See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.

net/publication/240209769

Stimulus-Organism-Response Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Step in

Modeling (Consumer) Behavior

Article in Journal of Consumer Psychology · December 2002

DOI: 10.1207/S15327663JCP1201_05

CITATIONS READS

724 25,995

1 author:

Jacob Jacoby
New York University
104 PUBLICATIONS 15,445 CITATIONS

SEE PROFILE

All content following this page was uploaded by Jacob Jacoby on 19 January 2018.

The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file.

JOURNAL OF CONSUMER PSYCHOLUGY, 12(1), 51-57
Copyright O 2002, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

Stimulus-Organism-Response Reconsidered: An Evolutionary

Step in Modeling (Consumer) Behavior
Jacob Jacoby
Department of Marketing
New York University

The need to evolve the visual depictions of our consumer behavior models is addressed.Previ-
ous models are criticized for being constructionsthat fail to build on prior theory, and lack parsi-
mony, comprehensiveness, coherence, and flexibility. More revolutionary movement in con-
sumer behavior modelling is encouraged and an integrative Stimulus-Organism-Response
framework is presented for consideration.

Permit me to share some observations on how we model con-
sumer behavior (CB), and how I believe this can be improved.
I refer specifically to our pictorial models, more specifically,
how introductory and advanced texts in our discipline typi-
cally have chosen to graphically portray their conceptualiza-
tions of the factors that influence and determine CB.
At least since Whorf's (1940) seminal research, social sci-
entists have known that the words and language used by any
society or group to describe and communicate its thoughts
also serve to channel and limit thinking. Pictures are said to be
worth a thousand words. However,just as with verbal stimuli,
the graphic depictions we have developed to help us under-
stand and communicate regarding (consumer) behavior, al-
though very useful in certain respects, may in other respects
be masking and inhibiting us from seeing and studying im-
portant phenomena and relations.'
THE EARLY EVOLUTION OF
CB MODELS
Regardless of disciplinary orientation and without many ex-
ceptions, CB models to date have represented some form of
Input+Output (I+O) model. Holding sway for several de-
cades, the earliest (primarily microeconomic) models were
Requests for reprints should be sent to Jacob Jacoby, Departmentof Mar-
keting, Stem School of Business, 44 West 4th Street, New York, New
York 100 12. E-mail:jacoby@stem.nyu.edu
'As the subject of this article focuses on our visual depictions, consider
the following statement attributed to Renee Magrim, the surrealist painter:
"Eve-g we see hides something else we want to see." The later works of
Salvadore Dali (as examples, "Slave Market with the Disappearing Bust of
Voltaire," 1940; "The Hallucinogenic Toreador," 1970; and "Gala Contem-
plating the Mediterranean Sea," second version 1976) dmnaticallyillustrate
little more than this, with economic or financial factors being
the inputs, and spending or purchasing behavior being the
output. These early models contained numerous assumptions
we now recognize to have been untenable. Foremost among
these was the assumption that consumers can be expected to
operate "rationally," where rationality was generally defined
by reference to some external criterion.* Adopting this as-
sumption means that the significance of the consumer's men-
tal states and processes, as well as individual differences
across consumers, are minimized to the point of irrelevancy.
Essentially, consumers were conceptualized as reacting to ex-
ternal stimuli much as cue balls react to the angle and speed of
the impact of a cue stick.
Influenced by the wealth of relevant £indings adduced in
the social sciences, particularly psychology, a second genera-
tion of consumer behavior models began emerging in the
mid- 1960s. With the importance of factors internal to the in-
dividual no longer deniable, the simplistic I+O models gave
way to more sophisticated stimulus+organism+response
(S+O+R) models. In the 35 years since, CB texts at both the
graduate and undergraduate level generally have relied on
some form of S+O+R model. In contrast to the earlier I+O
models, contemporary models devote considerably greater
attention to elucidating internal organismic (0) factors than
either stimulus and input or output and response factors. In
fact, as depicted, one very insightful model goes so far as to
focus exclusively on the internal processes of the organism,
devoting no attention to either stimulus or response factors-
the emphasis on internal factors likely being a reaction to the
2Viawhat is known as the Law and Economics movement, this same per-
spective has permeated and exerted considerable influence in the legal arena
for the past 30 years. Further discussion of the questionof consumerrational-
ity may be found in Jacoby (2000).
52 JACOB JACOBY
overemphasis, at that time, on stimulus and response factors
(cf. Bettman, 1979,p. 17). Virtually all second generation CB
models share other notable characteristics as well.
PROBLEMS WITH OUR EXISTING
STIMULUS-ORGANISM-RESPONSE
MODELS
Although purporting to describe a fluid, dynamic process in-
fluenced by a multitude ofphenomena, the constructs and re-
lations that form the core of these models have almost always
been depicted as rigid, static boxes (or ovals, circles, etc.)
linked by various lines and arrows. Perhaps thls is to be ex-
pected. Most consumer behavior modelers have come fiom a
business school tradition where it makes perfect sense to de-
pict linear relations (e.g., chains of authority) or logically
temporal phenomena (e.g., the sequencing of tasks to accom-
plish a particular objective) as organizational charts and Pro-
gram Evaluation and Review Techtuque diagrams. Indeed,
there likely are many instances where CB phenomena also
may be "best fit" by a linear depiction (e.g., as when enumer-
ating the categories of choices available to the consumer con-
sidering whether and how to dispose of a product; Jacoby,
Berning, & Dietvorst, 1977, p. 23).
However, when the phenomena to be modeled are admit-
tedly nonlinear and not necessarilylogical, but psychological,
fluid, dynamic, and recursive, having enough feedback loops
to literally make one's head spin, then linear depictions likely
do them limitedjustice. Of greater concern, such linear depic-
tions may blind us to seeing important phenomena and rela-
tions, thereby impeding rather than facilitating understanding.
Moreover,with so many boxes and linkages, to the uninitiated
(e.g., students), suchmodels oftenassumethe intimidating ap-
pearance of a pipe-fitter's nightmare. As examples,the reader
has only to look at the following influential models that span
the past 3 decades: Andreason, 1965; Bettman, 1979; Engel,
Kollat, and Blackwell, 1968 (and successive editions);
Howard and Sheth, 1969 (p. 30); Hoyer and MacInnis, 1997
(p. 13);Nicosia, 1966(p. 156); and Wilkie (1990, p. 25; 1994,
p. 25). Notable exceptions are discussed later.
Two points need be noted at the outset. First, to emphasize
the pervasivenessof the problem, the models cited come from
the field's better-known introductory texts and treatises;
countless numbers of lesser known works in the field reflect
the very same problems. The author has to lookno W e r than
his own work to exclaim mea culpa! For example, many ofhis
works (e.g., Jacoby, 1984,p. 75; Jacoby &Hoyer, 1987,chap.
2; Jacoby & Szybillo, 1994, p. 239) rely on the traditional
General Communication Model involving sourcejmes -
sage+media+receiver+effects, which is little more than an
elaboration of Stimulus (source-+message+media), Organ-
ism (receiver) and Response (effects). Second, some draw a
distinction between scientific models and comprehensive
teaching models, contending that the latter are relatively easy
to criticize.Even assumingthisis so, as suchdepictionsmay be
hampering understanding, the fact that they are teaching mod-
els should not render them immune from having their limita-
tions noted. Constructive criticism is a fundamental aspect of
advancement in science.
Returning to limitations we see in the field's models, when
one considers how core constructs are portrayed pictorially
(as opposed to how these same constructs may be discussed in
the accompanyingtext), it sometimesbecomes difficult to de-
termine whether certain constructs belong to the stimulus
realm, the response realm, or the realm of the organism. For
example, in what was likely the most influential model of its
type, Engel, Blackwell, and Miniard (1986, p. 35) placed their
"marketer-dominated and "other" stimuli boxes at the ex-
treme left of their model, and their Social (qua Culture, Refer-
ence Groups, and Family) and "Situational influences" boxes
to the extremeright. Yet, do not the latter influences generally
serve as stimulus inputs or, at least, form part and parcel of the
organism's very core? A further problem was that, other than
a box labeled "External Search," as portrayed (vs. as dis-
cussed in the text), there seemed to be an absence of anythmg
meant to depict overt behavior. As depicted, the model fkiled
to incorporate any "boxes" representing either consumption
behavior or word-of-mouth communication, both of which
are fundamental forms of consumer response.
As another example, consider Hoyer and MacInnis (1 997,
p. 13). Although all the variables identified as part of the
"Psychological Core" clearly are aspects of the organism,
what about those listed under the "Process of Decision
Making?' In particular, are the "postdecision processes" or-
ganismic factors, response factors, or both? Although listed
under CB Outcomes, does not Symbolic CB also possess
stimulus and organismic characteristicsas well? Does not re-
sistance to adoption reflect a characteristic of the organism?
And how are we to characterize those factors listed as aspects
of the consumer's culture? Although part of the external envi-
ronment, once they impinge on and are incorporated by the
consumer, do not regional, ethnic, religious, social class, ref-
erence group, and other social influences actually operate as
internal stimuli?
Whereas the limitation just discussed pertains to a lack of
clarity in designating whether a particular phenomenon
should be represented as a stimulus, organism, or response
factor, a related limitation is the failure to grasp or accommo-
date for the fact that certain phenomena may be both stimuli
and responses. For example, are phenomena such as beliefs,
attitudes, intentions, and satisfactionstimulus inputs, aspects
of the organism or some form of response? Absent from most
depictions is any hint that these variables may serve two or all
three hctions.3 I suspect it is not that most CB modelers do
not somehow understand these possibilities. Rather, it is that
3~ notable exception is the 1969 Howard and Sheth model, where some of
the constructs(e.g.,attitudes, intentions) are conceptuaiizedasbeing both in-
ternal to the Organism as well as some form of Response.

they have not been able to come up with satisfactory ways of
depicting such relations that avoid becoming overly complex.
Struggling with the need to reflect greater interactivity in
CB processes and behavior, beginning in the mid-1980s, a
number of authors began thinking-and modeling-outside
the box(es). Reflecting evolution in their thinking, newer edi-
tions of the Engel, Kollat, and Miniard model moved away
from boxes and arrows depictions. Reversing course, the most
recent edition in this series (Blackwell, Miniard, & Engel,
200 1) again relies on boxes and connectingarrows set within a
sequence of mini-models (see pp. 7,7 1,72,74,75,77,79,8 1,
& 85). In contrast, other examples of "outside the box" think-
ing include the "wheel" models proffered by Peter and Olson
(1987, 1990, 1993, 1996, 1999,2002) and Solomon (1992,
1999). One ofour most influentialtheorists,Jagdish Sheth, re-
cently provided a treatment of consumer behavior (Sheth,
Mittal, & Newman, 1999) that contains no overall pictorial
model, but relies on more limited depictions, including dumb-
bells (p. 5), wheels (p. 97), and modified circles (p. 343).
Unfortunately, even these newer models possess a problem
in common with the earlier "boxes and arrows" models. Al-
though science is understood to proceed by incremental addit-
ions that build on prior knowledge, proceeding the way that we
have makes it unnecessarily difficult to see how ourmodels-
boxes and arrows, wheels, and so forth-relate to the more
widely accepted models of human behavior that preceded
them. At the very least, the current state of affairs makes it un-
necessarily difficult to compare and contrast the various mod-
els, or to identifytheir unique contributionsanddeficiencies.
To some, it may seem that, to develop anew CB model, all
one has to do is identify a number of variables thought to be
important, place these into boxes (or circles),arrange these al-
most anywhere on a page, then draw connecting lines. This
done, voila,the field has a new model. Added bells and whis-
tles include the depiction of feedback arrows to represent re-
cursive relations. A fundamental problem with this approach
is that, instead of being grounded in prior science, our con-
sumer behavior models seem to spring forth in medias res.
Moreover, there seems to be no generally accepted h e
work against which our models can be compared and evalu-
ated. How is one able to determine whether (and, if so, to what
extent) the new model is an improvement over existing mod-
els? If it cannot, in some way, be shown to be an improvement,
then it seems legitimate to ask whether it serves to further or to
detract from the development of thinking in thls field.
Moreover, consider the implications for the future. As the
field progresses,we continue to conceptualize new factors and
relations believed to exert important influences on CB. As we
do, the number ofpotential combinationsand permutations of
relevant variables and relations increases exponentially. Thus,
there seems to be no end to the number of boxes, arrows, and
organizational chart models that can be developed. Yet, the en-
tire process reflects a certain degree of arbitrariness. Each
modeler has his or her own ideas of what factors should be in-
cluded and what factors should be omitted from their model.
MODELING CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 53
Althoughthisis as it shouldbe, is itpossible that the fieldcould
benefit fkom a scientifically grounded, generally accepted
h e w o r k to guide the development and evaluation of these
models? I now turn to outlining such a h e w o r k .
RECONCEPTUALIZING
STIMULUS-ORGANISM-RESPONSE
Recognize that my principal focus is not, for the most part,
with the intellectual content of these models, but with how
they are pictorially portrayed. In a manner that seeks to be re-
sponsive to the criticisms offered earlier, the h e w o r k for
depicting CB models proposed here should assist in the devel-
opment and especially the evaluation of such models.
The framework is actually quite simple. It begins with the
traditional Stimulus, Organism, and Response. However, in-
stead of displaying these in the sequential (S+O+R) manner,
it depicts them as overlappingcircles forming a Venn diagram.
Doing so creates the 7-sector framework depicted in Figure 1.
Where they create boundaries within each other, dashed lines
are used to indicate that these boundaries are permeable.
Actually, it may make most sense to view this system
three-dimensionally. This is easily accomplished if we con-
sider it as a round hill that can be described in terms of a series
of irregularly shaped topographical lines. As is the case on
sloping blls, although the topography occasionally dlps
downward at some points, generally it moves upward as we
proceed from the outer sectors inward to Sector 4, the latter
sitting as a plateau. In this way, entry to the Sector 4 plateau is
achieved only with some effort and after exceeding some
threshold level. Threshold levels at each boundary may vary
as a function of simultaneous ongoing activity at the other
boundaries. As described later, although a plateau, Sector 4 is
terraced where it meets Sectors 2,3, and 6, so that thoughts,
feelings, and internal responses, and so forth, can easily roll
off into these sectors.Although generally sloping downward,
as these sectors do contain nooks, crannies, and gullies, it is
possible that items rolling off the plateau need not roll all the
way down to the far end of one of these other sector^.^
Even when depicted two-dimensionally, the basic Stimu-
lus-Organism-Response (S-O-R) h e w o r k becomes
much richer. In addition to Sector 4 (which represents what is
generally termed the cognitive workspace, short-term mem-
ory, working or active memory), there are three types of stimu-
lus factors,threetypes oforganismicfactors, andthreetypes of
response factors. Briefly, these may be described as follows.
4Subsequentto presenting thls notion during the address on which this
article is based, the author became aware of a compatible notion pro-
pounded by Hobson (1999, p. 223): "[consciousness] is continuously
graded at every instant, from the fully automaticnon-consciousprocessing
reflex adjustment ... to the equally automatic but exigent and intrusive
forces of instinct ... to the semiconsciousruminations ... to the fully con-
scious deliberate plane ... ."
54 JACOB JACOBY
FIGURE 1 Toward reconceptualizing Stimulus4rganismRe-
sponse: A temporally bound twodimensional representation. Sec-
tors of the psychological system: 1 = ~ncountered~nvironment;2=
Automatic Processing; 3 = Experiential Storehouse;4 = Conscious-
ness; 5 = Nontrace Stimulus-Response Events; 6 = Internal Re-
sponses; 7 = External Responses.
Stimulus Sector Factors
Sector 1 consists of the environment as encountered by the in-
dividual at a particular moment in time. This includes all
things that we generally understand to be external stim-
uli-namely products, brands, logos, ads, packages, prices,
stores and store environments, word-of-mouth communica-
tions, newspapers, television, and countless of other imping-
ing factors. In other words, Sector 1 is best understood as a
"package" of many, often interacting and competing stimuli.
Our task is to identify these and parse out their individual and
interacting influences. Note that Sector 1 is not thought to in-
clude the list of socioculturalfactors (e.g., culture, subculture,
social class, ethnic and religious background, membership
and aspirational groups, etc.) typically depicted as inputs by
many of our models. According to our thinking, these factors
generally reside in memory (Sector 3), having been intro-
duced as part of the environment encountered at earlier
point(s) in time. The only exception would be when they oc-
cur as part of the proximal stimulus package of the moment
(e.g., shopping with a friend).
Encountering environmental stimuli does not guarantee
that these will be experienced,either consciouslyor even sub-
consciously. Many never make it up the hill to Sector 4. Yet,
although not guaranteeing attention, research shows that
mere exposure sometimes leads to subconscious processing
(Jacoby & Brooks, 1984; Jacoby, Lindsay, & Toth, 1992).
When this happens, we enter the realm of Sector 2 phenom-
ena. If these phenomena later find representation in Sector 3
(discussed later), we give such phenomena labels like implicit
learning and learning without awareness. Indeed, Bargh
(1997) argued that, as opposed to being mediated by con-
scious thought and reflection, most psychological phenom-
ena (including how we perceive and interpret the outside
world) are essentially automatic and unconscious in nature.
Bargh's work (also see Wegner & Bargh, 1998) suggests the
possibility that many psychological phenomena, including
behavior (Sector 7), may engage all sectors other than Sector
4, our consciousness of the moment.
Also feeding into Sector 2 are stimuli that surface within
the organism (i.e., come from Sector 3), oftenhaving been ac-
tivated by changes in the individual's physiological or bio-
chemical systems.An example of the latter would be changes
in the person's blood sugar level causing the person to think.
"I'm hungry and thirsty." Also included here would be the ef-
fects of such things as antidepressant and "street" drugs that
alter beliefs and behavior.
Sector 5 contains those stimulus-response (S-R) connec-
tions (such as reflex behavior, or chemicallyinduced changes
in behavior) that fail to register at apsychological level. These
S-R relations are automatic and leave no psychological trace
of their occurrence. For example, although changes in room
temperature might fail to register on the individual's con-
sciousness, they nonetheless might lead to the individual en-
gaging in behavioral responses of which he or she remains to-
tally unaware (e.g., loosening one's tie, shifting one's weight
in a chair). It is only when these temperature changes exceed
threshold (and are experienced as "Gee, it's warm in here")
that they are sufficiently strong to move higher up the hill and
enter Sector 4 rather than Sector 5.
Sector 4, the sector that typicaily attracts most attention,
represents our consciousness of the moment, or our "aware-
ness of being aware" (Zaltman, 2000, p. 427). This sector in-
cludes the individual's active motives, moods, perceptions,
cognitions,and so forth. It represents the confluence of stimu-
lus, organism, and response factors and is deliberately meant
to suggest that we generally do not stop everythingto sequen-
tially process incoming stimuli. Rather, as we receive and
process stimulus inputs, we are concurrently responding (per-
haps only internally) to those and other inputs. Also note that
even at the Sector4 plateau, the terrain is hilly, so that entering
stimuli (those that are not fully processed or rehearsed) can
roll off, likely into Sectors 2 or 7.
Organismic Sector Factors
Sector 2 has been described as the realm where we subcon-
sciously process incoming stimuli, internally activated stim-
uli, or both. Sector 4 has been described as the realm where
we consciously process stimuli incoming from both Sectors
1 and 2.
Sector 3 is essentially the storehouse of the individual's
emotive and cognitivesystems, including all retained prior ex-
periences, and is generally referredto as "long-termmemory."
This sector includesprior experiences,knowledge, beliefs, at-
titudes, predispositions, intentions, values, cognitive net-
works, schema, scripts, motives, the individual's personality,
feelings, impressions, images, expectations, and so forth, in-

volving brands, companies, services, logos, and so forth. Ob-
viously quite vast, the contents of this realm can be conceptu-
alized as being topographically arranged in Freudian-like
levels. Someare very closetothe top ofthe hill and easily avail-
able to consciousness (Sector 4), although others are subcon-
scious, residmg somewhere in a deep gully and inaccessible
and impossible to retrieve. According to this fiamework, none
of the socioculturaI factors often identified inmost CB models
are considered inputs to the individual's decision processes
until and unless they first have been internalized by the indi-
vidual so that they reside somewhere in Sector 3.5
Sector 6 contains those outcomes from Sector4 that are not
directlyvisible to an outsider.These include learning, changes
in beliefs, attitudes, intentions, impressions, judgments (e.g.,
of risk, of quality), satisfaction, and so forth. It is likely that
many Sector 6 outputs shift rather rapidly into Sector 3.
Response Sector Factors
Sector4 contains mental responses ofthe moment ofwhich the
individual is consciously aware. Sector 5 contains those re-
sponses that have neverpenetrated that person's psychological
core, either consciously (via Sector 4) or unconsciously (via
Sector 2). Sector 6 represents the internal (i.e., nonvisible) re-
sponses, which, although no longer conscious (i.e., in Sector
4), result fiom prior conscious processing.
Sector 7, on the other hand, consists of all those responses
that are (or, in some cases, canbemade to be) externallydetect-
able. These include nonverbal responses, verbal responses,
and behavioral responses. Subsumed within this realm are the
physical and physiological responses (such as galvanic skin
responses, eye fixations,pupil dilations,etc.), smiles, commu-
nicative acts (e.g., groans, letterwriting, word-of-mouth com-
munications), as well as the acquisition, usage, storage and
disposal of products, services, time, and ideas.
It needs to be emphasized that the adumbrated fkamework
concentrates on the individual's psychological system. Com-
plicating matters is the fact that, at any given moment in time,
the psychological system can and does interact with the con-
tents and limitations of the individual's other systems. These
include the individual's physical system (e.g., height, weight,
hair color, baldness, etc.), demographic system (e.g., places
ofbirth and past and current residence, age, educational level,
marital status, income and savings, etc.), and biochemical,
physiological, and neuro-sensory systems. For example, a
committee of the National Research Council recently re-
ported the following:
Positron emission tomography (PET) and functional mag-
netic resonance imagery (MRI) literally show that the mind
does not follow a single "train of thought," but rather that
'The reader is directed to related notions described in Brothers (1997) and
Zaltman (2000).
MODELING CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 55
thinking happens in neural networks, or sets of coordinated,
but simultaneous neural events in relatively small, some-
times widely separated areas of the brain (Druckrnan &
Lacey, 1989; Posner & Raichle, 1994). We can see in the
brain that the mind is not a passive receptacle for ideas, but
an active constructor of sensations, patterns and meanings.
(1998, p. 81)
Relatedly, a reviewer of this article commented that reading
"Antonio Demasio's recent books, Descartes'Emr (1995)
and The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the
Making of Consciousness (1999), you get the idea that every-
thing internally is completely networked and integrated. His
neurological studies reflect significant interactivityas well as
complete integration of emotion, cognition and biochemical
response." I return to this notion later.
Accommodating Change: The Temporal
Dimension
The formulation discussed earlier represents a cross-sec-
tional point in time. Yet, as we know, the individual changes
over time. The motives, moods, attitudes, and so forth, that
operate at Time 1 (e.g., prepurchase) may not be the same as
those operating at some subsequent point in time, Time 2
(e.g., postpurchase usage, storage, disposal). Accordingly, to
accommodatethe temporal dimension, the model needs to be
seen as being multiply-replicated along a time line, as de-
picted in Figure 2. Once this is done, it becomes easier to visu-
alize and diagram some of the fundamental sequential activi-
ties discussed in our literature.
Consider, for example, the notion of instrumentallearning.
Figure 3 shows a simplistic chart I developed in the mid- 1970s
to help me better explain the notion of instrumentallearning to
introductory students. It places the concepts of
Drive+Cue+Response+Consequence into a context that il-
lustrates the impact of experience on one's response hierar-
chles. Using the S U R model adumbrated earlier, this illus-
tration may now be recast as in Table 1. (One benefit of doing
so is that it enables us to begin analyzingconsumerpsychology
and consumerbehavior interms oftime points, time spans, and
time intervals; Jacoby, Beming, & Szybillo, 1976,p. 333). As
exemplified via Figure 3 and Table 1, the S-0-R h e w o r k
presented in Figure 2 can be used in conjunction with existing
linear models to enhance our ability to see, clarify, and de-
scribe certain relations, thereby facilitating understanding.
Although relations among many of our core phenomena
(such as instrumental learning, involving, as it does, motiva-
tion, exposure, attention,retrieval fiom memory, behavior, ex-
perience, satisfaction,changes in response probabilities, etc.)
span several sectors,other core phenomenacanbe conceptual-
ized as occurring primarily within a single sector, particularly
Sector 3. For example, when information from Sector 1 enters
Sector4 and combines with informationretrieved fiom Sector
 3 to create anew belief, this belief is then stored in Sector 3. At
that point, it seems likely that any of the changes that are theo-
rized to subsequentlyoccurin related attitudes,intentions, and
in our cognitive networks, probably all occur at a level below
consciousness-that is, within Sector 3.

CONTRASTING THE REVISED S-O-R

FRAMEWORK WITH EXTANT MODELS

Relative to extant models, the framework just described ap-

pears to possess a number of positive features, including the
following. First, it is simultaneously compatible with the h n -
damental S-0-R model that has traditionally provided the
foundation for the socialand managerial sciences, althoughat
the same time being able to accommodate more recent k d -
t2 -- ings (e.g., automatic processing). Second, although admitting
to considerableelaboration, at core, it is parsimonious, entail-
ing only seven sectors or categories of variables. Third, with
one exceptiondiscussed later, these seven sectors are believed
to be exhaustive in identifyingthe types ofvariables thought to
be necessary for understanding the psychological dynamics
underlying individual consumer behavior. Fourth, the h e
work is also flexible, as it permits countless numbers of modi-
fications, additions to, and deletions from, each of these seven
sectors. Fifth, the h e w o r k should make it easier to identify,
visualize, and understand certain cross-sector, dynamic, and
recursive relations (e.g., Figure 3). Sixth, by showing how the
variables in extant models map onto the h e w o r k ' s seven
sectors, the h e w o r k should also make it easier to compare
and contrast the various models, enabling us to identify where
each is strong or deficient and the contributionmade by each.
Seventh, in contrast to the boxes and lines depictions that we
V now provide our students, this h e w o r k may make it easier
for them to understand where and how the various factors
come into play.
FIGURE 2 Reconceptualizing Stimulus4rganism-Response: As noted previously, an important limitation remains. Ad-
The basic two-dimensional representation over time. mittedly, numerous other internal factors (e.g., the individ-
Initial Resultant Response
++ ~ e s p o n s e + m __+-
__+
G3x=wmm
+Tendency Hierarchy
Hierarchv

(Innate.

l want
a drink*
C1 -Budweiser
-
Learned) C2 Pabst
-
"I'm Thirsty, C3 Hamms
C4 - Schlitz

C5 - Chief
Oshkosh -
-30
.25
.25
.I5

.05
Schlitz
Satisfying

-unsatisfying -
--b Reinforcement

Extinction
Ci:
C2:
C3:
*c4:

C5:
.32
.26
.26
.I0

.06

FIGURE 3 Illustrating instrumental learning.


ual's physiological, neurological, and biochemical systems)
and external influences (e.g., the actions of corporations and
governmental policies) can and do affect CB. Somehow these
factors need to be accommodated.This suggests that the Venn
diagram approach just presented may be but an evolutionary
step in the developmentof more sophisticatedmodels. In turn,
it may come to be seen as having serious limitations and some-
thing that needs to be replaced by more sophisticated thinking
and modeling. However, I leave this challenge to others.
Here, we take as fundamental that it is psychological reality,
not objective reality, which determines our behavior. As de-
picted, the model's seven sectors seem to comprehensivelyand
exhaustively cover the categories of variables comprising the
individual's phenomenological world that need to be consid-
ered when studying CB. As noted, others are likely to see prob-
lems and extensions I have not envisioned. Anyone so inclined
is thus invited and encouraged to expand on the model as he or
she sees fit. I hope the study of CB will be the beneficiary.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
T h ~ article
s is based on the first portion of the author's "Dis-
tinguished Scientific Contribution Award" address presented
to the Society of Consumer Psychology (Jacoby, 1999).
I acknowledge with appreciation the numerous helpful
suggestions regarding tlus article provided by David
Schumann.
REFERENCES
Andreason, Alan R. (1965). Attitudes and consumer behavior: A Decision
Model. In Lee Preston (Ed.), Nav research in marketing. Berkeley, CA:
Institute ofBusiness andEconomicResearch, University of California.
Bargh, John A. (1997). The automaticity of everyday life, 1-61. In Robert S.
Wyer, Jr. &John A. Bargh (Eds.),The automaticityof eveiyday life: Ad-
vances in social cognition (Vol. 10). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Inc.
Blackwell, Roger D., Miniard, Paul W., & Engel, James F. (200 1). Consumer
behavior (9th ed.). New York: Harcourt Inc.
Bettman, James R. (1 979). An information processing theov of consumer
choice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Board of Behavioral, Cognitive, and Sensory Sciences; Commission on Be-
havioral and Social Sciences and Education of the National Research
Council. (1998). Committee report. Psychological Science, 9,79-90.
Brothers, Leslie. (1997). Friday's footprint: How society shapes the human
mind. New York Oxford University Press.
Demasio, Antonio. (1995). Decartes 'error: Emotion, reason, and the human
brain. East Rutherford, NJ: Putnam.
Demasio, Antonio. (1999). Thefeeling of what happens: Body and emotion
in the making of consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Druckman, Daniel, &. Lacey, John I. (1989). Brain andcognition: Some new
technologies. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Engel, James F., Blackwell, Roger D., & Miniard, Paul W. (1986). Consumer
behavior (5th ed.). New York: CBS College Publishing.
Engel, James F., Kollat, David T., & Blackwell, Roger D. (1968). Consumer
behavior New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.
Hobson, J. Allan. (1999). Consciousness.New York: ScientificAmerican Li-
brary.
View publication stats
MODELING CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 57
Howard, John A,, & Sheth, Jagdish N. (1969).The theory of buyer behavior
New York: Wiley.
Hoyer, Wayne D., & MacInnis, Deborah J. (1997).Commer behavior.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Jacoby, Jacob. (1984). Some social psychologicalperspectives on closing. In
Jacob Jacoby and Samuel C. Craig (Eds.), Personal selling: Theory, re-
search andpractice. Lexington, MA: D.C. HeaWLexington.
Jacoby, Jacob. (1999, ~eb-)."~e-conceptualizing the way we model and
study consumer behavior." Fifth "Distinguished ScientificContribution
Award" address of the Societyofconsumer Psychology, St. Petersburg,
FL.
Jacoby, Jacob. (2000). Is it rational to assume consumer rationality? Con-
sumer psychological perspectives on Rational Choice Theory. Roger
Williams University Law Review (Fall).
Jacoby, Jacob, Beming, Carol A. K., & Dietvorst, Thomas. (1977). What
about disposition? Journal of Marketing, 41, 22-28.
Jacoby, Jacob, Beming, Carol A. K., & Szybillo, George J. (1976). Timeand
consumer behavior: An interdisciplinary overview. Journal of Con-
sumer Research, 2, 320-339.
Jacoby, Jacob, & Hoyer, Wayne D. (1987). The comprehension and
miscomprehension ofprint communications. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Jacoby, Jacob, & Szybillo, George J. (1994). Why disclaimers faiL The
Trademark Reporter, 84, 224-244.
Jacoby, Lany L., & Brooks, L. R. (1984). Nonanalytic cognition: Memory,
perception and concept learning. In Gordon Bower (Ed.), Thepsychol-
ogy of learning and motivation: Advances in research and theory (Vol.
18, 147). New York: Academic.
Jacoby, Lany L., Lindsay, D. Stephen, & Toth, Jefiey P. (1992). Uncon-
scious influences revealed: Attention, awareness and control.American
Psychologist, 47, 802-809.
Nicosia, Franco. (1966). Consumer decision processes: Marketing and ad-
vertising implications. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Peter, J. Paul, & Olson, Jeny C. (1987).Consumer behavior and marketing
strategv. Chicago: Irwin.
Peter, J. Paul, & Olson, Jeny C. (1990).Consumer behavior and marketing
strategy (2nd ed.). Chicago: Irwin.
Peter, J. Paul, & Olson, Jeny C. (1993).Consumer behavior and marketing
strategy (3rd ed.). Chicago: Irwin.
Peter, J. Paul, & Olson, Jerry C. (1996).Consumer behavior and marketing
strategy (4th ed.). Chicago: Irwin.
Peter, J. Paul, & Olson, Jeny C. (1999).Consumer behavior and marketing
strategy (5th ed.). Chicago: Irwin.
Peter, J. Paul, & Olson, Jeny C. (2002).Consumer behavior and marketing
strategy (6th ed.). Chicago: Irwin.
Posner,Michael I., &. Raichle, Markus E. (1994). Images ofmind. New York:
Freeman.
Sheth, Jagdish N., Mittal, Banwari, & Newman, Bruce I. (1999).Customer
behavior: Consumer behavior and beyond. New York: Dryden.
Solomon, Michael R. (1992).Consumer behavior Needham Heights, MA:
Allyn & Bacon. Solomon, Michael R. (1999).Consumer behavior (4th
4 . ) . Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Wegner, Daniel M., & Bargh, John A. (1998).Control and automaticity in so-
cial life. In Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, & GardnerLindzey (Eds.),
The handbook of socialpsychology (4th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 446-496).
Whorf, Benjamin Lee. (I 940). Science and linguistics. TechnologvReview
XZIY 221-23 1,247-248.
Wilkie, William L. ( 1990).Consumerbehavior (2nd ed.).New York: Wiley.
Wikie, William L. (1994).Consumer behavior (3rd 4 . ) . New York: Wiley.
Zaltman, Gerald. (2000).Consumer researchers: Take a hike! Journal of Con-
sumer Research, 26,423428.
Accepted by Guest Editor David Schumann.
Manuscript solicited by Curt Haughtvedt.