ICESCR-Torture

Article 7 states that no person "shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment".

Arab Charter
Article 8
1. No one shall be subjected to physical or mental torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
2. The State Parties shall protect every person in their territory from being subjected to such
practices and take effective measures to prevent such acts. The practice thereof, or
participation therein, shall be regarded as a punishable offense. Each victim of an act of
torture is entitled to a right to compensation and rehabilitation.

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Article 20

1. If the Committee receives reliable information which appears to it to contain

well-founded indications that torture is being systematically practised in the
territory of a State Party, the Committee shall invite that State Party to co-operate
in the examination of the information and to this end to submit observations with
regard to the information concerned.

2. Taking into account any observations which may have been submitted by the
State Party concerned, as well as any other relevant information available to it,
the Committee may, if it decides that this is warranted, designate one or more of
its members to make a confidential inquiry and to report to the Committee
urgently.

3. If an inquiry is made in accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, the

Committee shall seek the co-operation of the State Party concerned. In
agreement with that State Party, such an inquiry may include a visit to its
territory.

4. After examining the findings of its member or members submitted in

accordance with paragraph 2 of this article, the Commission shall transmit these
findings to the State Party concerned together with any comments or suggestions
which seem appropriate in view of the situation.

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5. All the proceedings of the Committee referred to in paragraphs I to 4 of th is
article s hall be con fidential , and at all stages of the proceedings the co-
operation of the State Party shall be sought. After such proceedings have been
completed with regard to an inquiry made in accordance with paragraph 2, the
Committee may, after consultations with the State Party concerned, decide to
include a summary account of the results of the proceedings in its annual report
made in accordance with article 24.

Article 30

1. Any dispute between two or more States Parties concerning the interpretation
or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through negotiation
shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six
months from the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are unable to
agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer
the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the
Statute of the Court.

2. Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification of this Con vention or
accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound by paragraph I of
this article. The other States Parties shall not be bound by paragraph I of this
article with respect to any State Party having made such a reservation.

3. Any State Party having made a reservation in accordance with paragraph 2 of

this article may at any time withdraw this reservation by notification to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.

CASES ON TORTURE

1. RASUL V. BUSH (2004; APPEAL TO US COURT) FOR GUANTANAMO BAY DETAINEES

TORTURE CASE

Facts of the case

Two Australians and 12 Kuwaitis were captured by the American military in Pakistan or Afghanistan
during the United States' War on Terror. The captives were transported to the American military
base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When their families learned of the arrests, they filed suit in federal
district court seeking a writ of habeas corpus that would declare the detention unconstitutional.
They claimed that the government's decision to deny the men access to attorneys and to hold them
indefinitely without access to a court violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The
government countered that the federal courts had no jurisdiction to hear the case because the
prisoners were not American citizens and were being held in territory over which the United States

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did not have sovereignty (the Guantanamo Bay base was leased from Cuba indefinitely in 1903, and
Cuba retains “ultimate sovereignty”). The district court agreed with the government, dismissing the
case because it found that it did not have jurisdiction. The US Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed the district court's decision.

Issue: Do United States courts have jurisdiction to consider legal appeals filed on behalf of foreign
citizens held by the United States military in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba?

Conclusion- 9 judge bench

Yes. In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court found that the degree of control
exercised by the United States over the Guantanamo Bay base was sufficient to trigger the
application of habeas corpus rights. Stevens, using a list of precedents stretching back to mid-17th
Century English Common Law cases, found that the right to habeas corpus can be exercised in “all ...
dominions under the sovereign's control." Because the United States exercised "complete
jurisdiction and control" over the base, the fact that ultimate sovereignty remained with Cuba was
irrelevant. Further, Stevens wrote that the right to habeas corpus is not dependent on citizenship
status. The detainees were therefore free to bring suit challenging their detention as
unconstitutional.

Outcome

Shafiq Rasul, plaintiff in Rasul v. Bush, was released from Guantanamo in March 2004, several
months before the Supreme Court handed down its decision. Shortly after the Court’s ruling,
Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA). The DTA divested the courts of
jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges by Guantánamo detainees. The Military Commissions Act of
2006 (MCA) made the DTA retroactive in order to apply to pending habeas cases. Thus, the other
Guantanamo habeas cases eventually made their way back to the Supreme Court on the question of
the constitutionality of the habeas stripping provisions of the DTA and MCA.

In the consolidated cases Boumediene v. Bush and Al-Odah v. United States, decided June 12, 2008,
the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 opinion that aliens designated enemy combatants and detained at
Guantánamo Bay, have the constitutional right to habeas corpus. Once again, the Court had ruled
that the Guantanamo prisoners could challenge their detention in federal courts.

2. BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH 553 US 723 (2008).

Facts of the case

In 2002 Lakhdar Boumediene and five other Algerian natives were seized by Bosnian police when
U.S. intelligence officers suspected their involvement in a plot to attack the U.S. embassy there. The
U.S. government classified the men as enemy combatants in the war on terror and detained them at
the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, which is located on land that the U.S. leases from Cuba.
Boumediene filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging violations of the Constitution's Due
Process Clause, various statutes and treaties, the common law, and international law. The District
Court judge granted the government's motion to have all of the claims dismissed on the ground that

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Boumediene, as an alien detained at an overseas military base, had no right to a habeas petition.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the dismissal but the Supreme Court reversed
in Rasul v. Bush, which held that the habeas statute extends to non-citizen detainees at
Guantanamo.

In 2006, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). The Act eliminates federal
courts' jurisdiction to hear habeas applications from detainees who have been designated (according
to procedures established in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005) as enemy combatants. When the
case was appealed to the D.C. Circuit for the second time, the detainees argued that the MCA did
not apply to their petitions, and that if it did, it was unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause.
The Suspension Clause reads: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."

The D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the government on both points. It cited language in the MCA
applying the law to "all cases, without exception" that pertain to aspects of detention. One of the
purposes of the MCA, according to the Circuit Court, was to overrule the Supreme Court's opinion
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which had allowed petitions like Boumediene's to go forward. The D.C.
Circuit held that the Suspension Clause only protects the writ of habeas corpus as it existed in 1789,
and that the writ would not have been understood in 1789 to apply to an overseas military base
leased from a foreign government. Constitutional rights do not apply to aliens outside of the United
States, the court held, and the leased military base in Cuba does not qualify as inside the geographic
borders of the U.S. In a rare reversal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari after initially denying
review three months earlier.

Question

1. Should the Military Commissions Act of 2006 be interpreted to strip federal courts of jurisdiction
over habeas petitions filed by foreign citizens detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba?
2. If so, is the Military Commissions Act of 2006 a violation of the Suspension Clause of the
Constitution?
3. Are the detainees at Guantanamo Bay entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment right
not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law and of the Geneva Conventions?
4. Can the detainees challenge the adequacy of judicial review provisions of the MCA before they
have sought to invoke that review?

Decision: A five-justice majority answered yes to each of these questions. The opinion, written by
Justice Anthony Kennedy, stated that if the MCA is considered valid its legislative history requires
that the detainees' cases be dismissed. However, the Court went on to state that because the
procedures laid out in the Detainee Treatment Act are not adequate substitutes for the habeas writ,
the MCA operates as an unconstitutional suspension of that writ. The detainees were not barred
from seeking habeas or invoking the Suspension Clause merely because they had been designated as
enemy combatants or held at Guantanamo Bay. The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's ruling and
found in favor of the detainees. Justice David H. Souter concurred in the judgment. Chief Justice John
G. Roberts and Justice Antonin Scalia filed separate dissenting opinions.

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 3. HAMDI V. RUMSFELD 542 US 507 (2004)

Facts of the case

In the fall of 2001, Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was detained by the United States military in
Afghanistan. He was accused of fighting for the Taliban against the U.S., declared an "enemy
combatant," and was held in Guantanamo Bay. Upon learning he was an American citizen, he was
transferred to a military prison in Virginia. Hamdi’s father, Esam Fouad Hamdi, filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus naming himself as Hamdi’s “next friend,” in an attempt to have Hamdi’s
detention declared unconstitutional. The district court granted Hamdi’s petition, and appointed the
Federal Public Defender for the Eastern District of Virginia, Frank Dunham, Jr., as counsel for the
petitioners. He argued that the government had violated Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due
Process by holding him indefinitely and not giving him access to an attorney or a trial. The
government countered that the Executive Branch had the right, during wartime, to declare people
who fight against the United States "enemy combatants" and thus restrict their access to the court
system.

The district court refused to answer the question of whether the declaration of "enemy combatant"
was sufficient to justify his detention without review of materials and criteria used in making the
determination. It ordered the government to produce these materials for a review by the court. Not
wanting to produce these materials, the government appealed. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
panel reversed, finding that the separation of powers required federal courts to practice restraint
during wartime because "the executive and legislative branches are organized to supervise the
conduct of overseas conflict in a way that the judiciary simply is not." The panel therefore found that
it should defer to the Executive Branch's "enemy combatant" determination.

Question: Did the government violate Hamdi's Fifth Amendment right to Due Process by holding him
indefinitely, without access to an attorney, based solely on an Executive Branch declaration that he
was an "enemy combatant" who fought against the United States? Does the separation of powers
doctrine require federal courts to defer to Executive Branch determinations that an American citizen
is an "enemy combatant"?

Decision

Yes and no. In an opinion backed by a four-justice plurality and partly joined by two additional
justices, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote that although Congress authorized Hamdi's detention,
Fifth Amendment due process guarantees give a citizen held in the United States as an enemy
combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decisionmaker. The plurality rejected
the government's argument that the separation-of-powers prevents the judiciary from hearing
Hamdi's challenge. Justice David H. Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, concurred with
the plurality that Hamdi had the right to challenge in court his status as an enemy combatant. Souter
and Ginsburg, however, disagreed with the plurality's view that Congress authorized Hamdi's
detention. Justice Antonin Scalia issued a dissent joined by Justice John Paul Stevens. Justice
Clarence Thomas dissented separately.

4. BARRY V. MOROCCO (CAT 2014);

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https://atlas-of-torture.org/en/entity/fls4d8t08wjy74lcslrofxbt9?page=1

The facts as submitted by the complainant

2.1 In early August 2008 the complainant, who had been expelled from Spain to his country of origin
in October 2007 after having entered the country illegally, set off by pirogue from Nouadhibou,
Mauritania, to the Canary Islands, Spain, with a group of undocumented migrants. The pirogue was
adrift for approximately 13 days, during which time some 30 persons died, their remains being
thrown into the sea. The boat was finally intercepted by the Moroccan authorities, who placed the
complainant and the approximately 40 survivors in a detention camp in Dakhla, Morocco, where
they remained for roughly 10 days.

The complaint

3.1 The complainant alleges that the Moroccan Government expelled him in a flagrantly illegal
manner by taking him to the desert border area with Mauritania without having brought him before
a court, depriving him of access to all domestic remedies to appeal his expulsion. According to the
complainant, the State party holds no official record of his detention or expulsion.

3.2 The complainant asserts that his abandonment in the desert without suitable equipment by the
Moroccan gendarmes was an intentional act by the State party authorities, because the gendarmes
were acting with the support of their superiors and the competent political authorities. The
complainant considers that these acts subjected him to pain and physical and mental suffering,
constituting at the very least cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment as defined in article 16 of the
Convention.

3.3 The complainant notes that all persons have the right to leave any country, including their own,
in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and that simply exercising this basic
right should not give rise to inhuman and degrading treatment such as that to which he was
subjected. The complainant stresses that Morocco has not signed a readmission agreement with
Senegal and, as a result, the Moroccan authorities decided simply to return him to Mauritania
without informing the Mauritanian authorities.

Decision of Committee

7.1 The Committee has considered the complaint in the light of all the information made available to
it by the parties, in accordance with article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention. The State party has
partially confirmed the facts as submitted by the complainant, although confusion regarding dates
and the number of migrants on board the intercepted boat means that it cannot be proven beyond
doubt that the State party and the complainant are referring to the same boat and group of
migrants. Given that the State party has not provided any observations on the treatment of the
complainant while the decision to expel him to Mauritania was being implemented, due weight must
be given to the complainant’s allegations. The Committee also refers to its concluding observations,
adopted following consideration of the fourth periodic report submitted by the State party, in which
it expressed its concern regarding information received that, in practice, “undocumented migrants
[had] been escorted to the border or otherwise expelled in violation of Moroccan law without having
been given the opportunity to exercise their rights. Several allegations have been made that
hundreds of migrants have been abandoned in the desert without food or water.” The facts
reported by the complainant are therefore not isolated.

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7.2 The Committee notes that, according to the complainant, Moroccan gendarmes abandoned him
and approximately 40 other undocumented migrants, some of whom were severely injured, in the
border area separating Morocco and Mauritania without adequate equipment and with minimal
supplies of food and water, and forced them to walk some 50 kilometres through an area containing
anti-personnel mines in order to reach the first inhabited areas on the Mauritanian side. The
Committee considers that the circumstances of the complainant’s expulsion by the State party
constitute the infliction of severe physical and mental suffering on the complainant by public
officials. They can therefore be considered cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as defined in
article 16 of the Convention.

8. The Committee against Torture, acting under article 22, paragraph 7, of the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, concludes that the facts
before it constitute a violation of article 16 of the Convention.

9. Pursuant to rule 118, paragraph 5, of its rules of procedure, the Committee urges the State party
to launch an impartial inquiry into the events in question for the purpose of prosecuting those
persons responsible for the treatment inflicted on the complainant, and to take measures to provide
the complainant with redress, including fair and adequate compensation. The State party is also
under an obligation to take steps to prevent similar violations occurring in the future. The
Committee asks the State party to inform it, within 90 days from the date of the transmittal of this
decision, of the steps it has taken in accordance with the above observations.

5. SONKO V SPAIN, UN DOC CAT/C/47/D/368/2008 (20 FEBRUARY 2012)

Facts

On the night of 26 September 2007, the Spanish Civil Guard intercepted four African migrants
attempting to enter the Autonomous City of Ceuta (a Spanish enclave in northern Morocco) by
swimming along the coast with the aid of a life jacket. One of these persons was Mr Lauding Sonko,
from Senegal. The Civil Guard brought the four persons into the vessel and, after taking them into
Moroccan territorial waters at a distance out from the shore, forced them into the water. The
complainant alleged that the Guard forced the asylum seekers into water out of their depth and
punctured the life jackets of the three men. Spain denied these facts. Mr Sonko clung to the vessel and
explained that he could not swim but was nonetheless forced into the water. It was disputed whether
the guards understood Mr Sonko’s protests. Seeing Mr Sonko struggling to reach the shore, a guard
entered the water to help him. Despite efforts to revive Mr Sonko, he died shortly after. The
complainant was Ms Sonko, a Senegalese national living in Spain and the sister of Mr Sonko. Ms Sonko
submitted that Spain had contravened its obligations under article 1 (prohibition on torture) and article
16 (prohibition on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment) of the Convention.

Decision

Before considering the merits of the application, the Committee dismissed Spain’s argument that the
complaint was not admissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, finding that the fact that the
national court had dismissed the case was sufficient. In considering the merits, the Committee noted

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that Spain denied that the life jackets were punctured. Despite being confronted with conflicting facts,
the Committee declined to make an assessment saying that “it is not its task to weigh the evidence or to
reassess the statements made regarding the facts or the credibility of the relevant national authorities.”
What was important was that both parties agreed that the swimmers, including Mr Sonko, were alive
when brought onto the vessel but that Mr Sonko died shortly after being brought to shore. Therefore,
“an undeniable cause-effect relationship [existed] between Mr Sonko’s death and the actions of the
Civil Guard officers”.

As a State’s jurisdiction extends to territory where the State exercises effective control, the Committee
held the Civil Guard officers were responsible for the swimmers’ safety because they exercised control
over the persons in the vessel. The Committee said that it was for Spain to explain the circumstances
surrounding Mr Sonko’s death. Further, irrespective of whether the life jackets were punctured or at
what distance from shore the swimmers were forced into the water, Mr Sonko “was placed in a
situation that caused his death.”

The Committee held that the actions of the Civil Guards were sufficient to meet the threshold of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment and were, therefore, a contravention of article 16 of the Convention.
The Committee stated, however, that this treatment and the physical and mental suffering of Mr Sonko
prior to his death did not amount to a violation of the prohibition on torture in article 1 of the
Convention. While the complainant did not contend that article 12 of the Convention had been
breached, the Committee also held that Spain failed in its “absolute” obligation under this article to
investigate the circumstances of Mr Sonko’s death. The Committee urged Spain to investigate the
events and to prosecute and punish any person responsible for Mr Sonko’s death, and provide the
complainant with adequate compensation.1

6. DMYTRO SLYUSAR V. UKRAINE (CAT 2008);

1. The complainant is Dmytro Slyusar, a citizen of Ukraine, born in 1981. He claims to be a victim of
violations of article 2, paragraph 1, and article 12 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. He is unrepresented.

The facts as presented by the complainant

2.1 On 17 April 2003, the complainant’s father disappeared under strange circumstances. Two days
before, he allegedly wrote a will whereby he was leaving all his property to his brother, Yuriy Slyusar.
On 18 April 2003, the complainant and his mother went to the police and other law-enforcement
agencies to report the disappearance; however, no actions were taken to investigate the
disappearance. Instead a criminal case was opened regarding his murder.

2.2 The complainant claims that his uncle, Yuriy Slyusar, created obstacles to the investigation of the
case, by giving false statements and instigating others to give false statements against the
complainant and his mother.

2.3 On 17 February 2006, on his way to work, the complainant was detained by three men carrying
police identification and taken to the Solomyanskiy District Police. Allegedly, they filed a report
accusing him of an administrative offence for having used inappropriate language despite their
1
https://www.hrlc.org.au/human-rights-case-summaries/sonko-v-spain-un-doc-catc47d3682008-20-february-
2012

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warnings. The complainant claims that these accusations are false. On the same day, he was taken
to the Svyatoshinskiy District Court, which sentenced him to seven days in detention. He claims that
he did not have legal assistance while in administrative detention.

2.4 The complainant submits that in fact his arrest was ordered by the Prosecutor’s Office, which
was also investigating his father’s murder. He claims that first he was kept in the Kyiv temporary
detention centre, and after two or three days, he was transferred to the Solomyanskiy Police
Department, where he was subjected to physical and psychological torture. He was severely beaten
and kept in a cell where the temperature was 4° C. He was not allowed to sleep or eat and was
threatened that his wife and mother would be harmed if he did not confess to having killed his
father. On 24 February 2006, he was again detained by the Prosecutor’s Office as a suspect for the
murder of his father and tortured again. His health deteriorated significantly and later, he was
diagnosed with hypertensive cardiovascular disorder.

2.5 The complainant appealed the decision of the Svyatoshinskiy District Court to the Kyiv Court of
Appeal, which annulled the decision and sent the case for re-examination on 4 April 2006. On 20
October 2006, a different judge of the Svyatoshinskiy District Court confirmed that the complainant
had committed an administrative offence.

2.6 The complainant submitted another appeal to the Kyiv Court of Appeal against the second
decision by the Svyatoshinskiy District Court. On 29 December 2006, it again annulled the decision of
the Svyatoshinskiy District Court and sent the case for re-examination by the same court. On 4 April
2007, the third judge of the Svyatoshinskiy District Court decided that the complainant had
committed an administrative offence and closed the case again due to the amount of time that had
elapsed. The complainant’s third appeal to the Kyiv Court of Appeal was dismissed. His appeal to the
Supreme Court was also rejected on 26 December 2007.

2.7 The complainant submits that his claims of torture are supported by a forensic medical report.
On 2 March 2006, he complained of the torture to the Prosecutor’s office, which ignored the
complaint. The lawsuit he filed with the Solomyanskiy District Court regarding the failure of the
Prosecutor’s Office to investigate his torture claims was dismissed. He appealed the decision of the
District Court to the Kyiv Court of Appeal, which partly annulled the decision of the former. Namely,
it recognized the failure by the Prosecutor’s Office to investigate his claims but did not oblige the
Office to conduct the investigation. Therefore, the complainant concludes that any domestic
remedies would have been ineffective and unavailable.

The complaint: 3. The complainant claims he was unlawfully detained and subjected to severe
torture in violation of article 2, paragraph 1, and article 12 of the Convention.

Consideration of merits

9.1 The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all information made available
to it by the parties concerned, in accordance with article 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention.

9.2 The Committee notes that the complainant has alleged a violation of article 2, paragraph 1, of
the Convention, on the grounds that the State party failed in its duty to prevent and punish acts of
torture. It also notes his allegations on the treatment he was subjected to while in detention and the
medical certificates, provided by the complainant describing the physical injuries inflicted on him as
well as the absence of legal safeguards while in administrative detention. The State party merely

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stated that there was no link between the facts established in the medical report of 28 February
2006, the report of the medical clinic of the Ministry of Interior of 4 May 2006 and the possible use
of torture against the complainant. In the absence of a detailed explanation by the State party, and
based on the documentation provided, the Committee concludes that the facts, as submitted,
constitute torture within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention, and that the State party failed
in its duty to prevent and punish acts of torture, in violation of article 2, paragraph 1, of the
Convention.

9.3 As to the allegations concerning the violation of article 12 of the Convention, the Committee
notes that according to the complainant the State party failed to investigate his claims that he was
subjected to torture while in detention. The State party has not refuted this allegation. Furthermore,
the complainant’s appeal against the inaction of the District Prosecutor’s Office has been pending for
several years, as confirmed by the State party. In the circumstances, the Committee reiterates that
article 12 of the Convention2 requires the State party to proceed to a prompt and impartial
investigation whenever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been
committed. In the absence of any other information, the Committee considers that the State party
failed to fulfil its obligations under article 12, of the Convention. The State party also failed to comply
with its obligation under article 13 of the Convention to ensure that the complainant has the right to
complain to, and to have his case promptly and impartially investigated by, its competent
authorities, as well as under article 14, to provide him, as a victim of torture, with redress and
compensation .

9.4 The Committee against Torture, acting under article 22, paragraph 7, of the Convention against
Torture and Other Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, considers that the State party
violated articles 1, 2, paragraph 1, 12, 13 and 14 of the Convention.

10. In conformity with rule 118 (former rule 112), paragraph 5, of its rules of procedure
(CAT/C/3/Rev.5), the Committee wishes to be informed, within 90 days, on the steps taken by the
State party to respond to this decision.

7. ALEXNDER GERASIMOV V. KHAZAKHASTAN (CAT 2010)

In Alexander Gerasimov v Kazakhstan, the complainant was inflicted several heavy blows to his
kidneys and was threatened with sexual violence, before he was forced to the floor with his hands
tied behind his back. Afterwards a polypropylene bag was placed over his head with which the
complainant was suffocated until he bled from his nose, ears, and from the abrasions on his face,
before he lost consciousness. The Committee clearly found that ‘this treatment can be characterized
as severe pain and suffering’ and did not add any additional reasoning or analysis.

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