Concept of Ownership

Javier v. Veridiano, G.R. No. L-48050, October 10, 1994

Petitioner Felicidad Javier questions before us the order of a regional trial court citing the final
decision of the city court previously dismissing her complaint for forcible entry, and on the basis
thereof, dismissed her petition to quiet title on the ground of res judicata. We summon the
time-honored remedies accion interdictal, accion publiciana and accion reivindicatoria or accion
de reivindicacion to resolve the issues presented in the petition.

It appears that on 25 January 1963, petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot
No. 1641, Ts-308 of the Olongapo Townsite Subdivision, Lower Kalaklan, Olongapo City, with
the District Land Officer, Bureau of Lands, Olongapo City. Sometime in December 1970, alleging
that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of the land by a certain Ben Babol, she instituted
a complaint for forcible entry before the City Court of Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No.
926, stating in pars. 2 and 3 therein that —

. . . plaintiff is the true, lawful and in actual, prior physical possession of a certain
parcel of land situated at Lower Kalaklan, City of Olongapo, said lot being
designated as Lot No. 1641, Ts-308 of the Olongapo Townsite Subdivision since
1961 and up to the present time, until the day and incidents hereinafter
narrated. . . . Sometime on December 12, 1970, the defendant, without express
consent of plaintiff and without lawful authority, through scheme, strategy and
stealth, forcibly entered a portion on the southwestern part of Lot No. 1641, Ts-
308, with the assistance of hired helpers, started construction of riprap along the
Kalaklan River perimeter of said portion of land; said entry was further
augmented by removing plaintiff's chain link, fence with galvanized iron posts
embedded in concrete, likewise destroying plants introduced by plaintiff by
removing existing BL (Bureau of Lands) monuments thereon, and by these
actions, defendant started exercising illegal possession of said portion of land
which contains an area of 200 square meters, more or less. 1

On 7 November 1972 the City Court of Olongapo City, Br. 4,2 dismissed Civil Case No. 926 on the
ground that "it appears to the Court that the Bureau of Lands has considered the area in
question to be outside Lot 1641 of the plaintiff. . . ."3 The Decision of the City Court of Olongapo
City became final and executory on 30 April 1973 when the then Court of First Instance of
Zambales and Olongapo City, Br. 3,4 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the findings and
conclusions of the City Court holding that appellant (herein petitioner) failed to give sufficient
evidence to prove that the area in question was within the boundaries of Lot No. 1641. 5

Subsequently, on 17 December 1973, petitioner was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent No.
5548 and issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-3259 covering Lot No. 1641. Meanwhile, Ben
Babol who was the defendant and appellee in the complaint for forcible entry had sold the
property he was occupying, including the portion of about 200 square meters in question, to a
certain Reino Rosete. Thus petitioner demanded the surrender of the same area in dispute
from Reino Rosete who repeatedly refused to comply with the demand.

On 29 June 1977, or after about four (4) years from the finality of the dismissal of Civil Case No.
926, petitioner instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with
damages against Ben Babol and Reino Rosete before the then Court of First Instance of
Zambales and Olongapo City, docketed as Civil Case No. 2203-0, alleging in pars. 2 and 3 therein
that —

. . . plaintiff is the absolute owner in fee simple of a parcel of land identified as

Lot No. 1641, Ts-308, Olongapo Townsite Subdivision . . . covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-3259, issued by the Register of Deeds for the province of
Zambales. . . . Sometime in December,
1970, and until present, defendants, relying on an application filed on December
23, 1969, with the Bureau of Lands, however have squatted, illegally occupied
and unlawfully possessed the southwestern portion of plaintiff's above-
described property of about 200 square meters, then by defendant BEN BABOL
and now by defendant REINO ROSETE, the former having sold the entirety of his
property to the latter, including the portion in question. . . . 6

Instead of filing a responsive pleading, therein defendant Reino Rosete (private respondent
herein) moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Defendant Ben Babol did
not file any pleading.

In its Order dated 27 January 1978,7 the then Court of First Instance of Zambales, Br.
1,8 sustained the argument of Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss. Thereafter,
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. 9 Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.

Petitioner contends that res judicata cannot apply in the instant case since there is no identity
of parties and causes of action between her complaint for forcible entry, which had long
become final and executory, and her subsequent petition for quieting of title. She argues that
private respondent Reino Rosete, who invokes the defense or res judicata, was never
impleaded in the forcible entry case, which is an action in personam; neither was he a
purchaser pendente lite who, perhaps, could have validly invoked the defense of res judicata.
With regard to the cause of action, she maintains that there is no identity of causes of action
since the first case was for forcible entry, which is merely concerned with the possession of the
property, whereas the subsequent case was for quieting of title, which looks into the ownership
of the disputed land.

Private respondent however submits that there is identity of parties in the two cases since he is
a successor in interest by title of the defendant in the first case after the commencement of the
first action. On the issue of identity of causes of action, he simply states that neither of the two
cases, i.e., the complaint for forcible entry and the subsequent petition for quieting of title,
alleges a cause of action. Thus, private respondent continues, both cases have to be dismissed.

Time and again it has been said that for res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent
action the following requisites must concur: (1) There must be a final judgment or order; (2)
The court rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) The
former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4) There is between the first and second
actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of causes of action. 10 The presence of the first
three requirements and the identity of subject matter in the fourth requirement are not
disputed. Hence, the only issues remaining are whether as between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil
Case No. 2203-0 there is identity of parties and of causes of action which would bar the
institution of Civil Case No. 2203-0.

Petitioner's argument that there is no identity of parties between the two actions is without
merit. We have repeatedly ruled that for res judicata to apply, what is required is not absolute
but only substantial identity of parties. 11 It is fundamental that the application of res
judicata may not be evaded by simply including additional parties in a subsequent litigation. In
fact we have said that there is still identity of parties although in the second action there is one
party who was not joined in the first action, if it appears that such party is not
a necessary party either in the first or second action, 12 or is a mere nominal party. 13 Thus, Sec.
49, par. (b), Rule 39, Rules of Court, provides that ". . . the judgment or order is, with respect to
the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation
thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity."

In the case at bench, it is evident that private respondent Reino Rosete is a successor in interest
of Ben Babol by title subsequent to the commencement and termination of the first action.
Hence, there is actual, if not substantial, identity of the parties between the two actions. But,
there is merit in petitioner's argument that there is no identity of causes of action between Civil
Case
No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0.

Civil Case No. 926 is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is prior possession,
regardless of who has lawful title over the disputed property. 14 Thus, "[t]he only issue in an
action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is,
possession de facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that
irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be turned out by strong hand, violence or terror." 15 And, a judgment
rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the question of possession
and not on the ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affect the ownership of the
land or building. 16
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 while inaccurately captioned as an action for "Quieting
of Title and Recovery of Possession with Damages" is in reality an action to recover a parcel of
land or an accion reivindicatoria under Art. 434 17 of the Civil Code, and should be distinguished
from Civil Case No. 926, which is an accion interdictal. From the averments of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 2203-0, plaintiff therein (petitioner herein) clearly sets up title to herself and
prays that respondent Rosete be ejected from the disputed land and that she be declared the
owner and given possession thereof. Certainly, the allegations partake of the nature of
an accion reivindicatoria. 18

The doctrine in Emilia v. Bado, 19, decided more than twenty-five years ago, is still good law and
has preserved the age-old remedies available under existing laws and jurisprudence to recover
possession of real property, namely accion interdictal, which is the summary action for forcible
entry (detentacion) where the defendant's possession of the property is illegal ab initio, or the
summary action for unlawful detainer (desahuico) where the defendant's possession was
originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of his right to possess, both of which
must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible
entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper municipal
trial court or metropolitan trial court; 20 accion publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery
of the right to possess and which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, accion reivindicatoria or accion de
reivindicacion which seeks the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus
fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court.

Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges

ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. 21 It is different
from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right
to possess without claim of title. 22

In Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the
disputed area without asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case No.
2203-0 where she expressly alleged ownership, specifically praying that she be declared the
rightful owner and given possession of the disputed portion. Hence, in Civil Case No. 926
petitioner merely alleged that she was "the true, lawful (possessor) and in actual, prior physical
possession" of the subject parcel of land, whereas in Civil Case
No. 2203-0 she asserted that she was "the absolute owner in fee simple" of the parcel of land
"covered by Original Transfer Certificate of Title No. P-3259." The complaint in Civil Case No.
2203-0 definitely raises the question of ownership and clearly gives defendants therein notice
of plaintiff's claim of exclusive and absolute ownership, including the right to possess which is
an elemental attribute of such ownership. Thus, this Court has ruled that a judgment in forcible
entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and declares only who has the
right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who
has the right or title of ownership. 23
And, applying the ruling of the Court En Banc in Quimpo v. De la Victoria, 24 even if we treat Civil
Case No. 2203-0 as a petition to quiet title, as its caption suggests, still it has a cause of action
different from that for ejectment. Consequently, there being no identity of causes of action
between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0, the prior complaint for ejectment cannot
bar the subsequent action for recovery, or petition to quiet title.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated 27 January 1978 of the then Court of
First Instance of Zambales, Br. I, with station in Olongapo City, dismissing Civil Case No. 2203-0,
and its subsequent Order denying reconsideration of the dismissal are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

The Clerk of Court is directed to remand the records immediately to the court of a quo and the
latter to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 2203-0 with deliberate dispatch. This decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Bustos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120784-85, January 24, 2001

The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari seeking to set aside the Court of
Appeals1 modifying that of the Regional trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55 2 and the
resolution denying reconsideration.3

Paulino Fajardo died intestate on April 2, 1957.4 He had four (4) children, namely: Manuela,
Trinidad, Beatriz and Marcial, all surnamed Fajardo.

On September 30, 1964, the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition5 of the estate of Paulino
Fajardo. On the same date, Manuela sold her share to Moses6 G. Mendoza, husband of Beatriz
by deed of absolute sale.7 The description of the property reads as follows:

"A parcel of an irrigated riceland located in the barrio of San Isidro, Masantol,
Pampanga. Bounded on the North, by Paulino Fajardo; on the East, by Paulino Fajardo;
on the South, by Paulino Guinto. Containing an area of 5,253 sq. mts., more or less.
Declared under Tax Declaration No. 3029 in the sum of P710.00."

At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral survey in Masantol, Pampanga. Later, the
cadastre was conducted and the property involved in the partition case were specified as Lots
280, 283, 284, 1000-A and 1000-B. The share of Manuela, which was sold to Moses, includes
Lot 284 of the Masantol Cadastre and Lot 284 was subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B.

Trinidad was in physical possession of the land. She refused to surrender the land to her
brother-in-law Moses G. Mendoza, despite several demands.
On September 3, 1971, Moses filed with the Court of First Instance, Pampanga a complaint for
partition claiming the one fourth (1/4) share of Manuela which was sold to him. 8

During the pendency of the case for partition, Trinidad Fajardo died. On December 15, 1984,
the heirs executed an extra-judicial partition of the estate of Trinidad Fajardo. On February 16,
1987, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio, son of Trinidad sold Lot 284-B to spouses Venancio Viray and
Cecilia Nunga-Viray.

On February 8, 1989, the Regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55 rendered a
decision in favor of Moses G. Mendoza, the dispositive portion of which provides:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiffs and against the defendants, and hereby orders.1âwphi1.nêt

"1. The division and partition of the parcel of land identified and described earlier with
the aid and assistance of a qualified surveyor, segregating therefrom an area equivalent
to 1/4 portion to be taken from the vacant right eastern portion which is toward the
national road the same to be determined by one (or the said surveyor) standing on the
subject land facing the municipal road, at the expense of the plaintiffs;

"2. The said 1/4 portion segregated shall be a fixed portion, described by metes and
bounds, and shall be adjudicated and assigned to the plaintiffs;

"3. In case of disagreement as to where the said right eastern portion should be taken, a
commission is hereby constituted, and the OIC-Clerk of Court is hereby appointed
chairman, and the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court of Branches 54 and 55 of this Court are
hereby appointed members, to carry out the orders contained in the foregoing first two
paragraphs;

"4. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees, and to
pay the costs of the proceedings.

"SO ORDERED."9

On September 13, 1991, Moses sold the subject land to spouses Warlito Bustos and Herminia
Reyes-Bustos.

In the meantime, on November 6, 1989, spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray,
buyers of Lucio Ignacio's share of the property, filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Macabebe-Masantol, Pampanga an action for unlawful detainer10 against spouses Bustos, the
buyers of Moses G. Mendoza, who were in actual possession as lessees of the husband of
Trinidad, Francisco Ignacio, of the subject land.
The municipal circuit trial court decided the case in favor of spouses Viray. Subsequently, the
trial court issued writs of execution and demolition, but were stayed when spouses Bustos filed
with the regional Trial Court, Pampanga, Macabebe, Branch 55,11 a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and injunction.

On December 18, 1992, the regional trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is as it is hereby, dismissed. The

preliminary injunction is ordered dissolved and the petitioners and Meridian Assurance
Corporation are hereby ordered jointly and severally, to pay the private respondents the
sum of P20,000.00 by way of litigation expenses and attorney's fees, and to pay the cost
of the proceedings."12

In time, the spouses Bustos appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. 13

On February 27, 1989, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio also appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals.14

Upon motion for consolidation of the petitioners, on August 9, 1993, the Court of Appeals
resolved to consolidate CA-G.R. SP No. 30369 and CA-G.R. CV No. 37606.15

On August 26, 1994, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision in the two cases, the
dispositive portion of which provides:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, consolidated judgment is hereby rendered

for bot CA-G.R. SP No. 37607 and CA-G.R. SP No. 30369 as follows:

"1. The appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 37607 is dismissed; Moses Mendoza is
declared as owner of the 1/4 undivided share previously owned by Manuela Fajardo;
and the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated February 8, 1989 in Civil Case No. 83-
0005-M is affirmed but MODIFIED as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiffs and against the defendants, and hereby orders.

"1. A relocation survey to be conducted (at the expense of the plaintiffs) to

retrace the land subject of the deed of sale dated September 30, 1964 between
Manuela Fajardo and Moses Mendoza;

"2. The division and partition of said relocated land by segregating therefrom an
area equivalent to 1/4 portion to be taken from the vacant right eastern portion
which is toward the national road, the same to be determined by one standing
 on the subject land facing the municipal road, at the expense of the plaintiff-
appellees;

"3. The said 1/4 portion segregated shall be a fixed portion, described by metes
and bounds, and shall be adjudicated and assigned to the plaintiffs-appellees;

"4. In case of disagreement as to where the said right eastern portion should be
taken, a Commission is hereby constituted, with the OIC/present Clerk of Court
as Chairman, and the OIC/present Branch Clerk of Court of Branches 54 and 55
of the Court (RTC) as members, to carry out and implement the Orders
contained in the second and third paragraphs hereof;

"5. The defendants are ordered to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P500.00 as
attorney's fees, and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

"2. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 92-0421-M is AFFIRMED but the reasons for its
dismissal shall be effective only as to the issue of possession. CA-G.R. SP No. 30369 is
DISMISSED.

"3. No. pronouncement as to costs.

"SO ORDERED."16

On September 9, 1994, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration; 17 however, on June 21,
1995, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.18

Hence, this petition.19

The issue raised is whether petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land.

The petition is meritorious.

In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the unlawful
detailer case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as to possession on
the ground that the decision has become final and executory. This means that the petitioners
may be evicted. In the accion reinvindicatoria, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ownership of
petitioners over the subject land. Hence, the court declared petitioners as the lawful owners of
the land.

Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. However, the ministerial
duty of the court to order execution of a final and executory judgment admits of exceptions.
In Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal,20 the Supreme Court reiterated the rule "once a
decision becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to order its
execution, admits of certain exceptions as in cases of special and exceptional nature where it
becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct the suspension of its execution
(Vecine v. Geronimo, 59 O. G. 579); whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of justice
(Pascual v. Tan 85 Phil. 164); or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the
judgment became final which could render the execution of the judgment unjust (Cabrias v.
Adil, 135 SCRA 354)."

In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal
owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by ejecting
petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice. Besides, the
issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the spouses
Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.

Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the necessary and logical
consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners is possession. It follows that
as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to possession of the same. "An
owner who cannot exercise the seven (7) "juses" or attributes of ownership-the right to
possess, to use and enjoy, to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to
recover or vindicate and to the fruits is a crippled owner."22

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals I Ca
G.R. SP No. 30609 for being moot and academic. We AFFIRM the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 37606.1âwphi1.nêt

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Heirs of Roman Soriano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128177, August 15, 2001

May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof, whose
security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB?

The instant petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision 1 dated September 20, 1996 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34930 as well as its Resolution 2 dated January 15, 1997,
denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

We quote the undisputed facts as narrated by the Court of Appeals, to wit —

The property subject of this case is a parcel of land containing an area of 24,550 square
meters, more or less, located in Lingayen, Pangasinan, and particularly described as
follows:
 A parcel of land (Nipa with an area of 8,410 square meters; fishpond with an
area of 14,000 square meters; and residential land with an area of 1,740 square
meters, more or less. Bounded on the N, by river and Filemon Anselmo; on the
South by Alejandro Soriano and Filemon Anselmo; and on the West by Fortunata
Soriano.

Originally owned by Adriano Soriano until his death in 1947, the above-described
property passed on to his heirs who leased the same to spouses David de Vera and
Consuelo Villasista for a period of fifteen (15) years beginning July 1, 1967 with Roman
Soriano, one of the children of Adriano Soriano, acting as caretaker of the property
during the period of the lease. After executing an extra judicial settlement among
themselves, the heirs of Adriano Soriano subsequently subdivided the property into two
(2) lots, Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459. Lot No. 60052 was assigned to Lourdes,
Candido and the heirs of Dionisia while Lot No. 8459 was assigned to Francisca, Librada,
Elocadio and Roman. In 1971, Lot No. 60052 was sold by Lourdes, Candido and the heirs
of Dionisia to petitioner spouses Braulio and Aquilina Abalos (hereinafter referred to as
petitioners), while, Elocadio, Francisca and Librada sold their three-fourths shares in Lot
No. 8459 also to petitioners.

On March 14, 1968, the de Vera spouses ousted Roman Soriano as caretaker and
appointed Isidro Verzosa and Vidal Verzosa as his substitutes. Thereafter, Roman
Soriano filedCAR Case No. 1724-P-68 for reinstatement and reliquidation against the de
Vera spouses. The agrarian court authorized the ejectment of Roman Soriano but on
appeal, the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which decision became final
and executory. However, prior to the execution of the said decision, the parties entered
into a post-decisional agreement wherein the de Vera spouses allowed Roman Soriano
to sub-lease the property until the termination of the lease in 1982. In an Order dated
December 22, 1972, the post-decisional agreement was approved by the agrarian court.

On August 16, 1976, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 38, an application for registration of title over Lot No. 60052 and
three-fourths (3/4)pro-indiviso of Lot No. 8459, docketed asLRC Case No. N-3405. Said
application for registration was granted by the trial court, acting as a land registration
court, per Decision dated June 27, 1983. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the land registration court. The petition for review filed with the Supreme
Court by Roman Soriano docketed asG.R. 70842, was denied for lack of merit and entry
of judgment was entered on December 16, 1985.

Meanwhile, it appears that on July 15, 1983, a day after the promulgation of the land
registration court's decision, Roman Soriano, together with Elocadio and Librada
Soriano, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Branch 37, and against
petitioners, an action for annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership and
damages, docketed asCivil Case No. 159568 (sic; should be 15958). Petitioners filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground ofres judicata, pendency of another action, laches,
misjoinder of parties and lack of jurisdiction, which was denied by the trial court.

Thereafter, on August 22, 1984, or eleven (11) years after the approval of the post-
decisional agreement between Roman Soriano and the spouses de Vera inCAR Case No.
1724-P-68 for reinstatement and reliquidation, petitioners filed with the agrarian court
a motion for execution of said post-decisional agreement which allowed Roman Soriano
to sub-lease the property. The motion prayed that petitioners be placed in possession of
the subject property, jointly with Roman Soriano, and to levy so much of Roman's
property to answer for the use and occupation by Soriano of 6/7 share of the property.
On October 25, 1984, Roman Soriano filed a motion to suspend hearing on the rental
demanded by petitioners, which, however, was denied by the agrarian court. The
agrarian court likewise authorized the substitution of the de Vera spouses by
petitioners. Soriano's motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting Soriano to
file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.

In the meantime, Roman Soriano died on December 11, 1985. Thus, the complaint
inCivil Case No. 159568 (sic) for annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership
and damages, was amended to substitute Soriano's heirs, herein private respondents, as
party-plaintiffs. The complaint was again amended to include Juanito Ulanday as party-
defendant for having allegedly purchased part of the disputed property from
petitioners. On motion of petitioners, the re-amended complaint was dismissed by the
trial court on the ground that the re-amended complaint altered the cause of action.
Upon reconsideration, the dismissal was set aside and petitioners were ordered to file
their Answer, in view of which petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals, docketed asC.A. GR SP No. 22149.

On April 25, 1990, the Court of Appeals denied the petition filed by Roman Soriano
(substituted by private respondents) impugning the denial of their motion to suspend
hearing on the rental demanded by petitioners, and authorizing the substitution of the
de Vera spouses by petitioners, on the ground that no grave abuse of discretion was
committed by the agrarian court. Thus, private respondents filed a petition for review
on certiorari with the Supreme Court, docketed asG.R. 93401.

Meanwhile, on December 7, 1990, the Court of Appeals inC.A. GR SP No. 22149, also
denied the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners, ruling that the land
registration court committed no error when it refused to adhere to the rule ofres
judicata. Petitioners then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review on
certiorari, docketed asG.R. 99843.

On June 26, 1991, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision inG.R. 93401, and
granted the petition filed by private respondents. Thus, the decision of the Court of
Appeals denying the petition of private respondents was set aside, and the motion for
execution filed by petitioners inCAR Case No. 1724-P-48 was denied.
 On June 22, 1993, the Supreme Court, inG.R. 99843, reversed and set aside the denial of
the Court of Appeals inC.A. GR SP No. 22149, and consequently,Civil Case No. 15958 for
annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership and damages, was ordered
dismissed.

On October 18, 1993, private respondents filed with the Department of Agrarian
Adjudication Board (sic), a complaint against petitioners for "Security of Tenure with
prayer for Status Quo Order and Preliminary Injunction" docketed asDARAB Case No.
528-P-93.

Meanwhile, it appears that the decision of the land registration court inLRC Case No. N-
3405 was partially executed with the creation of a Committee on Partition per Order
dated March 25, 1987. On July 27, 1988, the land registration court approved the
partition of Lot No. 8459, with Lot No. 8459-A assigned to private respondent, and Lot
No. 8459-B assigned to petitioners. For Lot No. 60052, O.C.T. No. 22670 was issued in
the name of petitioners; for Lot No. 8459-B, O.C.T. No. 22687 was issued, also in the
name of petitioner; and for Lot No. 8459-A, O.C.T. No. 22686 was issued in the name of
Roman Soriano. Dissatisfied with said partition, private respondents appealed to the
Court of Appeals, docketed asCA G.R. SP No. 119497. The appellate court affirmed the
partition but reversed the order of the land registration court directing the issuance of a
writ of possession on the ground of pendency ofCivil Case No. 15958.

On November 15, 1993, the trial court in compliance with the decision of the Supreme
Court inG.R. No. 99843, dismissedCivil Case No. 15958, in view of which, petitioner, on
November 25, 1993, inLRC Case No. N-3405, moved for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution and/or writ of possession to place them in possession of Lot No. 60052 and
Lot No. 8459-B. Per Resolution dated January 21, 1994, said motion was held in
abeyance by the land registration court until and afterDARAB Case No. 528-P-93 for
security of tenure with prayer forstatus quo, has been resolved.

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied on April 5, 1984, petitioners
interposed an appeal to the Supreme Court, docketed asG.R. 115073. In a Resolution
dated July 27, 1994 issued by the Supreme Court, petitioners' appeal, which was treated
as a petition for certiorari, was referred to this Court [of Appeals] for determination and
disposition.3

The Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Resolution of the land registration court and
ordered instead the issuance of the corresponding writ of possession in favor of private
respondents. With the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners are now before
us raising the following grounds:

1. THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE

CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF TENANT-CARETAKER.
 2. THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE
VIOLATIVE OF THE PROVISION ON RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING

DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD
EARLIER PERFECTED AN APPEAL OF THE RESOLUTION SUBJECT OF THEIR PETITION.4

Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing
pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law
and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among
which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other persons from
possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with
or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an
owner and possession of a holder.5 A person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled
to possession. The possession may be in the hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant. A
person may have improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived without due hearing.
He may have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession. A judgment for ownership,
therefore, does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident.6

There is no dispute that private respondents' (petitioners below) title over the land under
litigation has been confirmed with finality. As explained above, however, such declaration
pertains only to ownership and does not automatically include possession, especially so in the
instant case where there is a third party occupying the said parcel of land, allegedly in the
concept of an agricultural tenant.

While the issue of ownership of the subject land has been laid to rest in the final judgment of
the land registration court, the right of possession thereof is, as yet, controverted. This is
precisely what is put in issue in the security of tenure case filed by petitioners (private
respondents below) before the DARAB.

It is important to note that although private respondents have been declared titled owners of
the subject land, the exercise of their rights of ownership are subject to limitations that may be
imposed by law.7 The Tenancy Act provides one such limitation. Agricultural lessees are entitled
to security of tenure and they have the right to work on their respective landholdings once the
leasehold relationship is established. Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural
lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to
deprivation of their only means of livelihood.8 The exercise of the right of ownership, then,
yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant.

However, petitioners' status as tenant has not yet been declared by the DARAB. In keeping with
judicial order, we refrain from ruling on whether petitioners may be dispossessed of the subject
property. As ratiocinated inNona v. Plan9 —
 It is to the credit of respondent Judge that he has shown awareness of the recent
Presidential Decrees which are impressed with an even more solicitous concern for the
rights of the tenants.If, therefore, as he pointed out in his order granting the writ of
possession, there is a pending case between the parties before the Court of Agrarian
Relations, ordinary prudence, let alone the letter of the law, ought to have cautioned
him against granting the plea of private respondents that they be placed in possession of
the land in controversy,x x x. At the time the challenged orders were issued, without any
showing of how the tenancy controversy in the Court of Agrarian Relations was disposed
of, respondent Judge could not by himself and with due observance of the restraints
that cabin and confine his jurisdiction pass upon the question of tenancy. (Emphasis
ours)

In its challenged Decision, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on the principle of finality of
judgments. It applied the legal doctrine that once a judgment has become final, the issuance of
a writ of execution becomes ministerial. The appellate court held that petitioner's situation
does not fall under any of the exceptions to this rule since his occupation of the subject land did
not transpire after the land registration court's adjudication became final.

In so ruling, however, the Court of Appeals loses sight of the fact that petitioner's claim of
possession as a tenant of the litigated property, if proven, entitles him to protection against
dispossession.

Private respondents argue that petitioners' tenancy claim is barred byres judicata, having been
ruled upon in G.R. Nos. 99843 and 93401. However, not being an issue in the case before us,
this question should properly be resolved in DARAB Case No. 528-P-93. To restate, the only
issue before us is whether or not a winning party in a land registration case can effectively eject
the possessor thereof, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before
the DARAB.

A judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the possessor of the
land, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB. Stated
differently, the prevailing party in a land registration case cannot be placed in possession of the
area while it is being occupied by one claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending a
declaration that the latter's occupancy was unlawful.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of respondent
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34930 dated September 20, 1996, as well as its Resolution
dated January 15, 1997 are SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan in LRC Case No. N-3405 dated January 21, 1994 is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133140, August 10, 1999

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44707 entitled "Jose Ma. T. Garcia, Plaintiff-
Appellee versus Spouses Luisito and Ma. Luisa Magpayo and Sheriff of Makati, Defendants,
Philippine Bank of Communications, Defendant-Appellant".1

The facts are as succinctly summarized by the appellate court, viz.:

Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, in whose name TCT No. S-31269 covering a parcel of land
identified as Lot 17 situated at Bel Air II Village, Makati, was registered, sold with the
consent of his wife Remedios T. Garcia, the same to their daughter Ma. Luisa Magpayo
and her husband Luisito Magpayo (the Magpayos).

On March 5, 1981, the Magpayos mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCom) to secure a loan, Five Hundred Sixty Four Thousand
(P564,000.00) Pesos according to them, One Million Two Hundred Thousand
(P1,200,000.00) Pesos according to PBCom.1âwphi1.nêt

On March 9, 1981, Atty. Garcia's Title was cancelled and in its stead Transfer Certificate
of Title No. S-108412/545 was issued in the name of the Magpayos.

The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was registered at the Makati Register of Deeds and
annotated on the Magpayos title.

The Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon its maturity, hence, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed and at the public auction sale, PBCom which was the highest
bidder bought the land.

The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired without the Magpayos
redeeming the same, hence, title over the land was consolidated in favor of PBCom
which cancelled the Magpayo's title and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 138233 was
issued in its name.

On October 4, 1985, the Magpayos filed at the RTC of Makati a complaint seeking the
nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, public auction sale, and
PBCom's title docketed as Civil Case No. 11891. This complaint was dismissed for failure
to prosecute.

On October 15, 1985, PBCom filed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a petition
for the issuance of a writ of possession over the land, docketed as LRC Case No. M-731,
which Branch 148 thereof granted.

Upon service of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo's brother, Jose Ma. T. Garcia
(Garcia), who was in possession of the land, refused to honor it and filed a motion for
Intervention in the above-said PBCom petition, which motion was denied.
 Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff the instant
suit for recovery of realty and damages wherein he alleged, inter alia, that he inherited
the land as one of the heirs of his mother Remedios T. Garcia, and that PBCom acquired
no right thereover.

In its answer, PBCom averred, inter alia, that Garcia's claim over the land is belied by the
fact that it is not among the properties owned by his mother listed in the Inventory of
Real Estate filed at the then CFI of Pasay City, Branch 27, in SP Proc. No. 2917-P, "In the
Matter of the Intestate Estate of Remedios T. Garcia Petition for Letters of
Administration, Pedro V. Garcia Petitioner-Administrator.

The Magpayos, on the other hand, asserted that title over the land was transferred to
them by Mrs. Magpayo's parents to enable them (Magpayos) to borrow from PBCom.

Garcia filed a Motion for Summary Judgment praying that judgment be rendered in his
favor to which PBCom counter-motioned that judgment should be rendered in its favor.

The court a quo denied the motion for summary judgment on the ground that PBCom
raised in its answer both factual and legal issues which could only be ventilated in a full-
blown trial.

The court a quo, however, later issued a summary judgment.2

In its summary judgment, the lower court held that the mortgage executed by the Magpayo
spouses in favor of PBCom was void. It found that:

. . . [A]t the time that the defendants Magpayo spouses executed the mortgage in favor
of the defendant PBCom on March 5, 1981, the said spouses were not yet the owners of
the property. This finding is evident from the other undisputed fact that a new Torrens
title was issued to the defendants Magpayo spouses only on March 9, 1981 . . . . The
Magpayo spouses could not have acquired the said property merely by the execution of
the Deed of Sale because the property was in the possession of the plaintiff. The vendor,
Pedro V. Garcia, was not in possession and hence could not deliver the property merely
by the execution of the document (MANALILI V. CESAR, 39 PHIL. 134). The conclusion is
therefore inescapable that the said mortgage is null and void for lack of one of the
essential elements of a mortgage as required by Art. 2085 of our Civil Code . . . . 3

Thus, it invalidated the foreclosure sale and nullified TCT No. 138233 issued to PBCom.
Dissatisfied, PBCom appealed. In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals held:

(P)laintiff-appellee's assertion that ownership over the disputed property was not
transmitted to his sister and her husband-Magpayo spouses at the time of the execution
of the Deed of Sale as he was still in actual and adverse possession thereof does not lie.
 For in his complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that he entered into possession of the
disputed property only upon the demise of his mother, from whom he alleges to have
inherited it but who was not the registered owner of the property, that is, on October
31, 1980 (Certificate of Death, p. 17, Records), by which admission he is bound. Since
the execution of the deed of sale by Atty. Pedro V. Garcia in favor of the Magpayos took
place earlier or on August 1, 1980, then contrary to his claim, plaintiff-appellee was not
in possession of the property at the time of the execution of said public instrument.

Furthermore, it appearing that the vendor Atty. Garcia had control of the property
which was registered in his name and that the deed of sale was likewise registered, then
the sale was consummated and the Magpayos were free to exercise the attributes of
ownership including the right to mortgage the land.

When the land is registered in the vendor's name, and the public instrument of sale is
also registered, the sale may be considered consummated and the buyer may exercise
the actions of an owner (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code
of the Philippines, 1992 Ed., p. 55).

That the Magpayos' title, TCT No. S-108412, was issued four (4) days following the
execution of the deed of real estate mortgage is of no moment, for registration under
the Torrens system does not vest ownership but is intended merely to confirm and
register the title which one may already have on the land (Municipality of Victorias v.
Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 32, 44-45 [1987]).

Petitioner Garcia moved for a reconsideration of above decision which was denied. He now
comes before us raising the following errors committed by the Court Appeals:

The respondent Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of
proceedings when it decided the appeal subject of this case based on issues which were raised
neither in the trial court nor in the appellant's brief.

II

The Court of Appeals decided the appeal in a manner not in accord with applicable
jurisprudence when it disregarded the admissions of the private respondents and, despite
ruling that Summary Judgment was proper, made its own findings of facts which were contrary
to the said admissions.

III
The Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was not in accord with established
jurisprudence and even contradicts itself, as far as the issue of the propriety of the Summary
Judgment is concerned.

The petition has no merit.

Anent the first assignment of error, petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals resolved the
issues "ownership" and "possession" though they were not raised by PBCom in its appellant's
brief. The allegation is belied by page 17 of PBCom's appellate brief, viz.:

Due to the wrong cited case, the trial court opined erroneously that "Magpayo Spouses
could not have acquired the property merely by the execution of the deed of sale
because the property was in the possession of the plaintiff" (Order, p. 10).

Again, the trial court could not distinguish ownership from possession. Ownership and
possession are two entirely different legal concepts.

Plaintiff-appellee's possession as found by the trial court, started only "at the time of
the filing of the complaint in this present case up to the present." (page 2, Summary
Judgment).

Assuming that to be true, plaintiff-appellee's possession which started only in 1986

could not ripen into ownership. He has no valid title thereto. His possession in fact was
that of an intruder, one done in bad faith (to defeat PBCom's Writ of Possession). His
possession is certainly not in the concept of an owner. This is so because as early as
1981, title thereto was registered in the name of the Magpayo Spouses which title was
subsequently cancelled when the property was purchased by PBCom in a public auction
sale resulting in the issuance of title in favor of the latter in 1985.

Anent the second-assignment of error, petitioner contends that the following facts were
admitted by the parties in the trial court:

1. The petitioner is a compulsory heir of the late spouses Atty. Pedro V. Garcia and
Remedios Tablan Garcia;

2. The property subject of this dispute was previously the conjugal property of the said
spouses;

3. The petitioner and his family have been and are continuously to the present in actual
physical possession of the property. At the time of the alleged sale to the Magpayo
spouses, petitioner was in possession of the property;

4. When his mother Remedios Tablan (sic) Garcia died, sometime in October, 1980, he
became, by operation of law, a co-owner of the property;
 5. Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, at the time of the execution of the instrument in favor of the
Magpayo spouses was not in possession of the subject property. 4

We reject the contention of petitioner for a perusal of the records shows that these alleged
admitted facts are his own paraphrased portions of the findings of fact listed by the trial court
in the summary judgment.5 Indeed petitioner did not cite any page number of the records or
refer to any documentary Exhibit to prove how and who admitted the said facts.

Petitioner's third assignment of error that he alone as plaintiff in the trial court is entitled to a
summary judgment merits scant attention. A summary judgment is one granted by the court,
upon motion by either party, for an expeditious settlement of the case, there appearing from
the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important questions or issues of
fact are involved (except the determination of the amount of damages) and that therefore the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 6 Under Rule 34, either party may
move for a summary judgment — the claimant by virtue of Section 1 and the defending party
by virtue of Section 2, viz.:

Sec. 1. Summary judgment for claimant. — A party seeking to recover upon a claim,
counter-claim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the
pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits for a
summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.

Sec. 2. Summary judgment for defending party. — A party against whom a claim,
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any
time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or
any part thereof.

It is true that petitioner made the initial move for summary judgment. Nonetheless, PBCom
likewise moved for a summary judgment with supporting affidavit and documentary exhibits, to
wit:

COUNTER-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

PBCom Is Entitled To A Summary Judgment

The procedure for summary judgment may be availed of also by the defending parties
who may be the object of unfounded claims as clearly shown in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule
34.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to render summary

judgment in PBCom's favor by DISMISSING plaintiff's Complaint as well as Sps.
Magpayo's Cross-Claim for being sham and frivolous.7
Needless to state, there was no error on the part of the appellate court in resorting to summary
judgment as prayed for by both parties.

We stress again that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists
when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not
prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. 8 Ownership confers certain rights to
the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. 9 Atty. Pedro Garcia
and his wife Remedios exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the
subject property to the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand, possession is defined as the
holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. 10 Literally, to possess means to actually and
physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways:
possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder.11 "A possessor in the concept
of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so." 12 On the other hand, "one
who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to
be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong."13 The records show that petitioner
occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his
parents. We held in Caniza v. Court of Appeals 14 that an owner's act of allowing another to
occupy his house, rent-free does not create a permanent and indefeasible right of possession in
the latter's favor. Consequently, it is of no moment that petitioner was in possession of the
property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid
transfer of ownership. On the other hand, petitioner's subsequent claim of ownership as
successor to his mother's share in the conjugal asset is belied by the fact that the property was
not included in the inventory of the estate submitted by his father to the intestate court. This
buttresses the ruling that indeed the property was no longer considered owned by petitioner's
parents. We also uphold the Court of Appeals in holding that the mortgage to PBCom by the
Magpayo spouses is valid notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title over the property
was issued to them after the mortgage contract was entered into. Registration does not confer
ownership, it is merely evidence of such ownership over a particular property. 15 The deed of
sale operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes the buyer to
use the document as proof of ownership.16 All said, the Magpayo spouses were already the
owners when they mortgaged the property to PBCom. 17

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 44707 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129609 and 135537, Nov. 29, 2001
These twin petitions filed under Rule 45 seek to set aside the Decisions of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. Nos. 39919, 36381 and 37243.

Petitioner Rodil Enterprises Inc. (RODIL) is the lessee of the Ides O’Racca Building (O’RACCA)
since 1959. 1 It was a "former alien property" over which the Republic of the Philippines
acquired ownership by virtue of RA 477, as amended. 2

Sometime in 1980 RODIL entered into a sublease contract with respondents Carmen Bondoc,
Teresita Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon, 3 members of the Ides O’Racca
Building Tenants Association Inc. (ASSOCIATION).chanrob1es virtual law library

On 4 September 1972 the lease contract between RODIL and the REPUBLIC was renewed for
another fifteen (15) years. 4 At that time the O’RACCA was under the administration of the
Building Services and Real Property Management Office (BSRPMO) then headed by Director
Jesus R. Factora. 5

On 12 September 1982 BP 233 6 was enacted. It authorized the sale of "former alien
properties" classified as commercial and industrial, and the O’RACCA building was classified as
commercial property. 7

On 8 January 1987 RODIL offered to purchase the subject property conformably with BP 233
and the REPUBLIC responded that its offer to purchase would be acted upon once the
Committee on Appraisal shall have determined the market value of the property. 8

On 22 July 1997 the ASSOCIATION also offered to lease the same building through the
Department of General Services and Real Estate Property Management (DGSREPM). 9

Pending action on the offer of RODIL to purchase the property, Director Factora of the BSRPMO
granted RODIL’s request for another renewal of the lease contract on 23 September 1987 for
another five (5) years from 1 September 1987. 10 The renewal contract was forwarded to then
Secretary Jose de Jesus of DGSREPM for approval.

On 25 September 1987 Undersecretary of DGSREPM Rufino B. Banas recommended to

Secretary De Jesus the suspension of the approval of the renewal contract because the offer of
the ASSOCIATION was more beneficial to the REPUBLIC.

Resultantly, on 30 September 1987 Secretary De Jesus issued another memorandum to Director

Factora disapproving the renewal contract in favor of RODIL, at the same time recalling all
papers signed by him regarding the subject. Secretary De Jesus likewise directed RODIL to pay
its realty tax delinquency and ordered the issuance of a temporary occupancy permit to the
ASSOCIATION. 11

On 6 October 1987 RODIL filed an action for specific performance, damages and injunction with
prayer for temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against the
REPUBLIC, De Jesus, Banas, Factora and the ASSOCIATION. 12 RODIL prayed that a restraining
order be issued enjoining the ASSOCIATION or any person acting under it from collecting rentals
from the occupants or sub-lessees of O’RACCA. On 26 October 1987 the trial court granted the
writ of preliminary injunction. 13 On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction and ordered the deposit of the monthly rentals with the lower
court pendente lite.

On 20 November 1987 the REPUBLIC, De Jesus, Banas and Factora filed their Answer with
Counterclaim for damages. On 21 December 1987 the ASSOCIATION also filed its Answer with
Counterclaim for damages.

De Jesus, Banas and Factora were later substituted by Secretary Fulgencio Factoran of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in the action for specific
performance. On 31 May 1988 Factoran issued Order No. 1 designating the Land Management
Bureau represented by Director Abelardo Palad, Jr. as custodian of all "former alien properties"
owned by the REPUBLIC.

On 18 May 1992 RODIL signed a renewal contract with Director Palad which was approved by
Secretary Factoran. 14 The renewal contract would extend the lease for ten (10) years from 1
September 1987. A supplement to the renewal contract was subsequently entered into on 25
May 1992 where rentals on the previous lease contract were increased. 15

On 14 August 1972 the action for specific performance was dismissed by the trial court upon
joint motion to dismiss by RODIL and the Solicitor General. The order of dismissal however was
appealed by the ASSOCIATION to the Court of Appeals. 16

On 25 September 1992 the spouses Saturnino Alvarez and Epifania Alvarez, sublessees of
RODIL, filed with the Office of the President a letter-appeal assailing the authority of Factoran
to enter into the renewal contract of 18 May 1992 with RODIL, and claiming the right to
purchase the subject property. 17

While the appeal of the ASSOCIATION from the order of dismissal and the letter-appeal of the
spouses Alvarez were pending, the ASSOCIATION instituted Civil Case No. 92-63833 with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila 18 praying for the setting aside of the renewal contract of 18
May 1992 as well as the supplementary contract of 25 May 1992, and further praying for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. On 3 May 1993 the trial court denied the prayer for
preliminary injunction.

On 30 July 1993 RODIL filed an action for unlawful detainer against Divisoria Footwear, 19 and
on 4 August 1993, a similar action against Chua Huay Soon. 20

On 10 September 1993 the trial court dismissed the action for declaration of nullity of the lease
contract filed by the ASSOCIATION on the ground of litis pendentia. 21 The Order stated that
the action for declaration of nullity and the action for specific performance filed by RODIL were
practically between the same parties and for the same causes of action. 22 This Order was
appealed by the ASSOCIATION to the Court of Appeals. 23

On 19 January 1994 RODIL filed an action for unlawful detainer against respondent Teresita
Bondoc-Esto, 24 and on 1 February 1994 filed another action against respondent Carmen
Bondoc, 25 both with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On 8 February 1994 the Office of the President through Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona
Jr. denied the letter-appeal of the spouses Alvarez, but nullified the renewal contract of 18 May
1992 and the supplementary contract of 25 May 1992. 26

Meanwhile, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila upheld RODIL’s right to eject respondents
Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay Soon, 27 as promulgated in separate
decisions the dispositive portions of which read —

IN CIVIL CASE NO. 143301 —

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiff [RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC.] and against the defendant [CARMEN BONDOC], to wit: 1.
Ordering the defendant and all those claiming title under her to vacate the subleased portion of
the O’Racca Building, corner Folgueras and M. de los Santos Streets, Binondo, Manila; 2.
Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the back rentals from October 1987 to August 1992 at
the rate of P2,665.00 per month and from September 1992 at the rate of P2,665.00 per month
plus a yearly increase of 20% per month up to the time that she vacates the premises; 3.
Ordering the defendant to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees and to pay the cost
of suit.

IN CIVIL CASE NO. 143216 —

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff [RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC.]
as against the defendant [TERESITA BONDOC ESTO] ordering the defendant and all persons
claiming rights under her to vacate the premises at O’Racca Building located at corner Folgueras
and M. de los Santos Streets, Binondo, Manila, and turn over the possession thereof to plaintiff;
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P29,700.00 as rental in arrears for the
period from September 1992 plus legal rate of interest less whatever amount deposited with
the Court; ordering defendant to pay the sum of P3,000.00 as reasonable compensation for the
use and occupancy of the premises from January 1994 until defendant shall have finally vacated
the premises minus whatever amount deposited with the Court as rental; ordering defendant
to pay reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of P2,000.00 and the costs of suit.

IN CIVIL CASE NO. 142258 —

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff [RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC.],

ordering defendant [DIVISORIA FOOTWEAR], its representatives, agents, employees and/or
assigns to vacate the leased premises or portion of the Ides O’Racca Building presently occupied
by said defendant and to pay plaintiff the following: a) Rentals in arrears from October 1987 to
June 1993 in the amount of P521,000.00; b) Rentals in the amount of P9,000.00 a month from
July, 1993 until defendant will have vacated the premises; c) Attorney’s fees in the amount of
P15,000.00; d) Costs of suit.

IN CIVIL CASE NO. 142282-CV —

IN VIEW THEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered ordering: 1. defendant CHUA HUAY SOON and
all persons claiming rights through him, to vacate the premises occupied by him at O’RACCA
Building, located at the corner of Folgueras and M. delos Santos Street, Binondo, Manila, and
turn over possession thereof to plaintiff RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC.; 2. defendant to pay rentals
in arrears from October 1987 up to June 1993 at the rate of P6,175.00 a month, representing
the rentals in arrears; 3. defendant to pay P6,175.00 per month from July 1993 until he vacates
the premises, as reasonable compensation for the use of the premises; 4. defendant to pay the
sum of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees; 5. defendant to pay interests on the amounts mentioned
in Nos. 2 and 3 above at ten (10%) percent per annum from the date of the filing of the
complaint until said amounts are fully paid; and, 6. defendant to pay the costs.

The Regional Trial Court affirmed the Metropolitan Trial Court 28 in all the four (4) decisions
above quoted. Thus, respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto and Divisoria Footwear subsequently
filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals, 29 followed by respondent Chua Huay
Soon. 30

While the consolidated appeals from the unlawful detainer cases were pending, the Second
Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision on 12 April 1996 with regard to CA-
G.R. No. 39919 declaring the renewal contract between RODIL and the REPUBLIC null and void.
31 RODIL moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. 32 Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. 33

On 29 November 1996 the Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals promulgated its
Decision in CA-G.R. No. 36381 and CA-G.R. No. 37243 setting aside the decisions of the Regional
Trial Court, which sustained the Metropolitan Trial Court, and dismissing the action for unlawful
detainer filed by RODIL against its lessees. 34 RODIL moved for reconsideration but the motion
was denied. 35 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. 36

On respondents’ motion, G.R. Nos. 129609 and 135537 were consolidated.

RODIL now contends that the Court of Appeals erred in annulling its renewal contract with the
REPUBLIC and in dismissing its actions for unlawful detainer against respondents Bondoc,
Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua. RODIL claims that the assailed contracts are neither
void nor voidable as the facts show they do not fall within the enumerations under Arts. 1305
and 1409, and an implied new lease still exists by virtue of Art. 1670. As a result, the right to
eject respondents properly belongs to it. 37

With regard to CA-G.R. No. 39919, RODIL argues that the REPUBLIC, the only defendant who is
a real party in interest, signified its assent to having the action dismissed. Assuming arguendo
that the ASSOCIATION was a real party in interest, its counterclaim was nonetheless
unmeritorious. 38

On the other hand, respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua contend
that the lease contract which the lease contract of 18 May 1992 was to renew, never came into
existence. Therefore, since there was no contract to "renew," the renewal contract had no leg
to stand on, hence, is also void. 39 Respondents then conclude that since there was no lease
contract to speak of, RODIL had no right to relief in its action for unlawful detainer. The
ASSOCIATION, for its part, argues that the counterclaim it filed against RODIL cannot be
dismissed because the trial court has not passed upon it. 40

We rule for RODIL. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law. 41 Every owner has the freedom of disposition over
his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has no exception. The REPUBLIC being
the owner of the disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease contract with
RODIL in the exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right to eject
usurpers of the leased property where the factual elements required for relief in an action for
unlawful detainer are present.

Private respondents claim that the agreements of 23 September 1987, 18 May 1992 and 25
May 1992 did not give rise to valid contracts. 42 This is true only of the Contract of Lease
entered into on 23 September 1987 which the REPUBLIC did not approve. RODIL neither alleged
nor proved that such approval was made known to it. The so-called approval of the lease
contract was merely stated in an internal memorandum of Secretary De Jesus addressed to
Director Factora. 43 This is evident from the fact that Secretary De Jesus, in his letter, asked
Factora to duly execute a lease contract and forward it to his office for approval. 44 The
consequences of this fact are clear. The Civil Code provides that no contract shall arise unless
acceptance of the contract is communicated to the offeror. 45 Until that moment, there is no
real meeting of the minds, no concurrence of offer and acceptance, hence, no contract. 46

However, the same is not true of the contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992. As argued by
RODIL, these contracts are not proscribed by law; neither is there a law prohibiting the
execution of a contract with provisions that are retroactive. Where there is nothing in a
contract that is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order, the validity
of the contract must be sustained. 47

The Court of Appeals invalidated the contracts because they were supposedly executed in
violation of a temporary restraining order issued by the Regional Trial Court. 48 The appellate
court however failed to note that the order restrains the REPUBLIC from awarding the lease
contract only as regards respondent ASSOCIATION but not petitioner RODIL. While a temporary
restraining order was indeed issued against RODIL, it was issued only on 25 May 1992 or after
the assailed contracts were entered into. As correctly stated by petitioner, one cannot enjoin an
act already fait accompli. 49

Private respondents argue that the "renewal contract" cannot "renew" a void contract.
However, they could cite no legal basis for this assertion. It would seem that respondents
consider the renewal contract to be a novation of the earlier lease contract of 23 September
1987. However, novation is never presumed. 50 Also, the title of a contract does not determine
its nature. On the contrary, it is the specific provisions of the contract which dictate its nature.
51 Furthermore, where a contract is susceptible of two (2) interpretations, one that would
make it valid and another that would make it invalid, the latter interpretation is to be adopted.
52 The assailed agreement of 18 May 1992, "Renewal of Contract of Lease," merely states that
the term of the contract would be for ten (10) years starting 1 September 1987. This is hardly
conclusive of the existence of an intention by the parties to notate the contract of 23
September 1987. Nor can it be argued that there is an implied novation for the requisite
incompatibility between the original contract and the subsequent one is not present. 53 Based
on this factual milieu, the presumption of validity of contract cannot be said to have been
overturned.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Respondent ASSOCIATION claims that the Decision of the Office of the President declaring null
and void the lease contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 should be counted in its favor.

We do not agree. The contention does not hold water. It is well-settled that a court’s judgment
in a case shall not adversely affect persons who were not parties thereto.

Respondent ASSOCIATION finally argues that the 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 contracts can
be considered rescissible because they concern property under litigation and were entered into
without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority. 54 Civil
Case No. 87-42323 involved an action for specific performance and damages filed by RODIL
against the REPUBLIC and the ASSOCIATION. The right to file the action for rescission arises in
favor of the plaintiff when the defendant enters into a contract over the thing under litigation
without the knowledge and approval of the plaintiff or the court. The right of action therefore
arose in favor of petitioner RODIL and not respondent ASSOCIATION.

Having preliminarily dealt with the validity of the lease contracts, we now proceed to resolve
the issue raised by respondent ASSOCIATION with regard to its counterclaim.

The ASSOCIATION argues that its counterclaim should not have been dismissed. On this point,
we agree. The requisites for the application of Rule 17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure are clearly
present. 55 The counterclaim is necessarily connected with the transaction that is the subject
matter of the claim. In malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated
deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charge was false and groundless. 56 A
determination of whether the charge is groundless would necessarily involve an analysis of
whether the action instituted by RODIL is meritorious. The counterclaim did not require the
presence of third parties over which the court could not acquire jurisdiction, and that the court
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the counterclaim since the amount of damages
claimed by the ASSOCIATION in its counterclaim amounted to P3,500,000.00, clearly within the
jurisdictional amount for the Regional Trial Court under BP 129.
However, in the interest of making a final adjudication on an issue which has been pending for
fourteen (14) years, we will rule on the issues raised by the ASSOCIATION in its counterclaim,
and accordingly deny the same, dispensing with any discussion regarding the merits of RODIL’s
cause of action which is clearly neither "false" nor "groundless." Therefore, the elements of
malicious prosecution are absent.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

As regards the action for unlawful detainer, respondents Bondoc, Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria
Footwear and Chua argue that this should not prosper because RODIL is not in actual
possession of the property and because they are not its sublessees. 57 Their arguments do not
convince.

In an action for unlawful detainer the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession.
Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into any lease contract with the
REPUBLIC and that their continued occupation of the subject property was merely by virtue of
acquiescence. 58 The records clearly show this to be the case. The REPUBLIC merely issued a
"temporary occupancy permit" which was not even in the name of the respondents Bondoc,
Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear or Chua but of respondent ASSOCIATION. Since the occupation
of respondents was merely tolerated by the REPUBLIC, the right of possession of the latter
remained uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same to anyone it chose. Unfortunately
for respondents, the REPUBLIC chose to alienate the subject premises to RODIL by virtue of a
contract of lease entered into on 18 May 1992. Resultantly, petitioner had the right to file the
action for unlawful detainer against respondents as one from whom possession of property has
been unlawfully withheld.

Respondents finally argue that petitioner failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of
Rule 45 so that its petition must be dismissed. They allege that petitioner failed to state in its
petition that a motion for reconsideration was filed, the date of filing, when the motion was
denied, and the date when the resolution denying the motion was received.

A cursory review of RODIL’s petition belies respondents’ assertion. All dates required under
Rule 45, Sec. 4, are properly indicated except when the motion for reconsideration was filed.
Procedural rules are required to be followed as a general rule, but they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his noncompliance with
the procedure required. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon and
the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are
adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very aims.
The rules have been drafted with the primary objective of enhancing fair trials and expediting
the proper dispensation of justice. As a corollary, if their application and operation tend to
subvert and defeat, instead of promote and enhance its objective, suspension of the rules is
justified. 59 Petitioner did not repeat its error in its later petition filed under G.R. No. 135537.
The oversight must be fashioned with leniency.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The assailed Decisions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 36381, 37243 and 39919 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 39, in Civil Cases Nos. 94-70776, 94-71122 and 94-
71123 as well as the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 23, in Civil Case No. 94-72209
affirming in toto the Decisions of the MeTC — Br. 28 in Civil Case No. 143301, MeTC — Br. 15 in
Civil Case No. 143216, MeTC — Br. 7 in Civil Case No. 142258, and MeTC — Br. 24 in Civil Case
No. 142282-CV, as herein quoted, and the Orders dated 14 August 1992 and 6 November 1992
of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 8 in Civil Case No. 87-42323, recognizing the validity and legality
of the Renewal of the Lease Contract dated 18 May 1992 and the Supplemental Contract dated
25 May 1992, are REINSTATED, AFFIRMED and ADOPTED. Costs against private respondents in
both cases.

SO ORDERED.

Isaguirre v. De Lara, G.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000.

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre assails the October 5, 1998 decision1 of the Court of
Appeals2 and its Resolution promulgated on March 5, 1999.

The antecedent facts of the present case are as follows:

Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales Application over
a parcel of land identified as portion of Lot 502, Guianga Cadastre, filed with the Bureau of
Lands on January 17, 1942 and with an area of 2,324 square meters. Upon his death, Alejandro
de Lara was succeeded by his wife — respondent Felicitas de Lara, as claimant. On November
19, 1954, the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources amended the sales
application to cover only 1,600 square meters. Then, on November 3, 1961, by virtue of a
decision rendered by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated November 19,
1954, a subdivision survey was made and the area was further reduced to 1,000 square meters.
On this lot stands a two-story residential-commercial apartment declared for taxation purposes
under TD 43927 in the name of respondent's sons — Apolonio and Rodolfo, both surnamed de
Lara.

Sometime in 1953, respondent obtained several loans from the Philippine National Bank. When
she encountered financial difficulties, respondent approached petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre,
who was married to her niece, for assistance. On February 10, 1960, a document denominated
as "Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests" was executed by respondent and
petitioner, whereby the former sold a 250 square meter portion of Lot No. 502, together with
the two-story commercial and residential structure standing thereon, in favor of petitioner, for
and in consideration of the sum of P5,000.
Sometime in May, 1968, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner for
recovery of ownership and possession of the two-story building.3 However, the case was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

On August 21, 1969, petitioner filed a sales application over the subject property on the basis of
the deed of sale. His application was approved on January 17, 1984, resulting in the issuance of
Original Certificate of Title No. P-11566 on February 13, 1984, in the name of petitioner.
Meanwhile, the sales application of respondent over the entire 1,000 square meters of subject
property (including the 250 square meter portion claimed by petitioner) was also given due
course, resulting in the issuance of Original Certificate of Title No. P-13038 on June 19, 1989, in
the name of respondent.4

Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title and damages with
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City against respondent on May 17, 1990. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 20124-90. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment
on October 19, 1992, in favor of petitioner, declaring him to be the lawful owner of the
disputed property. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding
that the transaction entered into by the parties, as evidenced by their contract, was an
equitable mortgage, not a sale.5 The appellate court's decision was based on the inadequacy of
the consideration agreed upon by the parties, on its finding that the payment of a large portion
of the "purchase price" was made after the execution of the deed of sale in several installments
of minimal amounts; and finally, on the fact that petitioner did not take steps to confirm his
rights or to obtain title over the property for several years after the execution of the deed of
sale. As a consequence of its decision, the appellate court also declared Original Certificate of
Title No. P-11566 issued in favor of petitioner to be null and void. On July 8, 1996, in a case
docketed as G.R. No. 120832, this Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and on
September 11, 1996, we denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

On May 5, 1997, respondent filed a motion for execution with the trial court, praying for the
immediate delivery of possession of the subject property, which motion was granted on August
18, 1997. On February 3, 1998, respondent moved for a writ of possession, invoking our ruling
in G.R. No. 120832. Petitioner opposed the motion, asserting that he had the right of retention
over the property until payment of the loan and the value of the improvements he had
introduced on the property. On March 12, 1998, the trial court granted respondent's motion for
writ of possession. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on May
21, 1998. Consequently, a writ of possession dated June 16, 1998, together with the Sheriff's
Notice to Vacate dated July 7, 1998, were served upon petitioner.

Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction to annul and set aside the
March 12, 1998 and May 21, 1998 orders of the trial court, including the writ of possession
dated June 16, 1998 and the sheriff's notice to vacate dated July 7, 1998. 6
The appellate court summarized the issues involved in the case as follows: (1) whether or not
the mortgagee in an equitable mortgage has the right to retain possession of the property
pending actual payment to him of the amount of indebtedness by the mortgagor; and (b)
whether or not petitioner can be considered a builder in good faith with respect to the
improvements he made on the property before the transaction was declared to be an equitable
mortgage.

The Court of Appeals held that petitioner was not entitled to retain possession of the subject
property. It said that —

. . . the mortgagee merely has to annotate his claim at the back of the certificate
of title in order to protect his rights against third persons and thereby secure the
debt. There is therefore no necessity for him to actually possess the property.
Neither should a mortgagee in an equitable mortgage fear that the contract
relied upon is not registered and hence, may not operate as a mortgage to justify
its foreclosure. In Feliza Zubiri v. Lucio Quijano, 74 Phil 47, it was ruled "that
when a contract . . . is held as an equitable mortgage, the same shall be given
effect as if it had complied with the formal requisites of mortgage. . . . by its very
nature the lien thereby created ought not to be defeated by requiring
compliance with the formalities necessary to the validity of a voluntary real
estate mortgage, as long as the land remains in the hands of the petitioner
(mortgagor) and the rights of innocent parties are not affected.

Proceeding from the foregoing, petitioner's imagined fears that his lien would be
lost by surrendering possession are unfounded.

In the same vein, there is nothing to stop the mortgagor de Lara from acquiring
possession of the property pending actual payment of the indebtedness to
petitioner. This does not in anyway endanger the petitioner's right to security
since, as pointed out by private respondents, the petitioner can always have the
equitable mortgage annotated in the Certificate of Title of private respondent
and pursue the legal remedies for the collection of the alleged debt secured by
the mortgage. In this case, the remedy would be to foreclose the mortgage upon
failure to pay the debt within the required period.

It is unfortunate however, that the Court of Appeals, in declaring the transaction

to be an equitable mortgage failed to specify in its Decision the period of time
within which the private respondent could settle her account, since such period
serves as the reckoning point by which foreclosure could ensue. As it is,
petitioner is now in a dilemma as to how he could enforce his rights as a
mortgagee. . . .
 Hence, this Court, once and for all resolves the matter by requiring the trial court
to determine the amount of total indebtedness and the period within which
payment shall be made.

Petitioner's claims that he was a builder in good faith and entitled to reimbursement for the
improvements he introduced upon the property were rejected by the Court of Appeals. It held
that petitioner knew, or at least had an inkling, that there was a defect or flaw in his mode of
acquisition. Nevertheless, the appellate court declared petitioner to have the following rights:

. . . He is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses which he may

have incurred over the property, in accordance with Art. 526 and Art. 452 of the
Civil Code. Moreover, considering that the transaction was merely an equitable
mortgage, then he is entitled to payment of the amount of indebtedness plus
interest, and in the event of non-payment to foreclose the mortgage.
Meanwhile, pending receipt of the total amount of debt, private respondent is
entitled to possession over the disputed property.

The case was finally disposed of by the appellate court in the following manner:

WHERFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED, and this case is ordered

remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for further proceedings, as
follows:

1) The trial court shall determine —

a) The period within which the mortgagor must pay his total amount of
indebtedness.

b) The total amount of indebtedness owing the petitioner-mortgagee plus

interest computed from the time when the judgment declaring the contract to
be an equitable mortgage became final.

c) The necessary expenses incurred by petitioner over the property.7

On March 5, 1999, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the appellate
court.8 Hence, the present appeal wherein petitioner makes the following assignment of errors:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

RULING THAT THE RTC ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
ITS JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING A WRIT OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT.
 A.1 The RTC patently exceeded the scope of its
authority and acted with grave abuse of discretion
in ordering the immediate delivery of possession of
the Property to respondent as said order exceeded
the parameters of the final and executory decision
and constituted a variance thereof.

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE
POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY PRIOR TO THE PAYMENT
OF RESPONDENT'S MORTGAGE LOAN.

C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING

THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH.

D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING

THAT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO INTEREST COMPUTED
ONLY FROM THE TIME WHEN THE JUDGMENT DECLARING
THE CONTRACT TO BE AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE BECAME
FINAL.9

Basically, petitioner claims that he is entitled to retain possession of the subject property until
payment of the loan and the value of the necessary and useful improvements he made upon
such property. 10 According to petitioner, neither the Court of Appeals' decision in G.R. CV No.
42065 nor this Court's decision in G.R. No. 120832 ordered immediate delivery of possession of
the subject property to respondent.

The dispositive portion of the March 31, 1995 decision of the Court of Appeals in G.R. CV No.
42065, which was affirmed by this Court, provides that —

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered: (1) dismissing the complaint;
(2) declaring the "Document of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests"
(Exhibit B) dated February 10, 1960, to be an equitable mortgage not a sale; (3)
upholding the validity of OCT No. P-13038 in the name of Felicitas de Lara; and
(3) declaring null and void OCT No. P-11566 in the name of plaintiff Cornelio
Isaguirre. All other counterclaims for damages are likewise dismissed. Costs
against the appellee. 11

Petitioner argues that the abovementioned decision merely settled the following matters: (1)
that the transaction between petitioner and respondent was not a sale but an equitable
mortgage; (2) that OCT No. P-13038 in the name of respondent is valid; and (3) that OCT No. P-
11566 in the name of petitioner is null and void. Since the aforementioned decision did not
direct the immediate ouster of petitioner from the subject property and the delivery thereof to
respondent, the issuance of the writ of possession by the trial court on June 16, 1998
constituted an unwarranted modification or addition to the final and executory decision of this
Court in G.R. No. 120832. 12

We do not agree with petitioner's contentions. On the contrary, the March 31, 1995 decision of
the appellate court, which was affirmed by this Court on July 8, 1996, served as more than
adequate basis for the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of respondent since these
decisions affirmed respondent's title over the subject property. As the sole owner, respondent
has the right to enjoy her property, without any other limitations than those established by
law. 1 Corollary to such right, respondent also has the right to exclude from the possession of
her property any other person to whom she has not transmitted such property. 14

It is true that, in some instances, the actual possessor has some valid rights over the property
enforceable even against the owner thereof, such as in the case of a tenant or
lessee. 15 Petitioner anchors his own claim to possession upon his declared status as a
mortgagee. In his Memorandum, he argues that —

4.8 It was respondent who asserted that her transfer of the Property to
petitioner was by way of an equitable mortgage and not by sale. After her
assertion was sustained by the Courts, respondent cannot now ignore or
disregard the legal effects of such judicial declaration regarding the nature of the
transaction.

xxx xxx xxx

4.13 Having delivered possession of the Property to petitioner as part of the

constitution of the equitable mortgage thereon, respondent is not entitled to the
return of the Property unless and until the mortgage loan is discharged by full
payment thereof. Petitioner's right as mortgagee to retain possession of the
Property so long as the mortgage loan remains unpaid is further supported by
the rule that a mortgage may not be extinguished even though then mortgagor-
debtor may have made partial payments on the mortgage loan:

Art. 2089. A pledge or mortgage is indivisible, even though the

debt may be divided among the successors in interest of the
debtor or the creditor.

Therefore, the debtor's heir who has paid a part of the debt
cannot ask for the proportionate extinguishment of the pledge or
mortgage as long as the debt is not completely satisfied.

Neither can the creditor's heir who has received his share of the
debt return the pledge or cancel the mortgage, to the prejudice of
the other heirs who have not been paid. (Emphasis supplied.)
 xxx xxx xxx

4.14 To require petitioner to deliver possession of the Property to respondent

prior to the full payment of the latter's mortgage loan would be equivalent to
the cancellation of the mortgage. Such effective cancellation would render
petitioner's rights ineffectual and nugatory and would constitute unwarranted
judicial interference.

xxx xxx xxx

4.16 The fact of the present case show that respondent delivered possession of
the Property to petitioner upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and
Special Cession of Rights and Interest dated 10 February 1960. Hence, transfer of
possession of the Property to petitioner was an essential part of whatever
agreement the parties entered into, which, in this case, the Supreme Court
affirmed to be an equitable mortgage.

xxx xxx xxx

4.19 Petitioner does not have the mistaken notion that the mortgagee must be
in actual possession of the mortgaged property in order to secure the debt.
However, in this particular case, the delivery of possession of the Property was
an integral part of the contract between petitioner and respondent. After all, it
was supposed to be a contract of sale. If delivery was not part of the agreement
entered into by the parties in 1960, why did respondent surrender possession
thereof to petitioner in the first place?

4.20 Now that the Courts have ruled that the transaction was not a sale but a
mortgage, petitioner's entitlement to the possession of the Property should be
deemed as one of the provisions of the mortgage, considering that at the time
the contract was entered into, possession of the Property was likewise delivered
to petitioner. Thus, until respondent has fully paid her mortgage loan, petitioner
should be allowed to retain possession of the subject property. 16

Petitioner's position lacks sufficient legal and factual moorings.

A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal

obligation. 17 It is constituted by recording the document in which it appears with the proper
Registry of Property, although, even if it is not recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless binding
between the parties. 18 Thus, the only right granted by law in favor of the mortgagee is to
demand the execution and the recording of the document in which the mortgage is
formalized. 19 As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property
since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does not pass to the
mortgagee. 20 However, even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the property,
there is no impairment of his security since the mortgage directly and immediately subjects the
property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the
obligation for whose security it was constituted. 21 If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the
mortgage creditor may institute an action to foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or
extrajudicially, whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a public auction and the
proceeds therefrom given to the creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage
loan. Apparently, petitioner's contention that "[t]o require [him] . . . to deliver possession of the
Property to respondent prior to the full payment of the latter's mortgage loan would be
equivalent to the cancellation of the mortgage" is without basis. Regardless of its possessor, the
mortgaged property may still be sold, with the prescribed formalities, in the event of the
debtor's default in the payment of his loan obligation.

Moreover, this Court cannot find any justification in the records to uphold petitioner's
contention that respondent delivered possession of the subject property upon the execution of
the "Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests" on February 10, 1960 and that
the transfer of possession to petitioner must therefore be considered an essential part of the
agreement between the parties. This self-serving assertion of petitioner was directly
contradicted by respondent in her pleadings. 22 Furthermore, nowhere in the Court of Appeals'
decisions promulgated on March 31, 1995 (G.R. CV No. 42065) and on October 5, 1998 (G.R. SP
No. 48310), or in our own decision promulgated on July 8, 1996 (G.R. No. 120832) was it ever
established that the mortgaged properties were delivered by respondent to petitioner.

In Alvano v. Batoon, 2 this Court held that "[a] simple mortgage does not give the mortgagee a
right to the possession of the property unless the mortgage should contain some special
provision to that effect." Regrettably for petitioner, he has not presented any evidence, other
than his own gratuitous statements, to prove that the real intention of the parties was to allow
him to enjoy possession of the mortgaged property until full payment of the loan.

Therefore, we hold that the trial court correctly issued the writ of possession in favor of
respondent. Such writ was but a necessary consequence of this Court's ruling in G.R. No.
120832 affirming the validity of the original certificate of title (OCT No. P-13038) in the name of
respondent Felicitas de Lara, while at the same time nullifying the original certificate of title
(OCT No. P-11566) in the name of petitioner Cornelio Isaguirre. Possession is an essential
attribute of ownership; thus, it would be redundant for respondent to go back to court simply
to establish her right to possess subject property. Contrary to petitioner's claims, the issuance
of the writ of possession by the trial court did not constitute an unwarranted modification of
our decision in G.R. No. 120832, but rather, was a necessary complement thereto. 24 It bears
stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face of the decision, but
also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. 25

With regard to the improvements made on the mortgaged property, we confirm the Court of
Appeals' characterization of petitioner as a possessor in bad faith. Based on the factual findings
of the appellate court, it is evident that petitioner knew from the very beginning that there was
really no sale and that he held respondent's property as mere security for the payment of the
loan obligation. Therefore, petitioner may claim reimbursement only for necessary expenses;
however, he is not entitled to reimbursement for any useful
26 27
expenses which he may have incurred.

Finally, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, this case should be remanded to the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City for a determination of the total amount of the loan, the
necessary expenses incurred by petitioner, and the period within which respondent must pay
such amount. 28 However, no interest is due on the loan since there has been no express
stipulation in writing. 29

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 5, 1998 and its
Resolution dated March 5, 1999 are hereby AFFIRMED. Respondent is entitled to delivery of
possession of the subject property. This case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for
determination of the amount of the loan, the necessary expenses incurred by petitioner and
the period within which the respondent must pay the same.

SO ORDERED.

Custodio v. Corrado, G.R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004

For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated July 28, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 45764, and its Resolution2 dated November 13, 2000 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated September 9, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Balayan, Batangas, Branch 9, in RTC Appeal Case No. 3301, which reversed the
Decision4 dated August 19, 1996 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calatagan, Batangas,
dismissing respondent Rosendo F. Corrado’s Complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Ownership with Injunction and Damages, in Civil Case No. 120.

The facts and antecedent proceedings, as culled from records, are as follows:

On July 12, 1993, respondent Rosendo F. Corrado filed an ejectment 5 case against petitioner
Melchor Custodio with the MTC of Calatagan, Batangas, docketed as Civil Case No. 116. It was
dismissed by the MTC on March 15, 1994 on the grounds that (1) it had no jurisdiction as the
complaint is a possessory suit, (2) there was no barangay conciliation, and (3) the plaintiff failed
to prove his case by preponderance of evidence. Upon appeal, the RTC of Balayan, Batangas
affirmed the appealed decision docketed as RTC Appealed Case No. 3099. 6

On January 2, 1995, respondent filed with the same MTC another complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 120, 7 and which is the
core case subject of the present petition.

The Complaint avers that respondent Rosendo F. Corrado (then plaintiff) is the registered
owner of a residential lot in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan, Batangas covered by TCT No. T-21342.
He claims that more than a year prior to the institution of the complaint, petitioner Melchor
Custodio (then defendant), under a dubious claim of tenancy relationship with respondent’s
father, Crisanto Corrado and without his knowledge and consent, demolished his old residential
house on the said lot and constructed a two-bedroom bungalow where petitioner and his
family now reside.

In his Answer,8 petitioner Melchor Custodio alleged that he is a legitimate leasehold tenant of
Crisanto Corrado since 1961 up to the present. He further claimed that respondent’s father
consented to the construction of the bungalow thirty (30) years ago when the subject lot was
still owned by respondent’s father and before it was transferred to respondent. As affirmative
defenses, he alleged inter alia that: (a) the complaint states no cause of action; (b) the
required barangay conciliation under P.D. 15089 was not complied with; and (c) the present
complaint is now barred on the ground of res judicata and is violative of the rule on forum
shopping.

The parties agreed on the following stipulation of facts during the pre-trial conference:

1. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-21342 covering the lot in question is in the
name of plaintiff Rosendo Corrado;

2. That the defendant has never been a tenant of the plaintiff;

3. That the construction of the two-bedroom bungalow structure on the subject

premises was without the consent of the plaintiff;

4. That the dismissal of Civil Case No. 116 which involved the same parties was by
reason of alleged non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508;

5. That subject property is located in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan, and not in Barangay
Gulod, Calatagan;

6. That no Barangay Certification is attached to the instant complaint pursuant to

Presidential Decree No. 1508;

7. That the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court was appealed before the Regional Trial
Court which was docketed as RTC Appealed Case No. 3099. 10

After trial, the MTC rendered judgment dismissing the Complaint, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint without

pronouncement as to cost.

SO ORDERED.11
The MTC initially resolved several issues and ruled inter alia that: (a) It has jurisdiction over the
complaint which is an accion publiciana case although denominated as recovery of possession
and ownership; (b) Prior compliance with barangay conciliation is not required because the
parties reside in non-adjoining barangays of different municipalities with respondent residing
in Barangay Binubusan, Municipality of Lian, Batangas, and petitioner residing
in Barangay Balitoc, Calatagan and the complaint included a prayer for preliminary injunction
and TRO; and (c) The filing of the present Civil Case No. 120 does not constitute forum shopping
and the judgment in the previous ejectment case in Civil Case No. 116 will not amount to res
judicata in the present case because there was no judgment on the merits in Civil Case No. 116.
The MTC noted that there was no adjudication as to the rights of the parties, particularly the
determination of their possessory rights in Civil Case No. 116 as its dismissal was anchored on
respondent’s non-compliance with the required barangay conciliation under P.D. No. 1508 and
on respondent’s failure to allege the particular date of deprivation of possession required for
the court to determine whether the case was filed within the one (1) year period.

However, the MTC finds that the petitioner’s continued stay on respondent’s property has
factual and legal basis since evidence on record, such as milling tickets, convincingly show that
petitioner has been a tenant of respondent’s father, Crisanto Corrado, cultivating the latter’s
three (3)-hectare sugarcane land, including the subject lot, since 1961. It did not give credence
to respondent’s claim of ignorance to the tenancy relationship between petitioner and his
father since the latest milling tickets showed that petitioner continued working on the subject
lot even after it was transferred to respondent’s name.

Respondent appealed the MTC decision to the RTC, which set aside and reversed the MTC
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the decision
of the lower court dated August 12, 1996 and a new one entered declaring the plaintiff
as the true and absolute owner of the residential lot in question; ordering the defendant
to deliver the possession thereof to the plaintiff and to vacate the same, with costs
against the defendant-appellee.

SO ORDERED.12

In reversing the MTC, the RTC found merit in respondent’s allegation that petitioner cannot
claim any right to possess respondent’s lot on the premise that he is an alleged tenant of
respondent’s father. The RTC found it unacceptable for the MTC to rule that respondent is
bound by the action of his father in allowing petitioner to construct a house on the subject lot
and occupy the same. The RTC stressed that the parties had stipulated during the pre-trial that
the subject lot is registered under the name of respondent and that petitioner is not a tenant of
respondent. Further, respondent acquired the said lot in 1970 not from his father but from the
government, which was the registered owner since 1909. Thus, respondent’s father never
acquired any right over the said land, hence, he has no right to transmit or alienate the land to
anyone. The RTC further stated that petitioner’s alleged possession, if any, would have been
only by tolerance by the government and he would have acted promptly at the time
respondent purchased the lot if he truly believed that he had the legal right over the lot. Finally,
the RTC clarified that contrary to the MTC’s ruling, the case is not merely an accion publiciana,
where only physical possession is involved, but one of accion reinvindicatoria because
respondent claimed recovery of full possession as an absolute owner. The RTC concluded that
since respondent is the absolute owner of the property, the MTC cannot bar him from
recovering possession based on spurious authority granted by a third party who is not an
owner.

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC decision.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the RTC decision dated September 9, 1997 in RTC Appeal Case
No. 3301.

SO ORDERED.13

The CA ruled that the principle of res judicata is inapplicable because there is no identity of
causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. It stressed that the former is an
ejectment suit which was dismissed for failure of respondent to state the date of deprivation of
possession while the latter is for recovery of possession, and not ejectment. It also brushed
aside the alleged tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondent, noting that the
milling tickets were issued for respondent’s father as the planter and petitioner as the tenant,
but without any evidence showing that they referred to the subject lot and without any
indication that petitioner was getting his share from the subject lot.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals.

Hence, this petition submitting the following issues for our resolution:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CIVIL
CASE NO. 116 AND CIVIL CASE NO. 120 HAVE TWO (2) SEPARATE CAUSES OF ACTION
DESPITE THE FACT THAT WHAT DETERMINES THE NATURE OR CAUSE OF THE ACTION IS
NOT THE CAPTION OF THE COMPLAINT BUT THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED
THEREIN.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN NOT TAKING
INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT FOR RES JUDICATA TO APPLY, "SUBSTANTIAL"
AND NOT ABSOLUTE IDENTITY OF CAUSES OF ACTION WILL SUFFICE.
 III

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER HAS AMPLY ESTABLISHED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF

EVIDENCE A TENANCY RELATIONSHIP WITH RESPONDENT AND HIS FATHER, CRISANTO
CORRADO.14

In our view, the relevant issues for our resolution are: (a) whether or not the principle of res
judicata is applicable in this case; and (b) whether the alleged tenancy relationship between
petitioner with respondent and the latter’s father was established by preponderance of
evidence.

On the first issue, petitioner insists that the principle of res judicata is applicable in this case
since the material allegations in the complaints of Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120 would clearly
reveal an identity of cause of action. Citing jurisprudence, it argued that what should control in
determining the cause of action are the averments in both complaints seeking recovery of
possession of the subject lot with the ultimate goal of dispossessing and ejecting petitioner
from the property and restoring it to respondent and not the different captions of the two
complaints. He argued further that the application of the principle of res judicata only requires
substantial and not absolute identity of causes of action. For his part, respondent countered
that while there may be identity of parties and subject matter, the causes of action are not
identical in Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120 as the former is one for ejectment to recover material
possession while the latter is one for recovery of possession and ownership of the subject land.

We find petitioner’s contentions bereft of merit. The principle of res judicata is inapplicable
because Civil Case No. 116 for ejectment was not decided on the merits and its cause of action
is different from Civil Case No. 120 for recovery of possession and ownership.

For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions, (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of
subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of action. 15

In the present case, the judgment in Civil Case No. 116 was not on the merits. A judgment on
the merits is one rendered after argument and investigation, and when there is determination
which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary or
formal or merely technical point, or by default and without trial.16 Thus, a judgment on the
merits is one wherein there is an unequivocal determination of the rights and obligations of the
parties with respect to the causes of action and the subject matter of the case. 17 In this case,
the MTC’s dismissal of Civil Case No. 116 was anchored on its lack of jurisdiction and lack of
proof of the date of demand without determining and resolving who has the right of possession
between petitioner and respondent. Verily, the case was not resolved on the merits but was
dismissed on technical points. A judgment dismissing an action for want of jurisdiction cannot
operate as res judicata on the merits.18
There is also no identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. We agree
with the findings of the CA which we find no reason to set aside, to wit:

…In Civil Case No. 116, the case as found by the MTC is an ejectment suit and for failure
of plaintiff-private respondent to state the date when he was deprived of his possession,
the court held that it did not entitle him to file an ejectment suit against herein
defendant-petitioner. In Civil Case No. 120, the cause of action is for recovery of
possession and not ejectment. These are two separate causes of action and therefore
the principle of res judicata does not apply to the present case.19

Indeed, an ejectment case such as Civil Case No. 116, involves a different cause of action from
an accion publiciana or accion reinvindicatoria, such as Civil Case No. 120, and the judgment of
the former shall not bar the filing of another case for recovery of possession as an element of
ownership. A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than
possession and establishes only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a
bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership. 20 Incidentally, we
agree with the findings of the RTC that Civil Case No. 120 is not an accion publiciana but more
of an accion reinvindicatoria as shown by the respondent’s allegation in the complaint that he is
the registered owner of the subject lot and that the petitioner had constructed a bungalow
thereon and had been continuously occupying the same since then.

The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of
possession and/or ownership of the land is well-settled in our jurisprudence. What really
distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and
from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question
of possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry
are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property.
Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover
the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which
includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover
possession.21

Further, it bears stressing that the issue on the applicability of res judicata to the circumstance
obtaining in this case is far from novel and not without precedence. In Vda. de Villanueva v.
Court of Appeals,22 we held that a judgment in a case for forcible entry which involved only the
issue of physical possession (possession de facto) and not ownership will not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title or ownership, such as an accion reinvindicatoria or a
suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership, because there is no
identity of causes of action between the two.

Anent the second issue, petitioner contends that tenancy relationship between him and
respondent’s father was amply supported by evidence. It must be stressed that this is a factual
issue requiring re-evaluation and examination of the probative value of evidences presented
which is not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Besides, this issue had already been
squarely resolved by the Court of Appeals and we find no impelling reason to set it aside.
According to the Court of Appeals, the milling tickets only showed that they were issued to
Crisanto Corrado but did not show whether such tickets referred to the same lot in question. In
petitions for review on certiorari, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought before
it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing questions of law. For a question to be one of
law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants. The findings of fact of the appellate court are generally conclusive on this Court, which
is not a trier of facts.23

At any rate, the issue of tenancy relationship had already been settled during the pre-trial stage
where the parties stipulated that the subject lot is registered in the name of respondent and
that petitioner was never a tenant of respondent. Petitioner and respondent are bound by such
stipulations which are deemed settled and need not be proven during the trial. Pre-trial is a
procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic issues between the parties. It thus
paves the way for a less cluttered trial and resolution of the case. Its main objective is to
simplify, abbreviate and expedite the trial, or totally dispense with it. Prescinding therefrom, it
is a basic legal precept that the parties are bound to honor the stipulations they made during
the pre-trial.24

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed Decision dated July 28,
2000 and Resolution dated November 13, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45764
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Abejaron v. Nabasa, G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001

With the burgeoning population comes a heightened interest in the limited land resource,
especially so if, as in the case at bar, one's home of many years stands on the land in dispute. It
comes as no surprise therefore that while this case involves a small parcel of land, a 118-square
meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 in Silway, General Santos City, the parties have
tenaciously litigated over it for more than twenty years.

Petitioner Abejaron filed this petition for review on certiorari to annul the respondent court's
Decision dated April 26, 1988 and Resolution dated July 12, 1988 reversing the trial court's
decision and declaring respondent Nabasa the owner of the subject lot.

The following facts spurred the present controversy:

Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and claimant of a 118-
square meter portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in Silway, General Santos City
described as "Block 5, Lot 1, Psu-154953, bounded on the North by Road, on the South by Lot 2
of the same Psu, on the East by Felix Nabasa, and on the West by Road." 1 In 1945, petitioner
Abejaron and his family started occupying the 118-square meter land. At that time, the land
had not yet been surveyed. They fenced the area and built thereon a family home
with nipa roofing and a small store. In 1949, petitioner improved their abode to become a two-
storey house measuring 16 x 18 feet or 87.78 square meters made of round wood
and nipa roofing.2 This house, which stands to this day, occupies a portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-
154953 and a portion of the adjoining Lot 2 of the same Psu. Lot 2 belongs to petitioner’s
daughter, Conchita Abejaron-Abellon. In 1950, the small store was destroyed and in its stead,
petitioner Abejaron built another store which stands up to the present. In 1951, he planted five
coconut trees on the property in controversy. Petitioner's wife, Matilde Abejaron, harvested
coconuts from these trees.3 Petitioner Abejaron also planted banana and avocado trees. He
also put up a pitcher pump.4 All this time that the Abejarons introduced these improvements on
the land in controversy, respondent Nabasa did not oppose or complain about the
improvements.

Knowing that the disputed land was public in character, petitioner declared only his house, and
not the disputed land, for taxation purposes in 1950, 1966, 1976, and 1978. 5 The last two
declarations state that petitioner Abejaron’s house stands on Lots 1 and 2, Block 5, Psu
154953.6 Abejaron paid taxes on the house in 1955, 1966, and 1981. 7

Petitioner stated that beginning 1955, respondent Nabasa resided on the remaining 57-square
meter portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953.8 Nabasa built his house about four (4) meters away
from petitioner Abejaron's house. Beatriz Gusila, a neighbor of the Abejarons and the Nabasas
confirmed that when she arrived in Silway in 1949, Nabasa was not yet residing there while
Abejaron was already living in their house which stands to this day.

Before 1974, employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area in controversy. Abejaron
merely watched them do the survey9 and did not thereafter apply for title of the land on the
belief that he could not secure title over it as it was government property. 10 Without his
(Abejaron) knowledge and consent, however, Nabasa "clandestinely, willfully, fraudulently, and
unlawfully applied for and caused the titling in his name" of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-
154953, including petitioner Abejaron's 118-square meter portion.11 Petitioner imputes bad
faith and fraud on the part of Nabasa because in applying for and causing the titling in his name
of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, Nabasa represented himself to be the actual and lawful possessor
of the entire Lot 1, Block 5, including petitioner Abejaron's 118-square meter portion despite
knowledge of Abejaron's actual occupation and possession of said portion. 12

On September 24, 1974, Nabasa was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-4140 pursuant to
Free Patent No. (XI-4) 2877 covering Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. As the title included petitioner
Abejaron’s 118-square meter portion of the lot, his son, Alejandro Abejaron, representing
Matilde Abejaron (petitioner Abejaron's wife), filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands,
Koronadal, South Cotabato against Nabasa's title and application. The protest was dismissed on
November 22, 1979 for failure of Matilde and Alejandro to attend the hearings. 13 Alejandro
claims, however, that they did not receive notices of the hearings. Alejandro filed a motion for
reconsideration dated January 10, 1980. Alejandro also filed a notice of adverse claim on
January 14, 1980. Subsequently, he requested the Bureau of Lands to treat the motion as an
appeal considering that it was filed within the 60-day reglementary period. The motion for
reconsideration was endorsed and forwarded by the District Land Office XI-3 of the Bureau of
Lands in Koronadal, Cotabato to the Director of Lands in Manila on November 24, 1981.14 But
because the appeal had not been resolved for a prolonged period for unknown reasons,
petitioner Abejaron filed on March 12, 1982 an action for reconveyance with damages against
respondent Nabasa before Branch 22, Regional Trial Court of General Santos City. 15 On May 10,
1982, petitioner filed a notice of lis pendens.16

Abner Lagsub, geodetic engineer, testified for the petitioner. Lagsub stated that on March 30,
1980, Alejandro Abejaron hired him to relocate Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, the land in
controversy. He surveyed the lot measuring 175 square meters. Fifty-seven (57) square meters
of Lot 1 and a portion of the adjoining Lot 3 were occupied by Nabasa's house. This portion was
fenced partly by hollow blocks and partly by bamboo. On the remaining 118 square meters
stood a portion of petitioner Abejaron’s house and two coconut trees near it, and his store.
Abejaron's 118-square meter portion was separated from Nabasa's 57-square meter part by
Abejaron's fence made of hollow blocks. Both Nabasa’s and Abejaron’s houses appeared more
than twenty years old while the coconut trees appeared about 25 years old.

Back in 1971, Lagsub conducted a subdivision survey on Psu-154953. He was then hired by the
Silway Neighborhood Association to conduct the survey for purposes of allocating lots to the
members of the association, among whom were respondent Nabasa and petitioner Abejaron.
When the 1971 survey was conducted, both the Abejarons and Nabasa were already occupying
their respective 118 and 57 square meter portions of Lot 1, Block 5. Nabasa and Matilde
Abejaron, representative of petitioner, were present during the survey. 17

Respondent Nabasa had a different story to tell. He contends that he had been residing on a 12
x 15 meter or 180-square meter public land in Silway, General Santos City since 1945. He admits
that petitioner Abejaron was already residing in Silway when he arrived there. Nabasa
constructed a house which stands to this day and planted five coconut trees on this 180-square
meter land, but only two of the trees survived. Nabasa never harvested coconuts from these
trees as petitioner Abejaron claims to own them and harvests the coconuts. In many parts of
respondent Nabasa’s testimony, however, he declared that he started occupying the 180-
square meter area in 1976.18

Nabasa avers that previously, he and petitioner Abejaron were in possession of portions of Lot
2, Psu-154953. This lot was subsequently surveyed and divided into smaller lots with the area of
petitioner Abejaron designated as Lot 2, Block 5, Psu-154953 measuring one hundred eighty
(180) square meters, while his was designated as Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 with an area of one
hundred seventy five (175) square meters.

Instead of applying for free patent over his Lot 2, petitioner Abejaron gave this lot to his
daughter Conchita Abejaron-Abellon and allowed her to file the application with the District
Land Office XI-4, Bureau of Lands, Koronadal, South Cotabato. Conchita secured Free Patent No.
(XI-4)-3293 over Lot 2. Pursuant to this, she was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P-4420.
On April 27, 1981, Conchita's title was transcribed in the Registration Book of General Santos
City.

Respondent Nabasa, on the other hand, filed an application for Free Patent over Lot 1, Block 5,
Psu-154953 with the District Land Office No. XI-4, Bureau of Lands, Koronadal, South Cotabato.
While the application was pending, petitioner Abejaron forcibly encroached upon the northern
and southwestern portion of Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-159543. Abejaron fenced the disputed 118-
square meter portion of Lot 1 and despite Nabasa's opposition, constructed a store near the
road. Petitioner Abejaron then transferred his old house constructed on Lot 2, Block 5, Psu-
154953 to a portion of the disputed 118-square meter area. Petitioner's daughter, Conchita,
patentee and title holder of Lot 2, constructed her own house in Lot 2.

Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877, covering Lot 1, Block 5, was issued to respondent Nabasa on
September 24, 1974. But before the patent could be transcribed on the Registration Book of
the Registrar of Deeds of General Santos City, the District Land Officer of District Land Office
No. XI-4 recalled it for investigation of an administrative protest filed by the petitioner. 19 The
protest was given due course, but petitioner Abejaron or his representative failed to appear in
the hearings despite notice.

On November 22, 1979, the administrative protest was dismissed by the District Land Officer
for failure of petitioner Abejaron or his representative to appear in the hearings despite
notice.20 Respondent Nabasa's Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877 was then re-transmitted by the
District Land Officer of District Land Office XI-4 to the Register of Deeds, General Santos City,
and the same was transcribed in the Registration Book of the Registry of Property of General
Santos City on December 13, 1979. Original Certificate of Title No. P-4140, covering Lot 1, Block
2, Psu-154953, was issued to respondent Nabasa.21

On March 12, 1982, petitioner Abejaron filed against respondent Nabasa an action for
reconveyance with damages seeking reconveyance of his 118-square meter portion of Lot 1,
Block 5, Psu-154953.

During the trial, respondent Nabasa presented Abundio Guiral, his neighbor who had been
living since 1945 in Lot 3, Block 5, Psu-154953, adjoining Nabasa's Lot 1. He testified that when
he arrived in Silway, petitioner Abejaron was already living there. Four months after, Nabasa
started residing in the area. Nabasa constructed a house, planted coconut trees, and fenced his
12 x 15 meter area. Abejaron's house in 1945 is still the same house he lives in at present, but
in 1977, it was jacked up and transferred from Lot 2 to Lot 1, Block 5. Nabasa tried to prevent
the transfer to no avail. The house was then extended towards Lot 2.22

On rebuttal, petitioner Abejaron presented two neighbors. One of them, Alejandra Doria,
started living in Silway in 1947. She testified that when she arrived in the neighborhood,
Abejaron's fence as it now stands between the 57-square meter portion occupied by Nabasa's
house and the 118-square meter area claimed by petitioner Abejaron was already there. 23 The
other neighbor, Pacencia Artigo, also started living in Silway in 1947. She declared that the
house of the Abejarons stands now where it stood in 1947. She also testified that the Abejarons
previously had a store smaller than their present store. 24

On September 27, 1985, after trial on the merits, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner
Abejaron, viz:

"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this court hereby renders judgment as
follows:

1. Declaring the possession and occupancy of Pacencio Abejaron over 118 square
meters of Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953 in good faith and thereby declaring the
inclusion of 118 square meters of said lot in OCT No. P-4140 erroneous and a mistake,
and for which, defendant Felix Nabasa is hereby ordered to reconvey and execute a
registerable document in favor of plaintiff Pacencio Abejaron, Filipino, married and a
resident of Silway, General Santos City, his heirs, successors and assigns over an area of
one hundred eighteen (118) square meters of Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, situated at
Silway, General Santos City, on the Western portion of said lot as shown in the sketch
plan, Exhibit "R", and the remaining portion of 57 square meters of said lot to be
retained by defendant Felix Nabasa;

2) Should Felix Nabasa fails (sic) to do so, upon the finality of this judgment, the Clerk of
Court shall executed (sic) it in the name of Felix Nabasa, widower, and will have the
same effect as if executed by the latter and the Register of Deeds, General Santos City,
is hereby directed to issue New Transfer Certificate of Title to Alejandro Abejaron over
118 square meters of Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, and New Transfer Certificate of
Title over 57 square meters of same Lot No. 1, Block 5, Psu-154953, in favor of Felix
Nabasa, and ultimately to have OCT No. P-4140 of Felix Nabasa cancelled accordingly."

Respondent Nabasa's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he appealed to the Court
of Appeals. On April 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondent
Nabasa, viz:

". . . the only basis for reconveyance is actual fraud. In this case, Abejaron failed to
substantiate the existence of actual fraud. . . There was no proof of irregularity in the
issuance of title nor in the proceedings incident thereto nor was there a claim that fraud
intervened in the issuance of the title, thus, the title has become indefeasible (Frias v.
Esquival, 67 SCRA 487). Abejaron was not able to establish his allegation that Nabasa
misrepresented his status of possession in his application for the title. . . In fact, in
Abejaron's answer to Nabasa's counterclaim, he said that Nabasa has been occupying
the area since 1950.
 Contrary to the finding of the court a quo, the Bureau of Lands conducted an ocular
inspection before the title was issued. This was confirmed by Abejaron himself (tsn,
January 19, 1984).

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new one entered declaring Felix Nabasa as the owner of the lot covered
by O.C.T. No. P-4140. Costs against plaintif-appellee.

SO ORDERED."

Petitioner Abejaron filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. On July
22, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari with the following assignment of
errors:

"I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ACTUAL FRAUD
WAS COMMITTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND PROVEN BY THE PETITIONER AND
SUSTAINED BY THE TRIAL COURT WHEN PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROCURED THE TITLE IN
HIS NAME OF THE AREA OF THE LOT IN QUESTION, LOT 1, BLOCK 5, LOCATED AT
SILWAY, DADIANGAS, GENERAL SANTOS CITY.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE LOT WHICH
BELONGS TO THE PETITIONER IS LOT 2 OF THE SAME BLOCK AND PSU, AND THAT THE
PETITIONER FORCIBLY ENTERED INTO LOT 1 OF THE SAME BLOCK AND PSU, AND
FORCIBLY TRANSFERRED HIS OLD HOUSE FROM LOT 2 TO LOT 1 IS BASED ONLY ON THE
SELF-SERVING ALLEGATIONS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND NOT SUPPORTED BY
ANY COMPETENT AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE FACT THAT
PETITIONER HAS A CLEAR RIGHT OVER THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION BECAUSE HE HAS
BEEN IN ACTUAL AND LAWFUL POSSESSION FOR SO MANY YEARS AND A CLAIMANT OF
THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION."

We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name after one year from the date of
the decree so long as the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value.25 The
action does not seek to reopen the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of
registration but only purports to show that the person who secured the registration of the
property in controversy is not the real owner thereof.26 Fraud is a ground for reconveyance. For
an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, it is essential for the party seeking
reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of
fraud.27

Petitioner Abejaron does not claim to own Lot 1, Block 5, Psu-154953. He in fact admits that he
believed the land in dispute was public in character, thus he did not declare it for taxation
purposes despite possession of it for a long time. Neither did he apply for title over it on the
mistaken belief that he could not apply for title of a public land. In his Complaint, he stated that
respondent Nabasa's fraudulent procurement of Free Patent No. (XI-4)-2877 and OCT No. P-
4140 over the disputed land deprived him not of ownership, but of his "right to file the
necessary application thereon with the authorities concerned" 28 as long-time possessor of the
land.

Nonetheless, petitioner contends that an action for reconveyance is proper, viz:

". . . for an action of reconveyance of a parcel of land to prosper, it is not necessary that
the proponent be the absolute owner thereof. It is enough that the proponent has an
equitable right thereon. In the case at bar, the plaintiff had been in lawful, open,
continuous and notorious possession, occupation and control in the concept of an
owner of a greater portion of the subject lot since 1945 and have (sic) thereby acquired
an equitable right thereon protected by law. Possession of public lands once occupation
of the same is proven, as the herein plaintiff did, under claim of ownership constitutes a
grant from the state (Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210). A portion of the public land
ceased to be public as soon as its claimant had performed all the conditions essential to
a grant (Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875)."29

Petitioner's contention, buttressed by the Vera case and Chief Justice Teehankee's dissent in
the Villanueva case, is similar to the position taken by the plaintiff in Mesina v. Vda. de Sonza,
et al.30 In that case, plaintiff filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija an action for
cancellation of the original certificate of title procured by the defendant by virtue of a
homestead patent. The title covered a public land which she claimed to own through public,
open, and peaceful possession for more than thirty years. The law applicable in that case, which
petitioner Abejaron apparently relies on in the case at bar, is Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
141 or the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22,
1957, viz:

"Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Courts) of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act
(now Property Registration Decree), to wit:

xxx
 (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter." (emphasis
supplied)

Citing Susi v. Razon,31 the Court interpreted this law, viz:

". . . where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied
with through actual physical possession openly, continuously, and publicly with a right
to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926 (carried over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the
possessor is deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts -an application therefor
being sufficient under the provisions of Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as
Section 50, Commonwealth Act No. 141). If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired
the land in question by grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public
domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands. (Italics supplied)"

The Mesina and Susi cases were cited in Herico v. Dar,32 another action for cancellation of title
issued pursuant to a free patent. Again, the Court ruled that under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, with the plaintiff's proof of occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessor-in-interest,
title over the land had vested in him as to segregate the land from the mass of public land.
Thenceforth, the land was no longer disposable under the Public Land Act by free patent. 33 The
Court held, viz:

"As interpreted in several cases (Susi v. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424; Mesina v. Pineda Vda.
de Sonza, G.R. No. L-14722, May 25, 1960) when the conditions as specified in the
foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of public domain, and
beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency
of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon
the strength of said patent."34

In citing Republic v. Villanueva, et al.,35 petitioner Abejaron relied on the dissenting opinion of
Chief Justice Teehankee. However, the en banc majority opinion in that case and in Manila
Electric Company v. Bartolome,36 departed from the doctrines enunciated in the Susi, Mesina,
and Herico cases. Citing Uy Un v. Perez,37 the Court ruled that "the right of an occupant of
public agricultural land to obtain a confirmation of his title under Sec. 48(b) of Com. Act. No.
141, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, is 'derecho dominical incoativo' and that before the
issuance of the certificate of title the occupant is not in the juridical sense the true owner of the
land since it still pertains to the State."38

The Court pointed out that the Villanueva and Meralco cases are different from the oft-cited
Susi case as the latter involved a parcel of land possessed by a Filipino citizen since time
immemorial, while the land in dispute in the Villanueva and Meralco cases were sought to be
titled by virtue of Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. In explaining the nature of land
possessed since time immemorial, the Court quoted Oh Cho v. Director of Lands,39 viz:

"All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should
have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors-in-interest since
time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had
never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before
the Spanish conquest."

In 1986, however, in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.,40 this Court en
banc recognized the strong dissent registered by Chief Justice Teehankee in the Villanueva
case and abandoned the Villanueva and Meralco ruling to revert to the Susi doctrine.
Reiterating the Susi and Herico cases, the Court ruled:

"Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering

possession of public land which is of character and duration prescribed by statute as the
equivalent of express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself [Sec.
48(b)] that the possessor(s) 'x x x shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title x x x.' No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption,
confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and
length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize
a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public
to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already effected by operation of
law from the moment the required period of possession became
complete."41 (Emphasis supplied)

This is the prevailing rule as reiterated in the more recent case of Rural Bank of Compostela v.
Court of Appeals, a ponencia of now Chief Justice Davide, Jr.,42 viz:

"The rule under the latter (Section 48[b] of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. No.
1942), is that when the conditions specified therein are complied with, the possessor is
 deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant, without
necessity of a certificate of title being issued, and the land ceases to be part of the
public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands."43

The question brought to the fore, therefore, is whether or not petitioner Abejaron has satisfied
the conditions specified in Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. No. 1942. Sec.
48(b) has been further amended by P.D. No. 1073 which took effect on January 25, 1977. Sec. 4
of the P.D. reads as follows:

"Sec. 4. The provision of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land
Act, are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his
predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June
12, 1945."

Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as further amended by P.D. No. 1073, now reads:

"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter."
(Italics ours)44

However, as petitioner Abejaron's 30-year period of possession and occupation required by the
Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942 ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of P.D.
No. 1073 in 1977, the requirement of said P.D. that occupation and possession should have
started on June 12, 1945 or earlier, does not apply to him. As the Susi doctrine holds that the
grant of title by virtue of Sec. 48(b) takes place by operation of law, then upon Abejaron's
satisfaction of the requirements of this law, he would have already gained title over the
disputed land in 1975. This follows the doctrine laid down in Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al.,45 that the law cannot impair vested rights such as a land grant. More
clearly stated, "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been,
prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947"
may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the
Public Land Act.46

Having laid down the law applicable to the case at bar, i.e., Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended by R.A. 1942, we now determine whether or not petitioner has acquired title over the
disputed land. In doing so, it is necessary for this Court to wade through the evidence on record
to ascertain whether petitioner has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the 118-square meter disputed land for 30 years at least since
January 24, 1947. It is axiomatic that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals
are final and conclusive on the parties and upon this Court, which will not be reviewed or
disturbed on appeal unless these findings are not supported by evidence or unless strong and
cogent reasons dictate otherwise. 47 One instance when findings of fact of the appellate court
may be reviewed by this Court is when, as in the case at bar, the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals and the trial court are contradictory. 48

Petitioner claims that he started occupying the disputed land in 1945. At that time, he built
a nipa house, a small store, and a fence made of wood to delineate his area. This nipa house
was improved in 1949 into a two-storey house. The small store was also made bigger in 1950.
The wooden fence was also changed to a fence made of hollow blocks. The two-storey house,
bigger store, and hollow-block fence all stand to this day. In 1951, petitioner planted coconut
trees near his house. While the petitioner has shown continued existence of these
improvements on the disputed land, they were introduced later than January 24, 1947. He has
failed to establish the portion of the disputed land that his original nipa house, small store and
wooden fence actually occupied as of January 24, 1947. In the absence of this proof, we cannot
determine the land he actually possessed and occupied for thirty years which he may acquire
under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Worthy of notice is the fact that the disputed land was
surveyed, subdivided into and identified by lots only in the 1970's. Therefore, prior to the
survey, it would be difficult to determine the metes and bounds of the land petitioner claims to
have occupied since 1947 in the absence of specific and incontrovertible proof.

The neighbors presented by the petitioner, namely Alejandra Doria, Pacencia Artigo, and
Beatriz Gusila, could not also further his cause as both Doria and Artigo stated that they started
residing in Silway in 1947, without specifying whether it was on or prior to January 24, 1947,
while Gusila arrived in the neighborhood in 1949. While Doria testified that there was a fence
between Abejaron's and Nabasa's houses in 1947, she did not state that Abejaron's 118-square
meter area was enclosed by a fence which stands to this day. This is confirmed by Geodetic
Engineer Lagsub's 1984 survey plan which shows that a fence stands only on one side of the
118-square meter area, the side adjacent to Nabasa's 57-square meter portion. Again, this
poses the problem of determining the area actually occupied and possessed by Abejaron at
least since January 24, 1947.

Finally, as admitted by the petitioner, he has never declared the disputed land for taxation
purposes. While tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property or supported by other effective
proof.49 Even the tax declarations and receipts covering his house do not bolster his case as the
earliest of these was dated 1950.
Petitioner's evidence does not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary to
acquire title through possession and occupation of the disputed land at least since January 24,
1947 as required by Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942. The basic
presumption is that lands of whatever classification belong to the State and evidence of a land
grant must be "well-nigh incontrovertible."50 As petitioner Abejaron has not adduced any
evidence of title to the land in controversy, whether by judicial confirmation of title, or
homestead, sale, or free patent, he cannot maintain an action for reconveyance.

In De La Peña v. Court of Appeals and Herodito Tan,51 the petitioner filed an action for
reconveyance, claiming preferential right to acquire ownership over a 3/4 hectare of land and
imputing fraud and misrepresentation to respondent in securing a free patent and original
certificate of title over the land in controversy. The action for reconveyance was dismissed by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals. This Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals, viz:

"It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the
property alleged to be erroneously titled in another's name. (Tomas v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 79328, 21 May 1990, 185 SCRA 627, 633; Esconde v. Barlongay, G.R. No. 67583,
31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 603, 611; Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio, et al., 104 Phil. 126 [1958];
Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds of Rizal, 92 Phil. 826 [1953]; Azurin v. Quitoriano,
et al., 81 Phil. 261 [1948]). In the case at bench, petitioner does not claim to be the
owner of the disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a "preferential right" to
acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his actual possession since January 1947. . . Title
to alienable public lands can be established through open, continuous, and exclusive
possession for at least thirty (30) years. . . Not being the owner, petitioner cannot
maintain the present suit.

Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally
issued by the State. (Reyes v. Rodriguez, 62 Phil. 771, 776 [1936]) In such cases, the real
party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines to whom the property would revert if
it is ever established, after appropriate proceedings, that the free patent issued to the
grantee is indeed vulnerable to annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to
comply with the conditions imposed by the law. (See Sec. 101 of C.A. 141 [Public Land
Act]; Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157, 1158 [1957]; Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cotabato, et al., 96 Phil. 946, 953 [1955]). Not being an applicant, much less
a grantee, petitioner cannot ask for reconveyance." (emphasis supplied)52

In the more recent case of Tankiko, et al. v. Cezar, et al.,53 plaintiffs filed an action for
reconveyance claiming that they were the actual occupants and residents of a 126,112-square
meter land which was titled to another person. The trial court dismissed the action, but the
Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. Despite the appellate court's finding that plaintiffs had
no personality to file the action for reconveyance, the disputed land being part of the public
domain, it exercised equity jurisdiction to avoid leaving unresolved the matter of possession of
the land in dispute. On appeal to this Court, we reinstated the decision of the trial court and
dismissed the action for reconveyance, viz:

". . . equity is invoked only when the plaintiff, on the basis of the action filed and relief
sought, has a clear right that he seeks to enforce, or that would obviously be violated if
the action filed were to be dismissed for lack of standing. In the present case,
respondents have no clear enforceable right, since their claim over the land in question
is merely inchoate and uncertain. Admitting that they are only applicants for sales
patents on the land, they are not and they do not even claim to be owners thereof.

Second, it is evident that respondents are not the real parties in interest. Because they
admit that they are not the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents
thereon, it is daylight clear that the land is public in character and that it should revert
to the State. This being the case, Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically
declares that only the government may institute an action for reconveyance of
ownership of a public land. . .

xxx

In the present dispute, only the State can file a suit for reconveyance of a public land.
Therefore, not being the owners of the land but mere applicants for sales patents
thereon, respondents have no personality to file the suit. Neither will they be directly
affected by the judgment in such suit.

xxx

Clearly, a suit filed by a person who is not a party in interest must be dismissed. Thus, in
Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157, September 23, 1957, the Court affirmed the dismissal of
a Complaint filed by a party who alleged that the patent was obtained by fraudulent
means and consequently, prayed for the annulment of said patent and the cancellation
of a certificate of title. The Court declared that the proper party to bring the action was
the government, to which the property would revert."54

Similarly, as petitioner Abejaron has failed to show his title to the disputed land, he is not the
proper party to file an action for reconveyance that would result in the reversion of the land to
the government. It is the Solicitor General, on behalf of the government, who is by law
mandated to institute an action for reversion. 55 He has the specific power and function to
"represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings" and to "institute
actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain and improvements
thereon as well as lands held in violation of the Constitution." 56 Since respondent Nabasa's Free
Patent and Original Certificate of Title originated from a grant by the government, their
cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee. 57
Having resolved that petitioner Abejaron does not have legal standing to sue and is not the real
party in interest, we deem it unnecessary to resolve the question of fraud and the other issues
raised in the petition. These shall be timely for adjudication if a proper suit is filed by the
Solicitor General in the future.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the impugned decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. The Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 2492 before the Regional Trial Court of South
Cotabato, Branch 1, is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Javier v. Lumontad, G.R. No. 203760, December 3, 2014

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 29, 2011
and the Resolution3 dated October 1, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
113046 which set aside the Decision4 dated August 20, 2009 and the Order5 dated January 18,
2010 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74 (RTC) in Sp. Civil Case No. 08-744,
finding that the action instituted by petitioner was not one for forcible entry, but for recovery
of ownership and possession, hence, within the original jurisdiction of the latter. Consequently,
the CA ordered the remand of the case to the R TC for trial on the merits.

The Facts

This case originated from a forcible entry Complaint 6 dated July 3, 2007 filed by petitioner
Homer C. Javier, represented by his mother and natural guardian Susan G. Canencia
(petitioner), against respondent Susan Lumontad (respondent) before the Municipal Trial Court
of Taytay, Rizal (MTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 1929.

In his complaint, petitioner alleged that he is one of the sons of the late Vicente T. Javier
(Vicente), who was the owner of a 360-square meter (sq. m.) parcel of land located at Corner
Malaya and Gonzaga Streets, Barangay Dolores, Taytay Rizal (subject land),7 covered by Tax
Declaration (TD) No. 00-TY-002-11458.8 Since his birth, petitioner’s family has lived in the
residential house erected thereon.9 Upon Vicente’s death, petitioner, together with his mother,
continued their possession over the same. On March 26, 2007, respondent gained entry into
the subject land and started to build a two (2)-storey building (subject building) on a 150 sq. m.
portion thereof, despite petitioner’s vigorous objections and protests. 10 The dispute was
submitted to barangay conciliation but no amicable settlement was reached between the
parties.11 Thus, petitioner was constrained to file against respondent the instant forcible entry
complaint, averring, in addition to the foregoing, that reasonable compensation for the use and
occupancy of the above-said portion may be fixed at 5,000.00 per month.12

In her Answer13 dated July 30, 2007, respondent admitted that during Vicente’s lifetime, he
indeed was the owner and in physical possession of the subject land. 14 Nevertheless, she
claimed tobe the owner of the portion where the subject building was being constructed, as
evidenced by TD No. 00-TY-002-1303115 in her name.16 Hence, she took possession of the said
portion not as an illegal entrant but as its owner. 17

The MTC Ruling

In a Judgment18 dated November 11, 2007, the MTC dismissed the complaint for want of cause
of action and lack of jurisdiction.19

It found that Vicente actually subdivided the subject land into two (2) lots: the first lot, with an
area of 187.20 sq. m., was given to petitioner, while the second lot, with an area of 172.80 sq.
m. and where the subject building was erected, was given toone Anthony de la Paz Javier
(Anthony), son of Vicente by a previous failed marriage, but was eventually acquired by
respondent from the latter through sale. 20 Based on this finding, the MTC concluded that
petitioner had no cause of action against respondent since she was merely exercising her rights
asthe owner of the 172.80 sq. m. subdivided lot. 21

Also, the MTC observed that petitioner’s complaint failed to aver the required jurisdictional
facts as it merely contained a general allegation that respondent’s entry into the disputed
portion was made by means of force and intimidation, without specifically stating how, when,
and where were such means employed. With such failure, the MTC intimated that petitioner’s
remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria instituted before the
proper forum.22 Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the RTC.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision23 dated August 20, 2009, the RTC reversed and set aside the MTC ruling, and
accordingly ordered respondent to vacate the disputed portion and surrender possession
thereof to petitioner. Likewise, it ordered respondent to pay petitioner the amounts of
₱5,000.00 a month from March 2007, until she vacates said portion, as reasonable
compensation for its use and occupation, and ₱20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, including costs of
suit.24

Preliminarily, the RTC ruled that the facts averred in petitioner’s complaint – namely, that
petitioner, through his late father, owned and possessed the subject land, and that by means of
force and intimidation, respondent gainedentry thereto25 – show that his cause of action is
indeed one of forcible entry that falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC.26

On the merits, the RTC found that petitioner, being the owner and possessor of the property in
question, has the right to be respected in his possession and that respondent forcibly and
unlawfully deprived him of the same.27

Unconvinced, respondent moved for reconsideration,28 which was, however, denied in an

Order29 dated January 18, 2010, prompting petitioner to file an appeal before the CA.
The CA Ruling

In a Decision30 dated September 29, 2011, the CA set aside the RTC ruling and remanded the
case to the latter court for trial on the merits.31

It held that the issue of possession of the subject land is intimately intertwined with the issue of
ownership, such that the former issue cannot be determined without ruling on who really owns
such land. Thus, it remanded the case to the RTC for trial on the merits in the exercise of the
latter’s original jurisdiction in an action for recovery of ownership and possession pursuant to
Section 8 (2), Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.32

This notwithstanding, the CA still concluded that respondent had the subject building
constructed in the concept of being the owner of the 172.80 sq. m. portion of the subject
land.33 In this relation, it was observed that petitioner gave a misleading description of TD No.
00-TY-002-11458, considering that said tax declaration only covered petitioner’s family house
and not the subject land where said improvement was built, as petitioner alleged in his
complaint.34 In truth, the CA found that the subject land is separately covered by TD No. 00-TY-
002-9660,35 which was cancelled when the land was subdivided into two (2) lots, namely: (a)
the 187.20 sq. m. lot covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-1282536 given by Vicente to petitioner; and
(b) the 172.80 sq. m. lot covered by TD No. 00-TY-002-1282437 given by Vicente to Anthony,
which the latter sold to respondent, resulting in the issuance of TD No. 00-TY-002-1303138 in
her name.

Further, the CA stated that petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish that respondent
employed force and intimidation in entering the 172.80 sq. m. portion of the subject landas he
failed to demonstrate the factual circumstances that occurred during his dispossession of said
property.39

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,40 which was, however, denied in a
Resolution41 dated October 1, 2012, hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The main issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly set aside the RTC
Ruling and ordered the remand of the case to the latter court for trial on the merits in anaction
for recovery of ownership and possession.

The Court’s Ruling

Although the Court finds that the complaint was indeed one for forcible entry, petitioner’s case
nonetheless fails to impress on the merits.

A. Nature of the Case: Forcible Entry.

The Court disagrees with the findings of both the MTC and the CA that the allegations in the
petitioner’s complaint do not make a case for forcible entry but another action cognizable by
the RTC.42

As explicated in the case of Pagadora v. Ilao,43 "[t]he invariable rule is that what determines the
nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case, are the
allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement
of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which [Section 1, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court] provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the
court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. Hence, in forcible entry, the complaint must
necessarily allege that one in physical possession of a land or building has been deprived of that
possession by another through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. It is not essential,
however, that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, but it would
suffice that facts are set up showing that dispossession took place under said conditions. In
other words, the plaintiff must allege that he, prior to the defendant’s act of dispossession by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, had been in prior physical possession of the
property. This requirement is jurisdictional, and as long as the allegations demonstrate a cause
of action for forcible entry, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter." 44

A plain reading of petitioner’s complaint shows that the required jurisdictional averments, so as
to demonstrate a cause of action for forcible entry, have all been complied with. Said pleading
alleges that petitioner, as the original owner’s, i.e., Vicente’s, successor-in-interest, was in prior
physical possession of the subject land but was eventually dispossessed of a 150 sq. m. portion
thereof on March 26, 2007 by respondent who, through force and intimidation, gained entry
into the same and, thereafter, erected a building thereon. Clearly, with these details, the means
by which petitioner’s dispossession was effected cannot be said to have been insufficiently
alleged as mistakenly ruled by the MTC and later affirmed by the CA. The "how" (through
unlawful entry and the construction of the subject building), "when" (March 26, 2007), and
"where" (a 150 sq. m. portion of the subject land) of the dispossession all appear on the face of
the complaint. In Arbizo v. Sps. Santillan,45 the Court held that the acts of unlawfully entering
the disputed premises, erecting a structure thereon, and excluding therefrom the prior
possessor, would necessarily imply the use of force,46 as what had, in fact, been alleged in the
instant complaint. Hence, it was erroneous to conclude that petitioner only made a general
allegation that respondent’s entry in the premises was made by means of force and
intimidation47 and, consequently, that a forcible entry case was not instituted before the MTC.
Given that a forcible entry complaint had been properly filed before the MTC, the CA thus erred
in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for trial on the merits in an action for recovery of
possession and ownership, otherwise known as an accion reivindicatoria,48 pursuant to
Paragraph 2, Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which reads:

SEC. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction.– x x x.

If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject
matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction
thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice
to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.

Verily, ejectment cases fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the first level courts
by express provision of Section 33 (2)49 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,50 in relation to Section
1,51 Rule 70, of the Rules of Court.52 Even in cases where the issue of possession is closely
intertwined with the issue of ownership, the first level courts maintain exclusive and original
jurisdiction over ejectment cases,53 as they are given the authority to make an initial
determination of ownership for the purpose of settling the issue of possession. 54 It must be
clarified, however, that such adjudication is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice
an action between the same parties involving title tothe property. It is, therefore, not
conclusive as to the issue of ownership.55

B. Merits of the Forcible Entry Complaint.

Notwithstanding petitioner’s proper classification of his action, his forcible entry complaint,
nonetheless, cannot be granted on its merits, considering that he had failed to justify his right
to the de facto possession (physical or material possession) of the disputed premises.1âwphi1

As pointed out by the CA, TD No. 00-TY-002-11458, or the supposed document from which
petitioner hinges his right to the de facto possession of the subject land, only covers his house
and not the entire land itself. Nothing appears on record to show that he has the right to the de
facto possession of the 172.80 sq. m. portion which, on the contrary, appears to be consistent
with the claim of ownership of respondent in view of TD No. OOTY-002-13031 covering the
same property as registered in her name. Thus, with no evidence in support of petitioner's
stance, and the counter-evidence showing respondent's right to the de facto possession of the
172.80 sq. m. portion as its ostensible owner, the forcible complaint must necessarily fail.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, petitioner's forcible entry complaint in Sp.
Civil Case No. 08-744 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. v. Ando, G.R. No. 195669, May 30, 2016

Well-settled is the rule that the filing of the summary action for unlawful detainer during the
pendency of an action for recovery of ownership of the same parcel of Land subject of the
summary action of unlawful detainer does not amount to forum-shopping.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the December 10, 2010 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the Petition in CA-GR. SP No. 01935 and its January 26,
2011 Resolution3 which denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration thereon.4

Proceedings before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)

Before Branch 2 of the MTCC of Mandaue City, the petitioner Bradford United Church of Christ,
Inc. (BUCCI) filed a Complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against herein respondents
Dante Ando, Abenigo Augis, Edgar Cardones, Zacarias Gutierrez, Cornelio Ibarra, Jr., Zenaida
Ibarra, Teofilo Lirasan, Eunice Lirasan, Ruth Mission, Dolly Resales and Eunice Tambangan, in
their capacities as Members of the Mandaue Bradford Church Council, the Mandaue Bradford
Church (MBC), and the United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. (UCCPI). This Complaint
was docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 4936.5

In an Order dated February 9, 2005, the MTCC directed BUCCI to show cause why its Complaint
should not be dismissed for its failure to comply with the requirement on the certification
against forum-shopping under Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.6 According to the MTCC,
BUCCI failed to mention in its certification against non-forum-shopping a complete statement
of the present status of another case concerning the recovery of ownership of certain parcels of
land earlier filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) by the UCCPI and the MBC against BUCCI.
(Civil Case No. MAN-1669, captioned "United Church of Christ in the Philippines, Inc. and
Mandaue Bradford Church, Plaintiff v. Bradford United Church of Christ in the Philippines,
Defendant, for Recovery of Ownership with Preliminary Injunction".)7

The recovery of ownership case also involved Lot 3-F, the same parcel of land subject of the
unlawful detainer case, and yet another parcel of land, denominated simply as Lot 3-C. On
October 13, 1997, the RTC of Mandaue City-rendered its judgment in the recovery of ownership
case against therein plaintiffs UCCPI and MBC and in favor of therein defendant BUCCI. On
November 19, 1997, both the MBC and the UCCPI filed a motion for reconsideration of said
decision but their motion was denied by Order of March 10, 2005. 8

Meanwhile, the MTCC Branch 2 of Mandaue City, issued an Order 9 dated March 31,2005
dismissing the unlawful detainer case with prejudice for BUCCI's failure to comply with the rule
on certification against forum shopping. BUCCI appealed to the RTC which was docketed as Civil
Case No. MAN-5126-A.

Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision10 of March 13, 2006 in the unlawful detainer case, the RTC of Mandaue City,
Branch 56, affirmed the MTCC's dismissal thereof, with prejudice. The RTC held that BUCCI was
guilty of forum-shopping because it failed to certify under oath that there was another action
involving the same parties and the same Lot 3-F still pending before another court.

BUCCI moved for reconsideration but it was denied in the Order11 of June 23,2006.

Aggrieved, BUCCI filed a Petition for Review 12 before the CA docketed as CA-GR. SP No. 01935.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

In its Decision13 of December 10, 2010, the CA held that the MTCC and the RTC correctly
dismissed the unlawful detainer case. The CA opined that whatever decision mat would be
rendered in the action for recovery of ownership of the parcels of land in question would
amount to res judicata in the unlawful detainer case. The CA ruled that identity of the causes of
action does not mean absolute identity, and that the test lies not in the form of action but in
whether the same set of facts or evidence would support both causes of action. Furthermore,
the CA found that BUCCI indeed failed to state in the certification against forum-shopping in the
unlawful detainer case a complete statement of the status of the land ownership recovery case;
and that such failure impinges against Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the
CA dismissed BUCCI's Petition for Review. The CA likewise denied BUCCI's Motion for
Reconsideration in its Resolution dated January 26, 2011. 14

Hence, BUCCI is now before this Court through this Petition for Review on Certiorari.15

Issue

Petitioner presents the following issue for our consideration

WHETHER XXX THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY
OF FORUM[-] SHOPPING FOR FILING THE CASE FOR EJECTMENT OR UNLAWFUL DETAINER (CIVIL
CASE NO. 4936) DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE [ACTION FOR] RECOVERY OF OWNERSHIP XXX
(CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-1669)[,] AND FOR FAILING TO [DISCLOSE] THE PENDENCY OF THE [LATTER
CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-1669] IN THE CERTIFICATION OF NON[-] FORUM[-]SHOPPING IN THE
[FORMER CIVIL CASE NO. 4936].16

The fundamental issue to be resolved in this case is whether BUCCI committed forum-shopping
when it failed to disclose in the certification on non-forum shopping of the unlawful detainer
case a complete statement of the status of the action for recovery of ownership of property
then pending before the RTC of Mandaue City. The unlawful detainer suit involved Lot 3-F
which was also involved in the complaint for recovery of ownership.

Herein petitioner BUCCI's verification and certification against forum-shopping attached to the
instant Petition, stated that UCCP had also filed an appeal with the CA pertaining to the
recovery of ownership suit; and this appeal was docketed as CA-GR. No. 00983, then still
pending adjudication before the CA. In the same verification and certification against forum-
shopping, BUCCI stressed that the case for recovery of ownership of the disputed parcels of
land was entirely different from the unlawful detainer case, because the first case does not
involve at all the issue of material/ physical possession of Lot 3-F.17

Petitioner's arguments
BUCCI posits that the most decisive factor in determining the existence of forum-shopping is
the presence of all the elements of litis pendentia, namely, (1) identity of parties or
representation in both cases; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for; (3) the reliefs
are founded on the same facts; and (4) the identity of the preceding particulars should be such
that any judgment which may be rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

BUCCI likewise maintains that there is only identity of parties between the unlawful detainer
case and the case for recovery of ownership; and that the other three essential elements are
absent, to wit: that mere be identity of cause/s of action; that the reliefs sought are founded on
the same facts; and that the identity of the two preceding particulars be such that any
judgment which may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Specifically, BUCCI
maintains that the cause of action in Civil Case No. MAN-1669 is for recovery of ownership of
the parcels of land in dispute, whereas the cause of action in Civil Case No. 4936, the summary
action of unlawful detainer, is the determination of who has the better or superior right to the
material/physical possession (or possession de facto), of Lot 3-F; that the prayer that they be
declared the lawful owners of the disputed lots in said Civil Case No. MAN-1669 is entirely
different or dissimilar from the reliefs prayed for in the summary action of unlawful detainer
(Civil Case No. 4936) by BUCCI, which is that BUCCI be given or awarded the material or physical
possession (or possession de facto) of the disputed Lot 3-F.

Respondents' arguments

Respondents counter that BUCCI's claim that the issues involved in the two cases are dissimilar
or different is of no moment or consequence because the latter's deliberate non-disclosure in
the certificate against non-forum shopping in the summaiy action of unlawful detainer of the
pendency-in-fact of the action for recovery of ownership of the disputed parcels of land, which
involved the same parties and the same property, in the action for recovery of ownership, is an
irremissibly fatal defect that cannot be cured by mere amendment pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7
of the Rules of Court.

Our Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SEC, 5. Certification against forum[-]shopping. - The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days
therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of
the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission,
of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum[-
]shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions, (n)

The above-stated rule requires a twofold compliance, and this covers both the non-commission
of forum-shopping itself, and the submission of the certification against forum-shopping.18

xxx The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment. It exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. On the other hand, for litis
pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, the following requisites must concur:
(a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts;
and (c) the identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that
any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other case.19

Here, there is only identity of parties between the summary action of unlawful detainer and the
land ownership recovery case. However, the issues raised are not identical or similar in the two
cases. The issue in the unlawful detainer case is which party is entitled to, or should be
awarded, the material or physical possession of the disputed parcel of land, (or possession
thereof as a fact); whereas the issue in the action for recovery of ownership is which party has
the right to be recognized as lawful owner of the disputed parcels of land.

With respect to res judicata, the following requisites must concur to bar the institution of a
subsequent action: "(1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and [over] the parties; (3) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, (a)
identity of parties, (b) identity of subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of action." 20 It bears
notice that in its certification against non-forum shopping, now attached to this instant Petition,
BUCCI mentioned that the decision in the land ownership recovery case was still pending
appeal before the CA, a claim that was not controverted at all by respondents. Simply put, this
means that the former judgment is not yet final. Furthermore, the causes of action in the two
cases are not identical or similar. To repeat, in the summary action of unlawful detainer, the
question to be resolved is which party has the better or superior right to the physical/material
possession (or de facto possession) of the disputed premises.� Whereas in the action for
recovery of ownership, the question to be resolved is which party has the lawful title or
dominical right (i.e., owner's right) to the disputed premises. Thus, in Malabanan v. Rural Bank
of Cabuyao, Inc.21 the petitioner therein asserted, among others, that the complaint for
unlawful detainer against him must be dismissed on grounds of litis pendencia and forum-
shopping in view of the pending case for annulment of an action for dacion en pago and for the
transfer certificate of title in another case, this Court reiterated the well-settled rule that a
pending action involving ownership neither suspends nor bars the proceedings in the summary
action for ejectment pertaining to the same property, in view of the dissimilarities or
differences in the reliefs prayed for.

Petitioner and respondent are the same parties in the annulment and ejectment cases. The
issue of ownership was likewise being contended, with same set of evidence being presented in
both cases. However, it cannot be inferred that a judgment in the ejectment case would
amount to res judicata in the annulment case, and vice-versa.

The issue is hardly a novel one. It has been laid to rest by heaps of cases iterating the principle
that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action between the same
parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be conclusive as to the facts therein
found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.

It bears emphasizing that in ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of
the party litigants. However, the issue of ownership may be provisionally ruled upon for the
sole purpose of determining who is entitled to possession de facto. Therefore, the provisional
determination of ownership in the ejectment case cannot be clothed with finality.

Corollarily, the incidental issue of whether a pending action for annulment would abate an
ejectment suit must be resolved in the negative.

A pending action involving ownership of the same property does not bar the filing or
consideration of an ejectment suit, nor suspend the proceedings. This is so because an
ejectment case is simply designed to summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or
building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the
settlement of the parties' opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. 22

The CA thus erred in holding that, "[a]n adjudication in respondents' recovery of ownership
case would constitute an adjudication of petitioner BUCCI's unlawful detainer case, such that
the court handling the latter case would be bound thereby and could not render a contrary
ruling in the issue of physical or material possession."23 It bears belaboring that BUCCI alleged
in the instant Petition that although the RTC dismissed the complaint against it in the
ownership recovery case, it still filed the unlawful detainer case because there was never a
ruling in the former case as to who between the parties had the better right to the material or
physical possession (or possession de facto) of the subject property. Of course, no less
significant is the assertion by BUCCI that although it had previously tolerated or put up with the
lawful occupation of the disputed property by respondent MBC, it nonetheless had to put an
end to such tolerance or forbearance, because all possible avenues for reconciliation or
compromise between the parties in this case had already been closed. 24 Thus, a favorable ruling
for BUCCI in the action for recovery of ownership would not at all compel or constrain the other
court (here the MTCC of Mandaue City) to also obligatorily rule in the summary action of
ejectment that BUCCI is entitled to the material or physical possession, (or possession de facto)
of the disputed Lot 3-F because even if it be proved that it has the lawful title to, or the
ownership of, the disputed lots, there is still bom the need and necessity to resolve in the
summary action of unlawful detainer whether there are valid or unexpired agreements
between the parties that would justify the refusal to vacate by the actual occupants of the
disputed property. Indeed, in a summary action of ejectment, even the lawful owner of a parcel
of land can be ousted or evicted therefrom by a lessee or tenant who holds a better or superior
right to the material or physical (or de facto) possession thereof by virtue of a valid lease or
leasehold right thereto.

In Custodio v. Corrado,25 we declared that res judicata did not obtain in the case because,
among others, the summary action of ejectment was different from the case for recovery of
possession and ownership. There, we expounded that:

There is also no identity of causes of action between Civil Case Nos. 116 and 120. xxx

xxxx

The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of
possession and/or ownership of the land is well-settled in our jurisprudence. What really
distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (action publiciand) and
from a reinvindicatory action (action reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question
of possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (action interdictal) together with forcible entry
are the two fonns of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property.
Aside from the summary action of ejectment, action publiciana or the plenary action to recover
the right of possession and action reinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which
includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover
possession.

Further, it bears stressing that the issue on the applicability of res judicata to the circumstance
obtaining in this case is far from novel and not without precedence. In Vda. de Villanueva v.
Court of Appeals, we held that a judgment in a case for forcible entry which involved only the
issue of physical possession (possession de facto) and not ownership will not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title or ownership, such as an accion reinvindicatoria or a
suit to recover possession of a parcel of land as an element of ownership, because there is no
identity of causes of action between the two. 26

This ruling holds true in the present Petition.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The December 10, 2010 Decision of the Court of
Appeals and its January 26, 2011 Resolution in CA-GR. SP No. 01935 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Mandaue City, Branch 2 is hereby DIRECTED to give
due course to the complaint for unlawful detainer and damages, docketed thereat as Civil Case
No. 4936, instituted therein by petitioner Bradford United Church of Christ, Inc. against therein
respondents.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Heirs of Cullado v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals[3] (CA) dated December 6, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 121737
and the Resolution[4] dated May 27, 2014 denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners, the heirs of Alfredo Cullado.

Facts

The Decision of the CA dated December 6, 2013 states the facts as follows:[5]

The evidence on record shows that on May 10, 1995, Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. [(OCT
No.)] P-61499 which covered a parcel of land measuring 18,280 m2 located at Aneg, Delfin
Albano, Isabela, was issued in [Dominic Gutierrez[6]]'s favor.

On May 5, 1997, [Dominic]'s father, Dominador L. Gutierrez, representing [Dominic] who was
then still a minor, filed [before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22 of Cabagan, Isabela (RTC)] an
action[7] for recovery of ownership,[8] possession with damages with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order against Alfredo C[u]llado (C[u]llado).
In the action for recovery of ownership, [Dominic] maintained that C[u]llado had been
squatting on the parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-61499 as early as 1977, and that despite
repeated demands, C[u]llado refused to vacate the said lot.

C[u]llado, in his Answer with Motion to Dismiss[,] interposed the special and affirmative
defenses of his actual possession and cultivation of the subject parcel of land in an open,
adverse and continuous manner. He likewise asked for the reconveyance of the property,
considering that [Dominic] and his father fraudulently had the subject property titled in
[Dominic]'s name. [As his counterclaim, he wanted to recover "incidental litigation expenses in
the amount to be determined during the trial."[9]]

C[u]llado died during the course of the trial and was substituted by his heirs, [composed of his
wife Lolita Cullado and their children, Dominador Cullado, Romeo Cullado, Noel Cullado,
Rebecca Lambinicio, Mary Jane Bautista, and Jimmy Cullado[10]].

[Dominic]'s counsel repeatedly failed to attend the scheduled hearings, and as a consequence,
[the heirs of Cullado] were eventually allowed to present their evidence after [Dominic] was
deemed to have waived his right to cross-examine [the] witness [of the heirs of Cullado].

On May 18, 2010, the RTC rendered [a] Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the [heirs of
Cullado] and against [Dominic], as follows:

Ordering the dismissal of the complaint.

Ordering x x x Dominic Gutierrez to reconvey in favor of the Heirs of Alfredo C[u]llado the land
covered and embraced by Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-61499.

SO DECIDED.

On March 18, 2011, [Dominic] filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment wherein he alleged,
among others, that his counsel's negligence in handling his case prevented him from
participating therein and from filing his appeal. However, the same was denied by the RTC for
having been filed out of time.

On October 18, 2011, [Dominic] filed with [the CA a] petition for annulment of judgment on the
ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. [The CA] initially dismissed[11] the petition but
reinstated the same upon [Dominic]'s motion for reconsideration and gave it due course in [the
CA] October 23, 2012 Resolution.[12]
The CA granted the petition on the following grounds:

In the action for recovery of possession filed by [Dominic], [the heirs of Cullado] in their Answer
[raised as affirmative defense and not as a counterclaim, and] asked for[,] the reconveyance of
the lot in issue as the same was supposedly fraudulently titled in [Dominic] 's name, considering
that neither [Dominic] nor his father actually possessed or cultivated the same. These
allegations constitute a collateral attack against [Dominic]'s title, which cannot be allowed in an
accion publiciana. In sum, the defenses and grounds raised by [the heirs of Cullado] ascribe
errors in [Dominic]'s title that would require a review of the registration decree made in
[Dominic]'s favor.

xxxx

Clearly then, the court a quo had no jurisdiction to resolve the twin issues of reconveyance and
fraudulence raised by [the heirs of Cullado] before the trial court.[13] (Emphasis supplied)

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 18, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela in Civil Case No. 22-805 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.[14]

The heirs of Cullado filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15] and Dominic filed a
Comment/Opposition (To Private Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration).[16]

The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution[17] dated May 27, 2014.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue

Whether the CA erred in reversing the Decision of the RTC and in granting Dominic's petition
for annulment of judgment.

The Court's Ruling

Before delving into the sole substantive issue raised before the Court by the heirs of Cullado,
the preliminary question that needs to be addressed is whether Dominic's availment of the
exceptional remedy of annulment of judgment before the CA was proper.

Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that the remedy of annulment by the CA of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of the Regional Trial Courts can only be
availed of where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. Thus, a petition
for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, had failed to avail of the ordinary or
other appropriate remedies provided by law; and such action is never resorted to as a
substitute for a party's own neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or other
appropriate remedies.[18]

As to the grounds, Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court states that:

SEC. 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.

The applicable period for filing the petition for annulment of judgment depends upon the
ground. If based on extrinsic fraud, the petition must be filed within four years from its
discovery and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.[19]

As to the remedy of annulment of judgment, the CA correctly ruled: "considering that [Dominic]
had already availed himself of the remedy of a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38,
raising the issue of extrinsic fraud with the trial court, he is effectively barred from raising the
same issue via [his petition for annulment of judgment]."[20] The CA, however, further ruled:
"[h]owever, the same cannot be said for the ground of lack of jurisdiction, x x x [Considering
that [Dominic] immediately resorted to court action — i.e. a petition for relief from judgment
and the x x x petition for annulment of judgment - upon learning of the unfavorable Decision
dated May 18, 2010 of the [trial court], he cannot be deemed guilty of laches nor placed in
estoppel. Thus, if [Dominic] is able to prove that the trial court indeed went beyond its
jurisdiction in issuing its Decision, nothing prevents him from asking for its annulment."[21]

The Court agrees with the CA that the RTC, as will be explained, was bereft of jurisdiction to
rule with finality on the issue of ownership and consequently was without the power to order
the reconveyance of the subject land to the heirs of Cullado given the fact that the original
complaint was only an accion publiciana.[22] Accordingly, the CA was correct in upholding the
remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment.

Proceeding now to the main issue, it may be recalled that the three usual actions to recover
possession of real property are:

1. Accion interdictal or a summary ejectment proceeding, which may be either for forcible entry
(detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), for the recovery of physical or material
possession (possession de facto) where the dispossession has not lasted for more than one
year, and should be brought in the proper inferior court;[23]

2. Accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the better right of possession (possession
de jure), which should be brought in the proper inferior court or Regional Trial Court
(depending upon the value of the property)[24] when the dispossession has lasted for more
than one year (or for less than a year in cases other than those mentioned in Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court)[25]; and

3. Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion or reivindicatory action, which is an action

for recovery of ownership which must be brought in the proper inferior court or Regional Trial
Court (depending upon the value of the property).[26]

Cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are governed by Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
Under Section 1 of Rule 70, "a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration
or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, the
legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any
time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding
or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs."

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are governed by the rules on summary
procedure.[27] The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer is
conclusive with respect to the possession only, will not bind the title or affect the ownership of
the land or building, and will not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the
land or building.[28] When the issue of ownership is raised by the defendant in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.[29]

When the ejectment court thus resolves the issue of ownership based on a certificate of title to
determine the issue of possession, the question is posed: is this a situation where the Torrens
title is being subjected to a collateral attack proscribed by Section 48 of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1529[30] or the Property Registration Decree, viz.: "A certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law." The answer to this is "No" because there is no real attack, whether direct
or collateral, on the certificate of title in question for the simple reason that the resolution by
the ejectment court cannot alter, modify, or cancel the certificate of title. Thus, the issue of
whether the attack on a Torrens title is collateral or direct is immaterial in forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases because the resolution of the issue of ownership is allowed by the
Rules of Court on a provisional basis only. To repeat: when the issue of ownership is raised by
the defendant in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the
issue of possession.[31]

In an accion reivindicatoria, the cause of action of the plaintiff is to recover possession by virtue
of his ownership of the land subject of the dispute. This follows that universe of rights
conferred to the owner of property, or more commonly known as the attributes of
ownership.[32] In classical Roman law terms, they are:

Jus possidendi or the right to possess;

Jus utendi or the right to use and enjoy;

Jus fruendi or the right to the fruits;

Jus accessionis or right to accessories;

Jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use;

Jus disponendi or the right to dispose or alienate; and

Jus vindicandi or the right to vindicate or recover.[33]

Jus vindicandi is expressly recognized in paragraph 2 of Article 428, Civil Code, viz.: "The owner
has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it."

If the plaintiff's claim of ownership (and necessarily, possession or jus possidendi) is based on
his Torrens title and the defendant disputes the validity of this Torrens title, then the issue of
whether there is a direct or collateral attack on the plaintiffs title is also irrelevant. This is
because the court where the reivindicatory or reconveyance suit is filed has the requisite
jurisdiction to rule definitively or with finality on the issue of ownership — it can pass upon the
validity of the plaintiff's certificate of title.

In this connection, the court's jurisdiction to determine the validity of the Torrens title in
question is limited by Section 32 of PD 1529, which provides:
SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. - The decree of
registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability
of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the
branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a
petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and
after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an
interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. x x x

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of
title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration
in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other
persons responsible for the fraud.

In the consolidated cases of Catindig v. Vda. de Meneses[34] (Catindig) and Roxas, Sr. v. Court
of Appeals[35] the Court reiterated that:

x x x [I]t is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the
land described therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person who has a Torrens title
over a land is entitled to possession thereof.

In addition, as the registered owner, [the] right to evict any person illegally occupying [the]
property is imprescriptible. In the recent case of Gaudencio Labrador, represented by Lulu
Labrador Uson, as Attorney-in-Fact v. Sps. Ildefonso Perlas and Pacencia Perlas and Sps. Rogelio
Pobre and Melinda Fogata Pobre, the Court held that:

As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to eject any person illegally occupying his property.
This right is imprescriptible and can never be barred by laches. In Bishop v. Court of Appeals, we
held, thus:

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any
person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed
that they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the
length of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their
property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.
This right is never barred by laches.[36]
In turn, the imprescriptible right to evict ostensibly proceeds from paragraph 2 of Article
1126[37] of the Civil Code in relation to Section 47 of PD 1529, which provides:

SEC. 47. Registered land not subject to prescription. - No title to registered land in derogation of
the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

Section 47 of PD 1529 retains most of the wordings of its predecessor Section 46[38] of Act No.
496[39] or the Land Registration Act of 1902.

In an ordinary ejectment suit, the certificate of title is never imperiled because the decision of
the ejectment court on the issue of ownership is merely provisional. On the other hand, in a
reivindicatory suit, where the Torrens title or certificate of title is the basis of the complaint's
cause of action, there is always a direct attack on the certificate of title the moment the
defendant disputes its validity in a counterclaim or a negative defense.

As to accion publiciana, this is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of real property independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after
the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the real property.[40]

However, it should be noted that, unlike forcible entry and unlawful detainer which are
procedurally acknowledged,[41] accion publiciana is not. Indeed, there was even a doubt as to
whether it continued to exist after the passage of the old Civil Code. In the 1906 case of The
Bishop of Cebu v. Mangaron[42] (The Bishop of Cebu) the Court observed:

But the doubt which now exists is whether, after the promulgation of the Civil Code, the accion
publiciana continued to exist.

The doubt arises from the provisions of article 460 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:

"The possessor may lose his possession—

"1. By the abandonment of the thing.

"2. By transfer to another for a good or valuable consideration.

"3. By the destruction or total loss of the thing or by the thing becoming unmarketable.

"4. By the possession of another, even against the will of the former possessor, if the new
possession has lasted more than one year."
The last provision of this article has given rise to the doubt whether possession which is lost by
the occupation of another against the will of the former possessor is merely possession de facto
or possession de jure.

The most powerful reason why it is thought that it refers to possession both de facto and de
jure is that, whereas the two are equally lost in the manner indicated in the first three
provisions of this article, it would be rather strange that the fourth provision should only refer
to possession de facto.[43]

Article 460 of the old Civil Code was amended and became Article 555 of the new Civil Code, to
wit:

ART. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:

(1) By the abandonment of the thing;

(2) By an assignment made to another either by onerous or gratuitous title;

(3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing, or because it goes out of commerce;

(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new possession
has lasted longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of
ten years.

Article 555 of the new Civil Code recognizes that a possessor may lose his possession de facto
by the possession of another when the latter's possession has lasted longer than one year.
However, his real right of possession is not lost until after the lapse of 10 years. This same
Article 555 thus recognizes the registered owner's remedy to institute an accion publiciana
within the said 10-year period. Thus, the doubt expressed in The Bishop of Cebu was resolved in
favor of the subsistence of accion publiciana.

The issue in an accion publiciana is the "better right of possession" of real property
independently of title. This "better right of possession" may or may not proceed from a Torrens
title. Thus, a lessee, by virtue of a registered lease contract or an unregistered lease contract
with a term longer than one year, can file, as against the owner or intruder, an accion
publiciana if he has been dispossessed for more than one year. In the same manner, a
registered owner or one with a Torrens title can likewise file an accion publiciana to recover
possession if the one-year prescriptive period for forcible entry and unlawful detainer has
already passed.

While there is no express grant in the Rules of Court that the court wherein an accion
publiciana is lodged can provisionally resolve the issue of ownership, unlike an ordinary
ejectment court which is expressly conferred[44] such authority (albeit in a limited or
provisional manner only, i.e., for purposes of resolving the issue of possession), there is ample
jurisprudential support for upholding the power of a court hearing an accion publiciana to also
rule on the issue of ownership.

In Supapo v. Sps. de Jesus[45] (Supapo), the Court stated:

In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession of the
subject lot but they based their better right of possession on a claim of ownership [based on
Transfer Certificate of Title No. C-28441 registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo's
names[46]].

This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover
possession only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess
the property.

This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of ownership; it is only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked
to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a
bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in
short, is not conclusive on the issue of ownership.[47]

The Court, recognizing the nature of accion publiciana as enunciated above, did not dwell on
whether the attack on Spouses Supapo's title was direct or collateral. It simply, and rightly,
proceeded to resolve the conflicting claims of ownership. The Court's pronouncement in
Supapo upholding the indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of Spouses Supapo's title was,
however, subject to a Final Note that emphasized that even this resolution on the question of
ownership was not a final and binding determination of ownership, but merely provisional:

Final Note

As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of determining
who between the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is not a final and
binding determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties or
even third persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership.[48]

From the foregoing, the Court thus clarifies here that in an accion publiciana, the defense of
ownership (i.e., that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, is the rightful owner) will not trigger a
collateral attack on the plaintiffs Torrens or certificate of title because the resolution of the
issue of ownership is done only to determine the issue of possession.
In the present case, the Answer[49] of Cullado raised, as "special and affirmative defenses" to
Dominic's accion publiciana,[50] the issue of fraud in obtaining Dominic's certificate of title on
the ground that "neither he nor his father [had] been in actual possession and cultivation of the
[subject parcel of land]" and that Dominic was not qualified as he was then a minor.[51]

In this regard, there is no dispute that Dominic was awarded a patent (no. 023118 95 10606) on
May 10, 1995 and Original Certificate of Title[52] No. (OCT) P-61499 was issued in his name
pursuant to the said patent on May 17, 1995.[53] Cullado's Answer, filed on August 18, 1997,
questioned the OCT issued in Dominic's name. At that time, Dominic's OCT had already become
incontrovertible upon the lapse of the one-year period to question it by reason of actual fraud
as provided in Section 32 of PD 1529, viz.:

SEC. 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for value. - The decree of
registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of absence, minority, or other disability
of any person adversely affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the government and the
branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a
petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one year from and
after the date of the entry of such decree of registration, but in no case shall such petition be
entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an
interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for
value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent
lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration and the certificate of
title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration
in any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the applicant or any other
persons responsible for the fraud.

In Wee v. Mardo[54] (Wee) the Court reiterated that: "A public land patent, when registered in
the corresponding Register of Deeds, is a veritable Torrens title, and becomes as indefeasible
upon the expiration of one (1) year from the date of issuance thereof. Said title, like one issued
pursuant to a judicial decree, is subject to review within one (1) year from the date of the
issuance of the patent. This rule is embodied in Section 103 of PD 1529,"[55] viz.:

SEC. 103. Certificates of title pursuant to patents. - Whenever public land is by the Government
alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Decree. It shall be the duty of the official issuing the instrument of alienation,
grant, patent or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such instrument to be filed
with the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies, and to be there registered
like other deeds and conveyance, whereupon a certificate of title shall be entered as in other
cases of registered land, and an owner's duplicate issued to the grantee. The deed, grant,
patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the grantee shall not take effect
as a conveyance or bind the land but shall operate only as a contract between the Government
and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make registration. It is
the act of registration that shall be the operative act to effect and convey the land, and in all
cases under this Decree, registration shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds of the
province or city where the land lies. The fees for registration shall be paid by the grantee. After
due registration and issuance of the certificate of title, such land shall be deemed to be
registered land to all intents and purposes under this Decree.

The Court further stated in Wee that the issue as to whether title was procured by falsification
or fraud can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose and a Torrens title
can be attacked only for fraud within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of
registration.[56]

Since the period of one year had already lapsed when Cullado questioned the OCT's validity on
the ground of fraud (i.e., counted from the issuance on May 17, 1995 of the OCT in the name of
Dominic), via his Answer filed on August 18, 1997, then Dominic's OCT had already become
indefeasible and, until cancelled in an appropriate direct proceeding, remains to be valid.

Applying Supapo and Catindig, Dominic has a better right of possession because his right is
based on ownership recognized by OCT P-61499 registered and titled under his name. The age-
old rule that the person who has a Torrens title over the land is entitled to possession thereof
squarely applies in his favor.

In view of the foregoing, the RTC was clearly without jurisdiction in ruling that Cullado had
become the owner of the land in controversy "through the medium of acquisitive prescription"
having been in possession by himself and with his wife for 36 years[57] and that Dominic must
reconvey the land in favor of the heirs of C[u]llado.[58] While the RTC could have resolved the
issue of ownership provisionally to determine the "better right of possession," which is allowed
in an accion publiciana, it was without any power or jurisdiction to order the reconveyance of
the land in dispute because that can be done only upon a definitive ruling on the said issue —
something that cannot be done in an accion publiciana.

More than that, the RTC's ruling that Cullado had become owner by acquisitive prescription is
likewise without basis since the evidence adduced by the heirs of Cullado, as summarized in the
trial court's Decision, do not show that "the land which contains an area of more than one
hectare"[59] which Cullado was claiming was already private land at the time Cullado started
his possession thereof. It must be recalled that the land in dispute was acquired through a free
patent, which presupposes that it was initially public agricultural land pursuant to
Commonwealth Act No. (C.A.) 141[60] or the Public Land Act. While the RTC's Decision
reckoned the year 1974 as the beginning of Cullado's possession, it was conjectural to conclude
that Cullado acquired the same by virtue of prescription in the absence of any clear indication
as to when the land claimed by him was declared alienable and disposable. To be sure, the land
in dispute can be said to have become private land only when Dominic was issued his OCT in
May 1995.

Furthermore, the discrepancy in area of the "more than one hectare" land being claimed by
Cullado and the almost two hectares or 18,280 square meters land appearing in Dominic's OCT
was not satisfactorily reconciled in the RTC's Decision. The metes and bounds of the land being
claimed by Cullado being unclear, it could not be determined if it is within the boundaries of the
land technically described in Dominic's OCT. As required under Article 434 of the Civil Code,
"[i]n an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the
strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim." The heirs of Cullado
have failed to properly and sufficiently identify the property they are claiming as their own.

The Court notes that while the CA did not provisionally rule on the issue of ownership, it
nonetheless arrived at the same result, i.e., that the RTC had no jurisdiction to order the
reconveyance of the land covered by OCT P-61499 in the name of Dominic to the heirs of
Cullado and effectively nullify the said certificate of title. As concluded by the CA, the RTC erred
in allowing a collateral attack against Dominic's Torrens or certificate of title because it acted
contrary to Section 48 of PD 1529. The CA properly relied on the ruling in Ybañez v.
Intermediate Appellate Court[61] as it applies squarely to the present case, viz.:

It was erroneous for petitioners to question the Torrens Original Certificate of Title issued to
private respondent over Lot No. 986 in Civil Case No. 671, an ordinary civil action for recovery
of possession filed by the registered owner of the said lot, by invoking as affirmative defense in
their answer the Order of the Bureau of Lands, dated July 19, 1978, issued pursuant to the
investigatory power of the Director of Lands under Section 91 of Public Land Law (C.A. 141 as
amended). Such a defense partakes of the nature of a collateral attack against a certificate of
title brought under the operation of the Torrens system of registration pursuant to Section 122
of the Land Registration Act, now Section 103 of P.D. 1529. The case law on the matter does not
allow a collateral attack on the Torrens certificate of title on the ground of actual fraud. The
rule now finds expression in Section 48 of P.D. 1529 otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree.[62] (Emphasis in the original)

Since the special and affirmative defenses raised by the heirs of Cullado in the Answer pertain
to discrepancies or errors in Dominic's certificate of title, which necessarily entails a review of
the decree made in Dominic's favor, the RTC was bereft of any jurisdiction to rule on such
defenses in an action for recovery of possession or accion publiciana initiated by the registered
owner. The RTC even ruled on the issue of the nullity of Dominic's certificate of title on the
ground of his minority at the time of the issuance of the free patent in his favor — an issue that
clearly involved a collateral attack on Dominic's Torrens title, which "is beyond the province of
this proceeding and not within the jurisdiction of [the trial c]ourt."[63]

Given the nature of an accion publiciana, the heirs of Cullado could have only raised the fraud
allegedly committed by Dominic and his father and the reconveyance of title as permissive
counterclaims[64] because the evidence required to prove them differ from the evidence to
establish Dominic's demand for recovery of possession.[65] However, had the heirs of Cullado
raised the same as permissive counterclaims, and not as special and affirmative defenses, then
they should have fully paid the prescribed docket fee to vest the RTC with jurisdiction.[66]
Unfortunately, there is no proof on record that the heirs of Cullado had paid the prescribed
docket fee. Given the foregoing, the mere invocation by the heirs of Cullado in their prayer for
an order for reconveyance of the subject land in their favor will not be sufficient to vest the RTC
with jurisdiction over their belatedly intended counterclaims where the complaint involves an
accion publiciana.

The predicament on the non-payment of the legal fees regarding permissive counterclaims has
been resolved with the express requirement under Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court
that they should be assessed by the Clerk of Court "[f]or filing x x x a permissive or compulsory
counterclaim x x x and/or in cases involving property [based on] the fair market value of the
real property in litigation stated in the current tax declaration or current zonal valuation of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher, or if there is none, the stated value of the
property x x x."[67] The payment of "the new rates of the legal fees under Rule 141 x x x [for]
Compulsory counterclaims" was, however, suspended effective September 21, 2004 pursuant
to A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC.

The Court notes that while the heirs of Cullado interposed the fraud purportedly committed by
Dominic and his father in the acquisition of Dominic's OCT and pleaded their open, adverse and
continuous possession and cultivation of the subject land as "special and affirmative defenses,"
such allegations are, in reality, not affirmative defenses. As defined, an affirmative defense is an
allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in the
pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery.[68] Such allegations do
not "hypothetically admit" the material allegations of Dominic in his complaint. Rather, such
allegations are, in actuality, negative defenses. A negative defense, as defined, is the specific
denial of the material fact or facts alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his cause
or causes of action.[69] Also, "special defenses" are not expressly recognized by the Rules of
Court. Section 5, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides that defenses may either be negative or
positive.

It is observed that the Court has recognized two approaches in dealing with the claim of
ownership raised in the defendant's answer in an accion publiciana, namely: (1) to allow the
provisional resolution of the issue of ownership to determine the "better right of possession,"
or (2) not to allow its resolution because the accion publiciana court is bereft of jurisdiction to
rule with finality on the issue of ownership and the attack on a certificate of title is deemed a
collateral one that is therefore proscribed.

While the CA took the second or "collateral attack" approach, and not the first or "provisional
determination of ownership" approach, it was correct in reversing and setting aside the
Decision[70] dated May 18, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela in
Civil Case No. 22-805. Accordingly, the heirs of Cullado and all persons claiming under them
should be ordered to vacate and surrender the land subject matter of the case to Dominic.
That held, the Court, having taken the first approach, also adopts the Final Note in Supapo that
the ruling in this case, being one of accion publiciana, is limited only to the issue of determining
who between the parties has a better right to possession — and this adjudication is not a final
and binding determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties or
even third persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership.

Indeed, the bedrock of the Torrens system is the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of a land
title where there can be full faith reliance thereon. Verily, the Government has adopted the
Torrens system due to its being the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land
titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and
recognized.[71] To the registered owner, the Torrens system gives him complete peace of mind,
in order that he will be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of
any right over the covered land.[72] On the part of a person transacting with a registered land,
like a purchaser, he can rely on the registered owner's title and he should not run the risk of
being told later that his acquisition or transaction was ineffectual after all, which will not only
be unfair to him, but will also erode public confidence in the system and will force land
transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and
proof of ownership.[73]

However, registration under the Torrens system is not one of the modes of acquiring ownership
and does not create or vest title or ownership. The Torrens certificate of title is just an evidence
of ownership or title in the realty technically described therein. Thus, the issuance of the
Torrens or certificate of title does not preclude the possibility that persons not named in the
certificate may be co-owners with the person named therein, or that the registered owner may
be holding the property in trust for another person.[74]

The State may still bring an action under Section 101[75] of C.A. 141 for the reversion to the
public domain of land which has been fraudulently granted to private individuals and such
action is not barred by prescription.[76] The basis of the action for reversion is Section 91 of
C.A. 141, which provides: "The statements made in the application shall be considered as
essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on the basis of such
application, and any false statement therein or omission of facts altering, changing, or
modifying the consideration of the facts set forth in such statements, and any subsequent
modification, alteration, or change of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso
facto produce the cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. x x x"

Section 53 of PD 1529 (formerly Section 55 of Act No. 496) affords a party defrauded in a
registration case certain remedies, viz.: "In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the
owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud without
prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a certificate of title."
In Director of Lands v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal,[77] the Court stated: "The
sole remedy of the land owner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered
in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, x x
x, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an
ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages."[78]

It is settled that in an action for reconveyance or accion reivindicatoria, the free patent and the
Torrens or certificate of title are respected as incontrovertible and what is sought instead is the
transfer of the property which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant's
name. All that the plaintiff must allege in the complaint are two facts which, admitting them to
be true, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed land, namely, (1) that the
plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed him of
the same.[79] The action for reconveyance can be based on implied trust where the defendant
acquires the disputed property through mistake or fraud so that he would be bound to hold the
property for the benefit of the person who is truly entitled to it and reconvey it to him.[80]

As a final note, the Court adopts Supapo:

As a final note, we stress that our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of determining
who between the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is not a final and
binding determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties or
even third persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership.[81]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated December 6, 2013 and Resolution dated May 27, 2014 in CA-G.R. SP No. 121737 are
hereby AFFIRMED. The petitioners, the heirs of Alfredo Cullado, and all persons claiming under
them are ORDERED to vacate and surrender the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
P-61499 to its registered owner, respondent Dominic V. Gutierrez.

SO ORDERED.

Principle of Self-help (Art. 429) and State of Necessity (Art.

432)

German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 177 SCRA 495

Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro,
Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 square meters and covered by TCT No. 50023 of the
Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued on September 11, 1980 which canceled TCT
No. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally registered on August 5, 1948 in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by the
President of the Philippines on July 27, 1948, under Act No. 141.

On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney authorizing
petitioner German Management Services to develop their property covered by TCT No. 50023
into a residential subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on February 9,1983 obtained
Development Permit No. 00424 from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said
development. Finding that part of the property was occupied by private respondents and
twenty other persons, petitioner advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the latter
refused. Nevertheless, petitioner proceeded with the development of the subject property
which included the portions occupied and cultivated by private respondents.

Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the Municipal
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan, San
Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members of the Concerned Citizens of Farmer's Association; that they
have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve to fifteen years prior to the
promulgation of P.D. No. 27; that during the first week of August 1983, petitioner, under a
permit from the Office of the Provincial Governor of Rizal, was allowed to improve the
Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal at its expense, subject to the
condition that it shag secure the needed right of way from the owners of the lot to be affected;
that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter, petitioner deprived private respondents of their
property without due process of law by: (1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire
fence enclosing their farmholdings without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing
trees and other crops of private respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation, in
violation of P.D. 1038 and (3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject
private respondents from their respective farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815,
and 1028. 1

On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint for
forcible entry. 2 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI sustained the
dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court. 3

Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On July 24,1986,
said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the Municipal Trial
Court and the Regional Trial Court. 4

The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the
property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right
to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of
possession. 5 Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate Court in
its resolution dated September 26, 1986. 6

Hence, this recourse.

The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to petitioner
when it reversed the decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the opportunity to
file its answer and whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case
against petitioner. 7

We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due process
to exist. The comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently addressed the
issues presented in the petition for review filed by private respondents before the Court of
Appeals. Having heard both parties, the Appellate Court need not await or require any other
additional pleading. Moreover, the fact that petitioner was heard by the Court of Appeals on its
motion for reconsideration negates any violation of due process.

Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the
subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry
case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting
process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved. 8

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private
respondents were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses Jose
were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private respondents'
peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted rice, corn and fruit
bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of destroying their crops.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of title it
presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual possession
raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the
title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong
hand, violence or terror. 9 Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior
possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain
on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 10

Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's drastic
action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the
doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. 11 Such justification is
unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of actual or
threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has already been
lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is clear from
Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case may possession be acquired through
force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that
he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the
competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Caisip v. People 36 SCRA 17

This case is before Us upon petition of defendants Felix Caisip, Ignacio Rojales and Federico
Villadelrey, for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed that of
the Court of First Instance of Batangas, convicting them of the crime of Grave Coercion, with
which they are charged, and sentencing each to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to
exceed one-third of the principal penalty, as well as one-third of the costs.

As set forth in the trial court's decision, the background of the present case is this:

The complainant Gloria Cabalag is the wife of Marcelino Guevarra who cultivated
a parcel of land known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in sitio Bote-
bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas. The said parcel of land used to be
tenanted by the deceased father of the complainant. Hacienda Palico is owned
by Roxas y Cia. and administered by Antonio Chuidian. The overseer of the said
hacienda is Felix Caisip, one of the accused herein. Even before the occurrence
of the incident presently involved, there had been a series of misunderstandings
and litigations involving the complainant and her husband, on one hand, and the
men of Hacienda Palico on the other.

It appears that on December 23, 1957, Marcelino Guevarra filed an action with
the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking recognition as a lawful tenant of Roxas y
Cia. over lot No. 105-A of Hacienda Palico. In a decision dated February 22, 1958,
the Court of Agrarian Relations declared it has no jurisdiction over the case,
inasmuch as Guevarra is not a tenant on the said parcel of land. An appeal was
taken by Guevarra to the Supreme Court, but the appeal was dismissed in a
resolution dated April 10, 1958.

On May 17, 1958, Roxas y Cia. filed an action against Marcelino Guevarra in the
justice of the peace court of Nasugbu, Batangas, for forcible entry, praying
therein that Guevarra be ejected from the premises of Lot No. 105-A. After due
hearing, the said Court in a decision dated May 2, 1959 ordered Guevarra to
vacate the lot and to pay damages and accrued rentals. A writ of execution was
issued by Justice of the Peace Rodolfo A. Castillo of Nasugbu, which was served
on Guevarra on June 6, 1959, and the return of which was made by Deputy
Sheriff Leonardo R. Aquino of this Court on June 23, 1959 (Exhibit "10"). The writ
recites among other things that the possession of the land was delivered to the
 Roxas y Cia. thru Felix Caisip, the overseer, and Guevarra was given twenty days
from June 6, 1959 within which to leave the premises.

The record before Us does not explain why said decision was executed. According to the
complainant, her husband's counsel had appealed from said decision. The justice of the peace
who rendered it, Hon. Rodolfo Castillo, said that there really had been an attempt to appeal,
which was not given due course because the reglementary period therefor had expired; that a
motion to reconsider his order to this effect was denied by him; and that a second motion for
reconsideration was "still pending consideration," and it was October 19, 1959 when such
testimony was given.

Continuing the narration of the antecedent facts, His Honor, the Trial Judge, added:

On June 15, 1959, some trouble occurred between the complainant and Caisip
regarding the cutting of sugar cane on Lot 105-A. The following day June 16,
1959, the complainant allegedly again entered the premises of Lot 105-A and
refused to be driven out by Felix Caisip. Due to the aforementioned incidents,
Gloria Cabalag was charged in the justice of the peace court of Nasugbu,
Batangas, with grave coercion for the incident of June 15, 1959, docketed in the
said court as Criminal Case No. 968 (Exhibit "3"); and with the crime of unjust
vexation for the incident of June 16, 1959, docketed in the said court as Criminal
Case No. 970. Both cases, however, were filed only on June 25, 1959.

In other words, these criminal cases, Nos. 968 and 970, against Gloria Cabalag, were filed eight
(8) days after the incident involved in the case at bar. It is, also, noteworthy that both cases
were — on motion of the prosecution, filed after a reinvestigation thereof — provisionally
dismissed, on November 8, 1960, by the Court of First Instance of Batangas, upon the ground
"that the evidence of record ... are insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt." The decision of said court, in the case at bar, goes on to say:

It further appears that due to the tenacious attitude of Gloria Cabalag to remain
in the premises, Caisip sought the help of the chief of police of Nasugbu who
advised him to see Deputy Sheriff Aquino about the matter. The latter, however,
informed Caisip that he could not act on the request to eject Gloria Cabalag and
to stop her from what she was doing without a proper court order. Caisip then
consulted Antonio Chuidian, the hacienda administrator, who, in turn, went to
the chief of police and requested for the detail of policemen in sitio Bote-bote.
The chief of police, acting on said request, assigned the accused Ignacio Rojales
and Federico Villadelrey, police sergeant and police corporal, respectively, of the
Nasugbu Police Force, to sitio Bote-bote.1

On June 17, 1959, at about 5:00 p.m., Gloria Cabalag was seen weeding the portion of Lot 105-
A which was a ricefield. Appellant Caisip approached her and bade her to leave, but she refused
to do so, alleging that she and her husband had the right to stay there and that the crops
thereon belong to them. She having stuck to this attitude, even when he threatened to call the
police, Caisip went to his co-defendants, Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey, both of the local
police, who were some distance away, and brought them with him. Rojales told Gloria, who
was then in a squatting position, to stop weeding. As Gloria insisted on her right to stay in said
lot, Rojales grabbed her right hand and, twisting the same, wrested therefrom the trowel she
was holding. Thereupon, Villadelrey held her left hand and, together with Rojales, forcibly
dragged her northward — towards a forested area, where there was a banana plantation — as
Caisip stood nearby, with a drawn gun.

Inasmuch as Gloria shouted "Ina ko po! Ina ko po!" 2her neighbors, Librada Dulutan, followed,
soon later, by Francisca Andino, came and asked the policemen why they were dragging her.
The policemen having answered that they would take Gloria to town which was on the west —
Francisca Andino pleaded that Gloria be released, saying that, if their purpose was as stated by
them, she (Gloria) would willingly go with them. By this time, Gloria had already been dragged
about eight meters and her dress, as well as her blouse 3 were torn. She then agreed to proceed
westward to the municipal building, and asked to be allowed to pass by her house, within Lot
105-A, in order to breast-feed her nursing infant, but, the request was turned down. As they
passed, soon later, near the house of Zoilo Rivera, head of the tenant organization to which she
was affiliated, in the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria called out for him, whereupon, he went
down the house and accompanied them to the municipal building. Upon arrival thereat, Rojales
and Villadelrey turned her over to the policeman on duty, and then departed. After being
interrogated by the chief of police, Gloria was, upon representations made by Zoilo Rivera,
released and allowed to go home.

The foregoing is the prosecution's version. That of the defense is to the effect that, upon being
asked by the policemen to stop weeding and leave the premises, Gloria, not only refused to do
so, but, also, insulted them, as well as Caisip. According to the defense, she was arrested
because of the crime of slander then committed by her. Appellants Rojales and Villadelrey,
moreover, testified that, as they were heading towards the barrio of Camachilihan, Gloria
proceeded to tear her clothes.

His Honor, the Trial Judge, accepted, however, the version of the prosecution and found that of
the defense unworthy of credence. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which fully
concurred in this view, are "final," and our authority to review on certiorari its appealed
decision is limited to questions purely of law. 4 Appellants maintain that the Court of Appeals
has erred: (1) in not finding their acts "justified under Article 429 of the New Civil Code"; (2) in
holding that the 20-day period of grace given to Marcelino Guevarra and his wife, Gloria
Cabalag, by the sheriff, to vacate Lot 105-A, was valid and lawful; (3) in finding that the
elements of the crime of grave coercion are present in the case at bar; and (4) in finding
appellants guilty as charged. This pretense is clearly untenable.

Art. 429 of our Civil Code, reading:

 The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person
from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such
force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.

upon which appellants rely is obviously inapplicable to the case at bar, for,
having been given 20 days from June 6, 1959, within which to vacate Lot 105-A,
complainant did not, on June 17, 1959 — or within said period — invade or
usurp said lot. She had merely remained in possession thereof, even though the
hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor. Appellants did not
"repel or prevent in actual or threatened ... physical invasion or usurpation."
They expelled Gloria from a property of which she and her husband were in
possession even before the action for forcible entry was filed against them on
May 17, 1958, despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized them to
stay in said property up to June 26, 1959, and had expressed the view that he
could not oust them therefrom on June 17, 1959, without a judicial order
therefor.

It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A, Gloria had committed a crime in
the presence of the policemen, despite the aforementioned 20-day period, which, appellants
claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant. This contention is manifestly untenable, because:
(1) said period was granted in the presence of the hacienda owner's representative, appellant
Caisip, who, by not objecting thereto, had impliedly consented to or ratified the act performed
by the sheriff; (2) Gloria and her husband were thereby allowed to remain, and had, in fact,
remained, in possession of the premises, perhaps together with the owner of the hacienda or
his representative, Caisip; (3) the act of removing weeds from the ricefield was beneficial to its
owner and to whomsoever the crops belonged, and, even if they had not authorized it, does
not constitute a criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria and her husband had been sentenced
to vacate the land, the judgment against them did not necessarily imply that they, as the parties
who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any kind whatsoever, in or to the
standing crops, inasmuch as "necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor," 5 and
the cost of cultivation, production and upkeep has been held to partake of the nature of
necessary expenses.6

It is, accordingly, clear that appellants herein had, by means of violence, and without legal
authority therefor, prevented the complainant from "doing something not prohibited by law,"
(weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her "to do something against" her will
(stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), "whether it be right or wrong," thereby taking the
law into their hands, in violation of Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code. 7

Appellant Caisip argues that, not having used violence against the complaining witness, he
should be acquitted of the charge. In this connection, His Honor, the Trial Judge, correctly
observed:
 ... While it is true that the accused Caisip did not lay hands on the complainant,
unlike the accused Rojales and Villadelrey who were the ones who used force
against Gloria, and while the Court is also inclined to discredit the claim of the
complainant that Felix Caisip drew a gun during the incident, it sufficiently
appears from the record that the motivation and inducement for the coercion
perpetrated on the complainant came from the accused Caisip. It was his
undisguised and particular purpose to prevent Gloria from entering the land and
working on the same. He was the one who first approached Gloria with this
objective in mind, and tried to prevent her from weeding the land. He had tried
to stop Gloria from doing the same act even the day previous to the present
incident. It was Caisip who fetched the policemen in order to accomplish his
purpose of preventing Gloria from weeding the land and making her leave the
premises. The policemen obeyed his bidding, and even when the said policemen
were already over-asserting their authority as peace officers, Caisip simply stood
by without attempting to stop their abuses. He could be hardly said to have
disapproved an act which he himself induced and initiated. 8

In other words, there was community of purpose between the policemen and Caisip, so that
the latter is guilty of grave coercion, as a co-conspirator, apart from being a principal by
induction.9

In the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior

strength 10 and disregard of the respect due the offended party, by reason of her sex, 11 were
present, insofar as the three appellants herein are concerned. As regards appellants Rojales and
Villadelrey, there was the additional aggravating circumstance of having taken advantage of
their positions as members of the local police force. Hence, the penalty of imprisonment meted
out to appellants herein, which is the minimum of the maximum prescribed in said Art.
286, 12 and the fine imposed upon them, are in accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendants-
appellants. It is so ordered.

People v. Pletcha, Jr. 22 CA Rep. 807

https://dokumen.tips/documents/people-v-pletchadoc.html?page=1

Diamond Farms, Inc. v. Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, G.R. No. 192999,
July 18, 2012

Petitioner Diamond Farms, Inc. appeals the Decision1 dated December 17, 2009 and
Resolution 2 dated July 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101384.
The facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioner is a corporation engaged m commercial farming of bananas. 3 It owned 1,023.8574

hectares of land in Carmen, Davao. A big portion of this land measuring 958.8574 hectares
(958-hectare land) was initially deferred for acquisition and distribution under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).4 On November 3, 1992, Secretary Ernesto D.
Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) likewise approved the Production and
Profit Sharing (PPS) Scheme proposed by the Philippine Banana Growers and Exporters
Association as the mode of compliance with the required production sharing under Section 32
of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (CARL).5

Later, on February 14, 1995, the Deferment Order was lifted and the aforesaid 958-hectare land
was placed under CARP coverage. Thereafter, 698.8897 hectares of the 958-hectare land were
awarded to members of the Diamond Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(DARBMUPCO). Petitioner, however, maintained management and control of 277.44 hectares
of land, including a portion measuring 109.625 hectares (109-hectare land).

On November 23, 1999, petitioner’s certificates of title over the 109-hectare land were
cancelled. In lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-154155 to T-154160 were
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. On August 5, 2000, the DAR identified 278
CARP beneficiaries of the 109-hectare land, majority of whom are members of respondent
Diamond Farm Workers Multi-Purpose Cooperative (DFWMPC). On October 26, 2000, the DAR
issued six Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) collectively in favor of the 278 CARP
beneficiaries.6

Subsequently, on July 2, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint 7 for unlawful occupation, damages
and attorney’s fees against respondents. Petitioner alleged that as of November 1995, it was
the holder of TCT Nos. 112068 and 112073 covering two parcels of land within the 109-hectare
land. It alleged that it had been in possession for a long time of the two lands, which had a total
area of 74.3393 hectares (74-hectare land), and grew thereon export-quality banana, producing
on average 11,000 boxes per week worth P1.46 million. It alleged that the DAR’s August 5, 2000

Order distributing the 109-hectare land to 278 CARP beneficiaries was not yet final on account
of appeals, and therefore petitioner remains the lawful possessor of the subject land (109-
hectare land) and owner of the improvements thereon. But while the CARP beneficiaries have
not been finally designated and installed, respondents – its farm workers – refused to do their
work from June 10, 2002, forcibly entered and occupied the 74-hectare land, and prevented
petitioner from harvesting and introducing agricultural inputs. Thus, petitioner prayed that
respondents be ordered to vacate the subject land; that it be allowed to harvest on the 74-
hectare land; and that respondents be ordered to pay it lost income of P1.46 million per week
from June 10, 2002 until farm operation normalizes, exemplary damages of P200,000,
attorney’s fees of P200,000, appearance fees, incidental expenses of P100,000 and costs.
In their answer with compulsory counterclaim,8 respondents admitted that petitioner was the
holder of TCT Nos. 112068 and 112073, covering the 74-hectare land and that the said land
produces 11,000 boxes of export-quality bananas per week. Respondents added that besides
the 74-hectare land, petitioner owned four other parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 112058,
112059, 112062 and 112063 having a total area of 35.2857 hectares (35-hectare land). These
six parcels, which altogether have a total area of 109.625 hectares (109-hectare land), were
acquired by the government upon the issuance of TCTs in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. But even after CLOAs were issued to the 278 CARP beneficiaries, petitioner
continued to manage the 109-hectare land, paying wages to respondents as farm workers.
Since 1995 they had been demanding from petitioner payment of their production share to no
avail.

Respondents further claimed that petitioner conspired with 67 CARP beneficiaries to occupy
and cultivate the 35-hectare land. Petitioner tried to allow alleged beneficiaries to occupy
portions of the 74-hectare land, but respondents guarded it to protect their own rights, so the
intruders were able to occupy only the pumping structure. Thereafter, petitioner stopped farm
operation on the 74-hectare land and refused their request to resume farm operation. By way
of relief, respondents prayed that their rights as CARP beneficiaries of the 109-hectare land be
recognized and that their counterclaims for production share, profit share, accrued income and
interest be granted.

Petitioner filed a reply9 and alleged that respondents initiated the commission of premature
and unlawful entry into the 35-hectare land and did nothing to curb the unlawful entry of other
parties. Petitioner also admitted that respondents recently allowed it to harvest and perform
essential farm operations.

In their rejoinder,10 respondents denied that they illegally entered the 35-hectare land. They
averred that petitioner promoted the entry of third parties and cited petitioner’s agreements
with third parties for the harvest of fruits thereon.

During the proceedings before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator, petitioner submitted its
computation of respondents’ production and profit share from the 109-hectare land for the
years 1995 to 1999 and accordingly deposited the amount of P2.51 million. Respondents were
required to submit a project of distribution, and the parties were ordered to submit position
papers. Upon compliance by respondents with the order to submit a project of distribution, the
Office of the Regional Adjudicator ordered the release of the amount deposited by petitioner to
respondents.11 Respondents thereafter submitted their position paper,12 wherein they
reiterated that they had to guard the land to protect their rights. They confirmed petitioner’s
acceptance of their request to resume normal farm operation, and manifested that a
precarious peace and harmony thereafter reigned on the 109-hectare land. They also repeated
their prayers in their answer. Petitioner, on the other hand, failed to file its position paper
despite several requests for extension of time to file the same.13
In his Decision,14 the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator ruled that petitioner lost its
ownership of the subject land when the government acquired it and CLOAs were issued in favor
of the 278 CARP beneficiaries. The appeals from the Distribution Order will not alter the fact
that petitioner is no longer the owner of the subject land. Also, respondents have been
identified as CARP beneficiaries; hence, they are not unlawfully occupying the land. The
Adjudicator added that petitioner is unlawfully occupying the land since it has no contract with
the CARP beneficiaries. Thus, the Adjudicator denied petitioner’s prayers in its complaint and
granted respondents’ counterclaims.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the DARAB, but the DARAB denied petitioner’s appeal in a
Decision15 dated December 11, 2006. The DARAB ruled that petitioner is unlawfully occupying
the subject land; hence, its complaint against respondents for unlawful occupation lacks merit.
It also ruled that petitioner is no longer entitled to possess the subject land; that petitioner lost
its ownership thereof; that ownership was transferred to the 278 CARP beneficiaries; that the
appeals from the Distribution Order concern distribution and will not restore petitioner’s
ownership; that the 278 CARP beneficiaries can now exercise their rights of ownership and
possession; and that petitioner should have delivered possession of the 109-hectare land to the
CARP beneficiaries on August 5, 2000 instead of remaining in possession and in control of farm
operations.

In awarding production and profit share, the DARAB held that Section 32 of the CARL requires
petitioner to distribute said share to respondents. The DARAB computed the production and
profit share based on the PPS Scheme proposed by the Philippine Banana Growers and

Exporters Association and approved by DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao. The dispositive
portion of the DARAB’s December 11, 2006 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

The assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

1. DENYING the reliefs prayed for in the complaint;

2. ORDERING the [petitioner] to turn over to the respondents the possession of the
subject landholding and respect the respondents’ peaceful possession thereof;

3. ORDERING the [petitioner] to pay the respondents the following amount:

a. P27,553,703.25 less P2,511,786.00 as Production and Profit Share (PPS) from

15 February 1995 to 31 December 2005;

b. P17,796,473.43 as lease rental for the use of the land of petitioner from 26
October 2000 up to 31 December 2005;
 c. P6,205,011.89 as accrued interest on the unpaid PPS from 01 March 1996 to
01 March 2006; and d. P2,241,930.90 as accrued interest on the unpaid lease
rental from 01 January 2001 to 01 January 2006.

4. ENCOURAGING the parties to enter into an agribusiness venture over the subject
landholding, if feasible.

SO ORDERED.16

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner appealed to the CA raising the
following arguments: (1) respondents are not the lawful possessors of the subject land as well
as the valuable improvements thereon, prior to receipt by petitioner of the corresponding
payment for the land from the government, or upon deposit in favor of petitioner of the
compensation for the same in cash or in Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) bonds; (2) not being
lawful possessors of the subject land, respondents are not entitled to production share in the
amount of P25.04 million and interest thereon in the amount of P6.21 million; and (3) not being
lawful possessors of the subject land, respondents are not entitled to lease rentals as well as
accrued interest thereon.17

As afore-stated, the CA in the assailed Decision affirmed the DARAB decision. The CA, however,
deleted the award of lease rentals and interest thereon, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the assailed December 11, 2006 Decision and August 29, 2007 Resolution are
MODIFIED to delete the DARAB’s award of lease rentals and interests thereon in favor of
respondents. The rest is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.18

The CA agreed with the DARAB in rejecting petitioner’s bare and belated allegation that it has
not received just compensation. The alleged nonpayment of just compensation is also a
collateral attack against the TCTs issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The CA
found that petitioner has never sought the nullification of the Republic’s TCTs. Further, the CA
found no credible evidence relating to proceedings for payment of just compensation. The CA
held that the issuance of the Republic’s TCTs and CLOAs in favor of the 278 CARP beneficiaries
implies the deposit in cash or LBP bonds of the amount initially determined as compensation
for petitioner’s land or the actual payment of just compensation due to petitioner. Additionally,
the appeals over the Distribution Order cannot justify petitioner’s continued possession since
the appeals concern only the manner of distribution.

The CA held that petitioner became liable for respondents’ production share when the
Deferment Order was lifted. The CA noted that the DARAB computed the production share
based on the approved PPS Scheme. The CA also noted petitioner’s deposit of P2.51 million as
petitioner’s recognition of respondents’ right to production share.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration contending that the CA erred
when it affirmed the DARAB in ordering petitioner to (1) turn over possession of the subject
land to respondents and respect their possession thereof and (2) pay respondents production
and profit share of P25.04 million and interest of P6.21 million. 19 The CA, however, denied
petitioner’s motion for partial reconsideration.

Hence, petitioner filed the present appeal. Respondents, on the other hand, no longer appealed
the CA Decision and Resolution.

In its petition, petitioner argues that

I.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN COMPLETE

DEROGATION OF THE PETITIONER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO RECEIVE JUST
COMPENSATION FOR THE TAKING OF ITS PROPERTY, COMMITTED A SERIOUS

ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE PORTION OF THE DECISION OF THE DARAB
BASED ON ITS REASONING THAT THE ISSUE OF NON-PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION
TO THE PETITIONER IS AN ISSUE RAISED ONLY AT THE DARAB LEVEL; THIS RULING IS
SIMPLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND PERTINENT JURISPRUDENCE

II.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW IN CONSIDERING THE PETITIONER’S ASSERTION OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO JUST COMPENSATION AS A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE REPUBLIC’S TITLE20

Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: (1) whether respondents are guilty of
unlawful occupation and liable to petitioner for damages and attorney’s fees, (2)
whether petitioner should turn over possession of the subject land to respondents and
respect their possession thereof, and (3) whether the award of production share and
interest was proper.

Petitioner insists that prior to its receipt of the corresponding payment for the land from
the government or deposit in its favor of the compensation for the land in cash or in LBP
bonds, respondents cannot be deemed lawful possessors of the subject land and the
valuable improvements thereon, citing Section 16 (e) of the CARL. According to
petitioner, "it has yet to receive any compensation for the lands acquired by the
government."21 Petitioner also contends that the CA erred in ruling that the issue of
nonpayment of just compensation was raised only at the DARAB level, such being an
unavoidable issue intertwined with its cause of action. Petitioner further avers that the
CA erred in ruling that petitioner’s assertion of its constitutional right to just
compensation is a collateral attack on the TCTs of the Republic of the Philippines.
 Petitioner maintains that the Republic’s TCTs which are derived from its TCTs pursuant
to the CARL are neither attacked nor assailed in this case. Petitioner thus prays that it be
declared as the lawful owner and possessor of the subject land until its actual receipt of
just compensation.

In their comment, respondents claim that petitioner is just trying to mislead this Court
that it has not been paid compensation for its property. Respondents cite two
Certifications22 of Deposit (CARP Form No. 17) showing that the LBP deposited P9.92
million in cash and agrarian reform bonds as compensation for 91.3925 hectares of land
and another 18.2325 hectares of land, or for 109.625 hectares of land (109-hectare
land), owned by petitioner and covered by TCT Nos. T-112058, 112059, 112062, 112063,
112068, and 112073. Respondents also cite a DAR Memorandum 23 dated November 22,
1999 (CARP Form No. 18) requesting the Register of Deeds to issue TCTs in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. Respondents then summarized the consequent
cancellations of the TCTs by attaching certified true copies of:

xxxx

4. [TCT Nos.] T-112058, T-112059, T-112062, T-112063, T-112073 and T-112068 of

petitioner which show that LBP Certificates of Deposit and DAR Memorandum-Request
were duly annotated at the back thereof, and that the same were cancelled on 23
November 1999 upon issuance of TCTs in favor [of] the Republic of the Philippines;

5. [TCT Nos.] T-154159, T-154160, T-154157, T-154156, T-154155 issued in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines showing that the same were cancelled on 30 October 2000
upon issuance of TCT[s] in favor of herein respondents;

6. [TCT Nos.] C-14005, C-14006, C-15311, C-15526, C-15527, C-14007, C-14004 issued
infavor of herein respondents showing ‘THAT THE FARM/HOMELOT DESCRIBED IN THIS
CERTIFICATE OF LANDOWNERSHIP AWARD IS ENCUMBERED IN FAVOR OF THE LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES TO SECURE FULL PAYMENT OF ITS VALUE UNDER [THE CARL]
BY THE FARMER-BENEFICIARY NAMED HEREIN,’ and that the same were already
cancelled on April 30, 2009 upon issuance of TCTs in favor of herein respondent
cooperative now Davao Farms Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative
– DFARBEMPCO.24

In its reply, petitioner states that to "set the record straight, the documents presented by
respondents refer to the deposit of the initial valuation of the land" as determined by the LBP.
This is not the just compensation for the land which is required to be determined by a court of
justice.25 According to petitioner, Sections 56 and 57 of the CARL provides that the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), has the original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.
Petitioner also states that the issue of just compensation may be easily gleaned at least from
the submissions of the parties in their pleadings and one that had therefore been tried under
the parties’ implicit agreement. We find petitioner’s contentions bereft of merit. On the first
issue, we agree that respondents are not guilty of unlawful occupation and that there exists no
basis to award damages and attorney’s fees to petitioner as respondents are agrarian reform
beneficiaries who have been identified as such, and in whose favor CLOAs have been issued.
We thus uphold the ruling denying petitioner’s prayers in its complaint for unlawful occupation,
damages and attorney’s fees. However, we note significant facts which dispute some findings of
the Adjudicator, DARAB and CA, and make the necessary clarification or correction as
appropriate.

It is beyond doubt that petitioner is the farm operator and manager while respondents are the
farm workers. Both parties enjoyed possession of the land. Together, they worked thereon.
Before CARP, petitioner was the landowner, farm operator and manager. Respondents are its
farm workers. After the deferment period, CARP finally dawned. Petitioner lost its status as
landowner, but not as farm operator and manager. Respondents remained as petitioner’s farm
workers and received wages from petitioner.

Now, the unrebutted claim of respondents in their answer and position paper is that they
guarded the 74-hectare land to protect their rights as farm workers and CARP beneficiaries.
They were compelled to do so when petitioner attempted to install other workers thereon,
after it conspired with 67 CARP beneficiaries to occupy the 35-hectare land. They were fairly
successful since the intruders were able to occupy the pumping structure. The government,
including this Court, cannot condone petitioner’s act to thwart the CARP’s implementation.
Installing workers on a CARP-covered land when the DAR has already identified the CARP
beneficiaries of the land and has already ordered the distribution of the land to them serves no
other purpose than to create an impermissible roadblock to installing the legitimate
beneficiaries on the land.

We also find the action taken by respondents to guard the land as reasonable and necessary to
protect their legitimate possession and prevent precisely what petitioner attempted to do. Such
course was justified under Article 429 of the Civil Code which reads:

ART. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation
of his property.

Being legitimate possessors of the land and having exercised lawful means to protect their
possession, respondents were not guilty of unlawful occupation.

As to the immediate resumption of farm operations, petitioner admitted that respondents have
already allowed it to harvest and perform essential activities. Respondents have confirmed that
petitioner accepted their request to resume normal farm operations such that a precarious
peace and harmony reigned on the 109-hectare land. That farm operations resumed is evident
from petitioner’s claim of lost income amounting to P1.46 million a week for four weeks, from
June 10, 2002 to July 7, 2002.26 Due to the parties’ quick and voluntary agreement, farm
operation and the parties’ relationship normalized within five days from the filing of the
complaint on July 2, 2002. We thus agree that petitioner must respect respondents’ possession.

However, we disagree with the finding of the Adjudicator and DARAB that petitioner is guilty of
unlawful occupation. Since respondents themselves have asked petitioner to resume its farm
operation, petitioner’s possession cannot be said to be illegal and unjustified.

This notwithstanding, we sustain the order for petitioner to turn over possession of the 109-
hectare land. The DARAB and the DAR shall ensure that possession of the land is turned over to
qualified CARP beneficiaries.

The procedure for acquisition of private lands under Section 16 (e) of the CARL is that upon
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response
from the landowner, upon deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or in LBP bonds, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and
request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. Thereafter, the DAR shall proceed with the redistribution of the land to the
qualified beneficiaries, to wit:

SEC. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. – For purposes of acquisition of private
lands, the following procedures shall be followed:

xxxx

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR
of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall
thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.

xxxx

Petitioner eventually acknowledged that there was indeed a deposit of the initial valuation of
the land. There were two deposits of cash and agrarian reform bonds as compensation for the
109-hectare land owned by petitioner and covered by TCT Nos. T-112058, 112059, 112062,
112063, 112068 and 112073. Notably, petitioner also manifested that the Republic’s TCTs
which are derived from its TCTs pursuant to the CARL are neither attacked nor assailed in this
case. Petitioner even argued that the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government is conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or
deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. 27 Following petitioner’s own
reasoning, petitioner has already lost its possession and ownership when the condition was
fulfilled. Likewise undisputed is that in 2000, CLOAs had been issued collectively in favor of the
278 CARP beneficiaries of the 109-hectare land. These CLOAs constitute evidence of ownership
by the beneficiaries under the then provisions of Section 2428 of the CARL, to wit:

SEC. 24. Award to Beneficiaries. – The rights and responsibilities of the beneficiary shall
commence from the time the DAR makes an award of the land to him, which award shall be
completed within one hundred eighty (180) days from the time the DAR takes actual possession
of the land. Ownership of the beneficiary shall be evidenced by a Certificate of Land Ownership
Award, x x x. (Underscoring ours.)

In the light of the foregoing, this Court cannot grant petitioner’s plea that it be declared as the
lawful owner of the 109-hectare land. It is also to be noted that in its complaint, petitioner did
not even claim ownership of the 109-hectare land. Petitioner could only state that as of
November 1995, it was the holder of the TCTs covering the 74-hectare land and that pending
resolution of the appeals from the distribution orders, it remains in the meantime as the lawful
possessor of the 109-hectare land. Nothing therefore supports petitioner’s claim that it is the
lawful owner of the 109-hectare land.

To reiterate, petitioner had lost its ownership of the 109-hectare land and ownership thereof
had been transferred to the CARP beneficiaries. Respondents themselves have requested
petitioner to resume its farm operations and this fact has given petitioner a temporary right to
enjoy possession of the land as farm operator and manager.

We, however, agree that petitioner must now turn over possession of the 109-hectare land.

The matter has already been settled in Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated, etc. v. Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council, et al.,29 when we ruled that the Constitution and the CARL intended
the farmers, individually or collectively, to have control over agricultural lands, otherwise all
rhetoric about agrarian reform will be for naught. We stressed that under Section 4, Article XIII
of the 1987 Constitution and Section 2 of the CARL, the agrarian reform program is founded on
the right of farmers and regular farm workers who are landless to own directly or collectively
the lands they till. The policy on agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must
always be in the hands of the farmers.

Under Section 16 (e) of the CARL, the DAR is mandated to proceed with the redistribution of
the land to the qualified beneficiaries after taking possession of the land and requesting the
proper Register of Deeds to issue a TCT in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Section
24 of the CARL is yet another mandate to complete the award of the land to the beneficiary
within 180 days from the time the DAR takes actual possession of the land. 30 And under Section
20 of DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1998, also known as the Rules and Regulations
on the Acquisition, Valuation, Compensation and Distribution of Deferred Commercial Farms,
CLOAs shall be registered immediately upon generation, and the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) shall install or cause the installation of the beneficiaries in the commercial farm
within seven days from registration of the CLOA. Section 20 of the Rules provides:
SEC. 20. Registration of CLOAs and Installation of Beneficiaries – CLOAs shall be registered
immediately upon generation. The PARO shall install or cause the installation of the
beneficiaries in the commercial farm within seven (7) days from registration of the CLOA.

We hold that the 109-hectare land must be distributed to qualified CARP beneficiaries. They
must be installed on the land and have possession and control thereof.

A problem that emerged in this case is the identification of qualified CARP beneficiaries.
Respondents’ own evidence does not definitively show who are the legitimate CARP
beneficiaries in the 109-hectare land. TCT Nos. 112058, 112059, 112062, 112063, 112068, and
112073, issued in the name of petitioner, were cancelled by TCT Nos. 154155 to 154160 issued
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The Republic’s TCTs were cancelled by TCT Nos.
C-14002 to C-14007.31 Notably, TCT Nos. C-14004,32 C-14006,33 and C-1400734 show that they
were respectively cancelled by TCT Nos. C-27342, C-27344, and C-27345, all in favor of
DFARBEMPCO. It must be verified however if DFARBEMPCO is the legitimate successor of
DFWMPC, herein respondent cooperative. As regards TCT No. C-14005,35 there was a partial
cancellation by TCT No. C-27110 in favor of DARBMUPCO and total cancellation by TCT No. C-
27343 in favor of DFARBEMPCO. Nothing is shown about TCT Nos. C-14002 to C-14003.

Neither can TCT Nos. C-15311,36 C-15526,37 and C-1552738 provide clarity. These TCTs cited by
respondents contain entries of partial or total cancellation by TCT Nos. C-27346, C-27115 and C-
27114, in favor of DFARBEMPCO or DARBMUPCO. The areas covered by TCT Nos. C-15311, C-
15526, and C-15527 also appear to be different than those covered by the cancelled TCTs in the
name of petitioner and the Republic of the Philippines. Hence, it is imperative that the DAR and
PARO assist the DARAB so that the 109-hectare land may be properly turned over to qualified
CARP beneficiaries, whether individuals or cooperatives. Needless to stress, the DAR and PARO
have been given the mandate to distribute the land to qualified beneficiaries and to install
them thereon.

To fully address petitioner’s allegations, we move on to its claim that the issue of just
compensation is an issue that may easily be gleaned at least from the submissions of the parties
in their pleadings and one that had therefore been tried under the parties’ implicit agreement.

Petitioner’s claim is unfounded. Even the instant appeal39 is silent on the factors to be
considered40 in determining just compensation. These factors are enumerated in Section 17 41 of
the CARL which reads:

SECTION 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost
of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income,
the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by
government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the
nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said
land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
What petitioner stressed before us and before the CA to assail respondents’ possession is its
less-than-candid claim that it has yet to receive any compensation for the lands acquired by the
government.42 Petitioner’s cause of action in its complaint for unlawful occupation with prayer
that respondents be ordered to vacate and pay damages and attorney’s fees cannot also be
mistaken as one for determination of just compensation. Thus, just compensation was never an
issue in this case.

Sections 56 and 57 of the CARL likewise provides that the RTC, acting as SAC, has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, to wit:

SEC. 56. Special Agrarian Court. - The Supreme Court shall designate at least one (1) branch of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) within each province to act as a Special Agrarian Court.

xxxx

SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, x x x.

We said that the DAR’s land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and
conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as
SAC to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the
determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. 43

This case however was not brought before the SAC on determination of just compensation. No
reversible error was therefore committed by the CA when it did not rule on just compensation.

On the third issue, petitioner contends that respondents are not entitled to production share as
well as interest since they are not lawful possessors of the subject land. Petitioner asserts that
the 3% production share under Section 32 of the CARL may only be given if there are sales from
the production of the land. Petitioner however claims that it has incurred losses and that
respondents admitted that farm operations in the subject land have not normalized. Petitioner
thus submits that there is no factual basis in the production share from the sale of agricultural
products in the subject land.

The contention has no merit.

We have already ruled that respondents’ possession is legitimate. On petitioner’s claim that it
incurred losses, Section 32 of the CARL clearly states that the 3% production share of the farm
workers is based on "gross sales from the production of such lands," to wit:

SEC. 32. Production-Sharing. – Pending final land transfer, individuals or entities owning, or
operating under lease or management contract, agricultural lands are hereby mandated to
execute a production-sharing plan with their farmworkers or farmworkers’ organization, if any,
whereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of such lands are distributed
within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year as compensation to regular and other
farmworkers in such lands over and above the compensation they currently receive: Provided,
That these individuals or entities realize gross sales in excess of five million pesos per annum
unless the DAR, upon proper application, determines a lower ceiling. (Underscoring ours.)

Petitioner cites its net losses, computed after deductions were made on the amount of its
sales.1âwphi1 These losses however, have no bearing in computing the production share which
is based on gross sales. And petitioner’s own allegation of weekly production worth P1.46
million – the same amount used by petitioner as basis of its claim for damages – debunks its
claim that no basis exists that there were sales from agricultural products of the subject land.
Likewise supporting the existence of sales is petitioner’s own computation of respondents’
production share and its deposit of the amount of P2.51 million before the Office of the
Regional Adjudicator. It must be noted also that farm operations normalized within five days
from the filing of the complaint.

In sum, petitioner failed to show any reversible error committed by the CA in affirming the
DARAB’s computation of respondents’ production share based on the approved PPS Scheme.
Notably, petitioner has admitted the fact of approval of the PPS Scheme. 44

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit and AFFIRM the Decision dated December
17, 2009 and Resolution dated July 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101384.

We also DIRECT the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
to assist the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in the distribution of the I 09-
hectare land to the qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether individuals or cooperatives.

Let a copy of this Decision be served upon the Department of Agrarian Reform.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Spouses Fuentes v. Roca, G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010

This case is about a husband’s sale of conjugal real property, employing a challenged affidavit of
consent from an estranged wife. The buyers claim valid consent, loss of right to declare nullity
of sale, and prescription.

The Facts and the Case

Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, Zamboanga City. On October 11,
1982 she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. 1 But
Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name.

Six years later in 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes
(the Fuentes spouses). They arranged to meet at the office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom
they asked to prepare the documents of sale. They later signed an agreement to sell that Atty.
Plagata prepared2 dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated that it was to take
effect in six months.

The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of ₱60,000.00
for the transfer of the lot’s title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of
structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca
(Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarciano’s compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses
were to take possession of the lot and pay him an additional ₱140,000.00 or ₱160,000.00,
depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano
was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the
lot without any further formality and payment.

The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other
requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips to
Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. 3 As soon as Tarciano met the other conditions,
Atty. Plagata notarized Rosario’s affidavit in Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989 Tarciano
executed a deed of absolute sale4 in favor of the Fuentes spouses. They then paid him the
additional ₱140,000.00 mentioned in their agreement. A new title was issued in the name of
the spouses5 who immediately constructed a building on the lot. On January 28, 1990 Tarciano
passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards.

Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely, respondents Conrado G.
Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, and Rose Marie R. Cristobal, together with Tarciano’s sister, Pilar R.
Malcampo, represented by her son, John Paul M. Trinidad (collectively, the Rocas), filed an
action for annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City in Civil Case 4707. The Rocas claimed that the
sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did not give her consent to it. Her
signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They thus prayed that the property be
reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano. 6

The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that he
personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence in Paco, Manila, on September 15,
1988. He admitted, however, that he notarized the document in Zamboanga City four months
later on January 11, 1989.7 All the same, the Fuentes spouses pointed out that the claim of
forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could invoke it. Besides, the four-year
prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud had already lapsed.
Both the Rocas and the Fuentes spouses presented handwriting experts at the trial. Comparing
Rosario’s standard signature on the affidavit with those on various documents she signed, the
Rocas’ expert testified that the signatures were not written by the same person. Making the
same comparison, the spouses’ expert concluded that they were. 8

On February 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, dismissing the case. It ruled that the action
had already prescribed since the ground cited by the Rocas for annulling the sale, forgery or
fraud, already prescribed under Article 1391 of the Civil Code four years after its discovery. In
this case, the Rocas may be deemed to have notice of the fraud from the date the deed of sale
was registered with the Registry of Deeds and the new title was issued. Here, the Rocas filed
their action in 1997, almost nine years after the title was issued to the Fuentes spouses on
January 18, 1989.9

Moreover, the Rocas failed to present clear and convincing evidence of the fraud. Mere
variance in the signatures of Rosario was not conclusive proof of forgery. 10 The RTC ruled that,
although the Rocas presented a handwriting expert, the trial court could not be bound by his
opinion since the opposing expert witness contradicted the same. Atty. Plagata’s testimony
remained technically unrebutted.11

Finally, the RTC noted that Atty. Plagata’s defective notarization of the affidavit of consent did
not invalidate the sale. The law does not require spousal consent to be on the deed of sale to
be valid. Neither does the irregularity vitiate Rosario’s consent. She personally signed the
affidavit in the presence of Atty. Plagata.12

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision. The CA found sufficient
evidence of forgery and did not give credence to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he saw Rosario
sign the document in Quezon City. Its jurat said differently. Also, upon comparing the
questioned signature with the specimen signatures, the CA noted significant variance between
them. That Tarciano and Rosario had been living separately for 30 years since 1958 also
reinforced the conclusion that her signature had been forged.

Since Tarciano and Rosario were married in 1950, the CA concluded that their property
relations were governed by the Civil Code under which an action for annulment of sale on the
ground of lack of spousal consent may be brought by the wife during the marriage within 10
years from the transaction. Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997
fell within 10 years of the January 11, 1989 sale.

Considering, however, that the sale between the Fuentes spouses and Tarciano was merely
voidable, the CA held that its annulment entitled the spouses to reimbursement of what they
paid him plus legal interest computed from the filing of the complaint until actual payment.
Since the Fuentes spouses were also builders in good faith, they were entitled under Article 448
of the Civil Code to payment of the value of the improvements they introduced on the lot. The
CA did not award damages in favor of the Rocas and deleted the award of attorney’s fees to the
Fuentes spouses.13
Unsatisfied with the CA decision, the Fuentes spouses came to this court by petition for
review.14

The Issues Presented

The case presents the following issues:

1. Whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband

Tarciano’s sale of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;

2. Whether or not the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the
spouses already prescribed; and

3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the
action to annul that sale.

The Court’s Rulings

First. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of
consent had been forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the fact that she gave her consent
to her husband’s sale of the conjugal land would render the other issues merely academic.

The CA found that Rosario’s signature had been forged. The CA observed a marked difference
between her signature on the affidavit of consent 15 and her specimen signatures.16 The CA gave
no weight to Atty. Plagata’s testimony that he saw Rosario sign the document in Manila on
September 15, 1988 since this clashed with his declaration in the jurat that Rosario signed the
affidavit in Zamboanga City on January 11, 1989.

The Court agrees with the CA’s observation that Rosario’s signature strokes on the affidavit
appears heavy, deliberate, and forced. Her specimen signatures, on the other hand, are
consistently of a lighter stroke and more fluid. The way the letters "R" and "s" were written is
also remarkably different. The variance is obvious even to the untrained eye.

Significantly, Rosario’s specimen signatures were made at about the time that she signed the
supposed affidavit of consent. They were, therefore, reliable standards for comparison. The
Fuentes spouses presented no evidence that Rosario suffered from any illness or disease that
accounted for the variance in her signature when she signed the affidavit of consent. Notably,
Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958. And she resided so far
away in Manila. It would have been quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her signature and
avoid the risk that she would not give her consent to the sale or demand a stiff price for it.

What is more, Atty. Plagata admittedly falsified the jurat of the affidavit of consent. That jurat
declared that Rosario swore to the document and signed it in Zamboanga City on January 11,
1989 when, as Atty. Plagata testified, she supposedly signed it about four months earlier at her
residence in Paco, Manila on September 15, 1988. While a defective notarization will merely
strip the document of its public character and reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified
jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof
of Rosario’s consent to the sale of the land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the
notarized affidavit as proof of Rosario’s consent does not matter. The sale is still void without
an authentic consent.

Second. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the
Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano
sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few months after the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal partnership
of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole administrator
of the conjugal partnership, Article 16617 prohibited him from selling commonly owned real
property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wife’s consent, the
sale is not void but merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale annulled
during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs
may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property that Tarciano
fraudulently sold. Thus:

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should
the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may
demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.

But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property
Relations Between Husband and Wife.18 Further, the Family Code provisions were also made to
apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested rights. 19 Thus:

Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains
already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in
Article 256. (n)

Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989,
the law that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code.

In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a
period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real
property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order
allowing the sale, the same would be void. Article 124 thus provides:

Art. 124. x x x In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate
in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x x

Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has no
force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are declared
void by positive provision of law,20 as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the
other spouse’s written consent. A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely
wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription. 21

But, although a void contract has no legal effects even if no action is taken to set it aside, when
any of its terms have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow
restitution of what has been given under it. 22 This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil
Code does not prescribe. Thus:

Art. 1410. The action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe.

Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother’s (his wife’s) written
consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.

Besides, even assuming that it is the Civil Code that applies to the transaction as the CA held,
Article 173 provides that the wife may bring an action for annulment of sale on the ground of
lack of spousal consent during the marriage within 10 years from the transaction.
Consequently, the action that the Rocas, her heirs, brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of the
January 11, 1989 sale. It did not yet prescribe.

The Fuentes spouses of course argue that the RTC nullified the sale to them based on fraud and
that, therefore, the applicable prescriptive period should be that which applies to fraudulent
transactions, namely, four years from its discovery. Since notice of the sale may be deemed
given to the Rocas when it was registered with the Registry of Deeds in 1989, their right of
action already prescribed in 1993.

But, if there had been a victim of fraud in this case, it would be the Fuentes spouses in that they
appeared to have agreed to buy the property upon an honest belief that Rosario’s written
consent to the sale was genuine. They had four years then from the time they learned that her
signature had been forged within which to file an action to annul the sale and get back their
money plus damages. They never exercised the right.
If, on the other hand, Rosario had agreed to sign the document of consent upon a false
representation that the property would go to their children, not to strangers, and it turned out
that this was not the case, then she would have four years from the time she discovered the
fraud within which to file an action to declare the sale void. But that is not the case here.
Rosario was not a victim of fraud or misrepresentation. Her consent was simply not obtained at
all. She lost nothing since the sale without her written consent was void. Ultimately, the Rocas
ground for annulment is not forgery but the lack of written consent of their mother to the sale.
The forgery is merely evidence of lack of consent.

Third. The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not obtained,
that the law gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husband’s sale of conjugal
land. But here, Rosario died in 1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that the right to
have the sale declared void is forever lost?

The answer is no. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the
land remained the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they
passed on the ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. 23 As lawful owners,
the Rocas had the right, under Article 429 of the Civil Code, to exclude any person from its
enjoyment and disposal.1avvphi1

In fairness to the Fuentes spouses, however, they should be entitled, among other things, to
recover from Tarciano’s heirs, the Rocas, the ₱200,000.00 that they paid him, with legal interest
until fully paid, chargeable against his estate.

Further, the Fuentes spouses appear to have acted in good faith in entering the land and
building improvements on it. Atty. Plagata, whom the parties mutually entrusted with closing
and documenting the transaction, represented that he got Rosario’s signature on the affidavit
of consent. The Fuentes spouses had no reason to believe that the lawyer had violated his
commission and his oath. They had no way of knowing that Rosario did not come to Zamboanga
to give her consent. There is no evidence that they had a premonition that the requirement of
consent presented some difficulty. Indeed, they willingly made a 30 percent down payment on
the selling price months earlier on the assurance that it was forthcoming.

Further, the notarized document appears to have comforted the Fuentes spouses that
everything was already in order when Tarciano executed a deed of absolute sale in their favor
on January 11, 1989. In fact, they paid the balance due him. And, acting on the documents
submitted to it, the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued a new title in the names of the
Fuentes spouses. It was only after all these had passed that the spouses entered the property
and built on it. He is deemed a possessor in good faith, said Article 526 of the Civil Code, who is
not aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.

As possessor in good faith, the Fuentes spouses were under no obligation to pay for their stay
on the property prior to its legal interruption by a final judgment against them. 24 What is more,
they are entitled under Article 448 to indemnity for the improvements they introduced into the
property with a right of retention until the reimbursement is made. Thus:

Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good
faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built
or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that
of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does
not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree
upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
(361a)

The Rocas shall of course have the option, pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code, 25 of
indemnifying the Fuentes spouses for the costs of the improvements or paying the increase in
value which the property may have acquired by reason of such improvements.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 00531 dated February 27, 2007 as follows:

1. The deed of sale dated January 11, 1989 that Tarciano T. Roca executed in favor of
Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L. Fuentes, as well as the Transfer Certificate of
Title T-90,981 that the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City issued in the names of the
latter spouses pursuant to that deed of sale are DECLARED void;

2. The Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City is DIRECTED to reinstate Transfer Certificate

of Title 3533 in the name of Tarciano T. Roca, married to Rosario Gabriel;

3. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and Pilar
Malcampo are ORDERED to pay petitioner spouses Manuel and Leticia Fuentes the
₱200,000.00 that the latter paid Tarciano T. Roca, with legal interest from January 11,
1989 until fully paid, chargeable against his estate;

4. Respondents Gonzalo G. Roca, Annabelle R. Joson, Rose Marie R. Cristobal, and Pilar
Malcampo are further ORDERED, at their option, to indemnify petitioner spouses
Manuel and Leticia Fuentes with their expenses for introducing useful improvements on
the subject land or pay the increase in value which it may have acquired by reason of
those improvements, with the spouses entitled to the right of retention of the land until
the indemnity is made; and

5. The RTC of Zamboanga City from which this case originated is DIRECTED to receive
evidence and determine the amount of indemnity to which petitioner spouses Manuel
and Leticia Fuentes are entitled.
SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 26 June
20141 and the Resolution dated. 15 October 20142 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
01099, The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Sentence dated 15 September
20113 rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City in Criminal Case No. 65,734-
09, finding petitioner Marcelo G. Saluday (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive under Presidential Decree No.
1866,4 as amended (PD 1866).

The Antecedent Facts

On 5 May 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of
the Philippine Army at a checkpoint near the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. SCAA Junbert
M. Buco (Buco), a member of the Task Force, requested all male passengers to disembark from
the vehicle while allowing the female passengers to remain inside. He then boarded the bus to
check the presence and intercept the entry of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives,
and suspicious individuals.

SCAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a small, gray-
black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He lifted the bag and
found it too heavy for its small size. SCAA Buco then looked at the male passengers lined
outside and noticed that a man in a white shirt (later identified as petitioner) kept peeping
through the window towards the direction of the bag. Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the
owner of the bag was, to which the bus conductor answered that petitioner and his brother
were the ones seated at the back. SCAA Buco then requested petitioner to board the bus and
open the bag. Petitioner obliged and the bag revealed the following contents: (1) an improvised
.30 caliber carbine bearing serial number 64702; (2) one magazine with three live ammunitions;
(3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked
petitioner to produce proof of his authority to carry firearms and explosives. Unable to show
any, petitioner was immediately arrested and informed of his rights by SCAA Buco.

Petitioner was then brought for inquest before the Office of the City Prosecutor for Davao City.
In its Resolution dated 7 May 2009,5 the latter found probable cause to charge him with illegal
possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive under PD 1866. The
Information dated 8 May 2009 thus reads:
That on or about May 5, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly, with
intent to possess, had in his possession and under his custody an improvised high powered
firearm caliber .30 carbine bearing Serial No. 64702 (made in Spain) with one (1) magazine
loaded with three (3) live ammunitions and one (1) "cacao" type hand grenade explosive;
without first securing the necessary license to possess the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6
When arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

During the trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses namely, NUP Daniel Tabura (Tabura),
a representative of the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police, and
SCAA Buco. NUP Tabura identified the Certification dated 5 November 2009 7 attesting that
petitioner was "not a licensed/registered holder of any kind and caliber per verification from
records." Meanwhile, SCAA Buco identified petitioner and the items seized from the bag, and
testified on the details of the routine inspection leading to the immediate arrest of petitioner.
On cross�-examination, SCAA Buco further elaborated on the search conducted:

Atty. Mamburam

Q And that check point, which was conducted along Ilang [R]oad, Davao City, was by virtue of
a memorandum?

A Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q Now, you said that at around 5:00 of said date, you were able to intercept a Metro Shuttle
passenger bus and you requested all passengers to alight?

A Yes.

Q All female passengers were left inside?

A Yes.Your Honor.

Q And, after all passengers were able to alight, you checked all cargoes of the passengers in
the bus?

A Yes.
xxxx

Q And, you testified that one of those things inside the bus was a black gray colored pack bag
which was placed at the back portion of the bus?

A Yes.

Q You said that the bag was heavy?

A Yes.

Q And you picked up or carried also the other belongings or cargo[e]s inside the bus and that
was the only thing or item inside the bus which was heavy. Is that correct?

A There were many bags and they were heavy. When I asked who is the owner of the bag
because it was heavy but the bag was small, when I asked, he said the content of the bag
was a cellphone. But I noticed that it was heavy.

xxxx

Q And you said that somebody admitted ownership of the bag. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Who admitted ownership of the bag?

A (WITNESS POINTS TO THE ACCUSED)

Q Now, you said that while you are looking at the bag, you noticed that one male passenger
you pointed as the accused kept looking at you?

A Yes.

Q And, aside from the accused, all the other male passengers were not looking at you?

A The other passengers were on the ground but he was in front of [the] window looking
towards his bag.

xxxx
Q And the accused admitted that he owned the bag, you requested him to open the bag?

A Not yet. I let him board the bus and asked him if he can open it.

Q And, when he opened it?

A I saw the handle of the firearm.8 (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, the defense presented petitioner as sole witness. On direct examination,
petitioner denied ownership of the bag. However, he also admitted to answering SCAA Buco
when asked about its contents and allowing SCAA Buco to open it after the latter sought for his
permission:

ATTY. MAMBURAM

Q x x x [A]fter the conductor of the bus told the member of the task force that you and your
brother were seated at the back of the bus, can you please tell us what happened next?

A A The member of the task force asked who is the owner of the bag and what were the
contents of the bag.

Q To whom did the member of the task force address that question?

A To me because I was pointed to by the conductor.

Q And what was your reply to the question of the member of the task force?

A I told him it was only a cellphone.

Q By the way, Mr. Witness, who owned that bag?

A My elder brother.

Q And why did you make a reply to the question of the member of the task force when, in
fact, you were not the owner of the bag?

A Because I was pointed to by the conductor that it was me and my brother who were seated
at the back.

xxxx
Q Now, after you told the member of the task force that probably the content of the bag
was cellphone, what happened next?

A He asked if he can open it.

Q And what was your reply?

A I told him yes, just open it.

xxxx

Q Now, you said that the owner of the bag and the one who carried that bag was your
brother, what is the name of your brother?

A Roger Saluday.

Q Where is your brother Roger now?

A Roger is already dead. He died in September 2009. 9 (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, petitioner clarified that only he was pointed at by the conductor when
the latter was asked who owned the bag. Petitioner also admitted that he never disclosed he
was with his brother when he boarded the bus:

PROS. VELASCO

Q You said that you panicked because they pulled you but as a way of suving yourself
considering you don't own the bag, did you not volunteer to inform them that [the] bag was
owned by your brother?

A I told them I have a companion but I did not tell them that it was my brother because I was
also afraid of my brother.

Q So, in short, Mr. Witness, you did not actually inform them that you had a brother at that
time when you were boarding that bus, correct?

A No, sir, I did not.

xxxx
Q So, you were answering all questions by saying it is not your bag but you confirm now that
it was the conductor of that bus who pointed you as the owner of the bag, correct?

A Yes, sir, the conductor pointed at me as the one who [sic] seated at the back. 10 (Emphasis
supplied)
The defense subsequently rested its case and the prosecution waived the right to present
rebuttal evidence. Upon order from the trial cm.ni, the parties submitted their respective
memoranda.

The Decision of the Trial Court

Finding the denials of petitioner as self-serving and weak, the trial court declared him to be in
actual or constructive possession of firearm and explosive without authority or license.
Consequently, in the dispositive portion of the Sentence dated 15 September 2011, petitioner
was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearm, ammunition, and
explosive under PD 1866:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding Marcelo
Gigbalen Saluday GUILTY of illegal possession of high powered firearm, ammunition and
explosive. For the offense of illegal possession of high powered firearm and ammunition, he is
hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of prision mayor in its minimum period. He is
likewise ordered to pay a fine of P30,000.00. For the offense of illegal possession of explosive,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of P50,000.00.

x x x x

SO ORDERED.11
On 12 October 2011, petitioner timely filed his Notice of Appeal. 12

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioner challenged his conviction raising as grounds the alleged misappreciation
of evidence by the trial court and the supposed illegality of the search.13 On the other hand, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the warrantless search was valid being a
consented search, and that the factual findings of the trial court can no longer be disturbed. 14

In its Decision dated 26 June 2014, the Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of petitioner
and affirmed the ruling of the trial court with modification:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Sentence dated September 15, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 11, Davao City, in Criminal Case No. 65,734-09,
finding Marcelo Gigbalen Saluday guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of high
powered firearm, ammunition and explosive is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that:

(1) for the offense of illegal possession of high-powered firearm and ammunition, he is imposed
an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correccional maximum, as the minimum term, to seven (7) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor minimum, as the maximum term, in addition lo the fine of Thirty thousand
pesos (P30,000.00); and

(2) for the offense of illegal possession of explosive, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

SO ORDERED.15
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,16 to which the OSG filed its Comment. 17 In
its Resolution dated 15 October 2014,18 the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration for being pro forma. Hence, petitioner filed this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Issue

Petitioner assails the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to
warrant his conviction for the offenses charged.

The Ruling of this Court

We affirm.

Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.19 As a result, the Court, on appeal, is not duty-bound to weigh and sift through
the evidence presented during trial.20 Further, factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are accorded great respect even finality. 21

Here, petitioner assails his conviction for illegal possession of high�powered firearm and
ammunition under PD 1866, and illegal possession of explosive under the same law. The
elements of both offenses are as follows: (1) existence of the firearm, ammunition or explosive;
(2) ownership or possession of the firearm, ammunition or explosive; and (3) lack of license to
own or possess.22 As regards the second and third elements, the Court of Appeals concurred
with the trial court that petitioner was in actual or constructive possession of a high-powered
firearm, ammunition, and explosive without the requisite authority. The Decision dated 26 June
2014 reads in pertinent part:

In the present case, the prosecution proved the negative fact that appellant has no license or
permit to own or possess the firearm ammunition and explosive by presenting NUP Daniel
Tab[u]ra (Tab[u]ra), a representative of the Firearms and Explosives Division (FED) of the PNP.
He identified the Certification issued by the Chief, Records Section, FED of the PNP, stating that
appellant "is not a licensed/registered holder of any kind and caliber per verification from
records of this office."

Appellant, however, questions the competence of Tab[u]ra to testify on the veracity or

truthfulness of the Certification. He claims that the officer who issued it should have been the
one presented so he would not be denied the right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him.

There is no merit to petitioner's claim. The following is pertinent:

x x x x

The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a
certification from, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting
that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the second element of possession of illegal firearms. The prosecution more than complied
when it presented both.

xxxx
Also, appellant denies having physical or constructive possession of the firearms, ammunition
and explosive. However, his denial flies in the face of the following testimonies which he
himself made:

x x x x

Appellant gave information, albeit misleading, op the contents of the bag. He even allowed the
police officer to open it Based on his actuations, there could be no doubt that he owned the
bag containing the fireann, ammunition and explosive.

Shifting the blame to his dead brother is very easy for appellant to fabricate. Besides, the
allegation that his brother owned the bag is uncorroborated and self-serving.23
As above-quoted, the presence of the second and third elements of illegal possession of
firearm, ammunition, and explosive raises questions of fact. Considering further that the Court
of Appeals merely echoed the factual findings of the trial court, the Court finds no reason to
disturb them.

As regards the first element, petitioner corroborates the testimony of SCAA Buco on four
important points: one, that petitioner was a passenger of the bus flagged down on 5 May 2009
at a militaty checkpoint in Ilang, Davao City; two, that SCAA Buco boarded and searched the
bus; three, that the bus conductor pointed at petitioner as the owner of a small, gray-black pack
bag on the back seat of the bus; and four, that the same bag contained a .30-caliber firearm
with one magazine loaded with three live ammunitions, and a hand grenade. Notably,
petitioner does not challenge the chain of custody over the seized items. Rather, he merely
raises a pure question of law and argues that they are inadmissible on the ground that the
search conducted by Task Force Davao was illegal.

The Court disagrees.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which was patterned after the Fourth Amendment to
the United States (U.S.) Constitution,24 reads:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant.of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it operates against
"unreasonable" searches and seizures only. 25 Conversely, when a search is "reasonable,"
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does not apply. As to what qualifies as a reasonable
search, the pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court, which are doctrinal in this
jurisdiction,26 may shed light on the matter.

In the seminal case of Katz v. United States,27 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the electronic
surveillance of a phone conversation without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, what the Fourth Amendment protects are people, not
places such that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his or her own home or
office, is not a subject ofFourth Amendment protection in much the same way that what he or
she seeks to preserve as private, even m an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected, thus:

Because of the misleading way the issues have been formulated, the parties have attached
great significance to the characterization oftbe telephone booth trom which the petitioner
placed his calls. The petitioner has strenuously argued that the booth was a "constitutionally
protected area." The Government has maintained with equal vigor that it was not. But this
effort to decide whether or not a given "area," viewed in the abstract, is constitutionally
protected" deflects attention from the problem presented by this cast. For the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. See Lewis v.
United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563. But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727,
733.28 (Emphasis supplied)
Further, Justice John Harlan laid down in his concurring opinion the two-part test that would
trigger the application of the Fourth Amendment. First, a person exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy.29Second, the expectation is one that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable (objective).30

The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure ultimately stems from a person's right to
privacy. Hence, only when the State intrudes into a person's expectation of privacy, which
society regards as reasonable, is the Fourth Amendment triggered. Conversely, where a person
does not have an expectation of privacy or one's expectation of privacy is not reasonable to
society, the alleged State intrusion is not a "search" within the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.

A survey of Philippine case law would reveal the same jurisprudential reasoning. To illustrate,
in People v. Johnson,31 the Court declared airport searches as outside the protection of the
search and seizure clause due to the lack of an expectation of privacy that society will regard as
reasonable:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons
or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy,
which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in
airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has
come increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are
routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious
objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little
question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the
safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel.
Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs. and notices in
their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances
are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice
that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply
to routine airport procedures.32 (Citations omitted)
Similarly, in Dela Cruz v. People,33 the Court described seaport searches as reasonable searches
on the ground that the safety of the traveling public overrides a person's right to privacy:

Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search
warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy
should not be so literally understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety
of the traveling public.

x x x x

Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-related functions and
deemed agents of govemment, Marti is inapplicable in the present case. Nevertheless, searches
pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray
scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.

x x x x

Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when [they] used x-ray scanning
machines for inspection of passengers' bags. When the results of the x-ray scan revealed the
existence of firearms in the bag, the port authorities had probable cause to conduct a search of
petitioner's bag. Notably, petitioner did not contest the results of the x-ray scan.34
In People v. Breis,35 the Court also justitied a bus search owing to the reduced expectation of
privacy of the riding public:

Unlike the officer in Chan Fook, IOl Mangili did not exceed his authority in the performance of
his duty. Prior to Breis' resistance, IOl Mangili laid nary a finger on Breis or Yumol. Neither did
his presence in the bus constitute an excess of authority. The bus is public transportation, and is
open to the public. The expectation of privacy in relation to the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches in a public bus is not the same as that in a person's dwelling. In fact, at
that point in time, only the bus was being searched, not Yumol, Breis, or their belongings, and
the search of moving vehicles has been uphold.36
Indeed, the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy must be determined on a case-
to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case. 37 Other
factors such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular activity may
diminish this expectation.38 In Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,39 a common carrier was
held civilly liable for the death of a passenger due to the hostile acts of armed men who
boarded and subsequently seized the bus. The Court held that "simple precautionary measures
to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggages,
preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before allowing them on
board could have been employed without violating the passenger's constitutional
rights."40 In Costabella Corp. v. Court of Appeals,41 a compulsory right of way was found
improper for the failure of the owners of the dominant estate to allege that the passageway
they sought to be re-opened was at a point least prejudicial to the owner of the servient.
estate. The Court thus explained, "[c]onsidering that the petitioner operates a hotel and beach
resort in its property, it must undeniably maintain a strict standard of security within� its
premises. Otherwise, the convenience, privacy, and safety of its clients and patrons would be
compromised."42 Similarly, shopping malls install metal detectors and body scanners, and
require bag inspection as a requisite tor entry. Needless to say, any security lapse on the part of
the mall owner can compromise public safety.

Concededly, a bus, a hotel and beach resort, and a shopping mall are all private property whose
owners have every right to exclude anyone from entering. At the same time, however, because
these private premises are accessible to the public, the State, much like the owner, can impose
non-intrusive security measures and filter those going in. The only difference in the imposition
of security .measures by an owner and the State is, the former emanates from the attributes of
ownership under Article 429 of the Civil Code, while the latter stems from the exercise of police
power for the promotion of public safety. Necessarily, a person's expectation of privacy is.
diminished whenever he or she enters private premises that are accessible to the public.

In view of the foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military
checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of
public transportation where passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA
Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and minimally intrusive inspection was even less
than the standard x-ray and physical inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals
where passengers may further be required to open their bags and tuggagesConsidering the
reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application,
thereby precluding the necessity for a warrant.

As regards the warrantless inspection of petitioner's bag, the OSG argues that petitioner
consented to the search, thereby making the seized items admissible in evidence. 43 Petitioner
contends otherwise and insists that his failure to object cannot be construed as an implied
waiver.

Petitioner is wrong.

Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a

personal right, which may be waived. 44 However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary
such that it is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion.45 Relevant to this determination of voluntariness are the following character stics of
the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (a) the age of the
consenting party; (b) whether he or she was in a public or secluded location; (c) whether he or
she objected to the search or passively looked on; 46 (d) his or her education and intelligence; (e)
the presence of coercive police procedures; (f) the belief that no incriminating evidence will be
found;47 (g) the nature of the police questioning; (h) the environment in which the questioning
took place; and (i) the possibly vulnen1ble subjective state of the person consenting. 48

In Asuncion v. Court of Appeals;49 the apprehending officers sought the permission of petitioner
to search the car, to which the ]atter agreed. According to the Court, petitioner himself freely
gave his consent to the search. In People v. Montilla,50 the Court found the accused to have
spontaneously perfonned affirmative acts of volition by opening the bag without being forced
or intimidated to do so, which acts amounted to a clear waiver of his right. In People v.
Omaweng,51 the police officers asked the accused if they could see the contents of his bag, to
which the accused said "you can see the contents but those are only clothings." The policemen
then asked if they could open and see it, and the accused answered "you can see it." The Court
held there was a valid consented search.

Similarly in this case, petitioner consented to the baggage inspection done by SCAA Buco. When
SCAA Buco asked if he could open petitioner's bag, petitioner answered "yes, just open it"
based on petitioner's own testimony. This is clear consent by petitioner to the search of the
contents of his bag. In its Decision dated 26 June 2014, the Court of Appeals aptly held:

A waiver was found in People v. Omaweng. There, the police officers asked the accused if they
could see the contents of his bag and he answered "you can see the contents but those are only
clothings." When asked if they could open and see it, he said "you can see it." In the present
case, accused-appellant told the member of the task force that "it was only a cellphone" when
asked who owns the bag and what are its contents. When asked by the member of the task
force if he could open it, accused�appellant told him "yes, just open it." Hence, as
in Omaweng, there was a waiver of accused-appellants right against warrantless search.52
To emphasize, a reasonable search, on the one hand, and a warrantless search, on the other,
are mutually exclusive. While both State intrusions are valid even without a warrant, the
underlying reasons for the absence of a warrant are different. A reasonable search arises from a
reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds
no application. Examples include searches done at airports, seaports, bus terminals, malls, and
similar public places. In contrast, a warrantless search is presumably an "unreasonable search,"
but for reasons of practicality, a search warrant can be dispensed with. Examples include search
incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain view, consented search, and extensive
search of a private moving vehicle.

Further, in the conduct of bus searches, the Court lays down the following guidelines. Prior to
entry, passengers and their bags and luggages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin to
airport and seaport security protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray scanning
machines can be installed at bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic
scanners, passengers can be required instead to open their bags and luggages for inspection,
which inspection must be made in the passenger's presence. Should the passenger object, he or
she can validly be refused entry into the terminal.

While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel of
the bus owner in the following three instances. First, upon receipt of information that a
passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard can be
stopped en route to allow fot an inspection of the person and his or her effects. This is no
different from an airplane that is forced to land upon receipt of information about the
contraband or illegal articles carried by a passenger on board. Second, whenever a bus picks
passengers en route, the prospective passenger can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be
subjected to the same routine inspection by government agents or private security personnel
as though the person boarded the bus at the terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus
is able to stop and pick passengers along the way, making it possible for these passengers to
evade the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus can be flagged down at designated
military or police checkpoints where State agents can board the vehicle for a routine inspection
of the passengers andtheir bags or luggages.

In both situations, the inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus
terminal and the search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to
qualify as a valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least
intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched, minimizing, if
not altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation or ridicule. Second,
neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as insidious profiling,
stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances, the fundamental rights of vulnerable
identities, persons with disabilities, children and other similar groups should be
protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be contined to ensuring public
safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced
that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the
accused.

The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at risk.
Given the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses and
their tenninals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.

Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers at the
terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence, whenever
compliant with these guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself
while in transit constitutes a reasonable search. Otherwise, the intrusion becomes
unreasonable, thereby triggering the constitutional guarantee under Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution.

To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they applicable
to moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired
by only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down by
any other person until the passengers on board alight from the vehicle.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 26 June 2014 and the Resolution
dated 15 October 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 01099 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Tan-Yap v. Patricio, A.M. No. MTJ-19-1925, June 3, 2019

This administrative complaint stemmed from a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Damages filed by Nemesio Tan (Tan), father of complainant Madeline Tan-Yap (complainant),
against Robenson Benigla (Benigla), father-in-law of respondent Judge Hannibal R. Patricio,
docketed as Civil Case No. V-09-11 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Capiz. In the said case,
the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement which was approved by the RTC. The
pertinent portions thereof read:

xxxx
2) That [Benigla] admits [Tan's ownership of] Lots 703 and 706, both of Pilar Cadastre, the
properties subject of the above-entitled case;

3) That, the parties agreed to cause the relocation of the properties involved to determine the
exact location of the cockpit and other structures subject matter of the complaint;

4) That, the (costs or expenses for the) relocation shall be borne by the parties pro[-]rata;

xxxx

6) That, the parties shall peacefully cooperate in the conduct of the relocation survey;

7) That, in case the relocation survey will show that the cockpit and the other structures
constructed are inside the properties owned by [Tan], [Benigla] shall voluntarily remove the
same immediately and return possession thereof to [Tan], however, if said cockpit and
structures are outside of Lots 703 and 706, [Tan] shall seek the dismissal of the above- entitled
case;

8) That, failure of any of the parties to comply with the terms and conditions of this
compromise agreement shall entitle the aggrieved party to file an ex-parte motion for
execution;

x x x1

Complainant alleged that, pursuant to the said court-approved compromise agreement, the
trial court issued an order directing a private surveying company to conduct a relocation survey
on Lot Nos. 703 and 706. After the survey was done, it was found that the cockpit lay inside Lot
No. 706. Benigla, however, questioned this finding claiming that the private surveyor who
conducted the survey was not a licensed geodetic engineer. He, thus, asked the trial court to
designate a surveyor from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. This motion
was, however, denied, as well as the motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, Benigla filed
a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals (CA). However, the CA did not grant Benigla's
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order; thus, complainant filed a Motion for
Execution of the Judgment which was granted by the trial court. Accordingly, a Writ of
Execution was issued on February 6, 2015 and, together with a Demand for
Compliance/Delivery of Possession, the same was served upon Benigla on February 26, 2015.

In the morning of March 10, 2015, Sheriff IV Romeo C. Alvarez, Jr. (Sheriff Alvarez) and Process
Server Edgar Dellava (Process Server Dellava), both of the RTC of Capiz, Branch 19, went to the
premises of Lot Nos. 703 and 706 for the final implementation of the writ of execution.
However, they were met by respondent judge who told them that he would not allow the
fencing of Lot Nos. 703 and 706. Respondent judge claimed that he and his wife, Ruby Benigla
Patricio (Ruby), actually own the adjoining Lot No. 707, and not his father-in-law, Benigla.
Respondent judge allegedly lamented that he and Ruby were not impleaded as defendants in
Civil Case No. V-09-11 notwithstanding the fact that they owned the adjoining Lot No. 707,
consequently, they were not notified of the relocation survey that was conducted on Lot Nos.
703 and 706. Respondent judge thus suggested that, if Sheriff Alvarez and his men were to push
thru with the implementation of the writ of execution, "something untoward might happen".
Respondent judge then declared that he would file a manifestation before the trial court as
regards the situation at hand. Because of these, Sheriff Alvarez and Process Server Dellava,
along with the men who were supposed to fence Lot Nos. 703 and 706, left the premises.

In his Report of March 13, 2015,2 Sheriff Alvarez mentioned that during the confrontation with
respondent judge, a host of motorcycle-riding men started going back and forth in the
premises. This fact, coupled by respondent judge's statement that "kung padayonon nyo, basi
maghinagamo" (if you continue with the implementation, something untoward might happen),
impressed upon Sheriff Alvarez and his companions that their security was at risk; hence, they
decided to just leave the place.

After this, respondent judge's wife, Ruby, filed with the RTC a Motion to Intervene and
Opposition to the Implementation of the Writ of Execution and Issuance of Writ of
Demolition3 dated March 16, 2015. In the filing of this motion, Ruby was assisted by respondent
judge himself, who affixed his signature above the printed name "JUDGE HANNIBAL R.
PATRICIO" on page three of the said motion.

Nevertheless, the RTC denied this motion for lack of merit in an Order4 dated March 24, 2015.

Given these facts, complainant contended that respondent judge violated the New Code of
Judicial Conduct: (1) when he unduly intervened in the implementation of the writ of execution;
(2) when he threatened Sheriff Alvarez and the latter's companions and stopped them from
carrying out the writ of execution; (3) when he assisted his wife Ruby in filing a motion to
intervene in Civil Case No. V-09-11; and (4) when he abandoned his work station on the day of
the supposed implementation of the writ of execution.

In his Comment,5 respondent judge denied the accusations against him. He claimed that the
intended fencing of Lot Nos. 703 and 706 pursuant to the writ of execution would have
prejudiced him and his wife insofar as their Lot No. 707 was concerned; that the sketch plan on
which the relocation and fencing would be based was incorrect and invalid because on its face,
it omitted to show that Lot Nos. 706 and 703 were bounded or surrounded by Lot No. 707; that
this was the reason why he believed that the implementation of the writ of execution and the
intended relocation and fencing of Lot Nos. 703 and 706 would have resulted in the
encroachment on their Lot No. 707; that his action was justified under Article 429 of the Civil
Code under which the owner of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment
and disposal thereof, and under which the owner may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation
of his property.
Respondent judge denied that he threatened to stop Sheriff Alvarez from implementing the
writ of execution; that all he did was to engage Sheriff Alvarez in a conversation, that is, by
"telling, arguing, and asking the sheriff to afford him and his wife the time (until Friday or
March 13, 2015) for him and his wife to be able to file the proper manifestation in court with
respect to their rights over Lot No. 707, Pilar Cadastre, that would be affected or encroached
upon by the relocation and fencing of Lot Nos. 706 and 703 x x x".6 Respondent judge claimed
that Sheriff Alvarez in fact did not mention in his report that he (respondent judge) threatened
Sheriff Alvarez or would have inflicted bodily harm upon him; that he even assured Sheriff
Alvarez that, should it be confirmed that no encroachment would result from the fencing of Lot
Nos. 703 and 706, he himself (respondent judge) would help in putting up said fence; that his
statement that "trouble might ensue should Sheriff Alvarez proceed with the implementation''
was not synonymous with the use of brute force. In fine, respondent judge insisted that he was
only trying to protect his and his wife's proprietary rights, and that he never acted beyond the
bounds of the law.

Respondent judge added that he and his wife were entitled to their day in court and it was this
fact that prompted him to assist his wife in preparing and filing the motion to intervene; that
the assistance he provided his wife was anchored on their interest in Lot No. 707, and not on
any intention on his part to engage in the private practice of law. Respondent judge denied that
he abandoned his post on the day of the supposed implementation of the writ of execution
since he was on sick leave that day.

Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)

In its Report and Recommendation,7 the OCA found that respondent judge improperly
interfered with the implementation of the writ of execution and that this interference
constituted conduct unbecoming of a judicial officer, viz.:

In the instant case, there was a valid writ of execution to be implemented. Respondent Judge
Patricio committed an unlawful act when he interfered with the final implementation of the
writ. Such act was improper for the esteemed office of a magistrate of the law and is
tantamount to x x x conduct unbecoming a judicial officer. He practically took the law into his
own hands when he stopped the implementation of the writ invoking his proprietary rights. As
a judge, respondent Judge Patricio should be familiar with the laws and the appropriate legal
remedies to protect his and his wife's right[s] over Lot No. 707, which was allegedly encroached
[upon] by plaintiff Tan. Respondent Judge Patricio's defense that he merely asserted his right to
prevent the encroachment, invasion, and usurpation of Lot No. 707 owned by him and his wife
cannot justify his assailed action. He should have realized that the public would expect him to
act in a manner reflecting the dignity and integrity of a judge. His demeanor as a judge should
always be with utmost circumspection.8

Even then, the OCA recognized respondent judge's intention to protect his and his wife's
property rights, thus:
Still, respondent Judge Patricio cannot be completely faulted for protecting his and his wife's
proprietary rights. This is but human nature. Such action cannot be considered grossly
repugnant. Thus, while he was previously penalized for another infraction, a fine of ₱20,000.00
is the appropriate penalty after taking into account the attendant circumstances. 9

Thus, the OCA recommended that:

1. the instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;

and

2. Presiding Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, President Roxas-Pilar,
Capiz, be FINED in the amount of ₱20,000.00 for violation of Canon 4, Section 1 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, with a WARNING that a repetition of the
same or any similar act would be dealt with more severely. 10

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA but modifies its
recommended penalty.

To recall, respondent judge was charged with the following: (1) that he unduly intervened in or
interfered with the implementation of the writ of execution; (2) that he resorted to threats and
intimidation to stop the implementation of the writ of execution; (3) that he assisted his wife in
filing a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. V-09-11; and (4) that he abandoned his work
station on the day of the supposed implementation of the writ of execution.

At the outset, the Court finds no merit to the charge that respondent judge abandoned his
work station on March 10, 2015 since a Certification11 from the Office of Administrative
Services of the OCA shows that he was on sick leave that day.

Nevertheless, the Court holds that the other charges have been substantiated. Respondent
judge did not deny his presence at the premises of the properties subject of Civil Case No. V-09-
11 on March 10, 2015. Respondent judge also admitted that he prevented the fencing of Lot
Nos. 703 and 706 because he believed that the sketch plan on which the fencing of these said
properties would be based was erroneous for failing to indicate on its face that Lot Nos. 703
and 706 were bounded by Lot No. 707 which he says was owned by him and his wife Ruby, on
account of which a possible encroachment on their property might have resulted if the fencing
would have pushed through.

The Court finds respondent judge's rationalization of his actions unacceptable.

One thing is clear - the implementation was pursuant to the lawful order of the RTC in Civil Case
No. V-09-11. While respondent judge might have some misgivings on the accuracy of the sketch
plan, he of all people should have known that, under the circumstances, he could not insist on
his opinion about the sketch plan as the same had already been submitted to, evaluated, and
passed upon by the court. As a judge, he should know that it was incumbent upon him to resort
to suitable judicial remedies that he could avail of, and not to interfere with the
implementation of a lawful order of the court through recourse to an unwarranted shortcut.

Respondent judge's reliance on Article 42912 of the Civil Code is misplaced. The doctrine of
"self-help" enunciated in this article applies only when the person against whom the owner has
the right to use force (in order to exclude the former from the latter's property) is really an
"aggressor."13 In this case, Sheriff Alvarez was not an aggressor, as indeed he could not have
been one, because as an officer or agent of the court, he was simply carrying out his official
duty to implement the writ of execution covering Lot Nos. 703 and 706. The OCA was correct in
saying that respondent judge effectively took the law into his own hands, when he stopped the
implementation of the writ of execution using threats and intimidation. Needless to say, he also
clearly failed to accord due respect to legal processes.

While it may be true that respondent judge did not employ actual force in its literal sense when
he stopped the implementation of the writ of execution, the threats he uttered (that something
untoward might happen if the writ of execution were carried out) effectively prevented or
stopped the carrying out of the writ of execution. It has been held that: "Such threat of violence
is absolutely unbecoming [of] a judge who is expected to display proper decorum."14 It bears
stressing that a judge "must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety and
self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more caution and control in expressing
himself. In other words, a judge should possess the virtue of gravitas which means that a
magistrate should not descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by
uttering harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be
temperate, patient and courteous, both in conduct and in language." 15 Likewise, as a holder of
a judicial office that commands respect, respondent judge should accord respect to another
officer of the court, a sheriff who is implementing a writ of execution.

All told, respondent judge violated Canon 2, Sections 1 and 2, and Canon 4, Sections 1 and 2, of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provide, viz.:

CANON 2
Integrity

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity
of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
xxxx

CANON 4
Propriety

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions
that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the
dignity of the judicial office.

Canons 1 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandate:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND
TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS."

"Certainly, a judge who falls short of the ethics of the judicial office tends to diminish the
people's respect for the law and legal processes. He also fails to observe and maintain the
esteem due to the courts and to judicial officers."16

With respect to respondent judge's act of assisting his wife in preparing a motion to intervene
in Civil Case No. V-09-11 and affixing his signature thereon, the Court agrees with respondent
judge that the same does not constitute private practice of law. In Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge Floro, Jr., we held:17

x x x [W]hat is envisioned by 'private practice' is more than an isolated court appearance, for it
consists in frequent customary action, a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer. In herein case, save for the 'Motion for
Entry of Judgment,' it does not appear from the records that Judge Floro filed other pleadings
or appeared in any other court proceedings in connection with his personal cases. It is safe to
conclude, therefore, that Judge Flora's act of filing the motion for entry of judgment is but an
isolated case and does not in any wise constitute private practice of law. Moreover, we cannot
ignore the fact that Judge Floro is obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he
himself is the petitioner.18
To be sure, it does not escape the Court's attention that the title "Judge" is appended to
respondent judge's name appearing on the motion to intervene. The Court has already stated
that:

While the use of the title ['Judge' or 'Justice'] is an official designation as well as an honor that
an incumbent has earned, a line still has to be drawn based on the circumstances of the use of
the appellation. While the title can be used for social and other identification purposes, it
cannot be used with the intent to use the prestige of his judicial office to gainfully advance his
personal, family or other pecuniary interests. Nor can the prestige of a judicial office be used or
lent to advance the private interests of others, or to convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. To do any of these is to
cross into the prohibited field of impropriety. 19

Since respondent judge was asking for relief from the RTC through the subject motion, he
should not have used therein his title "Judge". For even if he did not intend to take undue
advantage of his title, it nevertheless gave the appearance of impropriety considering the
circumstances of the case.20 The same may be construed as an attempt "to influence or put
pressure on a fellow judge (the Presiding Judge of the RTC handling Civil Case No. V-09-11) by
emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus is in the right."21

Indeed, the aforementioned inappropriate actions of respondent judge constitute Conduct

Unbecoming of a Judicial Officer.1avvphi1 Under Sections 10 and 11, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, unbecoming conduct is a light charge which is sanctioned by any of the following: (1) a
fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00 and/or; (2) censure; (3)
reprimand; and (4) admonition with warning. Considering, however, that respondent judge was
herein found guilty of three counts of Conduct Unbecoming of a Judicial Officer, and
considering further that he was already previously adjudged guilty of gross ignorance of the
law, manifest bias, and partiality in MTJ-13-1834 (Carbajosa v. Judge Hannibal R.
Patricio)22 wherein he was meted out a fine of ₱21,000.00, the Court believes that respondent
judge ought to be meted out a fine in the amount of ₱40,000.00, with stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

As final note: it may not be amiss to state that a judge should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and
appearance of impropriety in all activities.23 "His personal behavior, not only while in the
performance of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach, for he is
the visible personification of law and justice."24

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Hannibal R. Patricio of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
President Roxas-Pilar, Capiz, is hereby found GUILTY of three counts of Conduct Unbecoming of
a Judicial Officer for which he is imposed a FINE of ₱40,000.00, with WARNING that a repetition
of the same or any similar act would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.