RULE 21:

SUBPOENA
Table of Contents

Roco v Contreras, G.R. 158275, June. 28, 2005......................................................................................................................................... 2

In Liebenow v. Philippine Vegetable Oil Co., G.R. No. 13463, Nov. 9, 1918................................................................................................6
In Re: Petition for cancellation and correction of entries in the record of birth, Lee v. CA G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010......................10
Macaspac v. Flores, A.M. No. P-05-2072, August 13, 2008.......................................................................................................................13
Pagdilao, Jr. v. Angeles, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1467, Aug. 5, 1999..................................................................................................................16
Nazareno v. Barnes, G.R. No. 59072, Apr. 25, 1984.................................................................................................................................. 22

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Roco v Contreras, G.R. 158275, June. 28, 2005

G.R. No. 158275 June 28, 2005

DOMINGO ROCO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. EDWARD B. CONTRERAS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CAL'S POULTRY SUPPLY CORPORATION, respondents.

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66038, to wit:

1. Decision dated 20 August 2002,1 dismissing the appeal filed by herein petitioner Domingo Roco contra the 18 October
2000 resolution of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Roxas City, denying due course to and dismissing his petition for certiorari
in SP Case No. 7489; and

2. Resolution dated 12 May 2003,2 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The material facts are not at all disputed:

Petitioner Domingo Roco was engaged in the business of buying and selling dressed chicken. Sometime in 1993, he purchased his
supply of dressed chicken from private respondent Cal’s Poultry Supply Corporation (Cal’s Corporation, for short), a domestic
corporation controlled and managed by one Danilo Yap. As payment for his purchases, petitioner drew five (5) checks payable to Cal’s
Corporation against his account with the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), which checks bear the following particulars:

Check No. Date Amount

004502 26 April 1993 ₱329,931.40
004503 4 May 1993 ₱319,314.40
004507 19 May 1993 ₱380,560.20
004511 26 May 1993 ₱258,660.20
004523 22 May 1993 ₱141,738.55.

Cal’s Corporation deposited the above checks in its account with PCIB but the bank dishonored them for having been drawn against a
closed account. Thereafter, Cal’s Corporation filed criminal complaints against petitioner for violation of Batas Pambasa Blg. 22 (BP
22), otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.

After preliminary investigation, five (5) informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Roxas City, thereat docketed as Crim. Cases No. 94-2172-12 to 94-2176-12, all of which were raffled to Branch 2 of
said court.

Meanwhile, and even before trial could commence, petitioner filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) at Iloilo City a
denunciation letter against Cal’s Corporation for the latter’s alleged violation of Section 258 in relation to Section 263 of the National
Internal Revenue Code in that it failed to issue commercial invoices on its sales of merchandise. Upon BIR’s investigation, it was found
that Cal’s Corporation’s sales on account were unavoidable, hence, the corporation had to defer the issuance of "Sales Invoices" until
the purchases of its customers were paid in full. With respect to the sales invoices of petitioner, the investigation disclosed that the
same could not, as yet, be issued by the corporation precisely because the checks drawn and issued by him in payment of his
purchases were dishonored by PCIB for the reason that the checks were drawn against a closed account. Accordingly, the BIR found
no prima facia evidence of tax evasion against Cal’s Corporation.3

Thereupon, trial of the criminal cases proceeded. After the prosecution rested, the MTCC declared the cases submitted for decision on
account of petitioner’s failure to adduce evidence in his behalf. Later, the same court rendered a judgment of conviction against
petitioner.

Therefrom, petitioner went on appeal to the Regional Trial Court, contending that he was unlawfully deprived of his right to due process
when the MTCC rendered judgment against him without affording him of the right to present his evidence. Agreeing with the petitioner,
the RTC vacated the MTCC decision and remanded the cases to it for the reception of petitioner’s evidence.

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On 11 March 1999, during the pendency of the remanded cases, petitioner filed with the MTCC a "Request for Issuance of Subpoena
Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum", requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap, both of Cal’s Corporation or their duly
authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court on 19 May 1999 and to bring with them certain documents, records and books
of accounts for the years 1993-1999, to wit:

a) Sales Journal for the year 1993;

b) Accounts Receivable Journal for the year 1993;

c) Sales Ledger for the year 1993;

d) Accounts Receivable Ledger for the year 1993 (in its absence, Accounts Receivable Ledger for the years 1994, 1995, 1996,
1997, 1998 or 1999);

e) Audited Income Statement for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Income Statements as of February 1999;

f) Audited Balance Sheet for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Balance Sheet as of February 1999; and

g) Income Tax Returns for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997.

The prosecution did not object to this request.

When the cases were called on 19 May 1999, the MTCC, then presided by Acting Judge Geomer C. Delfin, issued an order granting
petitioner’s aforementioned request and accordingly directed the issuance of the desired subpoenas.

During the trial of 14 July 1999, the private prosecutor manifested that it was improper for the trial court to have directed the issuance of
the requested subpoenas, to which the petitioner countered by saying that Judge Delfin’s order of 19 May 1999 had become final and
hence, immutable. Nonetheless, the trial court issued an order allowing the prosecution to file its comment or opposition to petitioner’s
request for the issuance of subpoenas.

The prosecution did file its opposition, thereunder arguing that:

a) Vivian Deocampo, who previously testified for Lota Briones-Roco in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-2177-12 to 94-2182-12 before
Branch 1 of the MTC, had earlier attested to the fact that the following documents, records and books of accounts for 1993
sought by petitioner were already burned:

1. Audited Income Statement for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Income Statement as of
February 1999;

2. Audited Balance Sheet for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Balance Sheet as of February 1999;
and

3. Income Tax Returns for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997.

b) the Sales Ledger for the year 1993 cannot be produced because Cal’s Corporation did not maintain such ledger; and

c) the account Receivable Ledger for the periods from 1993, the Income Statement for 1993 and the Balance Sheet as of
February 1999, cannot also be produced because Cal’s Corporation recently computerized its accounting records and was still
in the process of completing the same.

For its part, the corporation itself maintained that the production of the above-mentioned documents was inappropriate because they
are immaterial and irrelevant to the crimes for which the petitioner was being prosecuted.

In a resolution dated 19 October 1999, the MTCC, this time thru its regular Presiding Judge, Judge Edward B. Contreras, denied
petitioner’s request on the following grounds: (a) the requested documents, book ledgers and other records were immaterial in
resolving the issues posed before the court; and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delay the hearing of the criminal
cases.

His motion for reconsideration of the denial resolution having been similarly denied by Judge Contreras, petitioner then went to the RTC
on a petition for certiorari with plea for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Contreras, which petition was docketed in the RTC as SP Case No. V-7489.
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In a resolution dated 18 October 2000, the RTC denied due course to and dismissed the petition for petitioner’s failure to show that
Judge Contreras committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. A motion for reconsideration was
thereafter filed by petitioner, but it, too, was likewise denied.

Undaunted, petitioner went on appeal via certiorari to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66038.

As stated at the outset hereof, the Court of Appeals, in a decision dated 20 August 2002, 4 dismissed the petition and accordingly
affirmed the impugned resolutions of the RTC. With his motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its
resolution of 12 May 2003,5 petitioner is now with us via the present recourse on his submissions that -

I.

XXX THE DENIAL OF THE REQUEST FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM AND SUBPOENA DUCES
TECUM IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED AS ENSHRINED IN ART. III, SEC. 14 (2) OF THE
CONSTITUTION; and

II.

XXX THERE MUST BE A BALANCING OF INTEREST BETWEEN THE RIGH [sic] OF AN ACCUSED TO PROVE HIS INNOCENCE
AND THE RIGHT OF A COMPLAINANT TO THE SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE.

As we see it, the pivotal issue is whether or not the three (3) courts below committed reversible error in denying petitioner’s request for
the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum in connection with the five (5) criminal cases for violation of BP
22 filed against him and now pending trial before the MTCC.

We rule in the negative.

A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any
investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition. 6

In this jurisdiction, there are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used
to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein
specified. As characterized in H.C. Liebenow vs. The Philippine Vegetable Oil Company:7

The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum with the exception that it concludes with an
injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books, documents, or things described in the
subpoena.

Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites are
present: (1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy
(test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness). Again,
to quote from H.C. Liebenow:8

In determining whether the production of the documents described in a subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is
proper to consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of specific documents, or rather for specific proof, and
secondly, whether that proof is prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial
examination of all the books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain whether something of value
may not show up, will not be enforced. (Emphasis supplied)

Further, in Universal Rubber Products, Inc. vs. CA, et al., 9 we held:

Well-settled is Our jurisprudence that, in order to entitle a party to the issuance of a ‘subpoena duces tecum,’ it must appear, by clear
and unequivocal proof, that the book or document sought to be produced contains evidence relevant and material to the issue
before the court, and that the precise book, paper or document containing such evidence has been so designated or
described that it may be identified. (Emphasis supplied)

Going by established precedents, it thus behooves the petitioner to first prove, to the satisfaction of the court, the relevancy and
the definiteness of the books and documents he seeks to be brought before it.

Admittedly, the books and documents that petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his request with
definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this case.

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It is, however, in the matter of relevancy of those books and documents to the pending criminal cases that petitioner miserably failed to
discharge his burden.

In the recent case of Aguirre vs. People of the Philippines,10 the Court reiterated the following discussions regarding violations of BP 22:

xxx what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 301). All
the elements, therefore, of the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are all present in the instant criminal cases and for which the
accused is solely liable, to wit: [a] the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value; [2] the knowledge of
the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment
of such check in full upon its presentment; and [3] subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. (Navarro vs.
Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 639).

We stress that the gravamen of the offense under BP 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentment for payment.11 The offense is already consummated from the very moment a person issues a worthless
check, albeit payment of the value of the check, either by the drawer or by the drawee bank, within five (5) banking days from notice of
dishonor given to the drawer is a complete defense because the prima facie presumption that the drawer had knowledge of the
insufficiency of his funds or credit at the time of the issuance of the check and on its presentment for payment is thereby rebutted by
such payment.12

Here, petitioner would want it appear that the books and documents subject of his request for subpoena duces tecum are
indispensable, or, at least, relevant to prove his innocence. The Court disagrees.

Based on the records below and as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioner had been issued by Cal’s Corporation with
temporary receipts in the form of yellow pad slips of paper evidencing his payments, which pad slips had been validated by the
corporation itself. Clear it is, then, that the production of the books and documents requested by petitioner are not indispensable to
prove his defense of payment. In the words of the appellate court:

The Petitioner admitted, when he testified in the Regional Trial Court, that he had been issued temporary receipts in the form of yellow
pad slips of paper, by the Private Respondent, for his payments which were all validated by the Private Respondent (Exhibits ‘8’ and ‘F’
and their submarkings). Even if the temporary receipts issued by the Private Respondent may not have been the official receipts for
Petitioner’s payments, the same are as efficacious and binding on the Private Respondent as official receipts issued by the latter.

We do not find any justifiable reason, and petitioner has not shown any, why this Court must have to disbelieve the factual findings of
the appellate court. In short, the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum or ad testificandum to compel the attendance of Vivian
Deocampo or Danilo Yap of Cal’s Corporation or their duly authorized representatives, to testify and bring with them the records and
documents desired by the petitioner, would serve no purpose but to further delay the proceedings in the pending criminal cases.

Besides, the irrelevancy of such books and documents would appear on their very face thereof, what the fact that the requested
Audited Income Statements, Audited Balance Sheets, Income Tax Returns, etc. pertained to the years 1994 to 1999 which could not
have reflected petitioner’s alleged payment because the subject transaction happened in 1993. Again, we quote from the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals:

The checks subject of the criminal indictments against the Petitioner were drawn and dated in 1993. The Petitioner has not
demonstrated the justification, for the production of the books/records for 1994, and onwards, up to 1999. Especially so, when
the "Informations" against the Petitioner, for violations of BP 22, were filed, with the Trial Court, as early as 1994.

We are inclined to believe, along with that court, that petitioner was just embarking on a "fishing expedition" to derail "the placid flow of
trial".

With the above, it becomes evident to this Court that petitioner’s request for the production of books and documents referred to in his
request are nakedly calculated to merely lengthen the proceedings in the subject criminal cases, if not to fish for evidence. The Court
deeply deplores petitioner’s tactics and will never allow the same.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED

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In Liebenow v. Philippine Vegetable Oil Co., G.R. No. 13463, Nov. 9, 1918

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13463 November 9, 1918

H. C. LIEBENOW, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE VEGETABLE OIL COMPANY, defendant-appellee.

Kincaid & Perkins for appellant.

Hartigan & Welch for appellee.

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STREET, J.:

This action was instituted by the plaintiff, H. C. Liebenow, on May 11, 1917, in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against
the defendant, the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company, a corporation engaged in the manufacture of coconut oil in the city of Manila. The
purpose of the proceeding is to recover a sum of money to which the plaintiff considers himself entitled by way of a bonus in addition to
the salary earned by him while in the employment of the defendant company as superintendent of its factory in the district of Nagtahan,
city of Manila. At the hearing in the Court of First Instance judgment was entered against the plaintiff, absolving the defendant from the
complaint, and the plaintiff has appealed.

The contract under which the plaintiff rendered the service to which reference has been made is expressed in a letter of March 17,
1914, written by the president of the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company to Liebenow as follows:

We hereby confirm conversation had on yesterday by our Mr. Vorster and yourself to the effect that this company engages
your services as superintendent of its factory at Nagtahan for the period of one year from April 1st, 1914, at a monthly
compensation of P500 (five hundred pesos) and living quarters and such further amount in the way of bonus as the board of
directors may see fit to grant you.

In conformity with this agreement, the plaintiff entered upon the discharge of his duties as superintendent of the factory aforesaid on
April 1, 1914, and continued to render service in this capacity not only for the period of one year specified in the contract, but for an
additional period of four months, or until August 1, 1916, when his services terminated. At some time during the course of this
employment, the exact date of which does not appear, the monthly salary of P500 was raised to P750, but the contract was not
otherwise changed. After the employment ceased the defendant company continued to deliver to the plaintiff each month a check for
P750, the equivalent of the salary he had been receiving. These payments were continued until the total sum of P4,500 had been thus
paid.

The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that by reason of his skill and ability the defendant's plant was made much more productive and its
profits thereby enormously increased. It is not denied that the service rendered was satisfactory to the company, and the court found
that during the time the plaintiff was employed as superintendent the output of the plant had increased and the cost of operation had
diminished, with consequent profit to the defendant company.

It is the plaintiff's contention that the stipulation contained in the letter of March 17, 1914, to the effect that the plaintiff should receive
such further amount in the way of bonus, over and above salary, as the board of directors might see fit to grant has not been satisfied.
The P4,500, which he received in the form of a monthly check of P750 for six successive months after the termination of his services,
seems to be considered by the plaintiff purely in the light of a free gift, and it is insisted that this money was not paid to him in
satisfaction, in whole or in part, of the stipulated bonus. We cannot concur in this suggestion. It is true that the directors did not by
anticipation declare that these payments should be considered in the light of a "bonus;" and a resolution to this effect was not adopted
by them until after the trial in the Court of First Instance had commenced. This circumstance we consider unimportant. The money thus
paid was in addition to salary; and it came from the same source and was paid by the same authority as any bonus that might have
been awarded to him. The fact that the money was not so labelled is immaterial.

The plaintiff, however, contends that he is entitled to a bonus to be fixed by the court as a reasonable participation in the increased
profits of the factory under his care, taking into consideration his technical skill and the greater output resulting therefrom. He believes
that the increased profits of the enterprise due directly to this efficiency amounted to at least P100,000; and he suggests, as the lowest
proper minimum that he should be awarded an amount sufficient to raise his salary for the whole period to the sum of P12,000 per
annum, the amount supposedly paid to his predecessor. This last suggestion is based on the circumstance that, upon a certain
occasion, he talked to the company's manager about the amount of the bonus which he would expect to receive and informed the
manager that he would not be satisfied with less than his predecessor had been accustomed to receive. The manager, so the plaintiff
says, expressed his conformity with this idea.

The solution of the case makes it necessary to consider the legal effect of the stipulation inserted in the contract in question to the effect
that the plaintiff should be entitled to such further amount in the way of bonus as the board of directors might see fit to grant.

We see no reason to doubt that a promise of this character creates a legal obligation binding upon the promisor, although in its actual
results it may not infrequently prove to be illusory. Such a promise is not, in our opinion, nugatory, under article 1115 of the Civil Code,
as embodying a condition dependent exclusively upon the will of the obligor. Nor can it be held invalid under article 1256 of the same
Code, which declares that the validity and performance of a contract cannot be left to the will of one of the contracting parties. The
uncertainty of the amount to be paid by way of bonus is also no obstacle to the validity of the contract (article 1273, Civil Code); since
the contract itself specifies the manner in which the amount payable is to be determined, namely, by the exercise of the judgment and
discretion of the employer.

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The validity of the promise being conceded, the question which arises next is: What is necessary to satisfy it? Upon this point it must be
obvious that the obligation can only be satisfied when something has been paid as a bonus by or with the approval of the boar of
directors. In the case before us the promise to pay a bonus is absolute and unconditional. The payment is not conditioned upon
satisfactory service, nor upon the duration of the service, nor upon the profits which may accrue to the employer from the efficiency of
the employee. All these elements might and naturally would operate upon the minds and discretion of the directors in fixing the amount
of the bonus, but they are wholly unconnected with the legal right of the plaintiff to receive something as a bonus.itc@a1f

The amount of the bonus, it will be observed, is left by the contract to the discretion of the board of directors. Now, when that discretion
has once been exercised and a bonus has been pa by the directors or by the officers of the company, with the approval, express or
implied, of the directors, can that discretion be judicially reviewed? We are of the opinion that it cannot. The parties stipulate that the
discretion to be exercised was the discretion of the directors; and there would be a very manifest infringement of the contract, if we
were to substitute in place of the discretion of the directors the discretion of any other person or body whomsoever.

Practical considerations point to the same conclusion. An employer, in determining what amount to award as a bonus, naturally and
properly considers many things a court could not well take into account, as for instance, the personal peculiarities which make one man
more acceptable or more serviceable in the employment than another. In the complex enterprises of modern industry, especially, would
it be difficult for a court to undertake to say just what any particular employee might be entitled to. The best course, we think, in such a
case as this, is to recognize that the contracting parties have placed the discretion to determine the amount of the bonus in the hands
of the employer, and to hold them bound by than.

But it is suggested that where a contract of service provides for a salary in a fixed sum and an additional sum to be paid by way of
bonus, the whole contract is to be taken together, and it is to be considered as having about the same effect as if the parties,
recognizing the inadequacy of the amount fixed as salary, had agreed that a further bonus should be paid sufficient to raise the amount
to what should be considered adequate upon the basis of a quantum meruit. A more reasonable construction — and in our opinion one
which approximates more closely to the evident intention of the parties — is to hold that the fixed salary was adjusted with a view to
compensate the employee so far as those elements are concerned which could properly be taken into consideration in fixing a quantum
meruit and that the bonus was intended to be a mere gratuity the amount of which should be determined exclusively in the discretion of
the employer.

If, as supposed, the contracting parties are really bound by the stipulation which leaves the determination of the amount of the bonus to
the employer, two consequences necessarily follow. The first is that where something or other is paid by way of a bonus upon such a
contract, even though only a nominal amount, the obligation is satisfied. The other is that, if nothing at all is paid, the employee can
recover in a legal action only nominal damages. Such a contract contains nothing which could serve as the basis of a title to special
damages and affords no measure by which the amount of such damages could be ascertained.

It therefore becomes a matter of little or no practical importance whether the sum of P4,500, which was paid to the plaintiff after he quit
work for the defendant, was paid as a bonus or not; for even if it were not so paid, the plaintiff could in this action recover no more than
mere nominal damages.

A question which we consider of much importance is presented in an assignment of error directed to the action of the trial court with
reference to a subpoena duces tecum which the plaintiff caused to be issued a few days prior to the hearing in the Court of First
Instance. Said subpoena was directed to the managing director of the Philippine Vegetable Oil Company and commanded him to
produce in court upon the day set for the hearing of the cause the following documents. records, and papers relative to the company's
business, to wit:

(1) All Daily Mill reports showing daily output of oil and cake and consumption of copra of the P. V. O. Co., from April 1, 1913,
to March 31, 1915, both inclusive.

(2) All shipping reports of oil said company for the same period.

(3) All records showing cost of all shipments of oil made by said company, both in bulk and barrels for the same period.

(4) All records of all demurrage charges on said shipments for the same period.

(5) All records of receipts, expenses and profits from operation of the company's mill and all operating charges and costs of
said mill for the same period.

(6) All records and vouchers showing the salary and all other sums paid to Mr. Thompson, the company's mill superintendent,
or mill manager, during the entire period of his employment as well as all sums paid to him thereafter.lawphil.net

When the case was called for hearing the attorney for the defendant moved the court to vacate this subpoena on the ground that the
plaintiff was not entitled to require the production of the documents called for. The court reserved the matter for later determination and

8
in the end ruled that the evidence which the plaintiff sought to elicit was irrelevant. The witness was therefore excused from producing
the papers mentioned in the subpoena duces tecum and the plaintiff duly excepted.

According to the plaintiff's theory of the case, he was entitled to a bonus the amount of which should be determined by the court with a
view to the usefulness and efficiency which he had exhibited in the course of his employment; and he insists that the profits earned by
the defendant during the time he was employed as superintendent of the Nagtahan factory are relevant in determining the amount to be
thus awarded. For reasons already stated, this contention is untenable; and we are of the opinion that the court committed no error in
refusing to compel the production of the documents and records in question. The right to the bonus was wholly independent of the
profits, and the amount of the profits could not properly be taken into consideration by the court at all.

The subpoena duces tecum is, in all respects, like the ordinary subpoena ad testificandum, with the exception that it concludes with an
injunction that the witness shall bring with him and produce at the examination the books, documents, or things described in the
subpoena. It is issued in the same manner as the ordinary subpoena, and is procurable from the clerk as of course without application
to the court. Section 402 of the Code of Civil Procedure says that the subpoena duces tecum may be used to compel the witness to
bring any book, document, or other thing under his control, which he is bound by law to produce in evidence. The words "which he is
bound by law to produce in evidence" indicate a limitation upon the exigency of the writ; and it is evident that there is this difference
between the ordinary subpoena to testify an the subpoena duces tecum, namely, that while the person to whom the subpoena to testify
is directed is bound absolutely and without qualification to appear in response to the subpoena, the person to whom the
subpoena duces tecum is directed is bound only in so far as he is required by law to produce the documents in evidence.

It results therefore that, if the case is such as to make it doubtful whether the documents to be produced are such that the witness is
bound by law to produce them, the witness is entitled to have the court pass upon this question; and where a subpoena duces tecum is
improperly issued to enforce the production of documents which the witness is not bound to produce, a proper remedy is by motion to
vacate or set aside the subpoena. Such was the procedure adopted in this case.

The power to require the production of books, documents, and papers by means of the subpoena duces tecum is one which is
undoubtedly capable of abuse and one which, if improperly used, causes great annoyance, not to say, expense to the person against
whom it is directed. If the use of the subpoena duces tecum were in practice confined to the office of compelling the production of
documents and papers which are directly related to the issues in a case, occasions for complaint would be infrequent. However, in
modern business it is sometimes necessary for litigants to have access to voluminous materials. Journals, ledgers, cashbooks, invoice
books, and account books pertaining to the business of large enterprises may have to be examined. To enforce the production of these
great piles of material unconditionally in court would in many cases operate with unreasonable hardship on the party against whom the
subpoena is issued and not infrequently the step would be barren of results to the person seeking to examine them. Such procedure is
not to be encouraged; and it is the duty of the court, in such a situation, to control the process so as to make it conformable to law and
justice. (Subsection 7, section 11, Code of Civil Procedure.) The motion to vacate or set aside the subpoena gives the court the
requisite opportunity to examine the issues raised by the pleadings in the cause and to consider not only the relevancy of the evidence
which is to be elicited but also to consider whether an order for the production of the document would constitute an unlawful invasion of
privacy.

In determining whether the production of the documents described in a subpoena duces tecum should be enforced by the court, it is
proper to consider, first, whether the subpoena calls for the production of specific documents, or rather for specific proof, and secondly,
whether that proof is prima facie sufficiently relevant to justify enforcing its production. A general inquisitorial examination of all the
books, papers, and documents of an adversary, conducted with a view to ascertain whether something of value may not show up, will
not be enforced. (Street, Federal Equity Practice, vol. 2, sec. 1844.) No court, it is needless to say, would punish a witness for contempt
in refusing to obey a subpoena duces tecum the issuance of which has been procured with such end in view.

We observe in conclusion that where a party has any legitimate reason for inspecting the voluminous documents of an adversary, it is
usually more to the purpose to ask the court, before the hearing, for an order requiring such adversary to submit his books and records
for examination under such reasonable condition as the court may specify. If necessary, an expert can then be set to work; and the
result of his examination can be submitted to the court in a form at once intelligible and helpful. In the case before us if the documents
called for had been produced in the court room, both the court and the attorneys alike would have been helpless to discover from the
unsystematized mass the particular facts intended to be proved by them; and in the end it would have been necessary to adjourn the
hearing and call in an accountant to make the needed examination. While we do not wish to be understood as attempting to lay down
any hard and fast rule upon such a matter, we merely suggest that it is an abuse of legal process to use the subpoena duces tecum to
produce in court material which cannot be properly utilized by the court in determining the issues of the case; and in cases of this kind
the litigant should be required to resort to some other procedure in order properly to place before the court the evidence upon which the
case should be decided.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

9
In Re: Petition for cancellation and correction of entries in the record of birth, Lee v. CA G.R. No. 177861, July 13, 2010

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 177861 July 13, 2010

IN RE: PETITION FOR CANCELLATION AND CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE RECORD OF BIRTH,

EMMA K. LEE, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO K. LEE, LUCIA K. LEE-ONG, JULIAN K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, ROSA LEE-
VANDERLEK, MELODY LEE-CHIN, HENRY K. LEE, NATIVIDAD LEE-MIGUEL, VICTORIANO K. LEE, and THOMAS K. LEE,
represented by RITA K. LEE, as Attorney-in-Fact, Respondents.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the grounds for quashing a subpoena ad testificandum and a parent’s right not to testify in a case against his
children.

The Facts and the Case

Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had
11 children, namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-
Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children).

In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh
children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him.

Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tiu’s children with Lee (collectively, the Lee’s other children) claimed
that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
to investigate the matter. After conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report:

[I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably
TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK
CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the
status of his second family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary had not the
father and his second family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG. 1

The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the Lee’s other children, Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the
12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38 years old at the time. Another of the Lee’s
other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other words,
by the hospital records of the Lee’s other children, Keh’s declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave
birth to such other children, numbering eight.

On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of them before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Caloocan City2 in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one
of Lee’s other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mother’s name.

In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel
Tiu, Emma Lee’s presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming
that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lee’s
stepmother.3 On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu
was already very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lee’s mother.

10
Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh children’s motion for reconsideration, they filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the CA rendered a decision, 4 setting aside the RTC’s August 5, 2005
Order. The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or
unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that Tiu’s advanced age alone does not
render her incapable of testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that she would be unable to
withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner Emma Lee failed to do.

Since the CA denied Emma Lee’s motion for reconsideration by resolution of May 8, 2007, 5 she filed the present petition with this Court.

The Question Presented

The only question presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the
correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to
show that she is not Keh’s daughter.

The Ruling of the Court

Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it
was unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh
children’s theory that she had illicit relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee children.

But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds cited—unreasonable and oppressive—are proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for the
production of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against
invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides:

SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. — The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event,
at or before the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not
appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof.

Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court of Appeals6 that the Lee-Keh children have the right to file the
action for correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lee’s other children, Emma Lee included. The Court recognized that the
ultimate object of the suit was to establish the fact that Lee’s other children were not children of Keh. Thus:

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish
the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the
petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh
Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners'
contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to
declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's
children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and
petitioners.7 (Underscoring supplied)

Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh children’s action, obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the
mother of Lee’s other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not give testimony that Lee’s other children
were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tiu’s testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot
deprive them of their right to compel the attendance of such a material witness.

But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify: a) considering her advance age,
testifying in court would subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it would violate her parental right not to be
compelled to testify against her stepdaughter.

1. Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were compelled at her age and
condition to come to court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to the satisfaction of the trial court. About
five years have passed from the time the Lee-Keh children sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial
court. The RTC would have to update itself and determine if Tiu’s current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the
ordeal of coming to court and being questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued to her.

Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to badgering by adverse counsel. The trial court’s duty is
to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially true where the witness is of
advanced age.8

2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads:
11
SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children
or other direct descendants.

The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who
revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed
against parents and other direct ascendants or descendants.

But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to
them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry.1avvphi1 A
stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides:

Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him.
The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.

Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 92555.

SO ORDERED.

12
Macaspac v. Flores, A.M. No. P-05-2072, August 13, 2008

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. P-05-2072 August 13, 2008

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-1989-P)

ROMMEL N. MACASPAC, complainant,

vs.
RICARDO C. FLORES, Process Server, Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Balanga City, Bataan, respondent.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This administrative case arose from the Complaint1 filed on August 20, 2004 with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging
respondent, in his capacity as Process Server of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Balanga City, Bataan, with Serious Neglect of
Duty relative to Criminal Case Nos. 9038 and 9039 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Nova A. Catapang" for violation of Republic Act
No. 9165 (otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002").

Complainant, who introduced himself as a Police Officer (PO) I assigned at the District Civil Disturbance Management Group (DCDMG)
located at Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters, United Nations Avenue, Ermita, Manila, alleged: that he was previously
assigned at PRO 3 Police Station in Orani, Bataan from August 30, 2002 to December 19, 2003; that on January 14, 2003, he
apprehended Nova Catapang for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165; that an Information was filed, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 9038 and 9039, and raffled to Balanga City RTC Br. 3; that knowing that he was bound to testify as the arresting
officer, he waited for the notice of hearing to be sent but none came until his actual reassignment on December 19, 2003; that on July
22, 2004, he was shocked and surprised when it came to his knowledge that the criminal cases were dismissed by the court per Order
dated June 30, 20042 stating, among others, that "the prosecution of these cases went caput (sic) simply because of the failure of the
purported arresting officer to appear at the scheduled hearings"; that upon inquiry with RTC Br. 3, he was informed by a court
personnel that respondent made a report on the return of the notice of hearing at the back page of the subpoena dated October 22,
2003 certifying that he has not served a copy of the subpoena to complainant on November 18, 2003 because "the said PO1 Rommel
Macaspac is now [assigned] at WPD Station 2[,] Tondo, Manila according to SPO3 Antonio Capuli of the PNP, Orani, Bataan"; that
respondent perjured in his report because complainant was at the time not assigned or transferred to another station, and in fact the
latter was the desk officer-on-duty from November 17 to 19, 2003, in that same station where the subpoena was allegedly served; that
the act of respondent, in making a report without further inquiry as to the truth thereof, is a grave neglect of his duties as a process
server because it is detrimental to the prosecution of the case and the government’s campaign against illegal drugs; and that the act of
respondent against complainant’s case is not an isolated incident as complainant found out through inquiries that most of the cases
handled by the municipal police officers of Orani, Bataan were dismissed because of respondent’s reports that a subpoena was served
to a particular police officer but in truth and in fact it was never served or that respondent never tried to serve it by coming to the police
station. Complainant prayed that a proper investigation of the matter be conducted before further damage would be caused by
respondent.

In its Indorsement dated September 9, 2004,3 the OCA directed respondent to file his Comment within ten days. On October 7, 2004,
respondent requested for an extension of fifteen days – reckoned from October 9, 2004 – within which to file his pleading, which was
granted.4 However, it was only on January 18, 2005 that respondent filed his Comment dated December 2, 2004. 5

Respondent countered that he should not be faulted for making a report that is candid and truthful. To him, he simply made a statement
of fact, no more and no less. He asserted that the situation would have been different had complainant questioned the existence of a
certain SPO3 Capuli, which he did not. Respondent stated that he could not have gone beyond the advice of SPO3 Capuli for the same
was accorded truth only after complainant was found unavailable; that it was complainant who was first sought by respondent and it
was only after he was nowhere to be found that respondent started to inquire from his colleagues. As to complainant’s allegation that
respondent was also negligent in other cases, respondent argued that such accusation deserves scant regard for want of specific
evidence that would link him to the supposed acts.

In his Reply filed on January 27, 2005,6 complainant reacted that respondent merely went through the process of serving a subpoena
without exerting much effort to locate him. He suspected that respondent’s service of the subpoena is tainted with irregularity, giving
doubts as to his integrity. Complainant reiterated his plea that a full-blown hearing be conducted to prove respondent’s negligence in
the performance of his duty.

13
On August 4, 2005, the OCA found in its Report7 that respondent is guilty for neglect of duty:

It is clear from the records of the instant complaint that there was indeed an unjustified failure to serve the subpoena dated 22
October 2003 on the complainant. Respondent, in his comment, expressly admitted that he failed to serve the subpoena on
complainant because the latter had been reassigned to the Tondo Police Station in Manila. This is not true for the fact is that
the complainant was reassigned to the NCRPO only on 11 December 2003. As of 18 November 2003 the complainant was still
the desk officer at the Orani Municipal Police Station, Bataan.

Respondent’s explanation that he was not able to serve the said subpoena as per advice of SPO3 Capuli is unmeritorious. As
a Process Server imbued with a sense of dedication to duty he should have ascertained the veracity of the information given to
him that complainant has been reassigned elsewhere. His alleged attempt to serve the subpoena was downright perfunctory.

By promptly acting the way he did without further verifying the false information given to him the respondent was guilty of
neglect of duty which caused the dismissal of Criminal [Cases] Nos. 9038 and 9039 of the RTC, Branch 3, Balanga City. 8

The OCA recommended that the administrative complaint be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that respondent,
conformably with the ruling in Musni v. Morales,9 be fined in the amount of P3,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Per resolution dated September 12, 2005, this Court required respondent to manifest his agreement to submit the case for decision
based on the pleadings filed, as to which he assented.

After perusing over the records of the case, this Court agrees with the OCA findings, except as to its recommended penalty.

As opposed to the self-serving and uncorroborated declaration of respondent, documentary evidence substantiates the claim that on
November 18, 2003, the day respondent purportedly tried to serve a copy of the subpoena, complainant was actually still assigned as
the desk officer at the PRO 3 Police Station in Orani, Bataan. It can, therefore, be deduced that either respondent deliberately made a
false report as he, in fact, did not actually go to the police station or that he tried to serve the subpoena but no longer pursued it upon
relying on the representation of SPO3 Capuli. Since fraud or malice cannot be ascribed in the absence of clear and convincing
evidence to prove the same, the Court is inclined to regard the latter scenario as logical especially since complainant himself failed to
disprove the identity of SPO3 Capuli or present his testimony to belie respondent’s allegation of having talked to him.

Nevertheless, respondent cannot escape administrative liability, considering that he did not diligently exert his best effort to ascertain
the true whereabouts of complainant. Evidently, he conveniently depended on just a lone informant, who later on was not even willing
to exculpate him from the present charges, instead of endeavoring to double check the data he obtained with the view in mind that
justice to the cause of the People would be served.

Notably, under Section 6, Rule 21 of the Revised Rules of Court, service of a subpoena shall be made in the same manner as personal
or substituted service of summons. Pertinent sections of Rule 14, in effect, state:

Sec. 6. Service in person on defendant. – Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served by handing a copy thereof to
the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.

Sec. 7. Substituted service. – If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in
the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
business with some competent person in charge thereof.

Personal service and substituted service are the two modes of serving a subpoena. In this case, after respondent’s frustrated attempt to
personally serve complainant a copy of the subpoena he acted no further. This he cannot deny since the certification itself only
reflected: "I have this 18th day of November 2003 not served of (sic) witness subpoena upon PO1 Rommel Macaspac on the ground
that the said PO1 Rommel Macaspac is now [assigned] at WPD Station 2[,] Tondo, Manila according to SPO3 Antonio Capuli of the
PNP, Orani, Bataan."10 He did not attest in his report or aver in his Comment that, upon learning that personal service is not possible,
he served the subpoena by leaving a copy thereof to some responsible person at complainant’s dwelling place in Orani, Bataan or in
the police station. Respondent actually had ample time to properly serve it thereafter because complainant was only required to appear
as a witness on February 12, 2004, but respondent chose to be apathetic. The manner by which he served the court process clearly
does not suffice to comply with the requirements of the Rules.

Respondent’s lackadaisical deportment only shows his inefficiency and incompetence to perform the functions of his office. As public
servants, process servers like respondent must be constantly aware that they are bound by virtue of their office to exercise the
prudence, caution and attention which careful men usually exercise in the management of their affairs. 11 They should be fully cognizant
of the nature and responsibilities of their tasks and their impact in giving flesh to the constitutional rights of the litigants to due process
and speedy disposition of cases.12

14
In falling short of his mandate, respondent is guilty of simple neglect of duty, which signifies the failure of an employee to give attention
to a task expected of him and a disregard of a duty resulting from carelessness or indifference. 13 The term does not necessarily include
willful neglect or intentional official wrongdoing.14 The OCA’s recommended penalty of a fine in the amount of P3,000, however, does
not correspond to the range of penalties provided for under Section 52 (B) (1), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service,15 which took effect four days after the promulgation of the Musni case. Under the prevailing Rules, simple
neglect of duty is classified as a less grave offense which carries the penalty of suspension for one month and one day to six months
for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. Considering the adverse effect of respondent’s negligence to the Republic’s
efforts to curb the proliferation of illegal drugs, he should be suspended for three months without pay.

WHEREFORE, respondent is found GUILTY of simple neglect of duty and is SUSPENDED for three (3) months without pay, with
a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to the personnel records of respondent in the Office of Administrative Services, Office of the
Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.

15
Pagdilao, Jr. v. Angeles, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1467, Aug. 5, 1999

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. RTJ-99-1467 August 5, 1999

ATTY. SAMUEL D. PAGDILAO, JR., Chief of Police, Caloocan City, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES, RTC, Branch 121, Caloocan City, respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint for grave abuse of discretion filed against respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City. Complainant is the Chief of Police of Caloocan City, Samuel D.
Pagdilao, Jr. The complaint stemmed from several orders of arrest issued by respondent against Caloocan City
policemen for their failure to attend hearings in criminal cases and testify as state witnesses, which respondent
wanted complainant to personally enforce. 1âwphi1.nêt

The record shows that on August 10, 1998, respondent issued an order of arrest which reads as follows: 1

In today's initial trial in Criminal Case Nos. C-53625 (98), 53626 (98), 53622 and 53623 (98), accused
Manuel Mendoza and Romeo Cendaño appeared and assisted by Atty. Ojer Pacis of the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO). However, there was no appearance on the part of PO2 Alexander Buan. The records will
show however that he was duly notified of today's hearing but despite notice he did not appear thereby
delaying the early termination of these cases.

Consequently, and on motion of the public prosecutor, let a warrant of arrest be issued against PO2
ALEXANDER BUAN and the Chief of Police, Caloocan City, Police Superintendent Samuel Pagdilao is
hereby directed to effect the service of the warrant of arrest and to bring the body of the witness not later
then 8:30 o'clock in the morning tomorrow, August 11, 1998 for him to testify in these cases.

The accused is likewise directed to appear tomorrow, August 11, 1998.

WHEREFORE, let the scheduled hearing for today be cancelled and have it reset tomorrow, August 11,
1998 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED.

On August 11, 1998, respondent issued another order in another case (Criminal Case No. C-53081(97)), the
pertinent portion of which reads:2

After the pre-trial in this case has been waived by the accused through counsel, the Public Prosecutor failed
to present its evidence on the ground that his witnesses, mostly police officers, did not appear despite
notices.

Consequently, on motion of the Public Prosecutor, let a warrant of arrest be issued against SPO1 Edgardo
Fernandez and PO3 Eduardo S. Avila.

16
 Let the service of the warrant of arrest upon SPO1 Edgardo Fernandez and PO3 Eduardo S. Avila be
effected by no less than the Chief of Police of Caloocan City, Supt. Samuel Pagdilao and the latter is
directed to make a return on or before September 1, 1998.

On August 12, 1998, in Criminal Case No. C-53796(98), respondent issued an order reading: 3

A cursory examination of the records will readily show that on June 23, 1998 P/Insp. Emmanuel R. Bravo
appeared and signed for the scheduled hearing today, August 12, 1998 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning, but
he did not appear despite notice thereby delaying the early termination of this case.

Let it be noted that the accused is a detention prisoner who is entitled to a speedy trial and the trial could not
proceed in view of the non-appearance of the aforesaid witness.

Consequently, and on motion of the public prosecutor, let a warrant of arrest be issued against P/Insp.
Emmanuel R. Bravo of the Caloocan City Police Force and let the warrant be served personally by the Chief
of Police of Caloocan City, Police Superintendent Samuel Pagdilao and the latter is directed to make a
return of the warrant not later than 8:30 o'clock in the morning tomorrow, August 13, 1998.

Apparently, resenting the tenor of the orders directed personally at him, complainant wrote respondent on August
14, 1998 asking for the reconsideration of the foregoing orders:4

14 August 1998

Honorable Adoracion G. Angeles

Acting Presiding Judge
RTC Branch 125, Caloocan City

Your Honor:

This is with regards to orders lately coming from that (sic) Honorable Court directing the undersigned
to personally serve and return subpoenas and warrants of arrests against PNP personnel assigned within and/or
outside the Caloocan City Police Station.

As Chief of Police of one of the three biggest Police Departments in the National Capital Region (next only to Manila
and Quezon City), I have to attend to many matters which would prevent my personally performing the task of
service on (sic) subpoena and warrants.

May I, therefore, respectfully request the Honorable Court to reconsider such orders and instead allow the
undersigned to delegate to subordinate officers particularly, the Chief, Warrant and Subpoena Section and Sub-
Station Commanders, the performance of this task. This will allow the undersigned to personally attend to the many
operational activities of law enforcement as well as the various administrative functions as Head of the City's Police
Department.

The order of the Honorable Judge to the undersigned Chief of Police disregards the time honored tradition and
system of Command and Control practiced in our organization and reduces the level of the Chief of Police into a
subpoena server and arresting officer. A job which can be readily accomplished by the Chief of Warrant and
Subpoena Section and by other officers whom the Commander may direct under this system.

Records show that service of warrants and subpoena to PNP personnel have all been duly accomplished by our
warrant and Subpoena Section.

I hope that this request will merit your favorable consideration.

Very respectfully yours,

17
 (signed)

ATTY. SAMUEL D. PAGDILAO JR.

Police Superintendent (DSC)
Chief of Police

Copy Furnished:

The Honorable Chief Justice, Supreme Court

The Honorable Court Administrator, Supreme Court
The Chief of the Philippine National Police

Respondent's reaction was just as acerbic. In an order, dated August 21, 1998, denying complainant's request for
reconsideration, she said:5

Before this court for consideration is a Letter-Request dated August 14, 1998 filed by P/Supt. Samuel D.
Pagdilao, Jr., Chief of Police of the Caloocan City Police Department.

He assails the orders coming from this court directing him to personally serve and return subpoenas and
warrants of arrest against PNP personnel assigned within and/or outside the Caloocan City Police Station.
He further contends that such orders disregard the time-honored tradition and system of Command and
Control practiced in their organization and reduces the level of the Chief of Police into a subpoena server
and arresting officer.

Apparently, P/Supt. Samuel D. Pagdilao, Jr. perceives the assailed orders as an affront to the eminence of
his position as Chief of Police above all else.

Nonetheless, this court has never entertained thoughts of debasing the Chief of Police or anybody else for
that matter. Nor was it ever enticed to employ dictatorial schemes to abbreviate its proceedings despite the
fact that the Presiding Judge is practically handling three (3) salas at the moment — the first as the duly
appointed judge, the second in an acting capacity and the third as the pairing judge for the presiding judge
thereat who has been on leave for quite some time already. 1âwphi1.nêt

Notwithstanding the incessant pressure inherent in the job, this court takes pride in the fact that it has never
lost its clear vision that it exists primarily for the proper and expeditious administration of justice.

Indeed, this court has always been very zealous in the discharge of its bounder duties. Nonetheless, its
earnest efforts to promote a speedy administration of justice has many times been unduly hampered by the
frequent non-appearances of police officers in court hearings despite sufficient notice. It has always been a
big disappointment to the court that its dedication to duty is sometimes not matched by some law-
enforcement officers.

Hence, in order to solve this dilemma, the Court directed the Chief of Police to personally ensure the
attendance of his men in court hearings so much so that (sic) their testimonies are very vital to the outcome
of the criminal cases herein. The Orders of the court were never meant to disregard the system of
Command and Control being employed in the Police Force. Its only concern was that such system of
Command and Control must be effectively used to address the lukewarm attitude of the Chief of Police's
subordinate relative to their duty to appear in court.

It is noteworthy to mention that since the issuance of the assailed Orders, the concerned law enforcement
officers have shown an impressive attendance in court hearings which confirms that it makes a lot of
difference when the Chief of Police himself acts to ensure the compliance of his subordinates to a lawful
court Order.

Needless to state, the court was able to solve a perennial problem with the renewed cooperation of the
City's police force.
18
 The court should not therefore be taken to task for its issuance of the questioned Orders because the same
was done in the interest of justice.

On the other hand, the Chief of Police must be reminded that this is not the time to be onion-skinned and
regard the said Orders as a personal insult to his dignity.

During this time when criminality is on the rise, would it not be more prudent for the Chief of Police to lay
aside his egotistical concerns and instead work with the courts of justice in addressing the more pressing
problems of criminally, violence and injustice?

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Letter-Request of the Chief of Police of Caloocan City is duly
noted but the court reiterates its stand that its foremost concern is the administration of justice and with this
consideration indelibly etched in its mind, it will issue such Orders which are geared towards the
achievement of its noble purpose.

Let copies of this Order be furnished upon the Honorable Chief Justice and Honorable Court Administrator
of the Supreme Court as well as to the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP).

SO ORDERED.

In his complaint, dated October 28, 1998, complainant avers that respondent's orders betray her ignorance of the
rulings of this Court in several cases that non-attendance at a trial does not constitute direct but indirect contempt
punishable only after written charge and hearing under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He states that the action of
respondent not only seriously affects the service records of the concerned policemen but also jeopardizes their
promotions.

Complainant likewise assails the orders of respondent requiring him personally to arrest the policemen concerned,
make a return of the orders, and in the case of PO2 Alexander Buan, to bring the latter to respondent's court not
later than 8:30 in the morning of August 11, 1998. Complainant claims that the order is capricious and whimsical
because the time given to him for serving the warrant was short and disregarded the "system of command and
control, and the doctrine of qualified political agency in the administration of public offices." According to
complainant, when he asked respondent to reconsider her order and allow his subordinates, particularly the Chief of
the Warrant and Subpoena Section and the Sub-Station Commanders, to serve the orders in question, respondent
"arrogantly dismissed [the principle complainant was raising] as nothing but a display of egotistical concerns."

In her comment on the complaint, respondent contended that the warrants of arrest against the Caloocan City
policemen were issued merely for the purpose of compelling the attendance of the policemen at the court hearings
as state witnesses as it had been her experience that the policemen ignored her orders. She stated that in issuing
the orders in question she was never motivated by ill will but that her concern was solely to expedite the
proceedings in two salas of the court over which she was presiding since justice delayed is justice denied. She
reiterated what she said in her order denying complainant's request to be relieved from serving the orders.
Respondent contends that a prior charge or hearing is not required before a warrant of arrest may be issued under
Rule 21, §8 of the Rules of Court. She argues that this provision only requires proof of service of subpoena on a
witness and the fact that the witness failed to attend the scheduled hearing before a court can exercise its power of
compulsion.

On the allegation that complainant was given a very short period of time for serving the warrant of arrest against
witness PO2 Buan, respondent points out that the policeman was right in the Caloocan City Police Station were
complainant held office. As for her statement that complainant's letter was "nothing but a display of egotistical
concerns," respondent said that obviously complainant took offense because of what he considered his "exalted
position as chief of police."

Replying to respondent's comment, complainant argues that Rule 21, §8 invoked by respondent to justify her orders
is not applicable. He points out that the orders were intended not only to compel the attendance of policemen in
court but also to punish them for contempt of court. He also alleges that, contrary to respondent's statement in her
order dated March 10, 1999, in Criminal Case Nos. C-55145(98) and 55146(98), that he did not make a return of the

19
warrant of arrest against PO3 Nestor Aquino, complainant says he made a return which, in fact, was received in
respondent's court on March 10, 1999 at 10:22 a.m.6

Respondent's order reads as follows:7

In an order of the court dated March 8, 1999, a warrant for the arrest of PO3 Nestor Aquino, prosecution's
witness in these cases were issued by the Court directing the Chief of Police of Caloocan City or the duly
authorized representative of the latter to produce the body of the aforesaid police officer not later than March
10, 1999 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.

A cursory examination of the records will show that the order was received by the Chief of Police of
Caloocan City on the same date, March 8, 1999 but despite receipt thereof, the Chief of Police of Caloocan
City did not bother to make a return of the warrant of arrest thereby delaying the early disposition of these
cases.

Let it be stressed that this is a joint trial of Crim. Case No. 55145 (98) and Crim. Case No. C-55146 (98) for
the violation of the drugs law.

This indeed does not speak well of the Chief of Police of Caloocan City.

WHEREFORE, the Chief of Police of Caloocan City is hereby given a period of three (3) days from receipt of
a copy of this order to explain and to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt of court for failure
to produce today, March 10, 1999, the body of the afore-said witness.

Let copies of this order be furnished upon the Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) National
Capital Judicial Region (NCJR), Bicutan, Metro Manila as well as to the Director General of the PNP,
Roberto Lastimosa for them to know the actuation of the Chief of Police of Caloocan City in the discharged
of its official function.

Complainant's return, bearing the stamp "RTC, Branch 121, Caloocan, City, received, 3/10/99, 10:22 a.m.," reads: 8

Date 10 March 1999

Respectfully returned to the Branch Clerk of Court RTC BR 121 Cal City the attached Warrant/Order of Arrest in
Crim. Case No. 55145-55146 (98) against PO3 NESTER AQUINO with address at DDEU, NPDC, Tanigue
St., Kaunlaran Vill. Caloocan City for the crime of Non-appearance (at the scheduled hearing held on 8 March 1999.

REASONS: UNSERVED. Subject PNP personnel was already dismissed from the service effective 16
February 1999. Attached herewith is the xerox copy of Spl Order No. 366 relative to his dismissal.

Complainant adds that, in Caloocan City, only respondent issues orders to policemen to serve court processes on
short notice, and orders their arrest without hearing in case they fail to comply without taking into account that they
also have other work to do. He states that he filed the instant complaint against respondent not to cause her
dishonor but to promote respect for the law and to correct the misimpression that Caloocan City policemen are
"inefficient or defying court orders."

The Office of the Court Administration (OCA) recommends the dismissal of the complaint against respondent for
lack of merit. In its report, it states among other things:

A cursory reading of the records of this case shows the utter lack of merit of complainant's cause.

First, a perusal of the questioned orders issued by the respondent reveals that the subject policemen were
not punished for contempt of court hence the contempt provisions under the Revised Rules of Court is not
applicable. Prior written charge and hearing therefore is not necessary before Judge Angeles can issue
warrant of arrest to compel their attendance in court hearings;

20
 Second, a judge is not prohibited to issue orders directing heads of police stations to personally serve and
return processes from the court;

Third, it cannot be considered as unreasonable the period given to complainant within which to effect the
service of the warrants of arrest issued by the court considering that the police officers to be served by said
warrants are working right at the Station headed by the complainant himself; and

Lastly, on the charge that respondent arrogantly regarded the letter of complainant as "nothing but a display
of egotistical concerns" we are inclined to believe that the respondent's remarks were not tainted with malice
and that her only concern is for the "speedy and efficient administration of justice."

Rule 21, §8, pursuant to which respondent issued her orders, states that "in case of failure of a witness to attend,
the court or judge issuing the subpoena, upon proof of the service thereof and of the failure of the witness, may
issue a warrant to the sheriff of the province, or his deputy, to arrest the witness and bring him before the court or
officer where his attendance is required." Respondent is thus correct in contending that a judge may issue a warrant
of arrest against a witness simply upon proof that the subpoena had been served upon him but he failed to attend
the hearing. The purpose is to bring the witness before the court where his attendance is required, not to punish him for contempt which requires a previous
hearing.9 However, unnecessary tension and asperity could have been avoided had respondent simply called the attention of complainant to the failure of the
latter's men to comply with her orders instead of directing complainant to personally serve the orders and bring the policemen himself to her sala. Moreover, as is
clear from Rule 21, §8, the orders of arrest should have been addressed to the sheriff or the latter's deputy. Respondent could have done this while calling
complainant's attention to the alleged disregard by policemen of her orders so that appropriate disciplinary action could be taken if necessary.

It would appear that respondent's order of August 10, 1998 in Criminal Case Nos. C-53625(98), 53626(98), 53622,
and 53623(98), which provoked this incident and gave rise to the "word war" between the parties, was made
because respondent thought that in the other cases (Criminal Case Nos. 55145(98) and 55146(98)) heard that
morning, complainant ignored her order to produce a policeman whom she had ordered arrested. However, as
already noted, the policeman could no longer be presented in court as he had already been dismissed from the
service, and complainant did make a return informing the court of this fact, although his return did reach the court a
few hours after the hearing in which the policeman's testimony was required.

It was this unfortunate incident which provoked the exchanges between complainant and respondent: respondent
acting on the erroneous belief that complainant had ignored her order and, consequently, requiring complainant to
personally arrest his own men and take them to her court, and complainant taking umbrage at the orders. The
observance of restraint was never more demanded on the part of both parties.

Respondent acted a bit rashly while complainant reacted too strongly. The courts and the law enforcers are two of
the five pillars of the criminal justice system, the other three being the prosecution, the correctional subsystem, and
the community.10 Cooperation among, and coordination between, the five pillars are needed in order to make the
system work effectively. Indeed, complainant and respondent, both avow a common objective of dispensing justice.
More than that, the parties should observe mutual respect and forbearance.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121, Caloocan City is
ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the discharge of her judicial function with WARNING that repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. The instant complaint is DISMISSED. 1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

21
Nazareno v. Barnes, G.R. No. 59072, Apr. 25, 1984

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-59072 April 25, 1984

HIDULFO D. NAZARENO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE ROQUE M. BARNES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Baganga, Davao Oriental, respondent.

Pedro S. Castillo for petitioner.

CUEVAS, J.:

This certiorari case arose from a contempt proceeding conducted by the Honorable respondent Judge against the
herein petitioner captioned "In Re: Contempt Proceedings vs. Hidulfo D. Nazareno, accused" criminal Case No. 436
for "Indirect Contempt of Court and Judge of the Court of First Instance," resulting in the issuance of the challenged
Order finding petitioner GUILTY of indirect contempt and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months
and to pay a fine of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos. 1

The aforesaid contempt case was brought about by a letter-complaint dated August 22, 1981, 2 addressed by the herein petitioner to His Excellency, Ferdinand E.
Marcos, which was subscribed and sworn to before Fiscal Diosdado Llamas. Said letter reads as follows — têñ.£îhqwâ£

August
22,
1981

His Excellency
Ferdinand E. Marcos
Malacañang Palace
Manila

Your Excellency,

In line with your call to the general public to come up with charges and/or evidence against
incompetent and/or corrupt Judges in connection with the reorganization of the Judiciary, I am most
respectfully bringing to your attention specific charges against Judge Roque M. Barnes of the Court
of First Instance of Baganga, Davao Oriental, which I believe render him unfit to continue as a
member of the Judiciary. The following are specification of charges:

I— IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

(A) In Civil Case No. 174 entitled Baganga Consolidated Arastre-Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs.
NLRC, et al., Judge Barnes issued an injunction against the National Labor Relations Commission
enjoining an execution issued by the latter. I believe since the NLRC is equal in rank if not higher
than the Court of First Instance and said commission has exclusive jurisdiction in Labor cases,
Judge Barnes displayed ignorance of the law in entertaining the suit for injunction. It might be

22
mentioned in passing that the NLRC filed a Motion to Dismiss the suit but up to now has not yet
been resolved.

(B). In the case of People of the Philippines versus Jeonardo Ty docketed as Criminal Case No. R-
1116-160, the accused therein was convicted by the Municipal Court of Cateel for Slight Physical
Injuries, after which the accused appealed to the Court of First Instance of Baganga. In a decision
dated January 19, 1976, Judge Barnes also found the accused guilty not of Slight Physical Injuries
but of Serious Physical Injuries, which decision was promulgated to the accused. However, after the
promulgation, the accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration based on an Affidavit of Desistance of
the complaining party. In an Order dated October 4, 1976, Judge Barnes vacated his previous
decision finding the accused innocent of the crime charge solely on the basis of the affidavit of
desistance. Considering that the affidavit of desistance was submitted after the promulgation of the
judgment, Judge Barnes committed grave error and/or displayed ignorance of the law in changing
his decision. Copies of the decision, motion for reconsideration and order are hereto attached as
Annexes "A", "B", and "C".

(C) In the case of Cresencio Maliño versus Ramon Ramirez vs. (sic) Vicente Estevas, Sr. in Civil
Case No. 122 for Reformation of Instrument, Judge Barnes while finding that the property in
question was in the possession of the defendant as mortgagee failed to apply the principle of
antichresis. Copy of the decision is hereto attached as Annex " D ".

II— ACTS OF HARASSMENT:

Sometime in October, 1980, Judge Barnes was on a private plane going to Baganga, Davao Oriental
from Davao City. The North Camarines Lumber Company which owns the airstrip in Baganga,
Davao Oriental advised all incoming planes that the airstrip was being repaired and therefore could
not be utilized for that trip. Failing to land in Baganga, Judge Barnes cited Mr. Ching Hai Cuan, the
Vice President for Operations of the North Camarines Lumber Company and Miss Norma Lo, the
company accountant for Contempt of Court and both were made to explain why the plane carrying
Judge Barnes was not allowed to land in the company's airstrip. Bth persons had nothing to do in
the landing field.

III— INCURRING INDEBTEDNESS IN THE COMMUNITY: It is of public knowledge in the

Municipality of Baganga that Judge Barnes has contracted many indebtedness in several stores and
from several persons without paying for the same.

IV— USING UNDUE INFLUENCE:

On enumerable occasions, Judge Barnes has requested for free rides in the planes of the North
Camarines Lumber Company in his trips to and from Baganga, Davao Oriental. Considering that the
company has its main offices at Baganga, Davao Oriental under the jurisdiction of Judge Barnes and
considering further that the company has cases pending before his sala, it was not proper to secure
favors from the company.

V— HABITUAL ABSENTEEISM:

It is also of public knowledge in Baganga, Davao Oriental that Judge Barnes holds sessions only
from two to three days a week.

Your Excellency, in due course I shall also submit other charges against Judge Barnes as soon as I
shall have verified certain reports reaching me. I hope that in the interest of attaining the objectives
of the Judicial reorganization, persons like Judge Barnes should not be extended a new
appointment. têñ.£îhqwâ£

Very truly yours,

23
 (S/T) HIDULFO D. NAZARENO
Baganga, Davao Oriental

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 20th day of October, 1981, in Baganga, Davao
Oriental; affiant having exhibited to me his Residence Certificate No. 2261630 issued at Baganga,
Davao Oriental, on January 20, 1981. têñ.£îhqwâ£

(S/T) DIOSDADO YAMAS

Fiscal

Getting hold of a copy of the aforesaid letter, the Hon. respondent Judge instituted before his branch or sala a
charge of Indirect Contempt of Court which, as herein earlier stated, was denominated as Criminal Case No. 436,
for "Indirect Contempt of Court or Judge of the Court of First Instance." The charge reads as follows — têñ.£îhqwâ£

The undersigned Presiding Judge hereby charges the abovenamed accused of the crime of
INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT and Judge of the Court of First Instance, defined and penalized
under Sec. 3(d) and Sec. 6, Rule 71, Revised Rules of Court, committed as follows:

That on or about August 22, 1981, in a letter-complaint the accused addressed to the President of
the Philippines, true copy of which was furnished by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Baganga,
Davao Oriental, and about which the accused have talked in restaurants and to several people in the
community of Baganga that he charged the undersigned with ignorance of the law in connection with
Civil Case No. 174, entitled "Baganga Consolidated Arastre-Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Hon.
Alberto Veloso, et al"; and in Civil Case No. 122, entitled "Cresencio Maliño vs. Ramon Ramirez vs.
Vicente Estevas, Sr.", which cases are sub-judice or pending resolution before this Court in view of
the pleadings intervening, thus undermining the faith and confidence of the people in the Court, and
tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, unlawfully interfere with or influence the decision in
the controversy or degrade and embarrass the administration of justice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Baganga, Davao Oriental, Philippines, November 9,1981. têñ.£îhqwâ£

(SGD) ROQUE M.
BARNES Presiding
Judge

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 9th day of November, 1981, at Baganga, Davao
Oriental, Philippines. têñ.£îhqwâ£

(SGD) ADOLFO A.
CAUBANG
Municipal Mayor

On the basis of the aforesaid charge, a warrant was issued for the arrest of the petitioner who was actually arrested
at eight-thirty in the morning of November 11, 1981. Thereafter he was brought direct to the sala of the Hon.
respondent Judge where the charge of Indirect Contempt was read to him. As recorded, the proceeding that
transpired in said case runs thus— têñ.£îhqwâ£

COURT:

Now, the charge had been read to you and the basis of that charge is the law that is
there in the charge. Read the rule (Reading).

Now, you have been making comments criticisms against the presiding judge of this
court of ignorance of the law. That will undermine the faith, confidence and respect of
24
the people in the integrity of this Court and of the presiding judge, and thereby
maligning, embarrassing, impeding the administration of justice when you mentioned
in your criticism cases which are pending decision and/or resolution by the court. It is
there in your complaint under oath to the President of the Philippines.

Now, you wanted that this presiding judge decide the case as what you think when
you made this criticism? The court knows that you are not a lawyer. Does the
accused know the law?

DR. NAZARENO:

Not necessarily a lawyer.

COURT:

Are you a party to these cases you mentioned in your complaint?

DR. NAZARENO:

Your Honor, may I ask if this is part of the proceedings. Because if it is part of the
proceedings, then I would ask that the presiding judge inhibits himself.

COURT:

Are you a party to these cases you mentioned in your complaint to the President of
the Philippines?

DR. NAZARENO:

Not a party to the case, Your Honor, but I am doing it as a concerned citizen.

COURT:

You are not also a lawyer?

DR. NAZARENO:

I do not pretend to be a lawyer, Your Honor, but only as a concerned citizen.

COURT:

You should know the law because you are denouncing this presiding judge as
suffering from ignorance of the law?

DR. NAZARENO:

Your Honor, if this is part of the proceedings, then I move for the inhibition of the
presiding judge.

COURT:

You answer the question of the court.

DR. NAZARENO:

25
 If this is part of the proceedings, Your Honor, then I would petition the Honorable
Court that the presiding judge inhibits himself because he is a party-in-interest to this
proceedings. The contents of my letter to the President was only a narration on the
part of the call of the President on the people to denounce incompetent and corrupt
judges; and that letter is not addressed to anybody else but only to the President. So
it is the President who has to decide on that letter or complaint of mine.

COURT:

Your response to the court is good if it is correct. But your response is not correct
because you are violating the rule on contempt. You have heard the rule when it was
read to you. And in your complaint you mentioned cases which are still pending
resolution by the court and therefore sub-judice Moreover, you are not a party to the
case. By doing so, you are impeding the administration of justice. The lawyers know
the status of the proceedings. Do you have more answers to say?

DR. NAZARENO:

I am petitioning the Honorable Court that the Honorable Presiding Judge should
inhibit himself from hearing this case as he is a party-in-interest to this case, Your
Honor.

COURT:

Petition denied. it is within the power and authority of the court to charge and
investigate you and to put you under custody that is as provided for under the rules.

DR. NAZARENO:

May I Request that the ruling of the Honorable Court be placed on record the ruling
of the Honorable Court, Your Honor.

COURT:

Put it on record Mr. Stenographer. Do you have anything more to say?

DR. NAZARENO:

No more, Your Honor.

COURT:

Order. The accused stands charged of indirect contempt of court in a charge quoted
as follows: (quote the charge) The court after hearing the explanation and answer of
the accused, and finding the same to be unsatisfactory, the accused having admitted
the charge in open court, he is hereby found guilty of indirect contempt and
accordingly, he is punished under the provisions of Sec. 6 of Rule 71 of the Revised
Rules of Court. WHEREFORE, the accused is hereby sentenced and ordered to pay
a fine of P 1,000.00 and to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months.

SO ORDERED. 1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioner now comes before Us through the instant petition for certiorari assailing not only the validity of his
conviction but likewise the legality of the proceedings conducted against him which resulted in his conviction ...
alleging that he was denied the opportunity to defend himself; to be assisted by counsel despite his insistence and
3

26
assertion of said right; and a reasonable time within which to prepare for his defense despite the penal nature of the
charge against him. Instead, respondent right then and there proceeded to investigate him on the basis of his letter-
complaint to the President which could not in anyway possibly interfere, impede nor obstruct the administration of
4

justice and could not therefore legally serve as a basis for a liability for indirect contempt.

In his COMMENT filed in compliance with our Resolution of March 8,1982, respondent Judge alleged that
petitioner's Letter-Complaint of August 2, 1982 to President Marcos, charging him of ignorance of the law
undermines the faith, respect, trust and confidence of the citizenry in the administration of justice considering that
the two cases therein dealt with and complained of are still pending consideration in his sala and therefore sub-
5

judice.

Respondent Judge also claims that he had been reliably informed that petitioner was not content in merely writing to
the President as he had done, but likewise had been talking to a lot of people in restaurants and other places on this
same subject-his (respondent's) alleged ignorance of the law. 6

Respondent Judge likewise contends that petitioner was merely seeking refuge under the guise of being a
concerned citizen answering the call of the President when in reality he was in truth and in fact really settling a score
against respondent who convicted him on appeal in a less serious physical injury case on December 14, 1971. He
denied having acted without jurisdiction nor in excess of jurisdiction, much less has he committed grave abuse of
discretion in adjudging petitioner guilty of indirect contempt and imposing upon him a fine of Pl,000.00 plus six ( 6)
months imprisonment which is in accordance with Rule 71, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.

At the outset, let it be stated that the contempt proceeding against the petitioner was wrongly initiated. The nature
thereof being that of indirect contempt, a written charge is necessary pursuant to Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. The written charge may partake the nature of (1) an Order requiring the respondent (not accused) to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt for having committed the contemptuous acts imputed against
him; or (2) a petition for contempt by way of special civil action under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. The first
procedure applies only where the indirect contempt is committed against a court or judge possessed and clothed
with contempt powers. The second, if the contemptuous act was committed not against a court nor a judicial officer
with authority to punish contemptuous acts.

Neither of the two modes of commencing an indirect contempt proceeding was resorted to nor availed of in the
instant case. What was filed against the herein petitioner was to all intents and legal purposes an information in a
criminal case.

Contempt, however, is not a criminal offense within the meaning of Sec. 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, and need
not be instituted by means of an information. The institution of charges by the prosecuting official is not necessary
7

to hold persons guilty of civil or criminal contempt amenable to trial and punishment by the court. All that the law
requires is that there be a charge in writing duly filed in court and an opportunity to the person charged to be heard
by himself or counsel. 8

But even disregarding said procedural infirmities, still we are not prepared to sustain petitioner's conviction. It can
not be denied that the letter-complaint authored and addressed by the petitioner to the President was in response to
His Excellency's appeal to the public to come up with charges and evidences against incompetent and corrupt
judges. Since that was the time when the proposed reorganization of the judiciary was being undertaken the
timeliness of the said letter may therefore be conceded. True, a mere causal perusal of the said letter will
immediately show that the statements contained therein are apparently degrading to the integrity and competence
of the respondent Judge. His Honor's remedy, however, if any exists, against such an onslaught or attack on his
character and reputation is a criminal action for defamations and not a citation for contempt since the power to
9

punish contempt should be exercised on the preservative and not on vindictive principle. 10 têñ.£îhqwâ£

A judge, as a public servant, should not be so thin-skinned or sensitive as to feel hurt or offended if a
citizen expresses an honest opinion about him which may not altogether be flattering to him. After
all, what matters is that a judge performs his duties in accordance with the dictates of his conscience
and the light that God has given him. A judge should never allow himself to be moved by pride,
prejudice, passion or pettiness in the performance of his duties. He should always bear in mind that
the power of the court to punish for contempt should be exercise for purposes that are impersonal,
27
 because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions
that they exercise. (Emphasis supplied) 11

Anent respondent Judge's assertion that the two cases referred to and dealt with in petitioner's letter are still
pending consideration before His sala 12 hence, sub judice, suffice it to state that precisely one of the complaints insofar as Civil Case No. 174 is
concerned is the unresolved motion to dismiss which is still then pending despite the lapse of a substantial period of time since its filing. With respect to Civil Case
No. 122, the copy of the decision in said case attached to petitioner's letter as Annex D sufficiently negates respondent Judge's assertion that the case is still
pending. But be that as it may, it seems clear that petitioner's referral to the two aforementioned cases do not appear motivated by a desire to obstruct nor impede,
much less degrade the administration of justice but apparently to make his complaint a more authentic one, hence the said reference to definite cases by way of
specifications.

Another disturbing circumstance which strongly argues for the nullification of petitioner's conviction is the denial of
petitioner's right to due process and to counsel. We can not ride along with respondent Judge's feeble reliance upon
Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court in justifying the procedure adopted by His Honor in the questioned
contempt proceeding. He claimed that petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard before being adjudged guilty
of the charge against him which was in full accord with Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Section 3. Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing.—After charge in writing has
been filed and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty
of any of the following acts may be punished for contempt;

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Our review of the records, however, convinces Us that petitioner was not afforded fun and real opportunity to be
heard. And this is so because he learned of the charge against him only on the very day he was arrested and hailed
to court to answer the said charge. Respondent should have granted petitioner ample opportunity to prepare for trial
and defend himself. While speedy trial should be encouraged, a person's right to due process should not be
sacrificed. In the case at bar, right at the very start and all throughout the proceedings, respondent Judge's burning
desire to send petitioner behind bars appeared clearly evident, thereby transforming his court into a despot's forum.
By reason thereof, he succeeded in having people, more especially the herein petitioner, lose confidence in courts
of justice thereby placing the administration of justice under a cloud of doubt, thus setting at naught his proclaimed
attempt to correct petitioner's alleged acts of undermining the faith, respect, trust, and confidence of the citizenry in
the court of justice. It should not be lost sight of that contempt proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in
nature, the same being penal in character. The safeguards therefore provided for by the Constitution and the Rules
of Court in favor of the accused should be similarly accorded to the herein petitioner of which he was denied by the
respondent Judge.

Petitioner's proper and correct remedy against the questioned order of conviction, pursuant to Sec. 10, Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, is appeal. Instead, he has resorted to certiorari. Considering, however, that this case has been
pending for quite some time and more specifically the view we take thereon on its merits, to compel petitioner to
follow said mode of review, will be sanctifying technicality against substance with no different result in view.

WHEREFORE, the Order convicting petitioner of indirect contempt is hereby REVERSED, and he is hereby relieved
of any liability for indirect contempt.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 1äwphï1.ñët

28