Locsin IL-vs. Mekeni Food Corp. GAR. No. 192105 Ponente DEL CASTILLO, J Decision Date Dec 9, 2013 A dispute over the refund of car plan payments between Antonio Locsin II and Mekeni Food Corporation is resolved in favor of Locsin, with the court ordering Mekeni to refund the payments based on the understanding that the service vehicle is primarily for the employer's business. Facts: + The case involves a dispute between Antonio Locsin Il (petitioner) and Mekeni Food Corporation (respondent) The case was decided on December 9, 2013, by the Second Division of the ‘Supreme Court of the Philippines, with Justice Del Castillo as the ponente. In February 2004, Mekeni offered Locsin the position of Regional Sales Manager and included a car plan as part of his compensation package. Under the car plan, Locsin would pay half of the cost of the vehicle through salary deductions, while Mekeni would cover the other half. Locsin accepted the offer and began his employment on March 17, 2004 Mekeni provided him with a used Honda Civic car valued at P280,000.00, which he paid for through monthly deductions of P5,000.00. Locsin resigned from his position on February 25, 2006, and offered to purchase the service vehicle by paying the outstanding balance. The parties could not agree on the terms of the purchase, and Locsin returned the vehicle to Mekeni on May 2, 2006. Locsin filed a complaint against Mekeni for the recovery of unpaid salaries, commissions, benefits, and the refund of his car plan payments. Issue: + Whether Locsin is entitled to a refund of his car plan payments. +The court ruled in favor of Locsin + Mekent is ordered to refund Locsin’s car plan payments. Ratio: + Inthe absence of specific terms and conditions governing the car plan agreement, Mekeni cannot retain Locsin’s installment payments and treat them as rentals for the use of the service vehicle. + The service vehicle was used in Mekeni's business, and any personal benefit obtained by Locsin from its use was merely incidental. + Therefore, Mekeni is ordered to refund Locsin’s car plan payments. + The court emphasized that the service vehicle is primarily used for the employer's business, and any personal benefit obtained by the employee is secondary. ‘+ Therefore, the employee is entitled to a refund of the car plan payments made. Page 1 of 34Loria vs. Mufioz, Jr. G.R. No. 187240 Ponente LEONEN, J Decision Date Oct 15, 2014 In the case of Loria v. Mufioz, the Supreme Court ruled that Loria must return the money he received from Muiioz for a subcontract that did not materialize, as it constituted unjust enrichment. Facts: + Ludolfo P. Mufioz, Jr. filed a complaint for sum of money and damages against Carlos A. Loria. Mufioz alleged that Loria visited him in his office and invited him to advance P2,000,000.00 for a subcontract of a river-dredging project. Loria represented that he would ensure the project's award to Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation, and that Sunwest would subcontract portion of the project to Mufioz. Mujioz agreed and gave Loria the money. However, Sunwest allegedly finished the project without subcontracting Mufioz. Mufioz demanded the retum of his money, but Loria refused. Issue: 1, Whether Loria initially obtained P3,000,000.00 from a certain Grace delos Santos. 2. Whether Loria is liable for P2,000,000.00 to Murioz. Ruling: + The Supreme Court denied Loria's petition for review on certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. + The Court held that Mufioz had proven Loria's initial receipt of P3,000,000.00 through testimonial and documentary evidence. + The Court also ruled that Loria must return the P2,000,000.00 to Mufioz under the principle of unjust enrichment. + Loria had received the money for a subcontract that did not materialize, and therefore, he had no valid basis or justification to retain the money. Ratio: + The Court applied the principle of unjust enrichment, which requires two conditions: (1) a person must have been benefited without a real or valid basis or justification, and (2) the benefit was derived at another person's expense or damage. + In this case, Loria received P2,000,000.00 from Mufioz for a subcontract that did not materialize, + Loria had no valid basis or justification to retain the money, and therefore, he was unjustly enriched, + The Court also noted that the prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy, and it is an exception to the application of the in pari delicto doctrine. Page 2 of 34+ Even if the subcontract was void, Murioz was entitled to recover the money he gave under the contract because Loria would be unjustly enriched if he were allowed to keep the money. Title US.T. Cooperative Store vs. City of Manila Case GR. No. L-17133 Ponente MAKALINTAL, J Decision Date Dee 31, 1965 A cooperative store in the Philippines successfully recovers taxes and license fees it had paid to the City of Manila after it was determined that the store was exempt from such payments under Republic Act No. 2023, Facts: + U.S.T. Cooperative Store, a cooperative association registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission in the Philippines, paid municipal taxes and license fees to the City of Manila from July 1957 to December 1958, amounting to 12,345.10. ‘+ The cooperative later discovered that it was exempt from such payments under ‘Section 66(1) of Republic Act No. 2023. + The cooperative requested a refund of the amount paid, but the City Treasurer denied the request. + The cooperative filed a lawsuit seeking the refund. Issue: + Is the cooperative entitled to a refund of the taxes and license fees it paid to the City of Manila, considering its exemption under Section 66(1) of Republic Act No. 2023? + The Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the City of Manila to refund the amount paid by the cooperative. + The de ion was affirmed by the appellate court. Rati The court ruled that the cooperative is entitled to the refund because it is exempt from taxes and license fees under Section 66(1) of Republic Act No. 2023. The law only imposes a restriction that a cooperative should not transact more business with non-members than with members. There was no evidence that the cooperative violated this restriction. Therefore, the cooperative is entitled to the exemption. The court rejected the argument that the payment of taxes and license fees was voluntary and therefore cannot be recovered. Page 3 of 34+ Itheld that a payment made under a mistake of fact, even if induced by a mistake of law, is recoverable. + The cooperative was not aware of the exemption provided by the law, and therefore, its payment was made under a mistake of fact. + Money paid through misapprehension of facts belongs to the person who paid it, according to legal authorities cited by the court, + The court found no negligence on the part of the cooperative in making the Payments, as it was trying to comply with what it believed to be the law. + Therefore, the cooperative is entitled to a refund of the amount paid. Title ‘Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Fortune Tobacco Corp. Case G.R. No, 167274-75 Ponente TINGA, J Decision Date ‘ul 21, 2008 ‘The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Fortune Tobacco Corporation in a tax refund dispute, affirming that the interpretation of the National Internal Revenue Code should be based on the literal wording of the law and rejecting the authority of the Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations that amend or expand statutory requirements, Facts: + Fortune Tobacco Corporation (Fortune Tobacco) obtained a tax refund after the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) and the Court of Appeals ruled in their favor. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Commissioner) filed a petition to reciaim the tax refund granted to Fortune Tobacco. The central issue in the case is the interpretation of Section 145 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) regarding the specific tax rates on cigarettes. The Commissioner argued that the tax due on cigarettes should be the higher tax imposed under the specific tax system and the ad valorem tax system, plus the 12% increase imposed by the law. Fortune Tobacco argued that the 12% increase should be based on the net retail price of the cigarettes in the market, as stated in Section 145 of the NIRC. + Whether the interpretation of Section 145 of the NIRC should be based on the literal wording of the law or on Revenue Regulation No. 17-99. + Whether the Commissioner has the authority to promulgate rules and regulations that amend or expand the statutory requirements. + Whether a tax refund should be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Rulin + The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Fortune Tobacco, affirming the decisions of the CTA and the Court of Appeals. Page 4 of 34+ The Court held that the interpretation given by the CTA and the Court of Appeals, which is based on the literal wording of Section 145 of the NIRC, is correct. + The Court held that Revenue Regulation No. 17-99, which imposed a different interpretation of the law, exceeded the authority of the Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations. + The Court rejected the Commissioner's argument that a tax refund should be strictly construed against the taxpayer. + The Court held that a tax refund is not based on legislative grace but on the legal Principle of solutio indebiti, which covers erroneous payments of taxes. + The Court held that the government has a duty to refund without unreasonable delay what it has erroneously collected and should not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of taxpayers. + The Court emphasized that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law and cannot amend or expand the statutory requirements. + The Court held that the interpretation of Section 145 of the NIRC should be based on the literal wording of the law, as interpreted by the CTA and the Court of Appeals. + The Court held that Revenue Regulation No. 17-99 exceeded the authority of the Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations. + The Court explained that a tax refund is not a tax exemption and should be granted if there is preponderance of evidence. + The Court emphasized that the government has a duty to refund without unreasonable delay what it has erroneously collected and should not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of taxpayers. Conclusion: + The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the CTA and the Court of Appeals, granting Fortune Tobacco's tax refund. + The Court held that the interpretation of Section 145 of the NIRC should be based on the literal wording of the law, and Revenue Regulation No. 17-99 exceeded the authority of the Commissioner. + The Court also emphasized that a tax refund is not a tax exemption and should be granted if there is preponderance of evidence, Title Orbeta vs. Sotto Case GAR. No, 39562 Ponente HULL, J Decision Date Sep 27, 1933 In the case of Orbeta v. Sotto, the Supreme Court ruled that a civil attachment issued in a civil action is invalid when itis based on the same acts that formed the basis of a criminal prosecution, as it goes against the provisions of the Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure. Facts: + Petitioner Juan L. Orbeta was convicted of arson in the Court of First Instance of Cebu and was ordered to indemnify respondent Filemon Sotto in the amount of 40,000. Page 5 of 34Orbeta appealed the conviction to the Supreme Court. After the appeal, Sotto filed a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking the same amount of P40,000 based on the same acts that formed the basis of the criminal prosecution. A writ of attachment was granted in the civil action. Orbeta filed a motion to discharge the attachment, arguing that it was improperly issued, Issue: Ruli Ratio: Title Case Whether the civil attachment issued in the civil action is valid or not. The civil attachment issued in the civil action is void and must be vacated. The Supreme Court examined the provisions of the Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure, specifically Articles 112 and 114. Article 112 states that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action is deemed. included unless the party injured waives it or reserves it to be brought after the criminal action has been decided. Article 114 states that upon the institution of criminal proceedings for a felony or misdemeanor, ne civil suit on the same act shall be prosecuted, and if it has been instituted, it shall be suspended pending final judgment in the criminal case. Based on these provisions, the Supreme Court held that civil proceedings instituted contrary to the Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure are without force and effect. Therefore, the attachment issued in the civil action must be vacated. The court reasoned that one of the requirements for an order of attachment under the Code of Civil Procedure is that a sufficient cause of action exists. Since the civil responsibility of Orbeta to Sotto will be decided in the criminal proceedings, the civil action and the attachment are improper. The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, discharged the attachment, and ordered the costs to be paid by respondent Sotto. Justices Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, and Imperial concurred with the decision. Equitable Banking Corp. vs Special Steel Products, Ine. GR. No. 175350 Ponente DEL CASTILLO, J Decision Date Jun 13, 2012 Equitable Banking Corporation is held liable for negligence in allowing a customer to deposit crossed checks in his personal account, causing damages to Special Steel Products, Inc., while the court rules on various issues including the recovery of interest, moral damages, and the wrongful attachment of Equitable’s personal properties. Page 6 of 34Facts: + Equitable Banking Corporation (Equitable) and Special Steel Products, Inc. (SPI) are involved in the case. ‘SSPI is a corporation selling steel products, while Equitable is the depository bank of Interco, a regular customer of SSPI. In 1991, SSPI sold welding electrodes to Interco and received three crossed checks as payment. The checks were payable to SSPI and had the notation "account payee only.” Interco’s employee, Uy, presented the checks to Equitable and claimed to have g004 title to them. Equitable accepted the checks for deposit in Uy’s personal accounts and Uy promptly withdrew the proceeds. It was later discovered that Uy, not SSPI, received the proceeds of the checks SSPI filed a complaint for damages against Uy and Equitable, alleging that Equitable's negligence allowed the checks to be deposited in Uy's account, causing SSPI to suffer damages. Issue: 1. Whether SSPI has a cause of action against Equitable for quasi-delict. 2. Whether SSPI can recover the stipulated interest from Equitable as actual damages. 3. Whether speculative fears and imagined scenarios can be the basis for the award of moral damages. 4. Whether the attachment of Equitable's personal properties was wrongful Rulin 1. SSPI has a cause of action against Equitable for quasi-delict. 2, SSPI cannot recover the stipulated interest from Equitable as actual damages. 3. Speculative fears and imagined scenarios can be the basis for the award of moral damages. 4, The attachment of Equitable's personal properties was wrongful Ratio: + Banks have a duty to sorutinize checks deposited with them and should exercise caution in verifying the authority of the depositor. Equitable's negligence in allowing Uy to deposit the crossed checks in his personal accounts, despite the checks being payable to SSPI and having the notation "account payee only," constitutes gross negligence. Equitable's reliance on Uy’ oral representations without verifying SSPI's authorization to deposit the checks in Uy’s account is a breach of its duty of care. The crossed checks with the notation “account payee only" can only be deposited in the named payee's account. Allowing the deposit of crossed checks in a different account without verifying the payee's authorization constitutes gross negligence. The payee of the checks can recover the profits it failed to obtain from the delayed use of its money, but not the stipulated interest rate in a contract to which it is not a party. Page 7 of 34Title Case ‘SSPI is entitled to recover the profits it failed to obtain from the delayed use of its money and should be awarded interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum. ‘Speculative fears and imagined scenarios can be the basis for the award of moral damages, as long as they are the result of the defendant's actions. Pardo, the president of SSPI, suffered anxiety, sleepless nights, and hypertension due to the defendants’ actions, entitling him to moral damages. The awarded amount of P3 million for moral damages is excessive, and the Court reduces the award to P50,000. The attachment of properties should be based on clear and concrete factual circumstances manifesting fraud. The affidavit and allegations submitted by SSPI in support of its application for a writ of preliminary attachment did not contain specific and definite allegations of fraud against Equitable. The attachment was based on mere abstractions of fraud and did not meet the requirements for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Equitable is entitled to damages for the wrongful attachment, including the amount it paid for a counter-bond. Equitable failed to prove damage to its goodwill and business credit. ‘Josefa vs. Manila Electric Co. GR. No. 182705 Ponente BRION, J Decision Date ‘Jul 18, 2014 A legal battle ensues between Vicente Josefa and Manila Electric Company (Meralco) over damages caused by Josefa's truck hitting an electricity post, resulting in the Supreme Court finding Josefa vicariously liable for the damages but modifying the awarded amount Facts: Incident occurred on April 21, 1991, along Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City, involving a dump truck, a jeepney, and a car in a vehicular accident. A 45-foot wooden electricity post, three 75 KVA transformers, and other electrical line attachments were damaged. Meralco discovered that it was Josefa's tuck that hit the electricity post and demanded reimbursement. Meralco filed a lawsuit for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. Meralco alleged that the truck driver, Pablo Manoco (later corrected to Pablo Manojo Bautista), was negligent in driving, and Josefa was primarily liable for his, alleged negligence in the selection and supervision of Manoco. Josefa denied that Manoco was his employee and claimed that he exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employees. Meralco presented testimonies from six witnesses and documentary evidence to support its claim for damages. Josefa filed a demurrer to evidence, which was denied by the RTC. Page 8 of 34Josefa challenged the denial in a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. (CA), but the CA affirmed the RTC's rulings. Josefa's motion for extension to file a petition for review on certiorari before the ‘Supreme Court was denied, and the RTC ordered him to present his evidence-in- chief. Due to numerous delays, the RTC eventually declared the case as submitted for decision without Josefa's evidence-in-chiet. + The RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The CA reversed the RTC's ruling, holding that the RTC erred in disregarding the patties’ stipulation that it was the truck that hit the electricity post. The CA found that Bautista was Josefa’s employee at the time of the accident and held Josefa vicariously liable for the damages. The CA awarded Meralco actual damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation. + Josefa filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court, arguing that the CA erred in reversing the RTC's factual findings. The Supreme Court partially affirmed the CA's ruling, + Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that Josefa's truck hit the electricity post. Whether Josefa was vicariously liable for Bautista’s negligence. Whether Meralco was entitled to actual damages. Whether Meralco was entitled to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Whether Josefa was given a fair opportunity to present his evidence-in-chief. The Supreme Court found that there was sufficient evidence to establish that Josefa's truck hit the electricity post. Josefa was held vicariously liable for Bautista's negligence. Meralco was not entitled to actual damages. Meralco was not entitled to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. Josefa was not given a fair opportunity to present his evidence-in-chief. Ratio: + The Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which presumes negligence on the part of the defendant when the accident speaks for itself. + Bautista’s negligence was deemed the proximate cause of the damage to Meralco's property. Josefa was vicariously liable for Bautista’s negligence under paragraph 5, Article 2180 of the Civil Code, which holds the employer primarily liable for damages caused by the employee within the scope of their assigned tasks. Josefa's denial of an employer-employee relationship was not supported by evidence, and he failed to show that he exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Bautista. Meralco failed to prove its entitlement to actual damages. Page 9 of 34+ The Court awarded temperate damages to Meralco as there was no doubt that it suffered pecuniary loss due to the negligence. + Meralco was not entitied to attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. + The award of temperate damages was subject to 6% per annum interest from the promulgation of the decision until fully paid. Title National Power Corp. vs. Heirs of Casio Case GAR. No. 165969 Ponente REYES, R.T.,J Decision Date Noy 27, 2008 ‘A 19-year-old pocket miner is electrocuted due to the negligence of the National Power Corp., leading to a court ruling that holds NPC liable for damages and rejects their argument of contributory negligence. Facts: + Noble Casionan, a 19-year-old pocket miner, was electrocuted on June 27, 1995, while passing underneath NPC's high tension transmission lines in Dalicno, ‘Ampucao, Itogon, Benguet. The trans ion lines sagged and dangled, reducing their distance from the ground to only about eight to ten feet. Community leaders had made verbal and written requests to NPC to address the safety concems, but no action was taken. ‘On the day of the incident, Noble and his co-worker were carrying bamboo poles. when Noble's pole touched the dangling wire, causing him to be electrocuted and die. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of the heirs of Casionan, finding NPC guilty of negligence and ordering them to pay damages. The RTC also dismissed NPC's counterclaim for lack of merit. NPC appealed the decision to the CA, arguing that they should not be held liable and that the damages awarded were excessive. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but reduced the amount of moral damages awarded, Issue: 1, Whether the damages should be deleted due to the contributory negligence of the victim. 2. Whether the awards for unearned income, moral damages, and exemplary damages should be deleted for lack of factual and legal bases. Ruling: + NPC was liable for the death of Noble Casionan and rejected NPC's argument of contributory negligence. + The court found that the sagging high-tension wires were a danger waiting to happen and that NPC's failure to properly maintain them was the cause of the electrocution. Page 10 of 34The court also found no contributory negligence on the part of the victim, as he was simply using the regularly used trail and there were no warning signs to inform passersby of the danger. The court upheld the computation of unearned income based on the victim's earning capacity and life expectancy. The court awarded exemplary damages due to NPC's gross negligence in failing to address the safety concerns despite previous requests. However, the court reduced the amount of moral damages awarded. The court held NPC liable for damages in the death of Noble Casionan and rejected their plea for mitigation of damages based on contributory negligence. The court found that NPC's failure to properly maintain the sagging high-tension wires was the cause of the electrocution, making them liable for the damages. The court also found no contributory negligence on the part of the victim, as he was simply using a regularly used trail and there were no warning signs to inform passersby of the danger. The court upheld the computation of unearned income based on the victim's earning capacity and life expectancy, as it was a reasonable basis for determining the damages. The court awarded exemplary damages due to NPC's gross negligence in failing to address the safety concerns despite previous requests. However, the court reduced the amount of moral damages awarded, considering the circumstances of the case. Title Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. vs. Mayfair Theater, Inc. Case GAR. No. 133879 Ponente PANGANIBAN, J Decision Date Nov 21, 2001 A dispute over ownership and possession of a commercial property in the Philippines leads. to the rescission of a sale and denial of back rentals, as the court rules in favor of the lessee who had a right of first refusal. Facts: Mayfair Theater, Inc. was a lessee of portions of a building owned by Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. Lease contracts contained a provision granting Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the subject properties. Before the contracts ended, the subject properties were sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. Mayfair filed a case for the annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial, specific performance, and damages. The court ruled in favor of Mayfair, rescinding the sale and ordering Carmelo to return the purchase price to Equatorial. Page 11 of 34Issue: + Whether Equatorial is entitled to collect back rentals from Mayfair. Ruling: + Equatorial is not entitled to collect back rentals from Mayfair. + Ownership is acquired through delivery of the property, which did not ocour in this case. + Equatorial acted in bad faith by entering into the contract with Carmelo despite knowing about Mayfair's right of first refusal. + Equatorial is not entitled to any benefits of ownership, including rentals, due to its bad faith + The previous judgment in the mother case barred Equatorial from claiming back rentals from Mayfair. Title Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro vs. De La Pefia Case G.R. No. 6913 Ponente MORELAND, J Decision Date Nov 21, 1913 trustee who deposited trust funds in his personal account is not liable for the loss. of the funds when they are confiscated by military authorities during a state of war, based on the absence of the law of trusts in Roman and Spanish law and the provisions of the Civil Code relating to obligations. [The plaintiff, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Jaro, was the trustee of a charitable bequest for the construction of ak i Father Agustin de la Pefia was the authorized representative of the plaintiff to| In 1898, Father de la Pefia, as trustee, had in his possession the sum of P6,641] {which was collected for the charitable purposes] f He deposited P19,000 in his personal account in the Hongkong and Shanghail Bank at lloilo. hos f+ During the war of the revolution, Father de la Pefia was arrested by the milita fauthorities and made an order on the bank to transfer the deposited funds to the United States Army officer under whose charge he was detained, f The funds were confiscated by the military authorities, claiming that they were| [collected for revolutionary purposes. (Whether Father de la Pefia, as the trustee who deposited the trust funds in hi [personal account, is liable for the loss of the funds when they were confiscated the military authorities Page 12 of 34Ratio: & When a trustee deposits trust funds in his personal account and mixes them with] hhis own funds, he does not assume a different obligation than if the deposit had [The law of trusts, known in England and America, has no counterpart in the Roman| jaw and Spanish law. [The liability of Father de la Pefia is determined by the provisions of the Civil Code] ielating to obligations. [Article 1105 of the Civil Code states that no one shall be liable for events that could not be foreseen or were inevitable, except in cases expressly mentioned in the| law. (Father de la Peiia's deposit of the trust funds in his personal account did not make] hhim a debtor who must respond at all hazards. Therefore, he is not responsible for the loss of the funds. Title Obejera vs. Sy Case ‘Adm. Case No. 34 Ponente JARANILLA, J Decision Date Apr 29, 1946 In the case of Obejera v. Sy, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, annulling a deed of transfer due to force and intimidation, lack of evidence supporting an alleged deposit, and the nullity of contracts lacking cause or consideration. OutlineParagraph [Plaintiffs Engracio Obejera and Mercedes Intak sought to annul a deed of transfer| [executed on April 19, 1943] (The plaintiffs and the defendant, Iga Sy, sought refuge in the house of Leon Villenal in Batangas, Philippines, due to the Japanese invasion. [On January 2, 1942, the plaintiffs and the defendant decided to hide their money| fand valuables in a dug-out belonging to Leon Villena] [When they returned on February 18, 1942, they discovered that their money and faluables had been lost] [The defendant reported the loss, leading to the arrest and investigation of the| plaintiffs. (The plaintiffs were released on April 19, 1942, afier they consented to execute the] [deed of transfer, [ssue: [1. Can the alleged deposit of the defendant's money and jewelry with the plaintiffs be) Page 13 of 342. Was any obligation arising from the alleged deposit extinguished upon the loss of Ithe items] 8. Is the deed of transfer null and void for lack of cause or consideration?) 4. Was the consent of the plait {and intimidation?| (6. Can an offer to transfer their property by the plaintiffs be considered an admission) ~The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and affirmed the decision of the lower court] The deed of transfer was annulled on the grounds of force and intimidation f° The alleged deposit of the defendant's money and jewelry with the plaintifis could hhot be believed Any obligation arising from the alleged deposit would have been extinguished upon| {the loss of the items. +The deed of transfer was null and void for lack of cause or consideration. (The consent of the plaintiffs to the deed of transfer was obtained through duress| [and intimidation. An offer to transfer their property by the plaintiffs cannot be considered an| [admission of debt The court based its decision on the lack of evidence supporting the alleged deposit land the use of force and intimidation to obtain the plaintiffs’ consent to the deed transfer. The court applied legal principles such as the extinguishment of obligations upor ihe loss of deposited items, the nullity of contracts lacking cause or consideration, land the nullity of contracts obtained through duress and intimidation. (The court emphasized that an offer to compromise is not an admission of debt and is not admissible in evidence. Title Cruzado vs. Bustos Case G.R. No. 10244 Ponente TORRES, J Decision Date Feb 29, 1916 In Cruzado v. Bustos, the court ruled that the simulated contract of sa plaintiff's father and the defendants was not valid, resulting in the plaintiff's inability to claim ownership of the property and bring an action for recovery of possession. Additionally, the court found that the defendant had acquired ownership through prescription, Facts: + Plaintiff Santiago Cruzado claimed ownership of a rural property in Bacolor, Pampanga, which he alleged was being detained by defendants Estefania Bustos and Manuel Escaler. Page 14 of 34+ Cruzado argued that he was the rightful owner of the property and demanded its return, as well as damages for losses suffered. Issue: ‘+ Whether the simulated contract of sale between Cruzado’s father and Bustos was valid and binding. + Whether Cruzado had acquired ownership of the property. Ruling: + The court ruled that the contract of sale was not consummated because the purchase price was not paid and the vendee did not take possession of the Property. + Therefore, Cruzado could not claim ownership or bring an aotion for recovery of possession. Ratio: ‘+ The court based its ruling on the Civil Code, which states that a contract of sale is only considered consummated when the thing sold is delivered to the buyer and the price is paid. ‘Since neither of these conditions were met, the contract did not confer ownership to Cruzado or his successors. The court emphasized that the legal fiction of delivery through a public instrument does not have any effect if the buyer does not take possession of the property. Furthermore, the court found that Escaler had acquired ownership through prescription. More than 35 years had passed since the execution of the simulated sale, and both the personal and real actions for recovery of possession had prescribed. Even if the action was proper under the provisions of the Civil Code and prior laws, the prescribed periods had already elapsed. In conclusion, the court ruled in favor of the defendants, absolving them from the complaint and the cross-complaint. The court affirmed that the simulated contract of sale did not confer ownership to Cruzado, and that Escaler had acquired ownership through prescription. The court also emphasized the importance of delivery and payment in consummating @ contract of sale, and the limitations on actions for recovery of possession. Page 15 of 34Siuliong & Co., Inc. vs. Ylagan G.R. No. L-17751 Ponente ROMUALDEZ, J Decision Date May 29, 1922 Siuliong & Co., Inc. v. Ylagan is a case where the court ruled in favor of Siuliong & Co., Inc., affirming their right to damages for the breach of contract by Ylagan, who failed to deliver the sugar as promised, based on the fact that the contract clearly specified the time for delivery and no further notice or demand was necessary. Facts: + Siuliong & Co., Inc. (plaintiff-appellee) entered into a contract with Pedro Ylagan (defendant-appeliant) ‘+ Under the contract, Ylagan promised to deliver 1,000 piculs of muscovado sugar at the agreed-upon prices and within the months of February and March 1920. + Ylagan failed to fulfil his obligation and did not deliver the sugar as promised. Issue: + Whether Yiagan’s failure to deliver the sugar constitutes a breach of contract. Ruling: + The court ruled in favor of Siuliong & Co., Inc., affirming their right to damages for the breach of contract by Ylagan. Rati + The court based its decision on the fact that the contract clearly specified the time for the delivery of the sugar. + When the time for the futfllment of the obligation is fixed in the contract, no further notice or demand by the obligee is necessary. + Therefore, the plaintiff's demand for the delivery of the sugar was not required, and Ylagan's failure to fulfill his obligation constituted a breach of contract. nal Points: The court determined that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the breach of contract. The amount of damages awarded was calculated as the difference between the contract price and the amount for which the sugar would have been sold in the market during the months of February and March 1920. According to the evidence presented, this difference amounted to P15 per picul The court addressed the issue of allowing a party to reserve certain evidence and present additional proofs. The court stated that this is a discretionary act of the court, and in this case, there was no abuse of discretion or prejudice to any substantial right. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of Siuliong & Co., Inc., and ordered Ylagan to pay the damages awarded, along with costs. Page 16 of 34Title De la Rosa vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands Case GAR. No. 22359 Ponente ROMUALDEZ, J Decision Date Noy 28, 1924 A contestant sues a bank for failing to award prizes in a d in favor of the bank, stating that the constitute a breach of contract. ‘ign contest, but the court rules ire to award prizes on the specified date did not Facts: + Plaintiff, Julio De la Rosa, sued the defendant bank, Bank of the Philippine Islands, for failing to award prizes in a design contest. The defendant bank had started a contest for designs and plans for the construction of a building The bank announced that the prizes would be awarded no later than November 30, 1921 The plaintiff participated in the contest, incurring expenses and performing work for that purpose. However, the bank did not name judges or award the prizes according to the stipulated conditions. Issue: + Whether the failure of the defendant bank to award the prizes on the specified date constituted a breach of contract. Ruling: + The court ruled in favor of the defendant bank, stating that they were not in default and the plaintiff had no cause of action. + The court held that while the bank was bound to comply with the conditions of the contest as long as the offer was not withdrawn, the date set for the award of prizes. was not the principal inducement in establishing the obligation. The court emphasized that a judicial or extrajudicial demand was necessary to declare the bank in default. The plaintiff arqued that the date was the principal inducement because the current cost of concrete buildings was fixed at that time. However, the court found that the fixation of price was not the principal inducement for the contestants or the bank. The court cited the Civil Code, which states that the designation of the time for the fulfillment of the obligation is the principal inducement only in certain cases, such as agricultural work or industrial operations with a determinate period. ‘Since the bank was not in default and the plaintiff had not made a demand for performance of the obligation, the court concluded that the plaintiff had no cause of action. Therefore, the defendant bank was absolved from the complaint. Page 17 of 34Martinez vs. Cavives GAR. No. 7663 Ponente ‘TRENT, J Decision Date Oct 20, 1913, In Martinez v. Cavives, the Supreme Court rules that the defendants are still liable for unpaid promissory notes despite their argument of novation, as the court finds no evidence of clear and unmistakable novation and emphasizes the plaintiff's silenc acceptance of the contract until the signatures of the brothers were obtained, Facts: + Pedro Martinez, the plaintiff, seeks to recover from Matias Cavives and Severino Cavives, the defendants, on promissory notes executed in 1896. The notes were jointly signed by the defendants and their deceased brother Carlos. Cavives. The defendants borrowed various sums of money under the same terms and conditions as the joint obligation, None of the notes were ever paid. In 1898, Carlos Cavives entered into an agreement with the plaintif to liquidate all the obligations and execute a new note. However, Carlos never obtained the signatures of his brothers to the new note. During the settlement of Carlos’ estate, the plaintiff entered into a compromise settlement with Carlos’ widow, agreeing to accept a reduced amount in satisfaction of his claim, The defendants argue that the original obligations were novated by the 1898 agreement between Carlos and the plaintiff. Issue: + Whether the original obligations were novated by the 1898 agreement between Carlos and the plaintif Ruling: + The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and held that the defendants are stil liable for the unpaid promissory notes. Ratio: + Novation is never presumed and must be clearly and expressly shown by the parties or acts of equivalent import. The court found no evidence of clear and unmistakable novation in this case. The plaintiff's silence until the signatures of the brothers were obtained does not constitute acceptance of the contract. The compromise settlement made between the plaintitf and the widow of Carlos did not mention the amounts borrowed by the defendants, indicating that the Plaintiff did not intend to novate the debts of the three brothers. Parties to a contract with mutual obligations are obliged to perform them in the same sequence in which they are due. Page 18 of 34+ The plaintiff was not obligated to accept the contract as anything more than an executory agreement until the signatures of the brothers were obtained. + The plaintiff never surrendered the original promissory notes and continued to pursue the case against the defendants. + Therefore, the defendants are still liable for the unpaid promissory notes. Title People vs. Bencer Case G.R. No, L-11328 Ponente STREET, J Decision Date ‘Jan 15, 1918 ‘A dispute arises over a contract for the sale of a parcel of land, with the court ruling that the landowner cannot rescind the contract due to her lack of full ownership at the time of the agreement, but is entitled to the unpaid balance of the purchase money. Facts: + Rufina Causing, the plaintiff-appellant, and Alfonso Bencer, the defendant- appellee, are involved in a dispute over a contract for the sale of a parcel of land in the barrio of Bokbokay, Vista Alegre, district of Barotac Viejo, municipality of Banate, Province of lloilo, Philippines. Rutina Causing, as one of several owners pro indiviso of the land, entered into a contract to sell the entire property to Alfonso Bencer for the sum of P1,200. However, at the time of the agreement, Rufina Causing did not have full ownership of the land as she shared ownership with certain minors. The contract stipulated that Rufina Causing would convey the property to Bencer, who paid part of the purchase price and took possession of the land. Rufina Causing was unable to execute a deed conveying the entire interest in the Property as no judicial approval had been obtained for the sale of the shares belonging to the minors. Over time, Rufina Causing acquired the shares of the co-owners by purchase and became the sole possessor of the land. Rufina Causing sought to rescind the contract and recover the property from Bencer, along with damages for his use and occupation of the land. Issue: + Whether Rufina Causing, as the landowner, has the right to rescind the contract for the sale of her property and recover it from Alfonso Bencer, the buyer, due to his failure to pay the remaining balance of the purchase price. ‘+ The court ruled in favor of Alfonso Bencer, stating that Rufina Causing cannot rescind the contract as she did not have full ownership of the land at the time of the agreement. + The court held that in reciprocal obligations, neither party can be deemed to be in default until the other party futflls or offers to futfil their obligation. Page 19 of 34+ Since Rufina Causing was not yet in a position to execute a deed conveying the entire interest in the property, she could not compel Bencer to pay the purchase price + The court found that Rufina Causing, by acquiring the interests of the co-owners, had placed herself in a position to comply with the contract and was therefore under a legal obligation to transfer the estate to Bencer. + The court affirmed the lower court's decision, dismissing Rufina Causing's claim for rescission and damages, but granting her the unpaid balance of the purchase money, amounting to P600, with interest from August 14, 1910. Ratio: ‘+ The court based its decision on Article 1100 of the Civil Code, which states that in ‘mutual obligations, neither party shall be deemed to be in default if the other party does not fulfill or offer to fulfill their own obligation. + The court reasoned that since the contract entailed mutual obligations, if either party could be said to be in default, it was Rufina Causing rather than Alfonso Bencer. + Rufina Causing had obligated herself to convey the entire interest in the land but was not yet in a position to do so due to the lack of judicial approval for the sale of the shares belonging to the minors. + Therefore, she could not rescind the contract based on Bencer's failure to pay the purchase price. + The court also emphasized that Rufina Causing’s acquisition of the co-owners’ interests indicated her intention to comply with the contract. + The court allowed Rufina Causing to recover the unpaid balance of the purchase ‘money with interest, considering the continuous use of the property by Bencer. Title Cinco vs. Canonoy Case G.R. No. L-33171 Ponente MELENCIO-HERRERA, J Decision Date May 31, 1979 The Supreme Court grants a petition to proceed with an independent civil action for damages to property, separate from a criminal case, emphasizing that liability in quasi-delict is distinct from civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. Facts: (- Pefitioner Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint in the City Court for recovery damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his car and a jeepney driven) by respondent Romeo Hilot and operated by respondents Valeriana Pepito and [Carlos Pepito. + Accriminal case was filed against the driver! (-_Atthe pre-trial of the civil case, the respondents’ counsel moved for the suspension] of the civil action pending determination of the criminal case, invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court [The City Court granted the motion and ordered the suspension of the civil case] Page 20 of 34[Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance, alleging that the City Judge acted ith grave abuse of discretion in suspending the in for being contrary to| + ‘The Court of First Instance dismissed the petition] + Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari issue: [Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damages to property| [during the pendency of the criminal action. & ‘The Supreme Court held that an independent civil action for damages to proper [ean proceed separately from a criminal action (The Court emphasized that liability in quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct irom the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. [The civil action referred to in Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which] {Should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted, is that arising from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi-delict. [- The concept of quasi-delict includes not only injuries to persons but also damage| property] The civil case for damages to property can proceed independently of the criminal (An action for damages based on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code i juasi-delictual in character, which can be prosecuted independently of the criminal east Liability in quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil ability arising] {from negligence under the Penal Code. [- The civil action referred to in Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, whict| should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted, is that arising {from the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi-deiict| The concept of quasi-delict includes not only injuries to persons but also damage] io property, [- The civil case for damages to property can proceed independently of the criminal] fase! [Conclusior [The Supreme Court granted the petition and ordered the City Court to proceed Iwith the hearing of the civil ease, Page 21 of 34Spouses Perefia vs. Spouses Zarate G.R. No. 157917 Ponente BERSAMIN, Decision Date ‘Aug 29, 2012 ‘The Supreme Court holds the school bus operators and the Philippine National Railwa jointly liable for damages in a case involving the death of a student due to a collision between a school bus and a train, establishing the requirement for common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence and the liability for negligenc Facts: + Spouses Perefia operated a school bus service, transporting students from Parafiaque City to Don Bosco Technical Institute in Makati City. ‘Spouses Zarate contracted the Perefias to transport their son, Aaron, to and from ‘school. ‘On August 22, 1996, the school bus driven by the Perefias’ employee, Clemente Alfaro, collided with a train operated by the PNR at a railroad crossing. + Aaron was thrown out of the bus and killed instantly. Zarates filed a lawsuit against the Perefias, PNR, and Alfaro for damages. RTC held the Perefias and PNR jointly and severally liable for Aaron's death and awarded damages to the Zarates. Perefias and PNR appealed the decision to the CA, which affirmed the RTC's decision with modifications. Issue: 1. Whether the Perefias and Altaro were liable for negligence in causing the collision and Aaron's death. n Whether the Perefias were liable for breach of contract of carriage. 3. Whether the PNR was liable for negligence in failing to provide adequate safety warning signs and railings at the railroad crossing, 4. Whether the Perefias and PNR were liable for damages, including actual, moral, and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. 5. Whether the Perefias observed the diligence of employers and school bus operators. 6. Whether the PNR was grossly negligent in operating the train and failing to install safety devices at the site of the accident. 7. Whether the PNR should reimburse the Perefias for any amount they may be held liable for. Ruling: + The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the CA, ruling that the Perefias and PNR were jointly and severally liable for damages. + The Court held that the Perefias, as operators of a school bus service, were considered common carriers and were therefore required to observe extraordinary diligence in the conduct of their business. + The Court found that the Perefias failed to prove that they had exercised extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of their driver, Alfaro. Page 22 of 34+ The Court also found that Alfaro’s negligence in crossing the railroad tracks without stopping and overtaking a bus contributed to the collision. + The Court upheld the award for loss of Aaron's eaming capacity, considering his enrollment in a prestigious school and his potential to become a minimum wage eamer, The Court found that the award was not speculative and was justified under the circumstances. The Court found that the amounts of damages awarded were not excessive and were reasonable given the nature of the case and the suffering of the Zarates. + The Court emphasized the need for exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent for common carriers to ensure the safety of their passengers. Ratio: The Perefias and PNR were jointly and severally liable for damages. + Perefias, as common carriers, were requited to observe extraordinary diligence in ‘the conduct of their business. + Perefias failed to prove that they had exercised extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervision of their driver. Alfaro's negligence in crossing the railroad tracks without stopping and overtaking a bus contributed to the collision. ‘+ Award for loss of Aaron's earning capacity was justified considering his enrollment in a prestigious school and potential to become a minimum wage earner, + Amounts of damages awarded were reasonable given the nature of the case and the suffering of the Zarates. Exemplary damages were necessary to serve as a deterrent for common carriers to ensure passenger safety. Title Baer Senior & Co.'s Successors vs. La Compaiiia Maritima Case G.R. No. 1963 Ponente WILLARD, J Decision Date Apr 30, 1906 In Baer Senior & Co.'s Successors v. La Compajiia Maritima, the Philippine ‘Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendant, absolving them from liability for the disappearance of a launch during a towage contract due to lack of negligence. Facts: (Contract of towage between plaintiff, Baer Senior & Co.'s Successors, and Hefendant, La Compafiia Maritima] [Plaintiff owned a launch called Mascota, which they contracted the defendant tol ow from Aparri to Manila] [Launch was delivered to the defendant at Aparri, and their steamer Churruca left [with the launch in tow! + During the journey, the launch disappeared. + Defendant conducted a search but was unable to find the launch] Plaintiff fled a complaint to recover the value of the launch: Page 23 of 34[What is the nature of the defendant's liability for the disappearance of the launch?| The Philippine Supreme Court ruled in favor of the defendant, La Compaiia| Maritima. [The court held that the defendant was not liable for the disappearance of the| launch due to lack of negligence. f- The court stated that a contract of towage is not a contract for the carriage of goods [and is governed by article 1104 of the Civil Code, rather than articles 1601, 1602, jor 1902. [The cour further explained that the defendant's obligation was to exercise ordinai Wiligence, taking into consideration the nature of the obligation and the| (Based on the evidence presented, the court found that the defendant had xercised the required diligence and that the loss of the launch was not due to| their fault f Therefore, the court absolved the defendant from the complaint and awarded costs| fto the defendant. |The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Civil Code and the evidence presented. {The court determined that the defendant was not a carrier of goods in relation t |the launch and, therefore, the provisions regarding the liability of carriers did not apply.) Instead, the defendants liability was governed by articles 1101 and 1104 of the] [Civil Code, which require the exercise of ordinary diligence. [-_ The court found that the defendant had fulfilled their obligation and was not at fault f the loss of the launch. Title Guzman vs, William X Case GR. No. L-3649 Ponente ‘TORRES, J Decision Date Oct 24, 1907 A dispute arises when the captain of a steamer abandons a vessel being towed, resulting in its total loss, leading to a ruling that the company responsible for the steamer must pay indemnity for the damages caused, Facts: + The case involves a dispute between Jose Guzman, the plaintif-appeliee, and William X, the captain of the steamer Kudat, and Behn, Meyer & Co., the defendants-appellants. Page 24 of 34Ratio: In January 1904, Guzman's lorcha Nevada was contracted to be towed by the steamer Kudat from Manila to lloilo for a fee of P150. During the towing process, the tow line broke near the Island of Cabras, and Captain William X ordered the crew of the lorcha to abandon the vessel. The lorcha was left adrift and eventually lost. Guzman filed a complaint seeking indemnity for the total loss of his vessel due to the captain's unjustified abandonment. Whether the defendants, Behn, Meyer & Co., are liable to pay indemnity for the loss of Guzman's vessel, the lorcha Nevada, due to the captain's abandonment during towing. The court ruled in favor of Jose Guzman and ordered Behn, Meyer & Co. to pay indemnity for the total loss of the lorcha Nevada ‘The defendants were found liable for fraud, negligence, or breach of contract under the Civil Code. The agreement between Guzman and Behn, Meyer & Co. for the towing of the lorcha Nevada was not a charter party but a contract for the hire of services, subject to the provisions of the Civil Code. Articles 1101 and 1601 of the Civil Code state that those guilty of fraud, negligence, or breach of contract are liable to indemnify for the losses and damages caused Carriers of goods by land or water are subject to the same obligations as innkeepers with regard to the keeping and preservation of the goods entrusted to them. Captain William X failed to fulfil the contract for towage and acted in contravention of the stipulations therein. By abandoning the lorcha in mid-ocean with the knowledge that it would be lost, the captain acted with negligence and a willful intent to cause the total loss of the vessel. ‘The owner of the lorcha is entitled to indemnification. The burden of proof for force majeure or other circumstances exempting the defendant from liability rests with the defendant. There was no evidence of force majeure or unforeseen accident that caused the loss of the lorcha, but there was evidence of negligence and willful intent to cause the loss. Behn, Meyer & Co., as the agents and representatives of the owners of the steamer Kudat, are bound to indemnify the owner of the lorcha Nevada for the damages sustained. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court, awarding indemnity to Guzman in the amount of 9,000 pesos. Page 25 of 34‘Tamayo vs. Gsell G.R. No. 10765 Ponente ‘TRENT, J Decision Date Dec 22, 1916 ‘A father files a personal injury claim against the owner of a match factory after his son suffers severe finger injury, leading to a court ruling in favor of the plaintiff and affirming the right ofthe attomey of the Bureau of Labor to represent injured employees and tax their fees as costs against the defendant. Facts: + Paciente Tamayo, the father of a minor named Braulio Tamayo, filed a personal injury claim against Carlos Gsell. + Braulio Tamayo suffered a severe finger injury while working in Gsell’s match factory. + The trial court ruled in favor of Paciente Tamayo and awarded him damages of P400. + Gsell appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing the attorney of the Bureau of Labor to represent the plaintiff and in finding Gsell liable for the accident. Issue: 1, Whether the attorney of the Bureau of Labor has the right to represent injured employees in personal injury cases and tax their fees as costs against the defendant. 2. Whether Gsell is the owner of the match factory where Braulio Tamayo was injured. 3. Whether the accident occurred because Braulio Tamayo was assigned to work he was not accustomed to and without any previous warning or instructions. 4, Whether the negligence of Gsell or his employees was the cause of the accident. 5. Whether the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risks should be sustained. 6. Whether damages should be awarded in the absence of a showing that the injuries diminished Braulio Tamayo's earning capacity. Ruli The court ruled in favor of Paciente Tamayo on all issues. The court held that the attorney of the Bureau of Labor has the right to represent injured employees and tax their fees as costs against the defendant. The court also found that Gsell was the owner of the match factory and that the accident occurred due to negligence on the part of Gsell or his employees. The court rejected the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risks. The court awarded damages of P400 to Paciente Tamayo, finding that the injuries caused pain and suffering and a permanent injury to Braulio Tamayo's finger. The court did not find any evidence of a diminished earning capacity. Page 26 of 34Ratio: Title Case The court interpreted the Employers’ Liability Act and concluded that the Act includes damages for pain and suffering. The court discussed the English rule on the measure of damages for personal injuries, which includes compensation for pain and suffering and the probable inability of the plaintiff to eam an income equal to what they earned in the past. The court cited various authorities, including decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, to support the argument that damages for pain and suffering and permanent injury are recoverable in personal injury cases, The court argued that the Act is remedial and defines certain rights that it will aid, including the right to damages. The court asserted that the Act is substantive law and grants a substantive right to damages, which is the essence of the cause of action. The court argued that the Act should be interpreted liberally to accomplish its purpose of remedying defects in the Civil Code rules. The court rejected the argument that the Act is solely an Employers’ Liability Act and not a law of damages, stating that the intent of the Legislature is the law and that the legislative meaning should be extracted from the statute as a whole. The court concluded that the measure of damages in personal injury cases brought under the Employers’ Liability Act includes damages for pain and suffering and permanent injury. The court emphasized that damages for such injuries cannot be ascertained with ‘mathematical exactness but should be awarded for a reasonable amount. The court cited several cases from other jurisdictions to support its conclusion that damages for pain and suffering and permanent injury are recoverable in personal injury cases. In the specific case before the court, the plaintiff proved no pecuniary or actual damages but suffered pain, permanent injury, and bodily disfigurement. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff and awarded damages for pain and suffering and permanent injury, although it reduced the amount of damages based on the specific circumstances of the case. .T, Hashim & Co. vs. Rocha & Co. GR. No. L-6195 Ponente MORELAND, J Decision Date Facts: ‘Jan 17, 1911 Rocha & Co. is held liable for the loss of value ofa shipment of potatoes due to their gross negligence in leaving the lorcha tightly closed and without ventilation for two days, resulting in the court ordering them to compensate N.T. Hashim & Co. for the value of the lost potatoes. N.T. Hashim & Co. filed a lawsuit against Rocha & Co. over a shipment of potatoes. Rocha & Co. discharged a portion of the shipment into a lorcha, which was left tightly closed and without ventilation for two days. Page 27 of 34+ Several thousand crates of potatoes from the same shipment were discharged into numerous cascos. + When the lorcha was eventually opened, the potatoes were found to be rotted and of no value, while the potatoes in the cascos remained in good condition. + Can Rocha & Co. be held liable for the loss of value of the potatoes due to their alleged gross negligence in leaving the lorcha tightly closed and without ventilation for two days? Ruling: + The court ruled in favor of N.T. Hashim & Co. + Rocha & Co. was found guilty of gross negligence and was held liable for the resulting loss. + Rocha & Co. was ordered to pay N.T. Hashim & Co. the value of the lost potatoes. Rati + The court based its decision on the evidence presented during the trial It was established that the lorcha containing the potatoes was left tightly closed and without ventilation for two days in the hot sun due to the wrongful acts and gross carelessness of Rocha & Co.'s employees. Witnesses, including the captain of the ship, the first officer, and the customs. inspector, testified to this fact It was proven that the potatoes were in good condition when discharged from the ship into the lorcha. Only the potatoes in the lorcha, after two days of exposure to the sun without ventilation, were found to be rotted beyond use or value. The court concluded that Rocha & Co.'s gross negligence in handling and caring for the potatoes was clearly demonstrated by the evidence. As a result, Rocha & Co. was ordered to compensate N.T. Hashim & Co. for the value of the lost potatoes, amounting to P3,865.31 Title Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Bingham Case GAR. No, 4895 Ponente JOHNSON, J Decision Date ‘Jun 15, 1909 Defendants are not held liable for failing to return a revolver and ammunition to the ‘government due to the loss caused by a fortuitous event, as ruled by the court based on the provisions of the Civil Code and the principle of excusing performance of a contract in cases of impossibility Facts: + Defendant, W. O. Bingham, obtained permission from the authorities of the Insular Government to purchase and keep a revolver and ammunition. Page 28 of 34The condition was that he would deliver them to the Government of the Philippine Islands on demand. + Prior to the demand for the return of the revolver and ammunition, Bingham's boat sank in a severe storm while he was engaged in pearl fishing. The storm was so violent that neither Bingham nor his crew had time to save the items. The revolver and ammunition were lost in 80 fathoms of water and it was impossible to recover them due to the depth of the sea Issue: + Whether the defendants were liable for failing to retum the revolver and ammunition to the government. Ruli + The defendants were not liable for falling to return the revolver and ammunition to the government. Ratio: + An obligation, consisting of the delivery of a specified thing, shall be extinguished when the thing is lost or destroyed without the fault of the obligor and before he is in default. The provisions of the Civil Code state that an obligation is extinguished when the thing is lost or destroyed without the fault of the debtor. ‘American legal precedents recognize that performance of a contract may be excused when it becomes impossible due to an act of God or a fortuitous event. The loss of the revolver and ammunition was due to a fortuitous event (the sinking of the boat in a severe storm) and was beyond the control of the defendants. Therefore, the defendants were not liable for failing to return the items. Title ‘Yap Kim Chuan vs. Tiaoqui Case G.R. No. 10006 Ponente ‘TORRES, J Decision Date Sep 18, 1915 ‘The Supreme Court absolves the lessor from liability for damages caused by a fortuitous event, a torrential rainfall, in the case of Yap Kim Chuan v. Tiaoqui. Facts: + Parties involved: Yap Kim Chuan (plaintiff) and Alfonso M. Tiaoqui (defendant) + Date and place: Not mentioned + Brief account of events: Yap Kim Chuan leased a building owned by Alfonso M. Tiaoqui. During a heavy rainstorm, the roof of the building leaked, causing damage to the plaintif’'s merchandise stored in the building. + Brief account of the case in the lower court: The plaintif filed a complaint seeking ‘compensation for the damages. Page 29 of 34Issue: + Can the lessor be held responsible for the damages caused by the rainfall? Ruling: + The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court and absolved the defendant from liability. Ratio: + The court held that the rainfall was a fortuitous event or force majeure, which could not have been foreseen or prevented by either party. + The lessor cannot be held responsible for damages caused by unforeseen and inevitable occurrences, unless expressly stated in the law or the contract. + There was no provision in the lease agreement that made the lessor liable for damages caused by leaks in the root + The lessor’s obligation to warrant the thing leased, including any defects, is separate from his liability for damages. + The lessor can only be held responsible for damages if he knew about the defects and failed to reveal them to the lessee. + There was no evidence that the lessor had knowledge of any defects in the roof. +The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that the lessor had promised to compensate for the damages due to lack of sufficient evidence. + The lessor cannot be held responsible for damages caused by a fortuitous event such as a torrential rainfall Conclusion: + The lessor cannot be held responsible for damages caused by a fortuitous event such as a torrential rainfall. + The court absolved the defendant from liability and reversed the decision of the lower court. Title Sons vs. Yangeo Steamship Co. Case G.R. No, 10283 Ponente PER CURIAM, J Decision Date ‘Tul 25, 1916 ‘A tugboat company is held liable for the loss of heavily loaded cascos and their cargoes due to the captain's negligence in leaving them exposed to dangerous weather conditions without proper means of propulsion Facts: + Limpangco Sons employed Yangco Steamship Co. to tow two cascos loaded with sugar from Guagua to Manila, + The cascos were heavily loaded with 2,041.80 piculs of sugar, valued at P11,229.90, Page 30 of 34The cascos were initially towed by the launches Tahimic and Matulin, owned by the defendant. When the launches arrived off the Malabon River, the patron of the Matulin decided to leave the cascos in the river due to threatening weather and dangerous sea conditions. The launch Tahimic towed the cascos into the river, while the Matulin continued to Manila. (On August 9, 1913, the patron of the Matulin agreed to tow the cascos to Manila if the weather was favorable. The crews of the cascos were instructed to use bamboo poles to move the cascos out of the river and meet the Matulin outside the bar. However, when they reached the open sea, they encountered high seas and strong winds, causing the cascos to be driven ashore and their cargoes lost. The patron of the Matulin claimed he was unable to render assistance due to the shallow water in which the cascos were caught. Issue: 1, Whether the captain of the Matulin was negligent in his actions, leading to the loss of the cascos and their cargoes. 2. Whether the defendant, as the tugboat company, is liable for the loss. Rulin 1. The captain of the Matulin was found guilty of negligence, which was the direct and proximate cause of the damage. The defendant is held liable for the loss. 2. A vessel undertaking a towage service is responsible for the reasonable care of the tow. Reasonable care is determined by the dangers and hazards the tow may be exposed to, which the master of the tug should know and guard against. The duty of the tug to the tow is continuous from the start of the service until it is completed. The responsibility of the tug includes providing safe and suitable appliances for the service, giving proper instructions for the management of the tow, and navigating the tug safely. The tug is held to a higher degree of care and skill i the locality is more dangerous. In this case, it was negligence to leave heavily loaded cascos in Manila Bay, exposed to the weather likely to exist in August, with no other means of propulsion than bamboo poles. The captain of the Matulin should have taken note of the time of year and the period of typhoons and strong southwest winds, and should have guarded the tow accordingly. The tug cannot be exempt from liability due to an act of God if it unnecessarily exposed the tow to such an accident through its own negligence or misconduct. Ratio: +The captain of the Matulin was negligent in leaving the heavily loaded cascos in Manila Bay, exposed to dangerous weather conditions, with no means of propulsion other than bamboo poles. The defendant, as the tugboat company, was held liable for the loss of the cascos. and their cargoes. A vessel undertaking a towage service has a continuous duty to provide reasonable care for the tow, including safe appliances and instructions for the management of the tow. The tug is held to a higher degree of care and skill if the locality is more dangerous. The tug cannot be exempt from liability due to an act of God if it unnecessarily exposed the tow to such an accident through its own negligence or misconduct. Page 31 of 34Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Amechazurra GAR. No. L-3762 Ponente WILLARD, J Decision Date Mar 27, 1908 In the case of Government v. Amechazurra, the court ruled that the loss of firearms due to force majeure was not a valid defense against the liability under the bond, resulting in a reduced liability of $400. Facts: + Case: Government of the Philippine Islands v. Amechazurra + Defendants: Alejandro Amechazurra and two others + Date: March 14, 1904 + Place: Philippines + Amechazurra obtained a license to possess firearms and gave a bond of $800, with $200 for each firearm, for the safekeeping and return of the firearms upon demand. + Amechazurra's house was attacked by a band of robbers known as babaylanes, resulting in the loss of three firearms. + Government demanded the return of the firearms, but Amechazurra was only able to deliver one. + Government filed a lawsuit against Amechazurra and his sureties to recover $600, or P1200, for the failure to deliver the lost firearms. Issue: + Is the loss of firearms due to force majeure a valid defense against the liability under the bond? Ruling: +The loss of firearms due to force majeure is not a valid defense against the liability under the bond. Ratio: + The court based its decision on Article 1105 of the Civil Code, which states that no ‘one shall be liable for events that could not be foreseen or were inevitable, except in cases expressly mentioned in the law or in the contract. + The contract expressly imposed an obligation on the defendants to safely keep and deliver the firearms, regardless of any unforeseen events. + The court cited a previous case, Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Punzalan, which held that failure to comply with the conditions of the bond imposes liability on the defendants, regardless of the occurrence of force majeure. + The court emphasized that the right to keep and bear arms is not secured by law, and the Government has the authority to impose terms and conditions for the possession of firearms. + Therefore, the defendants must fulfil the terms of the bond they agreed to. Additional Considerations: Page 32 of 34+ Two of the stolen firearms were later recaptured by the government. + The court applied Article 1154 of the Civil Code, which allows for the equitable mitigation of penalties if the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly fulfilled + Ina previous case, it was held that the recovery should be reduced when some of the stolen firearms were recaptured. + Therefore, the court reduced the liability under the bond from $1,200 to $400, taking into account the recapture of two of the firearms. Title IN RE: Ceballos, Case G.R. No. 4190 Ponente ‘TRACEY, J Decision Date Dec 17, 1908 In the case of In re: Ceballos, the court rules in favor of Matilde Aramburu, the widow, stating that she retains the right of redemption for the property sold under execution, allowing her to participate in the estate proceedings and potentially reclaim the property within a twelve-month period. Facts: + The case involves the dissolution of a partnership where two haciendas were awarded to Jose Ma. Ceballos, who is now deceased. + Matilde Aramburu, the widow of Jose Ma. Ceballos, had an interest in the property. + The property was sold by the sheriff under an execution issued upon a judgment against Matilde in favor of the purchaser, Angel Ortiz. +The certificate of sale conveyed not only the real estate but also all the rights and interests of Matilde in the estate of her deceased husband. + Whether Angel Ortiz, as the purchaser of the property, is entitled to exclude Matilde Aramburu, the widow, from participating in the estate proceedings and to appear as the owner of the property in the accounting and other proceedings relating to the estate, + The court ruled in favor of Matilde Aramburu, the widow. + Matilde retained the right of redemption for the property sold under execution, which gave her a standing in the estate proceedings. + Matilde was entitled to remain in possession of the real estate sold for a statutory period of twelve months and could defeat the sale by redemption at any time during that period + Matilde's personal rights alone entitled her to par ipate in the estate proceedings. Ratio: + The court's decision was based on the principle that the widow retained the right of redemption for the property sold under execution. Page 33 of 34This right allowed her to participate in the estate proceedings and potentially reclaim the property within a twelve-month period. The existence of the right of redemption prevented an entire subrogation, meaning that Angel Ortiz, as the purchaser, could not completely replace Matilde’s rights in the estate. The court also mentioned that it is a general rule that courts will not consider questions in which no actual interests are involved, indicating that they deciine jurisdiction of moot cases. Page 34 of 34G.R. No. 159617 ‘August 8, 2007 ROBERTO C. SICAM and AGENCIA de R.C. SICAM, INC. petitioners, vs. LULU V. JORGE and CESAR JORGE, respondents. Topic: E. Breach of Obligation -Excuse for Non- Performance 1. Fortuitous 2. Acto of Creditor Facts: 1. From September to October 1987- Lulu Jorge (respondent) pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R. C. Sicam to secure loan of P59,500 2. October 19, 1987- 2 armed men robbed the pawnshop. (took away whatever cash and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault) a. Investigation entered in the police blotter shows that while victims were inside the office, 2 male unidentified persons entered into the said office with guns drawn. One of them went straight inside and poked his gun toward Romeo Sicam and thereby tied him with an electric wire while the other poked his gun toward Divina Mata and Isabelita Rodriguez and ordered them to lay face flat on the floor. Suspects asked forcibly the case and assorted pawned jewelries items mentioned above b. After, suspects fled on board of a Toyota w/ unidentified plate number. 3. Petitioner Sicam sent respondent Lulu a letter informing her about the loss of her (Lulu’s) jewelry due to the robbery, a. Respondent wrote back, expressing disbelief, stating that when the robbery happened, it had been the practice that all jewelry pawned would be deposited with Far East Bank near the pawnshop and so, would require advance notice before withdrawal from the pawnshop. She then requested to prepare the pawned jewelry for withdrawal on November 6, 1987 but petitioner Sicam failed to return the jewelry. 4. September 28, 1988- respondent Lulu joined by her husband, Cesar Jorge, filed a complaint against petitioner Sicam with the RTC for indemnification for the loss of pawned jewelry and payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. a. Petitioner Sicam filed his Answer contending that he is not the real party-in-interest as the pawnshop was incorporated ‘on April 20, 1987 and known as Agencia de R.C. Sicam, Inc b. that petitioner corporation had exercised due care and diligence in the safekeeping of the articles pledged with it and could not be made liable for an event that is fortuitous, 5. Respondents subsequently filed an Amended Complaint to \clude petitioner corporation. a. petitioner Sicam filed a Motion to Dismiss as far as he is concerned considering that he is not the real party-in- interest. b. RTC- denied motion 6. RTC - dismissed the complaint. a. petitioner Sicam could not be made personally liable for a claim arising out of a corporate transaction; b. fortuitous event (the robbery) exempts the victim from liability for the loss in a pledger-pledgee relationship 7. CA- reversed the decision of RTC. Petitioners jointly liable for loss of the jewelrya. the corresponding diligence required of a pawnshop is that it should take steps to secure and protect the pledged items and should take steps to insure itself against the loss of articles which are entrusted to its custody as it derives earnings from the pawnshop trade which petitioners failed to do; that Austria is not applicable to this case since the robbery incident happened in 1961 when the criminality had not as yet reached the levels attained in the present day; that they are at least guilty of contributory negligence and should be held liable for the loss of jewelries; and that robberies and hold-ups are foreseeable risks in that those engaged in the pawnshop business are expected to foresee. b. MR- DENIED Not > Jewelry held as pledge were robbed from the pawnshop > In order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. Issue: WIN the robbery was a fortuitous event that would exempt the liability of the petitioner. Held: No. Ratio: 1. Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides: Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. 2. Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. 3. ELEMENTS OF FORTUITOUS EVENT:(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner; and, (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury or loss. 4. The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it. And, in order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. 5. One's negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person's participation -- whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act -- the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God. 6. Petitioner Sicam had testified that there was a security guard in their pawnshop at the time of the robbery. He likewise testified that when he started the pawnshopbusiness in 1983, he thought of opening a vault with the nearby bank for the purpose of safekeeping the valuables but was discouraged by the Central Bank since pawned articles should only be stored in a vault inside the pawnshop. The very measures which petitioners had allegedly adopted show that to them the possibility of robbery was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen and anticipated. Petitioner Sicam’s testimony, in effect, contradicts petitioners’ defense of fortuitous event. Moreover, petitioners failed to show that they were free from any negligence by which the loss of the pawned jewelry may have been occasioned. 7. On the contrary, by the very evidence of petitioners, the CA did not err in finding that petitioners are guilty of concurrent or contributory negligence as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit: Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with regard to pawnshops and other establishments which are engaged in making loans secured by pledges, the special laws and regulations concerning them shall be observed, and subsidiarily, the provisions on pledge, mortgage and antichresis. The provision on pledge, particularly Article 2099 of the Civil Code, provides that the creditor shall take care of the thing pledged with the diligence of a good father of a family. This means that petitioners must take care of the pawns the way a prudent person would as to his own property. Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required.