Towards the Sixth Generation (6G) Wireless

Systems: Thoughts on Physical Layer Security

Christoph Lipps† , Shaden Baradie† , Marjan Noushinfar† ,
Jan Herbst† , Andreas Weinand∗ and Hans Dieter Schotten∗†
† Intelligent Networks Research Group, German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence
D-67663 Kaiserslautern, Email: {firstname.lastname}@dfki.de
∗ Institute for Wireless Communication and Navigation, University of Kaiserslautern

D-67663 Kaiserslautern, mail: {lastname}@eit.uni-kl.de

Abstract
Wireless communication has already had a transformative impact on lifestyles, as well as the way of interacting and
communicating, throughout many years. This transformation is accelerated by technological drivers such as Artificial Intelligence
(AI) as well as the ever-increasing demand for bandwidth and throughput. However, it is already foreseeable that the Fifth
Generation (5G) cellular networks will not be sufficient to cope with the volume of mobile communication in 2030 and beyond.
This paper considers Beyond 5G (B5G) and Sixth Generation (6G) mobile communications and outlines challenges for them.
Alongside the technical requirements, the security, confidentiality and trustworthiness are of major importance. Therefore, the
paper discusses the various 6G research areas such as Visible Light Communication (VLC), Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfaces
(RISs) and (sub)Terahertz (THz) communication and highlights how the research areas contribute to Physical Layer Security
(PhySec) and how the development of 6G will act as catalyst for PhySec.

Please note: This work is a preprint.

Index Terms
Physical Layer Security, Next Generation Mobile Networks, Channel-PUFs, Network Security, B5G, 6G

I. D RIVING THE COMMUNICATION OVERLOAD applications, arise.

Confidentiality and integrity have always been the prereq-
uisites for trustworthy and secure communication. But it is
becoming increasingly challenging to achieve this objective.
Among others, the vast amount of communication participants
and exchanged information is what turns the task into such
a comprehensive one. For instance, it is expected by the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) that the total
number of Mobile Broadband (MBB) subscribers worldwide
will reach 17.1 billion by 2030 [1]. In addition the prediction
of Machine-to-Machine (M2M) terminals will reach about
100 billion -this is 14 times over that of 2020- by the
same period of time [1]. This quantity not only poses high
demands on security, but more fundamentally, the current
communication infrastructure (backbone) is not capable of
handling this amount of data. As the 5G cellular networks
is in its global realization, Jiang et al. forecast that this is not
enough to accommodate the volume of mobile traffic in 2030
and beyond [2].
This trend is emphasised by the development of a wide
range of new use cases such as Hologaphic-Type Com-
munication (HTC), Extended Reality (ER), Digital Twins,
Visible Light Communication (VLC) and Distributed Ledger
Technology (DLT) which require high data rates, bandwidths
and comprehensive coverage. Alongside that, applications and
devices with extremely low-resources, for instance, Body
Area Networks (BANs) with implantable sensors for medical
A starting point to meet these requirements in the future
is represented by Beyond 5G (B5G) and the Sixth Gen-
eration (6G) wireless systems, suggesting a massive switch
to automation and a deployment of the so-called intelligent
wireless communications through the Industrial Internet of
Things (IIoT). This requires a very high level of reliability
and as few power limitations as possible in order to ensure
a secure and reliable environment which is able to hold real-
time communications without any outages [3][4]. The aspired
future of communications describes the network to be fully
and globally connected [2]. With this high level of connectivity
between various types of end devices and the lack of human
interaction in some cases due to automation and dynamic
reconfiguration, more opportunities for malicious attacks and
actions of interfering are opened, which stresses the necessity
of new more reliable security measures.
In terms of Next Generation Mobile Networks (NGMNs)
security, Physical Layer Security (PhySec) [5] may become
a promising alternative: As traditionally security has been
implemented in higher layers of communication networks and
thereby have been addressed separately from the wireless
transmission, information theory offers a solution to simul-
taneously use the characteristics of the channel for security in
addition to pure data transmission. PhySec is considered as a
promising approach to improve the network’s security and reli-
ability levels while continuing to benefit from the features that
wireless networks have to offer, like for example, their high
flexibility, scalability and their low costs of maintenance and
manufacturing. But, by using inherently available information.
It provides security measures and precautions at the lowest
level of communication, which in turn helps in overcoming
bandwidth, reliability and transmission rates limitations [3].
This work outlines the beneficial and promising application
of PhySec in the upcoming wireless network generations and
their future developments in terms of security and reliability.
By highlighting the 6G enabling technological developments
and challenges from the perspective of 6G-PhySec, the addi-
tional value in terms of security and applicability is clarified.
Therefore, in Section II, a short introduction to the field of
PhySec is given and current research activities are highlighted.
The challenges for B5G and 6G networks are discussed in
Section III and PhySec solutions to meet these challenges
are identified. Section IV gives an insight into 6G research
topics and highlights how they are beneficial to the PhySec
deployment. Section V summarises the paper.
II. P HYSICAL L AYER S ECURITY
Especially since the proliferation of use-cases, PhySec is
becoming increasingly popular in the scientific community.
Not just for the IIoT and the multitude of resource-limited
devices, it represents alternatives in terms of scalability and
efficiency, moreover it provides security aspects in respect to
entropy H and Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). Due to the
inherently available and exploitable nature of cryptographic
primitive, combinations of different PhySec derivatives are of
increasing relevance.
A. Physical Layer Security in a Nutshell
Alongside the well-known hardware-based Physically Un-
clonable Functions (PUFs) -also known as silicon/electrical
-Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [6]-, the wire-
less Physical Layer Security -also refered to as Channel-
PUFs [3]-, are gaining popularity. For both, the working
principle, the utilization of inherent characteristics to derive
crpytographic primitives, is quite similar. Channel-PUFs are
based on the propagation of electromagnetic waves and the
influences of various (environmental) factors on these. They
are exploiting the randomness of (noisy) channels to provide
an additional level of security.
These variations are observed and analyzed by performance
metrics that highlight the possibility of having an eaves-
dropper intruding on the monitored channel. The most used
performance metric in the PhySec’s evaluation of a certain
connection is the secrecy capacity, which is the difference
in capacity between the legitimate channel and the channel
of the eavesdropper. This metric defines the maximum secret
rate, which indicates to what extent the sent information is
correctly decoded and recovered on the targeted destination
while being kept a secret from the eavesdropper. Besides the
secrecy capacity there are other performance metrics either
related to the evaluation of the secrecy capacity like the
secrecy outage probability, for instance, which measures its
effectiveness, and some metrics that offer an alternative in
the case of secrecy not being achieved or having failures in
recovery at the targeted destination like the alternative secrecy
outage formulation [7].
B. Cellular-PhySec: an ongoing field of research
For several years, especially since the rise of inter-
connectivity and the connection of low-resource (end)devices,
PhySec has been a very active field of research. Starting
with Secret Key Generation (SKG) and Channel-Reciprocity
Based Key Extraction (CRKE) in IEEE802.11 WLAN net-
works, there are many approaches to use the algorithms
in legacy radio networks such as Long Range Wide Area
Network (LoRaWAN) [8] and Long Term Evolution (LTE)
[3]. For instance Lipps et al. propose to apply Machine
Learning (ML) in form of the linear regression algorithm
to enhance the channel prediction -as basic building block
of SKG- and thus achieve a significant improvement in the
Bit Disagreement Rate (BDR) [3]. Yang et al. suggest to use
PhySec to safeguard 5G wireless communication [9], whereas
Sánches et al. provide a comprehensive survey about PhySec
in 5G networks [7]. Thereby they take into account different
5G enabling technologies, such as mmWave communication,
heterogeneous networks and massive Multiple Input Multiple
Output (mMIMO) systems. Security aspects regarding cellular
Internet of Things (IoT) networks and how to design a secure
access, enabled by PhySec is given by Qi et al. [10]. The
paradigm shift in enabling technology to 6G is done, for
instance, by Chorti et al. [11]. They are dealing with context-
aware security in 6G networks and outline the benefits of
PhySec in 6G. Li et al. address the edge caching in 6G
networks and propose a two-hop edge caching scheme secured
by PhySec [12].
In contrast to this, six different 6G research areas are ad-
dressed in this paper, with an explicit focus on the applicability
to Physical Layer Security methods: Reconfigurable Intelli-
gent Surfaces, Visible Light Communication, Ultra-Massive
MIMO, (sub)THz communication, localization & Sensing, as
well as Link Integrity monitoring.
III. B EYOND 5G AND 6G C OMMUNICATIONS
As indicated in Section I, the current 5G networks are not
capable to fulfill the upcoming requirements of the exponential
growth of traffic and continuous need for improvement in the
network efficiencies with respect to cost, energy, spectrum
and operational efficiency. The emergence of new fields of
applications such as HTC, ER, Tactile internet, Digital Twins,
pervasive intelligence and global ubiquitous connectability
underlines this development [2].
To meet these growing demands, for instance, Jiang et
al. propose to complement the existing 5G scenarios -Ultra-
Reliable Low-Latency Communication (URLLC), massive
Machine Type Communication (MMTC), enhanced Mobile
broad-Band (eMBB)- to be extended by ’interim’ scenarios ac-
cording to the assigned application areas: Ultra-Reliable Low-
Latency Broadband Communication (ULBC), massive Ultra-
Reliable Low-Latency Communication (mULC), ubiquious
Mobile Broadband (uMBB) [2].
These represent a proposal to meet the emerging require-
ments. In addition, this offers the opportunity to address the
requirements not yet solved by 5G, such as latency, mobility,
energy efficiency and peak data rate. Furthermore, with signal
bandwidth, positioning accuracy, coverage, as well as security
and privacy aspects, additional requirements arise which can
be realized by the development of 6G.
A. 6G technological enablers
For the development of the new 6G mobile standard, there
are a whole series of technological enablers, enhancements
of existing technologies. Thus, for instance, new spectrum is
available for the next generation of mobile communications.
This features sufficient capacity for heterogeneous Radio Ac-
cess Technology (RAT), whereas long-established RATs can
co-exist with lower radio frequencies and Line of Sight (LoS)-
dependent RATs as well. This available spectrum includes:
mmWave- Terahertz-, Visible Light- and Optical Wireless
Communication in general, as well as the overall dynamic
management of this spectrum.
In addition, there are enablers with respect to the networking
and routing itself. The main drivers are the softwarization and
virtualization of networks, the Radio Access Networks (RAN)
slicing and the Open-RAN approach.
A significant change will be necessary in order to
achieve widespread coverage, also beyond the mainland area
-especially for maritime and oceanic applications-, but also in
wild terrestrial areas. Therefore Integrated Space and Terres-
trial Networks (ISTNs) are an emerging topic.
A critical role in the development of 6G is expected to be
given by AI. It will be particularly interesting to see how edge
AI, intelligent edge computing and learning in the wireless
edge will impact mobile networks. As centralized machine
learning can suffer from critical security [11], decentralized
solutions can serve as enabling technologies for 6G.
Based on these enablers, 6G opens up a wide range of
advantages over current networks.
B. Benefits of 6G
The benefits of 6G are highlighted in the suggested usage
scenarios, in which the ubiquitousness of the 6G network
–in the sense that the network has global availability and
connectivity– can be translated into stronger features of mobil-
ity, coverage and positioning, which leads to better support for
disruptive services. Besides providing URLLC, 6G networks
also provide communication with extremely high throughput
which will be beneficial for services like, HTC, ER, the Tactile
Internet, multi-sense experience and pervasive intelligence
[2]. In their ”roadmap to 6G security” Porambage et al.
describe areas of application which benefit from the increased
connectivity, ultra low-latency (sub ms) and level of capacity
(Tbps) [13]. These include among others Unmanned Arial
Vehicless (UAVs), Connected Autonomous Vehicless (CAVs),
Smart Grid 2.0 and the Industry 5.0.
Among the advantages of (sub)terahertz applications is that
they easily absorb moisture in the air and are therefore suitable
for high-speed wireless communication over short distances.
Terahertz communication provides a narrow beam -up to
pencil-sharp beamforming- and superior beam directivity, re-
sulting in secure communication achieved through strong anti-
interference capability.
The involvement of VLC hardens the system, as VLC i) uses
electromagnetic radiation in a different wavelength domain,
and is hence not susceptible to external electromagnetic in-
terference and ii) enables targeted communication. Moreover,
since VLC does not penetrate walls, it is not subject to the
same attack vectors as broadcast radio communication.
Besides that, the virtualization of additional components,
such as the PHY- and the MAC layer, will decrease the costs of
network equipment and thereby supports the massively dense
deployment of the technology.
C. Challenges for 6G networks
Despite all the promises and visions, there are a number of
challenges that need to be addressed during design. This is
nothing novel, as each new generation of wireless networks
tries to overcome the limitations of the previous generation
and further enhance its capabilities. Since 5G still lacks the
high requirements in order to support the Internet of Every-
thing (IoE), 6G is focusing its development in the following
directions: pushing the communication further to the mm-wave
and (sub)THz frequency bands, considering reconfigurable
surfaces that transform the radio environment into a smart
one and reevaluating the cell structure by considering cell-free
massive MIMO. However, in practice each of these improve-
ments comes with its challenges. For instance, the suggested
expansion into higher frequency bands requires new measures
and considerations in terms of packaging, transceiver design
and measurement, as well as standardization techniques, due
to the signal and performance parameters degradation at high
frequencies. Second, in order to avoid the power consuming
and complex hardware architecture of the phased arrays,
Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfaces (RISs) are being examined
for 6G and they can be challenging in their design and dy-
namic reconfiguration. Also, it is challenging enough that the
applicability of cell-free MIMO in practice is still unclear. The
high multiplexing and array gain, the huge energy efficiency,
the high connectivity and the low-cost low-power components
of the access points, all of these game-changing benefits stress
the need for cell-free MIMO. Let alone its own challenges,
the structure of cell-free MIMO also adds new challenges in
the area of signal processing, as it encourages the generation
of high-dimensional and increasingly complex signals adding
more impairments to the signals such as interference [14].
IV. P HYSICAL L AYER S ECURITY AND THE 6G W IRELESS
S YSTEMS
As already indicated, the development of 6G offers the
option of integrating a variety of new technologies each with
certain benefits for the application of Physical Layer Security.
RISs, for example, open up a whole portfolio of approaches,
but VLC and the use of higher frequency ranges also create
starting points for improving PhySec but are also suitable for
positioning and localization applications.
A. Reconfigurable Intelligent Surfaces
During the realization of the 6G systems, RISs [15] are
expected to take a significant part. These special -intelligent-
man-made surfaces consists of sub-wavelength wide elements
each of which can be controlled individually. By reflecting
the incoming waves and steering them into desired directions,
they enable the manipulation and reconfiguration of the wire-
less propagation environment. Thereby they provide multiple
worthwhile security related applications:
1) RIS-enabled Channel-Profiles: By controlling the RIS
cells/meta-surfaces one can manipulate the radiation charac-
teristics. As the PhySec-SKG is based on individual channel
profiles, it can be actively influenced by RISs.
2) RIS-enabled Anti-Jamming: The broadcast characteris-
tics of the wireless systems render them vulnerable to jam-
ming: (intentional) interference from other signals. RISs en-
able constructively and destructively superimposition whereby
the interference signals can be mitigated. Phase-shifting sig-
nals ensure that just legitimate devices receive signals.
3) RIS-based Beamforming and -splitting: As mentioned, a
fundamental attribute of wireless systems and the transmission
of electromagnetic waves is their broadcast characteristic,
depending on the specific antenna setup. Tighter beams, up
to pencil-sharp beamforming (as indicated in Figure 1a) fa-
cilitate the switch from a pure broadcast medium to targeted
communication. Corresponding RIS configurations allow such
narrow beams, rendering eavesdropping and sniffing harder for
attackers.
4) RIS-individual ”Fingerprints”: RISs are man-made sur-
faces composed of multiple semiconductors, each equipped
with intrinsic, manufacturing related physical/electrical char-
acteristics. According to the same principle as PUFs [6],
the combination of characteristic semiconductors results in
an individual component again. Based on this, each RIS
possesses an intrinsically individual characteristic, comparable
to a device’s ”fingerprint”.
5) RIS-supported adding of Context Information: In net-
work security, the addition of contextual information [16] is
becoming increasingly attractive. For instance, the plausibility
of access from a certain device at a certain time is taken into
account, which allows conclusions to be drawn about possible
attacks. In addition to the aforementioned RIS fingerprints, it
is conceivable to insert selective meta-materials, which in turn
add specific properties. Thus, for instance, only signals that
have been reflected by a specific RIS can be allowed.
B. Visible Light Communications
Visible Light Communication as part of the optical wireless
communication, is considering the large unlicensed spectrum
of the visible light in the range between 400-800 THz, and
375-780 nm, respectively. It’s high capacity, robustness to
electromagnetic field interference, and the inherent security
offers advantages over Radio-Frequency (RF) communication.
In the simplest approach VLC uses Light Emitting Diodes
(LEDs) as transmitter, air as transmission medium and a photo
diode as receiver. LEDs can change their intensity very fast
which can be used for modulation and transmission.
As illustrated in Figure 1b, advantages of VLC are the LoS
communication on the one hand side and the limitation of the
range on the other. Unlike RF signals, light is constrained
by simple walls, which gives the VLC systems a security
advantage. In addition to the indoor applications of VLC
systems as shown in Figure 1b, they can be used in outdoor
applications considering their high transmission rate and ultra-
high bandwidth. High-speed VLC systems are being examined
as a possibly better solution for terrestrial, space, air, and
underwater communications, providing both offline and real-
time processing [17].
C. (sub)Terahertz Communication
Pushing communication to higher frequencies is another
solution to meet the requirements of the 6G systems. The
technological advances of (sub)teraherz communication will
enable 6G systems to support operations with a signal band-
width higher than 1 GHz [2] and thereby enable data rates in
the range of terabit per second. In addition this will enable
advances in accurate positioning and sensing -that can reach
centimeter level-, (see Figure 1c) and is thus closely linked to
Section IV-E.
As PhySec-SKG does not rely on fixed parameters provided
by a particular entity, but rather on entropy of the wireless
channel, the shift to higher frequencies offers just that: higher
entropy due to more randomness.
D. Ultra-Massive MIMO
In conjunction with the use of higher frequencies up to
(sub)THz communication, the wavelengths are becoming cor-
respondingly smaller. However, this also offers the possibility
of fitting more antenna elements onto the same physical
space, which in turn leads to tighter beams. As indicated in
Figure 1d, more antenna elements allow more users to be
served, but on the other hand, the narrower beams (again)
limit the opportunities for attackers to eavesdrop and sniff
communication.
E. Localisation and Sensing
Due to the usage of higher frequency band including
mmWave and (sub)THz bands new possibilities arise with
regard to localization and sensing (see Figure 1e). These
allow very fine resolutions in all physical dimensions: angle,
range and doppler positioning. In this context, applications of
purely passive sensing (exploiting the emissivity and natural
reflections of surfaces), active sensing (coherent echoes with
distance-, Doppler- and angle information), but also the com-
bination with radar is conceivable (whereby the challenge is
the use of different waveforms). These location information
will be able to be used as a security parameter for multiple
 (a) RISs enable several beneficial use cases:
e.g. beamforming and -splitting enable target-
oriented communication. In addition, there
are approaches for anti-jamming, but also for
fingerprinting and for Secret Key Generation.
(b) VLC uses ranges of visible light for
communication. Apart from higher data rates
and larger bandwidth, there are advantages
in security: harder to intercept and easier to
restrict to certain areas (unlike RF).
(c) (sub)THz communications will offer
higher bandwidth and enable data rates in
the terabit per second range. This benefits
more accurate positioning and sensing (down
to centimeter level).

(d) By pushing communication to higher fre- (e) The use of higher frequencies allows (f) Link Integrity Monitoring and the use
quency ranges, the wavelengths will become accurate localization and sensing. In combi- of context-based information ensure the in-
smaller as well. Ultra-Massive MIMO will nation with radar it will allow localization in tegrity of the radio nodes. Counterfeiting can
allow tighter beams. (sub)centimeter range. thus be mitigated.
Fig. 1: 6G research areas which are capable of affecting PhySec methods beneficially

use-cases such as health monitoring, surveillance and auto-
mated/autonomous driving.
F. Link Integrity Monitoring
PhySec based security functionalities in order to provide
message authenticity and integrity have been widely stud-
ied recently. Compared to conventional techniques for such
purposes, such as cryptographic certificates or Message Au-
thentication Codes (MACs), the physical layer characteristics
resulting from a message transmission are evaluated in order
to obtain whether authenticity and integrity are guaranteed
(Figure 1f).
Typical physical layer parameters considered here are for
instance Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI), Channel
Impulse Response (CIR), carrier frequency offset or the angle-
of-arrival. In order to evaluate the transmitter of a message or
whether it was altered during transmission various schemes
can be used: Starting from statistical methods for Physical
Layer Authentication (PLA), for instance in [18], where an
approach based on hypothesis testing is presented for static
scenarios towards ML based methods such as [19], where
two approaches based on Support Vector Machines (SVMs)
and Linear Fisher Discriminant Analysis are presented. Also
other ML based solutions have been studied for PLA such
as Gaussian Mixture Models based techniques in [20] or
supervised learning in [4]. Especially in highly challenging
scenarios such us URLLC, ULBC and mULC PhySec based
techniques provide better efficiency compared to conventional
techniques such as certificates or MACs, due to reduced
transmission overheads, while the detection probability of
potential attacks is nearly as good (e.g. > 99%). Further, it
is still tolerable to allow a small amount of false alarm or
misdetections, since the respective applications are typically
designed in an error tolerable way, such as e.g. robust control.
V. C ONCLUSION AND O UTLOOK
Actually we are on the verge of developing a new standard
in mobile communication: as the Fifth Generation mobile net-
works is currently being implemented worldwide, it is worth
already considering Beyond 5G and the Sixth Generation
wireless systems. This development is accompanied by the
use of new spectra -mmWave, Terahertz, Visible Light Com-
munication-, changes in the network infrastructure -slicing,
Open RAN, softwarization and virtualization-, as well as new
network paradigms -Artificial Intelligence, Digital Twin and
Intelligent Edge Computing. Therefore, in this paper, we have
elaborated on the challenges for the mobile communications
network of the future, but we have also highlighted six promis-
ing 6G research areas that can provide suitable approaches
to meet these challenges and to contribute to Physical Layer
Security.
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field of research, with many possibilities, if the requirements
for the meta-materials, the (intelligent) control and the timing
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