Canadian Journal of Philosophy

ISSN: 0045-5091 (Print) 1911-0820 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcjp20

What kind of evaluative states are emotions? The

attitudinal theory vs. the perceptual theory of
emotions

Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet

To cite this article: Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet (2018): What kind of evaluative states
are emotions? The attitudinal theory vs. the perceptual theory of emotions, Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2018.1472516

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1472516

Published online: 05 Jun 2018.

Submit your article to this journal

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rcjp20
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1472516

What kind of evaluative states are emotions? The

attitudinal theory vs. the perceptual theory of
emotions
Mauro Rossia and Christine Tappoletb
a
Département de philosophie, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal, Canada;
b
Département de philosophie, Université de Montréal, Montréal, Canada

ABSTRACT
This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions
faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to
establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of
emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the
attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these
problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the
attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory of emotions.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 26 June 2017; Accepted 1 May 2018

KEYWORDS Emotions; attitudinal theory; perceptual theory; formal object; Deonna and Teroni

The theoretical landscape in emotion theory has not moved much in recent
times. There is thus particular reason to welcome the new ‘attitudinal theory’
defended by Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni (2012; 2014; 2015), a philoso-
phically sophisticated account of emotions, which promises to improve on all
the existing accounts. In this paper, however, we shall argue that Deonna and
Teroni’s theory faces two serious problems, which significantly reduce its
appeal. The first is that the argument they offer to establish the central
tenet of their theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not
feature in the content of emotions, is flawed. The second is that the attitudinal
theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. In a nutshell, either the notion of
correctness at work in the theory is understood in terms of correspondence,
and the attitudinal account is likely to collapse into a perceptual theory; or the
notion of correctness is understood in normative terms such as ‘reasons’ or
‘ought’, and the attitudinal theory cannot motivate another of its main tenets,
namely, that the formal object determines a mental state’s correctness con-
ditions. As the two main contenders are arguably the perceptual theory and

CONTACT Mauro Rossi rossi.mauro@uqam.ca Département de philosophie, Université du

Québec à Montréal, Case postale 8888, succursale Centre-ville, Montréal, Québec, Canada, H3C 3P8
© 2018 Canadian Journal of Philosophy
2 M. ROSSI AND C. TAPPOLET

the attitudinal theory, this is good news for the perceptual theory of
emotions.
Our plan is as follows. In Section 1, we start with a presentation of the
contemporary landscape of emotion theories. In Section 2, we expound the
main features of the attitudinal theory. In Section 3, we debunk their main
argument in its favor, while in Section 4 we spell out a dilemma that the
theory faces.

1. Sketching the landscape

Theories of emotions generally focus on occurrent episodes of emotions, such
as the fear you experience when a bear attacks you, as opposed to the
disposition to feel fear when confronted with bears. Such theories can be
divided into three broad families: feeling theories, conative theories, and
cognitive theories.1 According to feeling theories, emotions are states that
are characterized by their phenomenal properties, but which lack representa-
tional content (James 1884; Lange 1885; Whiting 2011). Conative theories focus
on the motivational power of emotions and claim that emotions are, in essence,
motivational states, such as action-tendencies or desires (Frijda 1986;
Scarantino 2014). Finally, cognitive theories hold that emotions are partly or
wholly constituted by cognitive states. There are different ways to spell out this
idea, depending on the kinds of cognitive states that are considered. For
instance, judgmental theories hold that emotions are, or necessarily involve,
kinds of judgments, namely evaluative judgments (Solomon 1976; Nussbaum
2001), while so-called quasi-judgmental theories focus on states such as eva-
luative thoughts (Greenspan 1988) or construals (Roberts 2003; Roberts 2013).
According to these different theories, emotions require the possession of
evaluative concepts. By contrast, the perceptual theory argues that emotions
are a kind of perceptual experiences, i.e. perceptual experiences of evaluative
properties, such as the fearsome or the admirable, where it is understood that
there is no need for an individual to possess the concepts of the fearsome or
the admirable to be able to feel the emotions of fear or admiration (de Sousa
1987; Tappolet 2000; Tappolet 2016; Döring 2003; inter alia).
Over the last few years, philosophers working on emotions have paid
special attention to cognitive theories. These theories share four important
elements. The first is that they take emotions to have intentional objects, i.e.
to be about some items or states of affairs. We are indeed afraid of a bear,
angry at our neighbors, and hope that it snows, and so on – something
which the feeling theory has trouble acknowledging. The second is that they
conceive of emotions as evaluative states. Emotions are not neutral repre-
sentations of their objects, but they ‘evaluate’ them. For instance, an emo-
tion such as the fear you feel toward a bear evaluates the bear, in one way
or another, as being fearsome or dangerous. The third is that they take
 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 3

emotions to have evaluative contents: emotions represent their objects

(either conceptually or non-conceptually) as possessing certain evaluative
properties. Thus, an emotion like your fear toward a bear represents the
bear (either conceptually or non-conceptually) as being fearsome. The
fourth element is that emotions have correctness conditions.2 More specifi-
cally, and by contrast with conative theories, cognitive theories recognize
that emotions can be assessed as either correct or incorrect, depending on
whether or not their objects possess the evaluative properties that they
represent them to have. To illustrate this point, consider again fear: your fear
toward a bear is correct if and only if the bear is really fearsome.
The perceptual theory has arguably become the most popular cognitive
theory. This is so for a number of reasons. For a start, the perceptual theory
improves on judgmental and quasi-judgmental theories in that it allows for the
possibility that one can experience emotions without possessing evaluative
concepts. By so doing, it avoids the counter-intuitive implication that young
children and non-human animals cannot feel emotions. Furthermore, the
perceptual theory explains some aspects of emotions that judgmental and
quasi-judgmental theories have trouble explaining, for example the phenom-
enon of ‘recalcitrant’ emotions. Emotions sometimes conflict with evaluative
judgments, in the same way as perceptual experiences sometimes conflict with
perceptual judgments, as it happens, for instance, in the case of perceptual
illusions such as the Müller-Lyer illusion. Yet, judgmental and quasi-judgmental
theories seem to have no logical space to account for this phenomenon.
This brings us to the main argument in favor of the perceptual theory,
namely, the argument that emotions are relevantly analogous to perceptual
experiences.3 First, like visual experiences, emotions may both be conscious
as well as characterized by a rich phenomenology. Additionally, emotions
and perceptual experiences are typically caused by things in our environ-
ment. A third characteristic shared by emotions and perceptual experiences
is their relation to the will: neither is under its direct control. Even if it is
possible to position oneself to see things in a certain way, one can hardly
decide not to have the visual experience once one has opened one’s eyes.
Emotions are not under the direct control of our will in much the same way.
We cannot simply decide to feel angry – even though we doubtless have a
certain indirect control over our emotions, as when we breathe through our
nose to stave off a bout of anger.4
The perceptual theory of emotions is plausible, but by no means uncon-
troversial. In fact, several authors have pointed out that there are also impor-
tant differences between emotions and perceptual experiences.5 Unlike
paradigmatic perceptual experiences, e.g. color experiences, emotions do
not depend on sensory organs. Instead, they depend on the information
coming from other mental states, including sensory perceptions, beliefs,
memories, and imaginings. This point is often expressed by saying that,
4 M. ROSSI AND C. TAPPOLET

contrary to sensory experiences, emotions have cognitive bases. Another

difference is that emotions seem to admit of reasons, in the sense that one
can have reasons to fear something or admire someone, while one cannot
have reasons to have visual experiences. One would not, for example, ask of
someone who sees a lemon as yellow, what her reasons are for seeing the
lemon as yellow. Generally speaking, the question at issue is whether these
differences imply that emotions cannot be understood as perceptual experi-
ences. This is a question that depends, in the end, on what perceptions are
taken to consist in. Arguably, on a sufficiently liberal conception of percep-
tion, which does not require inputs from a dedicated sensory organ, nothing
prevents us from thinking that emotion is a kind of perceptual experience.6
In light of the previous issues, however, some authors have chosen to
explore alternative accounts of emotions. Deonna and Teroni’s attitudinal
theory is perhaps the most promising of these accounts. In the next section,
we illustrate the main characteristics of their approach.

2. The attitudinal theory

The attitudinal theory is an attempt to offer a fourth kind of theory, distinct
from all those offered in the literature. The basic idea is to apply to emotions
the distinction between attitude and content, as exemplified in the claim that
believing that p, supposing that p and desiring that p are different attitudes
toward the same content, p. Deonna and Teroni’s suggestion is that emo-
tions form a specific family of attitudes, namely, evaluative attitudes, whose
tokens may sometimes have the same contents. Deonna and Teroni agree,
then, that emotions are evaluative states. However, by contrast with cogni-
tive theories, they locate the evaluation at the level of the attitude, rather
than at the level of the content, for in their view emotions do not represent
their objects (either conceptually or non-conceptually) as possessing certain
evaluative properties.7 Thus, for example, to fear that it will snow is to have a
particular evaluative attitude toward the content that it will snow, while to
hope or to feel outraged that it will snow consists in different evaluative
attitudes toward the same content, and so forth for each and every type of
emotion.
Deonna and Teroni’s account is motivated by a particular diagnosis of the
alleged failure of cognitive theories. As we have seen, one aspect that
cognitive theories have in common is that they conceive of emotions as
having evaluative contents. According to Deonna and Teroni, this is the
main source of the problems that these theories face. For instance, the
perceptual theory’s difficulty in accounting for the fact that emotions can
be based on reasons derives, in their view, from the construction of such
reasons as reasons for having a particular evaluative content. However,
where ordinary perceptions are concerned, there exists no equivalent type
 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 5

of reason, i.e. no reason for having a particular perceptual content. If this is

the case, then it appears that the way out of problems such as this must
come from construing emotions not as attitudes toward an evaluative
content, but as evaluative attitudes themselves, something which undoubt-
edly allows for reasons. This is precisely what their account sets to do.
According to Deonna and Teroni, ‘there are as many emotional attitudes
as there are types of emotions.’ (Deonna and Teroni 2015, 294; see also
Deonna and Teroni 2012, 78) The difference between types of emotional
attitudes is grounded in differences in the evaluative properties in terms of
which emotions ‘evaluate’ their objects. Evaluative properties still play a role
in determining the correctness conditions of emotions. However, they do so
via their connection to the attitude that each emotion consists in, rather
than as part of the content of emotions. For example, an emotion like fear
toward a bear, while not representing the bear as fearsome, has nonetheless
fearsomeness in its correctness conditions because of the kind of attitude
that fear consists in. Symmetrically, the evaluative attitudes that emotions
consist in are individuated in terms of the evaluative properties to which
one appeals when one assesses the correctness of the emotion.
To give some meat to their account, Deonna and Teroni make the further
claim that emotions are ‘felt bodily attitudes’, i.e. ‘bodily experiences of
being disposed or tending to act in differentiated ways vis-à-vis a given
object or event’ (Deonna and Teroni 2015, 302; see also 2012, chap. 7).
Indeed, they claim ‘that emotions are evaluative attitudes because they are’
such bodily experiences. Even if the claim that emotions such as sadness,
hope, relief, joy or admiration always involve the experience of a specific
motivational tendency is far from obvious, it is clearly plausible in the case
of many other types of emotions. Consider fear, for instance. According to
Deonna and Teroni, if it is true that fear is correct on condition that its
object is fearsome or dangerous, this is because to experience fear at
something is to experience one’s body as being prepared to forestall the
danger, be it by flight, attack, immobility, or something else. Note, however,
that since bodily experiences concern bodily changes, and not objects that
we confront in the world, the claim that emotions are felt bodily attitudes
seems best understood as a claim about the phenomenology of emotions,
as well as their motivational power, rather than as a claim regarding the
intentionality of emotions.
The main differences and similarities between the perceptual theory and
the attitudinal theory can be summarized as follows. Both kinds of theories
agree that emotions are intentional states, in that they are directed toward
(i.e. they are about) particular objects. They also agree that the intentional
object of emotions is part of their content, in the sense that emotions
represent their particular objects. Both the perceptual and the attitudinal
theories take emotions to be evaluative states, in that they ‘evaluate’ their
6 M. ROSSI AND C. TAPPOLET

particular objects as possessing certain evaluative properties. The latter prop-

erties are typically said to constitute the formal objects of emotions,8 where
formal objects have two main features.9 First, they determine the correctness
conditions of emotions. Second, they individuate the type of emotion to
which an emotion token belongs. Both the perceptual and the attitudinal
theories take emotions to have formal objects in this sense. The main differ-
ence between the two, then, is that by contrast to the attitudinal theory, the
perceptual theory holds that emotions represent their formal objects (i.e. that
the formal object is part of the content of emotions). Thus, while both kinds of
theories recognize that, e.g. to fear that it will snow is correct just if this event
is fearsome, the perceptual theory claims this is the case in virtue of the
evaluative content of that emotion, whereas the attitudinal theory claims that
this is so in virtue of the evaluative attitude plus a content that is not
evaluative, namely, that it will snow (see Deonna and Teroni 2012, 77).10
It is easy to see that the attitudinal theory shares the same advantages as the
perceptual theory over feeling theories, conative theories, as well as judgmen-
tal and quasi-judgmental theories. Moreover, to the extent that it conceives of
emotions as attitudes, rather than perceptual experiences, and that it denies
that emotions have evaluative contents, the attitudinal theory also appears
immune from the objections raised against the perceptual theory.11 In parti-
cular, it seems to face no obstacles in recognizing that emotions, qua attitudes,
have cognitive bases and can be grounded in reasons.12
As we see things, the contest is pretty much one between the perceptual
theory and the attitudinal theory, and to see who wins that contest a great
many considerations need to be assessed. However, Deonna and Teroni
offer a distinctive argument to show that their account is superior to the
perceptual theory. In the next section, we shall argue that what we call their
‘master argument’ is unsuccessful.

3. Troubles with the master argument

The main claim to which Deonna and Teroni appeal in order to support their
attitudinal theory is that, unlike the perceptual theory, it allows us to make
sense of the intuitive idea that different emotions, as well as other mental
states, can have the same content (Deonna and Teroni 2012, 77; Deonna
and Teroni 2015, 297). As we have seen, the idea is that you can fear, hope,
be outraged, etc. that it snows, but you can also believe, suppose, or desire
that it snows, to mention only a few possibilities. Deonna and Teroni’s
‘master argument’ can be reconstructed as follows:

(1) For any two non-emotional mental state types X and Y that have a
formal object, it is possible for two tokens x and y, where x is a token
of X and y a token of Y, to have the same content.
 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 7

(2) For any two non-emotional mental state types X and Y that have a
formal object, if their formal objects featured in the content of their
tokens, then it would not be possible for such tokens to have the
same content.
(3) Therefore, for any two non-emotional mental state types X and Y that
have a formal object, it is not the case that their formal objects
feature in the content of their tokens.
(4) If (3) is true, then it is plausible to maintain that the formal objects of
emotions do not feature in the content of their tokens either.
(5) Therefore, the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the
content of their tokens.

If (5) is true, then emotions cannot be conceived of as having an evaluative

content, as all cognitive theories maintain. One needs, therefore, to look to
alternative theories. We can agree that the most promising non-cognitive
theory currently on offer is the attitudinal theory. If so, Deonna and Teroni’s
master argument provides support in favor of this view.
Deonna and Teroni’s master argument appeals to the alleged similarities
between emotions and mental states such as beliefs, suppositions, desires,
wishes, etc.; most notably, to the fact that they all have contents, which they
seem able to share, and specific formal objects. These similarities make
premise (4) compelling. It appears indeed that whatever is true about the
formal objects of all non-emotional mental states must also be true of the
formal objects of emotions. One might, of course, reject premise (4) by
stipulating that emotions constitute a special class of mental states.
However, this line of thought does not seem very plausible. So, in what
follows we shall take premise (4) for granted. Even so the previous argument
fails, or so we argue.
The main problem for Deonna and Teroni is that the conclusion stated in
(3) is false. Consider chromatic perceptions. According to a plausible view,
which can be traced back to Aquinas, color is the formal object of such
perceptions.13 However, color does feature in the content of chromatic
perceptions. If so, we have a counter-example to the conclusion stated in (3).
This argument can be refined. Color is a determinable property, which
admits of many determinate specifications. There are indeed various ways of
being colored, e.g. being blue, being red, being yellow, etc.14 If so, color
figures in the content of chromatic perceptions only in the sense that one of
its determinate specifications does. With that in mind, we can say that each
of the determinate specifications of color, i.e. redness, yellowness, blueness,
etc., constitutes the formal object of a specific type of visual perceptions. For
instance, redness constitutes the formal object of perceptions of red; yellow-
ness constitutes the formal object of perceptions of yellow, and so on. What
is important for the present purpose is that these specific chromatic
8 M. ROSSI AND C. TAPPOLET

properties do feature in the content of their corresponding perceptions. For

instance, redness features in the content of a perception of an object as red.
But then, if each specific chromatic property is the formal object of the
corresponding chromatic perception, it follows that the formal objects of all
chromatic perceptions do feature in the content of their token instances.
The view that chromatic perceptions have formal objects is, of course, not
uncontroversial.15 Crucially, however, it is the view to which Deonna and
Teroni’s own conception of formal object directly leads.16 As we have seen
with respect to emotions, Deonna and Teroni agree that the formal object of a
mental state token is that which, in conjunction with its intentional object,
determines whether that mental state is correct or not. Moreover, they agree
that the formal object individuates the type of mental state to which that
token belongs. These conditions are satisfied in the case of chromatic percep-
tions. Consider the claim that redness is the formal object of a perception of
an object as red. First, redness is that which, in conjunction with the inten-
tional object of a perception of red, determines whether that perception is
correct or not. Indeed, the perception of an object as red is correct if and only
if that object is really red. Second, redness is the property that individuates
the type of perception in question, namely, a perception of red.
In light of this, we can in fact vindicate the initial claim that the determin-
able property of being colored is the formal object of the class of chromatic
perceptions. Color is indeed the property that identifies certain perceptions
as chromatic perceptions. Moreover, it figures in the correctness conditions
of such perceptions via its determinate specifications.
It is worth noticing that the problem for Deonna and Teroni generalizes
beyond chromatic perceptions. Consider auditory perceptions. In the same
(qualified) way in which color can be considered the formal object of
chromatic perceptions, so sound can be considered the formal object of
auditory perceptions. But sound does feature in the content of such percep-
tions. The list may continue and include other kinds of perceptual experi-
ences together with their formal objects, e.g. olfactory perceptions and
smell. This shows that premise (3) is false: Deonna and Teroni’s universal
claim about the formal objects of non-emotional mental states needs to be
rejected. At least in the perceptual domain, being the formal object of a
perceptual state does not exclude being part of the content of such state.17
If these considerations are on the right track, then Deonna and Teroni’s
master argument fails. Generally speaking, the problem with their argu-
ment is that it attempts to derive a conclusion about the formal object of
all mental state types from premises that are, at most, sound only with
respect to some mental state types. Perhaps, then, we should reformulate
premise (1) as saying that the token instances of some mental state types
(other than emotions) can have the same content. From this starting point,
however, we can only derive the conclusion that the formal objects of
 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 9

some mental state types (i.e. those whose token instances can share the
same content) do not feature in the content of their token instances.
Clearly, this is a more modest conclusion than the one stated in (3). In
particular, it leaves entirely open the question of whether emotions belong
to the set of mental state types whose token instances can share the same
content.
For their part, however, Deonna and Teroni explicitly maintain that the
content of the token instances of different emotions can, sometimes, be the
same. In ‘Emotions as Attitudes’, for instance, they claim that somebody’s
aloofness can make one person angry but amuse another. According to
them, ‘it is quite reasonable to say that [these two persons’ emotions] relate
in different ways to one and the same thing’. Most importantly, Deonna and
Teroni take this to be evidence that ‘different attitudes can have exactly the
same content’ (Deonna and Teroni 2015, 297; our italics).
This claim provides the basis for an alternative version of the master
argument:

(1*) For any two emotional mental state types X and Y, it is possible for
two tokens x and y, where x is a token of X and y a token of Y, to have
the exact same content.18
(2*) If the formal objects of X and Y featured in the content of their
tokens, then it would not be possible for their tokens to have the
exact same content.
(3*) Therefore, the formal objects of X and Y do not feature in the content
of their tokens.

Unfortunately, this version of the master argument is no more successful

than the previous. The main problem is that (1*) completely begs the
question against the perceptual theory. Indeed, (1*) simply assumes that
different emotions can share the exact same content with each other.
However, this is precisely what the perceptual theory denies. The latter
holds that emotions represent their formal objects. Hence, different emo-
tions cannot have the exact same content. According to the perceptual
theory, Deonna and Teroni’s remark that different emotions can relate to
the same thing, e.g. somebody’s aloofness, shows, at most, that they can
have the same intentional object, but not that they can have the exact
same content. In other words, it shows only that different emotions can
share part of their content, but not their entire content. Assuming other-
wise from the start, without an argument, constitutes a petitio principii
against the perceptual theory.
If this is correct, then Deonna and Teroni’s argument, as we understand it,
is unsuccessful. There may be other ways of spelling out their argument.
However, the ones we discussed seem to us the most plausible. The upshot
10 M. ROSSI AND C. TAPPOLET

is that in all likelihood Deonna and Teroni’s master argument fails to provide
adequate support to their attitudinal theory.

4. The dilemma
At this stage, one might claim that, rather than refuting the master argu-
ment in favor of the attitudinal theory, the previous section has simply led
us to an impasse. Surely – as we have shown – Deonna and Teroni cannot
simply assume that different emotions can have the exact same content, on
pain on begging the question against the perceptual theory. But one cannot
presuppose the opposite either, on pain of begging the question against
the attitudinal theory.
However, the case against Deonna and Teroni’s attitudinal theory can be
strengthened further. As a starting point, note that Deonna and Teroni
provide a second argument in favor of their theory. This is that the attitu-
dinal theory offers a more convincing account of the correctness conditions
of emotions than its competitors – one that highlights the respective con-
tribution of the attitude and the content of emotions (see, e.g. Deonna and
Teroni 2015, 298–299).19 Contrary to what Deonna and Teroni claim, how-
ever, we believe that their account of the correctness conditions of emo-
tions is far from convincing, and that their theory performs significantly
worse in this respect than the perceptual theory. In fact, we will now argue
that, when it comes to the correctness conditions of emotions, Deonna and
Teroni’s attitudinal theory faces a dilemma.
To begin with, let us grant that emotions are attitudes. By itself, this claim
does not mark a fundamental difference between the attitudinal and the
perceptual theory. The latter theory can maintain that emotions are sui
generis attitudes, while simply adding that what makes them sui generis is
that they are affective perceptual experiences concerned with evaluative
properties. The main difference between the attitudinal and the perceptual
theory concerns the relation between the formal object and the content of
emotions. In light of what we have seen so far, we can say that Deonna and
Teroni are committed to the following theses:

(i) For all attitude types having a formal object, the formal object is that
by reference to which the token instances of that attitude type are
assessed as correct or incorrect.
(ii) For all attitude types having a formal object, the formal object does
not feature in the content of the token instances of that attitude type.

As we have seen, thesis (i) is commonly held by both attitudinal and percep-
tual theorists (as well as by all cognitivist theorists). By contrast, thesis (ii) is the
thesis that demarcates the two theories. In this section, though, we argue that
 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 11

Deonna and Teroni cannot hold (i) and (ii) together, since they face a dilemma
that obliges them to reject at least one of these two theses. If we are right,
Deonna and Teroni must reject either a generally accepted thesis about
formal objects or the very thesis that defines their attitudinal approach.
Our argument can be summarized as follows:

(1) Correctness is either conceived of as correspondence or in normative

terms such as ‘reasons’ or ‘ought’.
(2) If correctness is conceived of as correspondence and if (i) is true, then
the formal object of at least some attitude types (i.e. emotions)
features in the content of their token instances. If so, (ii) is false.
(3) If correctness is conceived of in normative terms such as ‘reasons’ or
‘ought’, then either, whether or not (ii) is true, the formal object of at
least some attitude types (i.e. beliefs and other cognitive states) is not
that by reference to which their token instances are assessed as
correct or incorrect, or the normative understanding of correctness
reduces to the understanding in terms of correspondence. If so, either
(i) or (ii) is false.
(4) Therefore, either (i) or (ii) is false.

Let us elaborate on each of these premises. Premise (1) states that there are
two plausible ways of understanding an attitude’s correctness conditions.
According to the first, to be correct is to correspond to what is the case.20
According to the second, to be correct is to be such that there is sufficient
reason to hold that attitude, or for that attitude to be required, or for it to be
the attitude that one ought to have, etc.

4.1 The first horn of the dilemma

Let us consider the first understanding of correctness. If correctness is
conceived of as correspondence, then an attitude’s correctness conditions
are simply its correspondence conditions. This raises the question of what
features of an attitude determine its correspondence conditions. One
answer is that an attitude’s correspondence conditions are determined
only by its content.21 Accordingly, an attitude corresponds to what is the
case if and only if its content corresponds to what is the case. To this, we can
intuitively add that the content of an attitude corresponds to what is the
case if and only if the world is as the content says it is. This leads us to the
following statement of an attitude’s correctness conditions:
(C) An attitude is correct if and only if the world is as the content of that
attitude says it is.
12 M. ROSSI AND C. TAPPOLET

Let us combine this account of correctness with thesis (i). Given (C), (i)
entails that the formal object of an attitude type can be seen as that by
reference to which we can assess whether or not the world is as the content
of an instance of that attitude type says it is. How exactly does the formal
object play this role? In particular, does the formal object feature in the
content of that attitude token? The answer to the latter question depends
on the specifics of each attitude type. Consider emotions. As we have seen,
generally speaking we can say that an emotion token is correct if and only if
its object possesses the evaluative property that constitutes the formal
object of the emotion type to which that token belongs. From (C), it then
follows that the world is as the content of an emotion token says it is if and
only if its object possesses the evaluative property that constitutes the
formal object of the emotion type to which that token belongs. Once things
are put this way, however, it appears evident that the formal object of an
emotion features in the content of its token instances. Indeed, the most
plausible way to make sense of the previous bi-conditional consists in saying
that the world is as the content of an emotion token says it is if and only if
(a) that emotion token represents its object as possessing the evaluative
property that constitutes its formal object, and (b) its object does possess
such an evaluative property.
Let us contrast emotions with beliefs. Generally speaking, we can say that a
belief token is correct if and only if its propositional object is true, where truth
is understood as the formal object of beliefs. From (C), it follows that the world
is as the content of a belief token says it is if and only if its propositional object
is true. Notice, however, that the following bi-conditional holds as well: the
propositional object p of a belief token is true if and only if p (is the case). If so,
it follows that the world is as the content of a belief token says it is if and only
if p (is the case); or, more precisely, that the world is as the content of a belief
token says it is if and only if (a) that belief represents its propositional object p
and (b) p (is the case). This shows that the formal object of beliefs does not
feature in the content of belief instances.
Let us take stock. We have argued that, if correctness is conceived of as
correspondence, then the formal objects of at least some attitude types, i.e.
emotions, feature in the content of their token instances. This is not the case
for other attitude types, e.g. beliefs. This conclusion is precisely the percep-
tual theorist’s view of the matter. Thus, if the preceding argument is correct,
it seems we have an argument that favors the perceptual theory over the
attitudinal theory.
Deonna and Teroni might object that the line of thought explored so far
relies on a mistaken assumption, namely, that the only feature of an
attitude that is relevant for determining its correctness conditions is its
content. According to them, however, the correctness conditions of an
attitude token are jointly determined by the content of that attitude and
 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 13

by the attitude type to which that token belongs. How can their account
be spelt out more precisely when correctness is conceived of as corre-
spondence? We can begin by saying that, on this understanding, an
attitude token is correct if and only if both its content (e.g. that it will
snow) and the attitude itself (e.g. fear) correspond to what is the case. Let
us combine this with thesis (i). The role of the formal object is now
different from what we have seen before. On the current understanding
of correctness, the formal object is that by reference to which we can
assess whether or not the attitude itself, rather than the content of the
attitude, corresponds to what is the case. In particular, Deonna and Teroni
are committed to saying, on the one hand, that the content of an emotion
token corresponds to what is the case if and only if (a) the emotion
represents its object as possessing certain properties, and (b) the object
does possess such properties; and, on the other hand, that the emotional
attitude itself corresponds to what is the case if and only if (c) its object
possesses the evaluative property that constitutes the formal object of the
emotion type to which that token belongs. For example, the content of an
episode of fear toward a bear attacking you corresponds to what is the
case if and only if (a) the fear represents the bear as attacking you, and (b)
the bear is indeed attacking you, whereas the attitude of fear itself corre-
sponds to what is the case if and only if (c) the bear is fearsome. According
to the resulting account, then, the formal object plays a role in the
assessment of whether the correspondence conditions of an emotion
token are met, but does not feature in its content.
We believe, however, that there is a strong reason to reject this account.
The main problem is that the meaning of ‘correspondence’ involved in
stating the content’s correspondence conditions is different from the mean-
ing of ‘correspondence’ involved in stating the emotional attitude’s corre-
spondence conditions. To illustrate this point, suppose we adopt a
conception of correspondence as isomorphism. This conception can be
straightforwardly applied to content correspondence. Within Deonna and
Teroni’s account, the content of an emotion corresponds to what is the case
if and only if there is an isomorphism between the object represented by
the emotion and the object in the world. By contrast, this conception of
correspondence is hardly applicable to emotional attitude correspondence.
An emotional attitude token is indeed not isomorphic to an evaluative
property, even if the latter is the property that defines the emotion type
to which that token belongs. Thus, for instance, fear is not isomorphic to the
fearsome. That its object is fearsome is, perhaps, what makes fear an emo-
tion of the right kind in the circumstances, or the emotion that one ought to
have in the circumstances. One prominent way to understand such claims
that seems congenial to Deonna and Teroni’s account appeals to the notion
of pragmatic reasons. The idea is that since the action-tendencies of fear
14 M. ROSSI AND C. TAPPOLET

have the function to help one deal with danger, this is the emotion that one
ought to have when there is danger. In this, but only in this, sense, fear
‘corresponds’ to the fearsome. Importantly, this is clearly a normative sense
of ‘correspondence’ that has nothing to do with the sense involved in
describing content correspondence.
One may, of course, take issue with the conception of correspondence-as-
isomorphism. But we have used this conception of correspondence only for
illustrative purposes.22 The previous considerations are simply meant to
convey the intuition that the sense in which the content of an emotion
‘corresponds’ to the world is different from the sense in which the emotional
attitude does. The problem is that the meanings of ‘content correspon-
dence’ and ‘attitude correspondence’ must be the same, in order for them
to be part of an unequivocal account of the emotions’ correspondence
conditions. Put differently, Deonna and Teroni owe us an account of ‘corre-
spondence’ that can be equally used to characterize the correspondence
conditions of the emotional attitude and of its content. Moreover, they have
to do so in a way that does not reduce the notion of ‘correspondence’ to
one of the normative notions explored in the next section. Nothing said so
far shows that it is impossible for Deonna and Teroni to provide such an
account. However, the burden of the proof lies with them. Unless Deonna
and Teroni take on this burden, we have prima facie reason to think that, if
correctness is conceived of as correspondence and (i) is true, then the best
account of emotions’ correspondence conditions is one in which the formal
objects of emotions feature in the content of their token instances. Absent
any better account, premise (2) of our argument is thus vindicated.

4.2 The second horn of the dilemma

Let us move to premise (3) of our argument and consider the normative
understanding of correctness. Our claim is that, in this case, either, whether
or not we endorse thesis (ii), thesis (i) does not hold or the normative
understanding of correctness reduces to the understanding in terms of
correspondence. To see why, consider an attitude type such as belief. As
we have seen, it is common to think that the formal object of belief is truth.
Thesis (i) implies, then, that a belief token is correct if and only if that belief
is true. Suppose, now, that we conceive of correctness in terms of ‘sufficient
reason’. The following claim should hold: there is sufficient reason to have a
belief token if and only if that belief token is true. It is easy to see, however,
that this claim does not hold – and this is the case for whatever kind of
reason one considers. On the one hand, there may be sufficient epistemic
reason to have a particular belief, which is actually false. For instance, this
may happen when there is strong evidence in favor of a particular belief
and, yet, this evidence is misleading, since this belief is false. On the other
 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 15

hand, and even more strikingly, there may be sufficient practical reason to
believe something even if that belief is false, as evil demon scenarios amply
show (see Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004, for instance).
One may suggest that this objection can be avoided if correctness is
conceived of in terms of ‘ought’, rather than ‘sufficient reason’. According to
this suggestion, an attitude token is correct if and only if one ought to have
that attitude. In the case of belief, the following claim should then hold: one
ought to have a belief token if and only if that belief token is true. Once
again, however, this claim does not hold; and this is so whether we consider
the epistemic or the practical ought. If the epistemic reasons are particularly
strong, it may indeed be the case that we epistemically ought to have a false
belief. Likewise, if the pragmatic reasons for a belief are particularly strong, it
may be the case that we ought to have a belief that is not true.
As a final attempt, one might counter that correctness should be for-
mulated in terms of an ‘ought’ that is both epistemic and objective.
According to this view, what one ought to believe depends entirely on
the facts that make one’s belief true, rather than on one’s subjective
evidence or pragmatic interests. Once this formulation is adopted, the
claim that one ought to have a belief token if and only if that belief token
is true follows as a tautology. The relevant ‘ought’ in terms of which beliefs’
correctness is understood is defined in terms of the formal object of beliefs.
The problem with this solution is that it renders the normative under-
standing of correctness indistinguishable from, and in fact reducible to, the
understanding of correctness in terms of correspondence. What one episte-
mically ought, objectively, to believe is no longer determined by one’s
(epistemic) reasons, or how these (epistemic) reasons weigh against each
other, but by a sort of direct ‘match’ between one’s belief and what is the
case.23 In the case of belief, such a ‘match’ is best conceived of in terms of
the correspondence between the content of one’s belief and the world.
What about other mental states, such as emotions? What does it mean to
say that one epistemically ought, objectively, to have a particular emotion
token, when the objective epistemic ought is completely detached from
someone’s (epistemic) reasons to have that emotion? One possibility con-
sists in conceiving the objective epistemic ought of emotions in terms of
(content) correspondence, as we do for beliefs. In this case, however, we run
into the problems explored in sub-section 4.1. If we adopt this option, it is
indeed correct to say (e.g.) that the fearsome is what makes fear the
emotion that one epistemically ought, objectively, to have. However, this
is so because the emotion that one epistemically ought, objectively, to have
is the emotion whose content corresponds to what is the case, i.e. in the
present example, that its object is fearsome. In order for Deonna and
Teroni’s theory to be viable, then, it must be the case that there exists
another account of the objective epistemic ought of emotions, which
16 M. ROSSI AND C. TAPPOLET

neither reduces to (content) correspondence nor falls prey to the objections

presented above. So far, Deonna and Teroni have not offered any such
account. In fact, we are skeptical about the prospects of doing so. Be that
as it may, the burden of the proof rests squarely with them.24
The upshot is the following: if truth is the formal object of beliefs (as it is
commonly maintained), then either (i) is false or the normative understand-
ing of correctness reduces to the understanding in terms of (content)
correspondence. Premise (3) is also vindicated.
The overall conclusion of our argument can be summarized as follows.
On the one hand, if correctness is defined as correspondence, then (ii) is
false. On the other hand, if correctness is defined in normative terms, then
either (i) or (ii) is false. Therefore, either (i) or (ii) is false. The only way out is
to argue that there is another concept of correctness at play. Once again,
nothing said here shows that this cannot be done. Though given the very
general specification of the two options we gave, the odds are against the
attitudinal theory.

5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that the master argument offered by Deonna
and Teroni in favor of their attitudinal theory is flawed. We have also argued
that the attitudinal theory itself faces what is likely to be a serious dilemma.
Both lines of argument show that, despite its promise, the attitudinal theory
is in trouble. This is good news for the other cognitive theories of emotions
on the market. In particular, since the attitudinal theory is specifically pre-
sented as an improvement on the perceptual theory, and since the master
argument for the attitudinal theory is in fact an objection against the
perceptual theory, this is good news for the perceptual theory.

Notes
1. Another possibility is to opt for hybrid views, such as, for instance, the view
that emotions are desire-belief pairs. See, e.g. Searle (1983). For critical discus-
sion, see Deonna and Teroni (2012), chap. 3.
2. These are sometimes also called ‘appropriateness’ or ‘fittingness’ conditions,
but nothing hinges on the terminology.
3. See, for instance, Tappolet (2016).
4. For more details on these arguments, see Tappolet (2016), chap. 1.
5. See Brady (2013); Deonna and Teroni (2012), 69; Dokic and Lemaire (2013).
6. For a discussion, see Tappolet (2016), chap. 1.
7. See Tenenbaum (2008); Schafer (2013); and Saemi (2015), for a similar strategy
applied to desires; and see Kriegel (2017), for the attribution of an attitudinal
theory of desires and emotions to Brentano.
8. See Kenny (1963), 132, who draws on Aquinas, as well as de Sousa (1987), 20;
and Teroni (2007).
 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 17

9. See Teroni (2007); Deonna and Teroni (2012).

10. More precisely, according to the attitudinal theory, the content of emotions
need not, but can, be evaluative, such as when you fear that you are not
admirable enough or you hope to become a better person.
11. Note that Dokic and Lemaire (2015) claim that the attitudinal theory is either
vulnerable to the same objections as the perceptual theory, or cannot account
for the relation between emotions and evaluative judgments.
12. See Deonna and Teroni (2012), especially pp. 82–89.
13. See Aquinas (1999) (Quaestiones Disputatae de Virtutibus, q. 2 a. 4), quoted in
Lisska (2016), 122–123. In fact, Aquinas held that color is the formal object of
visual perceptions, rather than chromatic perceptions. However, we think that
Aquinas’s claim is too broad to be plausible. For this reason, we have restricted
his claim to chromatic perceptions.
14. In this sense, color is arguably similar to goodness, for goodness is plausibly
taken to be a determinable property that can be instantiated by more specific
properties, e.g. admirable, amusing, awesome, etc. (See Mulligan 1998;
Tappolet 2004; Oddie 2005; inter alia).
15. For criticisms, see Mulligan (2007).
16. See Teroni (2007) and Deonna and Teroni (2012).
17. Insofar as it construes emotions as kinds of perceptual experiences, this is
precisely what the perceptual theory of emotions would have predicted. We
take this to be an additional point in favor of the perceptual theory.
18. This premise could also be formulated so as to include other non-emotional
mental state types involving formal objects, as long as such states are not
perceptual states.
19. Deonna and Teroni add that one advantage of their account of the correct-
ness conditions of emotions is that it construes them as similar in structure
to the correctness conditions of beliefs and desires. Whether this is a
genuine advantage depends, of course, on the precise nature of the simi-
larity between beliefs and desires, on the one hand, and emotions, on the
other hand. As we have seen before, this is a controversial issue. In any
case, insofar as Deonna and Teroni’s second argument relies on such a
similarity claim, it is vulnerable to the same kind of problems explored in
the previous section.
20. See, e.g. Mulligan (2007), 209. According to some, such as Thomson (2008),
105–106, 112; see also Tappolet (2016), 88, this sense of the term ‘correct’ is
not normative. Here, we can remain neutral regarding this question, for
correspondence can be taken to constitute a category that is distinct from
the other normative concepts we consider.
21. An alternative answer, which we turn to below, is that an attitude’s corre-
spondence conditions are determined jointly by its content and by the atti-
tude type to which that token attitude belongs.
22. Indeed, the notion of correspondence could just as well be understood in
terms of a deflationary account of correspondence, according to which p is
appropriate if and only if p.
23. See also McHugh and Way (2017).
24. One may object that the argument offered in this section is problematic
because it overgeneralizes, in the sense that it applies to the normative
accounts of the correctness conditions of all mental states, not just of emo-
tions. However, we think that this objection fails. Consider beliefs. It is indeed
18 M. ROSSI AND C. TAPPOLET

true that the normative accounts of the correctness conditions of beliefs are
vulnerable to the problems presented here. But this simply shows that we
should opt for a non-normative account of their correctness conditions, e.g.
one in terms of correspondence – or, at least, that we should address the
‘wrong kind of reasons’ problems generated by such normative accounts in
terms of (content) correspondence. Crucially, while this option is open in the
case of beliefs, it is not open in the case of emotions when the latter are
conceived of as evaluative attitudes. In fact, as shown above, if Deonna and
Teroni resort to an account of the correctness conditions of emotions in terms
of correspondence, they face the objections stated in subsection 4.1.

Acknowledgments
We are very grateful to Paul Boswell, Julien Deonna, Kevin Mulligan, Hichem Naar, Michele
Palmira, Angie Pepper, Sarah Stroud, Fabrice Teroni, the participants to the 4th Conference
of the European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions, and two anonymous
referees for their useful comments on previous drafts or presentations of the paper.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding
This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada [435-2016-0711];

Notes on contributors
Mauro Rossi is an Associate Professor in Philosophy at the Université du Québec à
Montréal. His research interests are in value theory and philosophy of economics. His
current scholarship focuses particularly on well-being, psychological happiness, and
the fitting-attitude analysis of value.
Christine Tappolet is Full Professor in the Philosophy Department at the Université
de Montréal. Her research interests lie mainly in metaethics, moral psychology, and
emotion theory. She is the editor a number of volumes, including, with Fabrice
Teroni and Anita Konzelman Ziv, Shadows of the Soul. Perspective on Negative
Emotions (2018, Routledge) and she is the author of three books, including
Emotions, Values, and Agency (2016, Oxford University Press).

References
Aquinas, T. 1999. Quaestiones Disputatae De Virtutibus. South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s
Press. Translated by Ralph McInerny, Disputed Question in the Virtues. modified and
html-edited by J. Kenny. http://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeVirtutibus.htm
Brady, M. 2013. Emotional Insight. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 19

De Sousa, R. 1987. The Rationality of Emotion. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Deonna, J., and F. Teroni. 2012. The Emotions. A Philosophical Introduction. London:
Routledge.
Deonna, J., and F. Teroni. 2015. “Emotions as Attitudes.” Dialectica 69: 293–311.
doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12116
Deonna, J., and F. Teroni. 2014. “In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?” In Emotion and
Value, edited by S. Roeser and C. Todd, 15–31. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dokic, J., and S. Lemaire. 2013. “Are Emotions Perceptions of Value?” Canadian
Journal of Philosophy 43 (2): 227–247. doi:10.1080/00455091.2013.826057
Dokic, J., and S. Lemaire. 2015. “Are Emotions Evaluative Modes?” Dialectica 69:
271–292. doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12117
Döring, S. A. 2003. “Explaining Action by Emotion.” The Philosophical Quarterly 53:
214–230. doi:10.1111/phiq.2003.53.issue-211
Frijda, N. 1986. The Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Greenspan, P. 1988. Emotions and Reasons. London: Routledge.
James, W. 1884. “What Is an Emotion?” Mind; a Quarterly Review of Psychology and
Philosophy 9: 188–205. doi:10.1093/mind/os-IX.34.188
Kenny, A. 1963. Action, Emotion and Will. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Kriegel, U. 2017. “Brentano’s Evaluative-Attitudinal Account of Will and Emotion.” Revue
Philosophique De La France Et De L’étranger 17 (143): 529–558. doi:10.3917/rphi.174.0529
Lange, C. G. 1885. “The Emotions: A Psychophysiological Study.” In The Emotions,
edited by C. G. Lange and W. James, 33–90. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1922.
Lisska, A. J. 2016. Aquinas’s Theory of Perception. An Analytic Reconstruction. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
McHugh, C., and J. Way. 2017. “Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic
Ought.” Ergo 4: 121–145.
Mulligan, K. 1998. “From Appropriate Emotions to Values.” The Monist 81: 161–188.
doi:10.5840/monist199881114
Mulligan, K. 2007. “Intentionality, Knowledge and Formal Objects.” Disputatio 2: 205–228.
Nussbaum, M. 2001. Upheavals of Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Oddie, G. 2005. Value, Reality and Desire. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rabinowicz, W., and T. Rønnow-Rasmussen. 2004. “The Strike of the Demon: On
Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value.” Ethics 114 (3): 391–423. doi:10.1086/381694
Roberts, R. C. 2003. Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Roberts, R. C. 2013. Emotions in the Moral Life. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Saemi, A. 2015. “Aiming at the Good.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45: 1–23.
doi:10.1080/00455091.2015.1054230
Scarantino, A. 2014. “The Motivational Theory of Emotions.” In Moral Psychology and
Human Agency, edited by D. Jacobson and J. D’Arms, 156–185. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Schafer, K. 2013. “Perception and the Rational Force of Desire.” The Journal of
Philosophy 96: 258–281. doi:10.5840/jphil2013110528
Searle, J. R. 1983. Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Solomon, R. C. 1976. The Passions: Emotions and The Meaning of Life. Indianapolis, IL:
Hackett Publishing Company.
Tappolet, C. 2000. Émotions et valeurs. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Tappolet, C. 2004. “Through Thick and Thin: Good and Its Determinates.” Dialectica
58 (2): 207–221. doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00297.x
Tappolet, C. 2016. Emotions, Values, and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
20 M. ROSSI AND C. TAPPOLET

Tenenbaum, S. 2008. “Appearing Good: A Reply to Schroeder.” Social Theory and

Practice 34: 131–138. doi:10.5840/soctheorpract20083417
Teroni, F. 2007. “Emotions and Formal Objects.” Dialectica 61: 395–415. doi:10.1111/
dltc.2007.61.issue-3
Thomson, J. J. 2008. Normativity. Peru, IL: Open Court.
Whiting, D. 2011. “The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed
Emotions.” European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2): 281–303. doi:10.1111/j.1468-
0378.2009.00384.x