 1702. Almira och Nero, 1705. Contemporary European Philosophy
In fact, the next step in this historical dialectic took an unexpected turn. Paradoxically, individual
freedom was best consolidated and developed (at this particular historical juncture) under a
dictatorship (that of Napoleon). Such paradoxical results of historical dilemmas are the frequent
focus of Hegel’s reflections. Hegel [49] • What, if anything, do we learn from Hegel? • * The “broad
canvas” • - But it seems to be so broad that you can’t make out anything in particular • * Not far
from saying that whatever is, is right • * the “organic state” is ill-defined • * The personification of
groups and states is dangerous... • * Individuals as such get lost in the stew • * a strain of liberalism
runs through it, but with no obvious relation to the “big picture” • [Patten credits Hegel with a fair
measure of recognizable liberalism. • He wasn’t in favor of the totalitarian state, as some have
thought.] • * Hegel’s talk of “freedom” is mostly free-association.... • * Freedom is “the Absolute
Idea realizing itself...” • - this would appear to be blarney.... • The general problem with Absolute
Idealism is absence of content: it seems to say nothing empirically discernible.... Worries that Hegel’s
arguments fail to fit his account of dialectics (see section 2, above) have led some interpreters to
conclude that his method is arbitrary or that his works have no single dialectical method at all
(Findlay 1962: 93; Solomon 1983: 21). These interpreters reject the idea that there is any logical
necessity
to
the
moves from stage to stage. “[T]he important point to make here, and again and again”, Robert C.
Solomon writes, for instance, Fig. 10-11 Contrast-type Give-and-Receive Action between
Proposition and Proposition Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 – 1831) was a German
philosopher, and a major figure in German Idealism. His historicist and idealist account of reality
revolutionized European philosophy and was an important precursor to Continental philosophy and
Marxism. The LORD is called the God of Truth (‫)אֵל אֱמֶת‬, and Yeshua our Messiah testified before
Pontius Pilate: "For this purpose I was born and for this purpose I have come into the world -- to
bear witness to the truth. Everyone who is of the truth listens to my voice" (John 18:37). Because
false teachers abound in the world, each of us is obligated to test (δοκιμάζω, lit. "determine if a
metal is pure") the thinking of others to see if they are truly children of God (1 John 4:1). We must
test truth claims. When confronted by false teaching, we are called to "earnestly contend for"
(ἐπαγωνίζομαι, lit. "wrestle over") the truth of the faith (Jude 1:3). That's our response to untruth. On
the
other hand, we are commanded to "always be ready" to provide a reason (λόγος) for the hope that is
within us (1 Pet. 3:5). That's the call to be a witness to the truth... (For more on this, see Teshuvah of
the
Mind). © 2008-2024 ResearchGate GmbH. All rights reserved. Courses 7.9k views Note that,
although Hegel acknowledged that his dialectical method was part of a philosophical tradition
stretching back to Plato, he criticized Plato’s version of dialectics. He argued that Plato’s dialectics
deals only with limited philosophical claims and is unable to get beyond skepticism or nothingness
(SL-M 55–6; SL-dG 34–5; PR, Remark to §31). According to the logic of a traditional reductio ad
absurdum argument, if the premises of an argument lead to a contradiction, we must conclude that
the
premises are false—which leaves us with no premises or with nothing. We must then wait around for
new premises to spring up arbitrarily from somewhere else, and then see whether those new premises
put us back into nothingness or emptiness once again, if they, too, lead to a contradiction. Because
Hegel
believed that reason necessarily generates contradictions, as we will see, he thought new premises
will indeed produce further contradictions. As he puts the argument, then, © The Book of Threes
2024 An amusing thought just occurred to me. If I am taking a limited view, is the OP taking an
expansive view? What is the synthesis of the two.... –––, 2002, Conjectures and Refutations: The
Growth of Scientific Knowledge, second edition, London: Routledge Classics. common sense
include philosophy, Relationship of skepticism with philosophy, Faith and –––, 1966, A
Reinterpretation, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books. (This is a republication of the first part of Hegel:
Reinterpretation, Texts, and Commentary.) Rosen, Stanley, 2014, The Idea of Hegel’s “Science of
Logic”, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hegel grasped the development of Idea as the
dialectical development of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. The Idea alienates itself and becomes nature;
and
later, by becoming spirit through humankind, it recovers itself. According to Hans Leisegang, this
way of thinking is unique to Hegel, and is based on his study of the Bible. Specifically, Hegel's
philosophy of opposition, which is transcended by a higher synthesis, is said to be based on the
theme of certain passages from the Gospel according to John, such as "Unless a grain of wheat falls
into the earth and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies, it bears much fruit," and "I am the resurrection
and
the
life; he who believes in me, though lie dies, yet shall lie live." 14 From this position, Hegel conceived
of
God as Logos, or Idea, and held that God manifests Himself in the external world just as the life of
a
seed sown on the earth manifests itself in the outside. Here lies the fundamental cause of Hegel's
errors. Limerick – anapesti... Limericks are short poems of five lines having rhyme st... First
published Fri Jun 3, 2016; substantive revision Fri Oct 2, 2020