Rule 72

I. Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules

a. Meaning and Scope of Special Proceedings

1 - Vda de Manalo v. CA, 349 SCRA 135 (2001)

DOCTRINE
It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or
petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. The fact of death of the decedent and
of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent
proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.
According to the Supreme Court, it is our view that herein petitioners may not be
allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for the settlement of
the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are irrelevant and immaterial
to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate court,
has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral
matters and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil
action.
In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as
well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the
complaint and not by the defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would
not be too difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly
delayed by simple stratagem. So, it should be in the instant petition for settlement of
estate.

FACTS
Troadio Manalo a resident of 1966 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died
intestate and was survived by his wife, Pilar, and his 11 children on February 14, 1992.
The deceased left several real properties in Manila and a business in Tarlac. He was
survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his 11 children, namely: Purita M. Jayme,
Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M.
Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda
Manalo, who are all of legal age. At the time of his death, Troadio left several real
properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the
name and style Manalo’s Machine Shop with offices in Quezon City and in Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. Herein respondents (originally petitioners), 8 of the surviving children, filed
a petition with RTC Manila for the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and
for appointment of their brother Romeo Manalo as administrator thereof.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are 8 of the surviving children of
the late Troadio filed a petition with the respondent RTC for the judicial settlement of the
estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as
administrator thereof. The trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing
and directing the publication of the order for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the
said order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned
therein.
On the date of hearing, the trial court issued an order “declaring the whole world
in default, except the government,” and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners
therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court set aside the order of general default
of herein petitioners (originally respondents - the other children of Troadic who did not
join the original petitioners) and they were granted 10 days within which to file their
opposition to the petition.
Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel,
culminating in the filing of an Omnibus Motion seeking: (1) to set aside and reconsider
the Order of the trial court dated which denied the motion for additional extension of time
to file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds
for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.
The trial court denied this motion. Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals averring among others that here was
absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same family. The
petitioners contended that:
(1) the venue was improperly laid; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate
proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among
members of the same family, in accordance with Article 222 of NCC, and (5) no
certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.
CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. The motion for reconsideration filed by
herein petitioners was likewise denied.

ISSUE:
1.) Whether the settlement of estate of late Troadio is an ordinary civil action, which is
adversarial in nature.
2.) Whether or not the requirement of earnest efforts to compromise with family members
is applicable to special proceeding cases.

HELD:
1.) No. The Supreme Court said that the settlement of Estate is a Special Proceeding.
The Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution
of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a
remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact. The petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the
fact of death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the
heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in
the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and
special jurisdiction of the probate court.

2.) No, Article 151 of the Family Code which provides that: "No suit shall be filed or
maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have
failed" is applicable only to ordinary civil actions and not with Special Proceedings. This
is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or persons against
another or other in a court of justice in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the
law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law
or in equity.
A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. The
Petition for issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in
this case is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners
therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. The petitioners therein
(private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fact of death of their father
and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased
so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special
jurisdiction of the probate court.

b. Nature of Special Proceedings

2 - Tabuada v. Ruiz, GR 168799, June 27, 2008

DOCTRINE
While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly
encouraged, the failure to consummate one does not warrant any procedural sanction,
much less provide an authority for the court to jettison the case. Dismissal of a case
should be ordered only in the extreme case where the termination of the proceeding is
the sole remedy consistent with equity and justice, but not as a penalty for neglect of the
parties therein.

FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner assails the March 2, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iloilo City,
Branch 39 in Special Proceedings (Sp. Proc.) No. 5198 and the May 20, 2005 Resolution
of the trial court denying the motion for the reconsideration of the challenged order.
During the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Jose
and Paciencia Calaliman, the parties manifested to the RTC their desire to amicably
settle the case. In light of the said manifestation, the trial court issued the following Order
on 6 December 2004:
“In view of the strong manifestation of the parties herein and their respective
counsel that they will be able to raise (sic) an amicable settlement, finally, on or before
25 December 2004, the Court will no longer be setting the pending incidents for hearing
as the parties and their counsel have assured this Court that they are going to submit a
“Motion for Judgment Based On An Amicable Settlement” on or before 25 December
2004. x x x”
The RTC, however, on 2 March 2005, invoking Section 3, 5 Rule 17, of the Rules
of Court, terminated the proceedings on account of the parties’ failure to submit the
amicable settlement and to comply with the aforequoted 6 December 2004 Order,
and therefore denied all the motions filed by the parties.
Petitioner, the administratrix of the estate, and private respondents separately
moved for the reconsideration of the 2 March 2005 Order arguing, among others,
that the termination of the case was premature, there being yet no payment of the
debts and distribution of the estate, and that they had already prepared all the
necessary papers for the amicable settlement. The same were denied by the RTC,
hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S
Whether or not submission of the amicable settlement in this case is mandatory
and failure of the parties to submit is a valid ground for the dismissal of the case.

RULING
No. While a compromise agreement or an amicable settlement is very strongly
encouraged, the failure to consummate one does not warrant any procedural sanction,
much less provide an authority for the court to jettison the case. Sp. Proc. No. 5198 should
not have been terminated or dismissed by the trial court on account of the mere failure of
the parties to submit the promised amicable settlement and/or the Motion for Judgment
Based On An Amicable Settlement. Given the non-contentious nature of special
proceedings (which do not depend on the will of an actor, but on a state or condition of
things or persons not entirely within the control of the parties interested), its dismissal
should be ordered only in the extreme case where the termination of the
proceeding is the sole remedy consistent with equity and justice, but not as a
penalty for neglect of the parties therein.
Furthermore, the third clause of Section 3, Rule 17, which authorizes the motu
proprio dismissal of a case if the plaintiff fails to comply with the rules or any order of the
court, cannot even be used to justify the convenient, though erroneous, termination of the
proceedings herein.
The said Order readily reveals that the trial court neither required the
submission of the amicable settlement or the aforesaid Motion for Judgment, nor
warned the parties that should they fail to submit the compromise within the given
period, their case would be dismissed. Hence, it cannot be categorized as an order
requiring compliance to the extent that its defiance becomes an affront to the court and
the rules. And even if it were worded in coercive language, the parties cannot be forced
to comply, for, as aforesaid, they are only strongly encouraged, but are not obligated, to
consummate a compromise. An order requiring submission of an amicable
settlement does not find support in our jurisprudence and is premised on an
erroneous interpretation and application of the law and rules.

NOTES
As far as the speedy disposition of cases is concerned, the court noted that
inconsiderate dismissals neither constitute a panacea nor a solution to the congestion of
court dockets. While they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of individual
judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence
of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief
continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court.

c. Applicability of Rules of Civil Action

3 - Hilado v. CA, GR 164108, May 8, 2009

DOCTRINE:
It is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of
deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court,
not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the
absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be,
as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings.

FACTS:
Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000; survived by his wife, private
respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter,
Francisca Benedicto-Paulino two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the
petitioners. Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor which was granted by the RTC of Manila.
The value of the assets of the decedent is P5 Million, "net of liabilities." In the List
of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the
liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before the
Bacolod City courts. RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated
inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.
Then, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining
to the intestate proceedings.
RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that
petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to
intervene in the intestate proceedings.
Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition and declaring that
the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in
the intestate proceedings. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto.

RULING:
 Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the
rule on intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special
Proceedings.
It is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure
necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of
deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court,
not the Rules on Civil Procedure.
Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions, the
rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special
proceedings."
We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as
set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based
on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not
accommodate contingent claims.
Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene
in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before
the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In
short, even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance
with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought
before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.

RATIO:
In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested
persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" to participate in varying capacities in
the testate or intestate proceedings.
Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of
the intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason
that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until
after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot
be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action
to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against the executor or administrator." What practical value would this
provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its
termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without
first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the
ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part
of the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action
and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules
would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed
by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs
It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an
action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit
behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan,
stated: "[t]he rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs,
intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but
not for a decision on their action."
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a
creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of
the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such
persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no
general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek
certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under
the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the
estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can
be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by
petitioners.

Rule 73 Venue and Process

a. Venue and Meaning of Residence

4 - Garcia Fule v. CA, 74 SCRA 189 (1976)

DOCTRINE
We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual
residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” Some cases make a
distinction between the terms “residence” and “domicile” but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
“inhabitant.” In other words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that
place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

FACTS
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severe A. Malvar, a petition for letters of
administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, “that on April 26, 1973,
Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of
Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.” At the same time, she moved ex
parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even date, May 2,
1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
Preciosa Garcia filed for a motion for reconsideration contending that the order
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction:
o There was no notice of the petition for letters of administration has been served upon
all persons interested in the estate;
o She contends that she should be preferred in the appointment of a special
administratrix, being the surviving spouse of Amado; and,
o Virginia is not an heir but a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia.
While the MR is pending, Preciosa filed a motion to remove Virginia as
administrator.
During the hearings for the case, Virginia presented that: Amado resided in
Quezon City 3 years before his death, therefore CFI Calamba has no jurisdiction over the
case.
CFI DENIED the two petitions of Preciosa.
CA REVERSED the decision. It vacated the decision made by the CFI. It held that
CFI Calamba, Laguna does not have jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Laguna have jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.

RULING:
NO, the Court of First Instance of Laguna DOES NOT HAVE jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.
 Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled; in the Court,
of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which
he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except
in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.” With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2,’
Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should
affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and
should allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the
decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied
upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or
otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence within
the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state
at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the
court to grant letters of administration. The appearance of this provision in the procedural
law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of
the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of
convenience to the parties.
We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual
residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” Some cases make a
distinction between the terms “residence” and “domicile” but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
“inhabitant.” In other words, “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant
in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time
of his death.
In the case at bar, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented
in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows the last
place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. Aside from this, the
deceased’s residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the
Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the
administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973,
transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina
B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in
bold documents that Amado G. Garcia’s last place of residence was at Quezon City.
Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule’s
petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna.

NOTES:
Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court over the subject matter.
Jurisdiction of all probate cases is within the Court of First Instance which is different from
the place of residence of the deceased. It cannot be changed by procedure and be
stipulated by the parties.
Venue is the place of the hearing. Since there are many Court of First Instance,
the venue can be fixed.

1 - San Luis v. San Luis, February 6, 2007

DOCTRINE:
For purposes of fixing venue under Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the “residence”
of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency. This doctrinal rule was laid down by the Court in
Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals (1976).

FACTS:
The decedent Felicisimo T. San Luis, the former governor of the Province of Laguna,
contracted three marriages in his lifetime.
· His first was with VIRGINIA SULIT on March 17, 1942.
- i. This marriage led to six children being born: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
Emilita and Manuel.
- ii. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
· b. His second marriage was with MERRY LEE CORWIN on May 1, 1968.
- i. This marriage led to the birth of Tobias.
- ii. However, Merry failed for a divorce and was granted one on December
14, 1973.
c. His third marriage was with respondent FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS SAN
LUIS on June 20, 1974.
- This marriage led to no children. However, Felicisimo lived with her for 18
years up to his death on December 18, 1992.
After this death, the respondent Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of the decedent’s estate, leading for her to file a
petition for letters of administration before RTC Makati.
On February 4 1994, the petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the decedent’s
children during his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper
venue and failure to state a cause of action.
Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed
in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his
death.
He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death,
was still legally married to Merry Lee.
In addition to this, petitioners Linda and her brother Rodolfo also filed a motion to
dismiss.
On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order denying the motions to
dismiss.
Unaware of the denial, the respondent Felicidad filed on March 5 1994 her
opposition.
She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the
powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982.
Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce of Merry and Felicisimo
issued by the Family Court. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to
marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid
down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 7.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that:
1.) At the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and resident of the
Province of Laguna. Thus, it should been filed in Laguna and not in Makati City.
2.) It also ruled that the respondent was without legal capacity to file the petitioner
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous.
The respondent Felicidad appealed to the CA, which reversed and set aside the
orders of the RTC. It found that:
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the ROC, the term "place of residence" of the decedent
refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode
of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile.
It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna,
he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration
was properly filed in Makati City.
Hence this petition by the petitioners, insisting that the venue of the subject
petitioner for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
They claim that "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They
claim that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never
changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the venue was properly laid?

RULING:
Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the
province "in which he resides at the time of his death." For purposes of fixing venue
under Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual or
physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be
his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. This doctrinal rule was laid down by the Court in Garcia Fule v. Court of
Appeals (1976). In this case, the Court found that that the term “resides” should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense and thus interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
of the state in which it is employed. In the instant case, while it is true that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Laguna, it was established by evidence that he maintained residence in
Alabang from 1982 up to the time of his death. a. This can be seen in the submission of
documentary evidence such as a Deed of Absolute Sale, billing statements, letters and
calling cards. Thus, the court found that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinupa for purposes of fixing the venue for the settlement of his estate,
meaning that the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed.

b. Limited Jurisdiction of Probate Court

2 - Camaya v. Patulandong, GR 144915, February 23, 2004

DOCTRINE
A probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be
part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties.

FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the
Court of Appeals Decision “In re: Petition for the Probate of the Codicil (Will) of Rufina
Reyes; Bernardo Patulandong v. Anselmo Mangulabnan v. Carolina G. Camaya,
Ferdinand Camaya and Edgardo Camaya.”
 On 17 November 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will
wherein she devised, among others, Lot No. 288-A to her grandson Anselmo
Mangulabnan (Mangulabnan). Bernardo Patulandong (Patulandong), teatrix’s son
was appointed as the executor. Lots 3348-A & 3349-A were also devised to
Mangulabnan (but only 288-A is the disputed property in this case).
During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed a petition for the probate of her will
before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Nueva Ecija which was admitted by the
latter on 11 January 1973.
On 27 June 1973, testatrix executed a codicil devising Lot No. 288-A to her
four children (Bernardo, Simplicia, Guillerma, and Juan Patulandong) and her
grandson Anselmo. Each will get 1/5 of the land. All other provisions of her will stayed
the same. Testatrix died on May 14, 1988.
Mangulabnan asked executor Patulandong to deliver to him the title to Lot
No. 288-A which the latter refused, in view of the codicil which modified the
testatrix’s will. As a result, Mangulabnan filed an “action for partition” against
Patulandong (partition case).
On 8 June 1989, the RTC granted the partition but pronounced that the court holds
that the partition is without prejudice to the probate of the codicil in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
On 17 July 1989, Patulandong filed before RTC Nueva Ecija a petition for probate
of the codicil. While the proceeding is ongoing, on 7 February 1991, by virtue of the
decision in the partition case, Mangulabnan caused the cancellation of the title of the
testatrix over Lot No. 288-A and a new TCT was issued in his name. Thereafter,
Mangulabnan sold the lot to petitioners Camaya so a new TCT was thus issued in the
name of the Camayas.
On 16 January 1996, RTC admitted the codicil to probate and pronounced the ff:
1.) Declared the TCT issued in Mangulabnan’s name and also his Deed of Absolute
Sale with the Camayas as NULL and VOID;
2.) Ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the TCT of Mangulabnan and to reissue the
same in the name of the five devisees (including Mangulabnan).
The Camayas filed an MR but was denied. CA affirmed RTC’s decision, hence this
petition

ISSUE/S
Whether or not the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null
and void and ordered the cancellation of the TCTs of petitioners and the deed of sale.

RULING
Yes. Petitioners are correct in contending that under the law, the probate court has
no power, authority, and jurisdiction to declare null and void the sale and titles of
petitioners; and that the probate court can only resolve the following issues:
1) Question of identity - WON the instrument which is offered for probate is the last will
and testament of the decedent;
2) Question of execution - WON the will has been executed in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law; and
3) Question of capacity - WON the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of the
execution of the will.
The court applied its ruling in Cuizon v. Ramolete which upheld that a probate court
or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally
claimed to belong to outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties
is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or
list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well
and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title because the probate court cannot do so.
 Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the
possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer certificate of title
issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the
motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from
the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third
persons of their possession and ownership of the property.
In this case, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it further
declared the deed of sale and the titles of petitioners null and void, it having had
the effect of depriving them possession and ownership of the property. Moreover,
following Section 48 of the Property Registry Decree which reads:
“SECTION 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.– A certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.”
Petition GRANTED IN PART. The decision allowing the codicil is AFFIRMED
but the following are set aside, without prejudice to respondent and his co-heirs’
ventilation of their right in an appropriate action:
1) Declaration nullifying the TCT issued in Mangulabnan’s name and nullifying the
Deed of Absolute Sale between him and the Camayas;
2) The order to reissue the TCT in the name of the five devisees in the codicil.

NOTE
As to the final judgment on the partition case, it does not bar the allowance of the
codicil. The petitioners argument is untenable when it argued that by allowing the codicil
to probate, it in effect amended the final judgment in the partition case which is not allowed
by law; and that petitioner Camayas are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal
presumption that the transfer was lawful.
Though the judgment in the partition case had become final and executory as it
was not appealed, it specifically provided in its dispositive portion that the decision was
“without prejudice to the probate of the codicil.” The rights of the prevailing parties in said
case were thus subject to the outcome of the probate of the codicil.
The probate court being bereft of authority to rule upon the validity of petitioners’
titles, there is no longer any necessity to dwell on the merits of petitioners Camayas’ claim
that they are innocent purchasers for value and enjoy the legal presumption that the
transfer was lawful.

3 - Pacioles v. Chuatoco-Ching, GR 127920, August 9, 2005

DOCTRINE:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a
probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate
and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.
The patent rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and
limited jurisdiction.
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a
probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose
is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In
such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional.

FACTS:
Miguelita died intestate. She was survived by her husband, petitioner Pacioles,
Jr. and two minor children. He filed a verified petition for the settlement of her estate
before RTC. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b)
that the net residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Respondent Miguela, who is the mother of Miguelita, filed an opposition on the
grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an
administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of “paraphernal
properties.” Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her
instead. Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special
administratrix.
Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has
no direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he,
being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator
under the law.
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate
because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of
them “would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of
business partners.”
In her omnibus motion, she nominated her son, Emmanuel Ching, to act as special
administrator.
Intestate court ruled for joint administration between petitioner and Emmanuel.
Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and paying the docket
fees. Notice to creditors was published.
Petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate.
Emanuel did not submit an inventory.
Intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only
compulsory heirs of Miguelita.
Petitioner filed before intestate court an omnibus motion including, among others,
a partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs.
Respondent opposed on the ground that partition and distribution is premature
considering that there is yet no determination “whether the properties specified in the
inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture.”
Intestate court ruled in favor of respondent – It denied the action for partition
and distribution of estate. Respondent contends that she owns bulk of Miguelita’s
estate as an heir and co-owner.
There should be a hearing to determine the issue of whether or not the properties
are entirely conjugal or paraphernal properties of Miguelita or a co-ownership between
the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.
Petitioner filed before CA a Petition for Certiorari. – This was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a trial court, acting as an intestate court, may hear and pass upon
questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate.

RULING:
No. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate
or a probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate
and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate
court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine
whether or not a property should be included in the inventory.
In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in
Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, we held:
"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is
provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to
resolve title."

RATIO:
 The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the
jurisdiction of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim. Such
reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose
of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is
merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The
facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s
inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which she believed or
considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory,
taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties
And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the settlement of
Miguelita’s estate, did not submit his own inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator, is
"to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a true inventory and appraisal of
all the real and personal estate of the deceased which have come into his possession or
knowledge.
He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those properties
which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to
submit one shows that he acquiesced with petitioner’s inventory.
Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a
ruling of what properties should or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted
something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final determination of her claim
of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate.
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by
the intestate court was actually to "determine the propriety of oppositor’s (respondent’s)
claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is true that the oppositor (respondent) owns
the bulk of (Miguelita’s) properties," then it means that she has a "material and direct
interest in the estate" and, hence, "she should be given her day in court." The intended
"day in court" or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondent’s
contention that she is the true owner of the bulk of Miguelita’s estate.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its
proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is
well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of
decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a
part of the estate of the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be
his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title
adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined
in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court
has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court
in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court

c. Exceptions to Limited Jurisdiction

4 - Coca v. Borromeo, 81 SCRA 278 (1978)

DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in
the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate
action. That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and
convenience. Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate
or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory
of a piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate
action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, however, the qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and
convenience are the following: (1) if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question
is one of collation or advancement, or (2) the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the (3) rights of third parties are not impaired, then
the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.

FACTS:
The spouses Juan Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and
1948, respectively. They possessed a homestead, consisting of two parcels of land,
located at Barrio Bunawan or Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental. The Pangilinan
spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria, Eusebio
and Apolinar, all surnamed Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan-Yamuta who
died in 1961, and (3) Francis, Algerian, Benjamin, Perla and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed
Pangilinan, the children of Francisco Pangilinan who died in 1948 and who was also
survived by his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras.
Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental
was instituted for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C.
Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. On September 25, 1965 the administrator presented a
project of partition wherein the combined areas of Lots Nos. 1112 and 1927, or 22.0082
hectares, were partitioned as follows:
(a) To Crispin Borromeo as payment of his attorney’s fees, three hectares which should
be taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-A;
(b) To the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan, 5.3361 hectares taken from Lot No. 1112 and
designated as Lot No.1112-B;
(c) To Prima Pangilinan, 6.3361 hectares, taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot
No. 1112-C;
(d) To the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan 7.3360 hectares, consisting of Lot No. 1927
and the remainder of Lot No. 1112, which remainder is designated as Lot No. 1112-D.
The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.) opposed that project
of partition. They contended that the proposed partition contravened the lower court’s
order of December 6, 1963 which recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan
to a twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112; that Prima Pangilinan, who sold her share to
Francisco Pangilinan, should be excluded from the partition; that the total share of the
heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720 hectares, while that of the heirs
of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan for P5,088.50 had not been properly allowed.
The lower court in its order of October 2, 1965 directed the administrator to pay
the debt of the estate to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action on the
project of partition until the ownership of the twelve hectares, which were claimed by the
heirs of Francisco Pangilinan, and the six hectares, which were claimed by Crispin
Borromeo is determined in an ordinary action. But after noting that no separate action
had been filed to determine the ownership of the twelve hectares, lower court issued an
order approving the project of partition but excluding the twelve hectares claimed by the
heirs of Francisco Pangilinan but did not bother to decide how the remainder should be
partitioned and whether Prima Pangilinan had a share in that remainder.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the lower court acting as a probate court can decide an issue of
ownership?

RULING:
NO, the lower court acting as a probate court CANNOT decide an issue of
ownership BUT this case is an exception to the general rule.
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in
the testate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate
action. However, that general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency
and convenience. Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or
testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece
of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
 To reiterate, generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or
ownership, however, the qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and
convenience are the following: (1) if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is
one of collation or advancement, or (2) the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the (3) rights of third parties are not impaired, then
the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.
We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule
that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate action.
In the case at bar, the probate court had already received evidence on the
ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion
from the inventory. The only interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the
intestate proceeding. As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of
society. They should not be forced to incur additional expenses (such as filing fees) by
bringing a separate action to determine the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion.
The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the heirs of Francisco
Pangilinan to file in the intestate proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 508, a motion in the
form of a complaint wherein they should set forth their claim for the twelve hectares in
question, stating the ultimate facts in support of their claim, such as the partition made by
Juan C. Pangilinan, their acquisition of the share of Prima Pangilinan and the usufructuary
rights of their parents, their long possession of the said portion, their claim for the produce
of the land, the expenses incurred by them in Civil Case No. 560, Labaria vs. Pangilinan,
and their contention that Lot No. 1920 forms part of the estate of the Pangilinan spouses.
Copies of that motion should be served upon the administrator and upon Prima
Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan (who are all represented by the same
lawyers). They should answer the motion within fifteen days from service. In their answer
the appellants should set forth the ultimate facts and the defenses (such as the violation
of section 118 of the Public Land Law) to support their theory that Lot No. 1112 still forms
part of the estate of the spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba and that the
heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should bear one-third of the expenses incurred by
Concepcion Pangilinan in Civil Case No. 560. After the issues have been joined and in
case no amicable settlement has been reached, the probate court should receive
evidence or, as indicated by the Court of Appeals in Atay vs. Catolico, supra, a full-dress
hearing should be held.
Crispin Borromeo may set forth also his claim for the three hectares but only for
the purpose of deciding what portion of the estate should be given to him in satisfaction
of his share. His claim for the sum of P416 had already been adjudicated by the lower
court in its order of August 31, 1966. No appeal was interposed from that adjudication.
Considering that the respective claims of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan and the
heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for reimbursement of the litigation expenses allegedly
incurred in Civil Case No. 560 will be included in the trial, the two orders of the trial court
dated May 11, 1968 regarding those matters (L-29545) should not be enforced. They
should be set aside.
WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court’s amended order of August 31, 1966, excluding
twelve hectares from the partition of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan spouses (L-
27082) and (2) the two orders dated May 11, 1968, regarding the claim of Gaudalupe
Pizarras and her children and the debt of the estate to Concepcion Pangilinan (L-29545)
are reversed and set aside.
A new trial should be held on those matters after the filing of the proper pleadings
and in case no amicable settlement is reached. The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should
file their motion within thirty days from notice of the entry of judgment in this case. The
case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the
guidelines already set forth. No costs.

1 - Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, GR 155555, August 16, 2005

DOCTRINE:
 Where the adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties
to the special proceedings for its settlement: 1.) if the special proceedings are pending,
or 2.) if there are none but under the circumstances of the case, there is a need to
file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship, should be raised
and settled in said special proceeding. Where the 1.) Special Proceedings had been
instituted but had finally closed and terminated, however, or 2.) if a putative heir has lost
the right to have himself declared in that Special Proceedings as co-heir and he can no
longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration
as heir in order to bring about the annulment of partition or distribution or adjudication of
a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.

FACTS:
In 1942, Jose Portugal married Paz Lazo, with whom he had a daughter Leonila
(respondent Portugal-Beltran)). In 1948, he married Isabel de la Puerta (petitioner), with
whom he had a son Jose (co-petitioner).
Portugal and his 4 siblings executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Waiver
of Rights over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate. In the deed,
Portugal‘s siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a parcel of land in
his favor.
Paz died in 1984 and Portugal died intestate in 1985. Respondent then executed
an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person” adjudicating to
herself the parcel of land. The Registry of Deeds then issued the title in her name.
In 1988, Leonila executed an “Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of
Deceased Person”, adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land, and was
subsequently registered (1988) in her name “Leonila Portugal Beltran, married to Merardo
M. Beltran, Jr.”
In 1996, Isabel and Portugal, Jr. (petitioners) filed a complaint against Leonila for
cancellation of Affidavit of Adjudication and TCT issued in her name, alleging that Leonila
is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, Sr., hence, not entitled to inherit the
Caloocan parcel of land, and accordingly prayed that said TCT be cancelled and a new
one be issued in their (petitioner’s) name.
A Pre-Trial Order was issued, citing the following issues to be resolved, to wit:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is
valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal
heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested
by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint.
After trial, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction without resolving the issues as stated in the pre-trial order, on the ground that
petitioner’s status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate
court.
Citing the case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the Supreme Court in this
case ruled that the establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied
through a special proceeding, not an ordinary civil action. Thus, the court, not being a
probate court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiff’s cause to establish their status and
right herein.
On appeal to CA, the petitioners cite the case of Carino vs. Carino. In this case,
the SC ratiocinates that the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity
of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
However, the CA found Carino to be inapplicable. The appellate court held that in Carino
case, the main issue was the validity of the two marriages, whereas in the instant case,
the main issue is the annulment of title to property. Thus, the CA affirmed the TC’s
dismissal of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine
their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondent’s
Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.

RULING:
NO. In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the
sole heir to Portugal’s estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of
Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a
property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein. Petitioners claim,
however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal.
A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs
of a deceased. It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the
circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not
expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is
burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding
and it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case – subject of the
present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling
reason to still subject Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a
determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by
petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the evidence presented by the
parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during
pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal
heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested
by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.

Rule 74 Summary Settlement of Estates

a. Extrajudicial Settlement by Agreement and Two-year Lien

2 - Malahacan v. Ignacio, 19 Phil 434 (1911)

DOCTRINE
The only ground upon which an administrator can demand of the heirs at law the
possession of real property, of which his intestate was seized at the time of his death, is
that such property will be required to be sold to pay the debts of the deceased.

FACTS
Malahacan, administrator of Guillerma Martinez’ estate, filed an action against the
heirs to recover the seized real estate of Martinez which is now occupied by the said heirs
for several years already.
CFI favored Malahacan and awarded the possession of the lands described in the
complaint to him, with costs. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the heirs of Martinez can automatically acquire her estate property,
extrajudicially settle and divide it among themselves.

RULING
Yes. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be
divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. When
there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the
intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the
heirs.
When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why
the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The
property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the
estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of
the estate among the heirs. They are co-owners of an undivided estate and the law offers
them a remedy for the division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the
present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or
that they intervened in any way whatever in the present action. If there are any heirs of
the estate who have not received their participation, they have their remedy by petition
for partition of the said estate.

3 - Pereira v. CA, 174 SCRA 154 (1989)

DOCTRINE:
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator,
in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case
he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. An exception to this rule is
established in Section 1 of Rule 74. Under this exception, when all the heirs are of
lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to
partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court,
however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if
the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to
an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among
themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said
provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different
course of action. It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if
the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting
to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate
should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons.

FACTS:
Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away
without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein
petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private
respondent. Nagac filed before RTC for the issuance of letters of administration in her
favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. Contending
that he and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased. That the
deceased left no will. That there are no creditors of the deceased. That the deceased left
several properties. That the spouse of the deceased had been working in London as an
auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased.
However, Victoria opposed contending that there exists no estate of the deceased for
purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the
letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving
spouse.
RTC: appointed Rita Pereira Nagac as administratrix of the intestate estate.
CA: affirmed the RTCs decision.

ISSUE/S
Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent
dies intestate without leaving any debts.

RULING
NO, a judicial administration proceeding is NOT necessary when the decedent dies
intestate without leaving any debts.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator,
in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case
he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein.
An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. Under this
exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate,
they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the
heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or
obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for
partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they
may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not
compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action.
It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate
has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an
action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should
not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case
the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and
unnecessary proceedings.”
WHAT CONSTITUTES "GOOD REASON" TO WARRANT A JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED when the heirs are all of legal
age and there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case.
In another case, we held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as
administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such
appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same
objective could be achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in
issuing letters of administration. In still another case, We did not find so powerful “reason
the argument that the appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his
deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order for him to have legal
capacity appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife’s deceased mother, since he may
just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in 2 intestate proceedings of the latter.
In the case at bar, there are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a
sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid.
What is at once apparent that these two heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable
reason why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain
possession of the alleged properties” of the deceased for her own purposes, since these
properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them
fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will
necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate
of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially
since the only real property left has been extrajudicially settled, to an
administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose
it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar nature, the
claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated
in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are protected in
any event.
We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration
proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being
no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira
with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.

b. Remedies Against Extrajudicial Settlement

Contribution from Distribution, Execution against Bond or Sale of Realty of

Decedent

4 - McMicking v. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil 211 (1912)

DOCTRINE:
At the head of the law of administration of the Philippine Islands stands sections
596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They are as follows:
SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without legal proceedings, in
certain cases. — Whatever all the heirs of a deceased person are of lawful age and
legal capacity, and their are no debts due from the intestate estate, or all the debts
have been paid by the heirs, the heirs may, by a family council as shown under
Spanish law, or by agreement between themselves, duly executed in writing,
apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without
proceedings in court.
SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts. — But if it shall appear,
at any time within two years after such settlement and distribution of the estate,
that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, any
creditor may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner
hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be paid, with interest; and the
administrator appointed by the court may recover the assets of the estate from
those who have received them, for the purpose of paying the debts; and the real
estate belonging to the deceased shall remain charged with the liability to creditors
for the full period of two years after such distribution, notwithstanding any
transfers thereof that may have been made.
These sections provide for the voluntary division of the whole property of the
decedent without proceedings in court. The provisions which they contain are extremely
important. The wisdom which underlies them is apparent.
It is the undisputed policy of every people which maintains the principle of private
ownership of property that he who owns a thing shall not be deprived of its possession or
use except for the most urgent and imperative reason and then only so long as is
necessary to make the rights which underlie those reasons effective. It is a principle of
universal acceptance which declares that one has the instant right to occupy and use that
which he owns, and it is only in the presence of reasons of the strongest and most urgent
nature that that principle is prevented from accomplishing the purpose which underlies it.
The force which gave birth to this stern and imperious principle is the same force which
destroyed the feudal despotism and created the democracy of private owners.

FACTS:
One Engracio Palanca was appointed administrator of the estate of Margarita
Jose. Mariano Ocampo became one of the sureties of Engracio Palanca. After the
execution of the bond, said Palanca took possession of all the property of Margarita Jose.
Later on, Mariano Ocampo died, testate.
 Doroteo Velasco was appointed administrator of the estate of Mariano Ocampo
while Pio de la Guardia Barretto (defendant) qualified as one of the sureties of said
Doroteo Velasco. Doroteo Velasco, as administrator, filed with the court a complete report
and inventory of the property of the deceased, together with a statement of all his debts
and liabilities.
As a part of this report and inventory said administrator filed an instrument signed
by all of the persons interested in the estate of the said Mariano Ocampo agreeing to the
partition of the estate among themselves without proceedings in court, at the same time
assuming the payment of all obligations against the estate. This agreement of partition
was drawn and executed under sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure for
the purposes and to attain the ends therein mentioned.
The Court of First Instance affirmed and approved the partition. Pursuant to such
agreement and order of the court approving the same, Doroteo Velasco, delivered to the
devisees and legatees of Mariano Ocampo, all of the property of said decedent leaving
in the hands of said administrator no property or thing of value whatever belonging to said
estate.
Meanwhile, Engracio Palanca was removed from office as administrator of the
estate of Margarita Jose, and Jose McMicking (plaintiff) was appointed in his stead. Said
Palanca was removed from office by reason of the fact that he failed and refused to render
an account of the property and funds of the estate of the said Margarita Jose. At the time
of his removal he was indebted to the estate in the sum of P41,960.15.
For the default of Engracio Palanca, Mcmicking filed a claim in the amount of
30,000 to the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto as the surety of Doroteo Velasco who
is the administrator of the estate of Mariano Ocampo who in turn is the surety of said
Engracio Palanca.
It is disputed in the case that all of the claims against the estate of Mariano Ocampo
were fully paid and satisfied at the time of the partition of said estate, with the exception
of the alleged claim arising by virtue of his having been a surety of the default Palanca.
The lower court dismissed the case and rendered judgment in favour of defendant.

ISSUE:
Whether the parties to the partition did not err in invoking their rights under section
596 and 597 provide for the voluntary division of the whole property of the decedent
without proceedings in court.

RULING:
Yes. These sections provide for the voluntary division of the whole property of the
decedent without proceedings in court. The provisions which they contain are extremely
important. The wisdom which underlies them is apparent. It is the undisputed policy of
every people which maintains the principle of private ownership of property that he who
owns a thing shall not be deprived of its possession or use except for the most urgent
and imperative reason and then only so long as is necessary to make the rights which
underlie those reasons effective.
It is a principle of universal acceptance which declares that one has the
instant right to occupy and use that which he owns, and it is only in the presence
of reasons of the strongest and most urgent nature that that principle is prevented
from accomplishing the purpose which underlies it. The force which gave birth to this
stern and imperious principle is the same force which destroyed the feudal despotism and
created the democracy of private owners.
These provisions should, therefore, be given the most liberal construction so that
the intent of the framers may be fully carried out. They should not be straitened or
narrowed but should rather be given that wideness and fullness of application without
which they cannot produce their most beneficial effects.
In the case at the bar, we are of the opinion that, under the broad and liberal policy
which we must adopt in the interpretation and application of the provisions referred to,
the decision of the property of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, in the form, in the
manner and for the purposes expressed, falls within the provisions of said sections
and may be termed, therefore, and we hold it to be, a partition of the property of a
decedent without legal proceedings within the meaning of those sections. The fact
of the prior appointment of an administrator and the filing of an inventory before such
partition is of no consequence so far as the right of the owners to partition is concerned.
The only requisite for such petition prescribed by the law is that "there are
no debts . . . or all the debts have been paid by the heirs." When the condition is
fulfilled the partition can take place, no matter what stage the administration may have
reached. By this it is, of course, not meant that the partition after the appointment of an
administrator will interfere with the rights acquired by third person dealing with said
administrator within the limits of his authority and prior to the partition; nor that the
administrator can be deprived of the property of which he is legally in possession without
proper proceedings and the consent of the court.

RATIO:
The parties to the partition stood invoking their rights under section 596 and 597.
Velasco was helpless. He was powerless to prevent the parties from taking the property
to which they were entitled under the agreement, it being conceded that they were actually
entitled thereto in law.
Those sections were applicable to the situation and there was nothing that
Velasco could do to prevent the estate from being divided according to their
provisions. In giving his consent to the partition and in assisting the parties to obtain the
approval of the court thereto he did no wrong. He simply aided in carrying out the
provisions of the sections referred to. It is a universal principle that one who follows a
law commits no fault, incurs no failure and wounds no rights.
If one obeys the law he is free not only in person but in property. Observance of
the law discharges obligations; it does not create them; and an obligation once discharged
cannot be re-acted by the act of others in which the person as to whom it was discharged
takes no part. The proceedings under sections referred to were, after the partition was
actually made and the property duly turned over the administrator under the proper
proceedings, a complete settlement of the estate of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, as it
then stood, so far as the administrator was concerned. Nothing further needed to be done.
Every duty which Velasco owed up to the time of the partition had been met. All debts
presented or known had been paid. The court had given it approbation to the delivery of
the property by the administrator to the partitioning parties. Every obligation which lay
upon him had been removed.

c. New Action to Annul Settlement within Reglementary Period

5 - Gerona v. de Guzman, 11 SCRA 153 (1964)

DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe when
defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title, otherwise, the
statute of limitations operates from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the
possessor of the property.

FACTS:
Marcelo De Guzman contracted his first marriage with Teodora Dela Cruz with
whom he had a daughter, Placida De Guzman, who is the mother of herein petitioners.
Marcelo then had his second marriage with Camila Ramos with whom he had 7 children,
who were the herein respondents.
Petitioners filed a complaint alleging that respondents executed a deed of
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Marcelo, fraudulently representing that they are
the only surviving heirs of the deceased although the former were also the deceased’s
forced heirs. Petitioners seek to cancel the TCTs of 7 parcels of land issued in the name
of respondents and demanded their share in the said properties. Finally, they want the
extrajudicial settlement to be nullified insofar as it deprives them of their share in the
properties.
Respondents maintained that petitioners’ mother, Placida, was not entitled to
share in the estate of Marcelo because she is a spurious child and that petitioners’ action
is barred by the statute of limitations.
The trial court held that Placida was a legitimate child of Marcelo; that the
properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Marcelo and Camila; and that
petitioners’ action has already prescribed. The complaint was thus dismissed. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contend that since they and respondents are co-heirs of Marcelo, the
present action for partition of the estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action;
that even if affected by said statute, the period of 4 years prescribed did not begin to run
until actual discovery of the fraud perpetrated by respondents, which took place in 1956
or 1957; and that said period had not expired when the present action was commenced.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the action of petitioners to annul the extrajudicial settlement executed by
respondents has prescribed

RULING:
Yes. The Court held that although, as a general rule, an action for partition among
coheirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the
property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates, as in other
cases; from the moment the possessor of the property asserts such adverse title.
When respondents executed the deed of extrajudicial settlement stating therein
that they are the sole heirs of the deceased, and secured new transfer certificates of title
in their own name, they thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased,
and consequently, set up a title adverse to them.
It is already settled in this jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance of real
property upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the
statute of limitations.
The action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of
fraud may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. In the case at bar,
such discovery is deemed to have taken place in 1948 when said instrument was
filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name
of the respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extrajudicial settlement,
constituting constructive notice to the whole world.

6 - Pedrosa v. CA, 353 SCRA 620 (2001)

DOCTRINE:
(1) Without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the extrajudical
settlement cannot be binding on said persons.
(2) A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had
no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.

FACTS:
Miguel Rodriguez died intestate survived by his wife Rosalina and their legally
adopted daughter Maria Pedrosa, the petitioner. Rosalina and Maria entered into an extra
judicial settlement of his estate. The other Private respondents, the Rodriguezes,
however filed an action an action to annul Maria’s adoption which the CFI upheld. It was
also appealed to the Court of Appeals which also upheld the adoption as legal.
In the meantime, Pilar, the sister of Miguel also passed away with no other heirs
but her brothers and sisters, the private respondents. Who then entered into an
extrajudicial settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel
and of his sister, Pilar. Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel
Rodriguez. The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels
of land covering a total area of 224,883 square meters. These properties were divided
among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the heirs of Miguel, represented solely by
Rosalina. Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents
Rodriguezes were able to secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able
to transfer some parcels to the other respondents herein.
Petitioner Maria tried to claim their share of the properties and after being unable
to do so, filed a complaint to annul the partition. Her complaint was dismissed by the RTC
and on appeal was also dismissed by the CA.

ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the complaint for annulment of the “Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
and Partition” had already prescribed;
(2) Whether or not said deed is valid;

RULING:
(1) No. The complaint for the annulment has not prescribed.
Section 4, Rule 74 provides for a two year prescriptive period (1) to persons
who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and in
addition (2) when the provisions of Section 1of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with,
i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
Petitioner, as the records confirm, did not participate in the extrajudicial
partition. So the two-year prescriptive period is not applicable in her case. The applicable
prescriptive period here is four (4) years as provided in Gerona vs. De Guzman, 11 SCRA
153 (1964), which held that:
[The action to annul] a deed of “extrajudicial settlement” upon the ground of
fraud...may be filed within four years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is
deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds
and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which
was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid
partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of
the nine heirs who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under
the rule, “no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof.”
As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not
correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed
after two years from its execution in 1941.

(2) No. The deed of partition is not valid.

No extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not
participated therein or had no notice thereof.
Under Rule 74, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings,
the extrajudicial settlement cannot be binding on said persons. The rule contemplates
a notice which must be sent out or issued before the Deed of Settlement and/or
Partition is agreed upon, i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the
said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition, not after, which was when publication
was done in the instant case. Following Rule 74 and the ruling in Beltran vs. Ayson, since
Maria Elena did not participate in the said partition, the settlement is not binding on her.
The provision of Section 4, Rule 74 will also not apply when the deed of
extrajudicial partition is sought to be annulled on the ground of fraud. A deed of
extra judicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no
knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Maria Elena is an heir
of Miguel together with her adopting mother, Rosalina. Being the lone descendant of
Miguel, she excludes the collateral relatives of Miguel from participating in his estate,
following the provisions of Article 1003 of the Civil Code
Rule 75 Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary

a. Probate Mandatory

1 - Guevarra v. Guevarra, 98 Phil. 249 (1956)

Doctrine:
The presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance
is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. The law requires the probate of the will and
public policy also requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given
to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be nugatory.

FACTS:
Ernesto and Rosario, legitimate son and natural daughter of the deceased
Victorino L. Guevara, are litigating here over their inheritance from the latter. The action
was commenced by Rosario to recover from Ernesto what she claims to be her strict
legitime as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased. It appears that in 1931,
their father executed a will wherein he made bequests and devises to various persons
and he set aside 100 hectares of a land he owns to be disposed of either by him during
his lifetime or by his attorney-in-fact Ernesto in order to pay all his pending debts and to
defray his expenses and those of his family us to the time of his death.
Subsequently, a deed was executed by their father selling, conveying and
transferring to Ernesto the entire parcel of land. In 1933, Victorino died. His last will and
testament, however, was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any
administration proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. In the
meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will and
testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary
dispositions made therein in her favor.
But a little over four years after the testator's demise, she (assisted by her
husband) commenced the present action and it was only during the trial of this case that
she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to
prove that the deceased Victorino had acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon
that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on
the theory or assumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated,
for which reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made by the testator in favor of
his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with by Rosario In claiming
her legitime as the natural daughter.

RULING:
No. Rosarios contention violates procedural law and considered to be an
attempt to circumvent the last will and testament of the decedent. The presentation
of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance is essential and
indispensable to its efficacy. Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public
policy for without probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will
may be rendered nugatory.
In this case, there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present
litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the
existence and of the provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded,
nor may those rights be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of
the will to present it to the court for probate.
According to section 1 rule 74, in relation to rule 76 of rules of court, if the
decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an
extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate
and divide the estate in accordance with the will.
They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are
contrary to law. Neither may they so away with the presentation of the will to the court for
probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The
law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the
will is probated and notice thereof given to the world, the right of a person to dispose of
his property by will may be rendered nugatory.
Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any questions as to the
authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of
the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its allowance or probate by
the court, first, because the law expressly provides that “no will shall pass either real
or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court’’; and second
because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed
with the substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extra judicial, without offending
against public policy designed to effectuate the testator`s right to dispose of his property
by will in accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and legatees under the
will thru the means provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal
notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees.
Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such
an action for partition which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the
registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action for
reinvindicacion or partition.
Rule 75 Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. — No will
shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the
proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be
conclusive as to its due execution.

2 - Fernandez v. Dimagiba, 21 SCRA 428 (1967)

DOCTRINE
A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning the
capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and
testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.
As such, the probate order is final and appealable and it is so recognized by express
provisions of Section 1, Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that "any interested
person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment... where such
order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will. xxx”

FACTS
This is a petition for a review of the decision of the CA affirming CFI in admitting to
probate the alleged last will and testament of the deceased, and overruling the opposition
to the probate.
On 19 January 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now respondent, submitted to the CFI a
petition for the probate of the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed
on 22 October 1930. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of the
deceased. The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio
Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all
surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to
the probate asked. Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent
of the testatrix, estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two
deeds of conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of
the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside by the
Supreme Court.
The CFI found that the will genuinely executed but deferred deciding on the issue
of estoppel and revocation until such time that the opportunity is presented. Oppositors
Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the
issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved but were denied.
The CA later ruled that the case had become final and executor due to failure to
appeal.

ISSUE/S
Whether or not the decree of the CFI allowing the will to probate had become final
for lack of appeal.

RULING
Yes. The oppositors-appellants contend that the order allowing the will to probate
should be considered interlocutory, because it fails to resolve the issues of estoppel and
revocation propounded in their opposition. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the
appellant’s stand is untenable. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and
definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper
execution and witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its
provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.
As such, the probate order is final and appealable; and it is so recognized by
express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109, that specifically prescribes that “any
interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment
xxx where such order or judgment: (a) allows or disallows a will.”
The appellants argument that they were entitled to await the trial Court’s resolution
on the other grounds of their opposition before taking an appeal, as otherwise there would
be a multiplicity of recourses to the higher Courts is untenable since Rule 109, section 1,
expressly enumerates six different instances when appeal may be taken in special
proceedings.
There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not
appealed on time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts
may no longer revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest.

NOTE
As to the estoppel issue, the presentation and probate of a will are requirements
of public policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator’s expressed wishes, which
are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent’s ownership and right of
dispossession within legal limits. It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy to be
evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the allegation of
estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently unmeritorious.

b. Probate Proceeding in Rem

3 - Manahan v. Manahan, 58 Phil 448 (1933)

DOCTRINE:
WILL; PROBATE OF WILL.—The appellant was not entitled to notification of the
order admitting the will to probate, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not
having filed an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof. Her allegation that she
had the status of an heir, being the decedent's sister, did not confer upon her the right to
be notified in view of the fact that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant
has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any
successional right.
AUTHENTICATION AND PROBATE.—In the phraseology of the procedural law
there is no essential difference between the authentication of a will and the probate
thereof. The words authentication and probate are synonymous in this case. All the law
requires is that the competent court declare that in the execution of the will the essential
external formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as
a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the law.
 CONCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF THE DECREE OF PROBATE.—The decree
admitting a will to probate is conclusive -with respect to the due execution thereof and it
cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of a fraud, in
any separate or independent action or proceeding.
PROCEEDINGS "IN REM".—The proceedings followed in a testamentary case
being in rem, the decree admitting the will to probate was effective and conclusive against
the appellant, in accordance with section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER.—The appellant could not appeal from the trial court's
order denying her motion for reconsideration and a new trial in view of the fact that said
order was interlocutory in character.

FACTS:
On August 29, 1930, Tiburcia Manahan instituted a proceeding for the probate of
the will of the deceased Donata Manahan. Petitioner Tiburcia, the niece of the testatrix,
was named the executrix of in the will. The will was probated, as no opposition was filed
against it. The trial court then appointed Tiburcia as the executrix.

One year and seven months later, on May 11, 1932, the appellant herein filed a
motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order admitting the will to
probate be vacated and the authenticated will declared null and void ab initio.
Appellant Engracia raised the following points for her opposition: (1) that she was
an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and, as such, was entitled to and
should have been notified of the probate of the will; (2) that the court did not really probate
the will but limited itself to decreeing its authentication; and (3) that the will is null and void
ab initio on the ground that the external formalities prescribed by the Code of Civil
Procedure have not been complied with.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not appellant is entitled to and should have been notified of the probate of
the will being an alleged interested party?
2. Whether or not the court probated the will?
3. Whether or not the will was validly probated?

RULING:
1. NO. She is NOT entitled to notification of the probate of the will and neither had she
the right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filed an
opposition to the petition for the probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of
an heir, being the deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be notified on the
ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has not been instituted
heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any successional right.

2. YES, the court probated the will.The court really decreed the authentication and
probate of the will in question, which is the only pronouncement required of the trial court
by the law in order that the will may be considered valid and duly executed in accordance
with the law. In the phraseology of the procedural law, there is no essential difference
between the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The words authentication
and probate are synonymous in this case. All the law requires is that the competent court
declared that in the execution of the will the essential external formalities have been
complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid and effective in
the eyes of the law.

3. YES, the will was validly probated. The last contention of the appellant may be refuted
merely by stating that, once a will has been authenticated and admitted to probate,
questions relative to the validity thereof can no more be raised on appeal. The decree of
probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned
on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or
independent action or proceedings.
4 - Alaban v. CA, GR 156021, September 23, 2005

DOCTRINE:
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any
other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place
for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the designated or other known
heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem,
such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends
to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.

FACTS:
Respondent Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and
Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado.
ALLEGATION: he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will.
RTC’s RULING: allowed the probate of the will and directed the issuance of letters
testamentaryto respondent.
Petitioners after 4 months filed a motion for the reopening of the probate
proceedings.
CLAIM:
1) they are the intestate heirs of the decedent.
2) RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct
docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs.

RTC’s Ruling: denied motion

1)petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing by publication and that the deficiency
in the payment of docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition.
2)RTC’s Decision was already final and executory even before petitioners’ filing of the
motion to reopen.

Petitioners filed a petition to annul RTC’s decision with the CA.

CA’s RULING: petition dismissed.

There was no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate
remedies through no fault of their own.

ISSUE:
Whether the allowance of the will to probate should be annulled for failure to
mention the petitioners as parties.

RULING:
No. To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result
of respondent’s deliberate omission or concealment of their names, ages and residences
as the other heirs of the decedent in his petition for allowance of the will, they were not
notified of the proceedings, and thus they were denied their day in court. In addition, they
claim that respondent’s offer of a false compromise even before the filing of the petition
prevented them from appearing and opposing the petition for probate.
The Court is not convinced.
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will,
or any other person interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the
time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3) consecutive
weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as furnished
to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.
Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in
rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the court's
jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the
estate of the decedent.
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator. perusal of the will shows that respondent was
instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the
decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be notified of the
probate proceedings under the Rules.
Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for
probate, or to personally notify them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the
purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon
the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.
The non-inclusion of petitioners’ names in the petition and the alleged failure to
personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners
were not denied their day in court, as they were not prevented from participating in the
proceedings and presenting their case before the probate court.

Rule 76 Allowance or Disallowance of Will

a. Jurisdictional Requirements for Probate of Will

5 - De Aranz v. Galing, 161 SCRA 628 (1988)

FACTS:
In 1986, private respondent Joaquin R-Infante filed with the RTC of Pasig a
petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late Montserrat
R-Infante. The petition specified the names and addresses of herein petitioners as
legatees and devisees. The probate court issued an order setting the petition for hearing.
Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of general circulation in Metro
Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks.
On the date of the hearing, no oppositors appeared. The hearing was then reset
and the private respondent presented his evidence ex-parte and placed Arturo Arceo,
one of the testamentary witnesses, on the witness stand. During the proceedings, private
respondent was appointed executor.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that, as named legatees, no
notices were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they
prayed that they be given a period of ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to
the probate of the will. This was denied by the Court. Petition for certiorari was filed and
referred to CA which was also dismissed. Hence, present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in ruling tha the requirement of notice on heirs, legatees and
devisees is merely a procedural convenience to satisfy the requirements of due process.

RULING:
Yes, Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules states that:
“Sec. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or
personally - The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for
proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heroes, legatees, and
devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and
deposited in the post office with postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before
the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like
manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the petitioner; also,
to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if their places of residence be
known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of
hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.”
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that notice of the time and place of the
hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known
heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence, if
such places of residence be known.
There is no question that the residence of herein petitioners legatees and
devisees were known to the probate court. But despite such knowledge, the probate court
did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the law for
the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for
three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

6 - Basa v. Mercado, 61 Phil 632 (1935)

DOCTRINE
The first publication of the notice need not be made twenty-one days before the
day appointed for the hearing.

FACTS
The Honorable Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, deceased.
On January 30, 1932, the same judge approved the account of the administrator of the
estate, declared him the only heir of the deceased under the will and closed the
administration proceedings.
On April 11, 1934, the herein petitioners-appellants filed a motion in which they
prayed that said proceedings be reopened and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction
to act in the matter because there was a failure to comply with requirements as to the
publication of the notice of hearing prescribed in Section 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure which states that:
SEC. 630. Court to appoint hearing on will. — When a will is delivered to a court
having jurisdiction of the same, the court shall appoint a time and place when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance of the will, and shall cause public notice
thereof to be given by publication in such newspaper or newspapers as the court directs
of general circulation in the province, three weeks successively, previous to the time
appointed, and no will shall be allowed until such notice has been given. At the hearing
all testimony shall be taken under oath, reduced to writing and signed by the witnesses.
Petitioners-appellants Contention: appellants claim that the provisions of section
630 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in view of the fact that
although the trial judge, on May 29, 1931, ordered the publication of the required notice
for "three weeks successively" previous to the time appointed for the hearing on the will,
the first publication was on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20, 1931, and the hearing took
place on the 27th of that month, only twenty- one days after the date of the first publication
instead of three full weeks before the day set for the hearing.

ISSUE
1.) Whether or not the publication of the notice of hearing should be made three weeks
successively in the General Circulation before the date set hearing for the hearing on the
will.
2.) Whether or not Ing Katipunan is a General Circulation newspaper.

RULING
1.) No. The Supreme Court held that the language used in section 630 of the Code of
Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published
for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words, the first
publication of the notice need not be made twenty-one days before the day appointed for
the hearing.

2.) Yes. The record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in
view of the fact that it is published for the dissemination of local news and general
information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is
published at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made
in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a "newspaper of general circulation in the
Province of Pampanga."
Furthermore, no attempt has been made to prove that it was a newspaper devoted
to the interests or published for the entertainment of a particular class, profession, trade,
calling, race or religious denomination. The fact that there is another paper published in
Pampanga that has a few more subscribers (72 to be exact) and that certain Manila dailies
also have a larger circulation in that province is unimportant. The law does not require
that publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure, should be made
in the newspaper with the largest numbers is necessary to constitute a newspaper of
general circulation.

b. Proof Required on Probate Hearing

1 - Gan v. Yap, 104 Phil 509 (1958)

Doctrine:
Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled when
such will is submitted to the courts for allowance. For that purpose the testimony of one
of the subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if there is no opposition.
``In the probate of a holographic will" says the New Civil Code, "it shall be
necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the
testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. If the will is contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required. In the
absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent's handwriting) and if the court
deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to."

FACTS:
On November 20,1951, Felicidad Esguerra died of heart failure in the University of
Santo Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan in the City of Manila. On
March 17,1952 Fausto Gan initiated a petition for the probate of holographic will allegedly
executed by the deceased and established its contents and due execution by a statement
that on November 5,1951 that felicidad wrote, signed and dated a holographic will in the
presence of her niece who was invited to read it and by a distant relative. The surviving
husband IIdefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any
testament during her life time and when the deceased found hardly breathing her husband
and her personal attendant, Mrs. Bantique constantly at her side and these two persons
swore that Mrs. Felicidad Esguerra made no will, and could have made no will on that
day.

ISSUE:
WON HOLOGRAPHIC WILL CAN BE PROBATED UPON THE TESTIMONY OF
WITNESSES WHO HAVE ALLEGEDLY SEEN IT AND WHO DECLARED THAT IT WAS
IN THE WRITING OF TESTATOR.

RULING:
NO. Since the will was not presented, the court is in the opinion that the case
should be decided not on the weakness of the opposition but on strength of the evidence
of the petitioner who has the burden of proof. And that the authenticity and due execution
is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled when such will is submitted to the courts for
allowance. The court find confirmation of ideas in the decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain in accordance with the provision of Civil Code (Spanish) “The will itself, whole and
unmutilated, must be presented; otherwise it shall produce no effect.’’ And the evidence
submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it
fails to measure up to that “clear and distinct” proof required by rule 77 sec. 11.
Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled when
such will is submitted to the courts for allowance. For that purpose the testimony of one
of the subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77).
If there is, the three must testify, if available. (Cabang vs. Delfinado, 34 Phil., 291;
Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). From the testimony of such witnesses (and of
other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion as to the genuineness and
authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its due execution. Now, in the matter
of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are demanded, since as
stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they are "entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself." The law, it is reasonable to suppose,
regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity, and as its own safeguard,
since it could at any time, be demonstrated to be — or not to be — in the hands of the
testator himself. "In the probate of a holographic will" says the New Civil Code, "it shall
be necessary that at least one witness who knows the handwriting and signature of the
testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the
testator. If the will is contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required. In the
absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent's handwriting) and if the court
deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to."
Rule 76 Section 5. Proof at hearing. What sufficient in absence of contest. — At
the hearing compliance with the provisions of the last two preceding sections must be
shown before the introduction of testimony in support of the will. All such testimony shall
be taken under oath and reduced to writing. It no person appears to contest the allowance
of the will, the court may grant allowance thereof on the testimony of one of the
subscribing witnesses only, if such witness testify that the will was executed as is required
by law.
In the case of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness who
knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator. In the absence of any such competent
witness, and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.

2 - Rodelas v. Aranza, 119 SCRA 16 (1982)

DOCTRINE:
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL, WHICH WAS LOST OR CANNOT BE FOUND, BE
PROVED BY MEANS OF A PHOTOSTATIC COPY. Article 811 of the Civil Code provides
that probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due
execution has been proved. If uncontested, at least 1 identifying witness is required and,
if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least 3 identifying
witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and
no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the best and only evidence
is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison
between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a
photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because
comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator.
FACTS:
Marcela Rodelas filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the
probate of the holographic will of Ricardo Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary
in her favor. The petition was opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla et. al. on
the following grounds:
(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to produce
the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule 75, section 2
of the Rules of Court;
(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of
property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it was
not a will
(3) The alleged hollographic will itself, and not an alleged copy thereof, must be produced,
otherwise it would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
(4) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested
as required by law.
Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court in
its order of February 23, 1979.
Aranza et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration, Rodelas filed an opposition.
The CFI set aside its order and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will
stating that “in the case of Gam vs. Yap, the Supreme Court held that ‘in the matter of
holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document itself as the
material proof of authenticity of said wills.” It held that the alleged holographic will was
executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of
the lapse of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of
the decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows that the
decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing Holographic Will. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by
means of a photostatic copy.
HELD:
Yes. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the
allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate
may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required
and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three
Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or
destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the best
and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there
be a comparison between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be
allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In
the case of Gan vs. Yap, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of a lost or
destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who
have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall
produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity."
But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a
photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other
similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may
be exhibited and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy
of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the authenticity of
the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

c. Grounds for Disallowance (Secs. 9, 10 & 13)

c. Grounds for Disallowance (Secs. 9, 10 & 13)

Rule 77 Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the Philippines and Administration of

Estate Thereunder

3 - Leon & Ghezzie v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 90 Phil 459

DOCTRINE/S:
The important thing to inquire into is the Manila court's authority with respect to the assets
herein involved. The general rule universally recognized is that administration extends
only to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted,
so that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in
another state or country.

FACTS:

The motion prayed for the citation of the Manager of the Manila Branch of the
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. of Toronto, Canada, to appear and under a complete
accounting of certain funds the said Branch allegedly has in its possession and claimed
to belong to the estate.

Basil Gordon Butler died and his will was duly probated in New York. Pursuant to a
provision in his will giving discretion to his executors to purchase an annuity in favour of
his universal heir Mercedes de Leon, the appointed trustee James Madison Ross bought
an annuity from respondent insurance company. After a few months of receiving monthly
allowance however, Mercedes presented the will for probate in the CFI of Manila.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the funds in question are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila.

RULING:

Yes. The important thing to inquire into is the Manila court's authority with respect to the
assets herein involved. The general rule universally recognized is that administration
extends only to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was
granted, so that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over
property in another state or country.

Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters
testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration,
shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and
the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the
Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country.

It is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question are outside the
jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in Canada
under a contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the money. The party
whose appearance the appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of the company which
holds the funds in its possession, the agency's intervention being limited to delivering to
the annuitant the checks made out and issued from the home office. There is no showing
or allegation that the funds have been transferred or removed to the Manila Branch.
Even if the money were in the hands of the Manila Branch, yet it no longer forms part of
butler's estate and is beyond the control of the court. It has passed completely into the
hands of the company in virtue of a contract duly authorized and validly executed.
Whether considered as a trust or as simple consideration for the company's assumed
obligation, which it has been religiously performing, of paying periodical allowances to the
annuitant, the proceeds of the sale can not be withdrawn without the consent of the
company, except, upon the death of the annuitant, the residuary legatee may claim the
remainder, if there be any. Neither the domiciliary or ancillary executor of Butler's will, nor
the trustee, nor the annuitant has disposition of any of these funds beyond the amounts
and except upon the conditions agreed upon in the contract for annuity.
4 - Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil 500 (1954)

DOCTRINE/S: WlLLS; PROBATE OF WlLLS; ASSIGNMENT OF INTEREST IN THE

ESTATE, NOT A BAR TO PROBATE OF A LOST OR FOREIGN WlLL.— In an intestate
proceeding that had already been instituted in the Philippines, the widow and child of the
testator are not estopped from asking for the probate of a lost will or of a foreign will just
because of the transfer or assignment of their share, right, title and interest in the estate
of the deceased. The validity and legality of such assignments can not be threshed out in
the probate proceeding which is concerned only with the probate of the will.

ID.; ID.; PROOF OF LOST WILL; PROVISIONS OF WILL MUST BE PROVED BY AT

LEAST Two CREDIBLE WITNESSES; WHO ARE CREDIBLE WITNESSES.—Granting
that a will was duly executed and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked
before, the death of the testator, still the provisions of the lost will must be clearly and
distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. "Credible witnesses" mean competent
witnesses and not those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay.

ID.; PROBATE OF WILL is A PROCEEDING IN REM; NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES

ESSENTIAL FOR ITS VALIDITY.—In the absence of proof that the municipal district court
of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it
may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the
Chinese courts are the same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a
proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by
publication or both to all interested parties must be made.

ID. ; ID. ; PROCEEDINGS LIKENED TO A DEPOSITION OR TO A PERPETUATION OF

TESTIMONY.—The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may
be likened to a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so, notice
to all interested parties was necessary for the validity of such proceedings.

ID.; WILLS PROVED IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY; PROBATE SHOULD BE IN

ACCORDANCE WlTH ACCEPTED BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND
PRINCIPLES.—Where it appears that the proceedings in the court of a foreign country
were held for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will
and the order of the probate court did not purport to allow the will, the proceedings cannot
be deemed to be for the probate of a will, as it was not done in accordance with the basic
and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills.
Consequently, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a
competent court of this country.

WILL, PROBATE OF; LACK OF OBJECTION TO PROBATE OF LOST WILL DOES

EXECUTION.—The lack of objection to the probate of a lost will does not relieve the
proponent thereof or the party interested in its probate from establishing its due execution
and proving clearly and distinctly the provisions thereof by at least two credible witnesses,
as provided for in section 6, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court.

ID. ; APPEALS ; JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT TO REVIEW FINDINGS OF

FACT AND LEGAL PRONOUNCEMENTS IN CASES INVOLVING MORE THAN
P50,000.—In an appeal from a judgment of the probate court, the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, has the power to review and correct erroneous
findings of fact and legal pronouncements of the probate court, where the amount
involved is more than P50,000.

FACTS: This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
disallowing the alleged will and testament executed in Manila on November 1929, and
the alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China, on 4 January
1931, by Jose B. Suntay. The value of the estate left by the deceased is more than
P50,000.

On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in
the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China. He left real and personal properties
in the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien province, China. In his first marriage with
the late Manuela T. Cruz he had 9 children : Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel,
Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr.

In his second marriage with Maria Natividad Lim Billian, he had a child named Silvino.
Intestate proceedings were instituted in the CFI of Bulacan and after hearing, letters of
administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay. When Apolonio died, Federico was
appointed the administrator of the estate.

On October 15, 1934, Maria Natividad Lim Billian filed a petition in the CFI of Bulacan for
the probate of a last will and testament executed and signed in the Philippines on
November 1929 by the decedent.

Said petition was denied due to the loss of the will after filing of the petition and before
hearing; on appeal the case was remanded to the CFI for further proceedings. The Pacific
War supervened. After liberation, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate
proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines in November
1929, or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien China on 4 January 1931(he found this
will in the records and documents of his father; said will was in chinese characters and
was probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien China)

The CFI of Bulacan disallowed the alleged will and testament executed in Manila on
November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament executed in Kulangsu, Amoy,
China, on 4 January 1931.

ISSUE/S: Whether the will probated in China may still be validly probated in the
Philippines?

RULING: NO, the will probated in China may NOT be validly probated in the Philippines.

As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law
on the point is Rule 78, Section 1. of the rule provides: “Wills proved and allowed in a
foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded
by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.”

Section 2. provides: “When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly
authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or
other person interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and
place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will
presented for allowance.”

Section 3 provides: “If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the
Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the
Judge, and attested by the seal of the court, to which shall be attached a copy of the will,
shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if
originally proved and allowed in such court.”

The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be
proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be
proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should
also be established by competent evidence.
In the case at bar, there is no proof on these points. The unverified answers to the
questions propounded by counsel ex or the appellant to the Consul General of the
Republic of China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the
appellee, are inadmissible, because apart from the fact that the office of Consul General
does not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on
procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse party would be
deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are appointed
to attend to trade matters. Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the
municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two
attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy
does not purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof that the municipal district
court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters,
it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in
the Chinese courts are the same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a
proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by
publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the
case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice
was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines. The proceedings had
in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened to a deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure or come up to the
standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties
and the proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties.

The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, which reads, as follows: “The
above minutes were satisfactorily confirmed by the interrogated parties, who declare that
there are no errors, after said minutes were loudly read and announced actually in the
court. Done and subscribed on the Nineteenth day of the English month of the 35th year
of the Republic of China in the Civil Section of the Municipal District Court of Amoy,
China.” In other words, it does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the
subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot
be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental
concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the
authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China,
cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of
a will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by
a competent court of this country.

The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Rule 78 Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When and to Whom Issued

a. Qualifications

5 - Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, 9 SCRA 113 (1963)

DOCTRINE/S:
For a person to be able to intervene in an administration proceeding concerning the estate
of a deceased, it is necessary for him to have interest in such estate.

FACTS:
Petitioner-appellant Ngo The Hua filed a petition to be appointed as the
administratrix of the estate of Chung Liu, claiming to be the latter’s surviving spouse. Her
petition was opposed by herein oppositors-appellees, all claiming to be the children of the
deceased by his first wife, Tan Hua.
The appellees claimed that petitioner Ngo is morally and physically unfit to execute the
duties of the administratrix, and that she was already divorced with the deceased in
Taiwan in 1955. They prayed that the eldest child of the deceased should be appointed
as the administrator instead.

Petitioner Ngo, on the other hand, alleged that the oppositors are not the children of the
deceased.

In 1957, oppositors-appellant Chung Kiat Kang, claiming to be the nephew of the

deceased, opposed the appointment of either petitioner Ngo or appellee Chung Kiat Hua
as administrator on the ground that they must first prove their respective relationship to
the deceased.

After hearing, the lower court found that petitioner Ngo and the deceased were validly
divorced in Taiwan and that the appellees are indeed the children of the deceased. Thus,
Chung Kiat Hua was appointed as the administrator. From said decision, Chung Kiat
Kang appealed.

ISSUE/S:
Whether Chung Kiat Kang may intervene in the proceedings

RULING:
No. It is well-settled that for a person to be able to intervene in an administration
proceeding concerning the estate of a deceased, it is necessary for him to have interest
in such estate.

An interested party has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate
such as an heir, or one who has a certain claim against the estate, such as a creditor.

Appellant Chung Kiat Kang does not claim to be a creditor of Chung Liu's estate.
Neither is he an heir in accordance with the Civil Code of the Republic of China, the law
that applies in this case, Chung Liu being a Chinese citizen (Art. 16, New Civil Code). The
appellant not having any interest in Chung Liu's estate, either as heir or creditor, he
cannot be appointed as co-administrator of the estate, as he now prays.

6 - Republic v. Marcos et. al., 595 SCRA 43 (2009)

DOCTRINE/S:

1. Hierarchy of Courts Direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not
be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lower tribunal

2. Letter of testamentary It is a legal document issued by a probate court that gives an

executor the power to act in a fiduciary manner on behalf of the estate.

FACTS:
RTC acting as a probate court a in Special Proceeding, issued an Order granting
letters testamentary in solidum to respondents Marcos upon filing of bond by the Marcos.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration in so far
as the RTC Order granted letters testamentary to respondents. This motion was denied
by the RTC. Petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Ruled
45 of the Rules of Court, questioning the aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters
testamentary to respondents. But this Court referred the petition to the CA since it was
the latter who has jurisdiction concurrent with this Court over the Case. Subseuqently, CA
issued a Decision, dismissing the referred petition for having taken the wrong mode of
appeal. CA’s basis was Supreme Court Circular 2-90. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA. Petitioner then files this instant Petition
for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:

1) WON it was proper for the petitioner to appeal the case directly to SC.

2) WON respondents Marcos can act and serve as executors

RULING:

1) NO. Supreme Court Circular 2-90, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948 provides the instances for a direct appeal to the Supreme court from the RTC
and all those instances provide that the subject matter involved must be a question of law
only and no questions of fact. In the present case, petitioner Republic seeks to determine
of whether or not respondents should be disqualified to act as executors. This subject
matter is a question of fact. Also, the above-mentioned provision clearly shows that the
other subject matter of therein petition, that is, the propriety of granting letters
testamentary to respondents, do not fall within any ground which can be the subject of a
direct appeal to this Court. Furthermore, the filing of the case directly with this Court runs
afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the
lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy
cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. Hence, the proper remedy of petitioner Republic
was to appeal to the CA, not to this Court.

2) YES. Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent
to serve as executors and Marcos does not fall in any of those grounds. Respondent
Marcos does not specifically fall in the ground of “want of integrity” and “conviction of an
offense involving moral turpitude” (these are the grounds raised by the petitioner) since
there are no evidence on record, oral or documentary, to substantiate and support the
said allegation that respondent Marcos have been convicted of a number of cases. Also,
the cases filed against Imelda Marcos has been reversed by this Court. Hence, the so-
called "convictions" against respondent Imelda Marcos cannot serve as a ground for her
disqualification to serve as an executor. As to the eight cases filed against respondent
Ferdinand Marcos, CA acquitted respondent Ferdinand Marcos II of all the four charges.
He appealed his conviction appealed his conviction relating to four violations of Section
45 of the NIRC hence those cases should not serve as a basis to disqualify him to be
appointed as an executor of the will of his father. More importantly, even assuming
arguendo that his conviction is later on affirmed, the same is still insufficient to disqualify
him as the "failure to file an income tax return" is not a crime involving moral turpitude.

b. Order of Preference

1 - De Guzman v. Limcolioc, 67 Phil 404 (1939)

DOCTRINE/S:

The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court is not absolute if there are
other reasons justifying the appointment of an administrator other than the surviving
spouse. If the interest in the estate is what principally determines the preference in the
appointment of an administrator, and if, under the circumstances of each case, it develops
that there is another who has more interest therein than the surviving spouse, the
preference established in the latter's favor becomes untenable.

FACTS:

Proceso de Guzman died on January 1, 1937, without leaving a will. The deceased
was first married to Agatona Santos, with whom he had four children, named Nicolasa,
Apolinario, Ana and Tomasa. After Agatona's death, the deceased contracted a second
marriage with Angela Limcolioc, with whom he did not have any child. The Court of First
Instance of Rizal appointed Nicolasa de Guzman judicial administratrix of the properties
of the deceased Proceso de Guzman.

Angela Limcolioc, widow of the deceased, asked that this appointment be set aside
and that she had named administratrix instead, on that ground of her preference as the
widow. The court denied this petition and sustained the appointment of Nicolasa.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in not appointing her administratrix of the
estate of the deceased Proceso de Guzman and in appointing Nicolasa de Guzman as
such administratrix without first setting the case for hearing

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the trial court correctly appointed Nicolasa as the administratrix
instead of the widow of the deceased.

RULING:

Yes, the appointment of Nicolasa as the administratrix is correct. The principal

consideration reckoned with in the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a
deceased person is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as such
administrator. This is the same consideration which the law takes into account in
establishing the preference of the widow to administer the estate of her husband, upon
the latter's death, because she is supposed to have an interest therein as a partner in the
conjugal partnership. But this preference established by law is not absolute, if there are
other reasons justifying the appointment of an administrator other than the surviving
spouse. If the interest in the estate is what principally determines the preference in the
appointment of an administrator of the estate of a deceased person, and if, under the
circumstances of each case, it develops that there is another who has more interest
therein than the surviving spouse, the preference established in the latter's favor becomes
untenable.

Nicolasa, in her application for appointment, alleged that her parents, through their
mutual labor, acquired all the properties left by the deceased, not having acquired any
property during his second marriage. This, Angela did not deny. For failure of Angela to
deny these allegations, thus taking them for granted, the court was justified in considering
them when it denied the reconsideration of its resolution and when it sustained the
appointment of Nicolasa.

Thus, if the properties left by Proceso were acquired during his marriage with
Agatona, his children, among them Nicolasa, have more interest therein than his now
widow, Angela Limcolioc, who would only be entitled, by way of usufruct, to a portion
equal to that corresponding to one of the children who has received no betterment.

2 - Torres v. Sicat, 93 Phil 155 (1953)

DOCTRINE/S:
The order of preference for the appointment of administrators provided in Section 6, Rule
79 of the Rules of Court, may be disregarded only if the person enjoying such preference
appears to be unsuitable for the trust, he having an adverse interest or is hostile to those
immediately interested in the estate, to such an extent as to render the appointment
inadvisable.

FACTS:
This is an APPEAL from an order of the CFI of Tarlac.

On 25 August 1950, Luis Morales (Morales), married to Hermenegilda Sicat

(Sicat), died in Tarlac, Tarlac. Seven days later, Jose Torres (Torres) alleging to be a
creditor of the conjugal partnership commenced this special proceeding in the Tarlac
court petitioning for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Atty. Pedro B. de
Jesus, for the purpose of settling the estate of the deceased.

Twelve days after, the widow opposed and claimed preference to be appointed as
administratrix. She said the only close relatives and forced heirs were her six legitimate
minor children, besides herself.

Torres presented evidence. Sicat submitted none. Then the trial judge,
disregarding preference established by law for the surviving widow, entered on 16 August
1951 an order appointing Atty. Pedro B. de Jesus as the administrator.

The widow appealed on time, and argued several assignments of error revolving
around the principal issue whether this appointment should be upheld, ignoring the
surviving widow's preferential right.

The trial judge was cognizant of this statutory preference. But invoking the ruling
in Sioca v. Garcia, he expressly stated his reason for disregarding it, saying in effect :
"Apparently the amount of credits exceeds the value of the conjugal assets ; therefore the
interest of the creditors deserves paramount consideration. Now, inasmuch as the widow
has shown hostility to the creditors by openly disputing their credits, she is there- fore
unsuitable, for having adverse interests."

The judge further alleged that Sicat has always consistently refused to recognize
the credits and manifested her determination to resist the claims of creditors.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Sicat’s preferential right may be disregarded by reason of
incompetence for resisting and opposing the claims of the creditors

RULING:
No. Under section 6, rule 79 of the Rules of Court, when a person dies intestate,
administration should be granted :
"(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, * * *;
"(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, * * * it may be granted to one or more of
the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
"(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select."

The order of preference provided in this section is founded on the assumption that
the persons preferred are suitable. If they are not, the court may entirely disregard the
preference thus provided. This is the reason for the rule that in the selection of an
administrator courts may exercise discretion, and, as stated elsewhere, the person
appearing in the order of preference may not be appointed where he appears to be
unsuitable for the trust, he having an adverse interest or is hostile to the interested parties
to such an extent as to make his selection inadvisable. But, of course, the order of
preference may be disregarded only when the reasons therefor are positive and clear.

As to the creditors, before their credits are fully established they are not "creditors"
within the purview of the law. It is proper for the administrator or whoever is proposed for
appointment as such, to oppose, or to require competent proof of, claims advanced
against the estate. "The propriety of contesting particular claims must frequently be left
largely to his discretion and no presumption of bad faith or misconduct will be made
against him."

In this case, Sicat did nothing more than to inform the alleged creditors, "Prove
your credit before I honor it." That is not necessarily dishonest nor contrary to real
creditors. And then, not having opposed all creditors, because she did not 'deny the
estate's liability to the People's Bank, she could not strictly be considered hostile to the
creditors. Had she acknowledged indebtedness to every one coming forward with a claim,
regardless of its merit, she would be useless, even harmful, both to the heirs and the
actual creditors.

The appealed order conceding that the evidence "showed clearly that the surviving
widow is fully competent in a high degree to administer the intestate of her deceased
husband", plainly indicates that except for her supposed hostility to creditors she was
suitable for the trust.

Consequently, having found that her attitude did not per se constitute antagonism
to the creditors,' the court must declare and enforce her superior right to appointment as
administratrix under Rule 79.

NOTES
Under Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, the creditors' claims may be filed and
considered only after the regular administrator has been appointed, hence in selecting
the administrator, the court could not yet normally accord priority treatment to the interests
of those whose credits were in dispute.

The creditors of the estate are those declared to be so in appropriate proceedings.

Before their credits are fully established they are not creditors. So it is not improper—it is
even proper—for the administrator or whoever is proposed for appointment as such, to
oppose, or to require competent proof of, claims advanced against the estate.

Rule 79 Opposing Issuance of Letters Testamentary. Petition and Contest for

Letters of Administration

a. Interested Party

3 - Gutierrez v. Villegas, L-11848, 31 May 1962

DOCTRINE/S: Intestate Proceedings; Effect of deed of assignment executed by an heir

but subsequently impugned as fraudulent.—Although ASG, one of the heirs in the present
intestate proceeding, executed a deed of assignment it is also a fact that she allowed the
same to be annulled in an action she instituted before the Rizal CFI and although said
heir had filed a manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings and presenting
therewith the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record nevertheless fails to show that
action therein had been taken by the probate court. Every act intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legates or devises is deemed to be a partition, although it
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction (Art.
1082, NCC). It appearing that the transaction is in the nature of extrajudicial partition,
court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction
over the estate and over their persons, by the mere act of assignment and desistance.

Same; Same; Judicial approval of deed of assignment effect on standing of parties.—The

judicial approval of the partition on the basis of the alleged deed of assignment did not
have the effect of making the party making the assignment lose his standing in the
proceedings.

FACTS:

ISSUE/S:

RULING:

4 - Duran v. Duran, 20 SCRA 379 (1967)

DOCTRINE/S: Executors and administrators; Settlement of decedents' estates;

"Interested party" who may petition for letters of administration.—A legal heir, who in a
public instrument assigned and renounced his hereditary rights in favor of the decedent's
widow, is not an "interested party" who can institute intestate proceedings and petition for
the issuance of letters of administration, He has no more interest in the dece-dent's
estate. His petition should be dismissed.

Same; Intervention in intestate proceedings which were dismissed.—The intervention of

a legal heir in the intestate proceedings initiated by another legal heir, who ceased to
have any interest in the decedent's estate by reason of the assignment of his hereditary
rights, should be dismissed because the proceedings were dismissed considering that
the petitioner was not an "interested party" qualified to institute the same.

Same; Estoppel; Ratification of intestate proceedings; Pleading and practice.—Where the

decedent's widow opposed the institution of intestate proceedings for the settlement of
her husband's estate on the ground that the legal heir, who initiated the same, had already
assigned his share to her, her alternative prayer that she be appointed administratrix did
not amount to a ratification of said proceedings. The prayer was contingent on the denial
of her motion to dismiss the proceedings.

Same; Judicial approval of assignment of hereditary share pendente lite.—The

assignment pendente lite by one heir of his hereditary share to another coheir requires
the approval of the probate court which has jurisdiction over the decedent's estate. Since
the court's approval is not deemed final until the estate is closed. the assigning heir
remains an interested person in the proceedings even af ter the said approval has been
given.

Same; Judicial approval is not required for assignment of hereditary share before
institution of intestate proceedings.— An assignment by a legal heir of his hereditary
share before the institution of an intestate proceeding does not need court approval to be
effective between the parties. Until the assignment is annulled, the assigning heir is bound
by it and he has no more interest in the decedent's estate.

FACTS: Pio Duran died without testament on February 28, 1961 in Guinobatan Albay.
Among his alleged heirs are Josefina Duran, as surviving spouse; several brothers and
sisters; nephews and nieces.Cipriano Duran, one of the surviving brothers, executed a
public instrument assigning and renouncing his hereditary rights to the decedent's estate
in favor of Josefina Duran, for the consideration of P2,500.00.
A year later, Cipriano Duran filed in the Court of First Instance of Albay a petition for
intestate proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate, further asking that he be named the
administrator. Josefina Duran filed an opposition, praying for its dismissal upon the
ground that the petitioner is not an "interested person" in the estate, in view of the deed
of transfer and renunciation.

Cipriano contended that the deed of assignment did not operate to render him a person
without interest in the estate. Relying on In re Irene Santos, L-11848, May 31, 1962, it is
argued that an assignment by one heir of his share in the estate to a co-heir amounts to
a partition needing approval by the settlement court to be effective; and that the assigning
heir does not lose his status as a person interested in the estate, even after said
assignment is approved by the court.

ISSUE/S: Whether Cipriano did not lose his interest in the estate, thus, he could file for a
petition for administration and settlement of an estate as an "interested person" under
Rule 79?

RULING: NO, Cipriano lost interest in the estate, thus, he could NOT file for a petition for
administration and settlement of an estate as an “interested person”.

The Rules of Court provides that a petition for administration and settlement of an estate
must be filed by an "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79). Appellants contend that the
deed of assignment executed by Cipriano did not operate to render him a person without
interest in the estate. Relying on In re Irene Santos, L-11848, May 31 1962, they argue
that an assignment by one heir of his share in the estate to a co-heir amounts to a partition
needing approval by the settlement court to be effective; and that the assigning heir does
not lose his status as a person interested in the estate, even after said assignment is
approved by the court.

The situation in the Santos case involves an assignment between co-heirs pendente lite,
during the course of settlement proceedings, properly and validly commenced. At the time
of said assignment, therefore, the settlement court had already acquired jurisdiction over
the properties of the estate. As a result, any assignment regarding the same had to be
approved by said court. And since the approval the court is not deemed final until the
estate is closed the assigning heir remains an interested person in proceedings even after
said approval, which can be vacated is given.

In the present case, however, the assignment took place when no settlement proceedings
was pending. The properties subject matter of the assignment were not under the
jurisdiction of a settlement court. Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition
as between the assignor and assignee, the same does not need court approval to be
effective as between the parties. An extrajudicial partition is valid as between the
participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are not
followed, since said requisites are for purposes of binding creditors and non-participating
heirs only (Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196). Should it be contended that said partition
was attended with fraud, lesion or inadequacy of price, the remedy is to rescind or to
annul the same in an action for that purpose. And in the meanwhile, the assigning heir
cannot initiate a settlement proceedings, for until the deed of assignment is annulled or
rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective against him, so that he is left without that
"interest" in the estate required to petition for settlement proceedings.

Anent appellant Miguel Duran, he sought in his petition below to "join petitioner Cipriano
Duran as co-petitioner in the latter's petition x x x and incorporates herein by adoption all
the allegations made in said petition." (Record on Appeal, pp. 45-46) The same, therefore,
amounted to a petition to intervene in the settlement proceedings. As aptly ruled by the
court a quo since there was really no settlement proceedings in the first place, the petition
to intervene must be denied.

Finally, altho Josefina Duran prayed to be appointed administratrix, her doing so did not
amount to ratification of the petition for settlement under the ruling in Eusebio v. Valmores,
97 Phil. 163, since she did so merely by way of an alternative prayer, should her motion
to dismiss fail. And said motion to dismiss was properly sustained.

Rule 80 Special Administrator

a. Circumstances Warranting Appointment of Special Administrator

5 - Relucio v. San Jose, 91 Phil 365 (1952)

DOCTRINE/S: EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; APPOINTMENT OF NEW

ADMINISTRATOR; CONTINUATION OF OLD ADMINISTRATOR PENDING APPEAL
AND IN ABSENCE OF EXECUTION OF ORDER OF SUBSTITUTION.—Where the order
of the court appointing a new administrator in substitution of the original administrator is
pending appeal, and in the absence of any order for the immediate execution of the order
of substitution, the old administrator has the right to continue as such until the appeal is
finally disposed of.

ID.; ID.; ID.; APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR.—A special administrator

may be appointed only in the cases specified in section 1 of Rule 81 or section 3, of Rule
87. The case at bar is not one of them. There is herein a regular administrator. Pending
an appeal from the order of substitution, the old administrator has the right to continue as
such. If the order of substitution was immediately executed, the new administrator would
act.

FACTS:
Petitioner Julita Relucio was appointed as administratrix of the testate estate of
Felipe Relucio, Sr. Upon petition by Lorenzo, Rolando and Leticia Relucio, the CFI of
Manila appointed Rolando Relucio as administrator in substitution of petitioner. Petitioner
appealed, but before the same could be perfected, Rolando moved for the immediate
execution of his appointment as administrator. However, the court did not pass on the
motion. So, Rolando filed a motion to declare petition in contempt of court for failing to
deliver to him all the papers, documents and properties of the estate.

The court denied this motion and appointed Equitable Banking Corp. as special
administrator while petitioner’s appeal is pending. It held that the appeal of petitioner
suspended the appointment of Rolando as administrator and justified the appointment of
a special administrator, saying that if petitioner will remain as administratrix during the
pendency of her appeal, “ a removed administrator may easily nullify such removal by
interposing an appeal.”

ISSUE/S:
Whether the court erred in appointing a special administrator.

RULING:
Yes. Yes. The cases in which a special administrator may be appointed are
specified in Section 1 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court which provides that: "When there
is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from
the allowance or disallowance of a will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a
special administrator to collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased and
executors or administrators thereupon appointed."
 A special administrator may also be appointed in a case covered by Section 8 of
Rule 87 which provides as follows: "If the executor or administrator has a claim against
the estate he represents, he shall give notice thereof, in writing, to the court, and the court
shall appoint a special administrator who shall, in the adjustment of such claim, have the
same power and be subject to the same liability as the general administrator or executor
in the settlement of other claims. The court may order the executor or administrator to
pay to the special administrator necessary funds to defend such claim."

The case at bar is one falling under either Section 1 of Rule 80 or Section 8 of Rule
87. In any view of the case, there is a regular administrator. Pending her appeal from the
order of January 15, 1951, the petitioner had the right to act as administratrix. If the
respondent Judge had decreed the immediate execution of the order of January 15, 1951,
Rolando Relucio would then be the administrator pending petitioner's appeal.
Consequently, the respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in appointing the
respondent Equitable Banking Corporation as special administrator.

Thus, the Court set aside the appointment of Equitable Banking Corp. as special
administrator.

The court said that it is not equitable to appoint a special administrator because
the following are not present:

a) Delay

b) Claim against the estate

6 - Heirs of Castillo v. Gabriel, GR 162934, November 11, 2005

DOCTRINE/S: Probate Proceedings; Special Administrators; Settlement of Estates; The

appointment of special administrator lies in the sound discretion of the probate court;
When appointed, a special administrator is regarded not as a representative of the agent
parties suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and
in fact, as an officer of the court.—The Court has repeatedly held that the appointment of
a special administrator lies in the sound discretion of the probate court. A special
administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed by the probate court to care for
and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is appointed. When
appointed, a special administrator is regarded not as a representative of the agent of the
parties suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and,
in fact, as an officer of the court. As such officer, he is subject to the supervision and
control of the probate court and is expected to work for the best interests of the entire
estate, especially its smooth administration and earliest settlement. The principal object
of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into
hands of person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs. In
many instances, the appointment of administrators for the estates of decedents frequently
become involved in protracted litigations, thereby exposing such estates to great waste
and losses unless an authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the
interim is appointed. The occasion for such an appointment, likewise, arises where, for
some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular
administration is delayed.

Same; Same; Same; The new Rules have broadened the basis for appointment of an
administrator, and such appointment is allowed when there is delay in granting the letters
testamentary or administration by any cause.—The new Rules have broadened the basis
for the appointment of an administrator, and such appointment is allowed when there is
delay in granting letters testamentary or administration by any cause, e.g., parties cannot
agree among themselves. Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator
or not lies in the probate court. In De Guzman v. Guadiz, Jr., the Court further elucidated—
Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special administrator should there
be a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause
including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this
qualification, the appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion of the Court.
This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or contrary to reason,
justice, equity or legal principle. The basis for appointing a special administrator under
the Rules is broad enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the will is being carried on in
the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding
on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree
among themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot be
immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve
the property of the deceased. It is obvious that the phrase “by any cause” includes those
incidents which transpired in the instant case clearly showing that there is a delay in the
probate of the will and that the granting of letters testamentary will consequently be
prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of a special administrator.

Same; Same; Same; In the appointment of a special administrator (which is but temporary
and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed), the probate court does not
determine the shares in the decedent’s estate but merely appoints who is entitled to
administer the estate.— The probate court has ample jurisdiction to appoint respondent
as special administratrix. The deceased Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel left a document
purporting to be her will where her adopted son, Roberto, was named as the sole heir of
all her properties. However, pending probate of the will, Roberto died leaving his widow,
the respondent herein, as his sole heir. Thus, the respondent has much stake in
Crisanta’s estate in case the latter’s will is allowed probate. It needs to be emphasized
that in the appointment of a special administrator (which is but temporary and subsists
only until a regular administrator is appointed), the probate court does not determine the
shares in the decedent’s estate, but merely appoints who is entitled to administer the
estate. The issue of heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the
findings of the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the
basis of distribution. Thus, the preference of respondent is sound, that is, not whimsical,
or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.

Same; Same; Same; Section 6, Rule 78 refers to appointment of regular administrators

of estates, while Section 1, Rule 80, on the other hand, applies to appointment of special
administrator—the appointment of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the appointment of regular administrator.—The petitioners’ strenuous
invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. The rule refers to the
appointment of regular administrators of estates; Section 1, Rule 80, on the other hand,
applies to the appointment of a special administrator. It has long been settled that the
appointment of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the
appointment of regular administrators. Thus, in Roxas v. Pecson, this Court ruled: It is
well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons
to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory
provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of
Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special
administrator. ... As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator
and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the
selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not
whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity.

FACTS:

ISSUE/S:

RULING:
b. Qualifications

1 - Corona v. CA, 116 SCRA 316 (1982)

DOCTRINE/S: Special Proceedings; Estates; Special administrator; Validity of

appointment of special administrator; Objections to appointment of special administrator
on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship of the special administrator overshadowed
by mutual representation of deceased wife and surviving husband in the management of
the estate due to inability of executrix to serve.—This Court, in resolving to give due
course to the Petition taking into account the allegations, arguments and issues raised by
the parties, is of the considered opinion that petitioner’s nominee, Nenita F. Alonte, should
be appointed as co-Special Administrator. The executrix’s choice of Special
Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion
given her by the testatrix in her will (Annex “A-1), is entitled to the highest consideration.
Objections to Nenita’s appointment on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are
overshadowed by the fact that justice and equity demand that the side of the deceased
wife and the faction of the surviving husband be represented in the management of the
decedent’s estate.

Same; Same, Same; Nature of duties of special administrators; Considered officers of the
court.—En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while they may
have respective interests to protect, they are officers of the Court subject to the
supervision and control of the Probate Court and are expected to work for the best
interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and its earliest settlement.

FACTS:

On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A.,
leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will dated October 3, 1980, which excluded her
husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her heirs, and the other, a formal Will
sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three weeks thereafter, which expressly
disinherited her husband Romarico "for reason of his improper and immoral conduct
amounting to concubinage, which is a ground for legal separation under Philippine Law";
bequeathed her properties in equal shares to her sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde, Vicenta L.
Faustino and Gloria L. Teoxon, and her nieces Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way;
and appointed Rowena F. Corona, herein petitioner, as her Executrix.

On November 21, 1980, Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal and for the appointment of Nenita Alonte as
Administrator because she (Rowena) is presently employed in the United Nations in New
York City. The probate Court appointed Alonte as Special Administratix. On On December
12, 1980, the surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an "Opposition and Motion" and
prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied and prayed for his appointment as Special
Administrator because the Special Administratix appointed is not related to the heirs and
has no interest to be protected. On December 18, 1980, Nenita P. Alonte posted her
Php100,000 bond and took her oath of office before a Notary Public.

On February 6, 1981, the Probate Court set aside its Order of December 2, 1980
appointing Nenita as Special Administratrix, and appointed instead the surviving husband,
Romarico as Special Administrator for the reasons that under Section 6, Rule 78, of the
Rules of Court, the surviving spouse is first in the order of preference for appointment as
Administrator as he has an interest in the estate; that the disinheritance of the surviving
spouse is not among the grounds of disqualification for appointment as Administrator;
that the next of kin is appointed only where the surviving spouse is not competent or is
unwilling to serve besides the fact that the Executrix appointed, is not the next of kin but
merely a niece, and that the decedent's estate is nothing more than half of the
unliquidated conjugal partnership property.
ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Romanico Vitug can be appointed as special administrator despite

being disinherited by the decedent (wife).

RULING:

Yes. The appointment of a Special Administrator is discretionary with the

Court and is unappealable; that co-administratorship is impractical and unsound and as
between the surviving husband, who was responsible for the accumulation of the estate
by his acumen and who must be deemed to have a beneficial interest in the entire estate,
and a stranger, respondent Court had made the correct choice; and that the legality of
the disinheritance made by the decedent cannot affect the appointment of a Special
Administrator. However, Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as co-Special
Administrator. The executrix’s choice of Special Administrator, considering her own
inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testratix in her will, is
entitled to the highest consideration. Objection to Nenita Alonte’s appointment on grounds
of impracticality and lack of kinship are overshadowed by the fact that justice and equality
demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be
represented in the management of the decedent’s estate. Special Administrators, while
they may have respective interests to protect, are officers of the Court subject to the
supervision and control of the Probate Court and are expected to work for the best
interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and its earliest settlement.

c. Powers and Duties of Special Administrator

2 - Liwanag v. Reyes, 12 SCRA 43 (1964)

DOCTRINE/S: Executors and administrators; Special administrators; The Rules of Court

do not expressly prohibit making a special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the
state.—Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor holding a
claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may
pursue any of these remedies: (1) abandon his security and prosecute his claim in the
testate or intestate proceeding and share in the general distribution of the assets of the
estate; (2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security by an action in court,
making the executor or administrator a party-defendant, and if there is a deficiency after
the sale of the mortgaged property, he may prove the same in the testate or intestate
proceedings; (3) rely exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within the
ordinary period of limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon the mortgage, he shall not
be admitted as creditor of the estate, and shall not share in the distribution of the assets.

Same; Same; Where special administrator can be sued.—The Rules of Court do not
expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the
estate. Otherwise, creditors would find adverse effects of the statute of limitations running
against them in cases where the appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. So
that if we are now to deny the present action on this technical ground alone, and the
appointment of a regular administrator will be delayed, the very purpose for which the
mortgage was constituted will be defeated.
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari to annul the orders of the Court of First Instance of
Manila appointing a receiver and deferring action on the motion to dismiss in Civil Case
No. 48154. A preliminary injunction was issued upon the filing of this petition.

On July 14, 1960, the late Pio D. Liwanag executed in favor of the Rotegaan Financing,
Inc., a real estate mortgage on a parcel of residential land with the building and
improvements thereon, at M.H. del Pilar Street, Manila, to secure the payment of a loan
in the amount of one hundred and eighty thousand pesos (P180,000.00), Philippine
Currency, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum on said loan. It was stipulated in the
mortgage contract that the total amount of mortgage debt be fully paid a year thereafter,
or on or before July 14, 1961. Before the one year period expired, the mortgagor Pio D.
Liwanag died intestate.
As the total mortgage obligation of the deceased was not fully paid within the stipulated
period, the mortgagee Rotegaan Financing, Inc., on September 21, 1961, instituted, in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint for foreclosure against the Estate of Pio
D. Liwanag and Gliceria Liwanag as administratrix of the estate. The action also prayed
for the appointment of a receiver.

The defendant Gliceria Liwanag filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for foreclosure,
on the theory that she may not be sued as special administratrix.

The said defendant also filed opposition to the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
receivership, on the theory that the property subject of the foreclosure proceedings is in
custodia legis, since administration proceedings had already been instituted for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased.

In two separate orders, the writ of receivership was issued, despite opposition, and action
on the motion to dismiss was deferred “until after the trial of this case on the merits
because there is a possibility that the estate of the deceased may be in a position to pay
the amounts claimed by the plaintiff, in which case the latter may choose to file its claim
against the decedent in the office of the Clerk of Court, and waive the mortgage.”

Motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant having been denied, the latter filed this
petition for certiorari, alleging abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in issuing
the questioned orders. As prayed for, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued upon the
filing of the petition.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the action for foreclosure against the special administratrix is
correct?

2. Whether or not there was abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in the
issuance of its order for the appointment of a receiver?

RULING:

1. YES, the action for foreclosure against the special administratrix is correct.

The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a
defendant in a suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse
effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases where the
appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. So that if We are now to deny
the present action on this technical ground alone, and the appointment of a regular
 administrator will be delayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage was
constituted will be defeated.

2. NO, there was NO abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court in the issuance
of its order for the appointment of a receiver.

It is to be noted that the contract of mortgage between the deceased and the
Rotegaan Financing, Inc., provides: “In case of judicial foreclosure, the Mortgagor
hereby consents to the appointment of the president of the mortgagee corporation
or any of its officers us receiver, without any bond, to take charge of the mortgaged
property at once, and to hold possession of the same, and the rents and profits
derived from the mortgaged property, before the sale, less the costs and expenses
of the receivership, the expenses of collection and attorney’s fees, which shall be
fifteen per cent (15%) of the total indebtedness then unpaid, exclusive of all costs
and fees allowed by law, shall be applied first to the payment of the interest and
then to the capital of the indebtedness secured hereby.”

It was therefore, the will of the deceased himself that, in case of foreclosure, the
property be put into the hands of a receiver, and this provision should be respected
by the administratrix of the estate. The cases cited by petitioner in favor of the
theory that property in custodia legis can not be given to a receiver is not
applicable, considering that this is an action to enforce a superior lien on certain
property of the estate and the appointment of a receiver, which is a very convenient
and feasible means of preserving and administering the property, has been agreed
upon by the contracting parties.

Wide latitude of discretion is usually given to the trial courts in the matter of
receivership and unless that discretion is exercised arbitrarily, We are not to
interfere.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the two orders complained of are affirmed. The
petition is hereby dismissed and the preliminary injunctive writ heretofore issued
dissolved. With costs against petitioner.

3 - Anderson v. Perkins, 1 SCRA 387 (1961)

DOCTRINE/S: Executors and administrators; Special administrator; Authority to sett.—

The special administrator may be authorized to sell the personal estate of the decedent
even if it is not perishable property. His authority is not limited to the sale of perishable
property. His function is to preserve not only the property of the decedent's estate but
also its value. Hence, he may be empowered to sell personal property which is not
perishable.

Same; Conjugal partnership; Necessity of liquidating conjugal partnership before sale of

personal estate,—The sale of the alleged personal estate of the deceased husband
cannot be authorized where his widow claims that some of the items thereof are conjugal
or are her own personal property. The conjugal partnership must first be liquidated and
the issue of ownership adjudicated.

FACTS:

ISSUE/S:
RULING:

Rule 81 Bonds of Executors and Administrators

Conditions of the Bond

4. Cosme de Mendoza v. Pacheco, 64 Phil 134 (1937)

DOCTRINE/S: EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; ACCOUNTABILITY ON BOND

OF ADMINISTRATOR AND SURETIES.—It lies within the discretion of the court to select
an administrator of the estate of a deceased person (Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 46 Phil.,
726, 727). Before an administrator, or an executor, enters upon the execution of the trust,
and letters testamentary or of administration are issued, the person to whom they are
issued is required to give a bond in such reasonable sum as the court directs, with one
or more sufficient sureties, conditioned upon the faithful performance of his trust (Code
of Civil Procedure, secs. 643, 662). The administrator is accountable on his bond along
with the sureties for the performance of certain legal obligations.

ID.; ID.; EXECUTION OF ADMINISTRATOR'S BOND.—It is clear that a Court of First

Instance, exercising probate jurisdiction, is empowered to require the filing of the
administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach
of the administrator's duty. Possessed, as it is, with an allembracing power over the
administrator's bond and over administration proceedings, a Court of First Instance in a
probate proceeding can not be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond
answerable for the very purpose for which it was filed.

ID.; ID.; ID.—It is true that the law does not say expressly or in so many words that such
court has power to execute the bond of an administrator, but by necessary and logical
implication, the power is there as eloquently as if it were phrased in unequivocal terms.
When the accountability of an administrator's bond is spoken of in the very provisions
dealing with and bearing directly on administration proceedings, it would involve a
strained construction to hold, as appellants would have us do. that where an administrator
is held liable for a devastavit for having squandered and misapplied property which he
was in duty bound to marshal and conserve, the estate is without a remedy to go against
the administrator's bond in the same probate proceedings, but in an action outside of and
separate from it.

ID.; ID.; ID.—Section 683 of the Code of Civil Procedure affords a person who may be
held liable as surety in respect to an administrator's account the right, upon application,
to be admitted as a party to the accounting, from which we may not unreasonably infer
that a surety, like the appellants in the case before us, may be charged with liability upon
the bond during the process of accounting, that is, within the recognized confines of
probate proceedings, and not in an action apart and distinct from such proceedings.

ID.; ID.; ID.—The execution of an administrator's bond, unlike the questions involved in
other cases, clearly stands upon a different footing, and is as necessary a part and
incident of the administration proceedings as the filing of such bond or the fixing of its
amount, Particularly is this true in. the present case where S's indebtedness to the estate
in the amount of P23,603.21, subsequently reduced to P5,000, is conceded on all sides,
and all that the trial court had to do was to see that said amount was turned over to the
estate.

ID.; ID.; ID.; DUTY OF COURTS OF PROBATE JURISDICTION.—It is the duty of courts
of probate jurisdiction to guard jealously the estates of the deceased persons by
intervening in the administration thereof in order to remedy or repair any injury that may
be done thereto (Dariano vs. Fernandez Fidalgo, 14 Phil., 62, 67; Sison vs. Azarraga, 30
Phil., 129, 134).
ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION.—The appellants could have raised the question of
jurisdiction now pressed upon us in civil case No. 5494 of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna and on appeal of that case to this court once before (G. R. No. 40998, Cosme de
Mendoza vs. Pacheco and Cordero [60 Phil., 1057]). They not only failed to avail of that
right but failed to appeal from the order complained of (Vide, Decision of this court in G.
R. No. 409,98). The questions raised in the appeal at bar, appellants' second attempt to
go about and frustrate the order in question, could have been passed upon once for all in
the case referred to.

ID.; ID.; ID.; POLICY AND PURPOSE OF ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.—We

cannot encourage a practice that trenches violently upon the settled jurisprudence of this
court that the policy and purpose of administration proceedings is "* * * to close up, and
not to continue an estate * * *" (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Abada, 40 Phil., 124, 133), and
that "* * * the State fails wretchedly in its duty to its citizens if the machinery furnished by
it for the division and distribution of the property of a decedent is so cumbersome,
unwieldy and expensive that a considerable portion of the estate is absorbed in the
process of such division. Where administration is necessary, it ought to be accomplished
quickly and at very small expense; and a system which consumes any considerable
portion of the property which it was designed to distribute is a failure. * * *" (McMicking
vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211, 220.)

FACTS: Manuel Soriano was former administrator of the estate of Baldomero Cosme. He
filed a bond for P5,000, for which appellants Januario Pacheco and Raymundo Cordero
were sureties. Soriano’s account upon approval showed him indebted to the estate for
P23,603.21. As he was unable to turn over said amount to the new administratrix Rosario
Cosme, CFI ordered the execution of his bond after serving notice to the sureties.

After a settlement between Cosme and Soriano, Soriano’s indebtedness was reduced
to P5000. Cosme then had the sheriff levy on the property of the sureties and advertise
the public sale thereof to collect said sum. Pacheco and Cordero both filed motions to be
discharged from the bond, which were denied by CFI. An appeal filed to the SC was
dismissed for being filed too late.

The case was remanded to CFI, where sureties filed a motion challenging for the first time
the jurisdiction of the trial court to issue the order executing the bond. Said motion was
denied hence this appeal.

ISSUE/S: W/N the trial court has jurisdiction to order the execution of the administrator’s
bond?

RULING: YES, the trial court has jurisdiction to order the execution of the administrator’s
bond.

Appellants claim that nothing in the law or Code of Civil Procedure that states that the
CFI, acting as probate courts, have the power to order the execution of the administrator’s
bond.

It lies within the discretion of the court to select an administrator of the estate of a
deceased person. Before an administrator, or an executor, enters upon the execution of
his trust, and letters testamentary or of administration are issued, the person to whom
they are issued is required to give a bond in such reasonable sum as the court directs,
with one or more sufficient sureties, conditioned upon the faithful performance of his trust
(Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 643, 662, cf. Rule 81 Sec 1) The administrator is
accountable on his bond along with the sureties for the performance of certain legal
obligations.
In the case at bar, it is clear that CFI, exercising probate jurisdiction, is empowered to
require the filing of the administrator's bond, to fix the amount thereof, and to hold it
accountable for any breach of the administrator's duty.

Possessed, as it is, with an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond and over
administration proceedings, a Court of First Instance in a probate proceeding cannot be
devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the very purpose
for which it was filed.

The law does not say expressly that such a court has power to execute the bond of an
administrator, but the power exists by necessary and logical implication.

When the accountability of an administrator's bond is spoken of in the very provisions

dealing with administration proceedings, it would involve a strained construction to hold
that where an administrator is held liable for a devastavit (devastavit = mismanagement)
for having squandered and misapplied property which he was in duty bound to marshal
and conserve, the estate is without a remedy to go against the administrator's bond in the
same probate proceedings, but in an action outside of and separate from it.

Section 683, Code of Civil Procedure (cf. Rule 85, Sec 11): "Upon the settlement of the
account of an executor or administrator, trustee, or guardians, a person liable as surety
in respect to such amount may, upon application, be admitted as a party to such
accounting, and may have the right to appeal as hereinafter provided." From which we
may infer that a surety may be charged with liability upon the bond during the process of
accounting, that is, within the recognized confines of probate proceedings, and not in an
action apart from such proceedings.

Appellants cited several cases where the Court held that probate courts have no power
to adjudicate on claims of other persons on property forming part of the estate, by title
adverse to the deceased. However, the execution of an administrator's bond, unlike the
questions involved in the cited cases, is as necessary a part and incident of the
administration proceeding as the filing of such bond or the fixing of its amount.

NOTES:
Possessed, as it is, with an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond and over
administration proceedings, a Court of First Instance in a probate proceeding cannot be
devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable for the very purpose
for which it was filed.

5. Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd. v. Luzon Surety Co., Inc., 95 Phil 924 (1954)

DOCTRINE/S:

FACTS:

Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., filed a complaint in CFI Negros Occidental against the
defendant Luzon Surety for the recovery of the sum of P6,000, plus the costs and P1,500
for attorney’s fees.

The basis of the complaint was a bond in the sum of P6,000 filed by Agueda
Gonzaga as administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Agueda Gonzaga on the condition
being that said bond would be void if the administratrix "faithfully prepares and presents
to the Court, within 3 months from the date of her appointment, a correct inventory of all
the property of the deceased, if he administers all the property of the deceased, faithfully
pays all debts, legacies, and bequests which encumber said estate, pays whatever
dividends which the Court may decide should be paid, and renders a just and true account
of her administrations to the Court within a year or at any other date that she may be
required so to do.

It was alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff Warner had a duly approved
claim against the Estate and that the administratrix violated the conditions of her
bond" (a) by failing to file an inventory of the assets and funds of the estate; (b) by failing
to pay or discharge the approved claim of the plaintiff; (c) by failing to render a true and
just account of her administration in general, and of the said war damage payments in
particular" ; that the defendant, as surety in the bond, failed to pay to the plaintiff,
notwithstanding the latter’s demand, the sum of P6,000, in partial satisfaction of plaintiff’s
unpaid claim.

CFI: ordered defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P6,000, P900 for attorney’s
fees, plus the costs.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the lower court had jurisdiction to pass upon the parties’ liability
under the bond in question?

2. Whether the bond in question was executed in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines?

3. Whether the plaintiff Warner should have first filed a claim against
the Estate of the deceased administratrix Agueda Gonzaga, in conformity
with Section 6 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court?

RULING:
1. Yes. In this appeal, appellant contends that the lower court had no
jurisdiction to pass upon its liability under the bond in question, because it
is only the probate court that can hold a surety accountable for any breach
by the administratrix of her duty, citing the case of Mendoza v. Pacheco. It
is, however, noteworthy that while the citation is to the effect that the
probate court has jurisdiction over the forfeiture or enforcement of an
administrator’s bond, it was not held therein that the same matter may not
be litigated in an ordinary civil action brought before the CFI. Hence,
forfeiture may be done in a separate proceeding or in the same case.
Hearing now is necessary.

In this case, you can either: (1) execute the bond before the probate court;
or (2) it may be laid in an ordinary action or separate proceeding.

2. No. Though nominally payable to the Republic of the Philippines, the bond is
expressly for the benefit of the heirs, legatees and creditors of the Estate of the deceased
Arguedo Gonzaga. There is no valid reason why a creditor may not directly in his name
enforce said bond in so far as he is concerned.

3. No. Section 6 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court provides that "where the obligation
of the decedent is joint and several with another debtor, the claim shall be filed against
the decedent as if he were the only debtor, without prejudice to the right of the estate to
recover contribution from the other debtor."
 Apart from the fact that his defense was not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer and was therefore waived, it appears that even as
late as September 17, 1952, when the present complaint was filed, (more
than two years after the death of Agueda Gonzaga), there were no
proceedings for the administration of her estate, with the result that Section
6 of Rule 87 loses its applicability. Moreover, appellant had also chosen to
file a third-party complaint in the present case against Romualdo Araneta,
joint and several counter-guarantor of the deceased administratrix, instead
of presenting a claim against the latter’s estate.

Rule 82 Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation, and Removal of

Executors or Administrators

6. Borromeo v. Borromeo, 97 Phil 549 (1955)

DOCTRINE/S:

FACTS:
Fortunato claimed a portion of the legitime being an illegitimate son of the deceased, by
incorporating a Waiver of Hereditary Rights supposedly signed by the rest of the
Borromeo’s. In the waiver, of the 9 heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the
disputed estate. The petitioners opposed this Waiver for reason that this is without force
and effect because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has
been a valid acceptance of the inheritance from the heirs who intend to transfer the same.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not a Waiver of Hereditary Rights can be executed without a valid
acceptance from the heirs in question.

RULING:
YES. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that “the properties
included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third persons
with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former. The
heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse
from the moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the
hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death,
in accordance with article 989 of the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned
upon the adjudication of the corresponding hereditary portion.

1. Ocampo v Ocampo, GR 187879, July 2, 2010

DOCTRINE/S:

a) Special administrator
A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision
and control, expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its
smooth administration and speedy settlement. When appointed, he or she is not regarded
as an agent or representative of the parties suggesting the appointment. The principal
object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it
can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of
creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.

b) Appointment of Special administrators

- Selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the
selection or removal of regular administrator
- The probate court may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other
than those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion
- Selection or removalof special administrators is at the discretion of the court as long as
the discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice,
and legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted

c) Appointment of Special administrators is interlocutory

Reason: The appointment or removal of special administrators is discretionary.
Effect: May be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court

d) Removal of Special Administrator

Even if special administrators had already been appointed, once the probate court
finds the appointees no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the
appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.

e) Giving of Bond is necessary to be appointed as special or regular administrator

Purpose of Filing a Bond an Administrator
1. The bond secures the performance of the duties and obligations of an administrator
provided under Section 1 of Rule 81.

2. Section 4 of Rule 81 - The bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the

administration of the decedent’s estate requiring the special administrator to:
(1) make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of
the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge;
(2) truly account for such as received by him when required by the court; and
(3) deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to
such other person as may be authorized to receive them.
3. Compels the administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in,
and discharge the obligations incumbent upon, him. This woud benefit of the creditors
and the heirs.

f) Section 1 of Rule 81 - Duties and obligations of an administrator namely:

(1) to administer the estate and pay the debts;
(2) to perform all judicial orders;
(3) to account within one (1) year and at any other time when required by the probate
court; and
(4) to make an inventory within three (3) months.

g) Sec. 1. Rule 78 of the Rules of Court – Who are incompetent to serve as executors
or administrators.
No person is competent to serve as executor or administrator who:
(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and
(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of
drunkenness, improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of
conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.

h) Sec. 6. Rule 78 of the Rules of Court - When and to whom letters of administration
granted.
If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse
the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin,
neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to
request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or
more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.

i) Sec. 2. Rule 78 of the Rules of Court - Contents of petition for letters of administration.
A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

FACTS:

Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo (Vince), Melinda Carla

E. Ocampo (Melinda), and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.) are the surviving wife
and the children of Leonardo Ocampo (Leonardo), who died on January 23, 2004.
Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato M. Ocampo (Renato) and Erlinda M.
Ocampo (Erlinda) are the legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses Vicente and
Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate on December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996,
respectively. Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in Biñan,
Laguna. Vicente and Maxima left no will and no debts.

On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated
a petition for intestate proceedings, entitled In Re: Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of
Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo M. Ocampo, in the
RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. B-3089. The petition
alleged that, upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and their brother
Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and administered the estate of their parents. Under
such circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3)
of the total income generated from the properties of the estate. However, when Leonardo
died, respondents took possession, control and management of the properties to the
exclusion of petitioners. The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of Vicente
and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo. It, likewise, prayed for the appointment of an
administrator to apportion, divide, and award the two estates among the lawful heirs of
the decedents.

After long side by side filing of motions, petitions and oppositions, Renato and
Erlinda were appointed as special administrators but refused to give an inventory of
properties as petitioned by herein petitioners until after the court ruled in their petition for
exemption in posting a bond. Meanwhile, petitioners subsequently learned that
respondents has disposed of real properties for P2,700,000.00 saying it was only for
P1,500,000.00 then move the court through a petition in removing the respondents as
administrators and proceed to partitioning the estate. The RTC ruled in the affirmative
and appointed Melinda as regular administrator conditioned with the posting of
P200,000.00 as bond which the later complied. The respondents appealed in the CA and
they received a favorable decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the court should have acted with grave abuse of discretion in revoking
and terminating the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators, on
account of their failure to comply with its Order, particularly the posting of the required
bond, and to enter their duties and responsibilities as special administrators and in
appointing Melinda as regular administratrix, subject to the posting of a bond in the
amount of P200,000.00.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court said that the trial court did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in revoking the appointment of the respondents as special administrators and
otherwise in appointing Melinda as regular administrator opining and ordering that she
should instead be appointed as special administration as according to the rules.

A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its

supervision and control, expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate,
with a view to its smooth administration and speedy settlement. When appointed,
he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative of the parties suggesting
the appointment. The principal object of the appointment of a temporary
administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person
fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to
Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.

While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their
deceased parents in their appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a
mandatory requirement for the appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or
removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the selection or
removal of regular administrators. The probate court may appoint or remove special
administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules at its
discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or
unfitness and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78, as
would be proper in the case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the
discretion is exercised without grave abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and
legal principles, interference by higher courts is unwarranted. The appointment or removal
of special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may be assailed
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the
duties and obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and
pay the debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders; (3) to account within one (1) year
and at any other time when required by the probate court; and (4) to make an
inventory within three (3) months. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule,
the bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of the
decedents estate requiring the special administrator to (1) make and return a true
inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which
come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as received by
him when required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to the person appointed
as executor or regular administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized
to receive them.

Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it
compels the administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in,
and discharge the obligations incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard
the properties of the decedent, and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as part
of the necessary expenses chargeable against the estate, not being included among the
acts constituting the care, management, and settlement of the estate. Moreover, the
ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of administration.

Rule 83 Inventory and Appraisal. Provision for Support of Family

Period
2. Sebial v. Sebial, 64 SCRA 385 (1975)

DOCTRINE/S: Special proceedings; Intestate succession; Probate court retains

jurisdiction to approve inventory of assets of decedent even if presented after 3-month
period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.—The three-month period
prescribed in section 1, Rule 83 (formerly Rule 84) of the Rules of Court is not mandatory.
After the filing of a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and the publication
of the notice of hearing, the proper Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction over a
decedent’s estate and retains that jurisdiction until the proceeding is closed. The fact that
an inventory was filed after the three-month period would not deprive the probate court of
jurisdiction to approve it. However, an administrator’s unexplained delay in filing the
inventory may be a ground for his removal (Sec. 2. Rule 82, Rules of Court).

Same; To determine if summary settlement is called for, probate court should ascertain
value of estate left by deceased by preponderance of evidence.—While the verified
petition for the issuance of letters of administration, it was alleged that the gross value of
the decedent’s estate was “not more than five thousand pesos”, in the amended inventory
the valuation was P17,000. Indeed, one of the lower court’s omissions was its failure to
ascertain by preponderance of evidence the actual value of the estate, if there was still
an estate to be administered. The approval of the amended inventory was not such a
determination. Anyway, in the present posture of the proceeding, no useful purpose would
be served by dismissing the petition herein and ordering that a new petition for summary
settlement be filed.

Same; Same; Intestate court’s approval of inventory of assets of deceased is not

conclusive of what assets really belonged to the estate and is without prejudice to a
judgment in an action on the title thereto.—The lower court’s order approving the
amended inventory is not a conclusive determination of what assets constitutes the
decedent’s estate and of the valuations thereof. Such a determination is only provisional
in character and is without prejudice to a judgment in a separate action on the issue of
title or ownership.

Same; Same; Probate court cannot pass upon question of title to property except where
the parties are all heirs arid submit such question before the probate court.—The general
rule is that questions of title to property cannot be passed upon in a testate or intestate
proceeding. However, when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon
them to submit to the probate court the question of title to property and, when so
submitted, the probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon. (The lower court was
held to have erred in ordering delivery to administratrix of certain properties claimed by
oppositors as their own and properties already sold to third persons.)

Same; Same; Probate court may take cognizance of properties under administration
provided interest of third persons who may be cited to appear in court are not
prejudiced.—Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro Recuelo are not heirs of the decedent. They
are third persons. The rule is that matters affecting property under administration may be
taken cognizance of by the probate court in the course of the intestate proceedings
provided that the interests of third persons are not prejudiced. However, third persons to
whom the decedent’s assets had been fraudulently conveyed may be cited to appear in
court and be examined under oath as to how they came into the possession of the
decedent’s assets, but a separate action would be necessary to recover the said assets.

Same; Prescription among co-heirs; Generally, prescription does not run among co-
heirs.—Generally prescription does not run in favor of a coheir as long as he expressly
or implied recognizes the co-ownership (Art. 494, Civil Code). But from the moment that
a coheir claims absolute and exclusive ownership of the hereditary properties and denies
the others any share thereto, the question involved is no longer one of partition but that
of ownership.

FACTS: Gelacio Sebial died intestate. His first wife died in 1919. They begot three
children named Roberta, Balbina and Juliano. In his second marriage, they begot six
children named Benjamina, Valentina, Ciriaco, Gregoria, Esperanza and Luciano.
Benjamina Sebial filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the settlement
of Gelacio Sebial’s estate. She prayed that she be appointed administratrix
thereof. Roberta Sebial opposed the petition on the ground that the estate of Gelacio
Sebial had already been partitioned among his children. The lower court appointed
Benjamina Sebial as administratrix and ruled that the alleged partition was invalid and
ineffective.
Subsequently, the oppositors filed motion to terminate the administration proceeding
on the grounds that the decedent’s estate was valued at less than six thousand pesos
and that it had already been partitioned and, therefore, there was no necessity for
the administration proceeding. Benjamina Sebial filed the first inventory and appraisal of
the decedent’s estate with a total value of nine thousand pesos.

The administratrix filed a motion to require Lorenzo Rematado, Demetrio Camillo and the
spouses Roberta Sebial and Lazaro Recuelo to deliver to her some parcels of land. The
lower court inexplicably required the administratrix to submit another inventory and the
administratrix obliged. The oppositor interposed an opposition to the said inventory.

The lower court in its order of December 11, 1961 approved the second inventory
and granted the motion of the administratrix for the delivery to her of certain parcels of
land mentioned earlier.

Oppositors-appellants appealed from the two orders of the probate court. They
argued that the probate court lacks jurisdiction to approve said inventory filed beyond the
three month period from the date of appointment of the administratrix; that the valuation
of the inventoried properties were fake, fictitious and fantastic; that the inventory is
not supported by documentary evidence; that the additional; two houses were
nonexistent; that the settlement of the estate can be made summarily because of its small
value and that an ordinary civil action is necessary to recover the lands in possession of
third persons. The Court of Appeals certified the appeal to the Supreme Court since only
legal questions were raised.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the three-month period within which to file the inventory of the
decedents estate from the date of appointment of the administratrix is mandatory?

2. Whether an ordinary civil action for recovery of property and not an administration
proceeding is the proper remedy, considering oppositors’ allegation that the estate of
Gelacio Sebial was partitioned in 1945 and that some of his heirs had already sold their
respective shares?

RULING:

1. No, it is not mandatory. The three-month period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 83

of the Rules of Court is not mandatory. After the filing of petition for the issuance
of letters of administration and the publication of the notice of hearing, the
proper court of first instance acquires jurisdiction over a decedent’s estate and
retains that jurisdiction until the proceeding is closed, and the fact that the
 inventory was filed after the three-month period does not deprive the probate court
of jurisdiction to approve it. However, the administrator’s unexplained delay in filing
the inventory may be a ground for his removal.

2. Yes, ordinary civil action for recovery of property and not an administration
proceeding is the proper remedy.

The lower court’s order of December 11, 1961, approving the amended inventory
of November 11, 1961, is not a conclusive determination of what assets constituted
the decedent’s estate and of the valuations thereof. Such a determination is only
provisional in character and is without prejudice to a judgment in a separate action
on the issue of title or ownership.

We hold that the said order is erroneous and should be set aside because the
probate court failed to receive evidence as to the ownership of the said parcels of
land. The general rule is that questions of title to property cannot be passed upon
in a testate or intestate proceeding. However, when the parties are all heirs of the
decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the probate court the question of
title to property and, when so submitted, the probate court may definitely pass
judgment thereon (3 Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., pp. 448,
473; Alvarez v. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892).

Lorenzo Rematado and Lazaro Recuelo are not heirs of the decedent. They are
third persons. The rule is that matters affecting property under administration may
be taken cognizance of by the probate court in the course of the intestate
proceeding provided that the interests of third persons are not prejudiced
(Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Ibid, 3 Moran 473).

However, third persons to whom the decedent’s assets had been fraudulently
conveyed may be cited to appear in court and be examined under oath as to how
they came into the possession of the decedent’s assets (Sec. 6, Rule 87, Rules of
Court) but a separate action would be necessary to recover the said assets
(Chanco v. Madrilejos, 12 Phil. 543; Guanco v. Philippine National Bank, 54 Phil.
244).

WHEREFORE, (a) the probate court’s order of December 11, 1961, granting the
administratrix’s motion of May 4, 1961 for the delivery to her of certain properties
is set aside; (b) its other order of December 11, 1961 approving the amended
inventory should not be considered as a final adjudication on the ownership of the
properties listed in the inventory and (c) this case is remanded to the lower court
for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines laid down in this decision.
No costs.

Provisional Inclusion in Inventory

3. Garcia v. Garcia, 67 Phil 353 (1939)

DOCTRINE/S:

TESTATE OR INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS; JURISDICTION; PROPERTIES

INCLUDED OR EXCLUDED. — A court which takes cognizance of testate or intestate
proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the properties
included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the deceased, although such
a determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right of the
interested parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or
existence of the right or credit.

FACTS:

After Luisa Garcia was appointed special administratrix of the properties left by the
deceased Paulina Vasquez Vda. de Garcia, she filed with the competent court an
inventory.

The heir Teresa Garcia objected to said inventory. taking exception to various items
therein.

On June 20, 1936, the court issued the following order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Without prejudice to the filing of an ordinary action by the heir Teresa Garcia de
Bartolome, the petition to include in the inventory certain properties of the estate, filed by
Teresa Garcia and others with the conformity of counsel for the administratrix, is denied."c

Teresa Garcia filed a motion asking that she be appointed special administratrix of the
intestate for the sole purpose of bringing any actions which she may believe necessary
to recover for the benefit of the intestate the properties and credits set out in her motion,
as well as other properties which might be discovered from time to time belonging to the
said intestate.

After hearing said motion and the administratrix’ opposition thereto, the Court of First
Instance of Manila denied the motion
.

On motion for reconsideration filed by Teresa Garcia, which was opposed by the
administratrix, the court issued the following orderalaw virt

"Before this petition was filed a hearing had been held to determine the ownership of
these properties as a direct result of Teresa Garcia’s objection to the inventory filed by
the administratrix. in which, it was alleged, those properties should be included. Now the
same party upon whose complaint that hearing was conducted repudiates the steps taken
by the court on the ground of alleged lack of jurisdiction.ua1aw l

ISSUE/S:

whether or not a court has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon the exceptions which an
heir takes to an inventory of the properties left by a deceased referring to the inclusion or
exclusion of certain properties and credits.

RULING:

Yes. It is the duty of every administrator, whether special or regular, imposed by section
668 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to return to the court within three months after his
appointment a true inventory of the real estate and all the goods, chattels, rights, and
credits of the deceased which come into his possession or knowledge, unless he is
residuary legatee and has given the prescribed bond.
The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through
the filing of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said
properties, and under the said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory
submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the properties, rights and
credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his inventory.

In compliance with this duty the court has also inherent power to determine what
properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the
inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly
call the court’s attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits have been left
out in the inventory, it is likewise the court’s duty to hear the observations. with power to
determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties referred
to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and
ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties.

The lower court, therefore, had jurisdiction to hear the opposition of the heir Teresa Garcia
to the inventory filed by the special administratrix Luisa Garcia, as well as the
observations made by the former as to certain properties and credits, and to determine
for purposes of the-inventor alone if they should be included therein or excluded
therefrom. As Teresa Garcia withdrew her opposition after evidence was adduced tending
to show whether or not certain properties belonged to the intestate and, hence, whether
they should be included in the inventory, alleging that the lower court had no jurisdiction
to do so, she cannot be heard to complain that the court suspended the trial of her
opposition.

4. Cuizon v. Ramolete, 129 SCRA 495 (1984)

DOCTRINE/S: Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Estate; Probate court cannot

adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and equally
claimed to belong to outside parties; Duty of probate court as regards said disputed
properties.—It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings
whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that
the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so
(Mallari v. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694; Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Probate court without authority to deprive third persons of
possession and ownership of property and covered by a transfer certificate of title in the
name of such third parties; Application for relief with intestate court unnecessary, probate
court clearly having no jurisdiction.—Having been apprised of the fact that the property in
question was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer
certificate of title issued in the name of such third parlies, the respondent court should
have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in
question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive
such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. Respondent court
was clearly without jurisdiction to issue the order of June 27, 1979. Thus, it was
unnecessary for the petitioners to first apply for relief with the intestate court.

Same; Same; Same; Separate civil action: Issues, such as that sale of disputed property
tainted with fraud and that the rights of the owner as alleged half-sister and sole heir of
the decedent remains open to question, better threshed out in a separate civil action filed
by the administrator and not in the intestate proceedings in the court below.—Even
assuming the truth of the private respondents’ allegations that the sale of December 29,
1971 was effected under suspicious circumstances and tainted with fraud and that the
right of Rufina as alleged half-sister and sole heir of Irene remains open to question, these
issues may only be threshed out in a separate civil action filed by the respondent
administrator against the petitioners and not in the intestate proceedings.

FACTS: Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels of land located at
Opao, Mandaue City. He distributed his property between his two children, Rufina and
Irene. Part of the property given to Irene consisted largely of salt beds which eventually
became the subject of this controversy. Irene Cuizon executed a Deed of Sale with
Reservation of Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor of the petitioners Francisco,
Rosita and Purificacion, all surnamed Cuizon. At that time, Francisco and Rosita were
minors and assisted by their mother, Rufina, only sister of Irene. However, the sale was
not registered because the petitioners felt it was unnecessary due to the lifetime
usufructuary rights of Irene. Subsequently, a corresponding Original Certificate of Title
No. 0171 was issued only in 1976 in the name of Marciano Cuizon. In that same year,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10477 covering the property in question was issued by
the Register of Deeds to Irene Cuizon. In the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Irene,
her alleged half sister and sole heir Rufina adjudicated to herself all the property of the
decedent including the property in question, and subsequently sold the parcel of land in
favor of the herein petitioners Cuizon. A new TCT was issued in favor of Cuizons.

In 1978, Domingo Antigua, who allegedly was chosen by the heirs of Irene to act as
administrator, was appointed administrator by the CFI of Cebu. Antigua included the salt
bed in the inventory of Irene’s estate and asked the Cebu CFI to order petitioners to
deliver the salt to him. Antigua filed a motion asking the court for authority to sell the salt
from the property and praying that petitioner Arche (the administrator of Irene’s estate)
be ordered to deliver the salt to the administrator, which was granted by the CFI.

Petitioners argued that the respondent court, as a court handling only the intestate
proceedings, had neither the authority to adjudicate controverted rights nor to divest them
of their possession and ownership of the property in question and hand over the same to
the administrator. Petitioners further contend that the proper remedy of the respondent
administrator is to file a separate civil action to recover the same.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not a probate court has jurisdiction over parcels of land already
covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of owners who are not parties to
the intestate proceedings if the said parcels have been included in the inventory of
properties of the estate prepared by the administrator?

RULING: NO, a probate court DOES NOT HAVE jurisdiction over parcels of land already
covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of owners who are not parties to
the intestate proceedings if the said parcels have been included in the inventory of
properties of the estate prepared by the administrator.

It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate
or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are equally (claimed to belong to outside parties).

All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they
should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered
by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. In
the instant case, the property involved is not only claimed by outside parties but it was
sold seven years before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of the
vendees who are not party to the proceedings. Having been apprised of the fact that the
property in question was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered
by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent
court should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the
property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate. It had no authority to
deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership of the property. Respondent
court was clearly without jurisdiction to issue the order of June 27, 1979. Thus, it was
unnecessary for the petitioners to first apply for relief with the intestate court.

NOTES:
Probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the
estate and equally claimed to belong to outside parties.

Rule 84 General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators

Powers

5. Wilson v. Rear, 55 Phil 44 (1930)

DOCTRINE/S:
As a general rule, his role as an administrator is not to run the business. Except,
the administrator requires a court order, absent which he has no authority (even if he is
in good faith) and is liable for all the losses incurred thereby, without right to receive
profits.

The administrator on his own volition, and without any authority from the court,
could continue the operation of the business. The court ruled that, although Wilson acted
in utmost good faith and believed that he was proceeding in the best interest of the estate,
he is still personally liable for the losses incurred by the estate because the normal duty
of the personal representative is limited only to the winding up of the business and he
allowed the business to still continue its operation. If you’re the administrator your duty is
only with regard to the management of the estate and the winding up of the business and
not to continue the operation of the business.

FACTS:

Charles C. Rear was murdered in his plantation in the Province of Cotabato.

Wilson is the special administrator of the deceased’s estate. The Commissioners then
filed an inventory and report of the property of the estate which was appraised at P
20,800. The Commissioners filed a report of claims against the estate, but it was claimed
that the administrator did not have any funds to pay, so the court ordered the sale of a
portion of the property.

With the consent of the heirs, a petition for authority to sell all the property of the
estate was filed, which was granted by the court. The public sale took place, and the
property was sold to Wm. Mannion for P 7,600.

Wilson submitted a report covering his administration and later filed his final
account. This was objected by the heirs, but the account was approved by the court.
Hence, the heirs appealed, questioning the final amended account of the administrator.

They alleged the following:

(1) That the disbursements made by the SA and the administrator were in excess
of the amount required to preserve the estate;
 (2) That no authority being asked for or granted by the court, all loans, advances,
made to the estate, were made contrary to law and are not legal charges against
the estate;

(3) That Wilson, as SA and administrator, was neglectful and imprudent and he
committed waste. Therefore, he is liable.
It appears from the first inventory of December 27, 1925, the assets of the estate
were P 15,300 and the personal property was valued at P 5,250. When Wilson was
appointed as SA in November 1925, he never made any report or filed any account until
1927. The first time that the attention of the court was called was when the
Commissioners asked to have their fees paid. Certain amounts of money were also
received by the administrator, totaling P 1,919.25.

ISSUE/S:
Whether Wilson, as special administrator and as administrator, was neglectful and
imprudent and he committed waste thereby making him liable.

RULING:
Yes. It was the legal duty of the administrator to apply to the court for an order to
sell the personal property to pay the debts of the deceased and the expenses of
administration.

Here, at the time of Wilson’s appointment, P 5,800 worth of the property of the
deceased came into his possession and the whole amount of claims against Rear at the
time of his death was P 3,422.58. Thus, if the personal property of the estate had been
promptly sold, all the debts of the deceased and the court costs and expenses of
administration would have been paid. However, instead of doing that, and without any
order, process or authority of the court, Wilson continued the operation of the plantation,
which have to pay its employees.

If he only followed the law and promptly sold the personal property, all of the debts
of the estate would have been paid, and it would have a cash balance of P 2,377,42, and
all of its real property left, which was appraised at P 15,000.

Wilson was appointed and qualified as administrator, and the law imposed upon
him legal duties and obligations, among which was to handle the estate in a business-like
manner, marshal its assets, and close the estate without any unreasonable or
unnecessary delay. He was not appointed to act for or on behalf of the creditors, or to
represent the interests of the heirs only. He should have administered the affairs of the
estate for the use and benefit alike of all interested persons, as any prudent businessman
would handle his own personal business.

When appointed, it is the legal duty of the administrator to administer, settle, and
close the administration in the ordinary course of business, without any unnecessary
delay. Neither does an administrator, in particular, without a specific showing or an order
of the court, have any legal right to continue the operation of the business in which the
deceased was engaged, or to eat up and absorb the assets of the estate in the payment
of operating expenses. Yet, in the instant case, the administrator on his own volition and
without any authority or process of court continued the operation of the plantation, and in
the end, as shown by his own report, the estate, which was appraised at P20,800, with
actual debts of the deceased of only P1,655,54 was all wiped out and lost, and left with a
deficit of P1,809.69.

The law does not impose upon an administrator a high degree of care in the
administration of an estate, but it does impose upon him ordinary and usual care, for want
of which he is personally liable. In the instant case there were no complications of any
kind and in the usual and ordinary course of business, the administrator should have
wound up and settled the estate within eight months from the date of his appointment.

Winding up Business — An executor or administrator ordinarily has no power to

continue the business in which the decedent was engaged at the time of his death; and
this is true although he acts in the utmost good faith and believes that he is proceeding
for the best interests of the estate. The penalty for continuing a business of the decedent
without authority is the imposition of a personal liability on the executor or administrator
so doing for all debts of the business. The normal duty of the personal representative in
reference to such business is limited to winding it up, and even where the beneficiaries
are infants the court cannot authorize the administrator to carry on the trade of the
decedent. However, an exception to the general rule is sometimes recognized; and so it
has been held that in order to settle an estate the personal representative may, in some
cases , be permitted to continue a business for a reasonable time.

6. San Diego v. Nombre, 11 SCRA 165 (1964)

DOCTRINE/S: The provisions on agency should not apply to a judicial

administrator. A judicial administrator is appointed by the court. He is not only the
representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the
estate.Before entering into his duties, he is required to file a bond. These
circumstances are not required in agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal.
The protection which law gives the principal in limiting the powers and rights of an agent
stems from the fact that control by the principal
can only be through agreements. Whereas, the acts of a judicial administrator
are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the appointing court.

FACTS:

(1)Respondent Adelo Nombre was the duly constituted judicial administrator. As

such, he leased one of the properties of the estate—a fishpond—to Pedro Escanlar, the
other respondent. The terms of the lease was for 3 years, with a yearly rental of P3,000.
The Transaction was done without previous authority or approval of theCourt.

(2)A year after, Nombre was removed as administrator, and was replaced by one
Sofronio Campillanos. Escalanlar was cited for contempt for allegedly refusing to
surrender the fishpond to the newly appointed administrator.

(3)Subsequently, Campillanos filed a motion for authority to execute a lease contract over
the fishpond, in favor of petitioner Moises SanDiego, for 5 years with yearly rental of
P5,000. Escalator was not notified of the said motion. Nombre, on the other hand,
opposed to the motion, pointing out that the fishpond was leased by him to calendar for
3 years. He alleged that the validity of the lease contract entered into by a judicial
administrator must be recognized unless declared void in a separate action.

(4)The lower court declared the contract in favor of Escanlar null and void for want of
judicial authority and that San Diego offered better lease conditions than Escanlar. In light
of this, Escanlar agreed to increase the rental to P5,000 after the termination of his original
contract. However, the trial judge stated that such contract was fraudulent and executed
in bad faith because Nombre was removed as administrator and the rentals of the
property was inadequate.
(5)However, on appeal, the CA ruled: No such limitation on the power of a judicial
administrator to grant lease of property placed under his custody is provided for in the
present law. Under Art. 1647, it is only when the lease is to be recorded in the Registry
of Property that it cannot be instituted without special authority. Thus, regardless of the
period of lease,there is no need for special authority unless the contract is to be recorded
in the Registry.Rule 85, Sec. 3 of the ROC authorizes a judicial administrator to administer
the estate of the deceased not disposed by will, for purposes of liquidation and
distribution. He may, therefore, exercise all acts of administration without special authority
of the Court; such as the leasing the property. And where the lease has been formally
entered into, the court cannot, in the same proceeding, annul the same. The proper
remedy would be a separate action by the administrator or the heirs to annul the lease.

(6)On appeal to the SC, petitioner contends that Art. 1878(8) limits the right of a judicial
administrator to lease the real property without prior court authority and approval, if it
exceeds 1 year. The lease in favor of Escalanlar, being 3 years and without court
approval, is therefore void.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the provisions on Agency should apply in this case.

RULING: NO. The provisions on agency should not apply to a judicial administrator.
Judicial administrator is appointed by the court. He is not only the
representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the
estate.Before entering into his duties, he is required to file a bond. These
Circumstances are not required in agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal.
The protection which law gives the principal in limiting the powers and rights of an agent
stems from the fact that control by the principal
can only be through agreements. Whereas, the acts of a judicial administrator
are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the appointing court.

The decision of the CA was affirmed.

Conflict of Interest
1. Jaroda v. Cusi, 28 SCRA 1008 (1969)

DOCTRINE/S:

It is highly undesirable, if not improper, that a court officer and administrator, in

dealing with property under his administration, should have to look to the wishes of
strangers as well as to those of the court that appointed him. A judicial administrator
should be at all times subject to the orders of the appointing Tribunal and of no one else.

FACTS:

The decedent Carlos Villa Abrille died intestate, leaving:

a. An estate consisting of real and personal property, including:

i. A share in the co-ownership of Juna Subdivision;
ii. Cash deposited in several bank ;

b. Forced heirs such as:

i. His surviving spouse;
ii. Nine children (including the petitioner Natividad Jaroda);
iii. Four grandchildren (including the respondent Antonio Tan);
The respondent Tan commenced the intestate special proceedings by filing a petition for
administration in Court of First Instance in Davao. He was first appointed as special
administrator and subsequently as the regular administrator. Tan filed an ex-parte petition
for the withdrawal of cash from PNB, which sums were actually not listed in his petition.
He alleged that these sums were held in trust for the decedent’s co-owners in the
subdivision. This was granted by the lower court. Tan also filed a petition with lower the
court, praying for the approval of the court of a power of attorney which appointed Tan as
an attorney-in-fact to sell the decedent’s share in the subdivision. This was also granted
by the lower court.

The petitioner Jaroda moved to nullify the two orders. However, this was denied
by the CFI for lack of merit. Jaroda appealed from this, but the court dismissed the appeal
on the ground that the order appealed from was interlocutory. Jaroda then filed before the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus but the SC dismissed the
petition, adding in its resolution that appeal in due time is the remedy.

Hence, this petition for certiorari, alleging that appeal would not be speedy and adequate
as the respondent Tan continued to sell lots of lands from the subdivision, to the detriment
of Jaroda and the other heirs.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or the lower court acted in Grave Abuse of Discretion in granting both
orders?

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court found that the lower court committed Grave Abuse of
Discretion in granting both orders.

1. Re: power to withdraw bank deposits for the co-owners.

The Court found that the lower court committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in granting the
order allowing the respondent to withdraw the bank deposits standing the name of the
decedent. Such withdrawal, according to the Court, is foreign to the duties and powers of
a special administrator. This was provided in Section 2, Rule 80, which states that a
special administrator can:
“Take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the
decease and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed,
and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell
only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator
shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.”

Also, the order was issued without notice to and hearing of the heirs of the deceased.

The Court specifically mentioned here that while the withdrawal of the bank deposits may
be viewed as a taking of possession and charge of the credits of the estate (which is
within the powers of a special administrator), such withdrawal is a waiver by the special
administrator of a prima facie exclusive right of the estate to the bank deposits in favor of
the co-owners. Such an action required notice to the heirs.

2. Re: power to act as attorney-in-fact.

The Court also found that the lower court committed GAOD in granting the order
allowing the respondent to act as attorney-in-fact in selling the decedent’s share in the
subdivision. The order approving the power of attorney is void for want of notice and for
approving an improper contract. More importantly, the Court noted that an administrator
is not permitted to deal with himself as an individual in any transaction concerning trust
property. The opinion of some commentators that, as a general rule, auto-contracts are
permissible if not expressly prohibited, and that there is no express provision of law
prohibiting an administrator from appointing himself as his own agent, even if correct,
cannot and should not apply to administrator of decedent's estates, in view of the
fiduciary relationship that they occupy with respect to the heirs of the deceased and their
responsibilities toward the probate court.

The court below also failed to notice that after the death of Carlos Villa Abrille, the
administrator Tan had replaced said deceased as manager of the Juna Subdivision by
authority of the other co-owners.

By the court's questioned order of 3 September 1965 empowering him to represent

the interest of the deceased in the management of the subdivision, the administrator Tan
came to be the agent or attorney-in-fact of two different principals: the court and the heirs
of the deceased on the one hand, and the majority co-owners of the subdivision on the
other, in managing and disposing of the lots of the subdivision.

This dual agency of the respondent Tan rendered him incapable of independent
defense of the estate's interests against those of the majority co-owners. It is highly
undesirable, if not improper, that a court officer and administrator, in dealing with property
under his administration, should have to look to the wishes of strangers as well as to
those of the court that appointed him. A judicial administrator should be at all times subject
to the orders of the appointing Tribunal and of no one else.

2. Mananquil v. Villegas, August 30, 1990

DOCTRINE/S: Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial

executor or administrator has the right to the possession and management of the real as
well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of
the debts and the expenses of administration. He may, therefore, exercise acts of
administration without special authority from the court having jurisdiction of the estate.
For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator has the power to enter into
lease contracts involving the properties of the estate even without prior judicial authority
and approval [See Ferraris v. Rodas, 65 Phil. 732 (1938); Jocson de Hilado v. Nava, 69
Phil. 1 (1939); San Diego, Sr. v. Hombre, G.R No. L-19265, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 165].

FACTS: This is actually a disbarment case against VILLEGAS. It turns out that
VILLEGAS was counsel of record of one Felix LEONG, the administrator for the testate
estate of one Felomina Zerna. In 1963, LEONG, as administrator of Zerna’s estate,
entered into a lease contract with the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS over several
lots included in Zerna’s estate. The said lease contract was renewed several times
henceforth. It is important to note at this point that VILLEGAS was both counsel of LEONG
and a partner in the partnership of HIJOS DE VILLEGAS. When LEONG died, this
disbarment suit was filed by MANANQUIL, the appointed administrator for LEONG’s
estate. MANANQUIL alleged that the lease contracts were made under iniquitous terms
and conditions. Also, MANANQUIL alleged that VILLEGAS should have first notified and
secured the approval of the probate court in Zerna’s estate before the contracts were
renewed, VILLEGAS being counsel of that estate’s administrator.

ISSUE/S:
 1. Whether VILLEGAS should have first secured the probate court’s approval
regarding the lease?

2. Whether VILLEGAS should be disbarred?

RULING:

1. NO, VILLEGAS is correct that he did not first secure the probate court’s approval
regarding the lease.

Pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, a judicial executor

or administrator has the right to the possession and management of the real as
well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the
payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He may, therefore,
exercise acts of administration without special authority from the court having
jurisdiction of the estate. For instance, it has long been settled that an administrator
has the power to enter into lease contracts involving the properties of the estate
even without prior judicial authority and approval.

In the case at bar, considering that administrator LEONG was not required under
the law and prevailing jurisprudence to seek prior authority from the probate court
in order to validly lease real properties of the estate, VILLEGAS, as counsel of
LEONG, cannot be taken to task for failing to notify the probate court of the various
lease contracts involved herein and to secure its judicial approval thereto.

2. NO, VILLEGAS should not be disbarred.

There is no evidence to warrant disbarment, although VILLEGAS should be

suspended from practice of law because he participated in the renewals of the
lease contracts involving properties of Zerna’s estate in favor of the partnership of
HIJOS DE VILLEGAS.

Under Art. 1646 of the Civil Code, “lawyers, with respect to the property and rights
which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of
their profession” are prohibited from leasing, either in person or through the
mediation of another, the properties or things mentioned. Such an act constituted
gross misconduct, hence, suspension for four months.

Rule 85 Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators

3. Joson v. Joson, 2 SCRA 82 (1961)

DOCTRINE/S:

EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR; EXTENT AND SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITIES

ENUMERATED. —

Section 1 of Rule 86 categorically charges an administrator "with the whole of the estate
of the deceased which has come into his possession at the value of appraisement
contained in the inventory; with all the proceeds of so much of the estate as is sold by
him, at third price at which sold."
Section 8 of the same rule imposes upon him the duty to render an account of his
administration within one year from his appointment, unless the court otherwise directs,
as well as to render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is fully,
settled. Section 10 likewise provides that before an account of the administrator is allowed
notice shall be given to all persons interested of the time and place of examining and
allowing the same.

FACTS:

Tomas Joson died on July 5, 1945 in Quezon, Nueva Ecija leaving behind heirs and
properties.

Upon his death, his will was presented to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija by his
son Felicisimo Joson for probate. In August, 1945, said will having been duly probated,
Felicisimo Joson was appointed administrator of the estate and, accordingly, he filed an
inventory of the properties left by the deceased.

the administrator filed his first account for the year 1945-1946. This was ordered by the
court to be examined by the clerk of court but the same has never been approved. The
administrator filed another account for the year 1947-1948 and, upon motion of the heirs,
he was ordered to file an accounting covering the properties under his administration.

Eduardo Joson, one of the heirs, filed an opposition to all the accounts filed by the
administrator wherein he alleged that the administrator diminished the shares of the heirs
in the yearly produce of the properties and had padded his expenses of administration.

the heirs were able to compromise their differences and entered into an extrajudicial
settlement and partition of the entire estate.

But, as the court was never informed of this extrajudicial settlement either by the
administrator or by the heirs, it issued on May 19, 1954 an order requiring the
administrator to file an accounting of his administration

Without said accounts having been heard or approved, the administrator filed a motion to
declare the proceeding closed and terminated and to relieve him of his duties.

Heir Eduardo Joson filed an opposition to said motion but, after hearing, the court issued
on order declaring the proceedings terminated and relieving the administrator not only of
his duties as such but also of his accounts notwithstanding the heirs’ opposition to said
accounts. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the duty of an administrator to make an accounting of his administration a mere

incident which can be avoided once the estate has been settled.

RULING:

NO. Section 1 of Rule 86 categorically charges an administrator "with the whole of the
estate of the deceased which has come into his possession at the value of appraisement
contained in the inventory; with all the interest, profit, and income of such a estate; and
with the proceeds of so much of the estate as is sold by him, at the price at which sold."

Section 8 of the same rule imposes upon him the duty to render an account of his
administration within one year from his appointment, unless the court otherwise directs,
as well as to render such further accounts as the courts may require until the estate is
fully settled.
Section 10 likewise provides that before an account of the administrator is allowed notice
shall be given to all persons interested of the time and place of examining and allowing
the same.

It thus appears that the duty of an administrator to render an account is not a mere
incident of an administration proceeding which can be waived or disregarded when the
same is terminated, but that it is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by
the court before the administration is finally ordered closed and terminated.

Here the administrator has submitted his accounts for several years not only motu proprio
but upon requirement of the court, to which accounts the heirs have seasonably submitted
their opposition. And when the administrator moved the court to close the proceedings
and relieve him of his administration and of his accounts, the heirs who objected thereto
objected likewise to the closing of the proceedings invoking their right to be heard but the
court ignored their opposition and granted the motion setting forth as reasons therefore
what we quoted in the early part of this decision.

4. Tumang v. Laguio, GR 50277, February 14, 1980

DOCTRINE/S: Estates; Accounting; Duty of executor/administrator to render a

supplemental accounting after approval of the final accounts but before issuance of an
order finally closing the testate proceedings.—There is no question that in the instant
case, the fact that the executrix received funds of the estate after the approval of her final
accounts and before the issuance of an order finally closing the proceedings is admitted.
She must, therefore, account for the same, in consonance with her duty to account for all
the assets of the decedent’s estate which have come into her possession by virtue of her
office. An executor should account for all his receipts and disbursements since his last
accounting.

Same; Same; Same; Nature of the duty of the executor/administrator to render an

accounting.—We disagree with the lower court’s finding that petitioners, by receiving the
dividends without requiring an accounting, had waived their right to do so. The duty of an
executor or administrator to render an account is not a mere incident of an administration
proceeding which can be waived or disregarded. It is a duty that has to be performed and
duly acted upon by the court before the administration is finally ordered closed and
terminated, to the end that no part of the decedent’s estate be left unaccounted for.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Submission of additional accounting; Jurisdiction; Approval

of final accounts by the court does not divest it of jurisdiction to require supplemental
accounting.—The fact that the final accounts had been approved does not divest the court
of jurisdiction to require supplemental accounting for, aside from the initial accounting,
the Rules provide that “he shall render such further accounts as the court may require
until the estate is wholly settled.”

FACTS: The widow Magdalena A. Tumang (Tumang), also the administratrix and
executrix of the will of the deceased Dominador Tumang, filed a petition to declare the
testate proceedings definitely terminated and closed with respect to herself and two of
her children,Melba Tumang Ticzon and Nestor A. Tumang. The petition was premised on
the fact that the aforesaid heirs had already acknowledged receipt of the properties
adjudicated to them, and in order for such properties to be transferred in their names,
there was need for an order of the court declaring the proceedings closed with respect to
the aforesaid heirs.

However, the petition was opposed by appellee's other daughter, Guia T. Laguio (Laguio)
and her children on the ground that: (a) appellee, as administratrix and executrix, had not
yet delivered all properties adjudicated to them and that (b) there could be no partial
termination of the proceedings. Tumang then withdrew the aforementioned petition

Tumang, as required by the court, filed a pleading captioned “Compliance”, alleging that
estate and inheritance taxes have been paid (BIR receipts) and that since the approval
of the partition, no claim has been presented alleging that not all the properties and
dividends of the shares of stock adjudicated to Laguio and her minor children; and that
with such admission, the court no longer has jurisdiction to entertain the motion under
consideration (certified by the Deputy Clerk of Court).

CFI ruling: Motion to require Tumang to render accounting DENIED, as the final
accounting of Tumang was already approved.

MR denied, holding that Laguio's receipt of the cash dividends in question without first
requiring the administratrix the accounting now being sought to be rendered for purposes
of determining the correctness of the cash dividends constitutes already a waiver on her
part. Laguio was also assisted by counsel in the person of her husband, who could have
rejected the receipt of the dividends if its correctness was being doubted

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the court can still require the administratrix to render an accounting
of the cash and stock dividends received even after the approval of her final
accounts?

2. Whether or not the duty of the administrator to render an account can be waived?

RULING:

1. YES, the court can still require the administratrix to render an accounting of the
cash and stock dividends received even after the approval of her final accounts.

Under Section 8 of Rule 85 provides that the “executor or administrator shall render
an account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving
letters testamentary or of administration xxx, and he shall render such further
accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled.”

Further, “it has been held that an executor or administrator who receives assets of
the estate after he has filed an account should file a supplementary account
thereof, and may be compelled to do so, but that it is only with respect to matters
occurring after the settlement of final account that representatives will be
compelled to file supplementary account.” It is only in a case where the petition to
compel an executor to account after he has accounted and has been discharged
fails to allege that any further sums came into the hands of the executor, and the
executor specifically denies the receipt of any further sums that the accounting
should be denied.

In the instant case, further accounts by the executrix appear to be in order, in view
of the fact that the dividends sought to be accounted for are not included in the
final accounts rendered by the executrix. It appears that the interests of all the
parties will be better served and the conflict between petitioners and respondent
will be resolved if such additional accounting is made.
 Thus, there is no question that in the instant case, the fact that the executrix
received funds of the estate after the approval of her final accounts and before the
issuance of an order finally closing the proceedings is admitted. She must,
therefore, account for the same, in consonance with her duty to account for all the
assets of the decedent’s estate which have come into her possession by virtue of
her office. An executor should account for all his receipts and disbursements since
his last accounting.

2. NO, the duty of the administrator to render an account CANNOT be waived.

We disagree with the lower court’s finding that petitioners, by receiving the
dividends without requiring an accounting, had waived their right to do so.

The duty of an executor or administrator to render an account is not a mere

incident of an administration proceeding which can be waived or
disregarded. It is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court
before the administration is finally ordered closed and terminated, to the end that
no part of the decedent’s estate be left unaccounted for. The fact that the final
accounts had been approved does not divest the court of jurisdiction to require
supplemental accounting for, aside from the initial accounting, the Rules provide
that “he shall render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate
is wholly settled.”

NOTES:

When can an administrator be compelled to file a supplementary account even after

approval of the final accounts?

- An executor or administrator who receives assets of the estate after he has filed an
account should file a supplementary account thereof, and may be compelled to do so, but
that it is only with respect to matters occurring after the settlement of the final account
that representatives will be compelled to file supplementary accounts.

When is an administrator not required to file such a supplementary account?

- It is only in a case where the petition to compel an executor to account after he has
accounted and has been discharged fails to allege that any further sums came into the
hands of the executor, and the executor specifically denies the receipt of any further sums
that the accounting should be denied.

Charges and Expenses of the Administrator

5. Rodriguez v. Silva, 90 Phil 752 (1952)

DOCTRINE/S:
The court may fix an administrator’s or executor’s fee in excess of the fees
prescribed by sec. 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court where the estate is large, and the
settlement has been attended with great difficulty and has required a high degree of
capacity on the part of the executor or administrator.

The amount of an executor’s fee allowed by the CFI in any special case under the
provisions of sec. 680 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a matter largely in the discretion
of the probate court, which will not be disturbed on appeal, except for an abuse of
discretion.
FACTS:

This case is an appeal from an order of the CFI of Manila, authorizing the
cancellation of the bond of Pablo M. Silva who had resigned as joint administrator of the
intestate estate of Honofre Leyson, deceased, and allowing Silva P600 as compensation
for his services.

The appellants are the remaining administrator and an heir of the deceased.

They contend that the lower court erred in ordering the cancellation of Silva’s Bond
and authorizing him to collect from the estate a sum of P600 as his administrator’s fees.
According to the appellants this is not in conformity with the provisions of sec. 7 Rule 86
of the Rules of Court.

They also contend that the court erred in not providing that the said amount of
P600 should be apportioned between the two administrators according to their services
actually rendered by them, in accordance with Section 7, par. 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court, and that the amount of P100 that was already received by Silva should be deducted
from any amount that may finally be conceded to him.

Lastly, the appellants contend that the court erred in canceling Silva’s administrator
bond, in as much as few months before the granting of his resignation, he secured the
cancellation of the TCTs issued in the name of Honofre Leyson, and in their stead another
titles were issued in Silva’s name, in a doubtful manner.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the court may fix an administrator’s or executor’s fee in excess of the fees
prescribed by Sec. 7 of Rule 86.

RULING:
Yes. Under Section 7, Rule 86, a greater sum may be allowed "in any special case,
where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and
has required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator."

And so it has been held that "the amount of an executor’s fee allowed by the CFI
in any special case under the provisions of Section 680 of the Code of Civil Procedure is
a matter largely in the discretion of the probate court, which will not be disturbed on
appeal, except for an abuse of discretion."

It is stated in the appellee’s (SIlva’s) brief that prior to his appointment and that of
Victorio L. Rodriguez (one of the appellants) as joint administrators, Justa Gomez, the
decedent’s cousin with whom Leyson lived was special administratrix; that during Justa
Gomez’s incumbency which lasted till December 8, 1947, the lease holdings of the said
estate were renting about 900.00 a month; that after appellee’s appointment, and through
his initiative, their income was increased to P1,300.00 and two parcels of land located in
San Juan, Rizal, were paid for in full and the corresponding certificates of title secured.

It is also asserted, and not denied, that the appellee was instrumental in the
gathering of decedent’s personal effects, and that as the result of his motion a court order,
whereby Margarita Leyson Laurente, one of the now appellants, had been authorized to
withdraw from the bank P3,400 as advance payment of her share of the inheritance, was
reconsidered and set aside. The fact that the appellee is an attorney-at-law has served
the estate in good stead, and this ought not to be lost sight of. Although being a lawyer is
by itself not a factor in the assessment of an administrator’s fee, it should be otherwise
when, as in this case, the administrator was able to stop what appeared to be an
improvident disbursement of a substantial amount without having to employ outside legal
help at an additional expense to the estate.
 On the basis of the foregoing circumstances, coupled with the fact that the appellee
Silva worked as co-administrator for about 2 years, the probate court did not commit any
grave abuse of discretion in granting Silva P600 or P700 as fee independent of the fee
that might be allowed the other administrator.

6. Phil. Trust Co. v. Luzon Surety Co., 2 SCRA 122 (1961)

DOCTRINE/S:
Actions against administrator who disbursed funds of the estate without authority will
result in the forfeiture of the administrators bond, aside from criminal liability of estafa.

FACTS:

CFI Manila appointed Francis R. Picard, Sr, as Administrator the intestate estate
of the deceased James R. Burt upon a bond of P1K, with Luzon Surety Co., Inc as his
surety. For reasons that do not fully appear of record, the Court dismissed Picard, as
administrator and appointed the Phil. Trust in his place.

Phil Trust submitted an inventory-report showing the sum of P57.75 as the only
asset left of the Intestate Estate of Burt. However, upon review of the record of the case,
the Court found that Picards previous inventory of the estate of the deceased had around
P7,000.00 balance (after deducting expenses). Thus, the Court ordered Picard to deliver
within 48 hours from the receipt of a copy of the Order the P7K (balance less the P57.75)
to Phil. Trust Company. Otherwise, he will be imprisoned for contempt until he complies
with the order.

In compliance with the Order, Picard submitted an itemized statement of

disbursements made by him as administrator of the estate, showing additional expenses
such as burial expenses, sums of money given to deceased adoptive
adoptive son, leaving a balance of around P900. The Court issued an Order finding Picard
guilty of having disbursed funds of the estate amounting to about P8K without authority.

For this reason, the Court referred the matter to the CityFiscal of Manila for
investigation. Picard had pleaded guilty to the crime of estafa and he was held civil liable
for 8,000 pesos.Thereafter, the Court issued an order requiring Luzon Surety Co.,Inc. to
show cause why the administrator's bond filed by it on behalf of Picard should not be
confiscated

Luzon filed a motion to set aside said order upon the following grounds: firstly, that
the Court cannot order the confiscation of the administrator's bond, on prejudice or injury
to creditors,legatees or heirs of the estate of James R. Burt having been shown,and
secondly, that "a probate court cannot, ex proprio motu,prosecute the probate bond." The
CFI denied the motion as well as the MR.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the probate court, ex proprio motu, can order the confiscation or forfeiture
of an administrator's bond?

RULING:

Yes.
1.) In the Philippine jurisdiction, probate court is possessed with an all-embracing power
not only in requiring but also in fixing the amount, and executing or forfeiting an
administrator's bond. The Execution or forfeiture of an administrator's bond, is deemed to
be anecessary part and incident of the administration proceedings as much as it’s filing
and the fixing of its amount. Thus, the probate court may have said bond executed in the
same probate proceeding.

2.) Also, the condition of the administrators bond in question is that Picard shall faithfully
execute the orders and decrees of the court; that if he did so, the obligation shall become
void, otherwise it shall remain in full force and effect.

3) Luzon contends that it was not proper for the lower court to order the confiscation of
its bond because no prejudice or injury to any creditor, heir or other interested person has
been proved is also without merit.

According to the record, the claims against the estate filed by Antonio Gardiner and Jose
Teruel for the sum of P200and P3K, respectively, were approved by the probate court but
the same have remained unpaid because of lack of funds.

4) Luzon also claims that it had been released from liability as surety because it received
no notice of the proceedings for the determination of the accountability of the
administrator. This Contention we also find to be untenable.

From the nature of obligation entered into by the surety of an administrators bond, which
makes him privy to the proceedings against his principal, he is bound and concluded, In
the absences of fraud and collusion, by a judgment against his principal, even though
said surety was not a party to the proceeding.
De Mendoza vs Pacheco: the sureties on the administrators bond were held liable thereon
although they were not parties to the proceeding against the administrator, nor were they
notified in connection there with prior to the issuance of court order for the confiscation of
bond.

5.) Lastly according to section 11 Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, upon the settlement of
the account of an executor or administrator, his sureties ``may upon application be
admitted as a party to such accounting meaning, sureties are not entitled to notice but
may be allowed to intervene in the settlement of accounts of the executor or administrator
if they ask for leave to do so in due time.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with costs.

Improper Charges

1. Sison v. Teodoro, 100 Phil 1055

DOCTRINE/S:

EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR; SERVING WITHOUT COMPENSATION;

PREMIUM PAID IN BOND NOT EXPENSE OF ADMINISTRATION. —

Expenses or premiums paid or incurred by an executor or administrator serving without

compensation to procure a bond is not a proper charge against the estate. Section 7 Rule
86 of the Rules of Court does not authorize the executor or administrator to charge against
the estate the money paid for premium. (Doctrine laid down in Sulit v. Santos, 56 Phil.,
626, reiterated.
FACTS:

The Court of First Instance of Manila, which has jurisdiction over the estate of the late
Margarita David, issued an order appointing Carlos Moran Sison as judicial administrator,
without compensation, after filing a bond in the amount of P5,000. The next day, Carlos
Moran Sison took his oath of office and put up the requisite bond which was duly approved
by the court. On the same day, letters of administration were issued to him.

the judicial administrator filed an accounting of his administration

"13. Paid to Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation on August 6, 1954, as renewal
premiums on the Administrator’s bond of Judicial Administrator Carlos Moran Sison
covering the period from December 20, 1949 to December 20, 1954, inclusive P380.70

"15. Paid to Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation on December 21, 1954, for
premiums due on the Administrator’s bond of Judicial Administrator Carlos Moran Sison
for the period from December 21, 1954 to December 21, I955 76.14"

Narcisa F. Teodoro, one of the heirs, objected to the approval of the above-quoted items
on the ground that they are not necessary expenses of administration and should not be
charged against the estate. On February 25, 1955, the court approved the report of the
administrator but disallowed the items objected to on the ground that they cannot be
considered as expenses of administration.

The administrator filed a motion for reconsideration and when the same was denied, he
took the present appeal.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not an executor or judicial administrator can validly charge the premiums on
his bond as an expense of administration against the estate

RULING:

The premiums paid by an executor or administrator serving without a compensation for

his bond cannot be charged against the estate. Further Sec. 7 of Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court does not authorize the executor or administrator to charge to the estate the money
spent for the bond. As held in the case of Sulit v. Santos (56 Phil 626), the position of an
executor or administrator is one of trust. The law safeguards the estates of deceased
persons by making as a requirement for qualification the ability to give a suitable bond.
The execution of said bond is therefore a condition precedent to acceptance of the
responsibilities of the trust.

Further, the giving of the bond is not a necessary expense in the care, management, and
settlement of the estate within the meaning of Sec. 680 of the Civil Code of Procedure,
since such are the requirements after the executor or administrator has already qualified
for the office and has entered the performance of his duties.

2. Uy Tioco v. Imperial, 53 Phil 802

DOCTRINE/S: PROHIBITION ; PROBATE PROCEEDINGS; ALLOWANCE OF

ATTORNEY'S FEES.—In probate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person the court allowed P15,000 for attorney's fees. Some of the heirs of the
deceased objected to the allowance on the ground that it was excessive and filed a motion
for reconsideration which was denied. They thereupon appealed. After the necessary
bond had been given and the appeal perfected, the court ordered the administrator of the
estate to make payment directly to the attorney of three-fourths of the P15,000 within five
days. The administrator refused to pay, and brought suit in this court for a writ of
prohibition to restrain the lower court from compelling him to make payment before the
amount of the fees was finally determined on. appeal. Held, that the appeal embraced the
whole amount of the allowance for attorney's fees; that after the appeal was perfected the
court had no jurisdiction to order immediate payment; and that the writ of prohibition
should issue.

LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES DISCUSSED.—The character of the liability for

attorney's fees in probate proceedings discussed. The services for which fees are claimed
are supposed to have been rendered to the executor or administrator to assist him in the
execution of his trust. The attorney can therefore not hold the estate directly liable for his
fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The
liability for the payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are
beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to reimbursement from the estate.
Such payments should be included in his accounts and the reimbursement therefor
settled upon the notice prescribed in section 682 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

SUMMARY: In probate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
the court allowed P15,000 for attorney's fees. Some of the heirs of the deceased objected
to the allowance on the ground that it was excessive and filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied. They thereupon appealed. After the necessary bond had been given
and the appeal perfected, the court ordered the administrator of the estate to make
payment directly to the attorney of three-fourths of the P15,000 within five days. The
administrator refused to pay, and brought suit in this court for a writ of prohibition to
restrain the lower court from compelling him to make payment before the amount of the
fees was finally determined on. appeal. The SC held, that the appeal embraced the whole
amount of the allowance for attorney's fees; that after the appeal was perfected the lower
court had no jurisdiction to order immediate payment; and that the writ of prohibition
should issue.

FACTS: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition to restrain the respondent judge from
compelling the petitioner to pay the sum of P11,250 to the other respondent, Alejandro
Panis, out of the funds of the estate of the deceased Basilisa Yangco, of which estate
said petitioner is the administrator. It appears from the record that the respondent Panis
was counsel for the administration of said estate and that he on October 31, 1927, before
the final settlement of accounts, presented a motion in the probate proceedings for the
allowance of attorney's fees in the sum of P15,000. On December 5, 1927, the respondent
judge, over the objections in writing presented by the administrator, granted the motion
and allowed the fees claimed by Panis. The administrator, herein petitioner, did not
appeal from the order of the court.

However, on February of 1928, Jacinto Yangco, in his capacity as guardian ad litem of

the minors Pedro and Bruno Uy Tioco, the sons and then only heirs of the deceased,
presented a motion for reconsideration under section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure
on the grounds. that he was not notified of the motion for the allowance of fees and had
no knowledge thereof or of the order granting the motion until a few days before the filing
of the motion for reconsideration; that the fees allowed Panis were excessive and
prejudicial to the interests of the estate; and that considering the nature of the work
performed, the services rendered by him did not warrant the payment of the sum claimed.

This motion was denied on February 15, 1928, the respondent judge holding that while
the heirs of the deceased were not notified of the hearing of the motion for allowance of
attorney's fees, such notice was duly served upon the administrator; that that was a
sufficient compliance with the law; that the curador ad litem might have the right to
intervene in the case but had no absolute right to be notified of the motion; that the
provisions of section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not applicable to the case;
and that, in any event, the motion for reconsideration is entirely without merit.

On February 23, 1928, the guardian ad litem excepted to the order of February 15, 1928,
and gave notice of his intention to appeal to the Supreme Court. On the 28th of the same
month, Attorney Felix Wijangco, on behalf of Panis, filed a motion in the probate
proceedings in which he set forth that the minor Bruno Uy Tioco is now deceased and
that his share of the inheritance will go to his father, the herein petitioner; that the property
involved in the case is community property of which one-half belongs to the petitioner;
that consequently the minor Pedro Uy Tioco is only entitled to a one-fourth of the property
pertaining to the estate, and that therefore his appeal from the order allowing the
attorney's fees can only relate to one-fourth of the amount allowed, wherefore the movent
asked that the administrator be ordered to make payment of threefourths (¾) of the
amount within five days from the presentation of the motion.

To this motion the guardian ad litem objected, but under the date of March 6, 1928, the
respondent judge ordered the administrator to make payment of three-fourths of the
P15,000, within five days. The administrator refused to make such payment, and on
March 17th the court, after citing him to show cause, again ordered him to pay as provided
for in the order of March 6, under penalty of removal from office. The present action was
thereupon brought. Upon the filing of the petition the respondents were ordered to answer
within ten days. Instead of filing an answer, as ordered, the respondents submitted a
demurrer which we, considering that there can be no dispute as to the essential facts,
shall regard as a sufficient answer to said petition.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the appeal was perfected and the writ of prohibition be granted?

2. Can the attorney hold the estate directly liable for his fees (attorney’s fees)?

RULING:

1. YES, the appeal was perfected and the writ of prohibition must be granted. In the
case at bar, some of the heirs of the deceased objected to the allowance of 15,000
attorney’s fees on the ground that it was excessive and filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied. They thereupon appealed. After the necessary
bond had been given and the appeal perfected. The appeal embraced the whole
amount of the allowance for attorney's fees; that after the appeal was perfected
the lower court had no jurisdiction to order immediate payment; and that the writ
of prohibition should issue.

For the reasons stated the respondent judge is hereby prohibited from enforcing
the payment of the attorney's fees above-mentioned until the appeal taken by
Jacinto Yangco, as guardian ad litem for the minor Pedro Uy Tioco, has been
passed upon by this court or dismissed. No costs will be allowed. So ordered.

2. NO, the attorney CANNOT hold the estate directly liable for his fees.

The services for which fees are claimed are supposed to have been rendered to
the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust. The attorney
can therefore not hold the estate directly liable for his fees; such fees are allowed
 to the executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The liability for the payment
rests on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial to the
estate and reasonable, he is entitled to reimbursement from the estate. Such
payments should be included in his accounts and the reimbursement therefor
settled upon the notice prescribed in section 682 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Rule 86 Claims Against Estate

Period to File Claims

1. Afan v. De Guzman, 107 Phil 839 (1960)

DOCTRINE/S:

CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE; WHEN FILED.

Prior to the distribution of the estate of the deceased, on application of a creditor
who has failed to file his claim within the time provided for in Section 2, Rule 87, of the
Rules of Court, the Court may allow such claim to be filed, subject to the following
conditions: (1) there must be an application therefor; (2) a cause must be shown why the
permission should be granted; and (3) the extension of time granted for the filing of the
claim shall not exceed one month.
"Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice provided in the preceding
section, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall
not be more than twelve nor less than six months after the date of the first publication of
the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application
of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court
may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claims to be filed
within a time not exceeding one month."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEN CLAIMANT NOT ENTITLED TO EXTENSION OF PERIOD FOR FILING CLAIM.

The failure to file a claim within the time provided therefor upon the sole ground
that the claimant was negotiating with one of the heirs for payment, is not sufficient to
justify the extension of the reglementary period for the filing of the claim (In re: Estate of
De Dios, 24 Phil., 573, 576).

NEGLECT TO FILE CLAIM AFTER CLAIMANT HAD KNOWLEDGE OF DEATH OF

DECEDENT.
Where a claimant knew of the death of the decedent and for four or five months
thereafter he did nothing to present his claim, the fact that he was negotiating with one of
the heirs can hardly be considered as a good excuse for such neglect (In re: Estate of
Tiangco, 39 Phil., 967).

FACTS:
It appears that, on July 12, 1957, De Guzman filed, in this special proceeding for
the settlement of intestate estate of Arsenio R. Afan, a claim for P1,000, allegedly due
from the latter, with interest thereon, within 30 days from August 16, 1949, as set forth in
a promissory note then issued by Afan. the administratrix of his estate objected to the
consideration of the claim upon the ground, among others, that it had been filed long after
the expiration of the period for the presentation of claims against said estate. For this
reason, the lower court issued the order appealed from, refusing to entertain the
aforementioned claim.

ISSUE/S:
 Whether or not the lower court should have entertained De Guzman’s claim, the
same having been filed prior to the distribution of the estate of the deceased.

RULING:
No. "Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice provided in the
preceding section, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate,
which shall not be more than twelve nor less than six months after the date of the first
publication of the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered,
on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously
limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such
claims to be filed within a time not exceeding one month."
The second sentence thereof clothes the court with authority to permit the filing of
a claim after the lapse of the period stated in the first sentence, but prior to said
distribution, subject to the following conditions, namely: (1) there must be an application
therefor; (2) a cause must be shown why the permission should be granted; and (3) the
extension of time granted for the filing of the claim shall not exceed one (1) month.
Here, De Guzman has not sought permission to file his claim. Moreover, the same
does not allege any reason why he should be excused for his failure to file the claim in
this proceeding within the period stated in the Rules of Court.
Again, whether or not the reasons given - and none were set forth in De Guzman’s
claim - are sufficient, rests upon the discretion of the court (Roguera v. Tanordra, 81 Phil.,
404; Umpig, Et. Al. v. De Gala, Et Al., 96 Phil., 77; 50 Off. Gaz, 5305), and the record
before us does not show that the lower court has abused its discretion in acting as it did
in the present case. De Guzman now alleges, for the first time, a "cause" why the lower
court should allegedly have considered his claim.
He says, in his brief (p. 6, thereof) that "he had no actual knowledge of the fact that
the estate of the deceased . . . was then already in the process of settlement . . ." He did
not explain why he refrained from making such averment either in his claim or in the
motion, filed by him in the lower court, for a reconsideration of the order appealed from.
The reason is, however, not difficult to surmise - he had actual knowledge of the present
proceeding long before the filing of his claim therein on July 27, 1957. To be precise, he
was aware of its existence as early as August, 1955.
Instead of furnishing a "cause" for the extension of the reglementary period for the
filing of his claim, this omission on the part of De Guzman fully justifies the denial of
such extension and the order appealed from.
We have already held that failure to file a claim within the time provided
therefor upon the sole ground that the claimant was negotiating with one of the
heirs for payment, is not sufficient to justify extension (In Re: Estate of De Dios, 24
Phil., 209), and that, where a claimant knew of the death of the decedent and for four
(4) or five (5) months thereafter he did nothing to present his claim, this can hardly
be considered as a good excuse for such neglect (In Re: Estate of Tiangco, 39 Phil.,
967).

2. Heirs of Pizarro v. Consolacion, G.R. No. 51278, 8 May 1988

DOCTRINE/S:
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Probate; Period of filing claims against the
estate; Purpose of fixing the period within which claims against the estate must be
presented.—The range of the period specified in the rule is intended to give the probate
court the discretion to fix the period for the filing of claims. The probate court if the by the
rule to set the period provided it is not less than six (6) months nor more than twelve (12)
months from the day of the first publication of the notice thereof. Such period once fixed
by the court is mandatory. The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims
against an estate must be presented, is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of
the deceased person and the person entitled to the same.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the notice issued and the period set by the
trial court was not in accordance with the requirements of the rules, the period fixed
in the rules is not less than 6 months nor more than 12 months from date of first publication
of notice.—Since the notice issued and the period set by the trial court was not in
accordance with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, what
should then apply is the period as provided for by the rules which is not less than
six months nor more than twelve (12) months from the date of first publication of
notice. The first publication of the notice in the Mindanao Times was on March 30, 1978.
Thus the two claims of petitioners against the estate which were filed on March 5, 1979
and March 29, 1979 respectively were filed on time.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Trial court with competence and jurisdiction to
determine whether the appeal involves a question of law or both questions of law and
fact; Provision on erroneous appeal under Sec. 3, Rule 50, when applicable.—We find
the action taken by the trial court to be well-taken. Certainly, it is within the competence
and jurisdiction of the trial court to determine whether the appeal interposed was based
on pure questions of law or involves both questions of law and facts in considering the
appeal. The provision of Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court applies only when
the appeal is already brought to the Court of Appeals at which time it may, instead of
dismissing the appeal, upon determination that it involves a pure question of law, order
that the case be certified to this Court.
Same; Same; Same; Notice of appeal; Failure to indicate in the notice of appeal
the court to which appeal is being interposed, merely directory, and non-compliance
therewith is not fatal to the appeal.—It must be noted that in the notice of appeal it is
not even required that the appellant indicate the court to which its appeal is being
interposed. The requirement is merely directory and failure to comply with it or error in
the court indicated is not fatal to the appeal.

FACTS:
Petitioners are the oppositors in SP No. 2116 in the Davao CFI for settlement of
the estate of deceased Dominga Garcia, filed by private respondent Luis Tan alias Chen
Yeh-An. Luis Tan filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in favor of a
certain Alfonso Atilano, alleging he is the only surviving son of Garcia who died intestate;
that the deceased left a parcel of land in the possession of the heirs of Ramon Pizarro, 2
petitioners herein.
Petitioners filed an opposition to the said petition claiming that they are the heirs
of Pizarro who died intestate; and that the deceased was the vendee of 1/2 of the lot by
virtue of an extrajudicial settlement of estate and deed of absolute sale executed by Tan.
Petitioners prayed that letters of administration of Garcia's estate be issued in favor of
anyone of them.
The respondent court set the petition for hearing and this was duly published in the
Mindanao Times. The parties then entered into a compromise whereby petitioners agreed
to withdraw their opposition to the appointment of private respondent's “recomendee (pls
wag niyo palitan ayan mismo nakalgay sa case)” and for the intestate proceedings to
proceed in due course; approved by court.
After the judicial administrator had qualified and his inventory of the assets of the
late Dominga Garcia was approved, respondent court issued an order requiring the
filing of creditors’ claim against the said estate within the period of six (6) months
from the date of the first publication. Copy of said order was received by petitioners
through counsel.
Private respondent and the City of Davao filed a joint motion asking respondent
court to take notice of their agreement which in substance provides for an agreement to
file a joint motion in the CFI of Davao to proceed with the determination of the heirs of the
deceased Garcia which shall be determinative of their respective claims against the
estate. Petitioners filed their opposition to the said joint motion on the sole ground that it
is without procedural basis.
Private respondent filed a motion to drop and exclude the petitioners on the ground
that they do not even claim to be the heirs of the deceased Dominga Garcia and that the
extrajudicial deed of partition and deed of absolute sale allegedly executed in Hongkong
in favor of the petitioners’ deceased father is spurious and simulated.
Petitioners filed their opposition to said motion. They likewise filed a claim against
the estate of the deceased Garcia in the amount of P350,000.00 representing services
allegedly rendered by their deceased father in favor of Vicente Tan.
Private respondent filed a reply to petitioners' opposition and a motion to strike out
or dismiss the claim on the ground that it is spurious and barred for having been filed
beyond the 6 month period set in the notice for the filing of creditors' claim.
Petitioners filed another claim against the estate for P200,000.00 allegedly
advanced by their deceased father for the payment of realty and income taxes of the said
lot sometime in 1936, to which claim private respondent filed an opposition on the ground
that it is barred for having been filed beyond the six (6) month period and that it was
merely intended to delay the proceedings.
Respondent court dismissed both claims of the petitioners on the ground that they
are barred for having been filed out of time.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the claims were filed on time?

RULING:
YES, the claims were filed on time. Petitioner contended that the filing of such
claims should be for a period of 6 months starting from the sixth (6th) month after the date
of the first publication of the notice down to the twelfth (12th) month. They argue that to
require filing of claims within the 6th month from publication of notice will shorten the
period in violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 2, Rule 86
Section 2, Rule 86, provides that: “Time within which claims shall be filed.—In the
notice provided in the preceding section, the court shall state the time for the filing of
claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve (12) nor less than six (6)
months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at anytime before an
order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim
within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as
are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one (1) months”
The court agrees. The range of the period specified in the rule is intended to give
the probate court the discretion to fix the period for the filing of claims. The probate court
is permitted by the rule to set the period provided it is not less than six (6) months nor
more than twelve (12) months from the date of the first publication of the notice thereof.
Such period once fixed by the court is mandatory.
The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against an estate
must be presented, is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased person
and the early delivery of the property to the person entitled to the same.
In Sikat vs. Vda. de Villanueva, this Court ruled that the speedy settlement of the
estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue
by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been
paid is the ruling spirit of our probate law.
However, in this case the trial court set the period for the filing of the claims within
six (6) months from the date of the first publication of the notice. It was obviously short of
the minimum limit of six (6) months provided for by the law. Petitioner correctly observed
that the trial court thereby shortened the period set by the law.
Since the notice issued and the period set by the trial court was not in accordance
with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, what should then apply
is the period as provided for by the rules which is not less than six months nor more than
twelve (12) months from the date of first publication of notice. The first publication of the
notice in the Mindanao Times was on March 30, 1978. Thus the two claims of petitioners
against the estate which were filed on March 5, 1979 and March 29, 1979 respectively
were filed on time.

Nature of Claims
3. Gutierrez v. Berretto-Datu, 5 SCRA 757 (1962)

DOCTRINE/S:
Settlement of decedent’s estate; claims required to be presented against
decedent’s estate claim for damages arising from breach of lease contract - The word
“claims” as used in statutes requiring presentation of claims against a decedent’s estate
is generally construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have
been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime and could have been reduced to simple
money judgments and among these are those founded upon contract. In the case at bar,
the claim is for damages arising from a breach of a lease contract allegedly committed by
the decedent. It falls squarely under sec. 5 Rule 87 of the Rules of Court

FACTS:
In 1940, Maria Gerardo Vda. de Barreto owned 371 hectares of fishpond land in
Pampanga. Such land was leased to herein appellant Ricardo Gutierrez for a term that
will expire in 1947. Sometime in November 1941, pursuant to a decision from the Dept.
of Public Works, the dikes of the fishponds were opened at several points resulting in
their destruction and loss of fish to the damage of appellant-lessee Gutierrez.
Maria Gerardo Vda. de Barreto died sometime in 1948 and on 7 June 1957 the
administration proceeding to settle her estate, appellant Gutierrez filed a claim for 32k
representing advanced rentals which he had paid to the decedent Maria and for 60k as
damages in the concept of unearned profits which Guitierrez failed to realize because of
the breach of the lease contract allegedly committed by the decedent.
Gutierrez commenced an ordinary civil action in the CFI against the executor
of the testate estate of the decedent for the recovery of the 60k claimed in the
administration proceeding. In July 1957, Gutierrez amended his claim in the
administration proceeding by withdrawing the 60k claim, leaving only the 32k.
The CFI dismissed the case filed by Gutierrez on the ground that the claim should
have been prosecuted in the testate proceeding and not by ordinary civil action.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Gutierrez’s claim for damages based on unrealized profits is a
money claim against the estate of the deceased within the purview of sec. 5, Rule 87.

RULING:
Yes. Under sec. 5 Rule 87, it states: “SEC. 5. Claims which must be filed under
the notice. If not filed, barred; exception. — All claims for money against the decedent,
arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses of the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time
limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set forth
as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the
claimants.
Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action
already commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer
the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the
court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such
action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so
determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim
had been presented directly before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims
not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.”
The word claims, in the above-quoted provision requiring the presentation of
claims against a decedent’s estate is generally construed to mean debts or demands of
a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the deceased in his his
lifetime and could have been reduced to simple money judgments; and among these are
those founded upon contract.
 The claim in this case is based on a lease contract between Gutierrez and the
decedent - specifically, on a breach thereof. Thus, it falls squarely under sec 5, Rule 87.
Simply put, the claim of Gutierrez for damages on the breach of the lease contract should
have been brought in the testate proceeding and not by ordinary civil action.

NOTE
Upon all contracts by the decedent broken during his lifetime, even though they
were personal to the decedent in liability, the personal representative is answerable for
the breach out of the assets. A claim for breach of a covenant in a deed of the decedent
must be presented under a statute requiring such presentment of all claims grounded on
contract.
The only actions that may be instituted against the executor or administrator are
those to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon,
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal. The
present case is not one of them.

4. Aguas v. Llemos, 5 SCRA 939 (1962)

DOCTRINE/S:
Those concerning claims that are barred if not filed in the estate settlement
proceedings (Rule 87, sec. 5) and those defining actions that survive and may be
prosecuted against the executor or administrator (Rule 88, sec. 1), it is apparent that
actions for damages caused by tortious conduct of a defendant (as in the case at bar)
survive the death of the latter. Under Rule 87, section 5, the actions that are abated by
death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent;
(2) judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from
contract express or implied". None of these includes that of the plaintiffs-appellants; for it
is not enough that the claim against the deceased party be for money, but it must arise
from "contract express or implied", and these words (also used by the Rules in connection
with attachments and derived from the common law) were construed in Leung Ben vs.
O'Brien, 38 Phil., 182, 189-194. to include all purely personal obligations other than those
which have their source in delict or tort.
Upon the other hand, Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against
a decedent's executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real and
personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to
recover damages for an injury to person or property. The present suit is one for damages
under the last class, it having been held that "injury to property" is not limited to injuries
to specific property, but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or
diminished (Baker vs. Crandall, 47 Am. Rep. 126; also 171 A.L.R., 1395). To maliciously
cause a party to incur unnecessary expenses, as charged in this case, is certainly
injurious to that party's property (Javier vs. Araneta, L-4369, Aug. 31, 1953).

FACTS:
Salinas and the spouses Felix Guardino and Maria Aguas jointly filed an action in
the Court of First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar (Civil Case No. 4824), to recover
damages from Hermogenes Llemos, averring that the latter had served them by
registered mail with a copy of a petition for a writ of possession.
Plaintiffs proceeded to the court from their residence in Manila accompanied by
their lawyers, only to discover that no such petition had been filed; and that defendant
Llemos maliciously failed to appear in court, so that plaintiffs' expenditure and trouble
turned out to be in vain.
Before he could answer the complaint, the defendant died. Upon leave of court,
plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the heirs of the deceased. The heirs filed a
motion to dismiss.
 Court below dismissed it, on the ground that the legal representative, and not
the heirs, should have been made the party defendant; and that anyway the action
being for recovery of money, testate or intestate proceedings should be initiated and the
claim filed therein.

ISSUE/S:
WON the plaintiff may include the heirs in the action for recovery of money.

RULING:
Yes. Plaintiffs argue with considerable cogency that contrasting the correlated
provisions of the Rules of Court, those concerning claims that are barred if not filed in the
estate settlement proceedings (Rule 87, sec. 5) and those defining actions that survive
and may be prosecuted against the executor or administrator (Rule 88, sec. 1), it is
apparent that actions for damages caused by tortious conduct of a defendant (as in the
case at bar) survive the death of the latter. Under Rule 87, section 5, the actions that are
abated by death are: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of
the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money against the
decedent, arising from contract express or implied". None of these includes that of the
plaintiffs-appellants; for it is not enough that the claim against the deceased party be for
money, but it must arise from "contract express or implied", and these words (also used
by the Rules in connection with attachments and derived from the common law) were
construed in Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil., 182, 189-194. to include all purely personal
obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort. Upon the other hand,
Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or
administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the
estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an
injury to person or property. The present suit is one for damages under the last class, it
having been held that "injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific property, but
extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished.
Be that as it may, it now appears from a communication from the Court of First
Instance of Samar that the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement of their
differences, and that they have agreed to dismiss this appeal.
The settlement has been approved and embodied in an order of the Court of First
Instance.
The case having thus become moot, it becomes unnecessary to resolve the
questions raised therein. This appeal is, therefore, ordered dismissed, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

Procedure

1. Santos v. Manarang, 27 Phil 209 (1914)

DOCTRINE/S:

FACTS:
Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real and
personal property which, by his last will and testament, he left to his three children. The
fourth clause of this will reads as follows:
“I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my
desire that they may be religiously paid by my wife and executors in the form and
at the time agreed upon with my creditors.”
Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in favor of the plaintiff,
Isidro Santos; one due on April 14, 1907, for P5,000, and various other described as
falling due at different dates (the dates are not given) amounting to the sum of P2,454.
The will was duly probated and a committee was regularly appointed to hear and
determine such claims against the estate as might be presented.
 This committee submitted its report to the court on June 27, 1908. On July 14,
1908, the plaintiff, Isidro Santos, presented a petition to the court asking that the
committee be required to reconvene and pass upon his claims against the estate which
were recognized in the will of testator. This petition was denied by the court, and on
November 21, 1910, the plaintiff instituted the present the will as due him. Relief was
denied in the court below, and now appeals to this court.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner’s claim is within the purview of the committee’s
jurisdiction.

RULING:
The petition of the plaintiff filed on November 21, 1910, wherein he asks that the
administratrix be compelled to pay over to him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts
due him appears to be nothing more nor less than a complaint instituting an action against
the administratrix for the recovery of the sum of money. Obviously, the plaintiff is not
seeking possession of or title to real property or specific articles of personal property.
When a committee is appointed as herein provided, no action or suit shall be commenced
or prosecute against the executor or administrator upon a claim against the estate to
recover a debt due from the state; but actions to recover the seizing and possession of
real estate and personal chattels claimed by the estate may be commenced against him.
(Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.)
It is evident from the brief outline of the sections referred to above that the Code
of Civil Procedure has established a system for the allowance of claims against the
estates of decedents.
Those are at least two restrictions imposed by law upon the power of the testator
to dispose of his property, and which pro tanto restrict the maxim that "the will of the
testator law:
(1) His estate is liable for all legal obligations incurred by him; and
(2) he can not dispose of or encumber the legal portion due his heirs by force of law. The
former take precedence over the latter. (Sec. 640, Code Civ, Proc.)
In case his estate is sufficient they must be paid. (Sec, 734, id.) In case the estate
is insolvent they must be paid in the order named in section 735. It is hardly necessary to
say that a provision in an insolvent's will that a certain debt be paid would not entitle it to
preference over other debts. But, if the express mention of a debt in the will requires the
administrator to pay it without reference to the committee, what assurance is there, in the
case of an insolvent estate, that it will not take precedence over preferred debts?
If it is unnecessary to present such claim to the committee, the source of
nonclaims is not applicable. It is not barred until from four to ten years, according to its
classification in chapter 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, establishing questions upon
actions. Under such circumstances, when then the legal portion is determined? If, in the
meantime the estate has been distributed, what security have the differences against the
interruption of their possession? Is the administrator required to pay the amount stipulated
in the will regardless of its correctness? And, if not, what authority has he to vise the
claim?
Section 706 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an executor may,
with the approval of the court, compound with a debtor of deceased for a debt due
the estate, But he is nowhere permitted or directed to deal with a creditor of the
estate. On the contrary, he is the advocate of the estate before an impartial
committee with quasi-judicial power to determine the amount of the claims against
the estate, and, in certain cases, to equitably adjust the amounts due. The
administrator, representing the debtor estate, and the creditor appear before this
body as parties litigant and, if either is dissatisfied with its decision, an appeal to
the court is their remedy. To allow the administrator to examine and approve a
claim against the estate would put him in the dual role of a claimant and a judge.
The law in this jurisdiction has been so framed that this may not occur.
 The most important restriction, in this jurisdiction, on the disposition of property by
will are those provisions of the Civil Code providing for the preservation of the legal
portions due to heirs by force of law, and expressly recognized and continued in force by
sections 614, 684, and 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But if a debt is expressly
recognized in the will must be paid without its being verified, there is nothing to prevent a
partial or total alienation of the legal portion by means of a bequest under a guise of a
debt, since all of the latter must be paid before the amount of the legal portion can be
determined.
Plaintiff's argument at this point becomes obviously inconsistent. Under his first
assignment of error he alleges that the committee on claims should have been
reconvened to pass upon his claim against the estate. It is clear that this committee has
nothing to do with legacies. It is true that a debt may be left as a legacy, either to the
debtor (in which case it virtually amounts to a release), or to a third person. But this case
can only arise when the debt is an asset of the estate. It would be absurd to speak of a
testator's leaving a bare legacy of his own debt. (Arts. 866, 878, Civil Code.) The creation
of a legacy depends upon the will of the testator, is an act of pure beneficence, has no
binding force until his death, and may be avoided in whole or in part by the mere with
whim of the testator, prior to that time. A debt arises from an obligation recognized by law
(art. 1089, Civil Code) and once established, can only be extinguished in a lawful manner.
(Art. 1156, id.) Debts are demandable and must be paid in legal tender. Legacies may,
and often do, consist of specific articles of personal property and must be satisfied
accordingly. In order to collect as legacy the sum mentioned in the will as due him, the
plaintiff must show that it is in fact a legacy and not a debt. As he has already attempted
to show that this sum represents a debt, it is an anomaly to urge now it is a legacy.
But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered as partaking of the
nature of a legacy and disposed of accordingly. If this be perfect then the plaintiff would
receive nothing until after all debts had been paid and the heirs by force of law had
received their shares. From any point of view the inevitable result is that there must be a
hearing sometime before some tribunal to determine the correctness of the debts
recognized in the wills of deceased persons. This hearing, in the first instance, cannot be
had before the court because the law does not authorize it. Such debtors must present
their claims to the committee, otherwise their claims will be forever barred.

2. Estate of Olave v. Reyes, 123 SCRA 767 (1983)

PETITIONER: ESTATE OF AMADEO MATUTE OLAVE, as represented

by JOSE S. MATUTE

RESPONDENT: HONORABLE MANASES G. REYES, Presiding Judge of

Branch III, Court of First Instance of Davao, SAMC

DOCTRINE/S: Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estates; Probate

Court; Purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of estate in the probate
court.—The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the
probate court is to protect the estate of deceased persona. That way, the executor or
administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one
which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring
presentation is to apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the
claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by
pro-rata portion in the due course of the administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a
person, his entire estate is burdened with the payment of all of his debts and no creditor
shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shall share pro-rata in the liquidation of
the estate of the deceased.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Where the estate of a deceased person is
already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter
into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court.—Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that “the court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of all other courts.” (Italics supplied). The law is clear that where the estate of the
deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the
administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the
probate court.

FACTS:
The subject in this case is the amicable settlement submitted by the parties in Civil
Case 4623 which was approved by herein respondent Judge Reyes. It is alleged that the
estate of Amadeo Matute Olave is the owner of a parcel of land, situated in sitio
Tibambam, municipality of Sigaboy.
In April 1965 herein private respondent (SAMCO) Filed the aforesaid civil case
against Carlos v. Matute and Matias S. Matute, as defendants, in their capacities as co-
administrators of the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, for the collection of an alleged
indebtedness of P19,952.11 and for attorney's fees of P4,988.02.
The parties (plaintiff and defendants) in Civil Case No. 4623 of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, submitted to the respondent court an Amicable Settlement whereby
the property of the estate covered by OCT No. 0-27 of Davao was conveyed and ceded
to SAMCO as payment of its claim.
That the said Amicable Settlement signed by the herein respondents was not
submitted to and approved by the then Court of First Instance of Manila nor notice thereof
made to the beneficiaries and heirs in said special proceedings; Respondent court despite
the lack of prior approval of the probate court, approved the said amicable settlement.
Respondent contended that the Amicable Settlement need not be approved by the
probate court, "the same having been entered into in another independent action and in
another court of co-equal rank”.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the prior approval of the probate court is needed in case of an amicable
settlement for the payment of debt of the estate?

RULING:
YES, the prior approval of the probate court is needed in case of an amicable
settlement for the payment of debt of the estate.
Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, provides that “no action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced
against the executor or administrator; x x x.”
The claim of private respondent SAMCO being one arising from a contract may be
pursued only by filing the same in the administration proceedings in the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Sp. Proc. No. 25876) for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Amadeo Matute Olave; and the claim must be filed within the period prescribed,
otherwise, the same shall be deemed “barred forever.” (Section 5, Rule 86, Rules of
Court).
The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the
probate court is to protect the estate of deceased persons. That way, the executor or
administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one
which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring
presentation is to apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the
claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by
pro-rata portion in the due course of the administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a
person, his entire estate is burdened with the payment of all of his debts and no creditor
shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shall share pro-rata in the liquidation of
the estate of the deceased.
It is clear that the main purpose of private respondent SAMCO in filing Civil Case
No. 4623 in the then Court of First Instance of Davao was to secure a money judgment
against the estate which eventually ended in the conveyance to SAMCO of more than
twenty-nine (29) hectares of land belonging to the estate of the deceased Amadeo Matute
Olave in payment of its claim, without prior authority of the probate court of Manila, in Sp.
Proc. No. 25876, which has the exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of Amadeo Matute
Olave. It was a mistake on the part of respondent court to have given due course to Civil
Case No. 4623, much less issue the questioned Order, dated November 10, 1967,
approving the Amicable Settlement.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that “the court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts.” (Italics supplied). The law is clear that where the
estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding,
the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of
the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the Order, dated
November 10, 1967, of the respondent court approving the Amicable Settlement of the
parties in Civil Case No. 4623 of the then Court of First Instance of Davao, is hereby SET
ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

Attorney’s fees

3. Salonga Hernandez v. Pascual, GR No. 127165, May 2, 2006

DOCTRINE/S:
We reiterate that as a general rule, it is the executor or administrator who is
primarily liable for attorney's fees due to the lawyer who rendered legal services for the
executor or administrator in relation to the settlement of the estate. The executor or
administrator may seek reimbursement from the estate for the sums paid in attorney's
fees if it can be shown that the services of the lawyer redounded to the benefit of the
estate.

However, if the executor or administrator refuses to pay the attorney's fees, the lawyer
has two modes of recourse.

First, the lawyer may file an action against the executor or administrator, but in his/her
personal capacity and not as administrator or executor.

Second, the lawyer may file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings, asking the
court to direct the payment of attorney's fees as an expense of administration.

FACTS:
The case actually centers on two estate proceedings, that of Doña Adela Pascual
(Doña Adela) and the other, her husband Don Andres Pascual's (Don Andres), who
predeceased her. Don Andres died intestate, while Doña Adela left behind a last will and
testament. an intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Don Andres was
commenced by his widow Doña Adela before the then Court of First Instance, now
Regional Trial Court of Pasig. In the meantime, Doña Adela died on 18 August 1987,
leaving behind a last will and testament executed in 1978, designating Olivia Pascual as
the executrix, as well as the principal beneficiary of her estate. The will also bequeathed
several legacies and devises to several individuals and institutions.
Olivia Pascual then engaged the services of petitioner in connection with the
settlement of the estate of Doña Adela.
Their agreement as to the professional fees due to petitioner is contained in a letter
dated 25 August 1987, signed by Atty. Esteban Salonga in behalf of petitioner and Olivia
Pascual. It is stipulated therein, among others, that the final professional fee "shall be 3%
of the total gross estate as well as the fruits thereof based on the court approved inventory
of the estate.
 Petitioner filed a Notice of Attorney's Lien equivalent to three percent (3%) of the
total gross estate of the late Doña Adela S. Pascual as well as the fruits thereof based on
the court approved inventory of the estate, pursuant to the retainer agreement signed by
and between petitioner and Olivia S. Pascual.
In an Order dated 4 November 1993, the Probate Court ruled that petitioner's
"notice of attorney's lien, being fully supported by a retainer's contract not repudiated nor
questioned by his client Olivia S. Pascual, is hereby noted as a lien that must be satisfied
chargeable to the share of Olivia S. Pascual.
This was followed by another Order, dated 11 November 1993, wherein it was
directed "that notice be x x x given, requiring all persons having claims for money against
the decedent, Doña Adela S. Vda. de Pascual.
Accordingly, on 22 November 1993, petitioner filed a Motion to Annotate Attorney's
Lien on Properties of the Estate of Doña Adela Vda. de Pascual.
Olivia Pascual filed a petition for annulment of the award of attorney's fees with the
Court of Appeals, but the same was denied, first by the appellate court, then finally by this
Court in its 1998 decision in Pascual v. Court of Appeals.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Writ of Execution for the partial execution of petitioner's
attorney's lien estimated at P1,198,097.02. The figure, characterized as "tentative," was
arrived at based on a Motion to Submit Project Partition dated 26 October 1993 filed by
Olivia Pascual.
Olivia Pascual, through Atty. Antonio Ravelo, filed her comment and/or opposition
to the motion for the issuance of a writ of execution on attorney's fees. She argued that a
lawyer of an administrator or executor should charge the individual client, not the estate,
for professional fees.

Olivia Pascual also claimed, citing jurisprudence, that the counsel claiming attorney's fees
should give sufficient notice to all interested parties to the estate, and that such was not
accomplished by petitioner considering that no notices were given to the several legatees
designated in Doña Adela's will.

the Probate Court issued the first assailed order denying the motion for writ of execution
in view of the fact that "the bulk of the estate of the late Doña Adela S. Vda. De Pascual
is still tied-up with the estate of the late Don Andres Pascual.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the counsel seeking to recover attorney's fees for legal services to the
executor or administrator is authorized to file a petition in the testate or intestate
proceedings to direct the payment of his fees as expenses of administration.
(Occena v Marquez Doctrine)

2. Whether the Motion for Writ of Execution by petitioner satisfies the requisites set
in Escueta for a claim for attorney's fees directly chargeable against the estate.

RULING:

1. Yes.

We consider whether a lawyer who renders legal services to the executor or

administrator of an estate can claim attorney's fees against the estate instead of
the executor or administrator. Petitioner correctly cites Occeña v. Marquez

as providing the governing rule on that matter as previously settled in the 1905
case of Escueta v. Sy-Juilliong to wit:
 The rule is that when a lawyer has rendered legal services to the executor
or administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust, his attorney's fees may
be allowed as expenses of administration. The estate is, however, not directly
liable for his fees, the liability for payment resting primarily on the executor or
administrator. If the administrator had paid the fees, he would be entitled to
reimbursement from the estate.

The procedure to be followed by counsel in order to collect his fees is to

request the administrator to make payment, and should the latter fail to pay, either
to (a) file an action against him in his personal capacity, and not as administrator,
or (b) file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings asking the court, after
notice to all the heirs and interested parties, to direct the payment of his fees as
expenses of administration. Whichever course is adopted, the heirs and other
persons interested in the estate will have the right to inquire into the value of the
services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his employment.

We reiterate that as a general rule, it is the executor or administrator who is

primarily liable for attorney's fees due to the lawyer who rendered legal services
for the executor or administrator in relation to the settlement of the estate. The
executor or administrator may seek reimbursement from the estate for the sums
paid in attorney's fees if it can be shown that the services of the lawyer redounded
to the benefit of the estate.

However, if the executor or administrator refuses to pay the attorney's fees, the
lawyer has two modes of recourse. First, the lawyer may file an action against the
executor or administrator, but in his/her personal capacity and not as administrator
or executor.

Second, the lawyer may file a petition in the testate or intestate proceedings,
asking the court to direct the payment of attorney's fees as an expense of
administration.

2. NO.

If the second mode is resorted to, it is essential that notice to all the heirs and
interested parties be made so as to enable these persons to inquire into the value
of the services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his employment.

It is these perspectives that we apply to the case at bar.

Notably, petitioner had filed both a Notice of Attorney's Lien and a Motion for Writ
of Execution.

The instant case is rooted in an incomplete attempt to resort to the second mode
of recovery of attorney's fees as authorized in Escueta, originating as it did from
the denial of petitioner's Motion for Writ of Execution, and not the Notice of
Attorney's Lien.

The Motion did expressly seek the payment of attorney's fees to petitioner. Escueta
and Occeña, among other cases, did clearly lay down the manner under which
such fees may be paid out even prior to the final settlement of the estate as an
administration expense directly chargeable to the estate itself.

The critical question in the present petition is thus whether this Motion for Writ of
Execution satisfies the requisites set in Escueta for a claim for attorney's fees
directly chargeable against the estate. It does not.
 The fact that the prayer for attorney's fees was cast in a motion and not a petition
should not impede such claim, considering that the motion was nonetheless filed
with the Probate Court.

However, the record bears that the requisite notice to all heirs and interested
parties has not been satisfied. Doña Adela's will designated 19 other individuals
apart from Olivia Pascual, and four (4) different institutions as recipients of devises
or legacies consisting of real properties, jewelries, and cash amounts. Yet only
Olivia Pascual was served with a copy of the Motion for Writ of Execution, the
motion which effectively sought the immediate payment of petitioner's attorney's
fees.

The requisite notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees is anchored on the
constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of property without due
process of law. The fact that these persons were designated in the will as recipients
of the testamentary dispositions from the decedent establishes their rights to the
succession, which are transmitted to them from the moment of the death of the
decedent.

The payment of such attorney's fees necessarily diminishes the estate of the
decedent, and may effectively diminish the value of the testamentary dispositions
made by the decedent. These heirs, devisees, and legatees acquire proprietary
rights by reason of the will upon the moment of the death of the decedent, incipient
or inchoate as such rights may be.

Hence, notice to these interested persons of the claims for attorney's fees is
integral, so as to allow them to pose any objections or oppositions to such claim
which, after all, could lead to the reduction of their benefits from the estate.

Rule 87 Actions by and Against Executors and Administrators

Recovery of Estate Property

2. Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil 561 (1942)

DOCTRINE/S
Upon the commencement of the testate or intestate proceedings, the heirs have
no standing in court in actions of the above character, except when the executor or
administrator is unwilling or fails or refuses to act, in which event the heirs may act in his
place.

FACTS
On 14 September 1940, while the proceedings for the probate of the will of the
deceased Eduarda de los Santos (Eduarda) were pending in the CFI Rizal, plaintiff,
Sinforoso Pascual (Sinfroso), instituted in the CFI Pampanga against Ponciano S.
Pascual (Ponciano) and others, an action for the annulment of a contract of sale of a
fishpond situated in Lubao, Pampanga, which was allegedly executed without
consideration by said deceased in her lifetime in favor of the defendants.

The complaint alleges that plaintiff and defendants are all residents of Malabon,
Rizal, and are legitimate children Eduarda. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, alleging
want of cause of action, limitation of action, wrong venue and pendency of another action.

The trial court granted the motion on the ground that the action should have been
brought by the executor or administrator of the estate left by the deceased, and directed
the plaintiff to amend his complaint within five days. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint,
the amendment consisting in that " the defendant Miguel S. Pascual has been appointed
by the Court of First Instance of Rizal as testamentary executor of the assets of the
deceased Eduarda de los Santos, in the matter of the testamentary of said deceased."

The trial court, declaring that such amendment did not cure the insufficiency of the
complaint, dismissed the action. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE/S
Whether or not Sinfroso, as one of the heirs, may file an action for recovery of the
property (in this case fishpond) included in the probate proceedings, in instances where
their executor or administrator refused or failed to do so.

RULING
Yes. This brings the case under the exception. As a general rule, under Rule 86,
Section 1, of the new Rules of Court, actions for the recovery or protection of the property
or rights of the deceased for causes which survive may be prosecuted or defended by his
executor or administrator. Upon the commencement of the testate or intestate
proceedings, the heirs have no standing in court in actions of the above character, except
when the executor or administrator is unwilling or fails or refuses to act, in which event
the heirs may act in his place.

Here, the fictitious sale is alleged to have been made to the defendants, one of
them, Miguel Pascual, being the executor appointed by the probate court. Such executor,
naturally, would not bring an action against himself for recovery of the fishpond. His
refusal to act may, therefore, be implied.

It should be noted that in the complaint the prayer is that the fishpond be delivered
not to the plaintiff but the executor, thus indicating that the action is brought in behalf of
the estate of the deceased.

NOTES
As to the issue on wrong venue, the defendants argue that an action for the
annulment of a contract of sale is a personal action which must be commenced at the
place of residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant, at the election of the plaintiff
(Rule 5, sec 1, Rules of Court), and in the instant case, both plaintiff and defendants an
residents of Malabon, Rizal, but the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga. It appearing however, that the ask is alleged to be fictitious with absolutely
no consideration, it should be regarded as a non-existent, not merely null, contract. There
being no contract between the deceased and the defendants, there is in truth nothing to
annul by action. The action brought cannot thus be for annulment of contract, but is one
for recovery of a fishpond, a real action that should be, as it has been, brought in
Pampanga where the property is located (Rule 5, sec. 3, Rules of Court.).

As to the jurisdiction of the probate court in deciding questions of title of

properties involved in the proceeding, the court is however, of the opinion and so holds
that, when as in the instant came, the parties interested on all heirs of the deceased
claiming tide under him. the question as to whether the transfer made by the latter to the
former is or is not fictitious, may properly be brought by motion in the testate or intestate
proceedings on or before the distribution of the estate among the heirs. This procedure
is optional to the parties concerned who may choose to bring a separate action and a
matter of convenience in the preparation or presentation of evidence, and accordingly,
the action brought by the appellant is not improper.

3. Rioferio et. al. v. CA, 419 SCRA 54 (2004)

DOCTRINE/S:

Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still
bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality
despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation,
namely Section 3, Rule 3 and Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.

In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young, this Court recognized the legal standing of the
heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under administration pending
the appointment of an administrator. Thus:

The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to

represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from
representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which
an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically
addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of
an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been
appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the
appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator
appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of
the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties
of the decedent are violated or dissipated.

FACTS:

On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving
several personal and real properties located in Angeles City.

He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11,
1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents.

Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour
and their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero.

On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered
that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the
properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City

Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00
from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the
properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.
respondent Alfonso "Clyde" P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
docketed as S.P. Case No. 5118 before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, praying
that letters of administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be
issued to him.

respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement

of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation
of Transfer Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related
Documents with Damages against petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the
Register of Deeds of Dagupan City before the Regional Trial Court,

The lower court denied the motion in its Order dated June 27, 1996, on the ground that
respondents, as heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in the absence of an
administrator who is yet to be appointed
Petitioners moved for its reconsideration but the motion was likewise denied.

Upon the appeal to the CA, petitioners averred that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed order which denied the dismissal of the case on the
ground that the proper party to file the complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased is the estate of the decedent and not the
respondents. The CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the
appointment of an administrator

RULING:

Yes. Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal
personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the
provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the
foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value
of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by
his will or by operation of law.

Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still
bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality
despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation,
namely Section 3, Rule 3 and Section 2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court.

Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz:

(1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and (2) when the
administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of and he is made a
party defendant. Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover
property of the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not
more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring
suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of
property of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three
exceptions, the third being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.

Provisional Authority of Probate Court

4. Modesto v. Modesto, 105 Phil 1066 (1959)

DOCTRINE/S: SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS;

PROCEEDINGS WHEN PROPERTY OF ESTATE is CONCEALED, EMBEZZLED OR
CONVEYED FRAUDULENTLY.—If an executor or administrator or any individual
interested in the estate of the deceased, complains to the court having jurisdiction of the
estate that a person or persons are suspected of having concealed, embezzled, or
conveyed away any of the properties, real or personal, of the deceased, the court may
cite such suspected person or persons to appear before it and may examine him or them
on oath on the matter of such complaint. In such proceedings the trial court has no
authority to decide whether or not said properties belong to the estate or to the persons
examined. If, after such examination there is good reason to believe that said person or
persons examined are keeping properties belonging to the estate, then the administrator
should file an ordinary action in court to recover the same.
FACTS: Bruno Modesto died leaving several heirs, among them, Cirilo Modesto and
Jesus Modesto. In the course of the intestate proceedings, Jesus Modesto, acting as
administrator of the estate of Bruno, filed on November 7, 1953, in the Court of First
Instance of Tacloban, Leyte, a motion to cite and examine under oath several persons,
especially Cirilo Modesto, regarding properties concealed, embezzled or fraudulently
conveyed. On December 7, 1953 the court issued an order appointing the Provincial
Sheriff of Leyte and the Chief of Police of Tanawan, Leyte, as joint commissioners, to
verify and ascertain persons who were holding, claiming or possessing properties
belonging to the estate of the deceased Bruno Modesto. In said motion of Jesus Modesto
he listed said properties supposed to belong to the estate, classified as follows: jewels
under items 1, 2 and 3; furniture and other personal properties under items 4-10; the 11th
item is supposed to be cash taken from a deposit in the Office of the Chief of Police of
Tanawan, Leyte, after taking funeral and other expenses, in the amount of P1,700; and
real properties under items 12-26.

On January 12, 1954, the joint commissioners submitted their report. On March 1, 1954
Jesus Modesto, administrator, filed a motion in court to require Cirilo Modesto to turn over
to him as administrator the personal properties belonging to the intestate supposed to be
in Cirilo's possession.

Pursuant to said motion, the trial court, on March 8, 1954, issued an order requiring Cirilo
Modesto to deliver to the administrator personal properties listed in the order, such as
one narra aparador, 1 desk, 1 looking glass 5x3 ft., 1 trunk containing clothes, 1 bicycle,
11 pieces of steel matting and money said to have been taken from a deposit made with
the Chief of Police in the amount of P1,700.00. Thereafter, on April 27, 1954, a writ of
execution was issued and on May 10, 1955 an alias writ of execution was also issued by
the trial court. By virtue of said writ of execution the Provincial Sheriff issued a Notice of
Attachment against the real property described in Certificate of Title No. 30167 of the
Register of Deeds of Leyte and under Tax Assessment in the name of Cirilo Modesto.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the CFI erred when it ordered Cirilo to deliver to the
administrator personal properties listed in the order?

RULING: YES, the CFI erred when it ordered Cirilo to deliver to the administrator personal
properties listed in the order.

Under Sec. 6, Rule 88 of the Rules of Court: "Sec. 6. Proceedings when property
concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.—If an executor or administrator, heir,
legatee, creditor, or other individual interested in the estate of the deceased, complains
to the court having jurisdiction of the estate that a person is suspected of having
concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the money, goods or chattels of the
deceased, or that such person has in his possession or has knowledge of any deed,
conveyance, bond, contract, or other writing which contains evidence of or tends to
disclose the right, title, interest, or claim of the deceased to real or personal estate, or the
last will and testament of the deceased, the court may cite such suspected person to
appear before it and may examine him on oath on the matter of such complaint; and if the
person so cited refused to appear, or to answer on such examination or such
interrogatories as are put to him, the court may punish him for contempt, and may commit
him to prison until he submits to the order to the court. The interrogatories put to any such
person, and his answers thereto, shall be in writing and shall be filed in the clerk's office."

In such proceedings the trial court has no authority to decide whether or not said
properties, real or personal, belong to the estate or to the persons examined. If, after such
examination there is good reason to believe that said person or persons examined are
keeping properties belonging to the estate, then the next step to be taken should be for
the administrator to file an ordinary action in court to recover the same.
In this the trial court committed error because the purpose of the section above-
reproduced, which section was taken from Section 709 of Act 190, is merely to elicit
information or to secure evidence from those persons suspected of having possessed or
having knowledge of the properties left by a deceased person, or of having concealed,
embezzled or conveyed any of the said properties of the deceased.

In the case at bar, the order requiring Cirilo to deliver the properties and cash stated in
the order, as belonging to the estate, said that Cirilo was supposed to have admitted
having received or taken possession of said properties after the death of Bruno. This
statement or findings of the lower court is not supported by the evidence on record. As a
matter of fact, in the answer of Cirilo to the motion of the administrator, he claimed that
although he held the aparador mentioned in Item 4 in the list of properties, nevertheless,
said furniture belonged to their parents and so Bruno Modesto had only 1/6 share; that
he, Cirilo, did not have the looking glass mentioned in the motion because the same had
been taken by Jesus himself, neither did he have the desk in question; that though he
held a trunk, it was empty and only contained clothes which were torn; that the bicycle in
question was in the possession of Mauricio Modesto, the nephew of Bruno; that he, Cirilo,
did not keep the 11 pieces of steel matting; neither did he ever receive the amount of
P1,700.00 supposed to have been deposited in the office of the Chief of Police. But, even
if Cirilo had admitted possession of the properties which he was required by the court to
deliver to Jesus, still it was necessary for the ordinary courts, not the probate court, to
determine the title and ownership of said properties.

5. Valera v. Inserto, GR 56504, May 7, 1987

DOCTRINE/S:
SPEC PRO; JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURT; EXCEPTION; REASON FOR THE
EXCEPTION. - Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction,and thus has no power to
take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person
adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the other parties having legal
interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question
to the ProbateCourt for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby
prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a
particular matter should be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction
or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g., probate, land registration, etc.), is in
reality not a jurisdictional but in essence a procedural one, involving a mode of practice
which may be waived.
SAME; SAME; FUNCTION OF RESOLVING WHETHER A PROPERTY SHOULD BE
INCLUDED IN THE ESTATE INVENTORY IS CLEARLY WITHIN THE PROBATE
COURT’S COMPETENCE; EXCEPTION TO THE RULE, NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS
CASE. - The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the
exception to the rule. As already earlier stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as
well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of title over the
fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and permanently, and
writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary
civil action", but merely to determine whether it should or should not be included in the
inventory. This function of resolving whether a property should be included in the estate
inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence, although the
Court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.

FACTS:
In the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Sps. Rafael Valera and
Consolacion Sarrosa - in which Eumelia Cabado and Pomillo Valera had been the
appointed administrators. Teresa Garin, the daughter of Sps. Rafael and Consolacion,
filed a motion to declare Admin. Cabado in contempt of court for her failure to render an
accounting of her administration of the estate of Sps. Rafael and Consolacion.
Admin. Cabado answered that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose
Garin, the husband of Teresa and their children, delivered to the administrator an 18
hectare fishpond belonging to the estate of Sps. Rafael and Consolacion. Jose, opposed
Admin. Cabado, saying that the fishpond was owned by his children and this is why it had
never been included in the inventory of the estate.
The probate court having jurisdiction over the case said that Admin. Cabado’s
prayer for the fishpond’s return to the estate of Sps. Rafael and Consolacion gave rise to
a claim for the recovery of an asset of the estate within the purview of Sec. 6, Rule 87,
ROC. Consequently, it ordered the heirs of Teresa Garin to immediately reconvey the
fishpond to the estate of Sps. Rafael and Consolacion.
The heirs of Garin contend that the probate court’s pronouncement regarding the
estate of Sps. Rafael and Consolacion to the fishpond was merely provisional in
character, made solely to determine whether the fishpond should be included in the
inventory of estate assets. The Administrators of the estate of Sps. Rafael and
Consolacion countered that the probate court has jurisdiction to determine ownership of
the fishpond for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the properties. The trial court
issued another order wherein it said that it did not intend to rule on the issue of ownership
of the fishpond, but the same must be delivered to the estate; and that the heirs of Garin
may pursue their claim of ownership over the same in an ordinary civil action in a court of
general jurisdiction.
Jose, the husband of Teresa moved for reconsideration of the probate court’s
decision saying that the probate court is a court of limited jurisdiction which had no
competence to rule on the ownership issue of fishpond. The motion was denied. He
appealed, but abandoned the same after the probate court authorized execution of the
order pending appeal. So instead Jose instituted a special action for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus (w/prayer for prelim.injunction) in the CA. The CA granted the petition
and ruled, among other things: that the probate court had no jurisdiction to resolve the
issue of ownership; and even assuming the probate court’s competence to resolve the
ownership question, the estate administrators would have to recover possession of the
fishpond by separate action, in view of the lessee's claim (the caretaker of the fishpond
was supposedly leasing the property with Jose as the lessor) of right to superior
possession, as lessee thereof.
The administrators of the estate of Sps.Rafael and Consolacion now goes to the
SC asserting, among others, that the CA erred in holding that the probate court had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and decide the issue of title covering the disputed
fishpond; and in ruling that the estate administrators should have filed a separate action
for the recovery of the possession of the fishpond which was then in the hands of a third
person (the caretaker/lessee named Fabiana).

ISSUE/S:
Whether the probate court has authority to order reconveyance of the fishpond to
the intestate estate of Sps. Rafael and Consolacion.

RULING:
No. Settled is the rule that a CFI (RTC) acting as a probate court, exercises limited
jurisdiction and thus has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title
to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and
all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to
the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of
third persons are not thereby prejudiced, the reason for the exception being that the
question of whether or not a particular matter should be resolved by the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (e.g.,
probate, land registration, etc.), is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence a procedural
one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived.
 In this case, as earlier stated in the facts, it was at all times clear to the probate
court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was being taken of the question of title
over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and
permanently, the question being explicitly left for determination in an ordinary civil action,
but merely to determine whether it should or should not be included in the inventory.
To put it simply, the function of resolving whether a property should be included in
the estate inventory is one clearly within the probate court’s competence, albeit the
probate court’s determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.

Rule 88 Payment of the Debts of the Estate

6. Aldamiz v. Judge of CFI-Mindoro, 85 Phil 228 (1949)

DOCTRINE:
Execution is an improper remedy for the payment of debts and expenses of
administration under the Rules of Court — the proper procedure is for the court to order
the sale of personal estate or the sale or mortgage of real property of the deceased and
all debts and expenses of administration.

FACTS:
Santiago Rementeria yAldamizcogeascoa, the decedent was a Spaniard and
member of the commercial partnership "Aldamiz y Rementeria." The other members were
his brothers. Santiago Renteria died in Spain in 1937, and probate proceedings were
instituted in the same year in the CFI of Mindoro by Gavino Aldamiz represented by Atty.
Juan L. Luna. Gavino Aldamiz was appointed administrator and was again represented
by respondent Atty. Juan Luna. After ten years from the date of his appointment, Gavino
Aldamiz, as administrator, through his attorney, Juan L. Luna, submitted his accounts for
the years 1944, 1945 and 1946 and also a project of partition with a view to closing the
proceedings. The court approved the accounts but refused to approve the project of
partition unless all debts including attorney's fees be first paid. In the project of partition,
it was expressly stated that attorney's fees, debts and incidental expenses would be
proportionately paid by the beneficiaries after the closure of the testate proceedings, but
the court refused to sanction this clause of the project. Attorney Luna, to comply with the
wishes of the court, without filing a written petition to have his professional fees fixed, and
without previous notice to all the interested parties, submitted evidence of his services
and professional standing so that the court may fix his compensation and the
administrator may make payment thereof. It is to be noted that Attorney Luna served as
attorney for the administrator as legal consultants to Santiago and his brothers and to the
"Aldamiz y Rementeria,". He did not charge them professional services, thus showing
disinterested and extreme liberality due to friendship and other personal considerations
toward his clients. When he wanted to close accounts of the estate, he showed no interest
in demanding for payment by preferring to leave the matter to the future negotiation or
understanding with the interested parties. When The amount of his fees was fixed by the
court and Gavino Aldamiz asked him for a substantial reduction, he answered that it was
not he who had fixed the amount but the court, and advise his client to file a motion for
reconsideration, with the assurance that he would offer no objection to any reduction in
amount and to any extension of the time for paying what might be granted by the court.
The Court issued its order of January 21, 1947,awarding respondent Attorney Luna, in
payment of his professional services, an aggregate sum of P 28,000. Petitioner was able
to pay P5,000 only, and upon his failure to pay the balance after several demands made
upon him by respondent attorney, the latter filed an ex-parte motion for execution which
was granted by the respondent Court.

ISSUE/S:
 WON the court erred in fixing the amount of attorney’s fees and issuing a writ of
execution

RULING:
The correct procedure for the collection of attorney’s fees, is for the counsel
to request the administrator or executor to make payment. If the judgment is rendered
against the administrator or executor and he pays, he may include the fees so paid in his
account as an expense of administration. If the administrator fails to pay, the petitioner
may file an action against him in his personal capacity and not as an administrator.
The order of execution is also null and void because a writ of execution is not
the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of the Court for the payment of debts and
expenses of administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of
personal estate or real property of the deceased and all debts or expenses of
administration should be paid out of the proceeds of the sale or mortgage. Execution may
issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs have entered into possession of their
respective portions in the estate prior to settlement and payment of the debts and
expenses of administration and it is later ascertained that there are such debts and
expenses to be paid, in which case “the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by
order for that purpose, settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much
and in what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue execution if
circumstances require.

1. Buan v. Laya, 102 Phil 662 (1957)

DOCTRINE/S:

ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSON; CONTINGENT CLAIM, CONCEPT OF. —

The petitioners filed with the CFI of Tarlac a contingent claim more than P500,000 against
the intestate estate of the deceased spouses FB and RB based on the fact that a
Philippine Rabbit Bus, owned and operated by said spouses collided in which JL and
others were riding and the collision was caused by the negligence of the driver of the bus
and as a consequence JL was killed whose surviving heirs are petitioners. The
administrator filed an opposition to said claim on the ground that it was not filed before
the death of said deceased and within the period as prescribed by the Rules. The Court
finally dismissed the contingent claim. Held: that the dismissal of the said claim by the
Court was based on incorrect and erroneous conception of a contingent claim. A
contingent claim is one which, by its nature is necessarily dependent upon an uncertain
event for its existence or validity. It may or may develop into a valid enforceable claim
and its validity and enforceability depending upon uncertain event.

TEMPORARY DISMISSAL OF AN ACTION; CONTINGENT CLAIM NOT

AFFECTED. — A contingent claim does not follow the temporary orders of dismissal of
an action upon which it is based; it awaits the final outcome thereof and only the final
result can cause its termination. The rules provide that a contingent claim is to be
presented in the administration proceedings in the same manner as any ordinary claim
and that when the contingency arises which converts the contingent claim into a valid
claim the Court should then be informed that the claim had already matured. (Secs. 5, 9,
Rule 87.)

FACTS:

A contingent claim for P50,000 was filed by Sylvia Laya against the intestate estate
of the deceased Florenica and Rizalina Buan.

The contingent claim was based on the fact that a Philippine Rabbit Bus, owned
and operated by the spouses Buan, collided with a private car resulting to the death of
Juan Laya, the father of Sylvia Laya. The driver of the bus was charged with homicide
and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and was sentenced therefor.
The heirs of Juan Laya had reserved the right to file a separate civil action, and they did
so.

Administrators of the estate opposed the contingent claim, arguing that the same
could not be allowed because it has not been filed before the death of the spouses. The
CFI of Tarlac admitted the claim, but denied that a portion of the estate be set aside to
answer for the claim. Counsel for administrator then moved to set aside the order, but
before they could do so, the civil action instituted in Manila was declared premature
because the criminal conviction is not yet final, and ordered plaintiffs therein to file an
amended complaint, which they did so. The CFI of Tarlac then dismissed the contingent
claim on the ground that the reason for the same had ceased to exist. Assuming that an
amended complaint had been filed, still, the same had not yet been acted upon.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the contingent claim may be admitted.

RULING:

A contingent claim is one that, by its nature, is dependent upon the happening of
an uncertain event. It may or may not develop into a valid claim, depending upon that
uncertain event.

Whether or not the heirs of the deceased, Juan C. Laya, would succeed in the
action brought in Manila against the administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses
Florencio Buan and Rizalina P. Buan, is the uncertain event or contingency upon which
the validity of the claim presented in the administration proceedings depends. While the
contingent event had not yet happened, Sylvia has no claim upon the intestate estate, for
such claim would only arise after the event happened. As such, the contingent claim may
not be dismissed.

Contingent claims follow the result of the action, and as such, the fact that the case
is temporarily dismissed may not terminate the claim, as only the final results of the action
could do that. The rules provide that a contingent claim is to be presented in the
administration proceedings in the same manner as any ordinary claim, and that when the
contingency arises which converts the contingent claim into a valid claim, the court should
then be informed that the claim had already matured.

Rule 89 Sales, Mortgages, and other Encumbrances of Property of Decedent

Authority to Sell/Mortgage Estate property

2. CFI of Rizal v. CA, 106 SCRA 114 (1981)

DOCTRINE/S
It is well-settled that for a person to be able to intervene in an administration
proceeding concerning the estate of a deceased person, it is necessary for him to have
an interest in such estate. An interested party in the estate of a decedent has been defined
as one who would be benefitted by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim
against the estate, such as a creditor.
 Probate court's ample discretion in determining whether conditions of a particular
sale would be beneficial to the estate, generally respected by appellate courts; Difference
in prices not a sole factor in approval of sale by the probate court.

Setting aside sale after the executrix had accepted benefits from the sale and the
vendee purchased the property in good faith is iniquitous. Subsequent increase in value
of property not justification for rejecting a conveyance made by the estate's administrator.

FACTS
On 20 October 1977, Elena Ong Escutin, executrix of the Testate Estate of the
Late Ponciano Ong Lacson, asked the probate court for authority to sell property of the
estate in order to pay the taxes and other claims against the estate. In an order dated 3
February 1978, authorized the executrix to sell the property for not less than P360,000.00.

On 28 February 1978, she was able to sold the property to Gan Heng (Gan) for
P400,000.00. She thereafter submitted the Deed of Sale to the probate court for approval
and the hearing thereof was set for 17 April 1978.

On 11 April 1978, Felix Ong (Ong) filed an opposition to the approval of the sale,
alleging, among others, that he had offered to buy the property at a higher price of
P450,000.00, which claim was denied by the executrix. The probate court then set for
hearing the only issue of whether or not Ong had made an offer to purchase the property
for P450,000.00 before the sale was made in favor of Gan.

The probate court found that Ong had not made an offer to buy the property prior
to its sale to Gan, and approved the sale to Gan.

Ong filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, to annul and set aside
the order of the probate court approving the sale, and to direct the probate court and the
executrix to accept his offer to buy the property for P450,000.00. The CA dismissed the
petition. He filed an MR.

On 21 June 1979, the Court of Appeals reversed its previous decision and granted
the petition of Ong finding that the probate court gravely abused its discretion in approving
the sale to Gan since there was an offer from Ong to buy the property at a higher price.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE/S
Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the probate court’s order allowing the
sale of the property to Gan and favoring Felix Ong’s contention to impugn the validity of
the sale of the property which was first offered to him and where he offered a higher price
to buy it.

RULING
Yes. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the order of the probate court
approving the sale of the property to Gan Heng; and in ordering the executrix to accept
the bid of Felix Ong to buy the property.
It appears that the sale sought to be annulled is a private sale duly authorized by
the probate court and not a public auction sale, although the executrix had offered the
property to different persons, so that Felix Ong, who merely offered to buy the property,
has no legal personality to impugn the validity of their said sale. It is well-settled that for
a person to be able to intervene in an administration proceeding concerning the estate of
a deceased person, it is necessary for him to have an interest in such estate. An
interested party in the estate of a decedent has been defined as one who would be
benefitted by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor, Felix Ong does not claim to be a creditor of the estate of Lacson. Neither is
he an heir of the decedent. Consequently, he has no right to intervene either in the
proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession.
At any rate, in a special proceeding for administration of an estate, the probate
court enjoys ample discretion in determining under what conditions a particular sale would
be most beneficial to all persons interested, and appellate courts are wont not to interfere
with or attempt to replace the action taken by it unless it be shown that there has been
positive abuse of discretion. In the instant case, the offer of Felix Ong to buy the property
at a higher price would not make the approval of the sale a grave abuse of discretion
because the difference in the prices was not the only factor taken into consideration by
the probate court in approving the sale.
It would be highly iniquitous to set aside the sale after the executrix had accepted
benefits therefrom. Besides, it has already been held that the subsequent increase in the
value of the property is not sufficient reason for turning down a conveyance made by an
administrator of an estate. Gan had already paid the purchase price to the executrix who
used part of it "to pay the estate and inheritance taxes due from the estate of the late Sps.
Lacson as well as in the necessary repairs made to preserve the family residence and
the 4-door apartment building belonging to the estate."
In addition, Felix Ong did not comply with the provisions of Section 3, Rule 89 of
the Rules of Court by submitting a bond in order to prevent the sale of the property.

3. Pahamotang v. PNB, GR 156403, March 31, 2005

DOCTRINE/S:
Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that when an order authorizing the sale or
encumbrance of real property was issued by the testate or intestate court without previous
notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees as required by the Rules, it is not only the
contract itself which is null and void but also the order of the court authorizing the same.
Thus, in Maneclang vs. Baun, the previous administrator of the estate filed a
petition with the intestate court seeking authority to sell portion of the estate, which the
court granted despite lack of notice of hearing to the heirs of the decedent. The new
administrator of the estate filed with the Regional Trial Court an action for the annulment
of the sales made by the previous administrator.
After trial, the trial court held that the order of the intestate court granting authority
to sell, as well as the deed of sale, were void. On appeal directly to this Court, We held
that without compliance with Sections 2, 4 and 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, "the
authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would be null and void ab initio".
In Liu vs. Loy, Jr., while the decedent was still living, his son and attorney-in-fact
sold in behalf of the alleged decedent certain parcels of land to Frank Liu. After the
decedent died, the son sold the same properties to two persons. Upon an ex parte
motion filed by the 2nd set of buyers of estate properties, the probate court approved the
sale to them of said properties. Consequently, certificates of title covering the estate
properties were cancelled and new titles issued to the 2nd set of buyers.
Frank Liu filed a complaint for reconveyance/ annulment of title with the Regional
Trial Court. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals affirmed the
dismissal. When the case was appealed to us, we set aside the decision of the appellate
court and declared the probate court's approval of the sale as completely void due to the
failure of the 2nd set of buyers to notify the heir-administratrix of the motion and hearing
for the sale of estate property.

FACTS:
The late Agustin then executed several mortgages and later sale of the properties
with the PNB and Arguna respectively without making a valid notification with the legal
heirs. The heirs later questioned the validity of the transactions prejudicial to them. The
trial court declared the real estate mortgage and the sale void. The decision was reversed
by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE/S:
 Whether the challenged orders of the intestate court granting Agustin’s petitions
were null and void for lack of compliance with the mandatory requirements of Rule 89 of
the Rules of Court

RULING:
Yes. Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that when an order authorizing the sale
or encumbrance of real property was issued by the testate or intestate court without
previous notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees as required by the Rules, it is not only
the contract itself which is null and void but also the order of the court authorizing the
same.
Clearly, the requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and
failure to give notice to the heirs would invalidate the authority granted by the
intestate/probate court to mortgage or sell estate assets.
Here, it appears that petitioners were never notified of the several petitions filed by
Agustin with the intestate court to mortgage and sell the estate properties of his wife.
According to the trial court, the "[P]etition for Authority to Increase Mortgage"
and "[P]etition for Declaration of Heirs and for Authority to Increase Indebtedness",
filed by Agustin on July 16, 1973 and October 5, 1974, respectively, do not contain
information that petitioners were furnished with copies of said petitions. Also, notices of
hearings of those petitions were not sent to the petitioners.
The trial court also found in Civil Case No. 16,802 that Agustin did not notify
petitioners of the filing of his petitions for judicial authority to sell estate properties to Arturo
Arguna and PLEI.

Rule 90 Distribution and Partition of the Estate

Partial Distribution

4. Gatmaitan v. Medina, 109 Phil 108 (1960)

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: FELICISIMO GATMAITAN

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: GORGONIO D. MEDINA

DOCTRINE/S: DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; PARTITION; PARTIAL DISTRIBUTION

PENDING TERMINATION OF PROCEEDINGS.—A partial distribution of the decedent's
estate pending the final termination of the testate or intestate proceedings should as much
as possible be discouraged by the courts and, unless in extreme cases, such form of
advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The reason for this strict rule is that
courts should guard with utmost zeal the estate of the decedent to the end that
creditors be adequately protected and rightful heirs assured of their shares in the
inheritance.

ORDER FOR PARTIAL PARTITION UNWARRANTED; CASE AT BAR.—The order of

partial distribution appealed from is unwarranted. Firstly, because it was prematurely
issued, the period for the presentation of claims not having as yet elapsed; and secondly,
because no bond was fixed by the court as a condition precedent to the partial
distribution ordered by it.

ORDER OF PARTIAL DISTRIBUTION INTERLOCUTORY; FAILURE TO MAKE TIMELY

OBJECTION; WAIVER.—When the objection is founded on the ground that the order
appealed from is interlocutory, but the appellee, before making such objection, has
allowed the record on appeal to be approved and printed, and has allowed the appellant
to print his brief, such objection is too late and is deemed waived.

FACTS:
 The petitioner in this case filed a petition, seeking his appointment as administrator
of the property of his wife, Veronica Medina, who died intestate. Gorgonio Medina and
Dominica Medina, as heirs of the deceased (she being their full-blooded sister), filed an
opposition, praying that Gorgonio Medina, or a neutral third party, or Felicisimo Gatmaitan
and Gorgonio Medina, jointly, be appointed as administrator or administrators of the
estate.
The court appointed Felicisimo Gatmaitan as administrator of the estate with a
bond in the amount of P2,000.00 and Gorgonio Medina as co-administrator without
compensation and bond.
On March 14, 1957, administrator Gatmaitan filed an amended inventory of the
estate left by the deceased consisting of an undivided half of the conjugal partnership
properties and amounting all in all to P31,336.60. An opposition to the admission of said
inventory was registered by the oppositors on the ground that the same did not represent
the true and faithful list of the properties left by the deceased, and, particularly, that a
parcel of twenty-two (22) hectares of land, more or less, was left out. In view of the
opposition, the hearing and consideration of the amended inventory was, in an order
dated April 29, 1957, postponed until further assignment.
On April 2, 1957, the heirs of the deceased, through counsel, filed a "Motion for
Partial Partition and Distribution," stating that the estate had no debts and the heirs were
all of legal age; that some of them were necessitous and in need of cash. The lower court
granted the motion without receiving any evidence whatsoever.
On April 26, 1957, the administrator, Gatmaitan, filed a motion for reconsideration,
calling attention to the fact that, contrary to what the order states, "he has not agreed to
the partial distribution of the estate in the manner contained in the order", and urging that
"the sums ordered to be partially distributed are not warranted by the circumstances
obtaining" in the case and that, moreover, "the manner of distribution will work difficulties
to the estate and to the heirs themselves". This motion was denied by the lower court.
Gatmaitan filed notice of appeal from the foregoing orders. On May 17, 1957,
appellant filed the record on appeal and notified counsel for the oppositors of the date he
would move for the approval thereof by the court. The order of Judge Felix Makasiar,
dated July 15, 1957, approving the record on appeal presented by appellant, states that
counsel for the oppositors had failed to file written opposition thereto as required in the
order of the court dated June 12, 1957, notwithstanding the length of time that had already
elapsed.
In his brief, appellant only made one assignment of error, and it reads thus: "The
lower court gravely abused its discretion in directing a partial distribution of the intestate
estate of the deceased Veronica Medina in favor of appellees, under its order of April 5,
1957, without requiring the distributees to file the proper bonds pursuant to the provisions
of Rule 91, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court."
This appeal was originally taken to the Court of Appeals, but, since there is no
serious issue of fact involved in the case, the same was certified to us pursuant to the
appellate court's resolution of August 28, 1958.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the partial distribution of the estate is valid.

RULING:
NO, the partial distribution of the estate is NOT valid. The partial distribution was
prematurely ordered by the lower court. It appears that at the time the questioned order
was rendered, the amended inventory and appraisal filed by the administrator-appellant
was not yet even accepted, and it was still under consideration by the court.
Consequently, it cannot be safely said that the court had a sufficient basis upon
which to order a partial distribution of the properties, having in mind the adverse effects
that it might have on the rights of the creditors and the heirs alike.
Second, no bond was fixed by the court as a condition precedent to the partial
distribution ordered by it, a bond which, because of the reasons already adduced,
becomes all the more imperative.
 Rule 91, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, specifically provides as follows: “When
the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowances to the widow,
and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been
paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the
estate to the person entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or parts, to
which is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from
the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. . .
. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees or any of them,
give a bond, in the sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the courts directs.”
It should be noted, furthermore, that the bond required by the Rules is not solely
for the protection of the heirs then appearing, but also for the benefit of creditors and
subsequent claimants who have not agreed to the advances.
Appellees contend that the order of partial distribution having been issued pursuant
to an agreement of the parties, the same could not now be assailed by the appellant.
While the wording of the appealed order seem to indicate that it was rendered with the
conformity of the heirs, there is reason to believe that it was just a mistaken impression
on the part of the court.

5. Quasha Pena v LCN Const, GR 174873, August 26, 2008

DOCTRINE/S:
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; REQUIREMENTS TO PERMIT THE ADVANCE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE. - In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC
whether or not to permit the advance distribution of the estate, its exercise of such
discretion should be qualified by the following: 1) only part of the estate that is not
affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject of advance
distribution (sec. 2, Rule 109); and 2) the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding obligations of the estate (2nd par. of
Sec.1, Rule 90)

FACTS:
Raymond Triviere passed away on 14 Dec. 1987. The following year, proceedings
for the settlement of his intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Triviere before
the RTC. The Quasaha Law Office represented the widow and the children of the
deceased. Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha of the aforementioned law firm were appointed
as administrators of the estate and as such they incurred expenses for the payment of
real estate taxes, security services, and the preservation and administration of the estate,
as well as litigation expenses.
Atty, Syquia and Atty. Quasha file before the RTC a motion for payment of their
litigation expenses. RTC denied their motion because both lawyer-administrators failed
to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate.
Atty. Quasha passed away, but was substituted by Atty. Zapata, also from the
same law firm. Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another motion for payment alleging,
among other things, that through their work, they were able to settle all the estate claims
except the remaining baseless claim of LCN Construction.
LCN filed its Comment/Opposition to the motion. LCN argued, among others, that
its claims are still outstanding and chargeable against the estate of the late Raymond
Triviere; thus, no distribution should be allowed until they have been paid; especially
considering that as of 25 August 2002, the claim of LCN against the estate of the late
Raymond Triviere amounted to P6,016,570.65 as against the remaining assets of the
estate totaling P4,738,558.63, rendering the latter insolvent.
This time, the RTC granted the second motion for payment. LCN moved for
reconsideration, but was denied. Upon appeal, the LCN argued, among others, that the
awards violate Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as there still exists its (LCN's)
unpaid claim in the sum of P6,016,570.65.
The CA ruled in favor of LCN. The appellate court revoked the P450k share and
P150k share awarded by the RTC to the children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere,
respectively, on the basis that Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court proscribes
the distribution of the residue of the estate until all its obligations have been paid. Hence,
the case.

ISSUE/S:
Whether the advance distribution of the estate is valid.

RULING:
No. While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the RTC
Order was not yet a distribution of the residue of the estate, given that there was still a
pending claim against the estate, still, they did constitute a partial and advance
distribution of the estate. Virtually, the petitioner children and widow were already being
awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations had been paid or provided
for.
Section 2, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly recognizes advance
distribution of the estate, thus:
“Section 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Notwithstanding a
pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court
may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that
such part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed
among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of
these rules.”
The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court allows
the distribution of the estate prior to the payment of the obligations mentioned therein,
provided that "the distributees, or any of them, gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs."
In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the
advance distribution of the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by
the following:
[1] only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or
appeal may be the subject of advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and
[2] the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of outstanding obligations of the estate (second paragraph of Section 1, Rule
90).
There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and widow
their shares in the estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations, complied with these
two requirements or, at the very least, took the same into consideration. Its Order is
completely silent on these matters. It justified its grant of the award in a single sentence
which stated that petitioner children and widow had not yet received their respective
shares from the estate after all these years.
Hence, the Court does not find that the CA erred in disallowing the advance award
of shares by the RTC to petitioner children and the widow of the late Raymond Triviere.
Furthermore, the SC held in previous cases, actually cautioned that partial
distribution of the decedent's estate pending final termination of the testate or intestate
proceeding should as much as possible be discouraged by the courts, and, except in
extreme cases, such form of advances of inheritance should not be countenanced. The
reason for this rule is that courts should guard with utmost zeal and jealousy the estate
of the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be adequately protected and
all the rightful heirs be assured of their shares in the inheritance.

Order of Partition/Distribution
6. Torres v. Encarnacion, 89 Phil 678 (1951)

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:
The petitioners contest the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge to issue the order
herein sought to be reviewed directing them to deliver to the administrator of the intestate
estate of Marcelo de Borja, (Special Proceeding No. R-2414 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal) a certain parcel of land which is in petitioners' possession and to which they
assert exclusive ownership. They contend that the administrator's remedy to recover
that property is an action at law and not by motion in the intestate proceeding.
It appears that in the above-entitled intestate estate, the commissioners appointed
by the court submitted on February 8, 1944, a project of partition, in which the land in
question, which is and was then in the possession of the herein petitioners, was included
as property of the estate and assigned to one Miguel B. Dayco, one of Marcelo de Borja's
heirs. Over the objection of the petitioners, surviving children of Quintin de Borja who was
one of Marcelo's children, the proposed partition was approved in February, 1946, and
the order of approval on appeal was affirmed by this Court in 1949. Although the
administratrix of Quintin de Borja's estate was the party named in the partition in behalf
of the estate, the proceeding for the reason that they had been declared their father's sole
heirs in the settlement of their father's estate. Moreover, one of these children was herself
the duly appointed administratrix of the last named intestate estate.
Pertinent to the question posed by the petitioners is section 1 of Rule 91 which
provides as follows: When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration,
the allowances to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall
assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the
proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, such persons may demand and recover
their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having
same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful
heirs of the deceased person or as to distributive share to which each person is entitled
under the law, the testimony as to such controversy shall be taken in writing by the judge,
under oath. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligation
above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributes, or any of
them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment
of said obligations such time as the court directs.
Applying this Rule in the case of De Jesus vs. Daza,* 43 Off. Gaz., (No. 6), 2055,
the facts of which were in all essential particulars analogous to those of the present case,
this Court said: ". . . the probate court, having the custody and control of the entire
estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this provision within the same
estate proceeding, said proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power
and function of the court can be exercised and performed without the necessity if requiring
the parties to undergo the inconvenience, delay and expense of having to commence and
litigate an entirely different action. There can be no question of the share to be delivered
the probate court would have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him
to deliver that possession to the person entitled thereto, and we see no reason, legal or
equitable, for denying the same power to the probate court to be exercised within the
same estate proceeding if the share to be delivered happens to be in the possession
of 'any other person,' especially when 'such other person' is one of the heirs
themselves who are already under the jurisdiction of the probate court in the same
estate proceeding."
There are factors present in the case at bar but not in the De Jesus vs. Daza case
which greatly reinforce the probate court's authority to make the order under review: The
partition here had not only been approved and thus become a judgment of the
court, but distribution of the petitioners had received the property assigned to them
or their father's estate. And this was not all. As the administrator had refused, on
technical grounds, to turn over to them their or their father's share, they moved for and
secured from the probate court an order for the execution of the partition. And when the
administrator elevated the case to this Court on certiorari, they as respondents in that
petition vigorously defended the probate court's action. They complained bitterly that
execution of the partition was long overdue and that the administrator was unduly
delaying the closing of the estate.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the execution of the partition was long overdue and that the
administrator was unduly delaying the closing of the estate.

RULING:
The order now before this Court has to be sustained if for no other reason than
that the petitioners are in estoppel. In the face of what they have done, they are precluded
from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it. A party can not, in law and in
good conscience, be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and
repudiate what does not suit him. There is not much to the complaint that the respondent
Judge issued the order under consideration without affording the petitioners a hearing on
the merits of their pretended title to the land in their possession. The question of the
petitioners' title and possession has been concluded by the partition and become a closed
matter. All they could prove if allowed to call witnesses would be that the aforesaid
property belonged to them or to their father's estate and that they are in possession of it
to the exclusion of Marcelo de Borja's personal representative. Granting all such proofs
to be true, as indeed we may for the purpose of this decision, yet they would not detract
from the authority of the court to make the order under consideration. The court had only
the partition to examine, to see if the questioned land was included therein. The inclusion
being shown, and there being no allegation that the inclusion was effected through
improper means or without the petitioners' knowledge, the partition barred any further
litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and
jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of the
partition. To all intents and purposes, the property was in custodia legis.
What the petitioners could have done was to ask for a reconsideration or
modification of the partition on the grounds of fraud, excusable mistake,
inadvertence, etc. if they could substantiate such allegations. They can not attack
the partition collaterally, as they are trying to do in this case. The petition is denied with
costs against the petitioners.

1. Imperial v. Monoz, 58 SCRA 678 (1974)

DOCTRINE/S:
It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and, therefore, appealable to this
Court. Under Rule 109, section 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from an
order of the Court of First Instance where such order "determines ... the distributive
share of the estate to which such person is entitled." The two (2) questioned orders,
being final in character, should have been appealed by the party adversely affected within
the 30-day reglementary period provided for appeal. This was not done.
The questioned orders having become final and, therefore, executory because of
the failure of the herein respondent Luis U. Santos to appeal on time by allowing the
period for appeal to lapse before filing his motion for correction on June 18, 1968, he has
to suffer the misfortune brought about by his own negligence and fatal inadvertence.

FACTS:
Reyes and his wife David executed three (3) indemnity agreements in favor of
Imperial Insurance jointly and severally to assure indemnification of the latter for whatever
liability it may incur in connection with its posting the security bonds to lift the attachments
in Civil Case No. Q-5213 and in Civil Case No. Q-5214, for the benefit of Reyes, and
under a homestead bond it had executed in favor of the Development Bank of the
Philippines. On the same date, Reyes and his wife paid to Imperial Insurance the sum of
P153.33 covering the premium and other expenses.
Reyes died and a Special Proceedings was commenced. His wife was appointed
as the administratix of said intestate estate of Reyes.
Meanwhile, judgment was rendered in the aforesaid two cases (Civil Cases Nos.
Q-5213 and Q-5214) against the spouses Reyes and David which has become final and
executory. Writs of execution of the decision on the said cases were returned unsatisfied.
As a consequence, judgment was rendered against the surety bonds. Imperial Insurance
made demands on David to pay the amounts under the surety bonds and arrears in
premiums thereon. When David failed to make payments, Imperial Insurance filed Civil
Case in the then CFI Manila for collection of sums of money under three (3) different
causes of action.
CFI Manila ruled in favor of Imperial Insurance. David contends that Imperial
Insurance’ claim should have been presented according to Rule 86 of the Revised Rules
of Court and its failure to do so operates to bar its claim forever.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction over Imperial Insurance’ causes of
action.

RULING:
Yes. When the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring his action
in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum. Thus, if husband and wife
bound themselves jointly and severally, in case of his death her liability is independent of
and separate from her husband’s; she may be sued for the whole debt and it would
be error to hold that the claim against her as well as the claim against her husband
should be made in the decedent’s estate.
In the case at bar, David signed a joint and several obligation with her husband in
favor of herein Imperial Insurance; as a consequence, the latter may demand from either
of them the whole obligation.
The Rules of Court provide the procedure should the creditor desire to go against
the deceased debtor, but there is nothing in the said provision making compliance with
such procedure a condition precedent before an ordinary action against the surviving
solidary debtors, should the creditor choose to demand payment from the latter, could be
entertained to the extent that failure to observe the same would deprive the court
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action against the surviving debtors. Upon the other
hand, the Civil Code expressly allows the creditor to proceed against any one of the
solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. Hence, there is nothing improper
in the creditor’s filing of an action against the surviving solidary debtors alone, instead of
instituting a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor wherein
his claim could be filed.

Rule 91 Escheats

2. In re Estate of Lao Sayco, 21 Phil 445 (1912)

DOCTRINE/S:
Section 750 of the Code of Civil Procedure, applicable to the case, reads as”
"When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal property in the Philippine
Islands, leaving no heir or person by law entitled to the same, the president and
municipal council of the municipality where the deceased last resided, if he was an
inhabitant of these Islands, or of the municipality in which he had estate, if he resided out
of the Islands, may, on behalf of the municipality, file a petition with the Court of First
Instance of the province for an inquisition in the premises; the court shall thereupon
appoint a time and place of hearing and deciding on such petition, and cause a notice
thereof to be published in some newspaper of general circulation in the province of which
the deceased was last an inhabitant, if within the Philippine Islands, and if not in some
newspaper of general circulation in the province in which he had estate. The notice shall
recite the substance of the facts and request set forth in the petition, the time and place
at which persons claiming the estate may appear and be heard before the court, and
shall be published at least six weeks successively, the last of which publications
shall be at least six weeks before the time appointed by the court to make
inquisition."

FACTS:
This is an appeal by the Chinaman Lao Chiama, administrator of the estate of the
decedent Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco, alias Saya, and guardian of the minor Lay
Cheating from the judgment rendered in a special proceeding. The municipal council of
Mambajao appeared in the said proceedings and prayed that, since Bernardo Rafanan
died in that pueblo without leaving any known legitimate successor, the real and personal
property left by the said decedent within the district of the property left by the said
decedent within the district of the aforementioned municipality be awarded to the latter.
The administrator also prayed that his administration be closed, and, as the
guardian of the Chinaman Lay Cheating, requested that the property referred to be
delivered to the latter as the son and sole heir of the decedent Rafanan. The municipal
council of Mambajao, which believed that it was entitled to the said property, opposed the
delivery of the property to the alleged heir. The lower court, rendered judgment ordering
that the property left by the decedent, Bernardo Rafanan Lao Sayco, be assigned to the
municipality of Mambajao, Province of Misamis, to be administered by its municipal
council and placed at the disposal of the school in the same manner as other property
intended for the same use

ISSUE/S:
Whether the municipality of Mambajao is entitled to the property left by the
decedent

RULING:
No. Rule 91 of the Civil Procedure provides the rules for filing a petition for escheat.
In the present case, it does not appear that there was made, at the request of counsel
for the president and the municipal council of Mambajao, the inquisition
provided by law, for the record is not accompanied by any certified copy of the
investigatory of the real and personal property that belonged to the said decedent, with a
statement of the places where the realty is located. Moreover, the notice summoning the
persons who believed they were entitled to his property should have been published
for at least six consecutive weeks, and not for three.
Furthermore, the person who lays claim to the property left by the decedent at
death, as the latter's successor or heir, must prove his identity and rights. In the
present case, counsel for the municipality of Mambajao merely prayed for an order of
reversion and for the adjudication in behalf of the municipality of the property
aforementioned; he did not comply with the provisions of the law by furnishing the
required proofs in regard to the matters hereinabove indicated, which must be the
subject of an investigation.

3. Republic v. CA & Solano, GR 143483 (2002)

DOCTRINE/S:
Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the
state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property
of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a
property is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first
comers." Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually
does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property
may be made. The procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is
generally prescribed by statute, and a time limit is imposed within which such action must
be brought. In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim
"within five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have
possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable
to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be barred
forever." The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud
any claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants
to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them forever in a final
judgment.

FACTS:
For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985)private respondent Amada
Solano served as the all-around personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins,
a widow and a French national. During Ms. Hankins' lifetime and most especially during
the waning years of her life, respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a constant
companion since no close relative was available to tend to her needs. In Recognition of
Solano's faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins executed in her favor two (2) deeds
of donation involving two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of the
Registry of Deeds. Private respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation
and were nowhere to be found. While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic
Filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth Hankins Before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City. During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed
by Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio Regosa, but on 24
June 1987 the motion was denied by the trial court for the reason that "they miserably
failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in question." Since it was established
that there were no known heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedent
Hankins, the lower court escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner
Republic of the Philippines

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the same
escheated in favor of the state.

RULING:
Yes. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby
the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of
a person who dies intestate leaving no heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property
is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to self-service by the first comers."
Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually does,
prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be
made. The Procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is generally
prescribed by statue, and a time limit is imposed within which such action must be
brought.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within
five (5) years from the date of such judgment, such person shall have possession of and
title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be accountable to him for the
proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be barred forever."
The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any
claimant; on the contrary, it is decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be
claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they may lose them
forever in a final judgment.
In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the petitioner is
not the sole and exclusive interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right
or interest in the property sought to be escheated is likewise an interested party
and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case, the Colegio
de San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in the
Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the exclusive owner
of the hacienda, and the latter because he claims to be the lessee thereof under a contract
legally entered with the former (underscoring supplied).
A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive against all persons with actual or constructive notice, but not
against those who are not parties or privies thereto. As held in Hamilton v. Brown, "a
judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all
persons interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to
deprive the appellee of any right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due process of
law, proper notice having been observed." With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore,
private respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the supposed
"discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify the
escheat judgment which has long attained finality.

Rule 109 Appeals in Special Proceedings

4. Testate Estate of Vda. de Biascan v. Biascan, 347 SCRA 621 (2000)

DOCTRINE/S:
Actions; Special Proceedings; Estate Proceedings; Probate Proceedings;
Appeals; An appeal is allowed in the cases mentioned in Section 1, Rule 109 as these
orders, decrees or judgments issued by a court in a special proceeding constitute a final
determination of the rights of the parties so appealing.—An appeal is allowed in these
aforesaid cases as these orders, decrees or judgments issued by a court in a special
proceeding constitute a final determination of the rights of the parties so appealing. In
contrast, interlocutory orders are not appealable as these are merely incidental to judicial
proceedings. In these cases, the court issuing such orders retains control over the same
and may thus modify, rescind, or revokethe same on sufficient groundsatanytime before
final judgment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The trial court, by so ruling that certain persons
are entitled to participate in the settlement proceedings, has effectively determined that
the said persons are the lawful heirs of the deceased, and said ruling may be the proper
subject of an appeal.—In the instant case, the Order dated April 2, 1981 of the trial court
decreed, among others, that Maria Manuel Vda. De Biascan, the lawful wife of the
deceased Florencio Biascan, private respondent Rosalina Biascan and her brother,
German Biascan, are entitled to participate in the settlement proceedings. Moreover, the
said Order likewise denied Maria’s motion to set aside the order appointing private
respondent as regular administratrix of the estate. These rulings of the trial court were
precisely questioned by Maria in her Motion for Reconsideration dated June 6, 1981. The
ruling of the trial court that Maria, private respondent Rosalina Biascan and German
Biascan were entitled to participate in the settlement proceedings falls squarely under
paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court as a proper subject of appeal.
By so ruling, the trial court has effectively determined that the three persons are the lawful
heirs of the deceased. As such, the same may be the proper subject of an appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrators; An order of the trial court
appointing a regular administrator of a deceased person’s estate is a final determination
of the rights of the parties thereunder, and is thus, appealable.—The ruling of the trial
court denying petitioner’s motion to set aside the order appointing private respondent as
the regular administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan is likewise a proper subject
of an appeal. We have previously held that an order of the trial court appointing a regular
administrator of a deceased person’s estate is a final determination of the rights of the
parties thereunder, and is thus, appealable. This is in contrast with an order appointing a
special administrator who is appointed only for a limited time and for a specific purpose.
Because of the temporary character and special character of this appointment, the Rules
deem it not advisable for any party to appeal from said temporary appointment.
Considering however that private respondent has already been appointed as regular
administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan, her appointment as such may be
questioned before the appellate court by way of appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; In special
proceedings, such as a proceeding for the settlement of estate, the period of appeal from
any decision or final order rendered therein is thirty (30) days, a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal being required.—It is thus clear that the Order dated April 2, 1981 may
be the proper subject of an appeal in a special proceeding. In special proceedings, such
as the instant proceeding for settlement of estate, the period of appeal from any decision
or final order rendered therein is thirty (30) days, a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
being required. The appeal period may only be interrupted by the filing of a motion for
new trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal period expires without an appeal or a motion
for reconsideration or new trial being perfected, the decision or order becomes final.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is well-settled that judgments or orders
become final and executory by operation of law and not by judicial declaration, and it is
of no moment that the opposing party failed to object to the timeliness of the motion for
reconsideration or that the court denied the same on grounds other than timeliness.—It
is well-settled that judgments or orders become final and executory by operation of law
and not by judicial declaration. Thus, finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse
of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or motion for reconsideration
or new trial is filed. The trial court need not even pronounce the finality of the order as the
same becomes final by operation of law. In fact, the trial court could not even validly
entertain a motion for reconsideration filed after the lapse of the period for taking an
appeal. As such, it is of no moment that the opposing party failed to object to the
timeliness of the motion for reconsideration or that the court denied the same on grounds
other than timeliness considering that at the time the motion was filed, the Order dated
April 2, 1981 had already become final and executory. Being final and executory, the trial
court can no longer alter, modify, or reverse the questioned order. The subsequent filing
of the motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the judgment or order.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The rules on special proceedings recognize
that a motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal and record of appeal may
be granted.—Considering that it is clear from the records that petitioner’s notice of appeal
was filed on September 20, 1996, the same was clearly filed out of time as it only had
until August 22, 1996 within which to file the said pleading. And while the rules on special
proceedings recognize that a motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal and
record of appeal may be granted, no such motion was ever filed by petitioner before the
trial court. Consequently, the trial court committed no error when it dismissed the appeal
of petitioner.

FACTS:
On 13 Aug 1975: Rosalina was appointed regular administratrix of the intestate
estate of Florencio Biascan (and Timotea Zulueta). On 10 Oct 1975: Maria Vda de
Biascan files a motion to intervene, a motion to set aside the appointment of Rosalina as
regular administratrix and a motion to have herself appointed as administratrix of
Florencio's estate.
On 2 Apr 1981: CFI Manila under Judge Serafin Cuevas issued an Order resolving
that:
a. Maria is the lawful wife of Florencio.
b. Rosalina and her brother German are the acknowledged natural children of
Florencio.
c. All 3 are the legal heirs of Florencio and are entitled to participate in the settlement
proceedings.
d. Motion to set aside the Order appointing Rosalina administratrix of Florencio's
estate IS DENIED.
e. Motion to approve inventory and appraisal of Rosalina is deferred.
 On 9 Apr 1981: Maria, through counsel receives above Order. On 6 Jun 1981:
Maria files her motion for reconsideration (MR), which Rosalina opposed. (58 days after
receipt of Order). On 15 Nov 1981: Records of the case were completely lost in a fire that
gutted the 4th Flr of Manila City Hall. Petition for Reconstitution of the records of the case
was filed on 2 Jan 1985. On 30 Apr 1985: RTC Manila DENIES Maria's MR.
Maria dies sometime after. (No Date of Death). Her counsel, Atty Lopez is
appointed special administrator of her estate. He engages the services of another law
firm in behalf of Maria's estate.
On 21 Aug 1996 or (almost 11 yrs after denial of MR): Law firm allegedly made
aware of denial of MR, but was able to secure a certification from the Clerk of Court that
there was no proof of service of the Order dated 30 Apr 1985 contained in the records.
On 20 Sep 1996: Trial court received Notice of Appeal (dated 22 Aug 1996, but
stamped "Received on 20 Sep 1996"). A Record of Appeal was also filed on the same
date. The Trial Court issues Order DENYING Estate of Maria's appeal on the ground that
it was filed out of time. (MR filed 65 days after Order and Notice of Appeal filed 11 years
after denial of MR). Trial Court denies Estate of Maria's MR (to allow her to appeal).
CA denies Maria's Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Mandatory Injunction which
questioned the RTC's refusal to allow her to appeal the Orders issued in 1981.
Estate of Maria: April 1981 Order did not become final and executory as no
opposition on its timeliness was filed and no ruling as regards to its timeliness was made.

ISSUE/S:
1.) Whether or not the Order issued in April of 1981 is subject to appeal?
2.) Whether or not the appeal was perfected on time?

RULING:
(1) YES, the Order issued in April of 1981 is subject to appeal.
Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court enumerates the orders and judgments
in special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal. Thus:
“Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken.—An interested
person may appeal in a special proceeding from an order or judgment rendered by a
Regional Trial Court or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, wheresuch order or
judgment:
(a)Allows or disallows a will;
(b)Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive
shares of the estate to which such person is entitled;
(c) Allows, or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
(d)Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
(e)Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final
determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that
no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and
(f)Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights
of the person appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for new
trial or for reconsideration.”
An appeal is allowed in these aforesaid cases as these orders, decrees or
judgments issued by a court in a special proceeding constitute a final determination of the
rights of the parties so appealing. In contrast, interlocutory orders are not appealable as
these are merely incidental to judicial proceedings. In these cases, the court issuing such
orders retains control over the same and may thus modify, rescind, or revoke the same
on sufficient grounds at any time before final judgment.
In the case at bar, the ruling of the trial court that Maria, private respondent
Rosalina Biascan and German Biascan were entitled to participate in the settlement
proceedings falls squarely under paragraph (b), Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court
as a proper subject of appeal. By so ruling, the trial court has effectively determined that
the three persons are the lawful heirs of the deceased. As such, the same may be the
proper subject of an appeal.
Similarly, the ruling of the trial court denying petitioner’s motion to set aside the
order appointing private respondent as the regular administratrix of the estate of Florencio
Bisacan is likewise a proper subject of an appeal. We have previously held that an order
of the trial court appointing a regular administrator of a deceased person’s estate is a final
determination of the rights of the parties thereunder, and is thus, appealable. This is in
contrast with an order appointing a special administrator who is appointed only for a
limited time and for a specific purpose. Because of the temporary character and special
character of this appointment, the Rules deem it not advisable for any party to appeal
from said temporary appointment. Considering however that private respondent has
already been appointed as regular administratrix of the estate of Florencio Biascan, her
appointment as such may be questioned before the appellate court by way of appeal.
It is thus clear that the Order dated April 2, 1981 may be the proper subject of
an appeal in a special proceeding.

(2) NO, the appeal was NOT perfected on time.

In special proceedings, such as the instant proceeding for settlement of estate, the
period of appeal from any decision or final order rendered therein is thirty (30) days, a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal being required. The appeal period may only
be interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. Once the appeal
period expires without an appeal or a motion for reconsideration or new trial being
perfected, the decision or order becomes final.
Under Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court then applicable, the time during
which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for a new trial shall be deducted
from the period from which to make an appeal.
The rule further states that where the motion was filed during office hours of the
last day of the appeal period, the appeal must be perfected within the day following
that in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.
It is well-settled that judgments or orders become final and executory by operation
of law and not by judicial declaration. Thus, finality of a judgment becomes a fact upon
the lapse of the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or motion for
reconsideration or new trial is filed. The trial court need not even pronounce the finality of
the order as the same becomes final by operation of law. In fact, the trial court could not
even validly entertain a motion for reconsideration filed after the lapse of the period for
taking an appeal.
As such, in the case at bar, it is of no moment that the opposing party failed to
object to the timeliness of the motion for reconsideration or that the court denied the same
on grounds other than timeliness considering that at the time the motion was filed, the
Order dated April 2, 1981 had already become final and executory. Being final and
executory, the trial court can no longer alter, modify, or reverse the questioned order. The
subsequent filing of the motion for reconsideration cannot disturb the finality of the
judgment or order.
Even if we assume that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner had the
effect of suspending the running of the appeal period for the April 2, 1981 Order, it is clear
that petitioner’s notice of appeal of the order of the trial court was still filed out of time.
The Order of the trial court denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the
April 2, 1981 Order was issued on April 30, 1985. Allegedly, petitioner was only made
aware of this April 30, 1985 Order on August 21, 1996 when it inquired from the trial court
about the status of the case. Giving petitioner the benefit of the doubt that it had indeed
received notice of the order denying its motion for reconsideration on August 21, 1996, it
follows that petitioner only had until the following day or on August 22, 1996 within which
to perfect the appeal.
At this point, we note with disapproval petitioner’s attempt to pass off its Notice of
Appeal as having been filed on August 22, 1996. In all its pleadings before this Court and
the Court of Appeals, petitioner insists that its Notice of Appeal was filed the day after it
secured the August 21, 1996 Certification from the trial court. While the Notice of Appeal
was ostensibly dated August 22, 1996, it is clear from the stamp31 of the trial court that
the same was received only on September 20, 1996. Moreover, in the Order dated
October 22, 1996 of the trial court denying petitioner’s appeal, the court clearly stated that
the Notice of Appeal with accompanying Record on Appeal was filed on September 20,
1996.
Considering that it is clear from the records that petitioner’s notice of appeal was
filed on September 20, 1996, the same was clearly filed out of time as it only had until
August 22, 1996 within which to file the said pleading. And while the rules on special
proceedings recognize that a motion for extension of time to file the notice of appeal and
record of appeal may be granted, no such motion was ever filed by petitioner before the
trial court. Consequently, the trial court committed no error when it dismissed the appeal
of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of
merit. The decision dated February 16, 1999 and the Resolution dated May 18, 1999 of
the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.

5. Republic v. Nishina, 634 SCRA 716 (2010)

DOCTRINE/S:
ACTIONS; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; APPEALS; MULTIPLE APPEALS; RECORD ON
APPEAL. - the filing of a record on appeal is not necessary where no other matter remains
to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting
the petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry.

FACTS:
Respondent Nisaida Sumera Nishina, represented by her mother Zenaida Sumara
Watanabe, filed before the RTC a verified petition for cancellation of birth record and
change of surname in the civil registry of Malolos, Bulacan. In the petition, Respondent
Nishina alleged that she was born in Malolos, Bulacan in 1987 to her Filipino mother
Zenaida and Japanese father, Koichi Nishina. Respondent Nishina’s father died in 1989
and her mother married another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada, but later divorced.
Zenaida caused the late registration of respondent’s birth in 1993 because no
record of her birth could be found at the civil registry of Malolos. The Respondent's
surname was registered as Hakamada.
Zenaida married another Japanese, Takayuki Watanabe, who later adopted
respondent. The adoption decree was issued by the Tokyo Family Court of Japan in 2001,
and said decree was filed and recorded in the civil registry of Manila in 2006.
In 2007, it surfaced that the respondent's birth was in fact originally registered in
the civil registry of Malolos under the surname “Nishina”. Respondent filed with the RTC
a petition to cancel her second birth certificate bearing the surname “Hakamada”; and
that in light of the decree of adoption, her surname “Nishina” in the original birth certificate
be changed to “Watanabe”.
RTC granted the petition and directed the LCR of Malolos to cancel the second
birth certificate and to change it particularly the surname from “Nishina” to “Watanabe”.
On 13 Dec. 2007, the OSG received the RTC’s decision and filed a notice of
appeal. Respondent Nisaida Sumera Nishina, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal,
alleging that the petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not file a record
on appeal as required under secs .2 and 3, Rule 41 (appeal from the RTCs) of the ROC.
Petitioner countered that a record on appeal is required only in proceedings where
multiple appeals may arise, a situation not obtaining in the present case. The CA
dismissed petitioner’s appeal holding that since respondent’s petition before the RTC is
classified as a special proceeding, petitioner should have filed both notice of appeal and
a record on appeal within 30 days from receipt of the RTC decision granting respondent’s
petition, and by not filing a record on appeal, petitioner never perfected its appeal.

ISSUE/S:
 Whether the filing of a record on appeal was necessary.

RULING:
No. The filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other matter
remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order
granting respondent’s petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in
the civil registry.
Sec. 1, Rule 109 of the ROC specifies the orders or judgments in special
proceedings which may be the subject matter of an appeal:
“Sec. 1. Order or judgments from which appeals may be taken. - An interested
person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court
of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or
judgment:
a. Allows or disallows a will;
b. Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share
of the estate to which such person is entitled;
c. Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased
person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;
d. Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;
e. Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower
court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from
the appointment of a special administrator;and
f. Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial
rights of the person appealing unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a
new trial or for reconsideration.”
The above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the pendency of
special proceedings. A record on appeal - in addition to the notice of appeal - is thus
required to be filed as the original records of the case should remain with the trial court to
enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is
resolved by said court and held to be final. In this case, the filing of a record on appeal
was not necessary since no other matter remained to be heard and determined by the
trial court after it issued the appealed order granting respondent’s petition for cancellation
of birth record and change of surname in the LCR.