9 BALANCE OF POWER _feveegty isthe mast 1 which thesis of mado stato Meat the precept of the alae of ower the wind hick “ines the esse oer he stormy ses of neratonal politics. The sre ecame the central concept of rationtood and of “Peat! ne, The ater has econ the mt portant single (ft of pla action in the international are. FL Schuman “Ager yng the concept of pour! and ts oe in the sphere of Trerratlonal poli, we take up the doctrine of lance of power ‘Gat has cota Benildering a8 wel a emotona overtones Tis {sed ina very loose a well aso alte prise way forthe reason ‘Gat poe nine the aor determinants of tteratonal poll Ibeniviou, Regardless of the fact that this term has diverse Interpretations making te devold of send character ook atthe (iplomate history ofthe yor reveals ths astonishing fact that ‘nos invoke ether fo ust thal alm of aintaning the state ‘tpl in the mame of preserving ntemational tangy oF {bctndarn the action of ober inthe name ofviaing the condions ff peace and harmony in intestate relations, AS a result, this Important term of world politics is often misunderstood | and ‘appli to acme ts danger tobe avelded 0 others itis a Seka etal Plc: Mew York: McGraw Hill Co, 1958), Maes. 97 2. Chem Had, A Set Hier of Intention Af, 120-1939 (Canes Ono ni Pe 600. Talend, ho a hi {ive ed voted ar cel bat male Notion end anc dominant onthe coningnt of Ecope spe ofthe lace of Balance of Power 298 tude of action fo be followed and condition to be sought.” Balance of Power: Nature, Implications, Characteristics and Asnumptone “Ree Daance of power has been in ase sine ance tines inh spre fara and neal polis. wa ted by a a sepa of wlan aang Majory ofthe Sates eer Tuner tines it fequeny ued bythe atesmen St dutai: anc, Austra Hungary Spain Prussia and Rusia, The sree Rinarcan eaders weed tin ropect of thls dames poli Sten bse ont dactine of Separation of powes and cece Pe ounces wel ay the rations of ter country wl Thome weep Wiser hemisphere t remained the hallark of European aie tar more hana hundred years after the Viewaseterent Sets Grin pursued iil te outbreak ofthe Second Gret War S280. Ever It the period following the Second World War, SE2F i relation foe balance of tor’ yell as in he context SP ttn sehen ented oth the power vacuu” are. SOLSPER Tenover ns term refers to something about the 1Ssiee sergio the navi, group, states and the Ike for the purpoe maintaining 2 sate of eguilvtum conducive to the Fer sezeinimoth htt nd eons he among Unmselves by which Europe seks fo ober {8 That he Sights aed postions of Power shall not be stacked Uy one or several ober Powers 9 a race de os al ver tin doe cup Tat he ombiation adopted shall ender rptue of the ‘itl der and oe rally f Europe ie or 9. CP. Slicer, Intemational Relations: Coapertion end Conf {Ergiewod Ci, New Jersey Pree Hall, 950, p38 Hlee we fnay hte the abseration of RD. Mantes: The regulators of ‘Rtrationalntcourc are he deste of rages fr rer and ‘Ber mal fur of confi and a conseqenees. Ton seapped of Als shri the tlanc of power provides policymakers Wh te Stanatves of ether ring warer eaching scope steers © tha apts deough nepssatons Informally te sbence of Being {ed enorenable ue, the rest an theo of viene so mee ttseling dope, nd te sens of ivan ave prompted ‘ome arly View the balance of power ae primitive poe {yiien.” Retro in paper “World Totes sz 2 Pimtve Peal System” in Weld ola Fenson Ye Jy, 196, pp. S956. Scanned with CamScanneree 308 Balance of Power (d) conscious but uncontrolle sovereign political actors world resources and values; and (e). an implicit understanding among the rulers of great powers that the perpetuation of the existing power distribution nefits them mutually. say stated, the term ‘balance of power’ has ‘several thousand possible meanings’ all hinging on the fact of ‘equilibrium’ of the ie type represented by a pair of scales.” When the weights in the scales “Applied to a world of sovereign are equal, the result is the balance. ; states, uncontrolled by effective supranational agencies, the concept assumes that through shifting alliances and countervailing pressures no one power ‘or combination of powers will be allowed to grow so strong, as to threaten the security of the rest.”* A leading writer like Georg Schwarzenberger defines it as an equilibrium or a certain amount of stability in international relations that, under favourable conditions, is produced by an alliance of states or by other devices. He goes to the point of asserting that the balance of power “is of universal application wherever a number of sovereign and armed states co-exist.”? Likewise, Fay asserts: “Balance of power_means such a jus ilibrium_i r ng the members of the famil. uch a just equilibrium _in power among the members of the family of nations as will prevent any one of them from becoming sufficiently strong, to-enforce.its will upor ne = irrespective of the fact that the term ‘balance of power’ has diverse and even: mutually exclusive connotations, Palmer and d competition and conflict among for what are perceived as scarce 7. See AF. Pollard, “The. Balance of Power” in Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs, London, Vol. U1, Me 1923, 7 51-64, 2 8 N.D. Palmer and, H.C. Perkins, International Relations: The World Community in Transition (Caleta: Scientific Book Agency, 1965), p. 243 Scuvarcecberger Power Politics (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, 10. SB, Fay: “Balance of Power” in Encyclopaedi ial Scie ) lopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1997), Vol. I, p. 395. According to Casteleagh it means fe pamenance of such a just equilibrium between the members of the family of rations as shall prevent anyone of them becoming sufficjently ae leper al por the rest.” To Quincy Wright, it is a system od to us conviction in any state that if it attempts of her (oh i sor Unventir ar aa invincible combisation of others A Stedy V : University of Chicago Pr eA cago Press, 1942), Vol. 1, p. 254. For insane, Morgenthau says that in a study of politics ener nations, the emearince of power is used in four diferent senses: (a) 38a policy aimed serena aba, @)as an actual state of affairs, (c) as an approximately of power, and (d) as any distribution of power. Op. cit, - Scanned with CamScanner304 International Relations and Politics Perkins present a synthesised view by throwing light on its following essential characteristics: 1. As the term itself suggests equilibrium or balance, almost the only certain thing about history is that it is subject to constant, ceaseless change, shifting political patterns and power relationships—in short, to disequilibrium. 2. It is established by the active intervention of man. The states cannot afford to wait until it happens, they may go to war to preserve the’balance. Thus, it is a case of diplomatic contrivance, not a: matter of historical: causation. Though balance of power desires a status quo to be i maintained, a policy which regards the forces making: for change is doomed to- eventual failure. To. be effective, a balance of power policy must ‘be-changing and dynamic. | 4 A teal balance of power can seldom exist, and it proba ly : would not be recognised if it did exist as such. The only real test; presumably, is:that of war, and-resorting to. war not only upsets the balance but also.creates the very conditions which a balance of power policy is supposedly designed to * prevent. 5. It offers both a subjective and: an: objective: approach. The | State.of balance is coextensive wittr the “INCEST OF the count e i < Hence, nations which play the balance of power. game sae ; OC, ntea balanst=Dut an inbalance a er oe Sa Se . ‘é ‘balance of power seems 107 ea is-suitable neither for democracies ‘nor for dictatorships. Unless , Beographical; political; military and other considerations are | peculiarly favourable, a democracy is a reluctant player and a poor leader in the: balance of power game. It is concerned with power politics only in pea isi Soncemed Vit Pp only in petiods of crisis, On a ’ @ dictatorship is usually interested in 3. P- 167 n 1. Emest B. Haas calls this concept ‘too va; havi exclusive versions: (a) equilibrium resulting fen enol Secntaaty St power among nation-states, (b) equilibritim resulting from wrequal mi aon of Power among nation-states, (c) equilibrium resultiny fom ee fominion Of one nation-state, (d).a system providing for and Wann i Pete Peace, @a system characterised by: instability ! Sawa i &r way of saying power politics, (g) a universal law pond (h) a, guide for policy-makers. “The Balance of Power: Pt or Propaganda” in World Politics, Vol § (uly, Op. cit, pp. 243-45, * ‘ Scanned with CamScannerBalance of Power dominating the continent, in establishing rules to suit its own convenience and in gathering all the rewards:) 7. The balance of power game is obviously one for the great states of the world. Although small or smaller states are vitally concerned in the outcome, they are more often victims, or at best spectators, rather than players. Apart from looking into these characteristics of the balance of power, let us also examine its major underlying assumptions regardless of the fact. that while some of them are obviously valid, others are questionable. These are:'* 1. The states are determined to protect their vital interests, rights and privileges by all means at their disposal, whether peaceful or violent. It is up to each state to decide for itself which of its rights and interests are vital. These commonly include such values as territorial integrity, independence, security, preservation of the domestic, economic and political and social systems, protection of certain rights and the like. Complete self-abnegation is extremely rare, if it ever occurs * at all. 2. ‘The vital interests of the states are, or may be, threatened and it implies every state to keep itself concerned with power relationships. 3. The balance of power will either deter the threatening state froma ‘ck or permit the victim to avoid defeat if'an attack should occur. It is assumed that the states are ‘ noflikely to attack uriless they command a preponderance Ae of power, or if they do not attack, they cannot win.,An i aggressive state may think that it possesses a preponderance ‘ of power only to be proved wrong; or an aggressive state, facing uncertain power relationships, may simply take a gamble on war hoping that the distribution of power ‘will turn out to be in its favour. 4. Relative power positions can be measured with a significant degree of accuracy and these power relationships can be projected into the future. The calculation of power is a complex problem; some of the elements are quite intangible ! and therefore difficult to assess. Nevertheless, if the states are determined to preserve their vital interests and if those interests are in any danger of attack, power calculations t 13. Vernon Van Dyke, International Politics (New York: Appleton-Century- Crofts, 1957), pp. 201-2. Scanned with CamScannerBalance of Power 307 must perforce be made. ‘There is a real choice. Without a calculation or a guess, the states would have no basis for deciding about proportion of their resources to be allocated to an armed establishment and military preparations. It is always better to have decisions made by those who know as much as can be known about the other elements which affect the power positions of the states. 5, The statesmen can and will make foreign policy decisions intelligently on the basis of power considerations. If this were not possible, the deliberate balancing of power could not occur. In short, though it is true that the schemes for defining the balance of power are often themselves intricate, depending upon how precisely and definitely the idea is delineated, a fairly plausible interpretation involves its three’ salient manifestations. First, it designates an exact equality of power_among nations, a power equilibrium among them so ‘that no one has or can become dominant~ @ Second, it means that where there are three OF) 2) cides ave approximately Equal in power, leaving the. third state to act 4S balancer’ between them by adding its power to one side or the other in order to prevent dominanc ce by the other side. Tast, paradoxically, it can also refer to the hegemony, to the idea that it is favourable to one state, giving it a greater or lesser degree of dominance over other states.’ When nations have a lust for gathering power arid manifesting it at different intervals and when by such activities they endeavour to disturb or overthrow the Status quo, it necessarily leads to a sort of configuration. Realising that in the absence of any common and impartial agency to interpret international law and supervise international relations, the states cultivate anxiety not only to increase their own authority but, if possible, to prevent any increase in the 14. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr. Nations in a Multipolar World (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 44-45. With a view to substantiate his point, he refers to a recent instance of international relations. If the Americans say that the attempt of the USSR to introduce missiles into Cuba in 1961-62 had upset the balance of power in the Western hemispHere, and perhaps globally, what is meant is that before this Soviet gambit, the distribution of power was deemed favourable to the United States (eg, its power was largely dominant in the Western hemisphere) and that the Kremlin threatened to change this fact. The ‘balance’ which the United States was determined to preserve was one which, in the official American view, was more favourable to it than to its diplomatic enemies. Ibid., p. 45. Scanned with CamScannerInternational Relations and Politics 308 thority of others. The instinct of self-preservation Operates to fake a dee ower in order to secure itself against any possible a ail opposing states, it becomes essential that alliances ond counter allinies be formed through “_ oe Chay or may seek to ensure the needed support in eae, i . In pursuance of this, nations folloy policy aaa ae oth preserve peace but simply to manent the independence of each unit of a state system by Lite fing any unit from so increasing its power as to threaten the rest. ture, Purpose and Devices oe ae me balance of power is based on the principle of equilibrium. As this equilibrium operates in the fields of nature, science, + Me economics and the like, Politics is.no. exception. However, jm the sphere of intemations own, In ie direction, i gina system here it is different from the balance existing in the world of nature inasmuch as, unlike the latter, it is disturbed and re-established at \ |" _various’ stages of historical development. In nature it is static, in y Politics itis dynamic. That is, it changes and assumes newer forme * + with. the onward, march. of world history, Whenever a particular situation of the balance is tudely shaken either by the intervention of an outside force or by a change in one or some elements it, it leads to serious endeavours aimed either at the restoration of the old balance.or the establishment of a new one as far as congenial to the interests of the major power or Powers. For instance, after the composing cit, p. 70. We may refer to the observati f Spykman at this stage who said "Th, eines ykman 3 ere are many instances in histor which show great and’ powerfiil States creating ‘alliances and ength. States are always engaged tate. The truth of the matter ic that alance (imbalance) which is in their in being just as strong as a potential being a little stronger. There is no th is fully checked; there is a chance if mae isa Margin of force which n be freely used, wove eoty: the rationalisation, the practical jective is the constarit improvementof the state's own relative power a ice) desired is the one which Neutralises idee saving the homie state free to be the deciding force and j organisations to limit their own str in curbing the force of some other s the states are interested only in a bi favour. There is no Teal security ij Scanned with CamScannerBalance of Power yer" Aygo ot 77302. defeat of Germany in the First World War, Britain opposed French designs for total suppression of Germany and, after a couple of years, she gave doses of strength so that Germany could revive as a power eventually to act as a check against the increasing power of France. Thus, the balance of power is essentially a pincess far the division of power, availabl i. jn..their.external lations among themselves. It “is a process of reducing state power by confronting it with state power from without." Then, the oper: and international _levels. Since the dome: ti J|_as international political systems desire to fulfil the same function for the sake of their_own preservation as well as for the autonomy of their constituent elements, and since both live under the weight of the caer conatmaints and are amenable to a state of disequilibrium leading to the restoration or re-establishment of the shaken or destroyed balance, it is inferable that this term has its application at both the levels with a line of difference in the means of employment and degrees of emphasis. However, a point of fundamental distinction between the two is that while in matters of domestic politics the balance has a stronger stability owing to the presence of a strong central authority, it is lacking in the international sphere as there is no such effective controlling system. That is, while on the national plane-a strong, central authority maintains a relatively stable framework and by its effective mechanism may arrest any disintegrating element, in the international field the consensus ig too weak and thus the freedom of the componenitelements depends for a much greater degree upon the operation of the balance of power.” Tt may, therefore, be pointed out that the concept of the balance 4 of power is based on the assumption that power, even though it may have been acquired as a means of protection, becoriies a rhenace to’ internationa! ace aS SOON AS a State possessing 16. See AP. Rana, “The Nature of India’s Foreign Policy” in India Quarterly, New Delhi, Vol. XXII, No. 2, p. 105. 17: Morgenthau well says that the international balance of power is only a particular manifestation of a general social principle for which all societies composed of a number of autonomous units over the autonomy of their component parts, that the balance of power and policies aiming at its preservation are not only inevitable but an essential stabilising factor in a society of sovereign nations; and that the instability of the international balance of power is not due to the faultiness of the principle but to the particular conditions under which the Principle must operate in a society of sovereign nations. Op. cit., p. 167. Scanned with CamScanner310 International Relations and Politics stronger than any possible foe. The guiding consideration behind it is that if any state acquires a predominant position in the community of nations, it would be a distinct menace to the interests and well- being of the rest of the world. Hence, the states follow a policy of . maintaining a situation of relative stability by several devices causing favourable conditions and effecting a certain amount of stability in the international sphere. This situation is described as the balance of power. It is also taken into consideration that if power is out of balance, it may be brought into the state of equilibrium by decreasing the power of the stronger units, or by increasing that of the weaker ones, or by making a combination of both. Hence, certain devices have been invented and practised to implement the principle of the balance: of power. These are: “"T. (Ditect‘ Confrontation) The state adhering to the policy of the alance. of power sticks to the course of establishing its superion might over others so as to. keep the opponent in a condition-of submission. But when:the other side refuses to accept the position of.vielding to the wishes of the ‘state following thé policy of precarious relationship, it inevitably leads to'the state of direct’confrontation. The peace is broken, war-comes to decide the matter-in question. For instance, whén the Austro-Hungarian empire attacked the small state of Serbia i.1914, Russia came tothe help of the latter and then France’ followed suit: Likewise, when in 1939 Hitler attacked Poland, France: declared war against Germany and. Though ‘intervention is a nebul with"emotions, the history of the world is fae ed instances when major power has adopted this device so as fo preserve the state of equilibrium of change may alSO adopt the FOr OF non-in intervened in Greece and Jordan, the then USSR did it i yi R did it in the aa of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the United State: sal Several statesof South-East Asia, Latin Aiistica and the Middle-East. One may say that in all such’ ce a is doubth Feat he Bieat powers was seeking a ce of power, it is true tha iv all’such-cases-power Scanned with CamScannerBalance of Power motivations were dominant and their ultimate aim w. “Offset the Situation Of war and create a s situation of balance Tor imbalance) in their own favour. : 3. (Alliances “and Counter-Alliancess When _a_state finds that it POuETS Alempl are, therefore; imatde to keep sacharone powers Ba 7 ee eas as \ we buffer’ or to divide such a zone amo ee es to minimise the sharpness of polilical a. e sha political rivaltiesArrexample-of Ke Se ran may be saad hers ae di ‘between Russia and Britain in 1907. It was resolved that the northem andsout em zones would remain under British and Russian spheres of influence, but in the central zone none would seek political existing situation is changed, the maj, ‘ged, the major power converts that Scanned with CamScannerBalance of Power ; buffer zone into a S| here un influe lt pet a prteeorate 28 happened in Iran. In some cases we find at a county is neutralised and the concerned powers také a pledge not to ‘attack it and also not to. take undue. benefits. from. it. The case of Belgium immediately “engages our attention at this stage. When Germany viola ted Belgian neutrality in 1914, France and Britain opposed it and shortly thereafter France concluded an alliance with Belgium. : It all demonstrates that the concept of the balance of power is one of the major principles of the statecraft. To the concerned statesmen, it is, what Sidney. B. Fay says, ‘an obvious maxim of _ common sense.’ It enjoins that every nation ought to endeavour to ‘prevent any other nation (ona combination of nations) from acquirin; for, if it fails to do so, it jeopardise: a position of political dominance, pardises” its own self-preservation. At this level attachment to the concept oF the balance of power by any nation'signifies merely its will to survive and:to remain independent'in policy formulation. In this sense, this principle *senves a8 a faridamental law of political fe, much 25.2% law. of gravity. governs the behaviour. of matter. So construed, ‘enezuela is actuate [yas much by the balance of power precept as West Germany, the Arab'states:and Israel agree on this principle, if on nothing, else. Communist and non-Communist states ‘alike subscribe to. this elementary maxim of survival.’"* Holder of the Balance: Role of the ‘Laughing Third Party’ The most tedious position of a state in the balancing process js that of the holder of the balance or that of the ‘laughing third party’, as it is sometime called.” A study of the principle of balance of power in practical terms informs us to look into the role of the super-actor. or the great balancer. Different states, whether big or small, may form alliances or counter-alliances, or some of them may adopt the strategy of playing off one against another so as to effectuate their design of divide and rule or the game of partition and compensation, but it all requires the intervention of a great balancer who may do the most tedious job of increasing or decreasing the weight of scales so to maintain the situation of equilibrium and thereby protecting its national interest. As such a role has been played by the British statesmen very tactfully and scrupulously in 18. Cecil Crabb; Jz, op. cit., p. 44. 19. ch Fatedrich Foreign Policy in the Making (New York: Norton, 1938), p. 126. Scanned with CamScanner322 International Relations and Politics bipolarity at the nuclear level of activity and multipolarity at the politico-economic and conventional military levels. The political and economic fragmentation of the international system: would prevent local wars from rapidly escalating into a major confrontation.® To sum up, we may now say that while the concept of the balance of power and its practical manifestation may assume many forms, whether realist or utopian, its effectiveness has so far rested on the assumption that participating nation-states “are led by rational leaders who constantly: strive to protect the existence of their governments:and their nation-states. As a result, they have devised techniques of diplomacy and limited war to protect their interests, and they have normally operated within the limits of prudence dictated -by the instincts of self-preservation.”“ Historical Perspective: From the Balance of Power to the Balance of Terror, . } We have’ made a passing reference to. this fact of European history that the principle. of, the. balance of power is as old as the Greeks, it was.demolished first by the imperialistic endeavours of Alexander the Great and then of the Romans..The establishment of the Greek and then of the Roman empires entailed the end of this principle. It witnessed, no. place during the middle ages when. the entire Christendom was,under the final authority of the Pope. It, however, witnessed its revival in.a very vigorous form in the. modern period. Machiavelli. xefetred to balance of power as one of the devices that a ruler, must resort to, for. implementing the:goal of taking a strong and united state. Thereafter, it became a very important principle of the statecraft at the hands of Roman, Spanish, French, English, Prussian and Russian statesmen. The alliances Francis I concluded with He VII and i tenry VIII and the Turks in order to Prevent Charles V of the Hapsburg from stabilising and expanding his empire “are the first moder examples on a grand scale of the balance of Power operating between an_alliance and one nati ers S monarchy." " nation upon establishing a universal ina kl 48: Richard N.'Rosecrance, “Bipolarity, Multipolari is Ipuracl of Conflict Resolution, Vol 10 (1968), pr oraeane pce” im House, aco a" anid International Relations (New Yorks Random ouse, 190 2), PP. 94 ff, 1D. Masters, “A Multi-Bloc Model of the (December 192m” an American Political Science Review, Vol, 5s Unthintons, 1260), pp. 782 ff. and Herman Kahn, Thinking About the inkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962) 44: Couloumbis:and Wolfe, op.cit, p21, 45. Morgenthau, Op. cit, p. 170. Scanned with CamScanner323 Balance of Power ‘The Thirty Years ‘War came to an end in 1648 and then the Pent { Westphalia firmly established the modern nation-state system. It ted to te res e mentality’ of the various ie gence of the ‘corporat autocracies valine the European countries. Now the balance of power began to play a greater role onan unprecedented scale. The statesmen of Britain and the Netherlands openly opposed the plans of French King Louis XIV (1643-1715) wh 0 wanted to upset the balance by making France as the most powerful empire of Europe. Then, the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) not only closed the matter of Spanish succession (in which a coalition led by Britain had defeated France) but expressly stated that its provision for the division of the Spanish inheritance between the Bourbons and the Hapsburgs were made a conservandum in European equilibrium. Henceforth, this expression ‘was repeated in a good number of bilateral and multilateral treaties culminating in the treaty relating to the partition of Poland in 172. Thus, the period (1713-72) “has been acclaimed as the golden age of the balance of. power in theory as well as in practice.” A significant change in this direction occurred after the French Revolution of 1789. Henceforth nationalism witnessed its powerful development. Before this, ruling circles of the major European powers found much more in common with one another than with their own people. Itresilted in the era of political and economic homogeneity to a considerable extent.” But the French Revolution intensified the wave of nationalism that assumed aggressive overtones under Napoleon’ Bonaparte. To meet the menace of French imperialism, European states entered into alliancés and they could celebrate their victory at the total defeat of France in 1815. The Congress of Vienna (1815) sought to maintain a new balance of power through the instrumentality of the Concert of Europe based on the principles of legitimacy and, as far as possible, the preservation of the status quo. 46. Palmer and Perkins, op. cit,, p. 250. 47, Carl J. Friedrich has observed that incredible as it might seem today, the theorists of the balance in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw it as.a ‘beautiful design’. It was a period in which men were seeing ‘natural balances’ everywhere; they believed in the ‘pre- established harmony of the universe’ and felt that ‘a harmonious society would result if each person pursued his own interests.’ Foreign Policy in the Making, p. 119. 48. ‘The Concert of Europe was a balance of power system where conflict was regulated and controlled by states dynamically entering into and abandoning alliances to maintain an intra-concert parity where no sovereign could retain an undue proportion of power. The story of Scanned with CamScannery 304 International Relations and Politics Prince Matternich of Austria-Hungary and Czar Alexander of Russia played a leading part in the Vienna Settlement. Thus, “a new era of the balance of power was structured.” i The nineteenth century may, then, be called the second golden age of the classical balance of power. Now the Balkan area engaged the attention of leading statesmen of Europe. Alarmed at the growing incapacity of Turkey and the rising influence of Russia in the Balkan peninsula, three countries (Britain, Prussia and Austria-Hungary) banded. together in 1854 so as to preserve the Ottoman Empire for the sake of maintaining the balance of power. For: this sake, Britain involved herself-in the Crimean. War. Later, the Berlin Congress of 1878 forced Russia to revise the Treaty‘of San Stefano that had been imposed by it on the defeated Turkey. This action of the then major European powers.‘must be explained as another attempt to prevent a great power from gaining a position of dominance in the Balkan cockpit.”54 j 7 ‘The situation changed significantly when two rival triple alliances came to have their existence:in the early phase of the present century. The Triple Entente (France, Britain-and: Russia) and Triple Alliance (Germany; Italy.and Austria-Hungary) stood like two armed camps. Deterioration: of situation could not be checked as there was no ‘balancer’, in the: field. Britain had changed its. role :to become a partner of the Triple Alliance. The First World War occurred. After the war, however, Britain once again tried to assume the role of a coer a a diplomatic practice was basically about how Central powers was achieved and maining opelanee between the round the role of the balancer and as the essential factors Preventing th 3 Mar of all against all or hopeney ; war 5 y. RS. Beal: “Thy ee ay at Intemational Politics” in K.P, Misra’ and "Beal dee lations Theory (New Delhi: Vikas, Joon 50 Congren® Albrecht-Carrie, A Diplomatic Fase, SPP. 30-31. Also , fi ir Condes of Vienna (New York, 1956) 6 TITY of Europe since the Ibid op. cit,, p. 210, 51. Palmer and Perkins, op. cit, p. 253, Scanned with CamScannerOn ruLeigit ATaIrs In March, 1935: “ foreign policy of England has been to aggressive, most dominating powe: particularly to prevent the Low Countries from falling into the hands of such a power. .. . It would have been very easy and must have been very tempting to join with the stronger and share the fruits of his conquest. However, we always took the harder course, joined with the less strong powers, made a combination among them, and thus defeated and frustrated the-Continental military tyrant whoever he was, whatever nation he held. . . . Here is the wonderful unconscious tradition of British foreign policy. . .. Observe that the policy of England takes no account of which nation it is that seeks the over-lordship of Europe: The question is not whether it is Spain or the French monarchy, or the French Empire, or the German Empire, or the Hitler regime. It has nothing to do with rulers or nations; it is concerned solely; with whoever is the strongest or the potentially. dominating tyrant: Therefore, we should not be afraid of being pro-French or anti-Gernian. If the circumstances were reversed, we could:equally be-pro-German and anti-French.”S A fundamental change in the British diplomacy occurred after the Second. World. War. Since’ Britain: lost the position of a ‘great power, she also lost the. status of the holder of the balance. In ‘the age of bipolar diplomacy of the two superpowers (the US and the then USSR),.she* preferred tobe an.ally of the former. The growth of-communisth became a common danger to all capitalist states of the world. Thus, they thought it expedient to constitute a bloc under the.stewardship of the Western superpower (US). It is well remarked: “With the final defeat of Germany.and Japan in 1945 world politics were thus dominated by the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, with Britain seeking to bind America to the defence of a-weak and demoralised Western Europe and later to act herself, if not as a mediator.in the Soviet-American tension, at least as its moderator.” ‘or four hundred years the Oppose the strongest, most r on the Continent, and Critical Appreciation The principle of the balance of power and its practice has been criticised for being uncertain, unreal and inadequate to the 56. Churchill, The Second World War: The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), Vol. I, pp. 207-8. 57. FS. Northedge: “British Foreign Policy” in his (ed.): The Foreign Policies of the Powers (London: Faber and Faber, 1968), pp. 151-52. Scanned with CamScanner330 International Relations and Politics preservation of peace and security in the international sphere for these reasons:, 1. It affords no quantitative criterion to judge the respective strength of a state, nor does it provide suitable measures to understand or recognise the real intents of other states. The adherence of the statesmen to the consideration of national self-interest often results in the Practice of secret diplomacy. Naturally, the elusive components of national power make it difficult to bring out a distinction between the friend and the foe, and in spite of this if a state sticks to the concept of the balance of power in a sincere or straightforward manner, it may suffer heavily. Thus, in 1768, Fredrick the Great tightly stated: “A similar uncertainty although every time in other form, dominates all operations of foreign policy so that great alliances have often been a result contrary to the one planned by their members.”* So said Bolingbroke: “The precise point at which the scales of power turn, like that of solstice in. either tropic, is imperceptible to common observation; and in one.case-as in the other, some Progress ‘must be made in the new direction before. the change is perceived.” 2. It very much contradicts the principle of reality. Since it aims at preventing the occurrence of a war, it also leads to the procreation of thosé conditions that eventually push things to that end. War is an evil, but sometimes it becomes a necessity and, as such, its prevention becomes disastrous That is, an endeavour. to prevent the growing might of another state produces in itself the Causes of a bigger war. Often it happens that attempts for Maintaining the status quo or preventing a bigger war for the sake of maintaining the balance of power become the causes of a global war, for the Very act of redressing the balance (or imbalance) breeds the 8erms of a greater disturbance. For instance, when in 1914 the Austro-Hungarian empire sought to redress the balance in its-favour, the result was the outbreak of the first great war. Thus, the effectiveness of the Principle of balance of Power may be much Apparent, it is not so real. For this Teason in reality, it “assumes a function that it actually does 58. See Morgenthau, op. ci 59. Ibid, NN OP: city p, 208. ni a a Scanned with CamScannerBalance of Power 331 not have and therefore tends to disguise, rationalise and justify international politics as it actually is.” 3. It proves exceedingly difficult to reconcile the principle of the balance of power with peaceful and orderly change in the international environment. Fay says that it aims “primarily to preserve peace and the status quo. Yet nations are never almost static; some are growing, others declining. Equilibrium between them is, therefore, unstable.” In the post-war period, how would the successful pursuit of the balance of power have allowed for the independence of the Arab states? Could France have simultaneously pursued the balance of power and relinquished its former position of influence and dominance in North Africa? Could Britain at the. same time adhere to the idea of the balance of power and grant independence to one African country after another? . Could both the-United States and the Soviet Union endorse : the. Organisation. of African Unity, when officials in both countries know that. the organisation may in time greatly add to Africa’s power in world affairs? This may be treated as the ‘final limitation’ inherent in the idea of the balance of power and may be in some respects its ‘gravest defect’. 4... The observance-of the principle of balance of power leaves an impression that it is like a half-way house between order and chaos in the world, the former referring to a pervasive authority, powerful enough to impose a given order of things 2 60. Ibid, p. 215. It is evident from the fact that in the early nineteenth century the nations of Europe faced one another as armed and distrustful rivals, recognising no rule of conduct except their own advantage, and entering into transitory alliances on the promptings of fear or gain. These unstable relationships among the states of Europe have received the name of the Balance of Power. This has been idealised by some as a safeguard for European peace and the protection of the world against despotism; it has been denounced by others as the cause i of the wars of Europe. It was, in truth, neither the one nor the other. i It is simply a convenient name for the way in which states act towards } one another when there is no influence to persuade them to concord, nor force-to coerce them, nor any court whose authority they are all i prepared to recognise.” See A.J. Grant and H. Temperley, Europe in $ the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (New York: Longmans Green, ; 1952), p. 2. : . 61. Sidney B. Fay, op: cit., p. 397. 62. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr, op. cit., p. 48: j Scanned with CamScannerInternational Relations and Politics upon various political actors and the latter implying political actors restrained only by the law of the woods. Thus, G.L. Dickinson in his book International Anarchy says that the balance of power “means on the one hand an equality as of two sides when an account is balanced and on the other hand an inequality as when one has a balance to one’s credit at the bank.”® The system’s lack of strong global institutions safeguards the sovereignty of participants to a greater or lesser degree. “The maintenance of each actor’s autonomy works, naturally, to the advantage of the stronger and more prosperous nation-states.“ Thus, it is the imbalance of power that “is the preserver of peace. However, this imbalance must be decisive and not marginal only.”© Above all, the balance of power is an inadequate remedy for the reason that it cannot ensure permanent peace on this earth. It is merely a temporary palliative. Sooner or later, wars break out to destroy the old and establish a new balance of power. Thus, the Concert of Europe so hopefully devised by the great statesmen ’of the nineteenth century failed to survive for long. Instead of living like a holder of the balance, Britain herself became a party to the Triple Entente and then jumped irito the first great war in 1914. Not only this, after 1930 the British statesmen twisted their policy of balance of power into the notorious course of appeasement towards the Fascist’ powers’ of Japan, Italy and Germany that ultimately led to the outbreak of the second great war in Se ~ on . See Schwarzenberger, op. cit,, p. 184, | Couloumbis and Wolfe, op. cit., p. 208, - AFK Organski, World Politics, pp. 316-38, » It may be added at this stage that some leadin, is is ti be ad s ig theorists of this tim had their divergent Notions about the usefulness of the balance of power. For instance, Richard Cobden says that it ” is a chimera. It is not a fallacy, a mistake, an im it i fot a fallacy, , posture—it is an undescrib indescribable, incomprehensible nothing; mere words, conveying e minds not ideas, but sounds like those equally barren syllabl which our ancestors tzzling themselves about Words.” Ridgeway, 1868), Vol. I, p. 25! RES a & ‘ \ Fenelon says: “The aes Sey of one may mean the ruin and subjection of I I Ours. . . . This attention to the mai kind of equality and equilibrium between nei ing aster a ighbouring states is what assures peace for alll.” Cited in Ys Op. cit, p. 396, Sidney B. Fa Scanned with CamScanner eee re RO SSPie rN ee Balance ‘of Power 333 1939. Despite the fact that the philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries thought of it as a ‘beautiful design’, it remained full of contradictions and inconsistencies even ona theoretical plane. “And it was sounder in theory than in practice. If it averted some wars, it led to greater ones.” For these pertinent reasons; the principle of the balance of power has not been appreciated as a very effective and perfect instrument to offset the fears of war. A great writer on geopolitics like N. John Spykman observes: “It is easy to balance mechanical forces, because they can be measured but there is no measuring stick for political power... . The second difficulty lies in the fact that the elements contributing to the strength are not static but dynamic; they do not stay put. A new economic development, a new material, a new weapon, a new martial spirit may produce the most profound inequality between states that only a few years before had been approximately equal. . .. Another problem which sometimes appears is the discovery that the state selected to be the ally in the opposition to the growing power has already made a deal with the opponent, and the chance for the balance has been missed. Similar unfortunate results may flow from the fact that statesmen occasionally believe in the, innocence of the statesmen.” As Schuman says: “In the balancing of power process, long festering fears and hatreds lead to periodical explosions of violence because the process operates haltingly and ineffectively. Any increase in the power of unsatiated states through heavier armaments or alliances creates new insecurities among the satiated and causes them to seek to redress the balance by still heavier armaments ‘or counter-alliances. But the compensatory policies seldom restore the equilibrium to its old level. They create new insecurities among the ‘have-nots’, driving them to further steps to enhance their ability to overthrow the status quo by force. The ‘haves’, moreover, are committed to ‘peace’ and are reluctant to risk conflict or meet a challenge by a war of prevention. They typically procrastinate, make excuses for inaction, and fall victims to depressing anxieties without taking decisive action until it is too-late to restore the balance. Imperial Germany after 1871 thus permitted France to re-arm and form a coalition against her, without counter-attacking until the strategic moment had long since passed. . . . But in every case 67, Palmer.arid Perkins, op. cit., p. 268. i 68. Cited in Sprout and Sprout, Foundations of International Politics (New York: D. Van Nostrand. 1962). n. 117. Scanned with CamScanner