APRIL 2024

China’s BRI: How

successful has it been?
BY STEWART PATERSON
RESEARCH FELLOW, HINRICH FOUNDATION
Contents

INTRODUCTION 3

HAS BRI PROMOTED CHINA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH? 4

HAS BRI IMPROVED CHINA’S ECONOMIC RESILIENCE? 7
Narrowing geopolitical distance 7
Asymmetric trade relationships 8
Diversifying supply 9
Avoiding geographic chokepoints 10

HAS BRI EXPANDED CHINA’S SPHERE OF INFLUENCE? 11

HAS BRI INCREASED CHINA’S ABILITY TO SHAPE 12

GLOBAL DYNAMICS IN ITS INTERESTS?

CONCLUSION 13

RESEARCHER BIO: STEWART PATERSON 14

ENDNOTES 15

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2
Introduction

In paper one of this series, we defined China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as
providing the guide rails for China’s capital exports to promote China’s “National
Rejuvenation”. In paper two, we identified four broad objectives of BRI: To
promote Chinese economic growth; to increase the resilience of China’s economy;
to grow China’s sphere of influence by increasing its economic leverage abroad;
and to increase China’s ability to project power to render the world order more
amenable to China. In this paper, we set out to assess how successful BRI has
been in helping China achieve these objectives.

BRI serves as the guide rails for China’s capital exports, aimed at advancing its “National Rejuvenation”
agenda.

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3
Has BRI promoted China’s
economic growth?

Prior to BRI, China’s overseas assets largely consisted of foreign exchange reserves
which were invested in low risk, highly liquid, fixed-income securities that were
largely, but not exclusively, dollar-denominated. By design, BRI has resulted in
a significant change in the mix of China’s overseas assets. As foreign exchange
reserves have shrunk as a percentage of China’s total foreign assets, overseas
lending and foreign direct investments (FDI) have increased.

The first and most direct impact of this shift should have been a boost to China’s
income stream from its overseas assets, due to the increased risk profile, expected
returns, and reduced liquidity profile of the asset mix. Going by official data this
has apparently not happened.

Using China’s State Administration for Foreign Exchange (SAFE) data on its
international investment position and the balance of payments, there has actually
been a modest deterioration in the yield from China’s overseas investments since
BRI was introduced. Between 2004 (the earliest year for which data is available)
and 2013, when BRI was conceived, China’s income flows from overseas investment
averaged about 3.3% of its overseas assets. Since 2013, the average yield has
decreased to 3.1%, with returns declining further in recent years.1

Figure 1 – China’s share in global exports

16%

14%

12%

10%

8%

6%

4%

2%

0%

1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022

Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

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 HAS BRI PROMOTED CHINA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH?

China’s net exports have been
extremely volatile relative to the size of
its economy and there is no discernible
increase post-BRI, according to official
data.
The recent decline (the reported income divided by average assets was just 1.8%
in 2022 and 2.6% in 2023) is particularly stark given that interest rates have been
heading higher around the world, and therefore yields should have risen. If the
SAFE data is a correct reflection of the returns on China’s overseas assets, then the
BRI has been very expensive. China’s US$9.4 trillion of overseas assets, if invested
in risk-free US securities, would be yielding about 4%, or US$376 billion. Given
the higher risk and lower liquidity profile of China’s assets, a yield of 5% to 6%
would seem a more realistic expected return on investment. If the actual yield is
indeed 3% below the expected return, then China’s BRI is costing perhaps US$280
billion per year in risk-adjusted foregone returns, equivalent to about 1.5% of gross
domestic product.

The question then arises: Are these opportunity costs being offset elsewhere?
The most likely category in which they would be is through superior net export
performance as a result of the externality benefits of seemingly uneconomic
investment overseas.

However, since BRI was conceived, China’s export growth has slowed dramatically
when compared to the years leading up to BRI. There are a number of reasons for
this. Most obviously, the base was much higher and world trade has slowed. What
is noticeable, though, has been that China’s share of global exports has continued
to grow, albeit more modestly than in earlier years. Nevertheless, 2022 saw a slight
drop in China’s share. It is quite likely that 2023 data will confirm that this was not
a blip, and that China’s share of global trade may be approaching its peak.

Figure 2 – China’s good & services surplus as percentage of world ex-China GDP

0.8%

0.7%

0.6%

0.5%

0.4%

0.3%

0.2%

0.1%

0.0%

-0.1%

-0.2%

1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022

Source: World Bank Open Data

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5
 HAS BRI PROMOTED CHINA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH?

When it comes to measuring GDP, it is of course net exports that contribute to

national income. China’s net exports have been extremely volatile relative to
the size of its economy and there is no discernible increase post-BRI, according
to official data. The heyday of Chinese current account surpluses was the
2005-2009 period. Time will tell if China’s global dominance in sectors such as
telecommunications equipment, electric vehicles, and new energy will lead to a
resurgence of rising surpluses going forward.

However, perhaps the more relevant metric is China’s goods and services balance
(always in surplus since 1993) relative to global GDP excluding China. As figure 2
shows, China’s external trade position is now slightly larger than it was even in
2008. Furthermore, with the exception of the 2017-2019 period, it has remained
elevated.

Thus, one could argue that some of BRI’s costs are being offset by a boost to
China’s net exports. This could be through securing preferential terms for imports
through ownership or concessions, facilitating exports through market access, or
lowering transportation costs using BRI infrastructure projects.

However, in absolute growth terms, the period after BRI’s inception has seen
a significant slowdown in GDP growth in China from the 7-8% range to a 4-5%
range. While BRI is not to blame for this, the fact remains that BRI has not been
sufficient to counter the structural headwinds China faces, including declining
capital efficiency and demographics. Furthermore, over the past three years
China’s share of world GDP is showing signs of peaking.

From a purely economic perspective, the thesis that BRI has been a growth driver
for China is weak. The best that can be said is that net export performance has
offset some of the opportunity costs of sub-optimal overseas BRI investments.
However, as we identified in paper two of this series, economic growth was not
the sole or even the primary objective of BRI.

Since the inception of the BRI, China’s export growth has experienced a significant slowdown
compared to the years preceding the BRI.

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6
Has BRI improved China’s
economic resilience?
Outside of the West, there is a case
to be made that BRI has succeeded
in closing the geopolitical distance
between China and certain countries in
the Global South.
HINRICH FOUNDATION REPORT – CHINA’S BRI: HOW SUCCESSFUL HAS IT BEEN?
The most direct ways in which BRI could have helped add resilience to China’s
economy are through opening up new trade routes to bypass geographic
chokepoints and to enable trade diversification through new infrastructure. To
this should be added the shortening of “geopolitical distance” in trade, by which
we mean trading more with countries which are more aligned geopolitically with
oneself in terms of interests. Conversely, where alignment of interests is lacking,
resilience can be potentially added by trading more with countries whose ability
or willingness to disrupt trade for geopolitical ends is limited by the asymmetry of
the relationship.
Narrowing geopolitical distance
For China, the convergence of geopolitics and trade has always been inevitable.
Firstly, for a large economy, China is unusually trade-intensive. Some of its largest
trading partners, including the US, the European Union (EU), United Kingdom
(UK), Australia, Japan, and South Korea, are also among its least geopolitically
aligned. There are two ways to shorten the geopolitical distance in a country’s
trade: to change trade patterns away from geopolitically distant countries towards
friendlier ones or to change geopolitical distance through engagement and
realignment of interests.
BRI has two potential roles to play: to reorient trade toward less geopolitically
distant countries, or to close the geopolitical distance between China and its trade
partners through largess, portraying the BRI as a public good and development
tool – China’s gift to the world.
Geopolitical distance in a country’s trade can be reduced by shifting trade patterns towards friendlier
countries or through engagement and realignment of interests.
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China’s re-orientated trade patterns
have increased the leverage China has
over its trading partners –particularly
when it comes to the destination of
trade partners exports.
HINRICH FOUNDATION REPORT – CHINA’S BRI: HOW SUCCESSFUL HAS IT BEEN?
HAS BRI IMPROVED CHINA’S ECONOMIC RESILIENCE?
Over the past 10 years, it is safe to say that the geopolitical distance between
Western countries and China has increased. This is reflected in increasing tariffs,
export controls, the failure of the EU to ratify the Comprehensive Investment
Agreement, and the raft of sanctions against China and Beijing’s counter-sanctions.
While this is not attributable to BRI in itself, it is largely a function of China’s
assertiveness on the international stage, of which BRI is a key part. One of BRI’s
failings has been to widen the geopolitical distance with some of China’s trade
partners, including segments of their societies including environmentalists and
human rights groups.
Outside of the West, there is a case to be made that BRI has succeeded in closing
the geopolitical distance between China and certain countries in the Global
South. But there’s still a long way to go. According to Chinese customs data, the
EU, US, Japan, and South Korea accounted for nearly 40% of China’s exports in
2023. China’s partners in the BRICS group – Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa
– accounted for just 9%. Southeast Asia accounted for 15%.2 When it comes to
imports, BRICs are better represented at 12% and China is less dependent on the
EU and US, but Taiwan (largely due to semiconductors) accounts for about 8% of
China’s total – not far off the EU’s 11%.3 The EU, US, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan
together account for 37% of Chinese imports.
China remains heavily dependent on geopolitically distant countries for trade.
Much of the rise in Chinese imports from geopolitical allies has come from crude
oil imports from Russia, as Beijing ignores Western sanctions on Moscow for its
invasion of Ukraine.
Asymmetric trade relationships
Given that China is the largest economy in the world by purchasing power parity,
trade with China will mean more to other countries than it does to China in terms
of the relative costs of a breakdown in the bilateral trading relationship. For China,
trade brings leverage.
The one exception is the US. In 2013, bilateral trade in goods was US$562 billion
and in 2023 it was US$575 billion. Trade has hardly grown, even in nominal terms,
and was well off US$659 billion in 2016, when the US-China tariff war escalated.4
Since China’s total trade in goods has expanded by over US$2 trillion since 2013,
it is clear that a greater proportion of trade is taking place in asymmetric bilateral
relationships, giving China more leverage in its geopolitical interactions with the
rest of the world.
In 2022, Chinese imports from the US accounted for just 6.6% of its total imports
by value. Imports form the next five largest economies in the world (Japan,
Germany, India, France, and the UK) accounted for 13.6%, meaning that the largest
six economies other than China accounted for 20.2% of China’s imports. Nearly
80% of China’s imports, therefore, came from countries with a GDP of less than
US$3 trillion, compared to China’s GDP of US$18 trillion, is bound to make the
relationship decidedly asymmetric. By comparison, these six economies accounted
for 25% of China’s imports in 2013.
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China’s re-orientated trade patterns
have increased the leverage China has
over its trading partners –particularly
when it comes to the destination of
trade partners exports.
HINRICH FOUNDATION REPORT – CHINA’S BRI: HOW SUCCESSFUL HAS IT BEEN?
HAS BRI IMPROVED CHINA’S ECONOMIC RESILIENCE?
When it comes to exports, 31% of China’s exports went to these six economies in
2022, only slightly down from 32% in 2013. The last 10 years has seen China’s trade
patterns tilt to smaller economies, but it is still economically dependent on access
to the larger Western-aligned economies.
China’s re-orientated trade patterns have increased the leverage China has over
its trading partners – particularly when it comes to the destination of trade
partners exports. In 2022, there were 22 countries for which more than 20% of
total exports went to China and Hong Kong. Importantly, however, while China is
the largest single trading partner for more than 120 countries, for almost all China
is not as large a trading partner as the liberal democracies are when combined.
This underscores the importance of a plurilateral approach to resisting China’s
economic statecraft.
Diversifying Supply
Many of China’s major imports are supplied by a handful of countries. Often this
is because only a few countries are able to supply products in volumes that are
relevant to China. Iron ore is a good example. In 2022, China imported US$128
billion of iron ore. Some 65% came from Australia, 20% from Brazil, and less than
4% from the third-largest source South Africa. In 2013, the same three countries
provided 77% of China’s total iron ore imports versus 89% now. Australia’s share
rose by 10 percentage points, accounting for the increased concentration.
When it comes to mineral fuels, the top three suppliers (Saudi Arabia, Angola, and
Russia) accounted for one-third of total supply, largely unchanged from36% in
2022.
China’s semiconductor manufacturing equipment sources remain concentrated
among geopolitically distant economies. These are the only countries with
substantive capabilities in this sector, making diversification impossible.
BRI’s emphasis on land transportation corridors are as much about through traffic to Europe as they are
about connecting with China’s “near abroad”.
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9

BRI has played a role in making China’s
trade patterns more asymmetric, and
enabled China to trade with potentially
more geopolitically aligned countries.
HINRICH FOUNDATION REPORT – CHINA’S BRI: HOW SUCCESSFUL HAS IT BEEN?
HAS BRI IMPROVED CHINA’S ECONOMIC RESILIENCE?
Cereals imports remain heavily concentrated among geopolitically distant partners.
The US and Australia account for over half of China’s imports in 2022. Brazil and the
US account for over 90% of China’s soy imports, a key feedstock. It would appear
therefore that BRI has not helped much to improve resilience through import
source diversification.
Avoiding geographic chokepoints
There is little data to enable good analysis of China’s success or failure in re-
orientating trade away from geographic chokepoint. Land routes into the Eurasian
land mass are functioning, and pipelines to Russia, central Asia, and Myanmar have
the potential to reduce dependence on seaborne trade and thus alleviate Beijing’s
fear of geopolitical encirclement.
Southeast Asia, as a substantial part of China’s “near abroad”, has been a prime
destination for BRI funding and investment. Given that the Malacca Strait is
the nearest geostrategic chokepoint when it comes to China’s trade, it is fair to
assume that part of the drive for China’s interest in Southeast Asia is to reduce
its vulnerability to disruption in the Malacca Strait. Just 7% of China’s trade with
peninsular Southeast Asia is via land transportation in 2022, according to data from
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.5
The value of trade between China and landlocked central Asia represents a tiny
proportion of China’s total trade. Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and
Kyrgyzstan combined account for less than 1% of China’s total trade. Even trade
with Pakistan only accounts for about one-third of one percentage point of China’s
total trade.6
Of course, BRI’s emphasis on land transportation corridors are as much about
through traffic to Europe as they are about connecting with China’s “near abroad”.
The China-Europe express railway network, which incidentally pre-date BRI as a
concept, handled about 7.3 million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) in its first 10
years of operation, carrying about US$340 billion of goods.7 China’s ports handled
269 million TEUs in 2022 alone.8 It seems unlikely that the China-Europe rail
network is going to handle more than a percentage point or two of China’s total
trade in the foreseeable future.
From the perspective of providing alternative trade routes, to bypass potential
chokepoint, perhaps the best that can be said of BRI is that it has provided modest
alternative routes to markets that can handle only small volumes should sea lanes
cease to operate smoothly. Some 90% of global trade remains seaborne.
It seems fair to say that BRI has achieved a modicum of success in embedding
more resilience in China’s economy. It has played a role in making China’s trade
patterns more asymmetric, and enabled China to trade with potentially more
geopolitically aligned countries. It has not, however, helped significantly with
the diversification of supply of key materials, nor has it been the only or even the
predominant factor in re-orientating China’s trade patterns.
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Has BRI expanded China’s sphere
of influence?

There are a number of direct and indirect ways through which BRI could have
helped China expand its sphere of influence. The narrative promoted by China,
promoting BRI as a public good aimed at helping the Global South achieve its
development goals, has helped in extending China’s diplomatic reach. According
to the Lowy Institute’s Diplomacy Index for 2024, China now has 44 diplomatic
posts in East Asia, surpassing America’s count of 27.9

In addition, while the negotiations around the Regional Comprehensive Economic

Partnership (RCEP) pre-date BRI, the promise of Chinese BRI-related investment
provided an inducement to the finalization of the trading agreement in 2020.
While RCEP was ASEAN-led in origin, India’s absence from the grouping leaves it
decidedly dominated by China which enjoys a GDP about five times larger than the
10 ASEAN member-nations combined. The expansion of BRICS last year could be
viewed as further evidence of this success, as could China’s deeper engagement
with the Group of 77, a coalition of developing countries (which actually has more
than 130 developing countries as members).

The extent that BRI has acted as a facilitator of trade, China’s re-orientated trade
patterns towards the Global South have increased its leverage over a number of
countries whose dependency on trade with China has compromised their ability to
resist Chinese influence.

Measures of Chinese influence in foreign countries – such as the Lowy Institute’s

Asian Power Index – tend to point to a significant rise in Chinese influence over
the past decade.10 Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar consistently crop up as Asian
countries where Chinese influence has increased. All three have been large
recipients of BRI financing and investment relative to their economic size.

The Doublethink Lab China Index, which seeks to measure China’s growing
influence around the world11, drew interesting conclusions: a country’s “exposure”
to Chinese engagement has a far higher impact on “effect” than China’s exertion of
outright economic coercion. In other words, China is more likely to be successful
in influencing policy through deepening economic linkages than through
coercion. It is the potential to disrupt that induces a degree of compliance
rather than coercion itself. Furthermore, the share of imports from China was a
key determinant of influence and therefore a degree of alignment. On the other
hand, higher-income countries with low corruption scores lead to higher levels of
coercive pressure from China but not compliance.

These findings are supportive of BRI as a factor in expanding China’s sphere of

influence. In so far as BRI helps produce economic dependencies, China does not
need to resort to more aggressive economic statecraft to induce compliance.

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11
Has BRI increased China’s ability to
shape global dynamics in its interest?
BRI-related investment could pave
the way for a more receptive hearing
when it comes to negotiating a military
presence.
HINRICH FOUNDATION REPORT – CHINA’S BRI: HOW SUCCESSFUL HAS IT BEEN?
In a recent Newsweek article, Liu Pengyu, Minister-Counselor at the Chinese
embassy in Washington, said: “The Chinese people are living, working and traveling
in many parts of the world. Cargo ships with Chinese goods sail along almost
all major international waterways. These fully justify China’s moves to build up
its defense capability to protect its legitimate interests overseas and promote
regional and international peace.”12 Increased international connectivity both
facilitates and requires a degree of power projection.
China’s only acknowledged overseas military base is in Djibouti. It became
operational in 2017. Interestingly, as Houthi rebels attack shipping in the Red Sea,
including a Chinese-owned oil tanker, there has been no evidence so far that
China is willing or able to use its presence in the area to bring pressure to bear to
ensure freedom of navigation.13 In addition to Djibouti, China is widely believed to
have military capabilities at Ream in Cambodia. According to the US Office of the
Director of National Intelligence’s (ODNI), China is considering pursuing a military
presence in Myanmar, Cuba, Equatorial Guinea, Pakistan, Seychelles, Sri Lanka,
Tajikistan, Tanzania, and the United Arab Emirates.14 These are all BRI-participating
countries, though correlation is not the same as causation.
BRI-related investment could pave the way for a more receptive hearing when
it comes to negotiating a military presence. Clearly, though, it is early days in
terms of being able to assess China’s success or failure in terms of being able to
convert BRI-related activities into international military power projection. BRI may
have increased China’s soft power and acted as a facilitator for a more receptive
stance from the global south when China puts forward candidate at multilateral
organization.
BRI likely enhances China’s soft power, fostering receptivity from the global south towards its
candidates in multilateral organizations.
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12
Conclusion

China’s BRI has not operated in a vacuum over the past decade. World events,
most notably the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, have obscured
the impact that BRI has had in shaping China’s position in the world. The fact that
it is impossible to isolate the impact of BRI from other events makes it equally hard
to judge its success or failure.

Any assessment of the success of BRI, however, must take into account the
resources spent on it and its opportunity cost. Between 2013 and 2022, China’s
stock of overseas assets rose from US$6 trillion to US$9.2 trillion. The assets
potentially classified as contributing directly or indirectly toward BRI rose from
US$2.1 trillion to US$6.1 trillion. 15 The foregone revenue, on a risk adjusted basis as
reflected in the official income account – is about 1.5% of China’s GDP annually. BRI
has indirect financial costs too. China spends increasingly large amounts of money
on industrial subsidies, without which it would not have the cost-competitive
products to push through the channels that BRI has opened. These subsides have
been conservatively estimated at 1.7% of GDP but could well be considerably
higher.16

Nor is it just financial costs that must be weighed in an assessment of BRI’s success
or failure. The Western perception of BRI as a geopolitical tool to expand China’s
sphere of influence was bound to produce a policy response of some sort. BRI has
not been universally welcomed in recipient countries, and when combined with
Chinese assertiveness has induced geopolitical distancing from China in some
instances. The Philippines is a good example.

When one assesses the change in attitude toward China among large parts of
the Western elite that has taken place in the past 10 years – from a stance of
accommodating China’s rise to resisting it or at the very least being suspicious of it
– it is possible to argue that BRI has been counterproductive. China now finds itself
facing a more skeptical, aware, and united democratic bloc that will potentially
increase the cost to China of achieving its “China Dream”.

Against this must be measured the headway BRI has lent China in its security goals.
China has re-orientated trade patterns but remains significantly economically
dependent on democracies for export markets. Geographic diversification of
suppliers of key imports remains difficult. Some progress has been made in
opening alternative trade routes but with limited capacity.

The most striking change that has occurred during BRI’s existence has been the
influence China has garnered in the Global South and the alignment with Beijing
this has brought in multilateral organizations. The world’s policy response to BRI
remains, perhaps, the key measure of its ultimate success.

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Researcher bio:
Stewart Paterson

Stewart Paterson spent 25 years in capital markets as an equity researcher,

strategist and fund manager. He has worked in London, Mumbai, Hong Kong and
Singapore in senior roles with Credit Suisse, Credit Suisse First Boston, CLSA and
more recently, as a Partner and Portfolio Manager of Tiburon Partners LLP.

Having started his career with Hill Samuel in London in 1991, Stewart has covered
the full spectrum of global markets equity strategy, developed market equities
and emerging market equities. In 2007, he co-founded Riley Paterson Investment
Management in Singapore, where he ran a macro-driven hedge fund. He returned
to the UK in 2012.

Stewart is the author of China, Trade and Power: Why the West’s economic
engagement has failed, a highly acclaimed book supported by the Hinrich
Foundation. He is also the Founder of Capital Dialectics, a monthly publication
aimed at financial institutions.

Stewart holds an MA degree in Economics from the University of Aberdeen.

Stewart Paterson
Research Fellow,
Hinrich Foundation

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14
Endnotes

1. Authors calculations using SAFE balance of payments and international investment

position data available here. https://www.safe.gov.cn/en/
2. https://www.statista.com/statistics/270326/main-export-partners-for-china/
3. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1199613/main-import-partners-for-china/
4. https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html
5. https://data.aseanstats.org/trade-by-mot
6. https://comtradeplus.un.org
7. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202309/1298260.shtml
8. https://unctadstat.unctad.org/datacentre/dataviewer/US.ContPortThroughput
9. https://globaldiplomacyindex.lowyinstitute.org/key_findings
10. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/asia-power-snapshot-china-united-
states-southeast-asia
11. https://china-index.io/updates/publications?p=1
12. https://www.newsweek.com/china-overseas-military-bases-us-intelligence-1878183
13. https://news.usni.org/2024/03/24/chinese-tanker-hit-with-houthi-missile-in-the-red-
sea
14. https://www.odni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2024-Unclassified-
Report.pdf
15. https://www.safe.gov.cn/en/2018/0928/1459.html
16. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/220523_
DiPippo_Red_Ink.pdf?VersionId=LH8ILLKWz4o.bjrwNS7csuX_C04FyEre

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HINRICH FOUNDATION REPORT – CHINA’S BRI: HOW SUCCESSFUL HAS IT BEEN?

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