SURMOUNTING THE STRIFE OF THE

AGE OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY:

A DIALOGUE WITH HEIDEGGER

AND ZEN BUDDHIST THOUGHT

A Thesis

Presented to

the Faculty of the Graduate School

Ateneo de Manila University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

Anton Luis C. Sevilla

2007
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study ................................................................... 1

Statement of the Problem................................................................... 3

Significance of the Study ................................................................... 5

Scope and Limitations ....................................................................... 6

Methodology ...................................................................................... 7

I. AN EXPLORATION OF THE PROBLEM

1.1 Modern Technology, The Will to Will, and the Will ............................... 9

The Mode of Revealing of Modern Technology ............................... 11

The Value-Positing Will to Will ........................................................ 17

The Will to Will and the Will of Being ............................................. 22

The Will to Will and the Ground for Salvation ................................. 26

Overcoming and Dualistic Representation ........................................ 28

Surmounting: The Metanoetic Task of Turning ................................ 32

II. UNDERSTANDING THE STRIFE OF THE WILL TO WILL

2.1 The Ultimate Antinomy of the Will to Will ............................................ 35

The Antinomy of Reason ................................................................... 36

The Antinomy of Existence ............................................................... 40

Ultimate Antinomy ............................................................................ 43

i
 Will to Will, Tanha and Suffering ..................................................... 46

The Second Noble Truth ........................................................ 47

2.2 Conscience: Calling the Will to Will to its Authenticity ......................... 51

The Call of Conscience ...................................................................... 53

The Ontological Sense of Guilt ......................................................... 57

They-Self, Egoity and Original Sin ................................................... 61

Angst in the Face of Conscience ....................................................... 69

Fidelity through Resoluteness............................................................ 76

III. SURRENDER AND SURMOUNTING

3.1 Awakening to True Self: The Enlightenment of

Sixth Patriarch Hui-neng ............................................................................... 80

The First Stage: The Ignorance of Dualistic Thought ....................... 83

The First Negation ............................................................................. 88

The Second Stage: Self is Empty; Grasping

at the Ungraspable ............................................................................. 91

The Second Negation ......................................................................... 97

The Third Stage: Awakening to Emptiness as Self;

Being the Unattainable ...................................................................... 99

The Unity of Realizer and Realized....................................... 100

Surmounting Ultimate Antinomy .......................................... 103

All Self is True Self ............................................................... 109

The Verse of Hui-Neng ......................................................... 116

ii
 3.2 Da-sein’s Fidelity to the Unfolding of Truth ........................................... 118

Phenomenological Ontology ............................................................. 119

Phenomenological Ontology and True Selfhood ............................... 122

The Need for Metanoia .......................................................... 123

True Self as Nexus of Self and Reality .................................. 125

Surmounting Technology from True Self.......................................... 128

IV. RETURNING TO THE WORLD AS TRUE SELF

4.1 Hisamatsu’s Vision of the Awakening of Mankind ................................ 131

Overview of the FAS Society ............................................................ 132

The Vow of Humankind .................................................................... 135

1. Calm and Composed, Awakening to Our True Self .......... 136

2. Being Fully Compassionate Humans................................. 141

3. Making Full Use of Our Abilities According

to Our Respective Vocations ................................................. 143

4. Discerning Suffering both Individual

and Social, and Its Sources .................................................... 147

6. Joining Hands as Kin Beyond the Differences

of Race, Nation, and Class ..................................................... 149

7/8. With Compassion, Vowing to Bring

to Realization Humankind’s Deep Desire
for Emancipation, Let us Construct a World
that is True and Happy ........................................................... 153

Actual and Supra-Actual Individual, Mankind, and History ............. 158

The Depth of Formless Self ................................................... 159

iii
 The Width of All Mankind .................................................... 160

The Length of Suprahistorical History .................................. 162

The Unity of Awakening and Actuality................................. 165

CONCLUSION

Recapitulation .................................................................................... 166

Conclusion ......................................................................................... 170

Recommendations.............................................................................. 171

BIBLIOGRAPHY...................................................................................................... 174

iv
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I would like to thank Dr. Remmon Barbaza, who supervised all my theses

and significant papers (thousands of pages, I’m certain) for the past three years. My

deepest gratitude for his patience, warmth and unfailing support, without which none of

my attempts at philosophizing would have acquired any solidity outside of the world of

ideas.

My thanks as well to Dr. Manuel Dy, Jr., and Dr. Agustin Rodriguez for their

kind mentoring and support as I endeavored to walk the path of teaching and doing phi-

losophy.

My thanks to my colleagues in the Department of Philosophy for all their help

and contributions to my betterment as a teacher, writer, thinker and human being. Spe-

cial thanks to the following for their constant guiding influence: Andrew Soh, Lovelyn

Corpuz-Paclibar, Jacqueline Jacinto, Michael Mariano and Marc Oliver Pasco. My

thanks to my students, for helping me make my thinking real and corporeal.

My thanks to my family, for their love, appreciation and interdependent arising.

My thanks to my panel of examiners for their insightful comments, incisive

questioning, and helpful feedback: Mr. Eduardo Calasanz, Dr. Adrian Danker, and Dr.

Luis David.

And last, my endless gratitude to Catherine Jao and Patrick Kevin Cabrera IV,

for holding me together when the price I paid had become too great to bear alone.
v
 INTRODUCTION

Background of the Study

On the 9th of October, 2006, tremors were felt in South Korea. Shortly after,

North Korea announced that it had just carried out its first test of a nuclear weapon. The

UN Security Council scrambled to formulate a response to this new threat to interna-

tional peace. Japan was the first to act, and the United States quickly asked for severe

sanctions. South Korea and China joined a worldwide condemnation of this act of ag-

gression. To this, North Korea responded with threats of more tests.

Do we not feel an unmistakable tension in this discourse of power and intimida-

tion, where a danger is presented through a display of power and is responded to by an

even greater display of power through various sanctions? Peace seems to have degener-

ated into a tense balance between powers deadlocked by enough threats and sanctions to

be forced into inaction. Is this peace? Or is this the blighted calm akin to the last cold

war, where the fear of mutually assured destruction remains rank?

The war on this planet is not only on the military front, but the economic and

cultural fronts as well. With the spread of globalization, countries wrestle with a sudden

upsurge of economic pressures and demands. Diaspora and incapacity to compete can

cripple countries financially, and drastically alter the cultural milieu of a nation. Many

1
 2

countries battle to maintain their cultural identity and economic development amidst a

plethora of global economic and cultural forces. Terrorism and violent religious funda-

mentalism have appeared as responses to these forces, resulting in increased global ten-

sion and terror.

The unrest appears on the environmental front as well. With the large-scale con-

sumption of resources and waste mismanagement, the environment appears to be on the

brink of collapse. There looms the threat of global warming, widespread pollution of the

land, seas and air, and the gross misdistribution of resources that shall make continued

growth and survival impossible for a great many people.

This constellation of dangers in this present era of modern technology—military

threats, economic and cultural concerns, side-effects of globalization, environmental

problems—all of these we shall refer to as modern technological strife,1 predicaments

that arise in various facets of human existence as mankind drives toward the creation of

a massive industrialized society.

In this age, global politics, economics, culture and environment find themselves

in a great deal of tension and duress. The threat of nuclear war, large-scale terrorism

and environmental collapse has been a topic of concern for political scientists, econo-

mists, sociologists, environmental scientists, etc. Their efforts are unmistakably neces-

sary in this age, to surmount the danger that is encroaching humanity. But is the multi-

1
The usage of the word “strife” in this thesis is merely literary, and does not draw from the nu-
ance of the word “strife” as it is used in Martin Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in Basic
Writings.
 3

faceted terror of technological strife that besets mankind reducible to merely politics,

economics, culture and environment? Is the only fear present the fear of mutually as-

sured destruction through nuclear war or environmental catastrophe?

Human life is not reducible to corporeal existence. The various dangers that be-

siege mankind are not reducible to the threat to its survival as a species. More primordi-

ally than military tension or a gross disrespect of cultural differences, more insidiously

than the corruption of the environment, lies a crisis in man’s relationship with reality.

The danger is not merely the bombs or the death count or the massive pollution. The

danger lies in how man stands before the world as such.

Hence alongside the disciplines of political science, economics, sociology and

environmental science, it is necessary to think of the problem of this present technologi-

cal age from the perspective that concerns itself directly with the fundamental relation-

ship between man and the world.

Statement of the Problem

The problem this thesis aims to reckon with is the strife of the age of modern

technology, as manifested in various military, political, social, economic, psychological

and biomedical problems in the present period. In these troubled times, this thesis aims
 4

to raise the question: What is the essence of the surmounting of the problems of modern

technological strife?2

The word “essence” here means: How the surmounting presences and endures as

such a presencing. Hence the question of this thesis can be broken down into a constel-

lation of questions: How is the surmounting revealed and made manifest in this age?

How is it possible to surmount the plethora of dangers presented by the age of modern

technology from the very ground of the relationship of man with reality? What consti-

tutes the ground of the surmounting of modern technological strife?

The question of surmounting shall concern us throughout this work. However, in

order to answer the question concerning the essence of surmounting, we will have to

contend first, with the age which is to be surmounted; second, the self-presentation of

the possibility of surmounting, and third, how such surmounting is to come about.

What is this age of modern technology, really? In order to answer this question,

we must delve deeper than the gadgets and the lifestyle that pervade this age of modern

technology, into the mode of revealing that underlies various tendencies in this age. On-

ly when we have clearly seen the roots of this global phenomenon in how man stands

before reality as such can we begin to truly understand the danger this age presents and

how we might possibly surmount it.

2
The idea of “surmounting the age of modern technology” and “surmounting technological
strife” will be shown to be identical, not as a reversion to antiquity and a pre-technological era, but by
turning over the very ground from which the technological as technological arises. The relation of these
two terms shall be clarified fully in the first chapter, pp. 16-17.
 5

At the roots of the problem of technology in the ground of humankind’s rela-

tionship with reality lies the most intimate ground of conversion. How does this conver-

sion manifest and present itself authentically to man as a possibility?

To what do we turn, when we turn from the very ground of our relationship with

reality? What is the standpoint from which man comes into a relationship with reality in

a manner that begins the surmounting of technological strife? How do we arrive from

this intimate conversion to the global and practical surmounting of the age of modern

technology?

Significance of the Study

This study aims to supplement various technological responses to the problems

of technological strife from various fields (such as political science, environmental sci-

ence, sociology and the like) with a more primordially ontological approach. This ap-

proach aims to show how the age of modern technology and the ensuing problems of

such an age are rooted in man’s disposition toward reality, and how perhaps one may

involve, as the integral and innermost part of a response to this strife, a revolution in the

very mode by which man sees reality.

 6

Scope and Limitations

The primary dialogue partners in this dialogue are Martin Heidegger and two

thinkers associated with the Kyoto School of Philosophy, Abe Masao and Hisamatsu

Shin’ichi.3

While Heidegger discusses the problem of man’s relationship toward reality in

many different ways and over many different themes, we shall be focusing on several of

Heidegger’s key writings concerning technology, such as “The Question Concerning

Technology,” “The Word of Nietzscheμ ‘God is Dead’,” “What are Poets for?,” and

“The Turning.” Heidegger has his own response concerning the mode by which we can

surmount the age of technology, for instance “releasement” and “meditative thinking.”

However, we shall not be discussing these concepts here.

For the analysis of the internal dynamics that have led to technological strife as

well as of the path for surmounting such an age of technology, we shall turn to the writ-

ings of Abe Masao and Hisamatsu Shin’ichi. Abe and Hisamatsu are hardly the most

prominent members of the Kyoto School of Philosophy. Perhaps more notable would be

Nishitani Keiji and Tanabe Hajime, both of whom deal directly with the problem of

technology (Nishitani) and the task of metanoia (Tanabe). However, Abe and

Hisamatsu present very lucid discussions of the personal dynamics of egotism, and

Hisamatsu’s reckoning with the question concerning the relationship of personal and

3
With all Japanese names, the names shall be given in standard Japanese order (Surname Given
Name [no dividing comma]) in both the text and the footnotes.
 7

social transformation is of note. Hence, while a lot of discussions have the ideas of

Nishitani and Tanabe in mind, we shall not be directly working with any of the Kyoto

Philosophers other than Abe and Hisamatsu.

Methodology

In order to answer the constellation of problems we have been tasked with in

this age of technological strife, we shall begin the first chapter with the work of Martin

Heidegger. Across several essays, Heidegger frames the problem of the age of technol-

ogy and roots such a problem in the manner by which man stands before reality. We

shall discuss these essays in order to explore and survey the problem with which we are

presented, as well as possibilities and contingencies for its surmounting.

Having rooted the problem of technological strife in the realm of the personal

relationship between man and reality, we shall turn, in the second chapter, to an analysis

of the strife as experienced by man. We shall begin with a discussion of the antinomic

character of the man who stands before reality as the will to will, and the suffering that

ensues from this mode of relation, through the work of Hisamatsu. Then we shall return

to Heidegger for an exploration of the impetus toward metanoia which is lent by such

suffering, as discussed in Heidegger’s phenomenology of conscience.

Having discussed the inner call for conversion in conscience, we turn to a dis-

cussion in the third chapter of the surmounting of the age of technology beginning with

an internal transformation. We shall turn to the work of Abe and a story of the enlight-
 8

enment of sixth patriarch Hui-neng, in order to explore the process and character of

awakening to true self, and the unique standpoint of true selfhood. Having begun with a

problematic formulated and framed by Heidegger, we return to his notion of fidelity to

reality as presented in his idea of phenomenological ontology as human fidelity, and

how this is necessary for any surmounting of modern technological strife.

In the fourth and final chapter, we find ourselves with a socio-historical problem

that compels us to a personal conversion toward a fidelity to reality. But how is an onto-

logical transformation to effect socio-historical change? In order to answer such a ques-

tion, we end with Hisamatsu’s way which moves from the authenticity of formless self

to the ethical task of joining hands with mankind and creatively revitalizing the world.
 I. AN EXPLORATION OF THE PROBLEM

1.1 Modern Technology, The Will to Will, and the Will

The human sciences have found themselves in a flurry of questioning about the

phenomenon of globalization. As the barriers between states fall and the pressures of

the trade and proliferation of various technologies pervade societies, questions concern-

ing the various facets of globalization and modern technology abound in the academic

scene. There are questions on the political, sociological, environmental, psychological,

biomedical and moral repercussions of changes that occur alongside the rise of the

modern technological world.

Given the outspoken concern over the modern technological mode of existence

and the various phenomena (globalization, economic models, etc.) that accompany it, it

is intriguing that a particular question is merely whispered, if not left completely unspo-

ken: What is modern technology? What makes possible the global project of modern

technology that has become so predominant today? The first question, thought to its

fullest extent, contains the second question, for to askμ “What is modern technology?” is

to seek out the grounds from which modern technology springs forth alongside the

ground of the existence of man.

“What is modern technology?”

Posed in this way, the question sounds ludicrous. The age of modern technology

is upon us, hence modern technology is a given. It is so simple, obvious, predominant,

9
 10

and inescapable that to be unaware of what it speaks of seems to indicate outright igno-

rance. Beset by the urgency of more practical concerns such as how to mitigate the var-

ious side-effects of this technological age, the question is likely to be altogether ignored.

But this is precisely why it is so fortunate that we have stumbled upon this ques-

tion. Ludicrous things strike upon the heart of unspoken presuppositions. Given the in-

escapability of the world technological apparatus, it is most tempting to ask questions

concerning technology technologically. Such a mode of questioning is necessarily blind

to its essence—technological thinking cannot contemplate what constitutes (and in so

doing lies beyond) the technological, and it cannot discern the dangers that may lie in

the technological itself. This chapter therefore attempts to question technology all the

way to the depths of where the ground of technology meets the ground of humanity it-

self. It is in these silent depths where there is great potential for genuine thought. Here,

where all is simple, obvious, and unquestioned, it becomes possible to root out the

origin, the ground which we do not see but step upon nonetheless.

Heidegger discussed the question of modern technology on numerous occasions.

Our discussion shall concern itself with four of his main published essaysμ “The Ques-

tion Concerning Technology,” “The Word of Nietzscheμ ‘God is Dead’,” “What Are

Poets For?” and “The Turning.” Through a discussion of these four texts, we hope to

gain an essential understanding of modern technology and frame the problem of the age

of modern technology, so that man may come into a truer ownership of this age he finds

himself entangled in.

 11

The Mode of Revealing of Modern Technology

What is modern technology?

In 1955, Martin Heidegger delivered a lecture entitled “The Question Concern-

ing Technology,” where he discusses this very question. He seeks the essence of tech-

nology, in order that humans, in their essence, may take part in a free relationship to

such. It is in this free relationship that truth may come to pass.

The first hurdle the question encounters is the ease of its answering. Heidegger

names two immediate answers: first, that technology is a means to an end; second, that

technology is a human activity. The immediate answers characterize technology as a

contrivance, an instrumentum.1 It is precisely because of this conception of technology

as an instrument that man is most concerned with technological questions concerning

technology, and that he strives for greater mastery in handling the “instrument” that is

modern technology. Heidegger approaches the essence of technology through what is

hidden beneath, yet betrayed by, this simplistic appropriation of modern technology.

The instrumentality of a technology lies in the activity of moving from means

toward ends. In this movement from means to ends, technology causes. To cause has a

fourfold meaning for Aristotle. The causa materialis is responsible for the matter of that

which comes forth. The causa formalis is responsible for the morphology and structure

1
Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” trans. William Lovitt, in Basic
Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), ed. David Farrell Krell (New
York: Harper & Row, 1977), 288.
 12

of that which comes forth. The causa finalis is responsible for the meaningfulness and

utility of that which comes forth. Last, the causa efficiens gathers together the three pre-

ceding causes into wholeness in that which comes forth. In this fourfold causation, we

see that a technology is a concerted effort that is responsible for the coming-forth of an

end. This is bringing-forth [Her-vor-bringen] from unconcealment to presencing. Such

bringing-forth is the ancient meaning of poiēsis.2 Technē belongs to poiēsis, to the poi-

etic that intrinsically resides in the realm of revealing, of truth.

Let us take the image of a man, wrinkled, calloused and burnt by the sun, a

farmer laboring in his fields. The farmer is taking part in a technology that attempts to

coax crops by laboring upon the earth. The technology of farming is responsible for the

coming-forth of crops—the ends—from the tarrying of the plants, the sun, the water and

the earth—the means. But beyond the coming-forth of crops, farming as technē is re-

sponsible for the poietic revealing of lands as the bountiful earth; of shafts of light as

the life-giving gaze of the sun; of water as the milk that nourishes the springing of life

from the earth; of the plants as the givers of harvest and health; and of the farmer as the

laborer who cultivates the togetherness of the loam, light, water, and sprouts. The tech-

nē of farming partakes in the truth of the fields and those who tarry in them, and reveals

them in their interrelatedness as individual constituents in communion.

From the veneer of technology as instrumentality, Heidegger uncovers some-

thing more primordial to technologyμ “Technology is therefore no mere means. Tech-

2
Ibid., 289-93.
 13

nology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the

essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of

truth.”3

But there is a distinct difference between technology as technē and modern

technology. When we observe the modern technology of strip-mining for ore, we see a

subtle yet unmistakably different character as from the technē of farmers as they labor

and cultivate the crops in the fields. What is the difference here?

The modern technology of strip-mining lands is not a cultivation of earth nor a

revealing of ore. Strip-miners do not dwell upon the land, nor tarry with the ore. Myste-

riously, neither land nor ore are brought to presence in this modern technology, because

none of them are the matter. When one oversees the strip-mining of the area, one sees

possibilities of yield and profit. One sees measure, money, market, and the management

that allows whatever anonymous stuff that is reckoned with in the mine to be secured as

such. One does not contemplate the ore (as the farmer contemplates the weather and its

bearing upon his fields and crops). Instead one calculates the possible gains and risks

that one may run across in the mining project.

The difference between technē and modern technology does not lie in the ac-

tions themselves, but in the peculiar revealing-concealment that holds sway in the activ-

ity of each technology. In modern technology, things do not come forth in themselves

and as themselves. This haunting muteness of the mutinous things that must be brought

3
Ibid., 294.
 14

to heel is the key difference that sets apart technē and modern technology. Heidegger

says:

The revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not unfold into
a bringing-forth in the sense of poiēsis. The revealing that rules in modern tech-
nology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable
demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.4

It is challenging that is the mode of thought of modern technology, a mode of

thought that constantly seeks to regulate and secure. Challenging expedites nature, and

wrings it of its energy. This energy, this resource, is first unlocked, and then trans-

formed, stored up, distributed, switched about, traded, marketed, and so forth.5

In the process of extracting energy from resources, nowhere does nature pres-

ence out of itself and as itself. Instead, nature stands objectified in the most peculiar

mode of standing objectification: standing-reserve. Heidegger says:

Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed

to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is or-
dered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve
[Bestand].6

Revealed as standing-reserve, nature does not stand, nature cowers. Ob-jectified7

by the challenging of modern technology, nature is not thrown-before man in its con-

spicuity. Instead, it is thrown behind man, to follow him mutely like the lowest of slaves.

4
Ibid., 296.
5
Ibid., 298.
6
Ibid.
7
Etymologically ob-ject is ob [against] + jacere [to throw], to throw against. Even the athwart-
ness denoted by “ob-” is lost here in the standing-reserve.
 15

Standing-reserve is a cowering, by which beings as they are in themselves suffer the

foulest obfuscation, silenced, condemned to hang invisibly as the secured sphere that

secures the securing of man.

As the age of modern technology rises to its high noon, the mode of revealing of

challenging reaches its apex, toward a world that is revealed as standing-reserve alone.

If the world is revealed merely as standing-reserve, nowhere will the world world as

world. Instead, everywhere man turns he will see nothing but his projects, resources,

allotments, possibilities, values, etc. Everywhere man turns he will see nothing but a

thin shadow of himself.

Given the violence of the mode of revealing of modern technology itself where-

in everything is challenged to standing-reserve, we must ask ourselves: what is really

dangerous in this age of modern technology? Is it the atom bomb that is dangerous, or is

it the capacity to look at neighboring countries as merely competitors in a race for

frightening, earth-devouring supremacy? Is it terrorism and its insidious deployment of

destruction that are dangerous, or is it the capacity to look at another culture and see one

another merely as affronts to humanity, barbarians to be educated, or otherwise eradi-

cated? Is it global warming and the carbon-spewing fossil fuels that are dangerous, or is

it the capacity to look at the world, its organisms and structures, its people, and see

nothing but a glorified warehouse for human needs, waiting to be ransacked? Heidegger

writes:
 16

What is deadly is not the much-discussed atomic bomb as this particular death-
dealing machine. What has long since been threatening man with death, and in-
deed with the death of his own nature, is the unconditional character of mere will-
ing in the sense of purposeful self-assertion in everything. What threatens man in
his very nature is the willed view that man, by the peaceful release, transfor-
mation, storage, and channeling of the energies of physical nature, could render
the human condition, man’s being, tolerable for everybody and happy in all re-
spects.8

It is not particular technologies themselves that constitute the true origin of the

strife of modern technology. Instead, it is something within the technological itself, seen

here as the very mode of revealing of modern technology as challenging to standing-

reserve. If we are to efficaciously overcome the problems of modern technological strife,

a change must occur on the ground of the technological itself—we must overcome the

age of modern technology as a whole.

Overcoming the age of modern technology does not mean doing away with the

“demonry of technology,” for there is no demonry of the technologies themselves.

Overcoming the age of modern technology is not about merely reverting to a more

primitive way of life and doing away with the technologies that have proliferated since

the industrial revolution. The overcoming of the age of modern technology necessitated

by the intense strife of modern technology is an overcoming on the very ground of this

revealing. It is an overcoming not of particular modern technologies but of the techno-

logical itself. But before we consider the overcoming of the age of modern technology,

8
Martin Heidegger, “What Are Poets For?” in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hof-
stadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 116.
 17

it is necessary for us to delve deeper into the roots of the obfuscation of reality in the

hands of modern technological man. From whence does this age of desolation come?

The Value-Positing Will to Will

The age of technology is characterized by challenging, which secures and regu-

lates the world as standing-reserve. This challenging that secures belongs to the man-

date of value-positing, which is the sphere of values.

The word “value” as it is used here belongs to the phraseology of the great

thinker Friedrich Nietzsche. Heidegger discusses Nietzsche’s conceptions in a lecture

delivered in 1942, which was published as the essay entitled “The Word of Nietzscheμ

‘God is Dead’.” Heidegger saysμ

What does Nietzsche understand by value? Wherein is the essence of value

grounded?

Nietzsche says in a note (1887-88) what he understands by valueμ “The point-of-

view of ‘value’ is the point-of-view constituting the preservation-enhancement
conditions with respect to complex forms of relative duration of life within be-
coming.” (Will to Power, Aph. 715)9

Value is a point-of-view [Gesichtspunkt]. Point-of-view here immediately sum-

mons the subjectivity of an opinion or standpoint. Surely, values are indeed points-of-

view in this sense; they are perspectives, directionalities by which we view the world.

But Heidegger means Gesichtspunkt more intricately than a mere standpoint. A point-

Martin Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzscheμ ‘God is Dead’,” in The Question Concerning
9

Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977), 71.
 18

of-view is literally a point that is held fixedly in view.10 This is of crucial importance in

understanding the secured sphere mandated by value-position. For the securing of this

sphere does not merely see the world from the point-of-view of value. Securing sees the

point of value alone, and stares at it fixedly, never penetrating to the beings in them-

selves.

As a point-of-view, value values. Value reckons with beings and accounts for

them in so much as they count, matter, to the point-of-view that is value. Heidegger

saysμ “Seeing [from the point-of-view] is that representing which since Leibniz has

been grasped more explicitly in terms of its fundamental characteristic of striving (ap-

petitus). . . . That aim provides the perspective that is to be conformed to. The aim in

view is value.”11 (Emphases mine) In valuing, beings are represented from and in terms

of value, and nowhere do they presence from and in terms of themselves. In valuing,

Being conforms to value.

The point-of-view that is valuing represents and accounts with respect to condi-

tions of preservation-enhancement. Preservation and enhancement are bound by a hy-

phen here, for they are inseparable. Heidegger saysμ “Every life that restricts itself to

mere preservation is already in decline.”12 For to merely preserve is to grasp at the spill-

ing away of life without furthering it. Conversely, enhancement without preservation is

10
Ibid.
11
Ibid., 72.
12
Ibid., 73.
 19

insecure, it does not succeed in attenuating the tenuous nature of its existence in failing

to gather together the stability of reserve. “Nowhere is enhancement possible where a

stable reserve is not already being preserved as secure, and in this way as capable of

enhancement.”13

Hence the securing of the standing-reserve is mandated by the point-of-view of

value. Value represents beings in their relation to their propensity to be secured, so that

thus secured as the standing-reserve, beings solidify the ground by which “life” 14 is

gathered together and asserted as solid, amidst the liquidity of becoming.

This value-positing emerges from the will to power. Heidegger writesμ “The will

to power is the ground of the necessity of value-positing and of the origin of the possi-

bility of value judgment.”15

The will to power is conceived by Nietzsche to determine the essentia, the

whatness of whatever is, such that all beings are fundamentally characterized by will to

power. 16 Will to power is a radicalized form of Arthur Schopenhauer’s will to life,

which is the tendency of all existents to preserve their existence. But as we have seen,

13
Ibid.
14
The word “life” appears in quotation marks because the word is meant in a sense peculiar to
modern human life. Preservation-enhancement is intrinsic to all life, and all being for that matter, as we
see in the writings of both Arthur Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, but the preservation-enhancement outside
human existence are of a markedly different character. This will become more apparent later.

Heidegger, “Word of Nietzsche,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays,
15

74.
16
Ibid.
 20

the will to life is merely a struggle with decline if it does not take enhancement into

consideration. Hence it is not merely life but power that is the will’s intrinsic motion.

Reading the phrase “will to power,” there is a danger that one shall interpret will

as separate from power, and that will is a striving towards this power. Heidegger clari-

fiesμ “The will is not a desiring, and not a mere striving after something, but rather, will-

ing is in itself a commanding.”17 The key difference lies here: desiring and striving are

movements toward that which lies outside oneself, as something that one does not have.

With will to power, such is not the case. For to command entails that what is command-

ed is already available, already subordinate to that which commands, the will. Hence, as

will to power, the will does not will (or strive for) something outside of it, but instead it

wills (commands) something that belongs to it.

Heidegger saysμ “What the will wills it has already. For the will wills its will.”18

The will commands itself in a gathering towards its given task. This commanding gath-

ering of the self upon itself is power itself. The will, thought radically, is in its essence a

movement of self-overcoming towards power. And power, thought radically, is in its

essence the commanding self-gathering of the will. Thus Heidegger saysμ “Will and

power are, in the will to power, not merely linked together; but rather the will, as the

will to will, is itself the will to power in the sense of empowering to power.”19

17
Ibid., 77.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid., 78.
 21

The will to power, in willing the will, is the purity of self-assertion. The will as-

serts itself toward itself as itself. This intrinsically same-ward orientation betrays a self-

consciousness of the highest order, a selfsame-consciousness where consciousness is

purely consciousness of the self. The involution of the will upon itself is one with the

phenomena of self-conscious self-assertion.

The mode of revealing of modern technology is characterized by challenging,

that sets-upon all beings and reveals them as standing-reserve. The standing-reserve

does not presence of itself. Instead, its presence-concealment is through value and as

value, hence strictly as represented and conforming to the selfsame. Values are posited

according to preservation-enhancement in line with the self-assertion of the will to

power. This will to power, in its purity, is the will to will that asserts itself in the purity

of its selfsame-consciousness. The ground of the modern technology is modern man,

who in his self-conscious self-assertion wills his willing in willful dominion over the

Earth.

The Will to Will and the Will of Being

At this point, the weight of the age of technology and the conscription that en-

shrouds the world weighs squarely upon the shoulders of modern man. As a burden up-

on his shoulders, it seems as if he can carry it about and carry it forth into passing. But

can we will away our willing, such that we no longer forge the world upon our points-

of-view? Sustainable development, which is but a shadow of environmental ethics, can

 22

only unshackle the binds that constrain resources. It cannot unshackle the binds that

make the world come forth as resource—it cannot free the will from its self-willing.

That is because the will to will, as the ground of modern technology, is not truly

grounded in itself. The will to will belongs to the Will.

Heidegger discussed the ground of the will to will in the course of a lecture de-

livered in 1946 on the 20th anniversary of Rainer Maria Rilke’s death. The lecture was

entitled “What Are Poets for?” Here, Heidegger saysμ

The Being of beings is the will. The will is the self-concentrating gathering of
every ens unto itself. Every being, as a being, is in the will. It is as something
willed. . . . That which is, is not first and only as something willed; rather, insofar
as it is, it is itself in the mode of will. Only by virtue of being willed is each being
that which, in its own way, does the willing in the will.20

To Be means to congeal upon oneself from the chaos of dispersal as a being; a

discrete, concrete, momentarily enduring being. A star, for instance, is a star in that it

has gathered itself from the swirling, the dust, and the quiet void, to stand as a present

whole, a one. This gathering-unto-itself is willing in its most primordial sense. Hence,

any willing being is first and foremost a being. That being is as a mode of Will, a mode

of gathering into the oneness of a being. Only as a being-will can any being bear the

possibility of being a willful being-will. Hence even modern man, as will to will, is first

and foremost Will, such that he belongs most originally to Being. Heidegger says:

20
Ibid., 100-01.
 23

The human willing that is experienced metaphysically remains only the willed
counterpart of will as the Being of beings.21

Human willing, even when it wills to will, and through such willing to will pos-

its values that refuse the very Being of beings and challenge them to standing reserve,

still belongs to the Will of Being. The very refusal of Being in the age of modern tech-

nology belongs to Being itself. We cannot simply will away the age of modern technol-

ogy, counter its danger and banish its obfuscation: the essence of the age of modern

technology is beyond modern man. As such, man is not the master and originator of

modern technology. Instead, man lies within it.

What does it mean for the human willing to belong within the Will of Being?

What does it mean for the essence of technology to be beyond modern man, his actions,

and his will? We see this in Heidegger’s explication of enframing as being challenged

to challenging. Heidegger says: We can only reveal the world through challenging as

standing-reserve because we, as men, are already challenged to challenge nature, sub-

jugate it, and wring it of its life. Even before nature is challenged by man to the stand-

ing-reserve, man already lies challenged into this challenging, already within the inven-

tory of the standing-reserve.22 Heidegger says:

Modern technology, as a revealing which orders, is thus no mere human doing.

Therefore we must take that challenging, which sets upon man to order the real as
standing-reserve, in accordance with the way it shows itself. That challenging

21
Ibid., 102.

Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in Basic Writings, 299.

22
 24

gathers man into ordering. This gathering concentrates man upon ordering the real
as standing-reserve.23

We now name that challenging claim which gathers man thither to order the self-
revealing as standing-reserveμ “Ge-stell” [en-framing].24

Enframing is the claim by which man himself is challenged to his challenging as

will to will, to challenge reality to stand as the standing-reserve. Heidegger characteriz-

es enframing as a mode of destining [Geschick]. This means that challenging is part of a

current, a tendency, that arises in the very history of man’s relationship with Being.

This current of enframing manifests as the desire to secure oneself amidst reality, to or-

der and control reality, in practice or in mere ideation. Heidegger says:

Man’s ordering attitude and behavior display themselves first in the rise of mod-
ern physics as an exact science. Modern science’s way of representing pursues
and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces.25

Long before the industrial revolution, man had already begun to manifest the de-

sire to secure oneself amidst reality in the development of exact science. Is not the ca-

pacity to predict weather, to model atmospheric forces and determine whither and

whence they shall go, merely a prelude to the modern technology of cloud-seeding and

climate control? The rise of modern technology and the mode of revealing as challeng-

ing to standing-reserve belong to an old current within the destining of Being, enfram-

23
Ibid., 300.
24
Ibid., 301.
25
Ibid., 302-03.
 25

ing. The challenging accomplished by man is welled-up by the momentum of a long

history of the attempt to control.

Hence it becomes apparent that while enframing manifests itself as challenging

by the self-willing man, it does not in itself belong to human doing. Enframing itself,

and its belonging to Being, is discussed in the lecture entitled “The Turning” which was

first delivered in Bremen in 1949. Here, Heidegger says:

Technology will not be struck down; and it most certainly will not be destroyed.

If the essence, the coming to presence, of technology, Enframing as the danger

within Being, is Being itself, then technology will never allow itself to be mas-
tered, either positively or negatively, by a human doing founded merely on itself.
Technology, whose essence is Being itself, will never allow itself to be overcome
by men. That would mean, after all, that man was the master of Being. 26 (empha-
sis supplied)

The Being of beings and the moment of willful self-gathering of all that is, is

beyond man and his self-assertive will to will. Technology’s essence is Being itself and

as such, its essence lies beyond man’s willful control. The very apex of man’s dominion

and self-assertion lies beyond man’s sphere of dominance, and asserts itself as self-

assertion of man from a ground beyond man’s self-assertion. Man is beset with a dark

quandary here: through his self-willing, the darkest night has come, and nothing

presences as it is, muted by the oblivion of modern technological revealing. But neither

the darkness nor his own self-assertion belong to him. It is as if the light itself has de-

faulted from the clearing, and the world, to darkness, is damned.

26
Martin Heidegger, “The Turning,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays,
trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977), 38.
 26

The Will to Will and the Ground for Salvation

This age of darkness is not a damnation of either Being or man, for damnation is

bereft of saving power. But this age of modern technology, of enframing, is saturated

through and through with a possibility for salvation that waits patiently to be awakened.

Where lies this saving power? Hölderlin says:

But where danger is, grows

The saving power also.27

Here in this age of concealed concealment, here in the age where the darkness

masquerades in a false light of a presencing that reveals nothing in itself, here grows the

saving power. But in order to find the salvific within what appears to be irretrievably

damned, it becomes necessary to understand the nature of the arrival of the danger itself.

Damnation says: Enframing is the mode of destining of Being. But enframing is

a mode of destining of Being. Enframing is Being’s ordained self-sending in this age,

but it is not the only self-sending of Being; for in its obfuscation lies the possibility for

change,28 a change from the self-enclosing darkness to the purest shining of enlighten-

ment.

How is this change to come about, if enframing is beyond man’s control?

Heidegger writes:

Because Being, as the essence of technology, has adapted itself into Enframing,
and because man’s coming to presence belongs to the coming to presence of Be-

27
Ibid., 42.
28
Ibid., 37.
 27

ing—inasmuch as Being’s coming to presence needs the coming to presence of

man, in order to remain kept safe as Being in keeping with its own coming to
presence in the midst of whatever is, and thus as Being to endure as present—for
this reason the coming to presence of technology cannot be led into the change of
its destining without the cooperation of the coming to presence of man.29

While enframing is beyond man’s control and man’s willing, and lies at a

ground more primordial than man (indeed the most primordial “ground” of all), be-

tween the most primordial stirring of Being and man lies an intimacy more primordial

than man’s willing. This intimacy, this nearness of Being and man lies in their belong-

ingness, such that Dasein comes to presence as Dasein only in that Being stirs up and

rises from within him, and only him, as a question; and the possibility of Being coming

to presence as Being only occurs in the safety and shepherding of Dasein. Hence the

change, by which the age of enframing may pass over, depends on the coming to pres-

ence of man, by which man becomes man in a manner truest to his nature. Despite the

beyondness of enframing with respect to human willing, the change needs and uses man.

This change, however, and the role man plays in it as suggested by the word “coopera-

tion,” are of a particular sort. Heidegger says:

Through this cooperation, however, technology will not be overcome [über-

wunden] by men. On the contrary, the coming to presence of technology will be
surmounted [verwunden] in a way that restores it into its yet concealed truth.30

What is the nature of overcoming, and why does it fail to bring itself to bear up-

on technology? What is the nature of man, in that he seeks to overcome? What is the

29
Ibid., 38-39.
30
Ibid., 39.
 28

difference between surmounting and overcoming, that makes it possible for surmount-

ing to bring about the change in the destining of Being? What is the nature of man, that

he is capable of such a surmounting?

Overcoming and Dualistic Representation

Overcoming is a movement from the self-assertion of the will to will. As the

will to will, overcoming does not reach the primordial ground from which enframing

springs. It does not reach this ground, for the will to will has departed from it.

The departure of the will to will from the Will that wills it is seen in full clarity

in Rainer Maria Rilke’s “Improvised Verses.” The poem reads:

As Nature gives the other creatures over

to the venture of their dim delight
and in soil and branchwork grants none special cover,
so too our being’s pristine ground settles our plight;
we are no dearer to it; it ventures us.
Except that we, more eager than plant or beast,
go with this venture, will it, adventurous
more sometimes than Life itself is, more daring
by a breath (and not in the least
from selfishness) . . . . There, outside all caring,
this creates for us a safety—just there,
where the pure forces’ gravity rulesν in the end,
it is our unshieldedness on which we depend,
and that, when we saw it threaten, we turned it
so into the Open that, in the widest orbit somewhere,
where the Law touches us, we may affirm it.31

31
Heidegger, “What Are Poets For?” in Poetry, Language, Thought, 99. Numbering omitted.
 29

Heidegger interprets this poem in the light of his fundamental ontology. Nature

here is akin to Being, as that which gathers all beings to itself (gravity) and in such a

gathering, releases each to itself (the venture). Heidegger explains:

This [Being] is the incipient power gathering everything to itself which in this
manner releases every being to its own self. The Being of beings is the will. The
will is the self-concentrating gathering of every ens unto itself. Every being, as a
being, is in the will. It is as something willed.32

But man is intrinsically different from non-human beings in that man is more

eager, he wills the venture and goes with it, as opposed to all other beings that remain in

their dim delight, “untroubled by the restless relating back and forth in which conscious

representation stumbles along.”33 To go with the venture of the Will in eagerness and

willing means to venture in relation to venture represented as “venture.” Heidegger

says:

For man, to go with the venture is something specifically represented and is pro-
posed as his purpose. The venture and what it ventures, Nature, what is as a whole,
the world, is brought into prominence for man, out of the mutedness of the draft
that removes all barriers.34

Man knows his being as “being,” and knows his commanding self-gathering as

“will.” As such, “will” and “being” are set-up before man, crystallized into objectivity,

the liquidity of their dynamism frozen into the solidity of substance and project. It is

32
Ibid., 100-01.
33
Ibid., 109.
34
Ibid., 109-10.
 30

with this solidity that it becomes possible for man to bend Being and refashion it in ac-

cordance with his own self-gathering will. Heidegger says:

To put something before ourselves, propose it, in such a way that what has been
proposed, having first been represented, determines all the modes of production in
every respect, is a basic characteristic attitude which we know as willing. . . .
Plant and animal do not will because, muted in their desire, they never bring the
Open before themselves as an object.35

Here we have a will that is intrinsically different from the self-gathering concen-

trating will common to plants, animals, stars and man. “The willing of which we speak

here is the putting-through, the self-assertion . . . This willing determines the nature of

modern man.”36 This human willing, in gathering itself onto itself, rejects the prospect

of dispersal. This willing, in asserting itself denies the not-self, the other. This willing,

in preserving-enhancing its life refuses death.

In the representation established by human willing, self is set up in opposition to

other, gathering in opposition to dispersal, life in opposition to death. It is through rep-

resentation and the speaking of Being that becomes possible (but woefully incomplete)

through it, by which Being comes to pass as enframing in the age of modern technology

that is shot, through and through, with the covering-over of death. Heidegger writes:

The parting self-assertion of objectification wills everywhere the constancy of

produced objects, and recognizes it alone as being and as positive. The self-
assertion of technological objectification is the constant negation of death. By this

35
Ibid., 110.
36
Ibid., 111.
 31

negation death itself becomes something negative; it becomes the altogether in-
constant and null.37

This will that represents x in opposition to not-x is a will that has parted from

the wholeness of the Will. It has fragmented Being itself, taking only what remains pal-

atable to its value-positing, and has named it as such: the reasonable, the valuable, that

which matters. But as the reasonable denies the unreasonable, the valuable spurns the

invaluable, and that which matters is taken in ignorance of the abundance of what is not

taken into consideration. Being itself is denied its wholeness’ abundant shining light.

Reduced to the reasonable and valuable matters, Being is reduced to that which is

skimmed off the surface of its infinite depth. This “being” is the foulest degradation of

Being, a farce, a thin shadow of the self-willing-self.

Overcoming will never heal the rift of this dualism, for overcoming is founded

on this dualism as the rejection of that which is overcome. What the destitute time calls

for is something more originary than overcoming. This darkest night calls for the heal-

ing metanoia of surmounting.

Surmounting: The Metanoetic Task of Turning

Surmounting is akin to the movement of moving past grief.38 Moving past does

not overcome, does not reject grief. Instead, moving past embraces grief, bears it in its

37
Ibid., 125.
38
Heidegger, “The Turning,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, 39.
 32

verity, and by bringing it to light allows the darkness to bring itself to pass. The same

holds true for the surmounting of technology—it bears the flight of duality in its danger,

and brings it to light. In so doing, it becomes possible for the oblivion to shine of its

own light once more. This is the task of turning.

The task of turning, that is, the changing of the destining of Being from the

oblivion of enframing to the truest shining light, depends on a cooperation that is a turn-

ing within man. Heidegger says:

Insight into that which is—thus do we name the sudden flash of the truth of Being
into truthless Being.

Only when man, in the disclosing coming-to-pass of the insight by which he him-
self is beheld, renounces human self-will and projects himself toward that insight,
away from himself, does he correspond in his essence to the claim of that insight.
In thus corresponding man is gathered into his own [ge-eignet], that he, within the
safeguarded element of the world, may, as the mortal, look out toward the di-
vine.39

For Being to presence once more as Being in its truth, man must heal the rift that

dualism has built in the presencing of Being. He must surrender the will by which he

has willed himself apart from the Will, and gathered himself in refusal of dispersal. This

surrender in turn is possible only through the courage to embrace the side of life he has

turned away from—death—and the side of being he has relegated to negativity—

nothingness. In this surrender, man becomes the most mortal of mortals. In living that

affirms its co-constitution with death, and gathering that affirms its co-constitution with

39
Ibid., 47.
 33

dispersal, man restores his wholeness as man, and is gathered together in a manner more

primordial than any self-assertion.

Such is metanoia 40 in the two-fold sense. Philosophically, it invokes meta and

nous, that is, to go beyond the mind of representation and dualism. But more immedi-

ately than any overt philosophy, metanoia invokes repentance—repentance for the most

originary of sins, which is the self-assertive refusal of abundance. Only by repenting

can we once more hope to dwell as we truly are—bearing witness to the dawning of the

light of the divine.

In this section, we have surveyed the main contours of Heidegger’s understand-

ing of the age of modern technology. Beneath the technological problems of technology

lies a more fundamental problem which is in the ground of truth, of Being. Beings are

no longer seen as what they are in this age. Instead, they are challenged forth as re-

source, as standing-reserve. It is from this challenging that the plethora of environmen-

tal, political and cultural problems are buoyed up into the mad mélange of technological

strife. Hence the problems of modern technological strife do not lie merely within tech-

nology but lie in the technological itself. Truly efficacious overcoming of the problems

of modern technology requires an overcoming of the age of modern technology itself.

40
Tanabe Hajime, Philosophy as Metanoetics, trans. Yoshinori Takeuchi (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1986), 2-3.
 34

But if we look deeper into the ground of revealing in modern technology, we

find that challenging is enacted by and rooted in the movement of the will to will, an

integral part of the mode of being of present technological man. But the will to will is

itself part of the will of Being. The movement of challenging, of willing the selfsame-

ness of the will, is not something that man can simply will his way out of. Hence, to

move past this age of its technology and the shrouding of beings that ensues, it is neces-

sary to discover another mode of surmounting, from a ground more primordial than the

will.

Why is the will itself incapable of surmounting the problems of technology?

How is the strife of technology inherent in the will itself? Heidegger has pointed to a

fragmentation of Being in dualism. But how is violence to the Being of beings violence

to man himself? Can we locate the attestation to the need to overcome the will to will

and the age of modern technology within man himself? In the next chapter, we shall at-

tempt to answer these very questions as we discuss the anguish and strife inherent to our

existence as the will to will.

 II. UNDERSTANDING THE STRIFE OF THE WILL TO WILL

2.1 The Ultimate Antinomy of the Will to Will

Heidegger’s usage of the phrase “will to will” has a profound two-fold effect: on

one hand, the phrase strongly illustrates the recursive selfsame assertion of the will. On

the other hand, the phrase is also able to capture a sense of romantic beauty in the idea

of a will that wills itself. The idea is seductive, attractive—a handsome demonic so to

speak. Hence the phrase captures not only what the concept points to but also the senti-

ment of this age. If will to will constitutes damnation, it is a vigorous, vivacious and

vital damnation.

However, beneath the flamboyant self-assertion of the will lies a hushed anxiety,

a depression on the verge of despair. Beneath the din and clamor of a world in the fever

of challenging and wresting control from reality is an agitation that is unspeakable yet

undeniably palpable. In this section, we shall probe into this inherent negativity of the

will through an article by Hisamatsu Shin’ichi entitled “Ultimate Crisis and Resurrec-

tion.” Alongside the Buddha’s fundamental teaching on the three marks of existence,1

we shall discuss Hisamatsu’s ideas concerning the antinomy of reason and the antinomy

of existence together as the Ultimate Antinomy, in order to understand the suffering in-

herent in the will to will.

1
The three marks of existence in Buddhism are anatman (not-self), anitya (impermanence), and
duhkha (suffering).
35
 36

The Antinomy of Reason

In his article, Hisamatsu discusses the notion of ultimate crisis through the no-

tions of sin and death. We begin with his treatment of sin. Hisamatsu points to the reli-

gious concept of original sin—sin that has been passed down from generation to genera-

tion from the original offense of Adam and Eve. While Hisamatsu acknowledges that

such an idea can no longer be taken literally, that does not mean it is without im-

portance. He writes:

Today, however, for us who attempt to understand original sin, the myth which at-
tributes it to Adam and Eve is completely unacceptable. Therefore, such a myth
cannot but be interpreted differently, perhaps, as a symbol.2

Hisamatsu sets out to interpret the importance of original sin in a symbolic fash-

ion. Original sin presents an attempt to grasp sinfulness not merely as individual acts or

transgressions but as something universal and inherent in the very existence of man.

Through the idea of inherited sin, the notion of original sin locates sinfulness in the fall-

enness of man’s mode of being.

This focus on sin and grasping sin in the very existence of man is not unique to

Christianity and its notion of original sin. Hisamatsu cites Jōdoshin (True Pure Land)

Buddhism as a school that “emphasizes contemplation upon man’s sinfulness”3 as inte-

2
Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, “Ultimate Crisis and Resurrection,” trans. Tokiwa Gishin, The Eastern
Buddhist VIII, 1 (May 1975): 12-29. [article on-line]; available from
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/fas/soc/writings/hisamatsu/ultimcrisis1e.html; Internet; accessed 1 November
2006.
3
Ibid.
 37

gral to the task of awakening. But why is the contemplation of sin, be it through the no-

tion of original sin or through the contemplation of man’s incapacity to liberate himself,

a matter of such importance?

The importance of sin lies in its existence as a limit. Hisamatsu writes:

Sin, from a moral perspective, must always be overcome by moral means. How-
ever, morally speaking, one can only be negative about the possibility of com-
pletely overcoming sin. In other words, moral strength is like the limitation of
idealism. Although, relatively, one can overcome each single sin, one can never
get rid of sin itself, no matter how long one may try.4 (emphasis supplied)

Sin is an inescapable and insurmountable limitation imposed upon moral action.

Evil is a constraint that moral life must constantly contend with and run across in its

movement toward the good. Hence the notion of original sin as a universal evil that is

inherent in man’s existence as human points to a fundamental limitation to man’s moral

action and existence.

It is from this notion of fundamental moral limitation that Hisamatsu begins, to-

ward elucidating an idea of an antinomy of reason itself. Hisamatsu writes:

Ordinarily sin may be considered to belong exclusively to morality. But when we

consider it well, we come to wonder whether we can limit sin to morality alone. I
rather think that sin exists in science and art as well, and not just in morality. Cer-
tainly it is not of a moral type, but just as we have evil against good, we have fal-
sity against truth, ugliness against beauty, and defilement against purity. Even if
we could get rid of sin in a moral sense, we could not be free from the contrast be-
tween ugliness and beauty in the world of art, or opposition between falsity and

4
Ibid.
 38

truth in the world of science. Therefore, sin ought to be extended to include the
problem of reason per se.5

The idea of universal inherent sinfulness is a motif for a more primordial notion

of a limit in man’s engagement with reality itself. Just as moral life constantly contends

with sins of omission and commission, the task of bringing the truth to light constantly

contends with the problem of limitations in conceptual expression, historical biases,

misrepresentations, and other occurrences of falsity. In art, the desire for aesthetic per-

fection finds itself similarly limited as well by ugliness. In our very engagement with

reality, we find a fundamental insurmountable obstruction, a limitation.

This is what Hisamatsu means by the need to extend the idea of sin to the prob-

lem of reason. Reason here is taken as a particular mode by which man relates with re-

ality, a mode that predominates the present age, a mode of grasping, challenging, re-

fashioning and otherwise trying to make sense of reality either through understanding or

active control. Reason is the will to will as man stands before reality. But reason finds

itself up against an ultimate limit which Hisamatsu terms as the irrational.

The irrational, be it in the form of chaos, evil, ugliness, falsity, or absurdity, is

the negating stamp that repulses the attempt of the will to will to grasp reality.

Hisamatsu asserts that the irrational cannot be overcome. He writes:

By this, I do not mean any impossibility of removing what is irrational in the pro-
cess of rationalization. . . . I mean rather that the impossibility of being freed from

5
Ibid.
 39

sin [or falsity or any form of the irrational] is indubitably based on the structure of
reason itself.6

This is what we mean by the notion of the antinomy of reason. In the very struc-

ture of reason, it is compelled to wrestle with the irrational. In any attempt to grasp real-

ity, be it through scientific study, artistic exploration, moral action or technological con-

trol, one is compelled to reckon with falsity, ugliness, evil and technological strife. Rea-

son itself is condemned to wrestle with the irrational.

Why is this so? We shall return to this later on. But for the moment, let us turn

to the teaching of the Buddha.

The Buddha spoke of three fundamental traits of existence, commonly known as

the three marks. One of these marks is Anatman, which literally means no-self. Anat-

man is a denial of the notion of atman, the idea of a graspable enduring entity within

things. This idea of atman is closely tied to the idea of svabhava, the notion of a self-

standing existence. These ideas, atman and svabhava, point to the ground by which we

grasp reality with a sense of security and ground our understanding, moral action, artis-

tic expression, and so on. But anatman means there is no self, no enduring entity by

which we will comprehend things, no self-standing existence which we can completely

make sense of. When the Buddha formulated the three marks of existence, he saw clear-

ly the fate of reason as it attempts to grasp reality fully: reason fails.

6
Ibid.
 40

This failure is enshrined in the concept of anatman. Anatman is hence seen as a

statement that bears within itself the antinomic character of reason, an understanding of

how reason struggles with the irrational, never capable of overcoming it completely.

The Antinomy of Existence

Earlier, Hisamatsu asserted that incapacity to surmount the irrational is not

merely accidental to reason but structural. Why is this so? Why is it inherent in reason

itself that it be incapable of completely grasping reality as it is?

Perhaps the answer lies in the standpoint that the will to will takes with respect

to reality. The will to will constitutes a standpoint that remains exclusively in the stand-

point of life, of existence, of the selfsame. The will to will, as the willing that refuses

dispersal, that asserts itself by clinging to values and refashioning reality in terms of its

values, remains constantly on the ground of life as apart from death. The will to will

flies from death. But can reality be reduced to life, without death?

This brings us to the idea of the antinomy of existence, which Hisamatsu dis-

cusses beginning with the notion of death. He writes:

There is no death as such alone; death, after all, is not to be separated from life. It
is death as the other side of life. In this sense, one must say that death is invaria-
bly of the nature of life-and-death.7

7
Ibid.
 41

Just as reason must always run up against the oppressive glare of the irrational,

life is always in relation to death; life must always contend with death as its fundamen-

tal limit. Death constitutes a negation of life. No amount of medical advances can pro-

long life indefinitely. Even if aging were surmounted, the very universe itself creeps

toward its own entropic death. Life, from its very inception, bears the negating stamp of

mortality. Hence, life-and-death in their tensional unity bears an antinomic character.

Let us note that death on its own cannot constitute a problem. Death can only

become a problem from the standpoint of life. It is because life runs up to death that

death is a problem. Hence, Hisamatsu insists that the problem is not death per se but the

antinomy of life-and-death.

What characterizes the antinomic character of the life-and-death? What is the re-

lationship of this antinomy to our existence as human beings? Every living being dies.

Dogs, ants, bacteria, various cells in our body—all of these things cease to exist as liv-

ing beings at a certain point in time. Every organized thing ceases to be. Mansions

crumble, fuels are consumed, even planets are destroyed and stars explode. All things

come to pass. But only man is called “mortal.”

Why is this? The designation of man as mortal points to the reality that for man,

his coming to pass is not just a fact; it is his problem and his passion; it is something

that he suffers. All animals instinctively preserve their lives. But the misery of ponder-

ing one’s death in bitter anxiety is a privilege reserved for man alone.
 42

While man, as mortal, experiences the problem of life-and-death as a personal

problem, the problem of life-and-death is not restricted to its personal character.

Hisamatsu writesμ “We must extend the content much further than life-and-death or

origination-and-extinction, and bring it to the very point of existence-and-

nonexistence.”8

Abe Masao, a student of Hisamatsu, talks precisely of this extension of the prob-

lem of life-and-death in his idea of “the dehomocentric nature” of samsara. In that man

is able to see mortality as a problem, as something that is suffered, the problem of the

impermanence of all beings comes alive in him. The personal problem of life-and-death

grounds the ontological problem of samsara, of impermanent existence. In “Dōgen on

Buddha-Nature,” Abe writesμ

In Buddhism the problem of birth-and-death, the fundamental problem of human

existence, is not only treated as a birth-death (shōji) problem merely within the
‘human’ dimension, but as a generation-extinction (shōmetsu) problem within the
total ‘living’ dimension. It is in this dehomocentric, living dimension that the
Buddhist idea of transmigration (samsara) and emancipation from it (nirvana) are
understood. . . . Dōgen carries the dehomocentrism of Buddhism to its extreme by
going beyond even the ‘living’ dimension [to the realm of all beings and their be-
ing-non-being (umu)].9

Mortality, in its most intimate depths, is about one’s own death, that and nobody

else’s. But from this intimate ground springs the death that is the death of all beings: our

pets die, our houses crumble, and our planet is on the brink of death. Because we die, all

8
Ibid.
9
Abe Masao, “Dōgen on Buddha-Nature,” in Zen and Western Thought, ed., William R. LaFleur
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 34.
 43

beings, in their impermanence, come forth as dying. Hence mortality is not just a per-

sonal problem. Because beings come forth as beings in the consciousness of man, a

consciousness quite thoroughly plagued by death, mortality is suffered by beings as a

whole.

Hence the problematic character of life-and-death embraces not only man, but

all things in existence, because they are bound to impermanence. Life-and-death ex-

tends to the antinomy of existence itself, wherein existence, as a galaxy, a star, a planet,

a river, or a mortal man, is condemned to eventually meet its end, its death, its non-

existence.

This leads us to another of the three marks of existence: Anitya. Anitya literally

means impermanence. The Buddha looked upon all things—empires, families, people,

happiness—and saw these things to be impermanent. All of these things are subject to

the character of arising and perishing. Hence the mark of Anitya speaks of the antinomy

of existence and its inevitable reckoning with nothingness.

Ultimate Antinomy

So far, we have discussed two of the antinomies that Hisamatsu discusses. First

is the antinomy of reason, by which man’s attempt to reckon with reality and grasp it

finds itself inevitably frustrated by the element of the irrational. Next is the antinomy of

existence, by which all forms of existence—human life, sentience, structural order—are

inevitably headed toward dispersal, death, and non-existence.

 44

What is the relationship of these two antinomies? Hisamatsu writes:

These two cases of ultimate antinomy are never two in us; in the concrete actual
man they are one. The ultimate antinomy of life-and-death and that of the ration-
al-irrational are not separable from one another; they are indivisible. To take up
either life-death or the rational-irrational alone, apart from the other, is evidently
an abstract matter. . . . To ask why the ultimate antinomy of life-and-death be-
comes pain or suffering in us is already a question based on the judgment of rea-
son. Not only because one feels that pain is detestable but because one judges that
it is to be detested, does liberation from pain come to be really objective problem
[sic]. Further, sin without a sinner is a mere idea; it is the concrete man of life-
and-death who is the sinner.10

The antinomy of reason and the antinomy of life-and-death are not two antino-

mies: they are one antinomy, the ultimate antinomy of which Hisamatsu speaks. They

are inseparable, for one cannot raise the antinomic character of each without the other.

It is only from the standpoint of reason that life can appear opposed to death, and exist-

ence opposed to non-existence. Hence, there is no antinomy of life-and-death without

the very reason that finds itself crashing headlong against the irrational.

In the same way, reason is always the movement of the will to will, a will that is

inevitably caught in the grips of the problem of life-and-death. The drive of reason is

only possible by taking the standpoint of life that reckons with and is opposed to death.

The limitation of reason and its incapacity to surmount the irrational is fundamentally

rooted in the problem of life-and-death, the antinomy of existence.

Hisamatsu says:

Such ultimate antinomy really pressing upon us is the true “moment” of reli-
gion. . . . This ultimate antinomy is the very self-awareness in which existence

10
Hisamatsu, “Ultimate Crisis and Resurrection.”
 45

and value are one; it is not anything to be known objectively. It is original to man;
it is at once my way of being and that of all human beings.11

“Existence and value are one.” In the notion of ultimate antinomy, existence (as

life-and-death, existence-non-existence) and our mode of relating to existence (reason

as it reckons with the irrational) are seen in their togetherness. Ultimate antinomy

speaks, with one breath, reality and man’s relationship with it.

Antinomy literally means the opposition of law. Perhaps, in the light of

Hisamatsu’s writings, we can understand antinomy as the opposition within law, the

self-refutation of law. When Hisamatsu states that this antinomy is “not anything to be

known objectively,” he is drawing our attention to the fundamentally subjective charac-

ter of this experience.

We spoke of the two facets in line with two of the three marks of existence. We

saw the antinomy of reason as anatman, and the antinomy of existence as anitya. There

is a third mark of existence, and it is this mark that calls to what antinomy is most im-

mediately experienced as: duhkha, suffering. To exist with this ultimate antinomy burn-

ing in one’s breast is to exist with a fundamental contradiction within oneself. Ultimate

antinomy speaks of the anguish, the suffering of mankind.

11
Ibid.
 46

Will to Will, Tanha and Suffering

But what accounts for the antinomic character of reality and man’s relationship

with it? What accounts for the suffering of man? The antinomic character is rooted in

the very standpoint that we have seen to characterize this age of modern technology: the

standpoint of the will to will.

Let us recall several lines from the preceding sectionμ “The will to power, in

willing the will, is the purity of self-assertion. The will asserts itself toward itself as it-

self. This intrinsically same-ward orientation betrays a self-consciousness of the highest

order, a selfsame-consciousness where consciousness is purely consciousness of the self.

The involution of the will upon itself is one with the phenomena of self-conscious self-

assertion.”12

The ultimate antinomy is elucidated through two facets: the antinomy of reason

as it is opposed by the irrational, and the antinomy of existence as it is opposed by non-

existence. The locus of the possibility of antinomy lies in the dualism between reason

and the irrational and existence and non-existence. This dualism is not merely a dualism

of distinction, by which we differentiate reason from the irrational. This dualism is a

dualism of assertion, of attachment.

Reason is opposed by the irrational because the will to will clings to reason and

asserts it. Existence is opposed by non-existence because the will to will clings to its life

12
See page 19.
 47

and wills itself away from death. Reason and existence comprise the standpoint of life,

or more radically, the standpoint of the selfsame. Hence, the antinomic character arises

because the will to will clings to the selfsame in earnest refusal of that which stands

other to it—the irrational, and death. This clinging that rejects, this craving of the self-

same, is captured in the Buddhist notion of tanha (craving, desire or attachment).

The Second Noble Truth

The second noble truth is written as follows:

What now is the noble truth of the origin of suffering? It is craving, which gives
rise to repeated existence, is bound up with pleasure and lust, and always seeks
fresh enjoyment here and there; that is, sensual craving, craving for existence and
craving for nonexistence.13

The fact of impermanence (anitya, existence-non-existence) and the fact of

anatman (reason-irrational) become the antinomy of existence and the antinomy of rea-

son because of the selfsame movement, the involution of the will to will. In Buddhism

this is referred to as tanha, which is translated as attachment, craving, or desire.

A brief note on the translation of this word is in order. The danger of the various

translations of the word tanha into English lies in that such translations only highlight

one face of tanha—the positive aspect, which seeks what it desires. From this one-sided

interpretation of tanha, the only danger and suffering that becomes apparent is the pain

of denial—when one is refused what one seeks.

13
Bhikku Bodhi, “The Buddha’s Teaching,” in The Buddha and His Teachings, eds. Samuel
Bercholz and Sherab Chödzin Kohn (Boston: Shambhala, 2003), 62-63.
 48

But tanha is not merely an orientation toward but also an orientation away.14

Tanha is a desire of . . . that rejects otherwise than . . . . In the case of Hisamatsu’s ulti-

mate antinomy, the desire of rationality and existence is simultaneous and inseparable

from the rejection of the irrational and of non-existence.

What this two-fold nature of tanha shows us is that the suffering that arises from

tanha is far more deep-seated than the mere pain of denial. The suffering begins more

primordially—in rending the world in half and preventing the original oneness of reality

as it is.

Abe saysμ “Attachment to something means substantializing that thing.”15 This

idea of substantialization sheds light on the ontological character of tanha. To substan-

tialize means to hold something as ground, as solid, as the nexus and the basis that holds

all things in one’s oriented world-view. But a necessary result of substantialization is

that things are seen in relation to that ground. And in the multifarious nature of reality,

some things will be related in opposition to that ground.

In the case of ultimate antinomy, there is a substantialization of reason/existence.

Good, truth, beauty, life—these things are seen as positive, in line with what is substan-

tialized. However, there is always that deplorable limit, which opposes what is substan-

14
Because of this difficulty in translation, I shall, for the most part, leave tanha untranslated.
Though if and when I do say “craving” or “desire” because of its more intuitive description, I mean such
in the two-fold sense of tanha.

Abe Masao, “Zen and Western Thought,” in Zen and Western Thought, ed., William R.
15

LaFleur (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 102.

 49

tialized—evil, falsity, ugliness, death—the manifestations of the irrational and non-

existence.

The result of this substantialization is that the world comes forth with a near side

and a far side, a side that is affirmed, and a side that is denied. Even individual beings

are seen in this two-sided manner. For instance, a human person has a “good side,” in

how he aids his neighbor and how he nurtures his children. But he has a “bad side,”

with his temper and his egocentrism. When asked what this person’s “true self” is, peo-

ple would point to his good side and his less agreeable side is treated like a dismal acci-

dent, a shadow that casts its darkness upon him.

The danger lies herein: in this two-sidedness, the world is not affirmed as a

whole. The world is affirmed only partially. Individual beings are only affirmed partial-

ly. With this affirmation that simultaneously denies, can we still say that reality is able

to come forth as it is in its suchness?

Tanha rends the world in half. And as the will to will, we dwell upon the jagged

edges of these shards, suffering. The antinomic character of impermanence and un-

graspability has been carved out by the blade of our own self-assertions.

The essence of modern technology lies in the movement of the will to will. The

will to will is involuted upon itself—it wills its will and nothing else. The will to will

holds fast to and asserts the standpoint of the selfsame, the standpoint of reason and ex-

istence. But this self-involution is none other than tanha that substantializes the stand-
 50

point of the selfsame in opposition to the realities of the irrational and non-existence.

The will to will rends the world asunder—this is the violence of the will to will. Its du-

alism is a sword that rends the law into two opposed pairs. The opposition is antinomy,

the degeneration of the law. In this age, amidst the clamor of self-assertion, it is ultimate

antinomy that characterizes reality, man’s relationship with it, and man’s inevitable suf-

fering.

How are we to overcome this antinomic character? How are we to surmount the

suffering on the personal and the global scale? To answer these questions, we must first

turn within, to our experience of this antinomy. We must let the suffering we have

wrought speak, and from there, perhaps we can derive answers as to where the solution

lies.
 51

2.2 Conscience: Calling the Will to Will to its Authenticity

There is a danger that presents itself when one discusses the anguish and strife

that beset man on a personal and socio-historical scale as “suffering” or “antinomy.”

The danger is that we shall take this suffering and antinomy and merely resign ourselves

to it. However, as we have seen from the beginning, our acceptance of our antinomic

fate as the will to will is always on the way, always in the light of a possibility of deliv-

erance.

In the light of deliverance that we do not merely await but cooperate with, suf-

fering and antinomy acquire a positive aspect. They are no longer merely something

negative and dismal. It is the very degeneracy and anguish of suffering and antinomy

that provides the impetus for the movement towards metanoia. The antinomic anguish is

essential for our surmounting of this age.

It could be most helpful for us to reframe these notions of antinomy and suffer-

ing in this perspective. If antinomy is pain that spurs mankind to release itself toward its

own deliverance, then is it not most appropriate to discuss this antinomic suffering as

the anguish, the guilt of conscience? Delving into this suffering as guilt, perhaps we can

discern the direction which is necessary for the surmounting of this age.

However, the phenomenon of conscience finds itself terribly maligned in this

current age. With the growing resentment toward the prohibitive structures of the Chris-

tian Church, one of the first to be spurned is the nagging sense of guilt that the Church
 52

has “imbedded” in each Christian. The strength of conscience might even be equated

with the strength of superego, which leads to being repressed and closed-up upon one-

self and one’s puritanical values.

But the phenomenon of conscience does not belong exclusively to the Church or

Judaeo-Christianity. Centuries before Jesus was born, Socrates spoke of his daimon that

would indicate to him when he was about to do something wrong. Outside of Christiani-

ty, Natsume Sōseki tells a dark tale of conscience, as it haunts a man in his dreams, in

his short story, “The Third Night.”

We must then ask ourselves: does the understanding of conscience in terms of

God or morality sufficiently grasp the fundamental character of this experience? It is

necessary to reappropriate the notion of conscience outside of the trappings of Christi-

anity and theism, from the more universal ground of fundamental ontology. What is

conscience? How does it call us? To what possibility does it call us, in this age of an-

guish and antinomic existence?

We shall discuss these questions through Heidegger’s phenomenology of con-

science in Being and Time. Following his discussion in the second section of the second

division of Being and Time, we shall discuss conscience, the ontological sense of guilt,

the relation of they-self and sin, and the call to Angst and resoluteness.
 53

The Call of Conscience

In his short story “The Third Night,” Natsume Sōseki weaves a dark tale of a

man hounded by his conscience in a dream. Conscience hounds. To say that conscience

calls is almost too tame to do justice to this reality. It hounds, like a blind child who

hears the herons a moment before they make a noise. It hounds, like the sniggering of a

burdensome child when it hears your thoughts. It hounds, like the weight of the stone

statue of the Bodhisattva patron of children, Jizō, that presses upon the back of a father

who has slain his own child. Conscience hounds.

“To be hounded by one’s conscience,” is not merely a poetic expression. Per-

haps the poesy is now lost in favor of a bland cliché. And yet the verb “hound” does

justice to the voice of conscience, whence it comes and how it speaks.

Who calls in the call of conscience? In Natsume’s story, it is most appropriate

that the child is tethered to the man’s back. There is a nearness to conscience, near as

the child nestled behind one’s spine, that attests to the haunting character of this hound-

ing. But the nearness of the caller in conscience is never a nearness of familiarity.

Natsume refers to the child on the man’s back as “this thing [もの, mono] on my

back.”16 It seems strange to refer to a child as “this thing.” It adds further to the uncanny

unfamiliarity, when he refuses to name the thing and says “脊中 い

Natsume Sōseki, “The Third Night,” in Breaking into Japanese Literature, trans. Giles Murray
16

(Tokyo: Kodansha International, 2003), 35. Original says: こ なもの 脊負っ い [Konna
mono wo shotteite].
 54

った ”17 [“Senaka de, ‘. . .’ to itta.” Literallyμ “From the middle of my back ‘. . .’ was

said.”] These, together with the commanding and fateful authority of the child, contrib-

ute to Natsume’s faithfulness to the unfathomable distance of the caller of conscience.

This tension between the haunting nearness and the unfathomable distance of

the caller of conscience are constitutive of its character. Heidegger says:

The caller of the call—and this belongs to its phenomenal character—absolutely

distances any kind of becoming familiar. It goes against its kind of being to be
drawn into any consideration and talk.18

Elsewhere, Heidegger saysμ “In its who, the caller is definable by nothing

‘worldly’.”19 The caller of the call is completely other to one’s self, other to the words

and ideas and conceptions that pervade the tranquillized tranquility of our everyday ex-

istence, such that it lies beyond all possibility of familiarity. But this otherness is not

one of separation, but one of absolute nearness, for this caller is none other than the self.

Heidegger says:

Da-sein calls itself in conscience. . . . However, ontologically it is not enough to

answer that Da-sein is the caller and the one summoned at the same time. When
Da-sein is summoned, is it not “there” in another way from that in which it does
the calling? Is it perhaps the ownmost potentiality-of-being that functions as the
caller?20

17
Ibid, 38. Giles translation readsμ “The thing on my back said, ‘. . .’”
18
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), 253.
19
Ibid., 255.
20
Ibid., 254.
 55

The caller is Da-sein itself. It is this that accounts for the inescapable nearness of

the call of conscience. But we, as Da-sein, are not the Da-sein that calls in conscience.

The caller is we ourselves, but in the most primordial possibility of being as Da-sein.

Heidegger says:

[The caller] is Da-sein in its uncanniness, primordially thrown being-in-the-world,

as not-at-home, the naked “that” in the nothingness of the world.21

The caller is Da-sein, anxious in thrownness (in its already-being-in . . .) about its
potentiality-of-being.22

Who calls in the call of conscience? The caller is none other than one’s very

own self in its ownmost potentiality-of-being, standing before the nothingness in all its

uncanny anxiety [Angst].

How calls the call of conscience? There are no words announced. While the

voice of conscience endlessly rattles in one’s ear, it is silent. Heidegger says:

The call is lacking any kind of utterance. It does not even come to words, and yet
it is not at all obscure and indefinite. Conscience speaks solely and constantly in
the mode of silence.23

Why then do we say, “My conscience told me . . .” Why do we interpret con-

science structurally, as an “informed” conscience that “understands” a situation? Why

do we speak of conscience as a verbose heuristic of moral character? But perhaps when

21
Ibid., 255.
22
Ibid., 256.
23
Ibid., 252.
 56

we do so, it becomes easier to turn down the thrumming of the silence by crystallizing it

into discernible words. “I should have done . . . I should not have done . . .”

So long as such interpretations fail to first be reticent in the face of the hounding

of the silence, such interpretations of conscience only serve to mute its call. But does

conscience not say “do this,” or “do not do this?” If one is to be reticent to the call of

suffering, what might one hear?

Natsume writes:

“You murdered me a hundred years ago, to the day, didn’t you?”

And as I heard him say those words, the knowledge suddenly welled up inside me
that a hundred years ago to the day, on just such a dark night as this, at the root of
this very cedar, I had indeed killed a man.24

It seems as if conscience points to an evil action that one has committed. Yet it

is something more originary than that. Natsume continuesμ “The instant I realized that I

was a murderer, the child on my back suddenly grew as heavy as a stone image of Jizō

himself.”25 (emphasis supplied)

The turning-point is not “I had indeed killed a man,” but “I was a murderer.”

More primordial than what we have done or not done is who we are, and who we have

failed to be. More originally than verbosely diagnosing moral failures, the call of con-

science calls us to who we are, as guilty.

24
Natsume, 45.
25
Ibid.
 57

The Ontological Sense of Guilt

In Heidegger’s discussion of guilt begins with a reckoning with the notion of

guilt in terms of “owing something,” “being indebted,” “being lacking,” and so on.26

We feel guilt when there is some obligation we have failed to fulfill, when there is a

debt that we have failed to repay. But such an analysis of guilt is insufficient. Heidegger

says:

The idea of guilt must not only be removed from the area of calculating and tak-
ing care of things, but must also be separated from relationship to an ought and a
law such that by failing to comply with it one burdens himself with guilt. For here,
too, guilt is still necessarily defined as a lack, when something which ought to be
and can be is missing. . . .

Still, the quality of the not is present in the idea of “guilty.” . . . Thus we define
the formal existential idea of “guilty” as being-the-ground for a being which is de-
termined by a not—that is, being-the-ground of a nullity.27

To say that the man in Natsume’s story is guilty because he “owed” his son a

life or because he ought not to commit murder, is insufficient to account for how thor-

oughly he is guilty. Guilt does not remain in the realm of what one has or has not done,

but who one is and who one has failed to be.

This is why Heidegger is careful to say that while there is a “lack” quality in

guilt, it is necessary that we understand guilt in terms of a “not” quality. Lack, which is

clear in this sense of indebtedness, or indicated quite emphatically in the Filipino word

“pagkukulang” indicates that something is necessary but there is a continuity between

26
Heidegger, Being and Time, 260.
27
Ibid., 261.
 58

the lacking state and the fulfilled state that can be bridged by an addition or fulfillment

of an obligation. “Not” however indicates a radically pervasive absence, such that no

amount of mere addition or fulfillment can attenuate it. There is no continuity between a

state of “not” and a state of fulfillment. There is a gap that requires a leap, an occur-

rence of metanoia in one’s existence.

What then are we not? How is it that in our troubled existence, we are the

ground of a nullity? Not, null and nullity28 are characterized by a repelling gesture, an

abyssal distance between Da-sein and himself. Heidegger says:

[Da-sein] exists as a potentiality-of-being which belongs to itself, and yet has not
given itself to itself. Existing, it never gets back behind its thrownness so that it
could ever expressly release this “that-it-is-and-has-to-be” from its being a self
and lead it into the there. . . . Because it has not laid the ground itself, it rests in
the weight of it, which mood reveals to it as a burden.29

Existing in the tranquillized tranquility of its everyday existence as they-self, we

as Da-sein are thrown to be the ground of possibilities which we have not laid out for

ourselves. We are thrown to project and live out possibilities that are not ownmost to us.

Hence, we lag behind our ownmost possibilities as we chase after burdensome possibili-

ties that are not our own. Even in our everyday caring we are assailed by this not.

Heidegger says:

Care itself is in its essence thoroughly permeated with nullity. Care, the being of
Da-sein, thus means, as thrown project: being the (null) ground of a nullity. And

28
Not, null and nullity form a verbal triptych, whose unity is lost in English. Not, null and nullity
are nicht, nichtig and Nichtigkeit, in German.
29
Heidegger, Being and Time, 262.
 59

that means that Da-sein as such is guilty if our formal existential definition of
guilt as being-the-ground of a nullity is valid.30

Before one is guilty of any sin of omission or commission, one is already guilty

of being-the-ground of a nullity. “It itself is a nullity of itself.”31 By calling us back to

this sense of nullity, conscience calls us forward to be ourselves.

While Heidegger’s discussion is more encompassing than particular religious

notions of conscience, there is the danger that it will lose touch with the reality of one’s

experience of conscience and guilt. There are two facets of Heidegger’s notion of guilt

that must be elucidated and phenomenologically verified. Guilt is first and foremost a

failure to be oneself, oneself in one’s ownmost possibility as individuated by the noth-

ing. But Heidegger primarily interprets this failure to be oneself as the ensnarement in

the anonymous, complacent they [das Man].

The first notion is more easily reconciled with our own experience. In Natsu-

me’s story, the father saysμ

I did feel that, whatever it was, it might have happened on a night like this. I did
feel that if I went on a bit further, I might understand. And I did feel that to under-
stand would be a terrible thing, so I should keep my peace of mind by disposing
of the child quickly while I was still in ignorance. I quickened my pace.32

30
Ibid., 263.
31
Ibid., 262.
32
Natsume, 41.
 60

Tranquillized everyday existence is characterized by this fleet-footed mindless-

ness that pushes away the call of conscience. This strong but muted attempt to be deaf

to conscience reveals that one is incapable of bearing the burden of the knowledge of

one’s own guilt. “I did feel that to understand would be a terrible thing,” says the father.

But that a man cannot even look at his guilt in the face indicates that the disappointment

and rejection of this failure is not a foreign one. For if it were foreign, then it would be

the mysterious caller of conscience alone who would be mortified at the sight of this

disappointment. But the failure is a treachery not to another, but to oneself. And hence it

is the self itself that buries its own shame in the shallow grave of forgetfulness.

“The instant I realized that I was a murderer, the child on my back suddenly

grew as heavy as a stone image of Jizō himself.”33 Understanding the act of murder

(which lasts for as little as an instant, at the most, several hours) in its radicality, we see

being a murderer, an existence that spans the entire duration after an act of murder, and

in the eyes of the guilty, even before. The treachery to oneself is therefore no mere

commission of murder. It is a treachery that one is, that cannot rest with what one truly

is. He is a murderer, and it is a dreadful thing, because he is not so.34

While the notion of nullity by which one is not-who-he-is is easily reconciled

with one’s experience, Heidegger appropriates this nullity as an entanglement in the

33
Ibid., 45.
34
A murderer who is a murderer through and through after all, would be scarcely troubled by the
thought of what he is. But is there such a murderer?
 61

they [das Man]—an entanglement more difficult to relate with the everyday notions of

self-disappointment. Heidegger says:

The calling back in which conscience calls forth gives Da-sein to understand that
Da-sein itself—as the null ground of its null project, standing in the possibility of
its being—must bring itself back to itself from its lostness in the they, and this
means that it is guilty.35

It is clear that we are the null ground of a null project—null in that we are not-

ourselves. But why is this nullity to be interpreted as lostness in the they? If our possi-

bilities are not our own, why is it that these possibilities belong to the they [das Man]?

They-Self, Egoity and Original Sin

The call of conscience calls from Da-sein standing in the throes of Angst, to Da-

sein in his entanglement in the they-self. By calling him to the nullity of his existence,

he is summoned, in guilt, to return to his ownmost possibility of existence, to his au-

thenticity.

Such a model can be experientially reconciled with one’s experience of guiltν

from the tension of the nearness and distance of the caller, to the sense of self-treachery

in nullity, to the need to return to something that is more truly oneself in authenticity.

The only true difficulty lies in reconciling Heidegger’s polemic against the they [das

Man] and the they-self that Da-sein is in its fallen state, with the conventional notion of

35
Heidegger, Being and Time, 264.
 62

evil which, while not ontologically primordial, is experientially relevant in the discourse

concerning conscience.

The they [das Man] is often interpreted in terms of the public, of being lost in

the superficies of societal flim-flam. This is not unwarranted. Heidegger himself dis-

cusses the they in terms of such publicness:

Distantiality, averageness, and leveling down, as ways of being the they, consti-
tute what we know as “publicness.” Publicness initially controls every way in
which the world and Da-sein are interpreted, and it is always right, not because of
an eminent and primary relation of being to “things,” not because it has an explic-
itly appropriate transparency of Da-sein at its disposal, but because it does not get
to “the heart of the matter,” because it is insensitive to every difference of level
and genuineness. Publicness obscures everything, and then claims that what has
been thus covered over is what is familiar and accessible to everybody.36

The vitriol in Heidegger’s statement is unmistakable. Truly, we do find our-

selves constantly trying to measure up to the they by competing or keeping pace (dis-

tantiality). And indeed we do find the need to be wary of deviating from the mean that

determines what is proper and expected of a man in society (averageness). Such meas-

uring and keeping the mean does lead a man to find himself in a world of superficies

and rigid standards, the immediacy of universally accepted perceptions, where truth is

substituted for facts that are without depth and leveled like a color-balanced digital im-

age of a murdered child (leveling down).37

36
Ibid., 119.
37
See Heidegger, Being and Time, 118-19.
 63

We are approaching the relation between the they-self and the evil of man. Let

us, for a moment, turn to Natsume’s character who narrates:

As I headed straight for the forest, I was wondering to myself how a miserable
blind brat could know so much, when the thing on my back said, “Yes, blindness
is a despicable inconvenience, is it not?”

“I’m carrying you, so it is no trouble at all.”

“I’m very much obliged to you for carrying me, but I really do not like being
looked down on by people. And I particularly do not like being looked down on
by my own father.”

Why I am not sure, but suddenly I felt disgusted. I hastened to get to the woods so
I could get rid of it once and for all.38 (emphasis supplied)

With the words “miserable blind brat,” the father betrays the burdensome char-

acter of this blind, bald son. This burdensome character is not merely private, but some-

thing belonging to convention. One looks down, with either pity or disdain, upon these

people. One dreads, rejects these people. One . . .

Heidegger says:

As everyday being-with-one-another, Da-sein stands in subservience to the others.

It itself is not; the others have taken its being away from it. The everyday possibil-
ities of being of Da-sein are at the disposal of the whims of the others.39

While there is an unmistakable taint of this “publicness” in Natsume’s charac-

ter’s filicide, it would be sheer deception to equate the father’s act of murder to an

“obedience to the they,” with the they understood merely as the societal others. While

38
Natsume, 39-41.
39
Heidegger, Being and Time, 118.
 64

the public interpretation of the they is warranted, we are in need of something more

primordial that is already contained within the concept of the they.

Heidegger says:

“The others,” whom one designates as such in order to cover over one’s own es-
sential belonging to them, are those who are there initially and for the most part
in everyday being-with-one-another. The who is not this one and not that one, not
oneself and not some and not the sum of them all. The “who” is the neuter, the
they.40

The they [das Man, literally, the one] is the neuter. It is no one in particular. In

English, one might sayμ “they say ‘take care’!” as “one says ‘take care’!” The they

points to an anonymous convention. But anonymous convention is anonymous not be-

cause it is mysterious but for the opposite reason—its anonymity is in that “everyone”

recognizes it. Its conventionality lies in that “everyone” holds it for true. The saying of

“One . . .” or “They . . .” rests on the authoritative premise of universal validity.

However, the universal validity of a statement is only possible on the basis of

two inseparable presuppositions: First, that a matter can be grasped fully and this grasp

can be expressed in this statement. Second, that anyone who grasps such a matter can

grasp it in accordance with the statement. These two presuppositions can be grasped

through the naïve notion of “objectivity.”

The saying of “One/They . . .” has a sense of objectivity to it, such that when

one mouths these words, he is accompanied by the comfort that he has grasped the mat-

40
Ibid., 118-19.
 65

ter fully and anyone else can grasp it as such—that he is being “objective.” But upon

what does this naïve objectivity rest?

Naïve objectivity is only possible with an unquestionable faith in one’s capacity

to grasp, such that the matter can be grasped fully, with no depth of the matter remain-

ing unfathomed. This unquestionable faith in this grasp is always already an unques-

tionable faith in that which grasps, in that which thinks, in that which is “objective.”

This, we can call ego.41 Again, we stumble upon the handsome demonic, the will to will

that grasps reality and reduces it to the superficies of the selfsame: the will, involuted

upon itself, in an undeniable egotism.

In a situation like this, Heidegger himself might intoneμ “Where have we

strayed?” The they-self is not merely a public self, it is an anonymous self, that is uni-

versally valid in that it grasps reality in a manner that is universally satisfactory. The

they-self is the self that is content to stand at the centre of existence and grab at “ob-

jects” and sayμ “this, this is the entirety of the matter at hand.” The they-self is Da-sein

in its egoity as the will to will.

Is this so foreign to Heidegger’s original intentions? All that is required to rec-

oncile the notion of the they and egoity is a subtle shift in the apparent level of respon-

sibility Da-sein has for this they-self. To read they-self as something pressed from with-

41
I use the sense of “ego” here that is used by the Kyoto philosophers Nishitani Keiji and Abe
Masao in their various writings. The ego-self is that which stands at the center of existence and arrogantly
asserts meanings upon the world in its self-attachment. This is of course inseparable from the previously
discussed notions of the will to will in its antinomic existence. One may even coin the phrase “ego-will”
to note the tendency of the will to will itself in its self-involution. This notion of “ego” will be fully de-
veloped in the third chapter.
 66

out is to have it seem that Da-sein is not responsible, Da-sein is the victim of the they.

But by reading “the they” as egoity and Da-sein’s existence as they-self as Da-sein’s

existence as ego, we retrieve for Da-sein a responsibility, a nearness to this they, such

that it can also be held responsible for its own disentanglement.

Instead of the they-self’s possibilities being something impressed from without,

we can see Da-sein chasing after its own naively objective, desiccated self-projections.

Distantiality, averageness and leveling down can be read in this sense as well. Distanti-

ality can be seen as how we try to keep measured pace with our own representations of

where we should be at the moment—representations that rest on this naïve objectifica-

tions of “should” and “ought.” Averageness can be seen as this need to uphold what is

“proper,” what is “allowed” on the basis of these pale generalizations projected by the

ego. Leveling down can be seen as the flattening of “all possibilities of being” 42 such

that being is reduced to a sham shadow of itself, stripped of depth and easily fathomed

by this ego that demands universal validity.

Hearing the they and the others as ego-will, the following lines completely re-

new their flavor:

As everyday being-with-one-another, Da-sein stands in subservience to the others.

It itself is not; the others have taken its being away from it. The everyday possibil-
ities of being of Da-sein are at the disposal of the whims of the others.43

42
Heidegger, Being and Time, 119.
43
Ibid., 118.
 67

In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the they unfolds its true dictator-
ship. We enjoy ourselves and have fun the way they enjoy themselves. We read,
see, and judge literature and art the way they see and judge. But we also withdraw
from the “great mass” the way they withdraw, we find “shocking” what they find
shocking. The they, which is nothing definite and which all are, though not as a
sum, prescribes the kind of being of everydayness.44

Da-sein stands in subservience to its own sham projections, to the demand for

what is graspable with this naïve sense of objectivity. Da-sein is ruled by its own repre-

sentations of what is pleasurable, beautiful, shocking and true. Da-sein in its everyday-

ness cowers beneath the demands of its ego-will, conscripted by the tyranny of its own

superficiality.

What has brought us to this fate? In the light of the they as ego-will, Heidegger’s

explanation makes even more sense:

The they is everywhere, but in such a way that it has always already stolen away
when Da-sein presses for a decision. However, because the they presents every
judgment and decision as its own, it takes the responsibility of Da-sein away from
it. . . .

The they disburdens Da-sein in its everydayness. Not only that; by disburdening it
of its being, the they accommodates Da-sein in its tendency to take things easily
and make them easy.45

Egoity disburdens Da-sein. When our understanding is perplexed by the nuances

of the interplay of things, by the abundance of the infinite depth of reality, there beck-

ons the superficiality of that which is grasped by the ego, levelled-down by the will.

When our judgment is beset by an array of options, pressing, demanding for a response,

44
Ibid., 119.
45
Ibid., 119-20.
 68

there beckon the easy answers of “one does . . .”46 But is this laziness worth the price of

failing to be ourselves?

We are now prepared to reconcile Heidegger’s notion of guilt and Natsume’s

character—and through this, with our own experience of guilt as well. Looking at

Natsume’s character, we askμ What makes the act of murdering one’s own burdensome

child possible? To be able to murder one’s own child, one must be able to see oneself,

as the burdened, as the center of one’s world, seated at the judge’s high chair. From this

high chair, one must be able to look at a child and see nothing but a burden, and see it

as some thing of which one must be rid. Seated on this high chair, we see what the fa-

ther meant when he saidμ “The instant I realized that I was a murderer, the child on my

back suddenly grew as heavy as a stone image of Jizō himself.”47 This man was a mur-

derer, long before he slew his child, because he saw people as things that could be slain.

By standing at the center of his existence, judging whether others might no longer de-

serve the right to live, he already lived a murderous existence.

But is this any other than the existence of the ego-will? To stand at the center of

its world, upon the high chair from which it passes judgement, to reduce the world to a

sham, a dessicated cut-out that fits to its own conventions, to see the world as nothing

46
This notion of “easiness” by which Da-sein conveniently disburdens itself by passing the
weight of the world into the abyss and reckoning only with the superficial is inseparable from
Heidegger’s later development of the notion of challenging [Herausfordern] where the world is reduced
to the superficiality of that which bolsters the convenience of human life. Perhaps the latter notion is
founded on the former.
47
Natsume, 45.
 69

but what “one has seen,” instead of that which continuously shows itself, to see the

world as nothing but that which stands in relation to the selfsame—this is ego-will; this

is a murderous existence—an existence that has murdered the coming-forth of things,

that has murdered the very Being of beings. This arrogant laziness of thought is the

most original of sins.

Angst in the Face of Conscience

The call of conscience calls to us in silence with haunting nearness and distant

authority. It calls us as we stand in the center of the fortified tomb of our ego-existence,

from the abyss which we have covered over with the sham solidity of our representa-

tions. It calls us to be guilty, to take responsibility for and own up to our nullity, in that

our existence as ego-will fails to be what we truly are. How then do we heed this call

that speaks no words and offers no clear instructions?

Heidegger says:

When Da-sein understandingly lets itself be called forth to this possibility, this in-
cludes its becoming free for the call: its readiness for the potentiality-of-being
summoned. Understanding the call, Da-sein listens to its ownmost possibility of
existence. It has chosen itself.48

We heed the call by being free for it, by letting ourselves hear it and in so doing,

choosing ourselves in our authenticity. But in the eyes of the they, ever concerned with

a constant bustling of instruction and action, this response seems inadequate. The truth

48
Heidegger, Being and Time, 265.
 70

of the matter is otherwiseμ This is the most difficult part of heeding one’s conscience.

Choosing one’s conscience, allowing one’s self to hear it instead of fleeing from it,

choosing oneself. This is the first step to the metanoia by which we return to the truth of

what we are.

Heidegger says:

Understanding the call discloses one’s own Da-sein in the uncanniness of its indi-
viduation. The uncanniness revealed in understanding is genuinely disclosed by
the attunement of Angst. The fact of the Angst of conscience is a phenomenal con-
firmation of the fact that in understanding the call Da-sein is brought face to face
with its own uncanniness. Wanting to have a conscience becomes a readiness for
Angst.49

The hearing the call of conscience is inseparable from this experience of anxiety.

The character of hounding attests to such. But it is necessary to understand the phenom-

enon of anxiety in the fullness of Heidegger’s notion of angst, lest it be reduced to a

mere feeling instead of its proper essence as the most important of ontological attune-

ments.

Heidegger discusses Angst as akin to fear.50 True enough, in the face of con-

science there is a dreadful feeling that repulses. If one were mad, one might shackle

oneself inside a room, to keep these dreadful things without. But that is madness, mad

as Natsume’s character who sought to rid himself of what he fears by disposing of the

49
Ibid., 272.
50
Ibid., 174.
 71

child in the forest, for no amount of boarding oneself up can keep oneself from what

one has Angst about.

This is the key difference between Angst and fear.51 Fear concerns innerworldly

beings. Fear is fear of the dark, or fear of violent people, or fear of spiders, or fear of

dying. But Angst is not fear, for that which one has Angst about is never an innerworldly

being. Innerworldly beings are still external, distant from the most intimate depths of

selfhood. But that which one has Angst about is nearer than that.

Heidegger’s discussion of Angst is structural, but in order to understand this

phenomenon and the nearness of that which it is about, it is necessary that we turn to the

experience of it.

Haunted by conscience, one is beset by the hollowness of all things. Everywhere

one turns, be it the muteness of the dark, or the pallor of colors that have failed to show

their sheen, the destitution of the world rises up like a foul stench. If one lets oneself be

immersed in the world of Natsume’s character, one is struck by the uncanniness of it

all—the child, the mud strewn across the winding paddies, the herons, the rain and the

laughter resounding in the darkness of the forest… The world in its entirety seems

wretched, desolate and altogether unlivable. And so the world slips from one’s grasp.

In the essay “What is Metaphysics?” Heidegger discusses the question of the

Nothing, and alongside such the phenomenon of anxiety [Angst]. He says:

51
Ibid.
 72

In anxiety, we say, “one feels uncanny.” What is “it” that makes “one” feel un-
canny? We cannot say what it is before which one feels uncanny. As a whole, it is
so for one. All things and we ourselves sink into indifference. . . . In their very re-
ceding, things turn toward us. The receding of beings as a whole oppresses us. We
can get no hold on things.52

The wretchedness of the experience of Angst is understood structurally as the re-

ceding/oppressing of the world, how they become conspicuous in our incapacity to get a

grasp of them. In Being and Time, Heidegger offers a striking illustration of this para-

doxical phenomenon:

Everything at hand and objectively present absolutely has nothing more to “say”
to us. Beings in the surrounding world are no longer relevant. . . . The nothingness
of the world in the face of which Angst is anxious does not mean that an absence
of innerworldly things is experienced in Angst. They must be encountered in just
such a way that they are of no relevance at all, but can show themselves in a bar-
ren mercilessness.53

In discussing the “nothingness” of the world, Heidegger speaks on one hand of

the receding: beings are mute, irrelevant and altogether barren. But this nothingness is

not an absence but a suffocating presence, a mercilessness that “is so near that it is op-

pressive and stifles one’s breath.”54

But what accounts for the unanimity of the uncanniness of things? How is it that

the entire world takes on this grotesque form? Heidegger says, “That about which one

Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?” in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge:

52

Cambridge University Press, 1998), 88.

53
Heidegger, Being and Time, 315.
54
Ibid., 174.
 73

has Angst is being-in-the-world as such.”55 Angst is for and about how one stands in the

world, how one is, such the world is. The destitution of the world points to the destitu-

tion of how we are being-in-the-world as they-self.

Angst turns the comfortable flatness of the world of the egotistical they-self into

a pallid sham, a hollow groaning muteness that haunts the self in its inauthenticity.

Heidegger says:

The “world” can offer nothing more, nor can the Mitda-sein of others. Thus Angst
takes away from Da-sein the possibility of understanding itself, falling prey, in
terms of the “world” and the public way of being interpreted. It throws Da-sein
back upon that for which it is anxious, its authentic potentiality-for-being-in-the-
world. Angst individuates Da-sein to its ownmost being-in-the-world.56

With Da-sein wrenched from its existence as the egotistic they-self, the world—

as it stands in the self-assured solidity of “objective” representations, the world of

norms and rigid standards, the world of “one ought to . . .”—collapses beneath this ob-

trusive nothingness. Stripped of the artifice of his “world,” Da-sein must stand before

reality in a new light. Heidegger saysμ “Innerworldly beings in themselves are so com-

pletely unimportant that, on the basis of this insignificance of what is innerworldly, the

world is all that obtrudes in its worldliness.”57

Heidegger points to a strange tension here. On one hand, the world collapses. On

the other hand, the world obtrudes in its worldliness. The difficulty of this statement lies

55
Ibid., 174.
56
Ibid., 175-76.
57
Ibid., 175.
 74

in that we are accustomed to thinking of the world as the sum total of beings, the cohe-

sive whole of all our representations as they hang together. It is world in this sense that

is completely and thoroughly negated. But in the annihilation of all innerworldy beings,

a sense of world obtrudes. This is not world in the sense of the whole of all “some-

things,” but the world as nothing.

The world as nothing is not a mere privation of world, but the world emerging in

its conspicuity as the very locus of the possibility of the beings coming forth as be-

ings.58 Before the clarity of “that is that” and the convenience of “one does . . .” is the

sheer abundance of the happening of things, an abundance that is more primordial than

any saying of “is.” This Nothing is the bottomless depth that lies beneath that which

swells up into the waves and froth, which we term as “beings.” This Nothing is the

abundance of Being itself (which is nowhere and never merely a being, and is hence no-

thing) and its co-belonging with man.59

Conscience calls us from the ground of this Angst to stand face to face with the

abyss of the Nothing. It calls us to stand courageously and be stripped of the homeliness

of the conveniently superficial egoism of the they-self. It bids us to stand as the sole be-

ing that can die its death and live its life.

58
Ibid., 175.
59
Heidegger fully develops this in “What is Metaphysics?” but a full discussion of the Nothing
lies beyond the scope of this essay.
 75

Standing before the Nothing that is world in its most primordial abundance, the

uncanniness of Da-sein can no longer be seen as a merely derivative phenomenon.

Heidegger says:

Angst . . . fetches Da-sein back out of its entangled absorption in the “world.”
Everyday familiarity collapses. Da-sein is individuated, but as being-in-the-world.
Being-in enters the existential mode of not-being-at-home. The talk about “un-
canniness” means nothing other than this.60

[Relative to the tranquillized at-homeness of everyday egoism,] not-being-at-

home must be conceived existentially and ontologically as the more primordial
phenomenon.61

Despite its chronological antecedence, not-being-at-home, not being entangled

in the superficies of the they-self, comes ontologically prior to the comfortable flatness

of our everyday existence. In the encounter between man and reality, the overwhelming

abundance and sheer strangeness of the questionability of the world comes first. And it

is through Angst, this uncanny individuation of Da-sein that wrenches him from the they

and the sham superficial objectifications of the “world,” that Da-sein finds his deliver-

ance, which fetches him home to the primordial meeting point between him and reality.

But can man bring himself, of his own will, to this deliverance?

But Heidegger saysμ “Wanting to have a conscience becomes a readiness for

Angst.”62 The key word here is “readiness.” Heidegger does not say that we embrace

60
Heidegger, Being and Time, 176.
61
Ibid., 177.
62
Ibid., 272.
 76

Angst or evoke it. We can only be ready for it. This assertion can be experientially veri-

fied.

With the recent upsurge of the “Emo[tive]” subculture wherein glorified wal-

lowing in self-pity is called “angst,” it seems as if one can evoke angst and make it hap-

pen. When one doubts one’s existence, one’s world, the conventions and structures and

superficies that bolster one’s sense of solidity, it seems that one thrusts oneself into the

abyss of the Nothing. Yet if one will undertake such a practice, it becomes readily ap-

parent that in such wallowing, one is still enacting the doubt. One is still enacting the

repulsive gesture to the object-world. One doubts. . . Thus in such practices, the self and

the will remain at the center of the experience.

However, that one can be put to doubt, that one can be thrust into nothingness—

the unanimous doubt where one cannot even stand as the doubter—this is the Angst that

Heidegger properly concerns himself with. This is an Angst that is beyond any willing

of man. And all man can do in the face of this is be ready.

Fidelity through Resoluteness

Conscience calls us from the authority of the otherworldly, with the haunting

nearness of that which is innermost. The call emanates from Da-sein in its ownmost

possibility of existence, standing uncannily in the abyss of the bottomless depth of reali-

ty. It calls us to our guilt, a guilt characterized by the fact that we are the ground of a

nullity. We are a failure to be ourselves, in that we have surrendered the depth of exist-
 77

ence and the abundance of the possibilities we reckon with to the superficies of the they

and its existence as ego-will. Acknowledging this treachery upon oneself, one is called

to return to oneself. The path back to oneself is an uncanny one, wherein one is stripped

of the comfort of a flattened world. The gate that leads back to oneself is the attunement

of Angst. In choosing to be ourselves and heeding the call of conscience, we become

ready for an Angst which we cannot conjure of ourselves.

Now we are coming to the end of our journey. The last piece that remains to be

thought out is the readiness that makes possible the fidelity to oneself.

Heidegger says:

We shall call the eminent, authentic disclosedness attested in Da-sein itself by its
conscience—the reticent projecting oneself upon one’s ownmost being-guilty
which is ready for Angst—resoluteness.63

Resoluteness is man’s response to the call of conscience. In resoluteness, one

holds fast upon the reality of his guilt, of his treachery to himself. Thus resolute, he

stands firmly and willingly in the face of the coming of Angst, and allows the disclosure

of the bottomlessness of reality to wrench him from the egoism of his they-self exist-

ence. It is through resoluteness that man chooses himself and chooses to return to him-

self.

Heidegger says:

In resoluteness the most primordial truth of Da-sein has been reached, because it
is authentic. . . . Authentic disclosedness then modifies equiprimordially the dis-
coveredness of “world” grounded in it and the disclosedness of being-with with

63
Ibid., 273.
 78

others. The “world” at hand does not become different as far as “content,” the cir-
cle of others is not exchanged for a new one, and yet the being toward things at
hand which understands and takes care of things, and their concerned being-with
with the others is now defined in terms of their ownmost potentiality-of-being-a-
self.64

It is through the path of resoluteness that Da-sein is faithful to the original meet-

ing point between Da-sein and reality. In the light of this fidelity, the very world trans-

forms from the sham artifice of the “world” of the they-self to reality as it shows itself

in its own light.

But is it enough for a man to be resolute in the face of his guilt, for him to have

courage for the coming of Angst? Is it enough that man be authentically guilty, that

things may be as they are and shine in their own light?

Guilt is not sufficient for the turn to originary thinking and the coming to light

of being as such. Such a turn requires another movement. But Heidegger’s omission of

this movement does not constitute a failure on his part, for in the analysis of Da-sein,

authentic resoluteness is as far as Da-sein alone can take us. Beyond such, the road to

originary thinking no longer belongs to Da-sein.65

Understanding the anguish of antinomy as guilt of conscience, Heidegger lends

us an important notion: this suffering arises from a failure for which one is held ac-

64
Ibid., 273-74.
65
The movement of the will to will can only carry oneself to a letting go of the will to will. But
moving from the ground beyond the will to will no longer belongs to the will to will, but to the dialogue
of happening. This notion will be clarified in the movement from the second stage of no-self to the third
stage of True Self in the next chapter.
 79

countable by no other than himself. It is we ourselves as Da-sein who hold ourselves

accountable for our existence as the ego, as will to will. For this existence as ego-will is

a failure to be ourselves.

Thus, the direction of surmounting the age of modern technology and the an-

guish that ensues has been pointed out for us as well. We do not surmount this age by

rejecting ourselves and our existence as Da-sein. While we are accountable for our ex-

istence as the ego-will, this existence is a failure as Da-sein to be authentically Da-sein.

The answer is not, therefore, to find just any other mode of being one’s self or to be an-

yone else for that matter. The answer is to be what we most authentically are.

But what does it mean to be authentically ourselves? What does it mean to arrive

at this authenticity, from this current situation that finds us incapable of being our-

selves?
 III. SURRENDER AND SURMOUNTING

3.1 Awakening to True Self: The Enlightenment of Sixth Patriarch Hui-neng

One midnight in the seventh century at Tung-shan monastery, the monk Shen-

hsiu1 tiptoed through the hallway in the darkness. With trembling hands, he sought to

grasp the crux of Buddhism and expound it as a verse on the monastery wall. He wrote:

Our body is the bodhi tree,

And our mind a mirror bright.
Carefully we wipe them hour by hour,
And let no dust alight.2

The abbot of Tung-shan, the fifth patriarch Hung-jen,3 having discovered the

verse written upon the wall, ordered his thousand followers to pay homage to the verse

and recite it that they may be guided in their practice. However, privately, the master

instructed Shen-hsiu:

Your stanza, shows that you have not yet realized the essence of mind. So far you
have reached the door of enlightenment, but you have not yet entered it. To seek
for supreme enlightenment with such an understanding as yours can hardly be
successful.4

1
Pinyin: Shenxiu.
2
Hui-neng, “The Sūtra of Hui-neng,” trans. Wong Mou-lam, in The Diamond Sutra & the Sutra
of Hui-neng (Boston: Shambhala, 2005), 70.
3
Pinyin: Hongren.
4
Hui-neng, 71.
80
 81

But when an illiterate barbarian pounding rice in a back room, a man called Hui-

neng,5 heard the stanza of Shen-hsiu being recited by a fellow monk, he composed a

verse in response to it. He dictated it as follows:

There is no bodhi tree,

Nor stand of a mirror bright.
Since all is void,
Where can the dust alight?6

It is in this verse that the fifth patriarch saw the flowering of an awakened mind

that had entered the door of enlightenment, and with this he passed on his robe and

bowl, that Hui-neng may succeed him as the sixth and final patriarch of Chinese Bud-

dhism.

We have been brought to this story by a question: What does it mean to be most

authentically the Da-sein that we are? Worded differently, one may ask: What does it

mean to awaken to one’s true self? In order to clarify the nature of awakening to one’s

true self, we turn to one of the best known and documented stories of such a blossom-

ing—the enlightenment of the sixth patriarch Hui-neng.

In this story, we have an exchage of verses between Shen-hsiu and Hui-neng.

What is the meaning of this exchange? Where is it that Shen-hsiu’s verse falters, yet

Hui-neng’s flourishes? In order to bring to light the matter of this exchange, it is helpful

5
慧能 or 惠能, Pinyinμ Huì Néng, Jp.μ Daikan Enō.
6
Hui-neng, 72.
 82

for us to turn to the writings of the ambassador of the Kyoto School of Philosophy,

Masao Abe. In the article “Zen Is not a Philosophy, but . . .,” he presents a discourse by

the Chinese Zen master Seigen Ishin:7

Thirty years ago, before I began the study of Zen, I said, ‘Mountains are moun-
tains, waters are waters.’

After I got an insight into the truth of Zen through the instruction of a good master,
I said, ‘Mountains are not mountains, waters are not waters.’

But now, having attained the abode of final rest [that is, Awakening], I say,
‘Mountains are really mountains, waters are really waters.’

Do you think these three understandings are the same or different?8

According to Abe, it is possible to see the development of thought from the

darkness of ignorance to the awakening of enlightenment in the three stages and two

negations presented in Ishin’s discourse. The first stage is represented by the assertion:

“Mountains are mountains, waters are waters.” The second stage arises as the negation

of the first stage and states: “Mountains are not mountains, waters are not waters.” The

third stage, the stage of awakening, again negates the second stage and declares:

“Mountains are really mountains, waters are really waters.”9

By understanding the matter of each of these levels of understanding and the

shifts that occur in each of the negations, it becomes possible to understand what the

7
Wade-Gilesμ Ch’ing-yüan Wei-hsin.
8
Abe Masao, “Zen Is not a Philosophy, but . . .” in Zen and Western Thought, ed. William
LaFleur (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 4.
9
Ibid., 4-5.
 83

fifth patriarch saw in Shen-hsiu’s verse and what he found lacking, as well as why Hui-

neng’s verse is radiant with the awakening of enlightenment. And perhaps by under-

standing the process of the blooming of the flower of the mind, we can glimpse what it

means to awaken to true self.

The First Stage: The Ignorance of Dualistic Thought

The first stage says: “Mountains are mountains, waters are waters.” According

to Abe, this stage is characterized first and foremost by differentiation and affirmation.

Implicit in the above assertion is that “mountains are not waters, but mountains, waters

are not mountains, but waters.”10 But the ignorance is revealed when we look behind

this differentiating affirmation of mountains and waters. According to Abe, what lies

behind the differentiating affirmation of mountains and waters in Ishin’s discourse is

objectification.11 One is able to make the distinction between mountains and waters by

virtue of the objectifying assertion of the I.

To us modern day men, perhaps the imagery of mountains and waters is lost.

Hence, we no longer see how the assertion of mountains as mountains and waters as

waters is an act of objectification. In a world where towering mountains are conscripted

and plundered for ore, and raging rivers are dammed and harnessed for hydroelectric

power, mountains and rivers are merely and strictly bare objects. Robbed of their majes-

10
Ibid., 5.
11
Ibid.
 84

ty and relevance, the mountain-ness of a mountain and the water-ness of waters are re-

duced to mere facts. Construed as mere facts, a statement like “mountains are moun-

tains” seems merely tautological. In order to understand the objectification borne by the

first assertion, it is helpful to turn to statements of meaning instead.

“I am I.” So begins the battle cry of Don Quixote de la Mancha. “I am I” is not

an assertion of fact, nor is it a tautology. The I, as the most treasured possession of eve-

ry modern day man, is guarded from the fate that has befallen mountains and rivers in

our age. “I am I” is an assertion of meaning.

Don Quixote continues:

I am I, Don Quixote, the Lord of la Mancha. My destiny calls and I go. And the
wild winds of fortune will carry me onward, oh whithersoever they blow. Whith-
ersoever they blow, onward to glory I go!12

There is a distinct difference between the I that asserts, and the I that is asserted.

It is because of this difference that the former can be roused by the latter and driven by

the latter. And it is also because of this difference that the former can fail to meet the

latter standard and the I can fail to be itself. This difference shows us that the assertion

of “I” is not identical to the I that asserts, but is instead its standard, its label, its concep-

tualization, a rigid objectification of the dynamic I that asserts. Implicit in this assertion

is the attachment to the I as “I” and the rejection of the possibility of the I’s failure to be

the “I.”

12
Lyrics by Joe Darion for a play by Dale Wasserman. See Mitch Leigh, Man of La Mancha: A
Musical Play (New York: Dell Publishing, 1969), 42.
 85

Understanding the disparity within the assertion “I am I,” it becomes possible to

return to Ishin’s statement: “Mountains are mountains, waters are waters.” Here, ac-

cording to Abe, mountains and waters are grasped and apprehended strictly from the

point of view of the I13 that asserts, the I that conceptualizes, the I that objectifies. A

mountaineer may look at a mountain and see nothing but a challenge. A surveyor may

look at a mountain and see nothing but possibilities for profit. And a traveler may see

nothing but an inconvenience, an obstacle around which he must take a detour. The

mountains and waters are not grasped from their own home ground. Instead they are

seen only as projections, objectifications imputed by this arbitration of the I.

But what is implied by this objectifying gaze of the I, by which it lords upon all

things, all selves (including itself) and judges all these with the powers of its own arbi-

tration? Abe says:

There is a duality of subject and object in this understanding. And in differentiat-

ing mountains, waters, and all the other things which constitute our world, we also
differentiate ourselves from others. . . . Behind the understanding in which moun-
tains are discriminated from waters lies the understanding in which self is dis-
criminated from other.14

The discrimination of the self from the other is not a mere symmetrical differen-

tiation. It is a differentiation that raises the ontological status of the I over and against

the others who are represented and validated by the I. This discrimination of the self

from the other is an assertion of the self over the other, over the world. Only by means

13
Abe, “Zen is not a Philosophy,” in Zen and Western Thought, 5.
14
Ibid.
 86

of this self-assertion does it become possible to stand as arbiter over the truth and lord

as subject over object. In this self-assertion, it becomes possible to rend the world in

two: on one hand, what is one, true, good and beautiful, what is reasonable and pleas-

ing; and on the other hand what is discordant, impenetrable, hurtful and despicable,

what cannot be understood or accepted. Abe says: “Herein, the ‘I’ is the basis of dis-

crimination, placing itself as the centre of everything.”15

As the centre of everything, is this I, this ego-self, able to come into a relation-

ship with reality as it is in itself? By taking the world and framing it in relation to its

own rationalities and desires, it deals only with what remains within the bounds of its

conceptualizations. The ego-self dwells in an object-world, a sham, a mere shadow of

an abundant reality as it is cast upon the mould of an egocentric existence.

This is the ignorance16 of dualism. Unaware of the inseparability of his existence

from the world, man exists as this ego-self, isolated by the abyss drawn by the separa-

tion of subject and object, of I and other, of the objectified world he imputes and the

abundance of reality.

15
Ibid., 6.
16
“Ignorance” is the rendering of the Sanskrit word avidya, which refers to the “darkness” to
which the “light” of enlightenment is counterposed. However it must be noted that the term “ignorance”
remains in tension with a passive and an active sense. Ignorance may perhaps be passive, a fallen state
that has not been graced by the light. Or ignorance may be active, to willfully ignore, to turn away from
the light and obfuscate the truth.
 87

Dualism and the darkness of ignorance constitute an ontological appropriation of

the first and second of the four noble truths of Buddhism. The second noble truth states:

What now is the noble truth of the origin of suffering? It is craving, which gives
rise to repeated existence, is bound up with pleasure and lust, and always seeks
fresh enjoyment here and there; that is, sensual craving, craving for existence and
craving for nonexistence.17

This noble truth can be distilled into one word: craving (tanha). To crave is to

cling to one possibility in exclusion of the others. To crave is to attach oneself to one’s

objectification. To crave characterizes man’s very existence as ego-self: that he sets up

reality in relationship to that which he desires and in opposition to that which he despis-

es, that he judges all in accordance with his own self-assertion, that he craves his exist-

ence as it accords with his own objectification, that he craves his existence as the centre

of the universe.

From the ground of the craving of the ego-self that warps the world and molds it

to his self-willing, arises the suffering of the very ego-self that wills. The first noble

truth states:

What now is the noble truth of suffering? Birth is suffering; decay is suffering;
sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair are suffering; in short, the five ag-
gregates of clinging are suffering.18

We suffer because that which we cling to is taken away from us. We suffer be-

cause we are denied the very things we crave. We suffer because what we fear, what we

17
Bodhi, 62-63.
18
Ibid., 62.
 88

relegate to the trash bin of the irrational and terrible rears its head and intrudes upon the

comfort of our ego-existence. We suffer because the world refuses to be constrained by

the cages we impute with our objectifying gaze.

This brings us to the most primordial distillation of the first noble truth: Who

suffers more than the man who lives amidst the abundant reality of the world, but can-

not bring himself to dwell in it as it is?

This is our fate in the age of technology. As the will to will, as the ego that

stands firmly on the side of reason and existence, throttled by the abyssal character of

death and the irrational, haunted by the bottomlessness of reality, we suffer the ultimate

antinomy of our own existence as ego-will. It is from the ground of this suffering, this

existence fragmented by dualism into the shards of antinomy, that Buddhism derives the

imperative of its search for enlightenment. But how else does one awaken a man who

has separated himself from reality, other than by touching him from his own existence?

The First Negation

The radical humiliation of the ego-self that allows one to negate the ego-self and

break through it occurs through the ego-self’s realization of its own impotence. And

what better a ground for the ego-self to realize its impotence but its incapacity to grasp

that which it has presumed to be its own.

 89

“I am I,” says Don Quixote. But Abe asks: “`Who am I?’ This is a natural and

inevitable question for the ego-self because it objectifies everything including itself.”19

It is this question that begins the unraveling of the ego-self’s existence. When one asks,

“Who am I?” probing into oneself, perhaps into the myriad assertions of “I am I,” one

may find himself posed with this particular quandary: Is the I which one seeks through

questioning the same I that questions? Attempting to grasp itself, one finds that one’s

true Self, the subject, always stands behind that which we are in the process of grasping.

Attempting to swing around behind this grasping self by asking, “Who is the I that asks

‘Who am I?’” one may find that once again the I that is grasping the I who is asking

“who am I,” has already turned behind that which is grasped.20 This endless retreat of

the self brings the ego-self before the impotence of its own grasp, in its incapacity to

objectify its own objectification. And in this endless retreat, the ego-self realizes that in

its isolated self-assertion it has lost even itself.

Abe says:

Self-estrangement and anxiety are not something accidental to the ego-self, but
are inherent to its structure. . . . To be human means to be an ego-self; to be an
ego-self means to be cut off from both one’s self and one’s world; and to be cut
off from one’s self and one’s world means to be in constant anxiety.21

But do we have courage for this realization? Do we have the courage to face the

fact that in our existence as ego-self, we are incapable of grasping even ourselves?

Abe, “Zen is not a Philosophy,” in Zen and Western Thought, 6.

19

20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
 90

Mankind, in this age of technology, seems more content to fly from the impotence of its

own grasp. The more his grasp fails, the more he allocates resources into funding the

growth of this system of grasping. Everywhere we see the continued self-assertion of

man, as he slowly reduces the world to that which, ontologically and pragmatically,

merely cowers at his feet as standing-reserve.

Yet when a man has the courage to return to the ground of the disclosure of his

own finitude as subject and his incapacity to grasp the one being that seems truly his,

then it becomes possible for him to reach a breakthrough.

Abe says:

When this [the unattainability of our very own selves] is existentially realized
with our whole being, the ego-self crumbles. That is, the existential realization of
the unattainability of the true Self culminates in a deadlock, the breaking through
of which results in the collapse of the ego-self, wherein we come to the realization
of no-self or no-ego-self.22

Broken by the realization of the incompleteness of his grasp, one becomes pre-

occupied with the nullity of one’s existence, of the ungraspability of one’s self, and the

haunting specter of the ungraspability of the very world. It is in the light of this, the first

negation, that the ego-self bears its own finitude, and trembles in the realization of its

own darkness.

22
Ibid., 7.
 91

The Second Stage: Self is Empty; Grasping at the Ungraspable

In the second stage, one says: “Mountains are not mountains, waters are not wa-

ters.” According to Abe, this stage has a twofold aspect—one which reflects its attain-

ment and another that reflects its incompleteness.

On one hand, in order to reach the second stage, one must pass through the first

negation. Through the first negation, one realizes the futility of the grasping of the ego-

self with the entirety of one’s being. Through the glimpse of the infinite depth of reality,

as revealed for instance in the endless retreat of the I from the grasp of the objectifying

gaze, one realizes the incapacity of the objectifying mind to grasp reality as it is. Such a

realization is none other than the realization of emptiness (Jp.: 無, mu).

The realization of emptiness begins with the realization of not-self, a realization

of the bottomlessness of one’s nearest reality and one’s incapacity to fathom such an

infinite depth with the grasping of the ego-self. This bottomless ungraspability of the

self is captured by the statement: I am not I; I am empty; my true self is unattainable.23

However, such a realization of the emptiness of the self is a realization not only

of the incapacity of the ego-self to grasp itself, but is simultaneously a realization of the

questionability of the capacity of the ego-self to grasp anything from that very thing’s

own home ground. The bottomlessness of the self betrays the bottomlessness of the rest

of reality, an infinite depth glimpsed before, in a glimpse refused until the gaze of ob-

23
Ibid., 10-11.
 92

jectification was humiliated by its attempt to grasp itself. Thus humiliated, the objectify-

ing self must come to grips with the farce that is the object-world.

The object-world, in which the world ego-self dwells in and which it presumes

to be the world as it is in itself, is seen by the ego-self as merely its own object-world.

As its own, the object-world is seen in its relativity to the superficial grasping of the

subject, the ego-self. As such, with the humiliation of the ego-self in its self-grasping,

the object-world assumes the same status as the “I” that was grasped (in a grasping that

finds that what is truly sought recedes behind that which is grasped). The object-world

is thus broken through, revealed as a sham, an empty projection, muddied by the desires

and attachments of one’s egocentric existence. The object-world is negated as a mere

shadow veiling the infinite depth of a world emptied of self. This ungraspability of the

world can be captured in the statement: The world is not the world; all things are emp-

ty; reality as it is, is unattainable.

In line with Hisamatsu and Heidegger, the second stage can hence be character-

ized as an acceptance of ultimate antinomy, a surrendering to primordial ontological

guilt. Instead of flailing against the incapacity of reality to be grasped and fleeing from

the darkness of one’s own imminent demise, one surrenders to the antinomy of reason

(in the face of the irrational, ungraspable bottomlessness of reality) and the antinomy of

existence itself (in the face of death, dispersal, and inescapable finitude). The no-self of

the second stage embraces its own nullity, its failure to be itself, and is thrust into the

oblivion of Angst.
 93

It is from the standpoint of the self-negation of self and world, the surrender to

ultimate antinomy and the nullity of guilt, squarely on the second stage that Shen-hsiu

writes his verse:

Our body is the bodhi tree,

And our mind a mirror bright.
Carefully we wipe them hour by hour,
And let no dust alight.24

The image of dust in this passage reflects Shen-hsiu’s awareness of his ego-self

and the craving that belongs to it. Contaminated by the dust of one’s attachments, the

mirror that is one’s mind does not reflect reality as it is. One looks upon the mirror and

sees nothing but dust—the warped projections and objectifications of the ego’s self-

assertion, the object-world. It then becomes a task for Buddhism to purify one’s mind of

these attachments and these self-assertive discriminations, that one may reflect reality

faithfully.

Despite its negating movement that awakens a pressing need to purify oneself of

one’s defilements, there is peace inherent in the second stage, a kind of peace that expe-

rientially reflects the achievement of the first negation. Abe says:

As this realization of the endlessness of the regression and of the unattainability

of the true Self must be a total and existential [one], rather than a partial and con-
ceptual one, the anxiety and restlessness of the ego-self are in one sense over-
come. . . . There is no continuous path from the first stage to the second, but rather
a discontinuity which can be overcome only by a leap in which the ego-self is rad-
ically and completely broken through. Realization of no-self thus entails a kind of
emancipation from the ego-self and liberation from the anxiety inherent in the
ego-structure. Hence, the genuine realization that the ‘true Self is unattainable’ is

24
Hui-neng, 70.
 94

not a source of desperation, but is freedom from restlessness, because in this real-
ization it no longer matters that the true Self cannot be attained.25

This peace in the unattainability of the true Self is simultaneous with the peace

of the ungraspability of reality as it is. It is a peace arising from the death of craving

[tanha], the cessation of one’s constant clinging to one’s representations of self and

world. In this peace, one is no longer preoccupied with hankering after pleasures and

bedeviled by the drive to secure the resources that bolster one’s own existence. One is

no longer caught up in the frenzy of the self-assertion of the ego-will. One comes to rest

in the darkness of ultimate antinomy, arriving at the peace of a mind resigned and reso-

lute in its finitude.26

As a realization of emptiness, the first negation and the second stage that ensues

hence represent a glimpse of the truth of Zen. Ishin says: “After I got an insight into the

truth of Zen . . . I said, ‘Mountains are not mountains, waters are not waters.’”27 (em-

phasis supplied) It is a standpoint that has, to a certain extent, broken through the naïve-

té of the self-assertive, egocentric existence of the ego-self. Perhaps it is for this reason

that the fifth patriarch Hung-jen told his disciples to read Shen-hsiu’s verse, venerate it,

Abe, “Zen is not a Philosophy,” in Zen and Western Thought, 9.

25

26
Heidegger speaks of Angst as an attunement “pervaded by a peculiar calm” that, unlike fear,
lets no confusion arise. This calm of resolute finitude is very much akin to the second stage, but the dis-
cussion of Heidegger breaks open into the third stage without any clear delineation between the two
phases.

Abe, “Zen is not a Philosophy,” in Zen and Western Thought, 4.

27
 95

and recite it. To those who have yet to break through their existence as ego-self, Shen-

hsiu’s utterance serves as a helpful guide along the way to enlightenment.

On the other hand, Abe says that implicit in the no-differentiation of the second

stage is a hidden form of differentiation, “between ‘differentiation’ and ‘no differentia-

tion’, ego-self and no-self – and is thereby not completely free from distinction.”28 In a

sense, the grasping self has not ceased to grasp on a radical level, its grasping has only

been silenced and appeased by grasping the world and the self as ungraspable. There is

a fixation, so to speak, on the emptiness of the world, such that instead of holding its

gaze fixedly on its projection of the world (as in the first stage), the ego-self holds its

gaze fixedly on the nullity of its gaze, on the farcical nature of its projections, of the

abyssal yawning of emptiness. Its last remaining attachment is an attachment to nothing

(無).

It is this attachment to emptiness that reveals itself in Shen-hsiu’s verse as his

fixation on the dust upon his mirror. Hour by hour he polishes his mind and purifies it

of the dust of his defilements. Moment after moment is spent agonizing over one’s in-

capacity to faithfully reflect the abundance of reality. A vitality is lost here, a loss which

is seen more clearly in the trembling of Shen-hsiu’s hands as he writes his verse upon

the wall. There is an agitation that haunts this mirror-polishing man.

Abe says:

28
Ibid., 9.
 96

Attachment to no-self results in an indifference to, and a nihilistic view of, both
self and world. There is no positive ground for one’s life and activity. In this
sense the second stage cannot be said to be free from a hidden form of anxiety.29

I am not I. The world as I see it is not the world as it is. I am incapable of attain-

ing even my own truest innermost self. The world and all the things within it are bot-

tomless, and empty. While I no longer cling to the world and the marred projections of

the world arising from my desires, I remain incapable of dwelling in the world. My

tranquility is one of disconnected solace. Staring at the abyss of the bottomlessness of

all things, I remain separated from all things—the world, even myself—by an unbridge-

able gap of emptiness.

It becomes clear then why Hung-jen told Shen-hsiu privately:

Your stanza, shows that you have not yet realized the essence of mind. So far you
have reached the door of enlightenment, but you have not yet entered it. To seek
for supreme enlightenment with such an understanding as yours can hardly be
successful.30

With Shen-hsiu’s remaining attachment to nothingness and his incapacity to

dwell in the world, fixated upon the dust upon his mirror and the failings of his grasp,

there is a need for a final negation.31

29
Ibid., 9-10.
30
Hui-neng, 71.
31
Some may accuse Heidegger of nihilism and lassitude. Perhaps it stems from understanding
Heidegger’s notion of Angst (elaborated in Being and Time and “What is Metaphysics?”) merely on this
level of the second stage. It shall become clear, as we go along, that Heidegger’s notion of Angst is al-
ways on the way to the fullness of the third stage of which we will soon speak.
 97

The Second Negation

The second negation draws its imperative from this remaining anxiety of un-

dwelling, from the solace of the disconnectedness of existing as separated from reality

and Self by an infinite void. It becomes possible through an emptying of emptiness,

such that emptied of itself, emptiness flowers into the fullness and abundance of abso-

lute emptiness (Jp.: 絶対無, zettai mu). But how is emptiness to empty itself?

According to Abe, the self-emptying of emptiness can be seen through the tran-

sition from the standpoint of: “(A) that the true Self is unattainable, to the realization

(B) that the unattainable itself is the true Self.”32

Abe attempts to explain the difference of realization (A) and realization (B) by

means of logical analysis. In realization (A), the subject is “true Self” and the predicate

is “unattainable.” The subject here is grasped in terms of the predicate, and as the predi-

cate is a negative one (un-attainable), the statement is a negative characterization: “True

Self is not attainable.” On the other hand realization (B) has “the unattainable” as its

subject and “true Self” as its predicate. Hence, the unattainable is characterized positive-

ly as true self.33

When we intuit the mode of standing of a person as he says “Self is empty,” or

“True Self is unattainable,” it becomes apparent that these statements still take the

32
Abe, “Zen is not a Philosophy,” in Zen and Western Thought, 11.
33
Ibid., 12.
 98

standpoint of the grasping self. While it no longer grasps at a reality through a positive

objectification, it still grasps at reality, but merely through a negative objectification34

(un-attainable), as something that cannot be grasped, as something that is void in its ex-

istence. As such, Abe says, “The ‘true Self’ still remains outside as something ‘unat-

tainable’ or as something empty, and is thus not completely free from somethingness.

The true Self is still objectively conceived.”35

That is why nothingness or unattainability, as an objectification, becomes a bar-

rier that must be broken past. And this barrier is broken past when instead of taking the

standpoint of the grasping self, the ego self, one takes the standpoint of the unattainable

Self. More than a mere positive characterization of the true self, the statement “The un-

attainable itself is the true Self,” takes the standpoint of the unattainable. Emptiness is

no longer a representation, an objectification, a grasping to one’s incapacity to grasp

and a clinging to one’s incapacity to cling. Emptiness here is self. Emptiness is realized

on the near side, as the very crux of one’s own existence. Abe says: “The ‘unattainable’

or ‘emptiness’ is no longer seen as ‘over there’ . . . but is directly realized as the ground

of the true Self.”36

The second stage says: “I am not I, Self is unattainable. The world is not the

world, reality is unattainable.” But through the second negation, by taking the stand-

34
Ibid., 11.
35
Ibid., 13.
36
Ibid., 12.
 99

point of nothingness, one is able to break through the separation drawn by the abyss of

nothingness between one’s existence and the world. Existing as the unattainable, stand-

ing as the “not,” one is able to touch reality and return to it, dwelling as the unattainable

amidst the unattainable, the awakening of nothingness amidst all that is not.

The Third Stage: Awakening to Emptiness as Self; Being the Unattainable

The third stage of Abe’s characterization is represented by the last line in Ishin’s

discourseμ “But now, having attained the abode of final rest [that is, Awakening], I say,

‘Mountains are really mountains, waters are really waters.’” This line reflects the awak-

ening of the True Self in Enlightenment.

But what is this true self? What does it mean to be enlightened? Of what conse-

quence is it to awaken to one’s original Buddha nature? The questions tread a dangerous

path, for the question of “what” has been claimed by objectifying thought. It seeks defi-

nitions and exhaustive explanations. It seeks solidity and finite graspability.

We need to reckon with the reality of the true self. But the very act of defining

or explaining the true self may deprive us of that which we seek. However, perhaps it is

possible for us to evoke the reality of the true self, to whisper about its facets and the

few familiar glimpses that it reveals to us, with the humble awareness that it is neither

possible nor desirable to exhaust the abundance of this true self.

What follows is such an attempt to evoke the true self from three facets. The

first facet concerns non-duality in realization. The second facet is the acceptance and
 100

surmounting of the ultimate antinomy. And the third facet is the unity of all selves and

stages in this true self.

The Unity of Realizer and Realized

Ishin saysμ “But now, having attained the abode of final rest [that is, Awaken-

ing], I say, ‘Mountains are really mountains, waters are really waters.’” What differenti-

ates the first stage (“Mountains are mountains…”) from the third is the word “really.”

What characterizes the return of the self to its originary dwelling with the world is a fi-

delity to how reality really is.

But how is such to happen within the constraints of finite understanding? The

first stage takes the standpoint of grasping. It represents mountains and waters from the

vantage point of the self-projecting, self-asserting ego-will. Because of the finitude of

representation, the first stage remains in the narrowness of reckoning with mere concep-

tual shadows of reality.

When the self breaks through to the third stage, however, that is no longer the

case. Abe says that here, mountains and waters are no longer grasped from the stand-

point of the ego, but instead are seen from their own home ground, from the ground

where the realizer and realized are one. Abe says:

 101

The true Self is talking about itself. Furthermore, this does not mean that the true
Self is talking about mountains and waters as symbols of its Self; but rather that
the true Self is talking about mountains and waters as its own Reality.37

One could also say that when one speaks about oneself from this standpoint,

saying, “I am I!” one is speaking about the reality of mountains and waters. The reality

of Self, mountains, waters, and world are seen as one in their unique expression, as seen

from the perspective of the infinite depth of their existence, from the perspective of ab-

solute nothingness.

This is the originary dwelling of non-duality, wherein all things in their particu-

larity, in the depth of their unattainability as they stand on their home ground are one.

There is no difference between the realizer and the realized. There is no difference be-

tween the subject and the object. The most original relationship between man and world

is not one of grasping, but one of dwelling-with. And this dwelling-with becomes pos-

sible only on the locus of absolute nothingness.

This non-dualistic dwelling-with that occurs on the locus of absolute nothing-

ness is best illustrated by a story. One morning, the poetess Chiyo left her cottage to

draw water from the well. Arriving at the well, she found that a flower, a morning glory,

had entwined itself around the handle of the bucket. She was so moved by the beauty of

the flower that she stood, dumbfounded, unable to bring herself to untwine the flower in

order to fetch water. This encounter with the flower gave birth to the following poem:

37
Ibid., 16.
 102

Oh! The morning glory!

The bucket seized away,
I beg for water.38

In this age of modern technology, it seems as if writing is yet another attestation

to the power of man to capture reality and bend it as he sees fit. It seems as if a poet is a

poet by virtue of his mastery over words and the nuances of language, and through such

mastery, the poet masters the reality before him. But this haiku is not a reflection of a

mastery of words. And most definitely, it is not a reflection of a mastery of the flower.

As a matter of fact, the poetess has very little to say about the flower save the exclama-

tory “oh!” The remaining two lines do not grasp the existence of the flower, they speak

of how the flower has grasped her.

Hence, it cannot be said that the poetess Chiyo willed this poem. For as such it is

beyond her will, beyond the capacity of her subjectivity to will such a poem. Needless

to say, for certain it is not the flower that willed this poem, for the flower is but a flower.

From whence then does this poem emerge?

In that moment of rapture, Chiyo becomes Chiyo, and the flower becomes the

flower. But this poetess is only a poetess in that she stands before a flower of over-

38
The 17 syllable haiku was written by the poetess Chiyo toward the end of the Tokugawa re-
gime. The original goes:

朝顔や Asagao-ya!
釣瓶 られ Tsurube torarete
もらい水 Morai mizu.

The haiku and the story of its creation are taken fromμ Suzuki Daisetz Teitaro, “Buddhist Sym-
bolism,” in The Awakening of Zen, ed. Christmas Humphreys (Boston: Shambhala, 2000), 75.
 103

whelming beauty. And this overwhelming beauty flows from its abundance only

through the mediation of the poetess. It is as if the flower has allowed Chiyo to be a po-

etess, and Chiyo has allowed the flower to resound in all its splendor.

At that moment, on the ground of the bottomless openness of the poetess and the

unfathomable abundance of the beauty of the morning glory, the flower and Chiyo are

one. The poem arises from the ground of the co-constitution of Chiyo and the flower,

the ground of originary dwelling, the locus of absolute nothingness.

On this ground, it is not a matter of grasping, seizing with certitude, or master-

ing reality. Hence when Ishin says that what is is really what it is, he is not referring to

omniscience or a perfection of conceptual knowledge. He is referring to a mindfulness

that tarries with reality and happens with it—instead of rising over and against reality

and constraining it. He is referring to the selfhood that is a self by virtue of reality being

reality, in its abundance and continuous unfolding.

Surmounting Ultimate Antinomy

In the first facet, we chart the three stages—from ego-self to no-self to true

self—as a return to the ground of originary dwelling together of man and reality. How-

ever, our existence as selves is not merely an ontological phenomenon—it is character-

ized by feelings, attunements, even torment.

We spoke of the stage of ego-self as characterized by suffering. Dwelling in the

narrowness of its own representations and finite conceptualizations, clinging to life, rea-
 104

son and the selfsame, the will to will dwells in what we spoke of as an object-world, a

sham world. And every intrusion of the abundance of reality into the constrained super-

ficies of this object-world causes perplexity and anguish.

Hisamatsu spoke of this phenomenon as ultimate antinomy. As the ego-will

takes its standpoint firmly on the selfsame—the side of existence and the side of rea-

son—the antinomic character of life/existence in the face of death/non-existence and the

perplexity of finite reason in the face of the suffocating darkness of the irrational assail

him. Man treads upon the jagged edges of the shards of a shattered world, in the violent

vacillations between agitated desire for that which is sought, and frightful flight from

that which is detested, fighting to assert his will toward the selfsame, in the light of in-

surmountable structural antinomies in the very structure of the selfsame.

It is from the ground of this suffering that we are spurred toward emancipation,

which begins in the darkness of the second stage. The stage of no-self is characterized

by coming to grips with the antinomic character of existence and reason. The will to

will realizes its own impotence in the light of the bottomlessness of reality. It resigns

itself to the inescapable fact of death and its incapacity to assert life over and above the

constraint of finite mortal existence. It resigns itself to the limitations of its own repre-

sentations and the incapacity to assert reason over and above the bottomless character of

reality as it is.

Such an acceptance frees the second stage from the agitated chasing and fleeing

that characterizes the tanha of the ego-self. Like a sailboat in a storm that has cut down
 105

its sails, it is no longer wrenched at and assailed by the howling winds of desiring and

detesting. But the calm of the no-self is a calm of non-dwelling. While it has accepted

death and the irrational, this acceptance has denied it the view of any positivity in life

and reason. One can hence see the second stage as taking a standpoint of

death/irrational which stands opposed to the standpoint of the selfsame of life/reason.

As such, the second stage is still unable to deal with reality in its unfragmented whole-

ness.

In the third stage, one no longer takes the standpoint of a will that clings to life

and to its finite representations. However, neither does one take the standpoint of death

that blights the positivity of life and an impotence of reason in the face of the irration-

al.39 What standpoint does the third stage take then?

It is helpful for us to subdivide the ultimate antinomy into its two facets. On the

side of the antinomy of existence, we have the tensional relationship between life and

existence, on one hand, and death and non-existence, on the other hand. Taking the

standpoint of life is to be tormented by imminent death. Taking the standpoint of death

39
Only two negations are presented here (neither life/reason nor death/irrational). Seen logically,
with x as the standpoint of the self-same (life and reason), then we have not-x and not-not-x. In lieu of
greater thoroughness, this can be expanded to a form akin to Nagarjuna’s fourfold negation (neither true,
nor false, nor both true and false, nor neither true nor false). The standpoint of the true self does not cling
to life nor reject life, nor cling to what is grasped as life and death, nor reject life and death. The stand-
point of true self is, as one might say, a standpoint of no standpoint, where emptiness is form. It is neces-
sary to reckon with both life and death, but the entirety of reality in its wholeness cannot be arrived at in
the mere union of what is characterized as positive and what is characterized as negative (as Nagarjuna’s
“nor both true and false”). However, this does not entail a rejection of existence-non-existence and rea-
son-irrational, for what is finitely disclosed in the form of these antinomic pairs is inseparable from the
formless abundance of reality.
 106

is to have life rendered meaningless. There is a need for a standpoint that is more origi-

nary than life or death. Perhaps it is helpful to refer to such a standpoint as the stand-

point of happening.

The standpoint of happening can be illustrated by the metaphor of a play in a

theatre. A play is commonly divided into acts and scenes. Each act has a different color

and movement inherent to it. The same holds for each scene within each act. But for the

play to happen, each scene must die to the next. And as the scenes in an act draw to a

close, the act itself is thrust into the past as the next act comes to life. If we take the

standpoint of merely one scene or one act, the finite temporal extension is a limitation.

Each scene must arise and perish into the past. But when we watch a play or take part in

one, we do not take the standpoint of merely one scene or act (or even of one actor for

that matter). We take the standpoint of the happening of the play. From that standpoint

there is the life and death of each scene and act, but at the same life and death here

break past their antinomic character. In a sense, one can say there is no life and death,

because scenes are not portrayed as living-dying discrete entities but part of the contin-

uous unfolding and happening of the reality of the play itself.

The standpoint of happening hence surmounts the antinomy of existence-non-

existence, not by overcoming either side but by seeing them from a unity more primor-

dial than any bifurcating designation of existence versus non-existence. From this

standpoint, no longer do life and death stand opposed. But it is in the finite surge of the

moment, with each moment dying to the next, that time happens, that reality happens.
 107

Recently, a student-leader died. Many of the students at our university were very

saddened by this, and no amount of discussion of Heidegger’s concept of “being-

toward-death” amounted to anything consoling. However, we had the fortune of stum-

bling upon a helpful line amongst our discussionsμ “Every thing that is born dies. But

only what is born dies.” It seems meaningless, from the standpoint of the will to will,

because we think to ourselves that all of us are born, all of the ones we love are born, all

of the projects we throw our efforts into are born. Hence all of these will die. And what

is not born? Everything is born, everything dies.

But our friend was a leader, like Ninoy Aquino and Mahatma Gandhi. Battling

with a terminal disease, he dedicated his life to helping people, to reminding the

wealthy that they were part of a world far larger than the bubbles of their glamorous ex-

istences. In his leadership, compassion and youthful vitality, he was the expression of a

happening far older than his twenty or so years. He reminded us of all the people who

walked this earth not as self-absorbed selves but as engaging, compassionate beings.

And with his passing, the legacy of compassionate engagement of peoples continues. As

we clamor for recognition of marginalized people and engage with the questions of hu-

man rights, we remember our friend, we take part in something he took part in but never

originated. We take part in that in him which is unborn and undying.

What we cling to, the finitude of this person, this task, this occurrence, all these

are born and will someday come to pass. But the happening that happens through aris-
 108

ing and perishing is beyond arising and perishing. And it is from the standpoint of this

happening that we surmount the antinomy of our existence.

The movement is similar in the overcoming of the antinomy of reason. Taking a

stand on the side of reason, one is perplexed by the complexities and intricacies of bot-

tomless reality. However, to take a stand on the side of the irrational is to relegate reali-

ty to the absurd, to deny truth its shining into its finite spaces. From what standpoint can

we take part in the finite disclosure of reality to reason and at the same time, the infinite

expanse of the unknown and the unknowable? Akin to the first facet of the non-duality

of realization, perhaps we can name this as the standpoint of the dialogue of co-

constitution of man and reality.40

Dialogue is the happening of light and shadow, concealment and unconcealment,

between man and reality. Dialogue, most intimately, is a conversation amongst close

friends. Amongst close friends, there is no mad rush to discover and to rob one’s friends

of their secrets. Nor is there the placid frustration, knowing that one will never know

everything about one’s friends. There is merely the dialogue, the finite disclosures

through which we make each other, take part in the happening of one another, love one

another. Dialogue is reality shining in finite spaces, with every glimmer a smile of

40
This is very similar to Heidegger’s notion of truth as alētheia, unconceal-ing, wherein atten-
tiveness to truth is not merely attentiveness to the unconcealed but attentiveness to the unconceal-ing of
the concealed into unconcealment, an unconcealing that always conceals itself in favor of what it reveals.
Seeμ Martin Heidegger, “The Essence of Truth,” trans. John Sallis, in Pathmarks ed. William McNeill
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 136-154.
 109

knowing, without the daring desire to know everything, and always the humility and

warm anticipation of the infinite depth of that which can someday come to light.

In the standpoint of dialogue, there is no fixation on reason, on thinking, on

knowing. Nor is there a fixation on absurdity and not-thinking that refuses the abun-

dance of thought. There is only the happening of abundant truth, in the contained abun-

dance of finite spaces, always happening, always changing, in the endless unfolding of

bottomless reality. From this standpoint, the antinomic character of reason-irrational is

surmounted, without clinging to either or rejecting either. Dialogue precedes all reason

and absurdity.

The standpoint of happening and the standpoint of dialogue are one and the

same standpoint. Happening is the movement of reality beneath all discrimination of

existence and non-existence, beneath all grasping of self and other selves (svabhava).

Dialogue is the meaningful disclosure of this happening. Each being in its primordial

dwelling with reality, shaped by reality and shaping reality in its fundamental dialogue

with the happening and unfolding of reality—this is true selfhood. This is the standpoint

that is emancipated from the suffering and ultimate antinomy of existence and reason.

All Self is True Self

In our existence as the ego-will, torn by the ultimate antinomy in our very being,

one may be impelled to yearn, to hunger for the wholeness and freedom of the true self.

The true self becomes an ought that stands in opposition to what is, an ought that de-
 110

mands that what is be broken through and disposed of. Thus craving for true selfhood,

one may find oneself despising one’s existence as ego-self or no-self. But does not this

very attachment to true selfhood, Buddha, and Nirvana keep us from that which we are

seeking and constrain us to the selfsame willing of the will?

In the first chapter, we spoke of the problem with the desire to overcome the age

of modern technology. We spoke of how this desire to overcome is itself a movement of

the will to will. Overcoming technology is a refusal of technology and an attempt to

master it and do away with it. Such throws us headlong into the very will that brought

us to the age of modern technology in the first place. What dire straits do we find our-

selves in here?

Let us turn to the 19th koan41 from the Mumonkan entitled “Ordinary Mind is

Tao.” It is writtenμ

Joshu once asked Nansen, “What is Tao?” Nansen answered, “Ordinary mind is
Tao.” “Then should we direct ourselves toward it or not?” asked Joshu. “If you try
to direct yourself toward it, you go away from it,” answered Nansen. Joshu con-
tinued, “If we do not try, how can we know that it is Tao?” Nansen replied, “Tao
does not belong to knowing or to not-knowing. Knowing is illusion; not-knowing
is blankness. If you really attain [the] Tao of no-doubt, it is like the great void, so
vast and boundless. How, then, can there be right and wrong in the Tao?” At these
words, Joshu was suddenly enlightened.42

41
A koan is a public saying that is used to aid monks in breaking through their representational
thinking and attain enlightenment. Two famous collections of koan are the Hekigan-roku (The Blue Cliff
Record) and the Mumonkan (The Gateless Barrier).
42
Zenkei Shibayama, The Gateless Barrier: Zen Comments on the Mumonkan, trans. Sumiko
Kudo (Boston: Shambhala, 2000), 140
 111

In his teisho43 on this koan, Master Shibayama says:

Etymologically, Tao44 means a way, or a passage where people come and go. It
can also be used in the sense of the right path for man to follow. It thus refers to
the moral code, or more broadly, the fundamental principle and reality of the uni-
verse, and has been used as an essential word in Taoism.

Later as the Zen of Bodhidharma’s line . . . the old traditional term Tao, with its
experiential connotations, began to be used as a Zen term referring to the Truth of
Zen.45

This Tao, as the right path and the essence of Zen, is our very existence as true

self. Two lines must be noted here. The first isμ “If you direct yourself toward it, you go

away from it.” To seek the true self is to move from the part of our existence that grasps,

wills, and craves. This part of our being will never arrive at the true self. The more we

grasp and will and crave and refuse and reject, the more mired we become in the ego

self. How then are we to arrive at the true self?

The heart of this koan readsμ “Ordinary mind is Tao.” Shibayama saysμ “Literal-

ly it means, ‘Everyday mind as it is without any discrimination is Tao.’” There is noth-

ing special, mysterious, or external to the way of the true self. It is none other than the

original nature of our very selfhood. In terms of the three stages of Abe Masao, one

might say: The third stage of true self comes first.

43
A teisho is a lecture given in the middle of a Zen retreat. One may call it simply a lecture, but
that somewhat misses the character of the experience of a teisho, for it is after hours, if not days of sitting
in Zazen that one listens to a teisho. As such, the listener’s experience of such is very different from, say,
an academic lecture.
44
道, jp. dō, michi, ch. dào
45
Shibayama, 141.
 112

Abe writes:

The ‘third stage’ is, as mentioned above, not a static end to be reached progres-
sively from the lower stages, but the dynamic whole which includes the lower
stages, both affirmative and negative. It is more than the third and final stage. It is
the standpoint from which the notion of process and even the notion of ‘stage’, as
well as their implication of temporal consequence, are overcome. ‘Mountains are
really mountains, waters are really waters’, is realized in a thoroughly non-
conceptual way in the absolute present which is beyond and yet embraces past,
present, and future.46

Why does the third stage come first? This can be understood from a logical per-

spective. One cannot move from the first stage to the third, for how can one negate flat-

ness in order to attain infinite depth? That would be like negating a picture to get the

three dimensional figure. In order for there to be any narrow engagement with reality

that clings to life and the standpoint of the will, there must first be the primordial dwell-

ing with the happening of reality in dialogue with and co-constituted by reality as it is in

itself. In order to cling to death and the irrational and reject the positivity of life and rea-

son in the second stage, there must first be the original wholeness of reality that is un-

deniably constituted by existence-non-existence and reason-irrational but at the same

time beyond the duality of such. For the narrowness of ego-self or no-self to happen,

there must first be the broad expanse of true selfhood and our abundant dwelling with

the happening of reality. All selfhood, be it ego-self or no-self, is always already true

self.

The 30th koan of the Mumonkan is entitled “Mind is Buddha.” It is writtenμ

46
Abe, “Zen is not a Philosophy,” in Zen and Western Thought, 17.
 113

Taibai once asked Baso, “What is Buddha?” Baso answered, “Mind is Buddha.”47

Shibayama’s teisho on this koan is most helpful. In our journey toward true self-

hood and the way (道) of Buddha, we find ourselves seeking outward in order to find

something that is already within. Shibayama offers a story to clarify a way out of this

conundrum:

When Master Nangaku was at Hannyaji in Kozan, Baso stayed at Denpo-in on the
same mountain, doing nothing but zazen day and night. One day Master Nangaku
asked Baso, “Reverend Sir, what are you doing here?” “I am doing zazen,” an-
swered Baso. “What are you going to accomplish by doing zazen?” asked
Nangaku. Baso replied, “I am only trying to be a Buddha.” Hearing that, Nangaku
walked away without a word, picked up a piece of brick in the garden, and started
to polish it with a grinding stone in front of his hut. Baso asked, wondering,
“What are you trying to accomplish by polishing that brick?” “I am trying to
make a mirror by polishing this brink,” replied Nangaku. Basu asked again, “Can
a piece of brick be made into a mirror by polishing?” Nangaku retorted, “Can one
become a Buddha by doing zazen?” Baso went on to ask, “What should I do
then?” Nangaku said, “It is like putting a cart to an ox. When the cart does not
move, which is better, to beat the cart or the ox?” Baso was unable to answer.
Nangaku kindly explained to him, “You practice zazen and try to become a Bud-
dha by sitting. If you want to learn how to do zazen, know that Zen is not in sit-
ting or lying. If you want to become a Buddha by sitting, know that Buddha has
no fixed form. Never discriminate in lining in the Dharma of nonattachment. If
you try to become a Buddha by sitting, you are killing Buddha. If you attach to
the form of sitting, you can never attain Buddhahood.”48

Many mistakenly see Buddha as something to be attained, some accomplish-

ment to strive for. Thus they go about polishing themselves in various manners. They

seek out Buddhahood as if it were a lost secret. But to do so is to move from tanha in

order to reach that which is obscured by tanha. Hence practice in this manner flirts with

47
Shibayama, 214.
48
Ibid., 215.
 114

futility, like polishing a brick in order to make a mirror, or beating the cart when the ox-

drawn cart does not move.

Fu-daishi writesμ “You truth-seeker, look into your own mind. If you realize that

Buddha is in yourself, you will not seek after him outwardly. Mind is Buddha; Buddha

is mind. If your mind is clear, you will realize Buddha.”49 If one is to realize Buddha

and reality as it is, one must rescind one’s attachment to this idea, this external ideal of

Buddhahood and turn the light within. One must move from the Buddha that one always

already is. No amount of seeking or striving or willing can arrive at the ground beneath

the will. We must move from the ground where man and reality are one.

This paints a very different picture then, of the true self as an ought. Commonly,

we think of the ought as something external to what is. But the danger here is the ten-

dency to reject what is in favor of what ought. This is dualistic attachment, the tanha

that characterizes the will to will. Conversely, we could think of the ought as purely

identical to what is. Here, one might say, “things are fine exactly the way they are.” But

here in the violence of our dualistic existence and the treachery we have wrought upon

the earth and our fellow men, can we really say that things are fine staying exactly the

way they are? This standpoint is incapable of any real, active compassion.

But with the notion of the true self as our original nature, our primordial mode

of dwelling with reality, we have an ought akin to Pindar’s imperativeμ “Become what

you are!” This ought is inseparable from how we are right now, in our wretchedness and

49
Ibid., 216.
 115

antinomy. But at the same time, this ought is beyond the willing of the will, the objecti-

fication and attachment of ego-existence.

We can turn to the metaphor of a flower to aid us here. The flower begins as a

bud, closed, clinging on the security of itself. If we are to seek the fullness of a flower

in bloom, bursting open, embracing the sky, we cannot reject the bud. It is only from the

bud that a flower comes to bloom. There is no ought, no bloom, outside of the bud.

Where then is the ought? The ought is in the being of the flower itself. But this being is

not a static, closed state, like the impertinence of a bud. The being of the flower is in its

verbality, its happening. The being of a flower is in its flowering. Hence, it is in engag-

ing the flower as it flowers that we accept reality as it as and simultaneously take part in

its happening as it is.

In the light of this metaphor, we can see true selfhood in two ways. Narrowly,

we can see true selfhood as the full bloom of the flower as it opens to the sky, in man’s

full fidelity to reality as it is in itself. But let this view not lead us to impatience with

ourselves in our existence as the bud of ego-self or no-self. There is no happening of the

true self outside of moving from the true self right here and now in our engagement

with ourselves. Just as there is no flowering of the flower outside the dynamic existence

of the bud, there is no Buddha outside embracing the will to will, in its brokenness and

fragmented realities, that in its own existence demands that it move and open toward a

full engagement with reality.

 116

The Verse of Hui-Neng

Hiding in shadows, trembling in the dark, the monk Shen-hsiu writes with trem-

bling hands the following words:

Our body is the bodhi tree,

And our mind a mirror bright.
Carefully we wipe them hour by hour,
And let no dust alight.50

To which the rice-pounder Hui-neng thoughtlessly51 replies:

There is no bodhi tree,

Nor stand of a mirror bright.
Since all is void,
Where can the dust alight?52

What is the meaning of this exchange? Our mind is defiled by the dust of the at-

tachments of our ego-self, hence we do not (in our object-worlds) reflect reality as it is.

But the mirror, no matter how polished and free from dust, does not permit one to reach

into it and touch his face. Taking the standpoint of the mirror that seeks to reflect reality,

Shen-hsiu still remains at the standpoint of grasping, despite the fact that he has purified

his grasp. As such, no amount of purification can bring him face to face with reality as

it is.

50
Hui-neng, 70.
51
Not thoughtless as from not-thinking, but thoughtless in the spontaneous immediacy of non-
thinking, a ground more primordial than the opposition between thinking and its absence. See the discus-
sion between Yakusan and his pupil inμ Abe, “Zen is not a Philosophy,” in Zen and Western Thought, 23-
24.
52
Hui-neng, 72.
 117

It is not the dust upon the mirror that gets between man and reality. It is the mir-

ror itself that is the barrier. It is the ideal of enlightenment beneath the bodhi tree that is

the barrier. It is all the lines and delineations of this self and that self that builds the bar-

riers between man and reality. Hence, Hui-neng says there is no bodhi tree, no mirror,

no body, no mind. If one lets go of this compulsion to know and grasp reality through a

perfectly polished mirror of representation, then one can cease grasping oneself as the

mirror that is separate from reality, and return to the original self-presentation of reality.

To the ground where there is originally, not a single thing,53 to the ground where the

unattainable is self, is other, is reality itself; to absolute nothingness, to the simple flow-

ing of the one that is the unfolding of reality as it is.

“All is void” can be interpreted as meaning “originally, there is not a single (discrete) thing.”
53
 118

3.2 Da-sein’s Fidelity to the Unfolding of Truth

We began this thesis with a danger that is sweeping the globe. We spoke of nu-

clear holocaust, terrorism, environmental collapse. Eventually, we wound down the path

to a crisis in the very manner humans stand before reality, and turned to the demand of

the very self for a more faithful relationship to reality. We have ended with something

far from a solution to these technological catastrophes. We have arrived at a conversion,

a metanoia in one’s very being in relation to reality itself—a solution that seems reli-

gious, in a manner far from the world of practicalities where we began.

In this state, Heidegger himself might askμ “Where have we strayed to?” What is

essential to understanding the winding path is to understand the integrality of the

metanoia from the ego-will to the true-self as an ontological fidelity that begins the res-

olution of the crisis of dwelling. From thence, we can begin to discern the role that on-

tological fidelity will play in the surmounting of the age of technology.

In order to understand the relationship of the Zen Buddhist notion of true self to

the ontological fidelity that is sought by philosophy, we turn to Heidegger’s introduc-

tion to Being and Time.

 119

Phenomenological Ontology

The discipline of fidelity to things as they are is commonly known in philosophy

as phenomenology. Heidegger discusses the notion of phenomenology from the Greek

terms phainomenon and logos. From phainomenon, he speaks of what shows itself in

itself, that which is in its self-shining. The phainomenon is the thing in its presencing, in

its coming-forth as a being by be-ing. From logos, he speaks of apophainesthai—to let

something be seen from itself.54 This is akin to Heidegger’s discussion in “Logos (Her-

aclitus, Fragment B 50),” where logos as legein is not seen merely as speech but as a

letting-lie-before that gathers and safekeeps what presences in its unconcealment.55

Phenomenology, most primordially understood, is hence no mere philosophical

discipline among others. Phenomenology is legein ta phainomena. Legein understood as

apophainesthai renders phenomenology as apophainesthai ta phanomenaμ “to let what

shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself.” 56 This is the pure fi-

delity to reality as it shows itself from itself. “Let” speaks of the subservient shepherd-

ing of the philosopher, by which he surrenders his will to the self-showing of the being.

“Just as” reiterates his safekeeping, his faithful and fateful protection of what is.

Hence, Heidegger says:

54
Heidegger, Being and Time, 24-30.
55
Martin Heidegger, “Logos (Heraclitus, Fragment B 50),” in Early Greek Thinking, trans. David
Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 62-63.
56
Heidegger, Being and Time, 30.
 120

Phenomenology is the way of access to, and the demonstrative manner of deter-
mination of, what is to become the theme of ontology. Ontology is possible only
as phenomenology. The phenomenological concept of phenomenon, as self-
showing, means the being of beings—its meaning, modifications, and deriva-
tives.57

The task of ontology, which is “to set in relief the being of beings and to expli-

cate being itself,”58 cannot be accomplished without the firm fidelity to the self-showing

of beings in their being. There is no be-ing outside of beings that are. There is no pres-

encing outside of the happening of what presences. Any study of the happening of being

must proceed by way of phenomenology, going back to the things themselves.

In the light of our discussion however, it is the converse that is most relevant to

us. The phenomenon of technological strife is inseparable from the challenging

[Herausfordern] of the world and the challenging of man to the conscription as the

standing-reserve. The danger of the age of modern technology lies in the incapacity of

things to be seen as what they are. Hence, it seems as if the phenomenological task

seems more pertinent than the ontological task. It seems more urgent that we let beings

be as what they are, to gather and shepherd what presences in their presencing, so that

once more the world can world as world, that people can be people, that things have

space in which to unfold as they are.

But just as ontology is only possible as phenomenology, phenomenology is pos-

sible only as phenomenology. Let us recall that phenomenology is “to let what shows

57
Ibid., 31.
58
Ibid., 24.
 121

itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself.” Taking Heidegger’s formu-

lation from “Logos,” one might say as well that phenomenology is “to let-lie-before

what has been lain before us (as phainomenon) in a manner that concernfully safekeeps

the happening of its unconcealment.” In either formulation, we have the notion of self-

showing and unconcealment. What have we here? In “Logos,” Heidegger pronounces

perhaps his most lucid evocation of what it means to be:

The unconcealing of the concealed into unconcealment is the very presencing of

what is present. We call this the Being of beings.59

The restoration of the standing-reserve to the freedom of its self-presencing is

only possible as the faithful restoration of beings to their Being. We cannot go back to

the things themselves other than by way of fidelity to the happening of their uncon-

cealment, their Be-ing. Hence the task of phenomenology is only possible via an implic-

it commitment to the task of ontology, which seeks “to set in relief the being of beings

and to explicate being itself.” For, in man’s falling, it is that which is forgotten in beings

that we are least faithful to. And it is that which recedes into the darkness, the uncon-

cealment of the concealed that in itself is concealed, which is most forgotten. Hence

phenomenology fails at its task when it clings to that which is readily available and re-

fuses the very happening which in itself recedes.

Phenomenology and ontology hence form an inseparable whole as phenomeno-

logical ontology. Letting beings be, in fidelity to the mystery of their being can be spo-

59
Heidegger, “Logos,” in Early Greek Thinking, 64.
 122

ken of, in a word, as fidelity. But this is philosophy—phenomenology and ontology be-

long to philosophy. Why must we speak of fides, of faith? Why must we speak of con-

versions, metanoia, returning to one’s original countenance?

Phenomenological Ontology and True Selfhood

“Higher than actuality stands possibility,”60 says Heidegger of phenomenologi-

cal ontology. Was he speaking merely of a possibility for a philosophical discipline? Or

was he speaking perhaps of something nearer, nearer to our very constitution as hu-

mans?

Heidegger speaks of man as Da-sein. Of Da-sein he says:

Da-sein is a being that does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it is on-
tically distinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its
very being. Thus it is constitutive of the being of Da-sein to have, in its very being,
a relation of being to this being. And this in turn means that Da-sein understands
itself in its being in some way and with some explicitness. It is proper to this be-
ing that it be disclosed to itself with and through its being. Understanding of be-
ing is itself a determination of being of Da-sein. The ontic distinction of Da-sein
lies in the fact that it is ontological.61 (underlines supplied)

Ontology, and along with it phenomenology, are not merely disciplines of phi-

losophy. Nor are they merely the foundational constitutional discipline of philosophy.

Phenomenological ontology is fundamentally constitutive of our existence as human

beings, as Da-sein, the space wherein beings unfold in their being. Such a constitution

60
Heidegger, Being and Time, 34.
61
Ibid., 10.
 123

suggests that the task of phenomenological ontology cannot merely reside in the realm

of various human disciplines, but in the realm of the discipline of being human. It is in

this realm wherein the notion of conversion becomes necessary, and the task of seeing

things as they are becomes a task of awakening to the ground where selfhood is consti-

tuted.

The Need for Metanoia

What attests to this need for a conversion in the very selfhood of the human per-

son, in order to be faithful to reality as it shows itself in itself? The most apparent im-

pediment to being faithful to the being of beings is reification, which is of course insep-

arable from Heidegger’s notion of the forgetfulness of Being. Reification, grasping,

tanha, and in their direst form, challenging the world to standing-reserve—all these are

forms of attaching to various facets of the unconcealed, all the while forgetting the

vastness of what remains concealed, the mystery of the very happening of unconceal-

ment. The standpoint of the ego-will turns its back on the Being of beings.

Is it therefore sufficient for the task of phenomenological ontology to merely re-

scind the arrogance of the ego-will and remember the abundance of the infinite depth of

the concealed? Can we merely resign ourselves to the unintelligibility of reality as it

stands in itself?

The demand for a depth in conversion arises from the rootedness of the problem

of reification in the problem of death. As seen in section 2.1 in the discussion of the re-
 124

lationship between the antinomy of reason and the antinomy of life-and-death, the ten-

dency toward reification is inseparable from the anxiety over death. The flight from

death that pervades the age of technological mastery and challenging testifies to man’s

desire to secure himself, amidst the vicissitudes of life, through reason and its embodi-

ment in technology.

It is truly difficult to determine which antinomy comes first—the antinomy of

reason (wherein lies the tendency toward reification and challenging as the assertion of

the will to will) or the antinomy of life-and-death (wherein lies the flight from death and

the desire for securing one’s existence). One might argue that one reifies and challenges

the world as an attempt to assert the solidity of one’s existence and hold the forces of

death at bay. One might also argue the opposite, that one can only see death as a prob-

lem because one has already reified oneself as “self” and “life” to begin with.

Either way, the antinomy of reason and the antinomy of life-and-death are in-

separable, and form the ultimate antinomy. Therefore, no true resolution of the antino-

my of reason and forgetfulness of Being can occur merely by willing to face the shadow

cast upon the world of reason. The forgetfulness of Being and the vehement challenging

of the world as standing-reserve can only be surmounted if man is able to resolve the

antinomy of life-and-death as well.

The twofold resolution of the ultimate antinomy is necessary for the task of phe-

nomenological ontology to restore the standing-reserve to the self-shining of their Being.

And it is in the light of this demand for a twofold resolution that the entire motion to-
 125

ward metanoia acquires centrality. Resolving both the antinomy of reason and the an-

tinomy of life-and-death requires not merely topical changes but an entire modification

in the very manner by which man stands before the world—a modification in the very

selfhood of man.

True Self as Nexus of Self and Reality

The notion of true-self has been shown to be the manner in which one is faithful

to his existence as the space wherein reality plays itself out. It has been discussed in

section 3.1 in terms of non-grasping,62 non-duality of realizer and realized, resolution of

ultimate antinomy, and the unity of all selves in true self. What is most pertinent in our

discussion concerning the restoration of the standing-reserve to the abundance of their

being are the first two notions of non-grasping and non-duality.

The notion of non-grasping and non-duality between Da-sein and world can be

seen through the metaphor of a nexus in an interference pattern. Illustrated below is an

interference pattern formed by three point sources in a wave tank. As waves emerge

from the sources, various waves converge at certain patterns, convergence/interference

patterns that hold—some for minutiae of a second, some enduring for several seconds,

62
The notion of non-grasping must be distinguished from not-grasping, just as non-thinking is
distinguished from not-thinking. This was the central flow in the discussion of ego-self, no-self, true self,
where they take the standpoint of thinking/grasping, not-thinking/not-grasping, and non-thinking/non-
grasping, respectively. Thought simply, non-grasping is touching reality in its unconcealedness, all the
while faithful to the mystery and abundance of that which remains concealed. This hence precludes
grasping, which refuses the concealed by clinging to the unconcealed, and not-grasping, which refuses the
unconcealed by clinging to its incapacity to grasp.
 126

some crawling throughout the screen, some

pulsing in and out of existence, some recurring

over time.

Through the Buddhist notion of no-self

[anatman] and co-dependent origination

[pratitya samutpadda] we can see the true na-

ture of selfhood as a nexus of reality. Our ex-

istence, in its intricacies and complexities, are a complex interaction of the convergence

of a set-magnitude occurrence (one may poetically intone “infinite forces” but the no-

tion of infinite may upset the mathematically keen). The what-how of our existence is

dependent on our parents, our genes, our birth circumstances, growth environment, and

various other minutiae that are impossible to account for. These forces congeal into a

nexus, a central space of meeting of reality.

In a sense, one might say there is no self, for this self is nothing but reality. In

the same breath, one might say there is no external reality, for reality is nothing but self.

There is no gap anymore between self and reality, and hence no self to contend and to

will itself against reality.

This is not to deny the uniqueness and particularity of each nexus. As a locus of

meeting, each nexus presents a unique microcosm that reflects the multiplicity of the

waves that have converged in the happening of reality. Each microcosm, in the unique-

ness and particularity of the interferences and interactions that occur within his being
 127

becomes the center for the emergence of occurrences that are dependent on the unique-

ness and particularity of his existence as nexus. Take away one locus of interference,

and the entire wave pattern is altered. No man leaves the world unscathed.

Awakening to one’s true self is akin to realizing one’s existence as a unique

nexus of reality. Instead of being wearied by the antinomy of the life and death of a self-

standing existence (as seen from the point of view of ego-will), one awakens to one’s

existence as the unborn and undying, as an occurrence that, while finite, is inseparable

from the infinite play of the happening of reality.

Awakening to one’s existence as the unborn and undying also entails the resolu-

tion of the antinomy of reason. Having realized itself as the unborn and undying, it be-

comes unnecessary for the will to involute upon itself and assert itself as itself. The will

no longer clings to itself through its self-reification and objectification. Simultaneous

with this cessation, wherein the unattainable is realized as self, all things are realized in

the bottomlessness depth of their unfolding.

As such, the self becomes faithful to its encounter with reality—an encounter

that is simultaneously abundant as the reflections of the jewels upon Indra’s Net, but

limited and perspectival in character. The self no longer seeks to contain reality, but

awakens to the never-ending role it plays in the happening and disclosure of reality it-

self.
 128

Surmounting Technology from True Self

Awakening to true self and one’s existence as a unique nexus of reality is akin to

Da-sein’s self-awareness of its simple oneness with Being. The happening of Da-sein is

the happening of Being. The happening of Being is the happening of Da-sein. There is

no play of assertion here. There is only the infinite abundance of self, of Being, of truth.

It is only from the ground of awakening that Da-sein can move to efficaciously

surmount the strife of the age of modern technology. But Heidegger says:

Technology will not be struck down; and it most certainly will not be destroyed.

If the essence, the coming to presence, of technology, Enframing as the danger

within Being, is Being itself, then technology will never allow itself to be mas-
tered, either positively or negatively, by a human doing founded merely on itself.
Technology, whose essence is Being itself, will never allow itself to be overcome
by men. That would mean, after all, that man was the master of Being.63

Overcoming and mastery belong to the will that does not rest in its oneness with

Being—it belongs to the self-standing self-asserting will to will. The attempt to over-

come technology is fundamentally flawed and incomplete. To will oneself against an

age that results from a percolation of the will cannot hope to succeed. Even if we over-

turn the side-effects and impending catastrophes of modern technology, if we remain in

the violent self-assertion of the ego-will, we are likely to merely move from one cycle

of domination and danger to the next. In order to break the cycle of self-assertive domi-

nation and violence (that subversively metamorphoses from one perversion to the next),

63
Martin Heidegger, “The Turning,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays,
38.
 129

it is necessary for the very will to yield itself. Only from the ground of true self, where

man and Being are one, can there be any true surmounting of this age.

Hence, surmounting of technology from the ground of true selfhood is no mas-

tery of Being, no overcoming of technology. The true self that is one with Being has

nothing to overcome or to master. The overcoming of the age of modern technology

from the ground of the true self is a movement of Being itself. Heidegger says:

Through this cooperation, however, technology will not be overcome [über-

wunden] by men. On the contrary, the coming to presence of technology will be
surmounted [verwunden] in a way that restores it into its yet concealed truth.64

Cooperation speaks of the unity between the happening of Being and the clear-

ing that man is. Only on the ground of man’s fidelity to reality and to himself can man

shepherd beings beyond this age of violence and self-assertion.

Only when man, in the disclosing coming-to-pass of the insight by which he him-
self is beheld, renounces human self-will and projects himself toward that insight,
away from himself, does he correspond in his essence to the claim of that insight.
In thus corresponding man is gathered into his own [ge-eignet], that he, within the
safeguarded element of the world, may, as the mortal, look out toward the di-
vine.65

We began with a questionμ “Where have we strayed?” We spoke of how the

practical world of technology and technological strife are rooted on a crisis in how man

sees the world. We spoke of the answer, the fidelity found in the primordial notion of

64
Ibid., 39.
65
Ibid., 47.
 130

phenomenological ontology. We found that the fidelity to man and to reality found in

phenomenological ontology is impossible without a complete resolution not only of

man’s forgetfulness of Being but the problem of life-and-death. Led to such a demand,

we have shown how it is necessary that a complete turning in the very selfhood of man

is necessary for us to reach toward the fidelity demanded by the possibility of phenom-

enological ontology. We have shown the incompleteness of any attempt to overcome or

master technology, and we have shown how it is only from the ground of true selfhood

and the simple oneness of man and Being that the surmounting can take place.

It still remains for us to return to the world of men, of praxis, of terror and glob-

alization and impending catastrophes, and show the role that metanoia plays in the ac-

tual and practical engagement with the problems of modern technology. In order to do

so, we turn once more to Hisamatsu Shin’ichi.

 IV. RETURNING TO THE WORLD AS TRUE SELF

4.1 Hisamatsu’s Vision of the Awakening of Mankind

This world is a world of happening. Beneath the world of clear-cut ideas and

conceptual thought lies the wild and muddy reality—volatile and untamed, beleaguered

by strife in so many ways. We have drawn the path from the practical realities of nucle-

ar arms, globalization, terrorism, environmental catastrophes, etc., to the inner world of

anguish and antinomy. We have awakened a need for conversion in the very selfhood of

man, a conversion that restores the world from its conscription as a resource in this age

of modern technology, to the abundance of its unfolding. Yet here we remain, troubled

by the real, the palpable, the urgent, practical problems of technology.

There is no shortage of questioning as to how to solve the practical problems of

technology. Political scientists continuously debate on which political systems are of

help in what particular situations. Economists and sociologists discuss the interplay of

pressures and differences in this globalized world. World leaders struggle to avert po-

tential nuclear disaster. Scientists rush to reverse the scars we have wrought upon the

planet we live in. The world is in the heat of a mad rush to uncoil the suffocating stran-

glehold of modern technological strife.

We have spoken of the danger of an attempt to disentangle ourselves from the

snares of technological life from a merely technological angle. But that is not to belittle

any of these technological attempts to alleviate the burdens of modern technological life.

131
 132

These attempts by political scientists, leaders, environmental analysts, and all other

forms of technologists are of undeniable importance to sustaining any possibility of

human life in a society such as this. What the discussion we have gone through concern-

ing the metanoia of man in the very ground of his being aims to achieve is to ground

these technological efforts more primordially, such that while we disentangle ourselves

from the barbed mesh of technological catastrophes, we move to a mode of existence

that ceases to spin these mechanized projections of an incapacity to dwell with reality as

it is.

But how shall we bind the ontological and personal efforts of metanoia with a

global practical effort to revitalize human existence? While this is a difficult and most

complex question that in itself will require its own thorough development, let it suffice

for now to turn to but one attempt to see practical coexistence grounded on ontological

fidelity. This attempt is that of Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, in his foundation of the FAS 1 Soci-

ety.

Overview of the FAS Society

The FAS Society began with what was called the Gakudo (学道) Dojo, which

was formed from the dissolved Young Men’s Buddhist Association of Kyoto Universi-

1
“FAS” is an English acronym which stands for Formless self, All mankind, and Suprahistorical
history. The meaning of this shall be clarified a few pages hence.
 133

ty.2 It was born in the tense atmosphere of the Second World War, around December

1943. Hisamatsu Shin’ichi was the guiding force of the students at Gakudo Dojo, as

they met weekly at Hoseki-an in Shunko-in, which was located at the grounds of the

Myoshinji monastery in Kyoto. During these weekly meetings, they discussed matters

such as fundamental Buddhism with an urgency lent by war, national crisis, and the re-

ality of their imminent deaths. Abe Masao explains the spirit of Gakudo Dojo as such:

Gakudo is more clearly explained in the first sentence of “Our Guiding Principles
for Attaining Awakening,” which states, “We are determined to attain awakening
to the ultimate, great way through critical study and struggling practice, and
thereby to participate in the honored work of creatively revitalizing the world.”3

Gakudo Dojo sought, through heated discussions and intent practice of Zazen to

attain enlightenment in a manner free from any sectarian biases and in a manner critical-

ly engaged with the immediate and practical reckoning with science, western philoso-

phy, politics, war (both as it was waged and as it was lost), and death. The members

were not from any one common background. Abe writes:

Not all of them necessarily intended to practice zazen. Some took the position of
Pure Land Buddhist or Christianity. They majored in philosophy, mathematics,
literature, history and many other fields. . . . We decided to open our Dojo to stu-

2
Historical data is taken from Abe Masao, “A History of the FAS Society,” from FAS Newsletter
1984 [article on-line]; available in six parts from:
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/fas/soc/writings/fasj/fj96fashistory1e.html;
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/fas/soc/writings/fasj/fj96fashistory2e.html;
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/fas/soc/writings/fasj/fj96fashistory3e.html;
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/fas/soc/writings/fasj/fj96fashistory4e.html;
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/fas/soc/writings/fasj/fj96fashistory5e.html;
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/fas/soc/writings/fasj/fj96fashistory6e.html; Internet; accessed 1 February 2007.
3
Abe, “A History of the FAS Society.”
 134

dents of other universities and laymen as well. . . . School teachers, nuns, Com-
munists, and Zen trainees of monasteries joined us.4

The result was not chaos or directionless drifting in guise of non-sectarianism.

Instead, what resulted was a broad mélange of backgrounds, standpoints, and experi-

ences, all united as donin (道人, seekers of the way), striving to “attain awakening to

the ultimate, great way through critical study and struggling practice,” 5 in a world that

presented an equally broad array of practical, political and personal problems.

It was in August 1958, having returned from the United States where he had

given lectures on “Zen and Culture” at Harvard University, that Hisamatsu introduced

the notion of FAS—which the Gakudo Dojo took on as its name. Abe writes:

“F” stands for awakening to Formless Self, which means to awaken to man’s fun-
damental realization . . . “A” means taking one’s stand on the standpoint of All
humankind. “S” stands for creating Suprahistorical history.6 (underlines supplied)

By understanding this notion of FAS that guides the society, as well as the

“Vow of Humankind”7 pronounced in July of 1951 as the public vow of the society, we

shall endeavor to understand the inseparable ties that bind the ontological and personal

efforts of metanoia with the global practical effort to revitalize human existence. In so

doing, we hope to see how ontological fidelity, as it has been discussed in the past two

4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
The “Vow of Humankind” is a term that is properly specific to the FAS Society, but in discus-
sions the quotation marks that surround this term shall be omitted.
 135

chapters, forms the inescapable ground of the coming-to-pass of the genuine surmount-

ing of technological strife.

The Vow of Humankind

We shall begin with the Vow of Humankind, a vow pronounced in public by the

donin of Gakudo Dojo in July of 1951, shortly after the Korean War. Abe Masao re-

counts:

Calm and composed,

awakening to our true Self,
being fully compassionate humans,
making full use of our abilities,
according to our respective vocations,
discerning suffering both individual and social,
and its sources.
Recognizing the right direction
in which history should proceed,
joining hands as kin beyond the differences
of race, nation, and class.
With compassion, vowing to bring to realization
humankind’s deep desire for emancipation,
let us construct a world that is true and happy.8

The translations of this vow seem varied, and an older translation by Abe Masao

is as follows:

Keeping calm and composed, let us awaken to our true Self, become fully com-
passionate humans, make full use of our gifts according to our respective voca-
tions in life; discern the agony both individual and social and its source, recognize
the right direction in which history should proceed, and join hands without dis-

Abe Masao, “Ethics and Social Responsibility in Buddhism,” in Zen and the Modern World: A
8

Third Sequel to Zen and Western Thought, ed. Steven Heine (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
2003), 33.
 136

tinction of race, nation, or class. Let us, with compassion, vow to bring to realiza-
tion mankind’s deep desire for self-emancipation and construct a world in which
every one can truly and fully live.9

We shall begin by discussing each part of the vow, as it was discussed in the

talks of Hisamatsu Shin’ichi himself during the April sesshin10 in 1951.

1. Calm and Composed, Awakening to Our True Self11

In his opening talk on the Vow of Humankind, Hisamatsu discusses the signifi-

cance of the vow. He speaks of this vow as a phenomenon of social awakening, the en-

lightenment of the FAS Society as a whole and not merely of individuals. However,

more than the enlightenment of the society as a whole, he stressed that the vow cannot

be merely the vow of merely a few people, merely the vow of a small society in Japan

like the Gakudo/FAS group. He says:

We must thus conceive of the establishment of the Vow of Humankind as a social

phenomenon, as a matter of the society of humanity we are representing, never a
society composed merely of a few people. This is why it is called the “Vow of
Humankind.”12

9
Abe Masao, “Transformation in Buddhism,” in Zen and Comparative Studies: Part Two of a
Two-Volume Sequel to Zen and Western Thought, ed. Steven Heine (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1997), 191.
10
Betsuji gakudō, intensive week-long meditation retreat.
11
For the headers, the latest translation of Abe Masao shall be used. For the body, the translation
of Christopher Ives shall be used.

Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, The Vow of Humankind: 1. Keeping Calm and Composed, Let Us Awake
12

to Our True Self, trans. Christopher Ives from Hisamatsu Shin'ichi Chosakushū, Vol. III: 207-49 (Risōsha,
Tokyo, 1971ν revised edition, Hōzōkan, Kyoto, 1994) [article on-line]; available in three parts from:
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/fas/soc/writings/hisamatsu/vowcalm1-2e.html;
 137

The vow of humankind opens with the lineμ “Keeping calm and composed, let us

awake [sic] to our true self.”13 The third chapter already attempted to elucidate the no-

tion of awakening to true self, but perhaps it is helpful to see several of Hisamatsu’s

points on this topic.

Hisamatsu begins with the notion of keeping calm and composed. He speaks of

this calmness through the metaphor of waves and water. Considering the metaphor of “a

bottomless abyss filled with water,”14 our existence is often from the standpoint of the

discrete waves, rising and crashing on the agitated surface of the water. Seeking calm-

ness and composure there, we try to level down the swells and troughs. But calm on the

level of the waves is only momentary calm, not true calm and composure. Hisamatsu

says:

True security cannot be found in that direction. Rather, it is found in the vertical
direction of the shift from waves to their source. In this, the self, heretofore exist-
ing as waves, quiets down and becomes bottomless water. The self-awakening of
the bottomless abyss itself is the “highly composed True Self.”15

This is much akin to our notion of the self as a nexus of reality. When the vow

speaks of “keeping calm and composed,” it refers not merely to the superficial appear-

ance of calm and composure, but calm and composure that encompass “every time and

http://www.ne.jp/asahi/fas/soc/writings/hisamatsu/vowcalm3-4e.html;
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/fas/soc/writings/hisamatsu/vowcalm5-6e.html; Internet; accessed on 1 February
2007.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
 138

every place.”16 This is the calm that arises when one no longer is restricted to the stand-

point of vicissitudes, selves, collisions, and turmoil; the calm that arises inseparably

from the awakening to true self.

However, when Hisamatsu discusses the notion of “awakening to True Self,” he

says:

Keeping highly composed stands as the direction leading to the awakening of the
True Self. The True Self is the “I” arrived at through becoming composed. In fact,
there is no True I lying outside of the truly composed I. You may view the ex-
pression, “keeping calm and composed” as expressing the way to the True Self,
but that view does not yet get at true composure. Keeping highly composed is it-
self the goal, for as I have said, there is no True I existing apart from the com-
posed I.17

It can be said from this discussion that calm composure stands as both the cause

and the effect of attaining the standpoint of True Self. Part of striving toward true self is

learning not to move from the ego-will, learning not to thrash violently at things that

reveal to us our sense of frailty and finitude. Hence, as we move toward awakening to

our existence as a nexus of reality, we just-sit (shikantaza)—not only in meditation,

when we sit with the mad rush of thought as they settle into stillness, but also in day-to-

day life, when we are set alight by various passions (tanha) and we seek to return to

stillness.

But the calm and composure that is on the way to true self is not yet true calm

and composure. True calm and composure is already the true self, it is already emerging

16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
 139

from a standpoint that is one with the happening of reality itself, that no longer wrestles

against the intricacies and difficulties life poses.

Hisamatsu writes, “The move from the split to true oneness or true unity neces-

sitates the split self’s dissolving of the very split. . . . The I of the waves must become

the I of the water; the I that emerges as a swelling wave must settle and return to the

oneness of water.”18 (emphasis supplied) As a settling down to the depth of true-self,

the practice of Zazen can no longer remain as an isolated, self-absorbed, self-

enlightening practice. When the donin of the FAS Society sit in Zazen together every

meeting, it is more than just a collection of persons aspiring for their own enlightenment.

Hisamatsu says:

To engage in true practice or zazen is to link up with one another and talk at our
source. There is no talking greater than the talking at the point of oneness. Com-
munication based on talking with words or actions is truly tedious. Sitting perfect-
ly still without talking is the true way of talking. . . . Precisely this way of talk-
ing . . . is the dialogue of buddha with buddha.19

Discourse ethics may be accused that it results in a “hegemony of reason” where

only that which can be spoken of, only the arguments that can carry over with great ra-

tional force, can triumph. Hence for the society to consider solely rational discussion as

they work toward their goals would be to fall prey to this danger. Considering the infi-

nite depth of all reality that is beyond reason but encompasses reason, can it not be seri-

18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
 140

ously considered that this attempt to settle down and be one with one another is an un-

deniable element of true discourse?

Seeing this notion of Zazen as communication, we begin to see Hisamatsu’s idea

of the engaging, outward, compassionate movement of true self. This is clearly stated in

his notion of the three stages of composure, as we read in the following:

The first stage is “composure with form.” . . . This composure with form must de-
velop into “formless composure,” the second stage, where mind and body [form]
have fallen away, for if it doesn’t, it won’t become true composure. . . . In the
third stage, though there is mind and body, composure is unobstructed by mind
and body. . . . This is formless composure within all forms.20

The idea of a formlessness that is one with form, instead of mere form or mere

formlessness reflects Hisamatsu’s understanding of the relationship between the actu-

al/graspable and the transcendent/ungraspable. Remaining merely in form, in that which

is graspable as self, is to take the standpoint of the split self, the ego-will, the wave.

There is no true composure there. Rejecting form, we enter the second stage, where in

the depth of reality we are no longer encumbered by form/concepts/reification. But like

Abe’s stage of no-self, this stage is unable to reckon with the world of actuality, of fi-

nitely communicated concepts, of systems and practical problems. The third stage is

formlessness within form, an engagement with the world of actuality from the stand-

point of infinite depth.

This notion of an engagement with reality that emerges from death is seen more

clearly as Hisamatsu discusses the succeeding line of the vow.

20
Ibid.
 141

2. Being Fully Compassionate Humans

Hisamatsu discusses that the notion of awakening to true self may seem to be,

for the most part, a matter of one’s own self-cultivation. But as beings who are shaped

by our fellow humans, whose very existence is made possible by our fellow humans,

whose existence shapes and alters the lives of our fellow humans, as social beings, we

are compelled to take other people into account. There can be no true and complete self-

emancipation outside a compassionate engagement, on the grounds of our co-

constitution, with our fellow man. This leads us to the notion of becoming fully com-

passionate humans. Hisamatsu develops this idea by calling to mind the Fourfold Great

Vow (also known as the Four Vows of the Bodhisattva).

However innumerable living beings are, I vow to save them;

However inexhaustible the passions are, I vow to extinguish them;
However immeasurable the Dharma is, I vow to master it;
However incomparable the Buddha Way is, I vow to attain it.21

While the notion of attaining enlightenment immediately calls to mind the sec-

ond, third and fourth vows, it is the vow of compassion that comes first. “However in-

numerable living beings are, I vow to save them.” Why is it necessary that this comes

first? Why is it necessary that in my own awakening, I endeavor to emancipate others as

well? Hisamatsu says:

21
Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, The Vow of Humankind: 2. Become Fully Compassionate Humans, trans.
Christopher Ives from Hisamatsu Shin'ichi Chosakushū, Vol. III: 250-74 (Risōsha, Tokyo, 1971ν revised
edition, Hōzōkan, Kyoto, 1994) [article on-line]; available in two parts from:
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/fas/soc/writings/hisamatsu/vowcompassionate1e.html;
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/fas/soc/writings/hisamatsu/vowcompassionate2e.html; Internet; accessed on 1
February 2007.
 142

I realized that one’s study and discipline must be done for all people. The starting
point of practice is where one’s salvation and the fulfillment of the Buddhist path
are practiced for the sake of the vow, “However innumerable living beings are, I
vow to save them.” Prior to self-benefit comes the benefit of others; this is some-
thing we must discern. Self-benefit and the benefit of others run parallel from the
beginning and are interwoven all along the way. Practicing for oneself is for the
sake of others, and practicing for others is for one’s own sake.22

As we undertake the movement toward awakening to our nature as nexus of re-

ality and gradually settle into the oneness of the infinite depth of all things, we cannot

fail to realize that the anguish that has awakened in each one of us is the anguish that

emerges in human society and resides in the very manner of human existence and how

man stands before reality, and hence is the anguish of the whole world. Hence, the

composure we are settling into is a response to this universal anguish. As we begin to

see the co-constitution by which each being takes part in the being of every other and

we see how we are shaped by all that is around us, we see that the ultimate antinomy is

buoyed up by the very force of man’s reckoning with reality, the destining of being. The

urgent call of conscience is hence buoyed up not only in the individual but from the

very possibility of Da-sein as Da-sein as well. Thus recognizing the oneness of human-

kind as we hang suspended over this abyss of antinomy, how can we not, as we endeav-

or to emancipate ourselves, not save all others as well?

Taking the standpoint of compassion and love means that the standpoint of FAS

must go deeper than mere morality or ethics. Hisamatsu says, “A moral heart always

22
Ibid.
 143

acts justly; it censures evil in others and praises just action.”23 Morality and ethics often

take the standpoint of correctness or goodness, in opposition to errancy or evil. But in

the light of the oneness of all mankind as we stand mired in the entanglements of ulti-

mate antinomy, can we possibly show no mercy to the evil and the errant? Shinran says,

“Even a good person attains rebirth in the Pure Landν how much more so an evil per-

son.”24 Compassion is a response to the brokenness of mortal man as he contends with

mortality. The more broken, the more wretched, the more entangled in antinomy a hu-

man is, the louder the call for emancipation, for compassion. Hisamatsu says, “This

kind of love is for humans something that is necessary prior to morality; it is demanded

from the very beginning.”25

From this notion of a calm and composed true self that comes bearing compas-

sion without reserve, Hisamatsu discusses the particularity of engagement in the actual

world.

3. Making Full Use of Our Abilities According to Our Respective Vocations

The line which says, “making full use of our abilities according to our respective

vocations,” speaks of the individual, actual, and practical functioning of the being that

endeavors toward true selfhood and compassionate emancipation. If we are to merely

23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
 144

cloister ourselves in monasteries or libraries and refuse to have anything to do with the

present day problems of modern technology, globalization, political tension, environ-

mental collapse, etc., we fall to the temptation of “Zen in the darkness of the demon’s

cavern,” a hollow practice detached from the actuality of day-to-day existence, an es-

capism par excellence. True selfhood, as a compassionate and composed mode of being,

is engaged with the world of actuality, of antinomy, of strife. Hisamatsu says, in Pure

Land Buddhist terminology, that the Going Aspect (toward transcendence and emanci-

pation) must be counterbalanced by a Return Aspect (back to the world of actuality) via

this engagement. If this engagement is to be possible, it means finite modes of reckon-

ing with reality, a self-limitation that arises from specialization according to our skills

and the demands of our environs.

Hence, Hisamatsu says that to make full use of one’s abilities according to one’s

respective vocation gives content to the transcendent practice of emancipation. The

teacher must teach. The student must study. The government official must govern. The

economist must understand and shape economies. But how is this different from the

mere mélange of specialized (and often alienated) workforce we have today? Are we

not already making full use of our abilities according to our respective vocations, here

in this age where we strive to master the age of technology as it threatens to spiral out of

control?
 145

Hisamatsu says, “By virtue of the whole lying at the base of our respective voca-

tions, we can for the first time possess our vocations in life.”26 Our engagement with

our specializations and vocations must be resting on the ground of the whole, on the

ground of reality itself, awakening to our existence as a nexus of that very reality. What

does it mean to ground action on the foundation of compassion and true self?

Hisamatsu says:

Insofar as the true self makes things without being restricted by them, it constant-
ly makes everything without making anything at all. Moreover, while separating
from what is made, it constantly makes things. Making things in this way, the true
self possesses a character of newness. It maintains itself without being shackled
by the past. Along these lines, we can conceive of things being extricated from so-
called karma.27

Karma is what characterizes our actions, our striving, in this age of modern

technological strife. Our actions are grounded on the ego-will. We strive to become bet-

ter doctors in order to secure our future. We take good care of our duties in order to as-

certain good compensation. We endeavor to build a lasting legacy in order that in death

we will not be forgotten. All of these are actions grounded on the flight from death, the

self-assertion that wills itself. Thus deluded, we sow the seeds of delusion. We build

lives, societies, nations, hell-bent on greater and more systematic modes of self-

26
Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, The Vow of Humankind: 3. Making Full Use of Our Abilities According
to Our Respective Vocations, trans. Christopher Ives from Hisamatsu Shin'ichi Chosakushū, Vol. III: 275-
90 (Risōsha, Tokyo, 1971ν revised edition, Hōzōkan, Kyoto, 1994) [article on-line];
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/fas/soc/writings/hisamatsu/vowfulluse1e.html; Internet; accessed on 1 February
2007.
27
Ibid.
 146

assertion, all the while refusing the antinomy that glowers from within. In Nishitani’s

words, our work is an endless payment and reinstatement of the debt of our existence.

To ground work and action on emancipation and true selfhood means to be free

of karma. We turn to Nishitani to aid us here:

In this Existenz of non-ego, work from one moment to the next, originates, as we
have seen, from the beginning of time. It is a revelation of the beginning of time
itself and, in that sense, is the emergence of that beginning into its nature. It is, so
to speak, a moment of eternity appearing in time. Here, too, our life comes to be
as a restless engagement in doing something. Our being preserves the form of
ceaseless becoming in ceaseless doing. This being, as a being-at-doing (samskrta),
is a becoming that comes to be and passes away at each moment.

But here our work is no longer an endless payment and reinstatement of a debt.
Our existence does not become an endless burden to us. Our work, our karma of
deed, word, and thought does not arise from the darkness of ignorance (the root of
self-centeredness), which is the home-ground of the infinite drive [to self willing];
nor does it return to that home-ground. Each one of our deeds is no longer . . .
karma on the field of nihility, a karma that produces being at the same time that it
nullifies it.28

Put briefly, “On the field of emptiness, then, all our work takes on the character

of play.” 29 No longer do we sow seeds of delusions of self-sustained existence. No

longer do we build habits of self-assertion with our work. We work as the world, mani-

fested in the particularity and uniqueness of this nexus, with these unique talents and

capacities, in constant compassionate engagement with those whose existence we not

only participate in, but share.

28
Nishitani Keiji, Religion and Nothingness, trans. Jan Van Bragt (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1982), 251-52.
29
Ibid., 252.
 147

4. Discerning Suffering both Individual and Social, and Its Sources

The process of emancipating man from the ultimate anguish that besets him re-

quires careful communal discernment. Hisamatsu says:

For us to be able to save people from “suffering both individual and social” we
must first discern the source from which this suffering arises. Then, by eradicating
that source, liberation from that anguish naturally follows, and for this reason we
must investigate the nature of our anguish and penetrate to the bottom of its
source.30

Heidegger’s analysis of the essence of technology falls largely within this sphere.

If we do not carefully discern the true source of the problems of technology, as when,

for instance we presume that is merely the “misuse” of the “instrument” of modern

technology that results in this plethora of problems, we fail to alleviate the strife that

besets this age altogether.

It must be stressed that Hisamatsu points out that the discernment required by

this anguish is not merely private personal discernment but communal discernment.

This communal discernment is necessitated by the manifold character of the anguish

that man needs to be emancipated from. Hisamatsu says that there is suffering that is

experienced by the individual, and suffering that is undergone by society as a whole. At

the same time, there is suffering that emerges privately, from one’s personal conflicts,

and there is suffering that emerges from how society comes together. Hence in order to

30
Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, The Vow of Humankind: 4. Discerning Suffering both Individual and So-
cial, and Its Sources, trans. Christopher Ives from Hisamatsu Shin'ichi Chosakushū, Vol. III: 291-308
(Risōsha, Tokyo, 1971ν revised edition, Hōzōkan, Kyoto, 1994) [article on-line];
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/fas/soc/writings/hisamatsu/vowdiscerne.html; Internet; accessed on 1 February
2007.
 148

truly understand the source of suffering, we must discern not merely as discerning indi-

viduals but exist as a discerning whole.

Hisamatsu expresses a key insight here. He says:

Saving individuals generally involves saving members of society one by one, but
the salvation of society does not end there. The saving of individuals one by one
is not enough: the saving of society, socio-religious salvation, is essential. And
because this comes down to creating a saved society, we need to consider history.
The salvation of history, the salvation of the history of human society, becomes
necessary.31

Saved society is more than just a society of saved individuals. Society must be

saved as a whole, from the anguish society experiences as a whole, as it struggles with

attempts to alleviate the burdens of existence.

The expansion continues “lengthwise,” as the discerning whole embraces the

length of history. Hisamatsu says:

We believe the end of history will come after millions of years, yet what I am
considering here is not a problem of the temporal future but a problem of the fate
of history itself, the question of whether all problems can be solved by history.
The source of history itself contains, in terms of logic, contradiction, in terms of
emotion, suffering, and, in terms of will, dilemma.32

What Hisamatsu seeks to consider here is a sense of antinomy not only in indi-

viduals as they reckon with reason/irrational and life/death, not only in societies as they

reckon with the limitations of their shared rationalities, relevance, and existence, but in

the history of mankind itself. Hisamatsu seeks to consider a sense of “absolute contra-

31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
 149

diction in history . . . [which] cannot be overcome by history.”33 He speaks of the en-

gagement with such a contradiction as we see in the following:

There is absolute contradiction in history, and this absolute contradiction cannot

be overcome by history. History is therefore negated, and one despairs of history.
Here resides the end of history. The end of history lies not in the future—it ulti-
mately exists in the source of history itself. This absolute contradiction also exists
in an individual’s subsistence and life . . . People might wonder whether the indi-
vidual’s absolute dilemma and history’s absolute dilemma differ, but they don’t.
They converge at the place called humanity. Humanity includes both individuals
and society, and the absolute dilemmas of humans and history together constitute
the fate of humanity and return to that place.34

The notion of discerning whole must coincide with the breadth (in terms of soci-

ety) and length (in terms of history) that characterizes Hisamatsu’s notion of humanity.

To truly emancipate mankind is to emancipate all individuals, all societies, all of history

itself. And no such emancipation can occur without a contemplation and discernment of

antinomy and suffering that arise from the whole of humanity itself.

6. Joining Hands as Kin Beyond the Differences of Race, Nation, and Class35

The notion of a discerning whole in breadth and length is only possible if we are

able to “join hands as kin beyond the differences of race, nation, and class.”36 Despite

33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Only the talks on the first four lines of the vow are available in published English translations.
The translations of talks on the sixth through eighth lines of the vow were generously made available by
Prof. Christopher Ives, Ph.D., via an unpublished manuscript. Unfortunately, the translation of the talk on
the fifth line of the vow, “recognize the right direction in which history should proceed,” is not available.
 150

the sense of distance that arises between two people—a sense of distance that heightens

the more differences and different people are involved—it is necessary for us to en-

deavor to cooperate fully, for there is no true discernment of the human condition and

emancipation from human anguish without this notion of kinship and togetherness.

Hisamatsu maintains that joining hands beyond the differences of race, nation,

and class is not about eliminating differences and creating one grand race, or one amal-

gamated nation-state, or leveling-off class differences through class revolution. At this

point in history, it is apparent what dangers arise from attempts to eliminate racial or

national differences, and it is clear that we must not make any attempts in such a direc-

tion. But Hisamatsu gives the lattermost difference—class—special consideration in the

light of discussions on Marx (and the presence of communists in the society).

Hisamatsu says, “reducing ‘distinctions of class’ to a bare minimum is our ide-

al.”37 From the point of view of Marxism, many evils arise from class distinctions, and

reducing these and improving wealth distribution may be very helpful for people. But

such a need does not justify class war. Hisamatsu says, “Perhaps a class struggle be-

tween capitalists and the proletariat would be effective in wiping out ‘distinctions of

class’. But I deem it desirable that we do away with the heart that, for example, hates

36
Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, The Vow of Humankind, trans. Christopher Ives [unpublished translation]
from “Jinrui no chikai,” in Hisamatsu Shin’ichi Chosakushū vol. 5 Kaku to sōzō (Tokyoμ Risōsha, 1976),
316. [Pagination from original]
37
Ibid., 319.
 151

someone for their wealth or looks down on someone because of their poverty.”38 He

continues, “Even granting the existence of actual ‘distinctions of class,’ we must all co-

operate without reserve in the bringing of ‘humankind’s deep desire for self-

emancipation’ to realization.”39

In taking such an attitude toward class distinctions, Hisamatsu forms a con-

sistent stance toward how humankind should unite given the differences of race, nation

and class. “We should link together in those differences.”40 Being Japanese, or Filipino,

or Yamato, or Malay, or rich, or poor—all these form a context that shapes the unique-

ness of the standpoint of each individual. Instead of trying to eliminate these differences,

Hisamatsu calls us to take a standpoint that simultaneously transcends (goes beyond)

these differences and through these differences acquires a creative and unique perspec-

tive into the revitalization of humankind.

Joining hands in and through yet going beyond difference makes possible the

task of emancipating mankind. But again, Hisamatsu points to the notion of length:

Both width and depth exist in “join hands” as it is conceived here. In this respect,
joining hands becomes something three-dimensional, not something planar. This
is the place without “distinctions racial, national, or of class.” Seen from this per-
spective, this is the place of the width which is the whole of mankind. Moreover,
this simultaneously becomes the place of the whole of mankind in an historical

38
Ibid.
39
Ibid., 320.
40
Ibid., 318.
 152

sense. This is not the whole of mankind in the present; rather, it includes all of the
future society of mankind and therein becomes the place of expansion.41

We join hands not merely in the present but in the past—in our national failures,

successes, learnings, our struggles—and in the future—as the rest of our descendants

continue to struggle to come to grips with reality. This is an important notion, especially

for countries like Japan and the Philippines that have to deal with painful and often

shameful histories of war and abuse (from opposite ends). For no real discernment can

occur so long as we turn our backs on the events that have shaped our present, or on the

future that awaits. To discern as the whole of humankind throughout history, we must

join hands as the whole of humankind throughout history as well.

How is uniting possible? In what place does this joining hands occur? Hisamatsu

says, “The mutual joining of hands in the place of intelligibility is the distinctively hu-

man place of human beings.”42 Joining hands in the realm of reason happens during dis-

course and dialogue between faiths and peoples. But beyond the realm of reason,

Hisamatsu speaks once more of “a deep place which the place of intelligibility cannot

exhaustively replace. . . . A transcendent place.”43 It is only on this place, on the ground

of infinite depth and true selfhood that true cooperation can occur.

41
Ibid., 322.
42
Ibid., 323.
43
Ibid.
 153

7/8. With Compassion, Vowing to Bring to Realization Humankind’s Deep Desire

for Emancipation, Let us Construct a World that is True and Happy

Hisamatsu begins his talk saying:

Today I would like to examine “Let us, with compassion, vow to bring to realiza-
tion mankind’s deep desire for emancipation.” This line and the next, “and con-
struct a true and happy world,” amount to the goal or object of the Vow of Man-
kind.44

Releasing oneself to the calm composure of the true self that compassionately

engages the actual world from the particularity of its vocation, which carefully discerns

the agony it seeks to alleviate, as it shapes history in cooperation with all of mankind

and all throughout history—this serves to move toward an emancipated world that is

true and happy. Emancipation, truth, and happiness—it is important that we carefully

consider the character of these three notions. What does it mean to be emancipated?

What is the truth, and what does it mean for a world to be faithful to it? What is happi-

ness?

The idea of emancipation lies in wresting oneself from the clutches of ultimate

antinomy, not merely as individuals, but as the whole of mankind in history. This

emancipation is effected in both the realms of the actual realm of practical concerns and

the supra-actual realm of our primordial relationship with reality. We see this in

Hisamatsu’s discussion on “national egotism” and other expanded forms of self-

centeredness. He writes:

44
Ibid., 329.
 154

Present national ‘self-benefit-ism’ and ethnic ‘self-benefit-ism’ are presently

causing great disaster, and switching this to the standpoint of the equality of man-
kind is quite desirable. I believe we must act this way. I am not, however, advo-
cating the mere negation of nations; rather, I am simply demanding the conver-
sion of self-centered nations rooted in the principle of supremacy of nations.

In the “emancipation of mankind,” we “emancipate” mankind from where it is

imprisoned in contemporary nations. . . . Slipping out of the restrictions of nations
and nationality comes down to standing in the standpoint of mankind, so in this
sense this amounts to the emancipation of mankind. I would like to hereupon
stress the emancipation in which all of us, closed up in assorted little shells—in
individual shells in the sense that there is this or that group of people in the
world—are freed into the expansive sky called ‘mankind.’

. . . Eradicating the suffering of unsatisfied demands arising in the cultural or

‘basic-necessity’ side of our actual life, the satisfaction of actual demands wherein
that which ought to be satisfied is satisfied, constitutes one “emancipation,” one
“emancipation of mankind.” We stand not in the standpoint of actuality but in the
standpoint transcending actuality[.] we must discover the various values and sig-
nificance of actuality, and all individual values must thereupon be established.45

We glean from this discussion two separate yet inseparable facets: the facet of

actual emancipation, where we have the actual emancipation from political constraints,

cultural oppression, deprivation of basic needs, etc. But the emancipation from these

actual constraints is inseparable from a supra-actual mode of emancipation, where we

are emancipated from delusions in how we see reality, how we cling to ourselves, how

humanity as a whole tends to cling to itself.

Take, for instance, the idea of national or ethnic “self-benefit-ism” which is

none other than an expansion of egotism and willing to will to the broader ground of the

nation or race. If we continue to take the ego-will standpoint that sees some races as su-

45
Ibid., 335-36.
 155

perior and others as inferior, we cannot solve the problems of racial discrimination.

Hence actual and supra-actual emancipation are inseparable.

Hisamatsu says that the inseparability of the actual and supra-actual is akin to

the indissoluble unity of form and matter. He writes, “Expressed in Kantian terminolo-

gy . . . the actual side of ‘emancipation’ by itself is blind, and the supra-actual aspect of

emancipation by itself is empty. Therefore, when both sides co-exist, the meaning of

‘emancipation of mankind’ reaches completion for the first time.”46 Returning to the

example of racial discrimination, if we merely emancipate people from the actual, con-

crete manifestations of discrimination by assuring them jobs, ensuring fair laws, etc.,

yet we are not able to emancipate ourselves from the constellation of ideas, conceptions

and understanding that see some races as inferior, this emancipation is “blind.” Nothing

stops new forms of discrimination from arising to express the unchanged internal milieu.

But on the other hand, if people merely believe that all races are equal, yet laws and

practices still prevent certain races from getting certain jobs and privileges, then the in-

ternal conversion to non-discrimination is empty. Only when both the actual and supra-

actual aspects of emancipation are fulfilled can there be real emancipation.

Hence, when the Vow of Humankind speaks of the need for building a world of

emancipation, truth, and happiness, we must take this notion of the supra-actual into

account. Hisamatsu writes:

46
Ibid., 336.
 156

We presently find a trend in which ordinary contemporary history moves along

solely in its actual aspect; a trend where the supra-actual side of politics or culture
has been ignored and neglected, where even religion has lost its supra-actual side
and has come down to just its actual side. We must at all costs guard against this.
Such a state of affairs makes mankind “blind.”47

As we constantly take merely the actual into account, there is a tendency for us

to think of merely the actual side of emancipation, truth, and happiness. But the actual

spect is very limited in its finite representations. By introducing the notion of the supra-

actual, Hisamatsu lends the notions of emancipation, truth, and happiness a sense of

depth, sustainability and universality.

We turn now to the notion of truth. The fidelity and openness that attends not

only to the actual but to that which lies beyond the conveniently graspable world of the

actual is what Hisamatsu terms as the “truthfulness” of the world. He writes:

The coexistence of something this-worldly and something un-worldly [or trans-

cendent, in the sense of supra-actuality] must be the true way of being of the
world. The world comes to be deepended in this way, so when we speak of the
true world, truth existing upon the fundamental structure of the world must be in-
cluded in the word ‘true.’ Since a world lacking either the actual or supra-actual
cannot be called a true world, we must by all means make a world in which the
demand for both is satisfied.48

As in the notion of emancipation, the truthfulness of the world is made possible

by the union of actuality and supra-actuality, of the graspable and the transcendent, of

the unconcealed and the darkness of the concealed unconcealing. It is from this notion

47
Ibid., 337.
48
Ibid., 345-46.
 157

of reckoning with both the actuality and supra-actuality of the world that Hisamatsu

hints at his notion of happiness.

Hisamatsu continuesμ “By becoming such a world [that is both actual and supra-

actual], this results in an ultimately happy world.”49 But what constitutes this happi-

ness? Hisamatsu is vague here, perhaps intentionally so. He alludes to Kant’s idea of

happiness to show that what we seek is not merely subjective, fleeting emotional states

of happiness, but the necessary “objective” preconditions of happiness, rooted in truth.

Hisamatsu writes:

As an ethical theory, the ‘happiness theory’ is not necessarily a correct way of

thinking, but the view that being unhappy does not matter as long as people are
correct is of course no good either. Hence, a world in which truth and happiness
are perfectly matched is the true desire of humans.50

Perhaps we can think of the notion of happiness as an unstructured and private

expression of emancipation toward fidelity to truth. If we believe ourselves to be faith-

ful to truth and to have emancipated ourself from our bondage to self-willing desire, yet

still we remain miserable and (in the unworded privacy of sheer experience) shorn by

antinomy, we would do well to question the authenticity of our emancipation and truth-

fulness.

49
Ibid., 346.
50
Ibid., 350.
 158

Actual and Supra-Actual Individual, Mankind, and History

Keeping calm and composed, let us awaken to our true Self, become fully com-
passionate humans, make full use of our gifts according to our respective voca-
tions in life; discern the agony both individual and social and its source, recognize
the right direction in which history should proceed, and join hands without dis-
tinction of race, nation, or class. Let us, with compassion, vow to bring to realiza-
tion mankind’s deep desire for self-emancipation and construct a world in which
every one can truly and fully live.51

The Vow of Humankind is the vow of seekers on the way to wisdom. It is their

commitment to awaken to the most primordial fidelity to reality as true self, a selfhood

that in calm composure, compassionately engages the strife and agony of all human be-

ings. In this engagement, from their finitude and unique creativity as individuals, they

join hands with all of mankind and history, as they discern the desolation that besets

mankind and work to emancipate us from it. This communal discernment and diligence

toward emancipation strive to creatively revitalize the world, such that all of mankind

may come to rest in fidelity to truth and the fullness of life.

The Vow of Humankind is not something externally imposed upon the FAS So-

ciety. As Hisamatsu Shin’ichi indicates, it is something that has always been present in

the spirit of the society. The vow is simply such a spirit toward the creative revitaliza-

tion of the world incarnating itself into a concrete formulation.

As we endeavor to understand the relationship between the private, ownmost

movement of awakening to ontological fidelity to truth, and the public, practical action

51
Abe, “Transformation in Buddhism,” in Zen and Comparative Studies, 191.
 159

of revitalizing human existence in an age of technology, several key insights arise from

Hisamatsu’s approach. The very name of the FAS Society can provide a framework to

understand Hisamatsu’s key insight, as reflected in the vow and the society’s struggle

itself. Abe writes:

“F” stands for awakening to Formless Self, which means to awaken to man’s fun-
damental realization . . . “A” means taking one’s stand on the standpoint of All
humankind. “S” stands for creating Suprahistorical history. 52 (underlines sup-
plied)

Formless Self, All Humankind, Suprahistorical History. In the spirit of the

Gakudo/FAS society, these three elements have always formed an indissoluble unity as

the three dimensions of the movement of awakening.

The Depth of Formless Self

Hisamatsu writes:

While by form one can mean either physical or mental, what is ordinarily called
the “self” has both these forms. Getting free from such a self and realizing the
Self that is in both ways formless is what I mean when I speak of the problem of
depth. . . . 53 (underlines supplied)

The notion of Formless Self is an attempt to be faithful to the ground of the in-

timate relation between man and reality. The awakening to the true, formless self that is

the vessel for the unfolding of reality was the point of discussion of the second and third

chapters. Essential in this awakening is the notion of depth—beneath the veneer of the

52
Abe, “A History of the FAS Society.”
53
Hisamatsu, “Ultimate Crisis and Resurrection.”
 160

standing-reserve, beneath the opacity of objectification, beneath the solidifying reifying

movement of desire (tanha), into the depths of the abyss, the free, the open… To the

nothingness where there is no gap between I and reality, where reality is the vessel, and

I, reality, bear forth the unfolding of myself. But this notion of Formless Self and depth

is inseparable from the notion of width.

The Width of All Mankind

Hisamatsu continues:

What I call width has some immediate connection with the Formless Self . . . It is
being liberated from the egoism of the state or race, expanding it to the entirety of
the human race, and thus standing on a perspective of brotherly love for all hu-
manity, while still paying due respect to the particularity of all nations and rac-
es. . . .54 (underlines supplied)

The notion of All Mankind speaks of the expansion of the deepening notion of

the formless self to the width of the entirety of mankind. This expansion is reflected in

the Vow of Humankind in the notions of compassion and cooperation in “joining

hands.”

An essential element in Hisamatsu’s discussion is the insight that as we deepen

our notion of selfhood (as for instance in Abe Masao’s notion of breaking through to the

stages of No Self and True Self), we stand on a ground of a more pervasive relation

with the rest of mankind and reality. As we reckon with the notions of Ultimate An-

54
Ibid.
 161

tinomy, for instance, and contemplate the crisis that besets us as individuals, we draw a

sense of unity in suffering with the rest of mankind. On the ground of our antinomy as

mortals, we acquire a deeper sense of relation with our fellow human beings. And as we

go deeper into the openness that we call “self,” we awaken to a ground of pure openness,

where mankind is one with reality itself.

Hence the movement of our ownmost metanoia from the they-ego-will to True

Self is inseparable from truly reckoning with the other. Heidegger’s parallel notion of

authentic resoluteness in Being and Time can be accused of being excessively individu-

alistic and self-centered, with the discourse of the ownmost and emancipation from the

they. But it is important to note that he is compelled to mention the rest of human socie-

ty when he contends with the idea of one’s personal quest for authentic existence. Ego-

tism and the movement of the will to will is not a purely private phenomenon but a pub-

lic one, one that arises from a community of thinkers, and can pervade in an age of

modern technology as the overarching culture of challenging.

Hence, inseparable from one’s private emancipation is the emancipation from

societal modes of egotism and the they-self. But Hisamatsu takes it further, saying that

no private emancipation is complete until the very they from whom the they-self learns

its infidelity is emancipated from its self-enclosure.

Apart from the inseparability of private and public emancipation, the notion of

All Mankind thought from the point of view of infinite depth points to a need to reas-

sess the conception of the notions of suffering and injustice. Oftentimes, societal prob-
 162

lems are seen from merely a topical, technological angle—from the level of the actual.

But as the self awakens to the depth of its formlessness, we find a deeper, ontological

root to the actual and practical problems that beset society. Hence the genuine and sus-

tained alleviation of the problems of society, environment, and politics necessitate an

acknowledgement of the depth of the supra-actual, the realm of the ontological.

As we try to work out the problems of this age in their entirety, we contend with

the inseparability of personal and societal emancipation, and actual and supra-actual

emancipation.

Having begun to discuss the notion of ages and epochs, we are led to the notion

of expansion in the realm of history.

The Length of Suprahistorical History

Hisamatsu continues:

Length, the direct meaning of which is chronological, of course includes the spa-
tial extension as well. Length, then, means forming history on the basis of the oth-
er two dimensions of man’s being. Therefore, this kind of length comes to have a
different meaning than history in the ordinary sense of the term, because it is
length which issues from the first and the second perspective, depth and width. In
other words—speaking from the point of the self—the self reaches to its depths,
from out of which it moves in width or extension. It is this kind of extension, as
extensive as to cover the whole of humankind which forms history, that I mean by
length. To summarize then, length means living the life of history while trans-
cending history.55 (underlines supplied)

55
Ibid.
 163

The notion of Suprahistorical History speaks of the broadening, from the aspect

of depth, of the formless self toward the entirety of the history of man. As we contem-

plate upon our ultimate antinomy and descend into the depths of true selfhood, having

found that our antinomy is not merely a private phenomenon but one that mankind as a

whole shares, we find ourselves compelled to think of the problem of history [Geschich-

te].

History is often seen as merely a narrative of the unfolding of events as they are

grasped from various points of view of mankind. This is merely the actual view of his-

tory—history seen from a vantage point devoid of the depth of ontological fidelity. Be-

neath the chronology of events is an encounter between mankind as a whole and reality

itself. Perhaps it is helpful here to turn to Heidegger’s notion of destining [Geschick].

Heidegger speaks of enframing [Ge-stell] as an ordaining of destining. Enfram-

ing is not merely the discrete event of the hegemony of challenging [Herausfordern] as

a mode of revealing. This pervasiveness of challenging that presents itself here as the

Age of Technology belongs to a greater current, the movement of destining in the very

“history” of the relationship between humankind and Being. As mortals engage Being

in the field of time, man learns—first to abstract, to conceptualize and to reason (meta-

physics), which in turn paves the way for learning to prove, to predict (exact science),

and then to control and to secure (modern technology). The age of modern technology

is part of the greater history of mortal man as he comes into relationship with Being—

an age of challenging that has been made possible by the road paved by metaphysics,
 164

exact science, systematic politics, and other glimmers of the enframing before challeng-

ing.

In thinking about the movement into and out of the age of modern technology,

Heidegger is forced to contend, not only with the depth of one man’s relationship with

reality, but with the depth of all mankind’s relationship with reality in time, in history.

Even if the age of modern technology and technological strife is overcome, if the cur-

rent of destining that has challenged man throughout history to secure himself—

religiously, intellectually, scientifically, technologically—is not surmounted, we will

merely turn toward another dark age. A truly efficacious and sustainable surmounting of

this darkness demands reckoning; delving into the very depths of the history of man’s

relationship with Being.

Only on the depth of understanding the very urges that shape man’s discourse

with reality, as expanded to the breadth of all mankind and the length of mankind’s his-

tory as a whole in relation with reality, can we truly discern the ground of all this strife:

mortality, the ultimate antinomy of the thinker who dies. When Hisamatsu speaks of

creating history suprahistorically, from the depth of the ontological fidelity of the form-

less self, perhaps he is speaking of such a thorough delving into the problem at hand in

actual history.
 165

The Unity of Awakening and Actuality

In the previous chapter, we spoke of how the surmounting of the age of modern

technology is made possible only when we look deeper than the gadgets, deeper than

the lifestyle, deeper than the mode of revealing, into the very antinomy that drives man

to this age. The depths from which this problem is buoyed up necessitates a thorough

conversion in the very mode by which humanity stands before reality, metanoia.

In this chapter, we began seeking how then to tie the private, personal conver-

sion and turning that occurs in awakening to the true and formless self, together with the

practical concerns of modern technology. In the Vow of Humankind as the incarnation

of the spirit of the Gakudo/FAS Society, we saw a three-dimensional approach to awak-

ening. We saw that awakening to true self is inseparable from awakening to the stand-

point of the self-emancipation of all humankind and all history. Hence, just as the sur-

mounting of modern technological strife is rooted in metanoia, so too is the movement

of metanoia inseparable from a compassionate embracing and an actual engagement of

the practical problems of the age of technology. In awakening to true self, in this world

of actual and practical concerns, we endeavor to join hands with all of mankind, and in

our differences as individuals and nations, strive to creatively revitalize our world to-

ward emancipation, truth, and abundance of the happening of life—from the standpoint

of the will that has emptied itself of its willful refusal of death and has returned, in pious

fidelity, to the abundance of the will of Being.

 166

CONCLUSION

Recapitulation

In this age of modern technology, as the world strives toward progress in a civi-

lization that rests on industry and productivity, we find ourselves entangled in a plethora

of problems. Wars are fought over land, resources, culture, political leverage, etc. These

wars, fought with implements far more destructive then has ever been conceived, sow

terror into the hearts of men. Globalization, with its burgeoning economic pressures,

forces various cultures to run headlong into one another. The environment totters on the

edge of collapse, with global warming and widespread pollution becoming a global

problem. Psychologically, more and more problems surface—from the industry of phy-

sique aesthetics, fashion and cosmetics, from economic pressures, alienation, religious

uncertainty, and so on. We find ourselves deeply mired in technological strife. Is there a

way out of this madness? Where is this way out attested to? How can we work toward a

surmounting of the strife of this age?

In the first chapter, we delved into the problems of the age of modern technolo-

gy by asking ourselves: what is modern technology, really? In so doing, we found a

more fundamental problem in technology beneath all the practical problems of techno-

logical strife. We found the problem of truth, of how things are no longer seen as they

are and instead are merely challenged as resource. It is from the ground of this degener-
 167

ation and blight that the practical strangulations come forth to entwine this age of tech-

nology. But from whence does this problem of truth emanate, this challenging to stand-

ing-reserve?

We found that towering over reality that leads to the plethora of problems in this

age is rooted in how man stands as will to will, as the ego that asserts its existence in

earnest refusal of death. But this will is rooted in the Will of Being—man’s movement

to challenge all reality to the inventory of the standing reserve is rooted in the very rela-

tionship between man and Being. Hence in order to surmount the ground from which

the problems arise, we found the need to delve deep into man’s very selfhood and his

relationship with reality itself.

In the second chapter, we attested to the need for a conversion in man’s very

selfhood by turning to his most intimate experience of technological strife, an experi-

ence captured in Hisamatsu’s notion of ultimate antinomy. On the ground of modern

technology in the will to will lies a self-involution that wills its will and nothing else. In

holding on to itself, the will to will clings to the standpoint of reason and the standpoint

of existence, in opposition to the absurdity of the irrational and the imminent possibility

of non-existence. In the one-sidedness of its self-assertion, the will to will violently

rends the world asunder and splits it in twain: on one hand, what is valued, desired, and

sought for (the selfsame), and on the other hand, what is spurned, feared, and flown

from (the Nothing). This dualism that splits reality in two is what results in ultimate an-
 168

tinomy: the anguish and suffering as man engages a reality, constantly torn as to wheth-

er he is to fly toward it or to flee from it.

The need to overcome the anguish of this split existence through a conversion in

man’s very selfhood is experientially attested to by the phenomenon of conscience. Un-

derstanding anguish of ultimate antinomy as guilt, we turned to Heidegger’s discussion

of conscience. There we saw that suffering arises from our failure to be most authenti-

cally ourselves, in our existence as a nullity, as they-self, as the ego-will that clings to

itself. Hence, the overcoming of technological strife from the very ground from which it

emanates will require that we not only practically concern ourselves with technological

problems, but turn the very ground from which the strife emerges through a metanoia, a

conversion toward a more authentic mode of being ourselves.

In the third chapter, we outlined the possibility of this metanoia. We turned to

the story of the enlightenment of sixth patriarch Hui-neng through the lens of Abe’s

three stages of selfhood. The self-assertive will to will was considered as analogous to

the self in the first stage (ego-self) that clings to life and reason. The first task on the

way to metanoia is accepting the side of reality that is turned away from life and reason,

the side of death and the irrational. This brings man to the second stage (no-self), akin

to Heidegger’s notion of Angst, where man accepts the finitude of his grasp and exist-

ence. But the stage of no-self is rank with the failure to dwell in the world. It accepts

death and the irrational at the price of being unable to see any positivity in life and rea-

son. Hence there is a need for a second negation, where instead of accepting emptiness
 169

as something that disparages and devalues our existence, we see emptiness, the bottom-

less depth of happening and dialogue between man and reality, as the innermost ground

of the self.

Having discussed the notion of True Self, we turned back to Heidegger’s notion

of phenomenological ontology. We sought to ground this departure to existential con-

version in the rootedness of technological strife in the crisis in how man stands before

the world. The need to restore the standing reserve to the abundance of its being de-

mands fidelity to reality as it is—fidelity sought in Heidegger’s understanding of phe-

nomenological ontology. However, fidelity to beings in their Being is impossible with-

out turning man from his forgetfulness of Being that arises from mankind’s flight from

death. Given such a demand, no superficial approach short of a complete conversion of

selfhood suffices to restore the standing-reserve to the abundance of their Being. And it

is only on the ground of a fidelity to beings in their Being that we can hope to truly and

efficaciously surmount the age of modern technology.

In the fourth chapter, we discussed Hisamatsu’s approach to engaging practical

problems in the age of technology from the ground of awakening to true self. We saw

that the FAS Society is guided by a three-dimensional approach to awakening, where

the depth of the true Formless self that is faithful to the happening of reality is com-

bined with the breadth of the standpoint of All mankind and the length of Suprahistori-

cal history. While, in the third chapter, we had contended with the deepening of self-

hood in metanoia toward True Self, we saw in the fourth chapter how Hisamatsu’s in-
 170

troduction of breadth and length in awakening revealed the compassionate and expan-

sive movement of True Self. The very movement toward self-awakening was shown to

be inseparable from reaching out to one’s fellow man, on the ground of man’s suffering

in this age of self-assertion, discerning as the whole of mankind, and working to bear

man beyond the vain fate of his self-willing toward a genuine surmounting of the age of

modern technology and its manifold strife.

Conclusion

So long as man is mortal, such that he remains embroiled between the antinomy

of finite reason and the antinomy of finite existence, man will suffer. Along the path to

extricating himself from such anguish, it is perhaps inevitable that suffering spur forth

the agitated self-assertion of the will to will. But as the will to will grows in its assertion,

and as assertion spreads and pervades the world of men, the world is led into darkness

and desolation.

This age of modern technology and the strife wrought by people upon the Earth,

people upon people, people upon reality as they secure the world and bind it as resource,

is but one age of darkness. For the sun to dawn on each age of darkness, there must be

those who attend—those who attend to suffering, those who attend to the will to will,

those who attend to the long forgotten wholeness of the One.

One such man whispers (a whisper long since hushed). Heraclitus of Ephesus

says:
 171

ἶνα ὰ ἓν ὸ όν, ἐ ί α α νώµ ν, ὁ ἐ ϐ ν ν α ὰ ν ων.

Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered
through all things.56

One thousand seven hundred years after, from halfway around the world came a

reply. Of this wisdom [ όν] Dōgen Zenji says:

To learn the Buddha’s truth is to learn ourselves. To learn ourselves is to forget

ourselves. To forget ourselves is to be experienced by the myriad dharmas. To be
experienced by the myriad dharmas is to let our own body-and-mind, and the
body-and-mind of the external world, fall away.57

Recommendations

Delving into the question concerning the surmounting of the age of modern

technology led us through many dimensions of human existence: history, society, per-

son, and the innermost core where man touches Being itself. Given the multi-

dimensional nature of the question, there are vast possibilities for the expansion and

deepening of this thesis. We shall enumerate several of them.

56
Heraclitus, 139 Fragments, trans. John Burnet (1912), [article on-line]; Available from:
http://philoctetes.free.fr/heraclite.pdf; accessed 1 February 2007.

Heidegger’s translation readsμ “Eines das einzig Eine ist das Wissende (und Wissen heißt) vor
der γ ώ η stehend verweilen, die steuert alles durch alles hindurch.” “One, the only one, is the knowing
one (and knowing means) to stand and dwell in front of the γ ώ η, which steers everything throughout all
[that is].”

From Heidegger on Heraclitus: A New Reading, ed. Kenneth Maly and Parvis Emad (Queenston,
Ontario: The Edwillin Mellen Press, 1986), 30.
57
Dogen Zenji, “Genjo-Koanμ The Realized Universe,” in Master Dogen’s Shobogenzo Book 1,
trans. Nishijima Gudo Wafu and Chodo Cross (London: Windbell, 1994), 34.
 172

1) Hisamatsu Shin’ichi’s idea behind the FAS Society and the Vow of Humankind

is an important one for it straddles a very important middle ground where few

Buddhist scholars dare to tread—the ground between awakening and the practi-

cal task of world-transformation. The single chapter devoted to briefly sketching

Hisamatsu’s approach is hardly sufficient to account for the depth and breadth of

Hisamatsu’s religious insight that fuels the concrete manifestation of his lifelong

task of compassionately engaging his fellow men. Such a field—applying per-

sonal metanoia to societal and global revitalization—is worth studying, be it

through the lens of Hisamatsu’s work, or even Martin Heidegger’s.

2) Hisamatsu Shin’ichi’s idea of “plural enlightenment,” that is the enlightenment

not only of individuals but of societies, epochs, and all of human history—over

and above the enlightenment of the individuals in such societies, epochs and

human history—is uniquely stressed in the field of Zen Studies. The possibility

of plural egotism, plural despair and plural enlightenment are worthy of strong

theoretical and religious consideration.

3) Martin Heidegger’s notion of destining [Geschick] that ordains enframing plays

a key but underplayed role in this essay. It is worth pursuing an analysis of the

notion of destining as the historical unfolding of man’s relationship with Being,

in relation to death and mortality. It is important to clarify the possibility of

freedom from the constraint of destining through authenticity as that which

makes possible enlightenment, poesy, and even Heidegger’s own anamnesis.

 173

4) The problem of the “desolate middle point,” showed itself in this essay with the

discussions on guilt, Angst, no-self, and the desolation of modern technology it-

self. Why is it necessary for the ego-self to first endure the first negation and en-

ter the stage of despair in no-self before entering the final stage of true selfhood?

Why is it necessary for man to first will himself into the darkness of oblivion be-

fore he realizes that abundance is ultimately lost in willful regulation and secur-

ing? It would be helpful to study further the role played by the despair between

naive optimism and fidelity to reality.

5) A significant expansion may occur for this thesis by way of an inclusion of sev-

eral key notions: First, Martin Heidegger’s notions of releasement and medita-

tive thinking, Second, Nishitani Keiji’s conception of technology (from whence

stems Abe’s), and Third, Tanabe Hajime’s conception of metanoetics. These

three (sets of) notions are already alluded to in or seminal with respect to many

of the key notions of this thesis, and the inclusion of such, while greatly expand-

ing the scope, may greatly strengthen the argument contained herein.
 174

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