COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

13th JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

GARRARD CIRCUIT COURT
CASE NO.: 24-CI-____________

ELIZABETH MARIE McWHORTER, as Administratrix of the PLAINTIFFS

Estate of Chastian Tyler McWhorter

and

ELIZABETH MARIE McWHORTER, Individually

and

ELIZABETH MARIE McWHORTER, as Next Friend of M.G.T.M.

and

ELIZABETH MARIE McWHORTER, as Next Friend of A.L.H.

and

FAITH HUCKABY, as Next Friend of K.A.M.

vs.

WILLIAM R. CLEM, Individually DEFENDANTS

Serve by certified mail:

181 Virginia Avenue
Lexington, Kentucky 40508

and

WILLIAM R. CLEM d/b/a CLEM’S REFRIGERATED FOODS

Serve by certified mail:

181 Virginia Avenue
Lexington, Kentucky 40508

and

CLEM’S REFRIGERATED FOODS

Serve by certified mail:
181 Virginia Avenue
Lexington, Kentucky 40508

and

COREY J. DUNN

Serve by certified mail:

117 West Sixth Street
Lexington, Kentucky 40508

and

KENTUCKY LEAGUE OF CITIES INSURANCE SERVICES ASSOCIATION

Serve by certified mail to registered process agent:

James D. Chaney
100 East Vine Street
Suite 800
Lexington, Kentucky 40507

COMPLAINT

* * * * * *

Come now the Plaintiffs, Elizabeth Marie McWhorter, as Administratrix of the Estate of

Chastian Tyler McWhorter; Elizabeth Marie McWhorter, Individually; Elizabeth Marie

McWhorter, as Next Friend of M.G.T.M.; Elizabeth Marie McWhorter, as Next Friend of A.L.H.;

and Faith Huckaby, as Next Friend of K.A.M.; by and through counsel, and, for their cause of

action herein, state as follows:

PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE

1. That the Plaintiff, Elizabeth Marie McWhorter, was and is, at all times relevant

herein, a legal resident of Clinton County, Kentucky.

2. That Elizabeth Marie McWhorter is the widow of the decedent, Chastian Tyler

McWhorter.
 3. At the time of the decedent’s death, the decedent, Chastian Tyler McWhorter,

was a legal resident of Clinton County, Kentucky.

4. That the Plaintiff, Faith Huckaby, was and is, at all times relevant herein, a legal

resident of Clinton County, Kentucky.

5. That on April 17, 2024, by order of the Clinton District Court in Case No. 24-P-

00032, Elizabeth Marie McWhorter was duly appointed as Administratrix of the Estate of

Chastian Tyler McWhorter.

6. That, upon Plaintiff’s information and belief, the Defendant, William R. Clem, was

and is, at all times relevant herein, a resident of Fayette County, Kentucky.

7. That the Defendant, William M. Clem, was and is, at all times relevant herein,

doing business as Clem’s Refrigerated Foods, and operating under the laws of the

Commonwealth of Kentucky. The principal place of business of Clem’s Refrigerated Foods is

181 Virginia Avenue, Lexington, Kentucky 40508.

8. That, upon Plaintiff’s information and belief, the Defendant, Clem’s Refrigerated

Foods, is an unincorporated business entity, doing business and operating under the laws of

the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The principal place of business of Clem’s Refrigerated Foods

is 181 Virginia Avenue, Lexington, Kentucky 40508.

9. That, upon Plaintiff’s information and belief, the Defendant, Corey J. Dunn

(hereinafter, “Defendant Dunn”), was and is, at all times relevant herein, a resident of Fayette

County, Kentucky.

10. That the Defendant, Kentucky League of Cities Insurance Services Association,

was and is, at all times relevant herein, a Kentucky liability self-insurance group transacting

business and authorized to transact business in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

 11. At all times relevant herein, the Defendants transported goods in the

Commonwealth of Kentucky, and each were subject to the dictates of the Kentucky Department

of Transportation, Motor Carrier Safety Act and Regulations, as well as all relevant state

and/or federal laws.

12. The complained of conduct and collision described herein occurred in Garrard

County, Kentucky. Therefore, venue is proper in the Garrard Circuit Court.

13. The damages sustained are in excess of the minimal jurisdictional limits of the

Garrard Circuit Court.

COUNT I – NEGLIGENCE CAUSE OF ACTION

14. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-13 are incorporated herein as if

transcribed in full.

15. At the time of the collision described below, Defendant Dunn was operating a

2021 Kenworth Motor Truck Company T3 Series vehicle (VIN 2NKHHM6XOMM458507)

owned, managed, maintained, controlled, inspected, repaired, and/or operated by Defendants

William R. Clem, Individually, William R. Clem d/b/a Clem’s Refrigerated Foods, and Clem’s

Refrigerated Foods (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Defendant Clem”). The vehicle is

believed to be titled to Defendant Clem. (The vehicle is hereinafter referred to as the “Clem

vehicle”).

16. At the time of the collision described below, Defendant Dunn was acting as an

agent, apparent agent, servant, representative, borrowed servant, and/or employee of

Defendant Clem and/or otherwise acting on behalf of and/or for the benefit of Defendant Clem.

17. At the time of the collision described below, Defendant Dunn was acting in the

course and scope of his employment and/or agent with Defendant Clem and/or acting for the
benefit of and/or on behalf of Defendant Clem.

18. Defendant Clem is vicariously liable for damages caused by Defendant Dunn as

alleged herein.

19. At the time of the collision described below, Defendant Dunn was operating the

Clem vehicle under Defendant Clem’s (U.S. DOT 00670766) operating authority.

20. At the time of the collision described below, Defendant Clem was responsible for

the actions or inactions of its employee and/or agent, Defendant Dunn.

21. At the time of the collision described below, Defendant Clem was responsible for

the dispatch of Defendant Dunn, was the custodian of Defendant Dunn’s logs, and permitted

Defendant Dunn to operate the Clem vehicle under Defendant Clem’s operating authority.

22. Defendant Clem was responsible for the maintenance and repair of the Clem

vehicle driven by Defendant Dunn at the time of the collision.

23. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Clem was subject to the Federal Motor

Carrier Safety Regulations.

24. At the time of the collision described below, the decedent, Chastian Tyler

McWhorter, was operating a 2018 Chevrolet Silverado ambulance in the scope of his

employment for Somerset-Pulaski County EMS.

25. On or about April 1, 2024, between mile markers 15 and 16 of United States

Highway 27, also known as Lexington Road, and roughly nine miles north of Lancaster, in

Garrard County, Kentucky, Defendant Dunn operated the Clem vehicle in such a careless and

negligent manner as to pull into the lane of travel of decedent Chastian McWhorter which

caused decedent Chastian McWhorter’s vehicle to collide with the Clem vehicle.

26. At the time of the collision described herein, Defendant Dunn and/or Defendant
Clem were under a duty to operate and maintain the Clem vehicle with reasonable care,

including, but not limited to, keeping a proper lookout, avoiding contact with other vehicles,

traveling at a safe speed, and using proper signals.

27. At the time of the collision described herein, Defendant Dunn and/or Defendant

Clem had a duty to act in accordance with the laws and regulations of the Commonwealth of

Kentucky and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.

28. At the time of the collision described herein, Defendant Dunn and/or Defendant

Clem negligently failed to follow safety policies and procedures.

29. At the time of the collision described herein, Defendant Dunn and/or Defendant

Clem negligently failed to comply with the rules and regulations set forth in the Kentucky

Revised Statutes.

30. At the time of the collision described herein, Defendant Dunn and/or Defendant

Clem negligently failed to comply with the Motor Carrier Safety Act and other Regulations.

31. The Defendants breached the above-reference duties.

32. At the time of the collision described herein, Defendant Dunn and/or Defendant

Clem failed to keep the Clem vehicle under reasonable control.

33. At the time of the collision described herein, Defendant Dunn and/or Defendant

Clem, while operating the Clem vehicle, failed to exercise ordinary care to avoid a collision

and/or failed to exercise ordinary care, and caused a collision.

34. At the time of the collision described herein, Defendant Dunn and/or Defendant

Clem failed to exercise ordinary care for the safety of persons, including decedent Chastian

McWhorter, using the roadway.

 35. At the time of the collision described herein, Defendant Dunn and/or Defendant

Clem failed to yield the right-of-way to the vehicle operated by Chastian McWhorter.

36. At the time of the collision described herein, Defendant Dunn and/or Defendant

Clem negligently obstructed Chastian McWhorter’s lane of travel and travel path.

37. At the time of the collision described herein, Defendant Dunn was negligent in

the driving of a commercial vehicle, and Defendant Clem was negligent in allowing the

negligent operation of a commercial motor vehicle.

38. At the time of the collision, Defendant Dunn and/or Defendant Clem failed to

comply with regulations governing commercial vehicles including, but not limited to,

regulations regarding driving commercial vehicles, general requirements, parts, and

accessories for safe operation, commercial driver’s license standard, inspection, repair, and

maintenance.

39. At the time of the collision described herein, the actions and omissions of one or

more of the Defendants constitute a breach and/or violation of statutory and/or regulatory

law including, but not limited to, the code of regulations, statutory law, and state statutory,

regulatory, and/or common law.

40. The actions and/or omissions of Defendant Dunn and/or Defendant Clem

constitute negligence per se.

41. The Defendants’ actions were negligent, negligent per se, reckless, and grossly

negligent.

42. The Defendants’ breach of the above-referenced duties was the direct and

proximate cause of and a substantial factor in causing the wrongful death of Chastian Tyler

McWhorter.
 43. As a result of the Defendants’ actions as alleged herein, the Plaintiffs have

suffered damages.

COUNT II – STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION

44. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-43 are incorporated herein as if

transcribed in full.

45. KRS § 446.070 provides that a person injured by violation of any statute may

recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation.

46. Defendant Clem and/or Defendant Dunn violated statutes contemplated under

KRS § 446.070 as previously stated herein.

47. The decedent, Chastian Tyler McWhorter, suffered damages and his wrongful

death as a result of the Defendants’ statutory violations, and is entitled to recover from same.

48. As a result of the Defendants’ actions as alleged herein, the Plaintiffs have

suffered damages.

COUNT III – NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT, TRAINING, HIRING,

SUPERVISION, SAFETY MANAGEMENT, AND CONTROL

49. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-48 are incorporated herein as if

transcribed in full.

50. At all times relevant herein, Defendant Clem controlled, oversaw, managed,

developed, supervised, and/or was responsible for safety policies, procedures, rules,

regulations, training, guidelines, standards, operations, and/or oversight for the drivers,

employees, and/or agents of Defendant Clem.

51. Defendant Clem negligently supervised, managed, controlled, oversaw, and/or

developed safety policies, procedures, rules, regulations, training, guidelines, standards, and

operations.
 52. Defendant Clem authorized, ratified, and/or was aware or should have been

aware or should have anticipated the acts and omissions of its employees, agents,

representatives, owners, managers, and/or servants.

53. Defendant Clem had actual and constructive knowledge and knew or should

have known that Defendant Clem’s drivers were not adequately trained and/or sufficiently

familiar with safety policies, procedures, rules, regulations, training, guidelines, standards, and

operations.

54. Defendant Clem had actual and constructive knowledge and knew or should

have known that Defendant Clem’s drivers were not adequately supervised regarding safety

policies, procedures, rules, regulations, training, guidelines, standards, and operations.

55. Defendant Clem failed in its duty of care by failing to adequately instruct and

train Defendant Dunn in the safe operation of the Clem vehicle prior to entrusting him with

said vehicle.

56. Defendant Clem failed in its duty of care by failing to provide Defendant Dunn

with the equipment necessary to safely operate the Clem vehicle.

57. Defendant Clem failed in its duty of care by its failure to supervise, train, and hire

safe drivers who obey laws, rules, and regulations pertaining to the safety of others using the

roadways, including Chastian McWhorter.

58. Defendant Clem negligently hired, managed, retained, supervised, and trained

Defendant Dunn.

59. Defendant Clem negligently entrusted the Clem vehicle to Defendant Dunn.

60. Defendant Clem negligently failed to ensure employees and/or agents, including

Defendant Dunn, followed safety policies, procedures, rules, regulations, training, guidelines,
standards, and operations including, but not limited to, those safety policies, procedures, rules,

regulations, training, guidelines, standards, and operations dictated by internal policies and

procedures, industry standards, Kentucky law, and/or federal law.

61. Defendant Clem and/or Defendant Dunn, acting individually and/or through

owners, employees, managers, representatives, and/or actual, apparent, and/or ostensible

agents, otherwise acted negligently and carelessly, and said negligence and carelessness was a

substantial factor in causing the subject collision and the damages alleged herein.

COUNT IV – NEGLIGENT MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND INSPECTION

62. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-61 are incorporated herein as if

transcribed in full.

63. Defendant Clem and/or Defendant Dunn, acting individually and/or through

each other and/or acting through owners, employees, managers, representatives, and/or

actual, apparent, and/or ostensible agents, negligently and carelessly failed to adequately and

safely maintain the Clem vehicle, failed to property maintain the Clem vehicle in an

appropriate and safe condition, negligently failed to perform proper maintenance and

maintenance checks of the Clem vehicle, negligently inspected and/or failed to inspect the

Clem vehicle, negligently violated guidelines, duties, rules, and regulations regarding the Clem

vehicle, negligently failed to ensure the Clem vehicle was safe for operation, negligently

violated industry standards in maintaining the Clem vehicle, negligently failed to ensure that

competent drivers were available and utilized for the Clem vehicle, and otherwise negligently

failed to properly maintain the Clem vehicle in accordance with generally accepted practices,

industry standards, internal policies and procedures, and/or the law.

 64. The actions and omissions of Defendant Clem and/or Defendant Dunn constitute

a breach and/or violation of industry standards and/or failed to meet, satisfy, and/or comply

with industry standards, and constitute a breach and/or violation of reasonably prudent safety

standards and/or failed to meet, satisfy, and/or comply with reasonably prudent safety

standards.

65. Defendant Clem and/or Defendant Dunn were negligent and careless in the

inspection, repair, and maintenance of the Clem vehicle.

66. Defendant Clem was negligent and careless in failing to provide adequate

training to truck operators regarding the maintenance of its vehicles in a safe manner and/or

otherwise failed to comply with reasonable and prudent safety and industry standards.

67. Defendant Clem and/or Defendant Dunn negligently failed to inspect the Clem

vehicle and/or have the Clem vehicle inspected when the Defendants knew or should have

known to do so.

68. Defendant Clem and/or Defendant Dunn, acting individually and/or through

owners, employees, managers, representatives, and/or actual, apparent, and/or ostensible

agents, otherwise acted negligently and carelessly in the maintenance, repair, and inspection of

the Clem vehicle, and said negligence and carelessness was a substantial factor in causing the

subject collision and the damages alleged herein.

COUNT V – DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DEATH

69. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-68 are incorporated herein as if

transcribed in full.

70. That the decedent, Chastian Tyler McWhorter, by and through Elizabeth Marie

McWhorter as Administratrix of the Estate of Chastian Tyler McWhorter, has sustained the
following damages, to-wit:

a. Wrongful death and loss of enjoyment of life;

b. Medical expenses incurred;

c. Conscious pain, suffering, and emotional distress endured;

d. Permanent impairment of his ability to earn money;

e. Loss of services; and

f. Funeral expenses.

COUNT VI – PUNITIVE DAMAGES

71. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-70 are incorporated herein as if

transcribed in full.

72. That the actions of the Defendants described above, and each of them,

constituted gross negligence, reckless indifference, fraud, malice, and oppression for the life of

Chastian Tyler McWhorter.

73. As a result of the conduct of Defendant Clem and/or Defendant Dunn, the

Plaintiffs are entitled to recover punitive damages in this action.

COUNT VII – LOSS OF SPOUSAL CONSORTIUM

74. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-73 are incorporated herein as if

transcribed in full.

75. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the Defendants as described

above, and each of them, Plaintiff Elizabeth Marie McWhorter, Individually, was caused to lose

the companionship, services, love, affection, and society of her husband, Chastian Tyler

McWhorter, and has and will suffer damages as a result.

COUNT VIII – LOSS OF PARENTAL CONSORTIUM

 76. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-75 are incorporated herein as if

transcribed in full.

77. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the Defendants as described

above, and each of them, Plaintiff M.G.T.M., the unborn daughter of the decedent, Chastian

Tyler McWhorter, by and through her next friend, Elizabeth Marie McWhorter, was caused to

lose the companionship, services, love, affection, and society of her father, Chastian Tyler

McWhorter, and has and will suffer damages as a result.

COUNT IX – LOSS OF PARENTAL CONSORTIUM

78. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-77 are incorporated herein as if

transcribed in full.

79. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the Defendants as described

above, and each of them, Plaintiff A.L.H., the step-daughter of the decedent, Chastian Tyler

McWhorter, by and through her next friend, Elizabeth Marie McWhorter, was caused to lose

the companionship, services, love, affection, and society of her step-father, Chastian Tyler

McWhorter, and has and will suffer damages as a result.

COUNT X – LOSS OF PARENTAL CONSORTIUM

80. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-79 are incorporated herein as if

transcribed in full.

81. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the Defendants as described

above, and each of them, Plaintiff K.A.M., the son of the decedent, Chastian Tyler McWhorter, by

and through his next friend, Faith Huckaby, was caused to lose the companionship, services,

love, affection, and society of his father, Chastian Tyler McWhorter, and has and will suffer

damages as a result.
 COUNT XI – UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

82. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1-81 are incorporated herein as if

transcribed in full.

83. That the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover underinsured motorist benefits

pursuant to a policy of insurance issued by Defendant, Kentucky League of Cities Insurance

Services Association, providing coverage to the named insured City of Somerset, said coverage

emanating under policy number L5516-2023-23597, which was in effect at the time of the

collision referenced herein.

84. That the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the Defendant, Kentucky League

of Cities Insurance Services Association, the sums that will reasonably compensate them for

the damages sustained as alleged herein, in an amount up to the respective policy limits of the

Defendant.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs demand judgment as follows:

1. Judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, that will fairly and

adequately compensate the Plaintiffs for the damages sustained as alleged herein.

2. That the Plaintiffs be accorded such other relief to which they may appear

entitled, including, but not limited to, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, costs

expended, and reasonable attorney fees.

3. A trial by jury on all issues so triable.

4. Any and all other relief to which they may appear entitled.
Respectfully submitted as
Counsel for Elizabeth Marie McWhorter,
as Administratrix of the Estate of Chastian
Tyler McWhorter; Elizabeth Marie
McWhorter, Individually; Elizabeth Marie
McWhorter, as Next Friend of M.G.T.M.;
and Elizabeth Marie McWhorter, as Next
Friend of A.L.H.

/s/ W. Matthew Garmon_________

W. Matthew Garmon
Rhett B. Ramsey
Garmon & Ramsey, PLLC
15 Huffaker Street
Monticello, Kentucky 42633
P: (606) 348-5199 | F: (606) 348-6669
E: matt@garmonandramsey.com
E: rhett@garmonandramsey.com

Respectfully submitted as
Counsel for Faith Huckaby, as
Next Friend of K.A.M.:

/s/ Jeremy A. Bartley_________

Jeremy A. Bartley
The Law Office Of Jeremy A. Bartley, PSC
35 Public Square
Somerset, Kentucky 42501
P: (606) 678-7265 | F: (606) 416-5974
E: jbartleylaw@gmail.com