Final Memo For Saumya

2ND AMITY NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY TOURNAMENT
IN THE COURT OF
SESSIONS JUDGE
TIS HAZARI COURT , NEW DELHI
SAUMYA GARG PROSECUTION

VERSUS
ABHINAV SINGH DEFENCE
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES_________________________________________________III
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION___________________________________________IV
STATEMENT OF FACTS___________________________________________________V
STATEMENT OF ISSUES__________________________________________________VI
ISSUE 1________________________________________________________________VI
WHETHER ABHINAV IS LIABLE FOR THE RAPE OF SOUMYA U/S 376?________VI
ISSUE 2________________________________________________________________VI
WHETHER ABHINAV IS LIABLE FOR FORGERY U/S 420, 463, 464, 466 OF THE
IPC?____________________________________________________________________VI
ISSUE 3________________________________________________________________VI
WHETHER MR. ABHINAV HAS DEFRAUDED MISS SOUMYA UNDER SECTION
406 OF IPC WHILE GETTING THE HOUSE REGISTERED IN HIS OWN NAME?___VI
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS_____________________________________________VII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED__________________________________________________1
ISSUE 1: WHETHER ABHINAV IS LIABLE FOR THE RAPE OF SOUMYA U/S 376?_1
1.1 SEXUAL INTERCOURSE HAS TAKEN PLACE DUE TO THE ARRANGEMENT OF A LIVE-IN
RELATIONSHIP.___________________________________________________________1
1.2 CONSENT FOR SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WAS OBTAINED BY FRAUD.___________________4

1.3 THE CONSENT WAS PRIMARILY BASED ON SUCH A PROMISE TO MARRY.______________4
ISSUE 2: WHETHER ABHINAV IS LIABLE FOR FORGERY U/S 420, 463, 464, 466
OF THE IPC?_____________________________________________________________6
2.1 THE ACCUSED FRAUDENTLY INDUCED THE COMPLAINANT TO DELIVER THE PROPERTY__6
2.2 THE ACCUSED FORGED THE MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE WITH THE INTENTION TO DECEIVE
THE COMPLAINANT AND THE PUBLIC___________________________________________7
2.3 THE ACCUSED HAD THE INTENTION TO CAUSE HARM TO THE COMPLAINANT__________9
II
MEMORIAL FOR PROSECUTION

ISSUE 3: WHETHER MR. ABHINAV HAS DEFRAUDED MISS SOUMYA UNDER

SECTION 406 OF IPC WHILE GETTING THE HOUSE REGISTERED IN HIS OWN
NAME__________________________________________________________________10
3.1 ENTRUSTMENT WAS DONE IN THE NATURE OF LIVE-IN RELATIONSHIP______________10
3.2 ABHINAV'S DISHONEST INTENTION WAS EVIDENT FROM THE VERY BEGINNING________11
3.3 THE OFFENCE OF CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED____________12
PRAYER_________________________________________________________________14
LIST OF WITNESS________________________________________________________15
III

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

STATEMENT OF FACTS
VI

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE 1
WHETHER ABHINAV IS LIABLE FOR THE RAPE OF SOUMYA U/S 376?
ISSUE 2
WHETHER ABHINAV IS LIABLE FOR FORGERY U/S 420, 463, 464, 466 OF THE
IPC?
ISSUE 3
WHETHER MR. ABHINAV HAS DEFRAUDED MISS SOUMYA UNDER SECTION
406 OF IPC WHILE GETTING THE HOUSE REGISTERED IN HIS OWN NAME?
VII

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
VIII

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE 1: WHETHER ABHINAV IS LIABLE FOR THE RAPE OF SOUMYA U/S

376?
Rape under the Indiana Penal Code is defined under section 375 1. This section deals with all
such acts that shall constitute as ‘rape’. It involves, penile penetration to any extent, insertion
of any object to any extent into the private parts of the woman or causes her to do so,
manipulation of any part of a woman for causing vaginal, urethral or anal penetration or oral
manipulation of such parts of a woman. 2 The basic essence of this offence is the idea of
coercive non-consensual and consensual in certain cases sexual intercourse or penetration. To
constitute such offence, there must be sexual intercourse and such intercourse must be non-
consensual or consent must be obtained by fraud or misconception.
Section 90 of the Indiana Penal Code describes consent to not be obtained by fear, injury,
misconception of fact and that the person knows such consent has been given on this basis.
Consent supposes three things-a physical power to act, a mental power of acting, and a free
and serious use of them.3
1.1 SEXUAL INTERCOURSE HAS TAKEN PLACE DUE TO THE ARRANGEMENT OF A LIVE-IN
RELATIONSHIP.
It is humbly submitted that live-in relationships have been addressed by the judiciary as
legitimate and although there is no special provision to govern this aspect, it has been read
into the Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”). The aforementioned Act grants rights and
obligations to the parties who are ‘in the nature of marriage’. To decide the ambit of such a
phrase the judiciary has specified certain guidelines keeping in mind the societal and
constitutional values of the country. The combination of the following requisites shall
constitute as some key criteria for evaluating the relationship “in the nature of marriage” 4:
1
Indiana Penal Code, 1860, § 375, Act no. 45 of Year 1860
2
Indiana Penal Code, 1860, Act no. 45 of Year 1860
3
Uday v State of Karnataka (2003) 4 SCC 46
4
Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755
1
a) Duration: Section 2(f) of the DV Act uses the phrase “any point” which entails the
doctrine of reasonableness. Therefore, a reasonable time period is to be decided by the
court as per the facts of the case.
b) Shared Household: Section 2(s) of DV Act describes a shared household as parties living
in a domestic relationship. The Section gives an exhaustive meaning as it uses the words
“means and includes” together. Hence, the two criterias involved are:
 Living together in a property as a domestic relationship.

 Property is either owned by the parties together, either of them or by their relatives
which is being utilized by them.
c) Pooling of resources: The distribution of the financial burden upon the two parties are
observed by the court. There must be contribution from both sides with some sense of
investment.
d) Domestic Arrangements: The arrangement between the parties of either one carrying out
the household responsibility, or both or have invested together to arrange a third party in
the nature of marriage.
e) Socialization: The socializing of the parties together as a married couple with friends,
family and the surrounding society.
f) Sexual relationship: Marriage like relationship refers to sexual relationship, not just for
pleasure, but for emotional and intimate relationship, for procreation of children, so as to
give emotional support, companionship and also material affection, caring etc.
It is humbly submitted that the relationship shared by the Accused and Prosecutrix is a
relationship in the nature of marriage as the duration of them living together began from
January 2021 when the Prosecutrix had shifted her residence form Mumbai to Delhi.
Therefore, they have been living for more than a period of one year. They had a shared
household as they initially moved into a 1-BHK flat in SS colony, Nangloi, New Delhi and
then further shifted into a new 3- BHK apartment in Punjabi Bagh West, New Delhi.
They also had pooled into their resources as the Accused took up the financial burden for the
purchase of the apartment and subsequent EMI payments whereas the Prosecutrix took up the
household expenses. They had distributed their domestic responsibilities and socialized with
2
their surrounding neighbours as a married couple as the Accused had submitted an alleged
marriage certificate indicating them as married.
It is therefore contended that fulfilling all such criteria of a live-in relationship, it can be said
that such a relationship being in the nature of marriage is a consummated relationship. In
Velusamy v. Patchaiammal,56 it was held that for such a relationship to be recognized as in
the nature of marriage, the following conditions must have been fulfilled:
 The couple must hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses.
 They must be of legal age to marry.
 They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being
unmarried.
 They must have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out to the world as being
akin to spouses for a significant period of time.
The Prosecutrix was of 26 years of age and the Accused was 27 years of age thereby crossing
the threshold of adulthood and therefore legally qualified to enter into a marriage. From the
statements of the Prosecutrix it is evident that she had foreseen the physical involvement in
the relationship before making her decision for her transfer to Delhi. From the statements of
the Accused also it is clear that he looked forward to the progress in their relationship.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that both parties were well aware that an arrangement in
the nature of marriage such as that of a live-in relationship will be the one as a consummated
relationship.
It is therefore humbly submitted that the nature of marriage and their arrangement is that of a
live-in relationship and this nature of relationship includes the domestic arrangements for a
period of more than one year and romantic relationship dating from May, 2020. Hence, the
consummation of the relationship thereby be denoted as the existence of a physical
relationship between the Prosecutrix and the Accused was presumed by both parties.
5
Velusamy v. Patchaiammal , (2010) 10 SCC 469
6
3
1.2 Consent for sexual intercourse was obtained by fraud.
It is humbly submitted that if consent is given by an individual under fear of injury or under a
misconception of fact, it will not be considered as consent as per Section 90 of the IPC.
Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance,
the good and evil on each side.7 Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,
obtained willingly or through deceit.
The Accused fraudently represented the fact that he would marry her by early 2022. He
copied the Prosecutrix’s signatures and forged a marriage certificate without her knowledge
so as to comply with the norms of the housing society. Further, he continued to take
household expenditure from her while constantly delaying their marriage. Therefore, it can be
inferred that the Prosecutrix gave consent to the Accused under a misconception of fact and
therefore, the Accused deceived her and used her for sexual, physical, emotional and
monetary gain.
Thus, it is pleaded before the Court that the consent obtained for engaging in sexual acts is
vitiated by the Accused’s fraudulent intention.
1.3 The consent was primarily based on such a promise to marry.
In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and another 8, it was held that if a
woman agrees to have a sexual relationship due to the promise to marry in future by the man
and such promise was made without any intention to honor it, the man can be said to have
committed the offence of rape.
The Prosecutrix was reluctant to move in with the Accused after her transfer to Delhi and
assured her that he will marry her by the end of 2021 or early 2022, considering their
emotional and financial conditions.9 However, as time went by the Accused kept dodging the
question of marriage leading to frequent skirmishes between the couple. Further, the Accused
did not accommodate her needs and consider her safety aspects while they were living in SS
Colony.
7
Deelip Singh @ Dilip Kumar v. State of Bihar, AIR 2005 SC 203
8
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and another , (2019) 9 SCC 608
9
STATEMENT OF WITNESS AS RECORDED BY POLICE, Soumya (Complainant)
4
The Accused was then promoted however was against the idea of buying a house and
specifically mentioned that trust for marriage cannot be built within a short span of a year. 10
This statement made by the accused was contrary to his prior statement of marrying the
Prosecutrix by early 2022 when he would be in a better financial position and have
established emotional connect with each other. It is to be emphasized that it was the Accused
who had proposed the idea of a live-in relationship on the ground that they already had
known each other for a long time and therefore, were ready for a physical and emotional
partnership.
Subsequently, the Accused bought a 3-BHK apartment in New Delhi viewing the investment
prospects for his personal gain, and he did not make the Prosecutrix a co-owner in the
property. On the other hand, it was the Prosecutrix who continued to pay the EMI
installments whilst the Accused was able to sponsor his brother’s education abroad.
The Accused was obviously aware that the Prosecutrix would have never consented to living
together and engaging in sexual acts if not for his promise to marry, and stated that he was
the sole owner of the house.11 The Accused’s mala fide motives are evident and made such
promise to satisfy his lust sexually, emotionally and financially.
The factual evidence is sufficient to establish that from the very beginning of their
relationship post-covid, the Accused did not want to marry the victim. Further, a conviction is
possible on circumstantial evidence if it forms a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave
any reasonable doubt for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused.12
Therefore, it can be inferred from the Accused’s constant denial to marry the Prosecutrix
while having the financial capacity as well as the emotional understanding gained after living
with her for a year, that the promise to marry was made with no intention to honor it; and
consent obtained by a false promise to marry would come under the garb of the offence of
rape. 13
Thus, it is pleaded before the Court that the consent based on the misconception of fact that
the Accused will honor his marriage will considered as no consent 14 and therefore, the
10
Id
11
STATEMENT OF WITNESS AS RECORDED BY POLICE, Rajni
12
Deonandan Mishra v State of Bihar (1955) 2 SCR 750
13
INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860, § 376, Act no. 45 of Year 1860
14
Anurag Soni vs The State of Chhattisgarh AIR 2019 SC 1857
5
offence of rape under Section 376 of the IPC has been committed, based on the precedents
cited and the statements of the witnesses.
ISSUE 2: WHETHER ABHINAV IS LIABLE FOR FORGERY U/S 420, 463, 464, 466
OF THE IPC?
It is humbly contended that Mr. Abhinav Singh is guilty of unlawful offences under Section
420, 463, 464 and 466 of the Indiana Penal Code, 1860.
2.1 The accused fraudently induced the complainant to deliver the property
The word ‘fraudulently’ connotes an intention to deceive and to cause injury to another
person.15 It can be noted that the offence of cheating under section 420 has two essential
ingredients: (1) deceit that is dishonest or fraudulent misrepresentation to a person, and; (2)
the inducing of that person thereby to deliver property or a valuable security.16
The accused and the complainant were living together in a 1-BHK flat despite the
complainant’s dissatisfaction with the semi-urban locality and the inadequate safety
standards. They moved to a 3-BHK apartment which was purchased in the accused’s name.
The complainant was exploited emotionally and economically as she was paying the
household expenditure as well as the EMI payments, and her demands to get co-ownership of
the property were denied leading to frequent skirmishes between the two.
Intention17 can be understood to cover consequences which reasonably flow from what is
deliberately done by an individual. The accused refused to accommodate the complainant’s
needs and changed his mindset from previously wanting to marry the complainant to not
wanting to overburden her with the home loan and subsequently, purchasing the house
without making the complainant a co-owner under the guise of future investment prospects.18
It can be inferred that from the very start, the complainant did not plan on marrying the
accused. The complainant responding to the inducement, that is, the house being an
15
Indiana Penal Code, 1860, § 25, Act no. 45 of Year 1860
16
Mobarik Ali Ahmed v State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 857
17
Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch, [1942] AC 435. cited in P. V. Jagannath Rao & Ors vs
State of Orissa & Ors 1968 SCR (3) 789
18
6
investment as a reassurance of their future together 19 paid the EMI installments whilst the
accused was reluctant to pay citing his family expenses. 20 It must be noted that the accused
however, had sufficient money to secure the loan for the flat and sponsor his brother’s
education abroad.
The accused denied making her the co-borrower despite her request to transfer ownership of
the property to her, her constant guidance in the home loan procedure and subsequently her
pivotal role in paying the EMIs. Through this fraudulent misrepresentation, the accused
compelled her to part with a significant amount of money for his personal benefits, causing
financial loss and detriment to the deceived.
The complainant has not only suffered from economic loss due to being deprived of the
property but non-pecuniary losses as well as she suffered harm to her body, mind, and
reputation; which falls within the purview of “injury” as mentioned in the provision. 21 She
was deprived of societal recognition, legal security and was exploited emotionally and
physically. Therefore, there has been injury to the deceived and, advantage to the deceiver
because of the fraudulent representation. Such unrepressed acts affected the reputation of the
resident welfare association and the public.22
The essential conditions required to prove the offence of cheating have been fulfilled making
the accused liable for an aggravated form of cheating and dishonest inducement of property
as per Section 420 of the Indiana Penal Code, 1860.
2.2 The accused forged the marriage certificate with the intention to deceive the complainant
and the public
The accused is guilty of unlawful offences under Section 463, 464 and 466 of the Indiana
Penal Code. The essential elements that constitute the offence of forgery are as follows 23:
(i) the making of a false document or false electronic record or part of it;
(ii) such making should be with intent to: (a) cause damage or injury to the public, or to any
person; or (b) support any claim or title; or (c) cause any person to part with property; or (d)
enter into any express or implied contract; or (e) commit fraud or that fraud may be
committed.
19
20
Ibid
21
VIMLA V DELHI ADMINISTRATION, AIR 1963 SC 1572
22
Id
23
Sushil Suri v CBI AIR 2011 SC 1713
7
The definition of “false document” falls within the purview of the definition of “forgery” and
the two sections must therefore, be read together. If so read, the ingredients of the offence of
forgery relevant to the present enquiry are as follows:
(a) (i) Making or executing a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by

someone else; or (ii) altering or tampering a document; or (iii) obtaining a document by
practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses
(b) Such document must be created with the intention to commit fraud.
In Province of Bihar v Surendra Prasad24, the Court laid emphasis on whether the act of
signing or making the document is done dishonestly or fraudulently and with the intention of
causing it to be believed that the document or any part of it was made, signed or sealed or
executed by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority the maker knows that it
was not made, signed, sealed or executed. Therefore, the section applies to a situation where
some unauthorized person commits forgery with a view to make it appear that the document
had been duly issued by the concerned officer. 25 Further, it is a fraud in law if a party makes
representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive
irrespective of the party’s intention.26
The housing norms of the residing area prohibited apartments being rented by bachelors
therefore, the accused produced an alleged marriage certificate that appeared to be issued by
the Marriage Registrar to comply with the norms of the housing society apartments 27. This act
clearly highlights his intent to deceive the complainant and the public at large. The
complainant was not aware of these norms and the fact that the accused produced the
certificate in compliance was suppressed from the complainant.
It can be inferred that the accused had exclusive control over the belongings and the personal
documents of the complainant, residing in a 1-BHK apartment. Therefore, the accused could
have easily forged the prosecutrix’s signatures.
It is further contended that the marriage was never solemnized as mentioned in the certificate.
The defense witnesses, Aman and Rahul’s affirmation of the same in the fabricated certificate
24
Bihar v Surendra Prasad, AIR 1951 Pat 86
25
Mahesh Chandra Prasad v Emperor AIR 1943 Pat 393
26
Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Savitri Devi and Others (2003) 8 SCC. 319
27
Para 3, Moot Prop
8
casts aspersions to the validity of the statements given by them as they are closely associated
with the accused.28
Section 466 is also attracted since the document was shown to be registered at the office of
the Marriage Registrar. The false electronic record 29 was purported to be a register of
marriage and appears to be on its face capable of effectuating the fraud intended. 30 Therefore,
the accused at the very outset, has made bogus claims about the presence of a valid certificate
and, can be said to have committed the offence of forgery.
2.3 The accused had the intention to cause harm to the complainant
The complainant had no knowledge of the prohibition of bachelors from renting apartments
as per the norms of the housing society. The complainant, an engineering graduate, was well-
versed with computers and can be said to have the requisite knowledge to know how to forge
a certificate.
According to the alleged certificate 31, Aman and Rahul witnessed the so-called solemnization
of marriage between the accused and the complainant as per the customs practiced by the
parties. This information was suppressed from the complainant at the house-warming party
that took place a year from the registration of the alleged certificate. Commission of fraud on
court and suppression of material facts further highlights the dishonest intention of the
accused to cause harm to the complainant.32
It is further submitted before the Court that registration itself cannot be a proof of valid
marriage per se, and is not a determinative factor regarding validity of a marriage. 33
The absence of crucial documents for a valid registration of marriage such as certificate from
pandit/priest as proof of solemnization of marriage at a religious place, marriage invitation,
expenses incurred have not been provided which further adds to the accused’s dishonest
intention. The address of the complainant is incorrect as both the complainant and the
accused were residing in a 1-BHK flat in SS colony, Nangloi, New Delhi.
28
Alleged Marriage Certificate, Page 8 of the Moot Problem
29
30
PSA Pillai, Criminal Law (12th Ed, 2014)
31
Supra at 11
32
Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Savitri Devi and others, 2003(8) SCC 319
33
Smt. Seema v. Ashwani Kumar (2006 (2) SCC. 578
9
Thus, it is pleaded before the court that the offence of forgery and other allied offences under
Section 464, 464 and 466 have been established based on the precedents cited and statement
of the witnesses.
ISSUE 3: WHETHER MR. ABHINAV HAS DEFRAUDED MISS SOUMYA UNDER

SECTION 406 OF IPC WHILE GETTING THE HOUSE REGISTERED IN HIS OWN
NAME
3.1 Entrustment was done in the nature of Live-in Relationship
It is humbly argued before the Hon’ble court that through the case of D. Veluswamy v. D.
Patchaiammal34, it enumerated five ingredients of a live in relationship which are as follows;
(a) Both the parties must behave as husband and wife and are recognized as husband and wife
in front of society. (b) They must be of a valid legal age of marriage. (c) They should qualify
to enter into marriage. Qualification here means none of the partner should have a spouse
living at the time of entering into relationship. (d) They must have voluntarily cohabited for a
significant period of time.
It is contended before the court that Abhinav and Soumya were living as a married couple, as
according to the norms of the housing society apartments could not be rented to bachelors 35,
Soumya was initially reluctant for a live-in due to hesitation of getting physical but on being
assured of marriage by Abhinav. Soumya and Abhinav were involved in a physical relation
the same was allowed by Soumya on the pretext of Abhinav marrying Soumya, initially both
of them had rented a 1-BHK flat in SS colony, later on they moved in a newly bought 3-BHK
apartment in Punjabi Bagh36 where Soumya was responsible for all the family's financial
outlays.
It is submitted before the Hon’ble Bench that the Live-in relationship in the present situation
is in the nature of marriage. In the case of Indra Sarma v. VKV Sarma 37, it was stated
Domestic relationship encompasses within it a relationship in the ‘nature of marriage’ which
can be implied as live-in relationships. The language of section 405 is very wide. The words
used are ‘in any manner entrusted with property’. So, it extends to entrustments of all kinds-
whether to clerks, servants, business partners or other persons, provided they are holding a
position of trust38.
34
D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, 2010 10 SCC 469
35
Moot proposition point III
36
Moot proposition point V
37
Indra Sarma v. VKV Sarma (2013) 15 SCC 755
38
State of UP vs Babu Ram, AIR 1961 SC 751.
10
Finally, it is contended that the above facts coupled with the authorities cited, it can be
established that Abhinav and Soumya’s Live-in Relationship was rooted in the trust that
Soumya had placed on Abhinav regarding his promise to marry her.
3.2 Abhinav's dishonest intention was evident from the very beginning
It is humbly argued before the honorable court that from the very beginning Abhinav just
wanted Soumya to make the payments for EMI but not give her an equal share, by not
making her the co-borrower even on being asked to do the same 39 as the same would provide
her with an right in the property. But on the time of paying EMI(s) came, it was Soumya who
paying the same most of the time as Abhinav had excuses like brother’s education, etc.
Dishonestly as defined in Section 24 40 means doing anything with the intention of causing
wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another. In the following situation there was
a presence of dishonest intention on the part of Abhinav, the same can be reiterated by the
following facts, Soumya was a banker 41, and she had guided Abhinav towards the procedure
for application of a loan, and she also requested Abhinav to make her the co-borrower as the
same involved tax-saving benefits, taking into consideration Abhinav’s finances, but the
same was rejected by Abhinav for the reasoning that he never wanted to overburden her.
It is argued before the court that, on several instances of EMI payments it was Soumya who
paid for them42, even on the occasion of not being a co-borrower, and this emerged as the
reason for daily feud between them as stated in the witnesses of Rahul, Rajini. In the
testimony of Rajini, she had heard Abhinav requesting Soumya to not speak about their
personal issues in front of them while Soumya was constantly jabbering about how he had
cheated her while buying the house. In the testimony of Rahul 43, Soumya lost control when
Abhinav chatted about how hard it was to pay for a house in post-covid times. All these
testimonies can be established as in direct connection to the fact that Soumya was paying the
EMIs and was discontented that she had not been given any entitlement over the property or
credit for it.
Furthermore, in the following case Abhinav being given the loan without any co-borrower
shows his capacity to pay the loan single-handedly as before approving an individual for a
loan, banks examine his credit and income history as well as his ability to repay the amount.
Thus, excuses made by Abhinav that he had financial difficulties while paying the loan was
39
STATEMENT OF WITNESESS AS RECORDED BY POLICE, Soumya (Complainant)
40
Indiana Penal Code, 1860
41
Moot Proposition Point I
42
STATEMENT OF WITNESESS AS RECORDED BY POLICE, Soumya (Complainant)
43
STATEMENT OF WITNESESS AS RECORDED BY POLICE, Rahul
11
mala fide and he just wanted to shift the burden on Soumya as he knew Soumya was
emotionally dependent on him and would help him in his bad days.
3.3 The offence of Criminal breach of trust has been established
In accordance with Section 344 of the Indian Evidence Act, the witness's statements would
indeed be admissible as evidence in the specific case, where police had recorded witness
statements under Section 16145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In accordance with
Sections 2246 and 22A47, which state that if oral evidence is submitted in a case, it must be
appended to the documents, oral testimony has been given as in the current instance in the
form of attached documents.
It is submitted before the Hon’ble Bench According to the High Court's statement 48, it is
advisable to act on the prosecution's oral evidence, it does not matter whether the evidence is
oral or written; what counts is that it be the strongest evidence that could be presented in any
scenario. A relationship between section 50 49 and 6050 of Indian Evidence Act has been
established which says that for proving evidence completely, two things shall be fulfilled
firstly, there shall be a presence of relevant facts and those facts have been presented directly
by the person who has either seen them, heard them or etc., henceforth in the present situation
all these criteria’s have been fulfilled.
The court is notified that Section 405 of IPC51 does not limit property to movables or
immovables. Under R K Dalmia vs Delhi Administration 52, the Supreme Court declared that
'property' is defined by the Law in a far broader sense than ‘moveable property.' Immovable
property can become the subject of criminal breach of trust.
It is submitted before the Hon’ble Bench that In Shivnatrayan vs State of Maharashtra 53 an
essential For Criminal Breach of Trust, is that a person had dominion and control over the
property. In the said case the House was registered in the name of Abhinav, although Soumya
was the one paying for household expenses, she did not have any control over the property by
the virtue of not being a co-owner
44
INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, §3, Act no 34 of Year 1872.
45
The CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973, §161 ACT NO. 2 OF 1974
46
47
INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872, §22A, Act no 34 of Year 1872.
48
Amar Singh vs Chhaju Singh and Anr, AIR 1973 P H 213
49
50
51
52
R K Dalmia v. Delhi Administration, 1962 AIR 1821
53
In Shivnatrayan v. State of Maharashtra
12
It is submitted before the Hon’ble Bench that, in Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v. State of
Andhra Pradesh54 Supreme Court has laid down that the accused must be actuated by
dishonest intention, and the person has done so in violation of any direction of law. In the
following situation Abhinav being the sole borrower should not have made Soumya pay the
EMI which goes against the policies of bank, the excuses taken by him about financial
difficulties if taken into consideration, it would have been in favour of Abhinav to add a co-
borrower which would save taxes and also reduce the financial burden on him but doing so
would Generally lead, the person to share a title 55 in the home or other asset that the loan is
for. Therefore, the said act of Abhinav has been done in violation of law.
Furthermore, Section 405 requires entrustment of property or dominion over property
coupled with dishonest misappropriation or conversion to one's own use of that property in
violation of the direction of law prescribing the manner in which such trust is to be
discharged, in the present situation, Soumya was involved in a Live-in relationship with
Abhinav, she had invested her trust in Abhinav based on the promise he made. Followingly,
after moving to the new house she took care of the household expenses, moreover even on
the occasion of not being a co-borrower and being provided with no title over the property
was made to pay the amount for EMI’s, this said act of Abhinav displays his dishonest
intention, coupled with a violation of law with respect to payment of loans.
Thus, it is pleaded before the court that the offence of Criminal breach of trust has been
established basing the precedents cited and statement of the witness
54
Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2012 SC 324.
55
State Bank of India v. Indexport Registered and Ors, (1992) 3 SCC 159
13
PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed to this hon’ble court to :-
1. The accused, Abhinav Singh should be convicted for the offence of Rape under
section 376 of the Indiana Penal Code 1860 and declare a sentence of rigorous
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years and also be liable for
fine.
2. Abhinav Singh should also be held liable for the offence of forgery under sections 420
, 463 , 464, and 466 of the Indiana Penal Code 1860 and be convicted for the acts
committed by him .
3. Abhinav Singh should also be convicted under the Section 406 for criminal breach of
trust and declare a sentence for imprisonment which may extend to three year or with
fine , or both.
AND/OR
Pass any other order it may deem fit, in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good
Conscience.
All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted
14
LIST OF WITNESS
15

Final Memo For Saumya

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Final Memo For Saumya

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2ND AMITY NATIONAL TRIAL ADVOCACY TOURNAMENT

SAUMYA GARG PROSECUTION

ABHINAV SINGH DEFENCE

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PROSECUTION

1.2 CONSENT FOR SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WAS OBTAINED BY FRAUD.___________________4

THE COMPLAINANT AND THE PUBLIC___________________________________________7

MEMORIAL FOR PROSECUTION

ISSUE 3: WHETHER MR. ABHINAV HAS DEFRAUDED MISS SOUMYA UNDER

MEMORIAL FOR PROSECUTION

MEMORIAL FOR PROSECUTION

MEMORIAL FOR PROSECUTION

MEMORIAL FOR PROSECUTION

MEMORIAL FOR PROSECUTION

MEMORIAL FOR PROSECUTION

ISSUE 1: WHETHER ABHINAV IS LIABLE FOR THE RAPE OF SOUMYA U/S

 Living together in a property as a domestic relationship.

 They must be of legal age to marry.

1.2 Consent for sexual intercourse was obtained by fraud.

1.3 The consent was primarily based on such a promise to marry.

(a) (i) Making or executing a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by

ISSUE 3: WHETHER MR. ABHINAV HAS DEFRAUDED MISS SOUMYA UNDER

3.1 Entrustment was done in the nature of Live-in Relationship

3.3 The offence of Criminal breach of trust has been established

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted

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