Enrique Larana - New Social Movements_ From Ideology to Identity -Temple University Press (1994)

N e.
Sacta 1
Movements
From Ideology to Identity
New Social
Movements
Copyrighted Material
New
Social
Movements
From Ideology
to Identity
Edited by
Enrique Laraiia,
Hank Johnston, and
Joseph R. Gusfield
Tem ple U niversity Press

Philadelphia
Templ e Uni versit y Press, Philadelphi a 19122
Co pyri ght © 1994 by Templ e Uni versity . All right s reserved
Published 1994
Print ed in the United States of Am erica
Th e paper used in this public ation meets the minimum requirements of Am erican N ation al
Stand ard for Informati on Sciences - Perm anen ce of Paper for Print ed Libra ry M aterials,
ANSI Z39.48-1984 @
Libr ary of Cong ress C atalogin g-in -P ubli cation D ata

New social movem ents : from ideology to identity / Enrique Lara fia,
Hank Johnston , and Joseph R. Gusfield.
p. em .
Includ es index.
ISBN 1-56639-186-5 (alk. paper). - ISBN 1-56639-187-3 (alk . paper:
pbk .)
1. Social movements. 2. Social history -1 945- 3. Social
psychology . I. Lar afia, Enrique . II. John ston, Hank .
III. Gusfield, Joseph R. , 1923-
HN17 .5.N4 855 1994
303.48'4 -d c20 93-37 495
CopyrightedMaterial
Contents
Part 1
Cultur e and Identit y in Contemp or ary Social Movements
Chapter I Ident ities, Gr ievances, and New Social Movements 3

Hank john ston , Enrique Larana, and josep h R. Gusfield
Chapter 2 Culture and Social Movements 36

Doug McAdam
Chapter 3 The Reflexivity of Social Movements: Collective Behavior

and Mass Society Theory Revisited 58
joseph R. Gusfield
Chapter 4 Ideology and Utopia after Socialism 79

Ralph H. Turne r
Chapte r 5 A Strange Kind of Newness: What' s "New" in New

Social Movements? 101
Alberto Melucci
Part II
Collective A ctors in N ew Social Movements
Chapter 6 Acti vists, Authorities , and Media Framing of Drun k

D riving 133
john D. McCarthy
Chapter 7 Transient Identities?Membership Patt erns in t he Dutch

Peace Movement 168
Bert K1andermans
Chapter 8 Identity Fields: Framing Processes and the Social

Construct ion of Movement Identities 185
Scott A. Hunt , Robert D. Benford , and David A. Snow
Chapter 9 Co ntinuity and Unity in New Forms of Collective Action :

A Comparative Analysis of Student Movements 209
Enrique Larafia
Chapter 10 Conflict Networks and the Or igins of Women 's

Liberation 234
Carol Mueller
CopyrightedMaterial
C ontents
VI
Part III
Collective A ction and Identity in Changing Polit ical Contexts
Chapter II New Social Movements and Old Regional Natio nalisms 267
Hank Johnston
Chapter 12 Greens, Cabbies, and Anti -Communi sts: Co llective

Action during Regime Transition in Hungary 287
Hate SzabO
Chapter 13 Social Movements in Modern Spain: From t he Pre-C ivil
War Model to Co ntempora ry N SMs 304
Jose Alvarez-Junco
Chapter 14 The Party 's O ver-So W hat Is to Be Don e? 330

Richard Flacks
The Contri buto rs 353

Index 357
CopyrightedMaterial
Part I
Culture and Identityin

Contemporary Social
Movements
Chapter I
Identities, Grievances, and

New Social Movements
Hank Johnston
Enrique Larafia
Joseph R. Gusfield
In th e last two decad es, the em ergen ce of

new forms of collectiv e action in advan ced
industrial so cieti es stimulat ed a provoc ative and inno vative recon-
ceptualization of the meaning of social mov em ents. Its relevanc e
has been highlighted by th e proc ess of delegitimization of major
political parti es in Europe at the en d of th e 1980s, as shown in
recent electoral results th at have demonstrat ed con siderable sup-
port for new or nontraditional parti es in German y, Austria , Italy,
and France . In both Europe an d North Ameri ca, mo vem ents have
arisen that str etch the explanator y capacities of old er th eoretical
perspectiv es. Peace movements , student movem ents , the ant i-
nuclear energy protests, minority nationalism , gay rights, wom-
en' s rights, animal rights, alternative medicine , fund am entalist re-
ligious movements, and New Ag e and ecolog y mov em ents are
but a sampling of the phenomena that have en gaged th e puzzled
attention of sociologists , historians , and political scientists. What
is significant for sociologists in such developm ents is the inability
of these movements to be clearly und erstood within th e European
or American traditions of analysis . Th ey constitut e th e anomali es
of Kuhnian "normal science."
For much of this century sociological studies of so cial move-
ments have be en dominated first by theories of ideol og y and later
by theories of organization and rationality . Especially in Western
Europe, but also in the United Stat es, sociologists have focused on
the systems of ideas that movements have espoused. These have
often been described in general terms, such as socialism, capital-
ism , conservatism, communism , fascism. The probl em of the ana-
lyst has often be en that of understanding th e econo m ic or class
base of the movement or at least som e set of discr ete int er ests and
sentiments, such as social status, that characterize a group in th e
social structure. The movement could then be seen as a response
Hank Johnston, EnriqueLaraiia, andJoseph R. Gusfie ld
4
to a felt sense of injusti ce that th e ideology specified a.~d t~at
pro vid ed th e basis for mobilization . Partisanship and rnobilization
involv ed a commitm ent to the ideas and goals of th e movement
and its progr am .
Th e basic probl em of m an y analy sts was to und erstand the
process of m ovement formation by anal ysis of th e so cial structure
th at gave rise to th e ideol og y and the probl ems to w hi ch it was
addr essed. Th e focus was directed to ward groups that occupied
spe cific places in the soci al structur e from which deri ved objective
int erests and demands. Th e ninet eenth-c entur y em ph asis on labor
and capit al fit well into thi s gen eral par adi gm , from w hi ch it was
also deri ved . Labor movem ents and th e rise of new political parties
have long been the ideal-t ypical images of social mov em ents and
mobilization ; through th em , th e revolutionary actions of commu-
nism and fascism wer e furth er exam ine d.
Marxist -orient ed scholars , as well as some oth ers , have em-
phasized the class origins and inter ests of movem ents and the ideo-
logical programs accompanying them . This em ph asis on elements
of ideology, commitment, and partisan ship led to the dominance
of ideas as ideologies in understanding th e eme rgen ce of social
movements and collectiv e action . It furth ered a focus on th e strains
and conflicts in social structur e as the sourc es of mov em ent forma-
tion , dissent, and prot est activity . What it ignor ed w as th e impor-
tance of organization and the cons equ ences of org anizing into
group associations . It assumed that th e exist en ce of potential con-
flicts and strains would automaticall y generat e associations of peo-
ple to correct them.
An interest in the organizational aspects of mo vements
tapped an existing vein of th eoretical and empirical inter ests . Since
Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch ther e had been a k een inter est in
charisma and routinization through the functional and strategic
considerations of organizational ex pansion . A seri es of studies of
religious organizations focus ed on the pathos associ ated w ith loss
of an original mis sion as sects becam e churc hes. Oth ers , influ-
enced by Weber 's writings on bur eau cratic organization, h ave em -
phasized the internal chang es within the mov em ent as an organiza-
tion . In more recent years, guid ed in part by con ceptions of
rational choice , sociologists have gon e well beyond Web erian in-
sights into a focus on how collectiv e action dep end ed on the ability
Identities, Grie vances, and Ne w Social Movements
5
of associations to mobilize resources and to conduct the organiz a-
tion on the basis of planned and rational action.
As a corrective to the dominance of ideas and structural strain
in the older theories, the resource mobilization persp ective was a
welcome addition and substitution. Sociologists , especially
Charles Tilly and John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, pointed out
that there was always strain in the society and that mobilization
required both resources and a rational orientation to action. Th e
actor in movements and in protest action was not und er the sway
of sentiments, emotions , and ideologies that guided his or her
action, but rather should be understood in terms of the logic of
costs and benefits as well as opportunities for action . When dealing
with existent organized groups , as in labor unions or in the civil
rights movement, the emphasis on organization could ignore the
already existing ideologies . By treating the activities of collectiv e
actors as tactics and strategy , the analyst could examine move -
ments and countermovements as engaged in a rational game to
achieve specific interests, much like pluralist competition among
interest groups in political analysis.
This broad canvas , theoretically spanning finer conceptual
and empirical issues that have been debated for more than a cen-
tury, nevertheless constitutes the painted backdrop for two funda -
mental questions about new social movements. Why did they
create a theoretical problem for the sociologist? And what was
lacking in either of the general perspectives outlined above? Such
movements had certainly occurred in the past. Earlier this century,
witness the Young Movements of Europe (Young Germany,
Young Italy, etc .) and the temperance movements in the United
States or suffrage movements and student movements on both
sides of the Atlantic . In many ways, the student movements of the
1960s, by raising issues that were more than just "problems of
interpretation," heralded the first challenges to these classic para-
digms (Flacks 1967; Larafia 1982; Katsiaficas 1987).
The concept "new social movements" is a double-edged
sword. On one side, it has contributed to the knowledge of con-
temporary movements by focusing attention to the meaning of
morphological changes in their structure and action and by relat-
ing those changes with structural transformations in society as a
whole . These changes are the source of these movements' " nov-
elty" when compared with the model of collective action based in
Hank john ston, Enrique Laraiia, andjo seph R . Gu sfield
6
class conflict that prevailed in Europe since the industrial revolu-
tion (Melucci 1989, see also Chapter 5). On the other side, there is
a tendency to "ontologize" new social movements (Melucci 1989).
This means using the term broadly, as if it captures the "essence"
of all new forms of collective action. There is also a tendency to
give the concept more explanatory power than is empirically war -
ranted, which no doubt derives from its popularization. The con -
cept, however, refers to an approach rather than a theory; it is not
a set of general propositions that have been verified empirically
but just an attempt to identify certain common characteristics in
contemporary social movements and develop analytical tools to
study them (Melucci 1989; Laraiia 1993b) . The bundle of new so-
cial movements mentioned earlier were difficult to conceptualize
with either the imagery of the ideological movements of the past
or the rationally organized interest group.
Conceived as such, the analysis of new social movements
(NSMs) can be advanced by cross-cultural research and by con-
trasting them with movements of the past that originated in class
conflict . To this end, a good starting place is the specification of
the fundamental characteristics of NSMs . By no means do all
current movements display the following characteristics of new
social movements, nor can all current movements be designated
new. In many cases, their appearance among current movements
leads us to conceptualize them along dimensions of differences
from earlier cases of collective action and social movements.
First, NSMs do not bear a clear relation to structural roles of
the participants . There is a tendency for the social base of new
social movements to transcend class structure . The background of
participants find their most frequent structural roots in rather dif-
fuse social statuses such as youth, gender, sexual orientation, or
professions that do not correspond with structural explanations
(Klandermans and Oegema 1987). This has been striking in two
especially strong movements: the Greens in Europe and the eco-
logical movement in America. It is evident also in such other
movements as the anti-nuclear energy movement in Europe and
America or the animal and children's rights movements in the
United States.
Second, the ideological characteristics of NSMs stand in
sharp contrast to the working-class movement and to the Marxist
Identitie s, Grie vances, and Ne w Social Movements
7
conception of ideology as a unifying and totalizing element for
collective action . Especially in Europe but also in the United
States, movements were characteristicall y perceived in accordance
with overarching ideologies : conservative or liberal ; right or left;
capitalist or socialist. Marxist thought , always more dominant in
Europe than in America, provided the paradigm for perceptions
of action, either bourgeois or proletarian. The new social move-
ments are more difficult to characterize in such terms . They ex-
hibit a pluralism of ideas and values, and they tend to have prag-
matic orientations and search for institutional reforms that enlarge
the systems of members ' participation in decision making (Offe
1985; Cohen 1985; Larafia 1992, 1993a). These movements have
an important political meaning in Western societies : They imply a
"democratization dynamic" of everyday life and the expansion of
civil versus political dimensions of society (Larafia 1993b).
Third , NSMs often involve the emergence of new or for-
merly weak dimensions of identity . The grievances and mobilizing
factors tend to focus on cultural and symbolic issues that are linked
with issues of identity rather than on economic grievances that
characterized the working-class movement (Melucci 1985, 1989).
They are associated with a set of beliefs, symbols, values, and
meanings related to sentiments of belonging to a differentiated
social group; with the members' image of themselves; and with
new , socially constructed attributions about the meaning of every-
day life. This is especially relevant to the ethnic, separatist, and
nationalistic movements within existing states. The Catalan and
Basque movements in Spain, the Asian and Hispanic movements
in the United States , the ethnic movements in the former Soviet
Union and even Palestinian nationalism are all examples of new
identities emerging in the modern world . The women 's movement
and the gay rights movement also exemplify this trend . All of
these new identities are formed as both private and public ones or
old ones remade along new lines.
Fourth, the relation between the individual and the collective
is blurred. Closely related to the above point , many contemporary
movements are "acted out" in individual actions rather than
through or among mobilized groups. The "hippie " movement is
the most striking instance, but it is equally true of aspects of other
movements where the collective and the individual are blurred,
for example, in the gay rights and the women 's movements. An-
HankJ ohnston, Enrique Laraiia, andJoseph R . Gusfield
8
other way of thinking about th e sam e phenomena is that in and
through mov ements that have no clear class or structural base, the
movement becomes th e focus for th e individual's definition of
him self or her self, and action within th e mov em ent is a complex
mix of the collectiv e and individual confirmations of identity . The
student movements and various countercultural groups of the
1960s were among th e earliest exam ples of this aspect of collec -
tive action .
Fifth , NSMs often involv e personal and intim ate aspects of
human life. Mov ements focusing on gay rights or abortion , health
mov ements such as alternati ve m edicine or antismoking , N ew Age
and self-transformation movement s, and th e wom en 's movement
all includ e effort s to chang e sexual and bodily behavior. They
ext end into arenas of daily life: what we eat, wear , and enjo y ; how
we make love, cop e with personal problems , or plan or shun ca-
reers .
Sixth, another common featur e of NSMs is th e use of radical
mobilization tactics of disruption and resistanc e that differ from
thos e practiced by the working -class mov em ent . New so cial
movements employ new mobilization patt erns characterized by
nonviolence and civil disob edienc e that , while oft en challenging
dominant norms of conduct through dramatic displa y , draw
equally on strategies influenced by Gandhi , Thoreau , and Kropot -
kin that were successfully used in the past (Larafia 1979; McAdam
1988; Morris 1984; Klandermans and Tarrow 1988).
Seventh, the organization and proliferation of new social
movement groups are related to the credibility crisis of the con -
ventional channels for participation in Western democracies . This
is especially true with regard to th e traditional mass parties from
which NSMs tend to have a considerable degr ee of autonom y -
and even disdain . This crisis is a motivational factor for colle ctive
action in search of alternativ e forms of participation and decision
making relating to issue s of collectiv e inter est (Whal en and Hacks
1989; Melucci 1989).
Finally, in contrast to cadr e-l ed and centralized bur eaucr acies
of tradit ional mass parties , new social mo vem ent organizations
tend to be segmented , diffus e, and decentraliz ed . While there is
~onsiderable variation acco rdin g to mov em ent typ e, th e tendency
IS toward considerable autonomy of local sections , wh ere collec-
tive forms of debat e and decision making oft en limit linka ges with
9
regional and national organizations . This has been called the "self-
referential element" of the new movements, and it constitutes
another sharp distinction with the hierarchical, centralized organi-
zation of the working-class movement and the role of the party
organization in the Leninist model.
These characteristics of new social movements are not inde-
pendent oflinks with the past. Nor is there an absence of continu-
ity with the old, although that varies with each movement. The
women's movement has its roots in the suffrage movement of the
late nineteenth century in America. New Age movements can
trace connections to earlier spiritualist teachings and Eastern phi-
losophies; and contemporary health movements have roots in vari-
ous quasi-medical orientations that proliferated earlier in this cen-
tury. Even movements with old histories have emerged in new
forms with more diffuse goals and different modes of mobilization
and conversion. It is both the newness of expression and extension
as well as the magnitude and saliency of such movements that con-
stitutes the basis for needing revised frameworks of under-
standing.
The theoretical roots of social movement scholarship provide
a backdrop to the contemporary discussion of new forms of social
movements. Are the new movements as new as they seem? What
social and cultural changes have led to the emergence of such
movements? Are the ideologies of the past 150 years, with their
general programs of reform and revolution , no longer operative
in these movements? Has the fulcrum of social movement action
shifted from a concern for large-scale societal change to narrower,
more self-oriented goals of claiming and realizing new individual
and group identities? As Alberto Melucci, one of the contributors
to this book, has written elsewhere concerning the influence of a
changed social structure on movements, "The freedom to have
which characterized . .. industrial society has been replaced by the
freedom to be" (Melucci 1989, 177-78).
This volume was conceived as an effort to provide some pro-
visional answers to these questions. Many of its chapters share ba-
sic assumptions of the social constructionist approach and synthe-
size the classic and modern perspectives in order to better explain
contemporary social movements in Western societies. Social con-
structionist insights into the way that meanings and collective be-
liefs arise as central to movement emergence help explain th e na-
HankJohnston, Enrique Laraha, andJoseph R. Gusfield
10
ture of new grievances and from whence they came. This first
chapter joins the theoretical debate .by focus~ng on three of the
themes mentioned above, all of which recur III the chapters that
follow: the role of identity in social movements, the place of ideol-
ogy and its relation to collective identity, and issues arising from
ideational and structural continuity in contemporary forms of mo -
bilization. Our goals are to identify the key issues, to point out
provocative junctures of theory and research, and to reassess where
this new conceptual apparatus might take us .
Dimensions of Identity in
Social Movement Theory
About twenty-five years ago several Amer -

ican sociologists noted the growing popu-
larity of social movements concerned with the identity of their
members. Ralph Turner (1969; see also Chapter 4) observed that
personal identity and personal transformation were increasingly
themes of diffusely organized social movement organizations . Or-
rin Klapp (1969) also discussed the collective search for identity as
a response to the impoverishment of interaction in modern soci-
ety. He argued that modern, rationalized, social relations no
longer provided reliable reference points from which to construct
one's identity . The movements he observed - "identity seeking
movements," such as religious and self-help groups, and less orga-
nized , trendy, collective behaviors -were attempts to reclaim a
self robbed of its identity.
The new social movement perspective holds that the collec-
tive search for identity is a central aspect of movement formation.
Mobilization factors tend to focus on cultural and symbolic issues
that are associated with sentiments of belonging to a differentiated
social group where members can feel powerful; they are likely to
have subcultural orientations that challenge the dominant system.
New social movements are said to arise "in defense of identity."
They grow around relationships that are voluntarily conceived to
empower members to "name themselves. "What individuals are
claiming collectively is the right to realize their own identity: the
possibility of disposing of their personal creativity, their affective
life, and their biological and interpersonal existence " (Melucci
1980,218) .
Identities, Grie vances, and Ne w Social Mo vements
II
Both approaches seem to assume that the pursuit of collective

identity flows from an intrinsic need for an integrated and continu-
ous social self, a self that is thwarted and assaulted in modern
society. The link between the "morphological social changes " de-
scribed by Melucci and identity-seeking behaviors seems to result
from four factors that are characteristic of postmodernism: mate-
rial affluence, information overload , confusion over the wide hori-
zon of available cultural alternatives, and system inadequacies in
providing institutionally based and culturally normative alterna-
tives for self-identification (see Inglehart 1990, 347). The issues
that NSM groups advocate reflect the expanded horizons of per-
sonal choice and point out cracks in the system, often in the form
of newly defined global concerns. Individuals seek out new collec-
tivities and produce "new social spaces" where novel life-styles
and social identities can be experienced and defmed. Much as
Klapp's explanation of the collective search for identity implicitly
criticized modern society, NSM research points out the need for
system adjustments via movement formation and the cultural chal-
lenges that new movements pose (Habermas 1981, 36-37).
NSM thinking and research so far has produced important
insights about the nature of these groups, but to date these insights
have not taken the form of an overall theory. The four factors
mentioned above are often left implicit; how they interrelate in the
formation of new groups has not been developed. A cynosure of
the new social movement perspective that needs further elabora -
tion is the linkage between the broad structural changes that are
said to characterize postindustrial society and identity problems
for individuals . This task can begin with a systematic approach to
the concept of identity itself . An understanding of who one is, in
all its complexity, is fundamental to the formulation of goals,
plans , assessments, accounts, and attributions that constitute mak-
ing one's daily way . That it is so fundamental may explain why,
from the new social movements approach, there is a tendency to
refer to the concept of identity in a taken -for-granted way. There
has been much written in sociology about various aspects of iden-
tity, and in the last decade, psychological research has increasingly
examined the relationship between individual and group identity
(Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1985; Turner 1985; Turner et al.
1987). From this vast literature, three distinct dimensions of iden-
tity stand out as central for participation in social movements:
Hank j ohnston, Enrique Laraiia, andj oseph R. G usfield
12
indi vidual iden tity, collective identit y , and publi c id entity. A
mor e theor etical appro ach requires clear conc eptu alizati on s about
how the y are related.
Individual Identity
For most sociologists , the term individual
identity is inh erently contradi ctory. Apart from the "hard wiring "
of gender and kinship- whi ch we are onl y beginning to und er-
stand-who a person is and what he or sh e becom es are thor-
oug hly social pro cesses . Yet , in several w ays indi vidual identit y is
imp ortant in und erstandin g social m ovem ent part icipation . It re-
lates to the w holly personal traits th at, although constru cted
through th e int eraction of biological inh erit ance and social life,
are internaliz ed and import ed to social mov ement participation as
idiosyncratic biographies . Psychologists studying group forma-
tion (Tajfel 1978, 1981; Turn er et al. 1987) clearly separat e individ-
ual identity from its social aspects deriv ed from group member-
ship , but a sociology of social mov em ents must recognize that
indi vidual identiti es are brou ght to m ovement participation and
chang ed in th e proc ess.
The degr ee to which th ey are change d can be used as a means
to classify mo vem ents-from totalizin g cu lts of personal transfor-
mation , wh ere the individual identit y is tak en over by the group ,
to checkbook quasi-mo vem ents lik e Gr eenp eace and Ross Perot's
United We Stand America , where individual identification may
not extend beyond a bump er stick er. Stephen Reicher has noted a
parallel continuum regarding th e degr ee to which group-based ,
sociall y constructed aspects of identit y com e to dominate the " im -
ported" indi vidual aspect s (see Turn er et al. 1987, 169-20 2).
The field of social mov ements ha s appropriated symboli c
interactionist approach es to social roles and social location
(Str yker 1980) as the con ceptual foundation for thinking about
individual identity . The social self of a movem ent adh erent is
made up of several social identities that are, in part , shaped as
th ey are acted out, but also that corr espond to institutional and
organizational roles that proscribe norm ative beha viors (Merton
1957). Th ese insights have influenced subs equent res ear ch in social
psycholog y on rol e strain, role chang e, and rol e conflict. Anoth er
line of research has been dir ected at op er ationalizin g an d m easur-
ing indi vidu al id entit y in its various dim ensions . A fund amental
Identities, Gr ievances. and New Social Movements
13
problem is that most people can describe "who they are" in only
limited terms . The verbal articulation of identity is often limited
to counseling psychology or self-help psychologizing of a popular
nature . Outside these contexts , and outside life-cycle influences
that bring identity issues to the foreground , expression of individ-
ual identity in all its facets is not usually necessary. In the ebb and
flow of everyday life, identity only becomes an issue when one 's
status quo is threatened.
In most sociological fields that touch on identity issues -
social movements, deviance, family studies , health and medi-
cine-discussions of individual identity are based on the basic
framework described above. Erving Goffman's insights into the
managed and situational nature of self-image (1959, 1967) have
important implications for a sociological approach to individual
identity, as does recent work on the relation between self-concept
and spoken discourse (Perinbanayagam 1991), but these ideas have
proven difficult to reconcile with positivistic research strategies .
Recently, feminist research has broken new ground in specifying
male-female differences in thinking about oneself and others that
derive from biology and culturally defined gender influences.
One of the problems with this key concept is also a source of
strength: its interdisciplinary nature in both sociology and psy-
chology. One aspect of a psychological focus emphasizes patho-
logical and unconscious forces and the developmental progress
toward adulthood. The work of Erik Erikson (1958, 1968) has
focused on the meaning of psychosocial identity as a subjective
sense of" continuity and being oneself," and as a fundamental step
in personal development. This subjective sense does not arise in
isolation but requires the existence of a community. Sociologists
and social psychologists have pointed out that personal identity
emerges through the mirror of social interaction, that is, by play-
ing different roles and by interpreting how others see us. Although
the degree to which a core identity is established and functions as
an integrating concept will vary, the basic insight of Meadian
social psychology also holds true: Individual identity is quintes-
sentially social and its core-if it can be apprehended at all by a
reflective self-is relativized according to interactive situations. If
identity is difficult to grasp because so much of its content is
locked away in the black box of mental life, then it is more difficult
to specify because the contents are shifted and rearranged accord-
HankJohnston, Enriqu e Laraiia, andJoseph R . Gusfield
14
ing to social context . The concept provides a tool to analyze a
concrete set of facts and problems where the individual and the
social realms intersect; this reinforces the need to integrate the
biological and sociological models of human behavior.
The dichotomy of a core identity versus a malleable one -or
individual versus social identity , to use Tajfel 's terms (1981) -
should be an important focus in future social movement research.
A key question is the extent to which NSMs are disproportion -
ately represented by a coming-of-age generation for whom ques -
tions of identity are paramount due to developmental psychologi -
cal factors. In the thre e NSM groups studied by Melucci and his
colleagues in Altri Codici (1984), in addition to the one that was
characterized by Giovanni Lodi and Marco Grazioli (1984) as a
"youth movement," all seem to be composed largely of people
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-eight .
More than in other stages in one's life cycle , search for iden-
tity is a youthful activity. Erikson 's (1968) fifth developmental
stage occurs in late adolescence, when a process of solidification
of a mature identity occurs through reconciliation of ascribed roles
and new or emergent adult roles . He also pointed out that there is
a intrinsic link between identity and ideology . An individual's
identity becomes consistent when it is built in a common ideologi-
cal orientation that renders it meaningful and gives it coherence .
To take one example , in interviews with leftist and nationalist
militants in Barcelona, Hank Johnston (1991) found that many
spoke vividly of psychological dissonance that arose from recon -
ciling a traditional , often religious, and middle-class upbringing
with newfound Marxism. Identity reconciliation was the sub-
stance of interaction with dense interpersonal networks of young
student and working-class militants . It forged a solidarity in these
groups that imparted a resilience against state repression. It also
provided for a unique flexibility and breadth that served to bridge
different oppositional groups during mass mobilization. Sustained
by intense discussions among friends, these networks were the
functional equivalent of "new social spaces" discussed by Melucci.
It is our guess that among different social movements , the
emphasis on identity quest results from th e intersection of several
factors, one of which is the coming of age of a cohort in an
economic and social milieu that frees them from immediate mate-
rial concerns and disposes them to intense introspection about
Identities, Grievances, and New Social Movements
15
who they are. Although research on new social movements recog-
nizes that these factors are related to participation, identity search
and temporariness of involvement are treated as something new,
deriving from system changes in postindustrial society (Lodi and
Grazioli 1984). To the extent that we are dealing primarily with
youth movements, or at least movements that bear the imprint
of a large youthful membership, then identity search cannot be
explained exclusively by postindustrial changes.
Collective Identity
The concept of collective identity has re-
cently been thrust into the foreground of social movement theory.
Aldon Morris's and Carol Mueller's book, Frontiersin SocialMove-
ment Theory (1992), contains several chapters that either deal di-
rectly with this concept or have sections that discuss it. Taken
together, these treatments point out the multifaceted and interre-
lated nature of the concept; the paradoxical result is that the theo-
retical spotlight simultaneously reveals many more angles, cor-
ners, niches, and shadows. Let us see if we can clarify the ways of
talking about collective identity, and in particular point out the
relationship between several closely related concepts like group
boundaries, group membership, solidarity, and the organization
of everyday life.
The concept of collective identity refers to the (often implic-
itly) agreed upon definition of membership, boundaries, and ac-
tivities for the group. According to Melucci (forthcoming), "Col-
lective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced
by several individuals (or groups at a more complex level) and
concerned with the orientations of action and the field of opportu-
nities and constraints in which the actions take place." It is built
through shared definitions of the situation by its members, and it
is a result of a process of negotiation and "laborious adjustment"
of different elements relating to the ends and means of collective
action and its relation to the environment. By this process of
interaction, negotiation and conflict over the definition of the situ-
ation, and the movement's reference frame, members construct
the collective "we. "
This social constructionist definition has three dimensions
that make collective identity an especially difficult concept to pin
down empirically. First, it is predicated on a continual interpene -
HankJ ohnston, Enrique Larana, andJoseph R . Gusfi eld
16
trati on of-and mutu al influ en ce between-th e indi vidual identit y
of th e participant and th e collecti ve identit y of th e gro up. Second ,
by th e very natur e of th e ph enom ena we study , th e coll ective
identity of social mov em ents is a " m oving tar get ," w ith diff er ent
definition s pr edomin atin g at different point s in a m ovem ent ca-
reer. Third , distin ct pr ocesses in identit y crea tio n and m aint en an ce
are operati ve in different ph ases of th e m ovem ent .
In th e mid st of all thi s change and flux , this conce pt is often
employ ed as if it w as froz en in tim e and space, neglectin g its
proc ess-based natur e and shifting boundari es. A related pr obl em
refers to th e " facticity " of collective identit y and th e w ay it serve s
as a predicate of behavior. A frequent usage, altho ug h one that
seems to occur m or e as a rh etor ical device tha n a consc io us ana lyt-
ical positi on , is to speak of collecti ve identit y as some thing th at
stands above and beyond th e indi vidual social actors an d takes on
a life of its own . Sugg estive of Herbert Blum er 's early con cep tual-
ization of esprit de corps (1955) and other early collective behavior
th eori sts th at em phasized gro up consciousness, this is a definition
that dir ects attention away from ind ividu al con tributions and at-
tach es it to a m ovem ent orga nization defined in th e agg rega te as a
collective actor. In thi s usage, both " collective id entit y " an d "so -
cial mo vem ent " can be spok en of w ithout referen ce to th e proc-
esses th at con stitut e th em . Rath er , like Emil e Durkheim 's con-
science collective, collective identit y is th e reposit or y of m ovem ent
values and norm s th at define m ovem ent beh avior from some epis-
temolo gical point beyond th e indi vidu al parti cip ant . It is a "soc ial
fact " that dictates prohibiti on s and appro p riate behavior s.
Yet ther e is a grain of insight th at can be w innowe d fr om th e
Durkh eimian position . We have in mind th e notion th at an identit y
is both cognitivel y real-that is, based on lived ex pe rience and
kno wl edge sto red in m emor y- and id ealized in Goff ma n's sense
of ideal noti on s of how a rol e beh avior sho uld be. To share a
collective identit y m ean s not onl y to have had a part in cons titu ting
it but also, in som e instan ces, "o beyi ng" its norm ative pr o scrip-
tions . Clearl y, thi s is an aspec t of collective identit y th at m eets
Durkh eims extern al and constrainin g crit eri a for social facts ' an d
from thi s perspective, to part ake in a collective ide ntity m eans
also doin g (and not doin g) certain thin gs. Th e key insig h t is th at
nor m ative and valua tiona l eleme nts of ex terna l socia l relation s are
closely associated w ith how on e think s abo ut ones elf; th ese ele-
Ident ities, Grie vances, and Ne w Social Movements
17
ments guide and channel behavior within-and without-the
group . In this sense, doing (appropriate movement-related behav-
iors) and being (identity) are inextricably linked . This closely fol-
lows Stephen Reichter 's treatment of identity and crowd behavior
(see Turner et al. 1987, 169-202) . He suggests that th e mor e the
individual identifies with the group, the more likel y emergent
group norms will constrain and shape behavior. The power of
emergent norms works through the mechanism of collectiv e iden-
tity and the intrinsic human tendency to affirm group identifica-
tion (see Tajfel and Turner 1985).
Bearing this in mind, we can turn to the more common,
constructionist usage that has been drawn on by NSM thinking .
The constructionist view has been emphasized in current analyses
of radical feminist , gay, and lesbian groups (Margolis 1985; Mar-
shall 1991), as well as attempts to explain ethnic politics and na-
tionalism (johnston 1985; See 1986; Nagel and Olzak 1982; Ander-
son 1991). Characteristic of this approach, Melucci asserts that
"collective identity is a product of conscious action and the out-
come of self-reflection more than a set of given or 'stru ctur al'
characteristics . [It] tends to coincide with conscious processes of
'organization' and it is experienced not so much as a situation as
an action" (1992, 10-11). By stressing the "process-based, self-
reflexive and constructed manner in which collective actors tend
to define themselves today" (10), contemporary approaches to
collective identity acknowledge a strong symbolic interactionist
influence. This tradition points to interaction among social move-
ment participants as the locus of research on identity processes. In
Europe , one tendency has been to explore this avenue of investiga-
tion through "intervention research" (Touraine 1981; Melucci
1984). In North America , research has followed an identity-fo-
cused agenda via traditional interactionist issues: self-presentation ,
dramaturgical analysis, conversions , and gender and gender inter-
action. Regardless of research strategy, the global point is that
collective actors define themselves in a social context, and any
constructionist view of identity must make reference to both the
interactive situations where identity is formed and shaped and to
the other people who join in the task.
This raises inevitable questions about the relation betw een
group membership and collective identity. Debra Friedman and
Doug McAdam (1992, 169) have discussed how individual attach-
Hank Johnston, Enrique Laraiia, andJoseph R . Gusfield
18
ments to preexisting groups and int erp ersonal networ ks fre que ntly
function as sourc es of collective identit y wh en th ese attach me n ts
are hi ghly valued. Th e assum ption of value d gro u p attac h me n ts
allows th e authors to recast collecti ve ident ity as a selective in cen-
tive, to use Mancur Olson 's (1965) term , as a w ay of reconcilin g a
microstructuralist focu s with rational choice mod els. C ollective
identit y becomes a valued com mo dity th at is worth th e co m m it-
m ent of tim e, resourc es th e "c apital" of indi vidu al aut on om y and
the risk of pr esentati on of self becaus e the group from which it is
derived is also valued .
Th e issue goes to th e cor e of social mov em ent formation ,
and ther e are several answers , whic h, tak en to geth er , can help the
stud ent of social movem ent s think m or e syst em atically about th e
creation of collectiv e identiti es. First , foll owing the arg ume n t of
Friedman and McAdam , on e can consider or ganiz ation al strat egy .
In th eir analysis, th e orga nization " prov ides an id ent ity " and
"sh apes it for con sumpti on. " Thi s mi ght be called a " strategic
constru ctionist persp ective," to coin a term , th at sugges ts, for
som e movem ents , th ere are leaders, committ ees, or caba ls th at
plot th e best collective identit y for th e m ovem ent , mu ch lik e mar -
keting executives strat egizin g th e best way to pr esent a pr odu ct . It
is a " top down " appr oach to collective identit y that seems to be
mor e useful in som e m ovem ent s than others. Thi s app roach would
be especially useful in later stages of mo vem ent developm ent w hen
social mo vem ent organization s are establishe d an d likel y to be
thinking of these strat egic terms . At earlier stages, ho wever , w hen
issues are being articulat ed and gro ups coalesce around issu es, it
makes sense that a mor e "bottom up " appro ach is, if not th e
entir e answ er , then at least deserving of a plac e in th e th eor etical
equation. These issues are expand ed in the next two sections .
Public Identity
Whil e the two pr evious dim ens ions of
identit y involve self-ass essm ents - eithe r b y an indi vidu al or by
th e group -th e conc ept of publi c identit y captur es th e influ ences
that th e extern al public have on th e w ay social mo vem ent adhe r-
ents think about them selves. Both indi vidual id entit y an d collec-
tive identity are affect ed by int eraction w ith nonm emb ers and by
definitions imposed on mov em ents b y state agenci es, co un ter-
mov em ents , and , especially in th e contemporar y mo vem ent envi-
Identities. Grie vances, and Ne w Social Movem ents
19
ronment, the media. There are different courses and different
channels by which public definitions can influence movement
identities, and it makes sense that, depending on the source, there
can be different effects .
On the one hand , there is a long tradition of research on how
impersonal influences affect movement identities . State repression
can intensify we-them distinctions and fortify group identification
and commitment (Trotsky 1957; Smelser 1962; Brinton 1965;
Hierich 1971), especially in radical political movements (Knutson
1981; della Porta and Tarrow 1986; della Porta 1992; Perez- Agote
1986). Particularly important in today's movement environment
are the information media and the role of the media in shaping a
movement's image (Gam son 1988; Gitlin 1980). Enrique Laraiia
(see Chapter 9) observes how a split in the internal and external
images of a movement can result from journalists' tendency to
focus on professionalized movement representatives and visible
aspects of movement activities . Another element of media identity
is the process of influencing the assignment of meaning through
framing activities by leaders. This occurred in the Basque and
Catalan movements in Spain and in Spanish student mobilizations
during the 1980s.
On the other hand, a neglected aspect of research on public
identity is personal influence and social impact. By this we refer
to concrete interaction between members of a movement and non-
members . Research in social psychology has demonstrated that
the more intimate, local , and personally relevant an informational
input, the greater the influence it has on opinion (Latane 1981). If
media images of a movement can influence personal or collective
identity , their influence carries more weight if it comes via people
who are close to and who are valued by the movement participant .
With the exception of totalizing groups such as cults and radical
cells, the collective aspect of identity formation tends to be at
best a part-time endeavor; and what others (especially primary
relations) think about the movement can carry great weight in a
developing collective identity . An individual's social life will in-
clude others outside the movement group . This is even more rele-
vant for movement participants who are deeply associated in com-
munity life, especially in the early phases of the movem ent when
the demands on time and resources characteristic of the increasing
Hank Johnston, E nrique Laraiia, and Joseph R . C usfield
20
pace of mobilization are just beginning . Th en th e relati on between
the public identit y and th e em erg ent collecti ve id entit y is critical.
As a movement mobiliz es, committ ed m emb er s will pro-
gressively exclude extraneou s ties in favor of mo vem ent-based
interaction . Boundary maint en ance, a term used in ecolog ical th e-
or y to und erstand the creation of resourc e nich es, is anoth er way
of thinking about increasingl y ex clusionary behavior. Verta Taylor
and N ancy Whitti er (1992) discuss ho w radical feminist s engage
in a species of boundar y maint enan ce by building alternati ve lo ci
of affiliation called " fem ini st count erinstitutions " to affirm their
collective identity . Th ere is a tim e-budgeting dimension to th ese
action s in that the larger proportion of daily acti vitie s that move-
ment-relat ed roles occup y in a social actor 's overall identit y-that
is, th e sum total of his or her roles-the sharper th e boundari es,
the clearer th e we-they distinctions, and the stronger th e collectiv e
identity. Boundaries can be thought of as activities and definitions
that reinforce collective definitions through we-they distinctions ,
which are often marked by differences in physical app earance ,
dress, speech , demeanor , and oth er behaviors. There is variation in
the panorama of movements regarding th e sharpness of boundar y
distin ctions . Taylor and Whitti er review the efforts at exclusion
among lesbian feminist groups , while other mo vem ents are less
exclusionary and even may wax inclusi ve in later stages of th eir
careers , w ith negati ve effects on collective identit y and commit-
ment (Zald and Ash 1966; Gerlach and Hine 1970). It mak es sense
that th e str ength of boundar y maint enanc e (which is an acti vit y)
and we-the y distinctions (which is a cognition) are related to col-
lectiv e identit y in terms of th e relationship between tim e and effor t
dedicated to movement activities.
We know a great deal about the so cial proc esses b y which
collectiv e identity gath ers str ength, but our thinking about th e
topic has not been able to explain starting mechanisms , that is, the
initial kick that moves potential participants to choos e on e set of
social ties above others . This brings us to the third approa ch to
the issue of emergent collective identiti es, and to what we see as
a forgott en theoretical issue: the relation between what a social
mov ement is about-its substanc e in the form of grievanc es, de-
mands , and a program for chang e-and th e way its collective iden-
tit y can be codified in an ideolog y .
21
Ideology, Grievances, and Collective Identity
"Old movements" coalesced around shared

grievances and perceptions of injustice .
Programs for amelioration of these grievances and attribution of
cause constituted the ideological base for mobilization. In the
movement conte xt , the link between ideology and gri evances was
strong, as it was conceptually in early theories of social move-
ments. Ideology as a codification of wrongs and injustices was
seen as a necessary process for mobilization to occur (Smelser
1962). In deprivation theories , the link between grievance s and
action was fundam ental to explanatory logic, but typically it was
left implicit. Research in the symbolic interactionist tradition em-
phasized the definition of a situation as unjust and warranting
action; the specification of collective solutions was understood as
key to mobilization processes . William Gamson, Bruce Firem an ,
and Steven Rytina's research into the em ergen ce of injustic e frames
offers decisive insights into the earliest mechanisms by which
grievances become articulated (1982; see also Gamson 1992).
In the 1960s, several observers-Daniel Bell , Ralph Turner,
Joseph Gusfield, Orrin Klapp , among others-noted that an in-
creasing number of movements and conflicts articulated griev-
ances that were not based on economic and class interests . These
movements were based on less "objective" elements such as iden-
tity, status, humanism, and spirituality. In a sense, the link be-
tween mobilization and grievances became less compelling. While
not without their own ideological base and in varying degrees
among different groups, these movements were less characterized
by the extensive ideological articulation usually found in socialist
and communist organizations . Shortly thereafter, the link between
grievances and mobilization was further deemphasized as factors
relating to resources, organization, and strategy gained theoretical
predominance in the field .
The year 1990 brought the collapse of Marxist-L eninist
states, and with it the debilitation of the most highly developed
oppositional ideologies of the twentieth century. Richard Flacks
(see Chapter 14) points out that there is much more to the Left 's
vision than the way it was distorted by the communist parti es of
the socialist bloc. He argues that the grand tradition of the Left
has both been an integral part of how generations of activists have
Hank Johnston, En rique L araiia, andJ oseph R . Gu sfield
22
thought about themselves and a transcend ent view of ~ha~ soci~ty
could be. This tradition was internalized into one 's so cial id ent ity;
it was lived in one's daily contacts and through th e content of that
interaction . Although ideology , gri evanc es, and coll ectiv e id entity
are analyticall y separate, there is a stron g relationship betw een
them , one that has been muted in the past but ha s been brought
into the theoretical foreground by NSM research .
The traditional th eori es of soci al mo vements did not em ph a-
size the link betw een grievances and identity as relevant to explain-
ing movement formation , but it makes sense th at the link was
ther e. For laboring m en and wom en , for peasant s, and for anar-
chist militants , th e substance of grievances, and th eir int erpr eta-
tion by ideologi es, was em bedded in ever yd ay life. E. P. Th omp-
son 's (1963) stud y of th e em ergence of th e Engl ish workin g class
shows that identity as a tradesman perm eated every day life and
that there wer e many instances wh en the collective identity deriv-
ing from a shared sense of injustic e was particularl y stro n g. In his
stud y of prot ests of weavers in Rouen , France , William Redd y
(1977) shows how stru ctural ch ang es outsid e village so ciety thr eat-
ened th e way of life for seven teenth-century weavers. Th e forms
of protest weavers instig ated wer e closely linked w ith the defense
of their traditional social status es. Similarl y , anarchist groups in
nineteenth -century Spain first or ganized athenaeums wher e work-
ers gathered at th e end of the day to socialize, discuss issu es, and
take courses . Famil y activities such as picnics and choral gro ups
were also organized (Esenw ein 1989). In West Vir ginia , th e iden-
tit y of a united mine work er 's or ganiz er in the 1930s was closely
linked to th e injustices he and his com patriots faced in th e min es,
in the company towns, in company stores , and in seeing the rav-
ages of poverty on their children . Although non e of the militants
would have characterized th eir invol vem ent in terms of a qu est for
identit y, through the newl y ground len ses of NSM conc epts , th e
degr ee to which close friends and every day acti vit ies wer e link ed
with the mov ement becomes apparent . Colle ctive identit y an d
grievances are not the same, but their clos e association lies in th e
fact th at the organization of how social m ovement adherents think
about themselv es is structured in import ant ways by how shar ed
wron gs are exp erien ced , int erpr eted , and rework ed in th e con text
of group interaction .
Th ese observations are strikingl y sim ilar to recent work in
Identities, Grie vances, and New Social Movem ents
23
feminist theory and the women's movement about the politiciza-
tion of everyday life. Because gender stereotyping and discrimina-
tion perm eates most modern social relations , th ere is a fundam en-
tal injustice embedded at the level of quotidian interaction . An
important aspect of the feminist program has been to creat e new
social spaces, ones that are equally quotidian, where women can
respond to, and in the extreme, withdraw from , gender discrimi-
nation and interaction with men in order to nurture their own
identities (Taylor and Whittier 1992). These kinds of groups ,
which are characteristic of the women 's movement , are often con-
sidered prototypical of NSM organizations .
To understand how movements are distributed on the axis of
grievances and identity , we suggest that the following reckoning
is helpful. First, all movements , to some degree, are linked with
issues of individual and collective identity via the way that focal
grievances affect everyday life. In th e United States , mobilizations
in response to economic crisis and rising unemployment during
the 1930s, often led by communist activists , followed the classic
pattern of European workers' movements (Piven and Cloward
1971, 62). People participated massively in collective action be-
cause they were hungry and without jobs. Th ese were matters that
went to the core of their existence and collective identity was not
the focus of action. Yet, in the United States , status movements
are closely linked with identity issues (Gusfield 1963; Zurcher and
Kirkpatrick 1976; Luker 1984). Here the grievances are actuated
by perceived threats to how one defines oneself , such as the way
that the popularization of abortion threatens, for some women,
traditional conceptions of motherhood. Status movements take
action about "other people 's business " because that business often
poses a threat to' how the mobilizing group defines itself. They
might be seen as precursors of NSMs if we accept that identity
issues become a basic mobilizing factor.
New social movements display a paradoxical relationship be-
tween identity and grievances . First, the very nature of grievances
for NSMs merges them closely with the concept of identity . For
movements about gender or sexual identity, for example , the col-
lective grievances are ine xtricably linked with issues of identity
quest in the group context. The support and identity-affirming
functions of feminist and gay rights groups are well known. Sec-
ond, where grievances have a more important place in group for-
Hank Johnston, Enrique Laraiia, andJoseph R. Cusjield
24
mation, such as in ecological groups, the NSM perspective tells us
that identity quest co-occurs as a displaced (or unconscious) but
nevertheless fundamental raison d'etre of group formation. Third,
for some NSM groups, such fundamental grievances as threats to
the ozone level, nuclear proliferation, or saving whales are so dis-
tant from everyday life that they can only remain immediate
through their ongoing social construction and reassertion in the
group context . Indeed, one might speculate that in those instances
when the goals of NSM groups are particularly global and distant
from achievement, it is the intensely personal orientations and the
close melding of the group with everyday life that provide the
sustaining lifeblood of cohesion. In rational choice terms , identity
defense and affirmation provide the necessary counterbalancing
selective incentives where the more practical payoffs of the move-
ment are small .
Continuity in New Social Movements

An important focus of recent research has
been the informal organizational networks
as the platform from which movement formation occurs. Joseph
Gusfield (1981) emphasizes the role of "carry-ons and carry-
overs" from one movement to another; Adrian Aveni (1977), Mark
Granovetter (1983), and Doug McAdam (1982, 1988) all argue for
the importance of preexisting networks of relations in collective
action; and Aldon Morris (1984) looks at the role of established
social organizations- "movement halfway houses" -in the growth
of the civil rights movement. In a similar vein, Leila Rupp and
Verta Taylor (1987) discuss "abeyance structures" during the re-
cumbent periods of the women's movement in a hostile political
climate . In the even more hostile setting of the authoritarian state,
Hank Johnston examines the role of" oppositional subcultures " in
several nationalist mobilizations (1991, 1992, 1993; see also Perez-
Agote 1990). These subcultures are comprised of well developed
but, for the most part, private social networks that are built up in
response to repression and the stilted discourse of public life in
closed societies.
The theoretical import of this work on the "microstructural"
factors prior to mobilization is that the temporal frame of analysis
gets pushed back in order to focus on premobilization phases as
Identities. Gr ievances. and New Social Movemen ts
25
partial explanations of the shape and course social movements
take. This shift also tends to lay bare the role of cultural content
since continuity arises not only through persistanc e of organiza-
tions but also through the shared meanings and beliefs of mov e-
ment members . Its significanc e for current research on social
movements might contribute to overcoming its structuralist bias
and to framing research within the persp ective of a " in terpretative
sociology" (see McAdam, Chapter 2; Gamson 1988). This " episte-
mological reframing " would permit a deeper approach to the
study of social movement formation that draws on the latent , non-
visible, cognitive dimensions instead of visible and political as-
pects (Melucci 1989; see also Larafia , Chapter 9). Consideration of
the historical preconditions of mobilization is of cours e nothing
new-seeking causes in itself implies temporal priority-but the
search for a movement's origins has , in the past , focused either
on intellectual currents or preexisting resources rather than on the
non visible networks that function in everyday life as premobiliza-
tion structures .
Prior to this research, the analysis of social movements had
taken a more "volcanic" approach: It is attracted to an event when
it erupts through the surface of social life, and it focuses on the
flow of human, organizational, and resource-related magma. Tay-
lor (1989, 761) points out that NSM research tends to succumb to
this tendency as well. Her research with Rupp (1987) chronicles
how organizational and cultural continuities can shape highly non-
institutionalized NSM forms of organization. Their study reviews
how the intense commitment, rich and variegated culture, and
strong activist networks facilitated the resurgent women's move-
ment in the mid 1960s. Although their emphasis is on continuity
in repertoires of contention, there are several points where one
sees continuities in the shape of everyday organization within the
retrenched movement, especially the solidarity , cohesiveness, and
commitment within the abeyance networks they describe. These
characteristics were important sources of personal support in the
difficult postwar years of the women's movement and suggest that
in periods of quiescence factors related to personal and collective
identity may be at work to establish links of continuity (Taylor
1989; see also Larafia, Chapter 9). One is led to speculate the de-
gree to which the prior organization stimulated smaller support
Hank Johnston. Enrique Laraiia, andJoseph R . Cu s.field
26
groups that , in contrast to lobb yin g o rga n izations, cha racterize th e
newn ess of contem porary femini sm.
In a similar vein, th e roots of th e N ew Left in th e Unite d
States have been tr aced by several resear cher s (Wh alen and Hacks
1984; Wood 1974; Isserm an 1987) w ho have point ed out strong
continuiti es with th e Old Left . Takin g the women 's mo vem ent
and th e New Left to geth er , th e po int is that w hile even ts of gr eater
or lesser m agnitud e punctu ate histor y , the re is an im po rtant thr ead
of org anizational and cultur al con tinuity for m an y NSM s in th e
Unit ed Stat es insofar as th e focu s of ana lys is shifts to every day
activ ities. O n th e other hand , research in th e Europ ean tradit ion
has stressed th e spec ial signifi can ce of grea t hist ori cal events and
th e path-b reakin g influen ce of ideas and per son s. From this per -
spective, as analysts of new social m ovem ent s in Eur op e sifted
thr ou gh th e soil of postm od erni sm , th ey have lo cated th e first
sprouts of new social mo vem ents am on g th e relati vely recent mo-
bilizations of students an d th e N ew Left in the late 1960s (Ha ber-
m as 1981; Kr iesi 1992).
Th e fact th at th e N SM per spective ha s gen erat ed w ider en-
thusi asm in Eur op e th an in th e Uni ted States pr ovide s ev iden ce
abo ut th e natur e of th eor y cons truc tion and its patt ern s of diffu-
sion in sociology . As we point ed out earlier, th e Eur op ean tr adi-
tion of social m ovem ent resear ch, reflectin g the influ enc e of M arx-
ist th ou ght , em phasized struc tura l bac kgro un ds of class to a
greater extent th an th e Am eri can studies. In th e Unit ed States, th e
situation ha s been historically different and ther e ha s ne ver been a
stro ng part y repr esentin g th e working class . Flacks (see Ch apt er
14) attribut es thi s fact to th e peculi ar cha rac teristics of th e Am eri-
can labor force , espe cially its multi ethnic chara cter , w hi ch is th e
result of w aves of immi grati on . Instead of th e unifi cati on of th e
peopl e sharing th e tr adition of th e Left , th ere has been a frag me n-
tation of th e working class in ethni c groups and tr ad e uni ons based
on ethni c solidarit y . Th e grow th of a unifi ed wo rking - class part y
was pr event ed by a system w he re th e com pe tition between ethnic
gro ups created ob stacl es to class solidarit y . Th e abse nce of str on g
leftist parti es and soci alist uni on s in th e Unit ed States atom ized
working - class orga nization int o lo cal mani festatio ns an d decen-
traliz ed civ il society to a greater ex ten t th an in Eur op e.
If we search for cultur al factor s, th ere is a lon g tr aditi on of
indi vidu alism and self-help/ self-im prove me nt moveme n ts in th e
Identit ies. Grie vances. and Ne w Social Movements
27
United States (Meyer 1975). These have roots in the broader cul-
tural templates discussed over 150 years ago by Alexis de Tocqu e-
ville in Democracy in America and more recently by Bellah et al.
(1985) . In the words of de Tocqueville, the American propensity
to "self-interest properly understood" fomented a wide array of
interest groups and voluntary associations that exercised influ ence
at local levels of government early in the nation's history. These
local forms of participation continued to charact eriz e American
society throughout the nineteenth and twenti eth centuries . In Eu-
rope, despite wid e variations betw een countries , there were two
social forces that shaped civil participation differently : the institu-
tional church and the Left. While Europ ean society today is more
secularized than th e United States, the Catholic church and other
religious groups played important roles in th e development of so-
cial movement organizations, especially in som e countri es like
Belgium, Italy, and Spain. The church in Europe enjoy ed a quasi-
monopoly on the kinds of transcendental qu estions that sects and
cults in th e United Stat es have regularly taken up . Th ese observ a-
tions must be taken as generalizations that gloss many factors, but
they stress that the utility of th e NSM perspective is intimately
related to the cultural and intellectual soil in which it germinat es.
A final point regarding continuity in NSM groups is oft en
overlook ed, but it is central to cultural and organizational continu-
ity over long periods . We have in mind the relations betwe en gen-
erational cohorts alluded to earlier (see Braungart and Braungart
1984). Int ergenerational relations are a key asp ect of how continu-
ity in culture, ideology, and organizational form is achi eved (Man-
nheim 1952) . Thi s is not to imply a one-way relation from the
wizen ed older generation to th e young. Rather , in man y mov e-
ments there are opportunities for reciprocity wher e th e older
memb ers mitigat e the radic alism of youth , and youthful m emb ers
open new horizons to the older gene ration (john ston 1991). Th ese
are proc esses that are not examin ed in depth by new social m ove-
ment research , despit e methodological strategies, for exa m ple,
participant obs erv ation and "int erv enti on , " that would seem to
lend them selves to such questions (Touraine 1981; Melucci 1984).
To the extent that th e qu est for id entit y is a youthful activ ity, th eo-
retical conc ern with int erg enerational relati ons will becom e m or e
relevant for th e stu dy of cont emporar y m ovem ent s. Whitti er 's
(1993) tr eatm ent of gene ratio nal relations in the wo me n's m ove-
Hank john ston, Enrique L araiia, andj oseph R . Gusfi eld
28
ment may signal the beginning of a shift in inter est in this area
of research.
Conclusions
This chapter opens with a review of Euro-
pean and North Am erican traditions in so-
cial movem ent scholarship and two questions about new social
movements : Why have they posed such a challenge to traditional
theori es? And , What was it about the traditional theories that
proved to be inadequate ? From the NSM persp ectiv e, the answer
to the first question centers on the link between structural change
characteristic of postindustrial society and movements that em-
phasize identity in the context of a wide variety of grievances and
forms of organization embedded in the everyday life of partici-
pants . The answ er to the second question is that traditions of the
past, perhaps color ed by their particular ideological lenses , did not
grasp the everyday and identity dim ensions of th e " old move-
ments " th ey sought to explain .
The heart of this chapter focuses on the idea that a more
systematic approach to NSMs requires stronger conceptual devel-
opment regarding identity , especially if th e linkages between the
social actor and structural changes characteristic of postmodern
society are to be specified. Identity has two central dimensions-
individual and collective- both of which are shaped by a third-
public identity. Both individual and collective identity are charac-
terized by a dualistic epistem ology in which continuity and change
coexist as alternative approaches . Individual identity is composed
of both its fixed aspects, which are "imported" by each participant
to social movement groups , and by its fundamentally malleable
quality, which is shaped in the course of interaction within the
collectivity . Similarly, collective identity can be conceptualized
at any point in time as a fixed content of meanings , frames of
interpretation , and normative and valuational proscriptions that
exercise influence over individual social actors . On the other hand ,
collective identity is also an emergent quality of group interaction ,
which is strengthened by group solidarity and boundar y mainte-
nance activities and shaped by public images of th e group via
interaction with nonmemb ers .
Part of the task we face is to refin e both conceptual and
Identities. Gr ievances. and Ne w Social Movements
29
methodological tools . Research strategies must permit the com-
plexity of identity to unfold in the data-gathering process . This
issue is echoed in Bert Klandermans 's call for longitudinal research
of movement activists (1992, 53-75 , see also Chapter 7). Batt eries
of questions focused wholly on identity issu es will be required for
meaningful comparisons over time. But the complexity of identity
is such that fixed choice questions can access only som e dim en-
sions of the concept . More often than not, the raw data of identity
is expressed in halting and fragmented accounts, platitudes, and
monologues - sometimes spontaneous, sometimes rehears ed - of
"who we are" and "who I am ." Moreover, aspects of identity can
change in the course of data-gathering itself. In some instances ,
different aspects of identity are invoked for different behaviors
being observed , or for different phases-and even respons es-in
the interview process. A woman may discuss issues of th e environ-
mental movement as an activist, as a mother, as a manager, as a
spouse, or as a Latina. Sociological intervention, discourse analy-
sis, informal interviewing, and qualitative research strat egies , such
as those suggested by Scott Hunt , Robert Benford , and David
Snow (see Chapter 8) would be very helpful.
Our examination of continuity and change in individual and
collective identities suggests further research. First, in examining
the "imported" qualities of individual identity, we note a potential
correlation between identity quest and youthful composition of
NSM groups. The degree to which there is a mix between young
adults , for whom identity questions are important, and older
members is an important dimension on which NSM groups might
be distributed. The processes of intergenerational relations , re-
flected in the cohort composition of new social movements , while
traced in several studies of the New Left and the women 's move-
ments, has not been pursued elsewhere .
Second, we note that the emphasis of "identity quest" will
differ among NSMs and, given the centrality of the concept, it
makes sense that this is a dimension on which NSM groups should
be categorized. Comparisons require reliabl e measures of both
individual and collective identity orientations that, by freezing
concepts that are also inherently malleable and emergent , violat e
the dual natur e of identity concepts . Neverthel ess, ther e is mu ch
to be gain ed by intermovement and cross-national comparisons . It
may be necessary to shed prejudices about measur es of individual
HankJ ohnston, Enrique La raiia, andJoseph R . G usfield
30
identity derivin g from sus ceptib ility theori es in orde r to establish
a compar ative dat a base about w ho joins NSM s.
Third , we also not e that the link betw een grievances and
every day life of m ovem ent parti cipant s might vary between NSM
group s. Th e ex ten t to w hich grievances are tied to every day con-
cern s in contrast to m or e global issu es that seem quit e remov ed
from mund ane con cerns is a provoc ativ e qu estion , and it mak es
sense that th ere w ill be consid erabl e variation in the panor ama of
NSM groups. A wo rking hyp oth esis is th at wh ere glo bal con cern s
are far rem oved from every day life, m ovem ent coh esion requir es
the selective in cen tives of a str on g identit y compon ent. Mor eov er ,
the relation ship between identit y and th e imm edia cy/globaln ess of
grievan ces m ay com p rise ano the r dim ensi on on w hi ch NSMs can
be analyzed .
A final observa tion arises fro m cur rent events in Europ e. Th e
specter of violent skinh ead s and neofascist youth m ovem ents in
Europ e raises th e qu estion if th ese, too , some how fit into th e
NSM equation of ident ity qu est , every day em bedde dnes s, and
bro ad stru ctural chang e. Wh en seen in th e contex t of th e crisis of
credibilit y of th e m ain tr adition al political actor s, the em ergen ce
of xenopho bic mo vem ent s pr esents sim ilarities w ith post -World
War I Europ e. In the past , NSM s have been discuss ed as a creative
forc e of change , signif ying dir ections for cultural and so cial inno -
vation . Yet , th ere may be a dark er sid e th at parallel s th e dang ers
pres ent ed by collectiv e identiti es in th e mold of tot alitari an mo ve-
m ents of th e past. Surel y th e rise of nation alist mo vem ents and
ethn ic hatr ed also go to th e cor e of ho w so cial actors think about
themselv es. Unlik e m ass society th eor y, th e NSMs repr esent al-
ternati ve channels for particip ation in public life (see Hack s, Ch ap-
ter 14). If this is so , th e revival of violen t racist gr oups in the sam e
Europ ean countr ies that give birth to Nazi sm and fascis m would
confirm th e Mar xist dictum , " H istory rep eats itself : th e first tim e
as a tragedy , the second as far ce. "
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Zurcher , Louis A., Jr. , and R. George Kirkpatrick. 1976. Citi zens for Decency :
Antipornography Crusades as Statu s Defense . Austin : University of Texas
Press.
Chapter 2
Cu Iture and Social

Movements
Doug McAdam
Over the past two decades, the study of

social movements has been among the
most productive and intellectually lively subfields within sociol-
ogy. But, as with all emergent paradigms , the recent renaissance
in social movement studies has highlighted certain aspects of the
phenomenon while ignoring others. Specifically, the dominance ,
within the United States, of the " resour ce mobilization" and "po-
litical process" perspectives has privileged the political, organiza-
tional, and network/structural aspects of social movements while
giving the more cultural or ideational dimensions of collective
action short shrift .
From a sociology of knowledge perspective, the recent igno-
rance of the more cultural aspects of social movements is the result
of the rejection of the classical collective behavior paradigm, which
emphasized the role of shared beliefs and identities but whose
hints of irrationality and pathology (Klapp 1969; Lang and Lang
1961; Smelser 1962) made it unattractive to a new generation of
scholars whose own experiences led them to view social move-
ments as a form of rational political action . Whatever the reason,
the absence of any real emphasis on ideas, ideology , or identity
has created, within the United States, a strong "rationalist" and
"structural" bias in the current literature on social movements. At
the most macro level of analysis, social movements are seen to
emerge in response to the "expansion in political opportunities "
that grant formal social movement organizations (SMOs) and
movement entrepreneurs the opportunity to engage in successful
"resource mobilization." At the micro level, individuals are drawn
into participation not by the force of the ideas or even individual
attitudes but as the result of their embeddedness in associational
networks that render them "structurally available" for protest ac-
Cultur e and Social Mo vements
37
nvit y . Until recently, " culture, " in all of its manif estation s, was
rarely invoked by Am erican scholars as a forc e in the eme rge nce
and development of social movem ents . The ren ewed int erest in
the topic has been spurred , in part , by the Europ ean " new social
mov ement" persp ectiv e, which has mad e cultural and cog nitive
factors central to the study of social mo vem ents (Brand 1990;
Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Melucci 1985,1989).
This chapter broadens the discours e among mov em ent schol -
ars by focusing on some of the links betw een culture and social
movements . Specificall y, I address thre e broad topic s: the cultur al
roots of social movements , the em ergence and development of
distinctive " m ovem ent cultur es, " and th e cultural con sequ enc es of
social movements .
The Cultural Roots of Social Movements
The "structu ral bias " in mov ement studi es

is most evident in recent American work
on th e emergence of social movements and revolutions . With but
a few exceptions, recent theorizing on the question has located the
roots of social movement s in som e set of political , econ om ic, or
organizational factors. Whil e acknowledging the importance of
such factors, I add cultural factors and processes to this list as
important constraints or facilitators of collective action . Th ere are
thre e distinct ways in which culture can be said to facilitate move -
ment emergenc e.
Framingas on Act of CulturalAppropriation

Drawing on the work of Erving Goffman
(1974), David Snow and various of his colleagues (Snow et al.
1986; Snow and Benford 1988) have develop ed the concept of
" frame alignment processes " to describe th e efforts by which or-
ganizers seek to join the cognitive orientations of individuals with
thos e of social movement organizations . The task is to propound
a view of the world that both legitimat es and motivates prot est
activity. Th e success of such efforts is determin ed , in part , by th e
cultural resonance of th e frames advanc ed by organiz ers . In thi s
sense, framing efforts can be thought of as acts of cultural appro -
Doug McA dam
38
priation , with mov em ent lead er s seeking to tap highly resonant
ideation al str ains in main stream so ciet y (or in a particular targ et
subcultur e) as a way of galvanizin g activism.
Much has been mad e of Martin Luth er Kin g , Jr.'s use of
Gandhian non viol enc e as an id eolo gic al corn erston e of th e civil
rights mov ement . In fact, King 's int erest in and advocacy of Gan-
dhi 's phil osoph y was lar gely irrel evant to th e rapid em ergence and
spr ead of th e civil right s strug gle. Far m ore signifi cant was King 's
appropriation and po werful evocati on of highl y resonant cultural
th em es, not only in the southe rn black Baptist tr adition, but in
American political culture mor e generall y .
Co nsider King 's " I have a Dr eam " speec h. Ju xt ap osing th e po etr y
of the scriptura l proph ets- " I have a dr eam th at every valley shall
be exalted, every hill and mount ain shall be m ade low " -with the
lyric s of patr iotic anthe m s-" T his w ill be th e day w he n all of Go d's
childr en will be able to sing with new m eanin g, ' My countr y 'tis
of th ee, sweet land of libert y, of th ee 1 sing' " - King's orat ion
reappr opriat ed th at classic str and of th e Am erican tr adit ion th at
und erst and s th e tru e m eanin g of freed om to lie in th e affirmatio n
of responsibilit y for unitin g all of th e div erse m emb ers o f society
int o a just social ord er. (Bellah et al. 1985, 249)
Inde ed , this was Kin g 's uniqu e gen ius: to fram e civil ri ght s activ-
ity in a way th at reson ated not only with th e cultur e of th e op-
pres sed but with th e culture of th e oppresso r as well. King success-
fully m obiliz ed Southe rn black s w hile he gene rated consid erabl e
sympathy and support for th e mov em ent amo n g w hi tes as well.
Th e student democrac y mo vem ent in Beijin g in the spring of
1989 also dr ew on deeply reson ant cultur al th em es and tr adition s
in the early days of th e strug gle. Th e initial m ar ch on April 27 that
stimulat ed the mov em ent was ostensibly org aniz ed to mark and
mourn th e death of form er pr emier Yu Yaobang . Such publi c
displays of respect and veneration for depart ed leaders (and th e
dead mor e generall y) have deep roots in C hinese politic al cultur e.
By framing the mar ch as an act of public mournin g , mov em ent
organiz ers appropriat ed long-standin g cultural symbols in th e ser-
vice of th e mov em ent. This help s explain both th e larg e size of the
initial march and th e surprising restr aint exe rci sed by Communist
part y leaders in dealing w ith th e stud ents . Th e cultural legitim acy
that attach ed to th e ma rch encour aged parti cip ation w hil e con-
straining official efforts at social con tro l.
Culture and Social Movements
39
ExpandingCulturalOpportunities
as a Stimulus to Action
Scholars such as Charles Tilly (1978), Sid-
ney Tarrow (1994), Doug McAdam (1982), Theda Skocpol (1979),
Jack Goldstone (1991), Hanspeter Kriesi (1990), and Herbert Kit-
schelt (1986), among others, have established the notion that social
movements/revolutions often emerge in response to an ex pansion
in the "political opportunities" available to a particular chall enging
group . The argument is that movements are less th e product of
meso level mobilization efforts than they are th e beneficiari es of
the increasing political vulnerability or receptivity of their oppo-
nents or of the political and economic system as a whole.
Although I generally concur with this view , I think it betrays
a "structural" or "objectivist" bias in many of its specific formula-
tions . It is extremely hard to separate these objective shifts in
political opportunities from the subjective processes of social con-
struction and collective attribution that render them meaningful.
In other words, "expanding political opportunities . .. do not, in
any simple sense, produce a social movement . .. . [Instead] they
only offer insurgents a certain objective 'stru ctur al potential' for
collective political action. Mediating between opportunity and ac-
tion are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their
situations" (McAdam 1982, 48) .
The causal importance of expanding political opportunities ,
then, is inseparable from the collective definitional processes by
which the meaning of these shifts is assigned and disseminated.
Given this linkage, the movement analyst has two tasks: account-
ing for the structural factors that have objectively strengthened
the challenger's hand, and analyzing the processes by which the
meaning and attributed significance of shifting political conditions
is assessed. This latter task prompts speculation about th e exis-
tence and significance of expanding cultural opportunities in the
emergence of collective action . By " expandin g cultural opportuni-
ties" we have in mind specific events or processes that are likely to
stimulate the kind of collective framing efforts mentioned above.
A close reading of the historical literature on social movements
suggests that framing efforts may be set in motion by at least four
distinct types of expanding cultural opportunities .
. The
Ideologicalor Cultural Contradictions first
type of cultural opportunity involves any event or set of events
D oug McAda m
40
that dramatiz e a glaring contradicti on between a hi ghly resonant
cultural valu e and conv entional social practices . Many su ch exam -
ples can be found in th e social mov em ent lit eratur e. For example,
the contrast between th e egalitarian rh etoric an d the sexi st prac-
tices of the early Am erican abolitionist movement have long been
regard ed as an important impetus in th e de velopm ent of th e nine-
teenth-c entury wom en 's rights mo vem ent. As Sara Evans (1980)
and others have argued , much the sam e thing happ ened in regard
to the wom en 's liberati on mov em ent of th e 1960s and 1970s. In
this case, it was the egalitarian rhetori c and forms of sexual dis-
crimination evident within th e civil rights mov em ent and the
whit e student Left that fueled the development of a radical femi-
nist " fram e" legitim ating protest activit y .
On e final exam ple of the facilitating effect of this kind of
ideological or cultur al contradiction can be seen in regard to the
thre aten ed 1940 m arch on Washington . A . Philip Randolph , the
president of the Am erican Association of Sleepin g Car Port ers ,
organiz ed a mass march on Washin gton to prot est discriminator y
labor practi ces in th e defense indu stri es. Th e app aren t spur to
action in this case was th e glaring contradiction between Pr esident
Franklin D. Roosevelt 's gro win g anti-Nazi rhet oric- especiall y its
"master race" philosophy-and his own tacti c acceptance of racial
discrimination at home (Fishel an d Quarl es 1970; Sitkoff 1978).
Suddenly Imposed Grievances. Anoth er cognitive

stimulu s to framing process es comes from what Edward Walsh
(1981) has called " suddenly impos ed grievanc es." Th e term de-
scrib es thos e dram atic , highly publicized , and gen erall y une x-
pect ed events - human-mad e disasters, major court decisions, of-
ficial violence-that increase public awar en ess of and opposition
to previously accept ed societal conditions . As an ex am ple of this
proc ess, Walsh (1981) cites and anal yzes th e gen eration of anti-nu-
clear power activity in the area of Thr ee Mil e Island follo win g a
1979 accident th ere . Bert Useern 's (1980) an alysis of a m ovem ent
in Boston during th e mid 1970s aimed at stoppin g th e busin g of
school childr en to achiev e school desegr egation leaves littl e doubt
that the resistance was set in motion by a highl y publi cized court
order mandatin g busing. H arvey Molotch (1970) documents a
similar rise in prot est activit y among resid ents of Santa Barbara,
California , in th e wake of a major oil spill that took place in 1969.
Culture and Social Mo vements
41
The initial verdict in the Rodney King beating case (Los Angeles ,
California, April 1992) is as another example of a highly dramatic
event spurring protest activity .
Dramatizations of System Vulnerability.Another

"cultural " or "cognitive opportunity" that may stimulate in-
creased framing and other mobilization efforts are those events or
processes that highlight the vulnerability of one's political oppo -
nents. For example, the unanimous 1954 U .S. Supreme Court
decision in Brown v . Board of Education declaring racially segregated
schools unconstitutional convinced many in the black community
of the political and legal vulnerability of the southern system of
segregation and , in turn, accelerated the pace of civil rights orga-
nizing nationwide (Gerber 1962; McAdam 1982).
The collapse of Communist party rule in Poland and the
unwillingness of Mikhail Gorbachev to use military force to sup-
press the Solidarity movement was widely interpreted throughout
Eastern Europe as a sign that all Communist regimes in the region
were in trouble. This is not to deny the deep structural roots of
the crisis in the Soviet Union (see Tarrow 1991), but a crisis needs
to be transparent if it is to serve as a cue for collective action. The
end of communist rule in Poland served as just such a cue. This
pivotal event led, in turn, to increased framing and other mobiliza-
tion activities by reformers in all of the Warsaw Pact countries.
Finally, the ineffectual 1991 coup attempt by Soviet hard-
liners made it clear just how weak and out of touch the once
formidable Communist party bosses had become, thus embolden-
ing citizens from across the USSR to step up demands for political
independence and economic reform .
The Availabilityof Moster Frames. Finally, one

other cultural opportunity has the potential to set in motion fram-
ing efforts and mobilization more generally. This is the availability
of what David Snow and Robert Benford (1988) term "master
protest frames" legitimating collective action . Movement scholars
continue to err in viewing social movements as discrete social
phenomena. Instead, movements tend to cluster in time and space
precisely because they are not independent of one another (McAd-
am and Rucht 1993). To illustrate, the major movements of the
1960s in the United States were not so much independent entities
Doug McAdam
42
as offshoots of a singl e broad activist communit y with its roots
squarely in the civil right s mov em ent (McAd am 1988). One of th e
things that clearly linked the variou s stru ggles during this p eriod
was th e existence of a " m aster prote st frame " that was appro-
priated by each succ eeding in sur gent group . Th e sour ce of this
fram e was the civil rights movement , but in short ord er th e other
major mov em ents of the period used th e ideologi cal understand-
ings and cultural symbol s of the black stru ggle as th e ideational
basis for their efforts as well. Ev ans (1980) has docum ent ed th e
idealogicallculturallinks betw een th e women 's lib eration and civil
rights mov ements , whil e D oug McAdam (1988) has done th e sam e
for the black struggle an d the antiwar and student mov ements .
The ideologic al imprint of th e civil rights m ovem ent is also clear
in regard to th e gay rights, Am eri can Indi an , farm work er s, and
other leftist mo vements of th e period. All of th ese groups, draw-
ing heavily upon the " civil rights mast er frame, " came to defin e
themselves as victims of discrimination and, as such , deservin g of
expanded rights and prot ection under th e law. Th ey m app ed th eir
und erstandings of their own situ ations on th e gen eral fram ework
first put forward by civil rights activist s.
The same point applies w ith equal force to oth er periods of
heightened movem ent activity . Th e rash of studen t mo vem ents
that flourish ed around the globe (for exampl e, in Spain , Mexico ,
Japan , France , Italy , Germany , and th e United States) in 1968 were
clearly attuned to and influenc ed by one anoth er , resulting in the
development and diffusion of a " stu den t left mast er frame " (Ca ute
1988; Katsiaficas 1987).
In similar fashion , the success of Solid arit y in fmall y br eakin g
the Communist party 's fort y-four-y ear monopol y on power in
Poland encour aged other East ern Europ ean dissid ent s to adopt
prodemocracy frames in their own countri es. Th e sam e proc ess
can be seen in th e former Soviet Union , with the succe ss of ind e-
pendence movements in the Baltic states en courag in g th e rise of
ideologically similar ethnic nationalist mov ements in man y of the
other former Soviet republics.
The more general theor etical point is th at suc cessful framin g
efforts are almost certain to inspir e other group s to reinterpret
their situation in light of th e available master fr am e an d to mobilize
based on th eir new und erstanding of th emselv es and th e world
around them . Thu s, the pres en ce of such a fram e constitutes ye t
Cu ltur e and Social Movem ents
43
anoth er cultural or id eological resource that facilit ates m ovem ent
emergenc e.
The Role of Long-Standing Activist Subcultures

inMovement Emergence
Mov ement scholars h ave focu sed a gr eat
deal of attention on th e role of exi sting organization s or associa-
tional network s in th e eme rgen ce of prot est activity (Freem an
1973; Gould 1991; McAdam 1982, 1986; Morris 1984; Ob ersch all
1973; Rosenthal et al. 1985) . This lit eratur e betrays th e " structural
bias " of th e field as a whol e. Virtuall y all of th ese auth ors attribu te
the importance of prior organization to th e concr ete or ganizational
resourc es, that is, lead ers, communi cation network s, and m eeting
places, that such group s pro vid e. Est abli shed organizations, ho w -
ever, are th e sourc e of cultural resources as well .
In other words, what is too often overlooked in structural
accounts of movement emerg en ce is th e ex tent to which thes e
establishe d organizations/n etworks are themselv es embedded in
long -standing activist subcultures capabl e of sustaining th e ide-
ational traditions ne eded to revitaliz e activism following a period
of movement dormancy . These enduring activist sub cultures
function as repositories of cultural materials into w hich succ eeding
generations of activists can dip to fashion ideolo gically similar,
but chronologically separate , movements . To use Ann Swidl er 's
(1986) term , th ese subcultur es repre sent th e specialized "tool kits "
of enduring activist traditions . The pr esenc e of th ese enduring
cultural repertoires fre es new generations of would-be activists
from the nec essity of constructing new mov ement fram es from
whol e cloth . Inst ead, most new movements rest on th e ideation al
and broad er cultural base of ideologically similar past struggl es.
To assert such continuity is to take issue w ith certain new social
movement theorists (Melucci 1989) who hold that th e movements
of the 1960s and 1970s represented a total break with past activism .
That these mo vements extended and modified exi sting activist
traditions is undeniabl e. At the same time, it seems clear that
they were initially rooted in the very traditions they subsequentl y
transcend ed. E xamples of these kinds of cross -gen eration al conti-
nuities in mov ement activity are numerou s.
In all west ern industrial nations , for exampl e, the tradition of
labor activism has serv ed as a broad cultural templat e available
Doug McA dam
44
to succeeding gene ratio ns of worke rs as a resour ce su pporting
m obili zation . In sim ilar fashio n, several gene ra tio ns of Am eric an
peace m ovem ent s have dr awn on a rich p a ci.fi~t tr aditi on , .as ~ur
tur ed and sustaine d by a com bin ation of religiou s den ominat ion s
(for exam ple, Qu aker s and Unitari an s) and secular-hum an ist or-
ganizations (for exam ple, Am erican Friends Ser vic e Com~i~tee
and Fellow ship of Reconcili ation) . At th e o the r end o f th e politic al
spectru m, an endur ing tr adition of an tiim m ig rant an d w hi te su-
prema cist activism has served as a bro ad " to ol ki t" enc ouragi ng
Am eric an righ t- win g m ovem ent s over many gene ratio ns . Fin ally,
in Spain, lon g- standin g separatist tr aditi on s in both Ca talonia and
th e Basqu e region have served as th e wellspr ing from w hic h sev-
eral cycles of nation alist m ovem ent s have flowed (see John ston ,
C hapter 11).
Alth ou gh th e rol e of such lon g-st anding activist subcultures
has received littl e att enti on in studi es of mov em ent eme rgence,
th eir impr int seem s app arent . In his defin itiv e study of th e stru c-
tura l ori gin s of th e Am eri can civil right s m ovem ent , Ald on Mor ris
(1984) docum ent s th e critical contribution m ad e by w hat h e term s
" move ment halfw ay hou ses." Th ese were suc h establishe d orga ni-
zatio ns as the H ighl and er Folk School and the Fellowship of Rec-
onciliation th at , despite in tense repr ession , su staine d earlier tr adi-
tion s of civil rights activism . Th ey were available to play th e ro le
of org aniza tional and cultura l " mi dw ives" in th e " birth" of th e
new mo vem ent .
Leila Rupp and Verta Taylor (1987) provid e a rich , detailed
portrait of th e sur vival of ano ther en dur ing activis t subc ulture -
th at of Am eri can femini sm-dur in g th e long hi atu s between th e
decline of th e suffrage m ovem ent an d th e eme rge nce of th e con-
tempor ary wo me n' s m ovem ent . Lik e Morri s, Rup p an d Taylor
focus on th e cruc ial role of or ganization s an d specific in di vidu als
in nurtu rin g and sust ainin g an activist subc ulture durin g a period
of m ovem ent dorm an cy. Th e result was th e surviva l of a set of
ideas, or ganiz ational pra ctices, and activist tradit ion s th at served
as one of th e important "tool kits " shapin g th e cultur al con tour s
of mod ern Am er ican femini sm .
Enr iqu e Larafia (see C ha pter 9) offers anoth er exa mp le of
cultur al con tin uity in activ ist tradition s. He docum ent s th e histori-
cal persisten ce of Mar xist discours e an d image s of strugg le in one
of th e two w ings of th e Spani sh student move me n t. Howard Kim -
45
meldorf's (1989) comparative study of unionism among East and
West Coast dockworkers has continued to shape the ideology and
practices of the union to the present . Finally, the imprint oflong-
standing traditions of student activism are evident on a number of
American college or university campuses . For example, one of
the best predictors of which colleges and universities contributed
student volunteers to the 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summer proj-
ect was the presence of an active socialist or communist student
organization on campus during the 1930s . It should come as no
surprise that Berkel ey and other colleges such as Antioch and
Oberlin sent large conting ents of volunteers to Mississippi in 1964.
In doing so they wer e merely drawing on and perpetuating the
localized activist subcultures that have long existed on and around
those campuses .
Movement emergence , then , is never simply the result of
some fortuitous combination of macropolitical opportunities and
meso level organizational structures. While important , these fac-
tors only afford insurgents a certain structural potential for suc-
cessful protest activity . Mediating between opportunities and con-
crete mobilization efforts are the shared meanings people bring to
their lives . These meanings, in turn, are expected to be shaped by
the cultural resources and opportunities mentioned above.
The Emergence and Development

of a Movement Culture
An interest in the relationship between so-

cial movements and culture clearly tran-
scends the emergent phase of collective action. Indeed , that rela-
tionship becomes more complicated and potentially more
interesting as the movement develops because the direction of
causal influence in the relationship can run both ways. Not only
will the movement bear the imprint of the broader cultural con-
text(s) in which it is embedded but insurgents are also likely to
develop a distinctive movement culture capable of reshaping the
broader cultural contours of mainstream society .
That such cultures do exist is intuitively clear to anyone who
has participated in any but the most ephemeral of movements .
Social movements tend to become worlds unto themselv es that are
characterized by distinctive ideologies , collective identities , behav-
D oug McA dam
46
ioral routine s, and mat erial cultur es. The m or e thorou gh going th e
goal s of th e mo vement are, the m or e likely it is th at a mov em ent
cultur e w ill develop . This is not sur prisin g. H aving dared to chal-
lenge a particular aspe ct of mainstr eam society , ther e is impli cit
pr essur e on insur gent s to eng age in a kind of so cial eng inee rin g to
suggest rem edies to th e probl em . Th e cha llen ge is to actualize
within th e movem ent th e kind of social arra n geme n ts deem ed
pref erable to th ose th e gro up is opp osing . Again , th e mor e thor-
ou ghg oin g th e change s pr op osed , th e m or e th e tend ency to con -
ceive of th e m ovem ent as an oppositio nal su bcu lture - a kind of
idealized communit y em bo dy ing the m ovem en t' s alterna tive vi-
sion of social life.
Mo vem ent culture s are not static ove r time . H avin g ope ned
up th e qu estion of th e restru cturin g of social arra nge me n ts, th ere
is no guara n tee th at insur gent s w ill confine th eir att en tion to the
specific issues or institution s origina lly tar geted. When thi s hap-
pens, mo vem ents can take on th e cha racter o f h oth ouses of cul-
tur al inno vation . An ythin g an d every thing is op en to crit ical scru-
tin y. C hange becom es th e order of th e day .
At th e m om ent , we lack any real th eor etical or em pirical
und erst andin g of th e proc esses th at sha pe th e on goin g develop-
m ent of distin ctive mo vem ent culture s, an d suc h an und er stan din g
is beyond th e scope of thi s chapt er. We can begin to move in th at
dir ection by calling atten tion to two factor s th at wo uld seem to
influence th e shifting character of a m ovem ent 's culture .
Shiftsin the SocialLocus of the Movement

Social mo vem ent s typi cally develop w ithin
particul ar social and generationa l strata or geo graphic lo cation s.
Th e expectation is that th e culture of th e m ovem ent wi ll, at least
initiall y, reflect th ese social, gene rational, and geog raphic ori gins.
Movements are hardl y th e prop ert y of th ose p opul ation seg m ent s
who gave them life in th e first pl ace. On th e con tra ry, it is not
uncommon for th e locu s of prot est activ ity to shi ft ove r th e life of
a movem ent . As su ch shifts occ ur, we sho uld see a shif t in th e
ideational and mat erial cultur e of th e m ovem ent th at reflects th e
new class, region al, generation al, or o the r so cial loci of th e
mov em ent .
On e exa m ple of this pr ocess com es from Lynn Hunt 's (1984)
definiti ve stud y, Politics, C ulture, and C lass in the French Revolution.
47
Hunt's work documents the dramatic shift in the dominant ideol-
ogy and material symbols of the Revolution that accompanied the
change in the class composition of the movement between 1789
and 1795. Dominated at the outset by the emerging bourgeoisie ,
intellectuals, and even elements of the aristocracy, by 1794-1795
control of the Revolution had passed to artisans, shopkeepers,
lawyers, and other less class-privileged elements of French society .
An equally dramatic shift in the cultural content of a move-
ment occurred in the American civil rights movement during the
decade of the 1960s as a result of a fundamental shift in the class
and geographic loci of protest activity. While the movement ini-
tially developed within the churches and other institutions of the
Southern, urban, black middle class, by the late 1960s its "home"
had shifted to the urban ghettos of a poorer and more secular
Northern black community. Partly in response to this shift, the
ideational and material culture of the movement became less reli-
gious in nature, more explicitly political, and more aggressively
focused on the assertion of a shared and distinctive "cultural na-
tionalism" among black Americans. This is not to say that these
shifts were solely the product of the geographic and social
changes, but they clearly played a part in the broader cultural
transformation that occurred during these years.
Nancy Whittier (1993) provides a final example of the shift-
ing cultural content of a movement in her analysis of generational
replacement in the contemporary women's movement. Whittier
argues persuasively that the very real differences in the cultural
content and "tone " of the current movement have come about
not because the pioneering feminists of the 1960s and 1970s have
changed their collective identities but because new "activist co-
horts" have entered the movement and brought distinctive cultural
styles and identities to the struggle .
PerceivedEffectivenessofthe
Movement'sDominantCore
Successful movements tend to be fairly het-
erogeneous, drawing adherents from a variety of subgroups
within the population. These subgroups will vie for cultural as
well as strategic political influence over the movement . At anyone
time, however, it is usually possible to identify a particular seg-
ment within the movement as dominant. To the extent that this
Doug McAdam
48
segme nt is w idely perceived as substan tively effective, its cultur al
" package" w ill likely be pr ivileged as well. To th e ex ten t it is seen
as ine ffective, strateg ic and organizational co nt ro l of the m ove-
m ent wi ll likely shift (often follow in g a peri od o f conflict) to
some ot he r contender , th ereb y enhancing th e im por tance of its
cultura l packa ge.
Th e contem po rary women's movemen t in th e Un ited States
affords a prim e exam ple of this ph enom enon . Init ially , th e m ove-
m ent coalesced aro un d radi cal fem inis ts wi th roo ts in both the
Am erican " New Left " an d th e "co un tercu lture" of the 1960s.
Eschewin g form al orga niza tion and lead ership , thi s w ing of th e
m ovem ent pion eered th e use of conscio usness-rais ing gro ups as a
form of activism. As effective as th ese gro ups were in dr awin g
new recruit s into the mo vem ent , th ey came to be seen by m any
as ineffectiv e vehi cles for pur suin g political an d econo m ic change
(Freem an 1973). Partl y as a result of thi s critique, influ enc e over
th e m ovem ent gradually shift ed to an olde r, m or e politi cally and
or ganization ally convention al gro up of wome n w ho we re affili-
ated w ith th e Nati on al Or ganization for Wom en (NO W). Th e
results of thi s shift were cultura l as mu ch as poli tical an d orga niza-
tion al, with th e countercultura l affinities of th e radi cal w ing grad-
ually giving way to th e m or e conve ntio nal, pr ofession alized ethos
of NOW loyalists.
The Cultural Consequences of Movements
In assessing th e imp act of socia l move-

m ent s, scho lars h ave ten ded to focus th eir
attention narro wl y on politi cal or eco nomic conse quences . Given
the central importan ce attache d to politi cal o r eco nom ic change
by most social m ovem en ts, thi s is cer tain ly an im po rtan t top ic for
system atic investigation . At th e same tim e, resist an ce to signifi-
cant politic al or econom ic change is likel y to be suffic ien tly int ense
as to mut e the mat erial effects of all but the most success ful m ove-
m ent s. As many comm ent ator s have not ed , even a m ovem ent as
br oad based and widely suppo rted as th e Am er ican civ il rights
m ovem ent failed to effect th e fund am ent al redi str ibuti on in politi-
cal and eco nom ic power th at it ult im ately soug ht . T he opposi tion
of th e polit ical and econo m ic establishme nt to such a redi stribu-
Culture and Social Mo vements
49
tion was simply too strong and too united to permit its occur -
rence.
Given the entrenched political and economic opposition
movements are likely to encounter, it is often true that their big-
gest impact is more cultural than narrowly political and economic.
Although the topic has never been systematically studied , the ex-
amples of movement-based cultural change would seem to be nu-
merous and extraordinarily diverse . What follows is an impres-
sionistic survey of some of these many changes . It is not
exhaustive; it merely reflects the richness and diversity of the
forms of cultural innovation that may be the result of movement
dynamics .
As Ralph Turner reminds us (see Chapter 4), social move-
ments have been the source of some of the most transformative
ideologies or belief systems the world has ever known. We would
do well to remember that Christianity, Islam, the Protestant Ref-
ormation, and subsequent sectarianism began life as the organizing
frames for specific socia l movements. In many other cases, move-
ments served as the principal vehicles by which belief systems,
derived elsewhere, were modified and extended . So, for example,
Marxist thought was profoundly shaped and deepened by figures
associated with both the Russian (Lenin, Trotsky), Chinese (Mao
Zedong, Jou Enlai, Lin Biao), and Cuban (Castro , Che Guevara)
Revolutions. Through such figures as Voltaire and Rousseau in
France and Thomas Paine and Thomas Jefferson in the American
colonies , the French and American Revolutions had a similar im -
pact on Enlightenment thinking .
Specific social movements can also give rise to what Snow
and his colleagues (1986) call "master protest frames"; that is,
ideological accounts legitimating protest activity that come to be
shared by a variety of social movements. So, as noted earlier, the
civil rights movement advanced a "civil rights" master frame that
was, in turn, adopted by other movements as the ideological
grounding for their efforts. These movements include the wom-
en's, gay rights, handicapped rights, and animal rights move-
ments . The various revolutions in Eastern Europe have appro-
priated the "democracy frame" first advanced by the Solidarity
movement in Poland.
Social movements have also served historically as the source
for new collective identities within society. For example, the iden -
Doug McAdam
50
titi es Christian and Muslim eme rged in th e contex t of social move-
m ents . So, too, did that of th e " wo rk ing class" via th e labor
mov ement . In a more cont empor ar y vein , th e iden tity of "f emi -
nist " grew out of the mod ern wom en 's mo vem ent. Ind eed , man y
propon ents of the new social m ovem ents perspe ctive (Ingl ehart
1981, 1990; Melucci 1980, 1989; Off e 1985; Tour aine 1981) argu e
that what is " new" about th e new social mo vem ents-including
th e women 's movement -is th e centr al importan ce th ey attach to
th e creation of new collecti ve ident ities as a fund am ental goal of
the movem ent. In fact , social m ovem en ts h ave alw ays serv ed this
function , w hether it was an explicit go al of th e mo vem ent or an
unintend ed consequen ce of stru gg le.
Social movem ent s h ave also been a force for inn ovation in
strateg ic action forms. Wh at began as eme rge n t and often illegal
tactics in yesterday' s m ovement s oft en becom e legitimat e, institu -
tion alized form s of politics in later yea rs. Th e strike an d the sit-
in are two exampl es. Both tacti cs were pion eered in th e labor
movement , but later came to be recogniz ed as legitimat e forms of
action by various groups . Elisab eth Cl em ens (1993) argues that
th e cont emporary importanc e of lobb ying owe s hi storicall y to its
successful and legitimating use by wo me n activists in the period
from 1880 to 1920.
Throughout history , social m ovem ents have also function ed
as a source of new material cultural items . Hunt' s (1984) cultural
analysis of th e French Revolution m akes clear th e ex ten t to w hich
popular symbols and the mat erial culture of Franc e we re trans-
form ed during th e Revolution . Virtu ally all political revolutions
usher in cultural revolutions as well. Th e Chin ese Revolution , for
exam ple, set in motion a thoroughgoin g state effort to fashion a
popular culture compatible with th e ideals of the mo vem ent . The
same thing has occured more recentl y in Ir an , wi th th e Islamic
Revolution ushering in a period of intens e anti-W est ern feeling
leading to the whol esale rejection of West ern -st yle consum er
goods and other cultural items. Ironicall y , th e revers e process is
currently und erway in the Soviet Union , with th e popular rejec-
tion of th e Communist party en coura gin g a simult aneous process
of Western -style cultura l liberaliz ation and ex perim en tation.
Revolutions are not th e only forc e that exe rt a pow erful trans -
formative effect on the mat eri al cultur e of a soci ety . For example ,
th e 1964 Mississippi Freedom Summ er Proj ect gave early exp res-
51
sion to a number of specific cultural items that came to be associ-
ated with the 1960s counterculture (McAdam 1988). In general, as
authors such as Morris Dickstein (1989) have shown, the counter-
culture and the movements of the 1960s had a profound effect on
American popular culture. Dress and hairstyles, popular music,
movies, dance, and theater were powerfully affected by the politi-
cal turbulence of the era . The roots of the "drug culture" can also
be found in the political and cultural movements of the 1960s.
Language was affected; "black English" made inroads into popu-
lar English, and the feminist critique of the traditional vernacular
prompted efforts to fashion more gender-neutral modes of ex-
preSSIOn.
Similar linguistic "insurgencies" are currently under way
elsewhere . In the Canadian province of Quebec, French-speaking
separatists affiliated with the Parti quebecois have succeeded in
making French the official provincial language . In Catalonia, sepa-
ratists continue to press for the same designation for Catalan,
underscoring their resolve by painting over street signs in Castilian
with the equivalent word or phrase in Catalan.
To round out this survey, mention should be made of the
effect of social movements on the culture and practices of main-
stream institutions in society . In his thorough study of the impact
of liberation theology on the Latin American Catholic church,
Christian Smith (1991) provides a fascinating example of this proc-
ess. Inspired in part by the spread of communist movements in
the region, the liberation theology movement spawned a kind of
revolution within the church that is still being waged today. In the
United States, the movements of the 1960s have had a dramatic
effect on the structure and curricular content of higher education
in the United States. Structurally, the political turbulence of the
era led to the establishment of African American, Native Ameri-
can, Hispanic, and women's studies programs on many college
and university campuses . In addition, the heightened awareness of
minorities spawned by the movements has resulted in far mor e
curricular attention to minority groups in social science and hu-
manities courses.
The forms of cultural change that flow from social move-
ments are many and varied, and we know little about which fac-
tors or characteristics of movements account for the extent of
their cultural impact. As a first approach to the question, I would
Doug McAdam
52
emphasiz e the role of four factors in m edi ating th e cultural cons e-
quen ces of social mo vem ent s. Th ese factor s are: th e ex tensivene ss
of the mov em ent 's goals , th e mov em ent' s suc cess in att aining
those goals , the ext ent to whi ch th e mov em ent results in pro-
longed and m eaningful contact betw een two pr eviousl y segr egated
groups, and th e extent of the mov em ent 's access to exis ting cul-
tur al elites in society .
Breadth of the Movement's Goals

All oth er thin gs bein g equal, th e more ex-
tensive its goals , th e mor e likel y th at a mo vem ent w ill be a forc e
for cultural change . Given this understanding , it is not surprising
th at all of the exam ples of cultural change menti oned in th e pr evi-
ous section are the pr odu cts of mo vem ent s w hose go als we re very
bro ad. Revolutionar y movem ents h ave th e broadest goals; th ey
seek nothing less than th e replacem ent of an exi sting political ,
econom ic, and soci al ord er. Accordingl y , of all typ es of move-
ment s, revoluti ons typic ally have th e grea test p otenti al for stimu-
lating significant cultural change. Giv en their fundam ental inter est
in replacin g th e old regim e, insurgents will almost invariably seek
to destro y th e cultur al exp ressions of the old order an d substitut e
a new revolutionar y cultur e in its place (Gram sci 1971) . At the
oth er end of th e revolution to reform continuum, mov em ents of
the narrow reform variety typically exert little cultural force. For
exam ple, the curr ent anti-drunk driving m ovem ent ha s but a few
if any cultural , as oppos ed to legal or politi cal, implications . Its
goals are simply so narrow and so specific as to rule out any
broader cultural critique of American soci ety .
The Degree of Success Achieved by the Movement

History , as th e old saying go es, is writt en
by th e winners. Th e sam e is tru e for all major forms of cultural
expr ession . A second det ermin ant , th erefore , of th e cu ltur al im-
pact of a mo vem ent is th e degr ee to w hi ch th e mo vem ent is suc-
cessful politically . Following Mar x (1977) , it would seem to be the
case that cultur al dominance rests , to a larg e ex tent , on a firm
political and econom ic base. Accordingl y , I hypoth esize that the
cultural impa ct of a mo vem ent w ill be com me n sur ate w ith the
sub stantiv e political an d econom ic su ccess it achi eves. A gain, this
is most eviden t in th e case of su ccessful revolution s, w he rein the
53
victors move to eradicate the cultural, as well as political, vestiges
of the old regime and to popularize cultural forms expressive of
the new revolutionary order. At the other extrem e, movements
that fail to achieve any political leverage typicall y leave few cultural
traces behind.
Contactbetween Previously SegregatedGroups

Those movements that have been especially
important as sources of cultural innovation would seem to be those
that resulted in meaningful , that is, egalitarian , contact between
previously segregated social strata. The significance of this kind
of contact-the interaction between what Harrison White (1991)
calls two "value streams" -is its potential to produce a new cul-
tural hybrid based on the two subcultures present in the move-
ment. Movements of this type have been among the most impor-
tant in human history.
The early Christian movement represented a unique cultural
hybrid based on a merger of a rural ascetic Jewish tradition with
that of urban Hellenized Jews and Romans throughout the eastern
Mediterranean. The Indian independence movement facilitated
unprecedented contact between the untouchables and the most
privileged Indian castes . The result was not simply political suc-
cess but a period of unusual cultural ferment as well . Finally, for a
brief period of time , the American civil rights movement encour-
aged egalitarian contact between black civil rights activists and
the white student left . In large measure , the roots of the 1960s
counterculture are found in the distinctive cultural hybrid that
grew out of this contact (McAdam 1988).
Tiesto EstablishedCulturalElites
The final factor that can be exp ected to
shape the broader cultural impact of a movement is the extent to
which it is linked to established cultural elites in society. One of
the commonplace observations concerning the cultural ferment of
the 1960s was that it represented "culture from the bottom up ."
Instead of cultural innovation flowing , as it normally does , from
an established cultural elite downward through society, it seemed
to emanate from groups whose impact on mainstream culture is
ordinarily quit e small. What this observation misses is the fact that
the groups in question had unusually strong ties to established
D oug McAdam
54
cultural elites, thus granting th em mor e access to th e means of
cultural production than they o rdin arily wo uld have had. The ties
forg ed in th e early days of th e mo vem ent between civ il rights
activist s and segments of th e North ern intell ectual and cu ltural
elite afforded blacks incr eased opportuniti es for cultural influ ence.
Th e white stud ent left, dominated as it was by middl e- and upp er-
middl e-class youth, enjoy ed considerable access to th e mean s of
cultural expression via th eir parents and othe r influ enti al adult s to
w hom th ey were dir ectly or indir ectly link ed . Gene rally, thos e
mo vem ents that are eithe r ro ot ed in cultur ally pri vileged classes
or that are able to forg e such links are lik ely to h ave a greater
imp act on th e cultura l contour s of main str eam so ciety than thos e
m ovem ents th at rem ain fundam ent ally isol ated from th e estab -
lished m ean s of cultural producti on .
Conclusion
Wh at I offer here is th e m ost prelimin ary

statem ent of th e relation ship bet ween cul-
tur e and social m ovem ents . Th e topi c is compl ex and multif ac-
eted. Th ese are the beginnin gs of w ha t I hop e w ill be an ongoin g
discour se on th e subject by both m ovem ent schol ars an d cultural
analysts. Onl y by encourag in g such a discours e can we hope to
mo ve toward a full er und er standin g of thi s relationship and m ove
beyond th e curr ent stru ctur al and ration alist biases ev ident in the
cont emporary movement literatur e.
A cknow ledg ments: Thi s chapter was com pleted while I was a Fellow at th e Cen ter
for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. Parti al sup po rt for th e year at the
Center was provid ed by the N ation al Science Foun dation (BNS -8700864) . I
would also like to than k Di ck Flacks, Hank John ston , Enr iqu e Laraiia, Dieter
Rucht , D avid Snow , and Sidn ey Tarrow for th eir ex tremely helpful com ments
on various dr afts.
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Chap ter 3
The Reflex ivity of Social

Movements: Co llective
Behavior and Mass Society
T heo ry Revisited
Joseph R. Gusfield
C oncepts and theories in the so cial sciences

are mark ed by a distinctive thriftin ess . Few
are was ted. Fashiona ble for a while , the y are criticiz ed, discarded ,
and then, sometime later , th ey are salvaged from the ash can of
ideas and rev ived, often in new cont exts and with new po lish on
th em . In this chap ter , I examin e some charac teristics of contempo -
rar y social movemen ts . In m y view , collective behavior and mass
society th eories, partia lly discr edit ed in curr ent thinkin g about
social mov ements, can be very useful in exam inin g certain mo ve-
m ents and some aspects of m any othe rs. This is espec ially th e case
in th e cont ext of recent thinkin g about the " new social mo ve-
ments ."
I do not sugg est yet anoth er tot alizin g paradi gm th at seeks
to destro y th e usefuln ess of all exis ting persp ecti ves in an effort to
enter a claim to a monop olisti c ow ne rshi p of th e entire tur f of
"socia l m ovement s." I have no th eor y for all season s.
D efinitions of social m ovem ents and th eori es abo ut th em
abo un d in sociolog y . Th e textb ooks are filled w ith th e n am es of
theori es and theorists, each purportin g to pro vid e th e defmiti ve
way of thinking about and of study ing th e subj ect m att er of the
field . But definitions and th eori es, especi ally in thi s area, bear a
relation to th e objects and hi stori cal co ntex ts th at elicit cur iosity
and attention (Gusfield 1978). In part , argu me n ts abo ut differin g
perspecti ves are reactions to th e different questions th at ana lysts
are asking abo ut differ ent ph enom ena . In man y respects all of us
are a littl e lik e the fam ed six blind Asian Indi an s in th e classic
Reflexivity of Social Mo vements
59
parable . Each places his hand on a different part of the elephant
and each, as a consequence, describes a different kind of animal.
Our arguments about theories are as much arguments about what
is worth studying and in reference to what intellectual, social , or
political problem as they are about the behavior of that which
we study .
The interest in social movements has been occasioned in gr eat
degree by attention to reformist and dissident mobilization of par-
tisans into organized attempts to change the institutional and polit-
ical structure of a society. Studies oflabor movements, of political
movements and ideologies , and of religious dissidence and sect ar-
ian development have abounded in Europe and in the United
States . Much attention has been given to major ideological parti -
sanship , such as communism, fascism , liberalism, and socialism .
Research has been fueled by the emergence of current events. The
emergence of German fascism led to a generation occupied with
the problem of the requisites for democracy and the decline of
liberalism . The rise of student protest and civil violence in th e
1960s prompted a concern for the problem of the conditions of
protest and riot (Gusfield 1978).
It is not that social studies mirror historical events or that
they are directed toward a particular resolution of political issues,
rather, the development of historical actions poses probl ems of
scholarly attention. Concern for understanding the roots of social
violence became a major scholarly pursuit in the wake of the riots
and demonstrations of the 1960s in the United States.'
The emergence in the 1970s and 1980s of movements con -
cerned with such matters as the ecology of the planet, nuclear
protest, gender equality , gay rights, animal rights, and new reli-
gions has seemed perplexing to old er schemes of understanding,
which have been directed toward relatively organized collectivi-
ties. Current scholarship focuses on efforts to understand the con-
ditions of em ergence , development , and disappearance of new
social movements. The y have constituted an anomaly, a puzzle for
earlier formulations and paradigms . In this sense, th ere has been a
Kuhnian motion in which a normal scienc e has found it difficult
to encompass new data in old theories (Kuhn 1962).
Joseph R. Gusfield
60
Social Movements as Associations
and as Meanings
Collective behavior and mass society theo-
ries are criticized for their failure to con-
sider the importance of the mobilization of partisans into orga-
nized, collective action. Such action is posited essential to the
emergence and effectiveness of movements (Oberschall 1973; Tilly
1978; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984). This criticism has been espe-
cially striking in the development of rational choice and resource
mobilization approaches (Tilly 1978; McCarthy and Zald 1973). It
has also been central to my own past criticism of mass society
perspectives (Gusfield 1962).
Collective behavior and mass society theories on one hand
and resource mobilization theories on the other reflect two diverse
images of the elephant we call social movements. The distinction
has been nicely put by Alberto Melucci (1989, 17-20). He refers
to collective behavior theories as "actors without action." He re-
fers to resource mobilization theories as "actions without actors."
I view these differences as those that emphasize movements as the
emergence of new meanings and those that emphasize movements
as collectively organized actions . The first places an emphasis on
ideas; the second on organizations.
A great deal of the study of social movements has been the
study of people organized into associations. The National Organi-
zation for Women, the American Federation of Labor , the Hare
Krishnas, or the Southern Christian Leadership Conference have
been central in social movement analysis in the United States. So
conceived, the study of a movement is preeminently the study of
the actions and reactiona to associations, of people organized into
a coordinated structure . The resources mobilization theory has
emphasized this image and focused analysis on the strategy of
mobilization and action as rational means for attaining fixed goals
(McCarthy and Zald 1973,1977; Tilly 1978; Olson 1971).
The collective behavior approach, as developed by Herbert
Blumer and later by Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian, focused on
the emergence and construction of new norms of social relation-
ships and new meanings of social life (Blumer 1939; Turner and
Killian 1987; Turner 1981). These new meanings emerged from
Reflex ivity of Social Movemen ts
61
processes in which people , in interaction with each oth er , develop
new conceptions of justice and injustice, or morality and immoral-
ity, or the real and the fictitious . So conc eived , the subject matter
of social movements is the appearance of new constructions of
rights, of procedures , of norms, of beliefs . To speak of feminism
or New Age movements is to plac e the stress of analysis on th e
growing adoption of an idea, an identit y, a way of conc eivin g a
situation. Associations and organizations are instan ces and em -
bodiments of meanings .
Resource mobilization theorists critiqued this imager y. Th ey
sought to bring the imag e of association from th e background
into the light of the foreground. They emphasiz ed the importanc e
of the mobilization of partisans or others into th e association al
contexts without which the ideas would remain ineffective and
unrealized. From the point of view of collective behavior theorists ,
what was important about a movement was its cons equ ences for
change. For resourc e mobilization theorists , the movement had to
be studied as a form of organizational behavior , that is, gathering
and utilizing resourc es (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977; Jenkins
1983). Complementing the approach of the resourc e mobilization
paradigm , the economic analysis of Mancur Olson and th e delin-
eation of th e " free rid er " probl em has had a major influence on
thinking about social mov ements (Olson 1971). Whether analysts
agreed with it or not, Olson 's work focused attention on individ-
ual goals and rational considerations. It brought ut ilitarian consid-
erations of costs and benefits into th e picture (Handler 1978) . In
throwing the light of deductive economic logic on the inductiv e
analyses of sociologists , it mad e the question of how and wh er e
movements obtain resources a major question (Till y 1978).
These highly warranted criticisms of collectiv e behavior th e-
ory have led to an implicit deemphasis on ideas and changing
meanings as pi votal to the und erstanding of many mov ements.
Yet, a focus on organizational and associational eleme n ts are insuf-
ficient tools for und erstanding diffuse and oft en apolitical new
social mov em ents. The recent mov ements that have piqu ed the
interest and attention of many sociologists oft en have not display ed
a clear relationship to utilitarian int erests , formed organiz ational
agents , created com m unal sects , or em erged as attem pt s to alter
existing institutions. What have com e to be kno wn as " new soci al
Joseph R . Gusfield
62
m ovem ent s" are , in one or ano the r of these featur es, distingu ished
from th e m odel of th e social mo vem ent as socio log ists have por-
trayed th em in th e past (Co hen 1985; Ed er 1985; Melucci 1985;
Off e 1985). Oth ers , usin g different designati on s, have pres ent ed
sim ilar conceptualizations stressing th e class or oth er structural
an d cultur al characteristics o f contem p orary mov em ents (Gusfield
1979a; Turn er 1969) .
It is imp ortant to clarif y th e distin ction between mo vem ents
seen as associa tions and m ovem ent s seen as ideas o r meanin gs.
Th e labor m ovem en t and its spec ific orga nizat ions are a mod el of
associational unit s th at com prise a m ovem ent . Th ere are m emb ers
and nonm emb ers, th ere are pr ogr am mat ically sta ted goa ls, an d an
int ern al or ganization th at constitutes a hier arch y of office-holding
leaders and a rank and file of m emb ers . In con tras t, w hi le th ere
are organiz ation s that are part of th e wo me n's m ovem ent , th ey are
only a part of th e diffu se goals, th e pro cess of mobilizin g partisans ,
th e locus of partisan ship. Being a m emb er or non m ember is not
const itute d by a specific act but refers to typ es of id eational com-
mitment. Th e action of th e m ovem ent h as its locu s in a multipli c-
ity of events , often th at of indivi duals. T he m ovem ent thri ves in
every day in terac tion as well as in th e con text of collective action
in instituti on s and toward th e state .
Thi s typ ology of im ages is, like most , to o definiti ve. Mo st
movem ents do both : take an association al form an d a form in the
spr ead of new meanings . Some mov em ents involv e on e form to a
greater ex tent than th e oth er. The civil rights mo vem ent , while
emphasizin g collecti ve actio n of orga ni zation s, was also a m ove-
m ent th at change d both w hite and bla ck con ceptio ns of w hat is
just and w hat right s are legitimate and pos sibl e. Its m ajor thrust
was to ward th e reform of instituti ons , but it has sig nifica ntly af-
fected racial identiti es and self-co nce ptions. Th e wo me n' s m ove-
m ent has its org ani zational side but is even mor e saliently a mo ve-
m ent tow ard a chan ge in conc ept ion s of wom en an d fem ale right s
relative to m en . As such , it exists both insid e and out side associa-
tiona I or organizational ph ases . Som e movem ents , notabl y the
" hippie" mov ement or th e ph ysi cal fitn ess mo vem ent h ave no as-
sociational or org anizational exis tence at all. Yet , th ey manif est a
sha red dir ection , a set of goa ls, and a sha re d conce ptio n of w hat is
right and ju st as well as a pr ocedur e to obtain suc h goa ls.
Reflex ivity of Social Mo vements
63
Utopianism of Social Movements:
Back to the Future
Am I putting irreconcilables together? Why

place the "hippie" movement, an unorga-
nized phenomenon with little overt social conflict, in the same
sociological bin as the abortion or antiabortion movement or th e
civil rights movement? Certainly, for many purposes, they are
radically different. Yet all three are perceived and talked about as
"movements." (That they are so perceived is important to my
analysis below.) Two considerations prompt this procedure .
First, the quality of deliberateness, of a socially shared and
conscious search for change has been the hallmark of phenomena
labeled "social movements " (Gusfield 1970). The imagination of
a future as a new way of behaving is common to both movements.
It has distinguished the social movement, as an instrument for
producing change, from those changes that occur without specific
direction or plan. A changing birthrate is an example of un-
planned, non deliberative change; it arises from the consequences
of multiple acts without mutual awareness of others. The sources
of change through movements implies the imagination of the fu-
ture and the attempt to realize imagined states . It is an imagination
that is perceived as shared; it recognizes a solidarity of partisans
against a defined opposition . Even without organizational affilia-
tions, peopl e can be "feminists," "women's libbers, " "hippies ,"
or "New Age freaks . "
Imagining an alternative to the present is the utopian element
in all social movements. Social movements become issues about
change or the repelling of change in ways that are broader than
individual , idiosyncratic choices. The movement produces a state
of choice , of decision between what has been accepted and even
enforced and what is now conceived as unacceptable . What may
have been unthinkable is now thinkable and possible. Once set in
motion, the " hippie" movement provided a socially shared and
supported choice of life-style where such social support had not
existed (Berger 1982). It is further distinguished from an individu-
ally chosen life-style where the knowledge and supportive exam-
ple of others is absent or not influential. Even where action is not
collective in the sense of organized and interactive , it nevertheless
occurs with the knowledge that others are acting similarly . The
Joseph R. Gusfield
64
" hippie" m ovem ent becam e su ch as in dividuals becam e aware,
thro ug h readin g and thro ug h per son al acco un ts of othe rs, th at
new sty les of livin g and new op po rtuni ties for actio n were
eme rgmg .
Second , w hile assoc iatio nal struc ture and cultura l mean ings
are typ ological distin ctions , in pr actice, few m ovem ent s are en-
tir ely one or th e othe r. Even if a move me n t lack s overt conflic t, it
enge n ders contention about possibiliti es an d cho ice between alter-
natives. It repr esents social relations an d culture in possible tr ansi-
tion. Th e gay rights m ovem ent , w hic h h as its or ganiz ational mani -
festation , also exis ts in daily jud gm ent s th at pose new issues for
hom osexu als and heterosexu als as to how the y are to id entif y
th emsel ves and others. Self- con sciou s and del ib er ate ch oice is be-
ing m ade against a back gr ound of awarenes s of m ovem ent s. In
this way th ey affect and influ enc e mor e than their m emb ers and
oppo nents (Greenberg 1988; D'Emili o 1983) .
Social Movements: Linear and Fluid
It is useful to m ake a distin ction between

linear and fluid m ovem ent s (Gusfie ld
1981b). Linear mo vem ents pr esent th e im age of a straight line
narr ative. Th e m ovem en t is a m eans tow ard an en d . Th e labor
m ovem ent and indi vidu al labor union s are exa m ples . T he m ove-
m ent is per ceived as associa tiona l. What is studie d are careers.
Th e effort to change br in gs th e m ovem ent int o overt con flict and
extrainstitutionalized action . Being goa l- direc ted , it is assessed in
terms of achieve me nt : Is it successf ul or n ot? H ave new pattern s
of lab or-m anagement relation s been achieve d , or do th e old con-
tinu e? Th e arena of action is publi c. Th e m ovem ent seeks institu-
tion al or politic al change. Th e goa ls of th e mo vem ent are fixed,
and th ey are crafted into pro gr amm atic action .
Fluid movements are mu ch m or e difficult to spec ify. Since
th ey impl y changes in how values and realitie s are conce ived , th ey
occur outside or in addition to orga nized an d dir ected action . Th ey
m ay involve cont ention with othe rs and w ith altern ative me aning s
and con stru ctions . Yet, th ey are less likel y to be dr awn int o such
collective actions as strik es, boycott s, pi ckets , or dem on str ation s.
Th ey occur in th e m yri ad actions of every day life; in m icro and
less publi c acts. It is h arder to iden tify success or failure. Th e
65
women's movement and feminism occur in more than the orga-
nized efforts at constitutional amendment, equal rights legislation,
and affirmative action . They also involve relationships and interac -
tions between men and women in micro and even intimate rela-
tions. The movement occurs in the multiplicity of events where a
conception of women's rights and gender justice have become
Issues.
The distinction is important and has been conceptualized in
different ways by different writers. There is much that is akin to ,
as well as different from, Richard Hacks 's distinction between
history and everyday life. "History is constituted by activity
which influences the conditions and terms of everyday life of a
collectivity" (1988, 3). Yet, by no means is all of everyday life in
history; much of it also creates and is history . My image here is
rather that of the locus of action than the content of ideas or
institutions. The institutional level of a movement is found in the
efforts to change the rules and procedures of organizations and
institutions . Often the state is either the target of change or the
instrument through which the linear movement hopes to gain
change . The animal rights movement or the antinuclear move -
ment are illustrations of linear movements where the effort is
toward protest of current procedures at the levels of the state
and such organizations as research laboratories. Changes in the
institutional rules are the goals of the movement . The animal
rights movement, for example, is an attempt to change procedures
of medical research so that animals are no longer used for research
purposes (Jaspers and Nelkin 1989) .
The everyday or interactive level is more fluid . It may not
even have an organizational base . The "hippie" movement is, per-
haps, a model. Many health movements, such as holistic health
care, are illustrative (Lowenberg 1989). Here there is no organiza-
tional base at all. The dissidence is not directed at changing the
state or an institution. It is concerned with developing alternative
styles of medicine. The movement is found in the set of ideas and
the individual responses to those ideas as they affect life-styles .
Such ideas are promoted through journals and through interac-
tion. Holistic health movements will have little impact on the state,
nor do they seek it . They are dissenting mov ements within medi-
cine, but they do little to change professional medicine , develop
new state laws , or protest current medical or hospital practices .
Joseph R. Gusfield
66
They become arenas of action with little direct conflict with insti-
tutions . They are alternatives to professional medicine; they are
not movements to change the medical institutions. In a sense, then
bypass rather than change institutions .
In what sense are fluid movements socially shared? I examine
this aspect of analysis more carefully below in relation to mass
society theories . For the present, what is involved is action taken
with the recognition that it is not isolated and individualistic. "The
train of thought and action in each individual is influenced more
or less by the action of every other" (Park and Burgess 1967, 225).
If we imagine the interaction between homosexual and heterosex-
ual persons prior to the emergence of the gay rights movement,
we posit a conventionalized set of norms to which people adhere
or behave in idiosyncratic, individualistic forms . Once the move-
ment is set in motion, behavior can no longer be conventionalized .
Behaviors are undertaken with a recognition that alternatives are
both possible and socially legitimated at some level. Homosexuals
attempt to chang e discriminatory laws but also become open about
their identity . Interaction between homosexuals and heterosexuals
takes on a new tone . That interaction need not be direct or face-
to-face . It may exist in the imaginative rehearsals of action that are
fostered by vicarious experience, such as reading or watching
news or dramatic presentations. What is happening is that the
conventional norms of deviance that have guided both homosexu-
als and heterosexuals have come to be doubted and the ir accep-
tance made problematic. What was "tak en for granted" has be-
come an Issue.
Microarenas and Macroarenas:

Collective Behavior Theory Revisited
The distinction between public an d every-

day arenas is significant in two senses. First ,
it indicates the importance of the linear-fluid distinction. Second,
it indicates aspects of contemporar y societ y that accentuate the
fluid elements of social movements . Here , aspects of collective
behavior theory point to an important ch aracteristic of modern
societies that social mov ement an alysis needs to consider.
Both in Park and Burg ess (1967, chap . 15) and in Blumer
(1939), the concept of collectiv e behavior is used as a contrast to
Reflex ivity of Social Movements
67
social organization. Social organization is conv entionaliz ed and
recurrent and provides institutionalized definitions of situations
and expected behavior. Collective behavior is postulated as ele-
mentary social behavior -what occurs when social organization
breaks down: " tho se phenom ena which exhibit in th e mo st obvi-
ous and elementary ways the processes by which soci eties are
disintegrated into their constituent elements and the proc esses by
which these elements are brought togeth er ag ain into new rela-
tions to form new organizations and new soci eties " (Park and
Burgess 1970, 440-41; quoted in Turner 1981, 3).
Where the Chicago School differ ed from the French sociolo -
gists, such as Gustav LeBon, w as in th eir assessment of th e poten-
tialities of collective behavior for social organization . The French
saw crowds through the model of irrati onal, blind , and savage
actors (Barrows 1988) . The Chic ago School saw th em as th e
source of new ideas and new social organizations, that is, as the
basis for the emergence of new norms (Turner and Killian 1987) .
Rather than viewing coll ective behavior as deviant , fearful , and
anomalous, th e Chicago School saw it as the seedb ed of new insti -
tutions. Thus , they could conceive of social movements and fash-
ion as part of the same area called " collective behavior."
The image of society that the collective behaviorists shared
with other sociologists was the classical conception of the inte-
grated community versus the institutionalized society . It was in
disorganization and "social unrest" (what today we might call
"alienation") that movements emerged . Mov ements and th e emer-
gence of new constructions of reality were contrasts to everyday ,
recurrent, and organized social life . The appearan ce of collective
behavior was something to be explained. The sociologists' job
was to study how new patterns of thought and new institutions
emerged from elementary nonorganized actions.
It is at this point that the collective behavior theorists need
revision. The contrast between a normal, established pattern of
routine and one of the creation or construction of new meanings
and institutions is not adequate to the und erstanding of contempo -
rary societies. As a number of sociologists (Gusfield 1979a; Tou-
raine 1977; Melucci 1989) have indicated, social movem ents , heter-
ogeneity, and the presence of alternatives and choices is as much a
pattern of contemporary life as is the model of social organization .
Collective behavior is not an abnormal aspect of social life, it is a
Joseph R . Gusfi eld
68
part of mod ern life. The general increases in income and discre-
tionary time as well as the improvements in communication and
transportation effect large areas of life; everyday life operates with
varying degrees of freedom from the constraints of institutional
organization . Richard Hacks (see Chapter 14) suggests that in the
United States political parties are diminishing as centers of politi-
cal power and innovation . Increasingly , he argues, social move-
ments are supplanting established political parties as the focus of
political activity .
A rigid view of social organization as " social fact" is giving
way to a view of social order as a product and subject of deliberate
action by members in what Alain Touraine calls "the self-produc-
tion of society ."
The sociolog y of social mov ements cannot be separated from a
repr esentation of society as a system of social forces competing for
control of a cultural field .... This sociology of action ceases to
believe that conduct must be a response to a situation, and claims
rather than the situation is merel y th e changing and unstable result
of relations betw een the actors who , through their social conflicts
and via their cultural orientations, produce society. (Touraine
1981,30)
Social Movements as Sign and Symbol:

The Reflexivity of Social Movements
Such critical considerations imply a revi-
sion of the collective behavior approach .
Collective behavior is not an island in a sea of organized, conven-
tional , and static human behavior. Social choices and social move -
ments are deeply embedded in daily interaction. Change, conflict ,
and reassessment are constant aspects of human societies .
The collective behavior image of movements has reappeared
in recent years in the attention given to movements as forms of
framing (Snow and Benford 1988, 1992; Gamson 1992). Attention
is given to the cognitive force of movements in defining events and
in the social construction of objects toward which the movement is
oriented. "Frame" is a vernacular term generally associated with
paintings and photographs . "Frame" applied to everyday conduct
IS a means of defining situations and objects. Except in Hindu
meditation, experi ence is never "pure"; it is an experience of
Reflex ivity of Social Movem ents
69
something . That something involves a definition or m eaning
given to phenomena . "Definitions of a situation are built up in
accordance with principles of organization which govern events-
at least social ones-and our subjective involvement in them :
frame is the word I use to refer to such of these basic elements as I
am able to identify" (Goffman 1974, 10-11; see also Bateson
1972). The concept of framing is a recognition that the m eaning
of events may mak e for differing experiences of the "same " data.
What is centrally attended to by one kind of interest or audience
may not be attended to at all by another. As Erving Goffman
suggests , "There is a sense in which what is play for the golfer is
work for the caddy " (1974, 8).
Social movements are involved in constructing the experien ce
of partisans and would-be partisans through the ways in which
they define and describe the arena of their int erest. The current
abortion and anti-abortion movements are examples of how th e
"same" actions are differently framed . Th e terms "pro-life " and
"pro-choice" conjure up diff erent images of the abortion issue and
relate it to different clusters of other issues and movements (Luker
1984). In this form , change has a significant ideational component .
Awareness that norms and meanings are at issue and in con-
tention is itself a step in the development of change. From this
standpoint, social movements have a reflexive character. Th ey are
something members of a society reflect on, think about, and are
aware of. In attending to movem ents, members of a society recog -
nize that social rules are at issue (Gus field 1981b). Even where no
association exists, as in the " hi ppie" movement," the recognition
that a similarity of actions is occurring creates the movement. The
very existence of a movement is itself a model of framing: It pres-
ents an area of life as at issue where it had previously been accepted
as the norm . Alternatives now exist where choice and cont ention
were absent.
In one sense , a social movement exists when members of a
society share the recognition that specific social rules are no longer
taken for granted. In th e United States , the movem ent connected
with laws against child abuse, both sexual and phys ical, has made
the treatment of children by parents or other family members a
matter of issue . What constitutes the "proper " behavior of parents
to children has taken on a variety of n ew meanings . Att ention and
notice is taken of behavior that in the past was eith er unnotic ed o r
Joseph R . Gusfield
70
unmentioned . Degrees and content of affection and of physica l
discip line have becom e matt ers to think about and to calculate.
The relations betw een parent and child that were less open to state
intervention are now legitimatel y reg ulated by law as well as by
community opinion .
What takes place in the organiz ed activities of many move -
ments is significant in its stat ed goals and as an indication of what
has become pu blic accep tanc e or rejection of alternative possibi li-
ties. Success is m easur ed no t only by victory or defeat in legisla-
tive, bargaining or legal arenas bu t also in how the movemen t has
chang ed th e rules that are admissibl e in public arenas . As such a
movement may support or undermine action at the interactiona l
level, at the level of everyd ay life (Gusfield 1981b). The struggle
over abortion in th e U nit ed States is symbolically a struggle about
the place of women relati ve to men (Luker 1984) . Even local move -
ments , for examp le, efforts to ch an ge str eet names in som e cities
from an existin g nam e to on e honoring Martin Luth er King , come
to symbolize th e relativ e place of blacks in th e American social
orde r. In a paradoxical sense , social movements occur when they are
perceived to be occurring . Th e existen ce of or ganiz ed mo vements or
the monitoring of even ts to sugg est a movement in action can
create the recognition that some accept ed patt ern of social life is
now in conten tion; it has becom e an issu e.
Insofar as movements possess a fluid rath er tha n a linear qual-
ity, the question of membership is also fluid. Movemen ts can have
cons equenc es and influ ence behavior without the kind of commit -
ment or ideologica l agreem ent that is often posited for th em . Fre-
quently, we develop labels to identify memb ers, for example,
"wom en' s libbers" or " peacenik s. " Movements may achieve stated,
forma l goals with little effect on the every day behavior they seek to
transform (Handler 1978), just as they may fail to achieve major
political goals whil e deeply affecting everyday behavior.
The Communication of Social Movements:

Monitoring the Society
Mov ements exist along at least two dimen -
sions . On one level, they are events and
proc esses seekin g, in a more or less delibera te fashion , to prod uce
chang e in the po litica l or institutiona l characte r of the society . On
Reflexivity of Social Movements
71
another level, they are signs that a segment of social life is poten-
tially under challenge and alternatives are possible (Melucci 1989).
Something that may have been unthinkable is now thinkable. They
have significance for those who engage in their activities, but they
may have significance also for those who become aware of them.
They symbolize the transformation of a fixed social organization
into an issue . Whether they are perceived as "right " or "wrong,"
they are perceived as in flux and in contention .
"Society" is not only the result of face-to -face interaction or
of institutionally organized rules . It also exists as an object of
observation and reflection (Gusfield 1979b) . In this fashion, it ex-
ists at a distance from most observers . To perceive it requires
organization and specialized institutions and their functionaries . It
has to be monitored and constructed in the process of being moni -
tored.
It is difficult to overestimate the influence of major communi-
cations industries and widespread formal education in understand-
ing contemporary social movements. While they monitor events
they also construct a more general sense of how events coalesce.
The "hippie" movement, for example, could not be perceived as
a movement without an agency that framed a set of individual
events as a movement. Mass media are significant sources of the
process of framing movements; of interpreting individual events
as movements of change (Snow et al. 1986) . Television news , for
example, puts together the separately occurring events and frames
them as a unity , as a movement of a particular kind. Whether
movements are relatively organized or not , their depiction by the
mass media influence both their understandings and those of less
partisan observers in the audiences .
In the process of constructing the reality of the society, mass
media do more than monitor : They dramatize. They create vivid
images, impute leadership, and heighten the sense of conflict be-
tween movements and the institutions of society (Gitlin 1980;
Ericson, Baranek, and Chan 1987). They project a vocabulary
with which to discuss the movement . Consider some of the social
types that are conveyed by terms such as "women's libber, "
"peacenik," "gay rights." The framing process is deeply influ-
enced by the ways in which vehicles of news and entertainment
frame the movements and their objects .
JosephR . Gusfield
72
Mass Society Theory Revisited:
Social Movements as Theater
Despite its considerable drawbacks as a the-

ory of modern politics , mass society theory
contains a perception of significant aspects of modern societies
that needs restatement. Developed in the effort to explain the
emergence and character of totalitarian and other extremist move-
ments, mass society theorists stressed the breakdown of class- and
interest-oriented groups and the importance of groups alienated
from social institutions, that is, groups that were not controlled
by elites and were open to leadership that projected emotive, ex-
pressive elements into public life (Mannheim 1940; Arendt 1951;
Selznick 1952, chap. 7; Kornhauser, 1959).
Mass society theory emerged in an effort to understand total-
itarian, nondemocratic movements in Western, industrialized soci-
eties . As William Kornhauser points out, aristocratic theorists fo-
cused their attention on the decline of the authority of established
elites and institutional controls. Democratic theorists focused at-
tention on the ways in which rank-and-file members ofbureaucra-
tized organizations were unable to effectuate participation and in-
fluence decisions and policies. Both, however, projected a view of
modern societies as ones in which great distances now prevailed
between the institutions of social control and influence: church ,
school, government, class, ethnicity, even family and the individ-
ual at the level of his or her everyday life. The social and cultural
diversities through which social commitment and control were
conducted were no longer operative. The result was an alienated
and homogeneous mass available to project raw, unmediated, un-
socialized feelings into public policies.
Karl Mannheim, in Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction,
was perhaps especially prescient (1940). In an era of fundamental
democratization, he argued, social and economic organization
were increasingly rationalized on a functional basis. The control
and influence of cultural elites diminished and the mass were un-
able to achieve the kind of substantive rationality essential to the
complex technology and political participation of modern social
organization. In his view, "The average person surrenders part of
his own cultural individuality with every new act of integration
into a functionally rationalized complex of activities .... [and]
73
gradually gives up his own interpretation of events for those others
have given him . When the rationalized mechanism of social life
collapses in times of crisis, the individual cannot repair it by his
own insight" (59). And, "In a society in which the masses tend to
dominate, irrationalities which have been integrated into the social
structure may force their way into political life " (63).
Akin to collective behavior theory , mass sociey theory was
vulnerable to the criticism that alienated, unorganized people were
unable to mobilize for collective action (Gusfield 1962). Further,
it became obvious that modem life was by no means so devoid of
social organization or so alienated and anarchic as mass society
theorists described (Shils 1972, chaps. 11,12).
Nevertheless , the insights of mass society theorists have rele-
vance for the kinds of fluid movements that I have been describing .
It is not necessary to a sociology of social movements that all
movements be studied through the same theory or that contrasting
images of modem life may not both be applicable, sometimes to
the same movement . Three aspects of mass society theory retain
importance . They catch the nature of "interaction" in a significant
area. First, a great deal of human "interaction" takes place at a
distance, apart from face-to-face interaction , in a form of "paraso-
cial interaction" (Horton and WoW 1956). I have stressed this in
discussing the role of mass media. In this sense the image of soci-
ety as an audience, which is implicit in mass society studies, is still
viable . Second, such interaction is, at least to an important extent ,
unmediated by socially organized institutions and groups. In that
sense, the mass is useful as a concept not so much as a collectivity
but as an area of action. Third, the mass audience is thus more
standardized and homogenized than given by concepts of class,
status, and ethnicity . This is not to negate the importance of these
concepts but to attempt to specify where and when they may be
most useful as analytical instruments. The same aggregate of peo-
ple may be divided into classes, ethnic groups, and the usual socio-
logical distinctions yet at other times and in other arenas operate
as masses where a differentiated identity is absent.
The conception of the mass audience as the observers of the
monitoring of movements underlines the view taken here of social
movements as theater. The theatrical component of movements is
a central way in which new meanings are disseminated (Edelman
1989). This is especially the case where the movement is oriented
Joseph R . Gusfield
74
tow ard chang ing behavior of every day life rath er th an th e rul es of
instituti on s. Again , th e labor an d suff rage m ovem ent s are not
useful m od els for mor e fluid m ovem ent s, w hile th e " hippie"
m ovem ent or th e wo me n 's m ovem ent are . Th e in sisten ce of man y
wom en on redir ecting conve ntional lan gu age to era se th e domi-
nance of mal e imagery is an effective form of th eat er , of dramatiz-
in g chang ed conceptions now br ou ght int o con scious ne ss.
This dr am atur gical cha racter o f m od ern mo vem ent s is of cru-
cial imp ort ance (Sn ow 1983). Both th e int erpr etive wo rk of th e
m onit ors and th e actio ns of orga nized m ovem ent s tow ard th ose
int erpr etation s becom e significant. Th ey form th e essen tial linka ge
between publi c arenas and every day life. Th e disposition of m ove-
m ents to und ert ake action s in or der to dr am atiz e th e m ovem ent is
a facet well caug ht in th e titl e of Todd Gitlin's acco unt of th e
int eraction between th e wo rld of new s coverage and studen t mo ve-
m ents of th e 1960s, Th e Wh ole World Is Watching (1980) . As other s
have point ed out, it oft en lead s th e m onit or s to depi ct movements
by concentrating on images of ex trem es of grea ter dr am atic con-
tent . This has been recentl y ob serve d in acco unts of th e new s
coverage of th e anti-abor tion m ovem ent in th e Unit ed States (Los
Ange les Ti mes 1990). Th is mo ni tor ing and dr am atic fram ing of
events m akes alterna tive m odes of beh avior accessible to wide
audiences. Movem ent s can be tr ansmitt ed in a sho rt p eri od of tim e
and peopl e can be m ade aware of w ha t th oughts and actions are
shared and acted on by othe rs, even outside th e orbit of their
personal acqu aintance . Th e movem ent thus becom es a " sign of
th e tim es. "
The revision of m ass soc iety th eor y that I assert as useful is
found in distin guishin g th e aliena tion th esis from th e und erst and-
ing of mas s communi cations as ima ginin g so ciet y as a homo ge-
neous , m ass audi ence. Th e form er , th e aliena ting cha rac ter of
m ass society , is far less viable than th e latt er , th e im age of the
m ass as an audien ce. Both collective b eh avior an d m ass societ y
th eories focus att ention on th e less or ganiz ed aspects of social life.
As perspectiv es toward social movem ents, the y face in opposite
dir ections . Coll ective behavior restor es th e import anc e of th e in-
teractive ord er as a signifi cant locu s of mov em ents , espe cially
m any of th e new mov em ent s ori ent ed toward per son al chang e.
M ass society th eori es height en our sens itivi ty to w ard th e homog e-
nizing , standa rdizing aspec ts of mod ern life. Here, th e imp act of
Reflex ivity of Social Movemen ts
75
mass communic ations media provide s monit oring and framin g
functions th at en ab le audien ces to share ex pe rience s despit e larg e
diversities in class, cultur e, gend er, and nation.
Th e plenitude of social mov em ents that exi st and persist in
mod ern societies makes any singl e sch em e of anal ysis too parti al
for ex pansion to all or even most mov em ents (Gam son 1992) . Th e
mor e abstra ct the perspe ctiv e, th e less helpful it is for empiri cal
stud y. In this chapt er I em ph asize th e m or e fluid qu alit y of man y
contemporar y mov em ents . My view has been well pr esent ed b y
David Snow . He points out that new or diff ering theor etical p er-
spectiv es have the virtue of calling att ention to oth erwis e unn o-
ticed ph enomen a.
Th eoretical per spectiv es, functionin g much like m et aphor s, not
onl y highli ghts ; the y also hid e. By focussin g atte n tion on som e
phenomena , oth er equally relevant things m ay be hidd en or glos sed
over. Thus , just as it is useful and illumin ating to approa ch th e
world w ith a range of met aphors , so it is useful to ex plain with a
ran ge of th eoreti cal persp ecti ves. And this esp ecially is th e case of
ph enom en a w hich are not well bound ed and about which th ere is
much taxonomi c debate and confusion , as is the case with coll ecti ve
behavior. (1983, 9)
Som e objections may b e m ade that man y of the mov ements
to which I have alluded in this essay are eithe r tri vial or do not
involv e dissent and gr eat conflict . I assert that so cial mov ements
studi es have shown an undu e emphasis on th e political and have
understat ed the importance of movements that create changes in
every day living outside the institutional structures of mod ern life
(1979a). As social historians have be en telling us in rec ent years ,
these, too , are very much part of history.
Note
1. Durin g the 1970s a rash of works eme rge d with attention to how ,
where, and when movem ent s utiliz ed viol ence. See, for exam ple, Till y 1978.
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Chapter 4
Ideologyand Utopia
after Socialism
Ralph H. Turner
It has often been observ ed that social

mov em ents exist and rise and fall in clusters
that are more or less unified by dedication to common underlying
values and worldviews . During any given period in history and
within a given sociocultural complex, a few basic themes tend
to shape the goals and worldviews of the most significant social
movements, even when their specific concerns are quite disparate .
Herbert Blumer (1939) called attention to this principle by distin -
guishing between specific and general social movements . General
movements are "rather formless in organization and inarticulate
in expression" (201), reflecting the historic emergence of new
values. A specific movement, in contrast, "has a well defined ob-
jective or goal . .. [and] develops a recognized and accepted leader -
ship and a definite membership characterized by a 'we -
consciousness' " (202). He illustrated the distinction by citing th e
American antislavery specific movement, which grew out of the
widespread nineteenth-century humanitarian general movement.
Just how broadly he meant this idea to be applied was never clear
because he failed to elaborate it . It goes considerably beyond the
contention of Amitai Etzioni (1970) and Charles Tilly (1979),
however, that a distinctive selection of tactics prevails in any given
historical period .
A somewhat similar idea underlies the more recent concept
of social movement "master frames" (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and
Benford 1988; Johnston 1991), although it places more emphasis
on strategies than on movement value orientations . "The master
frame can be thought of as a general formula for solving problems
related to the opposition mov ement : what collective actions are
appropriate , who might be acceptable allies, what demands can be
voiced, which ones are better left unvoiced, and how to interpret
the responses of the regime" (johnston 1991, 139). Likewise, Sid-
ney Tarrow's (1983) concept of "cycles of protest" incorporates
Ralph H. Turner
80
som e of th e same assum ptio ns as Blum er' s conc ept of general
m ovem ent s.
Recent discussion s of " ne w socia l mov em ent s" assume tha t a
com prehensive patt ern of values, spe cific go als, strateg ies, and
tactics distinguish es th e dominant contem porary so cial mov e-
ment s in Western Europ e and th e Unit ed State s from m ovem ents
in previous eras. Th ese discussions may usefully be thou ght of as
describing a new gener al m ovem ent , w hi ch has given impetus and
sh ape to a wid e variety of cont emporar y spe cific movem ents .
Th e most compreh ensi ve hist orical application of th e concept
of general mo vem ents is still th at of Karl M annh eim (1946), who
sou ght to identif y a patt ern in th e histori cal suc cession of such
general mo vem ents . My objective in this chapt er is to exam ine
some of th e impli cation s and issues from Mannh eirri's anal ysis in
order to see wh eth er th ey help to shed light on th e contem porary
diversit y of social m ovem ents and mov em ent styles and th e new
social mo vem ent th esis.
Mannheim: Ideology and Utopia
The pair ed con cept s of " ideology" and

"utopia ," w ith the spe cial m eanings he as-
signs to th em, are central to Mannh eirri's an alys is. Both refer to
widel y shared thought-syst em s that are not en tirely cong ruent
with reality . Th ey consist of the categori es into which peopl e
unconsciousl y organiz e th eir exp eri enc e in ord er to mak e sense of
it, and th ey reflect the fundamental assumptions about realit y that
people tak e for grant ed . When people shar e a common ideolog y
or utopia, they can discuss and deb ate social issu es w ith a reason-
able degre e of mutual und erst anding . When peopl e hold different
ideologies or when some peopl e's thou ght is organiz ed in terms
of an ideology and oth ers ' thou ght is org aniz ed in term s of a
utopia , they typicall y talk past each oth er , misund erst andin g each
other 's stat em ents and actions . Ev er y so cial ord er dep ends on the
general acceptanc e of certain myths and th e use of certain thought
categories for its effectivene ss and stabilit y . Th e co m prehensive
syst em of thought that under girds any exi stin g social ord er is
called ideology . Ideologi es are thus pot ent conserv ative forces ,
permittin g even dissid ents to work ultim atel y so as to maintain
th e existing social ord er. Und er some circumst an ces, how ever, a
Ideologyand Utopia after Socialism
81
system of thought that is wholly incongruous with the existing
order may emerge and gain widespread acceptance. When that
system of thought mobilizes a sufficient number of people into
action to shatter the existing social order and render the prevalent
ideology no longer meaningful, it is called a utopia. The utopia
becomes the basis for a general social movement that fosters pro-
found social change, leading ultimately to a different social order
and a new ideology to support it.
The relationship between ideology and utopia is conceived in
Hegelian terms as a dialectic. A dialectical process is one in which
a set of ideas known as the thesis gives rise to an opposing set of
ideas known as the antithesis. The ensuing struggle between thesis
and antithesis eventually results in a synthesis, which combines
ideas selectively from both thesis and antithesis into a harmonious
whole. That synthesis then becomes the new thesis, and the cycle
begins anew as a new antithesis develops. Mannheim (1946)
writes:
The relationship between utopia and the existing order turns out to
be a "dialectical" one . By this is meant that every age allows to
arise (in differently located social groups) those ideas and values
in which are contained in condensed form the unrealized and the
unfulfilled tendencies which represent the needs of each age. These
intellectual elements then become the explosive material for burst-
ing the limits of the existing order. The existing order gives birth
to utopias which in turn break the bonds of the existing order,
leaving it free to develop in the direction of the next order of
existence . (179)
A Historical Sequence
In his ambitious analysis, Mannheim (1946)
begins with the year 1520, when, under the leadership of Robert
Munzer, the chiliasm of the Anabaptists "joined forces with the
active demands of the oppressed strata of society" (190). Chiliasm
was a religious doctrine forecasting the imminent return of Christ
to rule on earth for one thousand years. The chiliastic utopia ex-
pressed the wish dreams of the peasantry in opposition to the
ideology of feudalism. Peasant protest was not driven by ideas but
by "ecstatic-orgiastic energies" (192), and not by "optimistic
hopes for the future or romantic reminiscences" (195) but by ex-
pectation of a union with the immediate present. Because existing
Ralph H. Turner
82
socia l stru ctures were tot ally irr elevant to th e immin ent new or-
der , peasan t fru str ation s were frequently exp resse d in o utb urs ts of
unr estr ained destructi ven ess an d viole nce.
As the feud al system decayed , partl y in respon se to chilias tic
outburs ts, th e liberal-hum anit ari an ut opi a associa ted wi th th e
Am erican and French Revolut ions displ aced chiliasm as th e dom i-
nant force challengi ng th e ideology of th e peri od . Alth ou gh chili-
astic ou tburs ts rem ain ed a significa n t elemen t in these m ovem ents,
" the fundame n tal attitude of the liber al is cha rac terized by a posi-
tive accep tance of culture an d the giving of an ethica l ton e to
hum an affairs . He is m ost in hi s eleme n t in th e rol e of crit ic rather
th an of creative dest ro yer " (198). Ex pressi ng the p erson al style
and w ish dr eam s of a risin g bour geois class, libe ral- huma nitarian-
ism was driv en by ideas, assume d free w ill, and saw free do m as
th e ultim ate goal. Th e liberal-hum anit arian m ent ality is closer to
reality th an chiliasm , but its ultim ate relian ce on ideas still pre-
serves a gulf betw een its ut opi a an d reality .
In conscio us con trast to this liber al outlo ok, th e succee ding
conserva tive utop ia "gave positive em phasis to th e n oti on of deter-
m ina teness of our ou tlook and beh avior " (206) . Co n tinuing the
exis ting tr end toward grea ter realism and acknow ledg me nt of ex-
istin g social struc tures, th e conse rva tive m ent alit y sim ply feels
com fortable w ith thin gs as th ey are . Wit h non e of th e liberal-
hum anit arian pr edispositi on tow ard theor izing, conse rva tives only
formul ated a ut opi a in defen se agains t attacks on th e exis ting or-
der , parti cularl y from surviving eleme nts of libe ralism and
chiliasm .\
Co m pleting th e series, th e succee ding socia list ut opi a was "a
new crea tio n based on an inn er syn thes is of th e various for m s of
utopia w hich have arisen hith ert o and w hic h have strugg led again st
one an othe r in society" (215); it was "a peculiar assimi lation of
th e conse rv ative sense of determini sm in to th e pr ogr essive ut opia
w hich strives to remak e th e wo rld" (218). D etermini sm was em-
bodi ed in th e th eory of class confli ct an d a mat erialisti c phil osoph y
of hum an motivation , which latt er was borrow ed from th e conser-
vativ e utopi a. The ideali sm of liberal-hum anitariani sm found ex-
pr ession in th e imag e of a harm on iou s and just soci alist society in
whi ch th e state would no lon ger be need ed to regul ate hum an
affairs. Th e w ish dr eam s o f th e pr oletari at are ex pressed in the
soc ialist utopi a.
83
Mannheim does not view the particular sequenc e of utopias
in a pattern -deterministic fashion, but he sees each utopia as re-
flecting the social order that gives rise to it. He neverth eless de-
scribes the sequence as a "general subsidence of utopian int ensity , "
as each succeeding stage " m anifests a closer approximation to th e
historical -social process " (223). As the utopian force diminish es,
life becom es less inspired and more matter-of -fact. Mannheim was
plainly distressed by what he saw as the imminent end of both
utopia and ideology. 2
It would requir e either a callousn ess which our generation could
probab ly no long er acquire or the uns uspecting naivet e of a gener a-
tion newly born int o th e world to be able to live in absolut e congru -
ence with the realiti es of th at world, utt erl y without any tran scen-
dent element, eithe r in the form of a utopia or of an ideolog y. At
our present stage of self-consc iousness this is perhaps th e onl y form
of actu al existence that is possible in a world which is no long er in
the making. It is possible that th e best th at our ethical prin ciples
have to offer is " genuineness" and " frankness" in pla ce of th e old
ideals. (230-31)
Mannheim saw two sources of tension to disrupt this condi-
tion of stagnation . On e consisted of social strat a whose aspirations
were still unfulfilled, who would k eep alive th e socialist ut opi a,
" and thus, to a certain ext ent, will always caus e th e count er-uto-
pias to rekindle and flare up again , at least whenever this ex trem e
left wing go es into action " (231). Th e other sourc e consists of th e
"intellectual section of societ y , which is becoming mor e and mor e
separat ed from th e rest and thrown upon its own resourc es" (233) .
This im age of a world in which utopian energy and vision
has almost altogether dissipat ed seems in credible half a centur y
later. Yet , Mannheim 's analy sis is well root ed in histori cal fact and
sufficiently sug gestiv e of generally applicabl e principl es to warr ant
a serious effort to essay application to th e cont emporar y social
mov em ent scen e. In addition, such obs ervations as his comm ent
about an ethics of genuin en ess and frankn ess , m ade sixty yea rs
ago , seem strikingl y cont emporary-at least in Am eri can soc iety."
We are now in a position to ask wh eth er th e pr esent cacophony of
social movements an d organized prot est is a continu ation of th e
process es M annh eim describ ed , a new sequ ence par allelin g th e
old, or a set of developments that are not susceptibl e of anal ysis in
Mannheirrr 's fram ework .
Ralph H. Turner
84
Issues
Th ere is often a vaguen ess in Mannheirn's
writing that makes it difficult eith er to apply or test his model.
For example, at tim es his reference to the chiliastic impulse that is
transf err ed from cause to cause an d that ebb s and occasionally
flows over tim e border s on the m ystic al. In addition, man y ques-
tions remain to be ans wered befor e we can appl y Mannheim 's
m odel with pr ecision .
Amon g the m any qu estions left un answer ed by Mannh eim 's
exc itin g analysi s, two sets are fundam ental. On e set of questions
concerns th e dynamic s of th e pr ocess by which succeeding utopias
are gene rated . Th e oth er has to do w ith w hat has and will follow
th e early twenti eth centur y , w he n th e sequ en ce he describ es came
to an app arent clo se. M annheim was quit e explicit in denying
th e possibilit y of pr edi cting futur e developm ents becaus e of the
decisive part played by hum an choice in shaping history. He did,
how ever , sug gest possibilities that are indi cated on th e basi s of his
scheme . At least som e ans wers to th e first set of qu estions are
essential befor e we can addr ess th e second set in an ythin g but a
gros sly empirical fashion .
Perhaps th e most critical question is to wh at extent th e pro c-
ess that Mannh eim describes is increm ental , in th e sense that the
dir ection of change is determin ed by th e idiosyncraci es of develop-
ment at each stag e in the proc ess. If unpr edictabl e developments
and ex tern ally caused event s contribute to ward shaping the utopia
that is spawn ed by a given id eolog y, outcomes w ill always remain
unpredictabl e. Altern ativel y, to what ext ent is there an overall
dir ectiv e principle , such that the last stage should be predictabl e
from a thorough understanding of th e fir st stage? Although
Mannh eim's use of th e dial ecti c seems to impl y th e former , his
propos al that th ere is a steady declin e in ene rgy or optimism about
th e prosp ects for th e human condit ion in th e sequenc e from the
chiliastic to the socialist utopia clearl y impli es th e latt er. If we
accept this latter interpr etation as at least partl y corre ct, we mu st
approa ch the qu esti on of recent and futur e utopi as by sear ching
for a new org anizin g principl e based on a maj or sy stem ch ange. If
we accept th e form er int erpr etation, we must look for appro priate
antithe ses to th e postso cialist ideol o gy. If, as seems th e case, both
int erpretation s are parti ally correc t, we mu st look for even more
com plicatedly determin ed out com es.
85
Closely related is the question of exactly how Mannheim
means the dialectical principle to apply . While the utopia is ideolo-
gy 's antithesis, there is not just one logically conceivable antith esis
but there are many, and the antithesis is far from absolute . What ,
then, determines the character of the utopia that becom es th e
dominant critique of any given ideology? In his analysis , Mann-
heim strangely neglects any reference to the stage of synthesis ,
which becomes the new ideology, as coming between successiv e
utopias. While utopias oppose ideologies , both of which are at the
cultural level, Mannheim speaks more of the distinctive conditions
of social structure than of ideology in explaining the focus of each
new utopia . It is clear , then, that Mannheirri 's implicit model
incorporates social structure as well as culture. Perhaps the model
might best be described as one in which each major utopia induces
or contributes to significant changes in social structure , which
synthesize utopian elements with surviving features from the pri-
ior stage of social structure . The functioning of the modified social
structure then has identifiable consequences that are different for
the members of different classes. Certain of these consequences ,
particularly in relation to the aspirations introduced or raised by
the recent utopia , becom e salient and constitute the basis for the
next utopia. The consequences consist of both constraints and
opportunities. New opportunities view as intolerable conditions
that were once taken for granted as misfortunes; they become
injustices (Turner 1969) . The particular way in which the cognitive
side of the new utopia is formulated reflects the dialectical princi-
ple of logical opposition to the justificatory ideology . The main
thrust or direction of the utopia is better explained as an emotional
response to the direct impact of social structure on members of
the general movement's principal constituency . Since the ideology
is not an accurate but a justificatory representation of the social
structural condition, no amount of understanding of ideologies
and prior utopias would allow one either to explain or predict the
nature of ensuing utopias.
Also unclear in Mannheirri 's analysis is the function of con-
stituency in shaping the dominant utopia . The content of each
utopia reflects the wish dr eams (or interests?) of a class in soci ety .
Mannheim never describes a principle to explain or predict what
particular class will be the constitu ency for th e dominant utopia
in any given era. For the chiliasts and the socialists , he seems to be
Ralph H. Turner
86
identi fyin g a class th at was part icul arly o pp ressed or at least by-
passed by th e benefit s accru ing to othe r stra ta; for th e lib eral-
hu m anit arians, th e significa nt fact was that they were the rising
class; for th e conse rv atives, th e imp ort ant obse rvation is th at th ey
did not feel depri ved but feared bur geonin g attacks on th e legiti-
macy of th eir existin g pr ivileges; an d for the socia lists , the debate
still rages over w hether th e work ing classes were in creasin gly op-
pr essed or slow ly gaining dur in g the early stages of in dustrial-
ization.
A closely relate d am big uity conce rns th e relation ship be-
tween the cons tit uen t class an d the broader sociocu ltura l dialectical
pro cess w he reby each new ut opia is in direc tly a reaction to the
pri or ut op ia. Th e impli ed p rinciple seems to be th at th e critical
constituency assim ilated ideas selectively from th e th en-curr ent
ideology and prio r utop ias- especially th e m ost recent-for con-
sistency wi th th eir own struc tura lly based per spectiv e. On e m ight
think of th e fashionin g of a ut op ian wo rldview as th e culm ination
of a learnin g pro cess in w hic h ideo logica l an d cultural-a ffective
resour ces are selectively ado pted, adapte d, reject ed , and reversed
according to how th ey harm onize wit h th e con stitu en cies' situa-
tion ally induced feelings.
A third realm of am bigui ty conce rns the relati onshi p between
th e dom inant value, goa l, or object espouse d by a moveme nt and
th e mo de of thou ght and action that characte rizes the movement.
M annh eim desc ribes the ut opian m entality as per m eating all as-
pects of behavior and tho ught . He po ints ou t, for exam ple, the
com pa tibility of dom inan t art for ms w ith th e preva iling ut opian
me ntality . He stres ses especia lly th e tim e o rientatio n cha rac teristic
of each ut op ia as affecting both pa tte rns of th ou gh t an d mo des of
action. On e wo nder s w he the r, for exa m ple, th e pur suit of free-
dom as a cru cial value necessarily requ ires th e acco m mo dating
m ent ality and m od e of action M annh eim ascribe s to th e liberal-
hum anit arian m ovem ent . And , attribu ting violen t outburs ts and
ex tre m ist declar ations in contem po ra ry m ovem ent s to surv iving
chiliastic surv ivals seems arbitra ry." As we look at con tem porary
socia l mo vem ent s, we should p rob ably tr eat th e lin ka ge between
parti cular m ovem ent values and mo des o f thou ght an d action as
an open ques tion.
A four th set of am big ui ties revolves ab ou t th e em pirical di-
versity and m ultiplicity of moveme nts duri n g any hist ori cal era.
87
Mannheim wrote as if there were but a single movement during a
given historical period and throughout Western Europe, or that
history was shaped by only one movement at a time. This seems
a gross oversimplification. What, then, determines the range over
which a given utopia holds sway? To what extent can major con-
tending utopias coexist? To what extent can the processes de-
scribed by Mannheim proceed at different rates in different sectors
of society, so that contentions based on different utopia-ideology
pairs are taking place simultaneously? To what extent are key ele-
ments from one dominant utopia diffused into the world views of
social movements promoting quite diverse causes? More pro-
foundly, can there be different social movement systems, each
with its own sequence of utopias, proceeding in parallel during
the same extended historical period?
Movements of the 19605
In 1969, I looked at the themes of contem-

porary social movements , and I attempted
to relate them to Mannheim's paradigm . I suggested that every
new movement era was heralded by the redefinition of a condition
heretofore viewed as a misfortune, now newly viewed and deeply
felt as an injustice. The condition so redefined in the 1960s was the
lack of a sense of personal dignity or a clear sense of identity . The
new utopia was a demand that society provide people with a sense
of personal worth - something that had been, and for many people
still is, regarded as a strictly individual and private problem. At
that time, alienation of the individual (in its social psychological
meaning as a feeling of estrangement in interpersonal relations and
from the organizations and communities in which one partici-
pates) and depersonalization of society were leading symbols in
the new utopia, and existentialism was the compatible philosophy.
In the United States, the most prominent and organized move-
ment embodying the new utopia became known as the New Left.
Departing from Mannheirrr's formula, I proposed that the
primary constituency for the new utopia was not an economic
class but an age cohort, namely, youth. This change occurred
because the major adjustments being made in social structure at
that time had more to do with the relative privileges and obliga-
tions of age groups than of economic classes. Proposing that the
Ralph H. Turner
88
constituencies for Mannheim 's utopias could all be seen as classes
that were rising economically or confronted with new opportuni -
ties ," I argued that revised patterns of childrearing and interna-
tional reaction against authoritarianism, symbolized by Adolf Hit-
ler, coupled with the demographic fact of swelling numbers in the
age cohort gave youth power and privilege that the age group had
not previously experienced. I suggested that "The problem of
alienation and the sense of worth is most poignantly the problem
of a youthful generation with unparalleled freedom and capability
but without an institutional structure in which this capability can
be appropriately realized" (Turner 1969, 399) . The spread of this
theme to prominence in other movements was illustrated with
reference to the "Black is beautiful " them e in the American "black
power" movement and similar applications in other movements .
As a slogan, " Black is beautiful" represented a new strategy in the
long struggle to overcome discrimination and inequality, a strat-
egy whose inspiration came at least in part from the currently
prevailing social movement theme ."
In subsequent work, not specifically addressed to social
movements, I proposed that there had been shift throughout the
Western world in the criteria people used in identifying their "real
selves" from institution to impulse (Turner 1976). Traditionally ,
people have thought of themselves in terms of their institutional
roles and group memberships. One's occupation, gender , age
group, family membership and role, religious affiliation, educa-
tional attainment, political affiliation, and publicly acknowledged
achievements and recognitions were among the typical compo-
nents in one's self-conception. The impulse self represented a
struggle to find one's true self by separating oneself from institu-
tional labels and constraints. The corresponding self-conception
consists of personality traits and dispositions, personal likes and
dislikes, and other characteristics that transcend any particular in-
stitutional role or group affiliation. "Institutionals" recognize their
real selves in their achievements, in their pursuit of ideals, and, for
many, in altruistic self-sacrifice . "Impulsers" find themselves in
freeing their behavior from the constraints of reason and social
norms so as to act strictly upon impulse, and in establishing rela-
tionships with others within which they can safely speak and act
on impulse . Comparison between survey data from a probability
sample of adults in the United States and questionnaire data from
Ideology and Utopia after Socialism
89
student samples in one U .S., one British , and two Australian uni -
versities documented the prevalence of the often proclaimed
"quest for identity " among university students in the thr ee coun -
tries; it also revealed the very low incidence of such a quest among
other segments of the population in the U. S. sampl e? (Turn er
1975; Turner and Gordon 1981).
Attempting to place this analysis in a larg er conte xt, I not ed
that movements or mov ement series typicall y begin with a patt ern
of rather chaotic, poorly focused prot est , without benefit of a clear
and constructive program for imp lementing their values. Thi s
may have been the proper interpretation of chiliasm , rather than its
being seen as comparable to the liberal-humanitarian and sociali st
utopias . The assumption was that the worldwide student disrup-
tions of the 1960s might correspond to the chiliastic phas e in Man-
nheim 's sequence of economic class-bas ed mov em ents. Th ey
might th en be followed by movements with mor e clearly defin ed
programs designed to implem ent the value of human worth and
mitigat e th e depersonalization of social institutions. Th ese subs e-
quent mov em ents might not be carried by youth but by other
common -inter est segments of society , especially other age co-
horts .
Contemporary Social Movements
Now that two decades have elapsed sinc e

th e original publication, and the distur-
bances of the 1960s have become ancient and not particularly rel e-
vant history to a new gen eration of college youth , how well do es
the preceding analysis stand up , and what linkage can be made to
Mannheim 's sequence? Following the analogy to chiliasm , can
the New Left and the more loosely coordinated worldwide youth
activism of the 1960s be conceiv ed as the beginning stage in a new ,
differently constituted sequence , but still am enabl e to Mannheirrr 's
typ e of dialectical analysis? Alternatively , can they be bett er un -
derstood now as a n ext stag e after soci alism in Mannheirrr 's origi-
nal sequ ence? In either case , has the movement' s impact lasted ?
Has it persist ed as a mo vem ent or have essen tial elem ent s of its
utopia been incorporat ed into the utopias of mor e recent social
mov ements? Or , is it to be dismissed as a " flash in th e pan, " an
idiosyncr atic episode caus ed by a unique coincid ence of several
Ralph H. Turner
90
histori c even ts, with little long -ran ge impact on contemporary
social mov ements ?
Let us con sider first the possibility , that th e N ew Left was a
fifth or sixth stage in Mannheim 's ori ginal seque n ce. Th e mov e-
ment was clearl y a reaction again st a social ord er that had exten-
sively accommodat ed to demands and values from th e liberal-
humanitarian, con serva tive, and socialist utopia s. Th e politico-
indu strial system and th e welfare state togeth er were blam ed for
m any of th e world 's ills. Furth ermor e, bo rr owin gs from socialist
and liberal -hum anit ari an ut opi as were abundan t in N ew Left ide-
ology . In thes e two important resp ects, th e N ew Left fits the
patt ern of a furth er stage in M annh eirrr's sequence . N evertheles s,
the m ovem ent clearly does not fit on th e trajector y tow ard in creas-
in g realism and pessimism abo ut hu man n atur e th at Mannhe im
found in th e four ut opi as he exa mi ne d. In addition, it never
evolved a clear im age of a pr ogr am to rec tify th e twin ev ils of the
politi coindu strial system and th e welfa re state . Also , th e mo ve-
ment rest s on a fund am ent al shift in th e b asis upon w hic h the
prin cipal cons tituency was differenti ated fro m the rest of th e pop-
ulati on , th at is, from econo m ic class to age gro u p . Hence , it re-
main s, in retros pect , mo re like chiliasm, as th e en thus iastic and
larg ely unr ealistic early expressio n of a new ut op ian patt ern th an
th e continu ation of a seque nce th at mov es toward greater and
greater realism . Like th e chili astic ut opi a th at borr owed funda-
m ent al elem ent s from early C hristianity and a varie ty of medi eval
mov em ent s, it dr ew selectively fro m pri or u to pias w hile adding
uniqu e featur es. Th e discontinu ity is to o great for it to be con-
ceived as an additiona l stage in th e orig inal sequen ce.
If yo ut hful pr ot est of th e 1960s is th er efor e to be conce ived as
th e start of a new sequen ce, th ere mu st be evidence th at imp ortant
elem ent s of its utopi a h ave becom e em bedde d in conte m po rary
cultur e, th at lastin g social struc tura l change s occ ur re d in society
in respon se to its dem and s, and th at new ut opi as in cor por ate both
th em es from th e 1960s' move men ts and critiq ues of a society th at
has acco m mo da ted to dem and s fro m th e earlier m ovem ent .
A search for clues to thi s pu zzle m igh t begin b y asking
whet he r a dist inctive m ent al fra me of referen ce associa ted wit h
th e 1960s has surv ived . One such clu e is evi dence th at , in spite of
externa l ap pearances, the imp ulsive concep tion of the true self has
per sisted and perh aps becom e eve n more preva len t among college
91
youth. This frame of reference has been documented by David
Snow and Cynthia Phillips (1982) . This finding lends further con-
firmation to the original thesis that this was a long-term trend,
predating the 1960s decade, a thesis that was also supported by
James Benton's (1981) content analysis ofleading American maga-
zines from 1920 to 1978. Like each of the utopian uprisings of the
past, and like the sudden worldwide eruption of "democracy"
movements in 1989 and 1990, youthful protest in the 1960s consti-
tuted the crystallization of previously accumulating changes in
worldviews, either provoked or facilitated by the conjunction of
critical historic events .
While the most salient theme of the 1960s movements in the
United States was peace, the peace theme was neither new nor
distinctive to the New Left movement. It was strong enough dur-
ing the early years of World War II that it might well have kept the
United States out of active combat except for the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor and the stigma of anti-Semitism ." Merle Curti
(1929) impressively documented the importance of peace move-
ments in American history throughout the nineteenth century .
The ebb and flow of American peace movements has reflected the
changing threat and costs of war. Consequently, I do not think
that the prevalence of peace themes in current movements can
serve as evidence for the start of a new movement sequence .
Rather, we must look for new ways of thinking about the issue of
peace and war that are more in harmony with the new utopian
trend-if there is one.
Other prominent themes in the New Left movement in-
cluded opposition to large-scale organization of all kinds, the anti-
growth and antitechnology theme that "less is better," and a str ess
on participatory rather than representative democracy . In Califor-
nia, the movement remained strong enough to elect and reelect a
leading exponent of these values, Jerry Brown, to eigh t years as
governor. Many chang es have been made, nationwide, in the di-
rections of decentralization, monitoring of new technology in
terms of human values, and openness of government and busin ess
decision making to public view.
The distrust of large government, large business , and large
labor has been documented for the United States by Seymour
Lipset and William Schneider (1987) . There is abundant evidence
to the present day of declining public identification with govern-
Ralph H. Turner
92
ment in th e United Stat es. Whil e it m ay be less clearly embodie d
in organiz ed social mov ements , it finds frequ ent ex pression in
grass -root s protests such as wildcat strik es and local protests of all
kinds. Symptomatic of th e longing for participator y democracy
are th e continuing insist ence on op en m eetings of decision-making
and advisory bodi es, th e almost ritualistic use of public demon -
strations in all causes, and th e wid espr ead ex pe rim en tation with
Japan ese participator y work organizati on in Am erican and Euro -
pean factori es (Cole 1989; Turner 1991).
The them e of " less is better," with a suspicious attitude
tow ard technology, gro wth , and so- called progr ess, may be the
most distincti ve legacy of th e mov ement. Slow growth and antide -
velopment mo vements have pro liferated in com m unities all over
the Unit ed States; th ey have an impr essive record of succes s. While
the enviro nme ntal mov ement is divid ed between an " appro priate
technolog y " and a chang ed life-st yle wing , th e cautiousness about
acceptin g technologi cal solutions to probl ems; the opposition to
nucle ar ene rgy; th e resist enc e to urb an exp ansion ; the conc ern
about env ironme n tal ex ploitation and pollution ; and the preser va-
tionist attitud e tow ard natur al env ironme nts, hi storic ally signifi-
cant structure s, and ecolo gical balanc e are all significant expres-
sions of th e general them e.
If th e Gr een m ovement is th e quint essential " new mo ve-
ment ," its continuit y with N ew Left them es is striking . The fol-
lowing words by the mod ern environm en talist Lester Milbrath
(1984) could easily have been transplanted with minor adaptations
from the New Left 's Port Huron Statement of 1962.
In modern society , we have develop ed a socio- techn ical-e conomic
system th at can dominat e and destro y natur e. Along side it , we have
retain ed a norm ative and ethica l system bas ed on 200o-y ear-old
religi ons . T he lack of congrue n ce betwe en th ese two systems
thre aten s th e continu ed exi sten ce of our civilization . Our science
tells us how our wo rld work s ph ysicall y but pro vid es no moral
guidance for our beh avior within it . Th e norm ative pr escription s
from inh erited religions do not addr ess th e power an d exu berance
of mod ern human activities . Th e env iro n me ntal mod ern -day
proph ets are tr ying to unit e a sophisticated und erstandin g of how
the wo rld work s with a new norm ative ethical sys tem th at recog-
nizes and addres ses tho se realiti es. (101)
Th e conc ept of alienati on , introdu ced b y M arx and used by
th e socialist utopia to refer strictly to th e wo rke r 's relationship to
93
work , and given central meaning in the 1960s with a chan ged ,
more psychological meaning , is once mor e given altered meanin g
to fit the values of the Gr een movement . Jonathon Porritt , a lead er
of the British environmenta l mov em ent , writ es that " alien ation
has become a part of our lives ." He defin es alienation as "t h at
sense of estrang ement people experience betwe en th emselv es an d
their work , their own health , th eir en vironment, and the workin gs
of their democracy " (1985, 77). Thus he broadens th e referent for
alienation and the m eaning of ecolog y to sub su me all aspects of
peopl e's relationship to their daily experienc e.
It seems fair to conclud e that important them es from the
New Left utopia have diffused and found expression in a wid e
variety of cont emporary movements . As th ey have done so, ho w -
ever, the constituency has broad ened . As many scholars have al-
ready obser ved , the constitu enci es for most of these " n ew mov e-
ments" are the educat ed middl e classes (Cohen 1985). Ind eed , th e
prominence of the middl e classes in recent mov em ents has oft en
been noted . The stud ent protest ers of the 1960s wer e dispropor-
tionatel y of middle-class origin . Frank Parkin (1968) earl y called
attention to the dominantl y middle -class constituency of th e Brit-
ish movem ent for nuclear disarmam ent . But , in most cases, the
movements have not defined either th e probl em or their go als
primari ly in terms of broad economic class oppositions or age-
group conflicts . In a surv ey of middl e-class campaigns in Britain
in the 1970s, Rog er King and Neill Nug ent (1979) conclude th at
"neither th e middle classes as a whole , nor our particular activists,
display a unit y of purpose warranting the description 'm iddle class
revolt ' per se" (184). Som e of th e campaigns th ey exa m ine d were
address ed to issu es that particularly impacted th e self-int erests of
a segm ent of th e middle class, while others had a classless referenc e
to gen eral issues of culture and morality . One might say that th ey
defmed their enem ies primarily in valu e terms . Frank Park in
(1968) makes th e point sharply :
It w ill be su ggest ed that w he rea s wo rkin g class radic alism co uld be
said to be geared largel y to reforms of an eco nomic or m ateri al
kind , th e radicalism of the m iddl e class is direct ed m ainl y to socia l
reform s w hi ch are basically moral in co nten t. Ag ain , w he reas th e
form er ho ld s out th e promi se of benefit s to one parti cul ar section
of societ y (th e wo rkin g class) from w hich it s own suppo rters are
drawn , th e latt er env isage s no reward s w hic h w ill accrue to th e
Ralph H . Turner
94
middle class spe cifically, but on ly to soci ety at large , or to some
und erpri vileged gro ups. It is argued in fact th at th e main pay-off
for middl e class radicals is that of a psych olo gical or emotio nal
kind-in satisfactions de rived from expr essing person al values in
action. (2)
Th e most critical que stion remains : Is th e conviction that a
sense of person al worth , of meaning in life, is a fundamental hu-
man right that must be pr otect ed and promot ed by our social
institutions germane to th ese new mo vem ents ? Or, was th e estab-
lishment of a sense of per son al worth and m eaning in life a distinc -
tivel y adolescen t pr obl em, with no count erpart among th e mid -
dle-cl ass adults w ho are th e ne wer m ovem ents ' prin cipal
constitu ents? In fact, a somew h at mor e sophisticated version of
th e sam e th em e recur s in mor e rec ent ut opi an pronounc ements .
The eco logists in part icular str ess the ne ed for hum ankind to un-
derstand th eir pr op er place as a part - variously signifi cant or in-
significant- of th e natural orde r, rath er than as a rac e ap art from
and abo ve natur e. Peace and an tin uclear mov ements and th e vari-
ety of " slow- gro wth " mov em ent s call for a reexamination of self
in relation to th e world or th e uni vers e. Th e women 's mo vement
pur sues opp ortu niti es for self-fulfilme n t an d human dignit y.
C learly th e probl em of w ho we really are has persisted and spr ead
even as it has bro adened to en com pa ss th e conc ern s of a variety of
mor e specific m ovem ents.
It is hi ghly plau sibl e, th erefor e, to think of th e youth ful pro-
test of the 1960s as a for erunn er in th e historical pro cess th at has
pr ecipitat ed a new m ovem ent patt ern th at seems charact erist ic of
th e contem porary era. This patt ern is in contra st to th e post -Mid-
dle Age s sequ enc e of mor e class-bas ed and class int erest-orient ed
socia l mov ements . Onl y histor y writt en in futur e decade s or cen-
turi es can establish securel y wh eth er thi s is the corr ect interpr eta-
tion of social mov em ents in th e second half of the tw enti eth cen-
tur y . For now , thi s seems the mo st reasonabl e interpr etati on .
Furth er Qu est ions

Whil e this essay has thus far dealt more in
question s than in answers, still furth er
qu estions are stim ulated by th e for egoing incompl ete anal ysis.
On e qu estion arises from a mor e com prehe n sive look at American
95
history. The nineteenth-century social movements that were taken
as prototypes for theory building from the perspective of collec-
tive behavior resemble in some ways the "new social movements"
more than the economic class-oriented movements on which
Mannheim and many traditional European scholars focus. The
movement for the abolition of slavery, the movement for public
education, the temperance movement, the movement for women's
suffrage, the children's movement, the foreign missions move-
ment (religious), prison reform, and others had largely middle-
class constituencies and promoted objectives that did not benefit
the middle class exclusively or even primarily. Charles Beard
(1913) advanced a class struggle interpretation of the writing of
the American Constitution (adopted in 1789), but subsequent his-
torical research has generally discredited or greatly moderated that
view.? The public education movement in the United States was
once interpreted as a working-class movement, but that interpreta-
tion, too, is hardly credited by contemporary educational histori-
ans. Similarly, Joseph Gusfield (1963) demonstrated a class ele-
ment in the temperance movement, but he would not place it in
the same category of class interest-based movements as Mann-
heim's examples .
The foregoing list reminds us that the American movements
were often counterparts to European movements. Yet these do not
seem to figure in Mannheirrr's analysis, unless they can be seen
as expressions of the liberal-humanitarian utopia. Hence, we are
prodded into asking whether the new social movements are really
new with respect to type of constituency and their value orienta-
tion or whether they represent a continuation and further evolu-
tion of a very significant, but overlooked, movement segment that
never fit the "old" pattern of class-oriented movements.
Another question concerns another important set of contem-
porary movements often neglected in discussions of new move-
ments. Raising the question "What next?" in the 1950s, I sus-
pected then that nationalistic, ethnic, and racial movements might
be to the twentieth century what Mannheirri's great movements
were to earlier centuries. As we near the end of the century, the
impression becomes even stronger that the most prevalent and
powerful movements worldwide have been of this type. Further-
more, nationalistic/ethnic movements have a history antedating
the current century. In a classic analysis , Carlton J. H. Hayes
Ralph H. Turner
96
(1931) tr aced th e histor y of mod ern nationali sm back to th e break
up of th e "o ld int ern ationalism " in eig hteenth-ce n tury Europe.
While th ese m ovem ent s have vary in g degr ees of class involv e-
m ent , th eir constituen cies and th e int erests in volved transcend
class bound aries. It has even been sug gest ed that pri or to the acces-
sion of Franklin Roose velt to th e U. S. pr esid enc y in 1933, politics
and politi cal m ovem ent s were mor e sectionall y bas ed than class
based (Bell 1955, 10). Sectionalism bears a close relationship to
nati on alism . Because of th eir lon g histor y , the se nationalistic and
ethnic m ovem ents are ripe for a longitudinal ana ly sis paralleling
M annh eims analysi s of class-b ased mo vem ent s. Have th ere been
stages in th e developm ent of ethnic and n ation alisti c utopia s that
have been link ed thr ough a dialectical proc ess , w ith each new
version of ethno na tion alism con stituting a reaction against a socio-
cultural syste m tha t incorpor ated elem ents from an earlier version?
Alt ern atively , have th ere been cha ng ing m eanings and sty les of
nationalism th at corr espond to the patt erns of concurr entl y evolv-
in g class-in terest m ovem ent s? To w h at ex tent are ethnic and na-
tion alisti c aspira tions ex p ressed in the langu ag e of class-bas ed is-
sues, so th at on e fmd s distincti vely chiliasti c, liberal -hum anitarian ,
conse rva tive, an d socialistic ima ges of th e ethni c com m uni ty or
nation ? On e wo uld then ex pec t to see n ew conc eptions of the
ethn ic com m unity an d nati on corr espondin g to th e themes of to-
day 's " new" social m ovem ents .
It is pr ob abl y much too early to sort out th e th em es in the
curre n t E astern Europ ean tr ansiti ons. Ind eed , th e un seating of
established po wer in th ese countri es may h ave com e too easily and
too quickl y to facilitat e th e focusin g and elaboration of utopian
goa ls and worldvi ew s. Howe ver , if we accept th e pr emis e that
th ese are lar gel y nation alistic m ovem ent s, th e evolving utopias can
be an alyz ed from two points of view. First , to what ext ent can
th ey be explaine d as antith eses to th e exi sting ideologi es that syn-
th esize soc ialist and earlier world views ? Second , to what extent
can th ey be ex plaine d as a next stage or continua tion of the historic
evoluti on o f n ationali stic wo rldview s? A compari son o f th e ana-
lyti c power of th ese two approache s, or discovery th at neither
contr ibut ed mu ch to under standin g , wo uld have signific ant th eo-
retic al impli cation s.
Th e 1960s witn essed black pow er, th en weake r Chicano
power , " Na tive Am eric an ' " " pow er , an d all- Asia m ovem ents in
97
the United States; they were clearly linked to nationalistic -ethnic
movements in other parts of the world . Ethnic revival movem ents
have usually been explained in either anthropological or political
terms, rather than treated as part of the general social movement
phenomenon . For example, a prominent review of studies gener-
alizes: "Ethnicity is mobilized by featur es of modern states that
legitimate ethnic politics , and rationalized market systems raise
the utility of ethnic organization over other forms of social organi-
zation" (Olzak 1983, 356) . But viewing the ethnic revival and
nationalism together in terms of a Mannheimian style of analysis
could shed valuable light on both the ethnic revival and the
broader field of social movements .
In the 1970s the resurgence of the women's movement
brought still another constituency to the fore. This , too , is the
revival of a movement that got under way in both Europe and
the United States in the nineteenth century. It is clear that the
movement's major discourse employed successively th e language
of the liberal-humanitarian , the socialist , and the 1960s move-
ments . An interesting question is, then, to what extent was the
transmission of utopian visions a one-way or a reciprocal exchange
between the class-interest movem ents and the women's move -
ments, and to what extent are the two sets of movements suscepti-
ble of parallel analysis?
Finally , one must ask where religious movements fit into the
scheme for social movement analysis. New religious movements ,
revivals of old religious movements, and religious themes in polit-
ical organizations seem to have intensified in recent years (Beck-
ford 1986). If it is the nature of major social movement utopias
to permeate the society 's patterns of behavior, expression , and
thought , then religious movements cannot be left out of the
analysis.
In conclusion , I have raised many questions and answ ered
few. I propos e simply that the analytic framework us ed by Karl
Mannheim in Ideologyand Utopia, with suitable updating and other
modifications , be em ploye d to shed new light on th e gen esis,
character, and dynamics of today 's major social mov em ents, in-
cluding nationalist , ethnic revivalist , gend er, and religiou s move-
ments . Such anal yses may help clarif y th e me anin g an d th e validity
of the concept of " new social mov ements. "
Ralph H. Turner
98
Notes
1. I have never been able to und erst and why Mannh eim designated the
postr evoluti on ary cons ervativ e th ou ght of the ninet eenth century as a utopia
rath er th an as ideology .
2. See "e nd of ideology" discu ssion s: Aron 1957; Bell 1960; Rejai 1971;
and Shils 1955. For a m or e recent view that major ideolo gical disput e has ended
with the final victor y of the liberal-hum anit ari an world view, see Fuku yama
1989.
3. See Bellah et al. 1985 for one characteriza tion of values in contem po rary
Am eri can society.
4. Expl ainin g Am eri ca' s " Bo sto n Tea Party" o r Patri ck Henry 's " Liberty
or Death " pron ouncem ent (m y illustr ation ) on the basis of surv ivin g chiliastic
elem ent s ha s a holl ow ring .
5. Thi s form ulation bear s some resembl an ce to status pol itics theor y.
Status politi cs is contrasted to class or econo mic int erest gro up politi cs; it was
int rodu ced initi ally to explain the prolif eration of conse rv ative social m ovement s
durin g period s of pro sperit y. Whil e class politi cs explaine d m ovem ents during
periods of econo m ic dep ression as reaction s ag ains t eco nom ic loss and hard ship,
status politi cs explaine d m ovem ent s of econo mica lly secur e or risin g classes as
effort s to pr ot ect or imp ose th eir tr aditi on al valu es and pr eserve th eir social
status. (See especia lly essays by Daniel Bell, Richard Hofstadt er , and Seym our
M. Lipset in Bell 1955.) Subsequently, a variety of cons erva tive mo vement s have
been explaine d as status polit ics, such as the American temp erance mo vem ent
(Gusfield 1963) and th e an tipo rnog raphy m ovem ent (Z ur che r and Kirkpatrick
1976). My formul ation differs, however, in pr op osin g th at constituencies need
no t be econo mic classes but th at they sho uld be categorie s of peopl e whose
pr ivileges have been rising .
6. Lest I be mi sund erstood , I did not attri bute choi ce of the " Black is
beautiful " them e to " unparalleled freed om " for bl ack yo uth. Rath er , I saw a
pro cess of cultura l diffu sion , where by a th em e that evolved princip ally among
w hite yo uth supplied a fram e of reference th at othe r gro ups th en assim ilated to
their concerns.
7. Co m pa rable gene ral popul ation da ta were not available for Australia
and Britain.
8. Th e " Am erica First " m ovem ent , as th e m ovem ent to keep the Unit ed
States out of World War II was called, was accused of being insen sitive to the
plight of Jews in Ger many and occ upied Eu rop e und er H itle r. Th e suspicio n that
Am eri ca Firsters were anti-Se mitic wa s accen tua ted w hen th e nati onal hero and
pr omin ent m ovem ent spo kes ma n C ha rles Lindberg declared publicly th at Amer-
icanJ ew s were behind th e effort to involve th e U nit ed Sta tes in th e war .
9. Th e Beard th esis held th at th e Co nstitution was w ritten and ado pted
by wealthy pr op ert y ow ners in a succe ssful attem pt to subv ert th e benefits gained
by less wealthy classes thro ug h the Ame rican Revo lution of 1776 and institute d
in the Articles of Confe deratio n (ado pted as the law of th e origi na l th irteen states
in 1781). T he classic attac k on the Bea rd th esis was by Forres t McDonal d (1958).
A mo re mode rate critiq ue was offered by Lee Benson (1960) . Th e debate is
sum mariz ed pro and con in a collection of papers edited by Leona rd Levy (1969).
99
10. "Native American" is the term employed polemicall y to refer to per-
sons of American Indian ancestry .
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bleday .
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Pr ess.
Chapter 5
A Strange Kindof Newness:

What's "New" in New Social
Movements?
Alberto Melucci
Insyst ems of high info rmation densit y , in-

dividuals and groups must poss ess a certain
degre e of autonomy and formal capaciti es for learning and actin g
that enable them to function as reliable , self-regulating units . Si-
multaneously, highly differentiated systems exert strong pr essur e
for integration. They shift social control from the content of ac-
tion to its languages , from th e ext ernal regulation of behavior to
interference in the cognitive and motivational preconditions for it .
Conflicts tend to arise in those areas of the system that are most
directly involved in the production of information and communi-
cative resources but at the same time subjected to intense pr essures
for integration. Today, the crucial dimensions of dail y life (tim e
and space, interpersonal relations , birth and death) , the satisfying
of individual needs within welfare systems, and the shaping of
personal and social identity in educational systems are constructed
through the production and processing of information .
Individuals and groups are allocated increasing amounts of
information resources with which to define themselves and to
construct their life spaces. At the same time, however , thes e sam e
processes are regulated by a diffuse social control that passes be-
yond the public sphere to invade the very domain where the sense
of individual action takes shape . Dimensions that were tradition-
ally regarded as private (the body, sexuality, affective relations) ,
or subjective (cognitive and emotional processes, motiv es, de-
sires), or even biological (the structure of the brain, the genetic
code, reproductive capacity) now undergo social control and ma-
nipulation. The technoscientific apparatus, the agencies of infor-
mation and communication , and the decision-making centers that
determine policies wield their power over these domains. Yet,
these are precisel y the areas where individuals and groups lay claim
to their autonomy, wher e they conduct their search for identity
Alberto Melucci
102
by transforming them into a space where they reappropriate, self-
realize, and construct the meaning of what th ey are and what
they do .
Conflicts are carried forward by temporary actors who bring
to light the crucial dilemmas of a society. The conflicts I describe
here, which do not exhaust the range of social conflicts , concern
the production and the appropriation of resources that are crucial
for a global society based on information . These same processes
generate both new forms of power and new forms of opposition :
Conflict only emerges insofar as actors fight for control and the
allocation of socially produced potential for action. This potential
is no longer exclusively based on material resources or on forms
of social organization; to an increasing extent, it is based on the
ability to produce information.
Conflicts do not chiefly express themselves through action
designed to achieve outcomes in the political system. Rather, they
raise a challenge that recasts the language and cultural codes that
organize information . The ceaseless flow of messages only ac-
quires meaning through the codes that order the flux and allow
its meanings to be read . The forms of power now emerging in
contemporary societies are grounded in an ability to "inform "
that is, to "give form." The action of movements occupies the
same terrain and is in itself a message broadcast to society convey -
ing symbolic forms and relational patterns that cast light on "the
dark side of the moon" - a system of meanings that runs counter
to the sense that the apparatuses seek to impose on individual and
collective events. This type of action affects institutions because it
selects new elites, it modernizes organizational forms, and it cre-
ates new goals and new languages.
At the same time, however, this action challenges the appara-
tuses that govern the production of information, and it prevents
the channels of representation and decision making in pluralist
societies from adopting instrumental rationality as the only logic
with which to govern complexity. Such rationality applies solely
to procedures, and it imposes the criterion of efficiency and effec-
tiveness as the only measure of sense . The action of movements
reveals that the neutral rationality of means masks interests and
forms of power; it makes clear that it is impossible to confront the
massive challenge of living together on a planet, by now become
a global society, without openly discussing the ends and values
Strange Kind of Ne wne ss
103
that make such cohabitation possible . Movements highlight the
insuperable dilemmas facing complex societies, and by doing so
force them openly to assume responsibility for their choices , their
conflicts, and their limitations.
By drawing on forms of action that relate to daily life and
individual identity, contemporary movements detach themselves
from the traditional model of political organization , and they in-
creasingly distance themselves from political systems . Th ey mov e
in to occupy an intermediate space of social life where individual
needs and the pressures of political innovation mesh. Because of
the particular features of movements, social conflicts can become
effective only through the mediation of political actors, even
though they will never restrict themselves to only this . The inno-
vative thrust of movments, th erefore, does not exhaust itself in
chang es to the political system brought about by institutional
actors. Nevertheless , the ability of collective demands to expand
and to find expression dep ends on th e way in which political actors
are able to translate them into democratic guarantees.
As my thinking in this area has developed, I have gradually
abandoned the concept of class relationships . This concept is in-
separably linked with capitalist industrial society , but I used it as
an analytical tool to defme a system of conflictual relationships
within which social resources are produced and appropriated . The
notion of class relationships has been a tool with which to analyze
systemic conflicts and forms of domination in complex societies.
It is a traditional category that I employed to focus on the rela-
tional and conflictual dimension of the production of the basic
orientations of a society. In systems like contemporary ones,
where classes as real social groups are withering away, more ap-
propriate concepts are required . This must be accomplished with-
out ignoring the theoretical problem that the category of class
relationships has left behind as its legacy. That problem can be
defined as knowing what relations and what conflicts are involv ed
in the production of the crucial resources of a particular system .
Addressing this question is essential to an understanding of the
dual articulation of autonomy and dependence that characterizes
the political system and the relationship between movements and
processes of representation and decision making .
The theoretical problem is therefore whether there are forms
of conflict that engage the constitutive logic of a system . The
Alb erto Melucci
104
notion of mod e of production is too closely associated with eco-
nomic redu ctionism . Production cannot be restricted solely to the
economic-mat erial sphere; it embrac es th e entirety of social rela-
tionship s and cultural orientations . Th e problem is thus whether
one can still talk of antagonist con flicts, that is, conflicts that in-
volv e the social relationships that produc e the constitutive resource
of compl ex system s: information . Analysis of exchanges internal
to the political market, or th e knowledg e we have acquired con-
cerning strat egic behavior in organiz ations and political systems ,
shows that many cont emporary conflicts , sometimes even violent
ones , are the expression of social categories or groups claiming
access to representation . A demand for inclusion in an institutional
syst em of benefits may even be radical , but it implies not so much
antagonis m tow ard the logic of th e syst em as pr essure for redistri -
bution.
If no analyti cal space is left open for asking the question
about antagonist conflicts, then we have not onl y erased such a
qu estion and failed to resolv e the problem it raises but we have
failed to demon strat e its futility . The Europ ean Left now seems to
be replacin g th e Mar xist model with a model of the ex change
or th e rationalit y of decision-making choic es. In the past , I have
analyz ed class conflicts from within a constructivist and systemic
framework already very far from th e M arxist model , but explana-
tion of contemporary conflicts solel y in terms of exchan ge strikes
me as inadequat e. I believe that th e question of the systemic nature
of conflicts should be kept op en : What do es the term "s ystem
logic" m ean in highly diff erentiat ed syst ems? Is it possibl e to iden-
tify antagonist conflicts without their actors being char acterized
by a stable social condition? Can the arenas of conflict chang e?
Th ese questions become stimul ating wor k ing hypotheses if the
analytic space for their formulation is kept op en . These qu estions
may serve to guid e analysis of contempor ary movements.
New Movements?
This analytical framework helps to clarify a
recurrent issue in th e debate of th e last ten
years (Coh en 1985; Off e 1985; Klandermans , Kr iesi , and Tarrow
1988; Tarrow 1989), which concerns th e " ne w n ess" of contempo-
rary conflicts . What is new about the new social movements? As
Strange Kind of Newness
105
one of those who introduced the term "new social movements"
into sociological literature, I have watched with dismay as the
category has been progressively reified. Newness is by definition
a relative concept, which here has the temporary function of sig-
naling a number of comparative differences between the historical
forms of class conflict and today's emergent forms of collective
action. If analysis and research fail to specify the distinctive fea-
tures of the new movements, we are trapped in arid debate be-
tween the supporters and critics of newness . On one hand, there
are those who claim that many aspects of contemporary forms of
action can be found in previous phenomena of history and that
their alleged newness derives only from the myopia of the present
from which so many sociologists suffer, especially when they are
emotionally involved with their subject of study . On the other
hand, the defenders of the newness of contemporary movements
endeavor to show that these similarities are only formal and that
phenomena change their meanings when set in different systems.
Both the critics of the newness of new movements and the
proponents of the paradigm commit the same epistemological
mistake: They consider contemporary phenomena to constitute a
unitary empirical object, and on this basis either seek to define
their newness or deny or dispute it. When faced with the women's
movement rather than the peace movement, one side in the debate
tries to mark out differences with respect to the past, the other
stresses continuity and comparability with previous events.
The controversy strikes me as futile. Contemporary phe-
nomena, in their empirical unity, are made up of a variety of
components, and if these elements are not separated out, compari-
son between forms of action belonging to mutually distinct histor-
ical periods is based on an epistemological misunderstanding. It is
not a question of deciding whether the empirical data observed are
equivalent or comparable, instead, the question is whether their
meaning and the place they occupy in the system of social relations
can be considered to be the same. Thus, it becomes extremely
difficult to decide, for example, how far the modern women's
movement, as a global empirical phenomenon, is new compared
with the first feminist movements of the nineteenth century .
In order to make this kind of comparison we must distin-
guish, within the overall empirical object, among different orien-
tations of action (for example, the presence or absence of a con-
A lbertoMelucci
106
flictu al attitude, dimen sion s of solida rity or of agg rega teness , a
br each or otherwise of th e system's com pa tibility limit s). We must
distin gui sh also amo ng th e vario us sys tems of socia l relation ship s
com prising th e action. Seen in th ese term s, th e wo me n 's m ove-
m ent of th e nineteenth cen tury , lik e its co ntem po rary co unte rpa rt,
is a com pos ite and hetero gen eou s ph en om en on . Thu s, rath er th an
com pa re two ethical objec ts in th eir en tirety, one can relate certain,
ana lytically defined aspec ts of th e form er w ith aspects of the latt er
and discern sim ilarities and differen ces (Melucc i 1984, 1989, 1991).
Paradoxica lly , th e result of th e deb ate on new m ovem en ts has
been th at th e idea of m ovem ent s-as-p erson ages h as fade d. C on-
tem po rary m ovem ents , like all collective ph en om en a, brin g to-
gethe r for m s of action th at invo lve vario us levels of th e social
struc ture . Th ey entail different p oint s of v iew . Th ey bel on g to
different histori cal period s. We mu st seek to und erst and , there-
for e, thi s multiplicit y of synch ro nic an d diachronic elem ents .
T hen we can exp lain how th ey co m bine int o th e con crete unit of
a collective acto r. Ever y em pirical ph en omenon of fers us a cross
section of a social struc ture, rather like a split in a ro ck revea ls its
inn er com pos ition and stra ta . Ju st as a photog raph of th e rock as a
w ho le canno t be confuse d w ith the mi ne ra ls an d stra ta th at com-
pose it, so collective ph enom en a do no t disclose th eir m eanin g to
us if we only consider th em in th eir to tality . Instead , we mu st
ins pect th e different orien tations pr esen t in th em (conflict ua l, non -
con flictual, solidary , ato mize d), the different levels of socie ty af-
fected by th e action (for exa mp le, mo des of pr odu ction , polit ical
systems, life wo rlds), an d th e diffe rent hist or ial peri od s con dense d
int o th at part icular ph en om en on . Ju st as one mu st exp lain how
th e m inerals and strata of th e rock have com bine d to crea te that
parti cular geo log ical form ation , so we mu st cons ide r collective
actio n as a result and n ot as a point of dep artur e. Th e task of
th e ana lyst is to explain ho w thi s outcome has been collectively
cons tru cted, ho w it is maint ained , an d , perh aps , how it alters
over tim e.
H aving clarifi ed this epistem olog ical pr emis e, we m ay still
ask ourselv es wh ether a new paradi gm of collecti ve actio n is tak-
ing sha pe . We do not ask thi s in an em pirical sense, th at is, in
term s of th e ob serve d ph en om en on as a w hole, but ana lytically,
th at is, in term s of certain levels or elem ent s of actio n . We mu st
ask ours elves, th erefor e, if th ere are dim en sion s to th e n ew form s
107
of action that we should assign to a systemic context other than
that of industrial capitalism. This question is dismissed by critics
of new movements, like Charles Tilly or Sidney Tarrow, who
place these phenomena on an exclusively political level. This kind
of reductionism eliminates from the field of scientific inquiry the
question of the appearance of a new paradigm of collective action:
Do contemporary movements reveal systemic conflicts that are
unrelated to those of industrial capitalism? This question disap-
pears from the scene without any detailed or well-argued answer
in the negative . Moreover, those specifically social dimensions of
action that are so significant for the new movements are ignored.
This gives rise to a myopia of the visible that concentrates exclu -
sively on the measurable features of collective action -that is, their
relationships with political systems and their effects on policies -
while it neglects or undervalues all those aspects of the action of
movements that consist in the production of cultural codes. This
myopia ignores the reality that the elaboration in daily life of
alternative meanings for individual and collective behavior is the
principal activity of the hidden networks of contemporary move -
ments and the condition for their visible action. In fact, when a
movement publicly confronts the political apparatus on specific
issues, it does so in the name of new cultural models created at a
less noisy and less easily measurable level of hidden action .
Do contemporary collective phenomena comprise antagonist
conflicts that are systemic in nature, or are these phenomena of
social margination, of aggregate behavior, of adjustment by the
political market? This general question can only be answered by
first exploring alternative explanations for collective action, for
example, in terms of dysfunctions or crisis (Alberoni 1977; Mos-
covici 1981; Turner and Killian 1987), or in terms of political ex-
change (Pizzorno 1978, 1985). Many contemporary conflicts can
be explained on the basis of the workings of the political market,
as the expression of excluded social groups or categories pressing
for representation (Tilly 1978, 1986; Tarrow 1989). Here there is
no antagonistic dimension to the conflict, there is only pressure to
join a system of benefits and rules from which one has been ex-
cluded. If political boundaries are rigid, the conflict may even
be violent (Gam son, Fireman, and Rytina 1982; Gamson 1990).
However, it need not necessarily entail antagonism against the
logic of the system but may, instead, express a demand for the
Alberto Melucci
108
different distribution of resources or for new rules (McCarthy and
Zald 1977, 1981; Jenkins 1983). Similarly, a poorly functioning
organization may be subject to even intense conflict , the aim of
which, however, is to reestablish the proper functioning of the
organization itself. The student movements of the late 1960s and
more recent ones in various European countries (Spain 1987,
France and Italy 1990) contained a common rejection of the au-
thoritarian behavior of the educational system and a demand for
greater efficiency and relevance.
Having exhausted the explanatory capacity of these dimen -
sions, we still need to ask ourselves whether everything has been
accounted for. We must preserve sufficient theoretical space in
which the question of systemic conflicts can be formulated. Other-
wise, the issue will have been glossed over without being given an
answer or proved to be useless.
Social scientists are still heirs to a tradition that attributes this
logic to "structures," regardless of the day-to -day relations en-
tered into by actors as they construct the meaning of their action .
The logic of a system is not necessarily to be looked for in large-
scale interests or in the more visible forms of power; it is also to
be found at the more simple levels of social life, where actors
interact to define the possibilities and constraints of their action .
Today , as overarching explanations (for example, global explana -
tions of the logic of capitalism) begin to disappear, their place is
taken by a kind of theoretical retreat into explanation of social
relationships couched solely in terms of exchange, or into a purely
terminological rearrangement of previous theories . Thus, the
change under way in contemporary systems is now only referred
to in allusive terms (complex, postindustrial , late capitalist soci-
ety) . The assumption is that these define a logic significantly dif-
ferent from that of industrial capitalism. This move neglects or
suppresses the theoretical problems that this assumption incurs .
The question of the existence of antagonistic conflicts with sys-
temic scope , however, keeps open a number of questions that
theoretica l analysis must now address. For instance, a theoretical
question of major importance is whether one can conceive of a
dominant logic that does not necessaril y manifest itself in a global
and overarching form , but which instead distributes itself among
various areas of the system to produce a wide variety of arenas
and actors of conflict . This is a logic to be identified not just in the
109
functional workings of the great apparatuses but, as the ethno-
methodologists have taught us, in daily interaction.
Facing these questions forces us to leave behind the dualistic
legacy of the nineteenth century that opposed, for example, struc-
tures and representations, or systems and actors (Giddens 1984;
Crozier and Friedberg 1977). We must rethink social action into
the process by which meaning is constructed through interaction
(Neisser 1976; Von Foerster 1973; Watzlawick 1984; Von Glazers-
feld 1985). It is actors who, through their relations, produce and
recognize the sense of what they are doing . But interaction is
never an entirely overt process. It lies within the field of possibili -
ties and constraints that actors observe and utilize. Domination
and power are not metaphysical realities lying outside the games
that actors play; they are the most solid, permanent, and unbal-
anced forms of such games. Conflicts, therefore, act as signals of
both the constructed nature of social action and its tendency to
crystallize into structures and systems .
Information Societies
Where, then, can we locate the action of
contemporary movements? Through an
ever-growing interlacement of economic structures, complex so-
cieties produce apparatuses of political regulation and cultural
agencies . Material goods are produced by information systems
and symbolic universes controlled by huge organizations. They
incorporate information and become signs circulating through
markets of worldwide proportions (Touraine 1971, 1978, 1984;
Habermas 1984). Conflicts move from the economic-industrial
system to the cultural sphere. They focus on personal identity, the
time and space of life, and the motivation and codes of daily
behavior . Conflicts lay bare the logic now gaining its sway over
highly differentiated systems . These systems allocate increasing
amounts of resources to individuals, who use them to become
autonomous loci of action; but the systems also exact increasing
integration . In order to maintain themselves, they must extend
their control by regulating the deep -lying sources of action and by
interfering with the construction of its meaning. Contemporary
conflicts reveal the contradictions in this process and bring to the
fore actors and forms of action that cannot be fitted into the con -
Alberto Melucci
110
ventional categories of industrial conflict or competition among
interest groups . Th e production and reappropriation of meaning
seem to lie at th e core of cont emporary conflicts; thi s understand -
ing requir es a careful red efinition of what a social movement is
and w hat forms of action displa y its pr esenc e.
In the cour se of hist ory , soci eties have run through th e gam ut
of th e resourc es that driv e every living syst em (m att er , energy ,
information). Th ere have been societies stru ctur ed on material re-
sourc es and societies that have dep ended on energy for th eir
grow th (steam and electricit y as th e engin es of industrialization) .
Now, societies exist that rely on informati on for th eir survival,
control of th e env ironme n t, expans ion into spac e, an d th e delicate
equilibrium that pr eserves them from tot al w ar.
Th e microel ectronic revolution has made it possible to con-
centrat e enorm ous quantities of circuits int o spac es that were un-
thinkabl y small tw ent y-fiv e years ago . Thi s has not onl y trans-
form ed th e size of com puters but has brought a staggering increase
in th e speed at w hich inform ation can be process ed and an enor -
mous expansion in the amount of data that can be stor ed . Parallel
advances in communic ation technologies m ean that information
can be collect ed , process ed, and transmitt ed in fractions of a sec-
on d and through limitl ess space.
What are th e featur es of an informati on so ciety? First , the
tr an sformations mentioned ab ove have accentuat ed th e reflexive,
artificial , and constru cted charact er of so cial life . Most exp eriences
oflif e in comp lex societies are exp erienc es " to the nth degree ." In
other words, they take place in cont exts that are produced by
social action , broadcast by th e media , and internalized and enacted
in a sort of involute spiral that turns realit y into a m emory or a
dream . Most of the trivial activiti es of daily life are alr ead y marked
by and depend on th e impact of transformations in the sphere of
information. New technologi es incorporat e an increasing quantit y
of information and contribut e in turn to th e massive expansion of
information output . Her e, too , a spiral proc ess seems to multiply
the reflexi ven ess of social action .
Anoth er feature of an information soci ety is th e planetariza-
tion of th e system . Th e circulation of inform ation ties th e world
syst em togeth er and rais es new transnation al problems over the
con tro l, circulation, and exchan ge of inform ation. At th e same
tim e, it inflat es th e issues and arenas of conflict into worldwide
Strange Kind of Ne wness
I II
proportions. The geographical localization of a problem is of sec-
ondary importance compared with its symbolic impact on the
planetary system. The processes of globalization reactivate ethnic -
and national-based forms of action that seek to give a stable and
recognizable basis to identity. Old national questions, processes
that were interrupted or historically repressed by the rise of the
nation-state are, paradoxically, revitalized by the formation of a
global space. Ethnic symbolism and concrete reference to a moth-
erland lay a foundation for the development of a culture and a
language for the identity of individuals and groups in a space that
has lost its traditional boundaries. Ethnic -national movements are
both the last residues of the process of modernization and the
signal that modernism is being left behind .
In a system whose most advanced sectors employ over 50
percent of the population in activities involving the production,
processing, and circulation of information, this basic resource
structures social life. Information is a symbolic and therefore re-
flexive resource . It is not a thing; it is a good which to be produced
and exchanged presupposes a capacity for symbolization and de-
codification. It is a resource that becomes such for the society as a
whole only when other needs have been satisfied and when the
capacity for symbolic production has been sufficiently freed from
the constraints of reproduction. The notion of "post-material soci-
ety" captures, at least in part , these transformations in progress.
Systems that increasingly rely on information resources presume
the acquisition of a material base and the ability to build symbolic
universes endowed with autonomy (which, in turn , become con-
ditions for the reproduction or the broadening of the material
base itself).
Information does not exist for a society independently of the
human capacity to perceive it . Being able to use a reflexive re-
source of this kind depends on the biological and motivational
structure of humans as transmitters and receivers of information .
The massive investment that complex societies make in biological
research, in research into the brain and the motivational and rela-
tional mechanisms of behavior , demonstrates that the role of infor-
mation as a decisive resource entails greater human intervention in
inner nature. It requires an increased capacity for self-reflection,
which reaches the point of the production of reproduction , the
Alb ertoMelucci
112
point at which int erf erence in th e deep biological stru cture of the
species begins .
If inform ation is characterized by the spe ed of its circulation
and its rapid obsolesc enc e, it becomes crucially important to con-
trol the codes by which mutable information is organized and
int erpreted . Increasingly , knowledge is less a knowledge of con-
tent s and more an ability to codify and to decode messages. Infor-
mation is linear and cumulative; it constitutes the quantitative base
of the cognitive process. Knowl edg e structures ; it establishes rela-
tions, links , and hierarchies. Th ere is a terrifying widening of the
gap between these two levels of experienc e and what used to be
called wisdom . Wisdom has to do with the perception of meaning
and its integration into individual exist enc e. Wisdom is the ability
to maintain an integral core of exp eri enc e in one 's relations with
oneself , with others , and with the world.
As information becom es th e cru cial resource for complex
systems, thes e three levels progressively separate. Control over
the production, accumulation , and circulation of information de-
pends on control over codes. This control is not equally distrib-
ut ed, howev er, and access to knowl edg e becomes the terrain
wher e new forms of pow er, discrimination , and conflict come into
being . Simultaneousl y , th e sense of individual experi enc e, that is,
th e ability to incorporat e th e increasing quantity of information
transmitt ed and received into an interior principle of unity , be-
comes increasingly fragile . A split op ens between the realm of
instrumental knowledge , which efficientl y manipulates the sym-
bolic codes that select, order , and dire ct information, and wisdom
as the integration of meaning into personal experi en ce.
The result is the search for identity , the quest for self that
addresses the fundamental regions of human action : the bod y, the
em o tions, th e dimensions of experience irreducible to instrumen-
tal rationality. This search allows the rediscov ery of an irremedia-
ble oth erness (other people, the Other, th e sacr ed) , a silent void
that escapes th e ceaseless flux of encod ed messages. In this closed-
ness and em ptin ess, we seek to fit back together the scattered
fragments of a human exp erience that is con stantl y aware that it
stands on the brink between life and death. To en counter the power
of human action that transforms the world and that int ervenes
even in inner natur e is simultaneously to encount er its limits . This
awaren ess may tak e the form of a return to organized religion (the
113
resurgence of sects and fundamentalisms), but it may open the
way for a desacralized experience of the sacred and a new search
for identity.
Information is difficult to control because it spreads through
many different channels : language or interpersonal communica-
tion, the objects that incorporate information, or a more elaborate
corpus of symbolic kind. Unlike other physical goods , informa -
tion can be divided without losing its quality . It can be multiplied
and divided among various actors without affecting its specific
content . If power in complex societies is based on the control of
information, it is potentially a very fragile kind of power, because
the simple acquisition of information puts the actors in a commu-
nicative relation on the same level.
Power cannot be exercised, therefore , solely over the content
of communications and over the manifest expressions of action .
To be effective, power must shift its basis and take control of
codes. Codes become formal rules , the organizers of knowledge,
the new foundation of power. Wisdom fades away and a search
for meaning seems senseless. Its place is taken by self-justifying,
operational expertise. The codes on which the new forms of power
build and develop themselves are invisible; the possibility itself of
speaking and communicating is already organized within them.
The risk is that there is no discourse other than that which privi-
leged areas and groups in the system control through their power
of naming and the monopoly that they seek to impose on lan-
guage. Information is no longer a resource circulating among all
actors; they cannot exchange it and they cannot cumulatively build
their potential for knowledge . Instead, information becomes a sys-
tem of empty signs, the key to which has been lost or hidden . The
signs no longer concern themselves with their meaning .
Simultaneously, the potentially limitless extension of infor-
mation increases the margins of uncertainty for the entire system.
Uncertainty derives first from the difficulty of establishing nex-
uses in the enormous mass of information that we transmit and
receive. This difficulty derives from the fact that the passage from
information to knowledge is not guaranteed; indeed , sometimes
the deluge of information actually impedes knowledge. Uncer-
tainty affects the meaning of individual action because the dispro-
portionate growth of information increases the options but also
A lberto Melucci
114
m akes th e decision difficult . The individu al ans wer to the qu es-
tion , Wh o am I? becom es p robl em ati c.
As a result , com plex sys tems are requir ed to pr odu ce deci-
sions in orde r to redu ce un cert aint y . An inf orm ation sys tem ex-
pand s its decision -m akin g cap acity to keep pac e w ith thi s requir e-
m ent to cop e with un cert aint y . It assum es th e featur es of a
decision al, contrac tual sys tem: decision al becau se redu cin g unc er-
taint y m eans assum ing th e risk of th e decision ; con trac tual be-
cause, in o rder to decide, agree m en t mu st be reached over the
ru les of th e game .
Un certaint y cannot be reduc ed ex cept by m akin g decision s
and by agreeing on th e fram ework wi thi n w hic h th ese decisions
are to be reached . Th e level of un cert aint y cons tan tly ren ew s itself
and expands , in part because th e decision s crea te new probl ems
even as th ey resolve th e old ones. Th e decision al and con tractual
dim ensi on s bec om e central to the social life of com plex systems.
In other wo rds , con tempo rary societies mu st continua lly establish
and renew th e pacts tha t bind th em to gether an d guide their
actio n.
Thi s applies both to soc iety as a w hole and to indi viduals and
gr oups . Individu ally and socially pr odu ced identity must con-
stantly cope with th e un cert aint y created by th e ceaseless flow of
inf ormat ion , by th e fact th at indi vidu als belon g sim u ltan eously to
a plur ality of systems, by th e variety of th eir spatiotem po ral
fram es of referen ce. Identit y mu st be for ever reestablish ed and
renegot iated . Th e search for identit y becom es a rem ed y against
th e opa city of th e system , aga ins t th e unc ert aint y that constantly
con strain s action (Pizzo rn o 1987). Pr odu cin g ident ity m eans step-
pin g up th e flow of inform ation from th e sy stem an d m akin g it
mor e stabl e and cohe ren t. Producin g identit y contribu tes to the
stabilization or m oderniz ation of th e system itself. It is not only
to th e requir em ent of secur ity an d con tinui ty th at thi s search for
identit y responds . It also p rovid es resour ces for in divi duatio n and
ena bles indi vidu als to per ceive them selves as distin ct from others.
In th e dep th of this separat en ess, indi vidual s dis cover th e capacity
to reject th e dominant codes and to reveal their qu estion able
pow er. Th ey recogni ze th em selves as produ cer s of m eaning and
th ey are ena bled to cha llenge th e m anipul ation of m eaning by
th e apparatus .
In system s of thi s kind, can we still talk of a dominant logic?
Strange Kindof Newness
115
Certainly the spatial metaphors that characterized industrial cul-
ture (base/superstructure, centrality/marginality) are increasingly
inadequate to describe the workings of centerless, and by now
headless, complex societies. The decentralization of the loci of
power and conflict makes it more difficult to identify central proc -
esses and actors. Does this mean that we must renounce any at-
tempt to identify dominant logic? Does this mean that in complex-
ity everything becomes the same as everything else?
A logic of dominance is not in contradiction with the idea of
complexity. Contemporary societies have a dominant logic, but
the site of this logic changes constantly. The areas and levels of a
system that insure its continuity may change in time, just as the
loci of conflict vary. Power does not inhere once and for all in
certain structures; its concrete manifestations in the form of actors
and relations are not definitive. Conflicts, too, may involve differ-
ent actors and different sectors of the system. This is not to imply,
however, that all forms of malcontent are equivalent , or that every
form of social agitation expresses conflicts that have systemic
scope. There are conflicts that strike at the logic of the system .
Although addressing a circumscribed area, they bring to the sur-
face the crucial dilemmas of complexity, and the power forms that
such complexity produces, and render them visible to society as
a whole.
Symbolic Challenges
Contemporary movements have passed
from sequence to coexistence. Slices of ex-
perience, past history, and memory coexist within the same em-
pirical phenomena . They become working components in the sin-
gle action system of the movement. The traces of the past that
persist in contemporary phenomena are not simply legacies of
history or residues on which new accretions build themselves;
they help to shape patterns of collective action in which historical
and cultural elements coexist or blend. In what has been called the
ecological movement, for example, we find traditional forms of
resistance to the impact of modernization coexisting with a reli-
gious fundamentalism that draws its renewed energy from the
appeal to Nature, pressures for a new ethical code regulating hu-
manity 's relationship with Nature, and political demands for the
Alberto Melucci
116
democratic control of energy policies . All these elements are
blended tog eth er, perhaps temporarily , in that concrete actor of
mobilizati on that we call a movement.
Becau se of their composite nature-a synchronous arrange-
ment of different epochs and different stag es of societal develop-
ment-mod ern movem ents hold up a mirror to the system as a
whole . In fact, in the gr eat scenario of the media everything be-
com es simultaneous : the last remnants of the archaeology of socie-
ties mix with th e most sensational images of the future . Amazon
Indians being chased from th eir forest by bulldozers are as much
part of the entertainm en t as films of outer space . As we watch
from the comfort of our armchairs , our television screens trans-
port us through time and space from prehistory to science fiction.
Remote and unrelated experiences are juxtaposed; interchangeable
signs stream past us in a pur e sequence of images without the leaps
in spac e and tim e that any reality would require .
Second, movements are not occasional emergencies in social
life locat ed on th e margins of the great institutions; nor are they
residual elements of the social order. In compl ex societies, move-
m ents are a permanent reality. They may be more or less visible
and they may emerge as political mobilization in cyclical form (as
Tarrow 1989 has done well to point out), but their existence and
their effects on social relationships are neither sporadic nor tran-
sitory .
In contemporary societies, a specific sector or subsystem for
collective action is becoming a differentiated and stable compo-
nent in the working of the system . Movements acquire a certain
independence from both the daily life of individuals and from
political action by creating a specific space for their actions. The
differentiation of complex systems is so extensive that collective
action can acquire autonomous status . Noninstitutionalized, col-
lective action separates from those other forms of action with
which it was formerly confused (political action , in particular) . In
th e industrial age , social conflicts were incorporat ed into struggles
for citizenship, just as in th e histor y of th e workers ' movement
anticapitalistic social struggl e and the fight against th e bourgeois
state coincided . Wh en th ese two levels separat e, as th ey do in
cont emporary so cieties, mov em ents los e th eir ch aract er as person-
ages en gaged in a confrontation-clash with a state for citizenship
117
rights. Instead, th ey form themselv es into social net works, w here
a collective identity is negoti ated and given shape .
Two features of these netw orks can be id entified . Fir st, a
movement network is a field of social relationships wher e, through
negotiation among various groups, a collective identity is struc-
tured. In this social field, the ori entations and constraints of action
are defined and redefined within the solidarity networks that link
individuals together in their daily lives . Second , a mov ement net -
work is a terrain in which identity is recomposed and unifi ed .
Networks within the movement insure a certain degree of continu-
ity and stability in the identities of individuals and groups in a
social system where this identity is constantly fragment ed or de-
structured. The movement provides individuals and groups with
a relatively stable point of reference from which to rebuild identi-
ties split among the various memberships , roles , and time scales
of social experience.
The inevitable th eor etical question at this point is wh eth er
contemporary movements are conflictual in character. Are th ere
elements of antagonistic conflict in phenom en a so distant from th e
image of the revolutionary, coll ectiv e actor that we have inherited
from the past? Is conflict found in phenomena so fragm ent ed ,
dispersed, and interwoven that they are more like subcultures than
political actors , more inclined towards expr essive action than in-
strumental effectiven ess? The answer lies at two differ ent levels.
The first level is the orientations of the movem ent's action . Such
orientations constitut e th e basis on which its collective identity is
negotiated . For th e reasons set out above , a mov ement combines
various orientations of action, and analysis must establish wheth er
any of them are antagonistic in nature . If so , this does not exhau st
the featur es of th e movement but indicat es th e pres ence of an
antagonism that cannot be reduced to political exch an ge or func-
tional adaptation. The second level reflects the concrete operation
of the mo vem ent 's networks . This is the level wh ere relation s
structure th emselves and wher e organization and action expr ess a
conflictual messag e.
Let us consider the first point. Drawing on m y em pirical
work (Melucci 1984) , I have found th at orientations of action are
both general and specific in character. Th ey are, in fact , th e point
of union betwe en a particular actor an d th e field of opportuniti es-
constraint s to which its action ref ers . A parti cul ar so cial con dition
Alb ertoMelucci
118
encourages conflict because it provides certain groups of people
with access to central resources of the system . At the same time,
it exp oses this group to pressures that affect th e formation of
identity and meaning . This is the case, for example , of women or
young people. In oth er cases, the factors that en cour age conflict
are not associated with a stable condition but nevertheless delimit
a social space (for exam ple, geographical location for certain sec-
tions of the environm entalist movement , or pr evious political and
cultural history for certain sections of ecologi st or pacifist mili-
tancy, or certain areas of the feminist mov em ent) . The conflict is
provoked by thes e particular conditions, but it simultaneously
brings into play probl ems that concern the system 's overall logic
and its dilemmas. The actor is always a specific entit y , but the
social field it addresses and th e issu es it rais es compris e the entire
syst em . This is th e parado x of contemporary movements: they
addr ess th e whole of so ciety in th e name of a categor y or a group ,
or on the basis of a particul ar place within the social structur e.
Being young in contem porary society ceases to be a biologi-
cal condition and is incr easingl y defin ed in cultural terms. People
are young not bec ause the y have a certain age, but be cause they
participat e in a cultur e or life-st yle , because th ey live in a state of
susp end ed animation relative to the duti es, schedules , and rules of
adult life. Youth as a sym bolic condition en gages th e possibilit y
and right to redefin e, to change , and to reverse choic es. This
problem concerns not only young p eopl e but also soci ety at large.
For syst ems that mak e change the condition of their exis-
tence , predictabilit y is an essential requir ement . The syst em prom-
ises and induces change , but it strives to keep it m easurable and
therefore controll able. Becaus e of this condition of so cial suspen-
sion, young peopl e oppose this logic by appealing the reversibilit y
of choices; th eir actions tak e th e form of an abs enc e of planning ,
living for the present, and claiming the right to belon g by choice
not by allocation . Youth , th e age par ex cellen ce of ind eterminate-
ness, openn ess, and discontinuity , becom es th e metaphor for a
right to change and to self-d etermin ation that challen ges th e social
rul es that impose continuity , conformit y, an d pr edictabilit y. By
seeking to appropriate th e pres ent and th e right to be able to
chang e things , youn g people em boody a gener al cult ur al need and
th ey qu estion th e roots of th e logi c of rational instrumentalit y.
For women, the profound m emory of subordin ation and en-
Strange Kind of Ne wness
119
trapment in a body "other" than that of the dominant culture
make a struggle for emancipation an important , and quantitatively
perhaps the most significant, component of the movement's ac-
tion. Collective action by women, however , is structured not only
on the campaign for equal rights but also for the right to be
different. The struggle against discrimination and for access to the
economic and political market interweaves with, but is neverth e-
less distinct from, the struggle for difference. Being recognized
as different is perhaps one of the most crucial rights at stake in
postindustrial systems. Granting recognition to women entails ac-
cepting a different outlook on reality, existence in a different
body, and a specific way of relating to others and to the world. In
societies that exert strong pressures toward conformity , the appeal
to difference has an explosive impact on the dominant logic . By
claiming difference , the movement addresses women and society
as a whole . At the same time, the movement's action gives women
access to political and cultural markets and helps to renew them.
Success in the market transforms the movement into a pressure
group , segments the network , bureaucratizes some groups, and
dissipates others. The movement's professionalization, however ,
does not affect its antagonistic nucleus but makes it more difficult
to locate.
This nucleus shifts toward the form of communication. The
self-reflective form of the small group-which was the core of th e
women's movement and preceded and fostered its public mobili-
zation-already expresses its intention not to separate doing from
meaning, or action from awareness of its significance and its emo-
tional content. The work done by the women in the movement
speaks for all of us. It shows that one cannot act publicly and
effectively without a stable component of reflectiveness that con-
stantly questions the meaning of what is being done. Communica-
tion must find room not only for the instrumental logic of effi-
ciency but also for the feelings, uncertainties , and affective
conflicts that always nourish human action . What does this privi-
leged communication of the women 's movement, which has been
engaged for so long and with such difficulty, actually express?
Power and difference . Women 's confrontation with male power
has taught them to recognize that difference becomes power (Gilli-
gan 1981). Female communication contains a demand and a chal-
lenge: it asks society whether a difference without power is possi-
Alb erto Melucci
120
ble ; it tries to establish forms of communication that preserve
difference.
Women rely on the fema le form of communication . They
know it is different from male communication. They also recog -
nize that it is not internally homogeneous and that it contains
differences among women. When they use this form of comm uni-
cation , women in terrogate the whole of society concerning the
roots of communica tion . They raise the qu estion of how diversity
can be reconcil ed , whether unity in separateness is feasib le,
whether, in sum, humans can communicate without oppressing
each oth er. In what sense is this message antagonistic? It is antago -
nistic in th e sense that the system , which multiplies communica -
tion and lives by it, knows only two kind s of communication :
identification , that is, incorporation into dominant cod es, fusion
with a pow er that denies diversity ; or separateness , that is, differ-
en ce as exclusion from all com m uni cation .
Other features of femal e communication reveal its antagonis-
tic nature . The requir ement not to lose sight of th e particula r -the
value assigned to the details of experi enc e, to memories of the
day-to -day , to small gestures, to events without histor y -all these
are features that have been dismissed as femal e narcissism but that
have, in fact, a profound ly subver sive significance. The y challenge
the standardization of ex perien ce and the homog enization of time
that an information society ex acts in ord er to make its procedures
generally applicabl e.
Not all women mobilize themselv es, however. The actors in
th e movem ent are th ose wom en who have experien ced the contra -
dictio n betwe en , on th e one hand , promises of inclusion in the
labor market, in the arena of politica l rights and equality, and , on
the other , th e social costs of being a woman restricted to the
immutable ro les of mother , wife , and mistr ess . Women who mo-
bilize, th erefore , are thos e who have experienced a surplus of re-
sourc es within the narrow confines of the female condition. They
are those with higher levels of schooling ; they are those exposed
to the con tradictions of welf are syst ems (edu cation , health , social
security) , of which th ey are oft en agents and recipi ents . The reac-
tion by th ese wom en takes th e form of cultur al overproduction
within th e mov em ent, a symbolic wast efulness that contains a
profound am bivalence. " Fem ale" activities within the movement
consist of pointl ess m eetings, writ ing for its own sak e not for the
121
market, apparently aimless communication, and time spent in
ways incoherent with utility and efficiency. The cultivation of
memory ; the search for the margins, nuances, and seams of expe-
rience; and the duplication of the same activities by a myriad of
groups, with complete disregard for economies of scale , are all
aspects that the dominant masculine culture judges as " sen seless."
Nevertheless, it is this waste that breeds innovation, as recent years
have shown .
In fact, on one hand, these activities comprise one way in
which the system controls uncertainty; they form a sort of enclave
where haphazard experiments in innovation are conducted. The
system absorbs the results of these experiments by sifting out their
essence in a kind of natural selection process. But, on the other
hand, this symbolic wastefulness is also the expression of an irre-
ducible difference; it is an expression of what is "valueless" be-
cause it is too minute or partial to enter the standardized circuits
of the mass cultural market. The symbolic extravagance of female
output introduces the value of the useless into the system, the
inalienable right of the particular to exist, the irreducible signifi-
cance of inner life that no history is able to record but by virtue of
which individual experience becomes the ultimate core of expe-
nence.
The women's movement is hazardously balanced between its
role as a modernizing force, a role which it cannot refuse but
which makes it into a pressure group, and its function as a sym-
bolic appeal that goes beyond the female condition . In its modern-
izing role, the movement helps to spread the political and cultural
contents of feminism , by now professionalized. Small, residual
fundamentalist groups resist institutionalization while groups of
intellectuals cultivate the memory of the movement. As regards
its symbolic appeal, the women 's movement seems destined to
deny itself as a specific actor. By giving everyone the chance to be
different, it cancels its own separateness. The dichotomy " bein g
yourself/being for others" seems to constitute the drama and the
symbol of femaleness ; it seems to define the collective action of
women as well.
Environmentalist mobilizations are more visibly channels for
the formation of new elites than the movements considered so far.
Because of their lack of a common condition , environmentalist
groups have a solidarity that is wholly symbolic in character. Here ,
Alb ertoMelucci
122
too , the antagonistic level is hard to pin down because the move-
ment's identity is largely structured by its rol e in institutional
pressure and th e presence of potential new elites. This movement
dir ectly confronts public polici es and decisions in an external arena
of action . In doing so, it has fulfill ed a crucial function in applying
pr essure that has not only influenc ed policies but altered the crite-
ria for innovation; it has redefined priorities and recalibrated the
yardstick with whi ch alternativ es are measur ed .
There is, how ever , a strictly cultural dim ension to the struc-
turing of the enviro nm entalist movement. In an artificial world ,
which is creat ed by the prolif eration of the instrumental capacit y
for social int ervention , ther e still remain areas of shadow. That
which escapes th e artificial , societ y 's construction of itself , speaks
of missed chances or of possible dr eams . Th e " N atur e" to which
th e mov emen t app eals symboliz es this fronti er ; it reminds the
societi es th at take efficien cy and effectiveness as their operational
credo of the limit s to th eir omnip otenc e. In th e ecological practice
of the m oveme nt 's bas e group s, N atur e is lived , acted, and experi-
enced by ups ett ing th e ope rationa l cod es of destructive pro -
duction.
This minu scul e, alm ost in visible action reminds societ y that
th e power th at ena bles it to pr oduc e is also the po wer that m ay
destro y it ; thi s respect for th e shade, for th e limit , for th e secret
rhythm s of th e cosm os w ithin and w itho ut us is the othe r , insepa-
rabl e side to hum anit y 's urg e to discover and to create (Bateson
1972, 1979) . In thi s appea l to the shadow, to th e uns aid and the
uns ayable , lies th e m ost pr ofound meanin g of th e new spiritual
urgency that dri ves th e collective acti on of man y gr oup s. Where
it is not a renewal of th e m essage of religi on , w he re it is not a
specialized sector of th e mar ket in em otion s, spiritu al ex perience
in inform ation societies is an app eal to w isdo m ; it is a call to
th at encoun ter wi th th e self th at is ne ver entirely expressible in
ope ratio nal cod es. Th e reint egration of hum an ex perien ce and the
recomp osition of o the rne ss and its limit w ithin a unit y of som e
kind m ay be the m ost significan t activity of th ese coll ective phe-
nom ena.
If acting as th e trans mi tte r and receiver of info rmation ac-
cording to co dified pro cedur es an d criteria of efficiency has be-
com e th e rul e in inf orm atio n societies , clo sedn ess, silence, and the
123
retreat into the void where the only words are those spoken to
oneself constitute behavior of extraordinary subversive impact.
The orientations of the action of contemporary movements
therefore reveal an antagonistic nucleus. If, in information socie -
ties, power is exercised in the control of codes, antagonism lies in
the ability to resist and, even more so, to overturn dominant
codes. Antagonism lies in the ability to give a different name to
space and time by developing new languages that change or re-
place the words used by the social order to organize our daily
experience. It lies in the ability to make room for wisdom beyond
knowledge, to adopt an affective rather than an instrumental re-
flectiveness . These are the ways movements shape and interpret
the flux of information, the ways they give another name to the
world. Antagonism expresses itself in the structuring of the collec-
tive actor, that is, in the way that it organizes its own solidarity.
As it structures itself, the action of movements is already a chal-
lenge to the system.
We can now turn our attention to the second dimension of
movements, namely, the forms of organization and action as mo -
dalities of conflict expressed not in the content but in the form and
in the process of collective action . The structure of mobilization is
provisional and reversible; it is based on direct participation,
which is considered a good to be used regardless of the results it
achieves; it is designed to meet the needs of individuals who no
longer distinguish between work time and leisure time. This struc-
ture broadcasts to the system beyond the concrete contents of
the mobilization other codes that concern the definition of the
individual in the collectivity. Predictable time is opposed by a
reversible time that follows individual rhythms that are based on
the plurality of memberships and on the requirement to experience
change at first hand. Participation is seen as commitment and not
as duty; it has sectorial and not global implications, but with a
global concern; provisional and not life-long commitment, the
circulation of individuals in different groups and organizations,
are also indicators of this upsetting of codes .
The features that render the challenge to the system most
visible are organizational structure and internal power relations.
Movements function as open spaces where constantly negotiable
contracts are made. The organization must insure this negotiation;
it must make sure that collective action is the outcome of a con-
Alb erto Melucci
124
tractual and reflective process . Concern for the quality of inner
relations entails recognition of power relations , that is, a recogni-
tion of differences and the risks connected with them. The attempt
to keep this dimension under control by intensifying self-reflective
activity runs the risk that groups will close in on themselves . At
the same time, however , it provides evidence of the contractual
and reflective character of the relation. People are not what they
are but who they choose to be. They do not belong to a group or
to a project becaus e they share an objectiv e condition or because
they have made a definitive, irrev ersible choice. They do so be-
cause they continue to choose and to assum e responsibility for
that choice.
This implicit contractuality is also th e basis for the relation
between more prof essionalized groupings and the rest of the
movem ent . Although the former help to structure the collective
identity and to nurture it , th ey also know that only by providing
certain kinds of symb olic goods , and only by respecting the model
of relations described abov e, will they be abl e to maintain their
role.
The organizational structur e of the networks and relations of
power stand in opposition to th e domin ant codes. They say, in
fact , that making power visible does not m ean nullifying it, but it
do es place it und er control. Th ey also remind us that pacts with
an invisibl e power are always false. They reject a logic of exchange
that do es not make its asymm etry ex plicit. This challenge is pro-
foundly significant in syst ems that hide and neutralize the loci
of power .
The antagonistic nucleus that I have described is flanked by
other meanings . The search for antagonistic meanings of action is
a product of analysis , and it is conduct ed once other explanator y
crit eria have been employed. It is used to explain those elements
of behavior that have resisted explanation in terms of , for ex am ple,
exchange relations or relationships bas ed on strategic calculation .
Th ere are dimensions to th e action of contemporar y movements
that cannot be explained by th ese paradigms . In particular , it is
impossible to reduce th e incr easingl y mor e formal and self-reflec-
tive charact er of group action , which seems to free its elf of the
contents that it m ay assume at any particul ar mom ent , to an expla-
nation in terms of exchang e relations. Such a deep con cern with
th e form of action, with its cha racter as a co de, with its nature as
125
a process, is difficult to reduce to analysis in terms of cost -benefit
calculation. It requires other explanatory criteria . A fruitful ap-
proach here might be analysis of the antagonistic meanings of
the action. The hypothesis is that conflict arises over the criteria
themselves by which meaning is created. What is at issue in a
conflict is not the terms of the exchange, or the best way to con-
duct it, but the actual meaning of the exchange itself.
At the same time, the antagonistic nucleus that engages for-
mal codes is not a separate entity from the concrete contents that
action assumes . The more the action coincides with its contents,
that is, the more the group coincides with what it does and not
how it does it, the more the challenge declines in strength and the
more the group is institutionalized. The spiritual quest becomes a
church; youth culture becomes a fashion that the media market
appropriates and rapidly consumes; the issues of feminism become
a renewal of customs and morals; ecology becomes a good traded
on the political market. Institutionalization shifts the arena of con-
flicts to other issues and other actors. Questions and social groups
that once stood at the center of the conflict find a few years later
that they have become new elites, modernizers of the market, or
reformers of the political system. In the meantime, in other areas
of the system , other conflictual issues come to the fore which, in
different ways and by mobilizing new actors, restate the funda-
mental dilemmas of complexity amid the conflicts inherent to
high-density information systems. The field of conflict, in fact,
comprises a number of central issues that have a certain perma -
nence and stability, whereas the actors who give voice to these
issues change quite rapidly. We can assume that a high degree of
variability in the action of a group will favor autonomy between
the forms and contents of action and a greater capacity to utilize
the antagonistic impact of codes.
The antagonism of movements is eminently communicative
in character. It offers other symbolic codes to the rest of society,
codes that subvert the logic of the dominant ones. It is possible to
identify three models of communicative action.
I. Prophecy: The message is that the possible is already real

in the direct experience of those proclaiming it. The struggle for
change is already incarnate in the life and in the structure of the
group . Prophecy is a striking example of the contradiction be-
Alb erto Melucci
126
tween th e form and th e content of action I spoke of abov e. Prop h-
ets always speak in th e nam e of someon e else, but they cannot
help but pr esent th emsel ves as th e model of th e m essage the y are
proclaiming . Thus , as mo vem ents battl e to up set th e cod es, the y
spread cultures and life-styles th at en ter th e m ark et or are institu -
tionaliz ed .
2. Parado x . Th e authorit y of th e dominant code app ears

through its exas pe ration or its overturnin g .
3. Repr esentation . Th e mes sag e tak es th e form of a symbolic

repr odu ction that sep arates th e cod es from the cont ents that habit-
ually m ask th em . It m ay combin e with the abo ve two forms.
Cont emp or ary m ovem ents mak e use of such form s of repre senta-
tion as th eat er , video, an d th e m edi a.
U sing th ese thr ee model s, m ovem ent s functi on for th e rest

of society as a speci fic kind of m edium, the chie f function of w hich
is to reveal w ha t a sys tem does not say of itself, th e kernel of
silence, of violence, or of arbitrary pow er th at dominant codes
alway s compri se. Mo vem ents are m edia that speak thr ough action.
It is not th at th ey do not say words , that th ey do not use slogans
or send out m essag es; but th eir function as int erm ediaries bet ween
the dilemm as of th e syst em and people 's dail y lives is mainl y
m anifest in what they do . Th eir pr im ary m essage is the simple
fact that th ey exi st and act . T his tells societ y at larg e th at there is
a probl em that invol ves everyo ne and around w hi ch new form s of
power are being ex ercised . Th e pow er stru ctur e says that their
solution to th e probl em is th e onl y on e possible while it hid es its
specific int ere sts and its cor e of arbitrary po wer and oppression .
Movem ents , doin g what th ey do and in th e way that th ey do it,
ann oun ce that oth er avenu es are op en , that th ere is always another
horn to th e dil emma, and that the needs of individu als or of
gro ups cannot be reduced to the definiti on th at po wer give s them.
Th e action of movem ents can be seen as symbol and as communi-
cation . This does aw ay with the old distin ction between th e instru -
m ental an d th e ex pressive m eaning o f action , for in contemporar y
mo vem ents th e result s of action and th e indi vidu al ex pe rien ce of
new cod es tend to coincid e. Action , ove r and above producing
calculable outcom es, chan ges th e rul es of co m m unicatio n .
127
Hidden Networks and Visible Action
Contemporary movements display a two-

pole pattern of functioning. The normal
situation is a network of small groups submerged in daily life that
require personal involvement in the creation and experimentation
of cultural models. These networks only come into the open over
specific problems, for example, mobilizations for peace. Although
the hidden network is composed of small, separate groups, it is a
circuit of exchanges. Individuals and information circulate
through the network, and there are specific agencies (the profes-
sionalized nuclei) that insure a certain amount of unity . The hid-
den network allows multiple membership; is part-time with re-
spect to both the life course and to the amount of time it absorbs;
and requires the personal commitment and affective solidarity of
those who belong to it.
The bipolar model shows clearly that latency and visibility
have different functions and that they are reciprocally linked. La-
tency makes the direct experience of new cultural models possible,
and it encourages change by constructing meanings and producing
codes. Its cultural output often challenges dominant social pres-
sures. Latency is a sort of underground laboratory for antagonism
and innovation. When the small groups come out into the open,
they do so in order to confront political authority on specific
grounds. Mobilization has a multilayered symbolic function . It
proclaims opposition against the logic that guides decision making
with regard to a specific public policy . At the same time, it acts as
a medium that reveals to the rest of society the connection between
a specific problem and the logic dominating the system. Third, it
proclaims that alternative cultural models are possible, specifically
those that its collective action already practices and displays. The
mobilization unifies the thrust of cultural innovation, antagonistic
demands, and other levels that comprise the movement's action.
These two poles are reciprocally linked to each other. Latency
makes visible action possible because it provides the solidarity
resources it needs and builds the cultural framework within which
mobilization takes place. Visible action strengthens the hidden
networks, boosts solidarity, creates further groups, and recruits
new militants who , attracted by the movement's public action,
join its hidden networks. Mobilization also encourages the institu-
Al berto Melucci
128
tion alizat ion of cert ain frin ge elem ents in the movement an d of
new elites that have formed in the area .
For this model to persist and to operat e effectively , cer tain
conditions have to be fulfilled . Thes e includ e:
I . A high degre e of varia bility in the environment that pre-

vents the groups in the hidd en network from closing in on them -
selves.
2. High elasticit y in the political system , which does not ob-

struct the delicate phases of passag e from one pole to the other.
3. Ar ea agencies and umbrella organizations , or temporary

organizations, able to insure internal communications (during la-
tency , mainly the former) and ext ernal communications (during
mobilizati on , mainly th e latt er) . These forms of leadership are
compati ble with a multifac eted structuring of groups and does not
impede the typic al structuring of th e area.
The two -poles model seems to indic ate that public mobiliza -
tion is the moment of direct contact w ith political systems. In
latenc y phases , only the professionaliz ed nuclei maintain chiefly
instrumenta l contacts with some sector of the political system . If
th e goal of th e movement is mainly symbolic in nature , wh y
should it engage in exchange relations with the political system ,
which are always part of a logic of representation? The main rea-
son seems to be that collectiv e actors must pr eserve areas of auton -
om y from the system , are as in w hi ch they can undertake change.
This is th e laboratory wh ere formal models are created and which
th e movem ent fills with cont ent addressed to specifi c goals . Thus ,
a relationship with the political system , in th e form of some kind
of exchang e, is a condition for th e safeguarding or th e extension
of this autonom y (Keane 1988).
A relationship of thi s kind can onl y come about by est ablish-
ing a pact; this pact is not th e basis of the exc ha n ge but onl y a
condition for its furth eranc e. This logic is first delin eated in the
action of umbr ella org anizations and agen cies as th e mobilization
pro ceeds. Th e pact- a cir cum scrib ed and reversibl e exc ha nge with
the institution s-simult aneousl y mak es pow er visible. Power that
is usu ally neutr alized by pro cedur es com es out into the open to
Strange Kind of Newne ss
129
take responsibility, that is, to exercise authority , in a pact. Thus,
it becomes possib le for movements to measure the distance that
separates them from power, as well as to accept, disenchanted,
the confrontation . Through these means it becomes possible for
society to openly address the dilemmas that social movements
have uncovered through their action, as well as to create or adapt
the political institutions best suited to cope with those dilemmas.
References
Alberoni, Francesco. 1977. Movimento e istituzion e. Bologna : II Mulino.
Bateson, Gregory . 1972. Steps to an Ecology of Mind . New York: Ballantine
Books.
--- . 1979. Mind and Nature. New York : Dutton .
Cohen, Jean L. 1985. "Strategy or Identity : New Theoretical Paradigms and
Contemporary Social Movements." Social Research 52,4:663-716 .
Crozier , Michel, and Erhard Friedberg . 1977. L 'acteur et Ie systeme. Paris: Seuil.
Gamson , William A. 1990. Th e Strategy of Social Protest. 2d ed . Belmont, Calif.:
Wadsworth.
Gamson, William A ., B. Fireman, and S. Rytina . 1982. Encounters with Unjust
Authority . Homewood, III.: Dorsey Press .
Giddens , Anthony . 1984. The Constitution of Society . Berkeley : University of
California Press.
Gilligan, Carol. 1981. In a Different UJice. Cambridge, Mass .: Harvard Univer -
sity Press.
Habermas, Jiirgen . 1984. The Theory of Communicative A ction. Boston: Beacon
Press .
Jenkins, J. Craig . 1983. " Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social
Movements ." Annua l Review of Sociology 9:527-53.
Keane, John, ed . 1988. Civil Society and the State . London: Verso.
Klandermans, Bert, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, eds . 1988. From Struc-
ture to Action. Vol. 1 of International Social Movement Research. Greenwich ,
Conn .: JAI Press .
McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N . Za ld. 1977. " Resource Mobilization and
Social Movements: A Partial Theory. " American Journal of Sociology 82 ,
6:1212-41.
--- . 1981. Social Movements in Organizational Society. New Brunswick, N.J. :
Transaction Books .
Melucci, Alberto. 1984. Altri Codici. Bologna : II Mulino.
--- . 1989. Nomad s of the Present. Philadelphia : Temple University Press.
--- . 1991. L 'Inuenzione del presente. 2d ed. Bologna : II Mulino .
Moscovici, Serge . 1981. L'Ag e desfoules . Paris : Fayard .
Neisser, Ulric. 1976. Cognition and Reality . San Francisco: Freeman.
Offe, Claus . 1985. "N ew Social Movements : Challenging the Boundari es of
Institutional Politics ." Social Research 52, 4:817-68 .
Pizzomo, Allessandro . 1978. "Political Exchange and Collective Identit y in In-
A lbertoMelucci
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dustri al Co nflict." In T he Resurgence of C lass Conflict in l#s tern Europe since
1968, edited by C. C rouc h and A. Pizzorn o . Lon don : Macmillan.
--- . 1985. "O n the Rationality of th e Democ ratic C ho ice." Telos 63
(Spring): 41- 69.
--- . 1987. " C on sider azioni sulle teori e dei m ovim enti socia li." Problemi del
Socialismo, n .s. 12:11-27 .
Tarro w , Sidney . 1989. D emocracy and Disorder. Ox ford: C larendo n .
T illy, C harles. 1978. From Mobiliz ation to Revolution. Readin g , M ass.: Addison-
Wesley.
--- . 1986. T he Contentious French. Cam bridge, M ass. : H arvard Un iversity
Press .
Tour aine, Alain. 1971. La Production de la societe. Paris: Seuil.
--- . 1978. La UJix et Ie regard. Paris: SeuiJ.
-- - . 1984. Le Retour de l'acteur. Paris: Fayard .
Turner, Ralph H ., and Lewi s M . Killian . 1987. Collective Behavior. 3d ed . Engle-
wood C liffs, N .J.: Pre ntice Ha ll.
Von Foerster, Heinz . 1973. "O n Cons truc ting Realit y." In Environmental D esign
Research, edited by W.F.E. P reiser. Stro udsbo urg , Penn .: Dow den, Hut ch-
inson, and Ross.
Von Glasersfeld , Erns t. 1985. "Re cons truc ting th e Co ncept of Know ledge ." Ca-
hiers de la Fondation A rchivesJean Piaget 6.
Watzlawick, Paul, ed. 1984. T he Invented Reality. N ew York: N ort on .
Part II
Collective Actors in
New Social Movements
Chapter 6
Activ ists,Authorities,
and Media Framing
of Drunk Driving
John D. McCarthy
Even prote st mo vement s in th e Unit ed States tend to

follow issue-specialized and geographically fissipa-
rous pattern s. State structur es, establish ed int erest
groups and oppo sitional groups all m ay mirror on e
anoth er's forms of or ganization and scop es of
purpos e.
- Th eda Skocpol
D eath caused by drunk driv ers is the only socially
acceptable form of homicide .
-Candy Lightner
The Drunk Driver has turned his car into a weapon ,
a weapon that thr eatens the lives of the inno cent .
- Ronald Reagan
With the rise of nearly universal use of au-

tomobiles during the past fifty years, deaths
and serious injuries associated with automobiles have escalated
rapidly. Highway fatalities are chronic in all rich nations simply
because the automobile is central to the everyday lives of most
citizens. Driving crash deaths in the United States have totaled
between forty thousand and fifty thousand a year during the last
several decades . Close to on e-half of these deaths are thought to
be alcohol related . Each of them has left behind grieving relatives
and friends. A recent estimate of people who believe that they
are victims of the " alcohol-related vehicular homicide" of a close
relative or friend puts the number of immediate family members
at 2.2 million people, the number of other relatives at 4.0 million,
and the number of close friends at 3.6 million (Kilpatrick , Amick ,
and Resnick 1990, 79). Yet despite this pool of people that has
existed for some time with the potential to initiate a collective
search for a solution to this problem, no movement emerged , nor
John D. McCarthy
134
did the issue receive much media attention, until the late 1970s.
If the loss of a child to a drunk driver were enough to moti-
vate a collective search for a solution to this problem, Marilyn
Sugg would have founded MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Driv -
ing) in North Carolina in the late 1960s. When her son was killed
by a drunk driver, Sugg tried to organize a collective response to
protect others exposed to the threat of drunk drivers. But events
like auto fatalities must be properly interpreted to be motivating,
and proper interpretations must resonate with existing communi-
ties of discourse before they can effectively orient collective action.
In 1968, automobile crashes were still generally understood as
accidents, largely beyond any serious measure of control. Within
this interpretive context, Sugg's outrage was channeled by local
officials and community leaders into auto safety activities popular
at the time.
The Marilyn Sugg case lacked the elements necessary to mo-
tivate collective action: an effective frame and organized constitu -
encies to whom that frame is accessible and resonant . According
to Gamson (1990), an effective frame "has three elements: (a) it
defmes the root of the problem and its solution collectively rather
than individually; (b) it defines the antagonists -'us' and 'them ';
and (c) it defines an injustice that can be corrected through the
challenger's action" (155). More specifically, Snow et al. (1986)
point out that creating an effective frame requires "fairly self-
contained but substantial changes in the way a particular domain
of social life is framed, such that a domain previously taken for
granted is reframed as problematic and in need of repair, or a
domain seen as normative or acceptable is reframed as an injustice
that warrants change." A frame must resonate with the experience
of a collectivity and be accessible with its mix of crosscutting
identities. In 1968, Marilyn Sugg had available neither the cultural
temp late of an effective frame for reinterpreting the dominant
traffic accident frame nor resonant constituencies with whom she
could create one. 1
By the late 1970s, however, Candy Lightner's outrage when
her daughter was killed by a drunk driver found both an existing
template for an effective "killer drunk" collective action frame and
a series of interlinked constituencies receptive to helping build a
movement. The process of change that had so favorably trans-
Media Framing of Drun k Dri ving
135
formed both the political and cultural opportunities confronting
these two mothers concerned with drunk driving began with a
group of American public health researchers in the late 1950s who
disseminated the idea that accidents of many kinds are preventable
and hence not accidents at all (Haddon, Suchman, and Klein 1964).
As this idea began to be taken more seriously, public debate com-
menced over how to understand the potentially remediable causes
of the deaths and injuries resulting from crashes involving auto-
mobiles . Several relatively coherent perspectives emerged during
the several decades of claims-making that ensued . Two of them-
auto safety and drunk driving-provided the cultural backdrop for
interpretations of automobile crashes that were widely available to
the surviving victims of crashes , some of whom became the activ -
ists of the citizens ' movement against drunk driving. The citizen
activists concerned with automobile crashes overwhelmingly
adopted and, by and large, have continued to embrac e, the drunk
driving perspective. And, since each perspective frames the causes
of the problem differently, thereby leading its proponents to offer
quite distinct remedies for reducing crashes , the one adopt ed by
the activists strongly shaped their goals and strategies .
As the first citizen activists began to organize, they entered a
public arena dense with competing understandings of the causes
of and solutions to automobile crashes and their consequences. In
this essay I explain the principal origins of the auto safety and
drunk driving frames , why the drunk driving frame became so
powerfully appealing, and why it subsequently achieved such wide
public attention. I begin by examining elements of the competing
frames themselves. Frames may vary in their resonance , coher-
ence, and sophistication. Recent thinking provides clues to the
relative importance of these dimensions in understanding the dif-
fering appeal of public frames (Snow et al. 1986; Gamson 1990;
Gusfield 1988b) . The relative legitimacy, power, and access to
resources of those who create and publicly advocate frames should
be important in explaining success in having one's chosen frame
prevail over others in the public imagination (Gamson 1988). Fi-
nally, the processes of newsmaking by media actors shape atten-
tion curves; our knowledge of many of the standard operating
procedures of media actors will inform the analyses as they are un -
folded.
John D . McCarthy
136
The Creation of Dominant
Auto Fatality Frames
Th e frames adva nce d to ex p lain automo-
bile crash-relat ed injuries and fatalities that
have achiev ed a wide degree of public acceptan ce in the United
States are "auto safety ," " drunk driving ," and , very recentl y,
"public health " (Gus field 1988a).2 Ea ch emphasiz es different as-
pects and mak es ver y different " sense" of a similar set of " facts."
Each targ ets culprits in em otive lan guag e. And , each has been
adv an ced by a mor e or less organiz ed group of adv ocates. For a
bri ef period in th e mid 1960s the aut o safety fram e received the
m ost publi c attention. Emb edd ed in a w ides prea d fed eral regula-
tor y effort, it thr eatened to becom e th e dominant fram e for years
to com e. But toward th e end of th e 1970s drunk dri vin g began to
achieve wid e attention and by the early 1980s had em erged as the
dominant fram e judging by public att ention .
Auto Safety
Befor e 1960 in th e Unit ed Stat es, if any
com m on publi c und erstandin g of aut om obil e accidents pr evailed
at all, dri ver erro r was th e dominant acco un t of cra she s (N ader
1972). " T he nut behind th e w heel" was a w idely kno wn ima ge
impl yin g unskill ed , unbalan ced dri vers responsibl e for killin g and
injuring th em selves and oth ers . In th e early 1960s, a loosel y con-
nected cadr e of professional reform ers an d guerrilla bureaucrats
promulgat ed a very differ ent und erstanding of th e caus es of high-
way injuri es and fataliti es. Ralph N ader (1972) expr essed their po-
sition: " T he hi ghwa y toll is neith er in dispute nor obs cure . The
trag edy is kn own . Ho w it is int erpr eted is an othe r m att er and one
w hich ha s rem ained th e principal ob stacl e to a rati on al selection
of safet y strateg ies and th eir impl em ent ation " (xiii).
Nad er summariz ed th e polic y age nda of th e new frame: " The
aim should be to have th e autom obile industr y produ ce an auto-
m obile that would be safe under th e assum ption that fools and
drunks would driv e it " (Gusfield 1988a, 115). In the same vein,
Daniel P. Moynihan , th en an em ployee of th e feder al Departm ent
of Labor , and befor e becoming sen ator from th e state of New
York , cont end ed:
Th ere is not much evidence that the numb er of accidents can be
substantially reduced simply by altering the behavior of drivers
Media Framing of Drunk Dri ving
137
while maintaining a near universal driver population . . . . This
leads to the basic strategy of crash protection : it is assum ed that a
great many automobile accidents wil1 continu e to occur. That being
the case, the most efficient way to minimize the overal1 cost of
accidents is to design the interior of the vehicles so that the injuries
that fol1ow the accidentsare relativel y mild . An attraction of this
approach is that it could be put into effect by changing the behavior
of a tiny population-the fort y or fifty executives who run the
automobile industry. (Moynihan 1966, 12)
Animated by a new approach to the reduction of automobile-

related injuries and deaths, a small band of reformers coalescing
around Ralph Nader was crucial in bringing it to wide public
attention . Their efforts rode the coattails of President Lyndon
Johnson's Great Society initiatives that began to gain stream after
1964, as the Congress and the president undertook an aggressive
program of domestic reform. In this climate , their activities
proved instrumental in creating a new federal agency in 1966 that
later became known as the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration (NHTSA). They hoped this agency would carry out
a program of auto safety reform. The goals of that reform empha-
sized improvement in vehicle design rather than driver perform-
ance as the appropriate strategy to ameliorate the consequences of
automobile crashes.
The essence of the frame was and is that improvements in
automobile design can reduce the likelihood of death and injury
by either making crashes less likely or, in the event of crashes,
minimizing their consequences. In practice, a variety of automo-
bile manufacturing standards were advocated to make crashes less
likely, including ones to improve tire and brake quality . Seat belts,
air bags, and safety glass would minimize the effects of the "sec-
ond collision," that is, the collision between the driver and passen-
gers and the interior of the vehicle.
The content of this frame is dense and sophisticated. Exten-
sive research accumulated to support it and was widely dissemin-
ated. The frame resonated with a highly educated, technocratic
elite who viewed public policy as a lever to improve the lot of the
masses . Yet it was and is highly abstract and the framing language
typically used by its advocates is unemotional. Finally , its logic
was structural. Gusfield (1981) in accounting the most emotionally
charged and popularly accessible versions of this frame says, "dra-
John D . McCarthy
138
rnatic attribut es occur as well in the personificati on of automobile
design as 'v illain.' . .. A po ssibl e dr ama o f scene , of environme nt,
is conve rted int o one of age nt, of auto indu str y dir ector s as vil-
lain s" (82).
Th e advocates sou ght a federal agen cy to create and enforce
safety standards an d enforce th em on vehicl e manufactur ers . " T he
legisl ative hi stor y of th e act [est abli shing th e ag en cy] indic ates that
C on gress intend ed th e feder al govern me n t to emph asize standards
th at would miti gate injuri es arising from th e so-c alled 'second
collision ' betwe en motorists an d th e vehicl e int erior " (Grah am
1989, 219) .3 In pra ctice, th e professi on al reformers focus ed much
attention on chan gin g th e beh avior of vehi cle m anufactur ers who
had been notori ou sly unint erested in safety design conce rns . Th ey
did so by brin gin g pr essur e to bear on th e newl y created agency
th at was em powered to establish minimum safet y standards for
newl y m anufactur ed autom obiles.
In th e pr ofession al reform tr aditi on typ ical of U. S. policy
m akin g (Low i 1969), a federal regul ator y age ncy was created to
gua rd th e publi c inter est in auto safety ." Th e agenc y 's efforts to
create and en force auto safety standards, center ed at th e nation al
level," have been strong ly resist ed by auto m anufa cturer s. Ag ency
encour age me nt h as com e from thr ee sources : th e C enter for Auto
Safety , a N ader-inspir ed but now ind ep end ent , prof ession al re-
form or ganizati on ; Publi c Citi zen, th e cen tral fundraisin g and co-
ordinatin g organization of th e Nad er prof essional reform empire ;
and the Insuranc e Institut e for Auto Safety , a coalition of automo-
bile insur an ce firms . Th e conflict aro und thi s fram e has generated
almo st no organize d grass- ro ots citiz en invol vem ent .
The Drunk Dri ver

Th e legislation that established NHTSA
focused almost ex clusively on auto safet y but ask ed , inc ident ally,
for a " thorough and com plete stud y of th e relationship between
th e consumption of alcohol and its effect upon hi ghwa y safety and
driv ers of motor vehicl es" (Highway Safety A ct of 1966, 6). In 1968,
th e Alcohol and Highwa y Safety Report w as deli vered to Con -
gr ess. Ba sed on a bod y of " accident" resear ch carri ed out by uni-
ver sit y resear cher s that showe d w ide alco ho l invol vem ent in auto-
139
mobile crashes , the report concluded, "The use of alcohol by
drivers and pedestrians leads to some 25,000 deaths and a total of
at least 800,000 crashes in the United States each year. Especially
tragic is the fact that much of the loss in life, limb and property
damage involves completely innocent parties" (U.S . Senate 1968,
1). It continued by assessing potential means for remedying the
problem within the frame it offered . These were heavily weighted
toward "legal means," later to be more commonly known as law
enforcement approaches .
By defining the issue , attributing blame to the drinking
driver , and embracing a law enforcement strategy, the report be-
came the template for an effective drunk driving frame. It laid the
groundwork for the extensive future activities of NHTSA and
others , especially the National Safety Council , in disseminating
the frame and in generating widespread state and local efforts
based on its assumptions about how to best solve the problem.
During the 1970s, NHTSA became the major institutional advo -
cate of the drunk driving frame and , through its state and local
programs, created a vast interlinked constituency of supporters
for it.
The main dimensions of the frame were well in place by
the time the citizens' movement against drunk driving emerged .
Gusfield (1981), assessing the frame then, described its main ele-
ments:
First, the drinking-driver is portrayed as " dru nk." The "sin" of
drinking and driving is almost a microcosmic and symbolic enact-
ment of the sources of disorder , the unwillingness to respect con-
trols and boundaries in social life. . . . The second aspect . . . is the
term "drunk en driver." Not the event "drinking-driving" but the
person "drunken driver" is described. The personalization of the
event keeps alive the sense of a drama of conflict against disordered
persons, a performance of deviance . It is a drama of agents in which
the individual is prime mover. (82)
The clear focus on personal responsibility embedded in the frame
made the detection and punishment of drunk drivers an obvious
solution to the problem for those who adopted the frame. Further,
the broader consequences of increased levels of punishment were
seen to be the reduction of drunk driving through its deterrence
John D. McCarthy
140
effects. Battlefield imagery was common among proponents, as
in the phrase "waging war against drunk driving." Emotive lan-
guage reviled "the scourge of drunk driving" and "the killer
drunk. "
As NHTSA developed a commitment to the drunk driving
frame along with its originally mandated one to auto safety, budg-
etary commitment expanded in ways that were consistent with the
new frame's implicit lines of action . A series of policies, including
grants to state and local jurisdictions, an expanded research and
development program, and an important series of enforcement
demonstration programs, created broad institutional and profes-
sional support for the drunk driving frame. Support was particu-
larly strong among state and local functionaries, state and local
police, and an expanding research community . All three of these
groups had a large stake in disseminating and institutionalizing the
new frame ; this was most true for local law enforcement officials.
Demonstration Programs. Between 1970 and

1974, thirty -five communities were provided large grants for Al-
cohol Safety Action Programs (ASAPs) . The central theoretical
mechanism of the programs entailed both general and specific
deterrence, which was to be achieved through law enforcement.
More than one -half of the ASAP funds were allocated to enforce-
ment programs. As stated by NHTSA, "Enforcement of DUI
laws constitutes the input factor of the ASAP system concept. Its
goals are: (1) to identify, apprehend, and channel offenders into
the judicial system, and (2) to optimize the level of effort directed
at this activity in order to instill a high perception of risk of being
apprehended in potential drinking drivers" (U.S. Department of
Transportation 1974, 1). Rates of arrest for DUIIDWI (driving
under the influence/driving while intoxicated) increased by more
than 100 percent in these demonstration communities during the
first two years of the programs as the police were provided support
for stepping up their enforcement efforts. The rate of DUIIDWI
arrests more than doubled during the 1970s across the United
States, importantly as a result of these and other efforts of NH-
TSA. This stepped-up enforcement provided local police agencies
an important stake in the drunk driving frame.
The ASAPs also supported extensive public information ef-
forts designed to bring the drunk driver frame to wide local atten-
Media Framing of Drunk Dr iving
141
tion. Reasoning from the premise " that only a third of the public
was aware that drunk driving is the major caus e of fatal crash es,
the ASAPs undertook public education campaigns on two levels .
The first was to inform the community of the exten t of th e drunk
driving problem, particularly the disproportionate rol e of th e
problem drinker in alcohol related crashes, and second , to inform
specific target audienc es about th eir opportunit ies to join a syst em-
atic effort to control and rehabilitat e drunk driv ers " (U .S. D epart-
ment of Transportation 1974, 1).
Drunk Driving Research. From th e beginning ,

NHTSA support ed research efforts relat ed to its concerns. Consis-
tent with the drunk driving frame , it funded res earch on the det ec-
tion of drunk drivers, especially br eath testing to m easur e blood
alcohol concentration (BAC) . This technology , alon g with th e
legal changes allowing its impl em entation , aided police en force-
ment . Extensive research on the relation betw een alcohol and au-
tomobile crashes was also supported , buttr essing th e earli er work
that had been summariz ed in U. S. Senat e 1968. And , NHTSA
launched an effort to create a reporting syst em in all states to test
persons involved in fatal crashes for BAC. Known as the Fatal
Alcohol Reporting System (FARS) , this data base was designed to
provide epidemiological evidence of the involvement of alcohol in
fatal automobile crashes as well as a monitorin g device to track
the success of efforts to control drunk driving.
State and Locol Grants. From 1967 to 1985

mor e than 1.8 billion dollars was allocated directly to local gov ern-
ments for community auto safety activiti es. Thes e grants were
shaped by th e broad er emphases ofNHTSA so that many of them
flowed to projects, such as dri ver education, pedestrian perform-
ance, traffic contro l, and emergency m edical services , that were
not central to th e drunk driver frame. But mor e than 28 percent
was for polic e traffic services, a significant proportion of which
went to DUIIDWI enforcem ent activities, and more than 15 per-
cent was alloc ated directly for what the agency called "alcohol
counter-measures." Th ese were programs derived dir ectly from
the drunk driving frame for und erstanding automobile crash fat al-
ities and injuries.
John D. McCarthy
142
Public Attention to Auto Safety
and Drunk Driving: 1962-1979
Th e fra mes of au to safety an d drunk dri v-
ing an d th e vigoro us efforts o f th eir pr op o-
nen ts to br ing th em to publi c at ten tio n pr ior to 1980 h ave been
briefly describ ed. I do not mea n to impl y th at th ese two frames
are necessar ily mutu ally excl usive of one ano the r. A reason able
observe r m ig h t con clu de th at th er e is an ele me n t of truth in both
frames and th at polic ies b ased o n each sho uld b e sim ultaneo usly
pur sued . But th ey do co m pe te w ith one ano the r for publi c atten-
tion (H ilga rtne r and Bo sk 1988) becau se th er e is a lim ited amo unt
of available space for m edi ated atte n tio n to public issu es in ge ne ral.
And , multi causal ex plana tio ns of pr obl em s ge ne rally lack th e in-
trin sic appea l of mor e sim plified acco un ts that tar get specific
gro ups as respon sibl e for th em (Gu sfield 1981 ; Sno w and Ben-
ford 1988) .
Ev ide nce develop ed from Th e Reader's Guide to Periodical Lit-
erature chro nicles th e publi c atten tio n focus ed on th ese two frames
in th e peri od ju st pr ecedin g th e bur st of atten tion to dru nk dri vin g.
T his source ind exes th e subs ta ntive articles in mo st m ass circula-
tion peri od icals publ ish ed in th e U nit ed Sta tes. " E ffort s of the
pr op onent s of th e aut o safety frame we re ve ry success ful, it wo uld
seem , in brin gin g it to public attentio n durin g th e m id 1960s.
Th er e ar e almos t no sto ries ind exed on au to safety issues in the
earl y 1960s, but a m ajor inc reas e in public atte ntion to au to safety
durin g th e peri od 1965 to 1967 coi nci de d w ith the establishme nt
of NHT SA . Aft er w aning in th e late 1960s, atte ntio n to auto
safety held ste ady at m od er at e level s. int o th e lat e 1970s. D espit e
th e w ides prea d efforts by NHSTA an d its local allies to prom ote
th e drunk dri vin g fram e and publi cizin g th e issu e, th e m edi a paid
almos t n o attentio n durin g thi s entire peri od . A clos e observer
bel ieved that , " A public con sen su s exi ste d about th e ev il of DUI
... for seve ral decad es [but it was ] .. . muted and immobiliz ed"
(Gusfield 1988 , 126) . But publi c atten tion to th e drunk driving
fram e escalate d rapidly aft er 1980 . 7
Media Framing of Drunk Driving
143
The Citizens' Movement Against
Drunk Driving
The rise in public attention to the drinking

and driving issue and the growth of the
citizens' movement concerned about it followed similar trajector-
ies." Before assessing the substantive and biographical content of
the public attention, I briefly describe the movement and demon-
strate its impact on the likelihood of media coverage.
Beginning in the late 1970s a widespread movement of citizen
advocate groups emerged in the United States whose members,
many of whom are victims of drunk driving crashes, began work-
ing to reduce the level and consequences of drunk driving. Their
efforts are widely seen by a variety of observers as having had
some success . For instance, Senator John Danforth (1988) said of
MADD, "This organization has made the public realize that drunk
driving is not a victimless crime. This change in public attitude
has made it possible for those of us in Congress and in state
legislatures to pass stronger drunk driving laws ." In discussing
these local advocacy groups, Franklin Zimring (1988), a consis-
tently skeptical social observer, says, "the mobilization [by the
groups] of public opinion has been partially responsible for the
increased prominence of drunk driving as a public policy issue "
(374). He goes on to say, "My guess is that citizen action groups
are a more important explanation [than others] of the passage
of legislation in the 1980s" (380). Finally, Mark Wolfson (1988)
concludes, in his systematic evaluation of the effects oflocal advo-
cacy, that the efforts of these groups positively affected several
state legislative initiatives and "may have [had] some influence on
fatalities" (9).
The movement consists of a number of national and local
organizations. At the national level, there are two umbrella
groups, Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD), with head-
quarters in Hurst, Texas, and Remove Intoxicated Drivers-USA
(RID), with headquarters in Schenectady, New York . Each of
these groups has a large number of local chapters spread across
many states. In addition to MADD and RID, there are a few
groups that are not affiliated with either of the national umbrella
groups. In 1985, there were about 450 local groups devoting them-
selves exclusively to the issue. The first local groups began in the
John D . McCarthy
144
late 1970s in upstate New York . These groups later became affili-
ated with RID , which was started by Doris Aiken in 1979. By
1985 there were seventy active RID chapters in twenty-three states.
MADD was started by Candy Lightner in California in 1980 after
her daughter was killed by a drunk driver. MADD was quick to
diversify geographically , and it accelerated at a breathtaking pace
over the next few years. By 1985 more than 375 MADD chapters
existed .
By 1985, the movement had become truly national in scope,
with more than 450 local groups with at least one in every state
but Montana. " By then the majority oflarge American communi-
ties had a local group, and 55 percent of the American population
lived in a county in which one of the groups resided , 67 percent
lived in a county in which such a group recruited members, and
95 percent lived in a media market that included such a group
(McCarthy, Wolfson, and Harvey 1987). By 1985, local groups of
the movement had come close to saturating local communities
across the United States.
LocolGroupsand Activists
The constituent elements of the anti-
drunk driving movement are emblematic of many similar local
groups seeking a wide variety of changes in their communities
that have emerged during the last several decades . They include a
variety of victims' groups (Gibbs 1982) and many women's groups
(Mansbridge 1983). Distinctive in their size and shape, in the scope
of their goals, and the range of their tactics , the groups usually
operate out of a leader's home and are typically quite small, labor
intensive, and leader-centered projects. To think of the " commu-
nal activism" (Dalton 1988) of these "minimalist organizations"
(Weed 1991; Halliday , Powell, and Granfors 1987) as we do large,
complex organizations distorts their essential structural features.
Groups like these typically seek narrow, issue-specific reforms
that are seldom even partisan much less regime threatening . They
prefer ruly tactics in their change-seeking efforts; they concentrate
mainly on community outreach and advocacy . When they do em-
ploy unconventional tactics, they tend toward what Joyce Musha-
ben (1985) calls "soft protest," for example, candlelight vigils
honoring victims.
Information was gathered from local groups in order to de-
145
scribe their typical dimensions and the characteristics of their lead-
ers. While a few of the groups are very large and resource rich ,
the typical group is small, with an average of thirty-five members
and a mailing list of one hundred names. About six people beyond
the leaders do volunteer work for the group during an average
month. Seventy percent of the groups had annual revenue of
$2,500 or less in 1985, with the median revenue being $1,229 .
Most local groups rely primarily on leaders, volunteers , and dona-
tions of money and other resources (for example, telephones,
postage, and supplies) to carryon their work . Despite wide sup-
port by their communities (McCarthy, Wolfson, and Harvey 1987;
Ungerleider, Bloch, and Conner 1987), the groups depend pri-
marily on their members for both labor and financial support .
This adds up to about 2,250 leaders, 2,700 regular volunteers,
15,750 group members, and 45,000 people on local mailing lists
among the 450 plus groups existing in 1985.
Activists in this movement closely resemble the profile of
activists in other advocacy movements (Verba and Nie 1972; Dal-
ton 1988). Not surprisingly, the typical chapter officer is a woman,
who either does not work outside of the home or works part-time.
Often she is married with school-age children at home. Although
all officers tend to be highly involved (Weed 1987), the chapter
president is usually the most active (McCarthy, Wolfson, and Har-
vey 1987). About forty-three years old , she has had some college
education . Weed (1987), in a survey of the MADD chapters, notes
that "presidents were less apt to be in the labor force than other
officers, and when they were employed they tended to hold
slightly higher status jobs" (265). The officers on average contrib-
ute the greatest labor to the efforts of their groups.
Victim members comprise about one-fourth of the typical
local group and fill most leadership positions. Among leaders,
presidents are most likely to come from the ranks of those respon-
sible for founding the organization. This description corresponds
with the reports by Weed (1987) and Ungerleider, Bloch, and
Conner (1987) on the leaders of MADD chapters.
GroupActivities
While all the groups aim to reduce drunk
driving, their efforts reflect different approaches, including vary-
ing emphasis on promoting public awareness, pursuing legislative
John D. McCart hy
146
strateg ies, and pro vidin g dir ect victim ser vi ces. The leaders , typi-
cally, m ake m any public appeara nces in a yea r on behalf of their
group s and in th e pro cess recruit m emb ers and volunt eers who
help carry out gr oup pr oject s. Pr oject s might includ e pr eparing
and mail ing new slett er s, organizing n onalcoh olic " prom s" and
" red ribbon " campaign s, monitorin g court proce edin gs involving
drunk driv ers, running legislati ve campaigns , and th e lik e. Groups
usuall y org anize som e task committ ees in order to dec entralize
wo rk on such pr ojects.
Drunk Driving Attention : 1979-1987

As th e mov em ent em erge d, public atten-
tion to th e issu e of drink ing and driving
escalated rapidl y . A compar ison of th e amount of att ention given
to th e issue of drunk dri vin g in thr ee different m edia sources
reveals sim ilar attention patterns for coverag e on national network
news pr ograms , in 5 nation al circul ation ne w spape rs, an d in lo-
cally ori ginat ed stor ies app earin g in 112 local newsp apers . to In the
peak years of covera ge th e n ational newsp ap ers devot ed an average
of more than 30 stori es to th e issu e, th e netw orks close to 10
stori es, and the local pap ers clos e to 5 stori es to the issue. A
not iceabl e incr ease in att ention occurre d between 1980 and 1981,
with att ention peaking during th e period 1983 to 1984, and a
noti ceable declin e in attention beginnin g ther eaft er. While the pat-
terns are similar , the varying att enti on is attributabl e to the vary-
ing amounts of spac e/time that th e thre e media sourc es have avail-
able for the coverage of issu es. The contrast in att ention to the
drunk dri vin g issue here com pare d to that befor e 1979 is striking.
Durin g the peak years of cover age attention to drunk driving
outstripp ed att ention to auto safety in each of these m edi a sourc es.
Recall that ther e were ex tensive efforts by pow erful federal
and lo cal actors to bring the drinking and driving issu e to public
att ention long befor e the citiz en activists arr ived on th e scene.
Th eir eme rgen ce coincided almost perf ectl y with the incr easing
m edia att ention to the issu e. Jame s R. Nichols ;'! long-tim e liaison
between NHTSA and th e citiz en activists , h as term ed th em the
" m issin g link " in bringing the probl em of drinkin g and driving
to wide publi c att ention in th e Unit ed Stat es. Gu sfield (1988a)
echoe s th is obs ervation wh en h e says MADD and o ther or ganiza-
147
tions "created a new movem ent that has given a dramatic form to
an issue that had been dormant in American life" (125). He contin-
ues, "The developments of the 1970's had built a res earch and
policy community that , even though relatively limited in power ,
could be utilized in the new atmosphere of public concern. Never-
theless, the ability of the movement to provide a symbolism, an
imagery, and a dramatic focus was a potent catalyst" (126).
The movement's raw emotive power was thought by many
to be its central avenue of impact on the public imagination. "The
very name, MADD, presents the symbols that carry an expressive
imagery . 'Mothers ' puts the issue in a framework of violence
against children. 'Against' provides an emotional sense of battle
and enemies. 'Drunk drivers ' provides an image of the DUI as
asocially irresponsible and out of self-control. This is the 'killer
drunk ' who constitutes the villain of the story. MADD has
brought to the public arena the emotional and dramatic expression
of the public as victim" (Gusfield 1988a, 125). Andrew McGuire
(1989), one of the earliest executive directors of MADD believes
that one of its keys to success has been "literally the name of the
organization .... It says what the organization does to you when
you are into blaming perpetrators. You are mad about it ." The
recollections of Marinelle Timmons (1989), founder of the first
MADD chapter in Texas and later Texas state coordinator of
MADD , reinforce the image of the media as highly receptiv e to
the anti-drunk driving message when delivered by the activists .
"The media was there every time we moved and they loved it . We
got tremendous print media. But , we did radio shows .. . we did
television shows at least weekly .... It was incredible , the support .
It really grew ." Is there any reason to believe that the anti-drunk
driving activists had any direct impact on the production of the
drunk driving media attention cycle , or did they just "surf " the
issue, that is, take advantage of a cresting wave of media attention
to the issue they had little, dir ectly, to do with generating?
The Role of Activists in Generating

Media Coverage
Most social movement activists in general,

and the anti-drunk driving activists in par-
ticular, attempt to bring their grievance as well as their int erpr eta-
John D . McCarthy
148
tion of its sources to public attention. They do so in the belief that
such attention will facilitate the social change they espouse. Wide
agreement among activists regarding the difficulty in getting me-
dia coverage yields to broad debate about the best ways of going
about achieving it on terms most advantageous to activists' causes
(see Ryan 1991). There is little systematic evaluation of the inde-
pendent role of varying activist efforts in achieving coverage . The
simplest test of the impact of activists would assess whether their
mere presence increases media coverage of their primary griev-
ances. A more complex test would evaluate the variable impor -
tance of their efforts and differences in how they go about attain-
ing media coverage.
Two sources of evidence offer an opportunity to estimate
each kind of activist effect across local communities for the drunk
driving media cycle . The first body of evidence relates the exis-
tence of a group in a local community to whether the local news-
paper covered the drunk driving issue . The second, based on sur-
veys of more than three hundred local groups, relates variations
in group agency, strategy, and structure to variable local media
coverage outcomes .
GroupPresenceand NewspaperCoverage
There exists an extensive research literature
on how "news" is created by media institutions (Kielbowicz and
Scherer 1986) suggesting that many factors beyond the efforts of
activists and the objective nature of events shape wha t will be
reported. Simply how much space .is available (Fowler 1979),
known among journalists as the size of the "news hole, " the range
of available news possibilities (Hilgartner and Bosk 1988), and the
dramatic appeal of the potential material (Molotch 1979; Gitlin
1980) provide parts of the context within which activists attempt
to get their story told.
The independent impact of the mere presence of activists in
a community for achieving media coverage was assessed using
evidence that was developed by selecting those local newspapers
whose locally produced stories were indexed by Newsbank for each
of the years 1979 to 1987 (McCarthy and Harvey 1989). An esti-
mate of the presence or absence of an anti-drunk driving group
on the likelihood of the drunk driving issue being the subject of
any newspaper story during each year for the period 1979 to 1987
Media Framing of Drunk Driving
149
in 111 local communities was developed.F Then the presence or
absence of an anti-drunk driving group in a community for each
year was estimated from a census of these groups (McCarthy,
Wolfson, and Harvey 1987). Finally, secondary data characterizing
the community and the local newspaper was developed from vari-
ous sources.
The impact of the size of the "news hole" was estimated by
the size of the newspaper's circulation-the more subscribers, the
more the advertising, and, therefore, the larger the news hole, and
whether it was published daily or weekly. Both estimates of news
hole size were significant predictors, in a logit regression analysis,
of the likelihood of any coverage of drunk driving. The previous
presence of an Alcohol Safety Action Program (ASAP) in a com-
munity had a significant impact on the likelihood of coverage of
the issue. This suggests that having had a local program aimed at
creating interest in drunk driving has a long-term effect on the
likelihood of coverage in a community . The mere presence of a
group had a strong and significant impact on whether the issue
received coverage during the year; community income and popu-
lation size had no effect on coverage. Apparently, no matter what
they did, the presence of an activist group noticeably increased
coverage of the drunk driving issue in a community.
GroupAgency,Strategy, and Structure

and LocolMediaCoverage
There is little systematic comparative evi-
dence across groups that evaluates how the variable efforts of
activists affect their ability to mobilize community resources, in-
cluding media coverage of their own efforts . 13 But it seems plausi-
ble that the harder they try and how they go about attempting to
mobilize resources should affect their success. In order to evaluate
this expectation for the anti-drunk driving activists, data from
a survey of local anti-drunk driving groups carried out in 1985
(McCarthy, Wolfson, and Harvey 1987) was used to assess the
impact of several measures of individual leader effort, group em-
phasis, and organizational structure on a summary estimate of the
group's success in gaining local media coverage of its efforts . The
group's president reported on the group's goals, activities, leaders ,
and membership and also estimated the level of media coverage of
John D. McCarthy
150
the group's efforts provided by the major television stations and
daily newspapers in the community.
The results of a multivariate analysis aimed at predicting me-
dia coverage with a variety of measures of leadership effort, pro-
gram emphasis, and group structure shows, at best, modest effects
ofleadership effort on levels of self-reported local media coverage .
However, groups that emphasize drunk driving victim issues and
services report gaining substantially higher levels of coverage: vic-
tim emphasis exhibits the strongest effect in the model. This anal-
ysis suggests that, beyond a mere presence in a community, the
most important thing that activists can do to attain media coverage
of their own activities is to stress victimization.
Actors and Themes in the Content

of Media Coverage
An analysis of the content of the media sto-
ries that make up the drunk driving media
attention cycle chronicled above illuminate the interacting roles of
stat e functionaries, activists , and media institutions in the produc-
tion of the media cycle. Media-especially newspaper-records
have been increasingly used by analysts of collective behavior (see
Franzoni 1987; Olzak 1989). Yet that research has been focused
almost exclusively on collective events of which the media - usually
newspaper-reports are thought to be a more or less adequate
representation (for exceptions see Gamson 1988; Gamson and
Modigliani 1989). Here I focus not on events but on the substan-
tive coverage of the drunk driving issue. 14 I regard this record as
one index of what Gamson has called an "issue culture." An issue
culture shapes the perceptions of activists and potential activists
while it may also be shaped, to some extent, by their efforts. I
attend to the actors who are part of the coverage, the main subjects
and themes of the stories , and some dimensions of the framing of
drinking and driving as it is portrayed in that coverage.
Sources
Three sources are used to create the popula-
tion of media stories on drinking and driving that form the basis
of the following content analyses. The first source is the National
Newspaper Index (1979-1987), which indexes the substantive con-
Media Fram ing of Drunk Dri ving
151
tent offive major daily newspapers, the New York Tim es, the Chris-
tian Science Monitor, the Los Angeles Times , the Washington Post, and
the Wall Street Journal, each of which purports to provide national
coverage of issues and each has a substantial readership beyond its
local community . All of the substantive content included in these
papers is indexed, including editorials and letters to the editor .
The second source is Newsbank (1979-1987), which in 1989
indexed 118 newspapers that had been continuously ind exed for
the 1979-1987 period of interest. Stories originating in these news-
papers provide the basis for the local coverage analyses. Th e papers
range from very small circulation weeklies to large circulation
dailies. News reports and feature stories make up a larger propor-
tion of this record than for the five national newspapers . As a
result, editorial coverage is rarer and wire service coverage of the
issue is totally excluded from the population of articles coded.
The Vanderbilt Network News Index and Abstracts (1979-1987)
is the third content source . It records the national nightly news
broadcasts by ABC, CBS, and NBC , creates summary descrip-
tions of story content, and indexes the content of the descriptions .
These serve as the basis of the content coding. Since the story
descriptions are not verbatim accounts of their texts, the analyses
of television media records are not strictly comparable to the par-
allel analyses of the newspaper records, if for no other reason,
because they leave out large portions of the text.
CodingCoverageContent
A systematic cross-referencing system was
created for each index in order to locate all stories that focused
primarily on the drinking and driving issue . The obvious key
phrases such as "drunk driving, " "alcohol , " and "automobiles"
were consulted , and a strategy of searching each index for articles
was developed . The National Newspaper Index is an online index
that produces a list of articles in response to a list of keyword
designations. The strategy for developing this list of articles was
to continue to provide keywords progressively distant from the
substance of drunk driving until no more new articles were uncov-
ered. The Newsbank hard-copy index was treated in the same way
until no new articles were being uncovered for each year. A similar
process was developed for the Vanderbilt abstracts . These proce-
dures provided a list of stories for each source.
John D. McCarthy
152
The national data set consists of 614 articles. The local data
set consists of 2,696 articles . Only the 1980 and 1985 articles,
about 16 percent of the total local newspaper articles, are analyzed
here. The network data set consists of 182 stories. These records
provided the raw material for content coding. The unit of analysis
is the story.
A series of coding dimensions was developed. Some of these
depended on earlier efforts to code this issue arena (Estep and
Wallack 1985). They included: (1) characteristics of the article be-
yond its substance such as the date it appeared, whether it ap-
peared on the front page, and its length; (2) the major substantive
themes and subjects treated in the article such as passing new
laws, law enforcement, alcohol-related crashes, and the rise of the
citizen s' movement; (3) the major corporate actors mentioned (up
to five), such as state and local governmental officials, industrial
representatives, and movement activists; and (4) evaluations of
such frame dimensions as doubts about the drinking and driving
frame itself , the use of extreme semantics, and suggestions for the
need for tougher law enforcement efforts. 15
Actors
The actor category scheme was developed
deductively and was aimed at capturing the major clusters of cor-
porate groups involved in creating and tending the drunk driving
frame.l " The first five corporate actors mentioned in each story
were coded. The variable size of the news hole across the three
sources resulted in more total mentions of actors in the national
newspapers than the other two sources . The dominance of govern-
mental officials among the actors mentioned is striking, but it
should come as little surprise after knowing the extent of federal,
state, and local governmental involvement in the drinking and
driving issue prior to this period . Officials are more likely to be
mentioned in national sources (both print and electronic) than
local, primarily because the local papers are substantially less likely
to attend to federal officials of any kind. Surprisingl y , local stories
are least likely to mention the activists .
There are some important trends in the notice of actors over
the cycle. The spread of the movement is indicated in its represen-
tatives being mentioned more often as they become active in more
communities . As the drunk driving issue became more widely
153
publicized, more diversity develops among the actors mentioned ,
for example, mentions of corporate actors from the voluntary
sector, such as church groups, professional associations, and non-
profit groups, and among the "other" category (for example,
schools , victims, and drunk drivers themselves) become more
prominent. These patterns suggest that governmental actors were
the dominant sources in the shaping of the issue culture surround-
ing drinking and driving during the cycle. While anti-drunk driv-
ing activists may have been a "catalyst" to this attention, they
were far less likely to be mentioned, or seen as authoritative, than
were governmental officials.
Themes
The theme category scheme was created by
another research group attempting to inductively map the subject
content of a large but haphazard sample of news coverage of this
issue (Estep and Wallack 1985).17An important reason why gov-
ernmental actors are so extensively noticed in the news coverage
of the issue is revealed in this evidence: there is extensive govern-
mental activity on drunk driving during the period , and that activ-
ity dominates the substantive coverage . Through the cycle, men-
tion of legislative activity expands and contracts pretty much
along the lines of the expansion of the movement and coverage of
the issue in general. Law enforcement activity generally declines
as a theme over the period, as widespread enforcement becomes
more routine. Particular drunk driving crashes as a central theme
declines throughout the cycle. Groups opposing drunk driving
become less newsworthy later in the cycle as coverage of the issue
declines. Legislative activity is more prominent as a theme in the
local press than in either the print or electronic national press.
FromeAttributes
Several attributes of the drunk driving
frame were coded in an attempt to grasp its dominance and appeal.
The first aimed to capture its emotional appeal. Was "hot" rheto-
ric-references to killer drunks, ravaged victims , and the like-a
part of the story? The second and third attributes focused on chal-
lenges to the frame itself. Was there any general doubt about the
frame expressed in the story or were civil liberties questions raised
about enforcement of drunk driving laws? And, finally , was the
John D. McCarthy
154
issue of alcohol availability, a key element of the most subversive
counterframe, raised?"
Doubt about the drunk driving frame is very rare in any
source and it is concentrated early in the cycle of coverage when
it does appear. Doubt about the frame is nonexistent at the local
level and in the national electronic coverage. The appearance of
debate about the availability of alcohol increases as the national
debate about a twenty-one -y ear -old drinking age escalates; it sub-
sides after the law takes effect. Focus on alcohol availability, how -
ever, is greatest at the local level, and it retains attention late in the
cycle there . There is a strong copresence of activists and the alco-
hol availability issue in stories in all media across the cycle . The
difference in aggregate attention levels to alcohol availability be-
tween the national and local media sources is striking: the net-
works tend to ignore it.
The use of extreme semantics, rarer than might have been
expected given the "focus -upon -the-victim" activists, is more
common early in the cycle; it becomes very rare in any source by
1986. It is more common in national sources than local ones . In
general, officials are more likely than other actors to be mentioned
in articles that also include extreme semantics . Surprisingly, in
neither the national nor the local coverage is there a significant
copresence of activists and the kind of "hot" rhetoric in stories.
Actorsand Themes
The analyses of national and local press
coverage of the issue shows the dominance of state actors in pub-
licly promulgating the drunk driving frame , even after the move-
ment became strong. The active legislative, judicial , and executive
agendas surrounding the issue as the activists took center stage
meant that a large pool of knowledgeable "experts" in the prob-
lem and its solutions was available to be tapped by the media as
"sources" who could speak authoritatively about it . The evidence
suggests, as well , that the activists were far less directly responsible
for the emotional presentation of the issue than has been the com-
mon perception. Yet, there is no question that the activists were
important in helping to bring the media attention to it, as the
evidenc e linking their presence and efforts in local communities to
th e likelihood of increased coverage has shown. What broader
sense can we mak e of the emergence of modern social movements
155
and their role in media attention cycles from the diverse evidence
I have assembled here on the activists, sympathetic state actors,
and the drunk driving media attention cycle itself?
Implications
Until recently, social movements were

commonly conceived as purely indepen -
dent manifestations of civil society. Accordingly, their main lines
of challenge to structures of power , accepted ways of doing things,
and ways of imagining the social world were seen to originate
wholly among citizens who could seek redress in actions of the
state (Tilly 1984) or through the redefinition of social reality (Mel-
ucci 1989). In these formulations, the state was seen either as an
adversary or, at best, a passive actor (Gamson 1990). Yet, as I have
shown, the movement against drunk driving was only possible
through the earlier efforts of federal , state, and local functionaries.
It emerged without direct assistance from the state, but it could
not have emerged when it did had the federal functionaries not
worked so diligently and successfully in framing the issue and
mobilizing a collectivity of diverse state advocates in support of
it. Only with the movement's emergence, however, were the
many state functionaries able to bring their framing of the issue to
wide public attention through the mass media. The movement
was, indeed, the missing link. The movement's independent char-
acter, however , may yet make it a fickle proponent of the frame
that enabled its emergence in the first place.
IndependentState Actors
Traditional characterizations of the origins
of state agency/citizen group partnerships portray a standard mo-
bilization sequence: outraged, oppressed, excluded groups mobi-
lize and draw attention to their plight, which results in the creation
of a state agency that outlasts their outrage and which remains
more or less committed to their concerns (Baumgartner and Jones
1993). The sequence is also embedded in common analyses of the
transformation of social movements into interest groups (Lowi
1971).
The sequence of events encompassing the media attention,
state efforts , and activist mobilization preceding the emergence of
John D. McCarthy
156
the drunk driving issue does not fit the standard mobilization
sequence. Instead, the many state functionaries first actively cre-
ated the opportunities for movement mobilization and then, once
it emerged, took advantage of that mobilization to communicate
their program through the media. The activist mobilization and
subsequent media attention also allowed them to expand the scope
and intensity of their efforts, for example, by increasing budgetary
allocations and fielding new programs at the local as well as the
federal level. The apparent anomaly presented by the case raises
several questions about the nature of the modern state and has
implications about the relationship between state segments and
social movements that can extend our unfolding comprehension
of their links (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Skocpol 1985; Costain
1992).
The first is the relative autonomy of state actors . 19 The state
initiative on drunk driving is best described as a "policy project"
conceived and fielded by an interlinked network of state actors .
They crafted the drunk driving frame; they created a knowledge
base that legitimated it, disseminated it, and embedded it in law
enforcement and judicial practices; and, by doing so, they mobi-
lized a wide "collectivity of state actors" (Skocpol 1985) who had
interests in its hegemony. All of this preceded the emergence of
the activist movement and reveals an independent band of state
functionaries succeeding in promulgating change prior to any
grass-roots citizen pressure. Their policy project is not inconsis-
tent with the assumption that "state managers collectively are self-
interested maximizers, interested in maximizing their power, pres-
tige and wealth" (Block 1987, 84) . The project was not motivated
to any great extent, however, by organized capitalist interests,
although it threatened, to some extent, and was , subsequently ,
constrained by the alcohol industry .
Once we have acknowledged the possibility of independent
agency on the part of state segments, we must ask how their
efforts can affect grass-roots citizen mobilization. Direct state fa-
cilitation of activist mobilization through the provision of material
resources has been stressed by resource mobilization analysts (Me-
Carthy and Zald 1977) and journalists (Bennett and DiLorenzo
1985) . Although both federal and local material facilitation of the
drunk driving activist 's efforts has been important to their ongo-
ing mobilization, its first appearance followed, rather than created,
157
the local activism. The pattern is the same as that seen in the civil
rights movement (McAdam 1982; Jenkins and Eckert 1986).
The facilitation most crucial to the emergence of this move-
ment was indirect. The mechanism was the creation and reinforce-
ment of "identity opportunities" for victims. Once the drunk
driving frame was widely available, aggrieved individuals could
conceive of themselves as victims of drunk drivers. Constructing
such collective identities was directly facilitated in communities
by the strong likelihood that local police and prosecutors would
participate in helping the activists to cocreate the victim identity.
The success of the drunk driving policy project had resulted in
local governmental actors who responded positively to their ef-
forts, which reflected legitimacy on their newly adopted victim
activist selves.
Recall the experience of Marilyn Sugg , whose son was killed
by a drunk driver in 1968 (Moose 1974), well before the hegemony
of the frame was established. It demonstrates the importance of
both the mobilizing frame and local state facilitators . Sugg tried
to mobilize but was soon channeled into the North Carolina chap-
ter of the National Association of Women's Highway Safety Lead-
ers, a group struggling at the time to act on the consequences of
the auto safety frame. As a result, her individual effort to adopt
and act on a drunk driving victim identity was unsuccessful.
MediaProcesses
Media organizations proceed on their own
logics of newsmaking, always dominated by profit making.
What is newsworthy depends upon what is already newsworthy if
the issue has not worn out its welcome, if importance as measured
by governmental or other major institutional involvement is guar-
anteed, if the conflict is big but not so big as to stymie resolution ,
if the issue 's sponsors manage to create an event or interaction
with a public official that provides a good news peg, if the conflict
involves appealing characters, if there's a good story line with a
fresh angle, an unusual twist, or something moving or funny.
(Ryan 1991,51)
As the 1980s began, drunk driving was perfectly suited to the

needs of media institutions, with diverse groups of well-informed
officials prepared to speak about it, emotional victims capable of
John D. M cCarthy
158
articulating the grief that result ed from it , and no vested inte rests
seriously thr eaten ed by the initial framing of it.
Medi a institutio ns commonly display a h eavy reliance on "of -
ficial " sourc es in th eir stories (Gam son 1988), but the dominance
of offi cial actors shown her e app ear s more ex cessive than usual. It
result s, in some part , from the lack of a credible counterfram e
advocat ed by organized groups -seen in the almost total lack of
disput e about the cor e elements of the fram e itself in the stories .
When fram es are in som e disput e, th e m edia 's concern for " bal-
ance " seems to lead to mor e div ersity in th eir choice of sources .
Evidenc e from network news coverag e of env ironme ntal risk,
wher e disput e is m ore typi cal, shows far more use of activists as
sourc es than has been seen her e for th e drunk drivin g issue (Gr een-
berg et al. 1989). Ironi cally , th e activists w ho app ear to be impor -
tantly responsibl e for spurrin g thi s m edia att ention cycl e are given
scant notic e in it , and thi s is m ost tru e in th eir own community
new spap ers.
Independent Local Activist Projects

I characteriz e th e anti -drunk driving activ-
ists as em powe red by th e gr ound work accom plishe d by a coterie
of state fun ction aries. My em ph asis, howe ver , should not devalue
th eir heroic efforts or th eir own contributions to rethinking the
problem of autom obile fataliti es. Their stru ggles have been
marked by deep dedi cation and wid espr ead tactical innovation .
Th eir efforts have shown a cha racteristic ge ographi cal diversit y in
goal s and tactics , mapping th e decentralized nature of the political
syst em they confronted. Th ey came to their acti vism with few
pr econc epti ons, no consistent ideological baggag e, and almost no
prior politi cal ex pe rience. Although th ere is no qu estion that they
shap ed th e public debat e about automobil e fatalities after they
becam e engage d, tiltin g th e public attention toward th e drunk
driving fram e, th ey rem aine d incr edibl y pr agm atic in their search
for solutions to reducing th e likelihood of automobile crashes and
the asso ciated cons equenc es in human sufferin g . Since th ey are,
typi cally , nonideological , pragmatic probl em solv ers who betray
no structur al critiqu e of the state or soci etal arr an gem en ts, they
h ave been op en to solutions to th e probl em from outside of the
drunk driving fram e. They were not adv ers e, right from the start ,
to tryin g to lim it alcoho l availabilit y (exemplifi ed by th eir heavy
Media Framing of Drun k Dr iving
159
engagement in efforts to raise the drinking age and to pr omot e
server liability) or to fight for social changes that made automo -
biles safer for " fools and drunks " (for exam ple, th eir wid e
involvement in laws requiring that seat belts be fast ened) .20
D evelopm ents in th e last several years sugg est th at adv ocates
of the "public health" frame-th e central goal of whi ch is to limit
alcohol availability-may be succ essful in wooing th e activists
toward their alt ernative frame despit e its serious threat to th e alco-
hol industry . The stat e functionaries who advoc ate this fram e suc-
ceeded in conv ening the Surgeon General's Workshop on Drunk
Driving in 1988 that led to the creation of the National Coalition
Against Drunk Driving, a coalition of organizations with dir ect
state subsidy that is seriously committed to advocating the public
health frame . Federal officials in the Offic e of Substanc e Abus e
Prevention (aSAP) and many university-based public h ealth pro-
grams have also become more actively involved in advocating th e
public health frame . Many local activist groups have adopt ed thi s
frame, and significant conflict has developed within and among
local groups about the appropriat eness of more compl etely adopt-
ing it as the basis for future action . Th e weak association between
the stat e actors whos e efforts indirectly spawned the mov ement
against drunken driving and its constitu ent local groups suggests
that new waves of victim activists may yet be alienated from the
frame that originally motivat ed their crusade .
Successfully establishing frame hegemony for an issue lik e
this one has broad social control implications. As a dominant
frame orients grass-roots action into centrain substanti ve channel s,
it diverts it from others. Templates of m eaning probably plac e
greater short-run constraints on grass-roots activists like th ese
than do es th eir relativ e access to material resourc es, sinc e, for th e
most part , th ey depend primarily on volunt eer labor. As som e of
the activists have begun to imagin e changes that threaten the alco-
hol and automobile industries, their understanding of entrenched
economic interests-r etarded by the wide con sensus surrounding
the killer drunk frame-has begun to develop. But , thus far , its
manif estations resembl e th e typically American primitive, popu-
list reproach es to "big business. "
Notes
Acknowledgments: An earlier versi on of thi s chapter was pr epared for the Wor k-
shop on Social Mo vem ent s, C ounter- forces and Bystand ers (Wissenschaftszen-
John D. McCarthy
160
trum Berlin fur Sozialforschung), Berlin , Jul y 5-7 , 1990 . Th e critical assistanc e
of Bob Edwa rds, Joe Gusfield, Hank John ston , D ou g McAdam , Frank Weed,
and, especially, jur gen Ge rhards as well as the other participant s in the WZB
Co nference is much appre ciated.
1. I attend to th e developm ent of available fram es in w hat follo w s. Poten-
tial activists, however , mu st und ergo wh at D oug McAd am (1982) calls " cogni-
tive liberation " befor e th ey can begin to act them selves. Th ey mu st tak e the
available fram e (or create a new on e) as th eir own in a dialectical proc ess of
makin g sense of th eir own person al circums tanc es - bas ically, inventin g activist
ident ities. I focus my atten tion primaril y on th e de velopment of m obilizin g
fram es th em selves and ign or e, for th e m ost part , th e indi vidu al pro cesses of
cog nitive liberation .
2. Th ese th ree frames by no m ean s exha us t th ose th at have been elaborated
to account for auto mo bile crash- related death and injur y. O ne of them str esses
the radically disprop orti on ate involvem ent of yo ung m ales in auto mobile crashes
of all kind s, parallelin g very closely th e involvem ent of young m ales in serious
crime. Such a "w ild bo ys" frame has received littl e atten tion outside of the expert
research com m unity.
3. Ano ther frame for und erstand ing auto mo bile accide nts, akin to that of
auto safety , is that of roa d design . As th e idea th at auto mo bile crashes were
prevent able became m ore w ides pread, beli ef th at bett er roa ds could redu ce the
likelih ood of crashes also spread. For exa m ple, in 1965 th e federal high way
adm inis trato r Rex Whitto n said in articulating th e "roa d design " version of the
auto safety frame, " I th ink th e majorit y of dri vers, m ost of th e tim e, are perform-
ing as well as we can reason abl y expect . . . . Th e dan ger in pur suin g the ph antom
of the bad dr iver pr obl em is th at undu e concentra tion on th e suppose d bad
dri vers too oft en tak es our attention and energy away from wha t we can and
sho uld be doing to make our roa ds and stree ts safer for dri vers" (U. S. Senate
1968,4) . While thi s fram e was and is w idely know n amo ng poli cy experts, it has
not becom e wid ely kno wn amo ng the gene ral public.
4. Th e art iculation and institutiona lizatio n of th e auto safety frame is a
classic exa m ple of the pr ofession alizati on of reform (see Mo ynih an 1969; McCar-
thy and Z ald 1977).
5. C rucia l to grasping the poli cy arena sur ro unding the publ ic control of
automo biles and driv ers in the Unit ed States is th e continuin g locus of autho rity
at th e local level. Whil e the fed eral ro le has grown dur ing the last several decades,
dri ver licen sur e, automo bile registr ation , traffic enforce me nt, and crim inal court
juri sdi ction rem ain local gove rn me ntal functi on s (see Laure nce 1988). Th e cre-
ation of frames of und erstandin g has take n place wi thin this contex t of scattered
autho rity . In genera l, auto safety advoca tes have conce ntrated th eir attention
m or e at th e nation al level and th ose attemp ting to co ntro l dru nk dr iving more at
the state and local levels.
6. Thi s ind ex has been wi dely used as a source for showing tr end s in the
coverag e of public issues in th e Unit ed States (for examp le, see Troyer and
Markle 1983; Nel son 1984). It is pr ob abl y m or e glacial in its reaction to sho rt-
term tren ds th an are dai ly, or even weekl y, newspapers.
7. I igno re the public health frame in w ha t follows . T he essence of the
161
frame is described by Gusfield (1988a): " Fro m th e persp ective of an int erest in
public health , DUI is a facet of th e problems produ ced by beverage alcohol. Th e
counterme asures associated with the consumption and distributi on of alcohol are
central in this con cern . . . . It is just as logical to control th e institution s th at sell
alcohol, to tr eat chronic alcoholics or 'alcohol abu sers, ' and to maint ain hi gh
prices on alcohol as it is to prohibit and puni sh DUI as a way of pr om otin g
automobil e safety" (116- 17). In this frame , th e alcohol industr y is th e villain as
it pursu es profit s at th e expense of publi c health . In th e same w ay th at tobac co
firms are portra yed as att empting to ho ok yo ung sm okers in ord er to create a
continuous m arket for their pr odu cts, alcohol producers , especially br ewers , are
seen as targeting youn g peopl e in an att empt to create a lifelong clientel e of heavy
drink ers . It is argu ed that their abilit y to do so should be curt ailed by m akin g
alcohol more difficult to get (e.g ., limitin g sales, increasin g price) and reducin g
the demand for it (e.g. , restricting adverti sing) .
8. Thi s section dep end s heavily on McCarthy , Wolfson , and Harvey 1987;
and McCarth y and Har vey 1989.
9. We have not includ ed certain kind s of gro ups that devot e extensive
efforts to the issue of drunk drivin g in our analysis of advo cacy groups . Such
groups include locals of Stud ents Again st Dri vin g Drunk (SADD) and Boo st
Alcohol Consciou sness Concerning the Health of Univ ersity Stud ent s (BAC-
CHUS) , which are, resp ectively , high school and college student groups . Thes e
other local groups have nev er reached th e promin ence or sustaine d level of advo-
cacy of the adult community-bas ed groups .
10. The evidence on whi ch thes e attention cur ves are based is described in
more detail below .
11. Dr . Nichol s w as instrumental in making the earliest activi sts aware of
one another 's efforts in th e late 1970s; he was th e NHTSA project officer for a
series of small grant s that th e agenc y mad e to th e earliest gro ups.
12. The unit of analysis here is communit y year-Ill communiti es over 9
years. The presenc e or absenc e of any newspaper coverage for each year is th e
dependent variable .
13. The following analyses as well as det ailed description s of th e m easur es
are reported in McCarth y and Wolfson 1992.
14. Ther e is an extensiv e literatur e that assesses the content of media sto -
ries for a variety of other purpo ses, how ever.
15. A sub sample of th e national data set , consisting of one hundr ed art i-
cles, was coded by pairs of coder s. On average th ey agreed in 86 perc ent of their
coding choices . This rang ed from a high of 100 percent agre ement for th e year
in which the article appe ared to 78 percent for m ain actor s m ention ed , and 72
percent of major them es m ention ed , and varying from 77 percent to 99 percent
for the variou s frame dim ension s. Th ese interrater reliabilit y result s are sim ilar
to tho se achieved by other research er s who have focused on this issue arena
(Estep and Wallack 1985), and the y are consistent w ith levels of reliability in
other studies of collective behavior . It is typical that the m or e com plex th e
substanti ve categor y to be cod ed , th e lower th e int err ater reliability . Th ese levels
of reliabilit y are well wit hin acceptable limits .
16. Actor s (actors in cluded in general catego ries)
John D . McCarthy
162
A . Stat e and local offici als: state dep artm ent s of transp ortation, state
legislato rs, gov ernor s, state att orney s general, mayor s, local
judge s, lo cal pro secutors, lo cal legis lators, stat e poli ce, local po-
lice, stat e app eals cou rts
B. Fed eral o fficials: U.S. repr esentativ es, U.S . senator s, U.S . General
Accounting Offic e, U.S . Depar tm ent o f Transp ortation , U.S . Su-
pr eme C ourt, U. S. Nationa l Transportation Safet y Board, U. S.
P resident, U.S. Justice Department , U.S . military , C ent ers for
Di sease C on tro l, U.S. courts of app eal
C. Federa l drunk drivin g pro gr am s: Alco hol Safety Action Pro-
grams, NHTSA , Pre sident 's C o m m ission on Drunk Dri vin g, Na-
tion al Co n feren ce on Youth and Drinking and Drivin g
D . Alcoho l indu str y : bar and restaurant owner s, alcohol beverag e
distri butor s, alcohol bev erag e ret ailer s, nati on al licensed beverage
association , T IP S (Trainin g for Int erv ention Procedur es for
Serv ers o f Alcoh ol) , Di sti lled Spirits Council
E. Co rpora tions: insur an ce co m panie s, N ational Association of
Bro ad casters, N ation al As soci ation of Indep end en t Insurers, Alli-
ance of Am erican In sur er s, Smith and Wesson (m anufactur er of
br eath -t estin g equipm ent) , lo cal radio statio ns
F. Voluntar y secto r: victims g ro ups, pri vate agenc ies dealin g with
alcohol ab use , churc h gr oup s, fratern al o rg aniz ations, tri al law-
yers bar, ho spit als, N ati ona l Safet y C ouncil , Am erican Automo-
bile Association , ACLU , Am eri can Ps ychi atri c Association ,
Am eric an B ar Associ ation , Bo at O pe rato rs Association , SMART
(Sto p Mark eting Alcohol on Radio and Television ), Hi gh way
Safety Institut e, N ation al C ha rities Inf ormati on Bure au, sport s
arena ow ne rs
G . Anti-drunk dri vin g citizens g ro u ps: RID-USA , loc al RID chap-
ter s, nation al MADD , lo cal MADD chapters, specific leaders,
SADD , C itizens for Safe Dri vin g, Footb all Player s Again st Drunk
Drivin g (FAD D), Truck er s Ag ainst Drunk Dri vin g (TAD D),
Ph ysicians Ag ainst Drunk Dri vin g, D ealers [aut o] Against
Drunk D riv ing
H. O ther: hi gh schoo ls (officials , teacher s, students), co lleges and
univ er sities (officials, teacher s, studen ts), int ern ation al acto rs, spe-
cific victims , drunk driv er s
17 . Th em es (exa m p les o f specific th em es includ ed in gene ral th em e cate-
go ries; aft er Est ep and Wallack 1985)
A . Legislativ e activity : law /poli cy passed ; law / po licy defeated; bill/
law/polic y di scu ssed , ex plaine d; im pac t ofl aw disc usse d; histori cal
back ground o f law/p oli cy ex plaine d
B. Judi cial activ ity: review s o f jud ges' beh avior/ of co ur ts ' pro cessing
of D U I cases; co ns titutiona lity of law passed ; cons titutionality
o f en fo rceme n t pr actices o f DUI ; rep ort s o f spec ific co nvictions;
gene ral tr end s in con victio ns; rep ort s o n j ail/ pri son conditions
resultin g from DUI offenders
163
C . Law enforcement activity : law enforcement strategi es (e.g., road-
block s, breathalyzers); general trends in arrests ; reports of spe-
cific arrests
D. Drunk driving programs : prevention/education programs ; treat-
ment issues of sentenced DUIs ; community campaigns against
DUI ; new ideas for combatting drunk driving
E . Public reactions to drunk driving : trends in public opinion ; avoid-
ing arrest and avoiding jail; reports on groups advocating changed
laws (e.g., MADD, RID)
E Social costs ofDUI: loss oflives; loss of property; individual costs
(e.g., victims, personal burdens of injury); task force investiga-
tions of social costs
18. Framing questions (answered yes/no by coders)
A . Rim talk: Is there any doubt of the "killer drunk" frame? (If
anyone or anything besides a drunk driver is implicated as a cause
of alcohol-related crashes in general or specifically , the answer is
yes). Record quotations of doubting instances .
B . Killer drunk : Does the article contain extreme semantics ? For ex-
ample , is drunk driving described as killing, murder, carnage,
and/or drunk drivers as killers? Record quotations .
C. Alcohol availability: Is there any statement made by any actor
mentioned or the writer of the article that, in any way, alcohol
availability needs to change (e.g ., sale hours restricted, sale age in-
creased)?
D. Enforcement doubt : Is there any statement made by any actor
mentioned or the writer of the article that an enforcement tech-
nique is oppressive or unconstitutional (e.g., that it violates the
rights of individuals)?
19. There is extensive debate on the issue of the relative autonomy of state
actors. See Carnoy 1984 for a summary of earlier lines of contention, and Block
1987 and Skocpol 1985 for more recent discussions.
20. There is good reason to believe (Ross 1985, 1992) that the drunk driv-
ing frame mis-specifies the problem of automobile fatalities. It does so in that
the solutions that it implies have not been and cannot be very effective . The lack
of much reduction in highway fatalities as the result of all of the legislative,
judicial, and law enforcement activity that has transpired has led some local
activists to seek other directions for solutions to the problem that motivates
them .
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Chapter 7
Transient Identities?
Membership Patterns in the
Dutch Peace Movement
Bert Klandermans
Among social mov em ent scholars there is

a growing awaren ess that movement parti-
cipants share a number of beliefs that make it possible for them
to act collectively (Morris and Mueller 1992). Alberto Melucci
introduced th e term "collective identity" to refer to these shared
beliefs. He defines collective identity as "a shared definition of the
field of opportunities and constraints offered to collective action"
(1985, 793) . Th ese shared definitions are developed in interactions
betw een individuals. Collectiv e identity , according to Melucci ,
provides actors with th e " com m on cognitive frameworks that en-
able th em to assess their environment and to calculate the costs
and benefits of their action " (1989, 35) . Verta Taylor and Nancy
Whitti er suggest a slightly different definition that stresses "we"-
feeling. For th em , collective identity is "the shared definition of a
group that derives from memb ers' common interests and solidar-
ity" (1991, 1). Both Melucci and Taylor and Whittier emphasize
the significance of coll ective identity for collective action to occur .
Whereas Melucci is rath er vague about collective identity , Taylor
and Whittier elaborate the concept more precisely . They distin-
guish three factors that contribute to the formation of collective
identity: "1) the creation of socially constructed boundaries that
insulate and differentiate a category of persons from the dominant
society ; 2) the development of consciousness that presumes the
existen ce of socially constituted criteria that account for a group's
structural position; and 3) the valorization of a group's 'essential
differences' through the politicization of everyday life" (1991, 28).
Although these factors may be too specific to th e movement Tay-
lor and Whitti er are studying-the lesbian mov ement-no doubt
the basic principles of creating boundari es, raising consciousness,
and changing the symbolic meanings of everyday life are relevant
for collective identity to evolve.
169
I carry this argument one step further. Where Melucci em-
phasizes the significance of collective identity as a prerequisite of
collective action, and Taylor and Whittier explore the formation
of collective identity, I argue that there is no such phenomenon as
a stable collective identity which, once formed, governs collective
action. Instead, I suggest that collective identities are transient
phenomena . Studies that demonstrate that social movements
change their character over time abound. There is every reason to
assume that the collective identity of movement participants
changes over time as the life cycle of a movement evolves . This,
by the way, is not in contrast to Melucci and Taylor and Whittier,
who both emphasize that collective identity formation is an ongo-
ing affair . In fact, Taylor and Whittier 's argument could be read as
an account of the reformulation of the collective identity of radical
feminists into a lesbian identity .
One of the vehicles for the transformation of collective iden-
tity is the changing composition of the body of activists within a
movement. As a movement wanders through different stages in its
existence, the profile of activists who enter the movement changes
accordingly. There are numerous accounts of transient member-
ship: Todd Gitlin 's (1980) study of Students for a Democratic Soci-
ety, Doug McAdam's (1988) account of the Freedom Summer are
only two examples. Because collective identity is generated and
maintained in interaction among participants, the influx of new
categories of activists may change the collective identity of the
people in the movement. To be sure, as long as new activists enter
gradually it is more likely for them to adapt to those who are
already active in the movement without changing collective identi-
ties too much, but if they enter in large numbers, a transition in
collective identity is more likely to occur. With a new wave of
activists entering a new configuration of shared beliefs evolves.
The result may be a transformed collective identity or a division
oflabor along identity lines. This process of the changing compo-
sition of a body of activists and its consequences in terms of collec-
tive identity is the focus of this chapter.
The movement from which I draw my evidence is the peace
movement in the Netherlands as it developed between 1967 and
1989. During this period, the Dutch peace movement went
through a major protest cycle in four stages. It was quiescent in
the early 1960s before organizing a successful petition against the
Bert Klandermans
170
produ ction an d depl oym ent of neutron bombs ; th en it stage d the
largest dem on str ation s th e country ha s ever seen an d collected
3.75 million signa tur es in cam pa igns against th e deploym ent of
cru ise mi ssiles in th e first h alf of th e 1980s. It end ed in a period of
declin e in th e seco nd half of th e 1980s. D ifferent catego ries of
activists entered th e m ovem ent durin g thi s cy cle. In th e m eant im e,
m an y of th em left th e m ovem en t. Acti vist s did not quit rand oml y;
th ey left in gro ups , ju st as th ey h ad entere d a numb er of years
befor e.
The Data
Th e data stem from four different sour ces:
(1) a study conduc ted by B en Schennink
(1988) am ong th e 1970- generati on of activ ists of th e Interd enomi-
nation al Peace Co uncil (IKV) , th e co re or ganizati on of the Dutc h
th e peace mo vem ent ; (2) a study b y Han speter Kri esi and Philip
van Pr aag (1988) among 149 co re activists of th e peace m ovem ent
in 1985; (3) a panel study a colleag ue an d I con ducted amo ng 119
activ ists from ten different lo cal IKV gro ups, w hich wa s con-
duct ed at thr ee diff erent tim es (Aug us t 1985 before th e petition
camp aign, D ecemb er 1985 after th e petiti on campaign, and June
1987 wh en th e m ovem ent began to declin e); an d (4) in-depth inter -
views we con duc ted in th e sum me r of 1989 with thr ee categories
of activists: nin e w ho were at th at tim e still active in th e peace
m ovem ent (pe rsisters) , six form er activists w ho shi fted toward
anothe r mo vem ent (shi fters), an d six form er acti vists w ho were
no lon ger politi cally active (termin ators) .
The Mov em e nt
A b rief ove rv iew o f two decades of peace
m ovem ent in the N eth erl and s w ill help put
th e dat a in perspecti ve. (See Roch on 1988 and O egema 1991 for
mor e ex ten de d descriptions.) H ansp eter Kri esi (1988) distin-
guishes four curr ents within th e Dutch peace mo vem ent : a Chris -
tian curr ent with th e IKV as th e cor e o rg an ization ; a socialist
cur rent, w hich was establishe d durin g th e petition aga in st th e neu-
tron bomb ; Wom en for Peace; and a radi cal antimilit ari stic ten-
den cy . O f th e peace or ganizati on s in vol ved in thi s cy cle of the
Transient Identitie s?
171
Dutch peace movement, the IKV is the oldest. It is not unusual to
split the twenty years into two periods. The first-consciousness-
raising - period lasted from 1967 through 1976. In this period ,
IKV, a consciousness-raising organization founded in 1966 by the
churches, tried to mobilize public opinion. The second-action-
period lasted from 1977 through 1986. In this period, the three
currents that were more action-oriented gained prominence .
The IKV was the logical outgrowth of the increasing concern
within the Dutch churches about the threat posed by nuclear
weapons. As early as in 1962, the General Synod of the Nether-
lands Reformed Church passed a resolution against nuclear arma-
ment. In the course of the 1960s, other denominations followed
and became increasingly explicit in their denunciation of nuclear
arms. In that same period, Pax Christi-a peace organization
within the Catholic church founded shortly after the Second World
War-replaced its spiritual, contemplative orientation with a more
practical, organizing approach (Schennink, Becker, Bos , and
Arends 1988). In 1965, Pax Christi took the initiative to approach
the Protestant churches and suggest the establishment of an inter-
denominational peace organization. The result was the formation
of the IKV, a council consisting of representatives of affiliated
churches. The council aimed at stimulating discussion of the nu-
clear arms issue within the uutch churches . The two largest Prot-
estant denominations, the Catholic church, and six smaller de-
nominations participated in the council. They financed a small
national secretariat to initiate and coordinate activities around the
theme of peace with an emphasis on information and conscious -
ness-raismg .
Beginning in 1967, the IKV organized an annual event
known as Peace Week. During Peace Week church parishes focused
on themes related to peace and disarmament . The themes of the
events indicate that the IKV placed the issue of war and peace in a
broad context : "Spread wealth, not nuclear weapons" (1967);
"Away with hunger and violence" (1975) . Church members who
showed an interest in the issue were asked to help organize the
annual event, and those who helped organize were asked to be-
come a more permanent local group. In this way IKV built up its
network of core activists. During this period IKV demonstrated a
lack of interest in political action.
In 1977, after ten annual Peace Weeks, IKV changed its strat-
Bert Klandermans
172
egy . Th e Peace Weeks had lost imp etus. Their objectives had be-
come vague and too gene ral, th e targ et gro up was und efin ed, and
th ere was insuffici ent int erest in pur suing con crete action. The
collapse of th e Peace Weeks w as on e of the reasons to look for a
new str ategy (O egem a 1991) . Anoth er reason was that moral ap-
peals prov ed unsuc cessful in deterrin g nucl ear armam ent . Con -
cerned about th e decr easing significan ce of nucl ear weapons as an
issue, the council decid ed in 1977 to start a lon g-t erm cam paign
to forc e the Dut ch gov ernment to abandon nucl ear weapons as a
stimulu s to th e proc ess of global nuclear di sarmament. This cam-
paign m ark ed IKV 's dep artur e from its str ategy of ab staini ng from
politi cal action . Th e Peace Week gr oup s were aske d to commit
th em selves to a ten - year cam p aign w ith th e sloga n " Help Rid the
World of Nucl ear Weap ons . Let It Begin in th e N eth erlands ." To
m any , th e surpri se of the campaign becam e an eno rmo us success.
In 1970 th ere were 220 local groups ; by 1985 th e numb er had
grow n to 450 . Th e numb er of cor e activists also gr ew from 4,500
in 1969 to about 20,0 00 in th e 1980s. C ert ainl y , IKV alon e would
not have been able to spur such enth usiasm . Two events sparked
m ass m obilizati on : th e decision by th e U. S. government to deplo y
neutron bomb s in Europ e, an d NATO 's decision to deplo y cruise
missiles. B oth decisions brought the nuclear arm s issue home to
th e Netherlands . Thi s wa s no long er an issue between sup er pow-
ers ; now th e Dutch go vernm ent itself had to decid e on deplo yment
in th e N eth erlands . Th e even ts that follow ed are well docum ented
(Rochon 1988; O egem a 1991): 1.2 million signatures against the
neutron bomb were coll ected in 1977; larg e-scale demonstrations
against th e deplo ym ent of cruis e missil es took pla ce in Am sterdam
in 1981 and Th e Hague in 1983, with 450 ,000 and 500,000 partici -
pant s, resp ectivel y ; and 3.75 million signatur es against th e deplo y-
m ent of cruis e missil es in th e N eth erl ands were collected in 1985.
Num erous activiti es took plac e on a small er scale all over the
co un try . N everthel ess , to th e activists ' dism ay , th e governm ent
decid ed in N ovemb er 1985 to dep loy cru ise mi ssiles . (Th e INF
tre aty betw een th e Unit ed States and th e Soviet Union prevented
th e deploym ent of th e cruis e missiles.) In th e yea r that followed
th e mov em ent rapidl y declin ed. With some simplification , one
co uld say th at two years later, on e-third of th e groups had col-
lap sed ; of thos e groups th at wer e still alive, on e-third of th e mem-
173
bers had left; and the activity level of the remaining groups was
less than one-third of what it had been before.
This cycle, and more precisely , the core activists who helped
to shape the cycle and engaged in the social construction and
reconstruction of collective identity , are the focus of the rest of
this chapter. The composition of the body of activists changed
during the life cycle of the movement. Some entered in the Peace
Week period, others in the era of mass action; some left when the
movement was geared to political action, others left when the
action was over. These changes can be related to transformations
in collective identity.
The Changing Composition

of Peace Movement Activists
The changes in the composition of the
body of activists of the peace movement
are investigated in three different ways. First, I compare core activ-
ists from 1970, the beginning of the cycle, with core activists from
1985, the year of the People 's Petition, the last mass action of the
movement. Then, I investigate turnover among activists between
June 1985 and June 1987. Applying a panel design, I describe which
core activists left the movement between June 1985, the beginning
of the petition campaign, and June 1987, a year and a half after the
decision of the Dutch government to deploy cruise missiles and
half a year after the start of the negotiations between Ronald
Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, which rendered the government's
decision obsolete . Finally, I discuss results of in-depth interviews
with core activists, which were conducted in 1989. Based on their
accounts, I reconstruct the changing configuration of core activists
in the Dutch peace movement and review the possible conse-
quences in terms of the transitions in collective identity .
A Comparisonof Core Activistsin /970 and /985

Schennink draws the following portrait of
the core activist from the Peace Week era (1967-1977): "Almost all
core activists are active church members . ... The daily work of
the core activist illustrates the consciousness raising characteristics
of the network; 41 percent did pastoral work, 18 percent taught, 5
percent worked in adult education, 12 percent studied, 21 percent
Bert Klandermans
174
had othe r work " (1988, 255). Ind eed , consciousness raising is the
main goal of two-thirds of th e cor e acti vists an d alm ost 90 percent
were en gaged in such cons ciousn ess-rai sing activities as serm ons
(47 percent), discussion group s (50 perc ent) , writing articles in
pari sh newsletters (32 per cent), and teaching at scho ols or local
Peace Week m anifestati ons (59 percent) . Schennink observ es that
gr adually a new category of cor e activists en tered the local Peace
Week groups, namely , peopl e wh o wer e parti cip ants of other
m ovement or ganiz ation s. Unlik e th e early cor e activists, who pr e-
ferr ed Chri stian D emo cratic parti es, th e new core activist s pre-
ferr ed radic al or pacifist left-win g partie s. In th e period of con-
scio usness- raising, th e pe ace m ovem ent could count on both
categori es. In fact , th e IKV had hop ed to brin g th e two to geth er
and to win suppo rt from C h ristian D em oc ratic cons titue ncies for
view s and p oli cies norm ally advoca ted by radi cal, pacifist constit-
uen cies. Accordin g to Schennink , m an y of th e activ ists from the
first categor y dr opp ed out wh en th e m ovement m oved in the
dir ection of action m obiliz ation .
A comp arison of cor e activist s ofI KV in 1970 an d 1985 con-
firms this assum ption (Tables 7-1 an d 7- 2). In 1970, one-third of
Table 7- 1 Political Party Preferences among Co re Activists

Co re A ctivists Core A ctivists Core A ctivists
IKV 1970 IKV 1985 Peace Movement 1985
('Yo) ('Yo) ('Yo)
Co ns erva tive s :2
C h ris tia n D em o cr at s 35 1
Dem o crat s '66 10 1 1
Soc ia l Dem o cr at s 13 43 46
R adi cal Left 39 56 49
N 479 119 149

Sources: IKV 1970: Schennink 1988; IKV 1985: Panel study; Peace Movement 1985: Kriesi
and van Praag 1988.
Table 7-2 Church Membership among Co re A ctivists

IKV 1970 94%
IKV 1985 80%
Peace m ov em ent o rga niza tio ns 1985 55 %
Ge ne ra l popu lati on 1985 54%
Sources: IKV 1970: Schennink 1988; IKV 1985: Panel study ; Peace movement and general
population 1985: Kriesi and van Praag 1988
Tr ansient Identit ies?
175
the cor e activists of IKV pref erred a Christian Democratic part y
and half of the activists preferred left-wing parties. In 1985, Chris-
tian Democrats are virtually replaced by left-wing ers. At th at
time , the political preferenc es of core activists of IKV were similar
to those of peace movement activists in general. This is not to say
that all church members quit. Although th e proportion of church
members dropped from 1970 to 1985, 80 percent of th e core IKV
activists represents a substantial numb er . Church m embership
among activists of the peace movement in general was 55 per cent
in 1985, which is comparable to the proportion of church mem-
bers in Dutch society .
From a church-oriented, consciousn ess-raising organization,
the movement turned between 1970 and 1985 into an action-ori-
ented movement against cruise missiles. Consequently, the com-
position of the body of activists in 1985 differed significantly from
that in 1970: conc ern ed Christians were overruled or replaced by
pacifists; radical socialists and social democrats shaped th e IKV
into a more militant configuration.
Turnoveramong Activists
In November 1985, the Dutch government
decided to deploy cruise missiles . In June 1987, we interviewed
our sample of IKV activists for the third time. At that point 28
percent of the people interviewed had left their group since our
previous interview in December 1985, many in reaction to th e
government's decision. The failure of the petition campaign was a
blow to the movement, and even among those who stayed, 43
percent considered leaving at that time. Three questions come to
mind regarding the composition of the body of activists: Who
were the people who left? Who considered leaving? And finally ,
what can we say about their motivations?
Our panel study of 119 IKV activists contained several items
that collected responses pertinent to the above questions . Because
we had measures at three times-before the petition campaign,
immediately after the campaign and the government's decision to
deploy , and eighteen months later-we were able to trace chang-
ing patterns in who left, who stayed, and who considered leaving.
We asked whether those who in 1987 had quit or considered doing
so were already considering to leave in the years before. We also
asked whether they were marginal members of their groups .
Bert Klandermans
176
We found that thos e who left th e m ovement in 1987 were
m or e often already consid ering leaving in D ecemb er 1985, imme-
diately after the petition failed. We arri ved at thi s assessm ent by
conducting a number of regression analyses on the relationships
between having left the movem ent in Jun e 1987 and having consid-
ered leaving with wheth er the y considered leaving in D ecember
1985. Th e analysis reveal ed a strong positiv e bet a coefficient (.36).
Furthermore , by two measures , we were able to assess marginality
of those who left . We found that thos e who left tended to be
m emb ers of the mov ement for a shorter time; also , they tended to
be less activ e m emb ers in th eir IKV groups. While their level of
activit y incr eased during th e petition campaign , their marginality
at its start was apparent. We found that thos e who left were less
activ e m emb ers in relativel y activ e groups. In oth er words , within
th e context of their own gro up , th ey were mor e margina l
memb ers .
What can we say abo ut those activists who decided to stay in
th e mov em ent? First , the y were n ot th e stereotypical "true believ-
ers ." Man y harbor ed doubt s about th e mo vement . Of those activ-
ists who were still member s in 1987 (but who were considering
leaving) , most had first thought of leaving a year and a half earlier
in Dec emb er 1985. Th eir doubts did not necessarily translate into
marginality . B y the same m easures used abov e (tim e spent in the
mo vement and averag e tim e spent in group activities) we found
that these m embers were more active in relativel y mor e active
groups , alth ough th e levels of activit y declin ed dramaticall y in
subsequ ent years. Giv en th eir levels of incorporation into local
IKV groups and despit e doubts about th e movement , which inte-
gration into loc al groups apparently help ed dispell , it m akes sense
that if thes e activists were to leave at all it would be a collective
phenom enon. A locally based , collective identit y as Christian
peace activists seems to have carried them through the cycle of
growth and declin e.
For many activists, defection and th e intention to defect had
their roots in th e period imm ediatel y after th e end of th e petition
campaign . While all m emb ers experienced the camp aign 's failure,
th ere are several shadings of attitudes and actions that warrant
examination. For exam ple, what mad e some activ ists consider
withdrawing in Dec emb er 1985 whil e oth ers held steadfast? Also,
Tran sient Identities ?
177
what made some of them resign whereas others stayed , even as
they harbored thoughts ofleaving?
We asked a number of questions of our panelists that could
provide insight into these differences, and we found a very strong
relationship between considering to leave after the failure of the
petition and having considered to leave six months earlier (in June
1985). This lends support to our contention that at least some of
those who considered leaving were more marginal members in
their groups. This was confirmed by the results of a regression
analysis with the consideration to resign in June 1985 as a depen-
dent variable. We found that activists who had considered leaving
then were less committed to their group, felt less kinship with the
people in the movement, and were less motivated to participate in
the movement. Six months later, we found the tendency of being
more estranged and less motivated was even more apparent.
In addition to the feelings of marginality that predated the
petition drive, we found two important changes in opinion that
seem to have contributed to the intention to leave in December
1985. Those who considered leaving in December 1985 were in
June 1985 still relatively optimistic about the movement's future;
they became pessimistic in December. We found a strengthening
negative relationship between those who considered leaving in De-
cember and ratings on the statement "the movement is declining ."
Negative beta coefficients dropped from - .12 in June to -.32 in
December 1985. Certainly, the failure of the petition campaign
made these people lose their faith in the movement.
In addition to being marginal and becoming more pessimistic
about the movement's future, those who intended to leave the
movement in December 1985 were younger, and more often not
members of a church. Not surprisingly, they did not have high
expectations of the petition campaign in June, before it got under
way. All these point to a shared set of characteristics that defined
a subgroup of IKV adherents as early as June 1985. This observa-
tion is supported by our in-depth interviews, which I discuss
below.
The second question asks, What made some of those who
were considering leaving to take action and quit their IKV group,
while others remained in the movement despite their ambivalent
feelings? The interviews showed that a combination of even more
pessimistic expectations about the future of the movement and a
B ert Kl andermans
178
even strong er estrang ement from oth er participants influenced the
decision to leave. Bas ed on int ervi ew s, we cons truc ted a profile of
tho se wh o left th e mo vement in Jun e.
I. Th ese people left becaus e th ey felt much more pessimistic

about the chanc es that the mov ement would survive. It is obvious
th at the governm ent's decision to deploy wa s an important factor.
Int erestin gly , man y of thos e w ho left mo ved on to other mo ve-
m ent s; perhaps the se m easur es reflect a tend enc y to po st-hoc self-
justification .
2. Th ose w ho were outsid e th e mo vement organization in

D ecemb er felt mu ch less akin to th e peopl e in th e mo vem ent than
th ey did in Jun e. Thi s respons e was certain ly influenc ed by the
failur e of th e camp aign.
3. Th ose w ho left were from th e beginnin g less political. We

m easur ed thi s cha rac teristic by eva lu ating th eir reason s for why
bein g a core activist m atter s. We asked th em to rate such items as
" to mobilize th e peopl e in m y community, " or " to put pressur e
on authorities."
4. Th ey were mor e ex pressively m oti vated . This was mea-

sur ed by th eir answ ers to su ch item s as " to demon strate m y indig-
nation" as a reason for being an activist .
5. Th eir own indi vidual contribution wa s felt to be noness en-

tial , as m easur ed by th e statement , " T he re is no need for m e to
participat e sinc e the action will be a success anyw ay. "
6. Th ey per ceived the co sts o f parti cip ation to be high er, as

gau ged by the tim e spent in th e m ovem ent and th e negati ve reac-
tions of significan t others . Th ese last two ch ara cteristics sugg est
that , as a group , those who left inJun e wer e less motivat ed initially
to engage in th e petition camp aign.
7. Thos e w ho left had becom e much mor e milit ant in De-

cemb er 1985 as compar ed to Jun e 1985. Again , this reflects the
failure of the petition campaign, but it also sugg ests increasingly
Transient Identities ?
179
strained relations between moderate and radical segments of the
movement.
Those who stayed, althoug h they continued to consider leav-

ing, may be profi led as follows :
I. They still evaluated the movement positively in Decem -

ber, even though the petition drive had failed.
2. They still felt akin to the other people in the movement in

December; they remained that way with no appreciable change
when we interviewed them again in June 1987.
3. They abided by the official IKV policy of refraining from

more militant action.
The decisive factor about staying seems to be the participant's

perspective about the future of the movement . Those who stayed
were still optimistic about the movement's future in December
even though their belief in the efficacy of the movemen t had
waned . By June 1987, however, we found that this optimism had
completely reversed . A highly significant positive beta coefficient
for the "movement is declining" in December 1985 (.21) was re-
placed by an even more significant negative one in June 1987
(- .49). In other words, initia l optimism was replaced by pessi-
mism about the movement's future . In view of our earlier findings
that pessimism contribu ted to the exp lanation of quitting, one
needs little imagination to expect that these activists would be the
next to leave.
These findings shape our views on the changing composition
of the body of core activists. Aft er th e failure of th e petition drive
to influenc e governmenta l policy, many activists considered aban -
doning the movem ent . Th ey were the more marginal group mem -
bers, the younger activists who were not affiliated with a church,
and thos e who were not very enthusiastic about th e petition in
the first place. Not all of them left . Thos e wh o stayed wer e still
committed to the movement , still beli eved in its future , and abid ed
by IKV's policy of refraining from militant action . Those, how-
ever, who doubted wh ether th e movement would surviv e, w h o
were more expressively motivated , and who had become more
Bert Klandcrmans
180
milit ant resign ed in th e m onth s foll owing . A spec ific typ e of core
activist distanc ed himself fro m th e m ovem ent after th e camp aign
agains t cruise mi ssiles had failed : th e m or e m ar ginal , th e younger,
th e more milit an t, th e m or e sensitive to th e mov em ent 's failure,
th e m or e oppo sed to th e petition , an d th e less affiliated to a
chur ch . This left behind a mor e m od er ate , ch urch-o riented con-
figur ation o f activists.
Persisters, Shifters,and Terminators

We observe d th e same p att ern s in th e in-
depth int erview s w ith twent y- on e peopl e who had been very ac-
tive in th e peace m ovem ent's heyd ay . Nin e were , at th e tim e of
th e int erview , still active in th e m ovem ent (pe rsisters), six shifted
to othe r m ovem ent s (shift er s), and six sto ppe d being politic ally
active (term ina tors). We were inte res ted in th e qu estion of w hether
persister s differed fro m term inators. In addition, we in vestigated
wh eth er shifters were different from terminat or s.
Alth ou gh th e thr ee gro ups were sim ilar in man y ways-a ll
had been a core activist - they differed in four hi ghl y significant
dim en sion s.
I. Mor e often th an termin ator s and persist ers , th e shifters

had been active in othe r m ovem en ts befor e th ey engag ed in the
peace m ovem ent . Th ese included th e anti -nucl ear power move-
m ent, an ti- Vietna m War mo vem ent , en viro n m en tal mov ement,
stud ent movem ent , third wo rld supp ort groups, and women's
m ovem ent . Mor eover , shifters had particip ated in milit ant prot ests
lik e blockad es an d site-occupa tion s mor e th an th e oth er two
gro ups.
2. Persister s tend ed to occup y form al positi ons in the peace

groups; shift ers wer e mor e oft en inf orm al lead er s; termin ators
were neith er of th e two . Term in ators spen t th e fewest hours per
week on th e mo vem ent ; shifters spen t th e m ost ; pers isters occu-
pied an int erm edi ate position .
J. At th e tim e of th e int erview (sum mer 1989), per sisters and

shi fters were still spe nding consi dera ble pr oport ion s of th eir time
in movemen t activities . However , shifters were active on a much
br oad er ran ge of socie tal issues th an persis ters. Th e in te rv iew s left
181
us with the impression that being an activist was a much more
central part of shifters' identities than persisters'. For terminators ,
activism was a more external affair. Though they were more active
than the average citizen , activism did not occupy their lives com-
pletely.
4. Commitment to a church was stronger among persisters

than among shifters and terminators.
In sum, persisters have no personal history of social move-

ment participation. The peace movement often was the first move-
ment they had ever joined. They spent relatively large amounts
of time in the movement, they occupied formal positions in the
movement, and they continued to be active. They were more
likely to be committed to a church. Of the three types, they identi-
fied most strongly with the peace movement . Shifters, on the
other hand, had a lifelong history as activists. They were active in
other movements before they entered the peace movement, and
they continued to be active in other movements after they left the
peace movement. They spent the most time on movement activi-
ties in the past and at the time of the interview. They participated
in a broad range of activities, which adds to the image of commit-
ted activists. Terminators had a more marginal position in their
groups . They spent less time, they assumed less responsibility,
and they identified less with the movement .
The following picture emerges. Some of the peace movement
activists joined a movement for the first time in their lives. They
were and still are completely committed to the peace movement.
They were the people who stayed in the movement . Some of the
activists were less committed to the peace movement as such, but
were activists in heart and soul. They participated in the peace
movement when there was action, and they left it for another
movement when the action was over. Other activists were both
less committed to the peace movement per se and less committed
to activism. They left the movement without attaching themselves
to a new movement.
These findings suggest a solution for the somewhat paradox-
ical result of the panel study that dropouts were both more mar-
ginal and militant members. Two different sets of activists left the
movement for different reasons and with different destinations.
Bert Kl andermans
182
On on e hand are th e relativel y less active activist s, who, after the
disappointing results of th e actions aga inst cruis e mi ssiles, decided
to give up activism. On the oth er hand are th e activists who joined
the mov em ent to sta ge collectiv e action , who respond ed to the
mo vem ent's failure w ith in creasin g militan cy , and who turned to
other movem ents wh en th e peace movem ent did not radica lize.
Conclusion
Diff erent coh ort s of participants carried the

mo vement at diff erent point s in time. It
started w ith th e early ch ur ch groups, who might not even have
concei ved of th emsel ves as m ovem ent activ ists . Yet, th ey were to a
large ex tent responsibl e for th e estab lishm en t of an or ganizational
network th at later fun ction ed as th e backb on e of the m ovement.
This first gen eration of activists was orien ted toward conscious-
ness-raising ; it had difficulti es when mor e radical activists - often
exp erienc ed in unc on venti on al politi cal action - cam e aboard .
Som e of th em left th e m ovem ent , othe rs stayed. At th e other end
of th e cycle, in 1989, those wh o stayed to ok pr ecedenc e again
w hen th e radical activists left th e mo vem ent to join action else-
w here . In the middl e period, rou ghl y bet ween 1980 and 1985, the
mod erate activists w ho staye d join ed forc es with th e m or e radical
activists and sha red w ith th em th e burd en of or ganizing th e mo ve-
ment . Yet, th e latt er seem to h ave put th eir stamp on th e public
im age of th e mo vem ent. In tho se days, th e mo vem ent turn ed into
an action- or iented, antigovern me n t coalition . On e might suppos e
that, w ith regret , th e origin al moderat e activists w itn essed direct
action taking priorit y over reflection and discussion ; an tigovern-
m ent demonstr ation s were more import ant th an consciousness
rai sing within th e ch ur ches. Aft er the go vernm ent decided to de-
ploy crui se missiles , part of th e activists radi calized ; th ey left when
th e mov ement refrain ed from milit ant action. Oth ers stayed , but
wh en th e m ovem ent declin ed rapidl y th ey began to leave as well.
A cor e of committ ed activists wer e left behind . Th ey were not
onl y mor e com m itted to th e peace mo vem ent but also mor e com-
mitt ed churc h m emb er s and less milit ant. Th ey lead th e m ove-
m ent back to its ori gins : con cerne d chur ch memb er s.
Th e dat a on fifte en ye ars of mo vem ent activity reveal consid-
erable shifts in the com pos ition of th e bod y o f activ ists. This
183
brings us back to the question of the stability of collective identity.
With such substantial changes in the configuration of activists,
just how stable or transient will collective identity be? Collective
identity has been described as the outcome of interpersonal inter-
action of movement participants . Although we were not able to
document changes in collective identity, it is very likely that the
three phases the peace movement went through not only brought
considerable transitions in the body of activists but also brought
transitions in the collective identity of core activists . Certainly,
the corporate image of the movement changed considerably.
Whether this was due to disparate sets of activists taking over at
different times, and emphasizing some elements of collective iden-
tity and suppressing others, or whether it was a real shift in collec-
tive identity is difficult to assess on the basis of our investigations.
The reappearance of church-oriented activists in the last period
seems to suggest the former, but we may assume that the collective
identity of these activists is formed by the previous action period
just as by the initial consciousness-raising period. Whatever the
dynamics may have been, shifts in the body of activists raise the
question of how stable or transient collective identity is and under-
score the importance of research into the formation and transfor-
mation of collective identity .
References
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Unmaking of the New Left . Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1988. "Local Mobilization for the People's Petition of the
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Movement ResearchacrossCultures, edited by Bert Klandermans , Hanspeter
Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, pp. 41-83 . Vol. 1 of International Social Move-
ment Research.Greenwich, Conn .: JAI Press.
Kriesi, Hanspeter , and Philip van Praag , Jr. 1988. "De beweging en haar cam-
pagne ." In Tekenen voor de vrede. Portret van een campagne, edited by Bert
Klandermans, Dirk Oegema, Ben Schennink, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Philip
van Praag, pp . 13-53 . Assen : Van Gorcum.
McAdam, Doug . 1988. FreedomSummer. New York: Oxford University Pr ess.
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184
Oe gem a, Dirk . 1991. "The Dut ch Peace Mov em ent , 1977 to 1987. " In Peace
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Yale Uni versity Press.
Chapter 8
Identity Fields: Framing

Processes and the
Social Construction
of Movement Identities
Scott A. Hunt
Robert D. Benford
David A. Snow
Two relat ed but th eoreticall y unconne cted

sets of concept s have influenc ed recent so-
cial movem ent th eory and res earch . On e set focu ses on framing
processes that affect th e int erpr etive schema mov em ent partici-
pants construct as th ey make sense of th eir social world s (Gamson,
Fireman , and Rytina 1982; Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford
1988, 1992; Johnston 1991; Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Tarrow
1992; Benford 1993a, 1993b) . The other set of conc epts dir ects
attention toward the personal and collective identities movement
actors con struct in their everyday accomplishment of collectiv e
action (Pizzorno 1978; Cohen 1985; Melucci 1989; Taylor 1989;
Gamson 1992; Friedman and McAdam 1992; Hunt 1992, Taylor
and Whittier 1992; Hunt and Benford, forthcoming) . In this chap -
ter we take a first step in elaborating the conn ections between
framing processes and identity constructions , and we sugg est how
these linkages can facilitate our understanding of collectiv e action
mobilization .
Our orienting assumption is that id entity constructions ,
whether intend ed or not , are inh erent in all social mov ement fram-
ing activities . Not only do framing processes link individuals and
groups ideologically but they proffer , buttre ss, and em b ellish
identiti es that rang e from collaborative to conflictual. Th ey do this
by situating or placing relevant sets of actors in time and sp ace
and by attributing charact eristics to them that sugg est spe cifiabl e
relationships and line s of action . Stud ents of social in teraction h ave
long not ed that inter action betw een two or more individuals or
groups minimall y requir es that they be situat ed or placed as social
objects (see Ston e 1962; McC all and Simmons 1978; Sno w and
Scott A. Hu nt, Robert D. Benford, and Davi d A. S now
186
And erson 1987). In other wo rds, situa tiona lly spe cific iden tities
m ust be establishe d. It is our con ten tion th at wi thin th e realm of
collective action pertin en t ind ivid ual an d collective id en titi es are
pr offered and affirme d in two analy tic ally distin ct but int ercon-
nec ted ways: thr ou gh engage me n t in collective action itself, such
as pr ot estin g and celebra ting, an d thr ou gh fr am in g pr ocesses. In
th is chapte r, we are concerne d w ith th e latt er connec tion, th at is,
wi th th e linka ge bet ween fram ing pro cesses an d th e esta blishment
or cons tru ction of identiti es relevant to collective actio n.
To elabora te the conce ptua l connec tions between fram ing and
iden tity cons truc tion, we take as our focus socia l move me nt orga-
nization (SMO) acto rs' claims abo ut relevant sets of acto rs within
th e contexts in w hic h th ey ope rate. B ased on resear ch we had
conduc ted on a varie ty of movemen ts since th e mi d 1970s (Ben-
ford 1984,1987; Hunt 1991; Snow 1993), an d based on th e concep-
tu al obse rva tions of o thers regardi n g th e categor ies of acto rs rele-
van t to social movemen ts (see Gamso n 1990, 14-16; McC arthy
and Z ald 1977,1221 -22; Zur cher and Snow 1981,472 -77; Turner
and Killian 1987, 216-17, 225-26, 255-58), we sugges t th at move-
m ent acto rs' claim s abo ut th ese relevan t catego ries of actors cluster
aro und three socia lly cons truc ted sets of ide nt ities we conce ptual-
ize as iden tity fields. First, th ere are th ose indiv idua ls and collec-
tivities w ho are iden tified as pro tagonists in tha t they advoca te or
sym pat hize wi th move men t values, beliefs, goa ls, and practices,
or are th e beneficiaries of moveme n t action . Secon d, th ere are
othe r persons an d collectiv ities who are seen as stan ding in opposi-
tion to th e protago nis ts ' effo rts, and are thu s iden tified as antago-
nists. Thir d , still ot hers are perceive d as au diences in the sense that
th ey are ne utra l or uncom m itted observers, even th ou gh some of
th em m ay respon d to or report on the events they obse rve . We
refer to these catego ries o f ident ities as iden tity fields because the
ident ities wi thin each category overlap an d h an g together, and
because the categories are elastic and expand and con trac t across
tim e.
We ex plore th e connec tions between th ese ide ntity fields and
framing processes wi th data draw n from our ethnog rap hic studies
of th e N ichi ren Shos hu Bu ddh ist movement (Snow 1993); N ebras-
kans for Peace (Hun t 1991); and other local, regiona l, and national
nuclear disarm am ent organizat ions (Ben ford 1984, 1987). But first
we review extan t trea tmen ts of iden tity, ident ity construc tion
Identity Fields
187
processes, and framing in the social movement literature. This
overview provides a baseline for assessing the concepts we intro -
duce and the theoretical extensions suggested by our analysis.
Identities and Social Movements
Although interest in the link between iden -

tities and movements has recently flour -
ished, this link has been of long -standing interest to movement
scholars . In tracing and critically assessing this interest, Hunt
(1992) has discerned at least three tendencies in the way in which
identity has been conceptualized and approached in the movement
literature. One tendency is to treat identities as products ofbiolog-
ical, psychological, or social structures. This tendency is evi-
denced in psychopathology models that suggest primitive instincts
or inherent psychological structures produce violence, panics, ri-
ots, and other asocial behaviors (MacKay 1932; LeBon 1960; Trot-
ter 1919; Freud 1922; McDougall 1928; Moscovici 1985). In this
view, identities are manifestations of innate, asocial biological and
psychological structures. These psychopathology perspectives are
not the only ones that conceptualize identity as a product of under-
lying objective structures. Early thinking about ethnic identity,
for instance, often treated it "as essentially 'primordial,' meaning
some underlying and fundamental set of ascriptive characteristics"
determines identities (Olzak 1983, 356) . Along similar lines, "es -
sentialist" approaches point to physiological characteristics , psy -
chological predispositions, biological reproduction, and historical
sexual divisions of labor as "determinants" of gendered, lesbian,
and gay identities (Epstein 1987; Marshall 1991).
Strain theorists also suggest that identities are products of
maladaptive social structures. For example, Klapp (1969), drawing
from both symbolic interactionism and mass society theories, ar-
gues that modern social structures produce estrangement that
pushes people toward collective searches for meaningful identities .
Relative deprivation and status inconsistency approaches suggest
similar arguments; they contend that movements emerge when a
category of people experiences psychological dissonance stem -
ming from discrepancies between real conditions and subjective
expectations (see, e. g., Davies 1979; Wilson and Zurcher 1976). It
is assumed that identities that are products of psychosocial struc-
Scott A. Hunt , Robert D. Benford, and David A . Snow
188
tural strain render individuals particularly susceptible to collec-
tive action.
Inherent in this tendency to view identity as a product of
objective structures are several shortcomings . Because identity is
seen as a product or even a symptom, analytical attention is riveted
on "discovering" the underlying structures that spawn identi ties.
Thus, identity as such has not been the central subject of empirical
investigations . There also is a tendency to reify identity concepts .
Researchers frequently imply that entire categories of peop le pos-
sess uniform identities. Further, focusing on "determinant" struc-
tures implies that identities arise from a single dimension, for
example, pathological instinct or psychosocial structural strain.
Unidimensional arguments overlook a variety of identity compo -
nents and complexities, especially how actors interpret, construct,
and articulate identities (Blumer 1969).
A second tendency is to conceptualize identity concerns and
changes in identity as manifestations of macro social change. This
line of argument has recently been advanced by New Social Move-
ment (NSM) theorists, who contend that changes in industrial
societies reflect the advent of a new historical epoch that has given
rise to a new set of identities (Pizzorno 1978; Habermas 1984,
1987; Cohen 1985; Gamson 1989; Kriesi 1989; Dalton and
Kuechler 1990). According to Melucci (1989), there are a num ber
of differences between previous forms of class conflict and today's
emerging forms of collective action. In other words, N SM s are
said to transcend traditional class divisions and corresponding
struggles for control of state and economic institutions. Instead,
they concentrate on transformations of civil society and life
worlds .
Despite notable contributions to the study of contemporary
movements, NSM theorists' tendency to view identities as mani-
festations of macro social change has several limitations. For one
thing, this focus is perhaps overly narrow, examining on ly a "sub-
set of social movements that happen to be predominantly white,
middle class, and located in Western Europe and North America"
(Gamson 1992,58). Second, NSM theory examines only political-
cultural movements with progressive agendas, thereby ignoring
other kinds of movements (for example, religious, consensus,
right-wing). Additionally, Melucci (1989), among others, argues
against NSM theorists' reification of the " new ness" of con tempo-
Identity Fields
189
rary movements . Further, in the light of Weber 's (1978) analyses
of status conflicts, charismatic leaders, religious movements , and
military ord ers, the assumption that all "old " movements wer e
class-based seems unwarranted. To soften the assumption by
maintaining that the only significant "old " movements were class-
based would be simply self-serving . The tendency of NSM theo-
rists to assert that the pivotal role of collective identity is new is
suspect, because by definition any self-identified group makes a
collective identity claim. Finally, some articulations of NSM the-
ory imply a tautology: NSMs, defined in terms of self-limiting
radicalism, identity politics, and transformations of civil society
and life worlds , are manifestations of a new, emerging historical
epoch, which is characterized by nonrevolutionary radicalism, val-
orization of devalued identities , and alterations of civil society and
life worlds. The implication of these conceptual tendencies, with
the exception of Melucci's work (1989), is that movement identi-
ties are viewed as being more or less historically determined rather
than interactionally accomplished .
The third approach to conceptualizing identities treats them
as interactional accomplishments. ]oane Nagel (1986), for instance ,
conceptualizes ethnic identity as political constructions . Construc-
tionist perspectives have countered essentialist arguments as well ,
by contending that gendered, lesbian, and gay identities are per-
petually (re)constructed through social interaction (Ponse 1978;
Gerson and Peiss 1985; Margolis 1985; Smith 1990; West and Zim-
merman 1987; Marshall 1991). Melucci (1989) also stresses the
interactional accomplishment of identity, arguing that " collective
identity is an interactive and shared definition " (34). Borrowing
from NSM, feminist, and symbolic interactionist theories, Verta
Taylor and Nancy Whittier (1992) examine the interactional ac-
complishment of collective identity in terms of boundaries, con-
sciousness, and negotiation.
Symbolic interactionist movement scholars have also had a
long-standing , albeit mainly implicit, interest in the construction
of identities. Blumer's (1939) emphasis on esprit de corps , morale,
solidarity, and ideology points directly to identity construction
issues. This focus is echoed by Turner and Killian (1987), who
state that the "continuity of group identity" is a key aspect of
collective action (224). And recent interactionist studies examine
the discourse of personal identity construction in a variety of con-
Scott A . Hunt, Robert D. Benford, and David A. Snow
190
texts (Snow and Machalek 1984; Snow and Anderson 1987). Ac-
cording to these works, personal identity, regardless of its objec-
tive constitution, is an interactional accomplishment that is
socially (re)constructed. The discourse of personal identity is un-
derstood as a rhetoric "constructed in accordance with group -
specific guidelines" and "redefined continuously in light of new
experiences" (Snow and Machalek 1984, 175-77) . At the organiza -
tionallevel of analysis, SMO actors provide "appropriate" vocab-
ularies and stories for participants and sympathizers to (re)con-
struct their personal identities in ways that link or further commit
them to the movement or SMO (Benford 1993b; Hunt and Ben-
ford, forthcoming) .
This interactionist emphasis on identity and universes of dis-
course is relevant to understanding the construction, establish -
ment, and transformation of collective identities . If collective iden-
tity is conceptualized in terms of the range of salient characteristics
an SMO avows and imputes to other sets of actors, then the con-
struction and affirmation of identities clearly can be linked to
framing processes.
Frames and Framing Processes

Attempting to elucidate ideational aspects
of collective action, Snow, Benford, their
colleagues, and others (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988,
1992; Johnston 1991; Gerhards and Rucht 1992; Tarrow 1992; Ben-
ford 1993a, 1993b) adapted Goffman's (1974) Frame Analysis to
illuminate how movement actors make sense of their social
worlds. A frame is "an interpretive schemata that simplifies and
condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and
encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of
actions within one's present or past environments" (Snow and
Benford 1992, 137). In the context of social movements, collective
action frames not only focus and punctuate "reality " they also
serve as modes of attribution and articulation . So conceived, col-
lective action frames focus attention on a particular situation con-
sidered problematic, make attributions regarding who or what is
to blame, and articulate an alternative set of arrangements includ-
ing what the movement actors need to do in order to affect the
desired change. Snow and Benford (1988) suggest that the forego-
Identity Fields
191
ing functions of collective action frames constitute three core
framing tasks SMOs must accomplish in order to affect consensus
and action mobiliza tion: diagno stic framing, and prognostic fram-
ing, and motivational framing.
Diagnostic framing identifies some event or condition as
problematic and in need of amelioration, and thereby designates
culpable agents. The attributional function of diagnostic framing
involves imputing traits and motives for those who are viewed as
having "caused" or exacerbated the problem . In other words , it
involves casting others into the role identities of villain, culprit, or
antagonist. Prognostic framing outlines a plan for redress , specify-
ing what shou ld be done by whom , including an elaboration of
specific targets, strategies, and tactics. While diagnostic and prog-
nostic framing are required to affect consensus mobilization,
agreement on these definitions of the situation does not automati -
cally yield collective action. For people to take action to overcome
a collectively perceived prob lem or "injustice," they must develop
a set of compelling reasons for doing so . Motivational framing
addresses this need by keynoting appropriate vocabularies of mo -
tive or rationales for doing something for the cause (Benford
1993b; see also Mills 1940). Thus, while diagnoses involve the
imputation of motives and iden tities regarding antagonists or tar -
gets of change, motivational framing entails the social construc -
tion and avowal of motives and identities of protagonists . These
shared identities and motives in turn serve as an impetus for collec -
tive action.
In consideration of these processes at the SMO level, Snowet
al. (1986) identify and elaborate a set of frame alignment strategies .
These are micromobilization processes whereby SMO actors seek
to affect various audiences' interpretations regarding the extent to
which the SMO's ideology and goals are congruent with targeted
individuals' interests, values, and beliefs . In the context of this
chapter, these frame alignment processes can be conceived as rhe-
torical strategies to affect the alignment of collective and personal
identities.
As used by Snow, Benford , and their associates, framing
concepts capture two interrelated qualities of movement actors'
interpretive work. One is that ideology or belief systems are inter-
actional accomplishments that emerge from framing processes;
the other is that frames are cognitive structures that guide collec -
Scott A. Hunt , Robert D. B enford, and David A . Snow
192
tive action, including subsequent framing processes . This suggests
a key recursive relationship: framing processes produce frames
which then condition ensuing framing processes . Framing con-
cepts thus underscore the dynamic quality of movement partici -
pants' belief systems by fixing attention on the dialectical interp lay
between interpretive processes and cognitive structures . Personal
and collective identities are, in part, a product or outcome of this
dialectical interplay.
Identity Fields and Fr am ing Processes
A central aspect of the framing process is

the avowal or imputation of characteristics
to relevant sets of actors within a movement's orbit of operation .
Their avowed or imputed characteristics tend to be of two kinds:
they assert something about a group's consciousness, or they
make claims about aspects of a group's character. In the case of
the former, levels or kinds of knowledge or awareness are attrib-
uted, values are highlighted, and changes in consciousness are
noted or encouraged. The alignment processes of frame bridging,
amplification, and transformation are the discursive vehicles
through which attributions about consciousness are made. In the
case of character attributions, specific claims are made about a
group's strategic, moral, and cathectic or relational character. Ad-
versaries, for example, are often personified as irrational, im-
moral, and devoid of compassion and feeling (Shibutani 1970).
Such attributions or claims are not only constitutive of collec-
tive identity but they are a necessary aspect of the collective action
process inasmuch as they situate and place other categories of
actors as targets of strategic action . As noted earlier, most such
placements or constructions cluster into one of three generic cate-
gories we refer to as identity fields : protagonists, antagonists, and
audiences . Each identity field typically consists of a multiplicity of
imputed or avowed identities .
To date, interest in collective identity has focused primarily
on what we call the protagonist field . From our vantage point,
this focus is too narrow because it glosses the extent to which
collective identities are social constructions, the extent to which
the constitution of targets of action is contingent on the establish -
ment of their identity, and the extent to which the flow of collec-
Identity Fields
193
tive action itself is based on the kinds of identities imputed to the
various sets of relevant actors . We argue that the identities associ-
ated with the antagonist and audience fields are as fund amental to
the dynamic of collective action as those that defme th e protago -
nists. It is in the construction of these identity fields that framing
processes are particularly relevant.
ProtagonistIdentityField
Protagonist identity fields are constella-
tions of identity attributions about individuals and collectivities
taken to be advocates of movement causes. These usually include
collective identity claims about "the movement" and allied aggre-
gations and organizations. They also involve a variety of personal
identity attributions such as movement heroes and heroines, paid
and unpaid staffers , leaders, rank-and-file followers, and star sup-
porters (for example, celebrities and politicians). Also included are
collective and personal identity attributions about constituents,
such as "innocent victims," aggrieved populations, "future gener-
ations," and "the silent majority ." SMO actors also make personal
and collective protagonist identity avowals. In this section we illus -
trate how the construction of numerous identities in a protagonist
identity field is contingent on framing processes .
Protagonist identity attributions are intricately related to sev -
eral framing processes. Through backstage negotiations and inter-
actions, SMO actors engage in diagnostic framing, attempting to
find the "best" ways, from their point of view , to convey to
themselves and others their interpretations of what is wrong with
extant conditions . SMO actors also construct prognostic and mo-
tivational frames that specify what needs to be done to rectify
identified problems and why corrective actions are necessary .
These framing processes represent emergent ideologies that ad-
vance implicit or explicit identity claims . As Downey (1986) con-
tends, "Social action that implicitly conveys an ideology also com-
municates a public identity" (360).
In the course of framing diagnoses, prognoses, and motiv es,
SMO actors locate their organization and its views within a coll ec-
tive action field or context . This entails making in-group /out-
group distinctions and assigning other organizations to ideologi-
cal, geographical , and tactical "turfs" (Blumer 1939; Melucci 1989 ;
Benford and Zurcher 1990; Taylor and Whittier 1992) . Such at-
Scott A. Hunt , Robert D. Benford, and Da vid A . Snow
194
tempts to situ ate on e's own organization in time and space in
relation to oth er groups can be thought of as boundary framing.
Taylor's (1989) work suggests th e importance of boundary fram -
ing when she argues that boundary maintenance is a key compo -
nent of abey an ce structure s and movement continuity. To illustrate
boundary framing , lead ers of the Nichiren Shoshu Buddhist
m ovement would constantly mak e " us" and " the m" kinds of dis-
tinct ion s. As explain ed in on e edito rial in th e mo vement's newspa-
per , "No matter how prosp erous some people may appear or how
peaceful th eir famil y and person al life m ay be, it is like a fantas y
th at can disapp ear w ith out even a tr ace remaining behind . As cold
as it sound s, that is a fact oflif e without faith in the Gohonzon (the
all- power ful scroll to which m embers cha n t)." Similarly , another
leader 's edit ori al ex plaine d, when referrin g to the rich , that, "they
are lu cky and live affluen tly, seemin g unburd en ed by problems ,
but th ese are on ly supe rficial appearance s. .. . Fortune is not only
financial wealth , but m ost important , it is a wealth of true happi -
ness gaine d onl y from th e consisten t practic e of true Buddhism
(the mo vem ent 's br and of Buddhism) ." In th ese and other such
instan ces, m emb ers are continu ously remind ed of the m yriad ways
in whi ch th ey differ from nonmember s, th us constitutin g and
affirm ing sim ultaneo usly th e m ark ers bounding adh erent s from
othe rs.
Th e need for and refer en ce to boundar y m arkers is also a
com mo n featur e of th e oth er mo vements we studi ed . In th e case
of N ebr askans for Peace (NFP) , for inst an ce, a nin eteen- year-old
m ale Youth for Peace leader in Om aha relied on a boundar y frame
to explain hi s or ganization's deci sion to engag e in gu errilla theater
tactic s at a planned demonstration at U. S. Air For ce Strateg ic Air
C omm and 's (SAC) headqu art ers in Bellevu e, N ebraska .
Th ere's a real need fo r our gro up here. We fill a m uch needed niche
I thin k . We can go to SAC and burn a SAC flag to show in a
powe rful sym bo lic way wh at we th ink of th eir so-ca lled peace mis-
sion . W hoever does th at w ill prob abl y ge t arres ted . So w hat? What
have any of us go t to lose? O ther gro ups aro und here, I won't
m ent ion any nam es, ju st can' t do th at kind of stuff. Th ey'r eju st too
hooked into th e sys tem w ith j ob s, rep ut ations, and B .S. like that.
T his stateme n t articulates a bound ar y frame; it dr aws a dis-

tin ction between Youth for Peace as a gro up th at can m ake unadul-
Identity Fields
195
terated political statements because its memb ers have not gott en
"hooked into the system" and other SMOs that tak e fewer "risks "
because their members are part of "th e system. " Such boundar y
framing differentiates between th e " tru ly committ ed" and those
unwilling or unable to make personal sacrifices for the cause .
Boundary frames do not emerge ex nihilo , howev er. Rather ,
such framings are condition ed and constrained by SMO actors'
interpretations of world, local , movement, and org anizational his-
tories. Indeed, a central feature of much diagnostic , prognostic,
and motivational framing is the embellishment an d reconstitution
of relevant aspects of the past. For example, Nichiren Shoshu, not
unlike most religious movements , claims that its mission was both
preordained and divinely given . As one rank-and-file member,
parroting movement leaders and literature , explained: "Ther e is a
whole history and theory going back 3000 years that points to
Nichiren Shoshu as both the orthodox practice of Buddhism and
the correct philosophy and practic e for this time period [referring
to the present] ." This and other comparable statements suggest
that Nichiren Shoshu sees itself not as some fly-by-night fad or
cult but as contributing, instead, to the realization of a kind of
cosmic plan that was divinely prophesized years ago. Not only do
such claims situate and justify the movement historically, but the y
also proffer and affirm identities that confer special status on ad-
herents.
While the link to some grand prophesy or moment in the
past may be particularly characteristic of religious movements,
such framings are also evident in more secular, political move-
ments. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War , for example, a male
NFP leader attempted , at a quarterly board meeting, to inspire
and justify current action in terms of past organizational linkages
and campaigns. " For many people out there , NFp, if it's anything
at all, is an anti-war organization . For them , NFP from the begin-
ning was anti-war , against the War in Vietnam. We really need to
remember that. We need to be there now for them again. So what
I'm saying is we need to really take the lead and make it clear we 're
still anti-war. "
The foregoing suggests that framings that mark and bound a
movement and its activities in space and time are central to th e
construction and maintenance of SMO actors' collective and per-
sonal identities . This process can be seen even more clearly when
S cott A. Hunt , Robert D. Benford, and David A . S now
196
we con sider th e avowal or imputation of aspects of consciousness
and/or chara cter. As noted earli er, consciousness claims attribute
an "aw areness" and also specify those things coll ectivities and
individuals possess awareness about . To illustrate , in the fall of
1990, NFP staff met to decide what the organization 's response
should be to th e U. S. military buildup in Saudi Arabia. After the
m eeting , on e of the staffers explained:
Thi s has caught us off-gu ard, co m pletely off-guard . We knew
about the Iran-Iraq war , we kn ew about Iraq 's use of chemical
weapons, but we reall y don 't know much about that region, really.
All the centuries of conflicts , religious tensions , political tensions ,
we only kn ow th e surfac e of th ese things. We know enough to
know we don 't know enough . We don 't know enough to make
dep end able statements on th e issue as an organization. We don't
even know enough how to act in th e best ways to promote peace.
We just have a sort of kn ee-jerk response . Our military 's involved
so we must be against it . Befor e we can tak e definitive action we
ne ed to educate oursel ves .
As a result of this meeting, NFP at the state , regional, and
chapter levels began a series of forums on the Persian Gulf and
the Middle East, relying on knowledgeable members and outside
organizations, such as the American Friends Service Committee,
to provid e lectures and educational materials . The NFP staffer's
response above suggests that the organization needed to have
greater awaren ess of the history in the region . In other words ,
NFP ers recognized the importanc e of consciousness expansion
with respect to the issue , thus suggesting a collectiv e identity that
included an awareness of ignoranc e. Notice how this consciousness
framing led to a preliminary prognostic frame. To overcome the
organization's ignorance , NFPers called for educational forums .
Before further diagnostic, prognostic , and motivational framings
could take place, NFP needed to be educated, to have its con-
sciousn ess enh an ced .
In addition to consciousness claims, SMO actors attribute
character to individuals and collectivities in protagonist identity
fields. In doing this , movement particip ants int erpret individual
and collective actions as manif estations of particular cognitive or
strat egic , affectiv e, and moral dispositions and prop ensities . SMO
members typically point to th eir framings as " evidence" of their
individual or collectiv e characters. Similarly , SMO actors usually
Ident ity Fields
197
do not want to frame situations in ways that might be perceiv ed
as incompatible with individual and collective character avowals .
The complex relationship between frames and character attribu-
tion is exemplified in the following field notes excerpt from the
NFP study (Hunt 1991) . During an informal conversation , a state-
level NFP leader discussed the organization's position on the Is-
raeli and Palestinian conflict.
There's been atrocities on both sides . I have good friends in NFP
on both sides of the issue . People passionately committed to th eir
convictions. All of them are good people . People who are commit-
ted to fairness and justice. If we took a stance on this as an organiza-
tion we 'd in effect just be asking some members to leave. We know
this wouldn't make sense. We have more in common then we have
differences. There 's so much work we can do together here in
Nebraska and th ere's so few people working on issues of peace and
justice here . To do something that would knowingly reduce our
numbers would be damn foolish. So NFP as an organization takes
no stand on the issue. We agree to disagr ee among ourselv es and
not to take a public stance . .. . I don't think this is a prostitution
of our commitment to peace . I think it's just a practical response to
a difficult situation. I think this stance of no stance speaks to our
commitment to encourage diversity of opinion within our organi-
zation.
Several character attributions are made here at both the indi-
vidual and organizational levels . Individuals (within NFP) "on
both sides of the issue" were imputed to be "passionate" and
"good people" "committed to fairness and justice." Similarly,
NFP's decision to not offer a public framing regarding this issue
was characterized as "practical" and ostensibly predicated on
NFP's commitment to the tolerance of "diversity." Such post hoc
avowals of motive or framings and reframings serve to foster a
sense of shared identity among NFP protagonists.
AntagonistIdentityFields
Antagonist identity fields are constellations
of identity attributions about individuals and collectivities im-
puted to be opponents of movement causes. These include claims
about countermovements, countermovement organizations, hos-
tile institutions, inimical publics, and social control agents. Addi-
tionally, numerous personal identity typifications are socially con-
S cott A . Hun t, Robert D . B enford, and David A . Snow
198
struct ed and imputed for specific villains , opp ositional leaders ,
rank-and-fil e oppon ents , and star adversaries . Collective and per-
sonal identity attributions are also mad e about antagonists ' con-
stitu ents such as "big busin ess, " " closet bigots , " "cultural elites,"
and a ho st of oth ers imput ed to be secret support ers or " conspira-
tors " of " libe ral," " con servative," or "radical " cause s.
SMO actor s use a vari ety of fram es and framing proc esses in
m akin g identit y claims about an tagonists. Th e most obvious way
SMO parti cip ants impute anta goni st identiti es is by identifying
and definin g individu als, coll ectiviti es, belief s, values , and prac-
tices as being in conflict with prot agonist identiti es and causes
(Benford and Hunt 1992 ; Morris 1992) . Such fr aming fost ers the
imputati on of person al and collectiv e id entiti es, consisting of con-
scio usness and charact er attributi ons .
To illu str ate, from its in ception in 1977, Mobilization for
Surv ival (M FS) bl am ed a host of social probl ems- environm ental
degr adati on , third world povert y , th e threat of nucl ear Arma ged-
don - on "unscrupul ous capit alists. " One MFS brochur e asserted ,
for instanc e, th at th e U. S. pr ojection of military might has been
at th e behest of U. S.-b ased multinati on al corporations . "Since
World War II, Ameri can foreign polic y has revol ved aro und devel-
opin g its sph ere of influence and maintaining an environm ent con-
duci ve to investm ent for Am eri can corporations. Th e centr al focus
has been in the underdevel op ed - or Third World - countri es.
Third World nations pro vid e natural resourc es, ch eap , non-union-
ized labor , and easy mark ets for larg e multination al corpo rations."
Followin g MFS's lead, activists of the Texas Mobiliz ation for Sur-
vival (TM) and University Mobilization for Sur vival (UM) harped
on the sam e them es: "Wh en Ronald Reagan talk s about 'national
defens e, ' he is really talking about defending profits ," a TM activ-
ist contended before a campu s audience. Simil arly, at an anti-draft
registration rally, a UM lead er ask ed rh etoricall y, " D o you wann a
die and po ssibly pr ecipitat e nucl ear w ar to protect th e int erests of
multination al corporati ons ?"
We sugg est that such diagnostic framings not onl y serv e the
obvi ous function of attributing blam e, the y also facilit ate the con-
stru ction of both prot agonist and antagonist id entity fields . By
spe cifyin g who is responsibl e for particul ar soci al ills, mo vement
actors m ake implicit character claims about themselves, their or-
ganiz ation , an d oth ers. For exam ple, the y, unlike their " im m oral
Identity Fields
199
opponents," are not willing to tolerate injustice, human suffering,
and the like.
Antagonist identity constructions are also important because
they guide SMO actors' deliberations about an opponent's vulner -
abilities and strengths and are therefore key in planning strategies
and tactics . To illustrate, prior to national discussions in early 1990
of a peace dividend derived from the thawing of the cold war,
NFP had devised a petition campaign modeled after the Freeze
initiative to persuade Nebraska senator James J. Exon to vote for
reductions in defense spending. An NFP staffer explained the de-
velopment of this particular tactic:
Exon, Mr. SAC , has not had an outstanding voting record on peace
issues . But we figured he'd go for modest reductions in defense
spending . . . . Why? Because of currents in the Democratic Party ,
because calls for reductions in defense spending by the Democrats
will be used to discredit the Republicans by linking them to
Reagan's outrageous increases in defense spending which was a big
contributor to our current budget problems . We felt Exon would
follow party line . . .. We've tried to guess what level of cuts Exon
would support and use figures slightly above that as a basis for our
"modest proposal" petition drive . The plan was to then present
Exon with large numbers of signatures and organizational endorse-
ments to apply some pressure on him to make sure he carries
through with reductions.
This account of tactical development illustrates several as-
pects of oppositional identity framing. An antagonist identity field
is referred to by equating Senator Exon with SAC. Alluding to a
less than "outstanding voting record on peace issues" is an opposi-
tional framing that portrays the senator's actions as being in con-
flict with peace movement goals. These claims also impute a par -
ticular identity to the senator, one that depicts him as a proponent
of military spending but a loyal Democrat. The antagonist identity
frame shaped NFP's "modest proposal" campaign .
AudienceIdentity Fields
Audience identity fields are constellations
of identity attributions about individuals and collectivities im-
puted to be neutral or uncommitted observers who may react to
or report on movement activities . For example, allied SMOs, the
media, powerful elites, marginal supporters, sympathizers, and
Scott A. Hunt , Robert D. Benford, and David A. Snow
200
bystander publics can be the subjects of audienc e identity claims .
A common characteristic of all imputed audience identities is that
they are capable of receiving and evaluating protagonist messages
in a favorable light . The construction of audience identities in-
volves audienc e framing, defined as the imputation of observer
role to individuals and collectivities. To illustrate, explaining her
involvement in a Omaha coalition against racism, an NFPer dis-
cussed a need for the organization to link peace politics to strug-
gles against racial prejudice and discrimination . "African Ameri-
cans und erstand injustice. They have experienced first hand the
inequalities brought about by the system. We [NFP] need to work
against racism and make connections between militarism , eco-
nomic injustice, and racism. " The audience framing in this exam -
ple imputes a consciousness of "injustice " to African Americans .
This claim implies that such a consciousness makes African
Am ericans a potential audience for traditional peace movement
concern s about militarism. Mor eover, the claim advanced here
suggest s that African Americans would be a receptive and support -
ive audience becau se they understand that inequalities are not mere
misfortun es but manif estations of an extant social system. In other
words, African Americans are imputed to be potential mobiliza-
tion targets be caus e they share a general diagnostic frame with
NFP.
Audi ence framing is particularly important because SMO
actors use these frames to determine what kinds of other frames
will resonate, what kinds of " eviden ce" need to be marshaled to
support movement claims, and how audiences ' cultural symbols
and narratives can be used in advancing movement claims (Snow
and Benford 1988). Imputed audience identities influence the de-
velopment of particular strategies and tactics. In a formal inter-
view , an NFP male explained the organization's approach to com-
municating with elected officials .
You have got to talk their [elected officials'] language . You can't tell
th em we should do x because x is the right thing to do. X is the
right thing to do but they won't listen to that . You have to go in
th ere and give them figures and statistics that support your posi-
tion. And , when dealing with politicians , you have to show them
the bottom line . You have to talk policies and programs in terms of
dollars or they just won 't listen .
Identity Fields
201
In this case , it is imputed that quantitative data and financial ex pe-
diency resonate with elected officials. Based on this understanding
of politician identities, NFP's arguments were often carefull y
made with "figures and statistics ," typically translated into " bo t-
tom-line" dollars .
FramingOutsiders' Identity Imputotions

In the course of attributing identities to th e
relevant sets of actors within their environm en t, SMO actors are
also confronted with interpreting outsiders ' claims about them or
other allied individual or group protagonist identities . There are
at least four ways in which outsiders ' identity imputations are
responded to and framed. One way is to interpret imputations
as incorrect . This kind of framing, or "keying" in Goffman 's
terminology (1974,43-45), was clearly evidenced during the 1991
Persian Gulf War. Upon reading a letter to the editor in the Omaha
WorldHerald, an NFP female commented:
This letter says that those demonstrating for peace are unpatriotic.
It says we should be grat eful that men were willing to die to guaran-
tee our rights of free speech. It suggests that since we protest for
peace , we aren't grateful and we shouldn 't be allowed to exercise
our right of free speech that those men died for. Make sense to
you? Even though this idea of patriotism has some limits , we are
patriotic. We love our countr y and want it to do the right thing. I
can't think of an ything more patriotic than taking a despised posi-
tion and making your voice heard so that your country will do the
right thing.
The imputed identity of "unpatriotic " group was framed as an
incorrect assessment. Indeed, this person reframed the meaning of
the outsider's conception of patriotism to underscore the virtuous,
principled character of NFP.
A second way to frame outsiders ' identity imputations is to
view them as a reinforcement of identity avowals. By this we
refer to SMO actors ' interpretations that external imputations are
accurate positive portrayals of collective and individual protago-
nist identities. The following discussion of a charismatic NFP
leader in Scottsbluff exemplifies this kind of framing .
The Star Herald did a series, I think it was called community leader-
ship series, and X was chosen of 1 of 20 people as communit y
leaders . And I think that that 's remarkable because he has only been
Scott A. Hunt, Robert D. Benford, and David A . Snow
202
here 5 or 6 years. He has touched that many people to have himself
in that kind of a position. That is really really remarkable . And X
is a perfect manifestation of all our best energy, our best selves. He
says what we would all say if we had those words, you know?
Claiming that the NFP leader is a personification of the organiza-
tion - he "is a perfect manifestation of all our best energy, our
best selves" -this NFPer frames the Star Herald personal identity
imputation as a reinforcement of the Scottsbluff chapter's collec-
tive identity .
A third way of framing outsiders' identity imputations is to
interpret them as misunderstandings based on flawed impression
management by the SMO and its adherents. In another words, the
imputed identities are not due so much to a faulty reading of the
movement but to adherent behavior that lends itself to such a
reading and is therefore indicative of poor impression manage-
ment. The resulting framing thus defines outsiders' imputations
as reflections of imag e problems and, in turn, specifies corrective
action to remedy th e flawed image. Snow's (1979) discussion of
building idiosyncratic credit as an impression management strat -
egy speaks to this issue. His examination of Nichiren Shoshu
revealed that the movement 's leadership was particularly sensitive
to its public image, as reflected in the comments of a leader at a
movement meeting . "The point to keep in mind is that many non -
members judge NSA by the way each member presents himself.
If anyone of us conducts himself in an obnoxious and disrespectful
manner, all who come in contact with us are going to think every-
one in NSA is like that one person . We should therefore be aware
of how we look and sound to the general public and make a
good impression." Snow also found that the movement countered
outsiders' claims about the organization's "deviant" qualities by
pursuing public activities that would alter the group's public iden-
tity. Such activities are constitutive of attempts to build idiosyn-
crasy credit and thereby secure a more respectable identity in the
public's eye. Idiosyncratic credit accentuates "positive" character
attributes and thus can be understood as a frame amplification.
Finally, a fourth way to frame outsiders' identity imputations
is to perceive the characterizations as accurate depictions of "ac-
tual" flawed identities. Such framings revolve around SMO actors'
interpretations that outsiders' negative identity imputations are
accurate accounts of serious identity defects . This kind of framing
Identity Fields
203
usually calls for radical identity or frame transformations. In the
NFP study, this kind of response to outsiders' imputations was
never widely shared. However, on e m ember 's dissatisfaction with
NFP's support of the blockade of Iraq prior to the 1991 Persian
Gulf War illustrates this framing process . " I know oth er groups
around here must be surpris ed at our support for the [blockade]. I
know I am. By international law [th e blockade] is an act of war
and NFP is supporting it. Unbelievable, just unbelievable . We'r e
not Nebraskans for Peace, we 're Nebraskans for a Little War. "
While this member continued to take an activ e part in NFp, his
interpretation suggests that the group's support of the blockade
represented a serious identity flaw that was reflected in his tongue-
in-cheek renaming of the organization.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have attempted to link

framing and identity construction proc-
esses. Both have received increasing attention in recent years by
social movement scholars , but discussion and research has pro-
ceeded as if these processes referred to different orders of phenom-
ena and therefore were essentially unrelated . Clearly that is not the
case. As our observations suggest, framing and identity construc-
tion processes are interconnected in a dynamic, almost recursive
fashion . The linkages between framing and identity construction
processes direct attention to SMO actors' efforts to interpret and
operate within collective action arenas . Making sense of collective
action arenas entails framing situations and attributing identities
to individuals and collectivities . We have suggested that identity
attributions are claims about consciousness and character that clus-
ter around protagonist, antagonist, and audience identity fields .
Further, diagnostic, prognostic, motivational, boundary, history,
oppositional, and audience framing tasks as well as frame align -
ment processes are central in attributing identiti es and communi-
cating relationships between and among identity fields .
Moreover, our discussion has suggested how framing and
identity construction processes condition micro and mesomobili-
zation activities . For movement participants , frames and identities
are part of an obdurate "reality" that conditions, constrains , and
enables collective action (see Blumer 1969). That is, SMO actors
204
follow certain lines of collective action rather than others based, in
part, on their perceptions of the parameters implied by particular
framing and identity constructions . Although we understand
framing and identity construction as emergent processes, our ap-
proach does not assume that SMO actors operate in a vacuum .
Indeed, as our observations show, key factors and events occur
that are beyond the control of SMO actors (for example, the
1991 Persian Gulf War). History , social structures, and cultural
arrangements constrain SMO actors' interpretive work. How
these " realities" condition interpretive work, however, depends on
how SMO actors ' perceive history, social structures, and cultural
arrangements. Particular lines of collective action emerge or fail to
emerge not because objective conditions allow or prohibit them,
but rather because SMO actors perceive "objective" conditions as
allowing or prohibiting them . In short, to understand the emer-
gence of particular expressions of collective action, analysts need
to attend to SMO actors' intersubjective definitions of "reality. "
Identifying and elaborating the relationships between and among
framing and identity construction processes promises to make ad-
vances along these lines.
Acknowledgments: Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the annual

meeting s of the Midwest Sociological Society, Chicago, April 1993, and the
International Institute of Sociology, Paris, June 1993. We are grateful to Hank
Johnston and Enriqu e Larafia for their insightful comments on previous versions.
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Chapter 9
Continuity and Unity in New

Forms of Collective Action:
A Comparative Analysis
of Student Movements
Enrique Larafia
This chapter revi ews an old and central is-

sue in social mo vem ent s res earch th at fo-
cuses on their origins and evolution in ord er to und erstand th e
reasons for th eir em ergen ce, the events and or ganizations that
made them possibl e, th eir resultin g process es, and their perma-
nence and impact in societ y. This also was the obj ect of my first
empirical research on the Free Speech Mo vem ent (FSM) at th e
University of California, Berkeley (Larafia 1975). My goal was to
explore the discontinuity of the stud ent mov em ent of that campus ,
one of the centers of stud ent activism in the second half of th e
1960s, ten years after th e FSM . The same topic underlies my stud y
of the stud ent mobilizations that took plac e in Spain during 1986
and 1987. This nationwide mov em ent acquir ed remarkabl e
strength and play ed a rol e in one of the major conflicts of th e
decade. It eme rged from "nowhere," w ithout any historical or
organizational antec edents and in an educational sector diff erent
from the stud ent mobilizations of the 1960s. Student demands
focused on th e syst em that regulates the access to colleg e education
in Spain . The movement chall enged th e entrance exam s that th e
Department of Education requires of all applicants to a public
university. Th e relevance of this conflict for th e analysis of con-
temporary social movements relates not onl y to its contribution
to the knowledge of their em ergence but also to the compl exity
of its constituency (high school stud ents who act ed independentl y
from political parti es) , and th e peculiar relationship th ey estab-
lished with another section of the mov ement , integrat ed by uni -
versity stud ents.
Enrique Laraiia
2 10
In spite of thos e features , this m ovement pr esents som e char-
acteristics sim ilar to oth er studen t movements that em erged in
different social contex ts an d decad es. I draw a com pa ra tive ana lysis
below. Two pr emi ses of thi s chap ter are that con tem po rary social
m ovem ent s in com p lex so cieties can be bett er und erst ood through
cross - cultura l ana lysis, and th at th e conce pt of " new soc ial mov e-
m ent s" is useful for th e interpretation of cur rent form s of collec-
tive actio n in com plex so cieties th at cann ot be expl ain ed by classi-
cal perspectives. Alth ough I am aware of th e debat e ab out the
validit y of this con cept (Tarr ow 1989; Taylor 1989; Melu cci 1989;
see also C ha pter 5), I use thi s term as a me ans to develop anal ytical
tools to in terp ret conte m po rary so cial m ovem ent s and as a relative
concept th at ste ms from comp ari son s w ith th e form s of class con-
flict th at were pr evalent in Eur op ean industrial socie ties. I draw
two ideas from one of its found er s, Alb ert o Meluc ci (1989). First,
th e novelt y of th ese m ovem ent s refer s to m orph ologi cal chan ges
in th eir stru ctur e and action as well as in the social cont ext in
w hic h the y arise . Second , in order to avoid an epistemo logical
probl em in trinsic to th e gro w ing popul ariz ation of th e term - its
onto logiza tio n as an abstrac t gene ralization tha t pr event s deeper
analysis - resea rch sho uld focu s on th e distin ctive featur es and the
spec ific eleme nts of con tem po rary m ovem ent s. Research should
stress w ha t is new and its social impli cation s.
Alth ou gh th e or ig ins of thi s app ro ach have been located in
Eur op ean schol arship (Melu cci 1980, 1985, 1989; Klanderman s
an d Tarrow 1988; Offe 1985, 1988; D alton and Ku elchn er 1992),
imp ort ant contribution s cam e from such Am eric an soc iolog ists as
Ralph Turn er (1969, see also C ha pter 4) an d ]ea n C oh en (1985). As
this ap proa ch em phas izes th e role of ideas and cultur al pro cesses in
th e eme rgence of con tem pora ry m ovem ent s, th e contribution of
fram e analysi s (Sno w et al. 1986; Sno w an d Ben ford 1988, 1992;
see also Hunt , Benf ord , and Snow , C ha pter 8) enha nces th e brid ge
betw een th e Am eric an and Eur op ean tr aditi on s in thi s field . Thi s
brid ge tak es th e form o f a tendency tow ard syn thes is m anifest in
th e grow ing int erest in research on identit y b y Am eric an scholars
an d an incr easing int erest in frame analys is by th eir Europ ean
counterpa rts (Stompka 1992; Mu eller 1993; Ibarr a and Rivas
1993; Lar afia 1993b, 1993c; see also Hunt , Benford , and Snow,
C ha pter 8).
Continuity and Unity
211
The Issue of Continuity in Social Movements
In this chapter, I review some assumptions

from collective behavior theory about con-
tinuities that contrast with my research on student movements;
then I focus on some insights from the new social movements
(NSM) approach that help to interpret that research and document
the need to revise classical assumptions on continuity and unity of
social movements. I analyze the relationship between both aspects
in the last section of this chapter.
The NSM and resource mobilization approaches must ad-
dress several problems of interpretation that are related to their
emphasis on the external, structural factors of movements' emer-
gence and their tendency to neglect cognitive and ideological fac-
tors (Snow and Benford 1988; see also McAdam, Chapter 2). I
argue that these factors are crucial for the analysis of the formation
and decline of contemporary movements. These factors are diffi-
cult to investigate using conventional research methods that try to
get "hard data ." I also argue that the traditions of ethnomethodol-
ogy and cognitive sociology contain key insights for research on
cultural factors. They may enable analysts to grasp a movement's
symbolic functions , as well as to understand interaction as a source
of collective beliefs . These symbolic functions, or "dimensions,"
consist of the ways by which movements achieve or construct
their identities: new codes of interpretation and interpersonal rela-
tions . I also refer to the "ethnography of speaking" approach that
focuses on the actors ' discourse and pays special attention to its
social context (Cicourel 1964, 1980, 1982; Briggs 1986; Johnston
1991). The integration of this approach within the field of social
movements closes the distance between the macrosociological dis-
course prevailing in this field and the microsociological analysis
that is needed for a better understanding of social movements and
their identity dimensions. A step forward in that direction is the
growing use of the term "micromobilization" in the literature on
social movements since the late 1980s.
A similar process of integration is already taking place in
social movement theory through the diffusion of frame anal ysis;
this integration clarifies the process by which the value orienta-
tions of the individual become linked to those of the social move-
Enriqu e La raiia
2 12
m ent organization (SMO) (Goff man 1974; Snow et al. 1986; Snow
an d B enford 1988). The integration of these approaches enables
th e an alyst to ground useful macrosociological assumptions about
NSMs in cultur al analysis of participation through the observa-
tion s of everyda y int eraction in social movements (johnston 1991,
1992) .
The collectiv e behavior persp ectiv e considers th e existence of
org anizational and temporal continuiti es as a defining characteris -
tic of social movem ents . A so cial movement is "a collectivity act-
ing with certain continuity to promote or resist changes in the
soci ety or in the group it is part of" (Turn er and Killian 1987, 222).
Continuity ref ers to the acti vities as a social mo vement develops to
achieve its goals and lies in strategy and organization, in leadership
and role structure, and in collectiv e identity . The amount of time
necessary to consid er a collective mobilization as a social move-
m ent seem s to dep end on variable and common -sense criteria ,
which exclude such events as an organiz ed demonstration that
lasts a few hours or a three-week occupation of a building. A
special coll ectiv e dimension and continuity over time are consid-
ered intrinsic attribut es of these phenomena that allow us to distin-
guish th em from other forms of collective action such as migra -
tions, strik es, or prot est demonstr ations (Gusfield 1970).
Although both are collective events , protest demonstra tions are
spont an eous and ephemeral , and migrations lack a symbolic ele-
ment that provides actors with a certain homogeneity in values
and beliefs. This unifying component is express ed not only in a
movement's orientation toward goals but also in its coercive ca-
pacity over individual behavior (Durkheim 1978).
Some conceptual problems arise if we apply those criteria to
the investigation of student mobilizations in compl ex societies.
Thos e taking plac e during the 1960s wer e categorized as "rebel-
lions ," "revolts ," and " uprisin gs" in ord er to highlight their spon-
taneous and unpredictable nature . These terms accentuate diffi-
culties in establishin g continuitie s among th em and in
conceptualizing th em as social mo vem ents (Drap er 1965; Lipset
1965; Wollin and Schaar 1970) . Two decad es later (1986-1987)
" m obilization" w as the most common term used by th e Spanish
media to ref er to prot ests again st th e official educational policy.
Th e meaning of th e later term enh an ces th e id ea of th eir spont ane-
ou s an d unpr edi ctable char acter , as well as th e perc eption of them
213
as more normal or everyday phenomena. However , the student
movements of the 1960s were the first cases of new social move-
ments and had crucial implications not only for the theories of
collective action but also for sociological theory because they con -
tributed to the questioning of Marxist and functionalist theories
of order and conflict (Hacks 1967; Giddens 1979; Larafia 1982,
1993a). In the 1980s, important assumptions about collective ac-
tion were revised in part because of the proliferation of new social
movements in complex societies during the preceding three dec-
ades and the need to use more precise criteria in analysis. The
current trend in sociology is to move from the construction of
broad theories to detailed knowledge of the social mechanisms
that lead to the emergence of collective phenomena (Elster 1989).
This seems related to investigations that highlight the role of non-
visible networks, where movements "incubate" befor e they
emerge into the public (McAdam 1988; Melucci 1989, see also
Chapter 5;Johnston 1991, see also Chapter 11; Perez Agote 1987).1
In his well-documented study of student activism in Missis-
sippi during the summer of 1964, McAdam (1988) locates the
starting point of the 1960s student movements in this collective
experience; it was the source of social relations between future
leaders and activists as well as the source of feelings of solidarity
and collective identity . McAdam credits white racial prejudice for
the emergence of these movements on the white university cam-
pus and locates it in the main organizational structure of the civil
rights movement , the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Commit-
tee (SNCC). His work shows the need to distinguish between the
discovery of the movement by the mass media and its organiza-
tional and cultural origins (SNCC and the white students ' pro-
gram called Freedom Summer) . McAdam asserts that an organiza -
tion of black students gave way to the student movements of the
1960s; his research poses an important question about the emer -
gence of social movements. Researchers distinguish between "la-
tent" and visible phases in the formation ofNSMs (Melucci 1989).
That distinction makes problematic the issue of the origins of
social movements as defined by conventional criteria in classical
theories ." it shows the need to explore the social networks that
exist before the public appearance of an NSM (McAdam 1988).
The need to differentiate both phases of a contemporary social
movement and the investigation of social networks in periods of
Enrique Larafia
2 14
"latency" becom es an essential tool in identifying continuities in
collective action . The difficulties involved in studying stu dent
movements mak es them a strategic platform for research on con ti-
nuities because the very condition of being a student is transitory
and because recent movement histories present important discon-
tinuities .
Verta Taylor (1989) has researched th e women's movement in
the Unit ed States during a period of absence of mobilizations
(1940-1960) . She uses the notion of "abeyance structures " to ex-
plain sustained activi sm in nonreceptive political environments .
This approach is a useful tool for explaining organizational and
cultural aspects of movements . I use it to look at the student
mobilizations at Berkeley . A current probl em is that the profes-
sional interpretation of social movements usually focuses on the
visible phas es of soci al mov em ents, neglecting the cycles of decline
in activism (Taylor 1989; Melucci 1989). This emphasis led to a
sup erimposition of the political over cultural meanings of a move-
ment. This tend ency is also manif est in th e sup erimposition of the
analyst 's rational categories over those of th e mov ement's actors ,
which I address in the following section . The " political-profes-
sional point of view" is the dominant view for describing social
conflicts ; it is spread by th e mass media and is responsible for
shaping the public image of movements (Baudrillard 1974). How -
ever, distinguishing betw een that imag e and the image th e move-
ment has for its m embers (or between the coll ective and the public
identity) is an initial methodological premise for sociological re-
search on new social movements .
McAdam argu es (see Chapt er 2) that the anal ysis of social
networks has a tradition in the investigation of coll ective action
sin ce th e 1970s in the United Stat es. Unfortunatel y, it pres ents a
"structural bias" becaus e the analysis cent ers on th e explanation
of preexisting organizations and their resources. This bias is re-
lated both to th e influ enc e of approaches that focus on the visible
aspe cts and political meanings of mov ements and to the lack of
emphasis on their cognitive and sym bolic elements . William Gam-
son (1988) consid ers this bias an important factor in the "underde-
velopm ent" of research tools in this field .
My research on the continuity of student mov ements indi-
cates that its exist ence cannot be an assumption prior to empirical
investigation , nor can th e research er focus on organizational re-
Conti nuity and Unity
2 15
sources or determin e continuity according to common-s ense no-
tions . Continuity is produc ed not onl y by the persistence over
time of organizations but also through the enduranc e of som e
cultur es that allow prot est mov em ents to reem erg e (see McAdam ,
Chapter 2) . Melucci 's work (1989,1990, see also Chapter 5) dev el-
ops the theoretical relationship that exists between organizational
and cognitive aspects of continuiti es in social mov em ents, exp an d-
ing the an alysis by stressing th e imp act of changes in social move-
ment s in comple x societies . He sug gests that cont emporary social
mo vem ents are be coming centered in social networks th at are es-
tablish ed betw een persons and groups without publi c visibility in
everyday life, and wh ere their coll ectiv e identity is produced (see
also Mu eller, Chapt er 10). Thi s is a helpful contribution to the
knowl edg e of th e sociocultur al m echani sms that lead to th e forma -
tion of coll ectiv e action .? How ever, in thi s field we need mor e
empirical, microsociological research documenting th e emerg ent
proc esses that occur in th e daily life of th e mov em ent s.
In th e spring of 1974, student mobilization s em erg ed in order
to prot ect a radical School of Criminology at the Berkel ey cam pus
of the Universit y of California . Th ey pro vid e evidence of th e
relationship betwe en latency and continuity of a social mo vem ent
that was supposed to have disappear ed at the beginnin g of th e
decade . At a period characteriz ed by th e absenc e of mobilizations ,
we witn essed larg e demonstrations and th e occupation of two uni-
versity buildings in respons e to th e chanc ellor 's decision to sup-
press th e school. Student action was the result of dail y work in
nonvisible networks during th e academic ye ar. Th ese networks
created both th e SMO and its alternativ e fram e of referenc e.4 This
frame provided a radical int erpr etation of cur ren t politi cal and
university issues and was produc ed by several gro ups through
weekly m eetings and non credited lectures by N ew Left intell ectu-
als. They involv ed diverse topics , from th e social sourc es of crime
to the U. S. role in the world to th e ene rgy crisis . Thes e stud ent
groups are also an example of th e " abeyance stru cture s" of th e
New Left that account for its continuit y in the period of thi s
movement's decline since 1969. In addit ion to this organizational
continuity, the goal to " save the school " constitut es th e mov e-
ment's cultural counterpart because it corr esponds to th e demand
for student control through participation in decision making in th e
university. Th ese mobilizations docum ented how th e non visibl e
Enrique L araiia
2 16
interac tion within submerged networks produced new co des of
interpr etation as well as the social relations (Melucci 1989) that
gave way to the mobilizations against institutional decisions .
The tendency of stud ent mov ements toward discon tinuity
anticipat es a frequent featur e of new so cial movements that has
been relat ed to two factors : (1) th e m eans by which personal iden-
tification amon g social actors em erg es and the goals of the move -
m ent constantly cha nge, and (2) the fact that th eir actors do not
bel ong to a single social category , nor do they maintain the same
attitud es for all th eir lives (Melucci 1989) . I draw from Melucci the
idea that th e chan ges in contem po rary movements demand the
revi sion of traditional assumpti ons and research categories . The
em phasis of mor e recent approach es on visible , structural , and
org anization al aspec ts mi ght negl ect research of earli er periods of
developm ental and cultura l aspects of movement formation ,
w hich are cru cial to our und erstanding of what has been going on
in th e social networks w here movem ents are produc ed . Classical
th eori es assum e th at continuit y and unit y are intimatel y related
aspec ts of a social mov em ent becaus e th e latter explains its persis-
ten ce in tim e. Althou gh the unity among th e differ ent elem ents of
a m ovem ent is a puzzl e to be solved, th e tend ency to presuppos e
unity as soon as a mov em ent exists and to focus on ex tern al causes
may h ave produc ed sim plified interpretations. > In th e follow ing
section I refer to an epistem ological qu estion that I consid er related
to th ese prob lems of interpretation, and which shows th e need for
an expan sion of this field 's boundaries .
Rati ona l Assump tions in t he Explanati on

of Collectiv e A ct ion
Sinc e the mid 1980s, the growing inter est

in th e symboli c and co gnitiv e aspe cts of so-
cial mov ements h as been develop ed within th e persp ectiv e of sym-
bolic intera ctionism throu gh fram e ana lys is. This tr adit ion has
provid ed a consi stent analysis of th e em erge nce of personal iden-
tit y as a product of social int er action , whi ch en abl es som e of its
author s to link frames and coll ectiv e identit y (see Hunt , Benford,
an d Snow , Ch apter 8; and Johnston , Larafi a, and Gusfield , Chap-
ter 1). Both are essential concepts for th e resear ch develop ed from
a soci al cons truc tivist persp ecti ve that m ay overco me som e of the
217
problems of interpretation mentioned above. I suggest that a fur-
ther step to understand the cognitive processes underlying social
movement formation will come from the analysis of the discourse
employed by movement actors. Although there is a rich material
on the theoretical grounds and the methods of discourse analysis,
it is hard to find studies using sociolinguistic techniques in this
field.6
Discourse analysis is a fashionable concept in sociology today
and it is employed from different perspectives, but the one I am
referring to here places special emphasis in the context of speech
and stems from ethnomethodology (Cicourel 1964, 1982). The
points of convergence between ethnomethodology and social con-
structionism may be found in their conceptions about the nature
of social movements and in the way to study them. They both
consider social movements not as a "thing" or an integrated
whole, nor the result of the characteristics of their social contexts,
but as social processes that emerge and develop, though in periods
with different degrees of visibility. We must investigate these
processes in such a way that we can grasp the exchanges, negotia -
tions, and conflicts going on inside them that generate collective
definitions about limits and opportunities for action (Iohnston,
Larafia, and Gusfield , see Chapter 1). In order to study a move-
ment's collective identity, and the webs of meaning where it devel-
ops, the analysis of the discourse used by actors to describe their
experiences and motivations becomes a strategic tool that com-
pletes and enhances the qualitative methods traditionally used by
symbolic interactionist scholars. A premise of the ethnography-
of-speaking approach is that social discourse is always framed in a
larger social context and its analysis provides substantive clues
about the structure of the social interaction within the networks in
which collective identity is constructed .
A central assumption of the ethnomethodology approach is
that a social movement is not an object to be categorized by ana-
lysts' frameworks . Instead, it is a temporal event, a process self-
ordered on the basis of the members' knowledge and know-how,
a collective and gradual production not only of the actors but also
of receivers and observers. Its organizational capacity lies in the
ordinary practices of its members, and it reveals an internal order
that provides identity and meaning for the participants (Quere
1987). This element of internal rationality highlights the role of
Enrique Larafia
2 18
the human agenc y that tends to be ne gl ected in structural ap-
pro ach es; this eleme nt originates in th e "structures of meaning"
that em erg e in dail y int eractions (Cicourel1 964) , within the social
networks wher e collective acti on is built.
A probl em for th e interpr etation of soc ial mov ements lies in
th e tend enc y to ex plain th em w ithout explorin g th ese cognitive
stru cture s an d apply ing stand ard m easur es and patt erns of ratio -
nalit y comm onl y used by scien tific discours e. This problem is
related to th e go al of analyst s to make social mov em ents intelligi-
ble by usin g th e pr evalent categories in th e rational ex planations
of the soc ial orde r. Conformit y w ith tr aditional norms is taken
for gran ted, despit e th e fact th at the w ill to transform som e of
th ese norm s is often a centra l ch ar acterist ic of soci al mo vements
(Turn er 1969; Gus field 1970 , 1973). Thi s probl em is also manifest
in th e tend ency of " po litical-pro fessio nal" persp ecti ves to focus
onl y on the vis ible aspec ts of m obilizati on s and th eir inability to
per ceive even ts from th e acto rs' point of view. Th ese perspectiv es
are gro unde d in th e soc ial move me nts th at eme rge d in Eur op ean
soc ieties sinc e th e Indu stri al Revoluti on , w hose m ain referenc e
was th e wo rk ing - class m ovement (Melucci 1989). But the exis-
ten ce of co n tinuities in th e past does not pro ve th eir occurr ence in
th e pr esent , an d assumi ng con tin uity might lead to int erpr etations
that take for gra nte d stabi lit y in th e forms of co llective action.
Wh en these forms chang e and co ntinuity becom es mor e pr obl em-
atic, th e searc h for th e latt er becom es a bypr oduct of th e sociolo-
gist's ration al ex pe cta tions. This is rel at ed to th e so ciolo gist 's tr a-
diti onal rol e as int erpret er of collective ph enom en a, th at is, one
w ho mu st ren de r th em me anin gful by sho win g th e logical order
und erl yin g th eir appa re nt incoh er en ce. " But fr om th e ethno me th-
od ol o gic al per sp ecti ve, m ovem ent s are n eith er or ganiz ed stru c-
tu res arra nge d acco rding to comm on scien tific assum ptions, nor
are th ey th e co nse que nce of certain feature s of th e so cial or ganiza-
tion; in stead , th ey co ns titu te tempor al social proc esses, self-gener-
ated on th e ba sis of th e daily pr acti ces of acto rs both am ong th em-
selves and wi thi n th e con tex t (Qu er e 1987).
An oth er probl em in th e stud y of so cial m ovem ents comes
from tak in g fo r gra n te d th at socia l m ovem ent s have an int ernal
unit y , w hich is man ifeste d in the ho m o gen eity of b eliefs and val-
ues of act ors, the ir con sens us on dem and s, and the ro le of org ani-
zatio ns where stra tegic decision s are ma de. Th is assum ptio n was
219
also present in the Marxist theory of ideology as a unifying force
for the working-class movement (Turner and Killian 1987). Carol
Mueller (1993) points out that modern perspectives have often
ignored conflicts between the organizations and groups that con-
stitute a movement. More recent research does not share the as-
sumption of unity and stresses the relevance of internal conflict as
an important factor in the emergence of, or a crisis in, a move-
ment's collective identity (Melucci 1989; Mueller 1993; Larafia
1993a). The recent history of the women's movement in the
United States provides very interesting information on the rela-
tionship between internal conflict and collective identity. This con -
flict has been related to the discriminatory practices toward women
by their male colleagues in the New Left. Sara Evans (1980) pro-
vides an in -depth account of the impact that this conflict had in
the development of a feminist identity and the radicalization of
the younger branch of the women's movement (see also Mueller,
Chapter 10).
In order to document this argument and my previous analy-
sis, I now refer to the student mobilizations in Spain (1986 -1987)
and to the discontinuity of the student movement in the United
States during the 1970s. These cases provide empirical information
on the relationship between ideology and identity in a social move-
ment, and they allow the study of the implications of the conflict
between public and collective identities.
The Public and Collective Identities

in the Movement against Selectividad
The mobilizations against SelectividaJ8were

characterized by the heterogeneity of their
demands, forms of action, and organizational structures, as well
as the diversity of attitudes and ideas of the actors in high schools
and universities . The first mobilizations in high schools provided
the social base of the movement, and few university students sup-
ported them or were attracted to the events." However, this was
not only a "high school movement." An important role was per -
formed by some college students in shaping the public image
of the movement through the mass media . The organizational
structures of the high school and university students were autono-
mous . The role of college students did not go beyond a representa -
Enrique Laraiia
220
tive functi on , nor did th ey provide the mov ement 's master frame
or its discour se. 10
Th ese mobilizations show ed th e str ength of the media and
th e power of th e public over th e collective identity (see Johnston ,
Lar afia, and Gusfield, Chapter 1). By shaping the movement's
public imag e, university students fulfill ed th e role of "e pistemo-
logi cal lead ers" and spok esmen of a mov ement whos e social base
was not yet in th e universiti es but wa s characterized by the expec-
tati on of ent ering them . This is on e of the defining characteristics
of this mov em ent : its public image was produced by a politiciz ed
gro up of universit y student s that had a diff erent status than the
m ovem ent's constituenc y , that did not adequatel y express the
movem ent's moti ves or its demands, that did not use the same
languag e, an d that had a diff erent ideology . My research shows a
sha rp contr ast between th e public image of the movement and the
meaning it had for its participants. This contrast wa s manifest in
th e langua ge, goals , and opinions of student s in both sectors .
Th e peculiar division of labor am ong ages and social status
in this mov ement creat ed a doubl e leadership: " de facto " and sym-
bolic. Whil e a group of univ ersity students played th e role of
spok esp erson , high school lead ers perform ed daily organizational
activities with less notori ety and public visibility. This was not
th e only factor explaini n g the divergences between the way the
mov em ent was framed by public opinion and by high school sup-
port ers . Th e most wid espread images show ed th e violenc e of
students and depicted the mov em ent as irrational and destruc -
tive.!' but those images did not reflect th e natur e of th e movement
according to my data and dir ect obs ervations . Although there
wer e demonstrations of considerable violenc e (Gonzal ez Blasco
1987), thos e actions came from small groups of ultra-ri ghtist ide-
olo gy and hooli gans that were not repr esentativ e of the
mov em ent.
If we draw from M ax Weber 's conc eption of social action as
som ething that dep ends on the m eanings indi viduals reciprocally
attribute to it , th e dist an ce betwe en th e m eanings this mo vement
ha d for its actors and tho se assig ne d by th e mas s m edi a illustrates
th e natur e of th e m edi a and th e stereot yp es it tends to generate in
publi c opinion . Althou gh this distortin g fun ction has long been
cons idere d intrinsi c to th e int ervention o f th e m ass media (Bau-
drill ard 1974) , in thi s case it w as exace rba ted by th e plur ality of
221
intervening elements in this conflict and by the delegation of the
spokesman function to some university students. This case also
highlights the complexity of contemporary movements and the
need to analyze the divergences and conflicts among its constituent
elements (Melucci 1989) . In my view, the contrast between "iden-
tity confusion" and the collective identities of this student move-
ment produced a "confusion" that was a decisive factor for its
discontinuity in high schools three months later, together with the
success it had through governmental acceptance of the need to
change the exams of Selectividad and increase the educational bud-
get. My analysis is based on data on the sharp differences in the
discourse used by university and high school students , the nega-
tive conception of politics among th e high school students and
their reactions to the increasing politicization of th e conflict , and
the presence of trade union leaders in the demonstrations. A wide -
spread feeling of being manipulated by political, nonstudent inter-
ests and organizations played an important role in the discontinu-
ity of the movement , as did signs of good will toward some
grievances by the Ministry of Education.
If we consider the strong differences in discourse , social posi-
tions, organizational structures, values, and goals of each sector,
the questions are: Why did they ally? What factors made their
collective action possible? These features might prevent treating
those mobilizations as if their main actor were a single social
movement. 12
One of the problems in understanding the natur e of current
movements is that we tend to think in terms of old assumptions
that may misguide the perception of those movements . In this
sense, Melucci (1989) argues the need to abandon the conception
of social movements as characters who play their roles on the stage
of history, an idea inspired by the analogy between social life and
dramatic representation . Movements were traditionally studi ed
taking for granted that they constitute a "unified empirical da-
tum," a homogeneous collective phenomenon that has its roots in
the social conditions of the conte xt where they arise. Environmen-
talist , peace, women's, and youth movements are thus vaguel y
described and often studied as if they were composed of individu-
als who share goals, values, meanings , and attitudes. Howe ver , th e
changes that are taking place in cont emporary social movem ent s
demand abandoning this conception and approaching them as a
Enrique L araiia
222
system of action and social relations to be explor ed. Instead of
assum in g the existence of an ex tern al social dynamic, rooted in
the mod e of production or in the value syst em shar ed by m embers
and promoting unity of action , Melucci propos es a differ ent, social
constructionist appro ach in which the causalit y of collectiv e action
is situated insid e the movements and in their int era ction with the
environm en t. If th e social mov em ent do es not constitut e an entit y
whos e elem ents are relat ed by an ex tern al logi c, the question is to
know how and why the y are unit ed. Unity is not a prior condition
to the existence of the mov ement but is th e result of th e negotia-
tion , int eraction, and conflict among differ ent elements (Melucci
1989, 1990; see also Mu eller , Chapter 10).
The case of student mobiliz ations m enti oned abov e is better
understood with the help of som e conc epts from fram e analysis.
" Frame bridging " refers to th e process by which em erges "the
linka ge of two or more ideologic ally con gru ent but structurally
unconnected fram es on a particul ar issu e" (Snow et al. 1986, 467).
Th e mass media is a ch aracteristic instrum ent for this reframing .
Th e reasons for th e "converg enc e in action" between the two
sectors of this mo vement are found in the diffusion of a cognitive
fram e that provid ed a link betwe en dissimilar goals and ideas in
high school and un iversit y stud ents that allow ed them to overcome
th eir differenc es. This ong oing cog ni tive pro cess ju stifies the use
of th e term " move me n t" to refer to mobilizat ions in both sectors ;
it had its ro ots in the wid espre ad unr est about the quality of public
educational institutions and in th e importanc e attribut ed to these
institutions for future occupational opportunities . This unrest was
th e main motivation al factor of th e conflict . Its detonator was a
diagnostic frame that had a high resonanc e in high schools and
universiti es. In a countr y wh ere 96 per cent of all univ ersity stu-
dents are registered in stat e educ ational institutions , the govern-
ment was consid ered responsible for their low qualit y and for the
arbitrary nature of th e exam s to en ter th em . The delegitimation
of official authorities was ground ed in th e every day life of students
in tho se institutions . The eme rgen ce of th e main griev ance, the
rejection of th ese ex am s, and the convicti on about th e need to act
collectively was a result of framing pr oce sses simil ar to th e ones
th at have char acteriz ed Catalan nation alism sin ce the 1960s (john-
ston 1991).13
Fram e bridgin g took place throu gh a cognitive relationship
223
between the issue of efficacy in educational institutions and the
principles of social justice establishing equal opportunities for all
citizens. Student mobilizations related to demands for more effi-
cient educational institutions have been taking place in other West-
ern countries as well (see Melucci, Chapter 5). But the difference
with the ones analyzed here lies in a process of frame bridging and
frame extension that produced the generalization of the movement
throughout the country by linking the dissatisfaction with educa-
tion, with its importance in contemporary societies , and with the
sociopolitical implications of the selection system to enter univer-
sities. The rejection of this system became an issue of social justice
that propelled the transformation of a specific demand-for more
efficiency in the educational institutions-and a restricted frame
into a broader one that had important political implications and
generated Widespread support in high schools , at some universi-
ties, and among parents of students.
This reframing process had a dual impact in the movement:
Initially , it extended its social support, but later it become a factor
of "identity confusion" (Erikson 1972) among high school adher-
ents as a result of a conflict between the public and the collective
identities. This process can be better understood through the con-
cept of "frame extension," which refers to the expansion of the
boundaries of the movement's primary framework "to incorporate
interests and points of view that were incidental to its primary
objectives , but of considerable salience for potential adherents"
(Snow et al. 1986, 472). High school students were initially mobi-
lized against what they perceived as a particular problem of effi-
ciency in the selection system, that is, its arbitrary, lotterylike
character that had dramatic consequences for those who were not
selected. This sector's grievances did not oppose any selection
exams per se, just the existing ones, whose nature was the object
of daily experiences in the preparatory courses. However, the re-
jection of any required exams to enter institutions of higher learn-
ing became part of the movement's program and a defining char-
acteristic of its public identity. This was a result of the role played
by university spokespersons, who extended the movement's frame
demanding a university "public, free, and open to everyone. "
These "media leaders" attributed a political meaning to an
"antipoliticist " movement and acted as an instrument of apparent
Enrique Larafia
224
ideol ogical unity between both sectors . But, according to my data,
this unity did not exist. I use the term "convergen ce in action" to
refer to the pragmatic alignment of two mov ement sectors with
differ ent fram es and discourses . If pragmatism and a search for
dem ocratic reforms are central characteristics of n ew social move-
ments (see Johnston, Laraiia , and Gusfield , Chapt er 1), this con-
cept might be mor e useful th an the usual meaning of "unity "
becaus e th e latter can become a self-explanatory concept that takes
for grant ed internal consensus.
In this case, th e consequ ences of th e imposition of a " politic-
ist public id entity " from abo ve promot ed its rejection by the
y ounger sectors. This imp osition was crucial in th e br eakdown of
th e con verg ence in action betw een the diff erent status groups and
th e discontinui ty of th e mo vem ent in high schools thr ee month s
earlier than in the uni versities. Inst ead of consensus around the
mov ement 's public id entity , th ere was an initial pragmatic align-
ment with a politic al fr am e th at did not respond to the moti ves
for mobilization in high school stud ent s who soon came to feel
m anipulated by nonstud ent organizations and interests . These
feelings wer e related to the rol e pl ayed by some political organiza-
tions and trade unions that used th eir access to th e mass media to
exploit the students ' dissatisfaction as an opposition instrument to
th e gov ernm ent (Gonzalez Blasco 1987) .
This case docum ents the conflicti ve relations that can arise
betw een collective and public identit y and their impact on the
mov em ent . Stud ent lead ers from th e univ ersity defin ed th e move-
ment 's fram e and its discours e with explicit terms that did not
reflect the sym bolic and often non verbaliz ed elements of the
mov ement's coll ective identity in high schools . They also pro-
vided information on th e delegitimation of conventional political
institutions and th e distrust toward politics in the youn ger const it-
uen cy , a widespr ead feature of new social mov ements (Offe 1985;
Laraiia 1992) . It is n ot by chanc e th at th e concept of " antipoli-
ticism " also defin ed th e work ers ' mov em ent fr am e during the pre-
mod ern period of soci al movements in Spain (from the 1850s to
th e Civ il War of 1936; see Alvar ez-Junco , C ha p ter 13; Laraiia
1993b) . Th e revival of this fr am e in a milder fashion among the
yo ung er con stitue nc y might account for applying th e theory Of
postmod erni sm to new social mo vem ents , to the ex ten t that they
qu estion som e elem ents of cont empor ary societies through a re-
225
tum to older, premodern meanings and ideas. The contempt for
parliamentary politics, the hostility toward political power , and
the indifference toward the political form of the state are central
characteristics of the old frame that reemerged in th e high school
stud ent mov ement of 1986 and 1987. This is another reason to
study movement continuities beyond visible phases of mobiliza-
tion and locate the search in a larger historical conte xt (Larafia
1993b). The existenc e of these kinds of continuities cannot fit in
the theoretical perspective of th e apocalyptic anal ysis of new social
movements as a " revolt against modernity , " a p erspective that
rules out their novelty by distorting the essen ce of the dialectical
process involved in the historical evolution of social movements
(Mannheim 1936).
Ideology and Pluralism

in Student Movements
Comparative research on other student

movements is useful to further understand
the reasons for convergenc e betw een the different sectors that sup-
port a social movem ent (Melucci 1989; Turner 1969, see also Chap-
ter 4). This consensus often resembles Erving Goffman 's notion
of " working consensus" (1959) .14 Inst ead of taking for granted th e
existen ce of shar ed values and ideas among participants , " consen-
sus mobilization " (Klandermans and Oegema 1987) is a social
construction of each group. It tends to emerge in relation to the
movement's pluralism , its capacity to integrate very diff erent po-
litical orientations, and its abilit y to produce new definitions of
the situation that account for individuals ' alignment with th e pro-
posed frame of reference . Those elements are very differ ent from
traditional ideologies of mobilization . To the extent that this po-
tential is associat ed with the group 's collective identit y , it tend s to
be stronger when it is bas ed on symbols and linguisti c categories
that const itute th e group 's boundaries ; and it is amplifi ed to th e
maximum in those ethnic communiti es with th eir own languag e,
as is the case of th e Basqu e or Catalan nationalis t m ovem ent (Linz
1980; Perez Agot e 1987; John ston 1991). A s shown in research on
the recent evolu tion of wome n 's mo vem en ts in th e U nit ed Stat es
and new so cial mo vem ent s in Mil an durin g the 1980s (Melu cci
1989; see also Mu eller , Ch apt er 10), thi s m ob ilization po tentia l
Enrique Laraiia
226
arises through daily int eracti on in social networks wher e move-
ments are incubated; it is expr essed in th e m eaning s, symbols, and
collective beliefs that em erg e from p articipati on in th e movement
and allow m embers to put aside their ideological differences (Lar-
ana 1993a).
Th e wide supp ort given to th e Free Speech Movement in
Berkel ey or to SDS , th e main stud ent SM O of the 1960s , was
relat ed to th eir capacity to integrate front group s and individuals
with differ ent ideologi es (Drap er 1965; Sale 1974; Wollin and
Schaar 1970, Larafia 1975). As in the 1987 studen t mobilizations in
Spain, th eir collective action was po ssibl e becaus e internal debates
centered on strat egic and not ideological issues, on which consen-
sus m obiliz ation would have been ex tre m ely difficult . A similar
pragmatic orient ation mad e po ssibl e th e em ergen ce of a unitary
ma ster fram e amo ng th e oppositional mo vem ent s to Franco 's dic-
tat or ship iri Spain (Johnst on 1991) . This fram e's characteristic
" politicism;" an d its associated patt ern of m ovem ent subordina-
tion to political partie s, stands in contras t w ith th e ant ipoliticist
frame of th e earlier period and w ith th e featur es of cont empor ary
new social mov em ents. Th e hi storical stages in the evolution of
social mov em ent s in Spain pr esent sharp discontinuiti es because
of refr amin g pr oces ses that cann ot be ex plaine d onl y by changes
in th e political conditions o f th e country (Lar afia 1993b ; Johnston
1991; see also Alvar ez-Junco , Ch apt er 13).
Th e student mo vem ents I h ave stu died not only sho w impor-
tant weakn ess in functionali st social theori es but also qu estion the
validity of Mar xist assum p tions that were very influ ential in man y
Eur opean m ovements until th e en d of th e 1960s. The y qu estion
th e notion of class cons ciousn ess as a pr econditi on for unit y of the
social mov em ent th at is cons idered the "a gency of his tor y ." That
unif orm element rarel y eme rge s in new social mo vem ents , and
classes are no lon ger th e soci al basis for th e m ajorit y of th e mobili-
zation s; instead of an ob stacle, th e id eol ogical plur alism of these
m ovem ent s becom es decisive for th eir con ver gen ce in action
(D raper 1965; Lar afia 1975 , 1993a) . The pr esen ce of this plur alism
in ma ny con tem porary m ovem ent s since the 1960s confirms the
rol e of studen t m ovem ent s as pr ecur sors of new so cial move-
m erits. It also supp ort s th e use of th e N SM con cept as a tool to
identif y com mo n featur es in cont empor ar y m ovem ents and points
to th e cha nges th ese m ovem ents im ply in referen ce to th e work er's
227
movement (see Johnston, Larafia, and Gusfield , Chapter 1; Larafia ,
1993c; Melucci 1989; Offe 1985).
The Spanish student movement of 1986-1987 provides us
with an example of the need to revise both traditional and modern
assumptions on the unity of social movements . It addresses a cen-
tral question in ongoing research: How are collective identities
related to the movement's frame and to the role that traditional
ideologies of mobilization may play (Melucci 1985, 1989; see also
Mueller, Chapter 10)? The absence of the traditional leftist ideol-
ogy among high school students strengthened the mov ement and
enabled it to integrate different tendencies, in spite of the fact that
university student leaders promoted a political frame based on
Marxist assumptions . This process was already emerging in the
student movements of the 1960s. Although they presented a pecu-
liar version of the traditional revolutionary ideology and the so-
cialist utopia , these elements had an essentially symbolic m eaning
as an alternative worldview and social project for the younger
generation. Marxism and its socialist utopia were mainly self-
affirmation symbols used by students to express their rejection
of the adult order and impel democratic reforms and their own
participation in social institutions . This ideology was only part of
the alternative cognitive structures from which the young New
Left tried to build its collective identity .
This analysis is reinforced if it is formulated in the opposite
way. A fundamental factor for discontinuity in th e U.S. student
movement in the 1960s was the internal conflict arising around
what model of society the movement was striving for. This ideo -
logical issue was related to the identity of students as an agency of
radical social change and to what strategies should be used to
achieve this goal (Ashley et al. 1970; Sale 1974). This conflict had
a turning point in the SDS national convention of June 1969, when
several groups advocated profound ideological and strategic
changes; the abandonment of some basic New Left ideological and
organizational principles such as ideological pluralism , autono -
mous and decentralized organization , and faith in democratic prin-
ciples; and a turn toward traditional Marxist assumptions (Jacobs
1970; Sa1;::1974; Larafia 1982, 1993a). Those elements , which an-
ticipated some of the main features of new social movements ,
constituted the "identity resources" of this movement (see John-
ston, Larafia , and Gusfield, Chapter 1; Melucci 1989). The tri-
Enrique L araiia
228
umph of th e proposal of som e Marxist groups produced a shift in
the politics of the N ew Left and the withdrawal of the wide sup-
port this movement had among coll ege students . Thi s shift was
intimately associated with the distinctive character of the " new
politics " and had strong cultural and generational elements (Lar-
afia 1982).
The 1969 SDS convention exem plified the depth of the disin-
tegrative process in the collective identity of th e movement . The
crisis was a result of four interrelated factors: repression, lack of
legitimation of political institutions and democratic id eals, grow-
ing radicalization , and separation between the political and cultural
sectors of the student movement (Larafia 1992). For one move-
ment sector close to the New Left ideas, the crisis affected the
available means to achieve th e democratic prin ciples , not the prin-
cipl es them selves or th e valu es supporting them . For the contend-
ing groups , th e crisis includ ed those principles and the prevailing
social model as a whol e. That debate trigg ered the disintegration
of th e movem ent after New Left groups abandoned SDS and the
Weatherman group went underground, becoming th e " suicidal
vanguard " who se mission was to bring th e liberation wars in the
Third World to th e Unit ed States (jacobs 1970; Sale 1974). This
group was one of th e first to en gage in th e widespread terrorism
of the 1970s and 1980s in European countries , which arose from
the breakdown of stud ent movem ents (Larafia 1993a) . They con-
stituted a bloody expr ession of the kind of continuities that can
em erge in movements that were initially motivated by liberal-
democratic ideas and later followed totalitarian ideologies .
Notes
Acknowledgments: Thi s chapter's findin gs are the result of research fund ed by
th e Ce ntro de Investigacion es Sociologicas and the Cornit e C onjunto para la
C oo peraci6n C ultural entr e Estado s Unid os y Espana . I th ank Aaron C icourel
and Hank John ston for their insightful com me nts on th e early version s of this
chapter.
1. Thi s tenden cy could be a consequence of m or e mod erate analytical
ambition s on th e part of researchers after recogni zing th e limit s of social science.
Thi s scaling down has been considered necessary for th e developm ent of the field
(Ci courel 1964; Shibut ani 1960).
2. Thi s term is used here to refer to Marxist and collective behavior theo-
ries of social movem ent s and conflict .
3. Accordin g to Melucci (1989), th ese net work s fun ction as laboratori es
229
for the development of alternative codes of behavior, interpretation , and interper-
sonal relations . Produced through daily interaction, these codes are the " cogni-
tive resources" of the movement for maintaining unity and allowing confronta-
tion with structures of political and institutional power. They are the source of a
collective identity that is the fundamental factor of unity and continuit y in new
movements . It substitutes in the role of "ideology," which was the unifying
factor of collective action in Marxist theory, and gives the movement a large part
of its mobilization potential (Larafia 1993a). The daily construction of alternative
cultural codes nurtures the antagonistic character of the movement (Melucci
1989, see also Chapter 5).
4. The Criminology School Defense Committee was an ad hoc group of
criminology students and members of several neo-Marxist organizations stem-
ming from SDS, such as the Radical Student Union, the New American Move-
ment, and the Young Socialist Alliance .
5. This is another reason why the validity of these assumptions is being
revised by current research . This process follows the historical path for the
development of science (Cicourel 1964).
6. A relevant exception to the neglect of discourse analysis in this field is
Hank Johnston's (1991) research on the nationalist movement in Catalonia .
7. This argument could be applied to my research in the mid 1970s of the
student movement in Berkeley, where the lack of visible action contrasted with
its intense public presence during the second half of the 1960s (Larafia 1975).
8. Seleetividadrefers to the required exams to enter Spanish universities .
They have a twofold function : to insure that all university students have a certain
competence , and to redirect students with poor results to other studies that do
not have high registration enrollments .
9. In the high schools, the demonstrations started in November 1986,
almost simultaneous with similar ones in France, and ended in the last weeks of
February 1987. In some universities, demonstrations started in January 1987 and
ended on different dates, even as late as May .
10. Part of my research was conducted in a popular , middle-class high
school located in the center of Madrid. I observed a considerable lack of knowl-
edge about the role of university students in the demonstrations ; a noncongruent
situation with the possibility of a shared leadership.
11. The best known are the pictures of an individual the media called cojo
Manteeas,a handicapped student who was transformed into the symbol of the
demonstrations after a photo showing him breaking a street lamp with his
crutches was widely displayed, and those of young people who covered their
faces with scarves to protect their identity when committing violent acts against
the police or public property .
12. As happens with the analysis of continuities in collective action, this is
not simply a formal question but a substantive one that concerns which theoreti-
cal model is used to analyze a social movement .
13. In his work on the Catalan nationalist movement, Johnston (1991)
shows how a similar process of frame extension integrated a new social sector
(immigrants) in the original movement constituency and has had parallel implica-
tions for the spread of the nationalist frame in Catalonia since the 196Os.
Enrique Laraiia
230
14. Thi s conce pt is an import ant contribution to count erb alance the func-
tion alist and Marxist th eori es on social conflict. It refers to th e pr ocess in social
inter action by w hich individua ls adapt th eir definition of th e situations to that of
the gro up, thr ou gh a pragm atic agreeme nt considered essen tial for th e construc -
tion and continuity of social gro ups (Go ffm an 1959).
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Chapter 10
Conflict Netwo rks

and the Origins of
Women 's Liberat ion
Carol Mueller
In creasing cross -fer tiliza tion of social

moveme nt th eory h as occurre d from both
sides of the Atlant ic over th e last five years. The Eur op ean " new
socia l movem en ts theory " and th e N o rth American th eory of "re -
source mobiliza tion ," developed since th e tumultu ous 1960s, have
been the major cont ributo rs. 1 Resour ce mobi lization th eor y is
based in a strategic approach to the stu dy of socia l m ovem ents ; it
em phas izes th e mobi lization an d alloca tion of reso urces by mo ve-
me nt actors in th e con tex t of oppo rtunities an d cons trai nts im-
pose d b y the social an d po litical env iron me n t . Particular attention
focuses on the role of forma l social move me nt organi zatio ns as
the key socia l actors planni n g stra tegies an d mo bi lizing resour ces.
Grieva nces are treated as a given pr eferen ce struc ture in some of
th e m ost powerful stateme nts of th e theory .
N ew soc ial move me nt th eor y h as, stra ngely, em pha sized is-
sues th at are largely ign ored by resour ce m ob ilization . Ins tead of
bein g tak en as given , gr ievan ces are at th e cen ter a th eor y th at
locates th eir sour ce in both soc ial struc ture and th e social psycho-
lo gical pro cesses underl yin g th eir identifi cation an d developm ent
as part of mo vem ent culture . For man y N orth Am eric an scholars,
th e str ength of new social m ovem ent th eor y lies at th e int erm edi-
ate and th e ma cro levels o f ana lysis. N ew socia l m ovem ent th eory
has point ed to the need for a soc ial psy chology based in th e social
inter action of m ovem ent acto rs as well as th e need to ident ify
th e so urce of grieva nces and collective actors for parti cul ar social
m ovements in th eir hist oric ally va riable stru ctura l con tex t, parti c-
ularl y th e chang ing class stru cture an d sym bo lic env iro n me nt of
postindu strial , capitalist soc ieties. Whil e th e latt er con tributio n has
been lar gely ign or ed," int erest in the int erm ed iate level of analysis
wh ere social conditi ons are defin ed as grieva nces and per son al
misf ortun es are tr anslated into a collective sense of injus tice has
Conflict Networks
235
coincided with a developing focus on the creation of meaning by
social movement actors among those who seek to expand the
resource mobilization paradigm."
As contributions to social movement theory increasingly
merge into a more comprehensive whole it is important to explore
the components of each theory more carefully and to "test" it
against empirical studies on both sides of the Atlantic. Particularly
important to scholars interested in developing the new emphasis
on social construction processes has been the work of the Italian
new social movement theorist Alberto Melucci . Melucci 's (1989)
theory develops the role of "submerged networks " in the process
of creating collective identities, interpreting grievances , and evalu-
ating the potential effectiveness of collective action . Despit e this
interest (see works by Gamson 1992; by Klandermans 1986, 1990,
1992; and by Taylor and Whittier 1992) and the publication of
Melucci's book Nomads of the Present, Melucci's theory of "collec-
tive identity" and "submerged networks" has not been systemati-
cally evaluated in the context of North American social move-
ments . This chapter rectifies this omission through a critical
examination of Melucci 's theory as applied to the origins of wom-
en's mobilization in the United States during the period from 1960
to 1970. It will then be possible to assess its role in a broader
theory of the social construction of social movements . Of primary
interest is Melucci's contribution to the intermediate level of anal-
ysis where social movement culture is generated and dominant
cultural codes are challenged.
Melucci's Theory of Socially Constructed

Collective Identities
Melucci's point of departure is what he
characterizes as the false unity attributed by
observers to collective action . He argues:
The collective phenomenon -whether a panic , a social movement,
or a revolutionary process-is treated as a unified emp irical datum,
which , supposedly, can be perceived and interpreted by observers .
It is supposed that, first , individuals ' behaviour forms a unitary
character or gestalt. Second, this assumption is then transferred from
the phenomenological to the conceptual level and acquires ontolog-
ical consistency: the collective reality is seen to exist as a thing .
(1989, 18)4
Carol Mueller
236
Melucci attribut es the error of false unity to a model of analysis
that gr ew out of the class struggles of the nineteenth century
and th e actions of the supposedly unitary working class as it [sic]
demanded the expansion of citizenship rights to encompass suf-
frag e, political association, free speech, and so forth (1989, 19).
The working -class mo vement , in this historic context , was tied to
th e idea of social movements "as historical agents marching
toward a destiny of liberation " (1988, 330) .
It is this perc eption of a social movement as ossified in a
unitary "collectiv e identity " that Melucci seeks to correct with his
own th eoretic al model. He attempts to explain social movements
at an intermediat e level of social processes that occur in face-to-
face int eractions. These proc esses connect the sense of personal
misfortune that people experi ence in their everyday lives with a
collective int erpr etation of th ese conditions as injustice or griev-
ances that justify coll ectiv e action . He seeks to identify those
groups pro cesses "by which individuals evaluat e and recognize
what the y have in common and decide to act together" (1988,
339) . Thus, he seeks to creat e a theory th at links the stru ctured
practic es of social life with th e collective action of a social move-
ment through th e intermediate steps of face-to -face interaction
and m eaning con stru ction .
There are thr ee key features of his th eory: (1) the content
or outcom e of the proc ess of social construction , the " collective
identity" of the mov ement that comes to exist as a part of the
movement culture; (2) the social proc esses by which the collective
identity is created in "submerged networks" of small groups con-
cerned with the ongoing routines of everyday life; and (3) the
em otional investments that enable individuals to recognize them -
selves as the " we" in a collective identity .
The first feature of Melucci's theory is his conception of the
coll ectiv e identity, which he defin es as "nothing else than a shared
definition of the field of opportunities and constraints offered to
collective action: 'sh are d' means con stru cted and negotiated
through a rep eated pro cess of 'activation' of social relationships
connecting th e actors" (1985, 793) . For Melucci , th e content of
th e collective identity or sens e of " we" consists of a social resolu-
tion of thr ee ord ers of orientation: "the ends of actions (i.e. , the
sense th e action has for th e actor); thos e relating to th e means (i.e.,
th e poss ibiliti es and the limits of action) ; an d finall y thos e relating
Conflict Networks
237
to relationships with the environment (i.e ., the field in which the
action takes place) " (1988, 33). In other words, people will interact
in "submerged networks" where they will arrive at a new defini -
tion of their situation . This definition is different from the ordi -
nary outcomes of daily social interaction in that it is action ori-
ented, and it includes a goal, tactics, and a strategy for collective
action on behalf of shared grievances.
The incubation period during which new collective identities
are formed occurs in submerged social networks out of view of
the public eye. Melucci argues that by the 1980s when he con-
ducted his research on three different movement groups in Milan,
collective actions were created within networks composed of
many groups that were dispersed throughout the urban landscape .
They are fragmented in terms of their relationships with each
other and they were invisible because of their immersion in every -
day life. Not only are the networks submerged in the sense that
their cultural experimentation is not readily visible to the wider
public but they are transitory in that individuals have multiple
memberships with temporary and limited involvement (1989,60).
The submerged network is a system of small, separate groups
engaging in cultural experimentation, and it is also a system of
exchange in which persons and information circulate freely within
the network. These networks act as "cultural laboratories " sub-
merged within civil society (1989, 60). Some agencies , such as
local free radios, bookshops, and magazines provide sources of
unity (1985, 800) .
In these cultural laboratories, new collective identities are
constructed from the expressive interactions of individuals experi-
menting with new cultural codes, forms of relationships, and al-
ternative perceptions of the world . The creation of the collective
identity occurs in the midst of tensions created by the inadequacy
of the means currently available for reaching personal and collec-
tive goals . From these tensions, as well as the close face-to-face
interaction, develops a heavy emotional investment that encour-
ages the individual to share in the collective identity . As the collec-
tive identity is created to address these tensions, both leadership
and organization attempt to give permanence through their tenta-
tive resolution. This process involves the negotiation of the three
orientations given the constraints of resources and political oppor-
tunities within emotionally enriched relationships.
Carol Mueller
238
For Melucci , the hidden networks become visible only when
collective actors "confront or com e into conflict with a public
policy ," that is, when they confront the state (1989, 90) . This
confront ation adds to a state of tension and enhanced emotional
investment. Melucci argues , for instance, that th e massive peace
mobilizations of th e 1980s wer e bas ed in the submerg ed networks
of wom en , young peopl e, ecologists, and alternati ve cultures .
Thus, Melucci 's sub me rged networks point to what he calls the
relationship betw een the latency and visibility poles of collective
action .5
Whil e Melucci associat es th e subm erg ed networks in which
collectiv e identiti es are form ed with th e relativel y quiescent period
of the 1980s in both Europe and th e Unit ed States, other scholars
have identified similar incub ation networks in periods prior to
mass mobilization . Aldon Morris (1984) , for instance , describ es
th e " halfw ay houses " throu ghout the south ern United Stat es that
served as laboratori es for working out a collective id entit y of ends
(civil right s an d racial int egration) , means (nonviolenc e), and envi-
ronment al relations (th e developm ent of a network of alliance sys-
tems linking North an d South) prior to th e publi c phas e of the
civil rights mov em ent that began in th e mid 1950s . Doug Me-
Adam's (1982) political proc ess th eory also posits a stage of " cog-
nitive lib eration " that pr ecedes m ass mobilization . Similarl y , Verta
Taylor (1989) describ es th e " abeyance pro cesses" that link th e peri-
ods of femini st activism in the Un ited States from the suffrag e
mov ement of th e early tw entieth centur y to the contemporary
mov ement.
Although Melucci argues that this proc ess of constructing
collective id entities is a uniqu e charact eristic of highl y comple x
societi es, he may also underestimat e how universal the process of
cultural transformation has been as a prelude to pr evious periods
of mass mobilization. Th e development of a collectiv e identity
center ed on class consciousness among th e working class in En-
gland (1780-1830) , Fran ce (1830-1833) , and Russia (1900-1914)
point to a similar combination of social anal ysis contained within a
new coll ectiv e identit y and institution building w ithin submerg ed
networks as prelude to collective action (see this ana lysis and a
compari son with political consciousn ess of African Americans by
Morris in Morris and Mueller 1992).
Th e basic thrust of Melucci 's conc eption of submerged net-
Conflict Netw or ks
239
works is th e proposition that the initial chall enge to th e pr ev ailin g
ord er takes place principall y on sym b olic ground s. Th at is, th e
status quo must be chall eng ed at th e cultural level in term s of its
claims to legitimacy befor e m ass co llective action is feasibl e. Thu s,
Meluc ci ar gu es that submerg ed networks " ch allenge and ove rturn
the domin ant code s upon w hi ch so cial relationships are found ed .
Th ese sym bolic challen ges are a m ethod of unmaskin g th e domi-
nant co des, a differ ent w ay of perc eivin g and namin g th e wo rld "
(1989, 75). B y concentrating onl y on th e visible, publi c signs of a
social mo vem ent 's chall en ge to th e exis tin g ord er , pr evi ou s th eo-
ries of so cial mo vem ent s h ave failed to appr eciate th e con tribu tion
of th ese cultural transformations . Melu cci argue s, for inst an ce,
that our con cep t of succ ess should be ex pan ded to en com pass
these cultural ch an ges. This is th e in vestment of the nasc ent mov e-
ment in what h e calls a " laten cy phas e" as dominant cultur al codes
are unmask ed an d overturn ed.
Melu cci contributes to a grow in g interest among stud ents of
social mo vem ents in th e way that cultural cod es are chall eng ed ;
in th e conn ection of social structur e to cultu re throu gh a so cial
psycholog y that identifies face-to-fa ce patt erns of int eraction and
their lo cation in submer ged net works w he re cultur al ex pe rime nta-
tion actu ally occurs ; and in th e n ew cultural cod es th at can serve
as th e basis of collective action . Th ese are important contribution s
that have been too littl e app reciated. In addit ion, it has been too
littl e realized that the tensions and emo tion al investm ent s asso ci-
ated wi th the process of gen eratin g coll ecti ve identitie s and initi at-
ing collective actions is oft en accom panie d b y int ern al dissensi on
and org anizational segm ent ation .
N everthel ess , there are unr esolv ed issues in Melu cci's th eor y
that must also be identifi ed before it can be succ essfull y appli ed to
a case study . While Melucci is uniqu e in pointing to th e role of
extern ally deriv ed tension in th e development of new cultur al con-
figurations within social mo vements, his focus on resourc e and
environmental constraints as th e major source of tension fails to
consid er the important rol e of int ernal conflict and comp etition
as an additional dynamic contributing to the generation of new
collective identities (see, as ex am ples, Mueller 1987; Tarrow 1989;
Taylor and Whittier 1992). Th er e are other unresolv ed issues in
Melucci 's th eor y as well, but th e most important for pr esent pur-
poses is his dis avowal of th e rol e of the coll ective identit y as hi s-
Carol Mu eller
240
toric actor. In his focus on an intermediate level of analysis, the
face-to-face interactions wh ere collective identities are forged, he
unn ecessarily abandons the cultural level of analysis at which the
product of th e submerg ed networks enters political culture . It is at
this point that the social mov ement em erges as historic actor and
agent of political change. These two concerns-the role of internal
conflict in shaping the collective identity and the level of analysis-
are brought togeth er here in the course of applying his theory to
a specific case, the origins of the contemporary women 's move-
ment in th e United Stat es. This application may also suggest the
utility of Melucci 's theory for read ers who do not have access to
his Italian case materials (see an evaluation of these materials in
Johnston 1991).
Collective Identity and the

Mass Mobilization of Women
To demonstrate the importanc e of sub-

mer ged networks in challenging dominant
codes and creating ne w coll ectiv e identities that facilitate mass
mobilizations , it is necessary to document that this configuration
of the new identity was not already widely available . This seem-
ingly simple condition is oft en ignored in em pirical demonstra-
tions of cultural innov ations but is essential for the curr ent case
study of the creation of a new collectiv e identity for women.
In the United States, th e decade after World War II was char-
acterized by later feminists as th e "decade of domesticit y" because
of its high birthrates an d its emphasis on hom e, family , and wom-
en 's traditional roles. So pervasive was the dominant cultural code
prescribing a narrow set of rol es for wom en that few social scien-
tists recognized its existen ce. To characteriz e women 's condition
as one of inequality much less as oppression would have been
regarded as her esy . Yet, in 1951, an article app ear ed in an Ameri-
can sociological journal strangely titled , " Wom en as a Minorit y
Group " (Hack er [1951] 1979). The author, Helen Hacker, took
th e lonely position that wom en 's chara cteristic behavior and posi-
tion of social inferiority paralleled that of Jew s and Negroes ,
groups well recognized as "minorities " in U .S. culture . Hacker 's
article can be tak en as a benchmark for its characterization of
women according to the dominant cultural code of the United
Conflict Networks
241
States in the 1950s. Despite its poor reception at the time, it
brought to consciousness a set of cultural assumptions that were
largely taken for granted .
After itemizing discriminatory patterns against women in
economic, political, and social life, Hacker noted that , although
women showed no conscious self-awareness of their inferior status,
other aspects of their behavior supported the analogy . She cited
data from the World War II period indicating high levels of self-
hatred associated with the status of being a woman. In surveys,
women showed high levels of dislike for other women, women
expressed a preference for working under the direction of men,
women had misgivings concerning the value of participation in
public life, and high proportions of women, compared to men,
wished they had been born in the opposite sex. Hacker showed
parallels in the castelike behavior and treatment of women and
Negroes. She noted, for instance, high social visibility and fre-
quent attributions of an inferior intelligence, a smaller brain, irre-
sponsibility, emotional instability, and moral weakness (514). Like
the Negro, the woman accommodated to her inferior status with
smiles, laughter, rising inflection in conversation, and downward
glances. She cultivated an appearance of helplessness and pursued
her goals with a flattering manner and " fem inine wiles ." Yet, after
Hacker identified a deeply repressed sense of inferiority, she issued
no call for women to overcome their condition and seemed to see
little possibility for change. Instead, she pointed out that there
were a few women, like those in nontraditional, professional occu-
pations, who broke the dominant cultural code and recommended
that these should be studied (520). Although there were other
women who had long challenged the assumptions of the dominant
code among minority women (Hooks 1981) and among a small
group of feminists who had pursued the Equal Rights Amend -
ment since 1922 (Rupp and Taylor 1987), both groups were largely
invisible because the challenge they represented had been margin-
alized and assimilated.
Hacker was not the only one who saw little potential for a
change in women's collective identity. More than ten years later ,
at a conference called by the prestigious American Academy of
Arts and Sciences, a dozen of America 's leading intellectuals con-
templated women 's condition (Lifton 1967). Many of the leading
male scholars celebrated women's traditional virtues . Erik Erikson
Carol Mu eller
242
not ed that women inhabit a special "inner space ," while Robert J.
Lifton praised women's possession of insight and wisdom. David
Riesman noted that the gre ater resourcefulness of the contempo-
rary gen eration of young women was possibl e "without storming
the barric ades at home or abroad " (Riesman 1964, 97) . Carl De-
gler, a historian , point ed to the revolutionary chang es taking place
in women 's growing paid em ploym ent , but he not ed that women
would prob ably remain in segregated and low -paying jobs because
ther e was no strong feminist push to improve their condition . He
was pessimistic about any such chan ge because , "The whole truth
is th at Am erican societ y in general, which includ es women , shuns
lik e a disease any feminist ideolog y " (D egl er 1967,203). That is,
in Melucci 's terms , th e mal e scholars eith er saw no need for a
collectiv e identit y for wo me n or, like Degler , found it impossible
to imag ine th e conditions und er which such a profound cultural
transformation mi ght be brought about .
Th ere was one m emb er of this august gathering , however ,
who was soon to achi eve a cert ain notoriety for her paper, " Equal-
ity betw een th e Sexes: An Immod est Proposal. " The author, Alice
Rossi , drew on Helen Hack er 's pap er from the 1950s to call for
uncompromising equality in th e socialization , schooling, and
adult responsibilities of men and women (Rossi 1967, 98-143) .
Her pap er was received with littl e enthusiasm by either male or
femal e participants at the conferenc e. Degl er (1967) responded to
Rossi's "immodest proposal" by asserting that, "in America the
soil is thin and the climate uncong enial for the growth of any
seedlings of ideology" (210).
Although this conf erence indicated the incr easing concern
with women 's status in soci ety, at this level of discourse where
scholars and intellectuals bring issues to public awareness, only
Rossi's paper suggests a potential for cultural reconstruction and a
new collective identity . Clearly , some of th e best informed leaders
of American intellectual life were unaware that they were sitting
on the brink of a massiv e shift of consciousness in the culturally
prescrib ed roles for wom en and an unprecedented mass mobiliza-
tion. How did it happ en? Did scholarly discourse on the plight of
women escalate from pap ers like that giv en by Rossi at the Acad-
emy of Arts and Sciences confer enc e? Did women 's organizations
disseminate persuasive communications on what should be done?
Conflict Networks
243
Did young women defy the advice of their elders and take to the
barricades? Did small groups of women get together in submerged
networks removed from the public eye and renegotiate their iden-
tities as women and consider tactics and strategies that would chal-
lenge the dominant cultural code? Clearly, all of these things hap-
pened, but paramount place must go to the submerged networks
where a transformed collective identity developed in the tense
atmosphere of disagreement and conflict over the nature of the
collective identity that would become the basis of a new set of
goals and programs for change. Once this collective identity had
been created, however, it would take on a life of its own as historic
actor and source of political influence. The process by which the
collective identity is created demonstrates the basic value of Mel-
ucci's theory.
The Origins of the Women's Movement

While the origins of women's mobilization
in the United States are well documented,"
two different explanations have been proposed to account for the
beginning of the movement. The first explanation corresponds to
the structural theories of the European new social movements
literature that attempt to link changes in the objective condition of
the mobilized group with changes in consciousness. Survey re-
search is the tool usually employed with the goal of correlating
clusters of attitudes reflecting a new collective consciousness with
the subgroup defined by the objective condition. The key propo-
nents of this approach for the U.S. women's movement have been
Joan Huber (1976) and Ethel Klein (1984).7 The second explanation
corresponds in many ways to Melucci's emphasis on the generative
role of submerged networks. Major contributors to this approach
are Jo Freeman (1973) and Sara Evans (1980) . A review of these
theories suggests both the strengths and the weaknesses of Meluc-
ci's conceptions of submerged networks and collective identities
in an understanding of the origins of the U.S. women's move-
ment. To make these theories accessible to a European audience, I
characterize them as the structural and the submerged network
theories.
Carol Muell er
244
StructuralTheories
Explanations based on changes in technol-
ogy and th e division of labor argue that "th e decline in fertility
an d th e shift of productive work from hom e to factory in th e past
two centuries has ups et th e equilib rium of sex stratification in
indu strial societi es, " thu s paving the way for a shift of conscious -
ness and th e mobilization of women (Huber 1976, 372) . Based on
a historic analysis of women's work and child -car e responsibilities ,
Hub er docu ments that , after 1940 , the fem ale work force was
in creasin gly com posed of m arri ed wom en with childr en. She ar-
gu es that the doubl e burd en of paid work and dom estic work was
so on erous th at wom en were compell ed to see that th ey were
treat ed unjustl y by societ y (1976, 372). From Hub er 's perspectiv e,
th e cont emp or ary wom en 's movem ent is th e " unplann ed result "
of the technological ch anges th at transform ed women 's work and
child- care responsibiliti es. She pr edict s th at th e mov ement will
continu e as long as wom en bear this double burden .
Althou gh Hub er describ es obj ectiv e conditions that might
logicall y lead wom en to develop an "inju sti ce frame ," she does
not demonstrat e em pirically that the women experiencing these
chang es wer e, in fact , developing a new consciousn ess (or collec-
tiv e identity). For this kind of data , it is necessary to tum to Klein
(1984) who ha s m ade this conn ection betw een stru ctur al position
and cha n ge d consciousn ess. Looking at thr ee different dimensions
of wom en 's traditional rol es -domestic em ploy me n t, mother-
hood, and marriag e-sh e, like Hub er, describes chang es brought
about through mature industrialization. She links thes e objective,
structur al chang es to shifts over time in public opinion toward
gr eater tol erance for women 's work outsid e the hom e, for reduced
fertilit y and family size, and for th e social acceptabilit y of either
singl e status or divorce . Despite th e mom entous ch ang es occur-
rin g in wom en 's lives throughout the century , she not es, it was not
until th e 1960s that public opinion poll s ind icated lar ge numb ers of
wom en were en dorsing a nontr aditional role.
Klein 's (1984) an alysis is b ased on th e overtim e data from the
Nati onal Elect ion Stu dies, w hich have been gathere d since the
1950s by th e Survey Resear ch Ce nter at th e Uni ver sit y of Michi-
gan . Th ey in dica te th at , b y th e en d of th e 1960s, th e majorit y of
women wer e in favor of nontr aditi on al roles for wo me n based on
socia l equality , and an inc reasi ng nu m be r felt th at wome n faced
Conflict Networks
245
discrimination (91). Klein characterizes this cluster of attitud es as
a " fem ini st consciousness ." Her data indicated that, b y 1972,
women who were psychologically more likely to support nontra -
ditional roles for women were themselves found in structural posi-
tions where they were more likely to work outside the hom e, to
have a job with high occupational status, to achi eve more than a
high school education, to be single , divorced, or separated , to live
in a large metropolitan area, to have a mother who had worked , to
be politicall y liberal, and to be little involved in organiz ed religion
(106-19) . The more of these characteristics a woman possessed ,
the more likely she was to have a highly develop ed feminist con-
sciousn ess .
Klein's data reveal a paradoxical finding, how ever. Despit e
the sharp increase in feminist consciousness among women, it was
even higher among men. By 1972, men were even more likely
than women to believe that society rather than nature or biology
was responsible for women 's roles; to support an equal role for
women in business and industry; and to endors e equal employ-
ment treatment (100). Yet, needless to say , men did not create
the women 's movement nor did they encourag e wom en 's mass
mobilization . This anomalous fmding points to the limitations of
the structur al explanation of the origins of th e wom en's move -
ment. Despite Klein's careful connection of structural chang es in
women's roles to changes in public consciousness, to some ex ten t,
changes in social structure affected the con sciousnes s of m en and
women similarly .
The structural th eories and Klein's careful documentation of
the rise of a feminist consciousness help to account for the larg e
public support for the wom en's movement during th e 1970s and ,
also, its considerable political influence after the period of mass
mobilization beginning in 1970, but it cannot explain the origins
of the movem ent for two simple reason s: (1) a new consciousnes s
that is shared equally by men and wom en cannot explain wh y
women rather than men formed a movement; and (2) widespr ead
support among women for greater equalit y do es not exp lain wh y
some few specifi c individuals of the millions of American wome n
affected by structural chang es did , in fact , create a mov em ent . To
try to explain the ori gins of the mov ement with a structural analy-
sis alone faces th e sam e limitation s that Melucci has iden tified
in some of th e Europ ean literature on new soci al m ovem ent s:
Carol Mueller
246
"Approaches based on the structure/motivation dualism view
collectiv e action either as a product of the logic of the system or
as a result of personal beliefs" (1989, 21). The basic problem is
that "both th e macrostructural factors and th e individual variables
imply an unbridgeable gap betw een the level of explanation pro-
posed and the concr ete process that allows a certain number of
individuals to act together " (1988, 332).
Melucci's proposed solution is an intermediate level of analy-
sis in which submerged networks are studied as the source of
new collective identities that enco m pass the definition of specific
possibilities and limits of action. At the sam e time, relationships
are activated within localized, submerged networks and particular
individuals make commitments to act tog ether in pursuit of spe-
cific goals (1988, 332). Applied to the origins of women's libera-
tion , a generally diffus e feminist consciousness, while perhaps
necessary, is not enough . To explain origins, specific individuals
must be identified who have formed em otional bonds from their
interaction , negotiated a sense of group membership , and made a
plan for change (or series of plans) , howev er tentative , with goals,
means, and a consideration of environmental constraints : a collec-
tive identity.
The Submerged Networks

Previous scholarship on the women 's
movement has provided many of the pieces necessary for the kind
of analysis that Melucci proposes . Freeman's (1973) and Evans's
(1980) work on the origins of the U.S . women 's movement are
best known in this tradition. As Freeman indicates, the movement
originated simultaneously in two different social locations in the
mid to late 1960s from their respective sources among, first , the
"older branch" of women active in national politics who were
involved in the new State Commissions on the Status of Women,
and a, second, "younger branch" of wom en who had been partici-
pants in the civil rights movement and the New Left. Freeman
(1973) argues that the origins of the movement in these two
branches can be expl ained by the availabilit y of compatible com-
munications networks, a series of "cris es" that focused each
branch of women on feminist issues , and experienced organizers
in the young er branch who could weld together local groups into
a national movement . It was the older br anch that created the
Conflict Networ ks
247
National Organization for Women (NOW), which eventually be-
came the major social movement organization for the movement .
The younger branch developed the small groups, consciousness-
raising, and the less conventional tactics of the movement. Evans
(1980) provides an in-depth study of how the younger women
were radicalized by the humiliations they experienced from their
male colleagues in the social movements of the 1960s. In the course
of describing what Melucci would characterize as "submerged net-
works ," Evans also indicates the degree to which conflict and
struggle played a role in developing collective identities in the
submerged networks of both branches of the movement . It was in
part the struggle over the notion of the emerging collective iden-
tity that led to cultural innovation, organizational segmentation,
and the spread of movement groups in the five years preceding the
Women's Strike. This event, in August 1970, marked the symbolic
beginning, the public "coming out," of the movement.
The proc esses of negotiation and identity construction in the
two branches reflected the very different political cultures of elec-
toral and movement politics in the mid 1960s. The older branch ,
or what came to be called "equal rights feminism ," was based in
the policy debates, organized interests, and campaign obligations
of political actors in state and federal governments . The conflicts
that led to changes in women's consciousness arose from policy
debates regarding women's rights. In this context, the collective
identity that developed followed the model of the civil rights
movement in emphasizing the source of women's problems in
systematic patterns of discrimination that could be eliminated or
mitigated primarily through appropriate legislation, regulations,
litigation, and enforcements but not excluding marches and dem-
onstrations. Through conflict with Commission members , con-
gressional representatives, officials, and the media over the Equal
Rights Amendment, the interpretation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, employment policy , the enforcement practices of the
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, and a host of
other policies, a relatively small network of politically well-con-
nected women developed a conception of gender equality or col-
lective identity that was thoroughly radical in its implications " (see
Hole and Levine 1971, 15-107 ; Carden 1974, 103-47; Freeman
1975, 44-102) .
Carol Mu eller
248
Th e conflict that occurred over the formulation of this iden-
tity among equal rights women led to a proliferation of organiza -
tions devot ed to effo rts on behalf of specific constitu encies, issues,
or polici es. In 1967, for instanc e, wom en from the United Auto
Workers were forced to withdraw from NOW because their union
oppos ed inclusion of the Equal Rights Amendment in the NOW
Bill of Rights (they formed th e Congress of Labor Union
Women). Further segmentation occurr ed with inclusion of abor-
tion in the NOW Bill of Rights , which led women mor e con-
cern ed with issu es of economic discrimination to leave and form
the Women's Equity Action Leagu e (WEAL). Further division
occurr ed when youn ger wom en from the New York NOW chap-
ter charg ed th e national organization with an elitist decision mak-
ing structur e and formed the Octob er 17 Mov em ent (later known
as Th e Feminists) . In 1968, two of NOW 's lawyers walked out in
disgust over th e inefficienc y of th e organization , taking two of its
most important cases. Th ey th en form ed oth er social movement
organizations-fir st, Hum an Rights for Wom en and, later, the
Legal D efens e Fund-to support sex discrimination cases (Free-
man 1975, 80- 81). Th e prolifer ation of equal rights organizations
reflected not onl y important differ enc es of em phasis am ong
women searchin g for political solutions to multipl e sour ces of
discrimination but also the pursuit of an area of action where
individual wom en could creat e a highly personal interpretation
of th eir collective identity . Unfortunately , for present purposes ,
accoun ts of these conflicts are devoted almost exclusivel y to the
polic y provisions invol ved in th e debates and tell us little about
the face-to-fac e proc ess of collective id entit y construction as it oc-
curred.
In con trast, th er e is a rich literatur e on the evolution of collec-
tive identity in th e submerg ed networks of youn ger wom en who
came to con stitut e the wom en 's lib er ation branch of the move-
ment. Wh ereas th e old er branch id entified wh at th ey came to
und erstand as th e " overt " discriminati on against wom en that ap-
peared in em ployme n t, politi cs, credit , and edu cational opportu-
niti es, th e young er branch turn ed to the personal politics that
Helen Hack er ([1951] 1979) h ad associ ated with wo me n' s status as
a minorit y . Th e collective identity th at eme rge d had no pr ecursor
in th e lib eral politic s of th e early civil rights m ovem ent. It came
to be identifi ed as " wome n's liber ation. "
Conflict Networks
249
Prior to 1970, women's liberation had been a "movement of
friends" in the submerged networks of civil rights and the New
Left. Several detailed historical accounts indicate the intensity of
the social interactions and the high level of emotional investment
of the young people who were experimenting with th e creation of
new social forms of living as well as the means of achieving politi-
cal goals . From 1964 to 1967, isolated pairs or small groups of
activist women began to voice a sense of uneasiness to each other
about what they perceived as a different and unequal role for
women in the actual day-to-day activities of these movements. As
Evans (1980) points out, attempts to articulate this uneasiness
about women's assignment to the mundane and routine activities
of kitchen work, mimeographing, typing , and cleaning evoked
reactions of scorn and fury from the male radicals-first in the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCq, the major
youth organization of the civil rights movement, and soon after
in Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), the leading student
organization of the New Left in the United States throughout the
1960s. The younger women were rebuffed time after time as they
tried to discuss their concerns regarding gender differences within
the limits of debate prescribed by the leaders of the civil rights and
New Left movements. Conflict, ridicule , and exclusion greeted
their attempts to extend the emotional bonds forged during the
early 1960s to the sense of injustice and grievances arising from
women's personal experiences within the movements .
As they continued to receive rebukes and scorn from the
male radicals-at a SNCC staff meeting in the summer of 1964; at
the SNCC Waveland Retreat in November 1964; at an SDS confer-
ence in December 1965; at a 1966 SDS convention; and, finally
and most dramatically, at the first nationwide gathering of New
Left groups in Chicago , the National Conference for a New Poli-
tics (NCNP), in September 1967 -women 's confusion and search
for a new identity turned to rage and alienation (Evans 1980; Hole
and Levine 1971, 109-16) . The submerged networks of women
that had developed within the New Left organizations moved out-
side to begin an autonomous existence in major cities in th e East
Coast and the Midwest .
The transitory processes that Melucci describ es of conflict ,
segmentation , and dissolution of organizations is illustr ated in Fig-
ure 10-1, which represents one year in the life of the New York
Conflict and Segmentation among New York
Figure 10-1 "Wo men's Liberation" Gro ups, 1968
RADICAL WOMEN /
NEW YORK
RADICAL WOMEN
Recrui ts from Prin ceto n Action: "Burial of Tra ditional W oman -
SDS Meeting • hood " at W ashington , D .C. , antiwar
de mo nstratio n Spring 1968 direc ted
at J eanette R ankin Brigade.
"Sisterhood Is Powerful" first used .
Defection of 300- Action: published mimeograp hed read throughout

500 wome n in • j ournal, " N ot es from the First Year," --. th e country
Washington , D .C. , Jun e 1968
from Jeanette • article "T he Myth of the Vaginal
R ankin Brigade O rgasm "
• dialogue "W om en R ap about Sex"
Joint actio n wi th Accion: Miss Ame rica Co nte st first national

women from Demo nstration, Septem ber 1968 --. medi a coverage
Ne w Jersey, • live sheep crowned
Washington, D .C. , bras, girdle s. high heels, cu rlers
and Florida dum ped int o Freedom T rashcan .
WITCH
fall 1968
W om en 's Int ern ational
Co nspiracy from H ell
San
/ r" ~ C oven s NYC
Fran cisco THANKSGIVING MEETING IN CHICAGO
N ovemb er 1968
200 wo me n/ 37 states
disint egrati on
GR OUP I REDSTOCKINGS FEMINI ST S NY RADICAL

Co unt er- • Wi de use of con- • Ti-Grace Atkinson FEMINISTS
InauguraJ Action , sciousness- raising • Th eo ry Action T hree- stage
Janu ary 1969 • "Pro W om en • " R adical structure:
Line" Feminism " • C o nscio usness-
• "W oman as a • Atta ck on sex raising
Political C lass" roles • Brigade mem-
• R ot ation of bership
leadership • Mass organiza-
• Anti-mal e tion
• Anti -" star-
m akin g"
disintegration 1969 disintegration 1969 disintegrati on 1970

Source: H ole and Levine 197 1, 115- 58 .
Conflict Netw or ks
251
women 's liberation gro ups after they separated from the New Left
in 1968. The collective identity that came to be associated with
"women 's liberation " in the early 1970s developed out of this
process of conflict and negotiation . Figur e 10-1 illustrates sch e-
matically how this process occurred in on e location . The upp er
left-hand colum n indicates the process es of repeat ed conflict and
segmentation of the New York radical feminists which, at th e
same time, gave rise to a series of coll ecti ve actions that symboli -
cally depicted the common understandings developing within the
network . In contr ast to the older branch of equal rights feminists,
the radicals challenged th e personal charact eristic s and patterns of
social interaction assign ed to women by the dominant cultural
code throu gh public actions and confrontation s that increasingl y
gained national m edia coverage and public att ention . By fall 1968,
the Atlantic City demonstrations against th e imag e of women por -
trayed in the Miss America bathin g suit con tests brought front
page cover age throughout th e country . A live she ep was cro wn ed
Miss America and bras, gird les, and oth er " in stru me n ts of tor -
tur e" were dumped into a Freedom Trashca n . Youn g women , with
their op en disr esp ect for" Miss Am erica " and th e image of wom en
it celebrat es, were soon dubb ed " bra burn ers " by the mass m edi a.
Despite this distortion of th eir collectiv e actions (or becaus e of
it), their numb ers continu ed to grow. B y Novemb er , a nati on al
meeting gave a sens e of comm on purpose whil e contributin g to
the formation of ad ditional radic al groups that continue d the pro c-
ess of conflict , segm entation , an d dissolut ion through out 1969. At
the sam e tim e, th e rudim ents of a ne w collective identit y were
takin g shape.
Although N ew York dr ew on an unu su ally lar ge con stitu en cy
of radical wome n, th eir ex pe rien ces reflect ed a mi crocosm of cen-
ters of mobilization around th e coun try . Th rou gh out th e year, an
und erstandin g of wo me n 's oppr ession (in con tras t to dis crimin a-
tion) devel op ed am ong th e N ew York wo m en that em ph asized a
politic s of interpers ona l relations ; th e bo nd ing of wo me n as an
oppr essed class; th e use of rapping (later , "co nsc iou snes s raisin g " )
to brin g out th e emot ion al pain of wom en 's lives; a fear of leader-
ship an d hi erar chy ; and th e creation o f n ovel and innova tive tactics
to voice wo me n's ange r aga ins t th e sy m bo ls of conven tiona l femi -
ninit y . T hese common und erst and in gs grew in an emo tio na l at-
m osph ere o f tension an d conflict over m aj or poin ts of disagree-
Carol Mueller
252
me nt wi thin th e eme rg ing identity of radical femi nists. Every
action and every organ izat iona l split reflected bot h a conflict over
identity and the eme rge nce of a new basis of understa n ding .
Throug h the processes assoc iated wi th identity cons tru ction,
the mo vem en t ex perience d ex trao rdina ry growt h bet ween 1969
and 1970 . By mid 1970, No tes from the Second Yt?ar, a feminist
journa l of 126 pages , sold over forty th ous and cop ies (Hol e and
Levine 1971,158) . T he numb er of move me nt perio dic als incr eased
from two in 1968 to sixty -o ne in 1972. Sma ll gro ups pr olif erated
througho ut the count ry, an d region al conf eren ces to coo rdinate
their activ ities ha d beco m e com mon place by 1970 (Ca rden 1974).
By August 1970, th e hi ghl y diver se subme rge d netw or k s of equal
rights femin ists and wo me n's liber ation were read y to em erge as
womanhoo d united, th e histo ric actor.
The Women 's Movement as

"Histo ric Actor "
Melu cci h as rig h tfully pointed to th e ori-

gins of soc ial m ovem ents at an intermedi ate
level of ana lys is: th e subme rge d net work s of face-to -face in terac-
tion s like th ose of th e N ew Yor k radical femini st s wh o created the
basis of a new collective iden tity durin g a short period of cultural
ex peri me nta tion. In th e pr oc ess of testin g new repr esentations
thr ou gh coll ective actions, expe rience s of conflic t, int ern al dissen-
sion, an d o rganizat io nal segme ntation and diss oluti on , new un-
der stand ings were devel oped th at b ecam e the basis for challengin g
the domin ant cultur al cod e at its roots . As this identit y develope d,
h owever , it gath er ed incr easing supp ort from the structural
ch anges th at had alter ed th e lives of U. S. wom en throughout the
twenti eth centur y an d led to a m assive shift in consciousne ss
amo ng both m en and wom en. As th e two br an ches of the m ove-
me n t in creasin gly engage d in common actions durin g th e sum mer
of 1970, th ey fou nd th at th e collective id entit y th ey repr esented
has ma ssive appea l.
Like othe r n ew m ovem ent s, th e wo men' s m ovement in the
Unit ed States fir st achieved w ides prea d nati on al recognition and
po litical influ en ce at its point of init ial mass m obi lization . Wom-
en's Strike for Equ alit y D ay , August 26, 1970, m arked the sym-
boli c start ing point for th e cont emp or ary wo me n's m ovemen t in
Conflict Netw or ks
253
the United States . Sponsored by a broad coalition of wom en 's
movement organizations and coordinated by the N ational O rga ni-
zation for Women (NOW) to commemorate th e fiftieth anniver-
sary of the Suffrage Amendment, tens of thous ands of wome n
went "on strike " for equality. It was the largest prote st on beh alf
of women in U.S . history (Hole and Levine 1971, 420) . Women
across the countr y marched and picket ed , held rallies and att end ed
teach-ins . In New York , women set up a child-car e center in City
Hall Park; in Chicago, sit-ins were held at restaurants barring
women (Deckard 1975, 343) ; in New York, feminists went to th e
editor of the New York Times to protest an editorial titled " Hen-
pecked House, " against th e Equal Rights Am endment (ERA) ; and
in Minneapolis , a guerrilla theater group portrayed the parts of
key figures in the universal abortion drama for downtown audi-
ences (Hole and Levine 1971, 263, 299) . The most memorable
event in media coverage , however , was the unpr ecedented out-
pouring of tens of thousands of women who marched down Fifth
Avenue in New York carrying signs that read, " D on' t Cook Din-
ner -Starve a Rat Today!" " Eve Was Framed , " and "End Human
Sacrifice! Don 't Get Married!!" (Hole and Levine 1971,78; Deck-
ard 1975, 343). Despite its label as "Equality Day, " the protests,
demonstrations , guerrilla theater, chants, and banners that marked
the day represented not only the discrimination issues of equal
rights feminists but also the personal politics of women 's liber -
ation.
Equality Day marked a turning point in terms of women 's
political influence and the nature of the women's movement. The
size of the mobilization made it clear that the movement would
now have to be taken seriously (Freeman 1973, 84). Only after
Equality Day did Congress act on behalf of women . During the
1960s, Congress had considered 844 bills concerned with women's
issues and passed only 10 (Klein 1984, 22). The Ninety -second
Congress passed more women's right legislation than the total of
all previous legislation combined (see Freeman 1975, 202-5) . By
1980, 71 bills had been passed on behalf of women (Costain 1988,
161). In addition to political influence in Congress , media intere st
in women began a sharp upward trend after Equality Day as well
(Cancian and Ross 1981) . Public awareness of the new mov ement
almost immediately reached 80 percent of adult Americans (Hole
and Levine 1971, 269) , and public opinion polls began to show a
C arol Mu eller
254
marked increas e in support for improvements in the status of
women . Women began to win elections to local, stat e, and federal
office in unprec edented numbers (Muell er 1987).
Th e mov ement itself was transform ed by the publicity asso-
ciated with th e Strike. New m emb ers had be en recruit ed primarily
thr ou gh person al netw ork s of acti vists in th e peri od from 1965 to
1970, but after th e Strike , contact with th e m ovem ent through the
media played an in crea sing role (C ard en 1974, 32-3 3). B ecau se of
its great er visibilit y and respectabilit y , th e ne w recruit s flood ed
th e m ode st N O W offices in m ajor cities . Ch apt er s often expanded
by as much as 50 to 70 per cent in a few m onth s (Freem an 1975,
85). Th e N ation al O rga niza tion for Wom en mu shr oomed fro m a
m emb ership of several th ou sand in 1969 to fift een thousand by
1972 (C ard en 1974, 194). B y th e en d of th e decad e, it h ad becom e
a m ass m emb ership orga niza tio n of several hund red th ou sand
(Cos tain an d Cos tain 1987).
For thr ee yea rs after th e Equ ality D ay Strike, th e Women 's
Movem ent acquire d th e cha rac ter of th at m ythic al, hist or ical actor
th at Meluc ci has typifi ed as a " un ified em pirical datum " or collec-
tive reality th at is seen to exist as a " thing" (Melu cci 1988, 330;
1989, 18). T his " thing ness " of th e m ovem ent 's collective identit y
in th e eyes of the n ational m edi a, Co ng ress, th e state legislators ,
and, prob ably , th e gene ral public is ana thama to Melucci because
it deni es th e diver sity an d the tent ativeness of th e " real" social
m ovem ent that he has obse rve d in subm erg ed n etworks . Yet, th ere
is con siderable eviden ce to sug gest th at Th e Mo vem ent as histori-
cal actor was th ought to repres ent an aroused and ang ry woman-
ho od. Congress yielded to its demand for equality in th eir passag e
of legislation on behalf of wom en. " For a bri ef moment , a very
bri ef mom ent , wom en em erged as historic actor w ith a seemingl y
homog en eous id entity cent ered on a wide-r ang ing quest for
equality .
Despite the impr essive evidenc e th at a homog en eous an d uni-
tary movement was demon str ated by th e Equ alit y Day march es,
both femini st activi sts at the core of th e mo vem ent th en and schol-
ars wh o have studi ed the movem ent sin ce h ave realized that Th e
Movem ent was a hi ghly div erse aggr eg ation of wom en with man y
differ ent grie vanc es, programs of action, and vision s of the futur e.
As Melu cci has claim ed for th e Europe an "n ew social move-
Confl ict Netwo rks
255
ments, " at the level of interpers onal , face-to-face relation ship s, th e
mo vem ent was not th en , nor has it ever been , a unified w hole. 10
Yet , a mor e compreh ensive an alysis would enco m pass n ot
onl y the int eractions and meanings of th e core actors w ho created
the mo vem ent or even those who wer e recruit ed to it but also it s
contributions to pub lic discourse an d politic al cultur e. To und er-
stand th e political influ enc e of th e mo vem ent would requir e con-
sideration of th e impr ession of unit y creat ed by th e Equal ity Strike
and its m edia coverag e as a major datum to be explaine d. Such
an anal ysis wou ld draw from much of th e n ew work on so cial
constru ction that seeks to explain th e cons equ en ces as well as th e
origins of soci al mov ements . To addr ess this level of publi c di s-
course and political influ enc e is not to den y that origins of mo ve-
ments lie in subm erged netw orks and must be ana ly zed w ith a
different set of conceptual an d empiric al to ols . N everthel ess, it
requir es an anal ysi s th at includes but ex ten ds bey ond Melucci 's
important con trib ution s.
Conclus ion
Th is case stud y focus es on tw o mom ent s

in th e life of the contem porary wom en' s
movem ent -th e first mass mobilization of U .S . wom en in th e
Women 's Equalit y Day Strike of August 1970, and the five-ye ar
period pr ecedin g th e Strik e-when th e two branche s of cont em-
porar y U .S. feminism were constructing a new id entit y throu gh a
proc ess of int ernal conflict and organizational segm ent ation . Thes e
two stag es in th e development of th e movem ent point to both th e
stren gths and the weaknesses of Melucci 's int erm ediate level of
analysis for a compr eh ensive th eor y of social con stru ction .
Melucci 's theory is most telling wh en it calls atten tion to
that level of face-to-fac e int eraction w he re coll ectiv e identiti es are
develop ed in subm erg ed n etworks through a proc ess of social ne-
gotiation . It is at this point that structural sour ces of personal
injury -such as th e contradiction that younger branch women felt
betw een their high levels of education and th e low status they
experienced in th e personal politics of the 1960s mo vements - are
translated into a shared sense of injustice focused on gri evanc es
that are articulated as part of a program for change. Th e case study
also demonstrat es, however , that the creativ e tensions that fuel
Carol Mueller
256
these negot iations spring as m uc h from int ern al compe tition and
conflict w ithin m ovem en t ne two rks as from the inadeq uacy of
mea ns for realizin g goa ls. Altho ug h th e new collective iden tity of
wo me n continue d to cha nge in th e submerged net work s of the
m ovem ent and to be challenge d b y coun termove me n ts such as
th ose th at aros e in th e mid 1970s to op pose early fem inist victo ries
in abor tion rights an d the Equ al Ri ght s Am endm ent , th e collective
identit y soon took on a life of its ow n.
T he ind ependent exi stence or " thingness" of the id ent ity of
"wo me n" th at exis ted in the early 1970s sugges ts that a compr e-
hen sive theory of social mo vem ent con stru ction cann ot restrict its
atten tion to th e int ermed iate level of subme rge d networks if it is
con cerne d wit h th e political influenc e and cultural changes
achie ved by th e m ovem ent . Th e collecti ve ident ities creat ed within
subme rge d networ ks achieve an ind ep end ent ex istence once the y
be com e public thro ug h th e m ovem ent 's explana tory apparatus of
m anifestos, progra ms, pr ess conference s, bann er s, slo gan s, insig -
nia, cos tumes, an d gue rrilla th eater th at attem pt to account for the
mo vem ent and its collective actions. Thr ou gh th ese devices , a
collective identit y becom es publi c th at has a pot ential for political
influ enc e. It is th en subjec t to attem pts at dis tor tion and marginali -
zation of state, m edia , an d count ermov em ents . (See Gitl in 's [1980]
description in his ex cellent stud y o f m edi a tr eatment of Students
for a De m ocratic Society [SD S] durin g th e 1960s .) At this public
stage of mov em ent developm ent , w he n the collective identity be-
com es a hist oric actor , it would be an em pirical as well as a theoret -
ical mistake to equate th e public pers on a of this collective identity
(an obje ct of political culture and public discourse) with the collec-
tive identity of Melucci's subm erge d networks (an object of con-
tinuing negotiation and rene gotiation am id fluid but intense face-
to-f ace int eractions).
The distinction between thes e two levels of anal ysis is impor -
tant not only for our appr eciation of Melucci 's streng ths and weak-
nesses but also for locating his contribution within the developing
work on the so cial mov ement of social movement s. As this work
has proliferated , it h as become incr easingl y import ant to identif y
th eor eti cal contributions in terms of appropri ate levels of analysis .
Th e most comprehensiv e attempt to spe cify th ese levels is
Kl anderrnans's (1992) essay in which he distinguishes three levels
of social construction : (1) public discours e an d the form ation and
Conflict Netw orks
257
transformation of collective identities; (2) persuasive communica-
tion during mobilization campaigns by movem ent organizations,
their opponents, and countermovement organizations; and (3)
what he terms "consciousness raising " during episodes of collec-
tive behavior. At the first level, he combines the two construction
processes that have been distinguished here: public discourse such
as William Gamson 's (1988) work on " issue packaging " by the
media and Melucci 's (1989) conception of the construction of col-
lective identities in submerged networks . The second level of per-
suasive communication by social movement organizations and
their opponents encompasses Klanderrnans 's (1984) own work on
consensus mobilization and the work of David Snow and his asso-
ciates (1986) on frame alignment . At the third level, Klandermans
includes the changes of meanings and perc eption that occur during
the course of experiencing collective action as described, for in-
stance, in the work of Rick Fantasia (1988) on industrial strikes.
Klandermans distinguishes these three levels in terms of two
implicit criteria: the number of people involved and the degree
to which social construction is purposive or spontaneous. Public
discourse is a diffuse process encompassing major media of com-
munication for a society or sector of society . Social constructions
created by social movement organizations are purposive and reach
a more limited audience th an public discourse. Finally, construc -
tion processes involving the participants and spectators at a collec -
tive action event are even more limited by the situational opportu -
nities for direct participation or observation .
While Klanderrnans's typological distinctions are extremely
useful in ordering this growing field of research, our lengthy con-
sideration of Melucci's theory of coll ective identity suggests sev-
eral modifications . After Melucci has so carefully indicated that
the submerged networks are part of the latency phase of social
movements, an " in visible process" out of the public eye , it is
inappropriate that this process should be considered a part of pub-
lic discourse. In fact, as Melucci argues, it is partly the freedom
from public scrutiny that permits people to interact in small
groups where experimentation and negotiation of identities can
result in the development of new social codes and goals for action .
Thus, when selecting groups for study in Milan, Melucci deliber-
ately chose the most grass -roots level of participation because, he
noted, leaders were more likely to present , what was to him, a
Ca rol Mu eller
258
falsely unified version of the collective identity if they had to
interact frequently with public actors such as media representa -
tives or officials (1989, 242) . It was only at the grass -roots level,
he felt , that such false presentations (which should properly be
considered part of public discourse) could be avoided and maxi-
mum heterogen eity in experime n tation and negotiation be ob-
serv ed.
On the oth er hand, our case study of th e public phase, or
" com ing out," of th e wom en 's mov ement at th e Women's Strike
for Equ ality Day indicat es that collective identities do become
a part of public discour se and, potentially, historic actors if the
mov em ent attempts to bring about social or political chang e. At
this public level of an alysis, a differ ent set of social and political
actors , parti cularly th e repr esentativ es of formal organizations ,
w ill atte m p t to influ en ce th e nature of the collectiv e identit y and
fit it to th eir ow n int ere sts and systems of me aning .
Th ese observation s suggest th e utility of four rath er than
thr ee levels of analysis : public discourse , persuasive communica -
tion initiated by m ovem ent organizations, "consciousness raising"
from particip ation in episodes of coll ectiv e action, and the creation
of collective ident itie s in subm erg ed netw orks . To th e ex tent that
the four levels of an alysis have a natural sequ encing in a cycle of
protest , it seem s likely that social movements based on a major
reconstruction of collective identitie s will requir e either a length y
o r an intensiv e peri od for the gestation o f th e new identit y . An
ideal typical sequence would pr ogress from least to most public
awarenes s (and , undoubt edl y , back again). Groups of ind ividual s
in subm erg ed networks would experiment w ith new collective
ident ities and action proposals , incr easin gly taking th eir new social
con structi ons into confli ct w ith targets of chang e or pot ential con-
verts out sid e their own sm all circle just as the New York radical
femini sts crow ne d a sheep "Miss Ameri ca. " As a collect ive iden-
tit y tak es shape, pot enti al activists m ay come to geth er and create
a so cial m ovement organization with a public declaration
anno uncing th eir new collectiv e identit y lik e the wome n from
th e State Co m m issions on th e Statu s o f Women w ho form ed the
N ation al Or ganization for Women an d dre w up a Bill of Right s
for wom en in th e mid 1960s . Coll ectiv e action s such as those
assoc iated w ith wom en 's Strike for Equalit y D ay offer opportuni-
ties for dir ect ex pe rience of action and perceptu al ch ange bas ed on
Conflict Netw or ks
259
the newly revealed collective identity . Finally , the national media
may be attracted by the newsworthine ss of the confrontation or
the importanc e of the values at stake , and the social reconstru ction
represented by th e new collective identit y may become a part of
public discour se. (See Freeman on the " grand pr ess blitz " of th e
wom en 's mov em ent , Janu ary through March 1970 [1975,
148-51].) O ver the course of an y social movem ent , th ese proce sses
of social construction will cycle back and forth betw een levels in
incr easingly com plex patt erns depending on th e degr ee to w hich
all sectors of society become invol ved and how quickl y th e mo ve-
ment is controll ed .
Yet, the search for stag es is somewhat prem atur e in a field
that is only now beginning to distinguish one level of anal ysis
from another. In this chapt er , I have attem pted to distingu ish two
of these levels and to suggest that Melucci 's contribution lies in
highlighting an intermediat e level of analysis in a latenc y ph ase
that may pr ecede th e creation of formal organizations . His work
sugg ests the importance of th e op ening skirmishes between mem-
bers of submerg ed networks and symbolic repres entations of th e
dominant cultural code through collective actions that begin a
more public phase of the movement.
Although the political fortunes of any subordinate group,
such as women , demand that it enter a public phase to challenge
the cultural order dir ectly and to influence public affairs , such an
analysis would not explain how women came to develop and id en-
tify with an analysis of women as a minority group and to share
what Gamson and his colleagues (1982) call an "injustice fram e"
and McAdam (1982) terms " cogni tive liberation. " To und erstand
how several hundred women throughout th e United States con-
structed the new identity of women as historic actor that became
an influential political force for chang e in the status of wom en , it
is necessary to understand the origins of the women 's movem ent
in the preceding decade . It is here that Melucci's th eory is most
convincing .
Notes
1. Increased awareness began with the New School volume, edited by Jean
Cohen in 1985, whi ch was followed by a series of pape rs by Bert Kland erman s
and Sidney Tarrow (see Kland ermans 1986; Klanderrnans and Tarrow 1988;
Klandermans 1990).
Carol Mueller
260
2. But see From S tructure to A ction, in w hich Kl and erm an s, Kri esi, and
Tarro w attem pt to co nne ct so cial struc ture to co llect ive actio n. In th e introduc -
tion , Kland erm ans and Tarr ow (1988) indi cate tha t th e vo lume seeks to " bridge
tha t gap bet ween struc tu re and par ticip ation " (10).
3. Im port ant repr esent ation s o f thi s developin g int erest in soc ial m ove-
m ent culture and pr ocesses o f socia l cons truc tio n as applied to soc ial m ovem ent s
are found in con tribu tio ns to Frontiersin Social Movement Th eory, edite d by Ald on
Morri s and Caro l Muell er (I 992).
4. Later , I argue that th e " unified em pirica l datu m " is not necessarily a
false reification but is inst ead a cultura l artifact th at serves to enha nce o r detr act
fro m th e m ovem ent 's politi cal in fluence. A sim ilar per cepti on of unit y in crow d
behavior b y obse rve rs is also a sta rting point for rece nt th eori es of collective
behavior (see th e first editi on o f Collective Behavior [Turn er and Killian 1957]) .
5. Th e latent /manif est distin ction refers to th e differ en ce bet ween th e pri-
vate, "s ubme rge d" life of th e m ovem en t in g ro u ps an d co m m unities that experi -
m ent an d negoti ate cha llenges to th e domin ant cultur al code and th e visible,
publi c cha llenges to th at co de th at usu ally b egin in collective action events o r in
sym bo lic insigni a o f dr ess o r beh avior (see also Taylor and Whitti er 1992) .
6. Th e m ost autho ritative acco un ts are th ose b y Hol e and Levin e (1971);
Ca rden (1974); Freem an (1973, 1975); Dec ka rd (1975); C asse ll (1977); Evans
(1980); and Ferr ee an d Hess (1985).
7. Co rres po n ding ex ampl es for th e new socia l m ovem ent appr oa ch in
Euro pe are In glehart 1977 and Ba rnes, Kaase, an d All erb eck 1979.
8. Ju st h ow radically dif fer ent th eir collective ide ntity h ad b ecom e from
wo me n ou tside th e m ovem ent cou ld not be appreciated until it was incorpor ated
int o th e Co ng ress ional hearin gs th at becam e th e basis for int erpr etin g the impli -
cations o f th e Equ al Right s Am endm ent (see Brow n et al. 1971). Th ese im plica-
tion s, includin g th e o bligation o f wo me n to perfo rm milit ary service and to
surre nde r th eir (larg ely inop erati ve) su ppo rt pr ero gatives in divor ce pro ceedin gs,
becam e th e tar get of attack in a fero ciou s cam paign in th e mid 1970s by conse rva-
ti ve wo me n th at un derm ine d th e impr ession o f th e wo me n's m ovem ent as united
wo ma nhoo d, a hi stori c actor (see M an sbrid ge 1986).
9. M ar garet Heckl er w as Republi can leader of th e Co ng ress io nal Wom en's
Ca ucus th rou gh out much of th e 1970s. Sh e was one of two wo me n first ap-
point ed to th e C abin et by Pr esident Ron ald Reag an in an atte m pt to woo the
wo me n's vo te.
10. N everth eless, th e po wer o f th e unitar y ima ge is reveal ed in com ments
by Freem an (1975) , who notes , " T he plur alistic nature of the women 's liberation
mov em ent is a ch aracte ristic that has not been adequately appreciated eithe r by
th e mov em ent' s participants or by it s critics " (150).
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Part III
Collective Action and

Identity in Changing
Political Contexts
Chapter II
New Social Movements and

Old Regional Nationalisms
Hank Johnston
Alongside the growth of New Social

Movements (NSMs) in the 1970s and
1980s, there has also been a proliferation of ethnic nationalist
movements. In Spain and Canada, ethnic nationalisms challenge
the integrity of the state; in what was Yugoslavia, they have de-
stroyed it; and in several former Soviet republics , nationalism has
become the fundamental principle of state power. Sometimes na-
tionalist sentiments are so strong and pervasive that they subsume
feminist , ecological, and peace agendas under the banner of the
nation, as occurr ed in Quebec, the Basque region, Catalonia, Es-
tonia, Latvia , and Lithuania . Although ethnic nationalisms do not
constitute a new social force by any means , it would be incorrect
to say that they are characteristic only of less developed social
structures . Ethnic movements have flourished in highly industrial-
ized regions such as Catalonia, Euzkadi, Quebec, Flanders, and in
the Baltic states where industrial development and standards of
living were superior to those in other Soviet regions.
The substantive goals of NSMs and ethnic nationalisms are
widely divergent: NSMs focus on the individual search for iden-
tity in the context of global programs for social change, while
nationalist movements reflect political and cultural aspirations of
communities that are subordinated by a core region. Nevertheless,
there exists an unexpected convergence of emphasis concerning
two key points. First, regarding motivations to participate, the
goals and activities of ethnic nationalist movements are thor-
oughly embedded in the identity of their proponents, although
the emphasis is on ascribed characteristics such as culture and
language rather than life-style. Second, patterns of participation
are anchored in the everyday lives of their adherents.
Insofar as theorists of NSMs discuss their ethnic movements ,
the concept of identity-search is appended to conventional expla-
nations, such as unequal nation-state development, without much
Hank John ston
268
empirical support. Alberto Melucci and Mario Diani (1983) ob -
serve that ethnic movements are a combination of both residues of
communal identity from the nation-building process and a reflec-
tion of identity needs arising from the demands of a complex
social system. Melucci (1989, 90-92) also suggests that they in part
reflect the need for an integrating identity that arises in response to
the disparate role constellations that confront the individual today.
" Ethn ic solidarity also responds to a need for identity of an emi -
nently symbolic nature . It give s roots " (93). This perspective , he
suggests, must be added to the better known explanations of eth-
nic nationalisms: age-old communal conflict, competition for
scarc e resources, and political contention in multinational states.
The student of contemporary social movements is left with
something of a dilemma. " O ld " ethnic nationalisms proliferate
alongside "new" movements that are conceptualized as unique
products of postindustrial social structure . This could be easily
explained if these two types of movements occur among groups
occupying different positions in society, but this is not always the
case since, as mentioned above, it is common that NSM issues
are " nested " within nationalist agendas. As an initial attempt at
conceptual refinement , I take a comparative approach to the ethnic
movements in both Spain and the several former Soviet republics.
I focus on two areas of similarity: identity formation and the role
of everyday life experiences in participation . I conclude by relating
my tentative findings to the NSM model.
In Spain, I refer to Catalonia and Euzkadi under the Franco
regime, leaving aside the weaker Galician nationalist opposition.
The newly independent states of Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania and the Transcaucasian states of Armenia, and Georgia
are the comparative foci. Each of these nations maintains a strong
cultural and linguistic heritage that has survived alongside (and
competed with) more extensive, world-status languages and cul-
tures: Spanish and Russian. These regions also share memories of
independence or autonomy, passed from one generation to an-
other, which combine with remembrances of war, repression, and
exile to foster am0ll;g the minority populations antipathy toward
either Russians or "Spaniards. "
What makes the movements in Spain and the former Soviet
Union especially interesting is the force with which they were
reasserted after long periods of state repression. In both cases,
N ew Social Movements and Old Regional Nati onalisms
269
latent sentiments of nationalism were reaw akened by cautiou s at-
tempts at liberalization by the stat e. Aft er 1985, p erestroika and
glasnostprovid ed opportunities for nation alist expre ssion that wer e
unfathomable a decade earlier. Spain 's tentati ve apertura (op ening)
in th e 1960s und er Manuel Fraga Iribarne pr ecipit ated the growth
of nationalist groups and several import ant mobiliz ations . Onc e
rekindl ed , th e forc e of protest gath ered mom entum in both cou n-
tries. It continu es in the form er Sovi et republic s, whil e in Spain ,
it has been for th e most part channel ed by democrati c comp etition
and regional decentralization . In both cases , questions about iden -
tity and everyday life were played out under conditions of consid-
erable personal risk . That nationalist sentiments survived in virtu al
dormancy to burst forth onc e repression was eased suggests an
analytical focu s on thos e aspects of social life wh ere ethnic identity
can be nurtur ed out of the view of the state , namely, the inn er
recesses of primary relations with family and friends .
Identity Recei ved: Socialization

in Nationalist Subcultures
Leaving asid e biol ogical influenc es on per-
sonality , a person 's iden tity can be con-
ceived as a thoroughly social construct. In analyzing its social
components, it is useful to distinguish betwe en primary and sec-
ondary socialization , between identity formation based on inti-
mate relations -family and close friends -and that which is based
on impersonal relations outside the orbit of parents and ascribed
social ties. Primary ties are characteristic of Gem einschaft, second -
ary ties of Ges ellschaft; and it is generall y agreed that as societies
develop and differentiate, the relative emphasis shifts from pri -
mary to secondary socialization as the fundamental inputs to adult
social identity.
The NSM perspective implicitly extends this dichotomy to
postindustrial society by locating key identity -formation processes
in temporary groups of erstwhile strangers. NSMs are said to
reflect system incongruities that appear as society develops , and
which are experienced on th e individual level as conflicting role
alternatives (Melucci 1985, see also Chapter 5). Attempts to forg e
new identities therefore comprise a " bott om -up " mechanism
whereby the need for structural adjustments in the social syst em
Hank Johnston
270
are point ed out by th e coalesc enc e and coll ectiv e action of like-
minded folk in NSM s. Social identit y is for ged in th e con tex t of
particip ation in group s unit ed by shar ed but n evertheles s ill-
defined answer s to identit y conflicts . In th ese gr oups new life-
st yles an d new identiti es are forg ed , radicall y der acin ated -at least
for the tim e bein g -from ant eced ents of famil y an d prim ary ties.
It is on thi s point that m y ow n thinkin g about identit y in
nation alist m ovem ent s takes a sha rp detour. Althou gh there is
con siderabl e deb ate abo u t th e actual str en gth of ethnic identit y in
mod ern societ y (for exampl e, Nag el an d Olz ak 1982; Na gel 1986;
and See 1986 argue th ey are attenua ted), th e Spanish and Soviet
cases indi cate th at primar y ties compr ise important channels in
keeping nationalist sentim ent s alive, and for som e participants ,
stro ng factors in the ir particip ation .
D ata for C atalonia and Euzkadi stron gly point to the exis-
tenc e of articul ated sub cultures w he re ethnic iden tification and
na tionalist sen tim ents were passed from on e gen erat ion to an-
othe r. 1 Whil e th e data are still ske tchy an d prelimin ary , th e sur-
vival of nati on alist sentim ents in th e form er Soviet Republic s over
fort y years of severe repr ession , and th eir rebirth in th e form of
N ationa l Fronts, strongl y suggest the pr esen ce of th ese sorts of
sub cultur al patt ern s and inte grated soci al relationships , especially
in th e Baltic and Transcaucasian region s.
Nationalist sub cultur es are based on relativel y perm anent so-
cial ties and a well-d evelop ed syst em of symbols , valu es, and be-
liefs derived from the minorit y cultur e. Be caus e the y embod y an
altern ative to th e offici al realit y en do rsed and promot ed by the
stat e, th ese subcultur es con vey th e illegitimac y of the state at a
very basic level. While m any people may carr y antiregim e and
nationalist sentiments, not all are int egrat ed into these subcultures.
For thos e on th e outside , the main differenc e lies in th e absenc e of
int erp erson al and organizational linkag es by whi ch a more devel-
oped set of oppositiona l symb ols are maintained , and, more im-
portant , by which th ey are passed to new gen erations .
These subcultur es can be analyzed in term s of th eir cultur al
content and of th e relations that sustain them . On th e on e hand,
th e cultural cont ent typically is a mi x of relig ious , politic al, and
national ideas and sym bols. Much of it reflects ideologic al continu -
ity with a tim e prior to the curr ent regim e when many of the
values and symbo ls of the subcultur e were publi c an d widely prac-
New Social Movements and Old Regional Nationalisms
271
ticed. In Catalonia and the Basque region, the Statutes of Auton-
omy under the Second Spanish Republic (1932-1939) served as
guideposts for political debate . Religious traditions, holidays, and
shrines took on subliminal oppositional and political significance.
The Monastery of Montserrat in Catalonia and the Marian cult
located there were prominent oppositional symbols, just as the
Hill of Crosses at Siauliai, Lithuania , and the Cathedral at Etchrni-
adzen in Armenia are symbolic of their respective national tradi -
tions. The church also played an organizational role in both the
Catalan and Basque nationalist opposition (johnston and Figa
1988; Johnston 1989), as it did the Catholic church in Lithuania,
the underground Uniate church in the Ukraine, and to a lesser
extent, the Lutheran church in Estonia and Latvia.
A second aspect of the nationalist subculture is the way this
cultural content is passed and refined between generations. A key
locus of this process is the primary socialization that occurs in the
family. This is especially true with respect to family religious
practice and traditions whereby antiregime attitudes were fused
with religious symbols and beliefs are passed from one generation
to another. In Catalonia, nationalist militants frequently came
from religious homes in which nationalist symbolism was closely
tied to the Montserrat Monastery (johnston 1989,1991) . The sub-
culture was further articulated in the context of youth activities
such as schools, catechism classes, and even boy scout troops that
took place under church auspices and away from the scrutiny of
the regime. In the Basque region, the religious link was also
strong . Schools called ikastolas that clandestinely taught the
Basque language were frequently located in churches. Through
these processes, a small but important proportion of the popula-
tion was schooled in antiregime values, assuring generational con -
tinuity of nationalist and oppositional sentiments. Although there
are important differences between the Basque and Catalan cases,
especially concerning the direction that Basque youth took their
nationalism (see Perez-Agote 1986; Zulaika 1988), national subcul-
tures can be identified in both regions. In Catalonia, there are
indications that a disproportionate number of future political lead-
ers emerged from this group .
Concerning Soviet nationalisms, a good starting place is
Lithuania, where a close identification of nationalism with Catho-
licism dates to the nineteenth century and suggests a subculture in
Hank Johnston
272
the Basque and Catalan mo ld. Lithuanian samizdat p ub lications
during the 1970s were almost w ho lly from Ca tholic secto rs. De-
spite the severe repression of th e church under the Soviets, esti-
ma tes of the Ca tholic faithfu l ran ge be tween 50 perce n t an d 80
per cent , even among Lith uanian youth (see Bourdea ux 1979; Var-
d ys 1978, 217) . The persis tence of Cat ho licism among the
yo unger genera tion who had no t only never exper ience d religious
free do m bu t also had been subjec t to intensive an tirel ig ious pr opa-
gan da and sanctions raises the que stion of how it was accom-
plished . T he answer , I suggest, is to be fou n d in the pr im ary
socialization accomp lished by th e fam ily and closest frien ds. For
the mos t part, this in teraction was beyon d pene tra tion by the
KGB and the Communis t party.
If we can draw pa rallels from the Bas que and Ca talan cases,
some families no t on ly passed religio us trad itions but also secular
accou nts of civil socie ty prior to the loss of in dep end en ce or auton-
omy. This was repor ted by some Ca talan m ilitants, altho ugh
other respon dents spoke of frustra ting quiescence in th eir own
fam ilies abou t civi l wa r politics . Alf on so Perez-Ago te (1986,
88-92) hol ds tha t silence on th ese matters was especially cha racter-
istic in the Basq ue region an d can par tly explain th e sing ular ex-
tr em e course of Basq ue nationalism. In the Ba ltics, littl e was said
officially abo ut the pe riod of " bourgeois inde pen dence" altho ugh,
privately , the secret Mo lotov -Ri bben trop accords th at ro bbed the
Ba ltics of thei r inde pendence were well know n . Beginn in g in the
late 1960s, Lithu ani an stude nts b egan to form "e thnogra phic study
gro ups" in or der to ex plore th e mut ed- or offi cially distorted -
aspec ts of recent his tory . T hese gro ups function ed as cover or gani-
zatio ns for nation alist activi ties, much lik e ex cursio nis t groups
(hikin g and ou ting club s) in Ca talo nia and Eu zkad i. In C atalonia,
excursionisme displayed a st ro ng nat iona list o rientatio n prio r to the
C ivil War. Aft er th e wa r, m ost were close d, but th e ones that were
able to rem ain (eith er b y dupli cit ou s assent to Francoist ideology
or th e patron age of well-placed ind ividu als) of ten pro mo ted the
cland estin e stud y of histor y , literatur e, and the Ca talan ton gue
un der th e inn o cuou s cove r of ma p-m aking, geograp hy, or archae-
olo gy classes (joh n ston 1985) . To a lesser ex ten t, sim ilar strategies
were foll owed by the Ba sque ou ting g ro ups called mendigortz ales.
In Lithu ani a, studen t ethnog ra ph ic gro ups, in addi tion to the
Ne w Social Movements and Old Regional Nat ionalisms
273
"bourgeois " promotion of national culture , collect ed docum enta-
tion on the period of independence and on the anti-S ovi et resis-
tance. Eventually their cov ers were penetrated by th e secr et poli ce,
and they were suppressed (Vardys 1978, 173).
There is also evidence of a subcultur e in the western Ukrain e
that persisted despite th e most int ense repression. Th e Ukr ainian
Uniate church , a Catholic church of the Gr eek rite , w as outlawed
by Stalin after World War II, but rath er than acquiesce to its man -
dated incorporation into Russian Orthodo xy , Uniat e rit es were
adminst er ed in the deep est secrecy b y pri ests-at gr eat per sonal
risk -for forty years . Onl y in the late 1980s have their clande stine
practices becom e widel y known. With neither buildings nor for -
mal organization , the central locus of th e Uniate church was the
family an d close circl es of friends (Marku s 1975 , 108).
Like Lithuania , Ukrainian nationalists see the Un iate chur ch
both as a symbol of national subordination and national resiliency.
Even nonbeli eving nationalists and dissid ents have adopt ed the
Un iate cause because of its close identification with th e people
of the region (Bociurkiw 1975, 73). While the intense repr ession
direct ed at the Uniat e church distinguishes it from Euzkadi and
Catalonia (where the church enjoy ed privil eges under the Franco
regime), and from Lithuania (wher e repression , while severe at
times, was generall y less blatant) , in all cases church -ba sed groups
carried strong oppositional cred entials , and th ere were linkages
between the religious and secular oppositions .
In Latvia and Estonia, the merg er of Luth eranism and n ation -
alism is ind icated by the presence of Lutheran clergy and human
rights groups at nationalist rallies. While th e na tionalist-r eligious
link was evident prior to Gorbachev (parming 1977, 30-31), it
seems weaker than in Catalonia, Euzka di, or Lithuania. This may
be due to its mor e recent origin , dating the period of independence
between 1923 and 1939. Prior to independence, German clerics
were common in Estonian and Latvian Lutheranism, and th ey held
positions of power in th e ecclesiastical hierarch y .2
German influence in the Lutheran church par allels the subor-
dination of the Autocephalous Georgian Orthodo x church under
the Russian Patri archy bet ween 1810 and 1917 an d m ay accoun t
for a weaker religionationalist linkage there as well (Zeigl er 1987,
27; Melia 1971 , 237). Nevertheless, like Estoni a and Latvia, a de-
H ank Johnston
274
gree of symbiosis does seem to be pr esent . On e description of
Geor gian nationalism states that many of th e int ellig entsia have
been baptiz ed and display religious icons in their homes . Also,
reli gious rites are commonly ad m inistere d at burials. Th e report
charact eriz es these vestig es of Geor gian Orthodo xy as reflections
of nation al consciousn ess (Kolack 1987 :40), rath er than measures
of fealty to church do ctrin e." Th ere were stron g religiou s over-
ton es in a 1981 nationalist prot est comm emor ating th e restoration
of Georgian as an official language .
In Arm enia, th e ind epend en ce of Arm eno-Gr egori an Chris-
tianity from both Rom e and Orthodo xy has fost ered a strong
linkage between church and nation . Thi s has been reinforc ed by
centuri es of religiou s an d nation al pers ecution by th e Ottoman
Turks . Communal prid e is foster ed b y the kn owl edg e th at Arme-
nia 's conver sion to Christianit y in A .D . 301 pr edat ed Constantin e's
con version of Rom e by fift een years . D espit e th e stren gth of the
religious-nationalist link , an d - pa ra doxi cally - be cause of it, the
Communist party app arentl y held Arm enian Christianity to be
less of a thr eat than Islam, Catholici sm , Luth eranism, or Judai sm
becaus e it did not impl y allegianc es beyond Soviet borders. Also,
the Arm enian church had tradit ionall y been pro-Russian in re-
spons e to th e Islami c thr eat to the south an d east. Thus , th e Arme-
nian church was not onl y tolerated but support ed w ithin limits
that were liber al by Soviet standards .
Church-stat e relations in Armenia pr esent a pattern much
closer to th e Catalan and Basqu e Spanish cases during th e Franco
regime . In August 1953, Spain sign ed a Concordat w ith the Vati-
can whereby the church was granted virtua l fr eedom from state
control. At th e national level , thes e lib erties wer e purchased by the
church 's legitimizing blessing on Francoism, but in Euzkadi and
Catalonia it had the delegitimizing effect of fre eing lo cal churches
to more openly promot e national culture and to serv e as one of
th e few plac es wher e the nascent opposition could escape police
surv eillanc e. In Armenia, subordin ation of th e church to the state
was greater, and it has been noted that most Armenians were rec-
onciled to subordination to Mosco w as long as th eir church sur-
vived in on e form or another (Dadrian 1977, 328 ; see also Wixman
1982, 150). But like Catalonia and Euzkadi , this allow ed the
Ne w Social Movements and Old Regional Nat ionalisms
275
church to serve as a crucible of national culture where elsewh ere
similar manifestations of "bourgeois nationalism" were prohib-
ited. Activities at Montserrat provided opportunities for national-
ist expression during the severest years of Francoist repression ,
such as the anniversary celebrations of Virgin of Montserrat in
1947, the Eucharistic Conf erence in 1952, and the "rutas de Mont-
serrat" pilgrimages . In a similar manner, Armenian pilgrimages
to Etchmiadzin , Caesarea, and Tcharchaban combined religious
practice and ethnicity, and no doubt a modicum of secular discus-
sion in the atmosphere of discontent that prevailed in the 1980s.
This brief review strongly suggests patterns of ethnic identi-
fication in several republics of the former Soviet Union that paral-
lel those in Catalonia and Euzkadi . It presents a picture of ethnic
identity that derives from primary socialization in national , cul-
tural, and religious values . In the words of one Lithuanian ob-
server, "Preschool education , generally accomplished in the
home, is done in such a way as to nurture and develop a national
consciousness: to teach the language, th e customs , and the national
character " (Finkle stein 1977, 64) . Th ese are the social processes by
which nationalist movements maintain continuity with th e past.
While they were not found in all families, and while th ere were
variations in what was passed on , it makes sense that, in the East
as well as the West, this kind of socialization played an important
role among young adults who wer e particularly adamant about
their national id entity , and who demonstrated a prop ensity to
some form of militancy .
The key point concerning the new social movem ent perspec-
tive is that here, a central aspect of identity is ascribed by virtu e of
the web of social relations one is born into instead of defin ed in th e
course of p articipation in the movement . Nationalist subcultures
provide networks of association that can serve as vehicles of re-
cruitment and often persist into adult life. Insof ar as nationalist
movements remain social forces in modern societies, the cultural
and social media of primary socialization must be factor ed int o the
theoretical equation. While it lies beyond th e scop e of this discu s-
sion to specify how variations in the organization and substance of
these subcultures might affect mobilization , this is an important
area for further study .
Hank Johnston
276
Group Identi ty, Grievance s,
and Everyday Life
W ithin N SM s, th e definit ion of id entit y

wi thin den se networks of adheren ts is a key
motivation fo r participation. NSMs provide "new soc ial spaces"
where (predominan tely yo ung) like- m in ded persons seek th eir
own indivi duality in a comp lex and often contradic to ry wo rld.
They ex periment in new life- styles as assertions of their indi vidu-
ality th at lie ou tside accepted models . These activit ies com bine
into a way of life th at, altho ug h typ ically in volvin g only a sho rt-
term comm itme nt, never theless provid es a socia l arena where
many are able to define w ho th ey are .
T his is a view th at sta n ds in sha rp con tras t to th e mo del of
social moveme nt pa rtic ipa tion b ased on ration al choice. Bri efly,
th e ratio na list model proposes that an in div idua l chooses to partic-
ipate in a moveme nt if the per ceived ben efit s of action outweigh
th e cos ts . O lson (1965) p redic ted th at in lar ge m ovem ent s, most
peo ple wo uld not p arti cip ate if no t for " selective in centi ves" such
as ancilla ry be nefi ts of associa tio n an d cama ra der ie. Th e rational
acto r und er stand s that the additio n of on e othe r person to the
mo vem ent often has littl e effec t on th e m ovemen t' s suc cess. Fur-
th erm or e, ma ny peopl e w ill w ithho ld partic ip ation because they
w ill enjoy th e fru its of th e m ovem ent' s su ccess anyway; th ey be-
come " free - ride rs" on th e backs of active m ovem ent parti cipants.
This is an app roac h th at do es not really deal w ith qu estions of
identit y, alth ough selective inc ent ives of solidarity and cam arade-
rie impl y th e salience of social aspec ts of identit y bas ed on partici-
pation . B y the sam e tok en , th e self-int er ested indi viduali sm of the
ration al-ch oi ce m od el suggest s th at participation wo uld be quickly
termin ated if th e gro up failed to m eet one's identi ty needs.
Both th ese approa ches deemph asize th e n oti on of injust ice as
a force beh ind gr oup formation an d solida rity. Resea rch by Gam-
son , Fireman , and Rytin a (1982) dem on str ates th e close affinity
between an em ergen t sen se of inju stice an d grou p cohe siveness.
Base d on a seri es of in genious ex pe rime ntal situatio ns, th ey show
th at an em erge n t " injus tice frame" pro vides a vehicle by which
previo usly un conn ected ind ividu als can coa lesce to act collec-
tively . In thi s section, I argue th at th e stro ng quo tidia n basis of
nationa list grieva nces imp arts a hi gh degr ee of commona lity that
Ne w Social Movements and O ld Regional Nati on alisms
277
easily translates into nationalist solidarity and that establish es a
strong association between national consciousness and on e's social
identity. This stands in contrast to the NSM model that , despite
an emphasis on everyday organization and particip ant id entity ,
does not accord much weight to collective grievanc es. In the Span -
ish and Soviet cases, nationalist movements exhibit fundam ental
grass-roots qualities that reflect definitions of injustic e based .in
everyday life rather than in abstract political or historic claims
to autonomy . This is not to say that historically based political
programs are absent or that strategic and individualizing motiva-
tions (characteristic of rational choice and NSM models) never
playa role . Rather , based on pr eliminary comparisons, and in the
aggregate, they seem to play secondary and som etim es symbolic
functions in mobilization .
Fundamental to nationalist grievances is the way minority
status renders the na tional culture a problematic featur e of daily
life. In the context of economic and political subordination, daily
activities in the local language , predicated on shar ed cultural values
and norms of b eh avio r, are subject to conflict with the majority
culture. Encounters with the state, typica lly in th e persona of a
representative of the core region, cause numerous quotidian mo -
lestations that are easily interpreted in the context of national sub -
ordination. To put it another way , everyday life is th e arena where
the shared injustice frame is maintained and articu lated . Not only
because grievances are so widely shared but also because these
little injustices pertain in a most immediate fashion to one's way
of life, nationalist movements are characterized by a high level of
solidarity. Indeed , defense of a way of life may in part explain the
high level of emotionality typical of nationalist movements.
The empirical bas is of these propositions lies in my own
Catalan interview data and is supported by Perez -Agote's inter-
views in Euzkadi (1986, 158-80). In Catalonia and the Basque
region, prohibitions against the language and culture caused innu -
merable situations where wha t was typica lly unproblematic on an
everyday basis suddenly becomes an experience of discrimination .
In th e course of in terviews with Catalan militants, I was struck by
the frequent mention of apparently insignificant experiences in the
context of explaining one's nationalism. One respondent opened
his interview wi th a description of how, immediately after the
Civil War, he was forced to retake exams in Castilian while all his
H ank John ston
278
pr evious secondary education had been in Catal an. For a youth,
this w as no doubt a particul arly on erous polic y . He also described
th e traditi onal , Catholic, and politically rightist background of his
family , and how they welcomed Franco 's victor y. But the re-
gime 's an ti-Ca talan polici es rend er ed probl ematic what for him
had pr evi ousl y been unprobl ematic. This was his justification for
takin g up nati on alist militan cy , in spit e of a social background
that would other wis e pl ace him among stalwart Francoists .
Anoth er repr esent ative accoun t describ es how activities of
th e respondent's boy scou t tr oop were brok en up by Falangist
bullie s. Lik e m an y othe r de scribed events, th ese seem unimportant
in th e sweep of history th at includes civil war , class conflict, and
severe st ate rep ression, but th eir importance is suggested by the
fact that th ey were pr esent ed as ex planation s of w hy one pursued
nation alist mili tanc y .
For exa m ple, uh . . . th e Spani sh state had its ow n yo uth organiza-
tion , whi ch was Falan gist . Wh en Falan gists and Scouts met on the
tr ain , th ere always we re fight s. Wh en in th e year 1952, the Boy
Scouts org aniz ed for th e first time a rather important camp-out ,
m emb ers o f Franco 's gu ardi a cam e to br eak it up with clubs. All
thi s created a reacti on w ith th e kids, who ne ver had any political
dis cours es. We react ed again st , th at is, we got to be in favor of a
situation and agains t th e offi cial regim e. It wa s, let 's say, a very
natural form of this phenom en on being pr oduc ed.
Th e respondent reports that man y ex-sco uts became leaders in
the nationalist opposition; during th e democrati c transition , they
becam e political leaders in Cat alonia.
Other respond ents recounted similarl y mundane and per-
sonal occurr ences: the arrogance of a petty official , a railroad clerk
who refus ed to answer if addr essed in Catalan, insulting remarks
to one 's mother or father , or a shove from a Falangist bully . Often
remembered were several anti -Catalan ep ithets of those years,
"Speak Christian, Catalan Dog, " or " Spe ak the language of the
Empir e." These everyday encounters, seemingly minor but per-
haps traumatic for a youth, accumulated over time to tax the
patience of Catalans . It is also significant that although the postwar
years were difficult economic times for the middle class and work-
ing class alike, it is comments such as thes e rath er than m emories
of hardship and deprivation that are invoked during interviews .
Similarly, in Perez-Agote 's study of Basqu e militancy, many of
Ne w Social Movements and O ld Regional Nat ionalisms
279
his respond ents described repression by th e state app aratu s. Som e
of his interviews cont ain vivid and emotion al descriptions of how
the stat e pen etrated th eir everyday lives (1986, esp. 173, 180).
In the Sovi et Repu blics, similar mundan e griev an ces were
often at the heart of nationalist outbursts , even in a time prior to
glasnost. In 1978, there wer e violent riots at Alm a Ata uni versit y in
Kazakstan over adm ission s polici es. Similarl y in Tbli si, Georgi a,
students react ed violently to a 1980 law that mad e Russian th e
official languag e. It would be incorr ect to int erpr et thes e outbursts
simply as ex plosion s of pent -up nationalism . Rather , as w ith th e
Catalan resp ond ent who se ex am s were nullifi ed, nationalist grie v-
ances wer e synon ymous with everyda y grieva n ces: lan gu age an d
admissions policies directly affect ed th e dail y lives of the partici-
pants .
The every day basis oflinguistic conflict is esp ecially appar ent
when high immigration incre ases th e likelihood of int er ethnic
contact . C entr alized econ om ic planning stimul ated Russian and
other Slavic immigration into peripheral republics (Zaslavsk y
1980, 57- 64) and has drastically increa sed contact betw een locals
and immigrants since 1980. In Lithuania , immigrants compri se 20
percent of th e total popu lation , an d th e proportion is clos e to 50
percent in the capital, Vilnius . This pattern is sim ilar to Cat aloni a
and Euzkadi , where immigrants to urban areas constitute almost
half the population and about 30 percent in the regi on as a w hole.
In Estonia and Larvia, th e proportion of immigrants is higher, 34
percent and 46 perc ent, resp ectively. In Jun e 1986, ten thousand
Ukrainian and Belorussian refu gees from th e Chernobyl disaster
worsen ed already severe housing shortages and arous ed resent -
ment among locals who feared furth er deterioration of th eir stan-
dard of living.
Karklins 's (1986, 67, 112) respondents reported considerab le
ethnic tension on the every day level, especiall y in the Baltics (epi-
thets hurled on th e str eet and in public transportation, for exam-
ple), and a high level of ethn ic tension in the Soviet Arm y , part icu-
larly in th e lingui stic domain . This is aggravated by th e
superordinate status of the Russian nationalit y as the " big broth er "
among the " little brother" minority nationalities . Kathr yn Wool-
ard (1989) demonstrates with respect to C atalonia that un equ al
status relationships are easily transferred to bilin gual speech situ a-
tions by immigrants . Prior to ind ependenc e, th e Estonian parli a-
Hank Johnston
280
m ent passed law s requirin g Russia ns to learn Estonian an d m an-
dat ed the use of Estoni an on stamps, signs, repor ts, and
adver tisem en ts in tended for th e pub lic. Russian text can also ap-
pear, but it cannot be larger (Fisher 1989, 8). It was also rep ort ed
that in Tallinn, public sign s in Russian were obli tera ted wi th spray
paint (Keller 1988, 6). T he passage of simi lar lan gu age law s in
Moldavia , Georgia, an d o ther na tiona l repu blics sugges ts th at re-
sentm ent of lin gu istic subordination to Russian was wi despread.
With ind epend ence , vindic tive lin gu istic po licies can poison rela-
tions between lo cals and im m igr ant s.
Finally, dete riorating economic condi tio ns can aggravate
communa l con flict on the every day level. In Riga, th e capital of
Latvia , Sm ith (1979, 61) observes th at shor tages of hou sin g and
consume r amenities and lack of services cause d conflic t w ith Rus-
sian immigran ts . Simi larly, prior to Es tonian indepe ndence,
shortages of food and cons umer goo ds were blam ed on Russian
touri sts attracte d by the relatively high stan da rd of livin g and
Western am bience . Signs appea red in sto res requiring bu yers to
show proof of Eston ian residen cy in orde r to m ake p ur cha ses.
Whi le th ese are all seconda ry acco un ts, th ey never th eless sug-
gest h ow co m m una l confl ict is played out on an eve ry day level.
T hey also sugges t th e poss ibility of a relation ship between every-
day gr ievances an d two disting uishing features of nati on alist m obi-
lization . If the degr ee to w hi ch na tiona l subo rdina tio n penetrat es
quotid ian life is conce ptua lized as a variable, it m ay be associated
wi th th e emo tiona lity of nati on alism th e br eadth of nation alist op-
pos itio ns.
Fir st , scholars h ave for a long tim e not ed th at th e nationalis t
panth eon hou ses sym bol s th at are cap able of invokin g em otional
an d often violent respons es from the faithful. This is typi cally
ex plained by refer enc e to th e collective hi stor y an d sha red experi-
en ces of su fferin g th at th ese sy m bo ls repr esent . Whil e hist orical
m em ori es are certainly pr esent, passed throu gh th e subcultural
net work s discu ssed earlier, I also suggest th at cul tur al and politi cal
legacies are fur the r animate d by ever yd ay repression . Indeed ,
wi tho ut th e kind of mund ane reinforc em ent I have been describ-
in g , it is likely th at th e po wer of th ese sym bo ls wo uld dissipate
Ne w Social Movemen ts and O ld Regional Nati onalisms
28 1
over time . On the other hand , th e destabiliz ation of every day life
reinforces historical symbols and interpr etation s. The em oti ona l-
ism of nationalist movements is more comprehensibl e w he n one
recognizes that interruption of everyd ay busin ess repr esent s a
threat to one 's way of life: it is a disrupt ion of all that is taken for
grant ed. Besides family an d daily bread, it makes sen se that thi s
will be defended mor e vigorously than anythin g else.
Second , by breadth of nationalist oppo sition , I refer to th e
ability of nationalist movements to subsume other mo vem ents
under the nationalist banner. Although th e " grieva n ce of pr efer-
ence" among adherents may differ, varying between economic
discrimination, cultural preservation , ecology, or even feminist
and peace agendas, because the m edium of debat e and solidarit y
is the minority culture, a strong affinity between nationalist and
other grievances exists. This is often reinforced by the relationship
between certain grievances and immigration , such as when large
atomic pow er projects (in Ignalina , Lithuania, for example) will
require a large immigrant labor force, or the association of the
Soviet military with the presence of nonindigenous personnel
(hence the peace movement's proposal to make the Baltic region a
nuclear free zone) . In a minority national context, almost any
problem can be defined as resulting from the policies of the core
region; its just resolution can be found in the devolution of politi-
cal power to the region .
Examples are num erous. While the Ukrainian Republic party
demanded an independent Ukrainian state, it also called for the
establishment of a private market economy and the closure of
nuclear power stations (Los Angeles Times, May 1, 1990, A6). Sim -
ilarly, the Lithuanian Sajudis movement subsumed several smaller
dissident movements such as the Greens and feminists. Basque
nationalist Herri Batasuna receiv ed the support of antinuclear
groups, homosexual rights activists, and women's groups (Doug -
lass and Zulaika 1990, 250) . Because the national culture is the
media through which contact between groups takes place, and
cultural preservation and promotion goals of the larger move-
ment, there is a tendency to mute conflict between different sec-
tors , and to accentuate points of agreement.
Hank Johnston
282
Final Thoughts on Identity,
Grievances, and NSMs
These comp arisons between minority na-

tion alism s in Spain and th e form er Soviet
Uni on help to dr aw tw o important distincti on s between nationalist
m ovem ents and NSMs . First, nati on alist m ovem ents seem to
shar e a stro ng ascrib ed compon ent in th e form of a subcultural
base. Thi s is a sourc e of continui ty w ith the past th at is absent
in cont emp or ary an aly ses of most NSM s. Second, while both
nation alism s and N SM s h ave th eir found ation in the eve ry day life
of th eir adhere nts, th e key diff erenc e is th at th er e is a str ong sense
of inju stic e at thi s level amo n g n ational ist militant s that is absent
in m any NSM s.
Th e sha red issues of id entit y an d mund anit y have justifi ed
th e use of th e N SM m odel as a con ceptu al co un terpoin t in these
com pa riso ns. But becau se th e pr eceding pages h ave focu sed more
atte ntion on nation alist m obilizati on th an on N SMs , I close by
comp ensatin g for th e rel ative neglect . Spec ifically, I h ave in mind
how these two issues, ascribe d aspec ts of identit y an d th e mundan-
ity of grievances, sugge st new dire ction s for NSM research .
First, lik e nation alist m ovem ent s, th e choic e to advocate
peace, wo me n's issues, or eco logy tak es place wi thin a historical
con tex t w he re th e m eanin gs of th ese cho ices and th e param eters
of th e actio n th ey en tail are alre ady parti ally establishe d in the
pr evailin g cultura l mil ieu . While in part received an d constrained
th rou gh various cultural m edi a, th ese identit ies are further elabo-
rated w ithin th e dens e network s of m emb er ship th at NSM ana-
lysts have ident ified . T he NSM mod el em phas izes elabor ation
w ithin th e con tex t of th e gro up but deemph asizes th e histor ical
an d cultura l con tex ts of th ese mo vem ent s.
Mu ch may be gain ed b y reco ns ide ring th e cultura l an d histor-
ical legac ies of m any N SM s. It has been dem on strated , for exam-
ple, th at th e wo me n's m ovem ent in the U nit ed States has drawn
heavily on th e work of its pr ed ecessor s an d th at thi s con tinuity has
been o bsc ure d by th e waxi ng and wa ning of po litica l an d cultural
oppor tuni ties (Rupp an d Taylo r 1987). Simi larly , the root s of the
env ironmen tal move me n t lie in th e anti -industr ial roman ticism of
the nine teen th cen tury . N or is th e not ion of pac ificism any thing
new : it h as strong root s in religiou s sects like th e Qua ke rs and
New Social Movements and Old Regional Nati onalisms
283
Mennonites. In a different light, many NSM repertoires of conten-
tion draw on different and New Left protests of the 1960s, and on
the civil rights movement in the United States.
These links are particularly apparent when there is intergen-
erational continuity, as demonstrated with the 1960s Free Speech
Movement and the New Left in the United States , many of whose
militants came from families of the "Old Left." While familial
socialization and historical continuity tend to soften the "new-
ness" of the NSM model, researchers in the future should look
closely into the social backgrounds of NSM participants for pat-
terns of family influence and for the mechanisms of organizational
and cultural maintenance.
Second, NSMs emphasize everyday life within the movement
as the locus of identity formation, whereas nationalist movements
grow out of discrimination and repression regularly played out in
mundane affairs. These grievances give rise to a sense of common-
ality based on national identity that is general and widely shared
but not in itself sufficient to account for participation in the move-
ment organization. They must be distinguished from the social
processes that occur within the militant group whereby everyday
grievances are defined and amplified in the context of interac-
tion-strategy sessions and militant actions, for example. Indeed,
it makes sense that, being so widely shared, mundane grievances
of national subordination are placed in the background in favor of
more immediate, intense, and interactionally based experiences
that comprise participation in the movement organization. Under
these situations, like NSMs, social identities of nationalist mili-
tants are based on interaction within the group.
Clearly there is a strong association between the intensity of
interaction among participants and the degree to which their social
identity derives from those activities. What distinguishes the NSM
model is the disjuncture between movement adherence and the
background of participation embedded in grievances. Rather than
an emerging collectivity defmed by shared definitions of injustice ,
NSM participants come as individuals (and apparently leave that
way, too) in search of solidarity qua social identity among erst-
while strangers. This is what makes the NSM model so interesting
and provocative, but I suggest that the place of collective griev-
ances has perhaps been too easily dismissed.
Despite the emphasis on identity, it is important to note that
Hank Johnston
284
th e NSMs m ost frequentl y m enti on ed have some grievan ce base .
Furth ermor e, a qu esti on remains about th e degr ee to w hi ch, exp e-
rien ced at the eve ry day level, th ese gr ievanc es pr ovid e m otivations
for parti cipation. In th e wome n's mo vement , for ex am ple, th e
go spels of feminis m accordin g to de Be au voir and Friedan had
such a w ide reson anc e among wome n that sur ely th ey articulat ed
gri evanc es that were w idely felt . Simil arl y , th e connection be-
tween the str esses an d cong estion of modern urban life and partici -
pation in th e en vironme ntal movem ent sugg ests an injustic e frame
in which a w ide rang e of ever yday ex pe rien ce fits . Perhaps the link
is mor e sym bolic, as with antinuclear mobilizations repres enting
a fo cused point of prote st for th e innum erabl e mol estations of
mod ern urban life.
Th e gene ral point is th at quotid ian griev anc es may be funda -
m ental to p ro cesses o f gro up formation and solidarity. Especiall y
in early stages of m ovem ent formation , th e coll ecti ve ex pression
of grievan ces repr esent s th e eme rge n ce of colle ctivit y-cum-mo ve-
m ent and a pri m ary so urce of init ial coordination. To put it an-
oth er way , griev ance s are a part of th e social m edia that conveys
or ganiz ation w hile th e int era ction al b ase of id entit y formation and
solid arity are still being forg ed . Futur e NSM research might focus
on th e period prior to w hen th e indi vidual is full y int egrat ed into
int erperson al networks to see what k eeps him or her th ere. It m ay
be th at at this crucial jun ctur e, w he n the mov em ent itself is most
vulne rable, " old- time" con cepts lik e griev anc es and a sense of
inju stic e are decisi ve.
Notes
1. D ata for Ca talonia was collected as part of a larger study report ed in
John ston 1991. Eigh ty-t wo int ervi ew s wi th nationalist and work ing -class mili-
tant s were conducted in 1981, w hen Spanish demo cracy was not yet firmly
established and debates conce rning regional auto no m y for mi no rity nation alities
were still ragi ng . C hapter 2 in th at work provi des a detailed descripti on of meth-
odo logica l pro cedur es and int erviewin g strategies .
2. Whil e it make s sense th at the linka ge o f religion and nation deepens and
streng thens th e op pos itional subculture, the religiou s factor m ay not be neces-
sary . In Ca talonia , the im po rtance of the church partl y resided in its provision of
orga niza tional resou rces and ready-m ade networ ks for recrui tme nt and action
(john ston 1991, chap. 4). Sim ilar orga nizational reso ur ces can com e from other
sources, such as com m unity struc ture, cultural patt ern s of friendship and ac-
qu aint ance, and inform al profession al and int ellectu al gro ups , as found in Estoni a
Ne w Social Movements and Old Regional N atio nalisms
285
(see Taagep era 1983, 78). Also in Estonia , the role of chor al gro ups was signifi-
cant, hence th e " Singin g Revolution " of 1989.
3. It sho uld be noted that thi s study focus ed on the intelligentsi a, a gro up
that one might expe ct to have attentuat ed religious beliefs . It may be th at even
deeper religiou s sentiments would be found amon g less cosmopolitan social
classes.
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Rutger s Universit y Press .
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gimes . " Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 27, 1:32-47 .
Karklins , Rasma . 1986. Ethnic Relations in the USSR : The Perspectivefrom Below .
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Markus , Vasyl. 1975. " Religion and Nationality : The Uniates of the Ukraine . "
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Chapter 12
Greens, Cabbies, and

Anti-Communists: Collective
Action during Regime
Transition in Hungary
MateSzabo
Social movements under authoritarian sys-

tems have mobilization patterns and policy
outcomes that are very different from movements in pluralist de-
mocracies . On the one hand, social forces have "unlimited possi-
bilities" for articulating new issues because the inertia of official
politics recasts any challenge in terms of the broader drama of
democracy versus authoritarianism. In Eastern Europe, the result
was the existence of some very limited initiatives that had public
and intellectual significance disproportionate to the small number
of supporters. These small groups set an example: they showed
how small, powerless groups could become capable of articulating
very important - even crucial- but neglected sociopolitical issues.
On the other hand, mobilization under authoritarian systems
is hampered by the administrative -bureaucratic environment and
the use oflegal and illegal means of social control. Otthein Ramm -
stedt (1978) observes that movements can fail to develop at all
stages of their "life -cycles." In East Central Europe, it was com-
mon that social mobilizations were often stopped and dispersed
before reaching the phase of fully developed movements . Move-
ment "initiatives" and "quasi" movements that could not expand
because of political pressure were often transformed into isolated,
self-contained subcultures, sects, and political -social groups.
In East Central Europe, the transformation of the sociopolitical
system posed challenges to former "oppositional" movements. Their
very identity, existence, and strategic -ideological character were
rooted in the ancien regime, and they had to change to keep up
with new sociopolitical environments . The result was that not all
oppositional movements of the state socialist past survived . The free
flow of the ideas and opinions relegated some of the earlier move-
Mat e Szab 6
288
ments to marginal positions . New , and even old, precommunist
social movements emerged and reemerg ed, challenging the former
"challengers. " Between 1988 and 1990, all movements rearranged
themselves according to changing political opportunity structures
(McAdam 1982; Till y 1978; Neidhardt and Rucht 1991).
Som e social movements have undoubt edly benefit ed from
the extension of th eir mobilization possibilitie s, but this does not
automati cally m ean a growth in their resourc e capacities . On the
basis of the " equality of th e opportunities ," the y now must fight
for th eir " real" pol itical space within a new po litical syst em . There
is cons ensus among the new politica l forces that urgent social
problems be dealt with efficiently . Survival in an environm ent
of pluralist political competition is a hard task for many former
movements . Th er e is no longer a special reward for " he ro ic dissi-
dence ." Moreov er, ther e is a " scarcity of support ," and sharp
comp etition for th e limit ed amount of support ers . In this chapter ,
I compare two important social mobilizations in Hungary , one
under th e communists and on e after system transition, to demon-
strate th e effects of changing politic al opportunity structures on
prot est mobilization , and conversel y, th e variable effects mobiliza -
tion can have on the pro cess of political transition .
Stage s of Regime Transiti on

In general , the process of system transforma -
tion in East Central Europe had a similar
overall dynamic, although there were important national differences
(Szabo 1991). Three charact eristic steps can be identified . Th e first is
the time of crisis, when the destabilization of the old political institu-
tions and elites and the em ergence of new political forces occurred .
In this phase, elite strategies interacted with the dynamics of the
protest. The opening up of new political spaces, agreements on a
fram ework of transition, and division within the old elite between
conservativ es and reformers were the distinctive features of this
phase. Elite reaction was an important factor in the unity of new
politi cal forces. There was some kind of cooperation betwe en all
the new, noncommunist political forces , but the organizational and
strategic unity of these groups was usually temporary .
Th e next phase was the breakthrough p eriod wh en th e dissolu-
tion of th e com m unist monopoly on polit ical and adm inistrative
Greens. Cabbie s. and Anti-Communists
289
power was completed. With the exception of Romania, this oc-
curred typically through negotiation and nonviolent mobilization ,
although there were differences between countries about whether
mass mobilizations were necessary to push the communists to
bargain and to accept compromise. National unity was repre-
sented in "umbrella organizations," in all-embracing "national
fronts," and in roundtable talks by all national political forces .
Traditional institutions and nationally recognized dissident figures
were accepted as symbolic and integrative forces of the new politi-
cal community. These functioned as temporary arrangements ,
however. With the advent of free elections, former movements of
"national unity" dissolved, and the organization of "national
fronts" began their transformation into to multiparty systems .
Institutionalization of a new political system also followed
similar patterns: constitutional change, free elections, and differ-
entiation of the new political forces between the poles of the gov -
ernment and the opposition . The distribution of power occurred
according to the recently established "rules of the game" in consti-
tutional-liberal democracies. Emergence of party systems was an
important step in the institutionalization process . With free elec-
tions, the distribution of power and the formulation of national
policy concluded in new institutional structures that represented
"national" interests within pluralistic, conflict-based modern soci-
eties. It was a long and precarious journey from the "national
unity" embodied in the "umbrella organizations" and "round-
tables" of the breakthrough phase; completion of the institutional-
ization process remains distant for most Eastern European coun -
tries. Interest articulation must occur along the lines of political
cleavages, political ideologies , and institutionalized political struc-
tures, but this has often been a highly unstable and volatile pro-
cess. Stabilization of new institutions and acceptance and internal-
ization of the rules of the game by the emerging political culture
are long-term processes.
Regime Transition in Hungary

Since 1956 there has been considerable po-
litical stability in Hungary . Elsewhere, a
scarcity of food and consumer goods provoked discontent and
protest, but in Hungary a type of "consumer socialism" had
emerged since the 1960s. Kadarist economic policy secured a regu-
Md te S z abo
290
lar supply of the con sum er goo ds an d accept able levels o f welfare
and health services; co m pa red to othe r soc ialist countr ies, livin g
standa rds in Hun gary were hi gh . Th is " pa tern alist" orien ta tio n of
th e welfa re state stabilized co m m unis t Hun gary for decades
(Bruszt 1988, 23- 47); but stabi lity was secure d by ex tre mely high
foreign debt . Op enn ess to th e West pr ovoked " rising ex pec ta-
tion s" th at were eventually di sapp oint ed by th e inevi tabl e turn of
econo m ic fort un es.
Kadarist poli cies also aide d th e developm en t of a limit ed civil
soc iety (Frentzel-Z ago rska 1990). T he stru cture of th e Hun garian
opposi tiona l subculture (john ston 1991, 49-54 ) w as m or e frag-
m ent ed , m or e int ellectu al, and less tied to chur ches or workers'
gro ups. Thi s im pede d th e crea tio n of " um brella o rga niza tions"
(like Solidarity in Poland) to repr esent nati onal cons ciou sness and
miti gated th e int ensit y of th e crisis stage considerably . It also con-
demn ed th e Hungarian oppos itio n to only temp or ar y unit y of
oppos itional gro upings for bar gainin g w ith th e Hun gari an Social-
ist Work er s part y (Kor osen yi 1991).
D espite th e abse nce of stro ng na tio na l unit y orga nizations,
sym bo lic issues of a national sco pe played an imp ort ant role in the
tr ansfor m ation to dem ocracy . T he re were seve ral large m obiliz a-
tion s dur ing 1988 and 1989: commemo ra tio n of th e Hun garian
revolu tion of 1956, a dem on str ation durin g th e reburi al of its
leader Imr e N agy , an ti- Cea ucesc u pro tes ts, and a dem on str ation
on th e anniversa ry of th e Hu ngari an revolut ion of 1848 (Murav-
chik 1990). D ur ing th e br eakth rou gh ph ase, jo int action of rele-
van t op pos itio na l gro ups was esta blishe d , and th eir di vision s were
held in abeya nce in th e co m mo n an tico m m unist strugg le. How-
eve r, as th e new Hun gari an gove rn me n t becam e instituti on alized,
th e unit y of th ese var io us opposi tiona l gro ups dissolved . Di vision
fir st occ ur re d during th e roundt abl e talk s in th e sum me r of 1989
w hen conflict ove r a stro ng pr esiden cy (in th e Poli sh patt ern)
eme rge d. Radi cal lib eral dem ocrats orga nized a success ful plebi-
scite again st a bar gain bet ween populi sts an d reform co m m unists
on a stro ng and dir ectly elected pr esid enc y.
Co m pa red with other form er soc ialist countri es, th e Hun gar-
ian br eakthrou gh was mor e a change of elit es and less a m ass
move me n t (Tok es 1990). Thi s had th e adva n tage th at viole n t con-
flicts bet ween th e polic e and masses were avoide d; on th e other
hand , no affective loyalty toward new lead ers and inst ituti on s was
Greens , Cabbies, and Anti-Communists
291
developed. Compared with other former socialist countries ,
where mass protests and violent conflicts raised a new democratic
consciousness, Hungarians in 1990 felt more alienated from the
new politics .
The institutionalization phase was impeded in Hungary by
the differentiation of oppositional movements (Schopflin 1979)
and the emergence of a fragmented party system (Korosenyi
1991). The electoral campaign was already under way when dis-
agreements about the presidency and sharp conflicts between the
nationalists, liberals , and socialists were taking place. While the
Hungarian party system is an adequate and relatively stable repre-
sentation of plurality within civil society, the rather weak presi-
dency and the absence of national unity organs on the level of
party system have impeded the institutionalization of a stable dem-
ocratic government (Korosen yi 1991).
The existence of democratic institutions does not necessarily
insure a political culture that regulates pluralist competition. At
first, mobilization against the old regime united all new political
forces. But during the process of democratization, competition in
elections and, later, in Parliament made it clear that compromise
and tolerance were in short supply. A high degree of "ideologiza-
tion" that recycled political conflicts from the interwar years oc-
curred in the parliamentary debates (Schopflin 1991, 60-68). Ef-
forts at holding consultative meetings between all parliamentary
parties were blocked by sharp tensions between liberals and Chris-
tian nationalists. The "camp mentality" of conflicting parties hin-
dered any cooperation in the public sphere. When programs to
rationalize the economy and reduce domestic consumption were
combined with the shocks of marketization and privatization/re-
privatization and with the collapse of the communist trade bloc ,
COMECON, social stability was severely challenged (see Burszt
1988, 716-29) . It was not possible to organize concerted action
among the political parties when the new regime encountered its
first major crisis: the taxi driver blockade .
The changing political opportunity structure in Hungary re-
defmed the political space for social movements in a very short
period of time. Political possibilities and mobilization capacities
changed through the three stages of system transformation , and
new movements emerged alongside or took the place of former
opposition groups. This was demonstrat ed in the evolution of a
MateSz abo
292
major ecology pr ot est, th e Danube movement, that occurred dur-
ing the crisis period in Hungar y. Its rapid m obiliz ation and success
can be attribut ed to th e peculiar shape of the crisis sta ge in Hun -
gary , while its rapid demobilization deri ves from radicall y chang -
ing political o ppo rtunities during th e br eakthr ou gh stag e.
The Danube Protest: Mobilization

during System Transition
Th e Hungarian ecolo gy movem ent was
born in th e mid 1980s (S6l yom 1988), but ,
given th e con str aint s of m obilizing und er th e on e-par ty stat e, it
never attaine d an int egrat ed organizati on . Rath er , it exist ed in the
form of un conn ected loc al citizens' initiativ es, sin gle- issue groups ,
and alterna tive life-style communiti es. Unlik e ecolog y mo vements
in Franc e and West Ger m any in th e 1970s , th ere w as no unif ying
antinucl ear gro up in Hun gary , desp ite Ch ernob yl and the scandals
surroundin g th e onl y Hungarian atomic po wer pl ant in Paks .
Th e big gest citizens' initi ative durin g th ese ye ars w as mobili-
zation aga ins t th e Hun gari an-Cz ech D anub e po wer plant at Bos-
N agym aro s, which w as fin an ced on the Hun garian side with
credit from th e Austrian go vernm ent and built b y Au strian firms .
Her e, too, p oliti cal inte gration und er th e br oad canop y of an or ga-
nized ecology m ovem ent wa s not achieved . B eginning in 1984,
plans for th e po wer station wer e cha llen ge d by a vari et y of groups:
The Blues , Friend s of th e Danub e, Allian ce for th e D anub e, and
th e Danub e Circl e. Th e Danub e Circl e disput ed th e proj ect 's eco-
nomic viability , qu estioned th e state's arg u me n ts that th e proj ect
was indi spens able to th e power suppl y , and criticized th e immens e
squ and erin g of ene rgy within th e Hung arian econo my. Abov e all,
th e pr oject was oppos ed for its catastrophic eco log ical conse-
qu en ces. Uniqu e flor a and faun a were en dange red, an d th e supply
of dri nking w ater was thr eatened .
Th e opp osition to th e D anub e power statio n orig inated
am ong a gro up of specialists w h o went pub lic afte r th ey criticized
th e pr oject w ithin th e scien tific commun ity. In 1984, a Com mi ttee
for th e Da nube collected ten thou sand signa tu res on a prot est
lett er to th e com m unis t gove rn me nt . Officia ls reacted w ith an
array of repr essive m easur es th at ran ged from hin der ing th e collec-
tio n of sign atur es and fo rbidd in g dem on str ation s an d publ ications
Green s, Cabbie s, and A nt i-Co mm unists
293
to firing individual activists . The official press barely covered chal-
lenges to the power station; it did so only through indirect allu-
sion . As a result, the Danube Circle published an unauthorized
magazine, and otherwise had to rely on reports in the under-
ground press of the democratic opposition . All attempts by civil-
ian environmentalists to form some sort oflegal organization wer e
blocked, which had the effect of closing off sources of funding
from international environmental groups. Demonstrations were
forcefully dissolved by the police. Signed petitions for a referen-
dum were regularly confiscated by the police. Finally, when th e
Hungarian government received massive financial assistance for
the project from Austria, the movement was weakened to the point
of marginalization.
Both analysts and activists have realized that in an authoritar -
ian system there is but scant political space for single -issue move-
ments challenging the state (Haraszti 1990, 71-88) . Yet, mobiliza-
tion in an authoritarian context paradoxically gives rise to an
unanticipated but often quite powerful symbolic resource . Because
activists must fight restrictions on freedom of association, press ,
information, and limitations on other basic civic rights, the asser-
tion of a particular grievance can be recast as part of the more
general democratic opposition. This was first appar ent with re-
spect to the Danube Circle in 1985 when , prior to parliamentary
elections, several movement activists joined with other dissidents
and for the first time presented themselves as independent candi-
dates . This paired the environmental movement with the broader
oppositional forces, and placed it in the avant-garde of the re-
emerging civil society in Hungary. It provided a forum for politi -
cal decision -making, participation, and public criticism of the re-
gime . This process gathered further momentum in 1988 when,
assisted by Kadar 's fall from power and by a more liberal stanc e
among the renewed political leadership, the hydroelectric project
became largely congruent with the division between those who
blocked and those who supported the process of democratization .
In May 1988, five thousand people demonstrated in front of
the Austrian embassy in Budapest against Austrian participation in
the building of the Danube power station. Reflecting th e changin g
political environment, this was the first time that a mass demon -
stration was tolerated . Mor eover, it was fully reported on Hungar-
ian television ; subs equently , the official press began to report the
Mit e Szab6
294
power project from a more critical perspective. In June , on the
parliamentary initiative of an independent member of parliament ,
twenty -three votes were cast for the cessati on of building on the
Danube . In September , thirty -five thousand people demonstrated
in Budapest when Austrian firms speed ed up work on the projec t.
These mobilizations were rallying points for broader de-
mands of democratization . Thematically specific grievances of the
Danube citizens' initiatives merged over the years with a general
rejection of the system by the democratic opposition ; the demon -
strations reinforced the self-confidence of the opposition. This
occurred even in the absence of immediate concr ete success , for
just one month lat er Parliament once more backed continuation of
the power project . For the time being, the campaign could not
achieve its goal, but its activities speeded up the process by which
the legitimacy of the parliament was challenged and the deficien-
cies of the prevailing constitutional fram ework wer e made abun-
dantly clear.
During 1989, the structure of political opportunities changed
rapidly in Hungary . Th e new reform-minded government of
Mik los Nem eth halt ed construction of th e Danube project in order
to regain legitimac y for the new government . Party reformers
tri ed to distanc e themselves from the conservative forces arou nd
th e party secretary Grosz , but by then it was too little too late.
Th e rehabilitation and reburial of Imre Nagy later that year indi-
cated that th e fall of the regime was under way . Already there was
a rapid ly growing opposition organized into parties that were
about to push through democratiza tion at roun dtable negotia -
tions .
Thi s marked a tur ning point for the Hungarian ecolog y
movement . After the decision to suspend new construction , the
political debat e was channeled in other directions . The main point
of crystallization was the roundtable bargaining between the Hun-
garian Workers' party and the "United Opposition " during the
sum me r of 1989, in whi ch the ecology mov em ent was not an
activ e particip ant . Many former activists left th e " um brella" of
th e Danub e prot est for oth er " real" and " m ore relevant" political
organizations and issu es. Ev en th e prot est coordin ation offices
were closed in th e sum me r of 1989. All th e new political parties
th at had support ed the Danub e protest befor e-e xplaining its
spectacular victo ry - turn ed to oth er matt ers- explaining its sub-
sequent dissolution as well.
Greens , Cabbies. and Anti-Communists
295
Because the ecological movement largely took the form of
small associations prior to the democratic transition , it was not
well situated to make the transition to a party organization . These
groups did not set up a broader network beyond protest coordina-
tion. Although they were united in opposition to the project , they
were often divided on other issues . A small group of former activ-
ists set up a Green party, but after the "Danube battle" had been
won, there were not many possibilities left for them in the election
campaign . The Green party received only 3.7 percent of the votes
on a national level in the elections of spring 1990, which was not
sufficient to secure parliamentary representation .
Today there is a wide range of ecological groups that form a
spectrum from loose local amalgams and temporary protest
groups to institutionalized and stable organizations . Still, ecology
remains on the margin of the new politics in Hungary, where
problems of economic and public policy seem much more imme-
diate. Problems of economic growth are urgent, and the so-called
postindustrial tasks of the ecologists, reducing growth and con-
sumption, are not likely to be mobilizing issues . The change of
the political opportunity structure and of relevant sociopolitical
issues, together with the dissolution of the protest issue as a "yes-
no question ," resulted in the marginalization of the Danube pro-
test movement. It was one of oldest and most successful protest
movements in Hungarian politics; it was a protest movement that
survived Kadarism, realized its protest goal, and enjoyed tempo-
rary political support of all relevant oppositional forces, yet it no
longer has a secure place in the new Hungarian democracy.
It was the changing political situation and not the organiza-
tional-strategic skill of the Danube Movement that was the pri-
mary determinant of success, that is, bringing an end to construc-
tion of the power plant. The dynamics of system transformation
thrust the Danube issue into the oppositional consciousness,
where it was an important theme uniting the extraparliamentary
opposition against the party state. For the major opposition
groups, the Danube project was a core symbol of democratization
processes in their protest activities. The symbolic role of the Dan-
ube protests and, ultimately, the limited capacities of the ecology
movement itself became very clear once success was achieved and
transformation of the state brought other issues to political center
stage.
MaleSzabo
296
The Taxi-Driver Blockade: Protest
in a New Democracy
The declaration of the Hungarian republic

on October 23, 1989, the thirty-third anni-
versary of the anti-Stalinist revolution of 1956, was an important
event in the democratization of the former Soviet bloc. Just one
year later, on October 26, 1990, the first crisis of the new Hungar-
ian Republic occurred . It took the form of a blockade of streets
and highways by taxi drivers and private truckers in protest against
a large increase in fuel prices. The blockade paralyzed the new
democracy for three days; it provoked an atmosphere of fear, ten-
sion, and aggression until an eleventh-hour compromise was
worked out. Rather than an organized social movement along the
lines of the Danube initiative , the blockade was a collective protest
of relatively short duration . Its relevance derives from its occur-
rence during the institutionalization phase of the transition and the
way that a relatively circumscribed event reverberated throughout
Hungarian politics and posed a serious challenge to the govern-
ment . There was a set of opportunity structures unique to the
institutionalization phase, and they both influenced the course of
mobilization and were altered in the resolution of the crisis.
The sudden and drastic raising of fuel prices on the night of
October 24, 1990, provoked a spontaneous and illegal demonstra-
tion. Mass actions emerged from discussions between private driv-
ers and entrepreneurs who were queuing up at stations late that
night. Protesting drivers first drove to the parliament building
hoping to open negotiations to restore prices to previous levels.
When their appeal was rejected, they moved to block all main
traffic routes in the country . The blockade developed quickly the
next day and almost all traffic was stopped throughout the coun-
try, including all international transport. The blockade was main-
tained all of Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, with some breaks for
medical and food supplies. During these three days the atmosphere
was electrified: people bought the stores empty and feared violent
conflict. Supporting protests were joined by masses of poor people
who were generally protesting worsening living conditions.
The government, backed by a strong coalition of Christian-
Democratic parties, at first rejected all bargaining with illegal pro-
test groups and threatened them with police intervention and ar-
Greens . Cabbies. and Ant i-Communists
297
rests. In the face of mounting protest, the police and army refused
to intervene, and they sided with the protesters . In the streets ,
there was a solidarity between the protesters, the police, and the
local population that reinforced discipline and order in the pro-
tests . No remarkable acts of violence were reported, despite prov-
ocation by a " counterm ovem ent" mobilized by the governing
party , the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fo-
rum, or MDF). Where there were confront ations , the police pre-
vented violence from erupting .
A compromise between the protest groups and the govern-
ment was worked out on Sunday night in order to secure a normal
start of the work week the next day . The rise in the fuel prices was
reduced 35 percent. There was also an agreement to ease fuel
prices in the future and connect them to prices on the world mar -
ket . Protest groups promised to remove all traffic barricades by
the morning, and a promise of an amnesty for all the protest
groups was given, although it had to be approved by parliament .
The compromise had been worked out in an extremely tense at-
mosphere while the social and political workings of the country
were stalled for three days.
The taxi drivers, as the main activists of the protest, were
commited to the single issue of fuel prices; but political organiza-
tions supporting the protest recast the mobilization into a more
general criticism of state policy. They even demanded the resigna-
tion of the government . At the grass-roots level, too, in talks and
discussions around the blockade points, participants voiced more
generalized grievances against the government; they shifted the
single issue of fuel prices to "social self-defense" against the "anti -
social" economic policies of the government. Thus the blockade-
wholly spontaneous and begun without any broader political ob-
jectives - became a serious delegitimizing threat to the new
Hungarian government (see Table 12-1).
The taxi driver protest presents a very special form of politi-
cal opportunity structure for the articulation of social -political
protest . The political system had been very recently democratized ,
and the institutionalization process was not yet complete. Legiti-
macy of the new government derived in part from recent antiau -
thoritarian and anticommunist mobilizations, but the newly estab-
lished political institutions were untested and unstable . Elites were
less experienced in political problem -solving and crisis manage-
MateSz ab6
298
Table 12-1 Citizens' Evaluation of Taxi-Dri ver Blockade
Percentage
Questi on Yes No Don 't Know
Do you think the majorit y of citizens

support ed the taxi drivers during the
crisis? 78 73
Were th e taxi drivers concerned only

with th eir own interests? 12 84 4
Did the taxi drivers represent public
opinion? 72 22 6
Note: Th ese public opinio n question s were posed to about on e thou sand citizens by tele-
phone imm ediately after the crisis by Ma gyar Kozvelemen ykutat o Intezer (1990,
597- 98).
'Refers to tho se w ho felt the majorit y support ed governme nt.
bRefers to tho se who felt the " majority supported neith er ."
ment, and many evinced a political style rooted in the authoritar-

ian past . There is virtually no tradition of democratic authority in
Hungarian history (Volgyes 1987, 191-213); on the other hand ,
rebellion against the state is part of the political mythology , espe-
cially since 1956. The combination of these elements produced a
certain ambivalence among some elites toward social protest, and
among others, outright rigidity . Still others, drawing on past tra-
ditions and on recent experiences in the anticommunist opposi-
tion, especially opposition groups and parties, saw protest mobili-
zation as a positive political force. The political opportunity
structure in Hungary can be summed up in the following way :
• A certain degree of openness toward social protest among some

sectors
• Unstable political alignments between parties
• Political volatility of support groups, trade unions , interest
groups, small parties, and other social groups in the newly con-
gealed civil society
• Division among the political elites
• Restricted possibilities of political-administrative control by the
government
The existence of a differentiated/pluralized political opportu-

nity structure is an innovation in Hungary, but it provided a highly
Greens , Cabbie s, and A nt i-Co mmunists
299
restricted opportunity structure-albeit restricted in different ways
from the authoritarian past-for protest movements . The result
was a series of events surprisingly similar to the expansion of goals
in the Danube protest movement even though the political cont ext
had radically changed.
Mobilization during regime transition can transform initial
and specific themes of protest into " rnetaconflicts" that transcend
the original aims of the movement and can be said to reflect the
way the broader society interprets its "real" meaning. Significant
actors in redefming a movement are the mass media; count er-
movements; and agents of control such as the police, army , and
quasi-official thugs and vigilante groups (Neidhardt and Rucht
1991, 459). In crisis and breakthrough phases, this kind of frame
bridging and frame expansion (Snow and Benford 1988) was ac-
complished through the participation of broadly based umbrella
and national unity organizations. Their central role was clearly
demonstrated in the Danube movement by its rapid disintegration
once these groups staked out their positions in the newly emerging
political environment. In the institutionalization stage, the " m eta-
conflict" of the taxi-driver blockade was generated by the unre-
sponsiveness of the government in the face of continued socioeco-
nomic deterioration.
Mobilizations during the institutionalization phase challenge
governments that are ill-equipped to deal with crisis . The taxi
drivers initially wanted to reach their limited, single-issue goal
through an aggressive protest, but inexperience and the unavail-
ability of established channels for managing pluralist competition
and protest embedded the narrow goal in a broader set of de-
mands, which were articulated by the mobilized parties : interest
organizations, mass media, and sectors of the public. The result
was a government reaction that in many ways parodied the author-
itarian past. Events were destabilized by initial refusals to negotiate
and by calling out the police and army. They were further aggra-
vated by the mobilization by the Christian Democrats of a
countermovement that bordered on vigilantism. Finally, there
were attacks on the media. Because the main parts of the talks
were broadcast live by the mass media, they produced a situation
that was highly challenging to the governing Christian-Demo-
crats. Broadcasts of the negotiations led to charges of disloyalty ,
and the government attempted to control the media by adminis-
Mdt e Szab6
300
trative means . In th e summer of 1991, th e prim e minister ap-
point ed n ew vi ce-presidents to the stat e-owned networks to coun-
terbalance liberal influenc es, but the stat e president refused to
authorize the appointments. Onc e again, in th e pr ecarious context
of the institutionalization of democratic legalit y , th e crisis was
broaden ed-or rather detoured -to embrac e intense political con-
flicts b etw een th e opposition Lib erals an d th e Christian -D emocrat
gov ernment over the compet enc e of the pr esident and control of
the media (East European Reporter 1992 , 28-40) .
The key differenc e between th e late 1980s and post-transition
1990 was the tentativ e structure of adapti ve, policy-making chan -
nel s of politi cal con sultation that had eme rge d in the first stages of
the institution alization ph ase. Tentativ e as th ese were , they were
em ploye d to negotiat e an end to th e crisis . In contr ast, mobiliza-
tion during the crisis ph ase led to capitu latio n by the gov ernment
that hastened th e downfall of the regim e, wh ereas resolution of
the blockad e, in som e w ays, can be said to have further institut ion-
alized democratic in stituti ons . Aft er initi al intr ansig ence and al-
most reflexi ve recours e to authoritarian solution s of the past , the
new Hungarian governm ent utiliz ed an establi shed consultative
organ , th e Council ofInter est Repres entation . Before the crisis the
Council had function ed nominall y as a forum for discussion about
social an d economi c policy betwe en emplo yees, employers , and
the government , but it had little political relevance . It became an
acceptable venue because it was legal and institutionaliz ed , and it
therefore implicitly support ed the legitimacy of the new state . By
the same token, the Council was acceptabl e to protest groups
because they could embed their particular demands in a broader
framework of public econ om ic and social criti cism .
Summary
Consideration of these two protest cam-
paigns in Hungary suggests that there are
considerable differences in the dynamics of mobilization for differ-
ent stage s in regime transformation . Possibilities for mobilization
wer e extend ed during the crisis and br eakthrough periods as polit-
ical institutions opened up and so cial and political protests spread
throughout the country . Later , revitalization of th e Hungarian
state and political life in general-esp ecially in local administra-
Gre ens, Cabbie s, and An ti-Com munists
301
tion, trade unions , voluntary associations, parti es, and repr esent a-
tive groups -channeled mobilization into part y comp etition in th e
local and national elections.
The Danub e protest was significantl y shap ed b y chan ging
politic al opportunit y structur es. After long years of politic al sup-
pression, the movement rapidl y reached its peak in 1988 an d 1989.
Th e susp ension of work on the dam and the pluralizati on of poli -
tics cut support for the issue , and , except for som e net workin g
and publi c relations activities, th e mass camp aigns did not last
beyond regim e transition .
The mobilization of the taxi-driver blockade occurr ed durin g
the institutionalization period in Hungary . Unlik e th e Danub e
prot ests , the taxi drivers ' prot est was pursu ed and legitimiz ed
within th e conte xt of a constitutional democrac y. Thi s w as th e
first tim e th at Hungarian politicians and intell ectuals had to deal
with questions of lo yalt y and legitimac y in a civil prot est . Al-
though branded by many as an illegal challenge to the new regim e,
the taxi-driv er prot est was broadly support ed by the Hungarian
public.
Changing politi cal opportunity structur es also affected th e
articulation of issues . The Danube prot est w as a mi xtur e of sym-
bolic prot est s against th e regim e and genuine ecologi cal conc erns
that echoe d protests in th e West against larg e energy projects. In
the taxi-dri ver blo ckade , ther e was no need for antire gime sym-
bolism . Rather , grie vanc es developed within and were primaril y
concerned with th e cont ext of th e em erging Hungarian de-
mocracy .
Ch anging political contexts prepared th e way for new politi-
cal actors . The Danube mov em ent organized through a slightl y
differentiated n etwork of informal groups and protest mo vem ents
that were reminisc ent of oppositional subcultur es elsewh ere (John-
ston 1991). These social networks formed the basis of an em erg ent
civil societ y that confronted a homogen eous , elite -dominat ed, au-
thoritarian state . As th e confrontation progress ed , a differ entiation
process occurred on both sides , resulting in a broad ened political
spectrum on the on e hand and a democratiz ed politic al-adminis-
trative system on th e oth er. Th e taxi -driver prot est occurred
within the conte xt of politi cal pluralism and a rapidl y differenti at-
ing civil society . Rather than a confrontation pittin g "s ociety "
against the " state," th e conflict took the form of a thr ee- way polit-
Mate Szab6
302
ical division alon g th e lines of " govern m en t, " "opposition," and
" ex tra- parliame n tary opposition ." In each of th ese three groups
th ere were instituti onaliz ed and informal political sub gro upin gs.
Although, on the surface , a single -issue m ovement backed
by the anticommunist opposition would seem to have little in
common with a protest of an organized prof essional subculture
against the social costs of the market econom y , the internal dy-
namics of these mo vements wer e surprisingl y similar. Both lacked
stable internal structures for mobilization; both suffered from a
lack of material resources; and , from the point of view of collective
behavior, both lacked strategic and organizational planning be-
yond the scope of th eir single issues . Nevertheless , both exp eri-
enced " w hi te-hot" mobilization and short-term successes; in the
longer term, th e lack of organization and resources led to an
abrupt end of the mobilization dynamics and rapid dissolution .
Any assessment of the impact of these two campaigns must
be placed in the cont ext of how social movements in transitional
regimes differ from those in Western democracies . Thes e protests
are benchmarks in the emergence of the new Hungarian democ-
racy, and constitut e learning proc esses for the political elite , pro-
test organizers , and the public. No one has long -term experience
with electoral effects of policy reactions to prot est movements .
The intermediary system of protest and the public feedback
through electoral choice is still in the making in East ern Europe.
Political institutions have not yet stabilized , and political parties
are still " m obilizin g parti es" with roots in mass mobilizations
against communist systems . The cultural background for new
political institutions is also em erging, and neither political institu-
tions nor political cultures are experien ced in conflict manage-
ment . The result is a tendency for transitor y, extrain stitutional
forms of bargaining and crisis manag ement.
Referenc es
Bruszt , Laszlo . 1988. " Political Orientati on in Hun gary . " Social Research 55, 1-
2:43-77 .
- - . 1989. " T he Dilemmas of Economi c Transition in Hun gar y. " Sudosteu-
ropa 38, 11-12 :716-2 9.
East European Reporter. 1992. 5, 1:28-40.
Frentzel-Z agorska , Janin a. 1990. " C ivil Societ y in Poland and Hun gar y ." Soviet
Studies 42, 4:759-77 .
Greens , Cabbies, and Anti-Communists
303
Haraszti , Miklos. 1990. "The Beginning of Civil Society: The Independent Peace
Movement and the Danube Movement in Hungary." In In Search of Civil
Society, edited by Vladimir Tismaneanu, pp. 71-88 . New York and Lon-
don : Routledge , Chapman, and Hall .
Johnston, Hank . 1991. Talesof Nationalism. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Uni-
versity Press .
Korosenyi, Andras . 1991. "Revival of the Past or a New Beginning? The Nature
of Post-Communist Politics." PoliticalQuarterly 62,19:52-75 .
McAdam, Doug . 1982. Political Processand the Development of Black Insurgency,
1930-1970 . Chicago: University of Chicago Press .
- - - . 1988. "MicroMobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Activism ." In
From Structure to Action, edited by Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi ,
and Sidney Tarrow, pp . 125-55. Vol. 1 of International Social Movement
Research. Greenwich , Conn .: JAI Press .
Magyar Kozvelemenykutato Intezet . 1990. "A politikai kozvelerneny 1990-ben ."
In Magyarorszdg Politikai Evkonyve, edited by Kurtan Sandor et al.,
pp . 597-98. Budapest: Economix. Rt.
Muravchik, Joshua , ed . 1990. "Democratic Transformation in Hungary ." Special
issue of WorldAffairs 151, 4.
Neidhardt, Friedheim, and Dieter Rucht. 1991. "The Analysis of Social Move-
ments: The State of the Art and Some Perspectives for Further Research. "
In Researchon Social Movements: The State of the Art in rtfstern Europe and
the USA , edited by Dieter Rucht, pp . 421-65 . Frankfurt am Main and
Boulder, Colo. : Campus Verlag and Westview Press.
Rammstedt, Otthein . 1978. Soziale Bewegung. Frankfurt am Main : Suhrkamp
Verlag.
Schopflin, George. 1979. "Opposition and Para-Opposition : Critical Currents in
Hungary, 1968-1978 ." In Opposition in Eastern Europe, edited by Rudolf
Tokes, pp. 142-87 . London: Macmillan .
--- . 1991. " C onservatism and Hungary's Transition ." Problemsof Communism
40, 1:60-68.
Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. 1988. "Ideology, Frame Resonance,
and Participant Mobilization." In From Structure to Action, edited by Bert
Klanderrnans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, pp. 197-217 . Vol. 1
of InternationalSocial Movement Research.Greenwich, Conn. :JAI Press .
S6lyom, Laszlo . 1988. "Citizen's Participation in the Environmental Move-
ment." Ijda-Dossier 6, 64:23-35.
Szabo, Mate . 1991. "Die Rolle von sozialen Bewegungen im Systemwandel in
Osteuropa : Ein Vergleich zwischen Ungarn, Polen und der DDR." Osterrei-
chischeZeitschriftfur Politikwissenschaft20, 3:275-89.
Tilly, Charles . 1978. From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, Mass .: Addison-
Wesley.
Tokes, RudolfL. 1990. "Campaign 90: A Midterm Report on Party Politics and
Elections in Hungary ." Siidosteuropa39,2 :110-19.
Volgyes, Ivan. 1987. "Political Culture ." In Ungarn. Sudosteuropa-Handbuch,ed-
ited by Klaus DetlefGrothusen , 5:191-213 . Gottingen : Vandhoek and Ru-
precht.
Chapter 13
Social Movements in
Modern Spain: From the
Pre-Civil War Model to
Contemporary NSMs
JoseAlvarez-Junco
This chapter compares three basic stages

in the development of forms of collective
action in modern Spain . I call the first stage traditional or classic.
Its beginning can be dated around 1890, the year that a universal
suffrage law was ena cted and the first May Day was celebrated .
The inaugration of universal suffrage made massive political par-
ticipation possibl e for the first time . May Day marked the begin -
ning of mass mobilization practices among the Spanish working
class. 1 The first stage culminat es in the Civil War of 1936-1939. A
modern stage comprise s collective protest actions arising under
late Francoism and the crucial years of th e transition to multiparty
liberal democracy . This stage developed after a "dormant " period
during which repression by Franco's dictatorship made impossible
any open political mobilization. Its beginning can be pinpointed
in the 1961-1962 miners' strikes in Asturias .? Its end came with
the first municipal elections in April 1979. The present stage can
be called postmodern. It began in 1979 or, more clearly, in Octo -
ber 1982, with th e resounding election victory of the Partido So-
cialista Obr ero Espafiol (PSOE) . This stage followed a transitional
period (1979-1982) , in which "mod ern" and " postm odern " traits
coexisted, but not without tension.
Contrary to the prevalent interpretation among historians of
social movements , I beli eve th e factor that genuinely marks and
differ entiat es the history of coll ectiv e protest in modern Spain has
littl e to do with class makeup , the absolut e or relativ e " dep riva-
tion " of th e peopl e mobiliz ed , or with th e socio economic goals
put forward . Rather , it involves the organization and degree of
development of th e state, th e participatory opportunities the polit-
ical system provid es, and, above all, th e political cultur e and self-
Social Movements in Modern Spain
305
perception of leaders and participants in the social-political strug-
gle that encourages them to avail themselves of such opportu-
nities.?
Social Movements in "Classic" Spain
The use of the term "classic" to designate

this stage is not without irony, for some of
the more widely held stereotypes about this historical period in
Spain were elaborated by non-Spanish romantic writers and art -
ists . The image they rendered -of a heroic people struggling for
freedom under brutal repression by medieval rulers -was so indel-
ibly etched that it came to be accepted by many as the "typical"
or "eternal" Spain . Forming an indispensable part of that depic -
tion were the anarchist and socialist movements, Jerez and the
Mana Negrajacqueries, Barcelona's Tragic Week and Ferrer Guard -
ia's execution in 1909, the convent burnings of1931, the October
1934 uprising in Asturias, and, above all, the Civil War.
Conversely, the most accepted perception among both Span-
ish historians and leaders and ideologues of movements in this
stage betrayed little romantic influence. This model was deeply
influenced by Marxism, which was dominant in academic circles,
which were largely hostile to Franco's regime, and among leaders
of social protests. This view can be summarized as follows: The
prime movers of collective protest actions are social classes, and
their actions are driven by common material interests and oppres -
sive labor conditions. Of the contesting classes, the revolutionary
class is the industrial proletariat. The "natural" representatives of
the proletarian movement are parties and trade unions, through
which the social group's interests achieve clear and faithful expres-
sion. Given that the ability to work is the only asset possessed by
those rising up against the established social order, the preeminent
tactic is, logically enough, the strike, which in confrontations of
the highest order is widened into the general strike. The "con-
scious" expression of the demands raised by the oppressed social
group's protest movement, regardless of how limited those de-
mands may be, form part of a globalizing "progressive" world
outlook or ideology. This means that every victory won through
popular protest is a step toward rooting out the cause of all social
Jose A lvarez-Junco
306
injus tice an d spee ding up th e arrival of th e free an d egalitarian
idea l in w hi ch hum an history will culminat e.
T he last tr ait of thi s m od el is that th e ba sic politi cal reference
in w hic h this social stru ggle develop s in m od ern societies is th e
bour geois revoluti on , w hic h is th e th e polit ical tran slation - both
conse quence an d agent at th e sam e time- of th e tr ansition from a
feudal to a capitalist mod e of production . Spanish lead ers and
ideol ogu es gen erall y tend ed to agr ee that bou rg eois revolution in
Spain h ad been " in com plete" (Alvar ez-Junc o 1985); as a conse-
qu en ce, politi cal stru gg le did not so clearl y revol ve aroun d the
bour geoisie-prol etariat binomial as in Europ e's most advanced
count ries. In stead , com plex allianc es betw een the proletariat and
mod ernizin g sectors of th e bourg eoisi e aros e again st an oligarchic
p ower bloc form ed from industrial and fmanc e capital's fusion
w ith th e old land ed aristocr acy . .
Und er th e rubric of " history of the labor mov em ent " or
" histo ry of Spani sh so cial mo vem ents ,"4 this model generated
su ch an enormo us numb er of studies th at it can be consid ered as
th e " inhe rited paradigm" in 1960s and 1970s Spanish historiogra-
phy . Th e mod el h as been th e object of vigorous critique for at
least a decad e now (Alvar ez-Jun co and Per ez Ledesma 1982) ; I do
not int end to add an ything to that debat e. Its problem s are man y
and deep , but no mor e so than those ailing classic histories of
labor m ovem ents in Fran ce or Italy.
What is surprisin g about the Spanish model , how ever , is its
rath er simplistic , mim etic regard for other European versions and
its longevity . This longevit y affected the developm ent of social
mo vements in the late Francoist and transition period . It becam e
the most widely accepted self-imag e for th e protagonist s of the
period 's social prot ests , notwithstanding that , by then , ongoing
social and political chang es and the em erge nce of new mo vements
wer e incr easingly expo sin g th e mod el's inad equac y. 5
Th e historians and social scientists who most clearl y per-
ceived th e p eculiaritie s of th e Iberian case were not Spanish . Even
tho se w ho accep ted M arxist social stru ggle as th e basic th eor etical
fram ework fus ed it with the rom anti c notion of th e uniqu en ess of
Spanis h hist or y. Iberian uniqu en ess wa s demonstr ated to them
b y , more th an an y othe r featur e, th e imp ort anc e an d persist ence
of anarchis m .
307
Anarchism is, indeed, a singularly important feature of Span-
ish history; also important are popular protests or phenomena
that were not labeled as anarchist. I suggest that, instead of social
struggle as explained in the "inherited paradigm," antipolititism
is the most characteristic and generic feature of labor and social
movements in Spain during the "classic" stage. As Santos Julia
puts it, "Spanish workers - both those in the CNT and in the
UGT - were characterized by their indifference to the political
form of the state and their hostility to political power, which
naturally gave rise to an absence of debate about the state and
conquering power and to the belief the revolution's entire content
lay in the administration of society by labor organizations. "6
Antipoliticism is defined here as the disdain for parliamentary
politics and reform . The goal of the Spanish workers' movements
was not to reform, nor even to take over the state, but to topple
it, or at least expose its weakness through blow s aimed at the heart
of the system . Even the moderate Socialist party, led by Pablo
Iglesias for more than forty years, concentrated its efforts in union
organization and strike activities . It considered its participation in
local and parliamentary elections only as a means for improving
its propaganda forums and possibilities . And, in spite of their
constant defeats, they stubbornly refused all offers made by "left
bourgeois" Republicans to enter in electoral coalitions before
1910. By that year, enough pressure had been put on the old leader
to force him to accept the coalition, and thus enter the Spanish
Cortes for the first time . Yet, the anti political frame of reference
was preserved among his successors. As late as in 1925, Largo
Caballero , the secretary of the socialist union, accepted an official
position offered by the dictator, Primo de Rivera, on the grounds
that all "bourgeois" regimes were similar and that the labor move -
ment should only be concerned with strengthening its organiza-
tion and its influence on social legislation (Ben -Ami 1978, 101-
27). When the Republic was instituted in 1931, working -class
loyalties were very unclear. The Partido Comunista de Espana
(PCE) contemptuously rejected the new Republic as a "bourgeois
farce"; the anarchists repeatedly rose against Republican govern -
ments, pressing for faster and deeper land reform (Malefakis
1970); and even the moderate PSOE engaged in an armed rebellion
in Asturias against the legal government when electoral results
Jose A lvarez -J unco
308
gran ted pow er to a con ser vati ve party in 1934 (julia 1977 ; Preston
1979) .
Thi s is n ot th e plac e to discuss th e com plex caus es of this
an tipo litical or an archistic tr end in Spanish labor m ovements. I
only list here som e of th e diverg ent int erpr etati on s off er ed by the
different histori cal schools on th e matt er, and I add a couple of
remark s. Th e tr adition al and romantic historian s root ed anarchistic
tend encies in m ysterious and indelibl e racial Iberi an peculiarities
(Diaz del Moral 1967; Br enan 1943; Castro 1954). Advocat es of eco-
nomic explanations tended to single out the coun try' s irregular and
insufficient industrial developm ent as the causal factor. Th ey focused
on the " failure" of th e industrial revolution, w hich was a result of
the "a bsence" or "incom plete nature " of th e bourgeois revolution. "
Above all, antipoliticism has been attribut ed to th e political structure
of th e Canovist Restoration , namel y, th e oligarchic and exclusionary
character of th e political syst em , the cacique clientele networks and
their mo ckery of th e recentl y achieved univ ersal suffrag e. In this
view, th ese factor s wi dened th e alienation of laboring classes and
generat ed radically antisystem forms of prot ests (Calero 1976; Bal-
cells 1980; Alvar ez-Junco 1986).
As for th e suppos ed Spanish innat e anarchistic tend ency , an-
archism was n eith er as constant a ph enomenon nor as deeply
root ed as is gen erally held. Befor e 1910, at th e earliest , Spain does
not pr esent anar chist featur es any more pronounc ed than , say,
France or Italy ." Nor should it be forgott en that oth er Europ ean
labor mov ements did not shed their antipolitical origins until very
late, basically on the eve of World War I. The question should
thus be seen as one of pac e, of lag , more than of any essential
exc eptionalism .
As for th e attribution of labor antipoliti cism to the politi cal
structur e in which th e movements develop ed , it is not as ob vious
as might first app ear. Were it so, antipoliticism should have spread
and stren gthene d und er Fran coism , a political system more closed
to popular participation than any oth er. Yet , ju st the oppos ite
occurr ed . Our assumption must therefor e be that an tipoliticism
wa s rooted in th e political culture develop ed by th e Spanish Left
itself, w h ich , following old mill enari an patt erns and per vad ed by
mid- nineteenth centur y rom antic revolut ionism , construct ed its
iden tity as an ene my of all " au th orities" an d th e liberator from
all oppresions.
309
The Reemergence of Social Mobilization
The 1936-1939 Civil War marked the cul-

mination and the end of the type of social
strife that had dominated the previous tumultuous decades of
Spanish history. General Franco's dictatorship broke that pattern
and initiated a new historical stage of mark edly different features .
Two phases of the long Franco era are usually distinguished;
each has a crucial , though very different , bearing on our subject.
In the first phase (1939-1959) the country lived through intense
political repression and a totalitarian attempt at ideological reori-
entation on a fascist model. Taken together, they proved brutally
effective in demolishing the inherited traditions of social rebellion.
During the second period (1959-1975), after having failed in its
effort to erect a new model of national " coexistence" on the ruins
of liberal-democratic and working-class traditions , the regime
poured its efforts into economic growth . Notable success in this
realm, aided by a favorable European period of expansion, kicked
off spectacular sociological changes in a few short years.
I do not attempt a detailed analysis or description of the
changes in Spanish society from 1959 to 1975. Simply put, by
1975, the dramatic increases in Gross Domestic Product and per
capita income, the geographical mobility of the population , the
redistribution of labor force, and the urbanization process made
Spanish society something altogether different from what it had
been only fifteen or twenty years before. 9
More important for our argument is that this social transfor-
mation was accompanied by major growth and increased effi-
ciency of the political apparatus. The nationalist totalitarianism
underpinning Francoism required a strong state capable of mold-
ing society along the lines demanded by the ideology. The combi-
nation of political repression and social paternalism required a
police force; a large, centralized civil administration; public ser-
vices; and a tax system with which to fund them. All this was
done in despotic fashion and at great cost , 10 but the state succeeded
in stamping its mark on society in an incomparably broader and
deeper way than ever before in Spanish history . By the 1960s,
oppositional forces aimed bitter criticisms at the economic polici es
of the desarrollistaor "developmentalist " governments, but those
very critiques implied acceptance of the necessity for the govern-
JoseAlvarez-junco
310
ment to have an industrial or commercial policy. The quality of
and waste in the public health-care system or the small retirement
pensions could also be criticized, but it would have been difficult
to convince Spaniards they could live without some type of gov-
ernment-administered welfare and social services system.
Thus , upon his death in November 1975, Franco left behind
a country that had undergone a dual process of "modernization. "
Social modernization was brought about by industrialization and
urbanization. Despite the lack of democracy, political moderniza-
tion resulted in the growth of the state and its administrative effi-
ciency .
Social change brought conflict . Initial conflicts were econom-
ically motivated ; later they were more openly political. Opposi-
tion spokesmen and intellectuals tended to view conflicts as mark-
ing a resumption of interrupted history-the decades of
dictatorship being a mere parenthesis-and believed that a return
to the "classic " model of popular mobilization was under way.
The labor movement , now captained by the Communist party
and imbued with a strong Leninist sense of its leadership role,
would be the antagonistic pole to the semi-feudal oligarchy that
was victorious in the Civil War.
The development of the political struggles of the late 1960s
and early 1970s supports such an interpretation. After a period
of isolation due to the unhealed wounds of the Civil War, the
Communist party had emerged as the dominant opposition
force. 11 This was probably due to its influence on or open control
of the clandestine trade union organization, Comisiones Obreras,
which was overwhelmingly dominant among politically active
workers, as was proven by syndical elections in 1966. Around the
Communist party and the Workers' Commissions there gravitated
the stormy student movement'? and the most politically commit-
ted intellectuals. The most frequently used-almost the unique-
method of action for confronting the regime, and the most desta-
bilizing , was the industrial or university strike . Finally, the semi-
clandestine anti-Francoist culture was dominated by a progresista
ideology (to use the revealing term the opposition attributed to
itself), which combined a defense of democratic liberties with an
anticapitalist economic outlook (Preston 1976; Vilar 1984).
Another argument in favor of the return of the "traditional"
model in this "modern" phase is that Spain had shed most of its
Social Mo vements in Modern Spain
31 1
anarchic singularity from the pre-1936 period. The CNT (Confed-
eraci6n Nacional del Trabajo) had not played any important role
in the conflicts of the late Francoist era, nor, counter to many
predictions, was the anarchist union reborn from its ashes when
the dictator died. In 1976, the anarchists held a couple of massive ,
fervid assemblies and there were those who thought that anarchist
Spain was indeed eternal. 13 What those fleeting explosions demon -
strated was not the continuity but rather the distance separating
1936 from 1976. The old CNT trade unionists found themselves
face to face with young , irreverant dcratas (libertarians), who were
less interested in trade unionism that in "happenings," personal
freedom, and transgressing social taboos-whether by free love,
drugs, or outlandish aesthetic provocations. The elders replied in
puritanical tones, unable to comprehend the new phenomenon. 14
In fact, what was occurring in anarchist circles was, not a
confirmation of the return to a traditional stage, but rather a
symptom of the country 's "modernization." In the prewar Spain
one could hardly find the individualistic and aesthetic anarchism
of the kind existing in radical intellectual circles north of the Pyre-
nees. In Spain, the dominant current was the militant and austere
solidarity represented by the "lay saints" of the CNT. The situa-
tion changed radically in the 1950s and 1960s, and the newly re-
emerged Spanish anarchist movement during late Francoism and
the transition to democracy period answered to the individualistic
model (Alvarez-Junco 1977). Spain was becoming "European-
ized" in this sense.
The importance of individualistic or dcrataanarchism was not
the only new development. In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
new types of conflicts and mobilizations appeared; they were very
different from those preceding the Civil War and apparently iden-
tified with the new social movements springing up in industrial
democracies after the institutional crisis suffered by political par-
ties and representative mechanisms in the wake of 1968. Workers
were not the only ones, indeed, perhaps not even the majority ,
rising up against Francoism . From the mid 1960s on, important
social mobilizations were emerging; massively in student and na-
tionalist circles , and more embryonically in such important arenas
as neighborhood associations, feminist organizations , and envi-
ronmental groups.
Student activism achieved a primordial importance among
Jose Alvarez-Junco
3 12
political protests emerging in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and
it became a genuine nightmare for the Franco regime in its later
years . 15 It seemed that Spain was not an exception amid the world -
wide university rebellion symbolized by the anti -Vietnam War
protests in American colleges and by the May 1968 revolt in Paris .
Although student unrest undoubtedly shared some common traits
all over the world, Spanish events cannot be seen as simply more
episodes in the general wave : The internal situation of the dictator -
ship stamped their development with very specific markings .
There were, to be sure, specific complaints against academic
authorities and rigid norms of student conduct, as well as calls
for modernizing academic institutions and subjects of study. Like
everywhere else, these demands were mixed with -or a pretext
for -more radical expressions of incompatibility with capitalism
and industrial society . The student mobilization as a whole, how -
ever, cannot be properly understood only in terms of problems in
the educational system, or the general revolutionary consciousness
of student leaders, or the mimicking of the European and Ameri -
can models .
What set the Spanish case apart and endowed student actions
with a distinctive meaning vis-a -vis those in advanced industrial
democracies was the rigidity of the political system that they were
confronting. For any dictatorship, all open conflict becomes an
intolerable defiance of the principle of authority. 16 For Francoism,
which had aspired to model an espiritu nacional, to exert totalitarian
control on culture and ideas , the university rebellion was even
worse : It was an attack on the fundamental values on which the
authoritarian system was based and a demonstration of its failure.
Thus, student protest -which also benefited from its characteristic
knack for communicative impact -acquired an inordinately large
"subversive" potential. Students were supported by faculty and
by the mass media that did not identify with the regime; they
became symbolic standard bearers for demands ranging far be-
yond the academic world.
Something similar could be said of social mobilizations in-
spired by or related to the reawakening of nationalist feelings,
especially in Catalonia and the Basque region. I do not deal here
with the regional nationalist agendas, since their clearly political
goals and quick institutionalization make it difficult to consider
them social movements in a strict sense. But under national ban-
313
ners there were many mobilizations that were not exactly driven
by nationalistic goals. Some of the claims in favor of regional
languages and local traditions were supported by patently conser-
vative sectors of those local communities (Catalan bankers and
Basque priests, to cite two clear examples), some of which had
even supported Franco in the Civil War (Carlists) . Yet, to the
regime, any recognition of cultural diversity that went beyond
local folkloric quaintness was subversive; it was seen as question-
ing the sacred principle of the "unity of Spain ." Police repres-
sion-including beating and jailing young people from respectable
social sectors-easily moved the entire "aggrieved" community
into identifying with the persecuted .
After 1965-1966, nationalism galvanized much more than
cultural and social elites in Catalonia and the Basque region.! ? It
also gave rise to very significant mobilizations throughout Spain,
as in 1970, when nine ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna [Basque
Homeland and Freedom]) militants were sentenced to death by a
military court in Burgos, sentences which had to be commuted
by Franco under strong national and international pressure (Tufion
de Lara 1980, 414-15; Payne 1987, 557-58) . The fact that most of
the outside support for peripheral nationalisms disappeared at the
end of the transition seems to indicate that it was not inspired by
truly sympathetic feelings for Basquism or Catalanism; rather,
there were oppositional attitudes toward the regime that took ad-
vantage of any opportunity to express their dissent.
A weaker movement of the mid 1960s saw the birth of neigh-
borhood associations, which protested against the problems stem-
ming from the accelerated urbanization of the 1950s and 1960s
(Castells 1983). By the end of the decade, some feminist and envi-
ronmentalist organizations also became visible, and there even
were some timid collective protests against the military service. I S
From many standpoints, all these developments seriously
modified the inherited working-class paradigm that anti-Francoist
leaders and ideologues were busy extending and shoring. They did
so at least in several fundamental ways , and in this sense seemed to
be giving birth to what in European and American industrial soci-
eties was being called " new social movements ."
These movements were defined by their belonging not to a
particular social stratum or class but to a new urban world (neigh-
borhood movements) , generation (students, environmentalists),
Jose Alvarez-junco
314
culture (nationalists), or gender (feminists), which were differen t
from the dominant movements. Each stepped forward to dema nd
recognition of new collective identities . T he content of movemen t
demands also placed these conflicts outside the traditional frame -
work of class struggle. Ca lls for salary increases and improved
working conditions, typical of the harshest stages of the first eco-
nomic take -off, were comp lemented or supplanted by new, mo re
sophisticated requirements relating to consumer ma tters, quality
of life, democratization of the forms of everyday commun ication,
control of the environment, and respect for cultural heritages.
T he organizational an d mobilizing model of the movement was
informal and discontinuous, far removed from the rigid and hier -
archical underground calls that the militarized Francoist po lice was
accustomed to battling. Finally, the strike continued to hold a
preeminent importance but was now -both in the aims of the
strikers and in the government plans for stifling them - more a
matter of disrupting public order than of exerting economic pres -
sure on employers. In fact, by the end of Francoism, strikes had
lost importance in favor of demonstrations, occupations of public
spaces, and a series of other "expressive" actions.
None of these characteristics , however, altered the funda -
mental self-perception and strategic approach of anti -Francoist
leaders and ideologues . Although their daily practice contradicted
many of the traditional class-struggle presuppositions, they con-
tinued to hold that all the new phenomena be subordinated to the
undeniable centrality of the "workers' movement." Old militants
could even think that student, citizen, and feminist protests were
transitional phenomena, and wave them off as products of an "in -
sufficient" unders tanding of historical reality attributable to the
"petty bourgeois" background of the activists . Of course, they
were considered useful to the movement if they fell in line behind
the pro letarian vanguard.
In fact, the traditional Left, notwithstanding apprehensions
it felt over the novelties presented by these new movements, was
using them politically. Their effectiveness in destabilizing the re-
gime was outstanding. Although both the mass media and po-
lice- equally under the sway of the traditional paradigm -viewed
workers' strikes as the gravest of confrontations, day-to-day prota-
gonism was achieved by the new conflicts.
Many of the new activists held political allegiances different
315
from orthodox communism and acknowledged difficulties in un-
derstanding the traditional Left parties-which they were begin-
ning to dub as "stodgy, " "machista, JJ and " cen tralist ." Some even
pondered the need to create th eir own organizations . Nonetheless ,
in the en d most of the activists accepted the need to have a workers'
vanguard and entrusted the PCE with symbolic representation
and decision-making power for th e movement as a whol e or at
least consider ed it th e fundamental ref erenc e when discussing
strategies.
The PCE 's strateg y-and this is key to understanding the
new situation-was no longer to push th e proletarian revolution ,
but rath er to subordinate it to political reform. After summary
analyses of the socioeconomic situation and non e-too-polish ed
strategic argumentations (in short , the bourgeois democratic revo-
lution had not yet been consummated in Spain) , th e PCE con-
cluded that the "workers ' " movement needed to ally itself with
the " refo rm ist bourgeoisie" to impose democratic reform on the
dictatorship. The pressing problem was ther efore th e stat e's de-
mocratization and its conversion into the main in strument of social
reform. It was a symptom of the new situation that th e rallying
cry or watchword for mobilization was the "gen eral political
strike ," to which was usually added, " aim ed at reestablishing
democratic liberties. "
The acceptance of this strategy distort ed th e ori entation and
significance of th e Spanish student, feminist , and citiz en mov e-
ments ; they could not fit the characteristics of the new social
movements as they developed in the 1970s in Europ ean and Amer-
ican industrial democracies . Citizens ' mov ements , for instance ,
" fulfilled th e political strategies of the Partido Comunist a de Es-
pana and of the Organizaci6n Revolucionaria de Trabajadores, the
two main parties that had agre ed to share power in the executiv e
committee of the Federation" (Castells 1983, 229). Th e larg est
feminist organization, Muj eres Democraticas , was also controlled
by the PCE and , naturally , submitted itself to the political necessi-
ties of the struggle against the regime . Similar , although oriented
toward different political goals , was the distortion forc ed on en vi-
ronmentalism by Basque radicalism in its struggl e against the nu-
clear plant of Lemoniz , when environmental conc erns were th e
apparent caus e for mobilizations in support of an armed organiz a-
tion characterized by anything exc ept respect for human lives.
Jose Alvar ez-Jun co
316
Thu s, social mobilization in Spain in th e last years of Franco-
ism (1960-1975) and during th e pol itical trans ition (1975-1979)
was born into a contradictory situation , in a compl ex mixture of
old and new elements . On the one hand , the country 's sociological
modernization had given rise to an urban middle-class culture,
which in turn generated new demands on the state and a remodel-
ing of collective identities, all expressed through new forms of
social mobilization . On the other hand , the obsolescence of the
regime 's structur es jarred ever louder with Spanish society 's mod-
ernization and desire to int egrate into its European setting, and,
insofar as its repressive institutions were concerned, proved inca-
pable of dealing with the new social mobilization phenomena.
The opposition's political culture was a mixture of obsolescence
and modernity . It was obsolete in that it failed to recognize the
novelty of opposition demands and forms of action and interpre-
ted itself in the language of working-class redemptionism. Much
of the opposition was still weighed down by pre-1936 anti pol i-
ticism , that is, it was more disposed to confronting the state than
to reforming it. 19 That working-class outlook, framed in the "in-
herited paradigm" of anti-Francoist ideologues, led newer move-
ments to accept subordination to class struggle , that is, to the PCE
strategy of securing democratic rights that eventually absorbed all
other strategic goals . In this sense , the movements finally become
political.
Anti-Francoist political preoccupations dominated NSM
concerns with objectives and modes of action; in this sense, there
was no newness in Spanish social mobilization . At the same time ,
that political concern was a genuine novelty in Spain, especially in
relation to the model from the pre-Civil War stage , which was
characterized by antipoliticism. Anti-Francoist mobilizations were
the first in the history of Spain to define their strategies in politi-
cal terms .
All that is to beg the question: Why this turn? And why at
that time? European working classes were integrated into their
respective national political systems on the occasion of the First
and Second World Wars, conflicts in which Spain was not involved
(Payne 1987, 6-7) . Spain did experience its own configuration ,
however, the Civil War of 1936-1939. It was then that the workers '
movements first became identified with a political regime : the
Republic . Recall the mistrust with which workers ' movements
Social Movem ents in Modern Spain
317
received the Spanish Republic of 1931 and the strat egy of confron-
tation they adopted during its first years . The PCE rev ers ed this
strategy in 1935 at Moscow's prompting ; it becam e a stalwart
defender of the Popular Front ; and , wh en th e w ar brok e out , it
defended a democratic republic as a positive response to fascism .
The Socialists (Partido Socialista Obrero Espafiol) lik ewise heed ed
the voic es calling for collaboration with th e republicans over the
on es drawn to maximalist pret ensions. Ev en th e anarchist CNT-
FAI (Consejo Nacional de 'Irab ajo-Ped eracion Anarquista Iberica)
accepted several ministerial portfolios (th e height of contradiction)
in republican wartim e governme nts .
It was in that conscious identification with antifascism that
the Spanish working -class framework of ref erence chang ed and
became politicized; this developm ent was eclipsed by subsequ ent
defeat in the Civil War and shaded from public view until th e
Left's reappearance at the en d of Francoism. The identification
with parliamentary democracy was express ed in th e progr ams of
the PCE , th e party that more fully than any other jettisoned all
antipolitical ambiguity while at the same time conserving enough
" revolution ary worker " legitimacy to be able to impose its politi-
cal project on the whole of the Spanish Left in the 1960s and 1970s.
The Transition to Democracy and

Postmode rn Social Mobilization
The transition from Francoist institutions

to a parliamentary democracy was at long
last carried out, and with much less strife than had been foreseen. 20
With regard to social movements, certain peculiarities can be
noted.
Although strik es, demonstrations , and labor conflicts un-
questionably constituted anti -Francoist pressure tactics and con-
tinued to do so during the transition 's first years. P the fact is that
it was neither th e unions nor the social movements but the political
parties that piloted reform. Of the parties, the pace of events was
not set by the prol etarian vanguard or by any coalition und er its
leadership , but rather by a recent formation , the Union de C entro
Democratico , w hi ch was composed of reformists from within
Francoism and lead ers of the most moderate oppos ition. Th ey
Jose A lvarez -J unco
318
were succeeded , in 1982, by a socialist party (PSOE) that had
played a minor role in the opposition to Franco ism . Despite its
old nam e, this party could also be consider ed a ne w political orga -
nization , with small revolutionary proletari an eng agem ent. The
whol e proc ess w as mark ed by fear of ren ewed politic al instability ,
which led to a constitutional and electoral fram ework that favored
the concentration of power in the national leadership of th e parties
and a weakened role for rank-and-file activists , parli amentary
groups, or lo cal networks . Little room was left for participation
and internal renewal. In the years of transition toward democracy,
th e social movements that had play ed such an important role in
the battl e against Francoism disappear ed or were subjected to or-
ganization s th at were mor e institutionaliz ed and fo cus ed on spe-
cific political objectives .
Th e primary and most spe ctacular 1977 elector al collapse was
that of th e pow erful and mod erate Partido Comunist a as well as of
th e revolutionary Left , which app arentl y had been behind so many
of th e anti-Francoi st mobilizations . Communism 's worldwide
weak ening was already obvious by the late 1970s , and it was espe-
cially lacking in app eal for a newl y prosp erous society such as
Spain. These politi cal or ganizations probabl y also suff ered from
th e inconsi stenc y betw een th eir institution al natur e as Leninist par-
ties at the sam e tim e as th ey wer e fostering th e idea of being
anti-institutional and grass-roots " m oveme nts." In any case, the
num erous revolutionary organizations th at had been con sidered
prime mov ers of mobilizations sim ply disappeared at th e first gen-
eral elections of 1977. Th e possibilit y should not be dismissed that
its strength had always been more app arent th an real. Th e PCE ,
the main anti-Francoist forc e, which ex pe cted to gain 20 to 25
percent of th e vot es in 1977, obtained less than 10 perc ent that
year and less than 5 perc ent in 1982. It was removed from the
primary position it had occupied in Spanish politics during th e
transition years .
Trade unionism, contrary to exp ectations, also declined, in
both strike activity and membership . The first sign was the fall
from preeminence of the Comisiones Obr eras. Its pl ace w as tak en
by th e Union Gen eral de Trabajadores (UGT) , which was much
more tightly institutionalized and politi cally controll ed b y the
PSOE. Th e second symptom was th e acceptance b y both unions
Social Move ments in Modern Spain
3 19
of th e priority of political reform over labor demands . Thes e
agreements were codified in the Moncloa Pacts, which insured
social peace in exchange for " consensus" agreement on political
reform. 22 Comisiones Obreras finally ended the political transition
as a political appendage of the PCE, as UGT was to the PSOE.
None of them has raised the low level of union m emb ership-
about 13 percent of the labor force-which tight ens th eir depen-
dence on state budgets (Fishman 1990, 187).
As for the student movement, the transition led to its dissolu-
tion. Its demands were revealed to be too thin or too het eroge-
neous to sustain an organized front. By the time political reform
was largely in place , radical revolutionary political lines were de-
fended by small leftist groups with little influence over the student
body. Thos e actively advocating positions close to the PCE subor-
dinated their entire strategy to the regim e's democratization ,
whose realization left them the sol e alternative of becoming pro-
fessional politicians in an electoral system . A certain degre e of
permanence was achi eved in the early 1980s by the demands raised
by unions and special collectives who , with the passing of time
and their incorporation into the low er ranks of the teaching body ,
were no longer made up of students but of young professors (the
so-called PNN s23). These demands eventually took the form of
salary increases and job stability (achievement of civil servant
status) and were basically satisfied by the successiv e reforms. Uni-
versity unrest as a chronic phenomenon disappear ed.
After the 1977 general election, nationalist demands wer e
reduced to socially conservative legal parties that used mobiliza-
tions in order to threaten Madrid and widen their decentralized
domains and their share of the national budget. ETA, of course ,
remained alive, but , instead of getting th e widespread support it
had enjoyed among anti-Francoists , the reaction now tended to b e
bitter enmity . It was viewed by the rest of the political spectrum
as jeopardizing a democratic edifice of whose solidity no one w as
entirely sure .
Citizens' movem ents, which once were labeled as "the largest
and most significant urban movement in Europe since 1945, "24
did not survive the first municipal elections of April 1979, when
most of Spain 's major cities elected nationalists, socialists, or so-
cialist-led coalitions to power. Madrid 's Federation of Neighbor-
Jose A lvarez -Junco
320
hood Associa tio ns dem and ed w itho ut success that th e ne w Span -
ish constitu tion recogniz e th e public int erest of neighborhood as-
sociations, as wa s don e with trad e unions. Th e mo vem ent was
unabl e to parti cipat e in th e newl y elect ed institutions oflocal gov-
ernme nt, and it was unabl e to surv ive as an orga ni zation indepen-
dent from politic al parti es (Ca stells 1983, 225 , 236) .
Th e social mov em ent s remaining at th e end of the political
reform proc ess (about 1981-1 982) were small groups of environ-
mentalists , pacif ists , and a few new voic es defending sexual mi-
noriti es. Only the se really can be called new social mov ements.
Th ey were stripped of politi cal colorings or dep end enc e on politi -
cal parti es, and, notwithstandin g how incomp atibl e th ey deemed
their values to be with resp ect to th e dominant on es, th ey har-
bor ed no dr eam s of revolutionar y conquests of power to propel
sweepin g social changes." The y were guid ed by pragmatism , and
th ey cen tered th eir efforts on th e reform or contro l of specific
segme n ts of social life or th e reco gniti on of new collective identi -
ties. From an or ganizational standpoint , th ey rejected both the
social-d emocratic bur eaucr atic model and Jacobin -L eninist disci-
pline; th ey idealized grass- ro ots politics and its segme nted, decen-
traliz ed , rank -and-fil e controll ed organization s.
Th ese charact eristi cs m ade Spanish m obilizations of the
1980s comparabl e to th e 1970s Europ ean NSM model. 26 Even so,
Spanish NSMs have peculiar featur es. Th ey are not ju st late , the y
are ex trem ely weak. This weakn ess is deri ved , on th e one hand ,
from Spanish society 's tradit ional in cap acity for civil organization
and action away from th e stat e, and , on th e oth er , from the consol-
idation of a system of repr esentation that is controlled by the top
lead ership of th e politi cal parti es.
Betw een 1977 and 1982, publi c opinion pour ed its hopes into
th e political arena . Especially from Februar y 1981, wh en th e dem-
ocr atic system was thr eaten ed by an att empt ed militar y coup , all
hop es were center ed on a PSOE accession to power. In 1982, the
new young rul ers arriv ed , back ed by th eir anti -Francoist creden-
tials; th ere w as peace and demobiliz ation for some thr ee years .
Th e "progr essiv e" int ellig entsi a had by th at tim e realized that
th e stat e of politi cal affairs was compl etely contr olled by part y
lead ers . Th e term desencanto (disench antm ent) wa s coine d to de-
scribe th eir feelings of impot enc e as well as th e destru ction of
321
millenarian-revolutionary expectations . The old revolutionary
Left saw itself withering away, laminated between two worlds:
politics, now the purview of professionalized parties and whose
only road to power was by way of election victories ; and social
movements, weak, depoliticized, and focused on partial objectives.
Spain did not witness a peace mobilization of the kind that
swept Europe in the early 1980s (Klandermans 1991). Toward the
end of 1985, when the PSOE 's reformist drive was ebbing and
harsh recessionary measures were wearing thin , the government's
decision to advocate remaining in NATO, counter to its implicit
electoral promises, catalyzed discontent . In the spring of 1986 the
NSMs, together with remnants from anti-Francoist social move -
ments, mobilized in the campaign to vote no in the NATO refer-
endum, which was nevertheless won by the government. The
sense of impotence heightened, and there began a period marked
by sporadic outbursts of angry collective protest actions. These
are exemplified by the student movements of 1986 and 1987 that
ousted Education Minister Jose Maria Maravall and by the general
strike of December 14, 1988, that demanded less austere social and
salary policies.
None of these protests, though, meant a reversal of the proc-
ess at work in the previous phase . Student activism vanished and
no viable organization survived in the 1986-1987 flare-up; union
membership remained rutted at the previous low levels and no
new phase of strike activity or social mobilization began. Nor did
the rebukes of the PSOE signify confidence in other parties: the
PSOE again obtained absolute majorities in the general elections
called in 1986 (after the NATO referendum) and 1989 (after the
general strike).
The occasional protest-mobilization capacity displayed by a
collection of groups with such a tenuous base can only be ex-
plained if the demonstrations against government education and
economic policies were vehicles for expressing other things: the
frustration of youth in a society and power system overly con-
trolled by a generation with much future still ahead of it; an ethical
sanction of the ready rapport of new socialist leaders with the old
oligarchiesr" or popular aversion for their prepotente (arrogant,
imperious) style of exercising power."
Jose Alvarez-Junco
322
Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter I emphasize the importance

of the internal framework of reference and
self-perception of social movements, following a comparison be-
tween different stages in Spanish modern history.
In the first, or traditional, period, an anti political culture
dominated . The political system provided few possibilities for
participation or social reform through legal channels . More im-
portant, social movements showed little interest in pushing for
reform of the state. It would be difficult to assert that the first
phenomenon caused the second , for in the next stage, despite the
total absence of participatory possibilities provided by Francoism,
social movements, guided by the realistic posibilista strategy of
the principal underground opposition force, fully embraced the
struggle to democratize the regime.
The most evident cause of this shift was the politicization of
the working classes during the struggle against Francoism initiated
during the Civil War. A quarter century of repr ession and silence
was followed by the reemergence of protests, this time under new
conditions . Unpreced ented economic growth and social modern-
ization was under way. The presence of the state in the life of
society-in the form of police vigilance but also of administrative
apparatus, social welfare programs, and public services-grew to
an extent previously unthinkable.
The new strategy adopted by anti-Francoist mobilizations
proved that the war had not been forgotten . The paramount objec-
tive was not social revolution but the replacement of the "regime
of 18 July" with a democratic political structure.F' This priority
was defended by most opposition forces, but it was above all
defended by the PCE, which was charged by the rest of the Left
with leading the social mobilization. This involvement in political
struggle marks the difference between Spanish social movements
of the 1960s and 1970s and NSMs in European and American
democracies of the same epoch . This politicization also differenti-
ates pre-1936 Spanish mobilizations from those after 1960. Similar
observations may be made about the most advanced countries in
Europe in the pre-1914 and post-1945 periods. The process of
political incorporation is similar, the timing is different.
The self-perception in working-class terms that drove the
323
social movements to become politicized eventually was their un -
doing. Subsumed by the political parties, they relinquished leader -
ship of the democratic transition to those who, out of fear of a
return of the pre -1939 constitutional and governmental instability,
organized a system in which social participation was much cir-
cumscribed.
Once the political reform has finished, a third, postmodern ,
stage begins . Again, the Spanish situation can be likened to that
in other advanced industrial societies. Yet, the predominantly po -
litical orientation of social movements in the previous phase now
makes them unable to organize and counterpoise the power exer-
cised by political parties . Social mobilization loses its strength of
the 1960s and early 1970s as its leaders either become part of the
"po litical class" or are pushed off-stage.
There is then a resurgence, though only sporadic and incom-
parably weaker than in the past, of the Spanish tradition of mis -
trust of the state, the antipoliticism of pre-Civil War culture . The
public feels disappointed and duped by los politicos. The govern-
ment is used as an excuse for impotence or inaction and is blamed
for all social ills. Social movements, though garnering little social
support in their day-to-day doings, become occasional vehicles for
sporadic criticisms of the government by society.
The combination of chronic weakness with a surprising rep -
resentative capacity at certain junctures seems to be the model for
social mobilization in the near future, unless there is a substantial
shift in the society's capacity for self-organization and the political
system's capacity for absorption and flexibility. 30 Either there
arises in Spain a tradition of organized citizen activism and the
institutional checks and impediments to citizen participation are
eased, or social mobilizations will continue to be characterized by
a somewhat schizophrenic duality. Incapable of achieving sus-
tained social support, they will live through long periods of apa-
thy, silence, and impotence, punctuated by heady moments of
protagonism when issue, climate, and rallying call combine to
bring forth popular outpourings of anger against the government.
Notes
1. Its antecedents can be traced to the 1830s, when the first workers'
associations began to operate in the Catalan textile industry .
2. Again, some could argue that the real awakening began in 1956, a year
Jose A lvarez -Junco
324
of stud ent s' prot ests and a transpo rtation strike in Barcelon a, but th at was an
isolated period of unr est. It is only since 1961 that confrontation wi th th e regime
becam e mo re or less contin uo us.
3. Thi s sugge stion parti ally dr aws from Till y's approac h (1990) to the
relation ship between social m ob ilization and th e state's repressive ability and
from Tarr ow 's (1991), according to which social mo bilization tr aits depend on
politi cal oppor tunities.
4. Am on g th e man y possible exa m ples, the m ost influential has been Tu-
ii6n de Lara 1971. Simi lar tr aits were shared by pr eviou s public ations , such as
Lamb ert 1953; specialized bo oks on ana rchism (Ne ttlau 1969; G6m ez C asas 1977)
or socialism (G6m ez Llor ent e 1976); or general hist ori es, such as Ramos Oli veira
1946 or the mor e recent Gil Nov ales 1985.
5. See, for exam ple, th e Manijiesto-Programa of the PCE , in 1975, especially
part 2: " T he strugg le against th e state power of the capitali st oligarch y; for social
and politic al democra cy; for socialism" ; or Tamam es 1973.
6. Julia 1990, 183; see also Juli a 1988. C N T (C onf edera ci6n N acional del
Trabajo) and U GT (U ni6 n Gene ral de Trabajador es) were, respectively, th e anar-
chosy ndicalist and socialist tr ade union s.
7. See for in stance, Vilar 1962. Thi s was also the tend ency of J. Vicens
Vives in his vario us works on nin eteenth- centu ry Ca talonia. Hobsbawm (1959)
parti ally took up thi s interpretation.
8. Th e IWMA (Interna tiona l Workin g Men 's Associati on) ent ered Spain
sligh tly late, in 1868; Spaniards opted for Bakuninism , in the 1872 split between
Mar xists and Bakunini sts, but so did all other southern Europ ean organizat ions.
Th e decadence of the First Int ernation al a year later w as as sudden as everyw here
else, only w ith th e bri ef exception of an ephem eral resurg ence in Andalu sia
(1881- 1883). Th e 1890s witne ssed anarchist terrorism in Barcelon a, but to a
lesser degr ee th an in Italy, France, tsarist Russia, or the Austro-Hungarian em pire
(the detailed files kept by the French police from 1892 to 1894 show onl y 2 or 3
percent of suspected anarchists to be Spaniard s). Th e assassination attempt on
the Spanish prim e mini ster, Antonio C anovas, in 1897 was carried out by an
Italian (see Alvarez-Junco 1992). The rise of revoluti on ary syn dicalism in the first
years of th e twenti eth cent ury had also occurred in France in the pre viou s decade.
Spanish exception ality really began in 1910, with th e foundati on of the anarchist
union CNT (Conf ederaci6n N acional del Trabajo) ; and even then we should
speak of bri ef flare-ups (1917-1 920,1 931-1 937), w ith a gr eat chro nological and
geographical discontinuit y . In industrial Catalonia , its tr aditional strong hold,
anarchism lost strength in th e 1930s, while it expanded amo ng Castili an and
Ara gon ese rural wo rke rs. Th e celebrat ed " anarchis t collectives" existed mainly
in Arag 6n . Many of th em were merely a produ ct of th e presence of anarchi st
troop s, located in villages wh ere th e C N T had no affiliates befor e th e C ivil War
(Casanova 1985).
9. By 1950, 70 percent of the Spanish popul ation was still livin g in locali-
ties ofless th an 50,000 inhabitant s and 48 percent of th e labor force was em ployed
in agriculture (no t very different from th e beginnin g o f the cent ury, w hen the
respective figur es were 80 percent and 60 percent) . B y 1975, th ese ratios dropped
to below 60 percent and 25 percent- signalin g a cruc ial adv ance toward the
325
situation in 1990, when mor e than half the popul ation lived in large cities and
less than 15 percent of the acti ve labor forc e was engaged in th e prim ary sector.
The total numb er of cars in the country , which in 1950 had not yet surp assed
100,000 vehicl es, jumped to 5 million in 1975 and topped 12 million in 1990. Th e
number of tourist s, barel y 1 million in 1955, surged to 6 milli on by 1960, and
sho t up to 14 milli on in 1965 and 30 million in 1975; it was mor e th an 50 milli on
in 1990. In 1975, after fifteen years of economic growth of about 7 percent each
year, th e country was th e world's tenth larg est indu strial pow er. Th e illiteracy
affecting 60 percent of Spaniard s at the beginning of th e centur y only survi ved
in marg inal cluster s of th e elderly and rur al population . Birth rat es fell belo w
those of France (Linz 1981; Herr 1971, chap . 15; or Anuarios from Instituto
Nacional de Estadisti ca).
10. Gallo 1969; Tamam es 1973; Tunon de Lara 1980; Fusi 1985; Payn e
1987.
11. The Communist party was excluded from the general oppo sition
meeting held in Munich in 1962.
12. The student movement included other force s, which , for th e most
part, were weaker or, as in the case of the FLP (Frente de Liberacion Popular) ,
more ephemeral than the com m unis ts.
13. A rally in San Sebastian de los Reyes, Madrid , and th e jornadas liberta-
rias in Barcelon a, in the summer of 1976.
14. See, for exampl e, th e article publish ed in L 'Espoir, the voice of the
exiled Spanish anar chists in France, on "L a droga " (Toulou se, June 24, 1973).
15. Maravall 1978; Pefia 1966. Student s prot ests had already been ex-
tremely important in the fall of Primo de River a's dictatorship in 1929-1 930
(Ben-Ami 1983,157,344-55) .
16. Wh en unrest began to grow in the 1960s, Franco was obsessed with
distingui shing between " labor-m otivated " and " political" strik es. He could not
understand that the ver y nature of his regime made all protests political (Tunon
de Lara 1980, 371).
17. A symptom of that support was the popularity of the Catalan nova
can{6 among th e progresistayouth all over Spain . The year 1965 was symbolic
because of the repercussion of the intellectuals' sit-in at the Capuchin convent
in Sarria,
18. The magazine Bicicleta, in the late 1970s, was very informative on
movements in defens e of the enviro nm ent in Spain . On pacifism , see Perez
Ledesma 1982.
19. A symptom of this could be th e ironi cal rebukes to the PCE leader's
moderate strategy so frequent among the progresista culture , as shown in the well-
known copla: " C arrillo / ladonde vas tu, Carrillo / con la reconciliacion? / Cog e
la hoz y el martillo / y haz la revolucion / no solo contra el Caudillo " (Why do
you talk so much of reconciliation, Carrillo? Take the hammer and sickle and
make revolution , not only against the Caudillo [Franco]) .
20. Among the vast academic production on the Spani sh politic al reform,
the most helpful are Carr and Fusi 1981; Casanova 1983; Maravall1 984; Gilmour
1985; Gunthe r, Sani, and Shabad 1986; Preston 1986; Diaz 1987; Julia 1988.
21. For example , the wave of strikes that the Arias-Fraga go vernm ent
Jose A lvarez J unco
326
confronted in th e first half of 1976; these strikes can be credited wi th thwarting
the gove rn me nt's pr oy ecto continuista (or the project of continuity , th e plan to
keep Fran coist institut ion s with mil d reforms) .
22. Th e Mon cloa Pacts we re signed by th e m ain part ies (rang ing from the
Co m m unis t part y to Ali anza Popular, a ne w co nse rva tive for ce m ade up by
form er Francoist " reforme rs" ) seeking to insur e stability after the gene ral elec-
tion s of 1977.
23. Th e Pro fesores N o Num erarios, or PNN s, were college lectur ers or
teachin g assistants w ho did most of th e teachin g at rapidl y ex panding publi c
uni versities in th e 1960s and 1970s. Q ualifications and research requir em ents
were low , but so was the salary; P N Ns did not enjoy tenur e guarantees. Th ey
becam e politi cized quick ly and the y were an im port ant factor of instabili ty dur-
ing late Francoism an d tr ansiti on years.
24. T his is Cas tells's (1983, 2 16) somew ha t idealized version ; Tour aine was
influ enced by it (1984, 6).
25. A tellin g evo lution was in the envi ro nme ntal m ovem ent . At a sto rmy
meetin g in Ce rcedilla in 1977, po liticos (con tro lled by th e revoluti on ary group
aR T ) and genuine env iro nme ntalists split. I th ank Enriqu e Lar afia for thi s ref-
erence.
26. In th e sense defined by Melu cci (1989), for instan ce.
27. Th e m arriage between the form er m ini ster of financ e, Mi guel Boyer,
w ho was respon sib le for the austere polici es of 1982 th rou gh 1985, and Isabel
Pr eysler , a well-k now n figur e of th e Cos ta del Sol "jet-se t, " cause d a great mor al
scanda l in the sum m er prior to th e gene ral strike. O n th e strike, see Juli a 1989.
28. Th e result was th e exclusive attributio n of politi cal po wer to those
who had won th e elections. Thi s was considered a betr ayal b y prota goni sts of
anti- Franc ois t m obili zation s w ho had bel ieved literally in " popular parti cipa-
tion " rhe toric .
29. Th e Franco regim e often used thi s nam e to refer to th e date on which
the milit ary p ronun ciam ient o against th e Republi c began in 1936.
30. In the sense in whic h Sam uel Hu ntin gt on has used th ese concepts in
Political Or der in C hang ing S ocieties (Ne w Haven : Yale Uni versity Pr ess, 1968), for
instance. See th eir applic ati on to the Spanis h case in Ca me ro 1988.
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329
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Chapter 14
The Party's Over- So What

Isto Be Done?
Richard Flacks
Two hundred years after the French Revo-

lution, when the division between Left and
Right began to be used to map political alignments, it seems obvi-
ous to many that such clear-cut political differentiation has lost
any meaning . Certainly, it is argued, the Left no longer can be
said to have reality in the light of the collapse of international
communism, the decomposition of the Soviet bloc , the abandon-
ment of socialism by those living under its "actually existing"
form, and the recent conservative drift of politics in many Westem
countries. I argue, however, that we still need "Left" and "Right"
to signify certain essential political and cultural differences. I pro -
pose that what is dying is a particular type of political mobiliza-
tion. It is the Left as a "party" that has come to an end.
The Left as a Tradition

The Left is, first of all, a tradition - a rela-
tively distinct body of belief and action that
began to have a coherent character at the time of the American
and French Revolutions. An enormous variety of ideological per-
spectives constitute that tradition. It is known by a host of labels:
socialism, anarchism, communism, pacifism, radical democracy,
feminism, and certain variants of libertarianism . In the United
States, instead of these relatively specific labels, leftists typically
refer to themselves by using such ideologically euphemistic terms
as progressive, liberal, populist, and radical.
Left ideological perspectives have often been propelled by
organizations created to advance them. The proliferation of ideo-
logical perspectives, of variants within these, and of organizations
representing them competing for support has meant that the tradi -
tion of the Left has been deeply structured by internecine struggle .
Given the ideological divisions and warfare on the Left, what
The Party's Over
331
warrants the assertion that there is nevertheless a shared tradition ?
What , if anything, do the Left fragments have in common?
One answer is that there is an essential idea that und erlies
these ideological differences . That idea can be captur ed best by a
statement like this: Society should be organized so that th e people
make their own history. Here are some other ways of putting it :
Social and economic life should be arranged so that every memb er
of society has the chance to have some voice in shaping the condi-
tions within which their lives are lived ; Socioeconomic arrang e-
ments in which a few can decide the lives of the many should be
replaced by arrangements based on collective self-government ; or
Social life should be structured as much as possibl e on the basis of
reasoned discourse among society's memb ers, rather than by the
exercise of power or by chance (or the working of imp ersonal
markets). 1
In short, the Left tradition is the cumulative struggle to envi-
sion and practice a fully realized democracy . Most of the ideologi-
cal differences within the tradition of the Left have revolved
around issues of power and strategy . Disputes over what kinds
of power-economic, political, military, sexual-are primary and
over the agencies, levers, and processes of change have been so
deeply divisive that they have frequently obscured the elements of
agreement in these ideological fragments . Still, th e factional strife
of the past seems now overshadow ed by a sense of commonality .
The Left as Identity

The Left tradition has provided rich mate-
rial for the construction of personal iden-
tity . Indeed, it is crucial to understand that th e tradition has been
carried forward not only by formal organizations and literature
but, more fundamentally, by individual human beings who share
a personal identity based in that tradition . That identity is cent ered
on a sense of responsibility to live one 's life in relation to history
and as an active contributor to social transformation . Conscious
Leftists, I imagine, conceive of themselv es as duty-bound to con-
nect to public life , to speak out against injustic e; they feel most
fulfilled when they beli eve that they have made some diff er enc e in
the world , hoping , at a minimum , that, as Brecht put it , " the
butchers would have slept more easily without me. " Current em-
RichardFlacks
332
phasis on identity as a central theme in "new" social movements
ignores the fact that, for generations, commitment to the labor
movement and other "traditional" movements has had much to do
with self-expression and not just a pursuit of "rational" interest.
Social traditions and identities do not "succeed" or "fail";
they develop, renew, stagnate, and die . The Left, defmed as tradi -
tion and identity, may well continue, even though many of its
most potent symbols have been discredited. Such continuity will
depend on a radical revision of the narratives that undergird the
Left's self-understanding . Can the dissidents in Eastern Europe
who took on the burdens of opposing communist authority come
to be seen as reinforcing and enriching an identity that was shaped
in earlier generations by communists? Will the moments in the
streets of Prague and Leipzig and Peking when masses confronted
the party dictatorships come to be viewed as episodes in a tradition
of popular democratic struggle marked, in earlier generations, by
the unfurling of red banners and socialist slogans? Such construc -
tions may appear absurd until one recalls that the most profound
critiques of communism have, for decades, been made from
within the Left tradition . To a great extent, our understanding of
the historical significance and cultural meanings of social move-
ments depends on such constructions, that is, on a continuing
contest about how particular episodes may be situated within long
traditions of thought, action, and expression .
The Left as a Party

For one hundred years, most people on the
Left throughout the world have shared ele-
ments of a vision and of an identity, and also a sense of common
strategy . The key strategic idea during this century of struggle has
been that social transformation depends on the development of
the Left as a vehicle of power. Most particularly, it depends on the
emergence of a party that is capable of winning power and using
the machinery of the state to implement a program of change .
This mass party strategy was seen as necessary for several
reasons . First, it was essential to unify the working class, articulate
its shared grievances, and mobilize its collective energy . Ever since
the mid-nineteenth century, Left activists and intellectuals have
seen the working class as both the moral source and the practical
The Party's Over
333
resource for democratic and socialist transformation . If th e work -
ing class could be united, its collectiv e power , based in th e produc-
tion process, could eventually achieve revolutionar y change ; more
immediately , the numerical strength of a politi cally unifi ed work-
ing class would be central to the achievem ent of Left political
power .
Second , workers and other subordinated groups needed a
vehicle of representation ; they needed the means to defend their
interests in capitalist society without always having to be prepared
to strike or engage in other direct action . A working-class party,
together with labor unions, would give workers an institutional-
ized voice that would enable them to be politically defended while
they, as individuals , could deal with the demands of personal life.
Third, the party provided the social framework within which
an effective professional stratum that was capable of governing in
the name of the working class could be created . The party was to
be the institutional arena within which specific policies and pro-
grams could be formulated and the leadership cadre could be
groomed and trained. Moreover, in addition to developing leader-
ship, the party could also be the primary means to enable the
political and cultural development of its mass constituency. All
manner of educational, cultural, and self-help institutions would
be created. Through its program and through its cultural prac-
tices, the mass party was built to be the embodiment of Left
tradition and identity for its members and for ever-widening cir-
cles to whom it reached out .
Finally, once the party assumed government power , it would
use the legal, economic , and military resources of the state to
implement a program of social transformation . Since this program
would be mightily resisted by the powers that be, the party in
power would not only govern society in the name of the great
majority but it would also be a framework for continuously mobi-
lizing popular energy to sustain the momentum of reform in the
face of various kinds of conservative resistance .2
Many of the weaknesses of this strategy have been known for
decades . In the European parliamentary states , social democratic
mass parties have never been able to win a majorit y by relying
solely on a strategy of uniting the working class. Th e base of the
working class has been too narrow to constitute a majorit y , and
the class itself has been too variegated with respect to skill and
RichardFlacks
334
sectoral difference to unite around a radical program. Accord -
ingly, all social democratic parties have had to adopt moderate
programs or otherwise reduce their ideological clarity and mili -
tancy in order to gain majority support (see Laclau and Mouffe
1985).
Robert Michels was the first -but hardly the last -to observe
that the representational character of the party, and the profession -
alization of its leadership, created an almost inescapable tendency
toward "oligarchy." The more that party leaders became career
politicians, the more stake they had in maintaining their control
of the party and using it as a vehicle for their own well-being. The
result: bureaucratic, top-down control; the depoliticizing of the
mass membership; the fostering of a privileged elite; corruptions
of various kinds; and a growing tendency for the party to abandon
its transformative goals. In the Soviet bloc, the communist parties,
exercising a monopoly of power, made bureaucratic, oligarchical
party dictatorship synonymous with communism . Michels, writ -
ing before World War I, had anticipated that the communists' so-
cial democratic antagonists in Western Europe would not be im-
mune to similar -if far less brutally expressed -tendencies
(Michels 1959).
The experience of parliamentary democracies has been that
party control of government does not equal party control of the
state, nor does it provide the power to bring about socialist re-
structuring. Every move toward radical reform of a capitalist soci-
ety by a governing socialist party has tended to result in destabili -
zation of the economy by capitalists seeking to protect their
investments against the threat of encroachment. The main state
functions-the military, the administrative bureaucracy-are not
readily controllable by a party just because it happens to win an
election. At this writing, one could hardly maintain that the elec-
tion of an established socialist party in any of the Western Euro-
pean countries would have any chance of resulting in a "socialist"
government. Disillusionment with these parties dates back to the
World War I and the advent of Leninism as a supposed alternative.
The Leninist solution to the riddle of how socialists could use
state power for socialist ends was to seize power through military
means. Through the use of ruthless force , the state became the
vehicle of the party's will and the party controlled the political
discourse of the whole society. We have known for decades that
The Party's Over
335
such party dictatorship created the opposite of the socialist ideal,
but for years, many Marxists assumed that , at least , something
alternative to capitalism was being constructed. We now know
that even this was not the case .
After one hundred years in which Left activists and intellec-
tuals tried to em body their emancipatory hopes in one or anoth er
form of party , we are now at the point where virtually all can see
that this strategy was doomed to failure. Today mass , " hege-
monic" parties seem to be disintegrating everywhere . I refer here
to the collapse of the Eastern European communist parties, and to
the decline of such social democratic parties as Labour in England
and Labor in Israel, as well as others as varied in form and ideology
as PRI in Mexico, the Liberal Democrats of Japan , Congress of
India , and the Democratic party in the United States. All of these
have seemed hegemonic, all have contributed to modernizing their
societies and to creating welfare-state supports for their mass con -
stituencies. That they were not vehicles of emancipatory aspiration
has long been understood . Today , they seem obsolete even as vehi-
cles of power; they seem to have lost a good deal of their capacity
to maintain their majority base. Indeed, to win back effective elec-
toral majorities, such parties have tended to jettison even a sem-
blance of their earlier programmatic emphasis on economic redis-
tribution and social equality.
How might we account for the decomposition of the mass
party? I think there are several clues :
I. The globalization of the world economy weak ens the ca-

pacity of mass parties to use the state as an instrument for allocat-
ing resources to benefit their constituencies. Welfare states face
intensifying fiscal crisis; capital flow is beyond state control; and
Keynesian policies supporting high wages seem to conflict with
the need to revitalize national competitiveness. The social demo -
cratic/welfare state program no longer seems sustainable , and
promises made in its name lose credibility.
2. The very success of the mass parties is part of their undo-

ing . Large numbers of workers seek now to protect relative advan-
tage, resent taxation that supports the welfare state, and hope for
more opportunity to own things. Against this , party appeals to
traditional bases of solidarity and impulses to equality and th e
RichardFlacks
336
common good seem stultifying . Class identity br eaks apart into
many fragments .
3. All the mass parti es established their dominanc e not only

by bein g a voic e for disadvantaged m ass constituenci es but by
maintaining th e silenc e of som e of the se (wom en , ethnic minorit-
ies, th e least skilled , for exampl e). One of the primary reasons for
th e declin e of th ese parti es is that previous ly silent minorities are
now mobilizin g. As a result , the parties find themselves paralyzed ,
no long er abl e to offer a credibl e, majoritarian program that meets
the needs of both th e relati vely adv antaged and the newly em er-
gent groups that constitute th eir base. Limited on the one hand by
the conservatism of their more advantaged constitu ents and on the
oth er hand b y th e fiscal constraints resulting from dependency on
global capital flows , th ese once dominan t parties app ear mired in
compromi se and contradiction. Becaus e state-bas ed strategies of
social reform - wheth er th ey are called socialist , capitalist , corpo -
ratist, or som ething else -app ear to be politicall y and economi -
cally unviabl e, th e parti es whos e programs were based on such
strate gies seem to have had their day as embodim ents of popular
hop e.
All during the tw entieth century , Am ericans leftists have

hoped to see a party of th e European typ e to represent th eir values
and serve as a vehicl e for working -class empow erment. For all
these years , th e fact that no such party formation was possible-
the so-ca lled American Exception - has been a sourc e of deep feel-
ing s of failure among Am erican leftists, who have typic ally m ea-
sur ed their efforts against the achi evem ents of various of the
Europ ean Lefts . Th e main reason for th e American Exception has
been the enormous diversity of th e American workin g class with
respe ct to rac e and ethni city . B ecause ethni c differenc e and compe-
tition became deeply int ertwin ed with differ ences in life chances,
American work ers typi cally found Left calls for class solidarit y
hopel essly impractic al. Inst ead of supportin g a Left part y , Am eri-
can work ers joined political machin es an d unions b ased on ethnic
solid arity and ex clusion . Th ese sourc es of em powe rme nt, in turn,
reinforc ed a conc eption of freedom , alrea dy cultura lly dominant
in th e Unit ed States, that was defin ed in terms of ind ividu al auton -
omy rath er th an parti cipator y democr acy , a cult ura lly rooted
The Party's Over
337
definition of rationality based on short-run advantage rather than
on the common good. " Having never experi enced a multiethnic
framework of political solidarity , Americans have regarded th e
good society as one in which they have th e opportunit y make
their own lives, rather than to make their common histor y . The
dominant culture encourages Americans to plac e their hop es for
fulfillment , not on collective action in the public spher e, but on
the results of their individual efforts within the sph eres of work ,
education, and family . Rather than endorsing ideological app eals
to overthrow the powers that be, Americans in th e majorit y have
preferred to live within what amounts to a contract with them-a
contract that allows elites to rule in return for continuing provision
of the material basis for a " norm al life. "
The privatism and accommodation of the American majority
is, however, not simply the natural expression of American cul-
tur e. Mass political apathy and conservatism has always been the
result of a prior history of mass mobilization and militancy . The
specific terms of the American social contract have changed funda-
mentally from generation to generation because our shared con-
ception of th e requirements of "normal life" has greatly expanded.
American history has been shaped by the fact that groups disad-
vantaged by a given contract have, over time, struggled to rewrite
the contract so that their rights will be taken into account.
Social Movements
The primary means for carrying on such

struggles , however , has not been to support
a party that inscribes these rights as its program . Instead , when
disadvantaged and disenfranchised groups in America have sought
change they have done so through social movements . The essenc e
of such mov ements is direct action-action that often breaches
political rules and conventional norms . Such action eventuates
when people who shar e common life circumstances come to be-
lieve that th eir daily lives are not normal , or that they are thr eat-
ened or unn ecessaril y disad vantaged . They discov er also that
through their collective action they h ave a reasonable chan ce to
change the conditions and terms that disad vantag e or threat en
them.
In the United States , left-wing acti vists could not build a
Ri chard Flacks
338
m ass part y of th e wo rke rs; inst ead th e grea t m ajorit y of Am erica 's
leftists - socialist s, com m unists , M arxi sts, soci al dem o crat s, radi -
cal demo crats, femini sts, pacifist s, ana rchists - hel pe d bu ild m ove-
m ent s by servin g in a variet y of lead ership , educa tive, an d organ -
izin g rol es. Such Left mov em ent acti vi sts wer e often m emb ers of
ideolo gically orien ted o rg an izatio ns, ye t th e record sug gests that
th ey were m ost effective not w he n th ey too k th eir cues from th e
part y lin e or follo wed part y dis ciplin e but w he n th ey respo n ded
to th e expe rience d conscio usness an d nee ds o f th e people with
who m they were sha ring strugg le. Th e id eologi cal Left parti es
rarely provid ed useful strateg ic direction to th eir activist m emb ers
(in dee d th e party lin es were often ex ceedin gly coun terpro duc tive);
instead , th e prim ary positive funct ion of the Socialist part y , the
Com m unis t part y , an d othe r ideolog ical org ani zatio ns w as to nur-
tur e m emb er s' activis m . Th ese part ies' m ain hi stori cal contr ibu -
tion was tha t th ey pr ovid ed tra in ing, suppo rt, and a sen se of m or al
purp ose th at ena bled at least some of their m ember s to becom e
cent ers for initi ative for gras s-roo ts action quit e sepa rate fro m the
party 's orbit.
Am eri can leftists for gene rations h ave h ad a con tradicto ry
attitu de towar d th eir part icip ation in movemen ts . On th e one
hand , w hen they ask th em selves w hat th ey h ave accom plished
in their politi cal lives, overw hel mi ngly th ey respond by takin g
satisfac tion fro m the histori c cha nges w ro ug ht by th e m ovem ents
th ey h ave help ed : th e right s th at h ave been wo n , th e ent itlem ent s
achieved, th e ways in w hich pr ot est has ope ned u p th e cultur e to
new voices and ex pand ed th e horiz ons of ex ploi ted and oppresse d
gro ups . But w he n con sciou s lefti sts tr y to int erpr et th e long -term
m eaning of th eir activity, they have a tend enc y to view th ese
moveme nts as some thing less th an the "rea l th ing ." T he real
th in g , th ey cann ot help but feel, is a uni fied , class-base d move -
m ent w hose cen ter is a part y cap able of taki n g power. Th e frag-
m ent ed , nonid eol ogical m ovem ent s of th e U nited States are seen
as rehearsals for the revolut ion , th at is, the bas e from w hic h mo re
"a dvance d " consc io usness an d action can be launched ."
Th is attitude toward m ovem ent s, we can now more clearly
see, was delusory . T he global decomp osition of th e par ty strategy
o ug h t to per suade us of w ha t, in fact, has alwa ys been the case: if
th e Left is und er stood as a cum ulative struggle for th e democra ti-
The Party's Over
339
zation of society, then social movements themselves are the real
embodiment of the Left tradition. 5
Movements rather than parties are more likely to be vehicles
of popular voice. Because the party by its nature is set up to
represent, it reinforces the passivity of most members, although
it may also serve as a socializing and educative framework for large
numbers. Because of their relatively spontaneous, uninstitutional-
ized character, because they are dependent on high levels of partic-
ipation by large numbers, because they are implemented in mani-
fold activities at a micro level, and because they are moments in
which previously inarticulate actors find voice and public visibil-
ity, movements are the closest thing we have, in practice , to au-
thentic democracy. It is in moments of collective defiance that
the possibility for democracy achieves some concrete reality and
lagging democratic faith gets renewed.
After decades in which the American Left looked to Europe
for models of advanced action, the tables have turned . If we want
to know what can fill the vacuum created by the decline of the
popularly based party, we might look to the U.S. experience,
where such a vacuum has been a permanent political reality. What
we learn from that experience is that social movements, represent-
ing a range of distinct interests and identities, constitute the pri-
mary vehicle of dramatic expression. Indeed, such a shift is now
taking place globally as the key to democratic transformation .
Movements and Electoral Politics
Movements act in the streets, in civil soci-

ety. They are, by definition, extraparlia-
mentary . They use means of expression and power other than
those available within politics normally understood . The Ameri-
can experience shows that movements must also interact with the
state not only as a source of pressure on elites from outside but as
a vehicle for achieving representation . Movement demands have
to be legislated; rights claimed have to be legitimated. Moreover ,
the high intensity of mass action is not sustainable indefinitely;
movement members need to go home, they want to live in the
space their actions have helped create. They need political repre-
sentation in order to carryon daily life. As a result, American
movements have sought entry into the electoral arena. After some
RichardFlacks
340
decades of experim entation with efforts to create their own par-
ties -of which the Populists , the Socialist party of Eugene Debs,
and the La Follette Progressiv e party of the 1920s are prime exam-
ples on the national level-movements have, especially since the
New Deal era , sought influence in the Democratic party .
The movement effort to influence and penetrate the Demo-
cratic party has been going on now for fifty years . It was spear-
headed by the labor movement in the 1930s and 1940s; it was
followed by the civil rights movement in the 1960s, the women 's
movement in the 1970s, and by gays, environmentalists, and anti-
nuclear groups in the years sinc e. Movement strategies have in-
cluded a variety of elem ents: the construction of movement-con-
trolled state and local organizations to back candidates especially
favorabl e to movement interests; election of delegates to party
conventions to directly influence candidate selection and platform
planks; mobilization to demand change of party rules to reduce
power of professional politicians and party machines, and to re-
quire representation in party decision-making of women , minorit-
ies, and other previously underrepresented constituencies; and for-
mation of national movement -based structures, such as the
National Women's Political Caucus or Jesse Jackson's Rainbow
Coalition, parallel to the official party structures, to influence se-
lection of candidates and party directions and to mobilize move -
m ent constituencies in behalf of endorsed candidates.
The Democratic party has been significantly reshaped by the
strategies and claims of diverse movements demanding place . La-
bor leadership succeeded in gaining access to the New Deal admin -
istration ; labor exercised considerable control over a few key state
party structures in the 1950s; and labor forged some fruitful alli-
ances with key Democratic politicians. The civil rights movement
succeeded in compelling the party to break the power of white
supremacist Dixiecrats and to open its internal procedures so that
blacks and other minorities could gain direct access. Machine con-
trol over urban party organizations was broken under the pressure
of civil rights and Left-liberal mobilizations . By the end of the
1970s, the party leadership both locally and, to some extent na-
tionally , included sizable contingents drawn from the ranks of
civil rights, women's , antiwar , and labor movements. The major
democratic movements are both outs ide and inside the Democratic
party; each has won some position and influenc e within it. From
The Party's Over
341
the perspective of party professionals and professional politicians,
the pressures of the labor, black, women's, environmentalist, and
other movements threaten the party 's organizational efficacy,
while alienating the support of millions of "moderate " voters (that
is, middle- and working-class privatized voters who are predomi-
nantly white, male, and middle aged). From the perspective of the
movements, the party's professional leadership appears increas-
ingly rudderless, lacking in will and imagination, and often cynical
in its use of movement symbols to avoid substantive change . Bill
Clinton's presidential campaign resolved this deadlock in behalf
of the professionals, but movement leadership actively supported
him nevertheless. The professional perspective dominates media
framing of the purposes and strategies of the Clintonites (move-
ment pressures are attributed to "narrow special interests" and
"old-fashioned liberalism," while Clinton is defined as a "new
Democrat neoliberal"). The character of the Clinton presidency
remains uncertain . Beneath the current media frame there contin-
ues to be a considerable contest between movement and profes-
sional perspectives on both policy and political reality.
The "Local Level"

Since the 1960s, movement activists have
had substantial success in influencing elec-
toral politics and governmental policy at the level of city and state
politics. In the aftermath of the 1960s, considerable numbers of
New Left activists came to see that the student movement as such
was a limited vehicle for advancing far-reaching social change.
The university campus, despite its significance in "post-industrial
society," remained too isolated from the political and cultural
mainstream; students, despite their capacity for dramatic and ef-
fective disruption, could not achieve their goals without subs tan-
tiallinks to potential majorities. And, from a biographical perspec-
tive, students must graduate into a wider world, where the styles
and perspectives of political activism are quite different.
These insights led many student activists into local commu-
nities. Since the United States lacked a national political party
framework that could smoothly absorb postgraduate students,
many embarked on efforts to "organize at the local level. " They
focused on issues rooted in the experienced threats and grievances
RichardFlacks
342
found there. What we mean by "new social movements" has much
to do with these post-1960s organizing efforts, for it is out of these
that feminism, environmentalism, gay liberation, and the anti-
nuclear movements emerged .
The localist emphasis of post -1960s activism resulted in part
from the limited resources available-most particularly the ab-
sence of any central organizational authority that could have di-
rected a national strategy. Localism derived also from the ideolog-
ical perspectives that dominated the New Left: the emphasis on
participatory democracy, on decentralization, on human scale.
The feminist critique of patriarchal leadership encouraged both
male and female activists to work in self-effacing, face-to -face
ways rather than in th e self-promoting, top-down manner that
"national " politics requires.
The new movements have developed , accordingly, in highly
decentralized ways. Although each of them contains national orga-
nizational structures , these have relatively little to do with direct-
ing the manifold movement activities that have evolved over the
last twenty years, most of which revolve around issues that arise in
particular regions, communities, neighborhoods, and workplaces .
For example, the "environmental movement" is best understood
as constructed out of a host of seemingly disparate local protests
and projects: struggles over land use, urban development, popula-
tion growth , toxic waste disposal, nuclear power, neighborhood
preservation , defense of traditional culture, occupational hazards,
and so forth . In each case, members of a local community act in
response to a threat while, at times, making use of the resources
(language, know-how , material support) made available by the
formal organizations of the national movement. In the midst of
such local struggles there may well be some veteran activists -
people whose identities were shaped in the Old or New Left -but ,
increasingly, such veteran leadership may not be a necessary ingre-
dient for enabling local protest to take off. After twenty years,
many who do not consider themselves to be "activists" have ac-
quired the consciousness and skills to act effectively in local
protest .
These local protests have been successful in deflecting some
of the particular threats that initially sparked them, or in achieving
various sorts of accommodations and ameliorations. But locally
based movement activity rather quickly developed a certain strate-
The Party's Over
343
gic thrust that went beyond the merely reactiv e. This thrust may
be summarized by saying that the movements have been struggling
for local institutional change that would enabl e them to exercise
a direct voice in governmental and institutional policy makin g .
Beginning in the early 1970s , new social mov em ent activists , espe-
cially in towns with large university populations , embark ed on a
strategy of running for local office . This effort has widened , and
to some degree has resulted in local "rainbow coalition" strat egies.
In some places, blacks have linked with feminist, environmental-
ist, gay, and peace constituencies. Today, progressive coalitions
have come to local pow er in a variety of places rath er diff erent
from the "progressive" university town. Indeed, such political
development seems likely wherever minority, environmental,
women's, or gay constituencies carry some strategic weight . In
many parts of the United States, local elections are nonpartisan ;
these provide the greatest space for such formation . There is prob-
ably no major city in the country whose local politics has not
been affected by the separate and combined efforts of movement
activists to win at least a piece of local power.
This is not the place to detail th e substantive programmatic
reforms that such local efforts have attempted, or to try to evaluat e
the results . It is perhaps a fair generalization to say that the most
successful achievements have been those involving symbolic and
legal reform rather than material reallocations. These include:
more "diversity" and "affirmative action" in governmental staff
appointments (so that more minorities and women now occupy
administrative and advisory positions); more community recogni-
tion of minority identity claims (the Martin Luther King holiday
was an early success in this regard; extension of antidiscrimination
principles to gays would be another); support for movement-based
human service activities (city subsidies for a variety of medical ,
counseling, legal, and educational services, but as the 1980s wore
on, budgetary crunches hit these particularly hard) .6
Perhaps the most interesting types of reform, however , were
those that compelled public accountability and voice with respect
to decisions that were previously reserved for specialized or elite
arenas . Perhaps the biggest local gain of the environmental move-
ment in California has been the environmental quality legislation
that requires that all local development be subject to environmen-
tal impact review . The EIR process requires a public weighing of
RichardFlacks
344
social costs, provides an arena for public testimony, and supplies
the opportunity for public negotiation of "mitigations" with re-
spect to all changes of land use. This process is a prime example
of the way in which governmental procedures such as mandatory
public hearings can provide community movements with signifi-
cant opportunities for mobilization, public education, the devel-
opment of expertise, and the exercise of community leadership .
From the perspective of public authority, the process is designed
to get movements" off the streets" and into the bureaucratic struc-
ture; in practice, however, it provides a degree of information and
opportunity for voice not previously available, especially if those
administering the hearing processes were elected with the backing
of the movement.
In general, a variety of mechanisms embodying principles of
public review and participatory planning have emerged in Ameri-
can community and institutional life . In addition to land use and
related environmental decisions, similar mechanisms exist in some
locales with respect to job hiring and promotion policies, police
practices, health service provision, provision of services for the
aged, and public education. The development of these mecha-
nisms has meant considerable change in the structure of power at
the local level in the United States . This statement is a limited one;
American communities are now places where social movements
have some ability to veto to modify unwanted decisions. What
eludes them are institutional mechanisms for promoting economic
redistribution, for effectively controlling the flow of capital, or
for effectively determining the planning processes that shape their
community's future . These processes derive from sources beyond
the locality-the megacorporation and the national state-and it is
these sources that are beyond the reach of locally based mobili-
zation .
Coalition
The national political stalemate and the

limits of local initiative together define the
political situation shared by all of the social movements that are
related to the Left tradition. Each of the movements-both "new "
and "old" -has succeeded in advancing parts of its particular
agenda. Certain rights, certain kinds of political representation,
The Party's Over
345
and certain aspects of cultural recognition have been achieved . As
a result , a society th at earlier denied work ers elem entary rights to
or ganize, deni ed blacks and wom en elementar y rights to vote, and
whose towns and cities were dominated by rather tight circles of
the economicall y powerful now more closely appro ximat es the
model of a politico cultural pluralism .
The most evid ent failur e of the mov em ents , how ever , has
been their ability to meet th e material needs of their most disad-
vantaged constituents. The labor mov em ent presents the most
glaring inventory of recent failure. It lost much of its power to
prote ct gains previously won for its members , and it cannot ad-
vance the claims of unorganized workers . The black movement's
advances in local power and cultural recognition, and the im-
proved material position of the black middle class has been accom-
panied by a frightening deterioration in the life chances of blacks
in the " inner city ." The women 's movement's gains have not pre-
vented the " fem inization of poverty ."
Each of the movements taken separately lacks the power in
numbers and in leverage to advance a credible program that might
lead toward economic redistribution. The most likely strategic
solution , then, would be to find the basis for movement coalition ,
since it is only by making effective alliance that political resources
for such change might be found . The political potential for move-
ment coalition stems from the immediate need of each movement
for allies. But there are deeper and more promising grounds for
movement coalition. Beneath each of the major movements' par-
ticular sectoral agenda is an implicit demand for fundamental so-
cial restructuring. Despite their apparently nonideological and re-
formist character , each movement embodies a far-reaching social
vision. Even when these movements have seem ed narrowly fo-
cused on a single issue, the cumulative effect of their pressure on
social institutions has broad implications for the way power is
structured and authority is exercised .
It is currently fashionable to assert that we have passed the
point in histor y where " com m on ground " can be found among
social fragments. The value of this claim is that it has perman ently
delegitim ated the notion that "class " is the primary political cate-
gory and that class interest constitut es the basis for a unifi ed and
more " advanced" politics . But "c om m on ground " as articulated
by contem porary movement theor ists does not require that dis-
RichardFlacks
346
cret e mo vem ents abandon th eir separat e cultur es and claims . In-
stead , what can be imagined are effor ts to find programm atic ways
to respond to the shared needs of mo vem ent con stituen cies. Such
ne eds exist in larg e m easur e becaus e " class" remains a fundamen -
tal m easur e o f life chanc es, even if it is n ot a consciou s framework
for social identity . To give a concr ete illu stration , in th e United
Stat es the socializ ation of health care is a programm atic dir ection
desperately needed b y large numb ers of worke rs, b y wom en of
diverse background s, by th e gay community struggling with the
scourge of AIDS, by min orit y co m m uni ties, as well as by millions
in th e " m iddle class" and by many busin esses whos e privat e provi -
sions for em ployee s are inadequate to cop e with spiraling health
costs. Simil ar point s can be mad e about oth er areas of social need
such as housin g and education . It is, in short , not en o rm ously
difficult to identify need s shar ed by black an d whit e worker s, by
wo m en and m en, by th e youn g an d th e old , and to ima gin e how
th ese shar ed needs mi ght form th e basis of a common politic al
agenda for a new polit ical coalition .
An effort to con stru ct suc h a coaliti on among th e movements
aro und such an age nda is th e main hop e for a revi val of social
reform in th e Unit ed States. Mo vem ent-ori ent ed int ellectuals have
be en arguing this for a numb er of ye ars. Jesse Jack son 's presiden-
tial effort in 1988 tried to articu late th ese th em es and to proj ect the
possibilit y of such a coalition . D espit e ex pe ctations that th e Jack -
son proj ect would be attem pted again during the 1992 campaign ,
Jackson and oth er mo vement lead erships chos e inst ead to work
actively but qui etly for th e Clinton cam paign, w h ose strateg y
focused on winning over thos e workin g-class vot ers (whit e, mal e)
wh o were most alien ated from th e m ovements . In oth er words ,
inst ead of tr ying to creat e a pro gram that mi ght serve to coalesce
th e mo vem ent s an d simultan eousl y appea l to the disaff ected " m id-
dle class, " m ovem ent lead ers tacitl y agreed to th eir tactical mar-
gin alization. Th e hop e, of cours e, was th at a D emocr atic presi-
den cy would reop en public space for a revival of soci al reform .
It seem s possibl e th at some signifi cant reform m easur es w ill
be enac ted during th e 1990s . In the ne xt decad e, some sort of
compr eh en sive national health in sur an ce seem s likel y to be
adop ted, some refund in g of education w ill take pl ace, and th ere
w ill be some national effort to restor e econo m ic ch an ces for som e
of th ose in th e wor kin g class who have lost ground in th e last
The Party's Over
347
decades. These are measures that are likely to have considerable
corporate backing because they provide some public investment
and socialization of costs that many corporate leaders have begun
to identify as necessary for capital accumulation and national com-
petitiveness. But such programs are likely to be an inadequate
basis for common ground . For one thing, state fiscal constraints
will limit their substantive value. Already we have been told that
there will not be a "peace dividend" large enough to meet pressing
social needs and that paying for the financial and environmental
costs of the Reagan years will further exacerbate already threaten-
ing budget deficits . A new movement coalition is likely to discover
that an effort to revitalize the New Deal during the Clinton years
will not result in major change, although it may succeed in provid-
ing at least a brief period of state-sponsored reform.
Beyond the Welfare State
A movement coalition needs to be

grounded in a vision that goes beyond the
welfare state if it is to construct a viable politics in a time when
the economy is globalized and society is decentered . I suggest that
the heart of that vision is to be found in the largely unarticulated
shared logic of each of the major movements-whether "new" or
"old. " What is shared by these movements is precisely the demand
that society should be structured so that people can shape the
conditions of their lives. The labor movement did not struggle
simply for better wages and working conditions ; it struggled for
workers' voice, for their right to organize and to determine the
terms of their employment. The black movement did not cam-
paign simply for equal treatment; its central demand has always
revolved around empowerment. Feminism is not just about gender
equality; it aims at the fundamental restructuring of power rela-
tions between the sexes. Both the peace and environmental move-
ments are fundamentally efforts to make public decision-making
fully accountable to those affected by it and to give people in their
communities the chance to control their own futures.
If we can no longer rely on the hope for a party to represent
the people, or on a nation-state to embody the people's hopes,
then we have to make concretely realizable a vision of a society
organized so that people have some chance to directly express
RichardFlacks
348
themselves as well as to hold those who speak for them account-
able. Perhaps the answer to the domination of the megacorpora-
tion and the disintegration of the national state is to enable people
to find power in and through communities .
The logic of social movements suggests that the nature of the
state needs to be fundamentally reconceived. If democratization
were taken as the guiding principle of political action and the
primary standard of political legitimation, then the state would be
seen not as the center of rule making and the source of social
welfare but as a vehicle for community empowerment and local
control. We need to think of the national state not as the source of
initiative and control, not as the vehicle for solutions of problems,
but principally as the potential source of capital and law that would
enable people to solve their problems at the level of the com -
munity .
Indeed , such a function may be the only viable one remaining
for the national state in a society that is both globalizing and
decentering. It may seem absurd to reimagine the central state as
a vehicle for decentralization . But the American experience, with
its federal constitution and traditions of local control, provides
some examples of how such a process could work . I briefly sketch
some of the kinds of state policies that would support the logic of
democratic decentralization .
I. Legal recogninon of movement-based organization. An

example in practice is the Wagner Act of 1936 that guaranteed
workers' rights to form unions and to strike and established a
machinery requiring collective bargaining between recognized
unions and employers. Similar kinds of organizing and bargaining
rights have been proposed for public utility consumers, neighbor-
hood organizations, and tenant unions. A number of federal pro-
grams have required "participation" in planning service delivery
on the part of client groups. Such provisions have encouraged the
growth of movement organizations among the urban poor and
among senior citizens.
2. Federal subsidy for community organization. Again, there

is precedent, in such programs as VISTA, and the 1960s War on
Poverty, and a variety of other direct and indirect programs.
The Party's Over
349
3. Legal and material support for locally based "impact re-
view." On the model of the California Environmental Impact
Review, communities could require a wide range of social ac-
counting with respect to a variety of publicly relevant decisions,
broadening the concept to include "economic" and " social" as
well as "environmental" impacts . Such review could be federally
mandated, and federal programs could assist community-based
groups by providing technical expertise, research support, and
the like.
4. Federal "block" grants. A necessary function of central

authority is redistribution; decentralization is bound to result in
manifold inequalities. Rather than administer such transfers, sub-
sidies, and reallocations through centralized bureaucracies with
elaborate rules and programmatic targets, a decentralizing ap-
proach is embodied in the idea of block grants-unencumbered
funds provided to communities on need-based formulas with the
use of these funds to be fought out politically at community or
regional levels.
5. Federal allocation of capital. Community empowerment

requires the ability to create community owned , locally based
enterprises where "private," market-based investments do not
meet community defined needs. Community ownership of public
utilities can support local autonomy, provide an infrastructure for
"soft" energy alternatives, and generate revenues for local use .
Community investment in job-creating enterprises can be a re-
sponse to the loss of private investment. Community provision of
services can offset loss of services from cost-cutting private firms .
The national government may be a necessary source for capital
and expertise for the initiation of such enterprises . A national ,
public bank could be such a mechanism for social investment .7
I am not here putting forward specific proposals; my point,

instead, is to illustrate how central government could provide the
legal, material, and technical foundation for various forms of lo-
cal, participatory democracy. The outcome of such a process of
decentralization would be the institutionalization of social move-
ments as frameworks of everyday, popular participation in institu-
tional governance, community planning, and regional resource
Ri chardFlacks
350
alloc ation . Such institution alizati on seems to me to be inh erent in
th e logic of th e mov em ents. Th e dri ve to tran sform th e state in
such a dir ection , I sugges t, could be an effective ba sis for move-
m ent alliance. No w that th e part y is ove r, th e peopl e th emsel ves
are going to have to take responsibilit y for th eir co llective futures .
The m ovem ents- as social formati on s, as repositori es o f soci al
vision , as tr aining gr ounds for politi cal co m petence -s eem des-
tin ed to be th e vehicles for such respon sibility .
Notes
1. O bv io usly in pr actice m an y lefti sts have fund am ent ally vio lated th eir
radical dem o cratic claims. As I discu ss b elow , lefti st strugg les fo r state power ,
using prof ession al polit ical orga niza tio n as a vehicle, were always con tradicting
th eir fund am ent al m oral claim s.
2. N ot e th at I am delib erately- and I hop e pro vocati vely- gl ossin g over
th e deep differences amo ng th e typ es of parti es th at eme rge d durin g thi s century.
Ce rtainly , th ere was a pr ofound m or al as well as pr actical gulf betw een th e social
dem ocr atic parti es of Western E urope and Leni n 's " party o f a n ew typ e, " be-
tween parti es led b y M arxists o f vario us stri pes an d n on-M arxist socia list or
labor part ies. Thr ou gh all of th eir histori es, th ese parti es fou ght each o the r mo st
bitt erly , both wi thin th eir ow n societies and in th e arenas of int ern ation al social-
ism . Yet , all of th ese part y form ation s were gro u nde d in cert ain sha red stra teg ic
prin ciples and, despit e th eir deep diff eren ces, all sh ared certain key co ntradic-
tion s.
3. T he int erpl ay of class, race, an d ethni city is a topi c of mu ch research
and discussion . I have been parti cul arl y influ en ced in m y ow n thinkin g b y Aro-
nowitz (1992) and Bon acich (1976).
4. Again, despit e cur ren t em phases on m ovem ent fragm ent ati on and iden-
tit y politi cs as " n ew " and " pos trno de rn . " th e actual hi stor y of U. S. socia l m ove-
m ent s sugges ts th at th ese h ave always been char act eristi c.
S. For a fuller developm ent o f thi s arg um en t, see H acks 1988.
6. Th e rise of pr o gr essive elector al coa litio ns h as been describ ed in C lavel
1986. Fo r studies of two ke y cases see K ann 1990 an d Co nroy 1990. See also
Klin g an d Posner 1990.
7. O ne o f th e best so u rces o f ideas an d sche mes -so me deri ved fro m o ther
societies - using go vern me n t as a so urce of capital for twent y- seven com m unities
is Ca rn oy an d Shearer 1980. An im port ant recent stateme nt o f a vision o f a
decentr alizin g nati on al state app ear s in Alp erovit z 1992.
References
Alp ero vit z, G ar. 1992. " Me mo to C lin ton ." Tikkun, N ovemb er , 13-1 9.
Ar on owit z, Stanley . 1992. False Promises. Durh am , N .C. : D uke Uni ver sit y
Pr ess.
The Party's O ver
351
Bonaci ch, Edna . 1976. "Advanced Capitalism and Black-White Relations in the
U. S. : A Split Labor Market Interpretation ." Am erican Sociological Review
41:34-51.
Carnoy , Martin, and Derek Shearer . 1980. Economic D emocracy. Amonk, N .Y.:
M. E. Sharp e.
Clavel, Pierre . 1986. Th e Progressive City . New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers Univer-
sity Press .
Conroy , W. J. 1990. Chall enging the Boundaries of Reform : Socialism in Burlington .
Philadelphia : Temple University Press.
Flacks, Richard . 1988. Making History : The American Left and the Am erican Mind .
New York: Columbia University Press .
Kann, Mark . 1990. Middle Class Radicalism in Santa Moni ca. Philadelphia : Temple
University Press .
Kling , J. M. , and P. S. Posner. 1990. Dilemmas of Activism. Philadelphia : Temple
University Press .
Laclau, Emesto, and Chantal Mouffe . 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy :
Toward a Radical Democratic Politics. London : Verso.
Michels, Robert . 1959. Political Parties. New York: Dover.
The Contributors
JoseAlvarez-Juncowas professor of history of political ideas and

social movements at the University of Madrid , and he currently
holds the Prince of Asturias Chair in Spanish History and Civiliza-
tion at Tufts University. He is the author of several books and
numerous articles on cultural and social aspects of Spanish political
life in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Robert D. Benford is an associate professor of sociology at the

University of Nebraska-Lincoln, where his teaching and research
interests are in social movements, peace and war, and social con-
structionism. He has recently published articles in American Socio-
logical Review, Social Forces, Sociological Quarterly, International So-
cial Movement Research, Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, and
Sociological Inquiry.
Richard Flacksis professor of sociology at the University of

California, Santa Barbara . His most recent books include Making
History: The American Left and the American Mind (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1988); and, with Jack Whalen, Beyond the
Barricades: The Sixties Generation Grows Up (Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1989).
JosephR. Gusfield is professor emeritus of sociology at the Uni-

versity of California, San Diego . He has written widely on devel-
oping nations, the sociology of education, and political sociology,
but his major work has been in social movements, social problems,
and the sociology of law, with focus on the legal and political
controls on alcohol and other health behaviors . Among his books
are Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the American Temperance
Movement (Urbana : University of Illinois Press, 1963); Protest, Re-
form, and Revolt (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1970); and The
Culture of Public Problems: Drinking-Driving and the Symbolic Order
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press , 1981). He has been presi-
dent of the Society for the Study of Social Problems and of the
T he Contr ibutors
354
Pacific Sociologica l Asso ciation . He received th e C ha rles Hort on
Co oley Award for outstanding book of 1981-1 983 fro m th e Soc i-
ety for th e Study of Symb olic Inter action ; h e was also awarde d
th eir Geor ge Herb ert Mead Award for lifetime achi evem ent .
Scott A. Hunt is assistan t prof essor of socio logy at the Uni ver-
sity of Kentuck y . He received his Ph .D . from th e Un iver sity of
Nebra ska-Lincoln in 1991. His publi cations includ e article s in Per-
spectiveson Social Problems, Sociological Inquiry, Journal of C ontemp o-
rary Ethnography, Rural Sociology, and Mi d-American Review of Soci-
ology . Hi s areas of in terest includ e soc ial m ovem ent s, ide ntity,
social problems , th eory , symb oli c int er acti onism , an d th e social
con struc tion of com mo nsense know ledge .
HankJohnston is a lectur er in th e D ep artm ent o f Soc iology , San

Di ego State Uni versity . He has publi shed resear ch on nation alism
and politic al oppos ition in Journalfor the Scientific Study of Relig ion,
Sociological Ana lysis, Research in Social Movements, Confl ict and
Change, Journal of Baltic S tudies, amo ng othe rs . He is th e au tho r of
Tales of Nationalism: Catalonia, 1939-1 979 (New B ru nsw ick, N.J. :
Rut gers Uni versit y Pr ess, 1991). He is con duc ting research on
nation alism and the arts and on th e socio ling uistic aspec ts of col-
lective identity .
Bert Klandermansis prof essor in th e D ep artm ent of Social Ps y-

chology, Free Uni versit y , Am sterdam . Hi s research focu ses on
m obilization and parti cipation in social mo vem ents . He is cur-
rentl y stud ying farm er 's prote sts in th e N eth erl and s and Spain
and , with John Oli vier , th e respon ses of m ovem ent and counter-
mov em ent suppo rters to th e social an d politi cal tr ansition s in
South Afric a. He is th e editor of a new seri es of monographs on
social mov em ents and prot est publish ed by Uni versit y of M inn e-
sot a Pr ess. His Social Construction of Protest: Social Psychological
Principles of Movement Participation is forthcoming from Basil
Blackw ell. He is the editor with Craig Jenkins o f Th e Politics of
Social Protest: Comparative Persp ectives on S tates and Social Movements
(Univ er sit y o f M inn esot a Pr ess, 1993).
EnriqueLarafiais titular profe ssor of sociology and coordin ator

of th e doct oral pr o gr am at th e Univer sit y of Madrid , Som o saguas
Th e C ontributors
355
Campus. He is currently studying th e organization and develop-
m ent of new social mov ements in Spain . He is th e author of nu-
m erous articles and chapter s in edited volumes. He organized th e
seminar " N ew Social Movements and the End of Ideology " in
August 1990 at the Men edez Pelayo International University , San-
tander, Spain, where several of the essays in this volume wer e
first presented.
Doug McAdam is professor of sociolog y at the University of

Arizona . He is the author of PoliticalProcess and the D evelopmentof
Black Insurgency, 1930-19 70 (Chicago : Universit y of Chica go
Press , 1982), and FreedomSummer (New York: Oxford Universit y
Press , 1988), which was honor ed as the cowinner of the C. Wright
Mills Award. His current research inter ests in social movements
include the cross -national diffusion of movement ideas and the
relationship between social movements/revo lutions and demo -
graphic processes.
John D. McCarthy is professor of sociology and a member of

the Life C ycle Institute at the Catholic Universit y of America,
Washington , D . C. He has served as pr esident of th e Collecti ve
Behavior and Social Movements Section of ASA . He has published
numerous articles and chapters, over the past two decades, that
have helped set the agenda for research in the field of social mov e-
ments . Many of these are collected in Social Movements in an Orga-
nizational Society, which he edited with Mayer N . Zald (New
Brunswick, N.J. : Transaction Books , 1987).
Alberto Melucci is professor of sociolog y and clinical psychol-

ogy at the Uni versity of Milano , and h e is a practicing psychother-
apist. Through numerou s books and articles , his contributions to
the field of social movem ents and collective and personal identity
are internationally recognized. His recent books includ e Nomads of
the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary
Society (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), and Il gioco
dell'io (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1991) .
Carol Mueller is associate professor of sociolog y in the Social

and Beha vioral Sciences Program of Arizona Stat e Universit y
West. She has served as president of th e Collectiv e Behavior and
The C ontributors
356
Social Movements Section of th e ASA . She is editor , with Aldon
D. Morris , of Frontiers in Social Movement Th eory (New Haven :
Yale Univ ersity Pr ess, 1992), and , with Mary Katzenst ein , The
Women'sMovements of the United States and WesternEurope (Philadel-
phia : Temple Univ ersity Press , 1987).
David A. Snow is prof essor of sociology and head of th e Depart-

m ent of Sociology at th e Univ ersity of Arizona in Tucson . He is
coauthor , with Leon And erson, of Down on Their Luck: A Study
of Homeless Street People (Berkel ey : Univ ersity of California Pr ess,
1993), and he is curr entl y con du ctin g research on social movem ent
mobilization among th e hom eless acro ss eighteen of th e nation 's
larg est cities . He has publish ed w idely on social mov ement micro-
m obilization, on framin g proc esses in relation to social move-
ments, and on con version pro cesses, particularly in relation to
religious cult s and movem ents .
MateSzab6 is assistant prof essor of political science at th e Eot-

vos Lorand Univ ersit y , Budap est, and he has writt en numerous
articles in Engli sh and German . He was a guest lecturer at the
Uni versity of Hambur g and a research fellow at the Alexander
von Humboldt Found ation at the Univ ersity of Hamburg Institute
of Political Scien ce. He has served as th e secr eta ry general of the
Hungarian Politi cal Scien ce Association , and he is currently editor
of th e Hungarian PoliticalScience Review.
Ralph H. Turner is profes sor of sociology emeritus at the Uni-

versity of California, Los Angel es. He has been president of th e
American Sociological Association and chair of the Coll ective Be-
havior and Social Movements Section . He is author , with Lewis
M . Killian, of Collective Behavior (Engel wood Cliffs , N.J. : Pr en-
tice-Hall , 1957, 1962, 1987), and he has written num erous articl es
in th e field of collective behavior and social mov em ents.
Index
Abeyan ce pro cesses, 214, 215, 238 Antiabortion movement , 63, 69, 74.
Abolitionist movement, 40, 79, 95 See also Abortion rights movement
Abortion rights movement, 8, 63, 69, Anti-drunk driving movement, 52,
70, 256 (seealso Antiabortion move- 139 (see also Drunk driving) ; activ-
ment) ; framing in , 69 ists' role in, 146-50, 154-55,
ACLU. See American Civil Liberties 156-57 , 158-59 , 161nll ,
Union 161-62nI6; constituents of, 144-45;
Activists, 93-94 , 95, 186,216 ,221 ; federal and state facilitation of,
discourse of, 211, 217; intergenera- 138-41 , 155-57 , 158, 159, l6On5,
tional relationship among , 27-28, 161-62nI6, 163n19; mobilization in,
29, 283; in political office, 343; atypical, 155-56 ; organizations in,
structural roles of, 6, 8, 226; subcul- 143-46, 161-62n16
tures of, 43-45 Antinuclear movement, 3, 59, 186;
African American movement, 341; British, 93; and the Democratic
common ground shared by other party , 340; grievances in, 40, 284;
new social movements and, 88, 96, and identity issues, 94; as linear
98n6, 347; failures of, 345 movement, 65; roots of, 342; struc-
African Americans , 200, 241 tural roles of participants in, 6
Aiken , Doris , 144 Antipornography movement, 98n5
Alcohol industry : and the anti-drunk Anti-Semitism , 91, 98n8
driving movement , 160-61n7, 161- Antismoking movement, 8
62n16, 163n18; and the public Antiwar movement. See Peace move-
health frame , 159 ments
Alcohol Safety Action Programs Armenia, 274; nationalism in, 268,
(ASAPs) , 140-41, 149, 161-62n16 271,272-73,274-75 . See also Soviet
Alternative medicine . See Health Union , nationalism in
movements ASAPs . See Alcohol Safety Action
Altri Codici (Melucci), 14 Programs
"America First" movement, 98n8 Asian movement (United States), 7
American Academy of Arts and Sci- Asturias miners' strikes , 304, 305
ences, 241-42 Atkinson, Ti-Grace, 250
American Civil Liberties Union , Austria , 3, 293, 294
161-62n16 Automobile crashes, 133, 135
American Constitution, 95, 98n9 Automobile safety , 140, 160n5; frames
American Friends Service Committee , for , 135, 136-38 , 142, 157, 160n2,
44, 196 160n3, l6On4, 16On5, 163n20; public
American Indian movement . See Na- attention to , 142, 146
tive American movement Aveni, Adrian , 24
American Revolution, 49, 82, 98n9 ,
330
Anabaptists, 81 Baltic states, 267, 272, 279, 281
Anarchism : and the Left, 330, 338; in Basque nationalist movement, 315 (see
Spain , 307, 308, 311,324n8 . also Spain, nationalism in); activist
Animal rights movement , 3, 6, 49, 59, subculture s in, 44, 270, 271, 272-73 ;
65 consen sus mobilization in, 225;
Index
358
Basque nationa list m ovem ent (con- C hild abuse, 69- 70
tinued) C hildren's right s mov em ents, 6, 95
identit y issues in , 7, 19; other m ove- Chiliasm , 81-8 7
ment s subsume d by, 267, 281, Chinese Revoluti on , 49, 50
312- 13; role of every day life in Ch ristianity , 49, 50, 53
grievances of, 277- 79 Civ il Right s Act, 247
Batasuna, Henri , 281 C ivil right s move me n t, 63; activist
Beard , C harles, 95, 98n9 subculture in, 44, 45; collective iden-
Beauvoir , Simon e de, 284 tity in, 247; contin uity in, 24; and
Belgium , 27 th e D em ocratic party , 340; framin g
Bell, Da niel, 21 in , 38, 41-4 2; as ideational m ove-
Bellah, Rob ert N ., 27 m ent , 62; ideological and cultural
Benford , Robert D. , 29; on framin g, contradictions within , 40; as m aster
41, 191-92 ; on framin g and m obil i- prot est frame, 42, 49; and new social
zation, 190- 91 movem ent s, 283 (seealso under indi-
Benson , Lee, 98n9 vidual movements); orga nizational
Benton, Jam es, 91 aspects of, S; politi cal and econo m ic
Berkeley studen t m ovem ent , 209, 214, chang e by, 48- 49; shi ft in cultur al
215- 16, 219, 229n4 content of, 47; social strata m erged
Black movem ent . See African Ame ri- in, 53; state facilitation of, 157; sub-
can movem ent m erged network s in , 238; and the
Blum er, Herbert , 79, 80; and collective wo m en 's liberation m ovem ent , 40,
behavior , 16, 60, 66- 67 42, 246, 249
Bound ary m aint enance, 20, 28; and C lass conflict, 22, 188; and econo m ic
framin g, 193- 96, 203 grievances, 7, 9, 21; and th e false
Boyer, Miguel , 326n27 unit y in social m ovem ent s, 236; and
Br own , Jerr y, 91 Mannh eim , 95, 96; in social m ove-
Brown v. Boardof Education, 41 m ent th eor y, 6, 26, 103, 104, 189,
Bur gess, Ern est, 66 210, 345
C leme ns, Elisabeth, 50
Ca ballero, Largo , 307 C linto n, Bill , 341, 346, 347
Ca nada, 51, 267 Cog nitive liber ation , 160nl
Canovas, Ant oni o , 324n8 Co hen, Jean , 210, 259n l
Ca pitalism , 3, 103, 106-7 , 108; and Co llective behavior , 16, 58, 95, 228n2;
class relat ion ship s, 103; and new so- and continuities, 211, 212, 213; criti-
cial mo vem ent s, 103, 106-7 cism of, 60, 61, 73; and fram ing ,
Cas tro, Fidel, 49 68-69; intera ctive order as locus of
Ca talan nationalist movem ent , 284nl , m ovem ent s in, 60-6 1, 74, 212; and
323nl (see also C atalonia; Spain, na- rnicroarenas and m acroarenas,
tion alism in) ; activist sub culture s in , 66-68; rejection of , 36, 213, 228n l;
44,270 ,271 , 272- 73, 275, unit y perceived in , 26On4
284- 85n2 ; anar chism in, 324n8; C ollective ident ity, 124, 214, 314; an-
con sensus m obili zation in , 225; dis- tagoni st an d prot agoni st fields in ,
course analysis of, 229n6; framin g 192- 97, 198; in anti-drunk drivin g
in, 19, 222, 229n 13; identit y issues m ovem ent , 157; audience fields of,
in, 7; other mov em ent s subsume d 193; bound ary fram ing and m ainte-
by , 267, 312-13 ; ro le of every day life nance in , 20, 28, 193- 96; and class
in grievances of, 51, 277-80 conscio usness, 238; and consensus
Ca talonia, 273, 274, 279 mobili zation , 225; continuity an d
Ca tho lic church , 27, 51 change in, 18, 28, 29- 30, 169, 183,
Che mo by l, 292 212, 228-29 n3 ; defined , 15- 16, 17,
C hicano power m ovement , 96 168, 212, 236-3 7; and discour se
Index
359
analysis, 217, 229n6 ; factors contrib- Down ey, Gar y L. , 193
uting to formation of, 168; and Drunk dri ving, 133; citizens' move-
framin g, 190, 192, 216, 227; and ment against (see Anti-drunk dri v-
grievances, 21-2 4; and ideolo gy, 22, ing movem ent); framing for ,
227; and indi vidu al identit y, 7- 8, 6; 134-35 , 136, 138-41 , 142, 153- 54,
as int eractional , 17, 168, 169, 183, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160n2 , 163n18,
190, 192- 93, 217; and int ernal con- 163n20; media attent ion to, 133,
flict and com petition, 219, 239-40 , 143, 146, 147-4 8, 155, 156, 157-5 8,
249, 251, 255- 56; in the latenc y 161- 62n16; media stories on , ana-
pha se of social mo vement s, 257- 58; lyzed, 150-55 , 161n12, 161n15,
new social movements as sour ce for , 161- 62n16, 162- 63n17, 163n18;
10-11 ,17-1 8,4 9-5 0,314 ; and nor- publi c att ention to , 142, 143,
m ative pro scriptions, 16-17 ,2 8; and 146-4 8, 160n6 , 161n9, 162- 63n17
political influen ce, 256; and publi c Durkh eim , Emil e, 16
identit y, 219; at the public level of Dut ch peace mo vement , 170; activists
analysis, 258-59 ; and public opin- in, compared , 173-74, 175, 180- 81;
ion , 18-20 ,28 ; and social netw orks, activists' turn over in, 170, 175- 82;
117, 215, 228- 29n3; and subme rged organizations involved in, 170-71 ,
networks , 237-40 , 243, 256-57, 258 182; stages of, 169-73 , 182- 83
Communism and the Communist
party, 23, 38, 51, 274; activism en-
couraged in, 338; collapse of, 21, 41, Eastern Europe , 302; and Commu-
42, 288- 89, 330; and dictatorship , nism , 332, 335; mobiliz ation und er
334; in Eastern Europe, 332, 335; authoritarian system s in, 287- 88; so-
ideolo gical articulation in, 21-22 ; cial democratic mass parti es in,
and the Left, 330, 332, 338; and Lith- 333-34 ; system transformation in,
uanian nationalism , 272; and social 288- 89
movem ent theor y, 3, 4, 59; in Spain , Ecology movem ent, 3, 6, 59, 115-1 6
310,31 8, 325nl1 , 326n22 (see also Environm ental movem ent );
Count ercultural group s, 8, 51, 53 in Hun gary (see Danub e mo vem ent);
Cuban Revolution , 49 identit y and grie vances in, 24, 94,
Culture : ignor ed as force in social 118; institution alization o f, 125
mov em ent s, 37; and social mo ve- Edu cation movement s, 95
ment s, 45 (see also under Social England , 238
mo vement s). S ee also Mov em ent Environmental mo vem ent , 93 (see also
cultur e Ecolog y movement) ; and the Dem-
Curti, Merl e, 91 ocrati c part y, 340, 341; framin g of,
158; grievances in, 284; and identit y,
Danforth, John , 143 118, 121-22 ; localism of, 342; and
Diani , Mari o, 268 oth er social movement s, 92, 347;
Danube movement , 288, 292- 95, 299, public accountability and voice
300, 301, 302 achieved by , 343-44 ; root s of, 282,
Degler , Carl , 242 342; Spanish , 313-14 , 315, 325n18,
D emocracy in Am erica (de Tocqueville), 326n25 ; unity in, 221
27 " Equality between the Sexes: An Im-
Demo cracy , 49, 91; and the Left , 330, modest Proposal" (Rossi), 242
331,33 8 Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) , 241,
Democratic party, 199,335 ,340-41, 247, 248, 253, 256, 260n8
346 (see also Political parti es) ERA. See Equal Right s Am endment
Dick stein, Morri s, 51 Erik son, Erik, 13, 14, 241
Discour se analysis, 217, 221, 224, Estonia , 279; nationali sm in, 267, 268,
229n6 280 (see also Soviet Union , national-
Index
360
Estoni a (continued) frames, 42, 49, 79, 226; by th e m e-
ism in); nationali st subcultures in, dia, 71, 158, 222; mo tivational, 191,
273-7 4, 285n3 , 284-8 502 193, 195, 196, 203; past em bellished
Et hni c movements, 95, 96, 97 (see also and reconstru cted in, 195, 203; as re-
N ation alistic moveme nts); identity cursiv e, 192; duri n g regime transi-
issues in, 7, 17 tion , 299; and socia l contro l im plica-
Ethn om eth od olog y, 217- 18 tion s, 159
Et zioni , Amit ai, 79 France, 3, 42, 306, 308
Eur op e, 3, 92, 238, 316; Eastern (see Franco and Francoism , 272, 278; anar-
Eastern Eu rop e); social m ovem ent chism duri ng, 311; antipo liticalism
theory in, 26, 59, 210, 243; social und er , 308; churc h-sta te relations
movem ent s in, 3, 5, 6, 26, 27, 30, und er , 273, 274-75 ; deat h of , 310,
37, 95, 322 311; ph ases in dictator ship of, 309;
Eu zkadi , 277, 279 (seealso Spain, na- social m ovem ent s und er , 226, 304,
tion alism in); chur ch-s tate relation s 305, 306, 313, 314, 316, 317, 318,
in, 273, 274; nation alism in, 267, 322, 325n 16, 326029; student m ove-
270, 272, 275 ment against, 312, 326023
Evans, Sara: on the orig ins of the Freedom Sum mer , 169, 213
wo men 's moveme nt, 40, 42, 243, Freem an , Jo, 243, 246-47, 260n1O
246, 247, 249 Free Speech Movem ent (FSM) , 209,
Exon , Jam es J., 199 226, 283
French Revoluti on , 47, 49, 50, 82, 330
Fantasia, Rick, 257 Friedan , Bett y, 284
Farm wor kers' movem ent, 42 Friedm an, De bra , 17-18
Fascism , 3, 4, 59 From Structure to Action (Klandermans,
Femini sm and femini sts. See Wome n' s Kri esi, Tarrow), 259- 6002
movem ent Frontiers in Social Movement T heory
Firem an, Bru ce, 21, 276 (Mo rris and Mu eller), 15, 26003
Flacks, Richard , 21- 22, 26, 65, 68 FSM . S ee Free Speech Movem ent
Fland ers, 267 Fun ctionalist theo ry , 213, 226, 230014
For eign mi ssion s movem ent , 95 Fund am entalist religiou s movem ents,
Fram e alignm ent pr ocesses. S ee 3
Framin g
Frame A nalysis (Go ffma n) , 190 Gam son , William, 150,21 4, 257; on
Fram ing, 68-69, 135, 190- 92, 203-4, th e effective frame , 134; and the in-
210, 211-12 ; and antagoni st identit y justice frame, 21, 259, 276
fields, 192, 193, 197-99; audience Gandhi, Moh and as, 8, 38
fields of, 193, 199- 201, 203; of au to Gay right s m ovem ent , 3, 59 (see also
safety, 135, 136-3 8, 142, 157, Lesbian m ovem ent) ; and th e civil
16002 , 160n5, 163020; bound ar y, rig hts m ovem ent, 42, 49; cultural in-
193- 96, 203; and cog ni tive liber a- fluence of, 64; and th e D em ocratic
tion , 16001 ; as cultu ral appro pria- party, 340; as a fluid moveme nt , 66;
tion , 37-38; cultur al pro cesses th at ident ity issues in , 7, 17, 23, 189; inti-
stimulate , 39- 43; defined , 37, 190, m ate and person al issues addressed
222; diagn ostic and progn ostic, 191, by, 8; ro ot s of, 342
193, 195, 196, 198, 203; of drunk Gend er equality m ovem ent , 59, 189.
dri vin g (see Drunk dri vin g, fram ing See also Wom en 's m ovem ent
for); elem ents of effective, 134; and Geo rgia : nation alism in , 268, 273-74 ,
th e environment, 158; and frame ex- 28503 (see also Sovi et U nion , nation-
tension , 223; and identity construc- alism in); ro le of everyday life in
tion , 185, 186, 190, 201- 3, 216, 227; grievances of, 279, 280
and ideology, 191; and master Germ any, 3, 42
Index
36 1
Gitlin , Todd , 74, 169 change, 188- 89; and nation alism,
Goffman , Erving, 16,37 , 69,1 90, 201; 17, 267- 68, 269, 270, 275, 276-77 ,
and self-im age, 13; and working 282, 283; person al (see Individual
consensu s, 225, 23On14 identit y); and postindust rialism , 15;
Goldstone , Jack , 39 psychop atholo gy perspective on,
Gorbachev , Mikhail, 41, 173,273 187-8 8; public (seePublic identit y);
Granovetter , Mark , 24 shift in, from instituti on to im pulse,
Grazioli , Marc o, 14 88; as social construc t, 269; in social
Green part y, 6, 92-93 , 281 mov em ents , 7-8, 9, 10- 12, 103,
Greenpeace, 12 203- 4, 267, 276, 332; in social
Grievanc es, 276, 283, 284; and collec- mov em ent theor y, 10, 11, 187- 90,
tive identit y, 21-24 , 28; economic, 210; and symbolic function s, 211; as
and class, 7, 9, 21; and everyday life, youthful pur suit , 14-15 , 27, 29, 89,
30; framing pro cess stimulated by , 118
40-41 ; and ideolog y, 20, 21, 22 Ideolo gy, 3-4 , 6- 7, 226; defined,
Guevara , Che, 49 80- 81; dialectical relationship with
Gusfield , Joseph R., 21, 24; on th e utopi a of, 81, 85; and framin g, 191;
framing of drunk drivin g, 137, and grievances, 20, 21, 22; and iden -
146-47, 160-61n7 tit y, 10, 14, 22,1 93,21 9, 227;
Mannh eim 's analysis of, 81-8 7
Hacker, Helen , 240-41, 242, 248 Ideologyand Utopia (Marx), 97
Handicapp ed rights movement , 49 Iglesias, Pablo, 307
Hare Krishna s, 60 IKV. See Interd enomination al Peace
Hayes, Carlton J. H ., 95-96 Council
Health movem ents , 3, 8, 9, 65-6 6 Indian ind epend ence mov em ent , 53
Heckler, Mar garet, 26On9 Individual identity , 216, 331; anta go-
Hegel, George Wilhelm Friedrich , 81 nist and prota gonist fields in,
" Hippie" mov ement, 63-64, 65, 69, 193-97 , 198; and boundar y framin g,
71, 74; as ideational mov ement , 62; 195-96 ; and collective identity , 7- 8,
individual and collective blurred in, 16; continuity and chang e in, 29-30 ;
7 as fixed or malleable, 28; and the
Hispanic movement (United States), 7 framing pro cess, 192; and griev-
Hitler , Adolf , 88, 98n8 ances, 23; and ideology , 14; as int er-
Huber , Joan , 243, 244 actional accomplishment , 28,
Humanitarian movement , 79 189- 90, 216; in social mov em ent s,
Hung ary, 288, 289-90 , 296- 300, 7-8, 9,10 -12,103 , 203-4 ,2 67,27 6,
301-2 332; and public opinion , 18-1 9; and
Hunt , Lynn , 46-47 , 50 social context , 12, 13-14 ; in social
Hunt , Scott , 29, 187 mov em ent theory , 12-13 ; verbal ar-
ticulation of, 12-13 ; as youthfu l ac-
Identity, 28-30 , 87, 111, 186,282 ; and tivity, 14-15 , 27
cognitiv e liberation , 160n1; collec- Industrial Revolution , 6, 218, 308
tive (see Collective identity); and Info rm ation societi es: conflicts in,
conflict , 118; defined, 11; ethnic, 101- 2, 109-11, 115, 123; dominant
187, 189; and everyday life, 283; and logic of, 114-15 ; and identity, 101,
framing (see under Framing) ; and 112-14 , 122; information in, 111-13 ;
grievan ces, 23, 28; and ideology , 14, power in, 113, 115, 123; and social
22, 193, 219, 227; ind ividual (see In- movement s, 102-3 , 104
dividual identity) ; in the information Interdenominational Peace Council
society , 101- 2, 112-14 , 122; as in- (IKV), 170; activists in, 171, 174,
tera ction al accomplishment, 189, 175; and political action, 171, 172,
283; as manif estat ion of macro social 179
Index
362
Iran, 50, 196 335-36, 338; as identit y, 33 1-32;
Iran-Ir aq war, 196 ideo log ical perspective of , 330-3 1,
Iraq, 203 350n1 ; as a part y, 332-37; social
Iribarn e, Manuel Fraga, 269 movem ent s as em bo dime nt of, 338-
Islam , 49, 50 39; strategy of , 332-34, 338, 350n2 ;
Islamic Revoluti on , 50 as a tradition, 330-3 1, 332
Israeli-Palestini an conflict, 197 Lenin and Lenini sm, 49, 310, 318, 320;
Issue culture , 150 and state power , 334- 35, 350n2
Italy , 3, 27, 42, 306, 308 Lenini st m odel , 9, 21
Lesbian movem ent , 168, 189 (see also
Jackson , Jesse, 340, 346 Gay right s m ovem ent )
Japan, 42 Levy , Leon ard , 98n9
Jefferson , Th om as, 49 Liberation th eology m ovem ent , 51
Jew s, 98n8, 240 Libert arianism , 330
John son , Lynd on , 137 Lifto n , Robert J., 241-42
John ston , Hank , 14, 24, 229n6, Lightne r, Candy , 133, 134, 144
229n13,28 4n 1 Lindb erg, C harles, 98n8
Julia, Sant os, 307 Lipset, Seymo ur , 91
Lithu ania, 267, 279; nation alism in ,
Kadar, Janos, 289, 290, 293, 295 267, 268, 270-73 , 275, 28 1 See also
Kar klins, Rasm a, 279 Soviet Un ion , nation alism in
Killian, Lewis, 60, 189 Lodi, Giova nni, 14
Kimm eldorf , Howard , 44- 45
Kin g, Martin Luther Jr., 38, 70, 343 McAdam , Do ug , 24, 39, 42, 169, 213,
Kin g, Rodn ey, 41 214; and collective identit y, 17-18 ;
King, Roger, 93 and cog nitive liberation , 160n 1,
Kitschelt, Herb ert , 39 238,2 59
Klanderm ans, Bert , 29, 256-57 , McC arth y, John ,S
259n 1,2 59-6 0n2 McD onald , Forr est, 98n9
Klapp , O rr in, 10, 11, 21,1 87 McGui re, Andrew, 147
Klein, Eth el, 243, 244- 45 M AD D . See Moth ers Against D ru nk
Kornha user, William , 72 Dr iving
Kri esi, Han speter , 39, 170, 259-60n2 Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruc-
Krop otkin , Peter, 8 tion (Ma nnhe im) , 72- 73
Kuhn , T ho m as, 3, 59 M annh eim , Ka rl, 72-739 5,96; ambi-
guities in m odel of , 84-87 , 98n4; on
Labor m ovem ent s,S , 50, 62, 64, 347 ideology and utopi a, 80-87, 98n 1,
(see also Work ers' m ovem ent s); ac- 98n .4
tivist subcultures in , 43-44 ; and the M aravall, Jose M aria, 321
D em ocratic part y, 340, 34 1; failur es March on Washin gt on (1940), 40
of, 345; and identit y, 50, 332; m odel Marx and Marxism , 30, 52, 230n 14,
for , 305- 6; and social mo vem ent 335, 338; and alienation, 92-93 ; ide-
th eor y, 4, 59; Spanish, 310, 325n16 ology conceived in , 6-7, 219,
Laraiia, Enr iqu e, 19, 44 228-29 n3; and th e link between
Latvia, 279; nation alism in , 267, 268, ident it y and ideology, 14; and social
273- 74, 285n3 . See also Sovi et m ovem ent s, 4, 305-6 , 350n2; in so-
Uni on , nationalism in cial m ovem ent th eor y, 26, 104, 226,
LeBon , Gustav, 67 228n2 ; and stu den t m ovem ent s, 44,
Left : achieveme n ts of, 344-45 ; Am eri- 213,22 7-28
can, 336, 338- 39; and the civil right s Mass societ y th eory , 72-75; criticism
movem ent , 42; Eur op ean , 104; he- of, 58, 60, 73
gemo nic parti es of, in decline, M aster fram es, 42, 49, 79, 226
Index
363
Media, 110, 199; and collective iden- N ation al H igh way Traffic Safety Ad-
tit y , 256, 258- 59; creation of new s mini str ation (N H T SA), 146,
by, 148-4 9, 157; and framin g, 71, 161n .ll , 161- 62n16; creation of ,
73, 75, 135, 222; influence on social 137, 138, 142; and th e drun k dri ving
m ovem ent s of, 19, 71, 73, 75, 214; fram e, 139-41
and th e pr esenc e of activis ts, N ation alistic m ovem ent s, 3, 96, 97,
148-4 9; and social m ovem ent s, 116, 111, 267 (see also Et hn ic m ove-
125, 154-55 , 220, 299 ment s); com pared w ith new social
Melu cci, Alb erto , 14, 60, 210, 216, m ovem ent s, 267, 268, 281, 282;
221; an d class conflict and new social fram ing in, 277; and identit y, 17, 30,
m ovem ent s, 188- 89; and collective 267-6 8, 269, 270, 276-7 7, 282, 283;
ident ity , 15, 17, 168, 169, 189, 215, othe r m ovement s sub sum ed by,
228- 29n3, 236-3 7, 242, 243; and 312- 13; and religion , 271, 273-75 ,
continuity an d unit y in social mo ve- 284-8 5n2 , 285n3; ro le of everyday
m ent s, 215, 235- 36, 249; on identit y life in parti cipation in, 267, 268, 269,
in n ation alist m ovem ent s, 268; an d 277, 280-8 1, 282, 283; roo ts of ,
interacti on and m eanin g construc- 95-96; subcultur es in, 270- 75, 282;
tion , 236; on th e limit ation s of struc - sym bols that invok e em otional re-
tur al analysis, 245- 46; on social spo nses in, 280-81
changes and identit y- seekin g, 9, 11; N ation al O rga nization for Wom en
social con stru ctionist approac h pro- (N OW ), 48, 60, 247, 258; m emb er-
posed by, 222; and submer ged net- ship gro w th in, 254; segmen tation
wo rks, 235 , 236, 237-4 0, 243, 246, in , 248; Wom en 's Strike coo rdinated
247, 252, 254, 255, 256, 257-5 8, 259 by , 253
Menn onite s, 283 N ational Safety Cou ncil, 139, 161-
Mexico, 42 62n 16
MF S. See Mobiliz ation for Surv ival Nati ve Ame rican m ovement , 42, 96,
Michels , Rob ert, 334 99n l0
Mil an, 225 NAT O . See North Atlanti c Treaty O r-
Milbr ath, Lester , 92 ganization
Minim alist orga niza tions, 144 N azism , 30
Mi ssissippi Freedom Sum me r Project, N CNP. See N ation al Co nference for a
45, 50-51 N ew Politic s
Mobili zation for Surv ival (M FS), 198 Nebr askans for Peace (N FP) , 186; an-
Molot ch , H arvey, 40 tagoni st and prot agoni st identit y
Moncl oa Pacts, 319, 326n22 const ruc tion by, 196, 197, 199; audi-
Morri s, Ald on , IS , 24, 44, 238, 260n3 ence identit y con stru cted by,
Mother s Against Drunk Dri vin g 200-201; bound ary fram ing in,
(M AD D ), 145, 161- 62n 16; found- 194- 95; and out siders' identit y im-
ing of , 134, 144; success of, 144, put ations, 201-2, 203
143, 146-47 Nem eth , Mikl os, 294
Movement cultur e, 37, 45-4 8 Neofascists, 30
Moynihan , D aniel P., 136-3 7 N ew Age m ovem ent s, 3, 8, 61
Mueller , Ca ro l, IS , 219, 260n3 New Amer ican Movem ent , 229n4
Munz er , Robert, 81 New Left : abeya nce struc ture in , 2 15;
Mushaben ,J o yce, 144 collective identit y and ideology in ,
227-28; ideological per spective of,
N ader , Ralph , 136, 137, 138 342; int ergeneration al relation s in ,
N agel , Joane, 189 29,283; and Mannh eim 's dialectical
N agy, Imr e, 290, 294 analysis, 89-9 4; and new social
Nation al Co nference for a N ew Politics movem ent s, 92-93, 283; as the new
(NC NP),2 49 ut opi a, 87; roo ts of , 26; sexist treat-
Index
364
New Left (continued) " No tes from the First Year ," 250
m ent of women in, 219, 249; and th e Notesf rom the Second ~ar, 252
studen t move me nt, 341; and the N OW. See Nati onal O rga niza tion for
women's move ment, 246, 249 Wome n
New social m ovem ents , 30, 61-62, N SA. See Ni chir en Shos hu Buddhi st
313- 14 (seealso Social movem ent s); move me nt
activists of (see Activists); antipoli- Nu clear prot est . See Antinucl ear
ticism of , 224-2 5, 226; coalition of, m ovem ent
345-4 7; com pared w ith past move- Nu gent , Neill, 93
ments, 7, 8, 9, 80, 93-94 , 95, 104-9 ,
115, 188- 89, 210; conflict and antag - Oc to ber 17 Movem ent , 248
onism in, 123- 26, 117-1 8; continu- O ffice of Substance Abu se Pr eventi on
ity and discontinu ity in , 10, 24-28 , (OS AP) , 159
29, 43,2 10, 213-1 4, 225, 283, 314; O lson , Mancur , 18, 61, 276
and cross-cultural research, 6, 29, OS AP. See Offic e of Substance Abu se
210; decentr alization and autono my Preventi on
in, 8-9, 342-43, 347- 50; disunit y in ,
254- 55; and every day life, 283; fail- Pacificism. See Peace mo vem ent s
ur es and successes of, 343-45 ; goals Paine, Th oma s, 49
of, 95, 216; as ideationa l, 10, 28, 43, Palestini an nationalism , 7
210; identity issues in (seeunder Iden- Park , Robert , 66
tit y); ideological charact eristics of Parkin , Frank , 93- 94
(seeunder Ideolo gy); instituti on aliza- Parti qu ebe cois, 51
tion of, 116, 125; latency and visibil- Pax C hristi, 171
ity of, 127- 29, 213; mobili zation Peace movem ent s, 3, 105, 347; activist
patt ern s of, 8, 123- 26; network s in, subcultures in , 44; and identit y is-
24-25, 117; origins o f, 9, 115, 213; sues, 94, 118; importan ce of, in
as spiritual qu ests, 122, 125; theories Am erican histo ry , 91, 98n8; and the
of (see New social m ovem ent Left, 330, 338; in th e Neth erland s
theor y) (see Dut ch peace m ovem ent ); roots
New social movem ent theor y, 211, of, 42, 282; subme rge d network s in,
259n l ; Europ ean , 26, 59, 210, 243; 238; unit y perceived in by social
grievances in , 234- 35; social con- movem ent theorist s, 221
struc tion pro cesses in, 234-3 5, Peace Week , 171-72 , 173, 174
256- 59, 259-6 0n2, 260n3 ; in th e Peopl e's Petition , 173
Unit ed States, 36, 37, 210 Perez-A got e, Alfon so , 272, 277, 278
NFP. See Nebr askan s for Peace Perot , Ross, 12
NHT SA. See N ational High way Traf- Persian Gulf War, 195, 201, 203, 204
fic Safety Admini stration Person al identity. See Indi vidu al
Ni chir en Shoshu Buddhist m ovem ent ident ity
(N SA), 186, 194, 195,20 2 Phillip s, Cynthi a, 91
Ni chols, Jam es R ., 146, 161n . 11 Ph ysical fitne ss mo vem ent , 62
1960s mo vem ent s, 93, 96, 255; con cern Poland , 41, 42, 49, 290
for prob lem s of protes t and riot s Political parti es, 3, 4, 8, 68 (see also
arising from , 59, 75nl ; impa ct on D emo cratic party ; Republi can party )
popular culture of , 51, 53-54; and Political pro cess th eor y , 36
Mannh eirri's dialectical analysis, Politics, C ulture, and Class in the French
89-9 4; and th e new social mov e- Revolution (Hun t), 46- 47
m ent s, 94, 98n6, 341- 42 Porritt, Jonath on , 93
Nomads of the Present (Melucci), 235 Postindustrialism, 15, 108, 119
N orth Atlant ic Treaty Org anization Postm od ern ism, 11, 26, 28, 224
(NATO), 172, 321 Pra gg , Philip van , 170
Index
365
Preysl er, Isabel, 326n27 Schneider, William , 91
Protestant Reforma tion, 49 SDS. See Students for a Demo cratic
Pu blic Ci tizen , 138 Society
Pub lic health : framing of, 136, 159, Sectionalism , 96
160n2 , 160-6 1n7 Seleaiv idad, 219, 221, 229n8
Pub lic ident ity, 18-29, 214, 219, Self-transformation movem ent s, 8
269-70 Skinhe ads, 30
Skocpo l, Theda , 39, 133
Quak ers, 44, 282 Slow -growt h movements , 94
Smith, Chri stian, 51, 280
Racial movements , 95, 96 SNCC. See Student Nonviolent Coor -
Racist movements, 30 dinating Commi ttee
Radical Student U nion , 229n4 Snow , David A., 29, 75, 91, 202; and
Rammste dt, O tthein, 287 framing , 37, 41,134, 190-92 ,257
Randol ph, A . Philip, 40 Social cons tructionist , 9-10, 189
Reagan, Ron ald, 133, 173, 198, 199, Socialism, 3, 21-22 , 59, 330, 338
26009, 347 Social movemen ts, 3-5 , 63, 71, 79 (see
Reddy, William, 22 also New social moveme nts); activist
Reform , pro fession alization of, 138, subcultures in, 43-45 ; as associa-
160n4 tions and as meanings, 58-62, 64;
Reformatio n, 49 und er authori tarian systems,
Reicher, Stephen, 12, 17 287-88, 293; changi ng character of,
Religio us moveme nts, 49, 97, 195 169; com municative action of,
Religious organizatio ns , 44; and iden - 125-26 ; and conflict, 107-8, 109;
tity, 112- 13; and nationa lism, 271, con tinuity and unity in, 211, 212,
273-75 , 284-85n2, 28503 219-19 ,226, 227, 235-36, 260n4;
Remove Int oxicated Drivers -USA cultura l im pact of, 37, 48-54, 116,
(RID) , 143, 144, 161-62n 16 239-40; and culture , 45 (seealso
Republican part y, 199 (seealso Political Move ment culture); and every day
parties) life, 103, 107; genera l and specific,
Resour ce mo bilizatio n theory, 36, 60, 79, 80; ideologies of (see Ideology) ;
61, 156, 234-35 latent and visible, 238, 239, 26005;
Revolut ions, 49, 50 linear and fluid qualities of, 64-66 ,
RID. See Remove Int oxicated D rivers - 73, 77, 75; motivation for par ticipa-
U SA tion in, 276; new (see New social
Riesman, D avid, 242 moveme nts); nin eteenth- centur y,
Right -w ing m ovements, 44 95; orig ins and evolutio n of, 37-45 ,
Rivera, Primo do, 307 209; and political systems and orga-
Romania, 288 nization, 103, 107- 8, 155, 32403 ,
Roosevelt, Frankl in D., 40, 96 339; reflexivity of, 69-70; durin g re-
Rossi, Alice, 242 gime transition , 299; and state
Rupp , Leila, 24, 25, 44 actors, 156; strategies of, 50, 75nl ;
Russian Revolutio n, 49 as tem pora l events, 217, 218; as the-
Ryan, Charlotte , 157 ater, 73-7 5; theori es of (see Social
Rytina, Steven, 21, 276 move men t theor y); in transitiona l
regi mes, 302
SAC. See U nited States Air Force Stra- Social movement theory, 3-5 , 7, 9,
tegic Air Command 218, 221; class em phasis in, 26; and
SADD . See Students Agains t Driv ing collective behavior paradigm (see
Drunk Collective behavior); contin uity and
Saudi Arabia, 196 unity in, 216, 218-19 , 221-22,
Schennink:, Ben , 170, 173- 74 22905, 229n7, 229n12 ; and cultura l
Index
366
Social m ovem ent theor y (continued) postm odern , 317-21 , 323, 325-
tran sform ation , 239, 256; and eco- 26n2 1, 326n27, 326n28 ; studen t
nomi c analysis, 61; in Europ e, 26, mov em ent in (1986-1 987) (see Span-
59, 210, 234; and identit y, 17, ish student movem ent [1986-1 987]);
187- 90; levels of analysis in, 234-3 5, student movem ent s in , 42, 311-12,
256-57 ,2 58- 59; and m ass society 325n 15; wo rke rs ' m ovem ent in,
theo ry (see Mass society theor y); and 313- 15
origins of social move me nt, 213, Spanish Civi l War, 304, 305, 309, 310,
228n2; poli tical pr ocess perspective 311,313,3 16,3 17,322
em phasized in, 36, 39; politi cal ver- Spanish student m ovem ent
sus pr ofessiona l point of view of, (1986-1 987),44 ,2 27, 229n8, 229n9,
214,2 18; ration alist model for , 276; 321; antipo liticism in , 224-2 5; char-
and resour ce mob ilization (see Re- acterized as m obili zation s, 212-13 ;
source mobili zation th eor y); struc- cons tituency of, 209, 219-20 , 227,
tur al bias in, 36, 37, 39, 43; and stu- 229n l0 ; disco ntinuity in , 209, 221,
dent movem ent s, 213, 228n1 ; in the 223-2 4; discour se analysis of , 221,
U nit ed States, 26, 36, 37, 59, 210, 224; dissolved durin g tr ansition to
234 dem ocracy, 319, 326n23; distin ctive
Society, 71, 72, 73 because of dictat or ship , 312, 315;
Solidarity m ovem ent , 41, 49, 290 framing in , 19, 222- 23, 224,2 26,
Southern Chr istian Leadership Co n- 227; ident ity confusio n in , 219,
ference, 60 220-21,223,22 4; and the m edia, 19,
Soviet Uni on , 7, 50, 172, 281, 334; 219-20, 224, 229n11 ; strateg ic rath er
collapse of , 21, 41, 42, 330; collec- than ideological issues centered on
tive identity centered on class con- in, 226
sciousness in, 238; nation alism in , State Com missio ns on th e Statu s of
267, 268-69 , 270, 271- 73, 275, 277, Wome n, 246, 258
279, 282 (seealso Arm enia; Estonia ; Status politi cs theor y, 98n5
Latvia; Lithu ania) Str ain th eori sts, 187
Spain, 14, 22, 27, 42, 274; activist sub- Student Democ racy move me nt
cultures in , 44; ana rchism in , 306- 7, (Beij ing),38
308, 311, 324n8 ; antipo liticism in, Student m ovem ent s, 3, 74, 213, 227,
224-25, 307, 308, 316, 322, 323, 228; activis t subculture in, 45; and
325n 19; church-s tate relation s in , the civil right s m ovem ent , 42; con-
273, 274-7 5; citizen's m ovem ent in, sensus m ob ilization in , 225; continu-
3D, 315, 319- 20; " classic" model of ity and discontinuit y in, 16, 212,
mobili zation in , 304, 305- 8, 310- 11, 214- 15, 227- 28; for ces included in,
316, 322, 323n l; framin g in oppos i- 310, 325n12; ident it y issues in , 18,
tion al m ovement s in, 19, 226; Fran- 2 13, 225, 227-28; and new social
co's dictator ship of , 309; labor m ovem ent s, 226, 34 1- 42; in 1960s,
movem ent in , 310, 325n 16; m odern- 5, 59, 75n l , 89; and other stude nt
ization in , 309- 10, 311, 316, 324- movement s, 42, 312; at the U niver-
25n9 ; nationali sm in , 7, 267, 268, sity of Ca lifor nia, Berkele y (see
270,277,2 82,3 11, 325n 17 (see also Berk eley student m ovem ent ); w hite
Basqu e nationali st mov em en t; C ata- Left , 40, 53, 54
lan nation alist m ovem ent ; Eu zkadi) ; Studen t Non violent Coo rdina ting
new social mo vem ent s in , 313- 17, Com m ittee (SN C C), 213, 249
320-2 1, 322, 323, 325n 16; social Stud ent s Against Dri vin g Drunk
m ovem ent s in m od ern , 304, 309- 17, (SAD D) , 161n9, 161- 62n16
322-23, 223-2 4n2; social m ove- Stud ent s for a Dem ocratic Society
ment s in, and polit ical organization, (SD S), 169,226, 229n4, 249, 256;
304- 5, 324n3; social m ovem ent s in and ideology and identit y, 227, 228
Index
367
Suffrag e movemen t, S, 9, 44, 95 Unit ed States C ongress, 137, 138, 143,
Sugg , Maril yn , 134, 157 254; and wom en' s right s, 253, 260118
Swid ler, Ann, 43 Unit ed States Departm ent of Labor ,
Symbolic int eractionism, 189- 90, 136
216- 17 Unit ed States Senate, 141
Unit ed States Supr eme Co ur t, 41,
Tajfel, Henri, 14 161- 62n16
Tarrow , Sidn ey, 39, 79, 107, 259n l, Uni ted We Stand Am erica, 12
259- 60n2 Use em , Bert, 40
Taxi- drivers ' movem ent (Hun gary), Utopia ; con stituenc y for , 85- 86,
288, 296-300 , 301-2 87-8 8, 98n5; defined, 80-81 ; dialec-
Taylor , Verta , 25, 44; on abeyance tical relation ship with ideolog y of,
structur es, 24, 214, 238; and bound- 81, 85; historic al sequence of, 81-8 4,
ary framing , 20, 194; collective iden- 98nl , 98n4
tity defmed by, 168-69 , 189
Temperan ce mov em ent,S , 95, 98n5 Victim s' gro ups, 144
Terrorism , 228 Vietnam War, 195,312
Third World , 198, 228
Thomp son , E. P., 22 Walsh, Edward, 40
Thoreau, Henr y David , 8 WEAL. See Women 's Equity Action
Three Mil e Island , 40 Leagu e
Tilly , Cha rles,S, 39, 79, 107, 324n3 Weatherm an, 228
Timmons , Marin elle, 147 Weber, Max, 4, 189, 220
Tocquevill e, Alexis de, 26 Whit e, Harrison , 53
Totalitariani sm, 72 Whittier , Nancy, 20, 27-28 , 47,
Tourain e, Alain , 68 168-6 9, 189
Troeltsch , Ern st, 4 Whitton , Rex, 160113
Trotsky , Leon , 49 Whole World Is Watching , Th e (Gitlin) ,
Turner , Ralph H ., 10,21 ,4 9, 60, 189, 74
WIT CH. See Women 's Int ernat ion al
210
Conspiracy from Hell
Wolfson , Mark , 143
Ukrain e: nationalism in, 268, 273, 281 Women : collective identit y of, post
(see also Soviet Union, nationali sm World War II, 240-43 ; sexist treat-
in) ment of, in 1960s mov ement s, 255,
Unionism, 45 249
Unitarians, 44 " Women as a Minorit y Group"
Unit ed Auto Worker s, 248 (Hacker), 240-41
United States , 23, 172, 198, 238; dec- Women for Peace, 170
ade of domesticity in, 240; declining Women's Equity Action League, 248
pub lic identific ation with govern- Women's groups, 144
ment , large busines s, and large labor Women's Int ernational Conspirac y
in, 91- 92; driving crash deaths in, from Hell (WITCH) , 250
133; freedom defmed in terms of in- Women 's mov em ent, 3, 47, 48, 61,
dividual autonomy in, 336-37 ; so- 121; abeyance structure s in, 214,
cial movem ents in, 3, 7, 26-27 , 42, 238; activi st subcultur e in, 44; actor s
95, 133, 337-3 8, 339-40, 344, 346, in, 120; boundary maintenance by ,
350n4 ; social movement theor y in, 20; and the civil rights mov ement ,
26, 36, 37, 59, 210, 234; and World 40, 42, 49; and collective identity ,
War II , 91, 98n8 17,50 ,16 9,219,235 ,244 -45 , 246,
United States Air Force Strategic Air 247-4 9, 250, 251-52 , 255, 259,
Command (SAC), 194, 199 260118; communication by, 119- 20;
Index
368
Women's movement (continued) m ent ; Wom en 's right s m ovement
and the D em ocratic part y, 340, 341; (19th cen tury)
equal rights femini st br anch of, Wome n 's right s m ovem ent (19th cen-
247- 48, 260n8; failur es of, 345; as tur y), 40, 105, 106, 241
fluid m ovem ent, 65, 74; framing in , Wom en 's Strike for Equ alit y Day, 247,
244; generational relation s in , 27- 28, 252- 55, 258
29; grievances in , 8, 284; as histori cal Woolard , Kathr yn A. , 279-80
acto r, 252- 53; as ideational and as- Work ers' movem ent s, 23, 116, 227,
sociational movem ent , 62; identit y 313- 15. See also Labor m ovem ents
issues in, 7, 13, 23,9 4, 118-1 9, 121; Workin g-cl ass m ovem ent s 6 313-14 ·
institutionali zation of, 125; and the an tipo liticism in, 224; a~d ~conomi'c
Left, 330, 338; in Lithuani a, 281; and grievances, 7, 9; m obili zation pat-
the media, 250, 251, 253, 254, 255; terns of, 8, 9; in social m ovem ent
mobilization pot ent ial in, 225-26; theor y , 218, 219, 236; in Spain , 304,
305-8,313 - 15, 316-17, 322-2 3,
or ganizational continuity in, 24,
323n 1
25-26; and other social m ovem ent s
Working consensus, 225, 230n 14
347; and the polit icization of every~
World War 1, 316, 334
day life, 23; roo ts of, 9, 26, 44, 48,
World War II, 91, 98n8, 171, 198,3 16
97, 105, 106, 243-4 9, 251-5 2, 282,
342; and social m ovem ent theory, Xeno pho bic m ovem ent s, 30
105; Spanish, 313- 14, 315; structural
theori es of origins of, 243- 46; sub- Young Socialist Alli ance, 229n4
merge d networ ks and collective Youth for Peace, 194- 95
identit y in, 235, 246-49, 251-52; Youth m ovement s, 5, 221
Yugoslavia, 267
unit y and disunit y in, 221, 254- 55,
260n lO; wom en 's liberation br anch Za ld, Mayer , 5
of, 248- 49. See also Suffrage move- Zi mrin g , Franklin , 143
Sociology/Political Science
Th e contribut or s to thi s
Cultur al changes over the past two decades volume are Jose Al varez-
have led to a proliferation of new social move - Junco , Robert D . Benford ,
Ri chard Hack s, Scott A .
ments in Europe and the United States . Ne w Hunt , Bert Kl anderman s,
soc ial m ovem en ts such as eco logy , peace, eth- Do ug McA dam , John D .
McCarth y, Alb ert o
nicity , Ne w Age phi losophies , alternati ve med - Melu cci, Carol Mueller ,
icine , and gender and sexual identit y are among M ate Szab 6, D avid A .
those th at are emergi ng to challenge tra ditiona l Snow , Ralph H . Turner ,
and the editors .
categories in social movement theor y . Synthe -
Enrique Larafia is Titular
sizing classic and modern perspectives , the con - Prof essor of Sociolog y at
tributors help to redefine the field of socia l th e Uni versit y of Madrid ,
Spain . Hank Johnston is a
movements and advance an und erstand in g of lecturer in the D epartment
them through cross -cultural research , comp ari- of Sociology at San Die go
State Uni versit y. Joseph R.
son wit h older movements , and an examination Gu sfield is Professor
of th e dim ensions of iden tity -in dividua l, col- Em eritu s of Sociolo gy at
th e Uni versit y of
lective , and melding of the two. C aliforni a, San Di ego.
"There has been remarkable interest in social

constructionist approaches to social
movements and integrating classical collective
behavior theory and European new social
movements approaches . This collection of
articles does the best job that I have seen of
accomplishing both of these agendas . The
editors' introduction pulls together one of the
first and most coherent statements of new social Verta Taylor,
movements . . . clearly on the cutting edge ." The Ohio State University
Des ign : Ellen C . Dawson
Print ed in U. S.A.
Temple University Press

ISBN 1-56639-187 -3 Philadelphia 19122
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Sociology/ Political Science

Enrique Larana - New Social Movements_ From Ideology to Identity -Temple University Press (1994)

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Enrique Larana - New Social Movements_ From Ideology to Identity -Temple University Press (1994)

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N e.

Tem ple U niversity Press

Libr ary of Cong ress C atalogin g-in -P ubli cation D ata

Chapter I Ident ities, Gr ievances, and New Social Movements 3

Chapter 2 Culture and Social Movements 36

Chapter 3 The Reflexivity of Social Movements: Collective Behavior

Chapter 4 Ideology and Utopia after Socialism 79

Chapte r 5 A Strange Kind of Newness: What' s "New" in New

Chapter 6 Acti vists, Authorities , and Media Framing of Drun k

Chapter 7 Transient Identities?Membership Patt erns in t he Dutch

Chapter 8 Identity Fields: Framing Processes and the Social

Chapter 9 Co ntinuity and Unity in New Forms of Collective Action :

Chapter 10 Conflict Networks and the Or igins of Women 's

Chapter 12 Greens, Cabbies, and Anti -Communi sts: Co llective

Chapter 14 The Party 's O ver-So W hat Is to Be Don e? 330

The Contri buto rs 353

Culture and Identityin

Identities, Grievances, and

In th e last two decad es, the em ergen ce of

About twenty-five years ago several Amer -

Both approaches seem to assume that the pursuit of collective

"Old movements" coalesced around shared

Continuity in New Social Movements

Cu Iture and Social

Over the past two decades, the study of

The Cultural Roots of Social Movements

The "structu ral bias " in mov ement studi es

Framingas on Act of CulturalAppropriation

Suddenly Imposed Grievances. Anoth er cognitive

Dramatizations of System Vulnerability.Another

The Availabilityof Moster Frames. Finally, one

The Role of Long-Standing Activist Subcultures

The Emergence and Development

An interest in the relationship between so-

Shiftsin the SocialLocus of the Movement

The Cultural Consequences of Movements

In assessing th e imp act of socia l move-

Breadth of the Movement's Goals

The Degree of Success Achieved by the Movement

Contactbetween Previously SegregatedGroups

Wh at I offer here is th e m ost prelimin ary

The Reflex ivity of Social

C oncepts and theories in the so cial sciences

Am I putting irreconcilables together? Why

Social Movements: Linear and Fluid

It is useful to m ake a distin ction between

Microarenas and Macroarenas:

The distinction between public an d every-

Social Movements as Sign and Symbol:

The Communication of Social Movements:

Despite its considerable drawbacks as a the-

It has often been observ ed that social

Mannheim: Ideology and Utopia

The pair ed con cept s of " ideology" and

Movements of the 19605

In 1969, I looked at the themes of contem-

Contemporary Social Movements

Now that two decades have elapsed sinc e

Furth er Qu est ions

A Strange Kindof Newness:

Insyst ems of high info rmation densit y , in-

I. Prophecy: The message is that the possible is already real

2. Parado x . Th e authorit y of th e dominant code app ears

3. Repr esentation . Th e mes sag e tak es th e form of a symbolic